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Cold War Capital: The , the Western Allies, and the Fight for , 1945-

1994

A dissertation presented to

the faculty of

the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University

In partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree

Doctor of Philosophy

Seth A. Givens

May 2018

© 2018 Seth A. Givens. All Rights Reserved.

2

This dissertation titled

Cold War Capital: The United States, the Western Allies, and the Fight for Berlin, 1945-

1994

by

SETH A. GIVENS

has been approved for

the Department of History

and the College of Arts and Sciences by

Ingo W. Trauschweizer

Associate Professor of History

Robert Frank

Dean, College of Arts and Sciences 3

ABSTRACT

GIVENS, SETH A., Ph.D., May 2018, History

Cold War Capital: The United States, the Western Allies, and the Fight for Berlin, 1945-

1994

Director of Dissertation: Ingo W. Trauschweizer

This dissertation focuses on U.S. Army forces in Berlin from 1945 to 1994 and on broader issues of U.S. and NATO policy and strategy for the Cold War. It seeks to answer two primary questions: Why did the U.S. officials risk war over a location everyone agreed was militarily untenable, and how did they construct strategies to defend it? Much of the Berlin literature looks at the city only during the two crises there—the

Soviet blockade in 1948 and 1949 and ’s periodic ultimatum between 1958 and

1962 that the Americans, British, and French leave—and maintain that leaders conceived of Berlin’s worth as only a beacon of democracy in the war against , or a trip wire in the event that the invaded Western . This dissertation looks beyond the crises, and contends that a long view of the city reveals U.S. officials saw

Berlin as more than a liability. By combining military, diplomatic, political, and international history to analyze the evolution of U.S. diplomacy, NATO strategy and policy, and joint military planning, it suggests that U.S. officials, realizing they could not retreat, devised ways to defend Berlin and, when possible, use it as a means to achieve strategic and political ends in the larger Cold War, with both enemy and friend alike. This research is broadly concerned with national security, civil-military relations, and alliance politics. It focuses on the intersection of the military and political worlds, and tries to 4 answer how governments analyze risk and form strategy, and then how militaries secure political and military objectives. Ultimately, it is a study of deterrence in modern war, an examination of how leaders can obtain objectives without harming friendships or instigating war.

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DEDICATION

For my second mother, Paula Romans

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

For several years, this project has been a constant companion, whether I liked it to or not. Its omnipresence meant finding time and places to write other than the comfort of my own home, like the south rim of the Grand Canyon or my sister’s couch in

Connecticut. Researching it also meant traveling to cities and towns to which I had never been, from sprawling Los Angeles to humble Abilene, Kansas. Throughout, I have learned that it is folly to think you can separate your professional and personal life, and perhaps it is best if you not try. Without one, you cannot have the other.

The places this dissertation have taken me would not have been the same without the people. I must give primary thanks to Ingo Trauschweizer, who is the model adviser to which all young professors should aspire. Through no master plan of my own did he come to Ohio University, where I already was, only months after I had read a journal article of his, which had led me to comment to my , “I wish I could study with him.” Thanks to my committee—Professors Steven Miner, Chester Pach, and James

Mosher—for their comments and suggestions, and for taking time out of their schedules to serve on my committee. Any mistakes in this dissertation are my own. Thanks also must go to Professor John Brobst for his championing of graduate students in his role of graduate director, and for his general suggestions to me in pursuing my degree.

Endeavors in history often require subsidization; without them, this dissertation would have been impossible. At Ohio University, thanks to the History Department for several research grants, and the Contemporary History Institute for awarding me the

2014-15 Baker Peace Fellowship. Thanks, also, to the Graduate Student Senate for an 7

Original Work Grant and the Office of the Vice President for Research for a Student

Enhancement Award. Like the National Archives, the presidential libraries located throughout the country are a treasure, as are the people who work in them. Without the grants that several of the libraries offer, this dissertation would not be as document-rich.

Thanks to the Foundation for a Travel Grant, the Lyndon Baines Johnson

Presidential Library for a Moody Research Grant, the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library for a Ford Presidential Research Grant, and the Scowcroft Institute of International

Affairs and the George H.W. Bush Presidential Library’s O’Donnell Grant. The U.S. military history community is also a great graduate student benefactor. Thanks to ABC-

CLIO Publishers for an ABC-CLIO Research Grant, as well as the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center for a Gen. and Mrs. Matthew B. Ridgway Research Grant.

It would have been far more difficult to finish this dissertation without unwavering support and understanding from my parents, Chris and Pam Givens. Thanks to Adam Givens, who is still the best research companion I have found, for being willing to talk about my dissertation when he would rather talk about his. Thanks also to Nate and Lauren Givens for their support and genuine questions, and to Kristin and Andy

Klatkiewicz, who supplied room and board as well as encouragement. Special thanks go to Sarah Finley for keeping me from slipping too far into the doldrums, and for always trying to help. Last, I am indebted to everyone at the Monuments Men Foundation, especially my boss and friend, Robert Edsel. His understanding allowed me time to write while he also crossed the finish line with his own book, and his boundless encouragement have made the last two years rewarding beyond measure. 8

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Abstract ...... 3 Dedication ...... 5 Acknowledgments...... 6 Introduction ...... 9 Chapter 1: Conquer and Divide ...... 21 Wartime Planning ...... 22 Military Policy and the German Question ...... 49 Chapter 2: The First Crisis ...... 64 Prelude to Tension in Berlin ...... 66 Decision in Berlin ...... 85 A for a Diplomatic Solution ...... 109 Chapter 3: “Eat, Sleep, and Drink Fear” ...... 122 An Uncertain Victory ...... 123 The View of Korea from ...... 143 Berlin and European Security ...... 156 Chapter 4: A at Berlin ...... 164 Early Challenges for Eisenhower ...... 166 The Eisenhower Administration and the Uprising ...... 174 Aligning Berlin and National Policy ...... 190 Chapter 5: “ Stares Us in the Face” ...... 200 A Crisis on a Crisis ...... 202 Road to a Double-Barrel Approach ...... 229 Road to Geneva ...... 242 Chapter 6: Managing the Alliance Crisis ...... 250 Shaping a Strategy ...... 252 Building Allied Consensus ...... 272 American Unilateralism ...... 291 Chapter 7: The Defense of Berlin Starts at the Mekong ...... 308 The Berlin-Vietnam Parallel ...... 310 The Western Alliance, Vietnam, and Détente ...... 316 A New Crisis ...... 334 Chapter 8: Leveraging Détente ...... 345 Nixon, Europe, and Détente ...... 347 Détente with a German Accent ...... 359 , Berlin, and Co-opting ...... 372 Conclusion ...... 388 References ...... 402

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INTRODUCTION

On July 24, 2008, , then a presidential candidate, gave a speech in

Berlin. At his back was the Victory Column, the Prussians’ commemoration of their string of triumphs on the battlefield. Before him, stretched down Straße des 17. Juni,

Berlin’s main east-west axis, were 200,000 people who had come to witness his coming- out party on the international stage, his attempt to establish foreign policy credentials. It was an unprecedented event in American election history, a candidate addressing a massive crowd in a foreign capital. He had wanted to speak a mile away, on the other end of the , in front of the Gate. His request, however, garnered criticism from some Germans and created uneasiness among others, Chancellor Angela

Merkel included. Built at the end of the eighteenth century to represent peace, the

Brandenburg Gate had become fraught with symbolism, first a symbol of Germany’s defeat, then Berlin’s division, and finally the country’s reunification. Obama had gone to the city to mend the transatlantic alliance, as he saw it, so he relented.1

His speech hit on themes of twenty-first century challenges, but he began by summarizing Berlin’s history since 1945, from the final climatic battle of World War II to the blockade in 1948, the airlift and creation of NATO in 1949, and construction of the

Berlin in 1961 and its dismantling in 1989. He also subtly echoed U.S. presidents’

Cold War moments in the city, like ’s appeal to tear down and John

1 David Paul Kuhn, “Controversy Precedes Obama Germany Visit,” July 20, 2008, Politico, https://www.politico.com/story/2008/07/controversy-precedes-obama-germany-visit-011675. DPA News Agency, “Berlin Welcomes Obama at Historic Gate, Despite Controversy,” July 13, 2008, , http://www.dw.com/en/berlin-welcomes-obama-at-historic-gate-despite-controversy/a- 3481074. 10

F. Kennedy’s rhetorical refrain for anyone who doubted Western determination,

American generosity, or the horrors of war to look at Berlin.2 For all the anticipation surrounding the speech, some Berliners and Germans left disappointed, believing that

Obama’s message was not for them but Americans.3 The exercise was emblematic of

U.S.-German relations and Berlin: the initial scrap over venue and its potential to detract from transatlantic unity, Berlin scenery as a dramatic backdrop but the inescapable feeling that its symbolism was complicated, soaring rhetoric that stirred hope but whose historical comparisons were strained and left questions of functional applicability, and skepticism that has led Americans and Germans to embrace one another while holding each other at arm’s length. Most importantly, Obama’s experience highlighted a change.

Berlin was ostensibly no longer the symbol that it once was, for Europeans or Americans.

For fifty years, Berlin was the defining center of the Cold War, one location that somehow exemplified the global struggle between the superpowers. It is perhaps the most identifiable symbol of the Cold War, thanks mostly to the crises that occurred there as well as the Soviet and East Germans’ unintentional creation of the Wall as a metaphor for division. Events in the city created some of the most identifiable moments between 1945 and 1989: C-54 transports lumbering overhead, M-48 tanks staring down Soviet T-54s at

Checkpoint Charlie, East German soldier Conrad Schumann jumping over barbed wire to

2 Transcript of Speech by Barack Obama, July 24, 2008, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/24/us/politics/24text-obama.html. 3 Gregor Peter Schimitz, “People of the World, Look at Me,” July 25, 2008, Der Spiegel, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/obama-s-berlin-speech-people-of-the-world-look-at-me-a- 567932.html. Mark Waffel and Josh Ward, “Huge Crowds Left with Mixed Feelings,” July 24, 2008, Der Spiegel, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/obama-in-berlin-huge-crowds-left-with-mixed-feelings-a- 567922.html. 11 defect to the West, East Berliners swinging sledgehammers against the Wall. U.S. presidents went to the city because of its symbolism, which is what led Obama there in

2008. The Cold War in Berlin, though, was twenty-one years in the past by that time, and the significance of a leader speaking there was lost. The backdrop mattered little now.

Why did Berlin become a symbol during the Cold War? Why did it remain one for almost fifty years? This dissertation attempts to answer those questions, but it addresses a more central issue, a key paradox about the city. Why did the Americans, who freely admitted Berlin, 110 miles inside hostile territory and indefensible, had no military or strategic value and could spark a global war, still argue that it was a place to defend at all costs? What logic could there be in stubbornly insisting that the West would not retreat in the face of Soviet belligerence, even to the point of war? In attempting to answer those questions, this dissertation considers Berlin’s place in Western strategy and policy during the Cold War.

Scholars have by and large relegated Berlin to two different types of literature.

The first places these moments as components of a larger narrative about the Cold War.

Well-regarded historians like and Melvyn Leffler merely use the crises as examples of how superpower intransigence almost sparked war.4 The second type analyzes the crises specifically, which has led to hundreds of books that walk over the same ground, popular history and scholarly works alike.5 Some, however, have given

4 The best example from each of these important historians are: Melvyn Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War (New York: Hill & Wang, 2008); John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin, 2005). 5 Most recent examples are: Andrei Cherny, Candy Bombers: The Untold Story of the Berlin Airlift and America’s Finest Hour (New York: Berkley, 2009); Frederick Kempe, Berlin 1961: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Most Dangerous Place on Earth (New York: Berkley, 2012). 12 us influential studies in crisis decision-making, such as Avi Schalim and Honoré M.

Catudal.6 Others like Daniel Harrington and Marc Trachtenberg have placed these crises in the larger context of the Cold War, the transatlantic alliance, and civil-military relations.7 Both examples share two features. The first is the implicit idea that the Cold

War descended upon Berlin in 1948 and left in 1949, only to return in 1958 and then leave three years later to go to other places such as Southeast Asia. The second is the oft- repeated view that the city was nothing more than a liability to U.S. power in Europe, or, at best, a trip wire in the face of a large-scale Soviet attack against Western Europe.8 This latter thesis raises the overriding question of this dissertation: If Berlin was merely a trip wire, why threaten a war over it?

Rather than another compartmentalized look at Berlin, this work seeks to show how the Cold War evolved from the vantage point of one place, which was also one of the contest’s most central locations. Doing so puts the already-examined moments in context, illustrating how they were part of a continuum rather than merely one crisis after another. It therefore considers what happened between 1949 and 1958 as having equal importance to the crises themselves. The post-1962 section of the dissertation serves as an important corrective to a historiography that has tended to see little use in examining

6 Avi Schlaim, The United States and the , 1948-1949: A Study in Crisis Decision-Making (Berkeley: Press, 1983). Honoré M. Catudal, Kennedy and the Crisis. A Case Study in U.S. Decision Making (Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 1980). Jack M. Schick, The Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962 (Philadelphia: University of Press, 1971). 7 Daniel Harrington, Berlin on the Brink: The Blockade, the Airlift, and the Early Cold War (Lexington, University Press of Kentucky, 2012). Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton: Press, 1991). 8 For the best examples, see: John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of : A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War (Oxford: University of Oxford Press, 1982), p. 168; and Lawrence Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 111. 13 the era beyond the crises. This long view of Berlin readjusts our lens of examination and reveals a host of other issues: the city’s role in Western strategies for the Cold War and the effects of those on the German Question, East-West relations, and alliance management. It therefore also offers larger Cold War historiographical questions. What role did Berlin play in, as some have termed it, the American postwar empire?9 If the

Cold War was truly global, and Europe was not of central importance because of the lack of open conflict there, how does one explain Berlin?10 Did the city have anything to do with creating the ideological Cold War structures that U.S. and Soviet leaders found so difficult to overcome?11

By tracking the arc of the East-West competition over the city from 1945 until the

Four Powers signed the Quadripartite Agreement in 1971, we can pose questions relating to issues of strategy and policy formation, war planning, civil-military relations, and alliance politics. How and why does a nation decide to risk its own security to defend an isolated location? When it is difficult to discern whether a problem is political or military, how do leaders form strategies? What issues strengthen or weaken an alliance? When new governments inherit their predecessors’ policies, is there room to modify strategic postures without endangering national objectives, civil-military relations, or unity within an alliance?

9 Geir Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe since 1945: From “Empire” by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 10 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Interventions and the Making of our Time (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 11 Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union and the Cold War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007). For its Soviet counterpart, see Vladislav Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill: University Press of Carolina, 2007). 14

By virtue of Berlin’s unique position in the Cold War, it was impossible for decisionmakers to divorce the city from the broader contest between East and West. This dissertation thus focuses on the intersection of the military, diplomatic, and political worlds when examining U.S. policy and strategy toward the city. It is that approach and the covering of fifty years of history that set this work apart from the literature. It is therefore not a case study in crisis management, nor merely a study of diplomatic decision-making, defense policymaking, or alliance politics. It is all four. To that end,

Berlin tended to reflect what was occurring in the wider Cold War, and I have therefore conceived of this dissertation as covering three distinct eras. The first is the Stalin era, which ran roughly from Allied postwar planning in mid-1944 to several months after his death in March 1953, when his successors maintained his policies regarding Germany. It was during this time that Berlin settled in as a Cold War flashpoint, and the structures that became the superpower competition over the city hardened. The second is the nuclear era, from summer 1953, when there was hope that a new page could be turned in

East-West relations, to John F. Kennedy’s death in November 1963. During that space of time, U.S. officials and NATO struggled to find ways to defend Berlin on the nuclear battlefield, and used the city in nuclear . The last is the détente era, from the widening U.S. commitment to South Vietnam and its effects on

Europe to the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, and signing the Quadripartite

Agreement in September 1971, theoretically ending tension over Berlin. It was during that era that the city transitioned from a potential military battleground to fully a diplomatic arena in which to spar. 15

The dissertation’s chapters reflect the breakdown of these distinct periods.

Chapter One begins the examination of the Stalin era, and considers how Berlin became a

Cold War hot spot. More than one individual’s postwar decision, hostility over the city had as much to do with agreements made during World War II, all perceived as short- term arrangements not to last more than eighteen months. These largely good-faith agreements endured as a series of insuperable problems that drove tension between East and West. Since wartime decision makers did not conceive of Berlin and Germany as separate postwar issues, the chapter examines the city’s place in the structures of the

German Question and asks whether tension in Berlin was inevitable.

Chapter Two discusses how Berlin became integrated into U.S. policy and strategy for the Cold War. The United States committed itself to the city in 1948 and made it an outpost of democracy out of a belief that Stalin would expand his influence wherever the Western Powers allowed him. Prime movers of policy on Berlin, like Gen.

Lucius D. Clay, American military governor for Germany and U.S. Commander in Chief,

Europe (CINCEUR), believed that Soviet expansion had to be contained in the city or the

Western Powers would have to fight the same battle in their occupation zones later. His idea was to use the garrisons there as a deterrent, which ran up against considerable pushback from the Pentagon and State Department before Harry Truman intervened and accepted Clay’s rationale. Berlin thus became the defensive complement to the Marshall

Plan’s economic statement that the United States would remain in Europe and contain

Soviet political expansion. 16

Chapter Three examines how the West approached Berlin in the wake of the crisis until the end of the Truman administration. Cold War events between 1949 and 1953 influenced Western policy toward the city, and vice versa. The had a profound effect on the way officials approached Berlin after it appeared that Stalin could use a proxy army or civil disturbances to overrun the garrisons there. In response, the

West, through U.S. coaxing, slid a shield over the city by integrating it into a West

German political program and NATO defense arrangements. The change was decisive, since it made Berlin a shared transatlantic problem.

Chapter Four begins the dissertation’s second part, the nuclear era. It discusses how Dwight Eisenhower approached Berlin from his inauguration in January 1953 to the eve of the Second Berlin Crisis in November 1958. Shortly after becoming president,

Eisenhower had to contend with the East German popular uprising, placing the young administration in a compromising position of either inaction or fulfilling campaign rhetoric to roll back communism and thereby risk a Soviet military response. The city also made it difficult for Eisenhower to fit his national security policy, the New Look, with its emphasis on balancing deterrence and U.S. spending, to an issue that was simultaneously political and military in character. Facing stiff resistance from his

National Security Council and the , he nonetheless bent plans to his will and oversaw the construction of military strategies that the United States into the crucial final years of his presidency and that eventually became NATO policy.

Chapter Five focuses on the Eisenhower administration’s handling of the Second

Berlin Crisis. Following Nikita Khrushchev’s November 1958 ultimatum to the Western 17

Powers that they find a solution to the German Question within six months or the Soviet

Union would sign a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic, Eisenhower and

Secretary of State undertook a delicate balancing act of finding a military and diplomatic solution to the crisis while maintaining Allied unity. The Allies, however, had varying national objectives, and resisted Washington’s strategy. Along the way toward finding agreement, the Western Powers had to debate lingering issues of the use of limited force, the utility of NATO policy, and if the German Question could or should be solved.

Chapter Six is the counterpart to the preceding chapter and examines Berlin and the transatlantic alliance from John F. Kennedy’s inauguration to the Cuban Missile

Crisis. When Eisenhower left office, he had achieved his objective of maintaining the status quo as well as Allied unity. Kennedy and his advisors, despite their repudiation of their predecessor’s handling of the crisis, traveled down many of the same roads and arrived at the same dual-track strategy of military preparations and negotiations. Along the way, Kennedy, in his attempt to apply Flexible Response to Berlin, had thrown

NATO into a series of mini crises which had profound effects on the alliance after

Khrushchev ended his brinkmanship over the city. In the end, he did succeed in informally introducing Flexible Response to NATO through Berlin planning bodies.

Chapter Seven begins the dissertation’s third part, the détente era. It illustrates how Berlin remained a point within the transatlantic alliance during the Vietnam

War, specifically during Lyndon Johnson’s presidency. After Kennedy and Khrushchev had taken the world to the precipice of nuclear war, American attention turned to 18

Southeast Asia, which pleased the European allies because the Cold War near home calmed down, but also made them worry that Washington had become disinterested in the continent. This paradox tested U.S.-German relations as well as Johnson’s patience.

Seeing Berlin and Vietnam’s security as linked, Johnson used the city in burden-sharing debates with , , and London as an illustration of U.S. resolve and Allied hypocrisy. The ensuing discussions cut to the heart of contentious issues of American military power, European defense, and NATO strategy.

Chapter Eight deals with the delayed reckoning of Kennedy’s handling of the

Second Berlin Crisis. In 1962, Chancellor could not abide Washington actively offering Moscow concessions that impinged directly on a Bonn-conceived plan for in the hopes of reaching a Berlin settlement. Adenauer’s successors, primarily , who was the governing mayor of the city during the crisis, charted a new course for German reunification, Ostpolitik. Fearful that Bonn could preempt U.S.-Soviet détente and thereby diminish American power that was already waning because of Vietnam, and his national security adviser, Henry

Kissinger, used Berlin and Four Power privileges there to block Brandt’s plan and couple wider Cold War negotiations on strategic arms and force reductions that favored the

West, leading to the Quadripartite Agreement of 1971.

“Cold War Capital” traces how military power can be used in a situation deemed indefensible. The Allied garrisons in Berlin, though only a fraction of the twenty divisions that the Soviets had surrounding the city, were used in two important ways: as a deterrent and a means to induce the Soviets to negotiate on terms that did not wholly 19 benefit them. Once the Western Allies made their statement about remaining in Berlin with the blockade, deterrence continued as the bedrock of U.S. policy toward the city.

The U.S. military presence in Berlin, when backed up with America retaliatory power on the continent and around the globe, served as a force multiplier. The use of military force as a means of negotiating was deployed at will, as evidenced during the Second Berlin

Crisis. Using military power to negotiate was not exclusively a weapon deployed against the Soviets, as U.S. leaders also used it against the Allies when it served American interests. By reminding NATO that U.S. power underwrote Europe’s defense, the United

States attempted to manipulate the transatlantic alliance at times, particularly when an ally’s policies impinged upon larger American objectives.

All these aspects, while not groundbreaking as component pieces of the East-West struggle from 1945 to 1991, serve to illustrate why Berlin is more useful than a study on crisis management or merely two footnotes in the Cold War narrative. It was a loadbearing part of U.S. policy and strategy toward Europe. It was also a linchpin of the transatlantic alliance, which served to unify the West early in the Cold War and threatened to break it apart later. Berlin was never solely a political or military problem— it was always both. For that reason, the entire U.S. national security apparatus built policy and strategy toward Berlin, which has led this dissertation to focus on the triangular relationship of the , Pentagon, and State Department. The city was also never solely an American issue. U.S. decisions had to be built with the Allies in mind.

Even here there were complications. Washington, London, and Paris, as the victorious powers and the guarantors of Berlin’s security, stood atop the alliance. The Federal 20

Republic, given that Berlin was the lodestar of its political aspiration to reunify Germany, was privileged over the other members of NATO, all of whom had a keen interest in what happened in the city because of the likelihood that it could spark yet another world war in which they would be the principal battleground. In practice, then, decision-making regarding Berlin was unwieldy. This added to the frustration that officials already felt about a place for which ostensibly there appeared to be no good solutions, or any solutions at all. It was because these structures were so relatively static, however, that the

United States found ways to use Berlin in the Cold War.

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CHAPTER 1: CONQUER AND DIVIDE

On a gray April afternoon in 1945, a Civil Affairs was leading his detachment down a road outside Bielefeld, Germany when a shabbily-dressed man jumped on the running board of the officer’s car. Startled, the American swung, landing a punch on what turned out to be a Soviet soldier who had just escaped German captivity.12

It was an inauspicious beginning for the man who was soon given command of the U.S. military government in Berlin, a job that came with an expectation that he would get along with the Soviets in Berlin. Col. Frank Howley was a little-known reservist officer from Philadelphia when he arrived in the destroyed German capital three months later.

His largest claim to fame in the Army was leading a military government detachment in

Cherbourg, France, which had earned him the job in Berlin. He was straight-talking and cared little for the intricacies of diplomacy, encapsulating many of the qualities that typified the U.S. military’s approach to Berlin.

The Four Powers came to jointly occupy the German capital by way of agreements they made during World War II. These decisions, which began at the

Moscow Conference in October 1943 and ended at in July and August 1945, framed the way the Allies interacted with one another in the city for decades, and each side called upon them throughout the Cold War to justify their actions or condemn their counterparts, often likening them to sacred texts. Most of them were made with military considerations in mind, not long-range policy.13

12 Frank L. Howley, Berlin Command (G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1950), p. 16 13 Walter M. Hudson, Army Diplomacy: American and Foreign Policy after World War II (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2015). 22

This chapter examines where Berlin fit into the structures of the German Question and the coming superpower competition.14 It attempts to understand why the city became a flashpoint of the Cold War, and focuses on wartime Allied debates at conferences and advisory bodies as well as the postwar application of those decisions. It argues that Berlin as a Cold War flashpoint was not inevitable, and tracks the various fault lines between the

Allies about the German Question. Berlin would fall into these cracks, not create them.

Wartime Planning

It had not been a foregone conclusion that Berlin would be a divided city when the Big Three were drafting postwar arrangements. Planners had briefly discussed making the lines of occupation converge at and setting up a military government there.15 Leipzig may have had some pragmatic worth, but it had no symbolic value.

Berlin’s importance had always been its power as a symbol, which was at once its allure for Germans but also the greatest target for their enemies. After years of war and countless deaths, the Allies agreed it was important to make it clear to the Germans that their nation was thoroughly defeated, lest another leader attempt to place the blame at the feet of someone else as Hitler had. As the Soviets saw it, Berlin was the center of the

“financial bourgeoisie, junkerism, militarism, and officialdom, the bulwark of German which systematically and persistently strove to re- the world.”16

Building a quadripartite government on the rubble of Germany’s destroyed capital, even

14 Nicolas Lewkowicz, The German Question and the International Order, 1943-48 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). For the structures of the Cold War, see John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). Vladislav Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill: University Press of Carolina, 2007). 15 John and Ann Tusa, The Berlin Airlift (New York: Atheneum, 1988), p. 12. 16 V. Vysotsky, , trans. D. Fidlon (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974), p. 15. 23 if it created an administrative quirk of sharing a city that was 110 miles inside the , would make a gratifying statement, Allied officials thought.

A destroyed capital it was indeed. No longer was Berlin one of the world’s great cities. Instead, it had been transformed into a smashed and broken metropolis. Many observers, upon seeing Berlin firsthand, referred to the once proud capital as a “dead city.”17 Those who knew it before the war noticed not just the visual changes but also the differences in sound: gone was the usual commotion of a bustling, vital city. Even the color of the once vibrant capital was now sallow, replaced with the gray of pulverized buildings and the olive drab and brown of the occupiers’ uniforms.

During the war, the British and Americans had launched 363 air raids and dropped over 75,000 tons of bombs on the heart of Berlin and targets in the outlying industrial areas, located primarily in the northern and western boroughs.18 The U.S. Army

Air Forces began sending armadas of 1,000 heavy bombers to pound Berlin beginning in

January 1945, further crippling war production and pulverizing the city center. All told, the forty-four months of on-and-off U.S. and British air raids against “Big B,” as

17 See Robert Powell, “Berlin To-Day,” Fortnightly Review, October 1945, p. 235 in Cornelius Collection, folder 5, box 41, Cornelius Ryan Collection, Ohio University Mahn Center for Archives and Special Collections. Letter from James Riddleberger, July 14, 1945, folder 1, box 1, Papers of James W. Riddleberger, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library (hereafter HSTL). Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1950), p. 21. 18 Cornelius Ryan, The Last Battle (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966), p. 420. David Clay Large, Berlin (New York: Basic Books, 2000), p. 371. Ann Tusa, The Last Division: A , 1945- 1989 (New York: Perseus Books, 1997), p. 11. Anthony Read and David Fisher, Berlin Rising: Biography of a City (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1994), p. 241. For comparison purposes, the Germans dropped 18,000 tons of bombs during the eight months of . 24

American bomb crews referred to it, dropped 75,000 tons of bombs and killed 50,000

Berliners.19

Within two hours of the last Allied mission over Berlin, on April 21, 1945, the

Soviet Union began pounding the city with artillery, and they would not stop until the battle was over, after firing 1.8 million shells.20 The ’s knockout blow had been over two months in the making, with the Soviets spending early spring resting and refitting sixty miles east of Berlin on the banks of the River. They had swelled their ranks to 1.5 million men before launching their two-pronged attack toward the southern and eastern boroughs. Along the way, the Red Army continued shelling and brought to bear other weapons like rockets and mortars once within range. Even a railway gun was eventually incorporated. The Germans had little in way of a defense force—only 85,000 men and young boys—but they did have a considerable number of panzerfausts, which soldiers hidden in buildings used in vain to slow the Red Army’s thrust into Berlin. The tactic elicited a practical response from the Soviets, which was to use tanks, self- propelled, antiaircraft, and antitank guns, as well as howitzers over open sights to blast what the bombs and artillery shells had not. As a result, the vicious street fighting physically shattered the capital block by block, leaving 76 percent of it destroyed and

30,000 Berliners dead.21 According to official Soviet numbers, they lost ten times that

19 Ryan, The Last Battle, p. 420. Read and Fisher, Berlin Rising, p. 241. Earl F. Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1990), p. 303. 20 Anthony Beevor, The Fall of Berlin, 1945 (New York: Penguin Book, 2002), p. 262. 21 Public Relations, Statistical and Historical Branch Office of Military Government, “A Four Year Report: Office of Military Government, U.S. Sector, Berlin,” box 1, Papers of Frank L. Howley, U.S. Army Military History Institute (hereafter MHI); Large, Berlin, p. 371; Tusa, The Last Division, p. 11; Read and Fisher, Berlin Rising, pp. 241, 243. 25 amount between April 16 and May 8, 1945.22 Hitler had hoped Berlin would go out “in a

Wagnerian burst of glory,” but there was little heroism to go around after six years of war.23

When the battle ended on May 2, all of Berlin’s great landmarks were damaged, if not demolished. , the mile-long, tree-lined that terminated in the city center, had drawn considerable attention from Allied bombardiers, who merely followed the city’s east-west axis until it ended and released their bombs on downtown

Berlin. Soviet shells further shattered the area, turning the basswood trees into matchsticks. Among the boulevard’s damaged structures was the , the neoclassical triumphal arch that served as the western entrance to Unter den Linden as well as the gateway to the city center. Only 300 yards northwest of the Brandenburg Gate was the shattered Reichstag, the building that Stalin had mistakenly believed was the heart of . He demanded its surrender before May Day. In trying to secure the prize, the Red Army unleashed a continuous barrage from ninety artillery pieces at the building for most of a day before sending in three rifle regiments in the early evening.

The fighting inside the building continued after a soldier hoisted the hammer and sickle over Berlin, lasting throughout the night.24 Half-a-mile south of the Brandenburg Gate was the ruins of the imposing . In the garden, Hitler’s bodyguards had burned his body after he had shot himself on April 30, and “gone to wherever it is that

22 Vysotsky, West Berlin, pp. 28-29. 23 Earl F. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1987), pp. 488. 24 Beevor, Fall of Berlin, 1945, pp. 255-56, 265-66. 26

Hitlers go,” as one British soldier put it.25 At the opposite end of Unter den Linden, one mile away, stood the burned-out shell of the Stadtschloss, the Prussian monarchy’s old residence. Across the boulevard was the once great . The traditional burial place of the Hohenzollerns was now missing most of its main dome, the victim of a bomb that had crashed into the spire and sent it through the floor and into the crypt below.

The city had fallen silent after the battle, the lack of sound due mostly to the lack of people. By the end of hostilities, the 4.6 million pre-war population had been reduced by half.26 Those who remained were primarily seniors, women, and children, most of whom were . Of the 2.3 million people who remained in Berlin at the end of the war, one-quarter were over the age of 60, and two-thirds were women.27 Most were forced underground to escape the weather and Soviet soldiers looking for things to steal and women to rape.28 With no protectors, there was little that Berliners could do but endure it.

There were also precious few places to run, nor the means to do so. With tunnels flooded and rail lines destroyed, the subways and trams were out of commission. Some trams clanked through the city center by the end of May, though most had been destroyed after they were pressed into service as makeshift defensive structures for the battle. Berlin once had 150 bridges, but less than two dozen survived. Canal traffic was virtually

25 George Clare, Berlin Days, 1946-47 (London: Pan Books Ltd, 1990), p. 9. 26 Roger G. Miller, To Save a City: The Berlin Airlift, 1946-1948 (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), pp. 5-6. Read and Fisher, Berlin Rising, p 245; Large, Berlin, p. 371; Tusa, The Last Division, p. 11. 27 Read and Fisher, Berlin Rising, p 245. 28 Norman Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949 (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1995), pp. 69-140. 27 nonexistent; the waterways were too choked full of debris for barges to pass.29 Much like the devastation wrought on Berlin’s central district of , the other nineteen boroughs had sustained considerable damage, especially those near the areas that were the home of the German aircraft, radio, and chemical industries. Of Berlin’s 1.5 million homes, the

Allied air raids and the battle for the city destroyed 612,000 of them.30 Water sources were polluted, and the sewage system destroyed, allowing typhus and dysentery to spread.31 The Four Powers’ trophy, which had taken years to secure, was now undeniably a city of rubble.

How did the Cold War map of Germany come to be, and why was Berlin landlocked inside the Soviet Union’s occupation zone? Settling the particulars of zones, sectors, and where to place the seat of the occupation had taken place at levels lower than the wartime conferences. At , Franklin Roosevelt, , and Stalin approved the plans that a tripartite organization in London, called the European Advisory

Commission (EAC), had made. The decisions the representatives in the EAC made in

1944 about Germany’s division and the quadripartite government in Berlin reflected the allies’ differing conceptions of postwar Europe and set the scene for the coming tensions between the Four Powers.32 The EAC was a well-intentioned but administratively problematic consultative body, built to plan for the future after World War II.33 Chiefly, the governments of the Big Three charged it with drafting an instrument of unconditional

29Large, Berlin, p. 371; Tusa, The Last Division, p. 11. 30 Read and Fisher, Berlin Rising, p 243; Miller, To Save a City, p. 6. 31Large, Berlin, p. 371; Tusa, The Last Division, p. 11. 32 Philip E. Mosely, “The Occupation of Germany: New Light on How the Zones Were Drawn,” , Vol. 28, No. 4 (July 1950): 581-82. 33 Carolyn Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-1949 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 26-27. 28 surrender for Germany, defining how the defeated Reich was to be divided and formulating plans for the joint Allied administration of the country. With such a substantial mission, the EAC required efficient and clear decision-making mechanisms.

No such apparatus would be realized, though. Since the governments had to coordinate with one another on all aspects of occupation problems, the Commission was inefficient by nature. The American apparatus was clogged with bureaucratic inefficiency, as the representative in the EAC could not respond to Allied proposals without first briefing the

State Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Civil Affairs Division (CAD) in the War

Department, and then an oversight body staffed with State, Navy, and War Department representatives called the Working Security Committee. This complicated web of consultation is the primary reason the EAC has been remembered, by and large, as a failure.34

Perhaps foreshadowing the difficulties to come, the EAC was born with some difficulty at the Tripartite Conference of Foreign Ministers, held in Moscow from

October 18 to November 1, 1943, which served as the preparatory meeting for the Tehran

Conference.35 When the Big Three agreed that a collective advisory body was needed for planning the peace, British Foreign Secretary quickly became its driving force. He proposed expansive powers that would allow the Commission to settle various

34 For a representative negative view of the EAC, see Bruce Kuklick, “The Genesis of the European Advisory Commission,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 4, no. 4 (Oct. 1969): 189-210. 35 See Daniel J. Nelson, Wartime Origins of the Berlin Dilemma (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1978), pp. 10-14. For a personal perspective on the , see Secretary of State ’s account in The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol. II (New York: Macmillan Co., 1948), pp. 1252-1318. 29 issues, including deciding future regimes for Eastern European countries and even boundary disputes.36

Eden’s ideal EAC would efficiently resolve questions before the end of the war.

His counterparts disagreed. Both Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Foreign Minister

Vyacheslav Molotov believed such broad powers of purpose and jurisdiction would undermine the authority of the foreign ministers in deciding postwar issues in the future.37 The United States preferred to take a conservative approach to the EAC, believing it better to solve postwar issues after the fighting was over. The underlying

American fear was the potential for war-time agreements shackling the country to Europe before knowing what the future held. The Soviet Union tended to agree with Washington on limiting the power that the EAC wielded rather than granting it free reign.38 Eden,

Hull, and Molotov finally came to an agreement after ten days of sometimes acrimonious debate and signed the Secret Protocol of the Moscow Conference on November 1, 1943.

Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin approved the protocol during their meetings at Tehran at the end of the month, giving birth to the EAC. 39 Of principal note was that the

Commission would have its seat in London, where the British already had an operational postwar planning committee. The Big Three now had their international forum, but much like its mandate, it was built upon an unstable foundation of vague responsibilities and

36 Mosely, “The Occupation of Germany,” pp. 580-601. 37 Summary of the Proceedings, Fifth Session, Tripartite Conference, October 23, 1943, FRUS, 1943, I: 620-621. 38 John W. Wheeler-Bennett and Anthony James Nicholls, Semblance of Peace: The Political Settlement after The Second World War (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1972), pp. 133-40. Nelson, Wartime Origins, pp. 10-13. 39 Secret Protocol, see “Summary of the Proceedings of the Fifth Session of the Tripartite Conference, October 23, 1943,” Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), 1943, I: 756-757. 30 unclear direction. Such ambiguities would allow for future differing interpretations of the

EAC’s scope and purpose.

The British were disappointed in their allies right away. Rather than assigning a representative whose sole responsibility was the EAC, both the United States and the

Soviet Union merely doubled the workload of their ambassadors to Britain by ordering them to also chair a delegation in the Commission. London had already appointed Under

Secretary for Foreign Affairs Sir William Strang as its representative, a man who resembled a spectacled and humorless Neville Chamberlain. Strang was a career diplomat, an expert in German affairs and a close friend of Anthony Eden, and would later go on to become Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from 1949 to 1953.40 He would square off against Fedor Tarasovich Gusev, a dour-looking forty- year old who was well known for his recalcitrance in negotiations. His successes as a diplomat eventually led him to rise to the rank of Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. The

American face in the EAC was the soft-spoken, congenial John G. Winant, U.S.

Ambassador to the since March 1941.41

Winant was the former governor of New Hampshire, a liberal Republican who was known as much for his awkward yet endearing personality as he was for defying

GOP leadership in 1936 by publicly attacking them for their militant stance toward the

New Deal generally and Social Security specifically. His mutiny extinguished any hope of advancement in the Republican Party, but it did garner praise from Roosevelt, who

40 For Strang’s view of the European Advisory Commission, see Lord William Strang, Home and Abroad (London: André Deutsch, 1956). 41 Jean Edward Smith, The Defense of Berlin (: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), pp. 18-19. 31 admired Winant’s selfless idealism and nicknamed him “Utopian John.”42 It did not hurt, too, that FDR, who found considerable joy in taunting his Republican counterparts, could use Winant’s banishment as political capital. Roosevelt rewarded Winant in 1939 by making him director of the International Labour Organization, which suited the progressive man who had championed workers’ rights as a state senator and governor. As director of the ILO, Winant became an unofficial advisor for FDR on European matters.

He crisscrossed the continent in the lead-up to World War II, meeting with leaders and reporting back to Washington the prevailing moods in Europe. Winant’s success in that position made him a natural successor to Joseph Kennedy at the Court of Saint James, and he went on to cultivate a strong relationship with both the British people and the

Churchill family, including carrying on an affair with the Prime Minister’s daughter,

Sarah.43

Winant and the other representatives in the EAC held their first formal session on

January 14, 1944. Throughout the commission’s existence, the delegates would agree on little and leave many decisions open-ended, to be reckoned with later and by someone else. There was no consensus on how long an Allied governing body would function, nor what kind of regime would succeed it. They did not draft a political surrender document, or a declaration of joint occupation policy. Even though the Big Three leaders had

42 Lynne Olson, Citizens of London: The Americans Who Stood with Britain in Its Darkest, Finest Hour (New York: Random House, 2010), pp. 12, 21-23. 43 Ibid., pp. 174-75. 32 discussed partitioning Germany and extracting reparations, the EAC produced no dismemberment plan or a schedule of payments.44

While the Commission failed to complete most of its assignments, it did produce two important recommendations that the Big Three would signature at Yalta in February, where the Allies dealt with a solution for the German Question formally and collectively for the first time: a blueprint for the control machinery that would administer Germany and Berlin, and the partition of Germany into three occupied zones and Berlin into three sectors.45 Indeed, creating these recommendations had exhausted the EAC and led to its inability to get anything else done. The exhaustion was well warranted, though, as the two agreements outlined important matters of how the Four Powers would interact with one another, politically and administratively. The long-term solution for the German

Question remained unclear, which suited Roosevelt, who would continue to postpone any

American planning for dismemberment. As he told Secretary of State Edward Stettinius in April 1945 upon seeing proposals for Germany, “I think our attitude should be one of study and postponement of final decision.” 46 He also advised Cordell Hull that he disliked making “detailed plans for a country which we do not yet occupy.”47 In the interim, it was unclear exactly what he wanted, which was characteristic of his diplomatic style.48 Each of the powers, which included France after Churchill insisted that they be

44 W.R. Smyser, From Yalta to Berlin: The Cold War Struggle Over Germany (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1999), p. 11. Mosely, “The Occupation of Germany,” pp. 582-83. 45 Nelson, Wartime Origins, pp. 76-78. 46 Stettinius to Winant, April 10, 1945, FRUS, 1945, III: 221. 47 See also FDR’s comments to Roosevelt to Hull, October 20, 1944, FRUS, Conference at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 158. For discussion of this topic, see Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 17. 48 Frederick W. Marks III, Wind over Sand: The Diplomacy of Franklin Roosevelt (, GA: University Georgia Press, 1998). 33 brought into the fold at Yalta, would occupy and administer their own respective chunk of Germany upon the Nazi regime’s capitulation. Crucially, Yalta had merely outlined the machinery that would coordinate policies; it did not define how the Allies would treat the defeated country.49

The Commission had been operational since January 1944, but agreements on control machinery for Germany had been stuck in bureaucratic deadlock until summer, when Ambassador Gusev finally submitted the Soviet proposal on August 25.50 The

United States and Britain applied only minor changes, leading to the signing of the

Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany on November 14, 1944.51 The agreement created a vast inter-allied governing body, dubbed the Allied Control Authority (ACA).

The term ACA referred to a collective body of committees that carried varying responsibilities and powers, and was not a synonymous term with the Allied Control

Council (ACC), which referred only to the four military governors who were the ACA’s most senior policy-making committee.52 Initially, the four commanders in chief would sit on the committee and meet every ten days to discuss issues that affected all of Germany.

Decisions had to be unanimous, which created a built-in ineffectiveness and would later prove to be the committee’s death. Below the ACC was the Coordinating Committee, which the deputy military governors staffed, and whose main responsibility it was to

49 For internal discussions on this topic, see Informal Record in the Office of the Secretary of State, March 15, 1945, FRUS, 1945, III:173. 50 Tony Sharp, The Wartime Alliance and the Zonal Division of Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 50-51. 51 Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany, Adopted by the European Advisory Commission, November 14, 1944, in: Documents on Germany, 1944-1985 (Washington, DC: Department of State Publication, 1985), pp. 6-9. 52 Personnel Roster, August 10, 1945, “Berlin Allied Command” folder, box 8, Floyd Parks Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library (hereafter DDEL). 34 carry out the decisions of the ACC. A dozen directorates inside a secretariat that coordinated the administration of occupied Germany were beneath the Coordinating

Committee. These offices oversaw the everyday administration of the country, divided into divisions such as finance, property, and public relations. Berlin, because it was also jointly occupied, received its own governing body, the . As an

ACC in miniature, the Kommandatura had the same features as the body to which it was subordinate: A Coordinating Committee and a secretariat that oversaw the administration of Greater Berlin, based on the prewar boundaries of the city. Both the ACC and the

Kommandatura had a rotating chairmanship, which would prove important later when

Moscow began using the bodies as a forum to disrupt Western plans for the administration of Germany.53

While deciding the details of control machinery had taken months, defining zonal boundaries for the occupation had been a swifter process, owing much to the haggling between capitals that had been taking place well before the creation of the EAC. On the second day of meetings in the Commission, Strang had presented a draft instrument for

German surrender, along with a memorandum of the German occupation.54 The Attlee

Plan, as it became known, had the same zonal boundaries as an earlier British plan that had been drawn up in October 1943, the work of a dull-sounding but important body, the

53 Elmer Plischke, Government and Politics of Contemporary Berlin (The Hague: Martinus Nijjoff, 1963), pp. 10-11. Harold Zink, American Military Government in Germany (New York: Macmillan, 1947), pp. 253-54. 54 Trevor Burridge, “Great Britain and the Dismemberment of Germany at the End of the Second World War,” The International History Review, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Oct. 1981): 565-579. Nelson, Wartime Origins, 29- 32. 35

Post-Hostilities Planning Sub-Committee.55 The map Strang presented would become iconic: Soviets in the east, Americans in the southwest with the possibility of ,

British in the northwest, and Berlin, 110 miles inside the Soviet zone, jointly divided.56

The disposition of the Allied armies during the war effectively set the zones, and were based on planning for a German collapse, called Occupation RANKIN.57 On February

18, Soviet representative Gusev accepted the British proposal.58 The move took the

Americans by surprise. They had expected Moscow to behave as it normally did and engage in protracted and laborious discussions, giving Washington time to realize

Roosevelt’s obsession of securing northwest Germany’s resources and industry for the

U.S. zone.59 The Soviets accepted the proposal with only two requests: East Prussian inclusion into the Soviet zone and setting up Austria as a jointly-occupied territory rather than a potential annexation to the U.S. zone. Moscow’s quick acceptance of the Attlee

Plan had much to do with the territory offered, which was equitable but, more importantly a larger amount than they had intended to request from their allies.60

Berlin’s placement deep inside Soviet territory was wrapped inside this zonal arrangement for Germany. Strang’s proposal had precluded more than just an American

55 Julian Lewis, Changing Direction: British Military Planning for Post-war Strategic Defence, 1942-47, 2nd ed. (London: Frank Cass, 2003), pp. 55-97. Sharp, Wartime Alliance, pp. 52-53. 56 Memorandum, Strang to the EAC, “Military Occupation of Germany,” January 15, 1944, FRUS, 1944, I: 139-54. 57 Daniel Harrington, Berlin on the Brink, pp. 10-13; Hudson, Army Diplomacy, p. 163. 58 Memorandum, Gusev to the EAC, “Terms of Surrender for Germany,” February 18, 1944, FRUS, 1944, I: 173-79. 59 Smith, Defense of Berlin, pp. 20-24. 60 Lord Strang, “Prelude to Potsdam: Reflections on War and Foreign Policy,” International Affairs, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Jul. 1970): 441-454. For FDR imploring Churchill to simplify the documents of surrender, see Letter, Roosevelt to Churchill, February 29, 1944, FRUS, 1944, I: 188-89. Sharp, Wartime Alliance, pp. 52- 53. 36 occupation of northwest Germany. It also prevented an agreement that would allow for direct connection between the Western occupation zones and Berlin. Geography had given planners few alternatives. Berlin’s location in the eastern third of Germany, and the pragmatic assumption that the Soviets would occupy the territory closest to its borders, meant there was no equitable way of dividing the country around the city. Various planning staffs in the State Department did consider dividing the zones so that they converged on Berlin, but they ultimately rejected the idea on grounds that it would distort traditional German administrative boundaries.61 A corridor linking the Western zones with Berlin was another option, but it was thought unlikely that the Soviet Union would allow a large portion of its zone be divided on an east-west axis.

Geographical reality mattered little to planners who saw occupation zones as merely administrative boundaries. With a belief that broad policy for Germany was to be decided in the ACA, the Attlee Plan had three primary assumptions. First, the British believed that a peace conference would convene after hostilities ended, and the zones would be replaced with more permanent solutions there. This assumption was based on how ended, and with this timeline in mind, planners estimated that the military phase of the occupation would last somewhere between six and twenty-four months. Second, the British conceived of the zones as jointly-occupied territories that allowed for free movement of troops. Rather than spheres of influence for the victorious powers, each zone would have an international staff under a zonal commander, who would command a garrison of troops made up of units from each Allied army. Third,

61 Nelson, Wartime Origins, p. 141. 37 planners assumed the civilian population of Berlin would get its food from the territory around the city, as it always had. Only the Western garrisons would rely on the and rail for supplies, which would come from military stocks in the British and American zones. These assumptions played a large role in building the potential for future conflict over Berlin.

The EAC later became infamous for what it failed to construct rather than what it accomplished in its short existence.62 Of all the Commission’s structural recommendations that lacked clarity, none was more divisive than the failure of Western representatives to secure a right-of-access agreement with the Soviets. Many Americans during the Cold War would look back on the EAC’s discussion in 1944 and wonder how the Western Allies did not have right-of-access guarantees to occupation sectors that were disjointed from their occupation zones. With hindsight, it appeared that no one had thought to ask the question in 1944. It was easy for civil-military leaders to believe that the current situation was a product of carelessness or naiveté. Such a view supposed that

Moscow’s actions in spring 1948 were inevitable, however. A lack of written agreements might have provided the Soviets the opportunity to blockade Berlin, but it did not provide the motive. Little did officials remember how different 1944 was from 1948, when the war was not yet won, Allied cooperation not yet fractured, and a cold war battle over a destroyed city not yet imagined. In truth, on the to-do list of postwar preparations, guaranteeing access rights to Berlin was the least of many overwhelming worries.

62 See, for example, Eisenberg, Drawing the Line, pp. 26-27. 38

Historians would later argue the lack of an access agreement was merely part of

Roosevelt’s overall assumption that he could deal with Stalin personally.63 More than binding agreements, the president believed a relationship of trust with the Soviet leader would ensure the two nations’ continued cooperation. Such expectations thus obviated pushing Stalin on any issue that could provoke Soviet distrust, Berlin included.

Commentary from contemporary decision-makers placed the blame at people’s feet other than Roosevelt. Robert Murphy, the political advisor to the U.S. military government, blamed John Winant for American timidity, pointing to the ambassador’s inarticulate nature and his belief in and experience with international organizations.64 Winant was indeed a shy, brooding personality, but these qualities had no real influence on the conciliatory nature of the Americans in the EAC.65

The lack of the United States securing an agreement was more complicated than a misplaced trust in the Soviets or bashfulness, and there were Americans who were uncomfortable about the lack of a right-of-access guarantee and had tried to secure a written agreement in the EAC, contrary to what critics thought in 1948. On April 13,

1944, a draft memorandum from the Working Security Committee, an interagency

63 Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, pp. 17-18, and Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors: The Unique World of a Foreign Service Expert (New York: Doubleday, 1964), pp. 231-33. 64 Harrington, Berlin on the Brink, p. 293. 65 The debate about who was to blame continued into academia. For the birth of the debate as it regarded the reasons behind the lack of access, especially from the perspective of a State Department official who was involved in the EAC, see Philip E. Mosely, “The Occupation of Germany: New Light on How the Zones Were Drawn,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Jul. 1950): 580-601. For the first exhaustive study of the topic, which is kind to the EAC and happens to be the product of a Philip Mosely advisee, see Daniel J. Nelson, Wartime Origins of the Berlin Dilemma (University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1978). For a more international perspective, see Boris Meissner, “Die Vereinbarungen der Europäischen Beratenden Kommission über Deutschland in 1944/45,“ Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichlte, 46 (November 14, 1970): 3- 14. For the most recent analysis, see Harrington, Berlin on the Brink, pp. 7-25. 39 advisory body to the U.S. delegation in the EAC, directed Winant that “freedom of movement between the respective zones and such central zone as may be established in

Berlin or elsewhere will be accorded, without restriction of any kind, to all forces and other such personnel of the Governments participating in the occupation and control of

Germany.” Two days later, before the directions were sent to Winant, someone deleted the right-of-access paragraph. 66

The insertion and deletion of such an important stipulation was a result of the dysfunction in the U.S. policymaking apparatus, mixed with intentional ambiguity from the White House. Both led to general disarray in U.S. postwar planning for Germany, confusing objectives and denying American influence. This dysfunction was far- reaching, but what it meant for the American delegation in the EAC was that officials operated with little direction from Washington. What orders the delegation did get were often purposefully contrarian and tone-deaf to what the other Allies were proposing. As a result, Winant and his advisors were often forced to follow British and Soviet proposals, which were built on the assumptions of planners in London and Moscow, each with their own view of how the occupation would operate and what the answer to the German

Question ultimately would be. In the case of access to Berlin, the British assumed the zones were administrative only, and the Soviets had no incentive to offer a right-of- access agreement across their zone to the Western allies. The American voices arguing for an access agreement were washed out in an echo chamber by the State Department, the War Department, and the White House. This combination of assumptions and

66 Quoted in Ibid., p. 14. 40 dysfunction would help set the groundwork for the West being marooned on an island in

Berlin in spring 1948.

At the heart of the dysfunction was a territorial dispute between leaders over what constituted military versus political matters. Since the entry of the United States into

World War II, the uniformed heads of the U.S. armed services and civilian leaders in the

War Department had grown accustomed to sweeping authority over how the military forces were organized as well as the strategic direction of the war effort.67 The nature of the war—coalition warfare fought globally and totally—meant that the United States could not plan its strategy in a diplomatic vacuum. As a result, the military and diplomatic corps’ traditional relationship of civil leadership outlining the “what” of foreign policy and the armed forces determining the “how” had become antiquated.

Wartime priorities of crafting an intricate worldwide strategy, defining objectives, and then supplying allies with materiel to execute the war meant military leaders, not diplomats, had close relationships with the British and Soviets. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, contrary to traditional interpretations, clearly understood Clausewitz’s policy and war dictum, and pushed for a detailed politico-military coordination and political judgments based on all facets of the U.S. war effort. For years they had been making political assessments on their own to create their strategic planning. They continued this throughout the war, and because of their expanded wartime influence, their requests and assessments carried weight for the first time.68 To coordinate U.S. strategy and policy

67 Mark A. Stoler, Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), p. vix. See also William Emerson, “Franklin Roosevelt as Commander-in-Chief,” Military Affairs Vol. 22, No. 4 (Winter 1958-59): 181-207. 68 Stoler, Allies and Adversaries, p. xi. 41 with the allies, military leaders enjoyed unprecedented access to the president. The JCS—

Chairman George C. Marshall, Adm. William D. Leahy, Adm. Ernest J. King, Gen. Hap

H. Arnold—regularly advised Roosevelt on war matters, authored his briefing books for the wartime conferences, and traveled with the president to the summits.69

Given that the nation was engaged in a world war, Roosevelt encouraged the radical break from American traditional civil-military relations. It was because of his policies that the service chiefs ascended at the expense of the civilians who served as the secretaries of state, war, and navy. Roosevelt lacked confidence in the State Department, mostly due to his distaste for professional diplomats. He preferred to keep diplomacy within the Oval Office, where he could better steer the ship of state. Doing so would allow him to use his charm, a widely-known quality of his and one in which he often placed too much confidence. His charisma was also an integral component to his management style, and often led him to rely on gentleman’s agreements. Roosevelt’s secretive manner often meant the left hand did not know what the right hand was doing, and led to the Pentagon and Foggy Bottom working at cross purposes.70 In light of

Roosevelt’s political instincts, maintaining rather than ruling out options is not surprising.

He saw the world as a series of solvable problems, and this translated into his preference to operate in the gray areas of verbal promises rather than written ones. Roosevelt often favored allowing a situation to develop, which would permit him to bring his

69 Ibid., p. x. 70 Melvyn Leffler, Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford: Press, 1992), pp. 26-30. 42 improvisational skills to bear and adapt himself to the issue.71 With regard to Germany, this meant he continually delayed any concrete plans for the country, doing so into fall

1944, even though he had been exploring the subject of occupation zones with Churchill and the Combined Chiefs of Staff since spring 1943.72 His view of the EAC, coupled with his taciturn management style, ultimately meant that he never offered policy guidance to Winant, even when he had the opportunity to do so. 73

Roosevelt preferred not to use the EAC as an instrument to influence the postwar.

From the moment of the EAC’s birth, he attempted to temper the influence it had on postwar policy. He was wary of the Commission because of its potential to hem in the

United States, especially when the Allies did not yet occupy Germany.74 To him, the most important part of the EAC was the word in the middle of its title, “Advisory.” He preferred to think that the agreements that came from the Commission were merely avuncular and not binding to Allied policies.75 His military advisors agreed. Admiral

William D. Leahy, whose access to Roosevelt was so complete that he held an office in the White House, advised the president during preparations for the Cairo Conference that the EAC would “mean nothing but trouble for us.”76

71 Frank Costigliola, Roosevelt’s Lost : How Personal Politics Helped Start the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012). 72 For documentation of FDR’s procrastination, see Roosevelt to Hull, October 20, 1944, FRUS. Conference at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 158; for analysis of the Allied discussion of occupation zones, see William M. Franklin, “Zonal Boundaries and Access to Berlin,” World Politics, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Oct. 1963): 2-12. 73 Cornelius Ryan, The Last Battle (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966), p. 150; Eisenberg, Drawing the Line, p. 25. 74 See Roosevelt to Hull, October 20, 1944, FRUS, Conference at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 158-59. 75 Roosevelt to Hull, October 20, 1944, FRUS, Conference at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 158. 76 “Proposed Agenda for President’s Conference with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin,” FRUS, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 260. 43

The little direction that Winant did get about his duties in the EAC came from

Hull, a man who also found himself in the dark about Roosevelt’s plans.77 Indeed,

Roosevelt characterized Hull as “much in the stratosphere.”78 Hull had unknowingly assisted the military in marginalizing the State Department, sticking to the traditional belief that the military would execute the war and the diplomats would guide the peace.

He may not have been preparing for the postwar alongside Roosevelt, but Hull did agree with the president that the EAC’s purview should remain as advisory only. Three weeks before the Commission’s first meeting, Hull sent a telegram to Winant and instructed his ambassador to keep the body’s focus on drawing up surrender terms and control machinery for enemy countries, not debating general political questions for both enemy and liberated territories as the British had hoped. Hull’s rationale was that the EAC should have limited scope and functions. He saw its purpose as only a forum inside which to discuss regional considerations; to invest it with any more power would overlap the authority of a “general organization for the maintenance of peace and security on a world-wide basis,” or the .79

Winant protested. Hull might have been planning to use the United Nations for all postwar issues, but the other Allies were not waiting. The British had already made it patently clear that they intended to follow Eden’s original wish that the EAC should discuss all European matters, and sooner rather than later.80 Particularly, Winant knew

77 For the most recent debate of FDR’s management style and policies, see Justus D. Doenecke and Mark A. Stoler, Debating Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Foreign Policies, 1933-1945 (Lanham, MD.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005). 78 Quoted in Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The and the National Security State (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), p. 57. 79 Hull to Winant, December 23, 1943, FRUS: 1943, I: 812. 80 Winant outlines these British statements to Hull in Winant to Hull, January 6, 1944, FRUS, 1944, I: 8-9. 44 the British Foreign Office’s insistence that the EAC discuss all aspects of postwar policy was not impatience, an attempt to manacle the United States to Europe, or the belief that a regional body should supersede the United Nations. London’s actual desire was to learn what the Soviet Union intended to do with the territories it would occupy.81 On this score,

Winant understood the dynamics within the Grand Alliance better than Hull. It was clear that there was nothing Winant could do to reign in the British from discussing issues other than surrender terms and control machinery for enemy territories. Thus, the

Americans would get left behind in all important conversations about postwar settlements. Another possibility troubled Winant, though. He worried that the Soviets would interpret U.S. relative inaction in the EAC as American indifference. If such an impression was gained, he feared, postwar Anglo-American-Soviet relations could be greatly endangered.82

Winant’s plea did not sway Hull, nor did it do anything for an already troubled relationship between the two men. Hull chastised his ambassador for not following instructions as well as for taking the British view of the EAC.83 The State Department, now reinforced with an unlikely ally in the Joint Chiefs, dug in on their argument that the jurisdiction of the Commission should be limited to drafting provisions that the Allies would impose on Germany and her when she surrendered.

At the heart of the Winant-Hull divide was a difference of perspective as well as long-term versus short-term goals. By virtue of his position, Winant’s scope was

81 Winant to Hull, January 6, 1944, FRUS, 1944, I: 10. 82 Hull to Winant, January 9, 1944, FRUS, 1944, I: 11. 83 Ibid., p. 11. 45 particularly Europe-centric. He understood why the British and Soviets thought it was beneficial to formulate postwar settlements as soon as possible, and he saw U.S. involvement in the EAC as the first step toward American cooperation with the Allies in postwar Europe. Comparatively, Hull’s goals were more global and long-term. As a

Wilsonian, his ultimate objective was the creation of a new and improved League of

Nations, which would serve as the international organization that would maintain peace and security.84 To Hull, postwar European issues fell within the scope of the United

Nations, and the settlement of Germany would be the first great act of a new international body.

More than just protecting the UN’s coming-out party, Hull worried about domestic politics. He saw the possibility of the EAC igniting an isolationist backlash in the United States. The Secretary realized he had to manage domestic perceptions of U.S. policy toward Europe while the war was still raging, which the EAC was making difficult.85 He worried about how the Commission looked to average Americans, as reports from London painting the body as a group of men planning for anything more than surrender terms and control machinery for Germany could appear like the Allies were organizing Europe for a new world order. The specter of the League of Nation drove Hull to protect what was to be the real victory of World War II, the creation of the

United Nations.86

84 Smyser, Yalta to Berlin, p. 6. 85 Steven Casey, Cautious Crusade: Franklin D. Roosevelt, American Public Opinion, and the War Against Nazi Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 162-210. 86 Adam Tooze, The Deluge: The Great War, America and the Remaking of the Global Order, 1916-1931 (New York: Viking, 2014). 46

While Roosevelt and Hull were preoccupied with keeping the EAC merely advisory, the British were attempting to use the Commission as an organ that could collectively guard against the Soviets communizing . 87 By ensuring that the Big Three agreed upon postwar terms in enemy and liberated territories alike, the

British hoped to cement a shared view of the continent before the common goal of defeating Nazi Germany disappeared and the Grand Alliance crumbled. By comparison, the Americans saw the EAC as a wartime placeholder for the eventual United Nations.

U.S. officials also wished to use the Commission to keep the Soviets placated. Planners assumed there was the possibility, after U.S. forces returned home, that German militarism may simmer below the surface only to reemerge. If that were the case, the Red

Army would be the only deterrent to future aggression in Europe.88 As a result, there were incentives for the Americans to cooperate with the Soviets rather than be a provocateur as the British could sometimes be. As for the Soviets, the EAC was a seat at the table of the world powers, a body that held some sway over the future of Europe.89

The Commission was a step in the direction of legitimizing their claims to great power status. Accepting whatever the Western powers offered with little compromise satisfied short-term goals, chief among which was the continuation of aid. Long-term goals could come later.

87 For a recent overview of British postwar strategy, which charts the formation of Britain’s foreign policy in response to Soviet power, see Anne Deighton, “Britain and the Cold War, 1945-1955,” in The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. I, eds. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 112-132. 88 Eisenberg, Drawing the Line, p. 21. 89 For the Soviet view of the Grand Alliance’s survival, see Vladimir O. Petchanov, “The Big Three after World War II: New Documents on Soviet Thinking about Postwar Relations with the United States and Great Britain,” Working Paper no. 13, Cold War International History Project (September 1999). 47

The schism in U.S. civil-military relations and the individual parts that Roosevelt and Hull played in the policymaking apparatus made the United States a spectator in the

Allied settlements of postwar German policy, creating the zonal boundaries as they would be in the Cold War. Ironically, Roosevelt’s attempt at maintaining political flexibility had meant that there was no American adaptability in the EAC. Winant was squeezed from several directions, which affected Berlin. Robert Murphy did confront

Winant in September 1944 about Berlin and the lack of a guarantee for Western transit across the Soviet zone, but there was little the ambassador could do. Negotiations had already concluded and there was little chance that the issue could be opened, especially with France’s entry into the EAC imminent, which, the Big Three’s representatives figured, would mean a complete deadlock in the body.90

These reasons explain only why the United States did not hold much influence over postwar German policy; they do not entirely explain why the postwar occupation of

Germany happened as it did. To be sure, it would be folly to think that the tension over

Berlin could have been averted had only there been a united American front in negotiations over Germany. Agreements made between the Big Three were the product of wartime planning, the confluence of military necessity and national interest. Britain had the most proactive plans, Soviet plans usually responded to those, and the United

States tended to split the difference. The EAC was not a complete failure, but it was the first stumble in quadripartite postwar cooperation. That stumble did not make the failure of four-power control of Germany inevitable, nor did it really portend a confrontation to

90 Harrington, Berlin on the Brink, p. 16. 48 come, as some scholars have argued.91 Allied motivations for Germany’s future did not align during the war, but they never truly did in the postwar either, especially because of the evolution of U.S. policy and objectives. There is therefore no direct, linear path from the EAC’s wartime falters to the Berlin Blockade. The Commission’s importance to the tensions of 1948 was the potential of conflict that it allowed. When the EAC shuttered, its agreements had merely opened the door for future tension. The Soviets still had to identify the Western Powers’ weakness as the best means to their objective, and then walk through that door three years later.

The dysfunction between military and civilian leaders was based on a definitional assumption. Army planners looked at access to Berlin as a military problem because only the garrison was to rely on the Autobahn for supplies; civilians were to get their food from the territory around Berlin, as they always had. The problem was that the Soviet

Union chafed at the notion that their occupation zone would have to provide for people who were under the administration of the United States, Britain, and France. In hindsight, the army hand-slapping against, as they saw it, diplomatic interference into military affairs was unnecessarily territorial. Moreover, it was illustrative of a perplexing question that no American had an answer to in 1945: When does a war end and peace begin? The

British and Soviets, by contrast, had little problem connecting wartime diplomacy with postwar planning.

There is a final, simple reason why the securing of an access agreement for Berlin did not overcome territorial disputes within the U.S. policy-making establishment and

91 Edward J.F. Thomas, “The European Advisory Commission and Allied Planning for A Defeated Germany, 1943-1945” (dissertation, American University, 1981). 49 differing national conceptions of the occupation. Berlin was unimportant to the British and Americans in 1945. It had no , it was not a industrial center, nor did it have access to the sea. It was merely a symbolic capital, with an equally symbolic quadripartite occupation to match, and there was little reason to fight over it.

Military Policy and the German Question

The man entrusted with making quadripartite control in Germany work was a career soldier, a short, quiet but energetic chain-smoker whose aquiline nose made him, as his British counterpart put it, appear like a Roman emperor.92 Few of his contemporaries would disagree that Lucius D. Clay, the deputy military governor of the

U.S. occupation zone, was a new-age proconsul. Ironically, a man who had never voted in his life was tasked with building a democracy.93 When Clay first arrived in Berlin on

June 5, 1945, the desolation he saw lessened the exultation he felt about the Allied victory. With the exception of a brief stint in Cherbourg, France in summer 1944, he had spent four years waging the war from afar, troubleshooting procurement and logistical problems in Washington. He had been given his military government position without much warning in March 1945. On April 7, 1945, he arrived in Paris to begin planning with the U.S. Group Control Council, the several-hundred strong team of officers and civilians that prepared for the military government takeover of Germany exclusive from the EAC. Only five days later, Roosevelt was dead.94 On paper, Clay was the second-in-

92 Jean Edward Smith, Lucius D. Clay: An American Life (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1990), p. 9. 93 Lucius Clay, “Proconsul of a People, by Another People, for Both Peoples,” in Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and , 1944-1952, ed., Robert Wolfe (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), p. 104. 94 Joseph Lelyveld , His Final Battle: The Last Months of Franklin Roosevelt (New York: Vintage, 2017). 50 command of the occupation, deputy to Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary

Force, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower. The title of Military Governor was merely titular for

Eisenhower; it was Clay who did much of the heavy lifting in policymaking. Apart from

JCS directives, he enjoyed near-total freedom over occupation decisions, which illustrated the trust that Eisenhower and government officials in Washington placed in him.95

Only two months after arriving in Europe, Clay was standing where the war in

Europe had ended. As a Southerner born in Marietta, Georgia in 1897, he may have been sympathetic to the plight of the Germans but he downplayed such notions later in life.96

Still, looking around Berlin, Clay realized that of victory in the war was an almost complete degradation of humanity, and he vowed to “never forget that we were responsible for the government of human beings.”97 He also saw in Berlin how much work was in store for him and his military government, both in rebuilding Germany and in cooperating with allies.98

Joining Clay in the city on June 5 was Eisenhower and Robert Murphy, the ranking State Department official in Germany and liaison to the military. The trio was in

Berlin to finally meet up with their British, French, and Soviet counterparts, thus signaling the first preparatory meeting of the EAC’s brainchild, the Allied Control

Authority. That day, the four commanders in chief– Eisenhower, Field Marshal Sir

95 John H. Backer, Winds of History: The German Years of Lucius DuBignon Clay (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1983), pp. 3-20. 96 Smith, Lucius D. Clay, p. 6. 97 Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 21. 98 Lucius Clay interview by Jean Smith, February 5, 1971, Oral History Project, DDEL. 51

Bernard Montgomery, Marshal Grigori Zhukov, and General Jean de Lattre de

Tassigny—signed three documents the EAC had prepared. The first was the Berlin

Declaration, which confirmed the total defeat of Nazi Germany and the abolishment of the regime’s governance of the nation, since the instrument of surrender signed on May 7,

1945 in Reims constituted only the defeat of the armed forces, not the German government. The second document divided the country into four zones of occupation and provided for the joint occupation of Berlin. The third established the control machinery that the EAC had built to carry out the occupation.99 Crucially, Zhukov refused to install the Allied Control Authority in Berlin, even though all had agreed to establish it only minutes before, until the Western Powers removed their troops from the Soviet zone.100

Until then, Germany was divided but it did not have a government. Moreover, the

Western Allies could not take over their sectors in Berlin, and the control machinery and policy that the Big Three had been negotiating for a year could not be applied.

Eisenhower, Clay, and Murphy urged Roosevelt’s successor, Harry Truman, to begin the withdrawal.101 Clay used Harry Hopkins, one of his Capitol Hill bosses during the interwar years, as his messenger. Hopkins was returning to the United States from

Moscow, where he had met with Stalin to set the groundwork for the Potsdam

Conference, which would begin the next month.102 In the message that Clay drafted and

99 Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme Authority by the Allied Powers; Allied Statement on Zones of Occupation in Germany and the Occupation of “Greater Berlin”; Allied Statement on Control Machinery in Germany and “Greater Berlin,” June 5, 1945, all in: Documents on Germany, 1944-1985 (Washington, DC: Department of State Publication, 1985), pp. 33-40. 100 Cable, Murphy to Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, June 6, 1945, FRUS, 1945, III: 328. 101 Harrington, Berlin on the Brink, p. 18. Cable, Eisenhower to Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 6, 1945, FRUS, 1945, III: 328-29. Cable, Murphy to Stettinus, June 6, 1945, FRUS, 1945, III: 330-32. 102 For the Clay-Hopkins relationship, see Smith, Clay Papers, Vol. I: xxxi. 52

Hopkins sent to Truman, he argued the U.S. government should make a condition to a

June 21 withdrawal that the respective commanders would agree to allow Western Allied troops move simultaneously to Berlin, “which would provide us with unrestricted access to our Berlin area from and by air, rail, and highway on agreed routes.”103 Truman and Churchill used Clay’s language in their offers to Stalin to conduct the withdrawal on June 21.104 When Stalin replied on June 16, he dragged his feet on the exchange, citing Zhukov and his generals’ presence in Moscow for a session of the

Supreme Soviet and a parade. Moreover, he assured Truman, mine-clearing operations in

Berlin were not yet complete, so the Western garrisons would have to wait until July 1 to enter the city.105 Stalin’s silence on the access request was not met with alarm in

Washington, nor was it unnoticed. Marshall instructed Eisenhower and Chief of the U.S.

Military Mission to Moscow, Maj. Gen. John R. Deane, to discuss the issue with the

Soviets. The Soviet Staff then informed the Americans that Zhukov would discuss the issue with Eisenhower on June 29.106

Truman and Eisenhower accepted Stalin’s date change, but they insisted advance elements of the military governments be allowed to enter Berlin to prepare for the

Potsdam Conference.107 They consequently received permission and the nucleus of

103 Cable, Hopkins to George Marshall for Truman, June 8, 1945, Clay Papers, Vol. I: 21. 104 Cable, Truman to Stalin, June 14, 1945; and Cable, Churchill to Truman with message to Stalin attached, June 15, 1945, both in: FRUS, 1945, III: 135-7. 105 Cable, Stalin to Truman, June 16, 1945, FRUS, 1945, III: 137. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman: Vol. I, Year of Decisions (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1955), pp. 303-05; Winston Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1953), pp. 605-08. Harrington, Berlin on the Brink, p. 18. 106 Smith, Defense of Berlin, p. 81-82. 107 Cable, Murphy to Director of European Affairs H. Freeman Matthews, June 15, 1945, FRUS, Conference of Berlin, 1945, I: 100. Cable, Churchill to Truman with enclosure of Churchill message to 53

Headquarters, Berlin District, under the command of Maj. Gen. Floyd Parks, set off for the city on June 22.108 Leading the convoy was Parks deputy and director of military government, Col. Frank Howley.

At Dessau, the Soviets stopped Howley’s convoy to count the number of men and vehicles he had, making sure it did not exceed the amount the Allies had agreed upon in their negotiations in Moscow: 50 trucks, 50 officers, and 175 enlisted men.109 Owing to unclear instructions from Parks, Howley had brought along his military government detachment with the ground force that was to prepare for the U.S. delegation at Potsdam, leading to an argument that lasted seven hours and a successive list of higher-ranking

Soviet officers, topping out at a three-star general. Relenting, Howley sent back his military government detachment and proceeded to Berlin with the stipulated amount.110

When the convoy did link up with Parks at , who was already there because the Soviets allowed him to fly in, they found themselves quarantined in their compound under the watchful eye of the NKVD. On June 26, Howley saw five of the six boroughs in the U.S. sector, only because he took advantage of a permitted trip to

Airport and the ignorance of his NKVD minder’s knowledge of Berlin streets.111

On June 29, Clay and his British counterpart, Lt. Gen. Sir Ronald Weeks, met

Zhukov to settle the issue of Berlin access from the June 5 conference. It would turn out

Stalin, June 17, 1945, and Cable, Truman to Stalin, June 18, 1945, both in: FRUS, Conference of Berlin, 1945, I: 106-07. 108 Cable, Churchill to Truman with enclosure of Churchill message to Stalin, June 17, 1945, and Cable, Truman to Stalin, June 18, 1945, both in: FRUS, Conference of Berlin, 1945, I: 106-07. 109 Harrington, Berlin on the Brink, p. 18. 110 Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, pp. 298-99. Howley, Berlin Command, p. 28- 32. Harrington, Berlin on the Brink, 18. 111 John J. Maginnis, Military Government Journal: Normandy to Berlin (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1971), pp. 257-59. 54 to be a fateful meeting. After complaining about Clay’s estimate that it would take nine days to evacuate all 16,400 square miles of the Soviet zone, Zhukov stipulated the

Western Powers could not bring their main forces to Berlin until the movement was complete. As a compromise, Clay guaranteed the evacuation would finish by midnight on

July 4. Zhukov’s position on access was just as frosty. The Americans and British requested two highways, three rail lines, and two air corridors from Berlin to Frankfurt and . Zhukov reasoned that one highway—the Berlin--

Autobahn—one rail line, and one air corridor would be enough for the 50,000 soldiers the

Western Allies said would make up their garrisons, and would not create administrative problems for the Soviet zone. Clay agreed, but stipulated that the ACC should be able to discuss the question of access rights once it was installed, to which Zhukov intimated that his generosity could be reversed.112

Neither side saw the decisions made on June 29 as permanent.113 As in the EAC,

Clay did not believe sparring with the Soviets was worthwhile or necessary. Of overriding concern was Allied cooperation generally and getting the ACC operational specifically.114 The wartime allies had yet to see each other enemies, and Berlin was not a vital position to the West. Only in hindsight would commentators criticize Clay’s lack of an access agreement—Clay included—but that assumes two things: that he could have

112 Notes of Conference, Clay, Weeks, Parks, June 29, 1945, FRUS, 1945, III: 353-61. Ziemke, U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, pp. 300-01. Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, p. 262. 113 Clay, Decision in Germany, pp. 24–27. Truman, Year of Decisions, pp. 306–307. 114 Ziemke, U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, pp. 300-01. 55 predicted future antagonism, and that a legal agreement could somehow nullify geographical and political realities.115

On July 1, Howley led his detachment to Berlin. He arrived without incident, and the Soviets informed him that he could move to his six boroughs— , ,

Tempelhof, Schoeneberg, , and Neukoelln—on July 4. In the meantime, the main force of the U.S. garrison, made up of the 2nd Armored Division and the First

Airborne Army, also headed for the city. Both Howley and the garrison force ran into

Soviet obfuscation: the armored and airborne columns were rerouted and only a portion arrived for the occupation ceremony the next day, and the military government detachment was told they could not occupy their sector until the Kommandatura was operational. The next day, the Soviets woke to find the Americans in their six boroughs, with the American flag flying and ordinances posted.116 On July 7, the ACC created the

Kommandatura, allowing the British the Allied structures necessary to administer their

800,000 inhabitants, and the British their 900,000.117

Ten days later, the Allied leaders met in the southwest corner of Berlin. The

Potsdam Conference, of all the summits, did the most to lead to Allied dysfunction in the

ACC. Stalin had dipped once again into the well of Berlin’s symbolic importance when he chose the Prussian royalty’s lake town playground as the location of the .

Meetings were held in the last Hohenzollern palace, Schloss Cecilienhof. Between July

17 and August 2, the Big Three dealt with the buck that Yalta had passed. They may have

115 Harrington, Berlin on the Brink, pp. 19-21. Smith, Lucius D. Clay, 265-76. 116 Henrik Bering, Outpost Berlin: The History of the American Military Forces in Berlin, 1945-1994 (: Edition Q, 1995), pp. 1-10. 117 Howley, Berlin Command, pp. 42-49. Ziemke, U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, pp. 301-03. 56 agreed to keep Germany whole back in February, but deciding how to administer it as one unit was another question in July. The conference was therefore a critical test of

Allied harmony. With the specter of Hitler now gone and a common goal no longer connecting them, the Grand Alliance found it was increasingly difficult to postpone key decisions.

With respect to Germany, Potsdam dealt with fundamental questions of economics: reparations, exports and imports, and currency reform. The decisions made there would have an impact on the eventual crisis in Berlin three years later. At Potsdam, the primary U.S. actor was James Byrnes, the newly-appointed secretary of state and former congressman, senator, Supreme Court justice, and wartime director of mobilization, where he had been another one of Clay’s bosses. Given his and Truman’s collegial relationships in the Senate, Byrnes had become the new president’s confidant and selected expert on inter-allied relations, particularly because of his experience on the

American delegation at Yalta.118 He had already concluded that Germany likely would have to be split into two parts, between east and west. He had come to the conclusion after Stalin advocated at the for pushing ’s borders west to the

Oder River to compensate for territory the Soviets had taken from the eastern parts of the country, a move that engendered a noticeable anti-Moscow bias amongst American officials, and a vow from Truman to stop the backsliding relations.119 The move need not

118 Leffler, Preponderance of Power, p. 27; Robert L. Messer, The End of an Alliance: James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman, and the Origins of the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University Press of North Carolina, 1982), pp. 31-70; Harry S. Truman, Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman, ed. Robert H. Ferrell (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), pp. 16-18. 119 For the best look at the internecine battle within the State Department and its role in confused U.S. policy, see John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York: 57 have surprised him, since disputes over Soviet territorial demands, the right of smaller nations to self-determination, and the balance of power in Europe had always been present in the Grand Alliance.120 The creation of Moscow’s much-coveted security buffer meant that spheres of influence had returned to European politics, a reality that Byrnes did not bemoan. Even Secretary of War Henry Stimson had come to the same east-west conclusion as Byrnes, but for economic reasons. During Potsdam, he reported to Truman in a memorandum that the Soviets were ravaging their zone to such an extent—a degree to which Stimson dubbed “oriental”—that the United States and Britain would be forced to “preserve the economy in western Germany” to “avoid conditions in our areas” that domestic opinion would not tolerate.121

Moscow’s reparations had already been massive. Since May, eastern Germany had been the Soviet Union’s shopping center. As recompense for the German invasion, the Red Army had institutionalized looting, allowing their soldiers to take whatever piqued their interest. The Soviet state was more interested in German industry, leading to the dismantling of entire factories, most of which lay at rail yards rusting in the open air waiting for transport east. The extractive policy had created a problem for the western powers, as Stimson reported at Potsdam. If Germany was to be administered as a single economic unit, Soviet rapaciousness in its zone directly affected the American, British, and French territories. This struck at the heart of a fundamental divide between differing

Columbia University Press, 1972), pp. 230-31. For discussion of the anti-Soviet contingent in the State Department, see Yergin, Shattered Peace, pp. 17-41. 120 Steven Merritt Miner, Between Churchill and Stalin: The Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the Origins of the Grand Alliance (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988). 121 Memorandum Secretary of War Stimson to President Truman, July 22, 1945, FRUS, Potsdam, II: 808- 09. 58 conceptions of German reconstruction.122 Byrnes repeatedly referred to the western territories of Germany as “our zone.”123 Under Byrnes’ assumptions, Germany would be divided into two economic units, trading as if they were foreign countries. Such thinking meant that the United States was beginning to choose a prosperous Western Europe over a reunited Germany. A weak Germany was a small price to pay for a strong and self- sustaining continent, one that would be resistant to Communist influence.124

Potsdam was a crucial moment for U.S. postwar policy because it allowed the chance to coordinate the long-term Allied approach to Germany. For a year, debates in

Washington had led it to pursue competing policies by the end of the war, one based on the idea of punishing Germany and ensuring that she would never again wage war, and the other serving long-term American interests of stabilizing Germany and rehabilitating it to allow the United States to disengage as quickly as possible. Privately, Roosevelt, who considered himself knowledgeable about Germany’s character because of time he spent there as a young man, had been more inclined to the latter, initially preferring a

Carthaginian peace.125 Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr. shared his views and proposed an unambiguously titled plan, “Program to Prevent Germany from Starting a

122 Naimark, Russians in Germany, pp. 141-204. 123 See Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, p. 26. For his examples, see Potsdam conference, foreign ministers’ meeting, July 30, 1945, FRUS Potsdam, II: 485, 487, 488, 491; and Clayton to Byrnes, July 29, 1945, ibid., p. 901. 124 Frank Ninkovich, Germany and the United States: The Transformation of the German Question Since 1945 (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1995), p. 61. For a contrary view on Potsdam as a march toward the Cold War, see Michael Neiberg, Potsdam: The End of World War II and the Remaking of Europe (New York: Basic Books, 2015). 125 For Roosevelt’s self-styled expert knowledge on Germany, see Ninkovich, Germany and the United States, p. 21; Michael Beschloss, The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman and the Destruction of Hitler’s Germany, 1941-1945 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), pp. 9-10. For Roosevelt’s views on a , see Eisenberg, Drawing the Line, p. 20; Robert Dallek, Franklin Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 438. 59

World War III.” Broadly, it called for demobilization, , and restitution, but in practice, Morgenthau wanted to make the country “pastoral in character.”126 It was more of an attitude than a plan, however.127 Still, Morgenthau’s view had found its way into occupation policy by fall 1944 in the form of JCS 1067. The directive was based on the belief that Germany was to be treated as a defeated nation, not a liberated one, and was therefore a toned-down version of the .128

Internationalists in Washington, among them Stimson, Assistant Secretary of War

John J. McCloy, and to a lesser extent Hull, all took economic from World War I and held the traditional American liberal view of war as a struggle of philosophies rather than one of cultures.129 McCloy charged Morgenthau with being “utterly innocent of any realization of the extent and complexity of the problem.”130 This group of reconstructionsts believed that turmoil in the world economy led to conflict in 1939, all of which was a product of the overly-aggressive settlement of the last war. To prevent future destruction, they believed that the European market should be integrated and the free movement of goods and capital made easier, thereby diminishing economic rivalries and with it nationalistic antagonisms.131 In this reconstruction plan, Germany as a whole,

126 John Morton Blum, ed., Morgenthau Diaries: Years of War (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), pp. 371-72. Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Germany is Our Problem (New York: Harper & , 1945). 127 Ninkovich, Germany and the United States, p. 22. 128 Ziemke, U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, p. 102. Gaddis, Origins of the Cold War, 95-103. 129 Ninkovich, Germany and the United States, p. 22. 130 Letter, McCloy to Eisenhower, October 25, 1944, “Memo and Correspondence from JJH to Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower 1942 Mar 21 – 1945 Nov 24” folder, box WD1, War Department Series, Correspondence Files, John J. McCloy Papers, Amherst College Library. 131 William I. Hitchcock, France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), p. 42. 60 not dismembered portions of the country, would bring Europe out of its economic doldrums.

At Potsdam, Truman put an end to Morgenthau’s plan, which he viewed as “an act of revenge.” His position put him on the side of McCloy, who was already pleased with Truman’s “remarkable decisiveness and capacity.” 132 The promptness of his decision making was on display when, before heading to Potsdam, Truman asked

Morgenthau for his resignation.133 The Allies might have attempted to construct a different Germany at Potsdam, but their program of denazification, disarmament, demilitarization, and democratization was more about destroying a legacy than building a future.134 Like Yalta, Potsdam had failed to settle the issue of a long-term solution. When the Four Powers had settled into their occupation zones and sectors, the structure of

Allied interaction was set, but the lack of defining anything beyond control machinery for

Germany produced considerable friction between them, and Berlin slowly transformed from the Allies’ forum for solving administrative problems into a battlefield over the

German Question.135

In the immediate wake of Potsdam, U.S. officials worried that unilateral actions in the Western zones would, from Moscow, appear as a lack of confidence in quadripartite arrangements and thus an acceptance of Germany’s permanent division.136 There was an

132 Letter, McCloy to Eisenhower, April 27, 1945, “Memo and Correspondence from JJH to Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower 1942 Mar 21 – 1945 Nov 24” folder, box WD1, War Department Series, Correspondence Files, John J. McCloy Papers, Amherst College Library. 133 Gaddis, United States and the Origins of the Cold War, p. 238. 134 Konrad H. Jarausch, After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). 135 John Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945-1949 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968). Hudson, Army Diplomacy, pp. 157-200. 136 Gaddis, United States and the Origins of the Cold War, pp. 238-42. 61 assumption that unilateral actions would undermine the autonomy of each other’s zones.

Of course, this need not have been a problem if all powers had observed the spirit of the

EAC’s plans, which was the administration of Germany as a single unit. Yet growing obstructionism, pettiness, and miscommunication between the allies had turned what was supposed to be a quick occupation into an indefinite one. It was inescapable that the agreements made at Potsdam were the sticking points in the ACC: setting reparation targets but being unclear about where it all was to come from, disagreement over German economic integration, French pettiness over not being invited to Potsdam. Crucial for

Stalin, he had gotten the security buffer he desired.137 The problem was that there was no longer a common enemy between East and West, which meant decades-old suspicions of one another crept to the forefront.138 Brynes’ untethering of the Soviets to do as they pleased in their own zone also occurred while Clay was attempting to pull the Soviets closer in line with the other allies. The difficulty in Germany lay in how the Grand

Alliance could achieve joint objectives without surrendering exclusive control of their respective zones.

Clay had to overcome the dysfunction in Washington between soldiers, diplomats, and statesmen to achieve the objective he was given. His intellect and managerial skills overcame those problems, but he could not induce stubborn allies to interpret the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements as he did. His Rooseveltian optimism for a new postwar Europe

137 Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 20-22. Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-67 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), pp. 390-92. 138 Melvyn P. Leffler, The Specter of Communism: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917-1953 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994). 62 ignored the deep, ingrained historical lessons that his allies had taken from years of war.

French leaders had little confidence in the probability of their neighbor rehabilitating.139

Britain was wary of what the Soviets would do next.140 The Soviets were skeptical of everyone else’s motives, illustrative of how Stalin’s paranoia increasingly infected his advisors.141 U.S. possession of an atomic bomb only intensified this mistrust.142 Clay pushed on anyway in a dogged attempt to end the military occupation as quickly as possible, which would incite a distrustful Moscow to dig in its heels in the quadripartite bodies and raise tension in Berlin.143 His view highlighted the debate not yet concluded in

U.S. decision making circles about how best to stabilize Europe: Was it to keep a long- term American military presence in Europe, or merely create the conditions for

Europeans to take care of containing the Soviets and Germans themselves?144

The cumulative effect of vague ends for Germany, loosely-defined administrative arrangements, and crucial mistakes made during the planning for the occupation would unintentionally divide Germany and set Berlin adrift in a communist sea.

Counterintuitively, the conflict over the city later would have little to do with the city itself. The structures created in 1943-1945 would endure. Given the often-uncoordinated way in which they were built, the structure of the occupation did not deserve the

139 Frédéric Bozo, French Foreign Policy since 1945: An Introduction (New York: Berghahn Books, 2016). 140 Michael F. Hopkins, Michael D. Kandiah, Gillian Staerck, eds., Cold War Britain 1945-1964: New Perspectives (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 141 Yoram Gorlizki and Oleg Khlevniuk, Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945-1953 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). 142 Campbell Craig and Sergey S Radchenko, The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War (New Haven: Press, 2008). 143 Smith, Lucius D. Clay, pp. 277-95. Clay, Decision in Germany, pp. 37-83. 144 James McAllister, No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943-1954 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), pp. 1-73. 63 canonization that officials would grant it later. The last years of the war and into the occupation were a period of immense disagreement, despite the flush of victory.

Disagreement would reign between the wartime allies and inside national camps, and that would turn an afterthought of a city into the capital of a cold war.

64

CHAPTER 2: THE FIRST CRISIS

Germany had brought the Four Powers together in war, but it tore them apart in peace. Few officials who drafted the occupation agreements in 1944-45 could have anticipated how far relations would sour by 1948. At the heart of the tension was the inability to find a solution to the German Question. Disagreements over what to do with the defeated nation slowly led to East and West pursuing their own policies, thereby transforming what were intended as temporary borders into the front lines of a cold war.

As a consequence, the U.S. Army found itself planning not how to occupy Germany but how to defend it. Their biggest challenge was what to do with their most vulnerable position in Europe, three Western garrisons of five battalions trapped out of reach inside

Soviet-occupied territory and surrounded by four Red Army divisions.

This chapter examines how Berlin became integrated into U.S. policy and strategy for Europe during the Cold War. It does not purport to be a new narrative on the blockade and airlift, nor is it a study in crisis management, both of which already have an extensive literature.145 As a consequence, it does not concern itself with the intricacies of the events that occurred after July 1948—that is, the U.S. Air Force’s achievements, the integration of Berlin politics into the East-West competition, the State Department and White

House’s attempts at diplomacy, and the settlement of the crisis in the United Nations. It

145 For studies on the blockade and airlift, see Roger G. Miller, To Save a City: The Berlin Airlift, 1948- 1949 (College Station, TX.: Texas A&M University Press, 2000); Daniel F. Harrington, Berlin on the Brink: The Blockade, The Airlift, and the Early Cold War (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2012); For studies on Berlin crisis management, see W. Philips Davison, Berlin Blockade: A Study in Cold War Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1958); Avi Shlaim, The United States and the Berlin Blockade: A Study in Crisis Decision-Making (Berkely: University of California Press, 1989). For narrative histories of the crisis in Berlin, see John and Ann Tusa, The Berlin Airlift (New York: Atheneum, 1988); Richard Reeves, Daring Young Men: The Heroism and Triumph of the Berlin Airlift, June 1948-May 1949 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011). 65 seeks instead to answer why and how, despite the inherent risks, the United States committed itself to Berlin in 1948, thereby establishing the strategic rationale for maintaining that position throughout the Cold War. It does so by examining the intersection of the politico-military worlds, particularly the close relationship between

U.S. Army commands in Europe, the Pentagon, State Department, and White House, and highlights their debates involving risk assessment and strategy formation.

This chapter argues that Berlin became the defensive complement to the Marshall

Plan’s economic statement that the United States would not only remain in Europe but attempt to contain Soviet political expansion. Despite the risks of staying in Berlin, there was no fundamental debate within the U.S. national security establishment about tying the city to European recovery. The debates that did happen revolved around more practical questions of how the garrisons in the Western sector would be supplied, if dependents should be evacuated, and the likelihood of triggering a war with the Soviets.

No discussion was more important than whether the West should cut its losses and evacuate Berlin altogether. On that score, U.S. military and civilian officials overwhelmingly advocated for a retreat to the safety of the occupation zone. Political considerations outstripped military concerns, however, and the statement of remaining in the city despite the risk was more important than devising a way to make it work. Lucius

Clay was instrumental in this discussion, framing Berlin as a fight for Europe’s future.

His role in forming how the United States would approach Germany, and consequently the Soviet Union, would transform Berlin into the West’s Cold War outpost. The sparring over Berlin in 1948-49 was therefore a fight, not crisis management. Those officials who 66 saw it as such believed war could erupt but was unlikely to, and therefore spent their efforts not trying to avert one but finding ways to wage a new type of conflict.

Prelude to Tension in Berlin

Tension between the Four Powers did not spontaneously erupt in summer 1948.

For three years, East and West maneuvered into what would become their respective positions in the coming Cold War. Chief among the disagreements was the question of what to do with Germany’s economy. It was a stormy issue that had been at the center of

Allied discontent since Potsdam. Britain and the United States agreed that the German economy was the key to European recovery. Without it, they believed, the continent would descend further into chaos, possibly even taking the victors with it. The French, who were more determined than the British to remember the recent past, feared a unified, robust Germany more than a thoroughly-collapsed Europe. The Soviets agreed with

Paris, and believed whoever harnessed German productive potential could use it as a weapon. Stalin might not have coveted that military weapon for himself after the war, but his distrust of capitalists assured him that the West would. 146

In January 1947, Britain and the United States combined their zones to form what became known as Bizonia. To Moscow’s chagrin, the merger cut off Germany’s industrial regions from the rest of the country, giving the West a monopoly on the ’s economic potential. Economic grievances gave way to political sparring. The emerging political competition between the Americans and Soviets transformed how both sides interacted with Germany, as it transitioned from a place to occupy to one to protect.

146 Hitchcock, France Restored, pp. 42-44; John W. Young, France, the Cold War and the Western Alliance, 1944-1949 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), p. 26; Smyser, Yalta to Berlin, p. 67. 67

Byrnes made the American case on September 6, 1946, in , where he repudiated the Morgenthau Plan and assured Germans that the United States, along with its military power, would stay as long as necessary.147 The speech buoyed Clay, who told his old boss that “every word” he spoke at Stuttgart “became a part of my ‘Bible’ for

Germany.”148

Incrementally, four-power cooperation eroded in Germany, as the acrimony that existed between the foreign ministers found its way into the Allied Control Council and

Kommandatura. Byrnes’ successor, George Marshall, arrived in Moscow at the foreign ministers’ meeting in March 1947 with the hope of finding a solution to economic problems plaguing the administration of Germany. Discussions bogged down on the same problems that had doomed previous attempts at compromise, however. With the specter of potential economic collapse, the Americans were in a hurry to conclude an agreement.

By contrast, Stalin could afford to be patient, since each passing day made Germany’s economy potentially weaker. Confident that history was on his side, he patronizingly told

Marshall at a meeting during the Moscow Conference to “have patience and not become depressed.”149 It was in this light that the United States unveiled the European Recovery

Act, a plan that signaled the importance of economic recovery of Europe over

147 U.S. officials in Germany knew the change was coming for a month. See Memorandum, Murphy to Clay and Gen. McNarney, August 10, 1946, “German Policy” folder, box 2, Correspondence File, Lucius D. Clay Personal Papers, Entry UD-3550, RG 200, United States National Archives, College Park (hereafter NARA). 148 J. F. Byrnes, “Restatement of Policy on Germany (September 6, 1946),” in Beate Ruhm von Oppen, ed., Documents on Germany under Occupation, 1945-1954 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 52-60; Letter, Clay to Byrnes, May 11, 1947, in Jean Edward Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, Germany 1945-1949 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), Vol. I: 351 (hereafter cited as Clay Papers). 149 Memoranda of Conversation, April 15, 1947, FRUS, 1947, II: 344. 68 cooperation with the Soviets in Germany.150 The kept in line with the

West’s already declared economic blueprint for Europe and formalized Germany’s relation to Western Europe. Stalin ensured that the dividing line between East and West was even more pronounced when he forbade Bloc countries from accepting funds.

Simultaneously, Washington began articulating a new American stance in the world. In a joint session of Congress on March 12, Truman reoriented U.S. foreign policy, unveiling a plan to use American economic, military, and political power to assist democratic nations under siege. His targets were communist movements in Greece and

Turkey, but the general tenor of the made it clear that the United States would not expect local issues to be resolved only regionally. By July, Truman addressed the changing nature of war, when Congress passed a reorganization of the defense establishment with the National Security Act, meant to better prepare the United States to act quickly in the face of potential conflict. The same month, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered the military change its occupation policy with JCS 1779, thus superseding JCS

1067. The occupation now understood that an “orderly, prosperous Europe requires the economic contributions of a stable and productive Germany.” Clay’s job was to foster the economy’s growth, not impede it along Morgenthau Plan lines.151 The cumulative effect of the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, National Security Act, and JCS 1779 was that the

United States had sent a message about its intentions: they would stay in Europe to stabilize the continent, and Germany would be the economic engine of recovery.

150 Ninkovich, Germany and the United States, p. 60. 151 For the text of JCS 1779, see U.S. Department of State, Documents on Germany, 1947-1949: The Story in Documents (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 33-41. 69

For Stalin, the trends in the West throughout 1947 were discomforting. By early

1948, though, they were downright alarming. On February 23, representatives from

Britain, France, the United States, and the Benelux countries first met in London to discuss the three western zones’ integration into the Marshall Plan. The most important outcome of the London Recommendations—later to become the London Agreements— was the establishment of a provisional, federal West German government, albeit one that was not sovereign. The occupying powers would still control the territory, as well as

Germany’s military and foreign policy. The West contended that the government was to incorporate the western states into the international community, and set the basis for

German reunification. The underlying message was the death of Four Power control of the country.152 Western officials knew their recent moves were provocative, and they worried how the Soviets might react. If Stalin launched an invasion of western Germany to stop the London Agreements’ implementation, it could mean a potential Red Army rout of the entire continent before the West could shore up its defenses.153

After three years of wrangling over how to rebuild Germany, the Four Powers had each concluded that keeping what they had was preferable to reuniting the component parts. The Soviet Union, some scholars have contended, believed the split was unnecessary. 154 After all, Stalin preferred a united Germany, and would even allow it to be capitalist. The realist in Stalin understood that a unified country would allow him to

152 Ninkovich, Germany and the United States, pp. 61-62 153 Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, pp. 78-79. 154 See, for example, Wilfried Loth, Stalin’s Unwanted Child: The German Question and the Founding of the GDR, trans. Robert F. Hogg (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), pp. 7-12; Smyser, Yalta to Berlin, p. 32. 70 maintain influence as well as access to the important resources in the areas that he did not control. His actions, however, reveal he could not fully make that bargain. Assuming that

Stalin’s representatives in the quadripartite bodies spoke for him, he wanted to solidify the lines that separated the zones and sectors, not make them invisible. In economics, the

Soviets handicapped production and impeded the creation of a unified German economy.

In politics, they tampered with the electoral process in contravention of Allied agreements, forcibly uniting the socialist and communist parties only for Germans to reject the new union at the polls. In the press, they encouraged their licensed newspapers to highlight the increasing difficulties between the Four Powers, again in breach of agreements. The police force for Berlin was never consolidated. Food distribution was compartmentalized. Disagreements even raged over how to unify the postal service.155

Stalin’s overriding goal had been to protect the Soviet Union from future aggression. He set out to work within the postwar framework to achieve that objective, but when he perceived his allies as being too eager to resurrect Germany, he believed it was better to hold on to at least part of the country than lose control of all of it. While the

West wanted to end the occupation as quickly as possible, Stalin needed it to have an indefinite conclusion. He was aware that a mutual withdrawal from Germany would likely mean he would have to retreat from Central and Eastern Europe. If that was to happen, those nations would orient themselves west, looking to U.S. funds to reinvigorate their destroyed economies. With Western money would come competing political

155 Howley, Berlin Command, pp. 77-134. For the meeting minutes, see “Quadripartite Kommandatura Stenographic Minutes” Commandants 1948” folder, box 7, OMGUS Records of the Berlin Sector, Records of the Director’s Office, Entry A1-1152, RG 260, NARA. 71 systems. Indefinite indecision on the German Question, therefore, was Moscow’s best option to mitigate losing wartime gains, and thus their security buffer.156 For all of

Stalin’s efforts to kill one enemy in 1945, it looked like three more had taken its place by

1947.

For the Western powers, Germany’s division was not ideal but seemed to be the only option to save Europe.157 British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin hoped for unification, but his fear of Soviet domination of the continent and his problem of a dwindling bank account led him to believe that division was the better gambit. To save

Western unity, politically and economically, Truman sacrificed eastern Germany and all lands beyond it by default. France got its wish of a divided Germany, but that division, ironically, now meant that they were their old enemy’s protector. Despite how it appeared, Germany’s post-London Agreement fate was not dismemberment. The country had been divided since the occupying armies took their positions in their respective zones in summer 1945. Since then, each power had governed their territories independent of the others. The London Agreements instead signaled the entrenchment of a preexisting arrangement and the death of the assumption of a settlement. In a twist of irony,

Germany, or at least the western half of it, was more unified in February 1948 than it had been since the war. Western Europe, too, had its best prospects for recovery, and cooperation between neighbors was on the rise. If there would be a price to pay for those

156 Zubok, Failed Empire, pp. 66-67. 157 Carolyn Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-1949 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 72 bright spots, no Western official knew. They did know, however, where in Germany they were the most vulnerable to a Soviet response.

In late spring 1947, U.S. Army officials on both sides of the Atlantic already had begun planning for a Soviet invasion of Europe. The same month that the United States unveiled the Marshall Plan, Clay’s office in Berlin, in conjunction with Maj. Gen.

Clarence Huebner’s European Command (EUCOM) in Frankfurt and Maj. Gen. Lauris

Norstad’s Plans and Operations Division in the Pentagon, started forming contingencies.158 EUCOM initially took the lead and assumed that the Red Army would attack the British and Americans simultaneously if Moscow did want war. Clay hoped for such a scenario, as he was more worried about the consequences of the Soviets focusing on only one power at a time. If that occurred, the political and legal time involved in one ally coming to the aid of the other could amount to several days, crippling the U.S. and

British forces’ ability to absorb the Soviet attack and remain on continental soil. As far as the Berlin situation was concerned, planners envisioned it as merely part of the larger

Soviet goal of taking Western Europe. They predicted that the Western governments would be able to seek only the “least worst solution” in the city. Clay might have hoped that the Soviets would attack the Western zones simultaneously, but EUCOM feared the opposite with Berlin. With the logistical difficulties that the city presented, the only hope for planners was Moscow focusing on one sector, allowing the nationals of the attacked

158 On March 15, 1947, United States Force European Theater (USFET) was redesignated European Command (EUCOM), with Gen. Clay as Commander in Chief, European Command (CINC EUCOM) as well as Military Governor (MG). His office took the name Office of the Commander in Chief, European Command (CINCEUR). Maj. Gen. Clarence Huebner was the Deputy Commander in Chief as well as Chief of Staff of EUCOM, and his office was in Frankfurt. On November 15, 1947, Huebner was also made Commanding General of U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), one of EUCOM’s four subordinate commands. 73 nation to seek refuge in one of the other sectors of the city and attempt evacuation by either land or air.159

By the end of September 1947, EUCOM planners in Frankfurt acted on the June discussions and drafted plans for the possibility of a Soviet surprise attack. Officials took a more pessimistic view than their earlier conversation and now assumed that an Allied victory was unlikely, given that the Red Army had an estimated 324,000 men at hand to the U.S. forces’ 165,000.160 Given the disparity in strength, U.S. and British units were to fight a delaying action at the while all dependents could evacuate to Dunkirk, à la the 1940 escape. Le Havre and Bremerhaven were also rallying points, and were to have military and civilian ships waiting to ferry the remnants of the Western units across the

English Channel. JCS planners eventually suggested to Clay that he assemble the German staff who planned the retreat after Operation Overlord, which was part of a borderline obsession in the U.S. military to defer to German warfighting abilities.161

Since Berlin and would be behind the attacking Soviet forces, EUCOM planned for those garrisons to capitulate. The outright surrender would leave 18,588 U.S. and

159 OPOT Division, HQ EUCOM, “Course of Action of U.S. Forces in Europe in Event the Soviets Attacks either the U.S. or UK Forces in Europe without Immediately Molesting the Other,” July 31, 1947, “P&O 381 TS (Section V-A) (Part I) (Case 88 Only) (Sub-Nos. 1-34)” folder, box 102, Plans & Operations Division Decimal File, 1946-1948, RG 319, NARA. 160 Briefing Paper for Maj. Gen. A.C. Wedemeyer, “Brief of EUCOM Plan for Joint Operations in Event of Soviet Aggression,” December 12, 1947, “P&O 381 TS (Section V-A) (Part I) (Case 88 Only) (Sub-Nos. 1- 34)” folder, box 102, Plans & Operations Division Decimal File, 1946-1948, RG 319, NARA. 161 Memorandum, Col. Robert Alan, Joint Strategic Plans Group, to Clay, July 22, 1948, “Trip to Washington – July 1948” folder, box 2, Correspondence File, Lucius D. Clay Personal Papers, Entry UD- 3550, RG 200, NARA. William J. Astore, “Loving the German War Machine: America’s Infatuation with , Warfighting, and Militarism,” in Arms and the Man: Military History Essays in Honor of Dennis Showalter, ed. Michael S. Neiberg (Boston: Brill, 2011), pp.5-30; Donald Alan Carter, “From G.I. to Atomic Soldier: The Development of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1945-1956” (dissertation, Ohio State University, 1987), pp.64-66. 74

Allied civilian and military personnel, along with two battalions of the 16th Infantry

Regiment, to fend for themselves.162

Berlin was the Western powers’ most vulnerable position in Europe, but it was not without some value. By December 1947, planners assumed that the Soviets would tip their hand before launching a war. Since the Red Army likely would have to reckon with

Berlin first, officials believed there would be some warning in the city before a full-scale

Soviet attack on Western Europe.163 On December 22, CIA Director Roscoe

Hillenkoetter warned Truman that the Soviets “will probably use every means short of armed force to compel” the Western powers “to leave the city.”164 The memorandum had come at the urging of the CIA station chief in Berlin, who saw the Western Allies and the

Soviet Union both using administrative needling as a tactic against one another in a war for Berlin. Only Moscow could use such means to serve larger military ends, however. In this case, technical difficulties in the city could be more than just harassment; they could be the opening sequence in an invasion of western Germany.

Clay expected a showdown with the Soviet Union, but he did not believe that it would escalate to war. “The penetration of Communism,” he wrote to Gen. Albert

162 OPOT Division, HQ EUCOM, “Joint Operations Plan for Operations in Event of Hostilities with the USSR,” September 30, 1947, “P&O 381 TS (Section V-A) (Part I) (Case 88 Only) (Sub-Nos. 1-34)” folder, box 102, Plans & Operations Division Decimal File, 1946-1948, RG 319, NARA. For other evacuation plans, see Memorandum for Brig. Gen. C.V.R. Schulyer, “EuCom Plan for Joint Operations in Event of Soviet Aggression,” December 22, 1947, “P&O 381 TS (Section V-A) (Case 88 Only) (Part VI) (Sub-Nos. 131 –)” folder, box 103, Plans & Operations Division Decimal File, 1946-1948, RG 319, NARA. 163 Memorandum, Col. R.W. Porter, Jr. for Wedemeyer, “Plan for Joint Operations in Event of Soviet Aggression,” December 22, 1947, P&O 381 TS (Section V-A) (Part I) (Case 88 Only) (Sub-Nos. 1-34)” folder, box 102, Plans & Operations Division Decimal File, 1946-1948, RG 319, NARA. 164 Memorandum, Hillenkoetter to Truman, December 22, 1948, in: Donald Steury, ed., On the Front Lines of the Cold War: Documents on the Intelligence War in Berlin, 1946 to 1961 (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999), pp. 139-40. 75

Wedemeyer, the Pentagon’s Chief of Plans and Operations, “has been checked, if not stopped, by the thin American and British screen through the middle of Germany and the middle of Austria.” Ever the realist, Clay understood that deterrence was relative. “While

I personally discount the prospects of war, I cannot forget for a moment that this is possible and that if it occurs we must not be caught as we were at Pearl Harbor.”165 If war did occur, he predicted the Red Army could sweep aside his ground forces and march to the Pyrenees, but he also knew that the American atomic monopoly ensured the Soviets would pay a high price if they attempted to take Europe. With this calculus in mind, he acted with confidence in Berlin.166

When Army staff planners contemplated what a Soviet eviction strategy for

Berlin would look like, they estimated Moscow had two options: direct military force, or disruption of city administration to the extent that the Allies would leave rather than weather the storm. Direct military force was unlikely, the planners thought, given the possibility of triggering a general war for what was a relatively limited goal of expulsion.167 The Pentagon and Clay both believed administrative interference was probable. In December, Clay first contemplated what his response would be to the

Soviets interfering with Berlin access. He decided that using an armed convoy as a battering ram was the best option.168 Any plan beyond retreat would mean maintaining at

165 Quoted in the CIA’s in-house, classified journal, William Harris, “March Crisis 1948, Act I,” Studies in Intelligence Vol. 10, No. 4 (Fall 1966), p. 4. 166 See Harris, “March Crisis 1948, Act I,” p. 8. 167 P&O Division Staff Study, “U.S. Course of Action in the Event the Soviets Attempt to Force Us Out of Berlin,” January 2, 1948, “P&O 381 TS (Section V-A) (Part I) (Case 88 Only) (Sub-Nos. 1-34)” folder, box 102, Plans & Operations Division Decimal File, 1946-1948, RG 319, NARA. 168 Harris, “March Crisis 1948, Act I,” p. 4. For Truman and the armed convoy discussion, see Memorandum for the President, July 23, 1948, “Memo for the President: Meeting Discussions (1948)” folder, box 186, President’s Secretary Files (hereafter PSF), Harry S. Truman Library (hereafter cited as 76 least a token force in the city. The calculus was simple: even one battalion would make it risky for the Soviets to attempt armed intervention, lest they increase the chances of war.

While planners studied potential Soviet aggression toward the West, it appeared the Kremlin’s foreign policy was becoming more aggressive by late 1947 and early 1948.

In October 1947, Stalin formed the Cominform, the successor to the post-Bolshevik

Revolution organ, the Comintern, to coordinate the Bloc’s communist parties.

Countermanding previous instructions, he ordered French and Italian communist leaders to destabilize their governments with strikes and demonstrations.169 On February 23, he demanded that Finland sign a treaty of friendship, which they finally did after holding out until April 6.170

Most worrying to the West were events in Czechoslovakia. In February, Stalin dropped all pretenses of winning over the country at the polls, and approved a communist plan to seize power.171 On March 10, Czechoslovaks found the body of their foreign minister, Jan Masaryk, beneath his bathroom window. The Soviets claimed it was suicide, but the embattled democrats countered it was defenestration. The coup shocked

Washington. A communist takeover did not disturb U.S. officials as a violation of self- determination; Czechoslovakia was, after all, in Moscow’s sphere. It did, however, confirm to officials that the Soviets were becoming more bellicose. The question was

HSTL); Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: Viking Press, 1951), p. 460; Harrington, Berlin on the Brink, pp. 136-37. 169 Zubok, Failed Empire, pp. 72-73; Gerhard Wettig, Stalin and the Cold War in Europe: The Emergence and Development of East-West Conflict, 1939-1953 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008), p. 109. Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity, pp. 28-29; Zubok, Failed Empire, pp. 73-74. 170 Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity, pp. 44-45. 171 Wettig, Stalin and the Cold War in Europe, p. 109. 77 whether Moscow was now looking west.172 Officials should not have been so concerned.

They were viewing the situation through the distorting prism of the Cold War. The

Marshall Plan had prompted the Soviets to act, but it was defensive in nature. As historian Vojtech Mastny put it, the coup was not the “first act in the incipient westward expansion of his [Stalin’s] empire rather than the last act of its sovietization.173

These events coalesced in Berlin. During the last week of February, the Army’s director of intelligence, Lt. Gen. Stephen J. Chamberlin, held talks with Clay. On March

5, a week after Chamberlin returned to Washington, Clay sent a cable, double-encrypted and in a special cipher, to his old friend about the situation in Berlin, rather than using normal Army channels.174 “For many months, based on logical analysis,” Clay wrote, “I have felt and held that war was unlikely for at least ten years. Within the last few weeks, I have felt a subtle change in Soviet attitudes which I cannot define but which now gives me a feeling that it may come with dramatic suddenness.” The message was short—only

130 words—but it sent shockwaves throughout Washington. Defense officials had already planned for a potential Soviet takeover of Berlin, so they were on the lookout for suspicious activity. Clay was the highest-ranking Army officer in Germany, and though he was known for being forceful, no one considered him an alarmist. A message from him indicating an atmospheric change in the city, particularly “a new tenseness in every

172 Anne Applebaum, : The Crushing of Eastern Europe, 1944-1956 (New York: Doubleday, 2012), p. 205; Ambassador Steinhardt to Marshall, February 27, 1948, FRUS, 1948, IV: 741-42; Ambassador Steinhardt to Marshall, March 10, 1948, FRUS, 1948, IV: 743 Ambassador Steinhardt to Harold C. Vedeler (Division of Central European Affairs), April 7, 1948, FRUS, 1948, IV: 743. 173 See Cable W-80037, Chamberlin to various Army commands, April 24, 1948, “Cable – Incoming Record Copies – April 1948” folder, box 679, OMGUS AGO Incoming Cables, RG 260, NARA; Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity, p. 43. 174 Harris, “March Crisis 1948, Act I,” pp. 6-7. 78

Soviet individual with whom we have official relations,” made it seem like Moscow may have already given its forces in Germany their marching orders.

Clay ended his message by inviting Chamberlin to brief Chief of Staff Omar

Bradley. Chamberlin found him in a conference, but nonetheless passed along the message, which, Bradley remembered, “lifted me right out of my chair.”175 The next day,

Secretary of Defense met with Truman in the White House to discuss the

“war warning” cable, as the Pentagon began calling it.176 Clay’s words had entered a hypersensitive environment in the capital, leading Army intelligence on March 10 to send a message to military attachés and army commands throughout the world to be on the lookout for actions that could indicate Moscow’s intentions in Europe. With the traditional campaign season of spring and early summer on the horizon, the Army reasoned the Soviets had four to six months to initiate an operation.177 Bradley ordered

OMGUS and Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s headquarters in Japan to “survey carefully your current emergency plans” and ensure that they could be put into place in short order.178

To examine Clay’s estimate, Bradley ordered Chamberlin to consider Soviet intentions. The task fell to the Intelligence Advisory Committee, an interdepartmental group composed of representatives from the CIA and the armed services. The group examined the situation for the next five days, and, despite infighting, reported its findings to Truman and the NSC on March 16. With the defense budget confirmation on the

175 Omar Bradley and Clay Blair, A General’s Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 477. 176 Steven L. Rearden, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Vol. I: The Formative Years (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), pp. 281-82. Harris, “March Crisis 1948, Act I,” p. 8. 177 Harris, “March Crisis 1948, Act I,” p. 9. 178 Quoted in author’s note, Clay Papers, II: 569. 79 horizon, Army and Air Force representatives had dragged their competition with each other into the discussion. The Army wanted to leverage the estimate to get universal military training passed, while the Air Force hoped to fund seventy air groups. It took

Hillenkoetter intervening to stop the quarrelling and demand answers to three questions, which had come straight from Truman and were to be answered in the negative or affirmative: Will the Soviets deliberately provoke war in the next 30 days? The next 60 days? In 1948? The group deferred answering the third, but they all answered “no” to the others.179

With confirmation from his intelligence apparatus that war was not likely in the short-term, Truman addressed a joint session of Congress the next day about the threat of communism to democracy in Europe. He intended to outline the “critical nature of the situation in Europe” and prepare Congress and the country for what he thought could be a sudden war. In language that was a stark change in tone, Truman blamed the Soviets for the Cold War, the first time he had done so publicly. Like Clay, the specter of Pearl

Harbor played a large role in the President’s decision to be so forward. He saw the spread of communism as reaching a critical stage, and he believed in the necessity of reinstating the draft and instituting universal military training to meet the threat.180

That same day, separated by only a few hours, the West European allies were in

Brussels signing the Treaty of Economic, Social, and Cultural Collaboration and

Collective Self-Defense, the pact that would lay the groundwork for the eventual North

179 Harris, “March Crisis 1948, Act I,” pp. 10-22. 180 “Special Message to Congress on the Threat to the Freedom of Europe,” March 17, 1948, in: Public Papers of Harry S. Truman, 1948 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 182-86. 80

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Truman heralded the Europeans’ cooperation to resist communism, and matched it with a promise that the United States would defend them. Bevin had already invited the United States to create an “Atlantic security system” with fellow West European nations after the Czechoslovakian coup, the signing of the

Finno-Soviet Treaty, and the likelihood that the Soviets would force a similar pact on

Norway. Bevin believed that a Western defense alliance was the best means of deterrence, lest Europe “repeat our experience with Hitler” and be forced into war from a position of weakness after granting concessions. Truman agreed, and five days before his address to Congress, instructed Marshall to give the British the green light.181 Truman was confident that he was reading the situation correctly but fatalistic about whether his own government would act swiftly. The core of his strategy—economic aid and military expansion—was out of his hands since it relied upon congressional support.

Pessimistically, he believed that the country would be “sunk” if Congress did not act.182

It was not only senators and representatives who Truman had to convince. His secretary of state also feared the his actions would “pull the trigger,” thereby sparking war with Moscow. Truman believed that, even so, it would be preferable over being caught out like the last war.183 He would make the same argument in his March 17 address, telling Congress there “are times in world history when it is far wiser to act than

181 Aide-Mémoire, British Embassy to State Department, March 11, 1948, FRUS 1948, III: 46-48; For the U.S. reply, see Marshall to Lord Inverchapel, March 12, 1948, FRUS 1948, III: 48. Wilson D. Miscamble, George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947-50 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 124-40. 182 Robert H. Ferrell, ed., Truman in the White House: The Diary of Eben A. Ayers (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1991), p. 247. 183 Ibid., pp. 247-48. 81 to hesitate.”184 Unconvinced, Marshall made a case against unconstrained rearmament a week later in an NSC meeting, arguing that it could cause Congress to balk at the price tag and provoke aggression from the Soviets. He called for an increase in defense spending only to the extent of what containment needed for success. It was anyone’s guess what that meant, but Marshall knew that unabated spending was dangerous, and, in keeping with his firearm theme, cautioned “against trying to get such a load of powder that the gun itself would blow up.”185

Clay was pleased at the prospect of an increased budget. He had listened to

Truman’s speech live on Armed Forces Network in Berlin. He knew that the Soviets would complain, but the “Germans and all western Europe needed this speech and reaction will be highly favorable.”186 There was still the issue of Congress following up on Truman’s request for action, though. The President did not get the draft and universal military training—those became tangled up in the ongoing Air Force-Army scrap over force supremacy and a congressional fear of a garrison state. He did get defense funding, so much that he feared it would endanger what he considered the primary weapon in the fight against communism, the Marshall Plan. In the weeks after his speech to Congress, the services had seized on the opportunity to expand and increase their respective slices of the defense budget pie. The military’s wish list added $8.8 billion to Truman’s defense budget that he had submitted in January. The next month, in light of the Czechoslovakia

184 “Special Message to Congress,” Public Papers of Harry S. Truman, p. 184. 185 Minutes of the 8th meeting of NSC, March 23, 1948, “NSC Meeting #8, 3-23-1948” folder, box 203, PSF: National Security Council Meetings, Truman Papers, HSTL. Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 105. 186 Teleconference, Clay with Lawton Collins and Chamberlin, March 17, 1948, Clay Papers, II: 582. 82 coup, the war scare over Berlin, and Truman’s speech, Congress authorized a defense budget of $13.9 billon, a billion dollars more than what Truman had requested.187 By comparison, when the President had signed the Marshall Plan on April 3, the United

States sent $5 billion in aid to sixteen European countries.188 The war scare framed how the United States would interpret Soviet moves. The question now became how to link broad approaches—the Marshall Plan and defense spending—with more specific, tactical responses wherever the Soviets probed.

While Washington debated, Clay’s subordinate commands had been finding ways to withstand or counter Soviet pressure on Berlin. Frank Howley was already known within OMGUS as a critic of the West’s policy toward the Soviet Union, which he considered . Direct, confrontational, and unapologetic, he often aggravated his Soviet counterparts in the Kommandatura with a straight-talking style and refusal to participate in the time-consuming political rhetoric that Moscow preferred.189 Despite his forwardness, Howley kept most of his personal beliefs to himself when it came to communicating with the Pentagon, at least until March 5. Only hours after Clay’s “war scare” message to Chamberlin, he sent his own cable to Washington, with no knowledge that Clay had as well. He reported that there had been a change in the last two

Kommandatura meetings, with “increased Soviet violence” from his antagonist,

Aleksandr Kotikov. He believed the prepared attacks were building a record of

187 Hogan, Cross of Iron, pp. 103, 113. 188Arnold A. Offner, Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945-1953 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), p. 240. 189Howley, Berlin Command, p. 16 83 ineffectiveness in the Kommandatura, which the Soviets would later use to blame the

Western Allies for the death of quadripartite administration in Germany.190

On March 25, Howley had his staff draw up contingency plans for the short-term survival of the western sectors on March 25, on the assumption that the Soviets would split their sector from the other three. It would be a blockade of a kind, given that the

Four Powers still operated the city as a whole, and the West would be denied supplies that came from the Soviet sector and zone. Ironically dubbed “Operation Counterpunch,” given Howley’s pugilist past, the idea was to ensure “breathing space and essential time to think,” not an attempt to outlast a Soviet blockade.191 Howley’s staff calculated how much food and coal it would require for a month, and they planned for a temporary,

Western-only city administration to maintain general day-to-day needs of the sectors.

Once the plan was complete, he showed it to his French and British counterparts, Jean

Ganeval and Otway Herbert. Both men were incredulous that the Soviets would attempt to push out the Western powers, but Ganeval approved of the plan. Herbert remained unconvinced that there was any worry.192

Shortly after Howley’s staff penned Operation Counterpunch, Gen. Curtis LeMay, commander of U.S. Air Force, Europe (USAFE), also began preparing for potential tensions with the Soviets when he realized that he might have to fight. Like Howley,

LeMay was worried most about supplies, a situation that he characteristically regarded as

190 Cable quoted in Harris, “March Crisis 1948, Act I,” p. 7. See also Howley, Berlin Command, p. 201. Frank L. Howley, “Personal Diary of General Frank L. Howley,” vol. II: 32-33, in Frank L. Howley Papers, Box 3, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA. (hereafter cited as MHI). 191 Howley, Berlin Command, p. 201. 192 Ibid., pp. 201-02. 84

“stupid.” 193 EUCOM’s lifeline stretched to Bremerhaven, 250 miles north of where most

U.S. forces were stationed, the equivalent of supplying New York City from Washington,

D.C. LeMay, as outspoken as Howley on supposed American appeasement, argued the situation was a “logical outgrowth of the God-bless-our-buddy-buddy-Russians-we-can- sure-trust-them-forever-and-ever philosophy” of the Roosevelt era.194 On April 1, he told

Washington the Soviets could overrun the U.S. position within eight hours, making current EUCOM plans insufficient. Air supremacy was a problem, too. With the aircraft on hand, LeMay knew it would be “stupid to get mixed up in anything bigger than a cat- fight at a pet show.”195 Only one fighter group was in theater, putting the Army’s hopes of even retreating to the Rhine in jeopardy with no sufficient air cover. 196

LeMay conferred with Clay and Huebner before reporting to the Pentagon.

Huebner assured his Air Force counterpart that new plans were already under development in his headquarters. Clay instructed LeMay only to ensure that the evacuation of dependents would not interfere with the deployment of troops, so much so that the new plan called for civilians to use privately-owned vehicles in their retreat.197

LeMay coordinated with allies, but he found no help from the British, who did not have air and ground plans on file and were wary of adopting the Americans’. The French and

Belgian Air Force Chiefs of Staff agreed with LeMay to stage supplies at airfields in

193 Curtis E. LeMay, Mission with LeMay: My Story (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), p. 411. 194 Ibid., p. 411. 195 Ibid., p. 411. 196 Memorandum, Mayo to Wedemeyer, “Brief of AF Telecon with CG USAFE 1 April 1948,” April 2, 1948, “P&O 381 TS (Section V-A) (Part I) (Case 88 Only) (Sub-Nos. 1-34)” folder, box 102, Plans & Operations Division Decimal File, 1946-1948, RG 319, NARA. 197 Ibid. 85 those countries for fallback positions.198 Crucially, the contingency planning that LeMay undertook in March and April occurred while a new crisis was brewing in Berlin, and would assist in the West’s response to later Soviet moves in the summer.

Decision in Berlin

The first march toward crisis in Berlin came on March 30, when Deputy Chief of the Soviet Military Administration in Berlin, Lt. Gen. Mikhail Dratvin, sent his counterparts a letter notifying an alteration in access protocol. Dratvin called the changes

“supplementary provisions” and reasoned that they were due to “increased traffic between the occupation zones” which could endanger safety and efficiency of freight shipments. A two-page note was brief for the loquacious Soviets, but that brevity belied the potential to aggravate and threaten the Western garrisons. All U.S. citizens entering the Soviet zone on rail and by highway now had to present identity cards to Red Army soldiers, and military freight required accompanying permits. The new procedures were important for three reasons. First, Zhukov and Clay had agreed in June 1945 that the

United States would have free and unrestricted access to and from Berlin on one designated rail line. Second, Red Army soldiers would board U.S. military trains, despite

Allied agreements recognizing them as sovereign. Third, the Soviet ability to check who and what came into Berlin meant they could control the Western powers’ access to the city.199

198 LeMay, Mission with LeMay, p. 413. 199 Report on the Exchange of Letters between General Dratvin and General Gailey regarding Soviet Interference with Allied Access to Berlin, March 30-31, 1948, in: Documents on Berlin, 1943-1963 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1963), p. 56. Harrington, Berlin on the Brink, p. 47. 86

The note played a considerable role in the U.S. military defining its strategy in

Berlin. Clay warned Bradley that it was “undoubtedly the first of a series of restrictive measures designed to drive us from Berlin,” and he wanted to protest as soon as possible.

The Americans would be willing to provide passenger lists and manifests at entry points, but nothing more. In Clay’s normal style, he reported the situation while also offering his preferred course of action. He advocated for a strict line, telling Bradley that the

Americans should flatly refuse any Soviet attempt to board trains. If Red Army soldiers did board, Clay wanted to authorize his guards to shoot on sight. Aware of how provocative his recommendations were, he ended his cable by explaining that the seriousness of the situation demanded a firm response. “Unless we take a strong stand now,” he wrote, “our life in Berlin will become impossible.” In his estimation, the

Soviets did not want war, but if they did, the West “might as well find out now as later.”200

Clay’s comment that he was prepared to order his guards to shoot frightened

Bradley the most. As he remembered later, if he still had any hair left the “cable would probably have stood it on end.”201 Later that day, Clay held a teleconference with

Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall, Bradley, Wedemeyer, Chamberlin, and Deputy

Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins. He again contended that the Soviets did not want war, a point the British agreed with. The French, too, believed the Soviet harassment was not a

200 Cable, Clay to Bradley, March 31, 1948, “P&O 381 TS (Section V-A) (Part I) (Case 88 Only) (Sub-Nos. 1-34) folder,” box 102, Plans & Operations Division Decimal File, 1946-1948, RG 319, NARA. 201 Quoted in Deborah Welch Larson, “Truman and the Berlin Blockade: The Role of Intuition and Experience in Good Foreign Policy Judgment,” in Good Judgment in Foreign Policy: Theory and Application, Stanley A. Renshon and Deborah Welch Larson, eds. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), p. 129. For the teleconference, see Clay Papers, II: 597-600. 87 prelude to war but rather an attempt to make life for the Western powers in Berlin so unbearable that they would evacuate.202 Still, Clay sensed that the situation made Royall nervous, especially the talk of shooting Red Army soldiers.203 The Pentagon was considering two options: a note from Truman to Stalin complaining of a violation of existing Four Power agreements, or calling the Soviets’ bluff by moving trains but not allowing the situation to escalate into a shooting incident. Clay believed neither was preferable, and advised Royall that any “weakness on our part will lose us prestige important now” and “cause great trouble.” After all, if the Soviets wanted war, finding a solution to the current problem might only defer a provocation.204 Clay was becoming fatalistic. His contention that Moscow did not desire war had not changed, but his belief that the West could do little to stop one outside of showing resolve deepened.

For the first time since the end of the war, Washington was beginning to realize the mistakes made in the European Advisory Commission four years earlier. In laying the groundwork for a possible note to Stalin, the Pentagon had requested that the State

Department provide all right-of-occupation documents. Foggy Bottom’s initial search yielded nothing. While the State Department continued to hunt for documents that everyone assumed existed, Royall asked Clay if he knew where to look. Clay replied that the right to occupy Berlin was inherent in the EAC agreements about zonal boundaries. It was true that the EAC outlined the sectors, but that was only half of the documents

202 Military Attaché in Paris to Department of the Army (Intelligence Division), OMGUS, April 7, 1948, “Cables – Incoming Record Copies – April 1948” folder, box 679, OMGUS AGO Incoming Cables, RG 260, NARA. 203 Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 359. 204 Teleconference, Clay, Royall, Bradley, Collins, Wedemeyer, March 31, 1948, Clay Papers, II: 602. 88 needed to prove the illegality of Dratvin’s proposed changes. The other half did not exist, which Clay tacitly acknowledged to Royall when he admitted that access right was in oral agreement between the Soviets, British, and Americans, and “expressed only in

[the] minutes” that Maj. Gen. Floyd Parks took during the June 29, 1945 meeting. The lack of unassailable documents was of little consequence to Clay. He steadfastly believed an access agreement was inherent in the occupation arrangement, a position he held back in 1945. Clay’s concern was not mounting a legal argument to maintain a Western presence in Berlin. He was looking instead for ways to signal to Moscow that the Allies would remain in the city, including defying something as innocuous as Soviet troops boarding Western trains.205

Clay made this point to Royall and Bradley in the third teleconference of the day.

“Our reply,” he said, “will not be misunderstood by 42 million Germans and perhaps 200 million Western Europeans.” That reply was also the only possible response, as Clay saw it, since there was “no which is not appeasement.” After consultation with

Forrestal and Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett, the group instructed Clay to send his proposed reply to Dratvin, which rejected the Soviets’ changes and declared that he would operate trains as he had before. Washington was risking that maintaining standard procedures would neither antagonize nor embolden Moscow. If war was on the horizon, however, the West could argue they were not responsible, since they had operated their trains as they always had. Truman, Forrestal, and the State Department all agreed that soldiers were not to open fire unless the Soviets fired first.206

205 Clay, Decision in Germany, pp. 359-61. 206 Teleconference, Clay with Bradley and Wedemeyer, March 31, 1948, Clay Papers, II: 604-05. 89

Between the afternoon and evening teleconferences in the Pentagon, Royall had brought Truman up to speed.207 Throughout the mounting crisis, Truman watched from afar, aware of the intricacies of the issue but allowing the Pentagon to manage the situation. In the afternoon, the Pentagon sent out a warning message to ground, air, and sea commands in the Caribbean, Mediterranean, Middle East, Southeast Asia, and the Far

East to be alert since a situation in Berlin could trigger a Soviet response in the city or elsewhere.208 That situation came the next day. Not long after midnight on April 1, Red

Army soldiers stopped four trains—two American and two British—bound for Berlin upon entering the Soviet zone. One of the American train commandants lost his nerve and allowed soldiers to board, a decision that led to Clay court-martialing the officer. The remaining trains refused boarding parties, and the Soviets did not force the issue. The

British had come prepared with several days of rations, and they stayed in the Soviet zone while the Americans reversed direction and headed west.

Clay canceled all other military trains and then conferred with his British counterpart, Gen. Sir Brian Robertson, about courses of action. The two men agreed that the garrisons could be supported with an airlift for the immediate future. It was a safe bet, much safer than Clay’s original plan of an armed convoy from the western zones driving down the Autobahn and busting through the blockade. To Washington’s relief, Robertson had discounted the convoy as an option. After all, with little effort, the Soviets could

207 Royall to Truman, April 1, 1948, “P&O 381 TS (Section V-A) (Part I) (Case 88 Only) (Sub-Nos. 1-34)” folder, box 102, Plans & Operations Division Decimal File, 1946-1948, RG 319, NARA; For Truman’s briefing docs, see President’s Secretary File, Subject File, Foreign Affairs, “Berlin Crisis” folder, Box 150, Truman Papers, HSTL. 208 Department of the Army to CINCEUR, USARAL, CINCARIB, EUCOM, USFA, TRUST, CINCFE, Task Force Seven, USAGG, ARMISH, TUSAG, USAFIK, AAG, April 1, 1948, “Cables – Incoming Record Copies – April 1948” folder, box 679, OMGUS AGO Incoming Cables, RG 260, NARA. 90 block or even destroy the convoy on the Autobahn wherever they wished. The airlift, as

Clay and LeMay had intended, was only to keep the garrison alive, effectively taking over the military train’s normal job.209 Though the situation in Berlin was not an invasion, the Army began reviewing existing contingencies. U.S. officials were aware that the new train procedures were likely the first stage of ever-increasing traffic restrictions. As political advisor Robert Murphy reported to Marshall on April 2, they expected by mid-month that the Soviets would ring Berlin with control stations and shut down select streets while targeting air traffic in the Berlin-Magdeburg corridor.210

In OMGUS, EUCOM, and the Pentagon, it was clear that the West had few options. Staff planners surveyed the situation, leading to Wedemeyer notifying Clay that

“we do not find any retaliatory measure [that] could be taken at this stage which would be effective in [the] situation you face in Berlin and which would not rebound to our disadvantage.”211 Wedemeyer’s findings only corroborated what Clay believed, and his latter point was one that the State Department was arguing from the sidelines. The

Dratvin letter and the Army’s discussion of responses had Foggy Bottom concerned that fighting for Berlin could affect other U.S. objectives, including the Marshall Plan. If the

United States took measures against the Soviets, there was a myriad of ways Moscow could counter, including placing “extremely undesirable restrictions on the strategic

209 Memorandum, Mayo for Wedemeyer, “Brief of AF Telecon with CG USAFE 1 April 1948,” April 2, 1948, “P&O 381 TS (Section V-A) (Part I) (Case 88 Only) (Sub-Nos. 1-34)” folder, box 102, Plans & Operations Division Decimal File, 1946-1948, RG 319, NARA. 210 Telegram, Murphy to Marshall, April 2, 1948, FRUS, 1948, II: 887-89. 211 Cable, Clay to Bradley, April 1, 1948, Clay Papers, II: 608. 91 materials which the Soviet bloc has been supplying to us.”212 The State Department preferred to take planning out of the Pentagon’s hands, and volunteered to draft a long- term program for retaliatory measures in case of future Soviet harassment. Much of their early suggestions were asymmetric responses, and centered on harassing Soviet shipping around the globe. Clay had already floated the idea of detaining Soviet ships refueling at

Bremen, but the plans made London nervous, particularly the idea of disrupting shipping through the strategically-important Suez Canal.213 Berlin, therefore, presented a unique problem. It was unthinkable to defend with military means, but it was also too risky to apply pressure on Moscow elsewhere to guarantee the safety of the West’s sectors.

Clay was confident the airlift was working well enough that it could supply the garrison indefinitely. Only four days into the operation, however, an incident over the

British sector proved the operation might not be impervious. At 2:30 p.m., a Soviet Air

Force Yak-3 buzzed and then struck a Vickers Viking. Both aircraft crashed, killing the Soviet pilot and fourteen people on board the Viking, including two Americans. Robertson was incensed, the ranking Soviet in Berlin, Marshal

Vasily Sokolovsky, was mortified, and Clay was unsurprised. Soviet officials argued the

Viking did not follow air safety regulations, while the British blamed the Yak pilot for flying provocatively, likely on orders to do so.214

212 Memorandum, “Transit through Soviet Zone – Berlin,” April 5, 1948, “P&O 381 TS (Section V-A) (Part I) (Case 88 Only) (Sub-Nos. 1-34)” folder, box 102, Plans & Operations Division Decimal File, 1946- 1948, RG 319, NARA. 213 Teleconference, Clay with Royall Bradley, April 2, 1948, Foreign Affairs, “Berlin Crisis” folder, box 150, President’s Secretary File, Subject File, HSTL; Cable, Clay to Bradley, April 1, 1948, Clay Papers, II: 607. Murphy to Marshall, April 2, 1948, FRUS, 1948, II: 888. 214 Tusa, Berlin Airlift, pp. 116-17. 92

Little came from the Viking crash. The British and Americans had threatened the

Soviets with using fighter escorts, mostly as a serious attempt to protect passenger aircraft but also as a show of resolve, though nothing had come of it. If anything, the incident made Clay question Robertson’s will to resist the Soviets, as the British commander’s reply to Sokolovsky’s charge of British culpability had been nothing short of “appeasement” and an “indication of weakness.”215 Clay need not have been so fatalistic. To date, the British had offered him more support for his policies than

Washington. Regardless, Soviet harassment did not increase in the weeks after the Viking incident; instead, it decreased. Quietly, the Soviet military government reversed its

Dratvin policies, and surface transportation continued to roll into Berlin once again by mid-April, bringing the “baby blockade” to an end and cooling tensions over access.

The March war scare had stiffened EUCOM and OMGUS’ resolve, but it made officials in Washington warier. The April Crisis only added to that difference of opinion:

Clay was confident that he and his staff were correctly interpreting the Soviet moves while the Pentagon and State Department began to plan for the worst. The first stage would be evacuating dependents from Berlin, either to Frankfurt or London. For the first time, Congress even weighed in when members began asking Royall and Bradley why they had not yet gotten families out of harm’s way.216 The lack of an airlift for non- crucial personnel was not because the military had overlooked one. Since late 1947,

Army staff contingencies for Berlin had called for the evacuation of dependents upon

215 Cable, Clay to Bradley, April 9, 1948, Clay Papers, II: 620-21. 216Memorandum of Conversation, April 2, 1948, “Berlin Crisis” folder, box 150, President’s Secretary File, Subject File, HSTL. For POLAD’s view, see Murphy to Marshall, April 2, 1948, FRUS, 1948, II: 888. 93

Soviet pressure in the city. After Dratvin’s letter, planners were in immediate contact with EUCOM and CINCEUR about such operations.217 The debate inside the military over evacuating dependents was not if they could do it but if they should. Without Clay knowing it, his March 31 cable to Bradley had rekindled discussions of airlifting dependents. Planners found that there were only half of EUCOM’s 130 C-47s ready to fly. With a capacity of only thirty people and a roundtrip to Rhine-Main of four hours, it would take considerable time to evacuate the 10,790 U.S. civilians in Berlin.218

Since the State Department, Pentagon, and Congress did not demand an evacuation, Clay continued to get his way. The U.S. national security establishment was prepared for the situation to get tougher, but they would rather American civilians not be in the city if it happened. Clay worried that, if the Western powers evacuated their dependents, it could be “politically disastrous and perhaps harmful to [the] military situation.” Since he believed the Soviet objective was to pressure the West into withdrawing, he reasoned that an American evacuation of any size would communicate to the Soviets that their eviction plan was working.219 In a test of will, an evacuation could also create “hysteria accompanied by [a] rush of Germans to communism for safety.”220 There was also the possibility of the Soviets using an evacuation for , arguing the West was preparing for war.221 Clay reasoned American citizens

217 Cable 98817, Mayo to EUCOM, April 1, 1948, “P&O 901 Germany TS (Section I) (Cases 1 - )” folder, box 13, P&O TS Decimal File, RG 319, NARA; Cable 71866, Wedemeyer to Clay and Huebner, April 1, 1948, P&O 370.05 TS (Section I) (Cases 2-12)” folder, box 84, P&O TS Decimal File, RG 319, NARA. 218 Memorandum, Mayo to Wedemeyer, March 31, 1948, “P&O 381 TS (Section V-A) (Part I) (Case 88 Only) (Sub-Nos. 1-34)” folder, box 102, Plans & Operations Division Decimal File, 1946-1948, RG 319, NARA. 219 Teleconference Clay with Collins, Chamberlin, March 17, 1948, Clay Papers, II: 580. 220 Ibid., II: 580. 221 Ibid., Clay Papers, II: 581. 94 were not at risk in Berlin. The Soviets, after all, were not prepared to threaten war to achieve their objectives in the city. The civilians, thus, were already hostages, and it was riskier if they left than if they stayed.

The episode was an illustration of how differently OMGUS and Washington saw the potential outcomes for remaining in Berlin. Clay did not see Berlin and a Western stand in it as existing in a vacuum, and it appeared to him that that point was lost on

Washington. “Why are we in Europe?” he exasperatingly asked Bradley. “We have lost

Czechoslovakia. We have lost Finland. is threatened.” The cost of an evacuation of Berlin would be American prestige, and likely larger negative effects for Europe.222

Spring 1948 appeared to Clay as a shift in Moscow’s favor. and France were flirting with communism, and Stalin had a firm grip on territories he occupied. If communist groups consolidated their gains in Western Europe, it could spell disaster for a free and independent Germany. If Berlin fell, it would increase the communists’ political strength.

The logic for defending the city, therefore, never could be militarily proven because

Berlin was of supreme political importance. Clay, as both the Military Governor of the

U.S. occupation zone and the Commander in Chief of European forces, understood this, and could not afford to divide the problems he faced into military and political categories.

“If we mean that we are to hold Europe against communism,” he wrote Bradley, “we must not budge.” The “future of democracy requires us to stay here until forced out.”223

222 Teleconference, Clay with Bradley, April 10, 1948, Clay Papers, II: 623. See also Teleconference, Clay, Huebner, Collins, Chamberlin, March 17, 1948; Cable, Clay to Wedemeyer, April 2, 1948; Teleconference, Clay, Royall, Bradley, April 2, 1948; Cable, Clay to Wedemeyer, April 27, 1948, all in: Clay Papers, II: 579-42. 223 Teleconference, Clay with Bradley, April 10, 1948, Clay Papers, II: 623. 95

More than the war of nerves with the Soviet Union, there was also a strategic component to an American stand. A Western evacuation of Berlin would roll back democracy’s outpost, forcing the Allies to man the battlements of their occupation zone’s eastern borders. If more countries on the political map of Europe would be soon painted red, and if Berlin was no longer a bastion of democracy, the western zones in Germany would be the new outpost. If anything, Clay argued, the West should secure the initiative and double down in Berlin. In a marked departure from his thoughts in March of not expanding forces in the city, he now asked Bradley on April 12 for the Allies to supply one division each to their garrisons. In light of the Dratvin letter, he had already expedited summer training for the 1st Infantry Division in and they could be prepared in short order.224 It was a calculated risk. If the Soviets allowed the transit of reinforcements across their zone, the West would deliver a blow to Moscow’s attempts to control access. If the Soviets blocked entry by force, it would precipitate war. Clay figured such likelihood was remote, but the West would not be at fault if it did and forces might be better used in a fight for Berlin than trying to defend the wide-open territory of the zones. Clay’s request for reinforcements capped off his growing belief that Western

Europe needed American backbone as well as a defensive complement to the Marshall

Plan’s economic power to contain the expansion of communism. Bradley did not see the situation the same way, and he rejected the plan.225

224 Teleconference, Clay, Bradley, and Wedemeyer, March 31, 1948, Clay Papers, II: 606. 225 Memorandum, P&O, April 14, 1948, “P&O 381 TS (Section V-A) (Part I) (Case 88 Only) (Sub-Nos. 1- 34)” folder, box 102, Plans & Operations Division Decimal File, 1946-1948, RG 319, NARA; See also Memorandum, “Transit through Soviet Zone – Berlin,” April 14, 1948, “P&O 381 TS (Section V-A) (Part I) (Case 88 Only) (Sub-Nos. 1-34)” folder, box 102, Plans & Operations Division Decimal File, 1946-1948, RG 319, NARA. Shlaim, United States and the Berlin Blockade, 137-38. 96

The extra divisions were a pipe dream, since the Pentagon believed the idea was too provocative. Such debates were moot if the Allies began to pull out of Berlin altogether, beginning with civilians and dependents. On that front, Clay eventually emerged victorious. He was successful in convincing the Pentagon to choose against a wholesale evacuation of noncombatants. He had already started reducing the number of nonessential people in Berlin. Civilians and dependents were free to leave on their own volition, and the creation of Bizonia also siphoned off many individuals whose offices were moving from Berlin to Frankfurt.226 Still, the War Department had taken the evacuation issue to such lengths that it created an ad hoc committee to the War Council, which Under Secretary of the Army William Draper chaired.227 The committee’s purpose was to review the policy of evacuating dependents in all critical overseas areas, not just

Berlin. The group agreed that the status quo be maintained in the city, and then moved the discussion up the chain of command to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. From there, the issue of evacuation was rolled into the question of sending reinforcements to Europe.

At a meeting on April 24, the War Council decided to offer Clay a compromise.

They would replace evacuated civilians with soldiers. The plan had originated inside

Wedemeyer’s office at the beginning of the month, when the Assistant Executive of Plans and Operations, Lt. Col. James Muir, argued that an exchange of military personnel for civilians “would psychologically strengthen our position against the Russians

226 Teleconference, Clay with Bradley, April 10, 1948, Clay Papers, II: 622. 227 See Draper/Vorhees Project Decimal File, box 14, Under Secretary of the Army, General Decimal Files, Entry A1-24B, RG 335, NARA. 97 immeasurably, by indicating to them that, far from withdrawing, we are attacking.”228

Clay was “strongly against” the plan that was intended to placate him. He was happy to take the offer of reinforcements, though, which he wanted to organize as combat teams in the U.S. zone. Apart from the several tank, antiaircraft, and infantry battalions that he requested, he also wanted a fighter group for Germany and an infantry battalion for his subordinate command to the south, U.S. Forces, Austria (USFA).229 Upon review, the

Joint Chiefs decided that Clay’s requests were possible but should not happen. They advised Forrestal to block such a realignment of forces, citing its negative effects on responding to emergencies elsewhere, the risk of sacrificing units for no appreciable gain, and even its ability to “prejudice the success of current war plans.” The dagger that the

Joint Chiefs placed in Forrestal’s hand was the argument that Clay’s request could put the

Army’s expansion plans in jeopardy, a project that, along with unification, the defense secretary had been working tirelessly to achieve.230 In the end, Clay was successful in the evacuation debate, but he was rebuffed on reinforcements. A middle road in the fight for

Berlin had been struck. If Clay was going to come up with a plan to deter the Soviets in

Berlin, he had to find ways other than strict military deterrence to do it.

228 Memorandum, Lt. Col. James Muir to Wedemeyer, “Some Stray Thoughts on Berlin,” April 2, 1948, “P&O 092 (Section IX-A) (Case 137 Only) (Sub-Nos. 15-21)” folder, box 118, Plans & Operations Division Decimal File, 1946-1948, RG 319, NARA. 229 Memorandum, Lt. Col. Underwood to Bradley and Forrestal, “Policy with Respect to Dependents in Overseas Areas,” April 30, 1948, “P&O 370.05 TS (Section I) (Cases 2-12)” folder, box 84, P&O TS Decimal File, RG 319, NARA; For Clay’s cable, see Clay to Wedemeyer, April 27, 1948, Clay Papers, II: 640-41. 230 Report, Joint Strategic Plans Committee to JCS, “JCS 1879/1: Policy with Respect to Dependents in Overseas Areas,” “P&O 370.05 TS (Section I) (Cases 2-12)” folder, box 84, P&O TS Decimal File, RG 319, NARA; See also Memorandum for Wedemeyer, “Status Report on Dependent Problem,” May 26, 1948, “P&O 370.05 TS (Section I) (Cases 2-12)” folder, box 84, P&O TS Decimal File, RG 319, NARA. 98

The Soviets made their next move in the Kommandatura. On June 16, the commandants met to discuss five issues, each tabled after a series of baffling debates that saw the Soviet representative agreeing and disagreeing with himself and the other members taking turns explaining parliamentary procedures to their colleague. Howley reached his limit when a French proposal to add 200 calories to Berliners’ diets devolved into bickering. He was fed up with what he believed was a Soviet tactic to make the body ineffectual through frustrating any possibility for compromise. Like he suspected in

March, he believed the Soviets were trying to “‘kill’ the Kommandatura, blame the West for its demise, and then try to drive us all out of the city.”231

By late April, the standard procedure for Kommandatura meetings was hours-long prepared statements from Kotikov. At the slightest unintended provocation, he would launch into a diatribe about the Western powers’ desire to end the group, which generally lasted an hour and could sometimes stretch beyond. The State Department was aware of

Moscow’s tantrums. As Murphy reported to Marshall at the end of April, the

Kommandatura was no longer a governing body but “merely one segment of a much broader battlefield on which a war of nerves and propaganda is being waged.” It had devolved into petty squabbling, including the Soviet deputy commandant refusing to shake Howley’s hand at the close of meetings.232 By the thirteenth hour of a meeting on

June 10, Col. Yelizarov, the Soviet Deputy Commandant who was sitting in for a reportedly ill Kotikov, had finally pushed Howley beyond his breaking point. Howley

231 Howley, Berlin Command, p. 174. See also his May 3, 1948 diary entry, box 3, Frank L. Howley Papers, MHI. 232 Acting Political Adviser for Germany Chase to Marshall, April 29, 1948, FRUS, 1948, II: 902. 99 told the French chairman that he was going home, since “the prolonged discussions and tirades” were “reducing the Commandants to a level to which it should not be lowered.”

He left his deputy in his stead, a not-uncommon practice. Upon Howley’s exit, Yelizarov charged the American with “hooligan action” and declared it impossible to continue the meeting. He stormed out of the room, with Ganeval shouting about scheduling the next

Kommandatura meeting. 233

Clay was irate about the affair. “You have done a terrible thing,” he told his deputy in a meeting the next day, adding that “the worst of it” was that Howley was “not even sorry about it.”234 Exhausted after months of sparring with the Soviets, Clay lectured Howley about his carelessness and lack of discipline. OMGUS and OMGBS knew Moscow was looking for an opportunity to kill the Kommandatura, and Howley should have known better than to allow the Soviets to get the better of him.235

Currency reform followed as a fault line in Four Power relations. Rather than revaluing the in August 1946, the ACC introduced a whole new note, the . They also agreed that the national debt should be forgiven, but the money in circulation should be reduced by a ratio of ten-to-one. Crucially, the Allies decreed there would be a central agency responsible for issuing notes, but they never did agree in

233 Kommandatura Meeting Minutes, June 16, 1948, “Quadripartite Kommandatura Stenographic Minutes – Commandants – 1948” folder, box 7, Records of the Berlin Sector, Records of the Director’s Office, RG 260, NARA. See also Murphy to Marshall, June 17, 1948, FRUS, 1948, II: 908-09 234 Howley, Berlin Command, p. 183. 235 James Kerr Pollock, Besatzung und Staatsaufbau Nach 1945: Occupation Diary and Private Correspondence, 1945-1948 (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1994), p. 329. John H. Backer, Winds of History: The German Years of Lucius DuBignon Clay (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1983), p. 103. 100 which zone the new currency would be printed.236 Since the Soviets considered Greater

Berlin as part of their zone, they claimed it as integral to the economic health of the territory that they occupied.237 It would thus make no fiscal sense to have in circulation a separate tender from what was used in the zone. Such a position could put the Western powers in a compromising position. Soviet currency as Berlin’s economic lifeblood would mean Moscow enjoyed unregulated financial control over the city. There would be little reason for the West to stay in a geographically- and economically-marooned city.

The Soviets had been contemplating a unilateral reform since January 1947 because they feared the West would preempt them with their own program. Word of Moscow’s plan spurred Clay to prepare Western notes as a contingency. Washington complied, printing one thousand tons of new bills. This action prompted Sokolovsky to urge Moscow to print new notes for their own zone. 238 This cyclical nature of mistrust finally led the

State Department to order Clay on March 10, 1948 to withdraw from Four Power negotiations that had been ongoing since January. Ten days later, Sokolovsky demonstratively walked out of the ACC, charging the Western powers with undermining

Four Power control of Germany by signing the London Agreements.239

236 Harrington, Berlin on the Brink, p. 68. Telegram, Clay to Echols, Chief of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department, May 23, 1946, FRUS 1946, V: 556-58. 237 Michail M. Narinskii, “The Soviet Union and the Berlin Crisis,” in: The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943-53, eds., Francesca Gori and Silvio Pons (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1996), pp. 65-66. 238 Cable, Clay to Assistant Secretary of War Howard C. Petersen, July 9, 1947, Clay Papers, I: 382-83; Harrington, Berlin on the Brink, p. 68; Narinskii, “The Soviet Union and the Berlin Crisis,” p. 61. 239 Cable, Army Dept. to Clay, April 29, 1948, “Cable – Incoming Record Copies – April 1948” folder, box 679, OMGUS AGO Incoming Cables, RG 260, NARA; Memorandum, Frank G. Wisner to Lovett, March 10, 1948, FRUS, 1948, II: 879-88. 101

The Soviet walkout was a favor for those in the West who wanted to enact reforms as quickly as possible. Clay and Robertson set into motion their program, and they planned to issue the new notes on June 1. France’s last-minute agreement to enact reform in their zone pushed back the date to June 20, however. While the financial arrangements were being made, the Soviets began their campaign to strike at the West over the London Agreements and currency reform by disrupting access to Berlin. In early

June, the West prepared to introduce new money for their zones. They would notify the

Soviet military government, SMAG, on June 18 and issue the money two days later.240

Sokolovsky responded swiftly after the Allies notified him of their currency reform by restricting rail, road, and foot access to his zone. The next day, SMAG announced the West’s new notes would not be allowed to circulate in the Soviet zone or

Greater Berlin. Financial experts in the Kommandatura attempted to find a compromise, but none was found.241 East and West still sparred over access issues while disputing currency reform. On June 20, Clay again tested the veracity of Soviet claims by attempting to send a U.S. military freight train into Berlin from , after restrictions on traffic the day before. The train only got as far as the Marienborn checkpoint, where, at 5 p.m., the Soviets halted and shunted it to a siding after the commandant refused Red Army soldiers to board and inspect the cargo. The Soviets suspected that it carried deutsche marks, and, tired of the standoff with U.S. personnel

240 Cable CC-4602, Clay to Draper, June 8, 1948, “Cables Outgoing Copies June 1948” folder, box 685, Classified Outgoing Cables, RG 260, NARA. See also Cable CC-4880, Clay to Royall, June 25, 1948, “Cables Outgoing Copies June 1948” folder, box 685, Classified Outgoing Cables, RG 260, NARA. 241 Murphy to Marshall, June 22, 1948, FRUS, 1948, II: 912-14; Narinskii, “The Soviet Union and the Berlin Crisis,” p. 66; Harrington, Berlin on the Brink, pp. 72-73. 102 after thirty-six hours, used their own engine to pull the train back to Helmstedt, five miles to the west. Clay had already reacted to the Soviets’ initial decision of shunting the train by calling upon the Air Force to once again supply the garrison. Just as he had in April,

Clay reported to Washington that the airlift was necessary because he would not submit to train inspections.242

Events had been moving quickly since the Western military governors notified

Sokolovsky of their currency reform on June 18, and they moved quicker still after the failure of a compromise in the Kommandatura on June 22. After the financial experts convened their unsuccessful meeting, Sokolovsky informed Clay, Robertson, and French representative Gen. Marie-Pierre Koenig that the Soviets would be introducing their own currency in the eastern zone and Greater Berlin. The West countered by extending the deutsche mark’s circulation to their sectors of the city. The issue had finally reached critical mass. At 2 a.m. on June 24, the Soviets closed all railway, road, and canal access to the western sectors of Berlin, the pretense being technical difficulties on the rain line from Helmstedt. After months of threatening, Moscow finally blockaded Berlin.243

Truman was directly involved in the next phase. Forrestal and Royall had been keeping him informed, but he had stayed relatively hands-off, allowing the Pentagon and

State Department to manage the situation. By June, with the situation escalated, Truman faced a decision that had been, until then, merely a theoretical discussion in contingency

242 Cable CC-4784, Clay to Bradley, Wedemeyer, June 19, 1948, “P&O 092 (Section IX-B) (Case 137 Only) (Sub-Nos. 22-60)” folder, box 118, P&O Secret Correspondence, RG 319, NARA; Harrington, Berlin on the Brink, p. 72. 243 Cable CC-4861, Clay to Royall, June 24, 1948, “Cables Outgoing Copies June 1948” folder, box 685, Classified Outgoing Cables, RG 260, NARA. 103 plans about whether to stay or go. The decisions that would shape the U.S. long-term response to the blockade took place in a four-day period, between June 24 and 28. In that span, there was a flurry of communication between Berlin, the Pentagon, Foggy Bottom, and the White House. In the bustle, Truman received a considerable amount of guidance from his advisors, which, apart from the agreement that the situation was precarious, much of was indecisive.

Internal conversations within the Army focused on withdrawing. Six days before the Soviet Union blockaded Berlin, staff planners prepared a study on the situation, modifying their position from the beginning of the year. They highlighted Stalin’s relative freedom of action. If the Soviets were indeed determined to force a withdrawal, they could do so “by means and methods short of war,” which were “reasonably within their capability,” or they could do so by risking war.244 There was no guarantee that the

Americans could pull the situation back from the precipice if Stalin risked the latter, since any Western response may trigger a conflict. The study still recognized that Berlin’s greatest strength was its psychological advantage in the Cold War, but it recommended that maintaining the advantage was “not worth doing so at all costs.”245 If the Soviets did block land access, the Americans would be unable to supply the civilian population with food and coal. For the sake of Berliners, the Army believed, the Allies would have to withdraw to prevent civilians from becoming hostages of a Cold War battle.

244 Quoted in Larson, “Truman and the Berlin Blockade,” p. 131. 245 Ibid., p. 131. 104

Clay was still unconvinced Stalin would go to war over Berlin, and he knew that

Berlin had “become a symbol of American intent,” whether for good or .246 Murphy made the same pitch to Marshall, arguing that the “presence in Berlin of Western occupants became a symbol of resistance to eastern expansionism,” thus making a retreat from the city “the Munich of 1948.”247 Clay wanted to call Stalin’s bluff and he again pushed for an armed convoy, but Royall and Bradley were apprehensive and both urged restraint. The Army Secretary was again uncomfortable with how audacious his general could be. Clay’s order to shoot any Red Army soldier who boarded U.S. military trains back in April was one thing, but using an armed convoy as a battering ram was another.

On June 26, Clay again broached the subject of an armed convoy with Royall, telling the

Secretary that he was still convinced that “a determined movement of convoys with troop protection” could break through to Berlin. Clay gambled that such an audacious plan

“might well prevent rather than build up Soviet pressures.”248 The same day, he and

LeMay expanded the air lift to feed the civilian population and the garrison. 249

Royall and Bradley discussed Clay’s proposal in an emergency Sunday afternoon meeting in Forrestal’s office, along with Undersecretary of State Robert Lovett, Secretary of the Navy John Sullivan, and Assistant Chief of Staff Lauris Norstad. The group decided they faced three options. First, the United States could defend its position in

246 Teleconference, Clay with Royall and Collins, June 25, 1948, Clay Papers, II: 699-704. Memorandum Clay for Chief of Staff to Clay, Charles K. Gailey, June 13, 1948, Clay Papers, II: 677. 247 Murphy to Marshall, June 26, 1948, FRUS, 1948, II: 919-21. 248 Clay to Royall, June 25, 1948, FRUS, 1948, II: 917-18; Shlaim, The United States and the Berlin Blockade, pp. 259-60; Millis, Forrestal Diaries, pp. 459-60; Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, pp. 386- 88; Jacob Beam interview by Niel M. Johnson, June 20, 1989, Harry S. Truman Library Oral History Project, HSTL. 249 Murphy to Marshall, June 26, 1948, FRUS, 1948, II: 918-19. 105

Berlin by any means necessary, which meant either implementing Clay’s plan of supplying the city with an armed convoy or finding some other use of force. Second, the

United States could stand firm in Berlin by less provocative means, attempting to find a solution locally while buying time through talks with the Soviets. Both options did nothing to solve the potential for future crises or humiliation. The third option, withdrawing from Berlin altogether, could solve this problem by cutting losses, but it had considerable diplomatic and military drawbacks, including a loss of trust in American promises, a spread of communism, and the endangerment of the U.S. position in

Europe.250

The Pentagon meeting adjourned without a consensus. The only thing the officials did agree on was that Clay’s armed convoy was an option of last resort, and that Royall,

Lovett, and Forrestal should meet with Truman the next day.251 The ad hoc committee’s findings hit the President’s desk at 12:30 on June 28. When Truman met with the three officials, the group presented the crux of the matter: Would the United States stay in

Berlin or withdraw? Truman cut off any further discussion, and spoke plainly that the

Americans would stay in Berlin.252 It was an important moment. Since the crisis began percolating in March, military and diplomatic officials in Washington had participated in academic discussions about Berlin, debating possible moves and probable Soviet responses. The Pentagon and State Department did a reasonable job communicating with one another, yet the efforts yielded no consensus. Throughout, Clay had been the only

250 Millis, Forrestal Diaries, pp. 452-53. 251 Bradley and Blair, A General’s Life, p. 479; Millis, Forrestal Diaries, p. 453. 252 Ibid., p. 454. 106 individual to advocate for a decisive stance. He always made his opinion clear to Royall and Bradley, to which Royall continually demurred, asking Clay for more information on the situation.253 Royall agreed with Clay in principle that the currency situation was only a pretext and the real issue was over quadripartite authority in Germany.254 Yet he believed going to war over currency was senseless.255 It was here that their perspectives differed: the Secretary believed an Allied misstep could escalate the situation into open conflict while Clay gambled that the Soviet Union had already decided if it would go to war.256 Prior to Truman deciding to stand firm in Berlin, then, Clay was on an island in the debate.

Royall was skeptical that Truman had thought through the problem. In the meeting, he argued the country should not commit itself to a position where it might need to fight its way into Berlin. Truman was clear that they would “deal with the situation as it developed.”257 Above all, he based his decision to stay on the legal rights of the

Western powers to occupy Berlin. Given these rights, the Soviet Union had no basis “to get us out by direct or indirect pressure.”258 He saw Berlin as a “struggle over Germany and, in a larger sense, over Europe.”259 He was sympathetic to Clay’s view that the Allies were helpless to prevent whatever it was that the Soviets would argue was the

253 Teleconference, Clay, Royall, Bradley, Collins, Wedemeyer, March 31, 1948, Clay Papers, II: 600-04; Teleconference between Clay, Royall, Bradley, April 2, 1948, Clay Papers, II: 613-15; Teleconference, Clay, Royall, Collins, June 25, 1948, Clay Papers, II: 699-704. 254 Cable, Royall to Clay, June 28, 1948, Clay Papers, II: 697. 255 Memorandum from Jacob Beam, June 28, 1948, FRUS, 1948, II: 928-29. Teleconference, Clay, Royall, Collins, June 25, 1948, Clay Papers, II: 699-704. 256 Teleconference, Clay, Royall, Collins, June 25, 1948, Clay Papers, II: 699-704. 257 Millis, Forrestal Diaries, p. 455. 258 Ibid., p. 455. 259 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. 2: Years of Trial and Hope, 1946-1953 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1956), p. 130. 107 provocation if Moscow, and he had been waiting for Stalin’s fateful blow since the Soviet delegation stormed out of the ACC on March 20, 1948, which he saw as “the curtain- raiser for a major crisis” in the city.260 Crucially, like Clay, Truman was skeptical that the

Soviet Union was prepared to go to war for Berlin.

In attempting to translate Moscow’s signals, Truman looked to the recent past. He concluded that the blockade was another test of American capacity and will to resist. The specter of Munich was never far from Truman’s mind, nor was Greece and , which had taught him that Moscow would back down when faced with firmness. Berlin was nothing more than another “plan to probe for soft spots in the Western Allies’ positions all around their own perimeter.”261 He believed fear and desperation motivated

Moscow’s decision to blockade the city. U.S. officials judged that the Soviets had suffered recent setbacks in Western countries, with Italy, France, and Finland’s strong communist movements all being rebuked at the polls. Even , who was the

Soviet Union’s strongest , “had suddenly developed a taste for independent action,” as Truman put it.262 As far as he was concerned, these were the actions of a regime that could only rule through outright strength and not proxies.

Truman also believed the Marshall Plan had caught Moscow off guard, and had forced a two-part response: building a Soviet counterpart in the occupied territories, and testing American resolve and patience in Berlin to provoke a military incident and

260 Ibid., p. 122. 261 Ibid., p. 131. Jonathan M. House, A Military History of the Cold War, 1944-1962 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2012), p. 27. 262 Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, p. 123. 108 undermine economic recovery.263 He gambled that if the United States could marshal its strength and resolve to supply the beleaguered city, it could land a knockout blow on

Moscow’s designs for Western Europe. The problem was that Moscow was using the same explanation for recent American moves, and presumed a new economic crisis in the

West was imminent.264 That belief led to a June 24, 1947 memorandum from economist

Eugen Varga for Molotov, who argued the “Marshall Plan was intended, primarily, as a means of mitigating the next economic crisis, the approach of which nobody in the USA denies.”265 With this line of thinking, a crisis in Europe could trigger an economic tailspin, presenting the chaotic environment upon which communism’s revolution theory was based.

By 1948, the Truman administration had four primary objectives in Europe: to circumvent , foster economic productivity, absorb western Germany into the

U.S. sphere, and integrate Western Europe into that sphere. 266 Germany was an integral component of these overall goals, and Berlin, as a test of U.S. resolve, the linchpin. The

United States did not intend to antagonize the Kremlin; officials merely wanted to guarantee their own security. Washington knew that risked provoking the Soviets, since securing Western security clashed with the Soviets’ attempts to guard their own security.

Yet Truman accepted the risk because he believed inaction was more dangerous.267

263 Ibid., p. 120. 264 Zubok, Failed Empire, pp. 74-75. 265 Narinskii, “The Soviet Union and the Berlin Crisis,” p. 58. 266 Leffler, Preponderance of Power, p. 504. 267 Ibid., p. 504. 109

Much like Clay, Truman saw Berlin as a strategic fight in a war for Europe. This perspective stood in contrast to advisors and allies, who concentrated on West Berlin’s location and the inherent difficulties of defending it. British representatives stood by most decisions that the Americans had already made without critical comment, but France was gloomy about the West’s prospects. The head of the Central European desk in the French

Foreign Office believed the Western powers had made a serious error by stressing the importance of Berlin.268 There were risks involved in either using force or withdrawing, as both could create a disaster. It was therefore crucial that Truman be decisive in articulating the objective—standing firm in Berlin—while being vague about means.

Doing so allowed flexibility in reacting to Moscow’s moves.269 Importantly, Truman’s belief that Berlin was not a military issue meant he did not seek a military solution. This led him to wager that diplomacy would solve what was largely a political issue.

A Military Strategy for a Diplomatic Solution

The Army continued to prepare for withdrawal, despite Truman’s intent to stay.

On June 26, planners even suggested that the United States should trade their sector for a part of the Soviet zone. 270 Looking at the Berlin situation in military terms, the Chief of

Operations Group in the War Department, Brig. Gen. T.S. Timberman, believed that it was important that action “should be taken to divest our eventual withdrawal of the appearance of rout.” He also suggested that officials should split the difference,

268 Ambassador Caffery to Marshall, June 24, 1948, FRUS, 1948, II: 916-17. 269 For the counter view, see Harrington, Berlin on the Brink. 270 Larson, “Truman and the Berlin Blockade,” pp. 131-32. Memorandum, Minutes of June 25 meeting, June 28, 1948, FRUS, 1948, II: 928-29. Cable, Murphy to Marshall, June 26, 1948, FRUS, 1948, II: 918- 19. 110 reaffirming American rights of free access to the city while reducing the garrison to only a tactical force. Should the Soviets make life unbearable for the civilian population, U.S. troops should be withdrawn completely.271

Meanwhile, Truman’s formal announcement to Moscow that the United States would stay in Berlin finally came on June 30, which Marshall did from Walter Reed

Hospital, where he was for tests.272 Aware of public opinion, Truman worried that war panic would constrain diplomatic flexibility, and he ignored Clark Clifford’s counsel that the White House should use leadership in foreign policy to help Truman at the polls in the upcoming election.273 On July 6, the United States handed a note to Ambassador

Aleksandr Panyushkin, which asserted the right to occupy Berlin.274 Britain and France followed suit with similar notes. In the meantime, Sokolovsky had coyly declared that

“technical reasons” accounted for the recent prevention of rail traffic into and out of

Berlin. On July 14, the Kremlin dropped any pretenses, as Clay believed they would, and argued that the real issue was the Allied intention to create a west German government and to supply it with a separate currency, both policies they believed violated the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements and thus constituted a forfeiture of their rights to Berlin access.275 Moscow was willing to negotiate, but Berlin would remain blockaded.

271 Memorandum, Brig. Gen. T.S. Timberman to Gen. Schulyer, June 30, 1948, “P&O 381 TS (Section V- A) (Case 88 Only) (Part II) (Sub Nos. 35-80)” folder, box 103, P&O TS Decimal File, RG 319, NARA. 272 Statement by George Marshall, June 30, 1948, Department of State Bulletin, July 4, 1948, p. 54. 273 Memorandum for Marshall, “U.S. Public Opinion of the Berlin Situation,” June 29, 1948, President’s Secretary File, National Security Files—Subject File, Box 150, Folder 6, HSTL. Wilson D. Miscamble, “Harry S. Truman, the Berlin Blockade, and the 1948 Election,” Presidential Studies Quarterly Vol. 10, No. 3 (Summer 1980): 306-16. 274 Secretary of State Marshall to Ambassador Panyushkin, July 6, 1948, FRUS, 1948, II: 950-53. 275 Ambassador Panyushkin to Secretary of State Marshal, July 14, 1948, FRUS, 1948, II: 960-64; Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, p. 123. Letter, Colonel Gillis, Chief of Cabinet, French Group Control Council, to 111

Truman continued to search for a diplomatic solution. The State Department suggested taking the issue to the International Court and the United Nations, but Berlin did not have the time to wait for the slow wheels of international mechanisms to turn.

Clay believed that standing firm in Berlin while searching for a diplomatic solution was the correct strategy, though he urged officials to form a long-term plan for supplying the city.276 It was becoming clear by the end of the second week of July that Truman faced the difficult decision that he had put off on June 28 of how to supply Berlin. Both British and American planners earmarked October as the deadline for a diplomatic resolution, before bad weather set in.277 There were two possible solutions to break the diplomatic deadlock, neither of them long-term. The first was the familiar armed convoy proposal from Clay.278 His view of the risks and rewards remained unchanged, but he now argued that a convoy was the only way to induce the Soviets to lift the blockade and negotiate on terms that they alone did not dictate.279 The second solution was to supply Berlin with an expansion of the airlift that had been operating since June 20.

The two proposals found few allies in the Pentagon or at Foggy Bottom. Army officials were wary of a plan that involved sending a column through 110 miles of

Soviet-occupied territory.280 Without much effort, Red Army troops could blow bridges, trapping the column and embarrassing the Americans or justifying war. They could also allow one convoy to enter Berlin only then to block the Autobahn against follow-up

Clay, July 6, 1948, Transcript of July 3, 1948 meeting, “MG-DMG-C/S Corres. 1948” folder, box 4, Miscellaneous Files Relating Primarily to Berlin, Office of the Executive Secretary, RG 466, NARA. 276 Cable Clay to Bradley, July 10, 1948, Clay Papers, II: 733-35. 277 Harrington, Berlin on the Brink, p. 119. 278 Cable Clay to Bradley, July 10, 1948, Clay Papers, II: 733-35. 279 Cable Clay to Bradley, July 15, 1948, Clay Papers, II: 739-40. 280 Teleconference, Brig. Gen. V.E. Pritchard with Col. R.W. Mayo, July 13, 1948, Clay Papers, II: 736-38. 112 attempts, making a clear statement that the city was once again isolated despite American attempts. Ultimately, the planners estimated that Clay’s plan would not work because it depended on “an imponderable psychological factor for success against the risk of an embarrassing failure.”281 Clay, who did not lack for tenacity, made yet another push for armed convoys on July 15 and then again on July 19.282 Contradicting his previous stance, Marshall was a Clay ally—the only one—and he argued at an NSC meeting that they should “pave the way for any possible use of armed convoys by showing that we have exhausted all other ways of solving the problem.”283 Doing so could prepare the

American public for the use of force to defend a commitment. Despite the lack of coordination between military and civilian leaders in formulating policy papers, both independently came to the same conclusion that a convoy would be the last step rather than the next one.284

The airlift proposal did not fare much better. The Pentagon had never considered supplying the city in the event of a blockade; planners only saw air power as a way to evacuate the garrison. The idea was Clay’s alone, and LeMay had executed it in April, then reprised it once the Soviets blockaded the city. That current operation had not convinced the Pentagon that the concept was workable in the short-term, as it was failing

281 Plans and Operations Study, Lt. Col. Osmanski, July 13, 1948, “P&O 381 TS (Section V-A) (Case 88 Only) (Part II) (Sub Nos. 35-80)” folder, box 103, P&O TS Decimal File, RG 319, NARA. 282 Cable, Clay to Bradley, July 15, 1948; Cable, Clay to Draper, July 19, 1948, both in: Clay Papers, II: 739-46. 283 Memorandum for the President, July 16, 1948, “Memo for the President: Meeting Discussions” folder, box 186, National Security Council Meetings Files, PSF, HSTL. 284 Harrington, Berlin on the Brink, p. 136. 113 to even make its minimum requirements by one-third.285 The deficiency came down to an ad-hoc nature of planning between air bases, and the British and Americans carrying on airlifts independent of one another.286 Mostly, though, it was because of an inadequate number of aircraft. LeMay had already requested fifty additional C-54s to increase the daily Allied tonnage to 3,000, a plan that Clay endorsed in his communications with

Bradley. 287 The Chief of Staff was skeptical that an airlift could work, but he recommended eighty-five more C-54s be sent to Germany, all that the airports could handle.288

During two meetings on July 19, Truman’s advisors once again sought to clarify the risk of standing firm in Berlin. Though Marshall argued that the United States stood a good chance of containing the Soviets in Europe, Forrestal reminded him that the U.S.

Army had a force in Europe of two-and-one-third divisions, and only one of those could be committed “with any speed.” The planned Army build-up would not occur for another year.289 Still, Truman reaffirmed what he had said on July 28 that they would stay in

Berlin “until all diplomatic means had been exhausted in order to come to some kind of an accommodation to avoid war.”290 Later that day, in a larger meeting with Royall,

Lovett, and Draper, he had to repeat himself. Frustrated, Truman reminded his advisors, particularly Forrestal, that the decision to stay was final. In his diary that evening, he

285 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, “U.S. Military Courses of Action with Respect to the Situation in Berlin,” July 17, 1948, “P&O 381 TS (Section V-A) (Case 88 Only) (Part II) (Sub-Nos 35-80)” folder, box 103, Plans & Operations Division Decimal File, 1946-1948, RG 319, NARA. 286 They would eventually merge in October 1948. Harrington, Berlin on the Brink, p. 296. 287 Cable Clay to Bradley, July 10, 1948, Clay Papers, II: 730. 288 Harrington, Berlin on the Brink, p. 130. 289 Millis, Forrestal Diaries, p. 459. 290 Ibid., p. 459. 114 recorded that “Jim wants to hedge—he always does.” Truman complained that he had to

“listen to a rehash of what I know already and reiterate my ‘Stay in Berlin’ decision. I don’t pass the buck, nor do I alibi out of any decision I make.”291 The apprehension of his advisors had much to do with Truman’s repeated lack of defining how to stay. He may have been decisive initially, but he was anything but in prescribing what the next move should be, as rhetoric did little to suggest how to stay in Berlin or even to what end.

Truman did know it was important to make a show of force. In the June 28 White

House meeting, Lovett outlined sending B-29s to Germany and England.292 Clay urged their immediate arrival, believing they would be a “deciding factor in sustaining Allied firmness.”293 He asked that the squadron of B-29s already in Germany be expanded to a group, and that additional groups be stationed in Britain and France.294 Clay’s request was more than Washington was willing to give, but Truman did approve sending two groups to England after the British government agreed, with aircraft, Stalin would not realize, unmodified to carry atomic bombs. Truman was being sure to control the message but without inadvertently triggering war.295 There was the added bonus, as

Forrestal saw it, of giving Strategic Air Command practice and getting B-29s in-theater before the British changed their minds.296

By July 22, the debate how to proceed in Berlin went to the NSC. There were more attendees than usual, among them Clay and Murphy, who had been ordered home to

291 Ferrell, Off the Record, p. 145. 292 Millis, Forrestal Diaries, p. 455. 293 Cable from Clay to Draper, June 27, 1948, Clay Papers, II: 707-08. 294 Ibid., pp. 707-08. 295 Miller, To Save a City, pp. 45-48. 296 Rearden, The Formative Years, pp. 291-93. Miscamble, “Berlin Blockade and the 1948 Election,” p. 310. 115 brief the Pentagon and State Department against Truman’s orders.297 In the meeting,

Clay’s armed convoy proposal was finally laid to rest, despite his earlier attempt to convince Forrestal that it could work.298 He found himself running against the Joint

Chiefs, however. Clay backed Washington’s current course, but he urged officials to form a long-term solution to keep supplying Berlin, which would mean expanding the airlift, possibly building a second airfield in the city, and coordinating operations with the

French and British.299

The airlift had begun out of necessity to supply the garrison, and the Pentagon assumed it would continue unabated for the time being.300 To supply the city with both food and coal for the coming winter, Clay estimated that 4,500 tons of supplies would have to be flown to the city daily, a 2,000-ton increase of what the airlift was currently doing, which would require seventy-five more C-54s. The number made Air Force Chief of Staff Hoyt Vandenberg balk. The Joint Chiefs had received a study on July 17 from staff planners that concluded the current air lift was failing to meet targets and that an “air supply for Berlin as a long term operation is not feasible.”301 Vandenberg argued that an expanded airlift would also compromise USAFE’s ability to respond to a general war, and stretch the Air Force everywhere. There was also the issue of increased use of air

297Cable, Royall to Clay, July 16, 1948, Clay Papers, II: 740. Letter, Truman to Bess Truman, July 23, 1948, in Dear Bess: The Letters from Harry to Bess Truman, 1910-1959 (New York: Norton, 1983), p. 555. 298 Millis, Forrestal Diaries, p. 460. 299 Ibid., pp. 459-60; Rearden, The Formative Years, p. 294. 300 Memorandum, Maj. Gen. Ray Maddocks to Bradley, “Military Implications of Continued Supply of Berlin by Air,” July 13, 1948; Memorandum for Forrestal, “U.S. Military Courses of Action with Respect to the Situation in Berlin,” July 17, 1948, both in: “P&O 381 TS (Section V-A) (Case 88 Only) (Part II) (Sub-Nos 35-80)” folder, box 103, Plans & Operations Division Decimal File, 1946-1948, RG 319, NARA. 301 Ibid. 116 lanes giving the Soviets justification for charging that the Western Allies had forced the

Red Air Force out of shared airspace.302

Truman had been given only two options, armed convoy or airlift. With the convoy plan unanimously rejected, Truman decided that his only course was to double down on supplying the city while continuing to find a diplomatic solution. At the close of the meeting, he authorized the expansion of the airlift by seventy-five C-54s and the construction of a second airfield in Berlin. The B-29s in England would remain grounded except for normal training flights over the Mediterranean.303 Truman’s expansion of the airlift was a means to aid his strategy of relying on a diplomatic solution that was to his strategic end—it was not the means to end the blockade. Diplomacy, not the airlift, was intended to end the blockade.

The decision to outlast the blockade did not automatically ensure victory in

Berlin. There were still months of trepidation to come for U.S. officials, who nervously watched the situation and expected there was a potential for withdrawal.304 Indeed, officials continued to trade memoranda and planning papers about withdrawal, but under only one condition, the potential for the West Berlin civilian population to starve. Since most U.S. decision makers were convinced by fall 1948 that the Soviets would not push the issue beyond where it already was, they believed there were more positives of remaining in Berlin than negatives. If the airlift met its daily targets, withdrawal was not

302 Shlaim, United States and the Berlin Blockade, pp. 261-61. 303 Record of Action by the National Security Council, July 22, 1948, NSC Action 84, “Actions, Record of: 1947-1949” folder, box 167, PSF: Subject File, NSC File, HSTL. 304 Harrington, Berlin on the Brink, pp. 91-140. 117 an option, making Truman’s July 22 decision to stay in the city and outlast a blockade the foundation of U.S. policy in the fight for the city.

With the military response in place, diplomats took over in search for a resolution to the situation. They had breathing space to do so, since the tension that had been building since March and reached a crescendo in the days after the Soviet blockade had slowly receded by the beginning of August. Truman advised the State Department to formulate a direct appeal to Stalin. Foggy Bottom was skeptical that the approach would work, but Chip Bohlen, head of the Berlin Group, saw it as a chance to calm Allied nerves about the recent show of resolve from the United States. Marshall sent Bohlen back to Europe with Clay to coordinate with the French and British. First, the Americans needed to construct their approach with the Allies, which they did in Berlin on July 25.

The next day, the group was in London, meeting with Bevin, Strang, and René Massigli.

Bohlen’s intent was to calm the Allies, but he found little success. The French and British cautioned the Americans, telling them their approach to stay in Berlin might antagonize the Soviets, and seeking a conference with Stalin to resolve the issue was fruitless.

Despite the lack of consensus, Bevin and Massigli agreed to present a united front against the Soviets. The Western Ambassadors would prepare identical aide-mémoire protesting the Soviet blockade and present them in Moscow, with a request for an audience with Molotov and Stalin. The notes were presented to the Soviet Government on July 30, and three days later, the envoys were sitting in front of Stalin. For all the tension over Berlin, the group had a cordial, relaxed conversation. Stalin was forward but conciliatory about the issue and what would it would take to resolve. He offered to lift the 118 blockade if the Western Powers agreed to pull their special currency for Berlin and replace it with the Soviet note. Bedell Smith took the olive branch at face value and was optimistic at the prospects of quickly ending the crisis, though he should not have been.

Granting Stalin’s wishes would mean using Soviet currency in Berlin, killing the idea of

West German government, and putting the West right back where they had started. The decision came down to finding solutions to short-term problems at the expense of long- term objectives. The ambassadors accepted the offer on the condition that the Soviet mark in Berlin be subject to quadripartite controls. When trying to hammer out the details with Molotov between August 6-16, the initiative failed, as did subsequent direct attempts to negotiate with the Soviets in both Moscow and Berlin throughout

September.305

The next stage of the diplomatic initiative took place in the United Nations

Security Council, though also unsuccessfully. On September 29, the Western Powers presented their case to the UN, and neutral members suggested a formula of Stalin lifting the blockade to occur simultaneously with the introduction of the Soviet zone in Berlin.

While Moscow agreed with the arrangement, the West refused to discuss currency while the blockade continued. Over the next five months, the Security Council offered three more options, and even created a committee to study the currency problem, but all with the same results. In February 1949, it was clear no solution would be found in the UN.306

305 Walter Bedell Smith, My Three Years in Moscow (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1950), pp. 238-53. Kenneth W. Condit, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy 1947-1949 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, 1996), p. 76. 306 Ibid., p. 80. 119

In the meantime, U.S. attempts to keep the airlift operational had created tension in Washington and created a situation that would become common in White House-

Pentagon-State Department discussions of Berlin. In an October paper, the Joint Chiefs demanded Truman decided to prepare for war or abandon Berlin, which led to a rebuke from Lovett during an NSC meeting on October 14. The decision had been made on July

22 to stay, he reminded the chiefs, and there would be no retreat. The point of tension between the chiefs and civilian leaders came down to the military’s desire to know whether they should prepare for war and the government’s evasion of answering that question until they had to. It would be a recurring theme in Berlin planning for the next fifteen years. On October 21, Clay received more aircraft to sustain the operation, which required, once again, Truman’s direct intervention.307

The decision to add sixty-six more C-54s sustained the city throughout the winter as well as the abortive diplomatic mission in the UN. The road to the end of the blockade began on January 30, 1949, after Stalin told an American journalist he might lift the blockade in exchange for a Council of Foreign Ministers meeting that would postpone the establishment of a West German state and the end to the Western Powers’ counterblockade, which had been denying the Soviets steel, chemicals, and manufactured goods from the western zones.308 The divisive issue of currency was purposefully missing, the West discovered, clearing the way for discreet negotiations between Philip

C. Jessup, deputy chief of the U.S. Mission to the UN, and the Soviet representative to

307 Shlaim, United States and the Berlin Blockade, pp. 363-65. Condit, Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, pp. 78-80. Rearden, The Formative Years, pp. 300-03. 308 Shlaim, United States and the Berlin Blockade, p. 378. 120 the UN, Jacob Malik.309 On May 5, the Four Powers announced an end to the blockade and the counterblockade in one week, and a Council of Foreign Ministers meeting eleven days after that.310

While the United States, with Allied blessing, was discreetly negotiating with the

Soviets, two programs already under way continued, both designed to strengthen Western unity. The first was the founding of NATO on April 4, 1949, which had come out of the

Treaty of Economic, Social, and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defense from

March 1948.311 The second was the birth of the Federal Republic of Germany on May 23,

1949, which had come from the London Agreements from February 1948.312 The West pursued both during the Berlin Crisis knowing that they had the potential to create even more tension between them and Stalin. Yet they reasoned that to postpone a military alliance and German state would weaken Western unity, thereby achieving Stalin’s ultimate ends after all.313

By the end of 1949, it appeared the United States had attained all its goals in

Europe. The Marshall Plan was stimulating economies in the Western European states. A federal government in was born, allowing at least a partial answer to the

German Question. On the military front, NATO tied together the once fractured European

309 Philip C. Jessup, “The Berlin Blockade and the Use of the United Nations,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Oct. 1971): 163-173; Philip C. Jessup, “Park Avenue Diplomacy—Ending the Berlin Blockade,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 87, No. 3 (Sep. 1972): 377-400. 310 Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History, 1929-1969 (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1973), p. 283. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1969), p. 267. Condit, Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, pp. 81. 311 Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO 1948: The Birth of the Transatlantic Alliance (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007). 312 Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, A History of West Germany, Vol 1: From Shadow to Substance, 1945–1963 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989). 313 Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 272. 121 states with a promise to defend the continent. As for Berlin, the western sectors remained free and democratic, an achievement that few could have anticipated in June 1948. The city itself, however, was still hostage of the Cold War, at once a strategic asset for the

United States and its most vulnerable position in Europe.

122

CHAPTER 3: “EAT, SLEEP, AND DRINK FEAR” 314

Surviving the Soviet blockade did not bring clarity to the Western Powers’ position in Berlin. In early summer 1949, officials took stock of what they had won, and realized their victory was more pyrrhic than transformative. West Berlin had a population of 2.2 million, minimal economic output, and twenty Red Army divisions surrounding it.

From a functional perspective, the Western Allies’ prize for doubling down in the city was yet more responsibility.315

They had made their position clear to the Soviets, however. The Allies would maintain their rights to be in the city, up to and including war. The question was how could the United States do that without endangering its larger goals in the Cold War. Or, as Director of the Policy Planning Staff put it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in

March 1951 about the increasing number of global obligations: how could the country improve its advantage over the Soviet Union and “avoid losing our shirts in local situations.”316 Berlin was especially vexing since Western and Soviet interests converged in a confined space. As a consequence, hyper-vigilance and a sensitivity to both large and small events throughout the world were the hallmarks of U.S. thinking on Berlin in the

1950s. Any bold communist move, they believed, could cause uncontrollable

314 Quote from John J. McCloy, Summary of Ambassador Meeting, Rome, March 22-24, 1950, FRUS, 1950, III: 811. 315 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Population of the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin, by Paul F. Myers and Wayman Parker Mouldin, International Population Statistics Reports, Series P-90, No. 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952), pp. 50-51. 316 Substance of Discussions, State-JCS Meeting, March 7, 1951, “20 Feb 1951 - 2 May 51” folder, box 1, Policy Planning Staff/Council Meetings with DoD and JCS, RG 59, NARA. 123 reverberations there, so officials monitored international events with an eye toward how they would affect the city.

Undergirding this chapter is the argument that U.S. officials often did not distinguish between local and international events when it came to Berlin. While the city was regionally significant to the United States in 1948, its importance expanded beyond

Europe’s borders in the wake of withstanding the blockade. The ways in which the

United States viewed the city between the crises followed the trajectory of the Cold War.

The basic goal of this chapter is to understand how U.S. officials’ views of Berlin changed throughout the 1950s. How did war in Korea, Allied discussions of West

German rearmament, and changing U.S. national security policy affect the way officials approached Berlin by the end of the decade? Government and military ruminations about the city did not disappear from the desks of officials in the White House, State

Department, and Pentagon after May 1949. Due to the Cold War’s ever-evolving nature in the 1950s, U.S. officials continually evaluated the city, and they did not wonder whether the United States should be firm in Berlin but instead how it could be.317

An Uncertain Victory

Five days after Stalin lifted the blockade, the NSC met in the White House to discuss the possible courses of action if Moscow resumed Allied access restrictions to

Berlin. 318 Decision makers struggled to transform their victory into any tangible

317 Douglas Brinkley, Dean Acheson: The Cold War Years (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), p. 98. 318 Summary of Discussion of NSC Meeting, May 17, 1949, “NSC Meeting 40” folder, box 178, NSC Meetings File, Subject File, President’s Secretary File, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library (hereafter HSTL). 124 advantage for the West, embodied in the debate about how to solve a problem that they just faced and survived. The difficulty lay in there being no fundamental change in the underlying tensions in the East-West relationship, nor any change in Berlin’s geographic realities. Secretary of State Dean Acheson simplified the discussion. He believed that there were three options: resume an airlift; use military means to impose access to surface routes; or probe the Autobahn, rail lines, and waterways to test Soviet intentions.319 His choices were, of course, no different than the options that lay before American decision makers in June 1948.

The NSC put the question of possible reactions to the Joint Chiefs, who then supplied their answers in NSC 24/2 on June 1, 1949. Even though Acheson urged his third option be studied, the JCS recommended that it be taken off the table. In their view, any resumption of the blockade would be an act of war; an Allied probe would merely mean that the “incidence of the war would be laid at the door of the United States.”320

Instead, the Joint Chiefs believed that U.S. policy should be to reply with the strategy that had successfully thwarted the blockade once before. Resume the airlift at full capacity, they argued, reimpose a counter-blockade, and do not attempt to establish a land supply route or probe the Kremlin’s intentions.321 In Germany, Robert Murphy disagreed. To him, Soviet “arrogance” had led to the blockade in the first place, and was built on their assumption that the West would not wage war to protect its interests in Berlin. Murphy

319 Telegram, Acheson to Webb, May 22, 1949, FRUS, 1949, III: 818. 320 Telegram, Webb to Acheson, May 26, 1949, FRUS, 1949, III: 818-19. 321 NSC 24/2, “Possible U.S. Courses of Action in the Event the USSR Reimposes the Berlin Blockade,” June 1, 1949, “NSC 24/2” folder, box 3, Policy Papers, Records of the NSC, Entry 1, RG 273, NARA. For the Army’s internal discussions that bore NSC 24/2, see “1949 – HOT FILE P&O 000.5 TS thru 091 TS” folder, box 10, Hot Files, Army – Operations General Administrative Files, 1949-1952, Entry 101, RG 319, NARA. 125 saw no substantial change in Soviet attitudes in May 1949, and he argued that Stalin, if he reimposed a blockade any time in the future, would place the Western Powers in the same box as before. To take the initiative, Murphy argued as he and Clay had in spring 1948, that the United States should test the Soviets on highway, rail, and waterway routes to see if Stalin would resort to force. If he did, public opinion against the Soviets would worsen even more; if he did not, the West would succeed in enforcing its rights to Berlin access.322

Truman reacted characteristically to the discussion. He told Acting Secretary of

State James Webb, who was standing in for Acheson while he was in Paris for a Council of Foreign Ministers meeting, that he had no particular comment on the JCS paper. Like

Murphy, the twelve months since the beginning of the blockade did little to change

Truman’s mind about how best to approach Soviet moves, and it did not clarify Berlin’s place in U.S. interests. He still believed that the airlift was the best of bad choices, and he waited for someone, as Webb said, to “come up with a better option.” That included a surface plan that had a reasonable chance of success.323 Truman did not allow himself a blank check to define Berlin’s place in a larger U.S. strategy. Even months after successfully weathering the Soviet blockade, he and Acheson still worried if the

American people could stomach the financial costs of solving the German Question, or the potential for conflict in Western Europe.324

322 Memorandum, Murphy to the U.S. Delegation at the Council of Foreign Ministers, “Comments on JCS Analysis,” June 1, 1949, FRUS, 1949, III: 825-26. 323 Memorandum, James E. Webb, “Meeting with President, Tuesday, May 31, 1949,” FRUS, 1949, III: 819-20. 324 Memorandum of Conversation, Truman and Acheson, October 17, 1949, “Germany 1949” folder, box 4, Policy Planning Staff Country Files, 1947-1961, Entry A1-558CA, RG 59, NARA. 126

U.S. officials, therefore, from Truman to the State Department and Pentagon, had not changed their opinions of how best to approach Berlin in the wake of the blockade, despite that many of the advisors who Truman had relied upon during the crisis were gone by the end of it. Acheson had replaced Marshall as Secretary of State in January

1949. Under Secretary of State Lovett left government service the same month. At the

Pentagon, Louis Johnson replaced Forrestal in ; Royall left in April 1949, with named as his replacement. Stability was maintained because officials were, for the most part, promoted from within. More importantly, geographic realities transcended personnel changes, as did military and diplomatic limits. The strategy of using Berlin to undermine Soviet power in Eastern Europe, though vaguer than defined, remained. But what if the complexion of the Cold War competition changed? If U.S. policymakers failed to conceptualize Berlin as anything more than a location to defend, how would that affect the way the West would meet the myriad challenges that were on the horizon?

Post-blockade U.S. policy toward Berlin slowly came into focus only after pivotal structures of the Cold War were put into place, chiefly five events that occurred between

May 1949 and June 1950: the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, founding of West and

East Germany, conclusion of the Allied military occupation, and drafting of NSC 68.

Owing to these series of events, more parties had stakes in Berlin than before. The largest effect of the structures on U.S. strategy was that U.S. officials increasingly viewed Berlin more globally and less regionally by summer 1950. 127

The formation of NATO in Washington, D.C. on April 4, 1949 was an exclamation point on the containment strategy that surviving the blockade embodied.325

The military alliance was a European initiative, though, not American. Governments were concerned about the threat of communist subversion in their own countries as well as external Soviet aggression. To thwart these pressures, they had drafted the

Pact in March 1948, which later became the Western European Union Defense

Organization after the blockade. The signatories of the pact—Britain, France, , the , and Luxembourg—had hoped that the United States would join. An

American guarantee to political and military security in Europe, they hoped, would reinforce and indeed protect the work that the Marshall Plan was doing. Yet there were also larger, more structural goals. Externally, NATO’s founders intended it to deter another 1914 or 1939, not to liberate Europe; internally, they hoped the alliance would make obsolete Europe’s age-old fire starter, national sovereignty.326

NATO’s teeth, if it can be perceived as having any, reside in Article 5, the alliance’s mutual defense clause. In it, the member states consider any attack upon one of them as an attack on all twelve. From an American traditional standpoint, Article 5 was a paradigm shift, the first time since the fledgling days of the country that the United States

325 Ingo Trauschweizer, “Adapt and Survive: NATO in the Cold War,” in Grand Strategy and Military Alliances, eds. Peter R. Mansoor and Williamson Murray (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp. 166-195. 326 Lawrence S. Kaplan, The United States and NATO: The Formative Years (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984), pp. 2, 4-5. Francis H. Heller and John R. Gillingham (eds.), NATO: The Founding of the Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1992). For a solid narrative overview, see Sir Nicholas Henderson, The Birth of NATO (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983). 128 would not practice a policy of non-entanglement in European affairs.327 This became dually important when NATO moved the West’s defensive line from the French-German border to the zonal frontier. Shifting that line 200 miles east meant that strategists’ assumptions from 1947 were gone. With the creation of the alliance, the West could not muster a stand on the banks of the Rhine while a tactical withdrawal took place across the

English Channel and the Pyrenees, as member states like Holland and who found themselves on the other side of the river would find it unacceptable.328 A forward strategy was necessary if Europe was to be defended, and Germany would be the battlefield in what was sure to be a war of maneuver. 329 Structurally, then, NATO slowly became an integral component to containment, a veritable force multiplier for the United

States.

One month after the Allies signed the North Atlantic Treaty, the London

Agreement’s child was finally born when the Federal Republic of Germany was founded on May 23, 1949. The path toward a “restoration of responsible German government from the village to the state,” as Clay put it, had been through exclusively economic partnerships, first with the British and U.S. occupation zones combining to form Bizonia

327 Lawrence Kaplan, Entangling Alliances with None: American Foreign Policy in the Age of Jefferson (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1987); Ronald E. Powaski, The Entangling Alliance: The United States and European Security, 1950-1993 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), pp. 1-32. 328 For the first draft of these 1947 plans, see Planning Paper, Plans and Operations Division, July 31, 1947, “Course of Action of U.S. Forces in Europe in the Event the Soviets attack either the U.S. or U.K. Forces in Europe without Immediately Molesting the Other,” “P&O 381 TS (Section V-A) (Part I) (Case 88 Only) (Sub-Nos. 1-34)” folder, Box 102, Plans & Operations Division Decimal File, 1946-1948, RG 319, NARA. For the details of EUCOM’s eventual evacuation plan, see, in the same box and folder as prior, Planning Paper, September 30, 1947, “Joint Operations Plans for Operations in Event of Hostilities with the USSR.” For Churchill’s concurrence, see Letter, Churchill to Truman through Ambassador Douglas, August 14, 1950, FRUS, 1950, III: 207-08. 329 Lawrence W. Martin, “The American Decision to Rearm Germany,” in American Civil-Military Decisions, ed. Harold Stein (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1963), pp. 645-47. 129 and then the three Allied zones merging to form Trizonia. 330 From there, the Allies disagreed on what form a potential state should take, and asked the German minister- presidents for input, who initially balked at the offer, knowing it meant certain division of

Germany. Eventually, however, at the prodding of Clay and the urging of West Berlin governing mayor , the politicians set about creating the FRG, doing so with an eye to eventual reconciliation with the eastern zone, embodied in the measured language of the Basic Law.331

The communist reaction to the founding of the Federal Republic would come, but the more immediate and a long-lasting consequence occurred inside the Allied bloc. It cannot be understated the degree to which a West German government affected U.S. policy and strategy toward Berlin. With the gradual promotion of the Federal Republic to the table of nations—a promotion Clay and Washington engineered—the West Germans became yet another voice on Berlin matters, and often a third rail. For the Cold War’s duration, U.S. officials had to balance their own plans for Berlin with an ally who sometimes disagreed. The difficulty was the degree to which the United States would publicly invoke their rights as occupier in the city and chastise the Federal Republic, all the while not undercutting the government that Washington held as the true voice of all

Germans.

On this count, U.S. officials lost a considerable amount of sleep during the first fourteen years of the FRG’s existence thanks to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. Elected to

330 Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany: A Personal Report on the Four Crucial Years that Set the Course of Future World History (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1950), p. 393. 331 Smyser, Yalta to Berlin, pp. 89-91; Clay, Decision in Germany, pp. 409-11; Loth, Stalin’s Unwanted Child, p. 93. 130 that position on September 15, 1949 by a single vote in the , Adenauer became the most powerful politician in the newly-created West Germany at seventy-two years old, the leader of the Christian Democratic Union as well as chancellor. Blunt, shrewd, and inexhaustible, the “Old Man,” as both supporters and detractors referred to him, was fiercely western-leaning and anti-communist, but never at the expense of his own country. He refused to relegate the Federal Republic to merely a client of the Allies, which both delighted and frustrated Washington, especially Acheson.332 U.S. officials encouraged German independence, but often emitted frustrated exhales when Adenauer made public pronouncements that ran counter to Allied policy, which he did often and with considerable aplomb.333

On Berlin, there was considerable dissonance between the two parties, at least privately. A devout Catholic from the Rhineland, Adenauer disliked protestant and regarded Berlin as a “pagan city,” the center of Bismarck’s Kulturkampf against the

Catholic Church’s influence in Germany. To him, the old capital embodied the things that he despised: Prussianism, , extreme . All the better, then, that the

FRG capital was at Bonn, in his beloved Rhineland and far away from the , the boundary to what he considered the beginning of the Asiatic steppes began and called

Kartoffelland (potato country). 334 Throughout his tenure as chancellor, Adenauer found that he had to reconcile his personal views of Berlin with the national good. He was

332 Ronald J. Granieri, The Ambivalent Alliance: Konrad Adenauer, the CDU/CSU, and the West,1949- 1966 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003). 333 On this issue, see the numerous examples in Steven J. Brady, Eisenhower and Adenauer: Alliance Management under Pressure, 1953-1960 (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010). 334 Large, Berlin, pp. 412-13; Curtis Cate, The Ides of August: The Berlin Wall Crisis, 1961 (New York: M. Evans and Company, Inc., 1978), p. 93. 131 encouraged that Allied resolve toward the city proved tripartite trustworthiness—he just disagreed that Berlin was something worth fighting for if it stood in the way of German reunification.335

For the German communists, the city was indeed a worthwhile fight. The

Kremlin’s reply to the London Agreement formally came on October 7, 1949, with the founding of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Three days later, SMAG transferred its administrative functions to the new government. Whether Stalin actually wanted the state in the first place is up for debate.336 Regardless, it is clear that east

Germans formally moved toward a GDR in March 1949 at a session of the Volksrat, and as a response to two Western military and political developments: the publishing of the

NATO treaty, which co-chairman of the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED) Otto

Grotewohl called an “anti-democratic crusade;” and the initial draft of the Federal

Republic’s Basic Law, which Grotewohl also regarded as nothing more than turning

Germans into “playthings of policy based on [the] West powers’ commercial interest.”337

While the western German politicians soberly met the offer for their own government, a revolutionary zeal formed the GDR. The SED members, with First Secretary Walter

Ulbricht at the vanguard, saw statehood as the first step toward reunion. Apart from personal ambition, Ulbricht prepared the way for a out of an unquestioning belief in class struggle and a pledge to protect the democratic order, as he perceived it, in

335Charles Williams, Adenauer: The Father of the New Germany (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2000), pp. 465-85. 336 Loth, Stalin’s Unwanted Child. 337 Cable, Acting POLAD James Riddleberger to Acheson, March 21, 1949, FRUS, 1949, III: 510-11. Regarding discussions and drafting of the Basic Law, see Cable, Murphy to Acheson, March 2, 1949, FRUS, 1949, III: 217-20. 132 the eastern zone. After all, history was on his side, and the struggle for unity had to begin with a spirited defense against the western imperialists.338 He had undertaken that struggle with his colleague and first president of the GDR, , with whom he had worked inside the Comintern in Moscow during the 1930s and had flown, via the

Red Air Force, into Berlin in 1945 while fighting still raged to set up a new communist party in Germany.339 Ulbricht’s influence increased after 1949, as he was widely understood as Stalin’s man, placing him above reproach in the GDR’s fledgling years despite being impersonal, uncharismatic, and dogmatic.340 With such wide latitude, he would come to test Western and Soviet patience alike.

Berlin became even more complicated for the Truman administration after the creation of . Its founding did not surprise U.S. officials, but they could not have known at the time quite how its existence would affect relations.341 They correctly surmised political tension in Berlin would increase, given the Western Powers’ proximity to a new government.342 Having formal relations with East Germany was a non-starter, and the Allies agreed at a foreign ministers meeting on November 11, 1949 that they would discourage other nations from recognizing the regime, a policy the United States

338 Loth, Stalin’s Unwanted Child, pp. 95-99. 339 Pieck was Secretary of the Comintern while Ulbricht was the body’s German representative. 340 Gerhard Keiderling, ed. “Gruppe Ulbricht” in Berlin, April bis Juni 1945: Von den Vorbereigungen im Sommer 1944 bis zur Wiedergründung der KPD im Juni 1945, Eine Dokumentation (Berlin: Arno Spitz GmdH, 1993), p. 58-59; Applebaum, Iron Curtain, pp. 44-45, 50. Cable 762B.00/1-1950, POLAD to State Department, “Present Day SED Leadership in the Soviet Zone,” January 19, 1950, folder 1, box 3906, Central Decimal Files, 1950-1954, RG 59, NARA. 341 For the first assessment, see Cable, Chargé in the Soviet Union Foy Kohler to Acheson, March 29, 1949, FRUS, III: 511-13. For October 7 reports, see Cable, Maxwell Taylor to Acting Secretary of State, October 7, 1949, FRUS, 1949, III: 527-28; Cable, John J. McCloy to Acting Secretary of State, October 7, 1949, FRUS, 1949, III: 529-31. 342 Cable, Walworth Barbour to Acheson, October 13, 1949, FRUS, 1949, III: 533. 133 enforced throughout much of the Cold War.343 Aggravatingly to the West, the GDR claimed as its capital, a violation of quadripartite agreements but a clever tactical move. With their government housed in the historic capital, SED leaders could claim themselves the legitimate successor upon unification. For the time being, though, they set up camp in , an East Berlin borough. The West had to balance non- recognition of the state with a day-to-day operating relationship for city services while being careful not to grant de facto recognition.344 The East Germans tested this balance almost immediately, when they announced in January 1950 that they would now control

Allied permits on the East-West border. In conceptual terms, Berlin found itself carved up into yet more pieces, with another party seeking to use the city for its own ends.

The bodies that would have to face these new challenges began work in

September 1949, when the belated American transfer of power from military to civilian control in Germany took place. With the occupation over, the War Department dismantled OMGUS, and on its foundation the State Department built the U.S. High

Commissioner for Germany, or HICOG. There would be no Clay figure in the HICOG period—no single U.S. official outside of Washington would enjoy such formidable power over the making of German policy again. As a result, many of his era’s distinctive features of U.S. decision-making disappeared. The Cold War battles lines in Europe were

343 Cable, Acheson to Truman, November 11, 1949, FRUS, 1949, III: 305-06; Christian F. Ostermann, “‘Little Room for Maneuver’: Relations between the United States and the GDR,” in The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945–1990: A Handbook. Volume 1, 1945–1968, ed., Detlef Junker (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 172-73. 344 Cable, High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG) John J. McCloy to POLAD Riddleberger, October 27, 1949, FRUS, 1949, III: 536-37. 134 set, and Berlin’s place was defined. The United States had a formulated a strategy of waging that war, one that was changeable only from the Oval Office.345

John J. McCloy took over as the U.S. Government’s representative in Germany.

The former Assistant Secretary of War and key architect of the occupation had returned to Wall Street after the war before becoming the second president of the World Bank in

March 1947.346 He arrived at his Bad Godesberg office in September 1949 to a Germany that economically looked like the one he had designed back in 1945, not the pastoralized version that Morgenthau had pushed for and McCloy had opposed vehemently. A successful career in finance before government service had made him somewhat of an obvious choice to lead HICOG, given that Marshall Plan aid was finally coming on line for Europe via the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA). McCloy’s immediate superior was Dean Acheson, who had succeeded James Byrnes as secretary of state in

January 1949. The two men were close—they had been Harvard Law classmates and were fishing partners—and both were part of an exclusive group that had already played important roles in shaping U.S. national security policy.347 Acheson’s knowledge of

Berlin policy was deep. As Under Secretary of State for Stettinius, Byrnes, and Marshall, he became well acquainted with the evolving nature of the geopolitical struggle there.

With McCloy, his relationship with the city would only get deeper.348

345 For John J. McCloy’s own words on this changeover, see “From Military Government to Self- Government,” in Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944-1952, ed. Robert Wolfe (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1985), pp. 114-34. 346 Kai Bird, The Chairman, John J. McCloy: The Making of the American Establishment (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), pp. 271-307. 347 Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986); Robert Beisner, Dean Acheson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 139. 348 Bird, Chairman, pp. 308-88. For their wartime correspondence, see “War Department – Memos and Correspondence from JJM to Dean Acheson” folder, box DY1, John J. McCloy Papers, Amherst College. 135

In Berlin, Brig. Gen. Maxwell Taylor replaced Maj. Gen. Frank Howley as U.S. commandant. Despite his fame as commander of the from

Normandy to VE-Day, Taylor’s peers regarded him as a scholar soldier.349 He spent almost the entirety of the postwar period as West Point superintendent before being posted to U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR) as Lt. Gen. Clarence Huebner’s Deputy Chief of Staff in February 1949. He was in only briefly before McCloy asked for him personally to lead the U.S. contingent in Berlin, or how the High Commissioner referred to it, “a windy corner.”350 The two knew each other before the war, when

McCloy was Assistant Secretary of War and Taylor was on the War Plans Division staff and later in the Office of the Secretary of the General Staff.351

Berlin is an often-overlooked aspect in Taylor’s career, but he excelled there and played an important role in influencing how the United States approached the city during the 1950s. Before arriving on September 1, 1949, he made his presence felt as the architect of the U.S. Army’s organizational overhaul following the Office of Military

Government, Berlin Sector (OMGBS) handover. Now called USCOB, shorthand for U.S.

Commander, Berlin, Taylor served two masters. Organizationally, USCOB was deputy to both the U.S. civil and military leaders in West Germany. In political matters, he acted as

McCloy’s personal representative in the Kommandatura, which still met without Soviet

349 John M. Taylor, General Maxwell Taylor: The Sword and the Pen (New York: Doubleday, 1989). 350 Cecil Lyon, The Lyon’s Share (New York: Vantage Press, 1973), p. 221. 351 Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares (New York: W.W Norton & Company, 1972), p. 124. 136 representation. In military ones, he was deputy to CINCEUR at Heidelberg, who, by the time Taylor arrived, was Gen. Thomas Handy.352

The reorganization also blended civil and military authority beneath Taylor. He oversaw two subordinate organizations, the Berlin Military Post (BMP) and the Berlin

Element (BE). The former was the entirety of the U.S. Army in the city, a menagerie of support troops until the 6th Infantry Regiment arrived in October 1950, all tasked with deterring military aggression and preventing civil disturbances. The Berlin Element took over the political aspects of Howley’s military government. An administrative mirror of

HICOG and staffed with State Department officials, it still retained vestiges of military control. Taylor exercised governmental functions on McCloy’s behalf while Col. William

J. Babcock, Howley’s former deputy, served as its first deputy director. Effectively,

Babcock’s title was all that changed in the transfer, adding to the appearance that little had changed in Berlin, a perception and reality that Taylor never intended and worked to rectify. Taylor had been reluctant to direct HICOG activities in Berlin; he saw himself instead as a military commander first, and one whose primary responsibility was security of the city, not its administration. Upon Babcock’s sudden and unexpected death in

January 1950, Taylor took the opportunity to clarify civil-military relations: the newly- created director of the BE exercised direct control over HICOG activities, and reported to

USCOB. This meant that the Element’s director, in the words of a future one, Cecil Lyon, was “forced to run counter to the Biblical adage and serve two masters.” The more immediate result was that the State Department took on a more assertive course when

352 Elmer Plischke, Berlin: Development of its Government and Administration (Westport, CT.: Greenwood Press, 1970), pp. 62-66. 137 career diplomat Edward Page became the first director in April. The U.S. Army thereafter concentrated on security matters almost exclusively.353

Taylor viewed his time as USCOB as a masterclass in Cold War tactics, since the city contained all the elements of the global competition intermixed with Berlin’s local idiosyncrasies. Like Clay, he believed the Soviets would not risk direct military confrontation there, lest they incur the consequences elsewhere. Nonetheless, he viewed the city as a “beleaguered beachhead situated in a Red sea over a hundred miles from the nearest friendly coast,” and thus understood that the garrison was hopelessly vulnerable to political, economic, and psychological threats. As Taylor and U.S. policymakers conceived it, Berlin’s economy was the cornerstone of the city’s stability, as well as a vital component of European security and the development of the FRG.354 He invested much of his time cooperating with McCloy, his Allied counterparts, and German leaders and industrialists to rebuild Berlin’s destroyed and plundered production capacity and ensure that subversion could not undermine the Western position. 355 After February

1950, he did so mostly through HICOG’s Political and Economic Projects Committee, a group that sought to take the initiative in Berlin by devising ways to undercut Soviet and

GDR authority while advancing U.S. objectives, large and small.356

353 HICOG Field Organization Study, Research Project No. 112, “Direction of the Berlin Element,” July 1951, “Berlin Elections” folder, box 1, Miscellaneous Files Relating Primarily to Berlin, Office of the Executive Secretary, RG 466, NARA. Howard P. Jones, Howley’s Public Finance Bureau chief, was the interim director before Page. Lyon, Lyon’s Share, p. 221. 354 Taylor’s notes to Sherman briefing, March 27, 1950, “Maxwell D. Taylor—Speeches, Public Pronouncements, Briefings—2 Sep. 49-19 Jan. 51” folder, box 3, Maxwell Taylor Papers, National Defense University (hereafter NDU). 355 Taylor’s notes to Acheson briefing, “Berlin Situation,” November 14, 1949, “Maxwell D. Taylor— Speeches, Public Pronouncements, Briefings—2 Sep. 49-19 Jan. 51” folder, box 3, Maxwell Taylor Papers, NDU. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, pp. 124-25. 356 HICOG Study, “Context of a Program for PEPCO,” undated, FRUS, 1950, IV: 643-653. 138

The sum of these organizational changes was bureaucratic and psychological.

Clay had shuttled between his offices in Frankfurt and Berlin, but he spent a considerable time in the latter. McCloy trusted Taylor’s abilities, and he rarely traveled to Berlin. By design, he relied instead on communication from USCOB and the Berlin Element to brief

Acheson and then form policies after consulting with the Pentagon.357 In times of potential crisis, Taylor reported directly to Acheson, but it was not common practice.

This distance between the city and Washington was effectively increased. The added levels of interdepartmental communication, mixed with the time it took to make decisions of consequence, created a lethargy in U.S. policymaking Berlin after 1950.358 For those personnel in the city, the result was the impression that they inhabited a position that increasingly felt like an outpost—even more than it had before.

That distance appeared to grow even more upon the shocking news that the Soviet

Union had successfully detonated an atomic device in August 1949. Nuclear weapons were, above all the issues that dominated U.S. officials’ conversations in Washington at the beginning of 1950, of paramount importance.359 To add insult to injury, the second of the dual shocks occurred in October, when slipped away into the communist camp and consummated a Sino-Soviet relationship a few months later. Of the two, the nuclear question was more pressing to the administration, leading Truman to create a JCS-State

Department study group in January 1950 to undertake a review of Soviet nuclear

357 McCloy outlined how HICOG would be different than OMGUS in Memorandum of Conversation, July 30, 1949, “Top Secret Documents” folder, box 1, Top Secret General Records, 1949-52, RG 466, NARA. 358 Lucius Clay bemoaned this point later, in reference to the Wall Crisis. He put the troubles beginning after 1951. Jean Edward Smith, Lucius D. Clay: An American Life (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1990), pp. 647-48. 359 Marc Trachtenberg, “A ‘Wasting Asset’: American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 1949- 1954,” International Security, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Winter 1988-1989): 5-49. 139 capabilities and their effect on U.S. policies and objectives. Moscow’s attainment of an atomic weapon did not automatically pose a threat for war. As Acheson’s advisors put it to him, it was “of cardinal importance” but not “a direct military matter” until the Soviets attained a stockpile.360 The end of the atomic monopoly was nonetheless a strategic matter for the United States. With the cudgel of a nuclear arsenal now gone, the strategic advantage that underwrote Berlin’s security appeared at stake.

The result was NSC 68, a paper whose primary author was George Kennan’s successor at the Policy Planning Staff, Paul Nitze. Whether Nitze’s conclusions were antithetical to either declared or widely-held policy views inside Washington is open for debate, but it is true that he endorsed an explosion in defense spending at a time when

Truman and Louis Johnson sought to curb it—a $40 billion budget, triple of what was set for 1950.361 NSC 68’s authors argued that the Soviet threat was more urgent than before.

Stalin’s military buildup, the JCS reported, had shifted the balance of military power and meant that he was now capable of attacking Western Europe without warning.362 To counter, NSC 68 argued for a perpetually mobilized military, one prepared for all contingencies, rather than relying on nuclear deterrence and mobilization potential to wage the Cold War as Truman had been advocating.363

360 Telegram, U.S. delegation at Tripartite Preparatory Meetings to Acheson, May 4, 1950, FRUS: 1950, III: 962. 361 For diverging views, see Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, pp. 89-126 and Leffler, Preponderance of Power, pp. 355-60. Most military historians concentrate on the budget battles. See Kenneth W. Condit, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Volume II, 1947-1949 (Washington, D.C., Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996), pp. 110-15; Walter S. Poole, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Volume IV, 1950-1952 (Washington, D.C., Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1998), pp. 10-12. 362 Poole, Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, p. 6; Norman Friedman, The Fifty-Year War: Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), p. 137. 363 Hogan, Cross of Iron, pp. 265-314. 140

Undergirding these warnings was Nitze’s belief—again, not unlike Kennan—that

Moscow had a “hostile design” of imposing its authority on the world, and that that threat would rise exponentially once the Soviets augmented their arsenal with nuclear weapons.

NSC 68 presented four possible courses in response, though there was only one real choice, the last one: a build-up of political, economic, and military strength.364 Nitze’s detractors, starting with Kennan, mistakenly view the military buildup as the Policy

Planning Staff’s misguided end rather than the crucial means to a strategic end that it was.365 They miss a key point of how Nitze conceived of politico-military strategy and the use of military power. Nitze assumed Moscow had a hostile design to impose its authority on the world, and he believed nuclear weapons would embolden the Kremlin to take risks while simultaneously paralyzing U.S. initiative and fracturing Allied cohesion.

He and military planners did not believe Stalin would use nuclear weapons in an attack.366 As he saw it, the value of such weaponry, was in diplomacy, not war. Superior military power, which a nuclear monopoly ensured, allowed the United States to maneuver the diplomatic sphere with some freedom, since Moscow could not afford to call Washington’s bluff. Preponderant U.S. power also comforted allies. For three years, deterrence was the cornerstone of European security, particularly the U.S. Air Force’s capability of dropping atomic weapons over the Soviet Union without a symmetric response from the Kremlin. Officials therefore assumed that strategic air power could do

364 NSC 68, “A Report to the President Pursuant to the President’s Directive of January 31, 1950,” April 7, 1950, FRUS, 1950, I: 235-92. 365 Samuel Wells, “Sounding the Tocsin: NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat,” International Security, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Autumn 1979): 116–158. On Kennan’s views, see John Lewis Gaddis, George F. Kennan: An American Life (New York, Penguin, 2011), pp. 389-92. 366 See Nitze study for Secretary of State, February 8. 1950, FRUS: 1950, I: 145. 141 the heavy lifting of containment. Once the Soviet Union built a nuclear arsenal, however, the Kremlin could be emboldened, both in diplomatic relations with the West and in subverting governments that lay outside their sphere. With military superiority gone, containment was effectively built on sand. Balanced forces, as the Army had been arguing, was Nitze’s answer. 367

The shift in balance also created a rising threat of general war due to superpower miscalculation in local areas. Prior to NSC 68, Nitze had argued that an improvement of

Soviet status in the world—the development of an atomic bomb, an increase in economic production, a consolidation of its control of Eastern Europe, and an increase in political prestige within Russia—was giving the Kremlin newfound confidence, which could make for reckless actions.368 His analysis was not dissimilar from what Kennan had argued two years prior during the March war scare.369 The Cold War, however, was no longer confined to Europe, and was on the verge of being waged in new areas, geographically and psychologically.

What did this mean for Berlin? The city was never mentioned by name in NSC

68, but it was a crucial specter when Nitze and the Policy Planning Staff assessed risks and objectives. NSC 68’s direct effect on U.S. policy toward Berlin was more psychological than material. After all, there was little that a ballooned budget could do to alter the strategic situation there. The superpowers had been successful in averting open

367 Leffler, Preponderance of Power, pp. 355-57. John Lewis Gaddis and Paul Nitze, “NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat Reconsidered Author,” International Security, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Spring, 1980): 164-176. David T. Fautua, “The ‘Long Pull’ Army: NSC 68, the Korean War, and the Creation of the Cold War U.S. Army,” Journal of Military History, Vol. 61, No. 1 (Jan. 1997): 93-120. 368 Nitze study for Secretary of State, February 8. 1950, FRUS: 1950, I: 145-46. 369 Kennan to Marshall and Lovett, March 15, 1948, FRUS: 1948, III: 848-49. 142 conflict with one another, but Iran, Greece, and Berlin had proven that local issues did have the potential to spin out of control and spark at least a . U.S. policymakers had also dealt with these cases individually. The foundational philosophy behind NSC 68 placed Berlin inside a larger Cold War strategy, which broke from a crucial notion of Kennan’s containment. Kennan believed that the United States need not defend everywhere against Soviet incursion since changes in the international balance of power would only come because of an imbalance in the superpowers’ respective industrial-military capabilities. Deterring Moscow, his thought went, could come through protecting strongpoints in conjunction with political and economic means, a category into which Berlin fell. Nitze and the NSC 68 writers agreed that Berlin was vital, but they rejected Kennan’s belief in the sources of geopolitical instability because it discounted the role psychological concerns played in decision making as well as the necessity to distinguish between vital and peripheral interests.370 Perception mattered as much as reality in the superpower competition. Moscow’s narrative was that it enjoyed predominant conventional power over the West, and was prepared to use it to advance its goals. Whether that was true was immaterial. If the West failed to respond in the war of perception, its image, prestige, and credibility would be damaged, tipping the balance of power. In the new world of NSC 68, then, Berlin was no longer a selected strongpoint of

U.S. power projection but a potential weak point in the U.S. perimeter defense. That argument may have been academic in spring 1950, but it was soon a practical problem.

370 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, pp. 91-92. 143

The View of Korea from Germany

Prior to June 1950, U.S. officials relied on a strategy of withstanding Soviet harassment to contain communism, built on the belief that Moscow would not escalate pressure to the point of war. After 90,000 North Korean soldiers crossed into Republic of

Korea territory in early morning on June 25, 1950, that assumption seemed questionable.

The situation in East Asia quickly became dire. Seoul fell within three days. The United

Nations unsuccessfully compelled North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung to pull his men back across the 38th Parallel. By August, the UN forces sent to South Korea’s aid were on the edge of defeat, clinging to the southeastern corner of the Korean peninsula. For several years, the West had been involved in tense posturing in Europe, prepared for war but not expecting one. U.S. officials had thought the same was true for Korea, but Kim’s invasion had proven them wrong. The United States now found itself involved in a shooting war, and far from where they anticipated a strike would come.371

Counterintuitively, it was disconcerting for U.S. officials that it was not the Red

Army flowing into South Korea. From Washington, it appeared Stalin had now devised a way to indirectly attack capitalist states. With proxies, the Kremlin could achieve their goals—clearly with conventional military means if need be—and claim it all a product of a popular, worldwide revolution, not Soviet design.372 What those officials did not know was that the initiative of military action, per William Stueck, was “squarely on Kim’s

371 William J. Webb, The Korean War: The Outbreak, 27 June - 15 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1995), pp. 9-11. For other works on operations, see Allan Millett, The War for Korea, 1950-1951: They Came from the North (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010); House, Military History of the Cold War, pp. 164-208. 372 Telegram, Acheson to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices, June 26, 1950, FRUS, 1950, VII: 166. 144 side.”373 When U.S. officials surveyed the situation, most of Washington agreed with the service secretaries that Korea revealed the Soviets had “moved openly into the use of force through puppets in their attack on the non-Communist world,” and there needed to be an “urgent and frank re-appraisal of the global position of the United States military potential.”374 It was an important assumption, and colored the U.S. reaction in Europe throughout the next months.

Policymakers struggled to understand Moscow’s timing. The Army reckoned that the Soviets feared an ever-closing window of opportunity to spread communism. A U.S. assistance package for Korea was close, which promised to stabilize the political, economic, and military strength of the regime in Seoul and block a communist revolution. 375 There was already precedence for Army officials to believe that Moscow was acting from a position of weakness. Moreover, the blockade of Berlin two years prior had been Stalin’s attempt—albeit one short of war—to stop the creation of an independent West German state. With his lesson learned in Europe, the analysts’ reasoning went, why would Stalin not take a different, stronger tack in Asia, especially when it did not involve his own troops? More worrying was the possibility that Stalin was not operating out of position of weakness but one of strength, as Nitze had warned.

Most analysts still agreed that, despite the heightened risk for general war, Stalin did not

373 William Stueck, The Korean War: An International History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 31. 374 Memorandum by the service secretaries to Secretary of Defense Johnson, August 1, 1950, FRUS, 1950, I: 353-55. 375 Cable, Dept. of Army to CINCEUR, USCOB, USFA Rear, Ryukyus Command, CINCFE, COMGENFEAF, USACG, TRUST, June 28, 1950, “June 1950 Top Secret Document McCloy Project TS (50) 40 to TS (50) 49” folder, box 2, Top Secret General Records, Records of the High Commissioner, RG 466, NARA. 145 desire one. Instead, as U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Alan Kirk argued, the

Kremlin was using a dual policy of “blandishment and threat.” Moscow’s concerted effort to cultivate a war scare while simultaneously depicting itself as the one true mediator of global peace could isolate the United States from its allies, depending upon how Washington responded to threats. If these were the new circumstances within which the United States had to operate, actions in one part of the world did indeed have consequences in another.376

The lack of devising a clear policy toward Berlin in the wake of the blockade became acute for those in Germany. Like Washington, HICOG and EUCOM saw the invasion as Kremlin-directed. Worryingly, there were few places in the world that resembled Germany’s division as did Korea, and there was little they could do in immediate reaction. McCloy ordered his staff to remain silent; CINCEUR Gen. Thomas

Handy placed his command on alert, and ordered round-the-clock border surveillance at possible Soviet avenues of approach to the FRG, all without alarming the German population.377 Korea made Handy nervous, so much that he complained to his director of intelligence that the British were being too quiet sharing information. As far as the British

Army of the Rhine was concerned, conflict in Korea posed no threat to Europe.378 Inside

376 Telegram, Kirk to Acheson, August 11, 1950, FRUS, 1950, I: 1230. 377 For McCloy’s reaction, see Bird, Chairman, pp. 338-39. For McCloy’s order, see Memo, HICOG staff meeting, June 29, 1950, “Mr. McCloy” folder, box 5, Miscellaneous Files Relating to Berlin, Office of the Executive Secretary, RG 466, NARA; Cable, CINCEUR to Constabulary Heidelberg, June 29, 1949, “June 1950 Top Secret Document McCloy Project TS (50) 40 to TS (50) 49” folder, box 2, Top Secret General Records, Records of the High Commissioner, RG 466, NARA. See also, in same box and folder as preceding, Cable, CINCEUR to USAFE, MA Paris, CINCEUR Berlin, COMNAVFORAGER Heidelberg, June 30, 1950.” 378 Cable 762B.00/7-1950, USPOLAD Heidelberg to State Department, July 24, 1950, folder 2, box 3906, Central Decimal Files, 1950-1954, RG 59, NARA. 146

U.S. planning circles, though, the invasion affirmed a growing belief prior to Korea that the Soviets were shifting their expansionist strategy from direct confrontation with the

West to operating through proxies. Two weeks before war erupted in Korea, the Berlin

Element had predicted such a change was on the horizon. In a June 9 memo, the Area

Affairs Division chief, George A. Morgan, drafted a study on the possible actions short of war that the Soviet and East Germans could use to drive the Allies out of the city, a paper that would eventually find its way in expanded form onto McCloy’s desk.379 In Morgan’s estimation, Moscow was undertaking a “world-revolutionary offensive,” one that relied on standard Soviet tactics of politically, economically, and ideologically isolating enemies before using force. In Germany, this was likely to take the form of a unilateral peace treaty, which would lead to the end of the occupation and the beginning of East

German sovereignty. This could allow plausible deniability in a new Berlin campaign, one that would operate behind the façade of GDR independent action. Morgan’s analysis was prescient, and foreshadowed the crux of U.S. anxieties eight years later. Officials also worried that open conflict anywhere could have wide-reaching security ramifications for Europe, particularly in Berlin. Morgan warned that if American “attention and resources are absorbed in other areas such as the Far East,” the Kremlin might “advance its time-table for Berlin and take greater risks than it otherwise would.”380

379 For Morgan’s expanded analysis, which was intended to brief McCloy on Korea’s effect on Germany for the next ambassadorial meeting, see “Appraisal of Next Soviet Moves in Germany,” July 10, 1950, “Page Hold” folder, box 5, Miscellaneous Files Relating to Berlin, Office of the Executive Secretary, RG 466, NARA. 380 Memorandum, “USSR/GDR action, short of war, to drive the Allies from Berlin,” Area Affairs Division to Director of Intelligence, Berlin Element, June 9, 1950, “Page Hold” folder, box 5, Miscellaneous Files Relating to Berlin, Office of the Executive Secretary, RG 466, NARA. 147

Morgan’s estimates aligned with the NSC staff, who submitted a draft paper to the

Council on July 1 about possible further Soviet moves in light of Korea that later became

NSC 73. In their estimation, the Soviet gambit was to induce an American exit from Asia without creating a superpower showdown.381 In that assessment, they were correct. North

Korea and China would both have to fail before Stalin would contemplate employing Red

Army troops. Planners anticipated the Soviets to make use of their free hands. While proxies fought the United States, there was a good chance that Moscow would probe U.S. resolve in Germany and Austria, two areas they deemed “sensitive points.” There was question about whether the Soviets had already begun testing in Berlin, since they were denying electric power generated in their sector to the western boroughs. The staff did not rule out an increase in harassment in the city, including another blockade.382 Acheson did not either. Yet the situation in 1950 was different than two years before. As he had argued in the NSC meeting in May 1949, Acheson believed another airlift would be ineffective, owing to aircraft needs elsewhere and decreased British capabilities. The likelihood was that the Americans would now have to rely on busting the blockade with a convoy, the option that Foggy Bottom and the Pentagon had repeatedly shot down but

Acheson had urged be studied one year prior. These questions prompted the State

Department to order McCloy on July 2 to submit a paper on possible Soviet moves

381 George Kennan disagreed, and argued that Korea was merely a consolidation of power. August 8, 1950 Memorandum to Acheson, enclosure to August 14 letter to Alfred Gruenther, “[TOP SECRET Correspondence] (1)” folder, box 1, Alfred M. Gruenther Papers, DDEL. 382 Draft report, NSC 73, “The Position and Actions of the United States with Respect to Possible Further Soviet Moves in the Light of the Korean Situation,” July 1, 1950, FRUS, 1950, I: 331-38. 148 against Berlin and American responses. Unbeknownst to Acheson, HICOG was already preparing one.383

The Cold War’s increasing interconnectedness meant Berlin transformed from a regional problem into a global one. Decision makers did not believe the superpower competition had moved on to another part of the world; for them, it was an expansion of the competition, not a change of location. War in Korea thus intensified Western fears that the Soviets may once again threaten their most vulnerable position. Until they could conceptualize Berlin’s place in that contest and the lengths to which either side would go to deny the other all the city, they were guarded and saw global challenges as inherently tied to its safety.384

Taylor was the architect of Berlin’s defense in the post-blockade period. He had arrived at the same conclusions as others regarding the altered U.S. strategic calculus in

Berlin. The creation of the GDR was, as he characterized it, a Soviet “cat’s paw” to be used against the city and the Allies; a newly-created paramilitary force, the

Bereitschaften, was “the claws for the East German cat’s paw.”385 The Bereitschaften occupied much of his attention since he became USCOB. A police force in name only, the unit was 90,000 strong, with rumored plans of expanding.386 On paper, it was

383 Cable, Acheson to McCloy, July 4, 1950, “July 1950 Top Secret Documents McCloy Project TS (50)50 to TS (50)64” folder, box 2, Top Secret General Records, Records of the High Commissioner RG 466, NARA. 384 For a solid look at how Korea affected Berlin, generally from the level of the NSC, see David Coleman, “The Berlin-Korea Parallel: Berlin and American National Security in Light of the Korea War,” Australasian Journal of American Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1 (July 1999): 19-41. 385 Memorandum, Taylor to HICOG and EUCOM, “A Review of Berlin Situation,” August 10, 1950, “Page Hold” folder, box 5, Miscellaneous Files Relating to Berlin, Office of the Executive Secretary, RG 466, NARA. 386 The Allies could not actually agree on concrete numbers. HICOG initially estimated a wildly unspecific number of “between 45 and 500,000 men.” Summary of Record of Ambassadors at Rome, March 22-24, 149 intended as a riot and anti- force, but its disposition, organization, and equipment effectively made it the East German army, six years before such a force was formally established. The Bereitschaften was composed of five groups, housed in barracks across the GDR, and, most worrying to U.S. planners and officials in Berlin, had one tank and one motorized division for each group.387

Conceivably, the East Germans could be the force that the Soviet Union used in

Europe as part of their new proxy war strategy. That potential had already given Taylor a scare in late May 1950, when the socialist Free German Youth planned a 50-60,000- member march through East and West Berlin. HICOG and USCOB—and indeed

Acheson—feared that the so-called Deutschlandtreffen was merely the first in a series of pressures on the city that would eventually peak in a “summer battle with the East” to drive the Allies out of Berlin and Vienna. In this opening play of Moscow’s supposed new strategy, McCloy and Taylor expected the Bereitschaften was spoiling for a fight with counter-demonstrators, giving them the opportunity to display their power or serve as a pretense for a popular uprising. There was also the more immediate threat of the group simply overthrowing the city government. 388 The rally was ultimately peaceful,

1950, FRUS, 1950, III: 811. McCloy’s staff later estimated the Bereitschaften was at 90,000, and could be at 100,000 by May 1951. Cable 762B.00/8-1550, “SovZone Report No. 19,” August 15, 1950, folder 2, box 3906, Central Decimal Files, 1950-1954, RG 59, NARA; Memorandum, HICOG, “A Review of the Berlin Situation,” August 24, 1950, “HICOG-EUCOM Meeting, August 28, 1950” folder, box 3, Office of the Executive Director, General Hay’s Files, 1949-1951, RG 466, NARA. The British put the number at 150,000 by September 1950. Personal Message from Bevin to Acheson via Hoyer Millar, September 4, 1950, FRUS, 1950, III: 264-65. 387 Cable, McCloy to Byroade, August 18, 1950, “August 1950 Top Secret Documents McCloy Project TS (50) 65 to TS (50) 100” folder, box 2, Top Secret General Records, Records of the High Commissioner RG 466, NARA. 388 Cable, Byroade (for Acheson) to McCloy, February 9, 1950, FRUS, 1950, IV: 824-25; Paper for Ambassadors’ Meeting at Rome, Louis A. Weisner, Office of German Political Affairs, “Berlin,” March 13, 1950,” FRUS, 1950, IV: 829-32; Summary of Record of Ambassadors at Rome, March 22-24, 1950, FRUS, 1950, III: 811, 814; Cable 762B.00/2-450, Taylor to State Department, February 4, 1950, folder 1, 150 but the Allies continued to eye the Bereitschaften warily until Korea, when officials’ outlook went from cautious to concerned. It was around this time that the Western

Powers created the Allied Staff, Berlin, a combined committee that developed coordinated plans for Berlin’s defense. Now there was the real potential Moscow and

East Berlin would use the unit as a battering ram rather than a Trojan horse.389

Though the rally occupied Taylor’s attention from a military standpoint, there were political problems that also troubled him, the same ones that Morgan’s memo portended. That same month, there were reports that Moscow would announce a peace treaty with Germany.390 While that did not come to pass, a GDR-Polish treaty did, which set the Oder-Neisse line as the frontier between the two states. Between July 20-24, the

SED held their Third Party Congress, at which they took the final step in adopting the orthodox Soviet-style party; a Central Committee now replaced party leadership, and

Ulbricht became General Secretary and de facto head of the GDR.391 These actions were troubling for two reasons. First, such changes moved the Soviets to the background in

box 3906, Central Decimal Files, 1950-1954, RG 59, NARA. For U.S. assumptions of changing Soviet tactics in Europe, see “Appraisals of Soviet Objectives and Tactics in Europe on Short Term Basis,” FRUS, 1950, III: 821-24; Paper Prepared in the Office of the High Commissioner for Germany, undated, FRUS, 1950, IV: 646-48. For the intelligence war, see David E. Murphy, Sergei A. Kondrashev, and George Bailey, Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 106. 389 For assessment on the eve of the rally, see Cable 762B.00/5-2550, Page to Acheson, May 25, 1950, folder 2, box 3906, Central Decimal Files, 1950-1954, RG 59, NARA. For post-rally assessment, see Cable, Page to HICOG, June 2, 1950, FRUS, 1950, IV: 861-62. Memorandum, Taylor to HICOG and EUCOM, “A Review of Berlin Situation,” August 10, 1950, “Page Hold” folder, box 5, Miscellaneous Files Relating to Berlin, Office of the Executive Secretary, RG 466, NARA. Donald A. Carter, Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951-1962 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 2015), pp. 77- 78. 390 Memorandum, Byroade to Under Secretary of State Webb, “Possible Announcement of GDR–USSR Peace Treaty,” May 23, 1950, FRUS, 1950, IV: 952-55. 391 Peter Grieder, The East German Leadership, 1946-73: Conflict and Crisis (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1999), pp. 24, 53. 151 internal and external politics, complicating a variety of issues for the Allies. Second, they could disrupt the FRG's consolidation into the West, as the GDR-Soviet propaganda played on German nationalism generally and unification specifically.

Inaction on issues after the last Foreign Ministers meeting in May 1950 motivated

Taylor to influence tripartite discussion of Berlin. Out of that London conference had come an Allied statement on the city and its relationship to the German Question. In the days before Korea, the Western governments were concerned less with defensive plans and more with ensuring that Berlin was a strong democratic bulwark against communism.

To achieve this objective, tripartite officials endeavored to decrease , which stood at 300,000 people, or 28 percent of the population. 392 These measures would not only lessen the burden on the Allied taxpayers but also serve the military purpose of acting as a defensive measure, as it would make the city less susceptible to communist subversion eroding its stability. Moreover, the arrangement could tie Bonn and Berlin closer together, and in some way, make the city the twelfth FRG state through economics.393 The plan would only be successful, however, if free communications between Berlin and the Western Zones could be maintained, a reality that the foreign ministers recognized in their statement. They charged the Allied High Commission

(HICOM) with ensuring that effective countermeasures be taken if the Soviets harassed the city. It was Taylor’s responsibility to develop U.S. retaliation plans in Berlin, a task

392 Summary of Record of Ambassadors at Rome, March 22-24, 1950, FRUS, 1950, III: 811-13; Papers for Ambassadors’ Meeting at Rome, March 22-24, FRUS, 1950, IV: 831. 393 For the HICOG plan to have the FRG and Berlin mutually support one another’s economies, see Paper Prepared in the Office of the High Commissioner for Germany, undated, FRUS, 1950, IV: 646-48. 152 he found complicated and frustrating.394 This policy for the city fed into what the Allies were doing globally, attempting to create a mutually-reinforcing strategy of Western military preparedness while, if the need arose, blocking Soviet exports to stunt the bloc’s ability to wage war.395

The High Commissioners had responded to the foreign ministers’ orders by creating the Berlin Joint Committee, a tripartite body tasked with planning reprisals in the event of Soviet interference. As was the case with most intergovernmental bodies responsible for Berlin planning, indecision reigned; it was difficult to form an opinion inside one headquarters, let alone three. The group was never effectual, and bogged when they could not agree on a staff. Taylor vented his frustrations to McCloy about the Berlin

Joint Committee, and complained that petty squabbling inside HICOG was obstructing the formation of economic reprisals. As far as he was concerned, the Soviets had already begun a new campaign against Berlin when they began seizing parcels inside the city bound for the Federal Republic. In Taylor’s mind, the actions were more than harassment; they were probes to learn how the Allies would react to further restrictions on communications. It was hardly a Bereitschaften incursion, but without a consensus on

394 Telegram, U.S. Delegation at the Tripartite Preparatory Meetings to Acheson, May 4, 1950, FRUS, 1950, III: 920-23; Paper Agreed upon by the Foreign Ministers, May 22, 1950, FRUS, 1950, III: 1091-92. For evidence of Taylor’s exasperation, see Letter, Taylor to McCloy, August 21, 1950, “Joint Berlin Committee” folder, box 5, Office of the Executive Director, General Hay’s Files, 1949-1951, RG 466, NARA. 395 Telegram, Acheson to Acting Secretary, May 9, 1950, FRUS, 1950, III: 1013-18. This strategy was defined at the New York FM meeting. See the Agreed Minutes on East-West Trade, September 26, 1950, FRUS, 1950, III: 1300-01. See also Telegram, State Department to HICOG, September 21, 1950, “September 1950 Top Secret Documents McCloy Project TS (50) 101 to TS (50) 116” folder, box 2, Top Secret General Records, RG 466, NARA. Eleanor Dulles, “General Comment on Visit to Berlin, June 12 to 23,” June 25, 1953, “Germany and Berlin, 1950-1953” folder, box 12, Eleanor Lansing Dulles Papers, DDEL. 153 how to strike back, the Allies were potentially risking their entire long-term program for the city.396

Taylor defined these problems and proposed courses of action in an August 10 study that he sent to McCloy and Handy. He could not have known it at the time, but his paper would serve as the basis for Allied discussion about Berlin policy. His prediction was the same as what Morgan had warned: GDR officials would claim sovereignty after the October 1950 general election, giving them control of Berlin access; they would then declare the Allies were in the city illegally, demand they evacuate, and then impose a blockade.397 Taylor’s task was to devise a response to this changing nature of the competition in Berlin. Prior to Korea, the garrison could be small, as it had only one enemy, the Red Army, and merely had to deter general war. The question after Korea was whether deterring general war was the same as discouraging proxy war.

There were limiting factors with which he had to deal. If the East Germans did impose a blockade, the war in East Asia severely limited Allied responses in Berlin. With

U.S. Air Force aircraft and materiel leaving Europe for Asia, another airlift would be difficult, making the city even more vulnerable than it outwardly appeared. The security assumptions made inside the NSC in May 1949, as well as a commercial airlift plan that

Taylor had been formulating with the Allies since March 1950, were now put into question.398 There was little hope, too, that the garrison could be reinforced with U.S.

396 Letter, Taylor to McCloy, August 21, 1950, “Joint Berlin Committee” folder, box 5, Office of the Executive Director, General Hay’s Files, 1949-1951, RG 466, NARA. 397 Memorandum, Taylor to HICOG and EUCOM, “A Review of Berlin Situation,” August 10, 1950, “Page Hold” folder, box 5, Miscellaneous Files Relating to Berlin, Office of the Executive Secretary, RG 466, NARA. 398 For the airlift plan, see Memorandum, Taylor to Page, “Kommandatura Paper on Requirement for Standby Air Freight Lift,” April 22, 1950, “Commercial Airlift” folder, box 2, Miscellaneous Files Relating 154

Army units, given USAREUR’s needs, or if an increase of American troops would make any difference in the city, either from a deterrent or an actual defensive standpoint.

Indeed, he later estimated that the Berlin garrison would need an additional 100 Allied battalions to have any hope of defending the Western sectors.399

Taylor’s answer to these dilemmas was to strike at the perceived Soviet program before it had time to be put into action. As the GDR was the linchpin in a possible communist takeover, so it was the Soviet weak spot. Taylor believed that the Allies had to convince Moscow that the timing was not right for the East Germans to declare sovereignty, or to demonstrate that the Soviet Union would pay dearly, either in Berlin or elsewhere in the world, if anything were to happen in the city. Understanding that inducing certain Kremlin behavior was somewhat passive, Taylor also suggested more active responses such as discrediting the GDR and resisting any of the regime’s attempts to prove their legitimacy in relations with the West.

Combining deterrent theatrics with tangible military preparations, Taylor suggested that the Allies study the feasibility of expanding German police to create a paramilitary and home-guard force. To him, a “reliable police force” was “necessary for

to Berlin, Office of the Executive Secretary, RG 466, NARA. For Taylor’s worries about Korea’s effect on the airlift, see Memorandum, Taylor to HICOG and EUCOM, “A Review of Berlin Situation,” August 10, 1950, “Page Hold” folder, box 5, Miscellaneous Files Relating to Berlin, Office of the Executive Secretary, RG 466, NARA. 399 Paper prepared by HICOG, CINCEUR, and USCOB, “A Review of the Berlin Situation,” August 29, 1950, FRUS, 1950, IV: 885. Hans-Jürgen Schraut, “U.S. Forces in Germany, 1945-1955,” in: U.S. Military Forces in Europe: The Early Years, 1945-1950, eds. Simon W. Duke and Wolfgang Krieger (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 153-180. Phillip A. Karber and Jerald A. Combs, “The United States, NATO, and the Soviet Threat to Western Europe: Military Estimates and Policy Opinions, 1945-1963,” Diplomatic History Vol. 22, No. 3 (Summer 1998): 399-429. 155 the control of the Commies in Berlin.”400 The militarization of a force had grown out of necessity after the creation of the Bereitschaften. The Federal Republic had been already inching toward a gendarmerie before Korea, which had sparked several skirmishes between Bonn and Washington. Adenauer pushed for a force, ostensibly to protect against the Bereitschaften but also for his own political purpose of legitimizing his government. The trouble for Adenauer was that external security was a matter for the Allies to decide due to the Basic Law, and McCloy and Acheson resisted because of the political minefield of German rearmament. Ultimately, the West German self-defense force was stillborn, but it did pave the way for a militarization of police inside Berlin along the lines of, as Taylor perceived it, the U.S. National Guard.401 Allied officials, including the Joint Chiefs, agreed with Taylor’s tentative plans to expand the police, as did Reuter and President of the Berlin Assembly . In a few months’ time, the regular police were rearmed, its ranks grown by 3,000 men, and a volunteer reserve force of 6,000 added.402

Taylor also lobbied for a unified command in the city, doing so outside of his

August 10 paper. The issue had preoccupied him since he arrived in Berlin. Allied

400 Speech, Maxwell Taylor, “Method Used in Berlin to suppress Communist activities in West Sect.,” September 20, 1950, “Maxwell D. Taylor—Speeches, Public Pronouncements, Briefings—2 Sep. 49-19 Jan. 51” folder, box 3, Taylor Papers, NDU. 401 David Clay Large, Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); A. J. Birtle, Rearming the Phoenix: U.S. Military Assistance to the Federal Republic of Germany, 1950–1960 (New York: Garland, 1991). For the documentary evidence, see “July 1950 Top Secret Documents McCloy Project TS (50)50 to TS (50)64” folder, box 2, Top Secret General Records, Records of the High Commissioner, RG 466, NARA. For Taylor’s recommendations about a Berlin police force, see Memorandum, Taylor to HICOG and EUCOM, “A Review of Berlin Situation,” August 10, 1950, “Page Hold” folder, box 5, Miscellaneous Files Relating to Berlin, Office of the Executive Secretary, RG 466, NARA. 402 Cable, Taylor to HICOG, October 7, 1950, FRUS, 1950, IV: 891-93. See also Minutes, Joint Allied High Commission-Berlin Commandants Meeting, November 9, 1950, “Berlin Papers Re: Unified Defense” folder, box 2, General Hay’s Files, Office of the Executive Director, RG 466, NARA. 156 organization in Berlin might have worked for political discussions, but it was cumbersome from a military perspective. Taylor complained that it would be difficult to strike back at Soviet harassment without a unified command structure.403 The commandants struggled with the question of whether their joint force should be a NATO in miniature.404 The Allied High Commission took up the issue of a unified Berlin command, but with no consensus, they sent the questions to their governments.

Ultimately, the Allies never implemented the idea; the more they talked, the more they found ways that it could complicate matters in the city, not to mention the wariness that they felt about placing their garrisons under a single commander in a city that could spark nuclear war.405

Berlin and European Security

The Allies’ European response to the conflict in Korea came in mid-September, at the New York Foreign Ministers meeting. The conference was not originally intended to focus on Germany and Berlin, but interdepartmental conversations throughout August and McCloy’s prompting had steered the proposed topics of discussion in that direction.406 By August 29, Taylor’s suggestions became a HICOG-EUCOM-USCOB

403 Letter, Taylor to McCloy, August 21, 1950 and letter, Hays to Taylor, September 5, 1950, both in “Joint Berlin Committee” folder, box 5, General Hay’s Files, Office of the Executive Director, RG 466, NARA. 404 Memorandum, Taylor to HICOG, “The Effect of the Appointment of a Supreme Commander, Western Europe, upon Plans for Unity of Command in Berlin,” January 8, 1951, “Berlin Papers Re: Unified Defense” folder, box 2, General Hay’s Files, Office of the Executive Director, RG 466, NARA. 405 See Meeting Minutes, Joint Allied High Commission-Berlin Commandants Meeting, November 9, 1950, “Berlin Papers Re: Unified Defense” folder, box 2, General Hay’s Files, Office of the Executive Director, RG 466, NARA. 406 Cable (963), McCloy to Acheson, August 3, 1950, “August 1950 Top Secret Documents McCloy Project TS (50) 65 to TS (50) 100” folder, box 2, Top Secret General Records, Records of the High Commissioner, RG 466, NARA. See also McCloy’s comments about needing better Allied coordination and strength after the rally, Cable 762B.00/5-2950, McCloy to Acheson, May 29, 1950, folder 2, box 3906, Central Decimal Files, 1950-1954, RG 59, NARA. 157 joint paper and were transferred to Washington in preparation for the New York meeting.

The differences in text between his and the ministers’ working draft was minimal. Since the deterrent aspect of Taylor’s strategy hinged on convincing the Soviets that the Allies had an “unequivocal intention” to maintain their rights in the city at the risk of war, he recommended that the officials make a statement to that effect. In his mind, a declaration would be the “most potent single force for the protection of West Berlin,” and would make clear that “[n]o action of the Korean pattern will be tolerated in Germany.”407

EUCOM thought it too provocative and deleted the suggestion. HICOG, however, reinstated it.408

At the meeting, Acheson, Bevin, and French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, agreed to renew the Allied declaration that they would protect Berlin, as they had at their previous meeting in May.409 That declaration now included a clause about an attack from the Bereitschaften, however.410 The biggest sticking point was whether the Allies should make the statement that they would hold the Soviets responsible for an East German attack even if Moscow legally disassociated itself from it, which made both Schuman and

Bevin uncomfortable.411 Acheson compromised and dropped the clause, and all parties

407 Memorandum, Taylor to HICOG and EUCOM, “A Review of Berlin Situation,” August 10, 1950, “Page Hold” folder, box 5, Miscellaneous Files Relating to Berlin, Office of the Executive Secretary, RG 466, NARA. 408 Memorandum, H.C. Ramsey to McCloy, “Defense of Berlin: Differences between EUCOM and Proposed HICOG Papers,” August 24, 1950, “HICOG-EUCOM Meeting 28 August 50,” box 3, General Hay’s Files, Office of the Executive Director, RG 466, NARA. 409 Paper Agreed Upon by Foreign Ministers, “Berlin,” May 22, 1950, FRUS, 1950, III: 1091-92. 410 Minutes, Second Meeting of the Foreign Ministers at New York, September 13, 1950, FRUS, 1950, III: 1203. 411 Memorandum, Director, Eastern European Affairs Charles W. Yost to Ambassador at Large Philip Jessup, “Order of Business for Tripartite Ministers Meeting September 18,” September [16?], 1950, FRUS 1950, III: 1232-34. See also Minutes, Fifth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers at New York, September 18, 1950, FRUS, 1950, III: 1240. 158 were ready to unveil their statement on Berlin on September 19, after discussing their decisions with the Benelux allies.412

The foreign ministers’ statement had the single greatest bearing on the defense of

Berlin since Truman and Attlee vowed to remain in the city in the face of the Soviet blockade. Within a communiqué on Germany, they declared the Allies would treat any attack against the “Federal Republic or Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon themselves.”413 In a separate agreement on Berlin security, they restated their warning to

Moscow, and made explicit that they would consider the Soviet Union responsible for an

East German attack “inasmuch as they are in occupation of the Eastern zone.” If there was an attack, the Allies vowed to defend the city by force and then “bring the relevant provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty into effect,” before presenting the issue to the

United Nations. Berlin now lived under NATO’s shield. 414

The security guarantee was due to the convergence of local and global threats, as well as timing. A tripartite statement on the city had been in the works since March, and was originally a suggestion from McCloy on how to “win the battle” of the city. 415 The

State Department, including Acheson, had prepared for the foreign ministers to make a statement about the Bereitschaften at their May meeting in London, but none was

412 Meeting minutes, Second Meeting of the Foreign Ministers at New York, September 13, 1950, FRUS, 1950, III: 1203. See footnote 18 for the deleted paragraph, Decision of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France with Regard to Germany,” September 19, 1950, FRUS, 1950, III: 1296. 413 Communiqué on Germany, Foreign Ministers of the United States, Britain, and France, September 19, 1950, FRUS, 1950, III: 1296-99. 414 Decision of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France with Regard to Germany, “Allied Agreement on Berlin Security,” September 19, 1950, FRUS,1950, III: 1296. 415 Summary of Record of Ambassadors at Rome, March 22-24, 1950, FRUS, 1950, III: 819. 159 made.416 The specter of an East German-fronted communist move on Berlin took on more meaning and immediacy after Korea. With the October general election in the GDR looming, McCloy and Taylor hoped to get in front of any communist ploy. Thus, the

United States had pushed the Allies to make such a strong declaration at New York to warn Moscow that they could not retreat, entice Pankow to launch an attack, and then claim that it was an internal revolution. The Allied agreement also codified much of what

Taylor had designed. In the ensuing months, the Western Powers would build up a year’s worth of food stocks and fuel in the city, and strengthen the garrisons with additional

Allied units before January 1, 1951 while simultaneously forming German auxiliary forces.417

The September ministerial meeting is most often cited as the moment when the

Allies came to terms with German rearmament, and rightfully so. At the meeting,

Acheson notified the Allies that the United States was willing to help build a collective force “adequate for the defense of Europe,” contingent on a unified command and a remilitarized Germany.418 It was a substantial shift in U.S. policy and for Acheson himself, who had been an opponent of a remilitarized Germany. In the literature, most attention is paid to Acheson’s change of heart regarding German rearmament. As the

416 State Department Paper FM D A-2d, “U.S. Objectives and Course of Action in the May Meetings,” April 28, 1950, FRUS, 1950, III: 1004. 417 Decision of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France with Regard to Germany, “Allied Agreement on Berlin Security,” September 19, 1950, FRUS,1950, III: 1296. For the memorandum dividing responsibility of the foreign ministers’ decisions, see Memorandum, Cap. Stephen E. Cavanaugh to Page, “Action Required Arising from Foreign Ministers Decisions,” October 11, 1950, “Conference of Foreign Ministers” folder, box 2, Miscellaneous Files Relating to Berlin, Office of the Executive Secretary, RG 466, NARA. 418 U.S. Delegation Minutes, First Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, September 12, 1950, FRUS, 1950, III: 1191-97. 160 argument goes, Korea convinced Washington that the defense of western Europe needed to be improved, and only under bureaucratic pressure from the Pentagon did Acheson relent to make remilitarization of Germany part of the U.S. package to the Allies.419

Outside of Acheson’s memoirs, though, there is little evidence to suggest that he was coerced.420 In fact, when viewed together, the New York declarations—German rearmament, the change in FRG status, and the Berlin statement—create a mutually- supporting whole, agreements that intertwined the military and political realms and West

Germany and Berlin.

The Berlin security guarantee was therefore not the result of pressure from

Adenauer, as some have argued.421 The Chancellor did make Allied security guarantees for the Federal Republic and West Berlin a prerequisite for a German defense contribution to NATO in two memorandums to McCloy, but it is inaccurate to argue that the declaration was in response to that request. It was already Allied policy to protect the city—the belief that Adenauer had to induce the Allies to make a public pronouncement to that effect conflates the wily statesman’s abilities. Acheson instead accepted and promoted the HICOG-EUCOM-USCOB paper’s assumptions for NATO reasons. At the

September meeting, the foreign ministers considered fundamental issues regarding

419 Martin, “The American Decision to Rearm Germany,” pp. 656-57; Robert McGeehan, The German Rearmament Question: American Diplomacy and European Defense after World War II (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971), p. 41; Large, Germans to the Front, pp. 84-85. 420 Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 438. Marc Trachtenberg persuasively argues this point in The Cold War and After: History, Theory, and the Logic of International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), pp. 110-41. 421 Helga Haftendorn, Coming of Age: German Foreign Policy since 1945 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), p. 22. Bruno Thoss, “Information, Persuasion, or Consultation?: The Western Powers and NATO during the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962,” in Transatlantic Relations at Stake: Aspects of NATO, 1956-1972, eds. Christian Nuenlist and Anna Locher (Zurich: Center for Security Studies, 2006), pp. 73- 94. 161

European security. In their May meeting in London, they had only begun roughly sketching those ideas; in New York, they debated details. The foreign ministers agreed to form an integrated military command for NATO, creating Supreme Allied Commander,

Europe (SACEUR), which Dwight Eisenhower would helm at the beginning of 1951.

They also agreed to increase the number of Allied troops in Germany. When viewing

Berlin from a fledging NATO that was looking warily east, the foreign ministers’ statement takes on a different complexion. In making the western sectors of Berlin

NATO’s frontier outpost, the Allies bought time for the alliance. Crucially, as a deterrent, the agreement protected Western Europe as much as it did Berlin, and in this way fit into

NATO’s conventional force posture.422

Though Korea dominated the latter part of the Truman administration, Berlin never fully left the president’s desk. He did not have to deal with the city on the scale of crisis management again, but he was never convinced that Stalin was done attempting to expel the Western Powers. The last major Berlin issue with which he dealt came in the wake of May 27, 1952, when the Western Powers signed a “Special Agreement” which established the European Defense Community (EDC). The EDC was a French plan from

Prime Minister René Pleven, a response to the discussions about German rearmament that the foreign ministers had during their September 1950 New York meeting. As part of

Paris’ strategy of German containment, first evidenced in the Schuman Plan, it sought to block the Federal Republic from joining NATO, which would give Bonn control of its

422 For a solid look at this force posture, see John S. Duffield, Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO’s Conventional Force Posture (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995). 162 own military. Instead, the French proposed the West Germans join a supranational

European army with units from France, Italy, and the Benelux countries.423

In the May 27, 1952 declaration, the Allies included a clause about Berlin which superseded the September 1950 declaration. It reaffirmed the West’s belief that the security of Berlin and the maintenance of their position there were “essential elements of the peace of the ,” as well as their vow to “treat any attack against Berlin from any quarter” as an attack upon themselves.424 Movement toward the EDC gave the Allies the opportunity to renew the original NATO message in anticipation of communist anger over the Kommandatura allowing the Federal Republic to include Berlin in international treaties.425 Truman concurred with the State Department’s advice during a NSC meeting to consider any coming East German harassment in Berlin a product of Soviet design, and to prepare for an airlift and countermeasures against Moscow. From that meeting also came the creation of an inter-departmental steering group on Berlin, which representatives from the CIA, the State Department, and the each of the services staffed for the remainder of Truman’s time in the White House.426

423 For a general overview of the EDC, see Edward M. Fursdon, The European Defense Community: A History (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1980). For France and the EDC, see Hitchcock, France Restored, pp. 169-202. For the U.S.-British angle, see Kevin Ruane, The Rise and Fall of the European Defence Community: Anglo-American Relations and the Crisis of European Defence, 1950-55 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000). The U.S. Army’s perspective can be found in Carter, Forging the Shield, pp. 171- 205. 424 Tripartite Declaration quoted in Editorial Note, FRUS, 1952-1954, V, Part I: 684-88. 425 Allied Kommandatura Declaration on Berlin, May 26, 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, VII, Part 2: 1246-48. For Acheson’s directions, see Cable, Acheson to McCloy, May 28, 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, VII, Part 2: 1250. 426 Memorandum, Under Secretary of State David Bruce to Bohlen, Matthews, and Nitze, May 28, 1952 and its attachments, FRUS, 1952-1954, VII, Part 2: 1251-52. 163

The blockade and Korea had conditioned the administration to view Berlin a particular way—the blockade proved that Stalin would openly challenge the Allies;

Korea proved that he would use proxies. The EDC therefore slotted into a set structure for U.S. officials. Throughout Truman’s presidency, his basic approach to Berlin was defensive in nature. He saw the city’s value as an illustration of American resolve, and it was for this objective that he had sparred with the Pentagon and State Department to stay put in spring 1948. Yet, despite his instincts, he failed to conceptualize the city as anything more than a location to defend, and he struggled to use it to wrest the initiative from Moscow. Regardless, Truman had defined U.S. policy toward the city, and set the parameters within which all subsequent presidents worked.

164

CHAPTER 4: A NEW LOOK AT BERLIN

When Dwight Eisenhower became president on January 20, 1953, he inherited a stabilized Berlin but a war in Korea. While working to bring that conflict to a close, a series of events behind the Iron Curtain impacted how he would approach Eastern Europe early in his administration. Stalin’s death, ’s socialization campaign, and the uprising in East Germany forced him to confront the campaign promise that he and his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, had made of rolling back communism, rather than containing it. In Berlin, Eisenhower was tasked with defending a position that he thought should not have existed. As Supreme Commander, he had worried about the potential political troubles that jointly administering a marooned city would be.427 Now he found himself pledging to maintain that position.

This chapter discusses how Eisenhower approached Berlin from his inauguration in January 1953 to the eve of the Second Berlin Crisis in November 1958. It is divided into two segments: How the administration responded to those potentially destabilizing events in 1953, and the discussions in the White House, Pentagon, and State Department about where Berlin fit into Eisenhower’s new national security strategy, Massive

Retaliation. While those two segments seem divorced from one another in time and topic, the latter informed the former. It was not a simple case of building contingency plans for

Berlin that implemented lessons from 1953, or ones that slotted into Massive Retaliation.

While Truman had worried about how global events could affect the Western position in the city, Eisenhower and his advisors sought ways to use Berlin. They did so to protect

427 Memorandum of Conference with the President, December 17, 1958, “Berlin – Vol. I (I)” folder, box 6, International Series, White House Offices Files, Staff Secretary, DDEL. 165 the Federal Republic’s integration in the Western alliance and the creation of the

European Defense Community.428 That outlook changed by the mid-1950s, owing to

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union stabilizing but also a changing defense strategy.

The shift was due to Moscow’s advances in their atomic capability, which prompted

Eisenhower to shift to mutually assured destruction through a nuclear exchange.429 Berlin transitioned back to a place to defend, not to use. These discussions are not just illustrative of the nuclear age, then; they also explain why the Eisenhower administration reacted as they did when crisis came back to Berlin in November 1958.

Scholars’ tendency is to view the coming of the crisis purely in terms of the unresolved German and Berlin Questions. In so doing, they effectively underplay transformational events between the two crises and the discussions that the Eisenhower administration had in discussing the implementation of Massive Retaliation. While trying to align national strategy with their prior experiences in Berlin, U.S. officials constructed plans that they set in motion when Nikita Khrushchev issued his ultimatum, built on the lessons they had learned over the previous five years. This chapter therefore argues that when understanding why U.S. leaders reacted as they did in November 1958, one need only look to the period between the crises.

428 Letter, Dulles to Adenauer, November 20, 1953, “[TOP SECRET Correspondence] (1)” folder, box 1, Alfred M. Gruenther Papers, DDEL. 429 Edward Kaplan, To Kill Nations: American Strategy in the Air-Atomic Age and the Rise of Mutually Assured Destruction (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015). 166

Early Challenges for Eisenhower

Eisenhower left Germany as U.S. Military Governor on November 10, 1945.430

Almost seven years to the day, he defeated Adlai Stevenson to become the thirty-fourth president of the United States. In between, he had been Marshall’s successor as Chief of

Staff at the Pentagon, where he served until leaving active service in February 1948.

Retirement was short lived. Out of respect for Forrestal, Eisenhower was presiding officer of the Joint Chiefs for the first half of 1949. His day job was president of

Columbia University, a position that made him uncomfortable since he did not consider himself an intellectual. When war came to Korea, he immediately accepted Truman’s invitation to serve as NATO commander, which he began in January 1951. As SACEUR,

Eisenhower built up NATO’s strength to deter future aggression. He believed the Korean attack made the strengthening of European defenses of paramount importance, lest

Moscow wanted to test alliance resolve while U.S. military strength was in Asia.431

His experience in those positions prepared Eisenhower well to manage the intricate nature of Berlin issues. By contrast to Truman, Eisenhower and Dulles actively used the city, the “great danger spot,” as Dulles referred to it, which they made into a centerpiece of their approach not just to the East but with allies as well.432 On substance, the Eisenhower administration initially did not approach Berlin radically different from

Truman: it accepted the strategic rationale that the city should be defended and that its

430 Jean Edward Smith, Eisenhower: In War and Peace (New York: Random House, 2013), p. 457. 431 Chester J. Pach, Jr. and Elmo Richardson, The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Revised Edition (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991), pp. 11-17. 432 Memorandum of a Conversation, Dulles and von Brentano, November 21, 1957, FRUS, 1955-1957, IV: 201. 167 greatest worth was as a symbol—that was above discussion. The primary difference was that Eisenhower and his cabinet made a concerted effort to be more assertive toward

Moscow, rather than reacting to Soviet moves. He would use the city as a positive symbol, a rallying point for those who struggled against Soviet control of Eastern Europe.

The rhetoric used in the service of this strategy was what would be attributed to John F.

Kennedy and his administration’s views of Berlin, but it was originally Eisenhower’s conception.433 Effectively, he used the city as a political weapon to overcome its military weaknesses.

This fed into Dulles’ doctrine of retaliation that he had unveiled in an article in

Life magazine during the primary campaign.434 Dulles’ critique of Truman’s containment rested on the idea that responding symmetrically to communist manpower, weapons, and actions would bankrupt the United States while not projecting any real strength. Boldness was needed. That meant responding “instantly against open aggression by Red armies, so that, if it occurred anywhere, we could and would strike back where it hurts, by means of our own choosing.”435 Nuclear weapons thus took on a deterrent as well as a political role.

Eisenhower was caricatured incorrectly at the time as a tabula rasa president whom others controlled behind the scenes. He in fact was in control, and the national security strategies attributed to Dulles were not without Eisenhower’s influential

433 David G. Coleman, “Eisenhower and the Berlin Problem, 1953-1954,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 2, No.1 (Winter 2000): 5-9. 434 John Foster Dulles, “A Policy of Boldness,” Life (May 19, 1952): 146-48, 151-52, 154, 157. Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973), pp. 126-28. For a less critical assessment of Dulles than Hoopes’ see Richard Immerman, John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in U.S. Foreign Policy (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1999), pp. 35-55. 435 Dulles, “A Policy of Boldness”: 151. 168 guidance. 436 As a complimentary piece to the idea of retaliation, both men advocated for liberating the people of the Soviet satellites. On the campaign trail, they had railed against containment as overly defensive and argued that it had allowed the Soviet Union to consolidate its power in Eastern Europe. To right this wrong, they called for U.S. foreign policy to liberate rather than promote the status quo.437 Propaganda, which the

Truman administration had already been using generally in the service of containment and specifically with PEPCO, became a central component of their strategy. They would use , a “five-dollar, five-syllable word,” as Eisenhower said, to win

“victory without casualties” in the Cold War.438 Before he could undertake his program, however, he first had to confront what Truman, HICOG, and USCOB had feared for three years, civil unrest in East Germany.

On June 16, 1953, construction workers in East Berlin went on strike to protest changing labor policies. The GDR now expected workers to meet an output quota, or risk not being paid. By the next morning, 40,000 people gathered in the streets, and what had started as a labor issue sparked a country-wide revolt—400 towns and cities in all— against the SED regime, with protestors demanding better working and living conditions,

436 For the standard work that underplays Eisenhower, see Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles. For the revisionists, see Pach and Richardson, The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower; Richard Immerman, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). 437 Dulles, “A Policy of Boldness”: 146-48, 151-52, 154, 157. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, pp. 120- 22. 438 Immerman, Waging Peace, p. 77. Gregory Mitrovich, Undermining the Kremlin: America’s Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947-1956 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000). See HICOG’s propaganda strategy documents in “PROPAGANDA—Organization and Plans” folder, box 6, Berlin Element, Public Affairs Division, Classified Subject Files, 1949-1953, RG 466, NARA; for Berlin-specific plans, see in same folder, Memorandum, Berlin Element Public Affairs Planning Staff, “The Unity Campaign: Politics and Propaganda,” February 25, 1952. 169 increased political freedoms, and national unity. Protestors skirmished with some of the sixteen divisions the Red Army had deployed across the GDR to quell the uprising, and futilely threw rocks and whatever else they had on hand at T-34 tanks. Within a few days, the uprising was put down, but tensions continued to flare throughout the summer. 439 It was the first open protest against a ruling regime in the Soviet sphere, and produced a faction inside the SED that called for Ulbricht’s resignation. In the uprising’s wake, U.S. officials began reevaluating their Berlin policy.

As with most events in the Cold War, the civil unrest had its roots in a series of local and regional reactions to geopolitical events, a veritable feedback loop of threat perception. None was more important than Stalin’s March 10, 1952 note to the Western

Powers in which he suggested a peace treaty for Germany. He called for a unified and rearmed country, though his offer was contingent on prohibiting the Germans from joining any military alliance.440 Into September of that year, the Allies evaded the overture, thinking it was disingenuous and designed for propaganda fodder or a sincere proposal that would have dangerous, unforeseen consequences. In return, they replied with their own offer that they had always sought and knew Stalin would never accept, free elections in Germany.441

439 “Document No. 31: Situation Report from and A. Tarasov to , 17 June 1953, as of 5:30 p.m. CET,” in Uprising in East Germany, 1953: The Cold War, the German Question, and the First Major Upheaval behind the Iron Curtain, Christian F. Ostermann, ed. (, and New York City, NY: Central European University Press, 2001), pp. 192-93. Leipzig estimate: see footnote 87 of above, Heidi Roth, “Der 17. Juni 1953 im damaligen Leipzig. Aus den Akten des PDS- Archivs Leipzig,” Deutschland Archiv 24:6 (1991): 573-80. Telegram, Lyon to HICOG, June 16, 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, VII, Part 2: 1584; Records of the Sixth CINCUSAREUR-HICOG Commanders Conference, June 29, 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, VII, Part 2: 1606-08. 440 The text of the note can be found in FRUS, 1952-1954, VII: 169-73. 441 Text of the American September 23 reply can be found in FRUS, 1952-1954, VII: 324-27. 170

Whether Stalin was sincere has been hotly debated, but it is generally agreed that he was reacting to West German remilitarization.442 Using short-term concessions to achieve long-term goals was characteristic of his diplomacy, and his note fit into his offering conflicting and contradictory policies.443 By 1952, it appeared time was not on his side, and he tried in vain to slow the rate of West Germany’s integration into the

Allied sphere. On May 26, the Federal Republic signed the General Treaty with the

Western Powers, formally ending the occupation and giving Bonn control over its foreign and military policies and thus sovereign rights it had not been granted in 1949. The treaty would come into force only after West Germany joined the European Defense

Community, which the Allies signed . From Moscow’s and Pankow’s perspectives, these were unimportant details to the larger danger of FRG remilitarization.

The treaties not only further established collective security in Europe but also codified

Bonn’s alignment with the West. In response to the Western Power’s rebuff of the Stalin

Note, and without the consent of Moscow, Ulbricht did as the U.S. Army’s Plans

Division predicted he might when he unveiled his “Accelerated Construction of

Socialism” in the second week of July. On the surface, it was a transition from an anti-

442 See Peter Ruggenthaler’s excellent review, “The 1952 Stalin Note on German Unification: The Ongoing Debate,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Fall 2011): 172-212. The discussion began as a West German one: Rolf Steiniger, Eine Chance zur Wiedervereinigung? Die Stalin-Note vom 10. März 1952: Darstellung und Dokumentation auf der Grundlage unveröffentlichter britischer und amerikanischer Akten (Bonn: Verlag Neue Gesellschaft, 1985). For the historical context of Steiniger’s argument about a missed opportunity, see Ruud van Dijk, “The 1952 Stalin Note Debate: Myth of Missed Opportunity for German Unification?” Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 14 (May 1996). For a representative view of Stalin as genuine, see Loth, Stalin’s Unwanted Child, pp. 132-46. For a counterpoint, see Zubok, Failed Empire, pp. 62-93. 443 Christian F. Ostermann, “‘This Is Not A Politburo, But A Madhouse’: The Post-Stalin Succession Struggle, Soviet Deutschlandpolitik and the SED: New Evidence from Russian, German, and Hungarian Archives,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin, no. 10 (March 1998): 62. 171 fascist democratic state to a soviet-style socialist system, a further “consolidation of the

Communist position” like the planners anticipated, complete with a collectivization program and rapid construction and industrialization.444 Effectively, it was an East

German version of Stalin’s first Five Year Plan.

Yet it also had much to do with building a firebreak against what, as the Bloc saw it, was impending capitalist aggression. Ulbricht had taken the opportunity of the rebuff to shut what remained of the open door to West Germany, and set about sovietizing his country and strengthening his own position. Stalin was not pleased, and commented to his ambassador to the GDR that Ulbricht might have been a loyal communist but “when he laid his fist on the table, it was sometimes bigger than his head.”445 Perhaps Stalin sensed what was likely to happen next. Just as with the Soviet Five Year Plan, the East

German program quickly spiraled out of control: collectivization met peasant resistance; the repression of churches, universities, and artists created tension within East German society; and the development of heavy industries fell well short of industrial production targets and created shortages of consumer goods and foodstuffs.446

444 Memorandum for Gen. Eddleman, “Analysis of Soviet Gesture re German Peace Treaty,” March 13, 1952, “G-3 091 GERMANY (SECTION I) (CASES 1-20)” folder, box 116, General Decimal Files, 1952, 091. Germany, RG 319, NARA. 445 V.S. Semenov, Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow: ein halbes Jahrhundert in diplomatischer Mission, 1939- 1991 (Berlin: Nicolai, 1995), p. 279. Historians argue whether Ulbricht’s actions opened a rift between Pankow and Moscow. For the view that it did: Loth, Stalin’s Unwanted Child, pp. 147-70. For the counterpoint: Dirk Spilker, The East German Leadership and the Division of Germany: Patriotism and Propaganda, 1945-1953 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 236. 446 Ibid., pp. 238-89. Victor Baras, “Beria’s Fall and Ulbricht’s Survival,” Soviet Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3 (July 1975): 381-95. 172

The instability of internal GDR politics coincided with Stalin dying in his dacha on March 5 following a stroke four days earlier. 447 After a power struggle inside the

Kremlin, a shaky system of collective leadership emerged. The United States immediately moved to exploit the situation to seek an end to Korea, which ultimately proved successful when the warring sides signed an armistice on July 27, 1953.448 They were more patient with the German Question, given its central place in East-West tensions, and waited to see how the new Kremlin leaders approached the problem specifically and foreign policy generally.449

The new Soviet leadership had two problems. First was Ulbricht’s crash socialization program and his socialist rhetoric, both of which placed Moscow’s peace initiative in danger. This was primarily the result of the Kremlin’s sometimes-conflicting recommendations to Eastern European allies after Stalin’s death, resulting in a retrenchment of Stalinization while the Soviet Union was moving away from the same

447 Robert Service, Stalin: A Biography (Cambridge: Press, 2004), pp. 581-90; Simon Sebag Montefiore, Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar (New York: Vintage Books, 2003), pp. 638-51; Vojtech Mastny, “The Elusive Détente: Stalin’s Successors and the West,” in The Cold War After Stalin’s Death: A Missed Opportunity for Peace?, eds. Klaus Larres and Kenneth Osgood (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), pp. 3-26. 448 Memorandum, Nitze to Dulles, “Exploitation of Stalin’s Death,” March 10, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, VIII: 1107-08; Memorandum, Chip Bohlen, “Policy Implications of Stalin’s Death,” March 10, 1953, “Miscellaneous Memos, Letters, etc.” folder, box 11, Records of Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen, RG 59, NARA. For an entire psychological strategy, see PSB D-40, “Plan for Psychological Exploitation of Stalin’s Death,” April 23, 1953, “PSB D-40” folder, box 6, Psychological Strategy Board Working File, Entry A1 1462, RG 59, NARA. 449 See Jacob Beam’s daily telegrams during this period, FRUS, 1952-1954, VIII: 1102-06. For the CIA’s estimate, see SE-39: “Probable Consequences of the Death of Stalin and of the Elevation of Malenkov to Leadership in the USSR,” FRUS, 1952-1954, VIII: 1125-29. The NSC’s original copy of the CIA estimate can be found in White House Office Files, NSC Staff Papers, NSC Registry Series, box 4, “Special Estimates 5-15 (4)” folder, DDEL. See also Minutes of the 136th Meeting of the National Security Council, March 12, 1953, “136th Meeting” folder, box 5, Official Meeting Minutes, Entry 5, RG 273, NARA. The administration’s copy is in box 4, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, DDEL. 173 policies.450 The second problem was deciding in which direction Moscow’s German policy should go. Given almost eight years of what can only be considered a meandering approach to a settlement from the Kremlin, the new collective leadership was not obliged to maintain a course that Stalin had set. The immediate question for the troika was how to simultaneously balance alliance and great power politics when the two worlds were colliding. 451 The debate came to a head in the May 27 session of the Presidium of the

Soviet Council of Ministers, when , head of the NKVD and Minister of the Interior, advocated for cutting the Soviet Union’s losses by halting Ulbricht’s socialization program and offering the Western Powers a united, neutral Germany.

Molotov and others in the foreign ministry called for maintaining Stalin’s policy and continuing the socialization of the GDR while making reunification proposals to the West along the lines of the 1952 note.452 Beria’s plan died with him shortly thereafter in the basement of the Lubyanka prison where so many Russians had died at the hands of his

NKVD, charged with treason, terrorism, and counter-revolutionary activities before and during the war. The Kremlin, despite its qualms, had invested itself in the Ulbricht regime’s survival and continued along Stalin’s 1952 course.453

450 Mark Kramer, “The East Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and Upheavals in East-: Internal-External Linkages in Soviet Policy-Making (Part I),” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Winter 1999): 10. 451 Zubok, Failed Empire, pp. 87-93. For a German-centric discussion, see Elke Scherstjanoi, “Die sowjetische Deutschlandpolitik nach Stalins Tod 1953. Neue Dokumente aus dem Archiv des Moskauer Außenministeriums,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 46. Jahrg., 3. H. (July 1998): 497-549. 452 Christian Ostermann, “Keeping the Pot Simmering: The United States and the East German Uprising,” German Studies Review, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Feb. 1996): 62-63. 453 Ostermann, “‘This Is Not A Politburo,’” p. 61. For the debate about the Beria program, see James Richter, “Reexamining Soviet Policy Towards Germany during the Beria Interregnum,” Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 3 (June 1992). See also Gerhard Wettig, “Zum Stand der Forschung über Berijas Deutschlandpolitik im Frühjahr 1953,” Deutschland Archiv, Vol. 26, No. 6 (1993): 674-82. Mark Kramer argues that the above scholars overemphasize the existence of a schism about intrabloc affairs: Kramer, “East Post-Stalin Succession Struggle,” p. 10. 174

While the Allies attempted to find a way to integrate West Germany that suited all parties, the Soviet Union after Stalin juggled with the SED’s attempted leap toward full

Marxist-Leninism. From their offices in the Kremlin, the collective leadership saw in the

GDR a situation that underscored their belief of the interconnectedness of security: instability in the Bloc could mean instability at home.454 In this climate, despite their actions appearing contradictory, the Eisenhower administration found a way to achieve two objectives simultaneously, and did so by using Berlin. They would fight a rearguard action against allies who were inclined to forsake the EDC and accept the Soviet peace offensive’s appeals while also undermining the SED and thus the further communization of East Germany.

The Eisenhower Administration and the Uprising

Officials in Washington watched the events in spring 1953 with an eye toward how it might affect FRG rearmament, Adenauer’s reelection, and ratification of the EDC

Treaty.455 Eisenhower had been skeptical of the defense community, but his time as

SACEUR convinced him that the concept was the best way to rearm Germany while also unifying Western Europe. He and Dulles would pursue ratification even if it meant threatening allies.456 The administration’s attention prior to the uprising had been on the

Soviet call for a Four Power conference on Germany and its potential to affect Western cohesion. The Americans understood that the Soviet unity overture had two different

454 For the persuasive argument of interconnection between the Bloc and Soviet foreign and domestic policy, see Kramer, “East Post-Stalin Succession Struggle,” pp. 3-55. 455 Christian Ostermann, “The United States, the East German Uprising of 1953, and the Limits of ,” Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 11 (December 1994): 8-9. 456 Kevin Ruane, “Agonizing Reappraisals: Anthony Eden, John Foster Dulles and the Crisis of European Defence, 1953-1954,” Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. 13 Issue 4 (Dec. 2002): 151-185. 175 audiences. Moscow hoped the Western governments—mostly France—would cut their losses and sign a peace treaty, thereby undermining NATO, the EDC, and Adenauer, who was up for election in September 1953. The Kremlin gambled the West Germans would forsake Western unity for their own, making the country whole again and allowing

Moscow to neutralize Bonn.

This possibility made U.S. officials nervous, and is why they paid attention to the upcoming federal election, the soft underbelly of the EDC as they saw it. The Social

Democrats (SPD), who had altogether different views on European defense than

Adenauer and his Christian Democrats, could spell disaster for continental integration and U.S. security policy in Europe.457 Eisenhower and Dulles were adamant that these issues not be undermined, since they were the pillars of the administration’s Europe policy.458 Protecting them would, Dulles believed, bring stability to the continent and create an integrated, united states of Europe, tilting the international balance of power toward the West.459 With these outcomes in mind, the administration’s strategy toward

German issues in the first months of its existence was the same as Truman’s had been since the Stalin Note: avoid any Four Power meeting on unification.460

457 Memorandum, Beam to Bowie, “Tactics in Presenting a Western Plan for a United Germany,” June 29, 1953, “Germany 1950-1953 (2)” folder, box 5, PPS Files, Country Files, Entry A1-558CA, RG 59, NARA. 458 See the PPS paper presented to the NSC “United States Position with Respect to Germany,” July 31, 1948, “Germany 1950-1953 (1)” folder, box 5, PPS Files, Country Files, Entry A1-558CA, RG 59, NARA. For a good survey of the administration’s European policy, see Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles, pp. 161-77. 459 Rolf Steininger, “John Foster Dulles, the European Defense Community, and the German Question,” in John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War, ed. Richard H. Immerman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 79-108. 460 Ostermann, “Keeping the Pot Simmering”: 65. 176

It was in this climate that U.S. officials in Berlin and Washington did not automatically seize upon the unrest following the SED’s crash socialization program. An overestimation of Ulbricht’s control of his country and of the Pankow-Moscow relationship, both built on several years of worst-case-scenario conditioning, underpinned this apprehension. Even within Germany, U.S. officials could not agree on what they were witnessing. The Army detachment inside the Berlin Element warned that the

Soviets were on the cusp of executing their plans to isolate the city. The notion that there was a linear communist plan to isolate the city distorted their interpretation of events in early 1953.461 Cecil Lyon, Berlin Element director and Washington’s most important source of information on events in the city, reported to HICOG on the eve of the uprising that he interpreted Soviet tactics in East Germany, the Korean Armistice, and “other

Soviet moves on world chess board” as a “tactical and not [a] strategic shift in

Germany.”462 Lyon believed the East Germans flooding into Berlin’s western sectors to escape collectivization and crippling taxes had forced Moscow to temper its ally’s internal policies, lest they adversely affect Soviet Cold War strategy. For those inclined to see a more nefarious foe behind the Iron Curtain, the fallout from GDR socialization could have been a possible communist trap. At HICOG, there was a fear along the same lines of Taylor’s 1950 warnings that the SED regime was sending refugees into the city

461 Enclosure, “A Study of the Berlin Situation,” in Despatch No. 939, HICOG Berlin to State Department, “Transmittal of a Study on the Berlin Situation,” May 7, 1953, “Dr. Conant’s Briefing Papers” folder, box 3, Miscellaneous Files Relating to Berlin, Office of the Executive Secretary, RG 466, NARA. 462 Telegram, Lyon to HICOG, June 15, 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, VII, Part 2: 1581-83. 177 to overwhelm authorities there and create a situation so chaotic that it could set the scene for a hostile communist takeover.463

When the uprising ignited across East Germany on June 17, the Eisenhower administration, though not short on interpretations about the origins of the protests, had little concrete plans for a response. Officials reacted as they had to Stalin’s death and

Ulbricht’s catastrophic policies, deciding to bide their time and make no moves that could turn a regional issue international.464 In a NSC meeting the day after the uprising, CIA

Director reported that the protests were illustrative of growing dissension within the Bloc, but they “posed a very tough problem for the United States to handle.”

U.S. officials were handed the fragmentation that they desired—and, in the words of

Dulles, without having anything “whatsoever to do with inciting these riots”—only to have it paralyze them.465

The lack of an immediate American response to SED frailty had the ironic result of making the United States appear weak.466 Dulles’ message from the campaign had made it behind the Iron Curtain with the help of Special Assistant to the

President C.D. Jackson, Eisenhower’s propaganda guru and the informal liaison between

463 Document 44: Telegram from Cecil Lyon to U.S. Department of State Reporting on Developments in Berlin, 18 June 1953, in Uprising in East Germany, 1953: The Cold War, the German Question, and the First Major Upheaval behind the Iron Curtain, Christian F. Ostermann, ed. (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2001), pp. 220-21; This belief continued into the next week: Working Paper, Eastern Affairs Division, Berlin Element, “Alternative Courses of Developments Arising out of June 16 Uprisings in East German,” June 25, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, VII, Part 2: 1595. 464 Ostermann, “Keeping the Pot Simmering”: 66. 465 Memorandum of Discussion, 150th Meeting of the NSC, June 18, 1953, “150th Meeting” folder, box 7, Official Meeting Minutes, Entry 5, RG 273, NARA. 466 Memorandum, Jackson to Eisenhower, July 3, 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, VII, Part 2: 1608-09. Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles, p. 179. 178 the CIA and Pentagon.467 Indeed, a primary reason why the unrest spread from Berlin to the rest of the GDR between June 16 and 17 was East Germans listening to broadcasts from the RIAS (Rundfunk im amerikanischen Sektor), the U.S. sector’s radio station.468

Eisenhower’s propaganda strategy included a public relations campaign for both international and domestic consumption, housed in a new body, the United States

Information Agency.469 In this early war of perception, Germany was the principal battleground and the United States had been more successful than they realized influencing public views of SED policy. Some East Germans believed that the New

Course was a result of American pressure via liberation rhetoric, and the uprising had made some people sure that substantive change was on the horizon. They celebrated its impending arrival like the citizens of Seehausen, who local SED officials found drunk in a pub toasting to Adenauer’s health.470 Washington’s initial lack of action placed the administration in a bind. Officials understood that there could would be a loss in confidence in the United States from allies and the people in the satellite states; at worst, there would be open antagonism from allies. It was a problem the administration continued to have, and was a product of their inability to reconcile bellicose public rhetoric with private recognition of coexistence with the Soviet Union.471

467 Valur Ingimundarson, “Containing the Offensive: The ‘Chief of the Cold War’ and the Eisenhower Administration's German Policy,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Summer 1997): 480-495; John Allen Stern, C.D. Jackson: Cold War Propagandist for Democracy and Globalism (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2012). 468 Nicholas J. Schlosser, Cold War on the Airwaves: The War Against East Germany (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2015), pp. 75-106. 469 Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006). 470 Ostermann, “Keeping the Pot Simmering,” p. 67. 471 Chris Tudda, The Truth Is Our Weapon: The Rhetorical Diplomacy of Dwight D. Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2006). 179

The administration eventually decided to implement a psychological warfare strategy in East Germany, embodied in NSC 158. Their objective was to seize upon the civil unrest and foment further protests against the regime in order to antagonize the Bloc and serve the larger objective of protecting the EDC. The directive had been born out the

Psychological Strategy Board (PSB), a coordinating body that Truman had formed in

April 1951 and on which the Director of the CIA, the Under Secretary of State, and the

Deputy Secretary of Defense sat.472 In a June 18 NSC meeting, Eisenhower had tasked the PSB with presenting him with policy options, which they did on July 1.473 The hallmark of the paper—and eventually of NSC 158—was its focus on protecting the

EDC. According to Christian Ostermann, the leading scholar on U.S. policy during the

1953 Uprising, NSC 158 as a strategy “sought to instrumentalize the East German crisis.”474 It was not a newly contemplated objective for Washington. In the days after the

Stalin Note, McCloy had urged the State Department to see the Kremlin’s unity offer as an opportunity to consolidate the Western position on the EDC. Foggy Bottom did not act on the advice, but it did play a large role in formulating a psychological strategy for

Berlin. Throughout spring and summer 1952, the State Department’s German experts

Henry Byroade and James Riddleberger headed a panel who, along with outside consultants like and Walt Rostow, created an October 1952 paper.475 A supplement on Berlin-specific strategy focused on maintaining and reinforcing “our

472 Mitrovich, Undermining the Kremlin, pp. 60-63. 473 PSB D-45, “Interim U.S. Plan for Exploitation of Unrest in Satellite Europe,” July 1, 1953, “PSB D-45” folder, box 6, Psychological Strategy Board Working File, Entry A1-1462, RG 59, NARA. 474 Ostermann, “Keeping the Pot Simmering,” p. 68. 475 By this time, George A. Morgan, the author of the influential 1950 Berlin Element paper on potential GDR moves against Berlin, was on the Psychological Strategy Board, and even served as its acting director. 180 political, military, cultural, and psychological position” in the city, yet the prescriptions were reactionary and defensive, effectively more contingency planning.476 Truman had used Berlin as a means of containing communism.477 Eisenhower would use it as a disintegrating factor in Eastern Europe.

Policymakers reasoned that if they exploited the unrest in Berlin and elsewhere, it would mean Moscow and Pankow could ill afford to continue their campaign against

FRG rearmament and the EDC. Washington would gain the necessary breathing space to solidify Western cohesion against the Soviet unification program and for the defense community. The uprising had also pushed the German Question to the fore in public consciousness. To get ahead of this, and to put Moscow on the defensive even further, the

NSC recommended that the United States reverse course and seek a Four Power conference on the German Question, one on American terms that stressed free elections as a path toward unification. This culminated in mid-July, when the three Western foreign ministers met and agreed that there should be a quadripartite conference. Those meetings took place between January 25 and February 18, 1954—in Berlin—but proved fruitless, since both sides remained intractable on the German Question. The move in summer 1953, however, signaled the Eisenhower administration going on the offensive with their German policy to serve larger objectives.478

476 PSB D-21/2, “National Psychological Strategy with Respect to Berlin,” October 9, 1952, “PSB D-21” folder, box 2, Psychological Strategy Board Working File, Entry A1 1462, RG 59, NARA. See also Memorandum, Riddleberger to Bruce, “PSB Paper on Berlin,” January 13, 1953, “PSB D-21” folder, box 2, Psychological Strategy Board Working File, Entry A1 1462, RG 59, NARA. 477 Telegram, Chargé in France (for McCloy) to Byroade, March 17, 1952, FRUS, 1952–1954, VII, Part 1: 180-81. 478 Daniel C. Williamson, Separate Agendas: Churchill, Eisenhower, and Anglo-American Relations, 1953- 1955 (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006), pp. 29-30; Memorandum of Discussion at the 181st Meeting of the National Security Council, January 21, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, VII, Part 1: 781-82. See also NSC 181

In practice, several measures comprised the U.S. psychological warfare strategy, with Berlin the primary battleground. The PSB envisioned two stages, both with the psychological objectives of undermining “satellite puppet authority” by fomenting

“resistance to communist oppression” and displaying to the world that “the Soviet Empire is beginning to crumble.” In the first phase, which would require less than sixty days to implement, planners called for an intensification of defection programs. In the international arena, a campaign “to honor martyrs of the East German revolt” would needle communist leaders, as would emphasis on free elections as a path toward German unification. Covert plans included the encouragement of resistance to place pressure on authorities and provoke a reaction, “black radio intruder operations” that would encourage defection, and the organization of cells that could expand to lead large-scale resistance. PSB planners even advocated for the “elimination of key puppet officials.”

The second phase, which would require lengthy preparation, was a more long-term affirmation of the first phase’s objectives, including the training and arming of underground organizations that could fight sustained warfare, if needed.479 Berlin’s geographical liability had turned to an advantage for the United States.

The city was not just a battlefield in the administration’s psychological warfare strategy—it could also be a weapon. Indeed, Berlin had always been a boon for the more subterranean activities of the CIA, given its location inside the Bloc and proximity to

160/1, “United States Position with Respect to Germany,” August 17, 1953, “Germany (7)” folder, box 48, Disaster File Series, NSC Staff Papers, White House Office Files, DDEL. 479 “Document No. 74: NSC 158, “United States Objectives and Actions to Exploit the Unrest in the Satellite States, 29 June, 1953,” in Uprising in East Germany, 1953: The Cold War, the German Question, and the First Major Upheaval behind the Iron Curtain, ed., Christian F. Ostermann (New York: Central European University Press, 2001), pp. 332-34. For commentary on the directive, see ibid., pp. 319-20. 182

Soviet agents and activities.480 Yet the administration understood the propaganda value of capitalist Berlin as an overt juxtaposition to communism. Plans outside of NSC 158 included investing $50 million in rebuilding the western sectors, thereby improving the city as a showcase of democracy inside the Iron Curtain and strengthening its pull for defectors. The administration even contemplated the Federal Republic using the

Reichstag’s grounds for a “Hall of Heroes” memorial for those who died during the uprising.481 Instead of building monuments, though, Eisenhower decided to offer an olive branch used as a sword.

It was this program to use food aid that was, by far, the most successful of the administration’s psychological warfare plans. It was also one of the few suggestions implemented, as most of PSB-45 and NSC 158 fell by the wayside. Though it is true that the administration believed the food aid program could counter those who charged them with indifference after their lukewarm reaction to the uprising, it was meant for larger ends. Washington carried it out to display the stark political, economic, and humanitarian differences between East and West and to undermine the SED by antagonizing its relationship with its own people and the Soviets. Yet, at its base, it was in the service of protecting the EDC and Adenauer’s chancellorship. 482

Distribution began on July 27, with West German officials handing out packages of flour, lard, condensed or powdered milk, and dried vegetables to East Germans at

480 See Murphy, Kondrashev, Bailey, Battleground Berlin; Donald P. Steury, ed., On the Front Lines of the Cold War: Documents on the Intelligence War in Berlin, 1946 to 1961 (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999). 481 Memorandum 862B.03/9-2353, Report on the Implementation of PSB-45 in Germany, September 23, 1953, folder 1, box 5259, Central Decimal File, 1950-1953, RG 59, NARA. 482 Ostermann, “Keeping the Pot Simmering,” p. 70. 183 thirty-five points in West Berlin. The Americans had devised a Marshall Plan in miniature, a fait accompli against the Soviets, and like the ERP, they knew Moscow would reject the $15 million aid package to the East Germans. The Kremlin played to type on July 11 when they spurned the offer. The day before, the White House released

Eisenhower and Adenauer exchanges that made it appear that the food program was an

FRG initiative to improve the Chancellor’s position in the eyes of East Germans and provide an undeniable contrast with Ulbricht.483

The program was an overwhelming success. Officials distributed more than 2.5 million packages to 865,000 people in the first phase alone. SED officials proved powerless to stop the nightmare. The transfer of East Germans between Berlin and the zone was more than the regime could handle, and they resorted to quarantining the city.

The SED tasked 575 Party members with disrupting the distribution of packages, but even that proved fruitless. Like their countrymen, the agents gave into temptation and took packages for themselves while reporting that they secured only 150 of them. By

August 1, the regime decided on a shame and mass agitation campaign to protect the New

Course. Both, like the previous measures, failed to completely deter East Germans from going to the distribution centers in West Berlin.484

When the program ended, the administration had achieved their objective of undermining the SED, creating friction between the Party and the population, and

483 Cable 862B.49/9-1753, HICOG Berlin to State Department, “First Program for Distribution of Food in West Berlin to Residents of the Soviet Sector of Berlin and the Soviet Zone of Germany,” September 17, 1953, folder 1, box 5263, Central Decimal File, 1950-1953, RG 59, NARA. 484 Ibid.; Memorandum, Geoffrey Lewis to Acting Secretary, “Note to the Soviets and Depots on Zonal Boundaries,” August 4, 1953, “PSB D-21” folder, box 2, Psychological Strategy Board Working File, Entry A1 1462, RG 59, NARA. 184 proving the bankruptcy of the regime. GDR officials’ attempts to defend against the psychological warfare program extended the uprising and its effects into August. Their instinct was to seal off East Berlin from what they perceived as the real problem, the

West, yet Moscow vetoed their ally. There was no denying that citizens fleeing west was a political black eye for the SED, but the Kremlin made it clear to their ally that isolating the western sectors was “politically disadvantageous and unacceptable,” and would serve only to cause more anger and dissatisfaction toward the regime. Instead, the regime’s time was better spent fighting against “hostile elements” in West Berlin, foreshadowing where Bloc policy was heading in 1958.485

The food program and the PSB’s larger strategy were not without their critics in the West. U.S. officials assessed the continued use of psychological warfare in late summer, and a schism formed between the White House and the diplomats who held posts in Europe. From a regional chiefs of mission conference for Western Europe came a memorandum that expressed dissatisfaction with U.S. policy. The envoys posted to

Eastern Europe followed suit with their own manifesto after meeting in Vienna several days later.486 The diplomats rejected Eisenhower and Dulles’ liberation rhetoric. They argued that psychological warfare “should never be allowed to run ahead of carefully considered political objectives,” lest it make rather than serve policy. The diplomats

485 “Draft Instructions to Chuikov and Semyonov,” September 25, 1953, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVPRF, f. 0742, op. 41, por. 92, pap. 280, ll. 80-81. Translated by Daniel Rozas. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110406, Accessed December 23, 2016. Hope Harrison, “The New Course: Soviet Policy toward Germany and the Uprising in the GDR,” in The Cold War after Stalin’s Death: A Missed Opportunity for Peace?, eds. Klaus Larres and Kenneth Osgood (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), pp. 193-94. 486 Memorandum, State Department Bureau of European Affairs, “Principal Conclusions Chief of Mission Meeting in Vienna, September 22–24, 1953,” September 29, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, VI, Part I: 681-83. 185 believed that unilateral U.S. operations in the service of political warfare stoked Allied fears that the Bloc may be so antagonized that they could ignite a military conflict. At its foundation, then, actions like those that the administration took in Berlin could be self- defeating, since they irritated both friend and enemy. Angering the latter could be justified; doing so to the former served Moscow’s goal of Western disintegration. As the diplomats saw it, the United States should adopt a policy that kept “the Eastern European pot lukewarm or even simmering” rather than political warfare’s inclination to “keep the pot at a constant boiling pot.”487

It was the confluence of three issues that led the officials in Europe to rail against

Eisenhower’s psychological warfare strategy. First, U.S. domestic politics had creeped into the foreign service in the form of McCarthyism. Diplomats found it difficult to promote the U.S. form of democracy when Senator Joseph McCarthy waged an anticommunist battle at home that made Americans appear intolerant and hypocritical.

James Conant, McCloy’s successor at HICOG, had taken a fair amount of criticism from

West Germans about McCarthy, who they likened to Hitler.488 Conant needed no lecture on the junior senator from Wisconsin. He had been firmly in McCarthy’s crosshairs since his confirmation hearings in winter 1952. After Conant arrived in Bad Godesberg,

McCarthy began lobbing salvoes from across the ocean, ruining several HICOG officials’ careers after charging them with being disloyal and potential security risks.489 The

487 Memorandum, Chiefs of Mission to the State Department, “Concept and Ideas for Psychological Warfare in Europe Developed by the Chiefs of Mission Meeting at Luxembourg on September 18–19, 1953,” October 1, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, VI, Part I: 678-81. The memorandum also appears in FRUS, 1952–1954, VIII: 82-86. 488 Telegram, Conant to State Department, July 27, 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, VII, Part 1: 496. 489 James G. Hershberg, James B. Conant: Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making of the Nuclear Age (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 655-57. 186 memorandum’s authors obliquely referenced McCarthyism when they argued that propaganda begins at home.490

Second, Eisenhower’s psychological warfare strategy strained alliance politics, particularly with the British. The White House’s strategy of antagonizing the East

Germans to undercut the Soviet peace offensive came at the expense of Churchill’s hopes of a post-Stalin era where the West could weaken communism by drawing Moscow closer.491 In Berlin, British officials worried that the Americans were endangering the city’s security. British High Commissioner Ivone A. Kirkpatrick threatened Conant with blocking the food program, doing so out of a fear that the Soviets would be so antagonized that they would cut off Berlin’s communication with the West. Though

Kirkpatrick never acted upon his threat, the administration’s unilateral actions rankled

British officials for some time thereafter.492 Some of that exasperation had to do also with the administration breaking with established policy regarding the city, outlined in NSC

132/1, which Conant had warned about prior to the food program.493 From friendly capitals, it now appeared Eisenhower did not recognize that courses of action in Berlin

“can be pursued effectively only with the support of our major allies.”494

Third, the Luxembourg memorandum reflected a deep displeasure with the rollback strategy within the Foreign Service. Most diplomats in Europe had been part of

490 Chiefs of Mission to the State Department, FRUS, 1952-1954, VI, Part 1: 679. 491 John W. Young, “Churchill and East-West Détente,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Vol. 11 (2001): 373-92. 492 Ostermann, “Keeping the Pot Simmering,” pp. 75-76. 493 Memorandum 862B.03/7-3153, W.K. Scott to Walter Bedell Smith (PSB), July 31, 1953, folder 1, box 5259, Central Decimal File, 1950-1953, RG 59, NARA. 494 NSC 132/1 Progress Report, “United States Policy and Courses of Action to Counter Possible Soviet or Satellite Action against Berlin,” September 10, 1953, “Germany (7)” folder, box 48, Disaster File Series, NSC Staff Papers, White House Office Files, DDEL. 187

Acheson’s State Department, and they had spent the previous six years carrying out containment and defining how it could be implemented on the ground. To have an administration complain that those efforts were unsatisfactory, and then put in place a strategy that could undo all that had been accomplished, smacked of hubris and impertinence.495 The diplomats’ displeasure found its intended audience, and their memorandum made it all the way to the White House. C.D. Jackson, Dulles, and

Eisenhower, defended their actions to one another. As Eisenhower argued to Dulles, the term “psychological warfare” meant “anything from the singing of a beautiful hymn up to the most extraordinary kind of physical sabotage,” and thus should not have been considered as narrowly as the diplomats had.496 Crucially, he believed psychological warfare was inseparable from the military, economic, and political components of the superpower competition, and the primary means of fighting the battle over the “minds and wills of men” in the Cold War.497

The authors of the memorandum had nonetheless posed important questions to the administration. Would the city be an instrument of containment, as Truman had originally conceived it, or was there a way that it could serve rollback without severe consequences? Would the liberation of oppressed peoples occur through an evolutionary or a revolutionary process? Eisenhower had proven that Berlin could be the tip of an

American spear that could jab without using military force. It could target the Kremlin’s

495 For this internal dissension from Conant’s perspective, see Hershberg, James B. Conant, pp. 662-63. 496 Memorandum, Jackson to White House Staff Secretary Minnich, October 12, 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, VIII: 102-03; Memorandum, Eisenhower to Dulles, October 24, 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, VIII: 108-09. 497 Kenneth A. Osgood, “Form before Substance: Eisenhower’s Commitment to Psychological Warfare and Negotiations with the Enemy,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Summer 2000): 405-433. 188 designs against Western cohesion on the brink of the ratification of the EDC while going after a Soviet client whose rhetoric and very existence annoyed Western leaders. There were limits to such a strategy, though, chiefly the internal skeptics who feared the administration would destroy the village to save it.

With respect to the eventual Berlin Crisis, the events and policies of 1953 were important for two reasons. First, it signaled Washington’s growing interest in East

German internal policies. Since the GDR’s founding, its meddling in what the United

States considered strictly quadripartite matters had been a central topic in U.S. officials’ discussions about the city. Between Bonn signing the General Treaty and the uprising,

Lyon noticed Berlin had become “a tight little island” due to Soviet and East German complicating Berliners’ interzonal and intra-city travel, and he suggested the United

States should expect Moscow to continue extending de facto sovereignty to Pankow. His analysis foreshadowed the crux of the 1958 crisis, chiefly that the United States could be forced into “being dependent on [the] goodwill of East Germans for our position in Berlin rather than quadripartite agreements.”498 The SED’s sealing off the western sectors during the food program illustrated the regime’s ability and willingness to quarantine the city, and doing so potentially without the blessing of Moscow.

Second, any American response to Bloc moves regarding the city had the ability to compound that initial action. This created an impression, ironically, that West Berlin’s fate was tied to the SED regime’s, which colored how Washington responded in 1958.

498 Telegram, Lyon to HICOM, January 27, 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, VII, Part 2: 1307-09. For Lyon’s February assessment, see Telegram, Lyon to HICOM, February 23, 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, VII, Part 2: 1312-14. 189

The flood of refugees into the western sectors after Ulbricht’s socialization campaign, though a public indictment of his policies, taxed West Berlin’s administration heavily.

There was little recourse for Reuter or Adenauer, who created programs to resettle East

Germans in the Federal Republic.499 For Reuter, encouraging more refugees to take flight would only add further burden, and building a “Chinese wall” to keep them out and stabilize the situation was impractical.500 From the American perspective, this reticence to knock over the SED’s wobbly house of cards contained the fear of German nationalism. In Conant’s opinion, which he sent to Dulles privately a week after the uprising, the East German workers rejected the regime for economic reasons. Until

Ulbricht supplied food to his hungry people and regained control, there existed a climate ripe for the creation of a “right-wing reactionary movement.”501 Conant repeated the same fear during the CINCUSAREUR-HICOG Commanders Conference several days later, stating that “we certainly don’t want to do anything that will cause more bloodshed; we don’t want to incite real revolts and insurrections.”502 The uprising uncovered a position that many people might not have subscribed to before, one that would resurface after the Berlin Wall’s construction eight years later: coexisting with a known enemy was preferable to creating an unknown one.

499 Minutes, Second General Meeting of Dulles and Adenauer, April 17, 1953, “Germany 1950-1953 (2)” folder, box 5, Policy Planning Staff Files, Country Files, Entry A1-558CA, RG 59, NARA. 500 Memorandum of Conversation, Reuter and Dulles, March 20, 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, VII, Part 2: 1321-22. 501 Private letter, Conant to Dulles, June 25, 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, VII, Part 1: 480. 502 Records of the Sixth CINCUSAREUR-HICOG Commanders Conference, June 29, 1953, FRUS, 1952– 1954, VII, Part 2: 1605. A copy can also be found in the PPS records, “Germany 1950-1953 (1)” folder, box 5, Policy Planning Staff Files, Country Files, Entry A1-558CA, RG 59, NARA. 190

Aligning Berlin and National Policy

The quandary in 1953 and onward, as the Berlin Element understood it, was that the city still had the potential to spark a violent response from the Soviet Union even when military forces were not used. This reality gave the West pause. War could come out of internal weaknesses in Moscow just as much as from the Kremlin feeling strong.503

Both potential situations highlighted the necessity of aligning allied policies. Indeed, while the White House had been acting unilaterally in Berlin, the Joint Chiefs were directing USAREUR to undertake protracted tripartite discussions to fall into line with the prescriptions of NSC 132/1, chiefly an overhaul in airlift planning that begin in

January and lasted into August 1953.504 Like the constant irritant of East Germany, however, there was considerable stress involved in aligning U.S. policy and objectives in

Berlin with the allies’ own plans.

In the long term, the importance of the uprising and Eisenhower’s psychological warfare strategy to U.S. strategy was that it spurred a critical appraisal of Berlin policy from the administration.505 The starting point was the aforementioned NSC 132/1, which

Truman had adopted on June 12, 1952, superseding NSC 24/3 from June 14, 1949. As a policy, it differed in no substantial way from how U.S. officials approached the Berlin problem in 1948. The intervening events had changed Truman and Acheson’s language about assumptions—chiefly, that the GDR was a threat—as well as their pledge to hold

503 Working Paper, Eastern Affairs Division, Berlin Element, HICOG, “Alternative Courses of Developments Arising Out of June 16 Uprisings in East Germany—What U.S. Decisions and Actions Do They Prompt?,” June 25, 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, VII, Part 2: 1594-99. 504 The JCS discussions with USAREUR, the DOD, and the State Department about this topic are voluminous and can be found in boxes 136 and 137, Central Decimal File, 1951-53, Entry UD-10, RG 218, NARA. 505 For an excellent study on this topic, see Coleman, “Eisenhower and the Berlin Problem,” pp. 3-34. 191

Moscow accountable for any tensions in the city. In effect, they had adopted as national security policy the September 1950 foreign ministers’ declarations. The central problem of Berlin remained, as did the binary options for the West in the event of Soviet interference with access: either go over the blockade or through it. Truman kept his incremental approach, beginning with the presentation of an Allied united front leading to the implementation of an airlift. As for Berlin’s defense, NSC 132/1 maintained a citadel mindset, believing that the city’s best hope was economic viability augmented with stockpiling and increasing airlift capabilities.506

Eisenhower rejected Truman’s approach, particularly the reliance upon exhausting all diplomatic options before resorting to military force. In Eisenhower’s mind, incrementally responding to a blockade diminished how aggressive the original act was, and could also embolden Moscow while increasing the chances of misunderstanding and miscalculation. The State Department reviewed Truman’s policy in early September

1953, and then presented their findings in an October 1 NSC meeting where they debated the relative positive and weaknesses of the previous administration’s policy. Dulles highlighted the expansion of the West Berlin police force, the incremental moves toward a unity of command, and an increase in stockpiles as well as an independence of West

Berlin’s infrastructural services—all Taylor’s key policies. The city’s weakness was still economics, however. A quarter of the work force was unemployed, and that number continued to grow, given that a steady flow of East German refugees sought sanctuary in

506 NSC 132/1, “United States Policy and Courses of Action to Counter Possible Soviet or Satellite Action against Berlin,” “NSC 132/1” folder, box 18, Policy Papers, Entry 1, RG 273, NARA; Memorandum of Discussion at the 118th Meeting of the NSC, Wednesday, June 11, 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, VII, Part 2: 1258-61. 192

West Berlin. With the inherent difficulties of manufacturing goods in a vulnerable location, the city’s economy remained dependent upon external aid. 507

During the resulting NSC discussion, Eisenhower tied the Berlin problem to the larger battle, as he saw it, of diminishing U.S. prestige abroad. He agreed with Truman that the position should be maintained at all costs. He did so because any perception that the United States was backing down in Berlin would be disastrous for the city, which relied on sustained morale to withstand near-constant propaganda assaults, as well as harmful to U.S. global standing. It was not altogether different from Truman’s conception of the , but was more robust in its prescriptions of negative outcomes. In the event of Soviet interference with Allied access to the city, therefore, general war was all but sure to occur; timing and blame would be all that was left to decide. In NSC 132/1, he saw no clear path to victory: the initial steps in the incremental approach would do nothing to avert the eventual war, and relying on an airlift meant that, if the situation became untenable and force was needed, the West would become the belligerents.508 The

State Department responded with an updated plan on December 10, which eventually became NSC 173. Eisenhower and the Joint Chiefs immediately rejected it, citing unsubstantial changes. The multi-stage response to Soviet actions remained, primarily the reliance on diplomatic and political options to respond to what was effectively an act of war.509

507 Coleman, “Eisenhower and the Berlin Problem”: 20-21; Memorandum of Discussion at the 164th Meeting of the National Security Council, October 1, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, VII, Part 2: 1364-65. 508 Coleman, “Eisenhower and the Berlin Problem”: 22. 509 NSC 173, “United States Policy and Courses of Action to Counter Possible Soviet or Satellite Action Against Berlin,” December 1, 1953, “NSC 173” folder, box 26, Entry 1, RG 273, NARA. 193

It is not coincidence or inconsequential that these discussions regarding the new direction of Berlin policy occurred when the administration was articulating its new strategy to wage the Cold War. Eisenhower and Dulles were not perceiving of the city in its own vacuum, or on an ad hoc basis. The administration had already undertaken Project

Solarium in June and July 1953, a three-team planning exercise at the National War

College intended to review national security policy. Of the teams’ designated strategies— containment, deterrence, and liberation—Eisenhower and his advisors had managed to simultaneously implement all three in Berlin over the summer.510 Ostensibly, though, the first option won out, embodied in NSC 162/2 from October 30, 1953 and dubbed the

“New Look.” In practice, however, all three were in varying ways represented in the new national security policy. Central to the policy was the idea that the United States should increase its effectiveness in the superpower contest but at a reduced cost. Eisenhower continued to fear the runaway deficit a perpetual garrison state demanded, and he also wished to seize the initiative against the Soviets.511 The move put him at odds with the

Army staff, who believed the reliance on nuclear weapons reduced capabilities and put the service at risk of atrophying.512

While Berlin and the New Look are rarely—if ever—used in the same sentence, they should be.513 As John Lewis Gaddis has pointed out, it is “a mistake to view the

510 Michael J. Gallagher, “Intelligence and National Security Strategy: Reexamining ,” Intelligence & National Security, Vol. 30 Issue 4, (Aug. 2015): 461-485. The Liberation team included two future SACEURs, Lyman Lemnitzer and . 511 Saki Dockrill, Eisenhower’s New-Look National Security Policy, 1953-1961 (New York: St. Martin’s, 1996). 512 Donald Alan Carter, “Eisenhower versus the Generals,” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 71, No. 4 (Oct. 2007): 1169-1199. 513 David G. Coleman believes otherwise. He argues Eisenhower’s policy toward Berlin was a “point of departure.” See “Eisenhower and the Berlin Problem,” p. 31. 194

Eisenhower administration’s ‘New Look’ strategy as revolving primarily around” the concept of massive retaliation, which Dulles articulated in a speech at the January 12,

1954 Council on Foreign Relations dinner. His and Eisenhower’s central idea was not to use nuclear weapons as a blanket response to any given situation, but to react to

“challenges in ways calculated to apply one’s own strengths against the other side’s weaknesses, even if this meant shifting the nature and location of the confrontation.”514 In

Berlin, a place where the West was operating from a position of disadvantage, it made little sense to react to a blockade in the same manner as Truman had. Doing so would only compound the Allies’ disadvantage and increase the Kremlin’s options. To reverse this course, they would have to be bold and respond quickly and forcefully, yet doing so while reducing financial support to West Berlin, which had cost the Allies $2 billion by

1952.515

The New Look’s influence on Berlin policy was manifested in NSC 5404/1, which Eisenhower approved on January 25, 1954, and thus established the administration’s basic stance toward Berlin until 1958. The paper built on the views

Eisenhower had previously expressed about Berlin, such as the importance to U.S. global prestige of resolve in the city; the necessity for a response to be immediate and forceful; and the city’s unrivaled propaganda value for rollback purposes, including undermining the GDR as they had during “the food program in the summer of 1953.”516 NSC 5404/1’s most important prescriptions were about the use of force. “Limited military force” would

514 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p. 147. 515 Financial annex to NSC 5401/1, January 25, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, VII, Part 2: 1391-92. 516 NSC 5404/1, “U.S. Policy on Berlin,” January 25, 1954, “Germany (8)” folder, box 48, Disaster File Series, NSC Staff Papers, White House Office Files, DDEL. 195 now be used to defend Berlin. This was conceived in two-parts: first, to determine Soviet intentions; second, to reopen access if Moscow attempted to deny Allied movement to or from the city. Limited force was not intended to be the opening play of a battle, though

NSC 5404/1 made it clear that “immediate and forceful” counteraction “might lead to general war.” It was instead intended to bend the politico-military issue to the West’s will, and use nuclear leverage to reinforce the tripartite position. Thus, the intention was to use military force to probe. Indeed, Dulles often referred to Berlin as a place where communists would test Western resolve, and he conceived of using that tactic in reverse.517 In essence, the NSC saw limited military force as conventional deterrence. By deploying forces quickly, Eisenhower believed that he could induce Moscow to back down, and thereby avoid a protracted situation that would become muddled and lead to a tripartite retreat, a miscalculation, or war.518

By mid-decade, a series of events took place that impinged upon, some directly and others obliquely, how the administration could implement NSC 5404/1. First, after a two-year drama, the EDC finally died in August 1954 when the French legislature did not ratify it.519 This effected Eisenhower’s defense plans and strategy for not just Berlin but

Western Europe as well. He had planned to reduce the U.S. financial and military commitment to the continent, believing that the EDC would shoulder the burden of

517 Memorandum of a Conversation, Dulles and von Brentano, November 21, 1957, FRUS, 1955-1957, IV: 193-206; Dulles to Adenauer, November 29, 1j957, FRUS, 1955-1957, IV: 211-13. 518 Coleman, “Eisenhower and the Berlin Problem”: 26-27; NSC 5404/1, “U.S. Policy on Berlin,” January 25, 1954, “Germany (8)” folder, box 48, Disaster File Series, NSC Staff Papers, White House Office Files, DDEL. 519 Michael Harrison, The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security (Baltimore: Press, 1981), pp. 26-36; Hitchcock, France Restored, pp. 169-202. 196 defense. Indeed, that is why he had fought so hard to protect the defense community idea during the Soviet peace offensive.520 The EDC’s death exposed the U.S. flank in Berlin, since Moscow and Pankow could use the Allied disagreement as a propaganda and diplomatic wedge.521

Second, Europe’s diplomatic landscape changed in 1955. With the EDC’s death, the Bonn-Paris conventions that the Allies had signed three years before finally came into force, officially ending the occupation of West Germany on May 5, 1955. The holdup had been the domestic debates about the EDC, since the defense community ratification was a precondition to the end of the occupation. The same day, HICOG ceased to exist, and Conant became the first U.S. ambassador to the Federal Republic. In Berlin, an

Allied declaration about the city, which had also been waiting in the wings since May

1952, came into effect and changed the relationship between the tripartite powers and the local government. Equally as important, the Federal Republic joined NATO only four days after the occupation ended. The effect of these events was a subtle change in the way the United States approached Bonn. Berlin, though a quadripartite issue, had been so ensconced in Western relations—purposefully so by the Americans—that Washington would now have to reckon with West German viewpoints. Moreover, and somewhat counterintuitively, full FRG integration meant that the United States was now further away from disengaging from Europe in any meaningful way.522

520 Ruane, “Agonizing Reappraisals,” pp. 164-85; Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, pp. 120-25. 521 Coleman, “Eisenhower and the Berlin Problem,” p. 30. 522 McAllister, No Exit, pp. 171-244. 197

Third, events in Berlin made it appear as if another war scare may be on the horizon, which put to the test the administration’s reliance on using limited force. Soviet harassment of Berlin had been routine since 1949, but the complexion of the hassling changed in March 1955, when the GDR proposed an increase in the Autobahn toll on the main roads linking Berlin with West Germany that would raise the annual cost for city hall from 5 million to 40 million deutschemarks.523 Officials inside Berlin judged it

Ulbricht’s attempt at blackmail, not a precondition to another blockade. They also saw the blackmail itself as less important than how they responded to it. Paying the exorbitant increase would condone Moscow not carrying out their 1949 agreement to guarantee

Allied access while also granting de facto recognition to the GDR.524 By May, the issue took on a life of its own, and the State Department began to consider the possibility that

Moscow could be preparing for another blockade. It was in this environment that U.S. officials debated just what “limited military force” meant in a joint State-JCS meeting on

May 20, 1955. NSC 5404/1 was not rigid contingency planning and offered more strategic guidance than tactical instructions. Therein lay the problem for the diplomat and military officers. All could agree that they should probe in order to test Soviet intentions, but as U.S. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Matthew Ridgway put it, a field commander without clear orders “would not know whether he should march up to the barricade, try to tear it down, or start shooting.”525 The discussion laid upon NSC 5404/1’s fatal flaw: for

523 Cable, Henry Parkman, Dir. Berlin Element to HICOG, March 31, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, XXVI: 349-51. 524 Cable, Dulles to Conant, April 5, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, XXVI: 354-55; Cable, Conant to State Department (Lyon), April 18, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, XXVI: 362-64; Cable, Conant to State Department, April 25, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, XXVI: 364-65; Dulles to Berlin Mission, May 17, 1955, FRUS, 1955- 1957, XXVI: 372. 525 Substance of Discussion, State-JCS Meeting, May 20, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, XXVI: 382. 198 an action that would have global implications and relied on the enemy’s response, the fate of the world was not in the hands of heads of state but instead a convoy commander and a checkpoint officer.

On September 20, 1955, Moscow granted sovereignty to the GDR and transferred authority of and access to Berlin. At the same time, the capital moved from Pankow to East Berlin. In late October 1956, a revolution in Budapest threatened

Soviet control of Hungary. Moscow violently crushed the uprising, given Hungary’s strategically-important position of bordering neutral Austria and independent Yugoslavia.

Like with the East German uprising three years earlier, the Eisenhower administration watched and wondered what effect it would have elsewhere.526 The changes to GDR’s status with Moscow, and a general wariness that instability in the Bloc could create unforeseen threats, induced U.S. officials to review war plans in 1956 and 1957. The most fundamental change was the Eisenhower administration reversal on whether they would distinguish between an East German and a Soviet attack. Their previous stance aligned with Truman and Acheson’s approach, which had been U.S. policy since the foreign ministers’ New York declaration in 1950. Though the administration repeatedly reaffirmed that position, events had overtaken the policy, from East German sovereignty to increased Soviet capabilities. Indeed, the NSC now considered a blockade of Berlin a

“possible prelude to [a] Soviet attack upon the continental U.S.”527 Since 1945, then,

526 Charles Gati, Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006). György Litván, ed. The Hungarian Revolution of 1956: Reform, Revolt and Repression, 1953-1963, trans. János M. Bak and Lyman H. Legters (New York: Longman, 1996). For documentation, see FRUS, 1955–1957, Eastern Europe, Volume XXV: 162-82. 527 National Security Council Report, NSC 5515/1, April 1, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, XIX: 75. 199

Berlin had gone from a local to global issue, and one that could now have consequences at home.

On the eve of the Second Berlin crisis, U.S. officials, from USCOB to the president, had contemplated a variety of threats to the city and possible ways to defend against them. Constant conversations took place, a product of U.S. officials’ attempts throughout the 1950s to balance the constancy of U.S. obligation to Berlin with the perpetual evolution of events and issues which affected that responsibility. Planning changed, but the obligation did not. That planning tended to evolve in parallel with national security strategy, from Truman and Acheson’s emphasis on NATO to

Eisenhower’s rollback and Massive Retaliation. All that had occurred since 1948 informed how the United States would respond in 1958. What was on the horizon put to the test the assumptions and plans that took ten years to formulate.

200

CHAPTER 5: “MUNICH STARES US IN THE FACE”528

The Second Berlin Crisis began with a demand. On November 27, 1958,

Khrushchev sent a note to the Western Powers ordering them to find a solution to the

German and Berlin Questions. It leveled charges against the West and was based on a trial balloon that Khrushchev had sent up two weeks before in a speech.529 He argued that the Western Powers had been overly antagonistic toward the Soviet Union and GDR, particularly recent West German policies they judged militaristic. The West had been insincere about supporting German reunification and had also “grossly violated” provisions of the , a curious charge since that was not the protocol that guaranteed Four Power presence in the city.530 As far as the Soviets were concerned, the only agreement the Allies continued to honor was the guarantee of their own presence in West Berlin, which they were using to turn “into a kind of state within a state,” a

“center from which to pursue subversive activity.” The violations of agreements, when combined with their activities, meant the West had forfeited their rights to maintain a presence in the city.

Khrushchev ended his note with an ultimatum: If the Western Powers did not work toward an agreement before May 27, 1959, the Soviet Union would sign a separate treaty with the GDR that renounced its occupation rights and handed over control access to Berlin. The threat was provocative. A nation that the West did not recognize could

528 Quote from David Bruce, Cable to State Department, February 16, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 361. 529 Khrushchev Address at Moscow Soviet-Polish Friendship Meeting in: U.S. Department of State, Documents on Germany, 1944-1985 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), pp. 542– 46. 530 See Protocol on Zones of Occupation and the Administration of “Greater Berlin,” September 12, 1944, Documents on Germany, 1944-1985 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), pp. 1-3. 201 control Allied communication with a city that victory in war had guaranteed. The Soviets also warned that an attack on the GDR to break a blockade would be an attack on the

Warsaw Pact. Khrushchev’s proposal thus was significant because it rejected the Four

Power protocol that established the joint administration of Berlin and a Western presence in the city. It also signaled the death of the East-West thaw. More consequential was

Khrushchev’s unconventional threat. Instead of threatening a military attack or blockade, he was attempting to use the city’s status against the Allies.531 After almost six years in office, Eisenhower had avoided a full-blown crisis in Berlin. Now the Kremlin had laid one at his feet.

This chapter focuses on how U.S. officials envisioned using military power during the second crisis in a place where most believed it was useless and could only lead to a nuclear exchange. It argues that both Eisenhower and Dulles arrived at the same conclusion: military power’s greatest strength was not in its implementation but its ability to corral Moscow into a predictable track toward political solutions. For the strategy to work, however, Allied acceptance of plans and solidarity in their application was a prerequisite. Given that allies had their own national goals, to which displays of military power seemed anathema, this proved laborious and frustrating. This chapter is thus most interested in strategies for deterrence during the crisis but also alliance politics. It asks

531 For the speech, see “Address by the Chairman Khrushchev Proposing that the Western Powers Thenceforth Deal Directly with the German Democratic Republic on Any Questions Concerning Berlin,” Moscow, November 10, 1958, U.S. Department of State, Documents on Germany, 1944-1985 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), pp. 542-46. For analysis of the speech, see William Burr, “Avoiding the Slippery Slope: The Eisenhower Administration and the Berlin Crisis, November 1958-January 1959,” Diplomatic History 18 (Spring 1994): 177-78; Petr Luňák, “Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis: Soviet Brinkmanship Seen from Inside,” Cold War History, Vol. 3, No. 2 (January 2003): 59-64. For its wider implications, Brady, Eisenhower and Adenauer, p. 224. 202 how the Allies, both tripartite and NATO, helped and hindered Eisenhower’s plans for resolving the Berlin crisis.

A Crisis on a Crisis

Khrushchev’s own proposal to the Berlin Question was to create a free city.

Instead of rejoining both halves, West Berlin would become a politically independent unit, precluding any involvement of outside states including the GDR and especially the

FRG, who Moscow viewed as attempting to reunify the country by force. Doing so would not just eradicate a source of tension but also allow for German reunification. In the meantime, Moscow would underwrite West Berlin’s economy with raw materials and food stuffs as well as orders for finished products. In security matters, the city would become demilitarized, which meant Allied forces would have to leave. While the note was ostensibly about Berlin, it was also a grab bag of unresolved, contentious issues about Germany, those that Khrushchev considered “abnormal.” There was the question of

Four Power rights and responsibilities in Germany and Berlin. The extent of Bonn’s relationship with Berlin was still yet undefined, as was the nature of relations between the

FRG and the GDR, and even Bonn’s interaction with the . Since the West refused to recognize Ulbricht’s regime, there was the question of who had the ability to regulate access to the city. Last, there was the complicated issue of European security.532

What, then, was Khrushchev hoping to accomplish in issuing an ultimatum that touched on so many antagonizing issues? Given Khrushchev’s proclivity to act rationally

532 William Glenn Gray, Germany’s Cold War: The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 1949-1969 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); Hannes Adomeit, Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), p. 187. 203 and irrationally simultaneously, and the lack of access to pertinent Soviet records, there has been a wide degree of speculation. All schools of thought on Khrushchev’s specific motivation, despite their wide range of views, share the assumption that his moves were defensive in nature. Khrushchev was likely not attempting to drive the Allies from Berlin so much as he was trying to block West German rearmament. His objective in November

1958 was therefore no different than in 1955 except that his means had changed.533 Yet it was not just rearmament that urged Khrushchev to act. A nuclear-equipped Federal

Republic made him anxious. Unwilling to believe that German character had changed, he was convinced that militarism and plans for eastward expansion were still alive and well in Bonn.534

Soviet historians have buttressed this nuclear argument and added a global perspective to the Kremlin’s timing and haste. With the foundation of Sino-Soviet cooperation cracking, Khrushchev may have hoped to solve the most pressing matter in

Europe, the German Question, before his attention would have to turn eastward toward a competitor for the worldwide communist revolution. China could put socialist unity into question publicly and undermine Moscow’s bargaining position in diplomacy worldwide.535 The Soviet leader may well have even seen Berlin as a way to combat critics at home as well as inside and outside the Bloc. To believe this is to stress the importance of Khrushchev’s faith in Marxist-Leninist ideology and the role of those

533 Schick, The Berlin Crisis. William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003), pp. 396-441. 534 Trachtenberg, History & Strategy, pp. 169-234. FRG ambassador to the USSR, Hans Kroll, argued that nuclear weapons were at the center of the crisis. Hans Kroll, Lebenserinnerungen eines Botschafters (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1967), p. 388. 535 Lorenz M. Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), pp. 80-156; Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, pp. 619-20. 204 beliefs in Soviet foreign policy after Stalin. Khrushchev’s ideology spurred him to counteract what he correctly perceived as a Western policy to highlight the superiority of in Berlin. Owing to his confidence that history was on his side, he saw a moment in late 1958 to act when he perceived that Moscow had preponderant power.536

This display of interest in bending the German and Berlin Questions to his will was beneficial for Khrushchev’s relations with Ulbricht. Indeed, Berlin may have been more a showdown between allies than it was with the United States, which means alliance politics drove Moscow into confronting the German Question.537 Such an argument takes the compromised position of supposing that pressure from a client translated into actions from Khrushchev, the patron.

It is more likely that the Kremlin note in November was an amalgamation of all these motivations, while also part of a Soviet grand design. Central to Khrushchev’s thinking in foreign policy matters was nuclear bipolarity. He understood that he could do little to harm the continental United States, but he did not allow fear of a thermonuclear war paralyze him. Instead, he saw new ways to navigate a more dangerous world, which led him to believe that a moment had arrived in dealing with Berlin. He hoped that the reality of the deadlock would make Washington recognize the Soviet Union as an equal power. The revolutionary in him believed the stalemate would allow Moscow to protect

536 Adomeit, Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior, pp. 183-311. 537 Hope Harrison, “Driving the Soviets up the Wall: A Super-Ally, a Superpower, and the Building of the Berlin Wall, 1958-61,” Cold War History, Vol. I, No. 1 (August 2000): 53-74; Hope Harrison, Driving the Soviets up the Wall: Soviet-East German Relations, 1953-1961 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003). For the counterpoint, see Michael Lemke, Die Berlinkrise, 1958 bis 1963: Interessen und Handlungsspielräume der SED im Ost-West Konflict (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995). 205 the expansion of national liberation movements.538 In terms of Europe, perhaps he saw an opportunity to pressure the Western Powers into settling the German Question with

Berlin, thereby removing the primary hindrance to a long-term settlement that could undermine capitalism and trigger the process of transforming the world via socialist revolution.539

Long-term structures and motivations aside, Khrushchev’s ultimatum rested on the intertwined short-term goals of weakening the ties between the Federal Republic and the Allies while shoring up the GDR. Convinced of the West’s aggressive intentions, he aimed to strike at the heart of NATO to block the rebirth of German expansionist tendencies. A back-pedaling West could allow the East Germans to stave off an emigration-driven economic collapse. When viewed as a regional problem, both served

Ulbricht’s objectives and Moscow’s larger strategy of breaking apart Allied cohesion, undermining the United States, and forcing them to sign agreements that benefited the

Soviet Union. Berlin for Khrushchev was therefore an instrument and a goal, a means by which to stabilize and destabilize areas that could serve his interests.540

Khrushchev made his ultimatum at an inopportune time for the Allies. The central issue was France. In May 1958, returned to power during the Algerian

War. After only a month, he began a campaign to redefine his country’s role within the

Western alliance, a three-pronged effort to create a Europe with France at its center.

Convinced that the Cold War had solidified between two blocs, the new leader decided

538 Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 193. 539 Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, p. 194. 540 Lunak, “Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis,” 63. 206 his country should chart its own course to restore its grandeur. In the first area, de Gaulle sought to expand the atomic program already underway, build an independent nuclear force, and declare only weapons under French control and strategic input would be allowed on French soil. In economics, he continued to block Britain’s entry to the

Common Market. For the coming crisis in Berlin, de Gaulle’s third initiative had the biggest bearing on the Allies. 541

On September 25, his ambassadors handed to American and British officials a secret letter proposing fundamental changes to NATO.542 It had two primary points. First, members of the alliance disproportionally shared risk, responsibility, and decision- making. From the French perspective, a war against the Soviets would be fought on

French soil, yet Paris had little power to influence debate over security issues. Second,

NATO’s founders had intended the organization to defend the North Atlantic, but that limited original conception meant that areas which lay outside of Europe’s borders, and which were very much now in play politically and strategically within the Cold War, were virtually defenseless. To meet these new challenges, he also proposed the creation of an Anglo-American-Franco tripartite directorate which would “take joint decisions on political questions affecting world security” and “effect strategic plans of action,” especially when it involved the “employment of nuclear weapons.”543

541 Beatrice Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), pp. 93-123. Maurice Vaïsse, “Intra-Alliance Conflict Related to Nuclear Weapons Politics: The French Case (1957- 63),” in A History of NATO—The First Fifty Years, Volume 3, ed. Gustav Schmidt (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 141-54. 542 Frederic Bozo, Two Strategies for Europe: De Gaulle, the United States, and the Atlantic Alliance (Lanham, MD.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), pp. 1-28. Sebastian Reyn, Atlantis Lost: The American Experience with De Gaulle, 1958-1969 (: Amsterdam University Press, 2009), pp. 35-36. 543 Enclosure, de Gaulle to Eisenhower, September 17, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, VII, Part 2: 82-83. Harrison, The Reluctant Ally, pp. 86-100. 207

De Gaulle desired allied cooperation, not integration. The real crux of his proposals was to wrest control of NATO away from the United States. His initiatives were part of a larger shift in French attitudes about the Atlantic alliance that had begun in

1955-56. American dominance meant France was relegated to client status, dependent upon Washington for defense and unable to make decisions on security matters or undertake its own initiatives, which became obvious after the humiliating .544

The recent crisis over Quemoy and Matsu had made de Gaulle’s point for him, illustrating how the Americans and Soviets could drag the European powers into a war that began halfway around the world but was fought in the West, all without consulting them. High-level cohesion, he wagered, would at once moderate Washington’s decision- making while bestowing upon France equal rights, therefore restoring French prestige.

Despite his criticism, de Gaulle maintained a belief in the centrality of NATO in Western defense. It was, after all, the organization that he hoped to reform. 545

The other members of the alliance had the letter almost immediately, owing to

Dulles briefing the Germans and Italians and de Gaulle giving NATO Secretary General

Paul-Henri Spaak a copy.546 Though it was not much of a surprise to the Americans and

544 Cyril Buffet, “The Berlin Crises, France, and the Atlantic Alliance, 1947-62: From Integration to Disintegration,” in Securing Peace in Europe, 1945-62: Thoughts for the post-Cold War Era, Beatrice Heuser and Robert O’Neill, eds (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), pp. 90-91. Gérard Bossuat, “France and the Leadership of the West in the 1950s: A Story of Disenchantment,” in Securing Peace in Europe, 1945-62: Thoughts for the post-Cold War Era, Beatrice Heuser and Robert O’Neill, eds (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), pp. 105-24; Harrison, The Reluctant Ally, pp. 6-48. For wider context of this relationship, see Mark Atwood Lawrence, Assuming the Burden: Europe and the American Commitment to War in Vietnam (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2005), pp. 17-58. 545 Buffet, “The Berlin Crises, France, and the Atlantic Alliance,” pp. 91-92. 546 Dulles also gave Spaak a copy. See Memorandum of Conversation, Dulles with Gruenther and McCloy, October 20, 1958, ProQuest ID 1679059022, Berlin Crisis Collection, Digital National Security Archive (hereafter DNSA); Memorandum of Conversation, Dulles and Spaak, September 27, 1958, FRUS, 1958- 1960, VII, Part I: 360. 208

British, as de Gaulle had outlined the ideas to Dulles in July, it was for everyone else.547

Adenauer was “considerably upset” and the Italians were “nearly hysterical.”548 On

September 27, the anger became public when Spaak delivered a barely-concealed rebuke of de Gaulle’s skepticism in a speech in Boston. The average person could not have known it, but the Secretary General’s full-throated defense of NATO’s current posture and organization was intended for Paris, not Moscow.549

Bonn’s primary grievance, like Spaak’s, was the French tripartite directorate proposal. Adenauer had first met his French counterpart only days earlier, at de Gaulle’s private residence, Colombey-les-deux-Églises. They left acknowledging that closer

Franco-German relations benefited both countries. De Gaulle had never sought a partnership of equals, however. He instead wanted an improved relationship with the

Germans to enhance French standing.550 The September 14 meeting now appeared as an attempt to harness Bonn’s ever-expanding economic and military power.551 Moreover, it was, in both Adenauer and Foreign Minister ’s estimation, a naked attempt to use the Federal Republic and Italy as counterweights against U.S. and British influence.552 Despite their anger, Bonn put a positive spin on the issue. De Gaulle was no

547 Frederic Bozo, Two Strategies for Europe, pp. 12-13, 19-21. Memorandum of Conversation, Dulles and de Gaulle, July 5, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, VII, Part 2: 53-64. 548 Cable, Bonn (Trimble) to Dulles, October 15, 1958, ProQuest ID 1679059451, Berlin Crisis Collection, DNSA. Memorandum of Conversation, Dulles with Gruenther and McCloy, October 20, 1958, ProQuest ID 1679059022, Berlin Crisis Collection, DNSA. 549 Paul-Henri Spaak, “NATO and the Communist Challenge,” in Department of State Bulletin Vol. XXXIV, No. 1008 (October 20, 1958): 607-11. Paul-Henri Spaak, The Continuing Battle: Memoirs of a European, 1936-1966 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co.1971), pp. 312-19. 550 Cyril Buffet, “De Gaulle, the Bomb, and Berlin: How to Use a Political Weapon,” in The Berlin Wall Crisis: Perspectives on Cold War Alliances, 1945-62, eds., J.P. Gearson and Kori Schake (New York: Palgrave, 2002), p. 76. 551 Williams, Adenauer, pp. 460-61. Buffet, “De Gaulle, the Bomb, and Berlin,” pp. 75-76. 552 Cable 1653, Cecil Lyon to Dulles, November 4, 1958, ProQuest ID 1679109472, Berlin Crisis Collection, DNSA. 209 longer a lone wolf inside the alliance, the chancellor told Ambassador David Bruce, but

“a wayward Western sheep who can be enticed back into the fold.”553

Eisenhower counseled the allies “to sit quietly and not exaggerate the situation.”554 He vetoed an offer to hold tripartite discussions in Washington, which

Macmillan had insisted since he was afraid of more complications for Britain’s bid to join the Common Market. As far as Eisenhower was concerned, “we should not do this 3 power business unless we have to.”555 The British olive branch was characteristic of how

London would deal with the coming crisis in Berlin, but so was Eisenhower’s intransigence. The French would carry the wounds of Allied scorn for years after. Into

1963, de Gaulle complained that Eisenhower and Macmillan had not even acknowledged receipt of his proposal, which the Kennedy administration did not realize was untrue until the ambassador to France, Chip Bohlen, found the reply in embassy records.556

Despite de Gaulle’s failure, his proposals were important on the eve of the Berlin

Crisis. First, it was the wedge within NATO that the Soviets had always sought. If the

Kremlin could exploit disagreement inside the Atlantic Alliance, it could break apart the

Western security arrangement at a crucial time in the Cold War. Second, it affected how the Allies interacted with one other. Interallied suspicion had been a feature since 1949, but the ones born out of the de Gaulle proposal, since they occurred so close to

553 Cable, Bruce to Dulles, October 31, 1958, “October 1, 1958 - December 31, 1958 Folder 1 of 2” folder, box 3, Diaries of David K.E. Bruce, Entry A1-5544, RG 59, NARA. 554 Memorandum of Conversation, Eisenhower, Herter, and Italian Amb. Brosio, October 6, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, VII, Part 2: 89. Letter, Eisenhower to de Gaulle, October 20, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, VII, Part 2: 108-09. 555 Emphasis in original. Quoted in editorial note, FRUS, 1958-1960, VII, Part 2: 100. 556 Cable No. 3521, Bohlen to Rusk, March 6, 1963, “France-General 3/1/61 – 3/9/61” folder, box 72, Countries series, National Security File, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library (hereafter JFKL). 210

Khrushchev’s ultimatum, were fresh on officials’ minds when NATO navigated the

Berlin Crisis. Third, that very navigation would underscore the proposal’s main points.

Given whom Khrushchev’s ultimatum was addressed to, de Gaulle’s tripartite directorate was effectively formed, and would serve France’s larger goals.

Khrushchev’s ultimatum had not caught the Western Allies off guard. After the

Soviet Premier’s November 10 speech, Washington prepared for another blockade. They also knew a week before, via the Soviet ambassador to the Federal Republic, that a formal message was imminent.557 The U.S. reaction to the ultimatum was initially more military in character than political, a product of following established procedures but also because of events. In the early afternoon on November 14, the Soviets detained U.S. soldiers at the Babelsberg checkpoint after the Americans would not permit the border guards to inspect their vehicles. USCOB Gen. Barksdale Hamlett submitted a plan to use force, but the Soviets allowed the convoy to turn back by evening. In the context of East-

West relations, the issue did not appear coincidental, and U.S. Army officers in Europe interpreted it as a test of resolve.558 Lt. Gen. Lauris Norstad, who was both SACEUR and

CINCEUR, activated contingency plans.559 He requested permission from the Joint

Chiefs to test Soviet intentions with a second convoy. His objective was to dispel the idea

557 Memorandum for the President from Herter, November 13, 1958, “Status Report on Berlin in the Light of the Khrushchev Statement of November 10,” “Berlin – Vol. I (1) [November-December 1958]” folder, box 6, White House Office Files, Staff Secretary, International Series, DDEL. See also Letter, Adenauer to Dulles, November 20, 1958, as attachment to message from John Calhoun to John Eisenhower, November 25, 1958, “Berlin – Vol. I (1) [November-December 1958]” folder, box 6, White House Office Files, Staff Secretary, International Series, DDEL. 558 Cable, Hamlett Barksdale to CINCUSAREUR, November 15, 1958, “CCS 381 (8-20-43) Sec. 41” folder, box 72, Central Decimal File, RG 218, NARA. 559 EP 103 (U) “USAREUR Plan for Reopening Access to Berlin (TS),” October 3, 1958, “CCS 381 (8-20- 43) Sec. 41” folder, box 72, Central Decimal File, RG 218, NARA. 211 that the United States would “accept a voluntary blockade,” which would have

“unacceptable political and military consequences.” If the convoy was detained, he recommended using force.560 The Joint Chiefs concurred, and upped the ante by proposing Norstad use a division. Dulles considered both recommendations “extreme.”561

Washington was thus finding it difficult to project power on the atomic battlefield, especially beyond NATO’s forward defense.562

Throughout November, Norstad’s communication with the Joint Chiefs set the baseline for the debate. His recommendations to expand the range of military options were often forwarded with JCS approval to Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy, who then passed them on to the State Department. By the end of the month, an ad hoc interdepartmental working group on Berlin, with Foy Kohler from the Bureau of

European Affairs at the helm, became the prime mover for discussion.563 This working group on Berlin, which was preparing a comprehensive study on courses of action, commiserated with Norstad’s point of view. Norstad, the Joint Chiefs, and the working group’s primary focus was on checkpoint procedure and the limited use of force, both of

560 Cable, Norstad to McElroy and Twining, November 15, 1958, “CCS 381 (8-20-43) Sec. 41” folder, box 72, Central Decimal File, RG 218, NARA. Memorandum, JCS to McElroy, “Berlin Situation,” , 1958, “Memos No 1958” folder, box 106, Nathan Twining Papers, Library of Congress. Dwight Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956-1961: The White House Years (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1965), p. 331. 561 Memorandum of Conversation, Eisenhower and Dulles, November 18, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 84. 562 Ingo Trauschweizer, The Cold War U.S. Army: Building Deterrence for Limited War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008), pp. 18-47. 563 See Memorandum for Admiral Dennison and Generals Moore, Gerhart, Roberts, November 26, 1958, “State-Defense-JCS Ad Hoc Working Report on Possible Courses of Action on Berlin,” and the November 28 updated and expanded version “Report by State-Defense-JCS AD Hoc Working Group Report on Possible Courses of Action on Berlin,” both in “CCS 381 (8-20-43) Sec. 41” folder, box 72, Central Decimal File, RG 218, NARA. For JCS-only discussions of the situation, see JCS 1907/157 Berlin Situation, discussed in a November 24 meeting, “CCS 381 (8-20-43) Sec. 41” folder, box 72, Central Decimal File, RG 218, NARA. 212 which were linked. While the Babelsberg incident involved Soviet inspection of

American vehicles, Khrushchev’s note changed Allied focus to Moscow handing over access controls to the GDR. More than a procedural change, East German control of access could mean de facto recognition from the Western Powers. For Norstad, such recognition would begin a “humiliating process.” He recommended the Allies “draw the line now” so the Soviets would “understand [that] we will use force to support this position if necessary.”564

Norstad’s views were in line with many officials in Washington, including consequential players such as Kohler and Robert Murphy, who reemerged on Berlin issues as the State Department’s Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

This group reasoned that establishing a predetermined position on checkpoint procedure and the use of force would allow the West to respond quickly. The thinking in

Washington held that Allied agreement on the use of force, given the strategic superiority the United States enjoyed, could deter Moscow and compel Khrushchev to negotiate.

Doing so would also illustrate Western resolve to Bonn.565 As such, Norstad and the working group’s focus was on determining what military options could produce political choice.566 The unique circumstances of Berlin meant most of the discussion was not different from 1948, a point Murphy made to West German ambassador Wilhelm Grewe.

As always, the Allies could either break through a blockade or fly above it. For Murphy

564 Cable, Norstad to Twining, EC 9-6265, November 23, 1958, “CCS 381 (8-20-43) Sec. 41” folder, box 72, Central Decimal File, RG 218, NARA. 565 Burr, “Avoiding the Slippery Slope,” p. 178. 566 Kori Schake, “A Broader Range of Choice?: US Policy in the 1958 and 1961 Berlin Crises,” in Berlin Wall Crisis, p. 27. 213 and others like him, an airlift was not an option. Radar-blocking technology was now advanced, and announcing the possibility of an airlift could invite more aggressive Soviet actions. Moreover, it avoided the question of ground access controls, accepted the blockade, and surrendered a right won in war. Murphy’s conclusion was stark if not monocausal: Any response without force would be evading the real issues and an invitation for war elsewhere, as had happened in Korea because Washington discounted

Clay’s armed convoy idea.567

Eisenhower and Dulles did not see such menacing storm clouds on the horizon, but they did agree that contingency plans should be prepared.568 Both assumed crisis could be averted if the Soviets were convinced that the West would fight. Given Dulles’ belief that Berlin was not merely a military issue, he did foresee political problems. His original opposition to the Norstad and JCS plan was based on the need to first garner public support. Gradual political escalation, he believed, could convince officials and the layperson that all reasonable means short of war had been exhausted.569 At the crux of this strategy was Allied consensus, which he thought crucial “before we took a position that might lead to shooting.”570 Eisenhower agreed. The White House and State

Department’s primary goal throughout December 1958 became to establish a united front

567 Memorandum of Conversation, Murphy, Kohler, and Grewe, November 24, 1958, ProQuest ID 1679076516, Berlin Crisis Collection, DNSA. See also Memorandum of Conversation, State-JCS Meeting on November 21, prepared November 25, 1958, ProQuest ID 1679075786, Berlin Crisis Collection, DNSA. 568 Campbell Craig holds Eisenhower avoided “his subordinates’ insistent requests that he openly commit to an ironclad plan for ‘K-Day,’” but the records suggest no such palace intrigue. Campbell Craig, Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 91-97. 569 Schake, “A Broader Range of Choice,” pp. 26-27. 570 Memorandum of Conversation, Eisenhower and Dulles, November 18, 1958, FRUS 1958-1960, VIII: 84. 214 against Moscow through agreeing on the use of limited force. This approach was characteristic of Eisenhower, who preferred to consult with allies in issues that involved them and once commented that “we cut our own throats” when “we treat many of our

NATO allies like stepchildren.”571 It was also the administration’s established policy for

Berlin, as the February 1958 replacement to NSC 5404/1 emphasized building Allied consensus.572 Here, too, the U.S. policymaking establishment was in lockstep. Norstad, in the days immediately following the Soviet note, argued it was “of the highest importance that France and Britain take the same unequivocal line. A major break between allies on this subject could lead to worse disaster than the loss of Berlin itself.”573 Eisenhower and

Dulles were preparing to walk down a well-worn path, though. Between 1955 and 1957, they had tried to convince the British and French to agree in principle when force should be used in Berlin, but to no avail.574

Dulles inadvertently tested Allied unity even before undertaking his campaign.

On November 26, he made statements to the press that seemed to indicate the tripartite powers would deal with GDR officials as agents of the Soviet Union. The so-called agency plan had existed since 1954, when the Allies anticipated that the Soviets would transfer control authority. The reaction from Berliners ranged from “disbelief to dismay

571 Memorandum of Conversation, 267th Meeting of the National Security Council, November 21, 1955, Ann Whitman File, National Security Series, box 7, DDEL. 572 Supplement I to NSC 5803, “Statement of Policy on U.S. Policy on Berlin,” February 7, 1958, “NSC 5803” folder, box 46, NSC Policy Papers, Entry 1, RG 273, NARA. NSC 5727 directly replaced NSC 5404/1 in December 1957. Supplement I to NSC 5727, December 13, 1957, FRUS, 1955-1957, XXVI: 521-25. Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, pp. 258-59. 573 Cable, Norstad to Twining, EC 9-6265, November 23, 1958, “CCS 381 (8-20-43) Sec. 41” folder, box 72, Central Decimal File, RG 218, NARA. 574 Burr, “Avoiding the Slippery Slope,” p. 182; Brady, Eisenhower and Adenauer, p. 233. 215 and downright anger.”575 Dulles’ comments were not flexibility as some have suggested, nor were they an example of the secretary not practicing what he preached.576 Officials scrambled to explain them, complaining that the press had “distorted” what he said.577 In fact, Dulles had misspoken. He assured Grewe that the Allies would be tough and remain unified, but procedural contacts with East Germans at checkpoints did not imply recognition.578 The Germans were not convinced, nor were they reassured. Adenauer and von Brentano anticipated a negative chain of events. De facto recognition would lead to the GDR asserting control over Allied and West German traffic, which could have political, economic, and psychological consequences.579 That would affect U.S.-German relations, since the refusal to recognize the GDR and the assurance of Berlin’s sovereignty was central to the FRG reunification plan.580 As a rule, they rejected anything that could lead to Berlin turning into a Danzig an der , as Adenauer thought of it.581

The British added to German skepticism of Allied resolve with a Whitehall paper on Berlin. The memorandum largely operated on the assumption that since “Khrushchev is going to do more or less what he has said he is going to do,” the West would have no

575 Cable, Berlin Mission to Dulles, November 26, 1958, ProQuest ID 1679076402; Cable, Berlin Mission to Dulles, November 27, 1958, ProQuest ID 1679109749, both in: Berlin Crisis Collection, DNSA. See also David Bruce diary entries, November 26-27, 1958, “Diary David K.E. Bruce October 1, 1958 – December 31, 1958 Folder 2 of 2” folder, box 3, Diaries of David K.E. Bruce, A1 5544, RG 59, NARA. 576 Schick, The Berlin Crisis, p. 91. 577 Cable, Dulles to U.S. Embassy Bonn and U.S. Mission Berlin, November 28, 1958, ProQuest ID 1679078821, Berlin Crisis Collection, DNSA. 578 Memorandum of Conversation, Dulles and Grewe, November 17, 1958, FRUS 1958-1960, VIII: 76-80. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, pp. 337-38. Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, pp. 260-61. 579 Cable, No. 1096, Bruce to Dulles, November 21, “Diary David K.E. Bruce October 1, 1958 – December 31, 1958 Folder 2 of 2” folder, box 3, Diaries of David K.E. Bruce, A1 5544, RG 59, NARA. 580 Wolfram F. Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), pp. 141-69. Burr, “Avoiding the Slippery Slope,” p. 186. 581 Cable No. 468, Berlin Mission to Dulles, December 10, 1958, “Germany – Vol. I of III (2)” folder, box 6, International Series, White House Offices Files, Staff Secretary, DDEL. 216 way to respond. The tripartite powers thus should be willing to deal with Moscow, or their negotiating position could deteriorate further at the Kremlin’s whim. That meant minimal contact with GDR officials on a practical level. Since abandoning Berlin could never be entertained as an option, the only alternative to this minimal contact was refusal to consider East Germans responsible for Soviet functions and resort to force if

Khrushchev carried out his threat. That, however, risked war. The Foreign Office presented the series of actions that could occur if this path was followed: A new communist halt of military traffic would force an Allied airlift, which could only last fifteen months and would likely escalate to a Soviet and East German blockade of civilian traffic to and from Berlin. That would compel the Western Powers to break through with force, and therefore risk war. The only logical choice, it seemed, was dealing with the GDR. After all, the Foreign Office argued, “nobody in the West would believe [GDR recognition] to be worth a war.”582 The problem was that Bonn believed it was.583

The net result of German doubt about the Anglo-American commitment to Berlin was Adenauer’s inclination to pursue his own foreign policy when it benefited him, but without giving the impression of Allied disunity.584 Bonn relied on presenting a united front to the East, but it vacillated between backing whichever tripartite power appeared

582 Memorandum, UK Foreign Office, British Views on Khrushchev's Ultimatum, November 17, 1958, ProQuest ID 1679075994, Berlin Crisis Collection, DNSA; U.S. receipt and discussion is in: Telegram, State Department to US Embassy Bonn, November 17, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 82-83; Burr, “Avoiding the Slippery Slope,” p. 187. 583 John Gearson, “Britain and the Berlin Wall Crisis, 1958-62,” in Berlin Wall Crisis: Perspectives on Cold War Alliances, 1945-62, eds., J.P. Gearson and Kori Schake (New York: Palgrave, 2002), p. 51. 584 Jill Kastner, “The Berlin Crisis and the FRG, 1958-62,” in Berlin Wall Crisis: Perspectives on Cold War Alliances, 1945-62, eds., J.P. Gearson and Kori Schake (New York: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 125-46. 217 the firmest. At the end of November, this meant reevaluating the Franco-German relationship. That break was being repaired when Dulles made his agency plan comments. On November 26, de Gaulle traveled to Bad Kreuznach, and it was there that the two men heard of Khrushchev’s ultimatum a day later. For de Gaulle, the timing could not have been better. Wagering the Soviets were bluffing, he made personal assurances to Adenauer that France would not negotiate over Berlin.

The British paper “astounded” Eisenhower, but he, unlike Bonn, did not take it personally. 585 Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd pulled the paper, backpedaled on its purpose, which he claimed was to stimulate discussion, and made it clear to the

Americans that “he was anxious we should remain on ‘same wavelength’ re Berlin problem.”586 Behind closed doors, however, the Foreign Office never modified its position on recognition.587 The Americans did. Owing to Khrushchev’s ultimatum and

“the violence of the reaction of Chancellor Adenauer,” the United States had decided as a matter of policy that it unequivocally would not enact the agency plan.588 British and

American officials were taking great pains to maintain a unified approach, but they had

585 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 333. “Briefing on Status of Berlin Crisis,” November 25, 1958, “Intelligence Briefing Notes, Vol. I (2)” folder, box 14, Subject Series, White House Office Files, Staff Secretary, DDEL. Eisenhower and Dulles, November 27, 1958, “Telephone – Nov. 1958” folder, box 37, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, DDEL. 586 Cable, Ambassador John Hay Whitney to Dulles, November 19, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 86. 587 Cable, No. 3119, Ambassador John Hay Whitney to Dulles, December 10, 1958, ProQuest ID 1679076702, Berlin Crisis Collection, DNSA. 588 Memorandum of Conference with the President, December 17, 1958, “Berlin – Vol. I (I)” folder, box 6, International Series, White House Offices Files, Staff Secretary, DDEL. Cable, CGUSCOB to Department of the Army, USCINCEUR, CINCUSAREUR, November 20, 1958, “CCS 381 (8-20-43) Sec. 41” folder, box 72, Central Decimal File, RG 218, NARA. Memorandum for Admiral Dennison and Generals Moore, Gerhart, Roberts, November 26, 1958, “State-Defense-JCS Ad Hoc Working Report on Possible Courses of Action on Berlin,” and the November 28 version “Report by State-Defense-JCS AD Hoc Working Group Report on Possible Courses of Action on Berlin,” both in “CCS 381 (8-20-43) Sec. 41” folder, box 72, Central Decimal File, RG 218, NARA. 218 both made the same mistake early in their response to the ultimatum: they failed to clearly distinguish between actions that appeared like recognition and the abandonment of Berlin.589

With Eisenhower believing that the “line had to be held where it stood,” Dulles began building consensus in Paris at the Foreign Ministers and NATO ministerial meetings.590 He took with him the completed State-Defense-JCS working group paper on possible courses of action, which was completed on November 26, revised in light of the

November 27 ultimatum, and then shortened into a joint State-Defense message.591 By the time the American delegation left for Paris, virtually every corner of the politico- military establishment, including those Berlin experts now outside of government service like Lucius Clay, John J. McCloy, and James Conant. There was no considerable schism in thinking. The West, they argued, should not take any action that would recognize the

GDR, and should be willing to use force if access to Berlin was blocked.

Quadripartite meetings began at the Quai d’Orsay on December 14. For the next several days, the ministers skirted around the issue of limited military force, which colloquially became known as “Paragraph D,” the section in the joint State-Defense paper which outlined suggestions for contingency planning revisions. Foreign Ministers

Maurice Couve de Murville and Selwyn Lloyd successfully postponed the discussion they knew was coming, and suggested to wait for tripartite talks in Washington.592 They

589 For the British response to Moscow’s ultimatum, see Gearson, “Britain and the Berlin Wall Crisis,” pp. 49-51. 590 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 338. 591 The paper was sent to U.S. Embassy Bonn on December 11: FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 177-80. 592 Burr, “Avoiding the Slippery Slope,” p. 196. See also Cable, Dulles to Herter, December 17, 1958, ProQuest ID 1679078150; Cable, Herter (as acting secretary) to U.S. Embassy London, December 17. 1958, ProQuest ID 1679060033, both in: Berlin Crisis Collection, DNSA. 219 did agree to a change in checkpoint procedures for Allied personnel, which changed procedure from protesting and proceeding if East German officials were present at checkpoints to simply turning back.593 The most important outcome was a communique reaffirming the tripartite determination to maintain their position and rights in Berlin on

December 14, which the NATO ministers echoed with their own statement two days later. Both reassured Berliners.594 Dulles’ comments before the NATO Council on Soviet abrogation of World War II agreements, which all “listened to solemnly,” had earned him considerable respect from the members, particularly Spaak.595 The Allies also drafted a response to the Soviet November 27 note, which they would issue on December 31.596

Despite those positives, the Paris meetings cannot be judged entirely successful for the

Americans, who had hoped to build Allied consensus on contingency planning and the limited use of force.

Macmillan may have viewed the disagreement as a “friendly interchange,” but recent “inconsistencies” from the British foreign office had been a topic of conversation in the White House, leading Eisenhower to quip that London was, “at the moment, confused.”597 The papers produced in Washington were directed at London as much as

593 Burr, “Avoiding the Slippery Slope,” pp. 195-96. 594 Cable, Dulles to Herter for Eisenhower, December 18, 1958, ProQuest ID 1679077112; Cable, U.S. Mission Berlin to Dulles, December 18, 1958, ProQuest ID 1679076530, both in: Berlin Crisis Collection, DNSA. 595 David Bruce diary entry for December 16, 1958, “Diary David K.E. Bruce October 1, 1958 – December 31, 1958 Folder 2 of 2” folder, box 3, Diaries of David K.E. Bruce, A1 5544, RG 59, NARA. 596 Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles, pp. 573–76. 597 , Riding the Storm, 1956-1959 (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 580. Memorandum of Conversation, Eisenhower, Dulles, Herter, December 12, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 192. 220

Moscow. An agreement on the use of force was a concerted effort to ensure that the

British did not hedge, which would weaken the entire Allied position by default.

Allied actions had been annoying Eisenhower, especially those of the French. The crisis had allowed de Gaulle to renew his efforts.598 Given that Berlin was a tripartite responsibility, France emphasized its position within the Western Alliance. Paris appreciated that Berlin affected NATO members, but it did not want others to define tripartite policy. This extended to even the appearance of equal voice, a sentiment that

Couve de Murville summed up when he rejected coordinating a reply to the Soviet note in Bonn, saying that France did not want it to seem the Western Powers were being “led around by [the] by Germans.”599 Thoughts like this rankled North representatives, who preferred the other members have the “chance to express views before those of the Four Powers firmed up.”600

Eisenhower had little patience for complaints about equity in the alliance.

Increasingly concerned about NATO’s capabilities and the seemingly one-sided nature of

America’s commitment after the NAC’s adoption of MC 70, a revised strategic guidance report built on Massive Retaliation but also on balanced nuclear and conventional means, he questioned why Germany did not contribute twenty divisions rather than twelve.601

Bonn was limited to twelve by agreement, his advisers reminded him, and any increase would likely scare Paris. Eisenhower had groused that scaring them would be useful,

598 Frederic Bozo, Two Strategies for Europe, pp. 29-58. 599 Cable, Ambassador to U.K. Whitney to Dulles, December 5, 1958, ProQuest ID 1679076907, Berlin Crisis Collection, DNSA. Cable, U.S. Representative on the North Atlantic Council W. Randolph Burgess to Dulles, December 7, 1958, ProQuest ID 1679078630, Berlin Crisis Collection, DNSA. 600 Cable, Burgess to Dulles, December 11, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 186. 601 Trauschweizer, Cold War U.S. Army, pp. 75-76. 221 since it might “have an effect on French pretensions at being a world power.”602 Dulles’ patience was dwindling, too, since de Gaulle was “beginning to be troublesome in his desire to be in on everything all around the world.”603 It was now obvious that the present crisis, though it shared similarities with its predecessor like Moscow’s use of Berlin as a lever to force a change in the status quo, was an altogether different beast. The 1948 crisis demanded Allied cohesion because of individual weaknesses, but ten years later, national interests had crystallized and economic successes and NATO had brought demand of parity to the alliance. The result was deep divisions on security.604

The most significant outcome of the Paris meetings was that the Americans had managed to focus all tripartite discussion onto one issue, Paragraph D. In effect, it was the distilled U.S. strategy for confronting the GDR if they blocked Allied surface access to Berlin. Limited military force would be used to demonstrate the West’s determination to maintain their rights and probe Soviet intentions. The subtext was that the Allies would not deal with East German officials at checkpoints, test Soviet intentions, or resort to an airlift. As a concept, it was NSC 5404/1 without military mobilization and additional use of force, complete with that plan’s lack of defining just what “limited military force” meant.605

602 Memorandum of Conversation, Eisenhower and Dulles, December 12, 1958, “Staff Notes – Dec. 1958 (II)” folder, box 38, Ann Whitman Files, DDE Diary Series, DDEL. 603 Memorandum of Conversation, Eisenhower and Dulles, December 12, 1958, “State Department – September 1958-Janauary 1959 (4)” folder, box 3, Subject Series, White House Office Files, Staff Secretary, DDEL. 604 Schake, “The Berlin Crises.” 605 Cable with paper attached, Herter to U.S. Embassy, Bonn, December 11, 1958, “CCS 381 (8-20-43) Sec. 42” folder, box 72, Central Decimal File, 1958, Entry UD-28, RG 218, NARA. Burr, “Avoiding the Slippery Slope,” pp. 193-94 222

The disagreement over Paragraph D came down to a divergence on perceived risk, degree of provocation and response, and possible outcomes. Throughout the crisis, the British considered how Allied moves would force the Kremlin to counter, and therefore saw successive communist responses as multiple roads leading to war. This stood in contrast to the Americans, who believed that Khrushchev had initially backed himself into a corner. The British disagreed with Paragraph D for two reasons. First, they believed the issue should not be brought to a head. London maintained testing Soviet intentions in a way that “could not be fudged” would disarm the crisis. Forcing the issue would immediately compel Moscow to choose between war or surrender, and the stakes in Berlin being equal for the Soviets and Allies, permitting U.S. tanks to roll through a checkpoint would be a form of surrender. Second, London believed any ground probe, regardless of size, was worthless if Moscow called the bluff, thereby forcing NATO to prepare for war or be humiliated. Given Soviet strength in East Germany, the Kremlin could make the Allies captives of their own show of force.606 USCOB estimates illustrated that starkly. Operational Plan BOTTLER, which called for an infantry company and assault gun platoon to reopen the Berlin-Helmstedt Autobahn, listed 147 obstacles, mostly bridges, along the 103-mile trip, any of which the division, brigade, and three regiments of Soviets and East Germans nearby could destroy to block the route.607

606 John P.S. Gearson, Harold Macmillan and the Berlin Wall Crisis, 1958-62: The Limits of Interest and Force (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), pp. 50-53. Memorandum of Conversation, “Berlin Contingency Planning,” Merchant, Kohler, and Hillenbrand with Hood and Jackling, January 2, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 225-28. 607 OPLAN BOTTLER, BC-B-58 (U), Headquarters, Berlin Command, December 15, 1958, “250/17 BC- T-58 and BC 63-8” folder, box 12, Operational Planning Files, 1954-65, Files, Entry 3004, RG 549, NARA. 223

The British were emphatic that they would follow American lead to maintain

Allied solidarity, but they found it difficult to support what they considered a provocative course.608 Officials routinely asked for patience to allow for diplomacy, arguing that all peaceful avenues must be explored so war, if it did come, would not be of Allied making.609 Dulles, Merchant, Murphy, and Kohler, who were the primary American salesmen of Paragraph D, pushed their allies on the urgent need to communicate to

Moscow that the West would take bold action “at the first turn of the screw.”610 Delaying, they argued, would signal Allied disunity and softness, increasing the chance of the

Soviets mounting a blockade. The disagreement highlighted the different ways

Washington and London saw the problem: the Americans wanted a solution to the first problem that faced the Allies, potential disruption of access, while the British had their eyes farther down the road, on solving the German Question. It was because of this that

Macmillan and Lloyd believed an airlift was still a viable option, and was perhaps where the Allies should probe Soviet intentions. All areas of the U.S. national security establishment loudly opposed one, however. At that point, the decision between war or surrender was for the Allies to make, and since they had staked the entire Western security system on deterrence, they could not afford to surrender in Berlin. Waiting

608 Cable, No. 3156, John Hay Whitney to Dulles, December 12, 1958, ProQuest ID 1679060118, Berlin Crisis Collection, DNSA; Memorandum, Ray L. Thurston, Counselor U.S. Embassy Paris to Livingston Merchant, January 6, 1959, ProQuest ID 1679076493, Berlin Crisis Collection, DNSA. 609 Memorandum of Conversation, Murphy, Kohler, and Irwin with Alphand and Hood, “Berlin Contingency Planning,” January 5, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1962, VIII: 242. 610 Memorandum of Conversation, “Berlin Contingency Planning,” Kohler, Hillenbrand, Irwin, and Hood with military representatives, January 3, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 229-32. 224 therefore diminished options. The only way to deter war, the Americans argued, was to make clear the West was willing to risk one.611

French disagreement to Paragraph D, contrary to the British, was not for fear of provoking the Soviets. After all, de Gaulle had already been dismissive of Khrushchev’s ultimatum and resolute in France’s determination to remain in Berlin. The French rejected the idea that the Allies first had to agree on the use of force in principle before undertaking a discussion of details, which was tantamount to making “a final decision on a hypothetical basis.”612 At its heart, Paragraph D was a political decision to make a military one, but France saw it the other way around. It was for this reason that Allied discussion came to a standstill in January 1959 over the fundamental disagreement of which decision should come first, or what Macmillan called “the egg or the chicken, the making of a plan or the decision to carry it out.”613 The distinction was not academic.

Until it was agreed which one was should come first, Paragraph D was either an operational plan or a statement of principle.

Given de Gaulle’s views of France’s role within the alliance before the crisis, consenting to an American plan was always a long shot.614 The discussion did give him a chance to defy Washington and still curry favor with Adenauer by talking tough about

Berlin, both of which fed into de Gaulle’s larger objectives. Apart from self-interest,

611 Memorandum of Conversation, “Berlin Contingency Planning,” Merchant, Kohler, and Hillenbrand with Hood and Jackling, January 2, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 225-28; Memorandum of Conversation, Murphy, Kohler, and Irwin with Alphand and Hood, “Berlin Contingency Planning,” January 5, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1962, VIII: 241. 612 Memorandum of Conversation, Murphy and Irwin with Caccia and Alphand, January 13, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 250. 613 Letter, Macmillan to Dulles, January 8, 1959, “Berlin Vol. I (2)” folder, box 6, International Series, White House Office File, Staff Secretary, DDEL. 614 Frederic Bozo, Two Strategies for Europe, pp. 1-31. 225 there was the French aversion to conceding to any one person the unilateral authority to make a decision which could spark war in Europe. Paragraph D virtually encapsulated the grievances that de Gaulle had highlighted about NATO command and control a year before. U.S. planners’ formulations allowed room for field commanders to respond with force as they saw fit. In effect, governments would give field-grade officers the right to shoot, but also the leeway of when and how much. While Washington believed this latitude would not make a situation spin out of control since it was a test of will and not strength, Paris preferred not to gamble with an American conception of deterrence.

“Limited use of force” to the French sounded like “force” nonetheless, and using it for a place that only theoretically was worth a war did not make sense.615

Allied relations over the Paragraph D debate hit bottom on January 13, when

Britain’s Ambassador to the United States Harold Caccia and his French counterpart,

Hervé Alphand, met with Murphy and Assistant Secretary of Defense John Irwin. In the meeting, Alphand outlined the French position. Paris wanted new language for Paragraph

D, somewhere between U.S. and British thinking, that seemed to push off a decision on force indefinitely. The French also wanted further studies of various contingencies, which the Americans had intentionally avoided, because the Allies would endlessly debate those details rather than deciding on actually implementing them. The shock for Murphy and

Irwin came when Alphand informed them France preferred to assert Allied rights in the

615 Memorandum of Conversation, Murphy, Kohler, and Irwin with Alphand and Hood, “Berlin Contingency Planning,” January 5, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1962, VIII: 241. Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, pp. 267-74. 226 air, not on the ground, to which Caccia agreed.616 Since the British and French both disagreed with the Americans that Khrushchev could be deterred with blandishment and the threat of force, neither were prepared to approve Paragraph D. The Americans felt betrayed. The French had backed off the firm language de Gaulle used on December 15, and the British willfully had run away from the essential question.617

This rebuke came the same day as another Dulles press conference that enraged

Bonn. When asked whether he believed free elections were the “only method of reuniting

Germany,” Dulles answered that it was a “natural method,” but not the only one.618

Adenauer summoned David Bruce and unloaded. Such a comment had domestic political implications, since the chancellor had staked his entire reunification policy on free elections, and now his political opponents could use Dulles’ words to demand negotiations with Pankow and Moscow. Though Washington argued it was merely a

“casual utterance,” that did little to assure Adenauer and von Brenato, whose expressions

Bruce characterized as “being little short of violent.” Since it was the second time Bruce had to answer for Dulles’ offhand comments, the ambassador wished “Foster would stop dropping tinder into powder kegs by being over-frank in press conferences.”619

616 Memorandum of Conversation, Murphy and Irwin with Caccia and Alphand, January 13, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 250-51. 617 Cable, Dulles to U.S. Embassy Paris, January 14, 1959, ProQuest ID 1679075978; Cable, Dulles to Bruce, January 16, 1959, ProQuest ID 1679077577; Cable 2532, Dulles to Amory Houghton, January 17, 1959, ProQuest ID 1679109003; Cable, No. 2652, Amory Houghton to Dulles, January 20, 1958, ProQuest ID 1679076158: all in Berlin Crisis Collection, DNSA. 618 Transcript of Dulles press conference, January 13, 1959, U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XL, No. 1023 (February 2, 1959), p. 161. 619 David Bruce diary entry for January 14, 1959, “Diary David K.E. Bruce January 1, 1959 – March 31, 1959 Folder 1 of 2” folder, box 3, Diaries of David K.E. Bruce, A1 5544, RG 59, NARA. 227

The timing was unfortunate for U.S.-German relations. Bonn was already angry that the Americans were hosting a visit from , the Soviet deputy premier, who was in the United States to probe Western intentions on the Berlin and

German Questions, especially in light of another note that Moscow had issued on January

10, this one in response to the December 31 Allied reply. 620 The note included a draft peace treaty with Germany and an invitation to hold a conference to that end.621

Adenauer, who worried that Mikoyan’s presence in Washington underlined Dulles’ free elections comment, warned the Americans not to “indulge in any optimism” over the visit since the Soviets could distort the deputy premier’s meeting with Eisenhower to their benefit.622 Adenauer’s chronic fear of an American parlay with the Soviets over Berlin had once again gotten the better of him.623 What he did not know was that Dulles had wagered he could use the talks to force Moscow to confront what had been U.S. strategy all along, deterring Soviet aggressiveness with Western solidarity and an unequivocal statement on access and force. He was to do that with Paragraph D, but the British and

French meant he had to go into the meetings empty handed. To relent to

Allied suggestions on Paragraph D was to neuter it, which could signal to Moscow that the West was retreating from their Paris statements and their December 31 reply,

620 See Memorandum of Conversation, Dulles and Mikoyan, January 16, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 270-76; Eisenhower and Mikoyan, January 17, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 276-81. 621 The note is reproduced in: Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XL, No. 1028 (March 9, 1959), pp. 333- 43. 622 Cable 1467, Bruce to Dulles, January 13, 1959, 762.00/1-1359; “Diary David K.E. Bruce January 1, 1959 – March 31, 1959 Folder 1 of 2” folder, box 3, Diaries of David K.E. Bruce, A1 5544, RG 59, NARA; Cable, Bruce to Dulles, January 14, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 258. 623 Brady, Eisenhower and Dulles, pp. 238-39. 228 therefore emboldening them to act more aggressively.624 On this point, the Germans and

Americans agreed where the French and British did not. Bonn also worried that were the

Western Powers to temper their recent strong statements, possible disaster would follow.

Dulles was therefore confronted with two allies who thought Washington was provoking a war and one who believed that at any turn the alliance was prepared to undercut the

Federal Republic.

The same day of the ambassadorial meeting and Dulles’ press conference,

Eisenhower was in the White House confiding in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen.

Nathan Twining. Eisenhower was often unwavering about Berlin when speaking with his cabinet, but in personal conversations with trusted advisers he spoke frankly. When he did allow himself to lament, he complained about World War II and postwar agreements—the European Advisory Commission formulas, the Clay-Zhukov talks, the

May 1949 Paris Agreement—all of which now he had to rely upon as president to maintain the Western position in Berlin. In a phone conversation with Dulles on the evening of Khrushchev’s ultimatum, after losing more sleep over the city, he told his secretary of state that he foresaw the political trouble “the thing was going to be” while he was still Supreme Commander, and he had tried to warn American and British leaders.

Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill’s unwarranted trust in Stalin had meant that all of Eisenhower’s fears now “had come to pass.”625 Still, he had navigated the crisis as best

624 Cable, No. 1515, Bruce to Dulles, January 16, 1959, ProQuest ID 1679078715, Berlin Crisis Collection, DNSA. 625 Memorandum of Conference with the President, December 17, 1958, “Berlin – Vol. I (I)” folder, box 6, International Series, White House Offices Files, Staff Secretary, DDEL. Substance of Discussion of State- Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, January 14, 1959, “State JCS January 14, 1959” folder, box 1, Records of State-JCS Meetings, 1959-1963, State Department Politico-Military Affairs Office, Entry A1-1604, RG 59, NARA; Telephone conversation, Eisenhower and Dulles, November 27, 1958, “Telephone – Nov. 1958” 229 he could, with firmness, not provocation. He had attempted to do so with Allied solidarity, but France and Britain had blocked the one culminating point of the U.S. strategy. A rethink was in order.

Road to a Double-Barrel Approach

When Dulles was in Paris for the December talks, he and Norstad had spoken about using graduated military steps in response to Soviet pressure. These “tightening up” actions of troop redeployments would demonstrate to Moscow the West’s intention to stand firm. Dulles and Norstad also intended them to pull up Allied forces to a state of readiness. By the end of December, Norstad’s staff had completed their study, though he requested that the Pentagon send a group of expert planners in psychological measures to

SHAPE before circulation. 626

Norstad’s recommendations served as the detailed military planning for the Joint

Chiefs. The paper, titled JCS 1907/162, “Berlin Situation,” covered everything from suggestions for military readiness to a specific plan to “test by application of force” at checkpoints.627 McElroy and the Joint Chiefs had built a check into JCS 1907/162 on the use of military force. They made clear to the State Department that, as a prerequisite, they required a “firm political decision” on four questions before considering any of their possible courses of action in Berlin: that the Allies were willing to use force on the

folder, box 37, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, DDEL. Campbell Craig overstates these moments of candor as Eisenhower wavering on Berlin. Craig, Destroying the Village, p. 93. 626 Memorandum, Norstad to Twining, December 23, 1958, ProQuest ID 1679109683; Letter, Director of Office of European Regional Affairs B.E.L. Timmons to Embassy Counselor, Paris Ray L. Thurston, January 6, 1959, ProQuest ID 1679058984; Letter, Ray L. Thurston to B.E.L. Timmons, January 9, 1959, ProQuest ID 1679109152, all in: Berlin Crisis Collection, DNSA. 627 Memorandum, “JCSM-16-59, Berlin Situation,” Twining to McElroy, January 13, 1959, with JCS 1907/162 as attachment, “CCS 9172 (1959)” folder, box 146, Central Decimal File, 1959, Entry UD-34, RG 218, NARA. 230 ground, would not use an airlift to evade the issue, were prepared to meet a communist challenge on the ground or in the air, and would use graduated escalation that could risk spark general war.628 The bottleneck was therefore the lack of tripartite agreement on the use of force. It was the State Department’s responsibility to achieve, something of which

Dulles needed little reminding.

The completion of the SHAPE and JCS studies coincided with the failure of

Paragraph D and general Allied disagreement. If Dulles was to maintain the administration’s strategy of presenting a united front to Moscow, he had to placate the

Allies without compromising the American position. On January 27, he instructed his principals to study Paragraph D, the JCS paper, and any possible alternatives to them. He also asked them to find a role for NATO in the Allied military and political responses to

Soviet pressure.629 Two days later, in a State-Defense meeting with Eisenhower, he unveiled his strategy. He dubbed it a “double-barreled” approach for its military and diplomatic components. In general, Dulles argued for his and Norstad’s plan from

December: The West should quietly take preparatory and precautionary military steps which Moscow could detect but that would not cause public alarm, a sort of muted rattling of Western sabres to communicate readiness, resolve, and solidarity. This long- term plan would underwrite his specific strategy for dealing with the contingency that

GDR officials would take over checkpoint controls. He proposed that “a small armored

628 See “Note by the Secretaries to Holders of J.C.S. 1907/162 (Berlin Situation (U)),” January 16, 1959, “CCS 9172 (1959)” folder, box 146, Central Decimal File, 1959, Entry UD-34, RG 218, NARA. For Twining making this point clear to Murphy, see Substance of Discussion of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, January 14, 1959, “State JCS January 14, 1959” folder, box 1, Records of State-JCS Meetings, 1959-1963, State Department Politico-Military Affairs Office, Entry A1-1604, RG 59, NARA. 629 Memorandum, J.N. Greene, Jr. to Executive Secretariat, January 27, 1959, ProQuest ID 1679060006, Berlin Crisis Collection, DNSA. 231 unit,” not a division as the Joint Chiefs envisioned, probe Soviet intentions on May 27. If they were obstructed, the unit was not to use force but instead return to its point of departure, whereupon the second part of Dulles’ approach would begin. The West would wage a political offensive against the Soviets by mobilizing world opinion, an international campaign to pressure Moscow in the U.N. Security Council and, if need be, the General Assembly. In the meantime, the West would continue to make defense preparations. 630 Military planning would therefore support diplomacy.

Though it appeared only a slight departure from Dulles’ original thinking, the plan solved several problems. First, it considered French and British concerns about the use of limited force to break a blockade. Second, it solved the problem of the West appearing as the aggressors on something as mundane as stamping papers. Third, it envisioned a second step, the use of international machinery, which the original

American plan had been missing. Last, and possibly most important, it pushed the Berlin issue on a political track rather than a military one. This new direction included a more robust NATO role. Including the alliance in formulating Allied military and political responses to Soviet pressure gave the NAC what they had been requesting since

November, to be a consultative body rather than a rubber stamp. Dulles had taken note of their displeasure, and responded when it seemed that the tripartite powers were at an impasse. In hoping to put NATO in a better frame of mind, he and the State Department

630 Memorandum of Conference with the President, January 29, 1959, and “Conclusions of White House Conference Re Berlin, both in “Berlin Vol. I (2)” folder, box 6, International Series, White House Office File, Staff Secretary, DDEL. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, pp. 340-41. 232 suggested providing members with the tripartite draft reply to the Soviet January 10 note and reactivating the NATO European Security Committee.631

Eisenhower responded enthusiastically. As he summarized it, the plan was

“designed to carry our allies with us.”632 Twining was less optimistic. The State

Department had undercut Pentagon planning from the past two years while evading answers to the four political questions outlined in JCS 1907/162. Twining wanted a decision on a sequence of action, but Dulles’ double-barreled approach relied on a pause between the initial probe and any use of force, pending government decision. Effectively,

Dulles now occupied de Gaulle’s position.633 Despite his misgivings, Twining and the

Joint Chiefs signed off on a February 3 paper highlighting detectable military steps with forces already in Europe: being more visible at checkpoints, conducting patrols and rapid reaction exercises in the Berlin corridor, and increasing radio chatter.634 With a new approach to a potential May 27 crisis, one that stressed military preparations supporting diplomacy, Dulles headed back to Europe.

He arrived in London on February 4, 1959 to begin a whirlwind five-day trip to the Western capitals selling his double-barreled approach. It would be his last trip as secretary. Since 1956, he had been fighting cancer. Throughout the Berlin crisis, he was

631 Cable, Dulles to U.S. Embassies London, Paris, Bonn, January 31, 1959, “Berlin Vol. I (2)” folder, box 6, International Series, White House Office File, Staff Secretary, DDEL. 632 Memorandum of Conference with the President, January 29, 1959, “Berlin Vol. I (2)” folder, box 6, International Series, White House Office File, Staff Secretary, DDEL. 633 Ibid.; Substance of Discussion of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, January 30, 1959, “State JCS January 30, 1959” folder, box 1, Records of State-JCS Meetings, 1959-1963, State Department Politico- Military Affairs Office, Entry A1-1604, RG 59, NARA. 634 Memorandum, Twining to McElroy, February 2, 1959, “Berlin Situation” with enclosure “Measures Discernable By The Soviet And East German Government Which Would Impress Them With Allied Solidarity And Determination Regarding Berlin Without Creating Undue Public Alarm,” ProQuest ID 1679109558, Berlin Crisis Collection, DNSA. 233 in and out of Walter Reed Hospital to receive treatment, leaving his deputy, Christian

Herter, to serve as acting secretary. Dulles’ talks in Europe were primarily over two issues: How to meet the Soviet threat to Berlin, and what potential proposals they would offer the Kremlin on German reunification and European security. On the latter, talks were only in their preliminary stage. On the former, the Allies finally agreed on a general course.

Dulles found a preoccupied and rambling Macmillan. The prime minister’s main emphasis, which he would return to in the coming months, was a “thinning out” of forces in Central Europe to precipitate an eventual demilitarization of the continent and a deescalation of the Cold War. It would require, however, “semi-permanent acceptance” of Germany’s partition.635 Dulles was more interested in finally securing the military and political steps that the Allies would take after May 27. He briefed Macmillan and Lloyd on the double-barreled approach, and made sure to say that his plan fell far short of what the Joint Chiefs wanted. The British were cautious, but agreed that military preparations should be made to avoid the Soviets gambling that the Allies were bluffing.636

Dulles was happier with his conversations in Paris. He predicted de Gaulle would be more decisive than Macmillan, though “not precisely the kind we would like.”637 He in fact found “the great General” in an agreeable and relaxed mood when they met on

February 6. Unlike Macmillan, de Gaulle and Couve de Murville firmly agreed with

Dulles’ argument that the Allies could not accept the East Germans, a defeated people,

635 Cable, Dulles to State Department for President, February 5, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 324. 636 Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles, pp. 470-72. Memorandum of Conversation, Dulles and Macmillan, February 5, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 323. 637 Cable, Dulles to State Department for President, February 5, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 324. 234 controlling the victorious powers’ access to and from Berlin. De Gaulle and Spaak, whom Dulles met in the afternoon, also supported the U.S. plan to begin military preparations, mobilize world opinion, and test Soviet intentions with a convoy on the deadline date.638

The rift between the French and Americans was over what to do if the East

Germans stopped the convoy, a point that current events reinforced when the Soviets detained four U.S. trucks at the border on February 2 after soldiers refused a search of their cargo.639 France, Dulles reported, was “pretty gun shy about the United Nations.”

De Gaulle’s primary concern was the U.N. General Assembly, who could seek compromise with Moscow and Pankow by appointing a commission that would negotiate a settlement the West might not like.640 Involving the U.N. in Berlin was to relinquish

Allied rights there, which ran counter to de Gaulle tightfistedly clenching power and influence that France already had. Allowing an intergovernmental body to moderate the

Berlin problem, and by extension the German Question, was therefore anathema to the

French national project. The next morning, Couve de Murville saw Dulles off at the airport and took the old American position. Paris now believed that the Western Powers should “instantly move with military force” if the GDR blocked a probe, rather than

638 Cable, Dulles to State Department for President, February 6, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 335. 639 Cable, Norstad to Twining, February 3, 1959, “CCS 9172/9010 Berlin (1959)” folder, box 146, UD-34, Central Decimal File, 1959, NARA. 640 Cable, Dulles to State Department, February 6, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 329-30; Cable, Dulles to State Department for President, February 6, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 334-35. See also Memorandum of Conversation, Murphy and Alphand, February 11, 1959, ProQuest ID 1679077123, Berlin Crisis Collection, DNSA. 235 following Dulles’ plan for a “preparatory stage.” Curiously, the French were willing to use force in Berlin, and were now the most hawkish of the tripartite powers.641

Dulles arrived in Bonn prepared for difficult talks. His objective was to make the chancellor “see possibilities in the situation to which he is now blind.”642 Despite their sparring, the two men’s personal relationship was strong and formed a strong foundation for U.S.-German relations.643 Dulles spoke more belligerently than he had in Paris and

London, emphasizing the use of force in his double-barreled approach over the political component by, inexplicably, adopting the Joint Chiefs’ rejected plan of using a full division for the convoy. The chancellor replied to Dulles’ remarks about contingency planning with a more moderate tone than the Americans had expected. Rather than demanding the Allies be more bellicose, Adenauer suggested they “bury the Berlin crisis under a layer of broader problems” in talks with the Soviets. He worried using force would intensify the situation, and he implored Dulles not to allow the issue to devolve into a fight. The overriding importance, Adenauer argued, was Allied unity, which was more effective a deterrent than nuclear bombs and missiles. The chancellor was being his shrewd self. He knew that any change in the status quo would have consequences, so he attempted to tie Berlin to the German Question and, by default, European security. He of course knew that those issues had been deadlocked for years, and the Berlin discussion would therefore go nowhere.644 Ultimately, the Federal Republic supported the American

641 Cable, Dulles to State Department, February 6, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 325; Cable, Dulles to State Department for President, February 7, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 344. 642 Cable, Dulles to State Department for President, February 6, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 335. 643 Hans-Jürgen Grabbe, “Konrad Adenauer, John Foster Dulles, and West German-American Relations,” in John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War, Richard Immerman, ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 109-32. 644 Brady, Eisenhower and Adenauer, pp. 238, 244-45. Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, pp. 274-81. 236 contingency planning for Berlin. With the West Germans on board, Dulles had achieved his objective for his trip to Europe, culminating in another Allied note on February 16.

Unfinished details remained, but the tripartite powers agreed that Berlin contingency planning meant taking preparatory military measures, Moscow was responsible for carrying out its responsibilities in Berlin, the agency principle would not be applied, the

Allies would probe Soviet intentions if Allied surface access was interrupted, world opinion would be mobilized against Moscow, and any use of force was dependent upon tripartite government study and decision.645

After pushback from the Allies on Paragraph D, Dulles ostensibly relented and agreed to be more flexible on Berlin. His double-barreled approach had found favor because it provided the Soviets an escape hatch. Military considerations, as Gen.

Maxwell Taylor, who was now Army chief of staff, saw it, were “directed more at strengthening our political power” and “supplementing our position at the negotiating table.”646 Dulles already had been moving in that direction, even if Eisenhower was not.647 The tripartite governments would codify contingency plans for Berlin on April

4.648 Dulles and Eisenhower’s position had always been to provide Khrushchev with a way out, which they believed he had not allowed himself, but the secretary’s supposed newfound flexibility was an illusion. The only difference between the Dulles plans before

645 Memorandum of Conversation, Dulles and Adenauer, February 8, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 346. State Department Paper, “Berlin Contingency Planning,” April 4, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 584-89. 646 Testimony by Chief of Staff of the Army Maxwell Taylor Before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Washington, March 11, 1959, FRUS, 1958- 1960, VIII: 450. 647 Immerman, John Foster Dulles, pp. 171-77. 648 LO(IN)-S-59-1006 “Berlin Contingency Planning,” April 4, 1959, “9172/Berlin/3100 Germany (East) (13 )” folder, box 115, Central File, Security Classified, 1961, Entry A1-1H, RG 218, NARA. 237 and after January 29 was what he stressed. The escape hatch became the emphasis, not an agreement on the use of limited force. He still rejected GDR officials standing in for

Soviets, since any “acceptance would constitute crossing [the] Rubicon.”649 Through better defining his ends, and reassuring his allies that diplomacy was the first resort, he resolved the tension within the alliance without qualitatively changing the American approach.

Dulles left Europe with an Allied consensus but also somewhat of an unsettled feeling. He had a verbal agreement from Macmillan on a course of action, but he could not be sure if there would “not be some subsequent slippage” from London.650 Both

Macmillan and Lloyd had given the impression they were still open to the agency plan, which made Dulles remark to Eisenhower that the British were “softer” than the United

States.651 His Europe trip had nonetheless settled how the Western Powers would meet

Khrushchev’s threat on May 27, thereby ending the first phase of the crisis. Thereafter,

Allied focus would be on potential negotiations with the Kremlin on German reunification and European security, not just on Berlin as Khrushchev wanted. It was for that reason that Dulles was unsettled. Against French and American advice, Macmillan already had scheduled a trip for early March to Moscow to “attempt reconnaissance but not conduct of negotiations.”652 The risk was that everything the Allies had built since

November could unravel.

649 Cable, Dulles to State Department, February 5, 1959, FRUS, 1959-1960, VIII: 320. 650 Cable, Dulles to State Department, February 6, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 326. 651 Cable, Dulles to State Department for President, February 5, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 324. 652 Cable, Dulles to State Department, February 6, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 326. 238

Macmillan was willing to break from the Allies and travel to Moscow out of fear, good intentions, and self-interest. He had inherited a German policy of contradictory approaches, a firm belief in a permanent Allied military presence there but a readiness to negotiate on European security with Moscow. Obligation to the alliance pulled London in one direction, but a traditional belief that Britain could avoid continental political entanglements, mixed with a chilly postwar view of the Germans, pulled it in another. He had continued these trends when he became prime minister in January 1957. Publicly ambivalent to any prospect of reunifying Germany, particularly after Bonn’s economic resurgence in the 1950s, Macmillan focused on controlling Germany more than unifying it. This became increasingly difficult once the Federal Republic became integral to

NATO and European security, and after Adenauer became insistent that any European settlement could only follow reunification. Macmillan’s acceptance of the above logic— that though a divided Germany was preferable to Britain, they should nonetheless ensure a reunited country would be attached to the West—did not preclude him from seeking security agreements with the Soviets.653

Since Macmillan emphasized European security over German reunification, he focused not on the negative effects of a summit with the Soviets but on the potential positives. He was convinced that personal diplomacy with Khrushchev could deescalate the tensions in the Cold War and the spending frenzy associated with them. This was anathema to Bonn, which believed that any abdication of military power left them

653 Gearson, Harold Macmillan and the Berlin Wall Crisis, pp. 56-78. See also Christoph Bluth, “Nuclear Weapons and British-German Relations,” in Securing Peace in Europe, 1945-62: Thoughts for the post- Cold War Era, Beatrice Heuser and Robert O’Neill, eds (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), pp. 139-56. 239 vulnerable. It was for these reasons that Anglo-German relations were so poor when the

Allies were establishing a course in the Berlin crisis.654 Still, Macmillan believed he could be an honest broker in informal negotiations and divert the collision course over

Berlin. This idea was built on a firm conviction—both Macmillan’s and the Foreign

Office’s—that Britain still enjoyed an independent role in .655 The problem, however, was that in the bipolar world of the Cold War, London was a junior partner in the transatlantic alliance.656

Though they believed the trip was unnecessary and dangerous, the Americans and

French refrained from chastising their ally. Dulles surmised Macmillan’s “solitary pilgrimage” was for domestic consumption, and he went to great pains to publicly distance himself from the idea.657 Couve de Murville worried the prime minister had no plan, and would discuss dates for a summit.658 Adenauer was perhaps the most morose.

He confided in Dulles he saw the trip as a fait accompli, and worried the Soviets would misconstrue Macmillan’s statements, no matter how guarded he was.659 Much like with

Mikoyan’s visit to Washington, Adenauer was incensed that an ally would hold bilateral

654 Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, pp. 263-67. Gearson, “Britain and the Berlin Wall Crisis,” pp. 44- 48; Macmillan, Riding the Storm, pp. 581-83. 655 Macmillan, Riding the Storm, pp. 581-83. 656 Gearson, “Britain and the Berlin Wall Crisis,” p. 52. 657 Cable, Dulles to State Department for President, February 5, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 324; Cable, Dulles to State Department, February 6, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 326; Memorandum of Conversation, Dulles and Macmillan, February 5, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 322. 658 Cable, Dulles to State Department, February 6, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 326; Cable, Dulles to State Department, February 6, 1959, FRUS, 1959-1960, VIII: 331. 659 Cable, Dulles to State Department for President, February 7, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 344-45; David Bruce diary entry for February 7, 1959, “Diary David K.E. Bruce January 1, 1959 – March 31, 1959 Folder 1 of 2” folder, box 3, Diaries of David K.E. Bruce, A1 5544, RG 59, NARA. 240 discussions on German issues—in Moscow, no less—and not consult with the rest of the

Allies.660

Macmillan arrived in Moscow on February 22. In talks with Khrushchev, he probed in vain for any flexibility in the Kremlin’s position.661 On the second day, he watched on in captive humiliation when Khrushchev harangued the West in a fiery electoral speech, charging the Allies with warlike behavior. Macmillan had nothing to offer the Soviets, since both sides had already outlined their positions in the series of notes since November, and thus exposed himself to Khrushchev’s usual dialectical haranguing and grandstanding. On the eve of the third round of talks, Minister of Foreign

Affairs presented Macmillan with a reply to the Allied note of February

16. The Soviets now agreed to a conference, but only on the terms outlined in the

November 27 ultimatum. Moreover, they insisted that a four-power foreign ministers’ meeting should only pave the way for a summit. The brightest spot in the note was the removal of Khrushchev’s six-month deadline. With that, the ultimatum crisis was over.

The Allies had successfully decoupled the Soviet demands from any discussion on

Berlin.662

It is difficult to judge what effect Macmillan’s trip had on Khrushchev’s acquiescence to the February 16 note.663 Any political points he scored were domestic,

660 Brady, Eisenhower and Adenauer, p. 243. 661 For Macmillan’s report to Eisenhower on the first day of talks, see Letter, Macmillan to Eisenhower, February 23, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 385-86. 662 Schick, Berlin Crisis, pp. 58-59; Soviet note, March 2, 1959, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XL, No. 1033 (April 13, 1959): 508-11; Brady, Eisenhower and Adenauer, p. 248. For Macmillan’s account of his trip, see Riding the Storm, pp. 592-632. 663 For an argument that the trip was a success, see Kitty Newman, Macmillan, Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1960 (New York: Routledge, 2007). 241 however. He had angered de Gaulle and Adenauer, which prompted him to go across the

Channel and smooth over relations after returning home.664 Macmillan’s approach to the

Berlin crisis writ large can be judged negatively. His and Lloyd’s actions and statements between November and February were largely in keeping with policy goals. Yet the

British argument for negotiations presupposed a few things: that the Soviets were being genuine, that a settlement could bring peace to Europe and not be another Munich, and that the alliance could weather such a unilateral action. Throughout, Britain had attempted to broker peace but could never convince anyone that they were honest brokers. Bonn did not trust their intentions, France was not willing to follow the British lead at the expense of its rapprochement with the Federal Republic, and the Soviets could never see London as anything but one of the powers still committed to the Western defense system. Macmillan’s dismissal of U.S. military planning and displays of force was because of a fundamental disagreement on their purpose. The Americans pushed for military planning and shows of force because it was for Allied consumption as much communist. The British were not a receptive audience for such posturing, and they especially did not care about sabre rattling for Bonn’s sake. Britain’s actions in the crisis, at best, aggravated everyone else; at worst, they dabbled in undermining NATO generally and West Germany specifically.

664 Schick, Berlin Crisis, pp. 60-63. 242

Road to Geneva

With Khrushchev lifting the ultimatum, the last phase of the Eisenhower administration’s strategy for the Berlin Crisis began.665 Talks did not preclude

Khrushchev from acting as he wished. In the opening stages of this phase, discussion in

Washington had graduated from the December debates about whether the Allies would use force to reopen access to whether the United States was willing to go to general war over Berlin. Effectively, the question was what would the Western Powers and NATO do if negotiations failed. Dulles had always taken a wait-and-see approach. With him virtually incapacitated in the hospital, Herter and Twining, who had already sparred with

Dulles and McElroy over the issue, pushed Eisenhower for a concrete answer. The president deferred.666

Eisenhower was not being indecisive. In a February 27 NSC meeting, he instructed Herter to study what the United States should do if Moscow carried out its six- month deadline threat. He wanted six questions studied for worst-case scenario planning, ranging from how to prepare the country for the prospect of war to measures that could be taken to coordinate with the Allies.667 By early March, congressional and press criticism had reached a fever pitch, with the president’s detractors arguing he was doing nothing about Berlin. On March 6, a day after a special NSC meeting, wherein Vice

665 Richard D. Williamson, First Steps toward Détente: American Diplomacy in the Berlin Crisis, 1958- 1963 (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2012), pp. 39-72. 666 Memorandum of Discussion, Special Meeting of the NSC, March 5, 1959, “Berlin – Vol. I (3)” folder, box 6, International Series, White House Office Files, Staff Secretary, DDEL; Memorandum, Twining to McElroy, March 11, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1969, VIII: 454-59; Cable, No. 956515, Twining to Norstad, March 18, 1959, “CCS 9172/9105 Berlin (21 Feb 1959)” folder, box 147, Central Decimal File, 1959, Entry UD-34, RG 218, NARA. 667 Memorandum, Eisenhower to Herter, February 27, 1958, ProQuest ID 1679059703, Berlin Crisis Collection, DNSA. 243

President Richard Nixon convinced Eisenhower to go on the offensive, the administration began hosting a series of congressional visits to the White House, including Senators

Lyndon Johnson, J. William Fulbright, and Everett Dirksen.668 Taylor was also sent to

Capitol Hill as an expert witness on Berlin to testify as part of the administration’s campaign. The idea was to prepare Americans for the potential for war.669

Deferring concrete decisions while preparing for the worst was the hallmark of

Eisenhower’s Berlin strategy in the last year-and-a-half of his presidency. The Soviets had agreed to a quadripartite foreign ministers’ meeting when they replied to the

February 16 note, but they really wanted a summit. Eisenhower, as was his wont with such high-level diplomacy, agreed with de Gaulle that a head-of-state meeting was unnecessary. He did, however, stipulate that he would agree to a summit if progress was made at the Foreign Ministers talks, which were to begin on May 11 in Geneva. Just what constituted progress, he never defined, leaving himself a perpetual escape hatch throughout negotiations.

In this last negotiation phase, the British and Americans swapped places in two crucial ways, both a likely consequence of Dulles’ incapacitation. Whereas Washington prior to Khrushchev dropping the deadline was impatient and hoped to influence its allies, London now found itself doing the prodding. As a result, Allied leadership in the final phase of the Berlin Crisis was centered primarily in London. Macmillan pushed both

668 Memorandum of Conversation, Special Meeting of the NSC, March 5, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 422-23; Memorandum of Conference, Eisenhower with Nixon, Herter, McElroy, Johnson, Dirksen, et al, March 6, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 428-37. 669 Testimony by Chief of Staff of the Army Maxwell Taylor Before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Washington, March 11, 1959, FRUS, 1958- 1960, VIII: 449-53. 244

Eisenhower and de Gaulle to forego any time-consuming foreign minister talks and agree to a summit. He increasingly superimposed arms limitations discussions, his pet project, over the Berlin and German Questions, which the Americans had opposed. Dulles and

Eisenhower viewed Berlin as distinct from those issues, whereas Macmillan wanted to either wrap them all together, or saw them as inseparable.670 He traveled to the United

States in March 1959 for that purpose but was, to his great frustration, rebuffed.671

Eisenhower’s reasons are unclear; de Gaulle’s were tied to his bid to restore French power. The status quo in Europe benefited France, and despite the outward appearances of a budding Franco-German friendship, de Gaulle was not interested in a balance-of- power-altering settlement in Europe. It was imperative that Bonn not lose faith in the

Allies and go neutralist, or set its own Eastern course. Paradoxically, de Gaulle needed

Germany to secure French leadership.672

At Geneva, the foreign ministers tried in vain to find some common ground. The

British delegation lurched from one position to another. The stalemate led the delegates to recess on June 19, with talks to resume on July 13. The recess was predicated on a stalemate between the heads-of-state. A few days prior, Macmillan had sought to convince Eisenhower that a summit was necessary, leading to the bizarre occurrence of both the British and Soviets publicly lobbying the American president to negotiate.673

Eisenhower still refused, which made a spurned Khrushchev go ballistic. In a June 25

670 Schick, The Berlin Crisis, pp. 56-57. 671 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, pp. 352-53. 672 Buffet, “The Berlin Crises, France, and the Atlantic Alliance,” pp. 96-98. 673 Gearson, “Britain and the Berlin Wall Crisis,” pp. 55-56; Craig, Destroying the Village, p. 103; Letter, Macmillan to Eisenhower, undated, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 906-08. 245 meeting with Averell Harriman, he screamed that the Soviets were determined to liquidate Allied rights in West Berlin. “If you want to perpetuate or prolong your rights,” he warned, “this means war.” Calling Eisenhower’s massive retaliation bluff, Khrushchev reasoned “we may die but the rockets will fly automatically.” He also sent a clear message about Allied contingency planning, telling Harriman American “generals talk of tanks and guns defending your Berlin position,” but they “would burn.”674

After nine weeks, the Geneva conference broke up when Eisenhower adopted a unilateral approach. On July 12, he invited Khrushchev to visit the United States. With that, the progression from a detached president on Berlin matters to an engaged one was complete. After Dulles’ resignation, Eisenhower had become central to the policymaking process. To Macmillan’s displeasure, his emphasis on a summit and the futile foreign ministers’ talks had convinced Eisenhower of the utility of personal diplomacy, cutting out the British prime minister from seeing through what he had begun in Moscow five months before.675 In some ways, though, Macmillan had sowed his own seeds of destruction, given that he considered it unimportant to hammer out details at Geneva when the heads-of-state could do that at their summit. Since no progress was ever made there, Eisenhower’s condition of progress was never met. Geneva also faltered because of

Dulles’ death. The prime mover of U.S. strategy toward Berlin had finally succumbed to cancer on May 24. He was buried, ironically, on May 27. The delegates adjourned for the funeral, but when they returned, negotiations fizzled.676

674 Cable, Thompson to State Department, June 25, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 941-43 675 Harold Macmillan, Pointing the Way, 1959-1961 (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), pp. 61-115. 676 Pach and Richardson, Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, pp. 204-08. Gearson, “Britain and the Berlin Wall Crisis,” pp. 55-56; Craig, Destroying the Village, p. 102. 246

Khrushchev arrived in Washington on September 15 for a twelve-day visit. He and Eisenhower began their Berlin discussions at on September 26, after the general secretary’s tour of the United States, from New York to California, Iowa, and

Pennsylvania.677 Their two days’ worth of talks about the city were productive, culminating in a carefully-worded U.S.-Soviet communiqué and an agreement to hold a four-power summit. Those talks were to take place in Paris in May 1960. Khrushchev’s

U.S. trip was a victory for him. Desperate for a settlement, he had finally gotten

Eisenhower to agree to a summit. That cooperative spirit was short-lived. By the turn of the new year, Khrushchev swung his approach back to pressure, and he renewed his demands that all knew the Western Powers could never accept. The delegates were spared another interminable stalemate when, two weeks before talks were to open in

Paris, the Soviets shot down Francis Gary Powers in his U-2 reconnaissance aircraft deep in USSR airspace. The summit became a victim of the ensuing turmoil between East and

West, and the good will from the bilateral talks had been undone. Khrushchev was furious and took the spying personally, though he first blamed CIA Director Allen Dulles and not Eisenhower for it. As a necessity, he changed tack to ensure that the wind of his internal, Kremlin hardliner enemies and external, Chinese, competitors was at his back.

After two days in Paris, the summit adjourned. Khrushchev then announced that he would wait for the next U.S. administration to find a solution for Berlin.678 With that, the first half of the Second Berlin crisis faded away.

677 Peter Carlson, K Blows Top: A Cold War Comic Interlude, Starring Nikita Khrushchev, America's Most Unlikely Tourist (New York: Public Affairs, 2009). 678 McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988), pp. 361-62. 247

Despite the failure of the negotiation phase of the administration’s strategy, they had achieved their objective. Some have charged Eisenhower and Dulles with not designing a fallback plan, and that once talks were unsuccessful, the West found itself in the same situation it had been in November 1958, without a diplomacy or military approach to confront a bellicose Soviet Union that was making demands.679 That, however, overlooks that their strategy was to use military power to push Khrushchev into a diplomatic track and thereby disarm the crisis. Whether negotiations were successful was less important. They understood that talks were not controllable, given years of impasse, any number of contradicting objectives from half-a-dozen participants, and the gravity of a German settlement.

The legacy of the Eisenhower administration’s Berlin strategy was how they dealt with the crisis. Eisenhower and Dulles’ approach was always to maintain Allied unity, keep open an escape hatch for Khrushchev, inform Congress and the public about the situation, and not allow the crisis to gain uncontrollable momentum. More lasting than their approach to the crisis were the structures that they built to deal with it. By the end of the administration, there were two organizations they had helped build to consult with the

Allies on politico-military issues. The first was the Tripartite Ambassadorial Group— later called the Washington Ambassadorial Group—which was born in the Paragraph D discussions, after Dulles returned from the Paris Foreign Ministers and NATO ministerial meetings in December 1958. The British and French ambassadors to the United States represented their governments, and the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

679 Schick, The Berlin Crisis, pp. 132-33. 248 served as chair. The body was effectively the formal politico-military liaison for the tripartite governments, and played an important role in overseeing the formation of Berlin planning. Its creation was made virtually in unison with the second of the consulting bodies during the Eisenhower administration, LIVE OAK, the code name for the covert tripartite military group under the command of Norstad and headquartered at EUCOM near Paris.680 LIVE OAK had been Norstad’s idea, but was likely a result of a State-JCS meeting on January 14, 1959.681 He had lobbied the British, French, and U.S. governments for its creation in February and March, arguing for the need to coordinate military plans since “if trouble starts, the whole military problem . . . falls squarely into my lap.”682 The body itself had no command authority, and was intended merely as a planning group.683 In the disagreement over Paragraph D, the Americans had contended that field commanders should do the detailed military planning, not governments. Though it had not existed at the time, LIVE OAK was the international body for that purpose. It also gave Twining what he had wanted in February. Both the Tripartite Ambassadorial

Group and LIVE OAK were integral to Allied coordination during the crisis, and illustrative of the Eisenhower administration’s approach to crisis management of

680 Cable, No. 1871, Bruce to Dulles, February 26, 1959, ProQuest ID 1679059210, Berlin Crisis Collection, DNSA. 681 State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, January 14, 1959, “State JCS January 14, 1959” folder, box 1, Records of State-JCS Meetings, 1959-1963, State Department Politico-Military Affairs Office, Entry A1- 1604, RG 59, NARA. Gregory W. Pedlow, “Allied Crisis Management for Berlin: The LIVE OAK Organization, 1959-1963,” in: International Cold War Military Records and History: Proceedings of the International Conference, ed. William W. Epley (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1996), p. 89. 682 Telegram, Norstad to Twining, March 17, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 496. See also Cable EC 9- 10240, Norstad to Twining, February 23, 1958, “CCS 9172/9010 (21 Feb 1959)” folder, box 147, Entry UD-34, Central Decimal File, 1959, RG 218, NARA. 683 Pedlow, “Allied Crisis Management for Berlin,” pp. 89-91. The extensive LIVE OAK planning papers are in “9172/Berlin/3100 Germany (East) (13 July 1961)” folder, box 115, Central File, Security Classified, 1961, Entry A1-1H, RG 218, NARA. 249 consultation and contingency planning. In that way, Eisenhower left a complete Allied structure for his successor, which would be needed sooner than most anticipated.

250

CHAPTER 6: MANAGING THE ALLIANCE CRISIS

On December 6, 1960, one month after narrowly winning the general election,

President-elect John F. Kennedy made his way to his future home. As his motorcade approached the White House, a military parade sprang to life, a courtesy that the outgoing occupant had arranged for his successor. Kennedy was there to discuss with Eisenhower the most pressing issues that would confront him on his first day as president, and he had personally determined the agenda.684 At the top of the list, under the heading “Three

Trouble Spots,” was Berlin. As a candidate, Kennedy often used the city rhetorically on the campaign trail, pointing to it as one of the Cold War’s most explosive situations, a problem that he accepted as a sober reality of the presidency, and an illustration of

American commitment that he would continue.685 Like his opponent, Richard Nixon, he was not unfamiliar with Berlin. Kennedy’s experience had come before the most recent crisis, however. In summer 1945, when working as a correspondent for William

Randolph Hearst, he had been in Germany covering the Potsdam Conference and interviewed Frank Howley.686 The Berlin of 1945 was a far cry from the present, and the campaign trail was not the same as the Oval Office. Now he would have to deal with the city as president.

684 Memorandum, “Agenda Items Suggested by Senator Kennedy,” December 6, 1960, “[ACW] DIARY December 1960” folder, box 11, Ann Whitman Diary Series, Ann Whitman File, DDEL. 685 John F. Kennedy: “The Presidency in 1960: National Press Club, Washington, DC,” January 14, 1960. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25795; John F. Kennedy: “Question and Answer Session, Statewide TV Appearance of Senator John F. Kennedy, Civic Auditorium, Seattle, WA,” September 6, 1960. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25655; All transcribed by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley for The American Presidency Project. Accessed November 1, 2017. 686 John F. Kennedy, Prelude to Leadership: The European Diary of John F. Kennedy, ed. Deirdre Henderson (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 1995), pp. 51-53. 251

This chapter focuses on the Kennedy administration’s view of Berlin and how its strategies for the crisis affected the transatlantic alliance. It examines two interrelated issues: the debate inside the U.S. national security establishment about Flexible Response and its application in Berlin, and the attempts of U.S. officials to build consensus in

NATO. For the duration of Kennedy’s presidency, the city never left his mind.687 It consumed him, leading him to push his advisors to undertake near-continuous contingency plan reviews and negotiation position proposals that led the State

Department experts to mockingly refer to him as the “Berlin desk officer.” Kennedy’s fear of a miscalculation leading to nuclear war drove his obsession and therefore led him to view Berlin and U.S. defense strategy as interwoven: he would formulate a strategy to defend the city while simultaneously replacing Massive Retaliation.

Any Berlin strategy required Allied consensus, however. As with chapter 5, this chapter asks if the alliance helped or hindered the West’s handling of the crisis. A routine sticking point in discussions was the role of military power in diplomacy. Kennedy believed it was imperative to display resolve through military actions, both for Allied and

Moscow consumption: for the Allies, it would prove American commitment; for

Moscow, it would hopefully offset the weak bargaining position the Western Powers held at the negotiating table. The administration struggled to strike a balance, however, as its strategy and lack of consultation ran afoul of NATO members now skeptical of preponderant American power. This chapter therefore argues that Kennedy, tired of the

687 Memorandum of Conversation, “Account of my December 6th, 1960 meeting with President-elect Kennedy,” “[ACW] DIARY December 1960” folder, box 11, Ann Whitman Diary Series, Ann Whitman File, DDEL. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 617. 252 transatlantic alliance impasse, acted unilaterally to solve the crisis, culminating in its resolution after the and NATO’s tacit adoption of Flexible

Response in the form of Berlin contingency planning. Though Kennedy set out to chart his own course, he followed Eisenhower and Dulles’ lead more often than is recognized.688

Shaping a Strategy

When Kennedy was inaugurated president on January 20, 1961, the crisis over

Berlin was in abeyance. He preferred it that way, since it afforded him the change to settle in his administration before dealing with the city. This, he explained to West

German Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano, accounted for the public silence about

Berlin early into his presidency, including its conspicuous absence from his inaugural address.689 Tension ebbed and flowed since 1958, following a pattern of threat and parlay, with each new round of talks taking at least six months to prepare and then implode. Khrushchev had continued his periodic bluster, chiefly a speech about wars of national liberation and a February 17, 1961 aide-memoire in which he threatened to end the occupation regime in Berlin. His routine statements of a separate peace with East

Germany were for domestic and Pact consumption, however.690 Kennedy and his advisers nonetheless expected the Kremlin to renew pressure in fall 1961. Until then, his strategy was to approach the issue obliquely, lest difficulties in the Congo, Laos, and

688 For the counterpoint view, see Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, pp. 283-351. 689 Memorandum of Conversation, Kennedy and von Brentano, February 17, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIV: 8-9. 690 Jonathan Haslam, Russia’s Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), p. 190. Soviet Aide-Mémoire, February 17, 1961, Documents on Germany, 1944-1985 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State Publication, 1986), pp. 723-27. 253

Latin America invite tension in Berlin.691 He was following the Eisenhower administration’s advice from his December 6 meeting of first gaining an agreement with the Soviets on basic issues.692 It was for these reasons that on February 22 he accepted

Khrushchev’s invitation to meet. His goal was to use the summit in Vienna to reduce the danger of nuclear war with disarmament and arms control agreements. 693

While the new administration was preparing for the summit, they also reviewed policy. The central actor was Dean Acheson, who had a working group of old policy hands and young academics: Berlin-expert Foy Kohler, former secretary of the Air Force

Thomas Finletter, and a coterie of RAND Corporation analysts, among others.694 Also involved was Paul Nitze, who had left government service during the Eisenhower administration but returned when Kennedy, on Acheson’s advice, offered him the

Pentagon’s politico-military shop at International Security Affairs. Acheson’s original purview was NATO, but Kennedy expanded it to Berlin after he reviewed contingency plans and judged them “not serious enough.”695 Both tasks meant Acheson dominated thinking on Berlin and strategy toward Europe in the fledgling presidency.696

691 Memorandum of Conversation, Kennedy and von Brentano, February 17, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIV: 10. Cable No. 2209, Llewelyn Thompson to Rusk, March 16, 1961, “Germany, Berlin Subjects Cables, 1/7/61 – 6/14/61” folder, box 91, Countries Series, National Security File (hereafter NSF), JFKL. 692 Briefing paper on Berlin, attached to “Account of my December 6th, 1960 meeting with President-elect Kennedy,” “[ACW] DIARY December 1960” folder, box 11, Ann Whitman Diary Series, Ann Whitman File, DDEL. 693 Cable No. 1784, Thompson to Rusk, January 28, 1961, “USSR General 1/29/61 – 2/1/61” folder, box 176, Countries Series, NSF, JFKL; “Notes on Discussion of the Thinking of the Soviet Leadership,” February 11, 1961, “USSR Security January-May 1961” folder, box 125A, Countries Series, POF, JFKL. 694 Bruce Kuklick, Blind Oracles: Intellectuals and War from Kennan to Kissinger (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 95-109. 695 Memorandum of Conversation, Kennedy and Acheson with Macmillan and Home, “East-West Issues: Berlin,” April 5, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIV: 38. See also Mark Jonathan Rice, “The Alliance City: NATO and Berlin, 1958-1963” (dissertation, Ohio State University, 2010). 696 Brinkley, Dean Acheson, p. 112, 118. NSAM 40, April 20, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIII: 286-91. 254

Since leaving the State Department, Acheson had remained a leading voice on foreign affairs. Exasperated at an Eisenhower administration that he judged unimaginative and passive, he published in his capacity as the head of foreign policy for the Democratic National Committee Advisory Council a March 1959 piece on Berlin in the Saturday Evening Post, titled “Wishing Won’t Hold Berlin.” In it, he proposed a

NATO conventional buildup and an assertion of access rights via armed convoys and trains, all of which would call Khrushchev’s bluff and induce him to rescind his deadline.

Acheson had not changed his approach since July 1949, and applied previous lessons to a situation now more complicated. Little did he know how stubbornly the Allies had blocked Dulles and Norstad’s proposals.697

Acheson’s first product as Kennedy’s special adviser came in April, when asked to brief Macmillan and Home. On April 5, he presented the British with a summary of his

“first-rate” paper, as National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy characterized it, and proceeded to crash into the delicate house of cards that Eisenhower and Dulles had built.698 Acheson’s assumption was that Khrushchev would force the issue in Berlin by fall 1961, and a test of wills would follow. Rather than suggesting diplomatic positions, he gave a “bloodcurdling” list of military countermeasures. Macmillan and Home, alarmed and no doubt exasperated that they had to refight the same battles with a new set of American leaders, pushed back, using the same reasoning they had three years before about the inadequacies and dangers of using force. The two sides agreed to review

697 Dean Acheson, “Wishing Won’t Hold Berlin,” Saturday Evening Post, vol. 231, issue 36 (March 7, 1959): 32-33, 85-86; Brinkley, Dean Acheson, pp. 96-99. 698 Memorandum, Bundy to Kennedy, April 4, 1961, with Acheson memorandum attached, “Germany – Berlin General 4/61” folder, box 81, Countries Series, NSF, JFKL. 255 planning but the conversation concluded on a divisive note, when Home, discussing the political problems of Berlin, asserted that the Allied claim of the right of conquest was

“wearing thin.” Acheson shot back, “perhaps it was our power which was wearing thin.”699

It was a harbinger for things to come with the Allies.700 Acheson’s NATO study became National Security Action Memorandum 40 on April 21.701 His conception of alliance strategy was built on two beliefs. First, it was unlikely the Soviets would launch a nuclear attack or invasion of Western Europe, but they would continue undermining the alliance. Second, the Allied nuclear deterrent remained an important factor in continental defense but its credibility depended on the ability and will to fight a non-nuclear war.

Both meant that he emphasized conventional capabilities and rejected Massive

Retaliation. He suggested building a force capable of “halting Soviet forces” or at least convincing Moscow of “the wider risks of the course on which they are embarked.”702

His idea was to prepare for the likely eventuality in the Cold War, not the worst, which slotted in with Flexible Response, a new concept the administration believed could better meet strategic realities, ranging from counterinsurgency to general nuclear war.

699 Memorandum of Conversation, Kennedy, Acheson, Macmillan, Home, “East-West Issues: Berlin,” April 5, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, XVI: 36-40. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 319. Macmillan, Pointing the Way, pp. 306-59. 700 Robert Davis, “The Dilemma of NATO Strategy, 1949-1968” (dissertation, Ohio University, 2008), pp. 185-92. 701 “A Review of North Atlantic Problems for the Future,” March 24, 1961, “NATO: General, Acheson Report, 3/61” folder, box 220, Regional Security Series, NSF, JFKL. NSAM 40, April 20, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIII: 285-91. 702 NSAM 40, April 20, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIII: 288. 256

NSAM 40 was a shock for the alliance, as Acheson’s premise repudiated NATO’s

MC 70, the modernization plan from June 1958.703 That document had lowered the alliance’s target number of active divisions, set in 1952 at , from ninety to thirty, and envisioned an expansion of nuclear capabilities to compensate.704 Acheson thought this move an admission of failure and an abandonment of the forward strategy he had helped build because of the Korean War.705 So deep was his loathing of nuclear weapons as the basis for NATO strategy that he advocated for burning the ships. He argued that it

“would be desirable if the British decided to phase out of the nuclear deterrent business.”

France had already detonated an atomic weapon in February 1960, but he urged no assistance.706

In the days before Kennedy issued NSAM 40, the administration laid the groundwork publicly. At the beginning of April, Vice President Lyndon Johnson declared in Paris that NATO should expand its conventional capabilities. On April 10, JFK addressed the NATO Military Council in Washington and echoed Johnson’s statement while making it clear that the alliance was “at a turning point in military planning.”707

Kennedy’s new ambassador to NATO and one of the report’s authors, Thomas Finletter,

703 Heuser, NATO, Britain, France, and the FRG, pp. 26-40. 704 Duffield, Power Rules, pp. 151-57. 705 See pp. 27-29 of “A Review of North Atlantic Problems for the Future,” March 24, 1961, “NATO: General, Acheson Report, 3/61” folder, box 220, Regional Security Series, NSF, JFKL. 706 NSAM 40, April 20, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIII: 289. 707 Remarks at the Opening Session of the Meeting of the Military Committee of NATO,” April 10, 1961, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 254-56. 257 briefed the NAC on the new direction.708 Meanwhile, Acheson set off on a month-long trip to Europe to discuss the changes with alliance leaders.

NSAM 40 stoked new concerns. The Germans feared that the raising of the threshold of nuclear weapon use undermined deterrence and invited Soviet aggressiveness.709 Most NATO members feared a rise in defense costs, Britain especially.

When viewing the benefits of the changes the Americans were encouraging, the

Europeans could see little increased value for money. The overriding question on the minds of alliance members, then, was “why?” Finletter perhaps summed up the disconnect best when he reminded Kennedy that “We in the United States are in a new

Administration, but NATO is not.”710 In fact, the alliance was going through a NATO leadership change, since former Dutch foreign minister Dirk Stikker replaced an exhausted Paul-Henri Spaak as secretary general on April 21. Still, JFK had intended the review to be a means of Allied consolidation, an overture to the members that signaled his aim to consult with them on multilateral issues.711 It was a lofty goal, one whose fatal flaw de Gaulle exposed when he interrupted Acheson’s explanation of Kennedy’s hope that interallied discussions would influence American views as much as Allied ones: “is this possible?”712

708 See footnote 2, Cable, Rusk to Bruce, May 5, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIII: 300; Duffield, Power Rules, pp. 155-56. 709 Cable, Finletter to Kennedy, May 29, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIII: 305; Duffield, Power Rules, pp. 155-57. 710 Cable, Finletter to Kennedy, May 29, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIII: 305 711 Cable, Acheson to Kennedy and Rusk, April 10, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIII: 270. 712 Cable, Acheson to State Department for JFK, April 20, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIII: 292. 258

The April 3 Acheson memorandum set off policy reviews within the State

Department and Pentagon.713 On April 17, Bundy asked Secretary of Defense Robert

McNamara to study potential scenarios for a Soviet blockade of Berlin, including how one-to-two divisions could reopen ground access to Berlin. McNamara’s primary job was to answer one question: How could the United States fight a Cold War that was now based on mutually-assured destruction? He worked on the assumption that the Soviets enjoyed a larger nuclear arsenal than the West, putting into question Eisenhower’s reliance on Massive Retaliation.714 Conventional forces were thus to be a determinant factor in conflicts, which required, per Kennedy’s instructions, to “respond, with discrimination and speed, to any problem at any spot on the globe at any moment's notice.”715 McNamara had already formed four task forces in the Pentagon to study a variety of problems, from strategic forces to limited war and research and development.

Like Acheson, he believed conventional forces were the keystone of European defense.

In NATO’s strategic philosophy, he saw a neglection of conventional forces and therefore inflexibility to meet the challenges. His emphasis on a non-nuclear buildup was not only for the purposes of building a force that could meet a myriad of threats across the globe, it was also a deterrent. Shifting the message away from nuclear weapons, the new secretary of defense hoped to convince the Soviets that U.S. military power would

713 Memorandum, Rusk to McNamara, “Berlin,” April 17, 1961, “Germany – Berlin General 4/61” folder, box 81, Countries Series, NSF, JFKL. NSAM 41, Military Planning for a Possible Berlin Crisis, April 25, 1961, “NSAM 41 Military Planning for a Possible Berlin Crisis” folder, box 329, Meetings & Memoranda Series, NSF, JFKL. 714 Memorandum, Rusk to Kennedy, “Policies previously approved in NSC which need review,” January 30, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, VIII: 18-19. 715 Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 30, 1961, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 24. 259 have enough strength remaining after a Soviet first strike that it could retaliate and destroy Moscow’s second-strike abilities.716

McNamara’s reliance on conventional forces led him to assess existing Berlin plans as insufficient. In March, he requested the Joint Chiefs supply suggestions for countermeasures, likely a result of Acheson’s report on the city. In two studies the next month, and another on May 4, the JCS judged their own August 12, 1960 countermeasures, such as a blockade of Soviet shipping, sufficient. LIVE OAK planning and training for a probe was not, however.717 Chairman Lyman Lemnitzer and the other chiefs urged patience and a larger force. Without reinforcements, deployments within theater, and partial mobilization, the East Germans could hold their own while the

Soviets would become involved and finish off the force. Both Norstad and the JCS argued that a division-sized probe was pointless when a battalion would do. After all, any probe served political, not military purposes, and it was illogical to allow valuable resources to be decimated along the Autobahn, leading Norstad to reason that “the greater the force used the greater the embarrassment which would result from failure.”718 His argument was the same that the British Chiefs of Staff had made to him the year before,

716 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 3rd Edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 213-26. William W. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (New York: Harper & Row, 1964). 717 Robert S. Jordan, Norstad: Cold War NATO Supreme Commander—Airman, Strategist, Diplomat (London: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 168-72. Memorandum, Twining to Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates, with enclosure “Check List of Possible Military and Non-Military Counter Measures, Berlin Contingency Planning,” August 12, 1960, “CCS 9172 Berlin/9105 Germany (East) (28 Mar 1960) Sec. 2” folder, box 79, Central Decimal File, Entry UD-37, RG 218, NARA. 718 As quoted in Lawrence S. Kaplan, Ronald D. Landa, Edward J. Drea, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense: The McNamara Ascendancy, 1961-1965 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2006), pp. 149; Walter S. Poole, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Vol. VIII: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1961–1964 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Joint History, 2011), pp. 140-41. Memorandum, Burke to McNamara, “Berlin,” April 28, 1961, “Germany – Berlin General Report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Part I 5/5/61” folder, box 81, Countries Series, NSF, JFKL. 260 after he ordered U.K. Army of the Rhine commander to develop a plan for a division- sized probe, since any such operation would begin in their command area.719 When the

Bundeswehr made the same points after being briefed, it was obvious the plan had few allies.720

The Joint Chiefs, who judged Acheson’s NATO report “a realistic analysis of a complex politico-military problem,” agreed with the idea of a buildup but not as an end itself.721 McNamara and Nitze were both annoyed that the JCS continued Eisenhower-era thinking of moving quickly from a conventional to nuclear response. In McNamara’s

May 5 report to Kennedy, he hedged the Joint Staff’s assertion that current planning comported with national policy guidance when he asserted that that very guidance no longer reflected U.S. strategic thinking. He therefore rejected Eisenhower’s NSC 5803, which planned for general war after a token probe, and he requested Nitze and the Joint

Chiefs revise the policy.722 The JCS and Norstad again rebuffed McNamara’s attempts to apply Flexible Response to Berlin, and were dismissive of the secretary’s argument there should be “Substantial (in contrast to limited) non-nuclear military planning to reopen

719Norstad to Mountbatten, “Berlin Contingency Planning: More Elaborate Military Measures,” August 22, 1960; LIVE OAK U.K. Chief R.J. Chaundler to Norstad, August 24, 1960; Mountbatten to Norstad, “‘LIVE OAK’ Planning: More Elaborate Military Measures,” September 19, 1960: all in “9172/Berlin/3100 Germany (East) (13 July 1961)” folder, box 115, Central File, Security Classified, 1961, Entry A1-1H, RG 218, NARA. 720 Bruno Thoss, “Information, Persuasion, or Consultation?,” p. 90. 721 As quoted in Kaplan, Landa, and Drea, The McNamara Ascendency, p. 148. 722 Memorandum, McNamara to Kennedy, “Military Planning for a Possible Berlin Crisis,” May 5, 1961, “Germany – Berlin General Report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Part I 5/5/61” folder, box 81, Countries Series, NSF, JFKL. 261 ground access,” arguing that the phrase was ambiguous.723 Like Bonn, they were also concerned about fighting a war without using nuclear weapons.724

On the eve of Kennedy’s trip to Vienna, the administration’s review of military planning reached an inconclusive climax without a strategy clearly in place. It was clear, however, that the administration was ignoring the structures that Eisenhower and Dulles had built. Rather than using interdepartmental groups on Berlin planning, conferring with the JCS, LIVE OAK, or Washington Ambassadorial Group, Kennedy sidestepped those organs and employed ad hoc policy study groups instead. 725 There was also a growing tendency in Kennedy’s national security team to fixate on the military aspects of Berlin, despite their acknowledgment early on that political plans should be formulated in parallel.726 Regardless, they continued along the same path that Eisenhower and Dulles had gone down and failed, with the cumulative effect an unsettled alliance.

Kennedy met Khrushchev in Vienna on June 3, confident in his ability to charm the Soviet leader, despite warnings from advisers. It quickly became apparent that

Khrushchev had a different agenda. While Kennedy hoped to appeal to reason and compromise, Khrushchev’s objective was to solve Berlin. If Washington wanted détente, first they had to give what Moscow wanted in Berlin.727 The meeting was a disaster for

723 Poole, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, pp. 141-42. Memorandum, McNamara to Kennedy, “Military Planning for a Possible Berlin Crisis,” May 5, 1961, “Germany – Berlin General Report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Part I 5/5/61” folder, box 81, Countries Series, NSF, JFKL. 724 Trauschweizer, Cold War U.S. Army, pp. 124-28. 725 Pedlow, “Allied Crisis Management for Berlin,” pp. 87-116. Kaplan, Landa, and Drea, The McNamara Ascendency, p. 147. 726 Notes for the President, “Planning Item, NSC Agenda,” February 23, 1961, “National Security Council Meetings, 1961 No. 477, 3/29/61” folder, box 313, Meetings & Memoranda Series, NSF, JFKL. 727 Vladislav M. Zubok, “Khrushchev and Berlin Crisis (1958-1962),” Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 6 (May 1993), p. 23. 262

Kennedy and underscored the necessity of a consensus among U.S. policymakers about a direction on Berlin in the era of Flexible Response. It did not alter strategic choices. It did, however, move up a timetable for possible Soviet pressure, given that Khrushchev brushed aside Kennedy’s strategy of buying time through negotiations when he handed over an aide-memoire. The Kremlin had decided instead to use its standard procedure: threaten, blandish, negotiate.

Acheson submitted his Berlin report to Kennedy on June 28. The next day, he presented the “grim business” to the NSC.728 He believed negotiating on Khrushchev’s terms was a “waste of time and energy” as well as “dangerous,” a not altogether different view than Eisenhower’s.729 Acheson, though, had always seen Berlin as the keystone of

U.S. strategy for Europe, which accounts for his tying together the city’s and NATO’s security in 1950, and his review of the two issues for Kennedy. Any Western appeasement in the face of Kremlin coercion would put that security system at risk and affect U.S. prestige. Acheson’s objective in this test of wills was to demonstrate to

Khrushchev that what he wanted was unattainable, and to convince him that to force the issue was to invite nuclear war. The solution was the same in Acheson’s NATO report, the United States had to establish the “credibility of the deterrent.”730 Paradoxically, he ventured that Khrushchev did not believe the Americans would resort to nuclear war, especially over Berlin, which emboldened him to act aggressively and raise the risk of the nuclear war. It was here where Acheson departed from Eisenhower, Dulles, and

728 Letter, Acheson to Truman, June 24, 1961, “Acheson-Truman Correspondence: 1961” folder, box 161, Acheson-Truman Correspondence File, Acheson Papers, HSTL. 729 Acheson Report, June 28, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIV: 139. 730 Ibid., p. 139-40. 263

Norstad’s approach. Conventional, graduated responses, he believed, would convince the

Soviets of the West’s seriousness in defending their position. The trick was convincing

Khrushchev of that.

That would be done through military, political, economic, and diplomatic preparations, all with tripartite and NATO consultation and planning. Militarily, Acheson proposed increasing U.S. conventional strength in Europe and on the high seas, as well as putting Strategic Air Command on alert. Politically, Kennedy would have to ask

Congress for defense funds. Diplomatically, the administration should prepare for counter-measures such as blockades on Soviet shipping.731 What Acheson did not realize was the same debates had occurred within the Eisenhower administration, and his and

Dulles’ positions were not far removed. White House discussions had been split on

Dulles’ conviction that a Berlin crisis could be solved with graduated responses and

Eisenhower’s opinion that such a stance was naïve. Acheson’s tacit argument was that he knew what the Soviets’ potential second or third moves in a military crisis would entail.

What, however, if there was no second or third move? That was Eisenhower’s point when he asked Dulles why the West should think Moscow would react logically and fight a limited war. If war between the superpowers was worth fighting, why would the Soviets not preemptively launch a nuclear attack and ensure their own survival?732

Unlike his NATO report, Acheson’s suggestion for Berlin created interdepartmental debates, highlighting divisions between the State Department,

731 Ibid., 146-46. 732 Campbell Craig, Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). 264

Pentagon, and White House.733 The fault line was between what commentators often refer to as the hard- and soft-liners, though that is an imperfect division.734 A finer delineation shaped the debate over Acheson’s plan. Among those in the State Department who believed it was too provocative were Director of the Policy Planning Staff George

McGhee, former ambassador to the Soviet Union Chip Bohlen, and legal adviser Abram

Chayes. Their counter was Foy Kohler, who had been Dulles’ driving force on Berlin matters with the Allies. Rusk was characteristically neutral.735 In the Pentagon, most civilian leaders supported Acheson, chief among them his protégé Nitze. McNamara agreed with the emphasis on conventional force, but he was skeptical of a plan that relied on a provocation. The service chiefs agreed with the latter point but not the former. They believed the Soviets could interpret a conventional buildup as a lack of confidence in using “our complete force to maintain our position in Europe.”736 It was a sentiment that likely did not surprise Acheson. He confided in Truman that he was “shocked” at the

“shoddy work” the military produced.737 He had toiled to convince them of his perspective, with partial success.

Acheson received the most resistance from the White House.738 As in

McNamara’s Pentagon, Kennedy had amassed a group of young and talented advisers.

733 Memorandum JCSM-464-61, Lemnitzer to McNamara, July 8, 1961, “9172 Berlin/3100 Germany (East) (30 )” folder, box 115, Central File, Security Classified, 1961, Entry A1 1H, RG 218, NARA. Memorandum for the President, “Berlin,” July 7, 1961, “German Security 7/61” folder, box 117, Countries Series, POF, JFKL. 734 Cate, Ides of August, pp. 84-85. 735 Ibid., p. 84. 736 JCS 1907/322, Joint Strategic Survey Council, July 20, 1961, “9172/Berlin/3100 Germany (East) (13 July 1961)” folder, box 115, Central File, Security Classified, 1961, Entry A1 1H, RG 218, NARA. 737 Letter, Acheson to Truman, June 24, 1961, “Acheson-Truman Correspondence: 1961” folder, box 161, Acheson-Truman Correspondence File, Acheson Papers, HSTL. Cate, Ides of August, p. 85. 738 Cate, Ides of August, p. 85. 265

Bundy and his Deputy National Security Advisor, Carl Kaysen, speechwriter Theodore

Sorenson, court historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.—all were under forty-five years old. It was this group that mounted an argument against the Acheson Plan, along with Henry

Kissinger, a young Harvard professor who the administration had used as a consultant on

Berlin since March.739 Worried that there was no counterbalance to Acheson’s calls for a military option, the group wrote a paper that attempted to steer Kennedy toward solving

Berlin rather than going to war over it.740 Their counter-memo, though important in its attempt to influence Kennedy, is overemphasized in the literature.741 In reality, there was an avalanche of reports and studies that flowed into Bundy’s office the first week of July from every corner of the national security establishment that concerned itself with

Berlin.742

The flurry of activity was in preparation for a weekend meeting at Kennedy’s family’s estate in Hyannis Port, Massachusetts, on July 8 and 9. Kennedy summoned

Rusk, McNamara, and the newest member of the White House, Maxwell Taylor, who

739 Niall Ferguson, Kissinger, 1923-1968: The Idealist (New York: Penguin Press, 2015), pp. 483-503. For his first report, see Memorandum, Kissinger to Bundy, May 5, 1961, with “Berlin” study attached, “HAK- 26” folder, box 462A, Kissinger Series, NSF, JFKL. 740 Memorandum, Schlesinger to Kennedy, July 7, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963: XIV: 173-75. Schlesinger, Thousand Days, pp. 386-88. 741 Cate, Ides of August, pp. 85-86; Peter Wyden, Wall: The Inside Story of Divided Berlin (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), pp. 73-75; Frederick Kempe borrows heavily from Cate and Wyden’s research and structure: Berlin 1961: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Most Dangerous Place on Earth (New York: G.P. Putnam & Sons, 2011). 742 NSAM 58, June 30, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIV: 162-65. Some of these reports include: Memorandum, Roger Hilsman (INR) to Kohler, “The Berlin Crisis: In What Sense a Test of Will?,” June 30, 1961, “Germany, Berlin General 6/29/61 – 6/30/61” folder, box 81A, Countries Series, NSF, JFKL. Memorandum, Kaysen to Bundy, July 3, 1961, “Germany-Berlin General. 7/1/61 – 7/6/61” folder, box 81A, Countries Series, NSF, JFKL. In same folder, Memorandum, Lucius Battle to Bundy, July 5, 1961, with enclosures. Memorandum, Helms to Kohler, “CIA’s Berlin Contingency Planning Paper,” July 10, 1961, “[No Title]” folder, box 3, Records Relating to the “Live Oak” Program, Bureau of European Affairs, Entry A1 5554, RG 59, NARA. 266 began work as Military Representative of the President a week prior. Immediately, Taylor reemerged as a voice on Berlin. Between his time in the city as USCOB, he had served a stint in the Pentagon as the Army’s head of plans, commander of the Eighth Army at the end of the Korean War, and then back to the Pentagon as Army Chief of Staff. It was in that last role that he had become the Joint Chief’s representative on Berlin.743 In May

1958, he had articulated his concept for limited war strategy to the NSC, which had kicked off a heated exchange between Dulles, who backed Taylor’s idea, and

Eisenhower.744 Taylor became part of the Eisenhower campaign in 1959 to notify the public of the measures being taken in the crisis, and he testified in front of a subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 11, where he subtlety vacillated between the administration line and his own belief that nuclear weapons were

“not reasonable” to defend Berlin.745 After retiring from active service, he emerged in

January 1960 as a public critic of the New Look as the author of The Uncertain Trumpet, a book that also outlined his thoughts on limited war, piquing Kennedy’s interest.746 After the failed Bay of Pigs operation in Cuba, Kennedy recalled Taylor to active service to head up an investigation of the operation. He then kept on Taylor as an advisor on military matters, creating a firewall between himself and the Joint Chiefs he no longer trusted.

743 Memorandum of Conference with the President, December 17, 1958, “Berlin – Vol. I (I)” folder, box 6, International Series, White House Offices Files, Office of the Staff Secretary, DDEL 744 Memorandum of Conversation, 364th NSC Meeting, May 1, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, III: 79-97. 745 Testimony by Chief of Staff of the Army Maxwell Taylor Before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Washington, March 11, 1959, FRUS, 1958- 1960, VIII: 449-53. 746 Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960). 267

With his principal advisors on hand at Hyannis Port, Kennedy hoped to find more options for a Berlin crisis than nuclear war or surrender. He found none. While

McNamara and Taylor swam, Kennedy broadsided Rusk on the State Department’s taking too long to reply to the Vienna aide-mémoire and lacking imagination in forming a negotiation strategy. Rusk answered that the Washington Ambassadorial Group first had to clear the draft and then send it to the NAC. Kennedy was impatient, and revealed his true thoughts on NATO in Berlin matters. The United States, as the most powerful member of the transatlantic alliance and the one who carried the most weight and responsibility for Berlin, would not depend upon allies. When McNamara returned from his swim, Kennedy criticized him for the lack of conventional strength available. Without this leverage, he argued, there were fewer options and little capability to signal to

Khrushchev American ability or willingness to defend Berlin with anything short of nuclear weapons. He gave both Rusk and McNamara ten days to supply answers.747

Some of the inefficiency was the result of a lack of coordination. To remedy this,

Bundy, Rusk, and Taylor already had advised Kennedy to create a committee that could handle day-to-day operations and detailed planning. The new group, called the

Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin but known better as the

Berlin Task Force, was thus born inside the State Department, with Foy Kohler at its helm.748 Theoretically, the Berlin Task Force might have allowed the State Department to

747 Catudal, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis, pp. 161-63. Memorandum, Taylor to Kennedy, “Actions agreed at the discussions at Hyannis Port, 8 July 1961,” July 12, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIV: 186. 748 Memorandum, Bundy to Kennedy, July 6, 1961, “Berlin Planning Organization,” “Germany-Berlin General. 7/1/61 – 7/6/61” folder, box 81A, Countries Series, NSF, JFKL. Memorandum, Taylor to Kennedy, “Actions agreed at the discussions at Hyannis Port, 8 July 1961,” July 12, 1961, FRUS, 1961- 1963, XIV: 186. 268 gain ground that it was losing, but, to Rusk’s chagrin, it did not. He worried that Kennedy was pushing Foggy Bottom out of planning, and he complained to Bundy that there were

“too many hands in the [White House] end of the Berlin business.” This fear was grounded but also self-fulfilling, since he and his German experts fixated on blunting

Acheson’s military contingencies rather than formulating a negotiation strategy.749 It was a deliberate approach. Rusk believed that plans should be formulated with the Allies, rather than issuing them ultimatums, and it was over this difference that he and Kennedy had come to blows at Hyannis Port. Kennedy wanted no Allied interference in the formulation of the American approach, thus he moved the White House into the role the

State Department had ceded. Simultaneously, McNamara and Nitze were also moving into the foreign policy realm.750

Berlin had begun to consume Kennedy. Those who sought to discuss other business with him found a distracted president. Secretary of the Interior Steward Udall commented that they city “imprisoned” Kennedy.751 In a NSC meeting on July 13, he took control of U.S. decision making and outlined what he wanted. The Treasury

Department was to get involved in creating economic countermeasures against the

Soviets. Kohler would create a program to discuss with the British and French. The

Pentagon would supply a report on what NATO members could contribute to match U.S.

749 Telephone Transcript, Rusk and Bundy, July 18, 1961, “Telephone Calls 7/1/61 – 7/31/61” folder, box 44, Transcripts of Telephone Calls, Dean Rusk Records, Entry A1 5379, RG 59, NARA. Lawrence Legere diary, July 30, 1961, ProQuest ID 1679058009, Berlin Crisis Collection, Digital National Security Archive (hereafter DNSA) 750 Deborah Shapley, Promise and Power: The Life and Times of Robert McNamara (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1993), p. 120. 751 Quoted in Catudal, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall, p. 172. 269 efforts.752 Following the meeting, the Berlin Steering Group met in the Oval Office to discuss military choices. There were four, ranging from all-out preparation for war to a search for a political solution. Taylor had been behind the four choices. He had feared that Kennedy would stop short of Acheson’s recommendations, and believed that spelling out four choices along with pros and cons would nudge the president in the right direction of a buildup that would ensure the military was prepared.753 Though he did not yet decide on one of the four choices, Kennedy did outline an important distinction for a military response. The United States, he told McNamara, would only react militarily if West

Berlin was threatened. Following a question from Rusk, Kennedy cleared up any ambiguity: The only two things that mattered were U.S. presence in and access to

Berlin.754 He thus drew a distinction between the two halves of the cities, which no president had done before.

The post-Vienna search for a Berlin strategy culminated in another NSC meeting, this one on July 19. In the lead-up, the Pentagon and State Department organized their responses, much of them funneled through the Berlin Task Force, which had marathon meetings for ten straight days.755 McNamara even consulted Eisenhower, and traveled to

Gettysburg with Lemnitzer and Allen Dulles. Eisenhower moderated his position, arguing that military force should be used if the Soviets denied Allied right of access, not over

752 Memorandum of Conversation, NSC Meeting, July 13, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIV: 192-94. Catudal, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall, pp. 172-74. 753 “Military Choices in Berlin Planning,” July 13, 1961, “Germany – Berlin General 7/13/61” folder, box 81A, Countries Series, NSF, JFKL. Lawrence Legere diary, July 30, 1961, ProQuest ID 1679058009, Berlin Crisis Collection, DNSA. 754 Catudal, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall, p. 175. 755 Those meetings created “Documents Prepared in Response to NS Action Memorandum 59,” July 18, 1961, “Germany Berlin Subjects Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany 7/18/61” folder, box 88, Countries Series, NSF, JFKL. 270 procedural issues like stamping. Still, he urged McNamara to be assertive, since if there would be war, “we must decide whether we are going to attack the head of the snake or nibble at his tail.”756 The studies that traveled across Washington were voluminous, mostly due to Kennedy’s penchant for sending out requests for studies at a moment’s notice, mostly about minutiae.757 The reports were so detailed that the fundamental issue of U.S. willingness to risk nuclear war over Berlin became lost. Due to this, Lemnitzer urged McNamara not to allow any discussion of probable sequence of actions in the upcoming NSC meeting. Curiously, then, he took the French line from 1959 that such things “cannot be determined in advance of a real situation.”758

The Acheson plan did not die in the July 19 fight, but it lost some of its teeth.759

Kennedy told his advisors that no national emergency would be proclaimed. Military spending would increase by $3.2 billion, not the Pentagon’s $4.3 billion request. Draft calls would triple, and Congress would be asked to stand by for a reserve call up, but there would be no immediate mobilization. Preparations for an airlift would be made.

Ground alert for bombers would increase by 50 percent, and six additional divisions would prepare for an eventual deployment to Europe. Last, a civil defense program

756 Notes of Meeting of Dulles, McNamara, General Lemnitzer with General Eisenhower at Gettysburg, July 15, 1961, “Defense 7/61 – 8/61” folder, box 77, Departments & Agencies Series, POF, JFKL. 757 Memorandum, Bundy to McNamara, July 10, 1961, “Department of Defense (B): General, 1961” folder, box 276, Departments and Agencies Series, NSF, JFKL. For the JCS answer, see Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, “Mobilization (Berlin Situation),” July 13, 1961, “9172/Berlin/3170 Germany (East) (10 July 1961) Sec. 2” folder, box 122, Central File, Security Classified, 1961, Entry A1-1H, RG 218, NARA. 758 Minutes of NSC Meeting, July 19, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIV: 219-22. Rusk Presentation Paper, “Outline on Germany and Berlin,” July 19, 1961, “Berlin Contingency Planning 1960 to March 1962 Folder 1 of 2” folder, box 4, Records Relating to the “Live Oak” Program, Bureau of European Affairs – Berlin Desk, Entry A1 5554, RG 59, NARA. Memorandum JCSM-486-61, Lemnitzer to McNamara, “Berlin (U),” July 18, 1961, “9172 Berlin/3100 Germany (East) (14 July 1961)” folder, box 179, Central Decimal File, 1961, Entry UD-40, RG 218, NARA. 759 Peter Wyden argues unconvincingly that the Acheson plan was dead: Wall, p. 76. 271 would launch.760 Kennedy had chosen a middle course. His approach allowed room to escalate the situation if needed while, like Eisenhower had, play for time and hope

Khrushchev took the escape hatch rather than leaping toward war.

Kennedy notified the American people about his decisions in a televised address on July 25. The day before the address, advisers met in the White House, creating some of the most memorable moments in the speech. To Sorenson’s prose, U.S. Information

Agency Director Edward R. Murrow added the pithy line, “What’s mine is mine, and what’s yours is negotiable.” Taylor added his own flair: “I hear it said that West Berlin is militarily untenable. And so was Bastogne. And so, in fact, was Stalingrad. Any spot is tenable if men—brave men—will make it so.”761 Illustrative of Kennedy’s use of rhetoric, the speech did four things.762 First, it defined the threat to Berlin in a global context, arguing that the city was an isolated outpost but not an isolated problem. Second, it described U.S. interests in Berlin and drew a line that Khrushchev could not cross.

Third, it requested congressional authorization to mobilize, increase the draft, and provide supplementary appropriation, building up the conventional forces Flexible

Response required and moving away from nuclear weapons. Fourth, it kept open the door to negotiations.763

760 Wyden, Wall, pp. 66-67. 761 Cate, Ideas of August, p. 109. 762 Kevin W. Dean, “‘We Seek Peace, But We Shall Not Surrender’: JFK's Use of Juxtaposition for Rhetorical Success in the Berlin Crisis,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 3, (Summer, 1991): 531-544. 763 Schick, The Berlin Crisis, pp. 149-51. 272

The strategy Kennedy had chosen and would maintain throughout the crisis was to manipulate risk to deter the Soviets and reassure the Allies.764 Functionally, though, he had adopted Eisenhower and Dulles’ double-barrel approach. The two administrations’ objectives were the same: deter Khrushchev with displays of military resolve and funnel him toward a negotiation track. The means of the deterrence was different. Between

January 20 and July 25, the U.S. policymaking establishment had been operating on the premise that they would approach an impending crisis in two stages. The first was to unilaterally form a strategy while staving off Soviet aggression by emphasizing deterrence. The second stage was to convince NATO of the decisions already made.765

Kennedy carried out the second stage when he sent notes to Macmillan, de Gaulle, and

Adenauer the day after the July 19 NSC meeting about his decision. He would find, like

Eisenhower and Dulles had, that the Allies were leery of agreeing to anything binding when it came to the military and Berlin.

Building Allied Consensus

Allied consensus building began in Paris, at the NATO and foreign ministers’ meetings during the first week of August. With U.S. officials’ minds already made up, there would be little room for consultations. They did not intend to discuss possible negotiating strategies—the meetings were simply to align Allied policy and planning and stress a NATO buildup. With policymaking already tracking in that direction, and the

764 Andreas Wenger, Living with Peril: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Nuclear Weapons (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), pp. 197-239. 765 Memorandum of Conversation, “Meeting of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin,” FRUS, 1961-1963, XIV: 169. Cable, Rusk to Finletter, July 9, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIV: 180- 82. 273

Allies more concerned with how to avoid a war than fight one, it was natural that discussion of negotiations nonetheless would dominate. 766

U.S. officials went to Paris with another Achesonian take on Berlin, contrary to popular accounts that the administration marginalized Acheson after the July 19 NSC meeting. 767 In between, he had formed a political program for Berlin that argued for

“leaving well enough alone” and accepting East Germans stamping Allied papers.768

Though a return to the agency theory, the plan appealed to the White House because it postponed a decision on the use of military force.769 With their instructions, the Working

Group in Paris, comprised mostly of Berlin Task Force members, completed their report on August 4, which the foreign ministers then used as a baseline for their agenda in the coming days. It covered contingency planning, economic countermeasures, propaganda strategies, and potential tactics for negotiations. The British, French, and German representatives agreed with Kennedy’s double-barrel approach, but they had reservations about a probe. They recommended the foreign ministers consider new directives for

766 Policy Planning Staff Memorandum, L.W. Fuller to George Morgan, “Foreign Ministers Meeting in August,” July 20, 1961, “State-Defense Relationship (1)” folder, box 3, Meetings with DoD and JCS, Policy Planning Staff Files, Entry A1-558J, RG 59, NARA. 767 See, for example, Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, 327; Wyden, Wall, p. 76. Acheson remained a close adviser on German issues into 1962. 768 A partial copy is in FRUS, 1961-1963, XIV: 245-59. For the entire report: “Berlin: A Political Program,” July 31, 1961, “Germany – Berlin General Acheson Report 8/1/61” folder, box 82, Countries Series, NSF, JFKL. 769 Acheson, “The Problem of the Breaking Point on Access,” July 25, 1961, “Germany – Berlin General 7/28/61 – 7/31/61” folder, box 82, Countries Series, NSF, JFKL. Meeting Minutes, Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Berlin, July 26, 1961, “Germany – Berlin General 7/28/61 – 7/31/61” folder, box 82, Countries Series, NSF, JFKL. Abram Chayes interview by Eugene Gordon, July 9, 1964, pp. 270-71, John F. Kennedy Oral History Collection, JFKL. Catudal, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall, pp. 220-21. 274

LIVE OAK and send military questions to the Ambassadorial Group in Washington for study.770

The basic disagreement about a probe set the tone for the foreign ministers’ meetings. They disagreed most over negotiations. Home presented the same position that the British had held since 1958, dealing with Moscow in the realm of ministerial meetings where the West could set the agenda and unite world opinion around them.

Couve took the well-worn French line of Khrushchev interpreting a willingness to negotiate as weakness. Rusk countered with the Kennedy administration’s foundational views: Berlin was not an isolated problem. Global perception of Khrushchev as the aggressor would put pressure on him elsewhere. The West should demonstrate that every effort was made to avoid nuclear war.771 On contingency planning, Couve and von

Brentano disagreed with the Acheson plan allowing for East Germans to stamp papers.

Ironically, the clause was the fourth paragraph in the section, “Paragraph D.”772

When they completed their talks, the ministers had agreed to postpone most decisions and send them to the Washington Ambassadorial Group for further study, thus finally making that body the primary forum for interallied discussions on Berlin. Before

Rusk had left for Paris, Kennedy instructed him not to push the Allies. He predicted their

“negotiating mood” would “mellow when they are asked to undertake costly military preparations.”773 Deferral to the Ambassadorial Group took on a different light when

770 Memorandum, T.C. Achilles to Rusk, “Status Report on Paris Working Group Meeting on Berlin,” July 27, 1961; and “Ministerial Decisions on Report of the Four-Power Working Group on Germany and Berlin,” August 8, 1961: both in “Germany – Berlin General 7/27/61” folder, box 82, Countries File, NSF, JFKL. 771 Tripartite Memorandum of Conversation, August 5, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIV: 269-80. 772 Quadripartite Memorandum of Conversation, August 5, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIV: 289-90. 773 Record of Meeting, Kennedy, Rusk, Owen, August 3, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIV: 265. 275

Couve agreed with the American proposal for West German representation in that body.

The reversal in French policy was part of the Franco-German rapprochement, and Couve framed the change in terms the Americans could agree with, telling Rusk and Home that their objective should be avoiding “German neutralism or an approach to the Soviets.”774

There was consensus by the end of the meetings, but it was split between the Americans and British on one side and the French and Germans on the other. The differences were not insurmountable, and the ministers agreed to readjourn in mid-September.775

Rusk addressed the NAC on August 8, and unveiled the planning that the members had been waiting for restlessly. He announced that SHAPE would coordinate

NATO policy, and asked that members cooperate in the quadripartite program of a military buildup, economic measures, and psychological operations, thereby balancing the alliance’s conventional and nuclear capabilities.776 He had last addressed the NAC on

June 5, when he briefed them on Kennedy’s meetings with Khrushchev. The fluid nature of settling on a Berlin strategy in Washington, and the quadripartite powers answering

Khrushchev’s notes, had made the body restive. Due to news reports about possible military responses, Finletter was under constant pressure from alliance members about planning, and they demanded the Western Powers report to them.777 Nitze addressed the discontent at the end of June, when he met with Stikker to hear complaints about the

774 Tripartite Memorandum of Conversation, August 5, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIV: 270. 775 Dean Rusk, As I Saw It (New York: W.W. Norton, 1990), p. 226. Catudal, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall, pp. 224-26. 776 Memorandum, “Statement to the North Atlantic Council in Private Session on Military Build-Up, Soviet Motives and Intentions,” August 8, 1961, Military Planning for Berlin Emergency Collection, DEF 4-4-04 (1961-1), Sec. 1, Doc. 2, NATO Archives Online. 777 Cable No. 1746, Finletter to Rusk, June 22, 1961, ProQuest ID 1679058862, Berlin Crisis Collection, DNSA. 276

Allies’ lack of communication as well as questions about NATO strategy. While Stikker asserted that he believed Berlin was separate from the problems of the alliance’s long- term strategy, Nitze assured him that the two were linked, as were limited war planning and a credible nuclear deterrent for the wider Cold War.778 The exchange was illustrative of the tension within NATO, split between members who feared contingency plans would endanger their forces, and the Americans, who continued to see continental defense tied to Berlin’s.779

Kennedy was likely not surprised at the pushback from the French at the Paris meetings, or the grumblings in the NAC. He had already confronted the ghosts from the

Eisenhower years in his discussions with de Gaulle on his way to Vienna. Contingency planning was useless, the French president had told him, because only the threat of automatic nuclear war could deter the Soviets from acting aggressively in a location so militarily indefensible for the Allies.780 Still, Kennedy was trying to make it appear that

Allied consultation was important, though his comments to Rusk at Hyannis Port and his actions after July 19 made clear his true thoughts.781 A July 22 memorandum from

Rostow to Kennedy summed up the president’s position on U.S. leadership over Allied coordination. Given that Khrushchev would be scrutinizing Western unity, Rusk argued, it was imperative that no discernable cracks were seen. Still, American responsibility to

778 Memorandum for Record, “Mr. Nitze’s Meeting with NATO Secretary General Stikker,” June 27, 1961, ProQuest ID 1679042148, Berlin Crisis Collection, DNSA. 779 Gregory W. Pedlow, “NATO and the : Facing the Soviets While Maintaining Unity,” p. 3. https://www.archives.gov/files/research/foreign-policy/cold-war/1961-berlin- crisis/overview/-and-berlin-crisis.pdf. Accessed November 1, 2017. 780 Kaplan, Landa, and Drea, The McNamara Ascendency, p. 150. See also Erin R. Mahan, Kennedy, de Gaulle, and Western Europe (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 49-66. 781 Frank Costigliola, “Kennedy, the European Allies, and the Failure to Consult,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 110, No. 1 (1995): 105-23. 277 protect the Western world meant sometimes ignoring individual member’s wants for the good of the whole. Rostow counseled that “we must be prepared in our minds for the possibility of a relatively lonely stage; and we should accept it without throwing our sheriff’s badge in the dust when the crisis subsides.”782

Rostow’s logic was put to the test a few days later. In the early hours of August

13, East German authorities began setting up roadblocks and stretching barbed wire at the checkpoints between East and West Berlin, as well as to the zonal frontier. After months of seeing his citizens escape into West Berlin, Ulbricht had convinced Khrushchev to let him stop the GDR’s bleeding with, as he called it, an anti-fascist protective barrier.783

Rather than denying Allied access to Berlin, the East Germans had blockaded their own people. Khrushchev had agreed for a few reasons. First, it was a substitute for signing the treaty with Ulbricht that surely would have provoked the West. Second, he believed it would make West Berlin wither economically. Third, he wagered that the Federal

Republic would transition from competition with the bloc to negotiation and economic partnership.784 In the long game over the city, his reason was more pragmatic, though.

After Kennedy’s July 25 military preparations, Khrushchev was no longer sure he could predict the American reaction if he signed a treaty with the GDR. He therefore limited his scope and decided to solve the less-divisive refugee problem.785

782 Memorandum, Rostow to Kennedy, “A High Noon Stance on Berlin,” July 22, 1961, “German Security 7/61” folder, box 117, Countries Series, President’s Office Files (hereafter POF), JFKL. 783 Hope Harrison, Driving the Soviets up the Wall: Soviet-East German Relations, 1953-1961 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003). 784 Zubok, Failed Empire, pp. 141-42. 785 Luňák, “Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis,” pp. 53-82. 278

When news reached Washington on Sunday morning, there was little alarm, nor were there many officials in town. Kennedy, McNamara, Nitze, and Bundy were relaxing elsewhere after the breakneck pace of the past two months. The other Western capitals were empty of their leaders, too: de Gaulle was at his estate and Macmillan was on vacation in Scotland.786 Kohler, recently returned from the Paris meetings, came to the

Berlin Task Force’s offices on the seventh floor of Foggy Bottom by mid-morning. He met with Rusk, who contacted Kennedy at Hyannis Port at noon. The State Department issued a statement at 12:30 criticizing the GDR, and Rusk went to an already-scheduled baseball game, reasoning that his absence may cause alarm.787

The Kennedy administration’s response to the construction of what would become the Berlin Wall was guarded.788 Of all the contingency plans on file, there was nothing for what was happening in East Berlin. This has been a point of unwarranted criticism in the literature.789 Four Power agreements stipulated Allied access rights, not German. As

Truman had found in 1945 and Eisenhower in 1953, despite agreements arranging for joint administration of the city, there was little that could be done about the way the

Soviets controlled their own sector. To this point, Kennedy had already communicated to

Khrushchev in a variety of ways that what happened in East Berlin was Soviet business,

Kennedy repeatedly used of the term “West Berlin” when talking about the city, thus making it clear that he delineated between the two halves, contrary to his predecessors’

786 Cate, Ides of August, pp. 304-05, 333. 787 Statement by Rusk Concerning Travel Restrictions in Berlin, , 1961, Documents on Germany, 1944-1985 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State Publication, 1986), p. 776. Cate, Ideas of August, pp. 317-22. 788 W.R. Smyser, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), pp. 104-07. 789 Wyden, Wall, pp. 172-73. Cate, Ides of August, pp. 305-06. 279 established practice. He had done so most obviously in his July 25 television address, likely a signal to the Kremlin of what he considered the limits of his interest.790

The timing of the internal blockade caught the administration off guard, not the action itself.791 While taking a walk with Rostow on July 31, Kennedy had predicted that

Ulbricht may build a wall to stop the flow of refugees.792 The day before construction began, Rusk cabled U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Republic Walter Dowling to inform him the State Department was concerned that the situation in East Germany could explode “along 1953 lines,” which would put in jeopardy the “military and political measures now underway” before they had become effective. He reported that the foreign ministers had discussed such a situation at Paris the week before, and decided that the

Allies should do nothing to “exacerbate the situation.” 793

In West Berlin, officials took Ulbricht’s actions seriously, since their proximity to what was happening made it appear more acute than it looked from Washington, where officials deridingly claimed their colleagues in the city suffered from “Berlinitis.”794

When Dowling and his British and French counterparts met with von Brentano on August

14, all settled on written protests from the tripartite commandants and a request that the

NAC consider an East German travel ban.795 A few hours later, the Washington

790 Gerhard Wettig, “Die sowjetische Politik während der Berlinkrise 1958 bis 1962: Stand der Forschung,” Deutschland Archiv 30 (1997): 383-98. 791 For the narrative of it being a surprise, see Schick, The Berlin Crisis, p. 173; Norman Gelb, The Berlin Wall: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and a Showdown in the Heart of Europe (New York: Times Books, 1986), pp. 166-88. 792 Catudal, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall, p. 200. 793 Cable, Rusk to Dowling, August 12, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIV: 324. 794 Howard Trivers, Three Crises in American Foreign Affairs (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1972), p. 40. 795 Cable, Dowling to Rusk, August 14, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIV: 328. 280

Ambassadorial Group’s steering group met and concluded the same, though they stressed that propaganda benefits could be exploited.796 Kennedy was thinking along the same lines, and he asked Rusk that day how to use the situation, since it “offers us a very good propaganda stick which if the situation were reversed would be well used in beating us.”797 From McNamara, he asked about sending reinforcements into Berlin to make the garrison combat-ready, and suggested they remain in Europe indefinitely. To augment those forces and raise long-term readiness, he believed the six divisions that he had requested from Congress on July 25 should deploy before January 1.798 Events had forced

Kennedy’s hand, and he understood that his timetable for negotiations was now disrupted. Due to his dual-track strategy, he could not hope to negotiate with the Soviets without answering the recent actions with a corresponding military move. He predicted there would be “more and more pressure for us to adopt a harder military posture.” To retake the initiative while also firming up Allied resolve meant putting to use the units and funding that Congress had given him.799

In a meeting of the Berlin Steering Group on August 15, Kennedy’s advisors tabled almost all the proposed reactions from the day before. McNamara disagreed with the president on reinforcements, seeing them as nothing more than a gesture. The group agreed that economic countermeasures were “inappropriate,” as was any East German travel ban. Rusk argued that, despite its seriousness, the border closing might make a

796 Cable, Dowling to Rusk, August 14, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIV: 329-30. 797 Memorandum for the Secretary of State, August 14, 1961, “Department of State General 8/5/61 – 8/14/61” folder, box 248A, Departments and Agencies Series, NSF, JFKL. 798 Memorandum, Kennedy to McNamara, August 14, 1961, “Germany Berlin General 8/11/61 – 8/15-61” folder, box 82, Countries Series, NSF, JFKL. 799 Ibid. 281

Berlin settlement easier. The only proposal that survived the meeting was Kennedy’s request for propaganda, since, as Rusk said, they could “reap a large harvest.”800 The most pressing issue was, counterintuitively, how to contain the outrage from Berliners and Germans. Rusk believed that it was important to separate “shooting issues and non- shooting issues,” which became more difficult when Governing Mayor Willy Brandt told

Kennedy the next day that there would be a crisis of confidence if he did not do something soon.801 Kennedy had a complicated relationship with the mayor, which began almost immediately after he entered the Oval Office, when Brandt insisted on meeting

Kennedy before Adenauer. Though their age and rhetoric mirrored each other, Kennedy resented a mayor placing him in awkward positions on protocol and lecturing him on

Berlin’s importance.802

On August 17, the Berlin Steering Group met again, this time with Kennedy. In that meeting, Rusk reversed his stance and proposed reinforcing the garrison on political and psychological grounds. McNamara, Taylor, and Lemnitzer argued it was a poor military choice, and for the same reasons that Acheson’s division probe was, that it would place more units in an indefensible position and weaken U.S. capabilities.803 Political considerations outstripped military concerns, though, and plans were made to move a reinforced battle group from USAREUR to the Berlin garrison. Scholars argue Brandt

800 Minutes of the Berlin Steering Group, August 15, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIV: 334. 801 Minutes of the Berlin Steering Group, August 15, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIV: 334. Cable, Chief of Mission E. Allan Lightner to Rusk, August 16, 1961, with Brandt letter to Kennedy attached, FRUS, 1961- 1963, XIV: 345. 802 Arne Hoffmann, The Emergence of Détente in Europe: Brandt, Kennedy and the formation of Ostpolitik (New York: Routledge, 2007). 803 Maxwell Taylor interview by Elspeth Rostow, April 26, 1964, second transcript, p. 16, John F. Kennedy Oral History Collection, JFKL. 282 had forced Kennedy’s hand, but there is no evidence to suggest it was the mayor and not the president’s earlier proclivity for sending reinforcement that led him to make the decision.804 It was agreed in the August 17 meeting that the administration would publicly announce that the troop reinforcement was made on Brandt’s request, but this was likely a tactical announcement. To maximize the political effect, Kennedy decided that Lyndon Johnson would hand-deliver his reply to Berlin. Lucius Clay would go along, and both men would meet the battle group as it entered the city.805

Norstad disagreed with the decisions made on August 17, except for Clay’s mission, which he considered “a brilliant stroke.”806 Nonetheless, he readied the battle group. The next day, Johnson and Clay left Washington for Berlin. Kennedy’s plan had the intended effect. When the throngs realized that Clay was in the motorcade traveling from Tempelhof to the Schöneberg town hall, it was mobbed. The square in front of the city hall was packed when Johnson delivered a speech in which he told Berliners that

Americans pledged “our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor” to the city’s survival.807 At 4 a.m. on August 20, the 1st Battle Group, 18th Inf. Reg., 8th Div. left their bivouac for the Helmstedt checkpoint with 60 jeeps, trucks, and trailers and 276 men in

Col Glover Johns’ leading detachment. Five minutes behind them was a Combat Support

Company, two rifle companies, a maintenance and supply detachment, an engineer

804 Poole, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, pp. 148-49; Kaplan, Landa, and Drea, The McNamara Ascendency, p. 158. 805 Record of Meeting of the Berlin Steering Group, August 17, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIV: 347-48. Letter, Kennedy to Brandt, August 18, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIV: 352-53. 806 Cable, Norstad to Lemnitzer, August 18, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIV: 351. 807 Robert Dallek, Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Time, 1961-1973 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 19-20. Kempe, Berlin 1961, pp. 383-90. 283 company, and a battery of 105 mm howitzers. The column entered Berlin at 12:30 and met up with Johnson and the dignitaries before a formal parade and review.808

The battle group had done its job as political theater. The problem of funneling the Soviets into a negotiation track and ensuring that the Allies were in lockstep was still of overriding concern to Kennedy. He had become impatient with the alliance, and lost faith in quadripartite meetings creating a consensus on negotiations with Moscow. On

August 21, Kennedy ordered Rusk to draw up a plan for bilateral talks and to notify the

Allies “that they must come along or stay behind.”809 Against Kissinger and Taylor’s advice, he was stepping toward Khrushchev, not the Allies, when he planned to consider recognizing the GDR and the Oder-Neisse River as Germany’s eastern frontier, and a non-aggression pact. Macmillan could not have been more pleased.810 Kennedy knew de

Gaulle was going to be a difficult sell, and he wrote him on August 24, requesting that

France agree to proposing a foreign minister meeting in New York when replying to the

August 3 note from Moscow.811 De Gaulle replied in the negative. He still saw no reason to negotiate.812 The Federal Republic proved reluctant, too. Kennedy found himself trying to convince Adenauer on the necessity of talks. He explained that the West was not suing for peace, which the “substantially increased military effort” proved. The buildup was

808 Cate, Ides of August, pp. 419-20, 426-27, 429. Carter, Forging the Shield, pp. 418-20. 809 Memorandum, Kennedy to Rusk, August 21, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIV: 359. 810 Memorandum, Kissinger to Bundy, “Acheson Memorandum,” August 11, 1961, “Germany Berlin General 8/11/61 – 8/15/61” folder, box 82, Countries Series, NSF; Memorandum, Taylor to Bundy, “Alternative Negotiating Positions,” August 28, 1961, “#32 Secret Sealed Package” folder, box 463, Kissinger Series, NSF, JFKL. Smyser, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall, pp. 167-68. Macmillan, Pointing the Way, p. 144. 811 Letter, Kennedy to de Gaulle, August 24, 1961, “France Subjects De Gaulle Correspondence 7/27/61 – 9/2/61” folder, box 73, Countries Series, NSF, JFKL. 812 Letter, de Gaulle to Kennedy, August 26, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIV: 377-78. 284 intended to spur the alliance into spending more on defense. After all, he reasoned, Berlin provided “an illustration of the need for NATO and justification of the reasons why it was founded.”813 NATO, however, was proving troublesome for the United States. More

Finletter reports indicated restlessness. Now members believed the Americans were overemphasizing the buildup and not tying it closely enough to a political program. Apart from France, the unanimous opinion in the alliance was support for negotiations, but the

NAC wanted to be part of the tripartite consultations. There was otherwise no guarantee that there would be a united front on Berlin.814

Kennedy’s strategy, even if it made sense to him, had a flaw. NATO members judged the Berlin crisis with varying degrees of seriousness. Given that there was not even a consensus on the threat, the Allies viewed the crisis through the prism of their own objectives and therefore overlooked the designed outcome of the U.S. strategy by questioning various aspects of the two tracks while championing others.815 Kennedy worried that NATO indecision could endanger his strategy for Berlin and deterrence. The result was Kennedy becoming further convinced that the United States would have to act on its own. He understood that acting unilaterally could threaten Allied unity, but he reasoned it was a gamble worth making given the alternative.

While setting the groundwork for talks, Kennedy also advanced the timetable for the conventional buildup that the July 19 NSC meeting had ordered, which was scheduled

813 Letter, Kennedy to Adenauer, September 4, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIV: 389-90. 814 Cable, Finletter to Rusk for Kennedy, August 30, 1961, “France – Security 1961” folder, box 116A, Countries Series, POF, JFKL. 815 See Memorandum of Conversation, Kennedy with quadripartite foreign ministers, September 15, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIV: 411-15. 285 to be completed by January 1, 1962. Allied indecision played a role but so did Moscow’s actions. The Kremlin had reversed a plan to discharge several hundred thousand men from uniform and resumed atmospheric nuclear testing. Taylor argued for shifting the buildup “into a higher gear” to counter Khrushchev’s signaling that he was willing to use the threat of force to achieve his objectives.816 Taylor had interpreted Moscow’s intentions correctly, since their moves were to remind the West “of the real balance of power.”817 The JCS and McNamara already had preparations underway. On August 25, the Pentagon mobilized 76,600 men. The Army received 46,500 to strengthen the six divisions on strategic reserve. The Air Force got 23,700 to activate 33 tactical, transport, and reconnaissance squadrons. The Navy received the remainder for 40 destroyers and 18 patrol squadrons.818 Next was the movement of ten fighter squadrons of F-100 and F-

104s to Europe, with six wings of B-47 bombers.819

After Kennedy requested McNamara review the July 19 decisions, the defense secretary recommended on September 7 calling up four National Guard divisions between October 15 and November 15. He also proposed transferring the 4th Infantry

Division to Europe between October 1 and October 31, as well as sending the USS

Saratoga to the Sixth Fleet.820 Kennedy was open to more reinforcements, but, at

Taylor’s urging, he wondered how they would be used. These questions—ten in all—

816 Memorandum, Taylor to Kennedy, September 4, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIV: 392. 817 Haslam, Russia’s Cold War, p. 190. 818 Poole, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, p. 149. 819 Memorandum for the President, “Status of Berlin Build-up and Planning,” September 7, 1961, “Germany Security 8/61 – 12/61,” box 117, Countries Series, POF, JFKL. 820 Poole, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, pp. 150-51. Memorandum for the President, “Status of Berlin Build-up and Planning,” September 7, 1961, “Germany Security 8/61 – 12/61,” box 117, Countries Series, POF, JFKL. 286 came in the form of NSAM 92 on September 8.821 NSAM 92 split the Pentagon with a debate over messaging versus improving capabilities. Some chiefs argued for six divisions while others urged no overseas deployments at all. On September 18, Kennedy adopted the plan that the JCS put before him, approving the call up of two National

Guard divisions, one armored and one infantry, for Norstad to use when he saw fit.822

Simultaneous to the discussions in Washington about advancing the buildup timetable, NATO was undertaking a capabilities review. Norstad had judged the alliance woefully underequipped to meet the Soviet threat, and warned that its equivalent of sixteen full divisions could not defend against a bloc invasion, even with the use of nuclear weapons. To meet what he saw as an approaching storm by year’s end, he proposed to the NAC an expansion in what he called “Plan of Action: NATO Europe,” which would raise the number of divisions to twenty-four by January 1, 1962.823 The council’s response was positive in principle, but economics diminished abilities. When combined with a lack of desire from the British and French, the buildup fell short of expectations.824 Norstad was pushing the alliance for a buildup along the lines that

821 NSAM 92, September 8, 1961, “NSAM 92” folder, box 331, Meetings & Memoranda, NSF, JFKL. McNamara’s reply came on September 18: “Military Build-up and Possible Action in Europe,” “Defense 9/61 – 12/61” folder, box 77, Departments and Agencies Series, POF, JFKL. The reply was discussed the same day in the White House: Memorandum of Conversation, September 18, 1961: FRUS, 1961-1963, XIV: 428-29. 822 Poole, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, pp. 152-53. Memorandum for the Record, Taylor, “Meeting with the President on the Military Build-Up and Possible Actions in Europe,” September 18, 1961, “Germany Berlin General 9/17/61 – 9/22/61” folder, box 83, Countries Series, NSF, JFKL. For the plan to mobilize and then move forces to Europe, see USAF-USA Joint Operation Plan 1-61, October 1, 1961, “9172 Berlin/3100 Germany (East) (9 Aug. 1961) Sec. 3A” folder, box 118, Central File, Security Classified, 1961, Entry A1-1H, RG 218, NARA. 823 Pedlow, “NATO and the Berlin Crisis of 1961,” p. 6. 824 Gregory W. Pedlow, “Three Hats for Berlin: General Lauris Norstad and the Second Berlin Crisis, 1958-62,” in: The Berlin Wall Crisis: Perspectives on Cold War Alliances, 1945-62, J.P. Gearson and Kori Schake, eds (New York: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 183-84. Vice President Johnson’s Briefing Notes for Paris Discussions, Tab C, “NATO Country Buildup to Meet Berlin Crisis,” September 27, 1961, “Paris Talks” 287

Washington had directed, but his support was to increase defensive capabilities, not to serve Flexible Response. His call for twenty-four divisions would only meet previously- deemed minimum NATO force goals. He did not subscribe to the belief that conventional forces could broaden options in a crisis, and argued to McNamara when answering

NSAM 92’s questions that such thinking was naïve, given strategic realities, and discounted Moscow decision-making.825 Using Acheson’s favorite turn of phrase,

Norstad flipped around the argument for Flexible Response, theorizing that the

“credibility of the deterrent” would be destroyed if Washington deemphasized nuclear weapons, thereby allowing the Soviets to engage without fear of nuclear retaliation and then disengage when they judged the risks too great.826

Norstad’s rejection of Flexible Response happened in the wake of a crisis inside

NATO. At the end of August, the quadripartite powers bypassed the NATO chain of command and gave draft instructions to Norstad on modification of non-nuclear military plans and selective use of nuclear weapons, as well as orders that he work through the

Washington Ambassadorial Group. The instructions were the result of the Paris foreign ministers’ meetings, but they were a tacit rejection of the NAC’s political authority.

Disturbed, Stikker went to Washington to meet with the group and Rusk on September 9.

Stikker urged the quadripartite powers not to give Norstad direct instructions. Rusk,

folder, box 2, Travel Files, Vice Presidential Security Files, Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library (hereafter LBJL). 825 Cable, Norstad to McNamara, September 16, 1961, “9172 Berlin/3100 Germany (East) (8 Sept. 1961)” folder, box 180, Central Decimal File, 1961, Entry UD-40, RG 218, NARA. Poole, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, pp. 152-53. 826 Jordan, Norstad, pp. 184-90. Cable, Norstad to McNamara, September 16, 1961, “9172 Berlin/3100 Germany (East) (8 Sept. 1961)” folder, box 180, Central Decimal File, 1961, Entry UD-40, RG 218, NARA. 288 annoyed at months of Finletter’s reports about complaints in the NAC, shot back. The

United States “is usually criticized for lack of leadership if it does not put forward firm proposals,” he complained, “but it is criticized equally for dictating to others when it does submit firm recommendations.”827 It was therefore in this context of alliance turmoil that

Norstad cautioned McNamara about any defensive buildup outstripping NATO capabilities or desire.828

Sensing Norstad was wearing his SACEUR hat over his CINCEUR one,

McNamara called him to Washington for meetings on October 2 and 3.829 In those meetings, the administration attempted to convince the “nuclear war man,” as Bundy dubbed him, to come around to the idea of Flexible Response. Taylor was more forceful about the meeting’s purpose, and urged Kennedy to make it clear to Norstad that the

White House set the policy and expected CINCEUR to carry it out.830 The lengthy discussion centered on when nuclear weapons would be used, and yielded no clear decisions. If anything, Norstad doubled down on the conventional-over-nuclear force debate. He argued against sending the divisions that the administration was willing to give him, reasoning that a buildup could never match Soviet capabilities.

827 Pedlow, “NATO and the Berlin Crisis of 1961,” pp. 7-8. For the U.S. discussion on instructions to Norstad, see Cable, JCS to Norstad, August 24, 1961, “9172 Berlin/3100 Germany (East) (18 Aug. 1961) (1) Sec” folder, box 180, Central Decimal File, 1961, Entry UD-40, RG 218, NARA. 828 Cable, Norstad to McNamara, September 16, 1961, “9172 Berlin/3100 Germany (East) (8 Sept. 1961)” folder, box 180, Central Decimal File, 1961, Entry UD-40, RG 218, NARA. 829 Cable, McNamara to Norstad, September 13, 1961, “9172 Berlin/3100 Germany (East) (8 Sept. 1961)” folder, box 180, Central Decimal File, 1961, Entry UD-40, RG 218, NARA. 830 Memorandum, Bundy to Kennedy, “Norstad Meeting,” October 3, 1961, “NATO – Norstad Meetings” folder, box 103, Subjects File, POF, JFKL. 289

Psychologically, he contended that sending them now, when the situation was not deteriorating, would mute the potential impact of a later reinforcement.831

It was not the first time the administration had attempted to sell Norstad on the idea of Flexible Response. In July, McNamara and Nitze flew to SHAPE headquarters and outlined what they hoped NATO would do after the decisions Kennedy had made in the NSC. In that meeting, Norstad spurned limited war on the basis that NATO could not engage in conventional war and protect its nuclear sites.832 Like the July meeting,

Norstad’s trip to Washington did not have McNamara’s intended outcome. Norstad’s reservations were illustrative of a politico-military disconnect. Flexible Response made the White House view Berlin’s defense incrementally, while military commanders had to begin with the assumption that there would be war and then work the problem in reverse.

Their vantage point made them doubt Kennedy would use nuclear weapons.

Kennedy ended the debate on October 20, when he sent Norstad a four-stage sequence of actions in a potential war over Berlin. He clarified that he wanted graduated actions, and that he did not see them as standing apart from a willingness to use nuclear weapons.833 The instructions Kennedy gave Norstad, which were issued as NSAM 109 on

October 23, were known colloquially inside the Pentagon as the Poodle Blanket, and had come from Nitze’s office. Since the summer, Nitze had been working toward

831 Memorandum of Conversation, Kennedy with Norstad, Rusk, McNamara, Taylor, et al, October 4, 1961, “NATO – Norstad Meetings” folder, box 103, Subjects File, POF, JFKL. 832 Shapley, Promise and Power, p. 119-20; Memorandum, McNamara to Lemnitzer, “Planning for NATO Military Operations in Relation to the Berlin Crisis,” August 9, 1961, “NATO General 5/61-3/62” folder, box 103, Subjects File, POF, JFKL. See also Letter, Norstad to Kennedy, July 25, 1961, “NATO – Norstad Correspondence 3/61-3/62” folder, box 103, Subjects File, POF, JFKL. 833 Letter, Kennedy to Norstad, October 20, 1961, “NATO – Norstad Correspondence 3/61-3/62” folder, box 103, Subjects File, POF, JFKL. 290 transitioning Berlin planning from Massive Retaliation to Flexible Response. The Poodle

Blanket had come originally from Col. Dewitt Armstrong, Nitze’s Berlin adviser in the

ISA since May 1961. Armstrong formerly had been the Army’s action officer on NATO and Berlin contingency planning at the International and Policy Planning Division, where he had been contemplating a counter to Massive Retaliation since July 1959. Though isolated in Army planning because of his negative view of nuclear weapons, he had gained a reputation outside his office, leading to Acheson recruiting him for his study on

Berlin and Nitze placing him on his staff.834 Nitze then adopted Armstrong’s myriad responses to specific contingencies in Berlin, narrowing them down with the help of the

Berlin Task Force. They were intended to clarify U.S. policy, provide Norstad with planning guidance, and focus Allied discussion.835 The courses of action that became

NSAM 109 were the distilled form of Armstrong’s work, designed to be four phases of controllable political and military pressures that accumulated, beginning with diplomatic protests, expanding to military courses of action like a naval blockade and an armed convoy probe, ultimately ending in nuclear war.836 After months of planning, the United

834 Paper, Policy Planning Staff, “History of Policy Planning Council,” edited record of talk given by Henry Owen, Deputy Chairman Planning Council at S/P Staff Meeting, December 6, 1963, “History of Policy Planning Council” folder, box 5, Ernest Lindley Policy Planning Council Files, Entry A1 5441, RG 59, NARA. Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), pp. 296, 302-03. 835 Letter, Nitze to John Ausland, April 24, 1984, folder 14, box 17, Name Files, Nitze Papers, Library of Congress. Kaplan, Landa, and Drea, The McNamara Ascendency, pp. 162-63. 836 NSAM 109, U.S. Policy on Military Actions in a Berlin Conflict, October 23, 1961, “NSAM 109” folder, box 332, Meetings & Memoranda Series, NSF, JFKL. Paul Nitze, From Hiroshima to : At the Center of Decision (New York: Grove Press, 1989), pp. 203-04. Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars, pp. 93-96. 291

States finally had a preferred sequence of actions for Berlin, and based on Flexible

Response. The administration next set its sights on NATO planning.837

American Unilateralism

The next problem for Kennedy was ensuring that Norstad and NATO adopted his limited war strategy. This became an acute worry at the end of October, when it appeared that battle could erupt in Berlin. At the center was Clay, who had been in the city since

September 19 as Kennedy’s Special Representative. Though he held ambassador rank and was the senior U.S. official, he had no formal authority.838 His position, in Norstad’s estimation, “complicated an already complicated administrative problem,” despite that being the reason Kennedy, at McNamara and Lemnitzer’s behest, had not followed through on appointing Clay commander of forces in the city.839 The arrangement meant

USCOB Maj. Gen. Albert Watson had five superiors: Norstad and his deputy,

USAREUR Gen. Bruce Clarke, Clay, and Dowling.840 Bundy was wary of the arrangement, seeing the potential for Clay to endanger negotiations.841

Clarke resented Clay’s direct access to Kennedy and Rusk, and was angry when the old military governor began using soldiers without permission to defend the isolated

837 Memorandum, Bundy to Kennedy, “Norstad Meeting,” October 3, 1961, “NATO – Norstad Meetings” folder, box 103, Subjects File, POF, JFKL. 838 Letter, Kennedy to Clay, August 30, 1961, “Germany, Berlin Subjects General Lucius Clay 8/28/61 - 10/31/61” folder, box 86, Countries Series, NSF, JFKL. 839 Memorandum of Conversation, Johnson, Finletter, Gavin, Norstad, September 30, 1961, “Paris Talks” folder, box 2, Travel Files, VP Security Files, LBJL. Memorandum, McNamara to Kennedy, August 24, 1961, “Germany, Berlin Subjects General Lucius Clay 8/28/61 – 10/31/61” folder, box 86, Countries Series, NSF, JFKL. 840 Catudal, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall, p. 132. 841 Memorandum, Bundy to Kennedy, “Issues to be Settled with General Clay,” August 28, 1961, “Germany Berlin General, 8/26/61 – 8/28/61” folder, box 82, Countries Series, NSF, JFKL. 292

West Berlin enclave of Steinstücken.842 The two men also did not get along because they viewed Berlin differently. Clarke saw his position militarily, and since he judged the city indefensible, nothing should risk its security. Clay viewed the situation politically, and understood that military force could be used to achieve that end.843 Power, he believed, should be used to lay bare those places where the communists were in open defiance of agreements. To demonstrate that, he drove to a sector checkpoint his first evening back in the city, crossed into East Berlin, and walked around. There were limits placed on Clay, though. In the wake of Clarke’s confrontation, Washington checked Clay’s unilateralism and required him to consult with them before acting.844

On October 22, East German authorities stopped Chief of Mission Allan Lightner at the Friedrichstrasse checkpoint, an out of the ordinary occurrence for a vehicle with official license plates. When the border guards requested identification, Lightner and his wife refused and demanded to speak with a Soviet official. The guards denied their request and entry, and a stalemate ensued until a tank-infantry team arrived and its military police squad escorted the Lightners through.845 Two days later, the East Germans denied two more U.S. vehicles entry, despite the Soviets assuring the Americans after the

Lightner incident that the GDR officials had overstepped their authority. The importance of the incidents was magnified because East German authorities had limited Allied access into the eastern sector to only one crossing point, Friedrichstrasse, or what the Americans called , in late August. In the two months of harassment that followed,

842 H.M. Catudal, Jr., Steinstücken: A Study in Cold War Politics (New York: Vantage Press, 1971). 843 Cate, Ides of August, pp. 469-70; Wyden, Wall, pp. 264-65. 844 Cate, The Ides of August, p. 462. Carter, Forging the Shield, p. 423. 845 Ibid., p. 426. 293

Clay had time to contemplate where the communists would make a bid in a new test of wills. He judged it would be GDR officials closing the remaining checkpoint. With the incidents on October 22 and 24, it looked as if that had come to pass.846

Clay’s plan, which he formed the first week of October, was to precipitate a crisis with the East Germans over Allied access, inducing Moscow to assume control and uncover the fallacy of GDR control. His prior experience in the city had taught him to respond promptly to Soviet moves, which had led him to form a plan to demolish barriers with tanks, set up defensive positions inside East Berlin, and demand a parlay with the

Soviets.847 Clay passed the plan to Rusk, who discussed it with Kennedy on October

14.848 Rusk judged it provocative, but compromised when Kennedy and the Pentagon supported Clay. On October 18, the administration issued instructions as NSAM 107: if

Friedrichstrasse was closed, he could crash the barriers with two or three tanks, withdraw, and remain in West Berlin.849

On October 24, he informed Rusk that he would conduct a series of probes with three tank-infantry teams and USAREUR-licensed civilian vehicles the next day.850 The first attempt proceeded into East Berlin at 6:35 a.m. without a challenge, but East

846 Ingo Trauschweizer, “Tanks at Checkpoint Charlie: Lucius Clay and the Berlin Crisis, 1961-1962,” Cold War History, 6, no. 2 (2006): 213-14. 847 Letter, Kennedy to Clay, October 8, 1961, “Germany, Berlin Subjects General Lucius Clay 8/28/61 – 10/31/61” folder, box 86, Countries Series, NSF, JFKL. Letter, Clay to Kennedy, October 18, 1961, “Germany, Berlin Subjects General Lucius Clay 8/28/61 – 10/31/61” folder, box 86, Countries Series, NSF, JFKL. 848 Cable 674, Clay to Rusk, October 5, 1961; Cable 727, Clay to Rusk, October 11, 1961; Cable 748, Clay to Rusk, October 13, 1961, all in: “Germany Berlin Subjects General Lucius Clay 8/28/61 – 10/31/61” folder, box 86, Countries Series, NSF, JFKL. 849 Trauschweizer, “Tanks at Checkpoint Charlie,” p. 213. NSAM 107, October 18, 1961, “NSAM 107 Friedrichstrasse Crossing Point 10/18/61” folder, box 332, Meetings & Memoranda Series, NSF, JFKL. 850 Cable 813, Clay to Rusk, October 24, 1961, “Germany, Berlin Subjects General Lucius Clay 8/28/61 – 10/31/61” folder, box 86, Countries Series, NSF, JFKL. 294

German police stopped the second. Over the next two days, they learned that they were successful only when using military police escorts. When Clay repeated the probes on

October 27, ten Soviet tanks appeared at the crossing point. With the tank-infantry team already waiting on the western side—five M-48s, five armored personnel carriers, and two jeeps—there was a showdown. The standoff became tenser when five more M-48s arrived, which the Soviets matched.851

The next morning, Clay consulted with Rusk about thrusting into East Berlin and tearing down part of the wall on the way back. Rusk urged restraint, as the issue was not worth resorting to force and would have negative effects on Allied unity. As a political issue, it was better dealt with at the governmental level.852 Over the next day, the tank crews continued their standoff, though the number changed several times. When the ranking Soviet officer in Berlin and conqueror of the city in 1945, Marshall , moved up twenty more T-54s, Clay interpreted it as Moscow’s signaling a willingness to find a solution short of war, since the number of Soviet tanks now equaled all that the

Americans had in Berlin. The action also meant the Kremlin was induced into acting, achieving Clay’s objective of proving GDR sovereignty a fiction. Clay could not have known, but Khrushchev preferred it that way since it disabused Ulbricht of the notion that he was the one in control.853 After secret backchannel communication between the capitals, there was a path out of the crisis.854

851 Carter, Forging the Shield, pp. 425-26. Poole, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, p. 157. 852 Cable, Rusk to Clay, October 26, 1961, “Germany, Berlin Subjects General Lucius Clay 8/28/61 – 10/31/61” folder, box 86, Countries Series, NSF, JFKL. 853 Zubok, Failed Empire, p. 142. 854 Trauschweizer, “Tanks at Checkpoint Charlie,” pp. 215-16. Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars, pp. 89-91. Memorandum for General Taylor, “Friedrichstrasse: 15 October to 2 November 1961,” November 2, 1961, 295

Clay’s handling of the checkpoint crisis did not go beyond a level of risk that U.S. officials had contemplated. He did not believe, as he told Kennedy, that using force could solve the Berlin Problem, or that a war was better than a wall. 855 His solution to the specific problem of access was in keeping closely with contingencies, even if they had been made for the Autobahn and not an interior checkpoint. The difference was immaterial, given that the objective in either scenario was the declaration of Allied rights.

Moscow could not have known his limits, but Clay never contemplated shooting his way into East Berlin.856 More than just a declaration of rights, Clay, Kennedy, and Rusk saw

Friedrichstrasse as tied to diplomacy. They worried the West would be at a disadvantage if the GDR controlled access during the leadup to negotiations. Kennedy saw his orders to Clay as the military track of his own double-barrel policy, and he realized that he had to act strongly to set the table for talks. It was Kennedy’s approach to the Berlin Crisis in miniature, and his conception of how Flexible Response could be used.857

The crisis at Checkpoint Charlie was strictly an American affair, which was

“distressing” to Clay, given that the incidents occurred over several days and the French or British never offered to help.858 Even in the wake of the crisis, there was little

“#66 TOP SECRET” folder, box 463A, Kissinger Series, NSF, JFKL. Michael R. Beschloss, The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963 (New York: Edward Burlingame, 1991), pp. 280-81. 855 Letter, Clay to Kennedy, October 18, 1961, “Germany, Berlin Subjects General Lucius Clay 8/28/61 – 10/31/61” folder, box 86, Countries Series, NSF, JFKL. 856 Raymond Garthoff, “Berlin 1961: The Record Corrected,” Foreign Policy, 84 (Fall 1991): 142-56. Cable 813, Clay to Rusk, October 24, 1961, “Germany, Berlin Subjects General Lucius Clay 8/28/61 – 10/31/61” folder, box 86, Countries Series, NSF, JFKL. 857 Cable, Rusk to Clay and Dowling, October 24, 1961; Cable 813, Clay to Rusk, October 24, 1961; Letter, Kennedy to Clay, October 8, 1961; Letter, Clay to Kennedy, October 18, 1961, all in: “Germany, Berlin Subjects General Lucius Clay 8/28/61 – 10/31/61” folder, box 86, Countries Series, NSF, JFKL. 858 Cable 859, Clay to Rusk, October 28, 1961, “Germany, Berlin Subjects General Lucius Clay 8/28/61 – 10/31/61” folder, box 86, Countries Series, NSF, JFKL. 296 agreement about procedures, which Kohler experienced firsthand in the Washington

Ambassadorial Group, when the agency theory debate began again.859 From the administration’s perspective, the military display of resolve at the checkpoint had been chastening but also created a favorable window for negotiations. Bundy and Kissinger believed there could be negative effects if they missed that window, from the Soviets pursuing a separate peace to more Allied fracturing or even war.860

The initial groundwork for bilateral discussion of Berlin was laid at the end of

September between Kennedy-Khrushchev communications and Rusk-Gromyko meetings.861 The exploratory talks were unsuccessful, and “did not move beyond the stage of verbal sparring,” as Kennedy told Adenauer.862 The change occurred in the wake of the XXII Party Congress, where Chinese Prime Minister left in protest.

The communist break meant Khrushchev no longer made decisions about Berlin with the

Sino-Soviet rivalry in mind, and he abandoned brinkmanship for diplomacy. 863 While the prospects for peace improved, the Gromyko meetings annoyed Paris. Ambassador James

Gavin predicted they were “heading into very heavy weather with France and de Gaulle on Berlin/Germany policy.”864 NATO disliked Rusk’s contact with Gromyko, and

859 Memorandum, Kohler to Rusk, “Problems of Berlin and Germany in the Last Week,” November 5, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIV: 554-55. 860 Memorandum, Bundy to Kennedy, “The Need for Negotiations,” November 20, 1961, FRUS, 1961- 1963, XIV: 588-89. See in same volume, Memorandum of Conversation, Kennedy and Adenauer, November 20, 1961, p. 592. 861 For the talks and correspondence, see documents in: FRUS, 1961-1963, XIV: 431-94. 862 Letter, Kennedy to Adenauer, October 13, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIV: 494. 863 Zubok, “Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis,” p. 29. 864 Cable, Gavin to State Department, October 7, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIV: 481. 297

Finletter reported a “deep malaise” set in when it became obvious that the Americans were not going to consult the NAC on negotiations with the Soviets.865

The lack of consultation was particularly bitter for Macmillan, who once again found himself shut out from his pet project. The Anglo-American alliance on Kennedy’s strategy was based on expedience more than ideology. Macmillan considered the

American emphasis on contingency planning “absurd,” and he dismissed Kennedy’s sending the battle to group to Berlin as “nonsense.”866 Like he had in 1958-59, he recognized the limits of British power, but he attempted to use its influence to steer

Washington toward a policy that aligned closer to his own views.867 After his Moscow trip in March 1959, Macmillan was sidelined in quadripartite communications, but he built a close relationship with Kennedy, which he used to his benefit in masking British views to the Allies through the Americans. In so doing, he projected Anglo-American interdependence, but with little actual success, leading to London’s marginalization.868

Allied discontent continued when the administration mounted their second concerted effort to establish a baseline for negotiations, beginning in January 1962 with

Thompson and Gromyko in Moscow.869 When contemplating the Berlin talks, Kennedy,

Bundy, and Rusk were establishing positions to avert nuclear war, but Khrushchev,

865 Cable 457, Finletter to Rusk, October 7, 1961, ProQuest ID 1679055905, Berlin Crisis Collection, DNSA. 866 As quoted in Gearson, “Britain and the Berlin Wall Crisis,” pp. 63-64. 867 For a critical view of Macmillan, see Gearson, Harold Macmillan and the Berlin Wall Crisis. For a more sympathetic view, see Toshihiko Aono, “‘It Is Not Easy for the United States to Carry the Whole Load’: Anglo-American Relations during the Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 34, No. 2 (April 2010): 325-56. 868 Nigel J. Aston, Kennedy, Macmillan, and the Cold War: The Irony of Interdependence (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). 869 Jack M. Schick, “American Diplomacy and the Berlin Negotiations,” The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Dec. 1965): 803-820. 298

Gromyko, Macmillan, de Gaulle, and Adenauer could only see negotiations over the

German Question.870 This was exacerbated when Kennedy was forced to look outside of

Berlin for a negotiating strategy, since he maintained Western presence in the city was nonnegotiable. He wanted a bold approach, not a reiteration of Eisenhower and Dulles’s talking points, but in so doing, he flirted with positions that had profound ramifications.

Beyond GDR and Oder-Neisse line recognition, he floated the idea of prohibiting Federal

Republic ownership of nuclear weapons as well as a thirteen-member International

Access Authority that would control air and ground access to Berlin.871 Khrushchev rejected that proposal, and then, angry at the idea of sharing air corridors with more parties, kicked off a mini crisis, ordering military aircraft to fly below 7,000 feet and buzz commercial flights.872 LIVE OAK coordinated plans in response that called for tactical air operations against the Soviets in the corridors.873 In the interim, Kennedy piled on the offers throughout winter and early spring 1962 and waited to see what Khrushchev would accept.

This was a fundamental misunderstanding on the administration’s part, and is why they could never pull the talks out of the established tracks of everyone’s national interest. France still feared German neutralism; Germany feared American sabotage of reunification; the Soviets feared German nationalism and militarism; and Britain feared

870 For a discussion that emphasizes Allied discussion of the German nuclear question and Berlin, see Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, pp. 327-51. 871 Letter, Kennedy to Khrushchev, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIV: 820-22. Smyser, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall, p. 175. 872 Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars, pp. 112-13. 873 Memorandum, JCS to Bundy, JACK PINE Operations Plan, September 6, 1962, “Germany Berlin General 9/62” folder, Countries Series, NSF, JFKL. See also Pedlow, “Allied Crisis Management for Berlin,” pp. 105-06. 299 anything that could lead to conflict. Since the Berlin and German Questions were inextricably linked, all issues Kennedy tried to untangle created more problems, and while Rusk was happy to talk endlessly with Gromyko, it made the Allies gnash their teeth, especially Adenauer.874

Anxious to achieve some success and ease the tension in the air corridors,

Kennedy moved beyond what he told the Allies were “probes” and offered Khrushchev more concessions. Rusk handed Gromyko a draft of a modus vivendi at Geneva, where both were attending the U.N.-sanctioned Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, before showing it to the French and West Germans, who were also in attendance.875

Months of exasperation over deadlock had lead Kennedy to order Rusk to discuss the paper with the Allies only unilaterally, a shrewd strategy to mold the message as needed.876 The Geneva paper transitioned to an actual proposal on April 11, after the

State Department adjusted language to Moscow’s liking.877

Kennedy’s gambit failed for two reasons. First, while Khrushchev was convinced of Kennedy’s earnestness to negotiate, he was not satisfied with what the Americans were offering. The sticking point was the Western garrisons in Berlin. Kennedy had offered the

Kremlin more than it demanded, but Khrushchev was fixated on his long-coveted victory

874 Francis J. Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America's Atomic Age (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012), pp. 30-56. 875 Foy Kohler, Understanding the Russians: A Citizen’s Primer (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), pp. 335-56. 876 Memorandum, Bundy to Rusk, “Further Berlin Negotiations,” April 7, 1962, “Germany Berlin General 4/62” folder, box 84, Countries Series, NSF, JFKL. 877 Paper, “Principles, Procedures, and Interim Steps,” April 3, 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, XV: 95-97. State Department records of the negotiations are in: box 3, Records Relating to Berlin, Bureau of European Affairs, Office of German Affairs, Entry A1-3089, RG 59, NARA. 300 and not tactical advances.878 His rigidity was a tacit acknowledgement of the importance of the Allied forces that the West had used as leverage against the Soviets for fifteen years. To banish them was to undermine Western claim to the city, which would improve

Ulbricht’s legitimacy by default.879

Second, Kennedy overestimated the ability to convince Bonn of the importance of his modus vivendi plan. The substance of the paper and the way that he handled the situation was shocking to Adenauer. After the Wall, Bonn sensed that Washington was now disinterested in the German Question.880 Now, the Americans had broken ranks and expected Bonn to support the modus vivendi, giving only twenty-four hours to do so.881

Adenauer exploded at Nitze over the American impertinence.882 On April 14, he wrote a terse letter to Kennedy asking for a pause in talks.883 Adenauer understood agreements on issues of Berlin’s administration, but he could not forgive Kennedy for attempting to grant concessions on the German Question to solve the Berlin Problem. Apart from the anger he felt about his country’s reunification being used as a bargaining chip, the chancellor thought the principles paper was bad policy. It jeopardized Berlin’s future, undermined European security, and put into question the Federal Republic’s place in the

878 Williamson, First Steps Toward Détente, pp. 147-82. 879 See State Department’s memorandum “The Soviet Position on Berlin and Germany in the Geneva Conversations, March 11-26,” April 4, 1962, “Germany Berlin General 4/62” folder, box 84, Countries Series, NSF, JFKL. 880 Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe, pp. 171-86. See also Frank A. Mayer, Adenauer and Kennedy: A Study in German-American Relations, 1961-1963 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996). 881 Memorandum, Rusk to Kennedy, “Further Berlin Discussions with the Soviets,” April 4, 1962, “Germany Berlin General 4/62” folder, box 84, Countries Series, NSF, JFKL. 882 Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, pp. 206-07. Memorandum of Conversation, Nitze and Adenauer, April 13, 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, XV: 101-05. For Bonn’s reaction, see Memorandum of Conversation, Kohler and Grewe, April 13, 162, “Germany Berlin General 4/62” folder, box 84, Countries Series, NSF, JFKL. 883 Letter, Adenauer to Kennedy, April 14, 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, XV: 111. 301 alliance. Without Adenauer’s support, Kennedy’s plan for a modus vivendi unraveled.

When the modus vivendi was leaked to the press on April 14, Kennedy believed Bonn was behind it.884 To make matters worse for him, fallout at home over the plan exacted a political cost. The principles paper faded away in late spring, as did the prospects for a settlement.885

While Kennedy’s ultimatum for negotiations ran aground on the shoals of

Khrushchev’s inflexibility and Adenauer’s ire, his ultimatum on defense strategy steamed ahead. At an Athens, Greece meeting of the NAC on May 5, 1962, McNamara outlined his thoughts on the deficiencies of NATO’s reliance on the nuclear deterrent.886 Though he spoke in theoretical terms, he used Berlin as his only example about the necessity of limited responses, both in deterrence and in taking military action that would not automatically escalate to nuclear war.887 McNamara’s timing was poor, since the Allies were still raw over the Geneva principles paper. The defense secretary had done what

Taylor had advised Kennedy not to do, use the NAC for “lecture or exhortation” rather than advancing “our strategic ideas in a low key.”888 The Germans judged the strategy deficient. Bonn could not supply enough troops to make the conventional deterrent credible, and assumed that only a nuclear response would deter the .889

884 Helga Haftendorn, Security and Détente: Conflicting Priorities in German Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1985), pp. 68-81. Cable, Rusk to Dowling, April 14, 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, XV: 113. 885 Smyser, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall, pp. 179-82; Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars, pp. 114-16. 886 Jane E. Stromseth, The Origins of Flexible Response: NATO’s Debate over Strategy in the 1960s (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988), pp. 42-68. 887 McNamara address before the NAC, May 5, 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, VIII: 275-81. 888 Letter, Taylor to Kennedy, April 3, 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, XV: 369. 889 Haftendorn, Coming of Age, pp. 100-01. 302

The consternation in the alliance remained, and would for years.890 The administration did convince NATO to consider the strategy in principle by September.

Nitze used as a Trojan Horse the military-sub group of the Washington Ambassadorial

Group, which he had formed and chaired in the wake of the Paris foreign ministers’ meeting, to apply Flexible Response to Berlin planning.891 It was illustrative of how much influence McNamara’s Pentagon had in shaping U.S. foreign policy.892 The

U.S. debate over the Poodle Blanket made Norstad’s relationship with Kennedy unrepairable, climaxing in November 1961 in a White House meeting where SACEUR spoke frankly. He told the president the Flexible Response instructions were “poorly drafted, ambiguous, and contradictory,” as well as “replete with clichés and jargon.”893

Two months later, he told Kennedy that he would not issue Washington’s instructions on contingency planning to SHAPE planners; he would use them only as “general background and guidance.”894 Kennedy could never reconcile the linkage between Berlin strategy and NATO policy. He recognized that Norstad wore two hats, but he misinterpreted Norstad’s positions as remnant of the Eisenhower era, not the representative views of NATO.895 With no chance of reconciliation, Kennedy and

890 Stromseth, The Origins of Flexible Response, pp. 96-174. 891 Dee Armstrong, “Quadripartite Politico-Military Planning Experience in Berlin,” February 28, 1963, “Berlin Planning Papers S/P” folder, box 5, Ernest Lindley Policy Planning Council Files, Entry A1-5441, RG 59, NARA. Letter, Nitze to John Ausland, April 24, 1984, folder 14, box 17, Name Files, Nitze Papers, LOC. 892 Lawrence S. Kaplan, “The Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962: Views from the Pentagon,” in International Cold War Military Records and History: Proceedings of the International Conference, ed. William W. Epley (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1996), pp. 65-86. 893 Memorandum of Conversation, Kennedy and Norstad, November 9, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIV: 559 894 Letter, Norstad to Kennedy, January 10, 1962, “NATO – Norstad Correspondence 3/61 – 3/62” folder, box 103, Subjects Series, POF, JFKL. 895 Robert S. Jordan, “Norstad: Can the SACEUR Be Both European and American?” in Generals in International Politics: NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, ed. Robert S. Jordan (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1987), pp. 73-92; Trauschweizer, Cold War U.S. Army, p. 125. 303

McNamara forced Norstad to retire, which he announced in July 1962. Events on the horizon, however, postponed his departure until the beginning of 1963.

In the wake of Norstad’s belated firing, Nitze’s Poodle Blanket had been modified, with the State Department, Pentagon, and Joint Chiefs considering SACEUR’s criticisms. It was redubbed BQD-M-30, “Preferred Sequence of Military Actions in the

Berlin Conflict,” and sent to the Washington Ambassadorial Group for comment on

September 8, 1962 before going to the NAC.896 As Rusk had explained to the group, the paper’s purpose was to increase Allied solidarity and make an unmistakable political statement to Moscow.897 Whether the Kennedy administration realized it or not, then, the

Poodle Blanket, despite its emphasis on Flexible Response, was nothing more than an updated version of Eisenhower and Dulles’ Paragraph D.

NATO was considering adopting these changes to Berlin contingency planning with, unbeknownst to them, the Cuban Missile Crisis on the horizon.898 Berlin talks had languished in summer 1962. Communication continued, but Moscow prepared for the next big offensive and hinted at what was to come. Khrushchev reasoned those in

Washington who desired war were to blame for the futile attempts at a Berlin treaty. He assured the Americans that war in the nuclear age would be insanity but he would be

896 Revised Military Sub-Group proposal on the Preferred Sequence of Military Actions in a Berlin Conflict, September 12, 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, XV: 316-20. For the NAC meeting, see Cable 1160, Finletter to Rusk, March 5, 1962, “Naval Blockade” folder, box 1, Memorandums Pertaining to Contingency Defense Planning for West Berlin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs Files, Entry A1-3057, RG 59, NARA. 897 Memorandum, Bundy to Kennedy, “Preferred Sequence of Military Actions in the Berlin Conflict,” September 10, 1962, “Germany Berlin General 9/62” folder, Countries Series, NSF, JFKL. 898 Sean M. Maloney, “Berlin Contingency Planning: Prelude to Flexible Response, 1958-63,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1 (March 2002): 121-26. U.S. contingency plans can be found, virtually in their entirety, in: boxes 1-9, 28-29, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Berlin Task Force Records, Entry A1-5553, RG 59, NARA. 304 ready if one came, warning that it had “been a long time since you could spank us like a little boy—now we can swat your ass.”899 His eye toward congressional politics as a battleground was why, in typical Khrushchev contradiction, he asked the Americans when they would prefer that the crisis be resumed, and offered to wait until November, after the midterm elections.900 As promised, the Kremlin declared on September 11 a pause in Berlin negotiations.

With his military and political options in Berlin exhausted, Khrushchev transported the crisis out of Europe and only ninety miles from American soil.901

Kennedy’s first indication that Moscow was exporting the competition came on October

16, when he received U-2 photos of medium-range ballistic missile sites in Cuba.

Evidence suggests that the missiles were intended to be Khrushchev’s own attempt at using military strength to pressure Kennedy into negotiations. As he told the Presidium on January 8, 1962, it was better not to have a Berlin agreement and preserve “the initiative of exerting pressure at the necessary moment” than to have one.902 That moment was coming but Washington discovered the missiles before Moscow was fully prepared.

Presumably, the missing piece was the United Nations. In comments that Khrushchev and

Gromyko made to U.S. officials, the Soviets were open to using the international body to

899 Memorandum of Conversation, Khrushchev and Stewart Udall, September 6, 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, XV: 308-09. 900 Cable, Thompson to Rusk, July 25, 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, XV: 252-53. For the assurance, see footnote 2 to Memorandum, Bundy to Sorensen, August 23, 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, XV: 285; Sorensen, Kennedy, pp. 667-68. 901 Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, pp. 668-72. For the counterview, see Zubok, “Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis,” pp. 30-31. 902 As quoted in, Haslam, Russia’s Cold War, p. 195. 305 settle Berlin, including replacing the Western garrisons with UN police.903 The culminating point was likely to be a speech in the UN General Assembly, where

Khrushchev would unveil his Berlin offer and the missiles in Cuba.904 Beyond the nuclear blackmail aspects, the missile’s larger benefit was altering the strategic balance of the

Cold War to a degree that Moscow could force the United States to reevaluate any number of issues.

Berlin never left Kennedy’s mind throughout the thirteen days of the missile crisis. He believed the city was Khrushchev’s primary target, and recognized that the

Kremlin had flanked him.905 If it was not for Berlin, he told the Joint Chiefs, “our answer would be quite easy.”906 To launch a first strike against the missile sites would give

Moscow “a clear line to take Berlin,” which would have devastating consequences for

NATO. Kennedy feared that the Europeans would regard the administration as “the trigger-happy Americans” who “didn’t have the guts to endure a situation in Cuba” and

“lost Berlin,” endangering European security in the process.907 His past battles with the

Allies conditioned him to see Berlin as the nexus of Allied unity and Soviet belligerence.

He feared that responding too soon could convince the alliance that Washington was preoccupied with Cuba and lacked interest in Berlin, leading to Allied disunity and

903 See Letters, Khrushchev to Kennedy, undated and September 28, 1962, both in: FRUS, 1961-1963, VI: 137-41, 157. SNIE 11-15-62: Current Soviet Tactics on Berlin, September 13, 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, V: 495-97. 904 Smyser, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall, pp. 192-95. Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars, pp. 119-20. 905 John C. Ausland, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Berlin-Cuba Crisis, 1961-1964 (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1996). 906 Transcript, Meeting with Joint Chiefs, October 19, 1962, in: Listening In: The Secret White House Recordings of John F. Kennedy, ed. Ted Widmer (New York: Hyperion, 2012), p. 149. See also NSC Minutes, 505th Meeting, October 20, 1962, and 506th Meeting, October 21, 1962, both in: FRUS, 1961- 1963, XI: 133, 146. 907 Transcript, Meeting with Joint Chiefs, October 19, 1962, Listening In, p. 147. 306 inviting Moscow to move on the city.908 Inaction was not an option, either, since

Kennedy believed Khrushchev when he said the crisis in Berlin would resume after

November. Doing nothing would mean the administration would “have this knife stuck in our guts” when the missiles became operational in two or three months.909 As Earle

Wheeler put it to his fellow chiefs after Kennedy left the room, “If we smear Castro,

Khrushchev smears Willy Brandt.”910

To resolve the crisis, Kennedy employed the same tactics he used in Berlin. He relied on the same core group of advisers, kept in contact with the Allies, communicated the possibility of war to the nation in an address on October 22, and used backchannel communications with Khrushchev. By using a blockade around Cuba—or a “quarantine,” as Rusk insisted on calling it to remove 1948 comparisons—and then threatening a U.S. attack against the missiles, Kennedy forced the Soviet leader to choose publicly between war and defeat.911 Privately, he offered to remove Jupiter missiles in Turkey that NATO had placed there in the wake of Sputnik.912

Kennedy’s reaction to Cuba cooled the situation in Berlin. Chastened,

Khrushchev abandoned his bluster about the city; emboldened, Kennedy acted more assertively. In December, he rejected Khrushchev’s offer to accept the principles paper that Rusk had submitted in the spring, rejecting the logic he had held for almost two years

908 NSC Minutes, 507th Meeting, October 22, 1962, both in: FRUS, 1961-1963, XI: 154. 909 Transcript, Meeting with Joint Chiefs, October 19, 1962, Listening In, p. 149. 910 Transcript, Joint Chiefs, post-meeting, October 19, 1962, Listening In, p. 157. 911 NSC Minutes, 506th Meeting, October 21, 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, XI: 143. Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble”: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997). 912 Philip Nash, The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1957-1963 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997). 307 of talking to Moscow to deter a crisis. Khrushchev’s power had always come from his ability to threaten tension in Berlin when he desired, but he had overplayed his hand with

Cuba, moving the crisis from a place where he had the advantage to one where Kennedy did. Relying on brinkmanship to achieve his objectives, Khrushchev never exploited the many interallied fractures of 1958-62, nor did he reconcile the inherent contradiction of stoking revolutions on the periphery while negotiating with the West on geopolitical issues.913 These mistakes meant Kennedy had the advantage after Cuba, and

Khrushchev’s power as General Secretary waned.914

That role reversal was on full display on June 26, 1963, when Kennedy stood on the steps of the Schöneberg town hall—the same place where Johnson had stood two years before— speaking to a crowd of 450,000 Berliners. It was the apex and conclusion of the crisis, as well as one of the more iconic moments of the Cold War, all carefully- choregraphed political theater: a U.S. president standing in Berlin made an undeniable statement about the West’s triumph over Khrushchev. 915 It was also an attempt to heal the wounds that the crisis had inflicted on transatlantic relations. Whether it had worked was difficult to determine.

913 Bundy, Danger and Survival, pp. 384-85. Zubok, Failed Empire, pp. 142-43. For the argument that Khrushchev’s ploy worked, see Kastner, “The Berlin Crisis and the FRG,” pp. 126-46. 914 Haslam, Russia’s Cold War, pp. 175-76, 213. 915 Andreas Daum, Kennedy in Berlin (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 308

CHAPTER 7: THE DEFENSE OF BERLIN STARTS AT THE MEKONG

On May 9, 1964, McNamara began three days of meetings with West German officials in Bonn. The visit was the first stop on a two-city trip. Three days later, he would be on the soil of another ally, this one in Southeast Asia. McNamara had left

Washington, D.C. on the orders of an agitated and impatient President Lyndon Johnson to find out why South Vietnam’s government was making slow progress against a communist insurgency, despite deepening American advice and assistance.916 First, though, McNamara and Maxwell Taylor, who was now JCS Chairman, had business to attend to in Bonn.

Over two days, they met with Minister of Defense Kai-Uwe von Hassel and discussed a range of issues, from France and NATO to the necessity of Germany helping offset the financial burden that the United States bore in keeping troops stationed in the

Federal Republic. 917 The topics they considered revolved around a central question: How could the United States and West Germany work together to contain communism throughout the world? The subtext was something Johnson would complain about to his advisors throughout his time in the White House. The Americans were most concerned about how they could get their friends to share in the weight of defending the world against communist encroachments, no matter where they occurred. McNamara masked these fundamental questions in the discussion, building up to one purposeful line.

916 Maxwell Taylor, Swords and Plowshares (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1972), p. 311. 917 Airgram, Ambassador George McGhee to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, May 11, 1964, “Germany – 1964-March 1966” folder, Box 20, Robert W. Komer Files, National Security File, Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library (hereafter LBJL). See also “Joint Communique Issued at Bonn by the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the German Defense Minister, May 11, 1964,” Document IV-70, American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 531-32. 309

Outlining the importance of Germany to the defense of the Free World outside of Europe, and using South Vietnam as an example, McNamara assured von Hassel that “the defense of Berlin starts at the Mekong.”918 He was not implying that the loss of Vietnam would be detrimental to Berlin. McNamara’s comment was instead a phrase for allied consumption, a rhetorical line wrapped in the larger request for Germany to help pay the large bill that the United States was footing to contain communism in Europe and

Southeast Asia.

This chapter focuses on how the Johnson administration viewed and used Berlin.

It advances two broad arguments about the city in the post-crisis period. First, U.S. attention might have been directed elsewhere, but officials still did not actively seek a settlement to Berlin’s division because, until there was a solution to the larger German

Question, they preferred to keep the issue unresolved. Doing so allowed U.S. leaders to enact a dual containment of the Soviet Union and West Germany, simultaneously reassuring allies while blocking FRG policies that could disrupt the status quo in

Europe.919 Second, the city was a tool to be used, when necessary, as leverage with both allies and enemies alike in this dual containment. This chapter suggests that Johnson saw

Berlin and South Vietnam’s defenses as linked, and challenges historians who have

918 McGhee to Dean Rusk, May 11, 1964, “Germany – 1964-March 1966” folder, Box 20, Robert W. Komer Files, National Security File, LBJL. The West German preparatory material for the McNamara meeting can be found in: Memorandum of Conversation, Ministry of Defense, May 4, 1964, “Besuch des US-Secretary of Defense McNamara vom 9. - 11.5.1964,” Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (hereafter AAPD), (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1995), 1964, I: 504-06. 919 Wolfram Hanrieder developed this now oft-repeated idea of a double containment policy, wherein the United States tried to contain the Soviets and West Germans in the 1950s. For the purpose of this chapter, I am arguing double containment, when viewed in a Berlin context, lasted into the 1970s. Wolfram F. Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989). 310 dismissed the administration’s linkage of Southeast Asia and the Cold War’s frontier city as an amateurish attempt at salesmanship.920 Johnson’s policies toward Berlin therefore must be viewed with Vietnam as an ever-present specter.

The Berlin-Vietnam Parallel

By 1964, Berlin was no longer the Cold War hotspot that it had been for over fifteen years. The superpower competition had since moved on to other parts of the world where there was less of a chance of nuclear war. The realignment meant the United States was increasing its involvement in Southeast Asia, and the Soviet Union began to concern itself with more internal matters. Moreover, apart from de Gaulle, all national leaders who were involved in the 1961 crisis were gone. The likelihood of nuclear war in Europe might have diminished, but Berlin’s importance for the superpowers had not. It continued to be the locus of East and West’s Cold War objectives and could still spark a crisis, but this now stemmed more from events elsewhere like Vietnam and Cuba and actors other than the Four Powers. The cumulative result was Berlin was no longer a potential military battleground after 1964, but it remained a diplomatic one, and battles could come from friends just as much as adversaries.

Several unresolved regional issues remained from Kennedy, particularly in

Southeast Asia. Amidst crises in the Caribbean, Africa, and the Middle East, Johnson faced uncertainty in the Kremlin, where Khrushchev appeared to be losing influence. In

920 See William Glenn Gray, Passport: Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, August 2008, p. 6, http://www.shafr.org/passport/2008/august/GrayFInal.pdf. See also Hubert Zimmerman, “The Quiet German: The and the Federal Republic of Germany,” in La Guerre du Vietnam et l'Europe, 1963-1973, Christopher Goscha and Maurice Vaїsse, eds. (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2003), p. 52. 311

Europe, American leadership was in flux. For the first ten years of NATO’s existence,

U.S. military and economic power had meant Washington dominated the Atlantic

Alliance. By the early 1960s, improving economic conditions in Europe made the allied capitals less reliant on the United States. Moreover, European leaders did not readily embrace Flexible Response as a credible deterrence strategy. De Gaulle led the challenge against American leadership when he unveiled a strategic and political plan that called for European unity and stressed a separate path from U.S. policy. Drawing the Federal

Republic away from the Atlantic alliance was a dangerous prospect for the United States.

To counter Gaullism, the Kennedy administration had unveiled a three-part plan to overhaul U.S. economic policy and military strategy toward Europe by reducing tariffs, emphasizing NATO as the center of the Atlantic community, and creating a nuclear- equipped international navy. Johnson continued the so-called Grand Design, despite little support among the Allies, and he attempted to balance a Europe that wanted greater influence over American decisions and his own foreign policy, which required more burden sharing from Europeans.921

Johnson’s foreign policy outlook was not markedly different from his predecessor’s.922 He believed that American power should be used to confront dictators

921 Frederic Bozo, Two Strategies for Europe, pp. 59-107. For Grand Design discussions, see Jeffrey Glenn Giauque, Grand Designs and Visions of Unity: The Atlantic Powers and the Reorganization of Western Europe, 1955–1963 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002); Thomas Alan Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe: In the Shadow of Vietnam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), pp. 10-11, 33-34; Trauschweizer, “Adapt and Survive,” p. 177; Thomas Schwartz, "Lyndon Johnson and Europe: Alliance Politics, Political Economy, and ‘Growing Out of the Cold War,’” in Beyond Vietnam: The Foreign Policies of Lyndon Johnson, ed. H.W. Brands (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1999), p. 44. 922 For a survey of the similarities and differences of Kennedy and Johnson, see Frank Costigliola, “U.S. Foreign Policy from Kennedy to Johnson,” in The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. II, eds. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 112-33. 312 and totalitarian states, but should do so while avoiding nuclear war. The Munich

Agreement before World War II, and the communization of Central and Eastern Europe after it, convinced Johnson of the dangers of appeasement. The Cuban Missile Crisis had proven to him that it was possible to resist an enemy without resorting to a nuclear exchange, and to control the situation from the centralized confines of the White

House.923 This lesson reinforced his reliance on limited war theory, and is where he departed sharply from Eisenhower.924 Johnson instead adopted Kennedy and

McNamara’s Flexible Response. Doing so moved nuclear weapons to the background, and allowed Johnson to focus on incrementally applying force to avoid the general war he so feared. For Berlin, the plans Johnson inherited was the Poodle Blanket’s incremental approach. The flaw to this approach—as would be seen in Vietnam—was that gradual application of force privileged managing a situation over applying a politico-military strategy, which forced the military to rely solely on tactics to achieve desired ends.925

Johnson was not an intimate member of Kennedy’s crisis management team. As vice president, he kept current on foreign policy decisions only because Rusk saw to it that he was briefed.926 His most direct involvement with Berlin policy came during his

August 1961 trip to Berlin with Clay. He had not wanted to go. “There’ll be a lot of

923 Jonathan Coleman, The Foreign Policy of Lyndon B. Johnson: The United States and the World, 1963- 1969 (Edinburgh, U.K.: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), pp. 6-8. 924 George Herring, LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994). For the original theorists, see Robert Endicott Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957); Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1957). 925 National Security Action Memorandum No. 109, “U.S. Policy on Military Action in a Berlin Conflict,” October 23, 1961, “NSAM 109 U.S. Policy on Military Actions in a Berlin Conflict 10/23/61” folder, Box 332, Meetings and Memoranda, National Security File, JFKL. Herring, LBJ and Vietnam, p. 180. 926 Ibid., p. 7. 313 shooting,” he reasoned, “and I’ll be in the middle of it.” When 300,000 Berliners gathered in front of City Hall on August 19, Johnson was in his element, and he transformed into a campaigning politician.927 After meetings with Adenauer and Brandt, he returned to Washington more engaged in European policy and knowledgeable about

Berlin. In his report to Kennedy, he recommended that the Allies be “urged to make additional contributions to the total defense strength of Western Europe” and that the

USIA translate and widely distribute Kennedy’s July 25 Berlin address.928

As president, Johnson maintained an understanding that local issues in Berlin were also global, and vice versa. This connection meant that both he and Rusk pressured the West Germans to temper any initiatives or public statements about Berlin in 1964, lest the city become a campaign issue in the upcoming U.S. presidential election.929

Rusk’s own views played a considerable role in Johnson’s outlook. Rusk had become an expert on two parts of the world, Berlin and Asia. He became Johnson’s most important advisor on the city, often serving as point man, both internally and in negotiations with other diplomats.930 His interest was such that he personally oversaw all levels of Berlin policymaking at Foggy Bottom.931 While Rusk reveled in global connections, they were a

927 Kempe, Berlin 1961, pp. 384-85. 928 Report, Johnson to Kennedy, “Visitation to Germany, August 19-20, 1961,” Folder 4, Box 2, Vice Presidential Security File, LBJL. 929 Telegram, Georg von Lilienfeld to Foreign Office, May 20, 1964, “Besuch des Regierenden Bürgermeisters Brandt in Washington hier: Gespräche mit Thompson, Rusk, Fulbright und Präsident Johnson,” AAPD, 1964, I: 547-51; Memorandum of Conversation, Rusk, Brandt, Knappstein, von Lilienfeld, Schuetz, and Bahr, May 18, 1964, FRUS, 1964-1968, XV: 89-93. 930 David L. De Leo, George Ball, Vietnam, and the Rethinking of Containment (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1991), p. 50. This is exemplified in Rusk inquiring to Gromyko about the possibility of improving the Berlin situation every September at the U.N. General Assembly. James S. Sutterlin and David Klein, Berlin: From Symbol of Confrontation to Keystone of Stability (New York: Praeger, 1978), pp. 83-84. 931 Cable, Knappstein to Foreign Office, January 30, 1968, “Amerikanische Einstellung zu unserer Ostpolitik,” AAPD, 1968, I: 117-20. 314 bitter reality for Johnson, and he dreaded that his policies elsewhere could affect Berlin.

With each new policy that incrementally applied force on Hanoi, he pushed his advisors to think about how the Soviets might react in Berlin and Cuba.932

Johnson’s worldview led him to see Vietnam and Berlin as a mutually supporting—or mutually damaging—test of American credibility and, by extension, his own will. His advisors, particularly Walt Rostow, reinforced this belief in their attempts to grow support for military escalation in Southeast Asia during what Fred Logevall has termed “the long 1964.”933 Citing Truman’s playbook for securing funding from

Congress for the Truman Doctrine, Rostow urged Johnson to emphasize a global domino theory in meetings with Congressional leaders. Losing Vietnam would not just endanger all Southeast Asia, it might also mean that the “Indian subcontinent would be outflanked,” and the Middle East and East Africa “would be substantially opened up.”

The ripple effects were sure to be felt in Europe, since the credibility of the Johnson administration’s European stance “would be put in question.” After all, Rostow wrote,

“our commitments to South Viet Nam are no less explicit than our commitments to

932 For his worries about how Rolling Thunder would affect Berlin, see Draft Memorandum for Johnson Prepared by the DoD, May 24, 1964, FRUS, Vietnam 1964, I: 363-68; Memorandum, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Tyler to Acting Secretary of State Ball, February 8, 1965, FRUS, Vietnam, January-, II: 197-99; Special National Intelligence Estimate, “Communist Reactions to Possible U.S. Actions,” February 11, 1965, FRUS, Vietnam, January-June 1965, II: 244-50. Recording of Telephone Conversation, Johnson and McNamara, May 27, 1965, 7:03PM, Citation #7838, Recordings of Telephone Conversations-White House Series, Recordings and Transcripts of Conversations and Meetings, LBJL. In 1966, Johnson worried about the effects on Berlin after bombing Hanoi and Haiphong. Recording of Telephone Conversation, Johnson and McNamara, June 28, 1966, Citation #10266, Recordings of Telephone Conversations-White House Series, Recordings and Transcripts of Conversations and Meetings, LBJL. 933 Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). 315

Berlin.”934 Rusk, too, linked the two areas. In discussions with West German officials in

May 1964, he warned that the United States might intervene in to protect the government in the south. If that occurred, he pledged the United States would protect

Berlin against Soviet responses.935 By tying those commitments together, however, the administration had potentially created a feedback loop. There was the possibility that once the United States committed itself to Vietnam on the grounds of protecting an ally, it could not disengage there for fear of undermining the credibility of U.S. resolve in

Berlin.936

Kennedy had also viewed U.S. obligations in the two areas as intertwined. In his

July 25, 1961 address to the nation, he sought to remind Americans that “We face a challenge in Berlin, but there is also a challenge in Southeast Asia.” If the United States honored its commitment to the city, he argued, other areas would be safer for it.937 It would not take long for Johnson to link the issues as well. In his first address to the nation, in front of a joint session of Congress on November 27, the new president pledged that the United States “will keep its commitments, from South Viet-Nam to West

Berlin.”938 By summer 1965, the State Department studied those commitments to

934 Memorandum from the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council Rostow, February 13, 1964, FRUS, 1964, Vietnam, I: 72-74. 935 Telegram, Georg von Lilienfeld to Foreign Office, May 20, 1964, “Besuch des Regierenden Bürgermeisters Brandt in Washington hier: Gespräche mit Thompson, Rusk, Fulbright und Präsident Johnson,” AAPD, 1964, I: 547-51; Memorandum of Conversation, Rusk with Brandt, Knappstein, von Lilienfeld, Schuetz, and Bahr, May 18, 1964, FRUS, 1964-1968, XV: 89-93. 936 Summary Notes of the 547th Meeting of the National Security Council, February 8, 1965, FRUS, Vietnam, January-June 1965, II: 188-92. 937 John F. Kennedy, Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis, July 25, 1961, http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/JFK-Speeches/Berlin-Crisis_19610725.aspx. 938 Lyndon B. Johnson, Address before a Joint Session of the Congress, November 27, 1963, http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/631127.asp. The idea of Johnson declaring the continuation of JFK’s policies was actually Eisenhower’s. For Eisenhower’s post-presidency 316

Vietnam, and contemplated eliminating U.S. aid to Saigon. Using the same rhetoric that

Clay had in 1948 when arguing against a withdrawal from Berlin, Under Secretary of

State George Ball uncharacteristically wrote that weakness would diminish U.S. prestige.939 Overwhelmingly, though, Johnson and his advisors viewed a Berlin-Vietnam parallel in terms of containment. It was, as the Berlin-Asia expert Rusk told Alphand in

July 1964, “all part of the same struggle, to prevent an extension of Communist influence.”940 U.S. activity in the two areas, in the minds of decision-makers, were two methods of fighting communism, and both were mutually supporting. The stakes were vastly different in each theater, but both constituted containment.941

The Western Alliance, Vietnam, and Détente

The problem of emphasizing Berlin and Vietnam’s connectedness abroad was that the Western Allies held varying degrees of apprehension about whether communism in

Southeast Asia threatened Europe. De Gaulle’s government, who having learned from

France’s own tumultuous experience in Vietnam, understood that preponderant military power could not solve an issue that required, by and large, a political solution.942 Britain supported Johnson publicly, but their private apprehensions kept them from contributing

role in U.S. decision making, see Richard M. Filipink, Jr., Dwight Eisenhower and American Foreign Policy during the 1960s: An American Lion in Winter (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014). 939 Memorandum to the President, “United States Commitments Regarding the Defense of South Viet- Nam,” prepared by Under Secretary of State George Ball, June 23, 1965, “McGeorge Bundy Vol. II June 1965 [1 of 3]” folder, Box 3, Memos to the President File, National Security File, LBJL. Teleconference, Clay, Royall, Bradley, Collins, Wedemeyer, March 31, 1948, Clay Papers, II: 602. 940 Memorandum of Conversation, Rusk and Ambassador Alphand, July 1, 1964, FRUS, Vietnam 1964, I: 533-37. 941 For criticism of this logic, see Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, pp. 237-73. 942 Fredrik Logevall, “De Gaulle, Neutralization, and American Involvement in Vietnam, 1963-1964,” Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 61, No. 1 (Feb. 1992): 70-71. 317 to the war.943 French officials scoffed at the arguments of their American counterparts that Paris knew little of the responsibility that the United States bore as both an Atlantic and Pacific power. When Rusk explained to Alphand in their July 1964 meeting that

“South Vietnam has the same significance as the defense of Berlin,” the ambassador was incredulous. The two were not comparable, he argued: the loss of Berlin “would shake the foundations of Western security,” while South Vietnam could fall away without much damage done.944

What the French saw as naiveté was firmness to the West Germans. Chancellor

Ludwig Erhard, not dubious of Vietnam’s importance to Europe, viewed U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia as a “testing ground” of American resolve, and he believed there “existed a parallel between Saigon and Berlin.”945 Historians have questioned Erhard’s veracity—George Ball also did at the time—but he repeated the same message to an unreceptive de Gaulle one week later, as did the officials in his diplomatic corps beneath him.946 Still, the Vietnam War put Erhard in a tough position.

943 Eugenie M. Blang, Allies at Odds: America, Europe, and Vietnam, 1961-1968 (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011), pp. 159-81; Fredrik Logevall, “America Isolated: The Western Powers and the Escalation of the War,” in America, the Vietnam War, and the World: Comparative and International Perspectives, Andreas W. Daum et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 178, 193-95. 944 Memorandum of Conversation, Rusk and Alphand, July 1, 1964, FRUS, Vietnam 1964, I: 533-37. The idea that Vietnam was a war that the United States could afford to lose has been most convincingly argued in Ingo Trauschweizer, The Cold War U.S. Army: Building Deterrence for Limited War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008), pp. 162-94. 945 Memorandum of Conversation, Johnson and Erhard, June 4, 1965, FRUS, Vietnam, January-June 1965, II: 718. For the FRG record, see Memorandum of Conversation, Erhard and Johnson, June 4, 1965, AAPD, 1965, II: 961-67. Erhard had used the same phrase with Rusk in an earlier conversation that day: Memorandum of Conversation, Erhard and Johnson, June 4, 1965, AAPD, 1965, II: 953-60. 946 Zimmerman, “The Quiet German,” p. 52; T. Michael Ruddy, “A Limit to Solidarity: Germany, the United States, and the Vietnam War,” in The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945- 1990: A Handbook, Vol. II, Detlef Junker et al. (Washington, D.C.: German Historical Institute, 2004), p. 127. For Ball’s comment: Paper, George Ball, undated, “Probable Reactions to the Cutting of Our Losses in South Viet-Nam,” FRUS, Vietnam, June-December 1965, III: 112. Memorandum of Conversation, Erhard and de Gaulle, June 11, 1965, AAPD, 1965, II: 1002-08. For the -Alphand meeting and Erhard’s statement, see Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe, p. 86. 318

Dependent upon U.S. protection and bound by tripartite agreements, the Federal Republic was not free to pursue an independent path when it came to security issues. There was quiet uneasiness that U.S. attention on Southeast Asia portended a decreased interest in

Europe’s defense, leaving Bonn vulnerable to Soviet encroachment. 947 Moreover, Erhard worried that the Americans had an increasing “messianic sense of mission,” which led them to be exasperated that they received no gratitude from allies.948 U.S. ambassador to

West Germany George McGhee best summed up Bonn’s conundrum: “They didn’t want us to capitulate in Vietnam, because that would decrease our credibility in Western

Europe. On the other hand, they didn’t want us to get too deeply involved so that we wasted our resources there, because they thought Europe [was] the most important.”949

Ultimately, the United States publicly linking Vietnam and Berlin’s defense made it difficult for the West Germans to disagree with their ally’s Southeast Asia policy.

Historians disagree on how dominant the Vietnam War was in U.S.-German relations. Those who believe the war was an overriding issue point to the downfall of

Erhard after the Chancellor’s unwavering support of U.S. policies in Southeast Asia.950

Others maintain that Vietnam was not an overly contentious issue between Washington and Bonn, and that U.S. officials did not twist Erhard’s arm.951 The Americans operated on the assumption that most Europeans, though they believed the U.S. war effort in

947 Blang, Allies at Odds, p. 2. 948 Memorandum of Conversation, Erhard and de Gaulle, February 14, 1964, AAPD, 1964, I: 203-15. 949 Quoted in Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe, p. 87. 950 Joachim Arenth, Johnson, Vietnam, und der Westen: Transatlantische Belastungen 1963-1969 (Munich: Olzog, 1994), p. 165; Eugenie M. Blang, “A Reappraisal of Germany’s Vietnam Policy, 1963-1966: ’s Response to America’s War in Vietnam,” German Studies Review, Vol. 27, No. 2 (May 2004): 341-60; Ruddy, “A Limit to Solidarity,” pp. 126-132. 951 Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe, pp. 86-87. 319

Southeast Asia was a mistake, agreed that European questions “are and should be their main international concern and that the issues involved in Vietnam are not primary.”952

The historical record supports their assumption. Conversations between Germans and

Americans during the Erhard chancellorship generally stressed détente and the German

Question.953 U.S. officials did not fully appreciate how interconnected their Federal

Republic counterparts saw Vietnam with other Cold War issues, and therefore did not realize how effective their message had been. In Bonn’s conversations with allies, they supported their transatlantic partner, despite confessing that Vietnam was a mistake. For the United States to retreat, as FRG State Secretary Karl Carstens told NATO General

Secretary Manlio Brosio in March 1965, “would be an unacceptable weakening” of the

West’s ability to negotiate with the East.954

Whether Vietnam was of overriding concern to Erhard, he played the supportive ally throughout his time as chancellor. The problem was the expectations that Johnson increasingly placed on West Germany. There were two ways that Vietnam impacted relations between the two allies. The first was the U.S. request for a tangible German contribution to the war effort. Given the recent past, it was politically impractical, both domestically and internationally, to send troops. Johnson had told Erhard in December

1965 that he understood the Federal Republic could not send troops outside of NATO for fear of a communist reaction in Berlin. Rusk and McNamara had assured their West

952 National Intelligence Estimate Number 20-66, May 12, 1966, “Western Europe: Problems and Prospects,” prepared by the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the State Department, DoD, and NSA, “20, Western Europe” folder, box 5, National Intelligence Estimates, National Security File, LBJL. 953 For transcripts of the early Johnson-Erhard talks, see “MemCons” tab, “Germany Erhard Visit 6/12- 13/64 [2 of 3]” folder, Box 191, Country File, National Security File, LBJL. 954 Memorandum of Conversation, Carstens and Brosio, March 25, 1965, AAPD, 1965, I: 614-19. 320

German counterparts of the same, but a group of senators began pushing for the deployment of Bundeswehr units in Vietnam two months later.955 The pressure led Bonn to issue a statement, informing the Americans that the “widespread thesis that Berlin be defended in Vietnam” did not mean that they could reciprocate, since FRG involvement in Southeast Asia would “provide a pretext” for the Soviet Union to threaten the city.956

As a result, Bonn’s contribution would have to be in money and public support, both of which Johnson desired. Erhard, an economist, enthusiastically declared that he would help in any way he could, but the money came slowly and not all that the United States asked for—only $30 million of a $75 million request. The lack of financial help increasingly aggravated U.S.-German relations. In the end, Bonn’s most visible contribution was a hospital ship, the S.S. Helgoland.957

The balance of payments and offset policy issues were the second way that

Vietnam impacted U.S.-German relations. With the deficit soaring because of Vietnam, and those expenditures impinging upon his Great Society programs, Johnson needed to cut or augment costs elsewhere. Since U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia was in the service of Asian and European security, Washington expected Bonn to offset the costs

955 Senator Mike Mansfield’s began regularly issuing legislation to demand unilateral U.S. troop withdrawals in 1966. See Phil Williams, The Senate and U.S. Troops in Europe (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985). 956 Memorandum of Conversation, Erhard and Johnson, December 20, 1965, AAPD, 1965, III: 1938-1942. The senators were John Pastore (D, RI), Donald Russell (D, SC), John Stennis (D, MS), Sam Ervin (D, NC) and Strom Thurmond (R, SC). For the FRG statement: Cable, Assistant Secretary Krapf to Ambassador Knappstein, January 28, 1966, AAPD, 1966, I: 111-13. For the debate about Vietnam and Berlin’s security, see Cable, Knappstein to Carstens, February 21, 1966, “Angebliche amerikanische Forderungen auf Entsendung deutscher Truppen nach Vietnam,” AAPD, 1966, I: 208-09. For the constitutional and legal debate about Bundeswehr troops in Vietnam, see Cable, Assistant Secretary Werz to Knappstein, April 18, 1966, “Ablehnung eines deutschen militärischen Engagements in Vietnam; hier: rechtliche Begründung,” AAPD, 1966, I: 506-10. 957 Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe, pp. 87-88. Blang, “A Reappraisal of Germany’s Vietnam Policy,” p. 349. 321 of basing troops in the Federal Republic. Johnson’s solution was nailing down the

Germans on balance-of-payments deficit by having them finally come good with the offset agreements, which meant purchasing U.S. military equipment. The balance of payments issue was not particular to the Johnson administration. Kennedy, too, had pushed Bonn to share the burden in the wake of the Second Berlin Crisis. Kennedy’s

NSC ultimately found that Bonn was indeed pulling its weight, and, as a consequence,

“allied needs should be taken into account in the preparation of the U.S. military build- up.”958 A shooting war had changed the situation dramatically. Berlin served the

American attempts to secure funds from the Germans, just as it had in the meetings with

Congressional leaders. McNamara laid the first block in that foundation with his Mekong comment, and Johnson built upon it in his 1965 meetings with Erhard.959 After a state dinner in December, the president cajoled the chancellor in private, in the White House.

Erhard was vague while Johnson pushed, leading him to angrily say that the United

States would find out who its friends were.960

958 For economic burden sharing and U.S.-FRG relations, see Hubert Zimmermann, Money and Security: Troops, Monetary Policy, and West Germany’s Relations with the United States and Britain, 1950-1971 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). For a broader view of Allied monetary policy: Francis J. Gavin, Gold, Dollars, and Power: The Politics of International Monetary Relations, 1958-1971 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004). Memorandum of Minutes of the National Security Council, July 20, 1961, “National Security Council Meetings, 1961 No. 488, 7/19/61” folder, Box 313, Meetings and Memoranda, National Security Files, JFKL. 959 He had even complained to Brand that NATO members were not pulling their weight. See citation in footnote 19, Telegram, Georg von Lilienfeld to Foreign Office, May 20, 1964, “Besuch des Regierenden Bürgermeisters Brandt in Washington hier: Gespräche mit Thompson, Rusk, Fulbright und Präsident Johnson,” AAPD, 1964, I: 547-51. 960 Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe, pp. 89-90. For the West German record, see Memorandum of Conversation, Erhard and Johnson, December 20, 1965, AAPD, 1965, III: 1938-1942. 322

The episode illustrated how badly the relationship had eroded. Johnson’s vehemence shocked McGhee, who along with Ball had been in the room.961 Erhard was the first leader Johnson had met as president, and their close relationship prompted

Johnson to express to the chancellor in that he “felt very close” to Erhard, something, he confided, that he had never said to another statesman.962 The Germans eventually wore out their welcome, though. “If I had a dollar for every time I consulted with the Germans,” Johnson once groused, “I’d be a millionaire.”963 A self-styled expert on Teutonic character because of his youth in the immigrant town of Fredericksburg,

Texas, he once claimed that there did not exist a German who “wasn’t a chiseler, and wasn’t thrifty, and didn’t hold onto his dime, and didn’t squeeze it, and didn’t make his wife do the work for him and everything else.” On how to deal with them, Johnson reasoned one should pat them on the head and then “every once in a while kick them in the balls.”964

Johnson worried little how Vietnam affected Bonn’s relations with other Western

European states. The communique of the McNamara-von Hassel discussions in May

1964 had angered de Gaulle, who considered it a tacit FRG endorsement of American policy in Southeast Asia, and in direct conflict with the French position. Erhard walked

961 George McGhee, At the Creation of a New Germany, From Adenauer to Brandt: An Ambassador’s Account (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), pp. 183-84. 962 Memorandum of Conversation, Johnson and Erhard, June 12, 1964, “MemCons” tab, “Germany Erhard Visit 6/12-13/64 [2 of 3]” folder, Box 191, Country File, National Security File, LBJL. Bonn’s record of the meeting can be found in: Memorandum of Conversation, Erhard and Johnson, June 12, 1964, AAPD, 1964, I: 651-59. 963 Memorandum of Conversation, Johnson with John J. McCloy, March 2, 1967, “Trilateral Negotiations” folder, Box 51, Subject File, National Security File, LBJL. 964 Recording of Telephone Conversation, Johnson and Henry “Joe” Fowler, September 24, 1966, 4:15PM, Citation #10837, Recordings of Telephone Conversations-White House Series, Recordings and Transcripts of Conversations and Meetings, LBJL. Quoted in Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe, pp. 87-89. 323 back the communique and assured his guest that the Federal Republic “had no interest or purpose in Southeast Asia.”965 Regardless of the Chancellor’s actual view of the

American war effort in Vietnam, it was difficult to escape the pull that the conflict had on issues that were important to him at home. He was an avowed Atlanticist but his biggest ally had placed demands on him that were difficult to meet. Though he was at odds with the Gaullists, Erhard still sought a compromise, for the good of his country and Europe.

The difficulty was balancing allied relations with overall security, stability, and prosperity. Ultimately, Erhard was unable to find a way, and three events coincided to strip him of power: a mild recession that prompted a tax increase, Johnson’s harsh treatment of him after his inability to raise money for offset payments, and the unrelenting criticism from Adenauer and the Gaullists, who undercut his authority at every turn. With his disintegrating, Erhard was forced to resign on

October 17, 1966.966

The new Federal Republic government was not as pliable as Erhard’s. Kurt Georg

Kiesinger became chancellor on December 1, 1966 with a “grand coalition” of his

Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats led by Brandt, who had used his popularity as West Berlin’s governing mayor as a springboard to the foreign ministry. Of overriding concern to Kiesinger and Brandt was détente and German reunification.967

965 For the meeting, see “Joint Communique Issued at Bonn by the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the German Defense Minister, May 11, 1964,” Document IV-70, American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 531-32. Washington learned of the episode from the French minister of foreign affairs, Maurice Couve de Murville. See Telegram, Chip Bohlen to State Department, July 18, 1964, “Germany Memos Vol. IV 7/64-8/64” folder, Box 184, Country File, National Security File, LBJL. 966 Zimmermann, Money and Security, pp. 171-201. Trauschweizer, “Adapt and Survive,” pp. 183-84. 967 Dirk Kroegel, Einen Anfang finden!: in der Außen- und Deutschlandpolitik der Großen Koalition (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1997), pp. 169-98. 324

They broke with Erhard’s Atlanticism and offered a fresh start to Paris, less a turn toward

Gaullism à la Adenauer than a new middle path. Bonn’s overture was worrying to

Washington, since de Gaulle had withdrawn French personnel from NATO’s planning bodies in June 1966.968 Johnson responded to German restiveness and French independence with a policy of “bridge building” to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Functionally, that meant opening political, economic, and cultural contact with those areas, but conceptually it was a way to make the Cold War competition more predictable, keep détente within the framework of the alliance, and bolster U.S. influence on both sides of the Iron Curtain. As a result, NATO became both an instrument of Western defense and détente with the East.969

Meanwhile, U.S. relations with the Soviet Union had changed considerably from the volatile days of 1961-63, when it seemed the superpowers stumbled from one crisis to the next. Most of this had to do with a change in Soviet leadership. The oligarchy had removed the acerbic Khrushchev in a palace coup on October 14, 1964, thinking it best to replace the capricious official with someone more compliant. The new leader, Leonid

Brezhnev, was more collegial and loyal to the dictums of Marxism-Leninism. He

968 See Frédéric Bozo, “The NATO Crisis of 1966–1967: A French Point of View” and Thomas A. Schwartz, “The De Gaulle Challenge: The Johnson Administration and the NATO Crisis of 1966–1967,” both in The Strategic Triangle: France, Germany, and the United States in the Shaping of the New Europe, Helga Haftendorn et al. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), pp. 103-48. McGhee welcomed it, since it improved French-FRG relations and lessened FRG dependence on Washington. McGhee, At the Creation of a New Germany, p. 202. 969 Frank Costigliola, “LBJ, Germany, and ‘the End of the Cold War’,” in Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World: American Foreign Policy, 1963-1968, eds. Warren I. Cohen and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 173-210. James Ellison, “Stabilizing the West and Looking to the East: Anglo-American Relations, Europe and Détente, 1965 to 1967,” in European Integration and the Cold War: Ostpolitik-Westpolitik, 1965-1973, ed. N. Piers Ludlow (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 105-27. 325 preferred, as the long-serving Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin characterized, “a fine ceremony signing final documents rather than working on them.”

Such an outlook meant he gave his diplomats a wide berth in negotiations. His instructions to Dobrynin were simple, but they embodied his attitude toward U.S.-Soviet relations: “Let there be peace; that’s the main thing.”970

Improving relations with the Soviets in the mid-1960s had allowed Johnson some breathing space, however small, to wage a war in Southeast Asia, but it had created problems inside the alliance. In some ways, détente was a European initiative, as the

Americans reacted to French and German dissatisfaction with a bipolar world.971 Prior to the early-1960s, the Soviet threat to Europe had disciplined the West to accept sacrifices, and it had also created a durable relationship between the United States and Federal

Republic. As the threat of nuclear war receded, however, there was the possibility that

Western cohesion could dissolve. European doubts of U.S. extended deterrence had existed early in the decade, yet the Alliance was kept together in part due to the Berlin and Cuban crises. These underlying doubts, however, once again came to the fore and created for NATO a crisis of credibility in 1966 and 1967.972 Relaxation in tensions between Washington and Moscow was also tricky for the Americans because it could

970 Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War President (New York: Times Books, 1995), pp. 134-35. See also Svetlana Savranksaya and William Taubman, “Soviet Foreign Policy, 1962-1975,” in The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. II, eds. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 140-43. Zubok, Failed Empire, pp. 192-226. 971 Jussi Hanhimäki, “Détente in Europe, 1962-1975,” in The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. II, eds. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 198- 218. 972 Helga Haftendorn, NATO and the Nuclear Revolution: A Crisis of Credibility, 1966-1967 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 326 make the Federal Republic question the continued need to fall in line with their transatlantic protector. Berlin, as the most visible symbol of the Cold War, gave U.S. officials an opportunity to maintain Western cohesion by reminding Bonn that the possibility of nuclear war was lessened but the superpower competition remained, as did

American resolve. Ultimately, as bitter as the reality was to FRG officials, Germany’s continued division helped stabilize the European status quo.973

The problem was that Bonn rejected the status quo, and wanted the Berlin

Question solved as a first step toward German reunification.974 U.S. officials had already made it plain that the German Question would have to be solved before Berlin, however, citing a fear that Moscow would simply renege once they took control of the city and thus achieve the closed bloc that they had desired since 1948. The SPD had already recognized this impasse before taking power with the Christian Democrats in December

1966.975 At their party congress in Dortmund the previous June, the Social Democrats outlined an Eastern policy built on relaxing tensions, the forerunner to Brandt’s

Ostpolitik. Though a junior partner in the new government, Brandt’s personality and leadership in foreign affairs gave them an opportunity to implement the new initiative.976

973 For this stability thesis, see Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe, pp. 172-73. See also John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 215-46. 974 Gray, Germany's Cold War, pp. 196-219. 975 See Memorandum, State Department Bureau of European Affairs, “The Problem of Berlin,” March 24, 1961, “German – Berlin General ‘The Problem of Berlin’ 3/21/61” folder, Box 81, Country File, National Security File, JFKL. For a scholarly discussion of détente’s impact on transatlantic relations, see Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe, p. 11; Max Guderzo, “Johnson and European Integration: A Missed Chance for Transatlantic Power,” Cold War History, Vol. 4, No. 2 (January 2004): 89-114. For the evolution of the SPD’s Eastern policy, see Manfred Uschner, Die Ostpolitik der SPD: Sieg und Niederlage einer Strategie (Berlin: Dietz, 1991), pp. 7-73. 976 The orthodoxy contends that Kiesinger played only a small role in the Ostpolitik of 1969. That view has been revised in recent years, and views Ostpolitik as more continuity than change, elevating Kiesinger’s importance. The leading scholar of this argument is Werner Link: “Westbindung und Ostverbindungen: Die 327

On top of détente’s effects on NATO, Johnson continued to resist completely withdrawing U.S. units from Europe, even though troop levels in Vietnam were nearing

400,000 by the end of 1966. In terms of Berlin’s defense, his reticence meant that, at least in concept, he retained established U.S. policy. Underwriting the U.S. position in the city was the units based in West Germany. Reducing those numbers would have blunted

Kennedy’s strategy for Berlin’s defense, which rejected nuclear deterrence as the primary shield over Berlin and instead relied on conventional forces discouraging the Soviets from interrupting allied access.977 By 1968, however, there were over 500,000 troops in

Southeast Asia, and the United States struggled to maintain its NATO force levels. In discussions with their allies, Johnson and his advisors pointed to the unwavering

American commitment to Europe, doing so through clenched teeth.978

The divisions in Europe were mostly symbolic of U.S. commitment to the NATO partners, however. Their presence was a moderating factor in East-West relations and had provided a shield behind which the Western nations could prosper, something that Erhard had once argued was central to the Federal Republic’s “political and social peace.”979 By

1964, that symbolism had taken on an even deeper meaning. The U.S. Army had indeed not redeployed whole divisions from Germany to Vietnam, but it had significantly

außenpolitische Staatsräson der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” in 40 Jahre Zweitstaatlichkeit in Deutscheland: Eine Bilanz, ed., Peter März (Munich: Landeszentrale für Politisches Bildungsarbeit, 1999), p. 206. For an excellent historiographical overview of Ostpolitik, see Julia von Dannenberg, The Foundations of Ostpolitik: The Making of the Moscow Treaty between West Germany and the USSR (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 6-12. 977 Bundy, Danger and Survival, pp. 372-73. Acheson Report, “Berlin: A Political Program,” July 31, 1961, “Germany – Berlin General Acheson Report 8/1/61” folder, Box 82, Country File, National Security File, JFKL. 978 Memorandum of Conversation, Rostow and Rainer Barzel, February 23, 1968, FRUS, 1964-1968, XV: 630-37. 979 Memorandum of Conversation, Erhard and de Gaulle, July 3, 1964, AAPD, 1964, II: 713-23. 328 hollowed out most units. As a result, the war in Southeast Asia compromised the U.S.

Army’s fighting strength in Europe. Eventually, the demands of Vietnam were too great, and Johnson and McNamara were forced to withdraw two divisions. They did so under the assurances of the REFORGER exercises (return of forces to Germany), which could theoretically redeploy the missing units from the United States quickly due to most of their heavy equipment and a nucleus fighting force remaining in West Germany.

REFORGER, however, was not entirely a benevolent act from the Americans, and actually part of a compromise with NATO members from 1967.980 Johnson and his advisors, when speaking with their FRG counterparts at the height of Vietnam, viewed

Europe as they had four years prior. As a result, they struggled to comprehend why their relationship with Bonn was changing.

Publicly, German officials remained supportive of U.S. policy in Vietnam. Yet they still could not shake the feeling that the United States was turning its attention away from Europe, particularly when they viewed U.S. plans for troop rotations.981 The depth of American involvement in the world was a difficult balance to strike for Bonn, though.

The debate inside Congress reducing the U.S. military’s commitments abroad had turned acrimonious and made FRG officials nervous.982 Both an overextended and isolationist

United States strengthened Bonn’s desire for a more unilateral détente policy. Kiesinger

980 Trauschweizer, Cold War U.S. Army, pp. 184-86. 981 Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, A History of West Germany: Democracy and Its Discontents, 1963- 1991, 2 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 53-54; McGhee, At the Creation of a New Germany, p. 222. 982 Cable, Knappstein to Defense Minister Schröder, June 10, 1966, “Amerikanische Truppen in Europa,” AAPD, 1966, I: 802-08. For FRG plans in the event of U.S. force reductions in Germany, see Memorandum, Hans Ruete, September 14, 1966, “Langfristige Verteidigungsplanung: Auswirkungen möglicher Truppenreduzierungen der USA und Großbritanniens in Deutschland,” AAPD, 1966, II: 1192- 1205. 329 and Brandt fundamentally disagreed with Adenauer and Erhard, who believed détente could exist only after reunification. They instead saw constructive relations with East

Berlin as a precondition for eventual German unity, though they did not consider reunification was an attainable short-term goal. First, improving the lot of their fellow

Germans in the GDR was paramount. Before the Bundestag on June 17, 1967, Kiesinger unveiled his plan, calling for the two Germanys to overcome the bipolar conflict with a

“more flexible policy toward the East” that would require patience.983

U.S. officials called for patience from the West Germans, though, telling them that the only hope of making progress with the Soviets was to present a united front toward bridge-building, which Bonn’s eagerness could undercut. As Rusk cautioned

Brandt during the December 1967 NATO meetings, pushing for reunification at the expense of security issues threatened Western cohesion and meant that they could “end up in a crisis land.” He assured Brandt that the Johnson administration would be supportive, but warned that Moscow wished to consult with Bonn as a vanquished power, not an equal partner. For that reason, he demanded FRG officials consult with their

American counterparts in all matters that concerned U.S. security, especially Berlin.984

The fundamental stumbling block between the Germans and Americans was that they had different expectations of the speed with which East-West relations would

983 Thomas F. Banchoff, The German Problem Transformed: Institutions, Politics, and Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), pp. 76-77. For the speech, see Kurt Georg Kiesinger, Die Große Koalition, 1966-1969: Reden und Erklärungen des Bundeskanzlers (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags- Anstalt, 1979), p. 81. 984 Memorandum of Conversation, NATO Foreign Ministers Conference, December 13, 1967, “Treffen der vier Außenminister anläßlich der NATO-Ministerkonferenz in Brüssel am 12.12.1967,” AAPD, 1967, III: 1637-48. For one of the best surveys on this continual question of whether the FRG would forsake Western security for reunification, see Helga Haftendorn, Security and Détente: Conflicting Priorities in German Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1985). 330 improve. Increasingly, European leaders were turning more of their attention to political and social unrest at home and allowing those problems to influence their foreign policy.985 When Brandt reported to the Western foreign ministers that students had begun protesting in the city during summer 1967 out of frustration, Rusk was dismissive.

“Berlin suffers from the fact that an illusion of détente has been created without the reality,” he grumbled. As far as he was concerned, the city had “neither the stimulus of crisis nor the opportunities that would come with genuine détente,” and he believed

Moscow might use the relaxation of tensions with Bonn to seek a change in its status along 1958 lines. Rusk and other U.S. officials continued to see Berlin strictly through a

Cold War lens, and one that was held in stasis in 1961. His prior experience with the city made him wary of any offer from Moscow, and also made him hear, as he told FRG

Ambassador to the United States Karl Heinrich Knappstein, a “ticking time bomb” whenever the Soviets uttered the phrase “new status for Berlin.”986 Despite the opportunities that Johnson’s bridge-building policy could offer, U.S. officials still faced the dilemma of waging war while proving American resolve to nervous allies, and simultaneously overcoming their own skepticisms of enemies and friends alike. Until those problems were solved, Washington preferred that Berlin, now a safe, contested ground over which it could spar publicly, remain the frontier of the Cold War. 987

985 Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003). 986 Cable, Knappstein to Bonn, January 4, 1968, “Tour d'horizon mit Außenminister Rusk am 4.1.68,” AAPD, 1968, I: 8-12. Jussi Hanhimäki, “Searching for a Balance: The American Perspective,” in European Integration and the Cold War: Ostpolitik-Westpolitik, 1965-1973, ed. N. Piers Ludlow (New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 161. 987 Memorandum, Rostow to Johnson, April 24, 1967, FRUS, 1964-1968, XV: 522-26. The Johnson administration was already exasperated with Bonn’s impatience on questions of reunification by December 1964. See Chancellor Erhard Briefing Book, December 19-21, 1964, “Germany Erhard Visit Brfg. Bk 331

Bonn maintained the course it had set with the more flexible Eastern policy, running headlong into a Soviet Union that was determined to be more doctrinaire. In late

1967, the Federal Republic began holding Bundestag plenary and Defense Committee meetings in Berlin, and plans were in the works to transfer several federal institutions to the city. It was not uncommon for the West Germans to hold sessions in Berlin, which

Adenauer had first proposed in June 1961. Moscow was outraged about that initial meeting, and had had enough in April 1965, leading them to disrupt traffic in the city over a plenary session in the Bundestag. Bonn judged the reaction a success, since it had brought the German and Berlin Questions to the fore once again in the American press.

Paradoxically, Washington worried that there might be some connection between the city and Vietnam, one that they could not control.988 It ultimately cost Bonn, as the Western

Powers forbade the Federal Republic from holding any meetings in Berlin for the entirety of 1966.989 While there was relative peace for a year, the tension recommenced in 1967, when the West Germans once again began holding sessions in Berlin. Again, Moscow balked, and in February 1968 charged Bonn with pulling Berlin into its sphere in blatant disregard for quadripartite rights. By March, some NSC staff began wondering if there might be another crisis building.990 Bonn wondered, too, and had prepared contingency

12/19-21/65 [1 of 3]” folder, Box 192, Country File, National Security File, LBJL. For the Rusk quote, see Telegram, Rusk to State Department, June 14, 1967, FRUS, 1964-1968, XV: 546-49. 988 For Knappstein’s assessment of how the Americans were reacting to Soviet traffic disruptions, see Cable, Knappstein to Foreign Office, April 13, 1965, “Bewertung der Bundestagssitzung in Berlin und der sowjetischen/ sowjetzonalen Störaktionen auf den Zugangswegen,” AAPD, 1965, I: 724-27. For U.S.-FRG conversations about the situation, see Cable, Knappstein to Foreign Office, April 13, 1965, “Besuch des Regierenden Bürgermeisters Brandt und des MdB Erler in Washington; hier: Gespräch mit Verteidigungsminister McNamara,” AAPD, 1965, II: 731-34. 989 Memorandum, Karl Carstens, January 27, 1966, AAPD, 1966, I: 82. 990 Memorandum, Nathaniel Davis to Rostow, “Eastern European Support for Berlin Crisis,” March 8, 1968, “German Memos Vol. XV 3/68-8/68 [2 of 2]” folder, Box 189, Country File, National Security File, 332 plans in December for the war of nerves that State Secretary Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz called “scary, intense, and persistent.”991

The West Germans had pushed too hard on détente generally and Ostpolitik specifically. Their activities in Berlin and their assertion of rights forced a Soviet and

East German reaction, which included more harassment than usual in the form of overflights, requiring visas for travel on the Berlin-Helmstedt Autobahn, and even denying some politicians passage through the GDR, including Berlin’s governing mayor

Klaus Schuetz.992 The episode culminated in July with Moscow threatening to invoke

Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter, which gave them the right to intervene in West

Germany as a former enemy power. The Kremlin then warned Bonn that it would be held responsible for any “aggravation of tensions” in the city.993

Chastened and nervous, Kiesinger backed down. He did so for three reasons.

First, West Germany lacked the rights to respond with countermeasures without tripartite consent. Second, the strong Soviet response had convinced him that Moscow and Pankow were enacting a planned strategy to internationally isolate Bonn.994 Third, the Americans

LBJL. The State Department appeared less worried. See Memorandum, Duckwitz and John M. Leddy, March 5, 1968, “Gespräch mit dem Abteilungsleiter für Europa im Department of State, John M. Leddy, am 28. Februar 1968,” AAPD, 1968, I: 317-19. McGhee, At the Creation of a New Germany, p. 244. 991 Memorandum, Ruete, December 22, 1967, “Eventualfall-Planung für Berlin,” AAPD, 1967, III: 1703- 06. 992 For the West German record of the initial Soviet verbal and written protest, see Memorandum of Conversation, Brandt and Soviet Ambassador Zarapkin, January 6, 1968, AAPD, 1968, I: 13-16. For internal discussions in Bonn about the situation, see Memorandum, Deputy Assistant Secretary Dr. Ulrich Sahm, January 30, 1968, “Beantwortung der sowjetischen Berlinnote vom 6.1.1968,” AAPD, 1968, I: 114- 17. 993 Memorandum, Rostow to Johnson, “Possible Crisis in Berlin,” October 4, 1968, “Germany Memos Vol. XVI 9/68-12/68 [1 of 2]” folder, Box 189, Country File, National Security File, LBJL. For discussion of this episode, see Haftendorn, Security and Détente, pp. 175-85. See also Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe, pp. 187-95. 994 Memorandum of Conversation, Kiesinger with Tripartite Ambassadors, June 12, 1968, AAPD, 1968, I: 701-05. For FRG internal discussions, see Memorandum, Sahm, June 12, 1968, “Beratungen des Kabinetts 333 had reacted ambiguously to Bonn’s policies, which had given Kiesinger and others pause.

For much of early 1968, FRG officials watched as officials in the State Department like

Rusk, Ball, and Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach spoke in public and private about unity and coordination within NATO and the necessity of peace in Berlin, particularly with Vietnam continuing to unravel. Bonn understood well that the United

States believed the Atlantic partnership, European integration, and German reunification were all connected. It was for these reasons that Knappstein recommended to the Foreign

Office in January that Bonn continued to consult with Washington to prove that they were capable of forming deliberate and reliable policy. Whether Kiesinger agreed is unclear, but he did reveal to Henry Cabot Lodge, who had taken over as ambassador from

McGhee in , that it was unwise for West Germany and the United States to proceed out of step with one another.995

Once the Federal Republic blunted its Berlin policy, Rusk chastised Brandt, telling the foreign minister at a NATO meeting on June 23 that the United States had been calling for Western solidarity all along. He also reminded the FRG officials that

Washington had been taking the lead on Berlin since 1961, with little to no help from the

Allies, including Brandt’s predecessors, who “directed their suspicions at us rather than at the Soviets.”996 The potential for crisis had concerned the Americans, but the possibility

und der Staatssekretäre der beteiligten Ressorts über unsere Reaktion auf die sowjetzonalen Maßnahmen im innerdeutschen Reise- und Güterverkehr am 12.6,” AAPD, 1968, I: 720-26. 995 Cable, Knappstein to Bonn, January 30, 1968, “Amerikanische Einstellung zu unserer Ostpolitik,” AAPD, 1968, I: 117-20. Memorandum of Conversation, Kiesinger and Lodge, June 21, 1968, AAPD, 1968, I: 746-52. 996 Memorandum of Conversation, Rusk and Brandt (with U.S. and German delegations at North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting), June 23, 1968, FRUS, 1964-1968, XV: 701-08. The Germans recorded Rusk as speaking in a “slightly bitter tone” about previous Berlin crises. Memorandum, Duckwitz, June 25, 1968, AAPD, 1968, I: 771-77. 334 that the Germans would negotiate with Moscow on Berlin and change the city’s status, thereby undermining Allied rights, had frightened them.997 Disruption of access had allowed the Western powers to reassert those rights, and also meant that Bonn had to resume a deferential role. The next day, Kiesinger sent a message to Johnson affirming his confidence in U.S. support for the city, and promising that there would be no further requests for new guarantees. The Chancellor explained his more moderate tone was the result of the world situation, particularly the ongoing Vietnam negotiations in Paris and

East-West détente in general.998 Ultimately, the danger had meant the Americans could reassert Berlin’s status quo.

A New Czechoslovakia Crisis

A short reprieve from tensions followed, but the Federal Republic resumed its

Berlin program in fall 1968. With a presidential election scheduled for , West

Germany planned to hold the Bundesversammlung in the Reichstag, rather than the

Bundeshaus in Bonn. The federal convention was a special body convened only when electing a president, and since the delegates who voted were not elected officials, it was not considered a legislative act. Regardless, Moscow opposed the move, and viewed the

Bundesversammlung as another FRG declaration of political rights to the city.

Bonn’s resumed campaign toward West Berlin was a product of Soviet actions in

Czechoslovakia. Throughout 1968, the Communist Party in undertook a

997 FRG officials continually reassured the Allies that was not their intention. For representative examples, see Memorandum of Conversation, German-French Consultations, February 16, 1968, AAPD, 1968, I: 210- 21; Memorandum of Conversation, Brandt and George McGhee, February 20, 1968, AAPD, 1968, I: 224- 25. 998 Memorandum, Rostow to Johnson, June 24, 1968, “German Memos Vol. XV 3/68-8/68 [1 of 2]” folder, Box 189, Country File, National Security File, LBJ. 335 liberalization campaign, from the lifting of restrictions on speech and travel to partially decentralizing the economy. Since 1964, Brezhnev had instituted a program of

“developed socialism” to revitalize the Soviet system, but it now threatened Moscow’s hegemony with the . Though the Alexander Dubček-led government did not intend to overthrow the , Moscow became nervous. Kremlin leaders saw Soviet national interest as extending beyond their borders and into the Bloc countries. Previous uprisings like East Germany in 1953 and Hungary in 1956 made officials believe that Eastern European stability was central to Soviet security. To preempt a deteriorating situation both abroad and at home, Kremlin officials agreed to overthrow the Czechoslovakian government and replace it with a more conservative regime.999 Under the guise of military exercises, Moscow moved a half million Warsaw

Pact troops into position to invade, which most did in the last hours of August 20. Within a matter of days, the units took control of Prague and several other major cities, and settled in for an occupation.1000

Much like twenty years prior, events in Czechoslovakia appeared to some in the

West as a change in Soviet policy that could have serious consequences for Germany.

999 Matthew J. Ouimet, The Rise and Fall of the in Soviet Foreign Policy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), pp. 4-5; Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp. 183-88. See also Jeremi Suri, “The Promise and Failure of ‘Developed Socialism’: The Soviet ‘Thaw’ and the Crucible of Prague Spring, 1964-1972,” Contemporary European History, Vol. 15, No. 2 (May 2006), pp. 133-158. For wider contextual discussions of divisions in the Warsaw Pact and the Sino-Soviet split, see Mary Ann Heiss and S. Victor Papacosma, eds., NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Intrabloc Conflicts (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2008). Lorenz M. Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 1000 Günter Bischof et al., ed., The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 (New York: Lexington Books, 2010). Vladislav Zubok adds to the well-known strategic reasons for the Soviet invasion and argues that Brezhnev was also defending his own political life. Aside from it being the General Secretary’s responsibility to protect the Soviet sphere of influence, Alexander Dubček had been Brezhnev’s protégé. Zubok, Failed Empire, pp. 207-09. See also Jiri Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: Anatomy of a Decision (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991). 336

Kiesinger was unsure whether the incursion was limited to securing Soviet control of the bloc, or the first phase in a larger strategy beyond the Iron Curtain, though he was inclined to believe it was the latter. He told Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford on

October 17 that he did not “favor reviving the cold war,” but he hoped that there would be a unified Western response to the Warsaw Pact incursion in Czechoslovakia.

Militarily, FRG officials requested the Americans recall the REFORGER units, undertake a review of force levels and political warning time, and deploy additional forces to the

FRG-GDR-Czech border in Bavaria.1001

Kiesinger found little enthusiasm from the Allies. Franco-German relations had soured by fall 1968. Along with its vagueness about solidarity with NATO, Paris had little more than harsh words for Moscow about the crisis. Brandt had visited the French foreign ministry on September 7 and Kiesinger had hosted de Gaulle on September 27 and 28 in a bid to convince the French that Berlin and Western security were tied together. Both, however, failed to convince the French.1002 As a result, Kiesinger’s disillusionment with de Gaulle deepened.1003 The British had continually promised to

1001 Memorandum for the President, Rostow to Johnson, September 12, 1968, “Your Meeting with Dr. Kurt Birrenbach,” “Germany Memos Vol. XVI 9/68 – 12/68 [1 of 2],” box 189, NSC Files, Country File, LBJL. 1002 Memorandum of Conversation, Kiesinger and de Gaulle, September 27, 1968, “Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kiesinger mit Staatspräsident de Gaulle,” AAPD, 1968, II: 1200-12; Memorandum of Conversation, Kiesinger and de Gaulle, September 28, 1968, “Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kiesinger mit Staatspräsident de Gaulle,” AAPD, 1968, II: 1248-60. 1003 For the effect of the Crisis on French policy, see Frederic Bozo, Two Strategies for Europe, pp. 219-40. For Kiesinger’s reaction, see Telegram, Rusk to Cabot Lodge, Jr., October 8, 1968, “Secretary's October 8 Luncheon with Brandt,” FRUS, 1964-1968, XV: 764-66. 337 contribute more soldiers to the alliance, but had yet to do so. It appeared the crisis would do little to change that reality.1004

As for the Americans, Kiesinger’s request was impractical. Not only were the circumstances of the new Czechoslovakian crisis different than in 1948, but the United

States was now involved in a war that was unraveling. In his meeting with Kiesinger,

Clifford had sidestepped the Chancellor’s warning of “a rude awakening” in the face of

Western inaction, and concentrated instead on financial realities. The Secretary of

Defense’s message was clear: As far as the White House was concerned, the West

Germans should be thankful that Johnson was resisting an insurgency in Congress that wanted to reduce the number of American troops in NATO to 50,000 via a defense appropriation bill. The fight could be better waged, of course, if Bonn would find a way to alleviate some of the $700 million deficit that the United States was carrying and serve as an illustration to Congress that Europe was contributing to its own defense.1005

Kiesinger had heard the argument before, and his alarmist language to Clifford was out of frustration. One month prior, Kiesinger had sent the Atlanticist CDU politician

Kurt Birrenbach to Washington to hold meetings with Johnson, most of the U.S. national security establishment, and even eight congressmen, including the man leading the

1004 For Kiesinger’s Czech-related discussion with a British official, see Memorandum of Conversation, Kiesinger and Ambassador Jackling, September 26, 1968, “Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kiesinger mit dem britischen Botschafter Jackling,” AAPD, 1968, II: 1197-99. 1005 Memorandum of Conversation, Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford and Kiesinger, October 17, 1968, “Germany Memos Vol. XVI 9/68 – 12/68 [2 of 2],” box 189, NSC Files, Country File, LBJL. Senator Stuart Symington’s call for troop reductions fed into Senator Mike Mansfield’s regular issuing of legislation to demand unilateral U.S. troop withdrawals, which he had begun in 1966. See Phil Williams, The Senate and U.S. Troops in Europe (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985). 338 current charge to reduce U.S. involvement in NATO, Senator Stuart Symington.1006

Birrenbach returned with little but a token message of support for holding a NATO meeting, as well as a sober reality. If Bonn expected more from the United States, he learned, then they would have to do more themselves. For all the events that had transpired since the Erhard chancellorship, then, Johnson refused to give up on the issue of burden sharing and approached U.S.-West German relations as he had for the past five years.1007

FRG officials believed they were witnessing a Europe in transition. Kiesinger viewed multilateral Western institutions as the basis for West Germany’s policy toward the East, and, as he saw it, NATO’s cohesion was weak, the product of a United States distracted in Southeast Asia, a bankrupt Britain, and a Gaullist France. For those various reasons, Kiesinger thought the Allies were underestimating Soviet intentions in Western

Europe. 1008 Most worrisome, he believed that Czechoslovakia was Moscow’s attempt to

1006 Telegram, Ambassador Stackelberg to Foreign Minister Brandt, September 18, 1968, “Gespräch mit Präsident Johnson,” AAPD, 1968, II: 1178-80. For the American Memorandum of Conversation: FRUS, 1964-1968, Western Europe, XIII: 756-59. 1007 Memorandum, Executive Secretary Benjamin Read to Rostow, September 12, 1968, “Issues Discussed with Birrenbach,” “Germany Memos Vol. XVI 9/68 – 12/68 [1 of 2],” box 189, NSC Files, Country File, LBJL. For Birrenbach’s report, see Telegram, Ambassador Freiherr von Stackelberg to the Foreign Ministry, September 13, 1968, “Gespräch von Bundestagsabgeordnetem Dr. Birrenbach mit Staatssekretär Eugene Rostow im State Department und mit Walt Rostow im Weißen Haus am 10. September 1968,” AAPD, 1968, II: 1147-51. For Birrenbach’s own recollection of his Washington trip, see Kurt Birrenbach, Meine Sondermissionen. Rückblick auf zwei Jarhzehnte bundesdeutscher Aussenpolitik (Düsseldorf: Econ Verlag, 1984), pp. 336-37. 1008 Benedikt Schoenborn, “NATO Forever?: Willy Brandt’s Heretical Thoughts on an Alternative Future,” in The Routledge Handbook on Transatlantic Security, eds. Jussi Hanhimäki, Georges-Henri Soutou, and Basil Germond (New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 81. Memorandum, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Leddy to Nitze and Rusk, September 9, 1968, “Germany Memos Vol. XVI 9/68-12/68 [2 of 2]” folder, Box 189, Country File, National Security File, LBJL. For FRG record of the NATO meeting, see Telegraph, October 17, 1968, “Gesandter Oncken, Brüssel (NATO), an das Auswärtige Amt,” AAPD, 1968, II: 1351-53. 339

“impose a solution” on the German Question.1009 To counteract NATO weakness and to deter the Warsaw Pact from further belligerence, the Chancellor doubled down where he could, and also where he thought West Germany was most vulnerable, in Berlin.

Kiesinger’s plan to press on with the Bundesversammlung was therefore a political means to serve a security end. The Federal Republic was within their rights to hold the primary in the city, but the action was no less provocative than four months prior.

Strategically, the chancellor was using the shield of Berlin’s status to force the Allies into presenting a united front to Moscow. He assumed that the Soviets were unleashing a new propaganda and political campaign against the West Germans, one that was related to the crisis that had occurred in the city in the spring. This time, Kiesinger was prepared to meet the aggressiveness with “calmness but also with firmness.”1010

Bonn officials believed they had no other move but to hold the

Bundesversammlung in Berlin. Alphand had suggested to diplomat Sigismund von Braun that the West Germans choose another city. Doing that had ramifications, von Braun argued. From Moscow, it would look like the Federal Republic was backing off against

Soviet threats; in Germany, it would look like they were “writing Berlin from the federal government.”1011 Holding the elections also cost little money and would involve little lag

1009 Memorandum of Conversation, Kiesinger and Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., September 4, 1968, “Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kiesinger mit dem amerikanischen Botschafter Cabot Lodge,” AAPD, 1968, II: 1081- 88. 1010 Telegram, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. to Rusk, September 5, 1968, “Ambassador’s Talk with Chancellor on Czechoslovakia,” FRUS, 1964-1968, XV: 733-36. 1011 Memorandum of Conversation, von Braun and Alphand, October 22, 1968, AAPD, 1968, II: 1362-63. For Bonn’s firm reply to Alphand, see Telegram, Duckwitz to von Braun, October 24, 1968, AAPD, 1968, II: 1374-77. 340 time to garner a response, while still proving Allied resolve and protecting against Bonn’s perceived Kremlin campaign to isolate Bonn from its allies.1012

Kiesinger’s boldness also stemmed from frustration with the East. In 1966, he had been hopeful that openness would be fertile ground within which the seeds of reunification could be sown. By fall 1968, after the Soviet response to Czechoslovakia and FRG actions in Berlin, it was difficult to see how the Grand Coalition’s Eastern policy was working. Rather than isolating East Berlin, the Federal Republic had helped integrate their communist neighbors into European politics. Instead of the Soviets becoming more amenable to discussing the German and Berlin Questions, they were now increasingly uncooperative.1013 Kiesinger noticed that relations with the Bloc had soured after Czechoslovakia.1014 Rather than abandoning his rapprochement, though, he now became more determined. “I never thought our new policy would fall on ready ground in the East,” he told the Bundestag on September 25. Instead of viewing those actions as a dead end in his efforts to improve the political climate in Eastern Europe, Kiesinger viewed them merely as bumps in the road. He called for the Federal Republic to continue pursuing its Eastern policy in defiance of a bloc that was apparently not above using military power to assert its rule. In showing resolve in the face of overwhelming force,

1012 Cable, Cabot Lodge to Rusk, September 25, 1968, “Kiesinger Bundestag Speech,” “Germany Memos Vol. XVI 9/68-12/68 [1 of 2]” folder, Box 189, Country File, National Security File, LBJL. For FRG analysis of their Berlin policy up to November 1968, see Memorandum, Ruete, November 6, 1968, AAPD, 1968, II: 1426-28. 1013 Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe, p. 189. 1014 Kiesinger bemoaned this to Nixon in August 1969. Memorandum of Conversation, Nixon and Kiesinger, August 7, 1969, “Country Files – Europe – Germany Vol. III – July 1969 – 11-69” folder, box 682, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, Richard Nixon Presidential Library (hereafter RNL). 341

Kiesinger hoped to improve his negotiating position and to defy what he saw in the

Brezhnev Doctrine as the solidification of Germany’s division.1015

The Johnson administration disagreed. For them, the important issue in Europe— apart from burden sharing—was stability through bridge building, which Kiesinger could put at risk with an assertive policy that placed Berlin at its center. When Johnson publicly commented on the U.S. stance toward the Czechoslovakia Incursion in a September 10 speech, he tied the city to the current situation by warning Moscow that “the use of force, and the threat of force, will not be tolerated in areas of our common responsibility like

Berlin.”1016 Johnson’s declaration was important because it was a rare official comment on the city from him.1017 He publicly mentioned Berlin fourteen times in all of 1968, all but two in the larger context of the threats that the United States had overcome in the

Cold War. Johnson preferred to think of Berlin in the past tense, and he would defer comment whenever asked directly about contemporary events there.1018 It was this relative silence that led FRG officials and West Berliners to believe that a malaise had

1015 For text of the speech, see Cable, Lodge to Rusk, September 25, 1968, “Kiesinger Bundestag Speech,” “Germany Memos Vol. XVI 9/68-12/68 [1 of 2]” folder, Box 189, Country File, National Security File, LBJL. 1016 “Remarks at the 125th Anniversary Meeting of B’nai B’rith, September 10, 1968,” Public Papers of the Presidents, Lyndon Johnson, 1968-69, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), II: 474. Rusk followed up Johnson’s message on October 2, 1968, in front of the U.N. General Assembly, and tied the German Question and Berlin to the U.S. commitment to defend Europe. 1017 On August 31, Rusk had also told Dobrynin that Berlin was a “state interest” while warning about potential moves on Romania. See Memorandum for the President, October 4, 1968, “Possible Crisis in Berlin,” “Germany Memos Vol. XVI 9/68-12/68 [1 of 2]” folder, Box 189, Country File, National Security File, LBJL. 1018 In a June 26 press conference, he argued that he was “not able to evaluate the reasons for the Communist action.” “The President’s News Conference of June 26, 1968,” Public Papers of the Presidents, Lyndon Johnson, 1968-69, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), I: 339. After being asked in a November 15 press conference if he was worried about Soviet harassment in Berlin, he replied, “I don’t think I’m going to go into that right now.” Press conference: “The President’s News Conference of November 15, 1968,” Public Papers of the Presidents, Lyndon Johnson, 1968-69, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), II: 1128. 342 settled over U.S. foreign policy and Johnson’s leadership.1019 These reports touched a nerve in the White House and at Foggy Bottom. During Birrenbach’s visit, he reported a drop in West Berlin morale after the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia. Rusk did not appreciate the insinuation that the United States should continually buoy spirits.

Over 10,000 Americans, he yelled, had died in Vietnam in 1968 alone “to show that we are a reliable Ally.”1020

It was not the first time Rusk had heard Czechoslovakia had damaged Berliners’ morale. On August 30, the U.S. Mission had sent a message reporting a deteriorating confidence in U.S. commitment to Berlin and recommended Johnson give a speech or press conference to reassure the allies.1021 The suggestion went nowhere, as did Rusk’s and Rostow’s initiatives that made it onto Johnson’s desk in late summer and early fall

1968. On September 17, Rostow proposed an Allied declaration on Berlin that would offer Western support of FRG activities in the city, with the idea of deterring the communists from attempting to “chip away” at Berlin. It was Brandt’s idea. He had requested a declaration from the Allies in , and proposed talks on Berlin as part of the East-West discussions about easing tensions in Europe. The Western Powers stopped short of supporting Bonn’s activities, mostly because new GDR visa and passport restrictions a week prior precluded any NATO statement about

1019 Letter, Minister Counselor Georg von Lilienfeld to Kiesinger, October 5, 1968, AAPD, 1968, II: 1283- 86. 1020 Memorandum of Conversation, Rusk and Birrenbach, September 9, 1968, “Subject: Berlin,” “Germany Memos Vol. XVI 9/68 – 12/68 [2 of 2],” box 189, NSC Files, Country File, LBJL. 1021 Telegram, U.S. Mission Berlin to U.S. Embassy Bonn, August 30, 1968, “Germany Memos Vol. XVI 9/68 – 12/68 [2 of 2],” box 189, NSC Files, Country File, LBJL. 343 accommodations.1022 The allies’ cautiousness was also out of exasperation for Federal

Republic political actions in Berlin, which served Bonn’s interests but compromised quadripartite relations and put the city at risk. U.S. officials often reminded their West

German counterparts that they would support FRG policies, but they loathed how they still took abuse from the German press for not doing enough.1023 It was in this context that, when the idea reemerged of supporting Kiesinger’s policies in Rostow’s September memorandum, Johnson shelved it, judging it too provocative.1024 He did so again in

October, after Rusk recommended a declaration in light of the lack of improvement.1025

Exhausted, disinterested in expending energy on Federal Republic political rights in

Berlin, and without any leverage on allies after announcing his de-facto resignation,

Johnson left the issue for his successor to resolve.1026

Johnson’s reluctance to make a bold statement was because his perception of the city was the same in 1968 as it was in 1964. To him, there was nothing to be gained in

1022 These ministerial meetings were held every six months. The dinners were designated for Germany and Berlin issues. This particular meeting was held on June 24 and 25, 1968. “Final Communiqué of the NATO Ministerial Meeting, Reykjavik,” June 25, 1968, Documents on Germany, 1944–1985 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State Publication, 1986), pp. 1013-15. For a discussion of Brandt’s proposals, see Sutterlin and Klein, Berlin, p. 84. 1023 Memorandum from Hans Ruete, April 9, 1965, “Sitzung des Bundesrates in Berlin,” AAPD, 1965, II: 691-95. 1024 Memorandum for the President, Rostow to Johnson, September 17, 1968, “Proposal for an Allied Declaration on Berlin,” “Germany Memos Vol. XVI 9/68 – 12/68 [1 of 2],” box 189, NSC Files, Country File, LBJL. 1025 These were in light of Rusk meeting with FRG officials over two months to discuss Soviet intentions: Telegram, Böker to Foreign Office, October 8, 1968, “Abendessen der NATO-Außenminister auf Einladung Rusks am Abend des 7.10.1968,” AAPD, 1968, II: 1287-90; Telegram, Knappstein to Brandt, October 11, 1968, “Gespräch Bundesaußenminister mit Außenminister Rusk,” AAPD, 1968, II: 1304-08; For the U.S. records: Memorandum of Conversation, October 7, 1968, “Secretary's Dinner for NATO Foreign Ministers,” FRUS 1964-1968, XIII: 768-774. Telegram, Rusk to State Department, November 16, 1968, “Wrap-up of NATO Ministerial Meeting,” FRUS 1964-1968, XIII: 790-92. 1026 Memorandum, Rusk to Johnson, October 4, 1968, “Possible Crisis in Berlin,” “Germany Memos Vol. XVI 9/68 – 12/68 [1 of 2],” box 189, NSC Files, Country File, LBJL. Study, F.G.A. Kraemer, October 2, 1968, “Impending Crisis in Berlin,” “Germany Memos Vol. XVI 9/68 – 12/68 [1 of 2],” box 189, NSC Files, Country File, LBJL. 344 challenging the status quo there—the Berlin Crisis had proven that. In the international fight against communism, the United States could bring its power to bear on peripheral areas like Vietnam, not the Cold War’s Gordian knot. The West Germans’ conception, however, had changed considerably in those four years. The Erhard government had an aversion to involving itself in quadripartite issues, but the Grand Coalition confidently questioned why they should not be active participants in discussions involving reunification. For them, Berlin could be the pivot for an entirely new foreign policy. For

Johnson, the city had the potential to unravel allied and East-West relations, and he worked to keep Berlin uncontroversial.1027 Johnson was not above of using the city for his own ends; he merely preferred to use it against allies rather than adversaries. The problem with that strategy is that it only works when an ally remains deferential. When

Bonn became more assertive, Johnson’s attempts to use Berlin as leverage sowed doubt and mistrust in the minds of West German officials. That acrimony meant that when

Johnson left office on January 20, 1969, the United States now had to manage one more entity on Berlin issues, something the next administration would find out soon enough.

1027 Memorandum of Conversation, Rusk and Lord Harlech, April 22, 1964, FRUS, 1964-1968, XV: 64-68. 345

CHAPTER 8: LEVERAGING DÉTENTE

Richard Nixon had his Kennedy moment in Berlin on February 27, 1969. He had been president for only a month, but he arrived in a snow-blanketed city as part of an overseas trip to improve transatlantic relations, with stops at the major European capitals:

Brussels, London, Paris, Bonn, Berlin, and Rome. The logic behind a trip so early into his presidency was to listen to the needs of allies but also to display that U.S. power and interests endured despite Vietnam. Unlike Johnson, who continually resisted suggestions that he visit Berlin to calm German fears of American disinterest, Nixon went to the city to make a statement that his administration would reengage the allies and Soviets on

Berlin issues.

He arrived at Tempelhof with Kiesinger and Brandt in tow. His motorcade stopped six times so that he could greet the throng of West Berliners who had lined the streets along the parade route. Above, there were some citizens who were less enthusiastic. One sign hanging from a balcony read “Bla, bla, bla. Nixon is here,” while another, “We Are Paid to Cheer.”1028 Rather than speaking to a crowded square of

450,000 Berliners, he delivered an address to 6,000 workers in a Siemens factory. The

State Department’s German expert derided the venue as a “huge metal shed,” likely chosen so the president’s voice and the crowd’s applause would reverberate, since the

White House knew it was impossible to equal Kennedy’s infamous speech.1029

1028 Ed Freakley, “A Divided City Greets President Nixon,” Stars and Stripes, March 1, 1969. 1029 Martin J. Hillenbrand, Fragments of Our Time: Memoirs of a Diplomat (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1998), pp. 269-70. 346

When Nixon finished his speech, the crowd chanted “Ha, Ho, He, Nixon is Okay” as he began to walk off stage, which compelled him to return the favor: “Ha, Ho, He,

Berliners are Okay.”1030 When he left the city that evening, he had done two things. First, he had made the statement that he had taken a personal interest in Berlin, a stark contrast to Johnson. Second, he firmly placed the city within his as-of-yet unveiled foreign policy doctrine by affirming U.S. obligations to the city but opening the door for more constructive and multilateral relations.

This chapter examines the Nixon’s administration attempts to restore U.S. power and influence with the Soviet Union and the Allies during Vietnam. It argues that Berlin was the nexus of these efforts, and that Nixon, like Johnson, viewed the city as a military outpost to use as a diplomatic tool. Since the United States could never employ Berlin in a militarily offensive manner, its worth was more abstract, useful as a way of containing communism, a means of deterrence, and proof to allies of U.S. resolve. All planning involving Berlin was therefore defensive, meant to thwart enemy and friendly attacks alike. He and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, used it as a vehicle to control Ostpolitik, a way to keep NATO bound together and ensure Bonn did not undermine the alliance’s cohesion, and a bargaining chip with the Soviets to reassert U.S. power in the world. Placed in a continuum of how U.S. officials viewed Berlin during

Vietnam, McNamara’s remark to von Hassel in May 1964 was not posturing, nor was

Kissinger speaking in hyperbole when he reasoned that the administration could only

1030 U.S. Army Berlin, “Thousands of Berliners Cheer President Nixon, Chief Executive Lauds Berlin Brigade Troops,” Berlin Observer (Berlin, Germany), March 1, 1969. 347

“defend Berlin by linking its freedom to other Soviet concerns.” 1031 Those comments were instead a function of how Washington viewed commitments and national security strategy, and an assertion of Berlin’s role in them. In that way, U.S. officials in the post- crisis period did not endure Berlin—they used it.

Nixon, Europe, and Détente

When Nixon entered the White House, he had some prior experience with Berlin policy. He had first visited the city in August 1947 as the youngest member of a nineteen- person Congressional select committee tasked with traveling to Europe to study the feasibility of the Marshall Plan. The Herter Committee, named after then-Congressman

Christian Herter, met with European leaders in Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Greece, and Trieste. When the group visited Berlin, Nixon judged the city “hopeless,” given the scale of destruction and the conditions in which millions of Berliners were living.1032 He was kept at arm’s length on Berlin issues as vice president. Though he was present for some meetings where administration strategy and contingency plans were debated, where he was strikingly perceptive, Nixon did not play an active role in helping Eisenhower shape policy.1033 The largest part he played during the Second Berlin Crisis was to sound out the Soviet Union’s intentions in the city when he met with Khrushchev during his

July 1959 Moscow trip.1034

1031 Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), pp. 405-06. 1032 Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), pp. 49-50. 1033 See his comments during a December 17, 1958 cabinet meeting where he argued that Khrushchev was likely seeking a conference. Memorandum of Conference with the President, December 17, 1958, “Berlin – Vol. I (I)” folder, box 6, International Series, White House Offices Files, Office of the Staff Secretary, DDEL. 1034 Memorandum of Conference with Eisenhower, December 11, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 172-77; Memorandum of Conference with Eisenhower, March 6, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 428-37. For the 348

Once he became president, Nixon took an immediate interest in Europe and

Berlin. The Germans had welcomed the new reengagement, especially Kiesinger, who in private called the new president “a man of immense perseverance, good health, great patience and endurance.”1035 Nixon identified the city as one of the three explosive issues in U.S. diplomacy. “The Berlin thing is really more important, really, in terms of world peace, than either the Mideast or . . . Vietnam,” he once told Kissinger. Nixon had even judged Vietnam “the least important” of the hot spots since it “never has risked world war.” In Nixon’s estimation, the importance that Moscow placed on Berlin distinguished it from Vietnam and the Middle East. As far as he was concerned, “Berlin is it. Shit, if anything happens in Berlin, then you’re at it.”1036

Nixon established his views toward Berlin within the first month of his administration, contrary to what critics later argued.1037 In doing so, he signaled to

Moscow that the Four Powers would once again discuss the city. The issue that revitalized U.S. engagement with Berlin was the election controversy that Johnson had left unresolved. Nixon was immediately interested in it because he saw its potential to create another Berlin crisis. In their first meeting, Nixon assured the new West German ambassador to the United States, Rolf Friedemann Pauls, that the United States would

Khrushchev meeting preparation, see Memorandum of Conference with Eisenhower, July 22, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 1029-30; MemCon, July 26, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 1057-69. 1035 MemCon, Kiesinger and Henry Cabot Lodge, November 12, 1968, AAPD, 1968, II: 1451-54. Kissinger and met with State Secretary Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz on November 22, 1968 to exchange foreign policy views: Letter, Duckwitz to Brandt, November 23, 1968, AAPD, 1968, II: 1507-09. 1036 Conversation transcript, Nixon and Kissinger, May 28, 1971, FRUS, 1969–1976, Germany and Berlin, XL: 716. 1037 Most argue Berlin uninterested Nixon, and he only became involved because the allies and Soviets had issued him a fait accompli. See Hillenbrand, Fragments of Our Time, pp. 276-93; Sutterlin and Klein, Berlin, pp. 79-107; William P. Bundy, A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1998), pp. 122, 249-51. 349 stand firm on the FRG’s rights to hold the convention in Berlin. After all, Nixon reasoned, three of the four previous Bundesversammlung had been in the city, and, using language reminiscent of Clay, any crisis originating from it would “not be a cause but a pretext.”1038 In the following weeks, Moscow and Pankow ratcheted up the pressure on

Bonn and Washington, culminating in the GDR’s Minister of the Interior issuing travel bans between the Federal Republic and West Berlin to dissuade the delegates from holding the convention. Though the inter-allied planning group in Bonn gambled that the threat was hollow, Nixon still ordered a review of Berlin contingency plans and prepared for an escalation.1039

At the Siemens factory in February, Nixon had appealed to Moscow to dispense with “the stereotype of Berlin as a ‘provocation,’” and he affirmed that the United States did not “consider the status quo to be satisfactory.” Invoking a Kennedy-esque hopeful message, Nixon argued he would break from the officials who were “trapped in the gray overcast of cold war.” As he saw it, the “men of the past thought in terms of blockades and walls; the men of the future will think in terms of open channels.”1040 The speech angered Dobrynin, who disregarded the détente rhetoric and focused instead on the underlying message, which was, in fact, directed at him and the Kremlin. The timing of the Bundesversammlung controversy and the transfer of power from the Johnson to the

1038 Given that they had a prior relationship, Nixon asked if Pauls might be a suitable candidate for a Washington-Bonn secret backchannel. See footnote 2 of MemCon, Nixon and Pauls, January 31, 1969, FRUS, 1969–1976, Germany and Berlin, XL: 10-12. See ibid. for the first meeting between Nixon and Pauls. 1039 Memorandum, Kissinger to Nixon, February 11, 1969, “East German Travel Ban and Berlin Contingency Planning, FRUS, 1969–1976, Germany and Berlin, XL: 14-19. 1040 Richard Nixon, Remarks at the Siemens Factory, West Berlin, February 27, 1969, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2427. Accessed April 15, 2016. 350

Nixon administration had put Dobrynin and Moscow at a disadvantage. Hoping to block any FRG influence in Berlin but not knowing how the new U.S. president would react to a communist move, he had presented the Kremlin’s position to Secretary of State William

Rogers during their first meeting together, on February 13, 1969. Dobrynin assured

Rogers that the Soviet Union did not want all the city, but it was “not prepared to give

West Berlin” to the Federal Republic. From Moscow’s perspective, Bonn had forced the issue, and whatever the Soviet and East German response would be, it was not directed at the tripartite powers. The Americans, therefore, should not consider the “present activities surrounding Berlin as a provocation.” He instead preferred constructive U.S.-

Soviet relations, which meant maintaining the status quo. Though Dobrynin was speaking about Berlin, there was little doubt that he also hoped the United States would maintain its policy of averting controversy in Europe, the cornerstone of Johnson’s attitude toward the continent for the previous five years.1041

Knowing that Moscow would be listening, Nixon had used his speech at the

Siemens factory to reply to Dobrynin.1042 He sent back particular words that the Soviet ambassador had used in Washington: provocation and status quo.1043 The intention was to make it clear that the Nixon administration would do things differently than its predecessor. First, it did not see the Bundesversammlung as purely a German matter like

Johnson had. Second, Nixon wanted Moscow to disabuse itself of the notion that

1041 Memorandum, Dobrynin and Rogers, February 13, 1969, FRUS, 1969–1976, Germany and Berlin, XL: 19-22 1042 Hillenbrand, Fragments of Our Time, pp. 269-70. 1043 Memorandum, Dobrynin and Rogers, February 13, 1969, FRUS, 1969–1976, Germany and Berlin, XL: 19-22. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 406. 351 allowing the GDR a free hand to harass West Germany was in no way directed at the

United States. As far as he was concerned, any communist move that threatened the guaranteed rights of the Western Powers in Berlin was unacceptable. He was willing to have frank discussions with the Soviets, but he wanted it to be clear that they should not attempt to play Washington against Bonn.1044

Nixon’s actions the week before the speech also spoke loudly. He had increased

U.S. military traffic over the access routes to Berlin as a display of U.S. resolve and to remind—if not publicly embarrass—the GDR about their lack of rights to block Allied access. It was also meant to underline Nixon’s warning to Dobrynin on February 22 that the Soviet Union should not allow any “unilateral acts.”1045 Here, too, Nixon had used his speech to communicate with the Soviet ambassador by reiterating that there should be

“no unilateral move, no illegal act, no form of pressure from any source [to] shake the resolve of the Western nations.”1046 In that way, Nixon was doing as Kennedy had done before, brushing aside the GDR and forcing the Soviets to take command of Berlin issues that directly affected quadripartite relations. Ultimately, the Bundesversammlung took place on March 5 without incident, and the delegates elected as president SPD candidate

Gustav Heinemann. Nixon and Kissinger judged it a victory. They had withstood what

1044 Memorandum, Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, February 14, 1969, “The Berlin Crisis,” “Berlin, Vol. I 1969 [1 of 2]” folder, box 689, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, RNL. A copy of can also be found in FRUS, 1969–1976, Germany and Berlin, XL: 22-24, along with instances of Nixon’s markings of his forwarded copy. 1045 Memorandum, Kissinger to Rogers, Laird, and Helms, February 22, 1969, “Increased Flow of Military Traffic over the Autobahn to and from West Berlin,” “Berlin, Vol. I 1969 [1 of 2]” folder, box 689, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, RNL. For Kissinger’s recollection, see Kissinger, White House Years, p. 406. 1046 Richard Nixon, Remarks at the Siemens Factory, West Berlin, February 27, 1969, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2427. 352 they considered another Berlin crisis—albeit a small one—and successfully distinguished themselves from the Johnson administration’s policies.1047

The long-term significance of the Bundesversammlung issue and Nixon’s Berlin speech was that a dialogue subsequently opened between Washington and Moscow. The process was slow, and began in March with the White House secretly informing

Dobrynin that it was essential the Four Powers normalize access procedures to Berlin.1048

Dobrynin responded positively, and in return Nixon extended an offer to Chairman of the

Council of Ministers on March 26 to begin talks, though it was conditional on all four powers being involved. Despite his consideration of the Allies,

Nixon was not briefing London and Paris. Kosygin positively replied two months later.

Sensing the timing was not ideal due to federal elections in the Federal Republic in

September, Nixon decided to wait for the new government to take power. Gromyko then went public to force immediate talks. In a July 10 address about Moscow’s foreign policy before the Supreme Soviet, he welcomed an exchange of views on how to avoid further complications in Berlin.1049 Forced to reply, the Western Powers responded as one on

August 7, calling for access guarantees.1050 It took over a month for the Soviets to answer, and the response was disappointing. Kremlin officials did not want to discuss access yet; they were still transfixed on FRG activities in Berlin and demanded that they

1047 Memorandum, Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, February 14, 1969, “The Berlin Crisis,” “Berlin, Vol. I 1969 [1 of 2]” folder, box 689, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, RNL; Kissinger, White House Years, p. 406. 1048 Memorandum, Kissinger to Nixon, March 6, 1969, “Conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin, Lunch, March 3,” “Berlin and European Security (Tabs 1-56) Vol. I March 3, 1969 – June 14, 1971 [1 of 6]” folder, box 57, NSC files, HAK Office Files, Country Files, RNL. 1049 Address by Foreign Minister Gromyko Before the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Regarding Germany and European Security, July 10, 1969, Documents on Germany, 1944–1985 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State Publication, 1986), p. 1046. 1050 The oral reply is quoted in Editorial Note, FRUS, 1969–1976, Germany and Berlin, XL: 60-62. 353 first stop. The Soviets had overlooked the Brandt-penned offer within the Western

Powers’ démarche that Bonn would curtail its activities as a sign of good faith. The lack of notice, however, may have been a product of its vagueness in writing, as well as the two years’ worth of FRG actions. A sudden reversal of policy, therefore, would have appeared suspicious.1051

Brushing aside Bonn’s offer, the Kremlin stated that their negotiating position stood on three principles: West Berlin was a separate entity, Four Power rights were applicable only in West Berlin, and the access routes to the Western sectors went through sovereign GDR territory. The first two positions were in direct contradiction to the

West’s views, and the third had been a contentious issue for years. In an October 20 meeting with Nixon, Dobrynin again tried to get a bilateral U.S.-Soviet negotiation, but again Nixon demurred, since Moscow could use the bilateral nature of the talks to drive a wedge between the Western Powers.1052

Attempts to hold talks on Berlin therefore stalled in late October 1969. In the meantime, a new government had taken power in Bonn. Despite there being no concrete plan to hold negotiations on the city, both sides’ appeals to one another were not dead letters. In the nine months between his visit to Berlin and exploratory talks stalling,

Nixon had emerged with a clear policy. His presence in the city and his speech there was a declaration of his views. The United States would defend its rights, though it did not see

1051 Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 406-08. U.S. draft text to the September 12 reply: Telegram, State Department to U.S. Embassy Bonn, November 21, 1969, “Draft Text for Tripartite Demarche in Moscow,” “Country Files – Europe – Germany Vol. III – July 1969 – 11-69” folder, box 682, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, RNL. 1052 Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 406-08. The State Department agreed: Sutterlin and Klein, Berlin, pp. 118-19. 354

Berlin in terms of the Cold War’s zero-sum game. Attempts to negotiate reinforced his statements; the impasse merely came down to disagreements on preconditions. Berlin would be an important early component of Nixon’s foreign policy, a way to reassert U.S. power and reengage with the world through détente.

Was Nixon’s détente an evolution of Johnson’s bridge building, or something altogether different?1053 The two men shared means but they differed on ends. Nixon’s détente was limited in its objectives. The continued slow burn of Vietnam demanded much of his attention, and like Johnson, he intended détente to promote stability between

Washington and Moscow, particularly in Europe. The good will produced from rapprochement was to serve two connected goals: ensuring that a crisis would not erupt in

Europe between the superpowers which could then distract the United States from

Vietnam, and enlisting the Soviets’ help in bringing Hanoi to the negotiating table. The first goal was not too dissimilar from what Johnson had attempted, particularly his efforts to keep Berlin uncontroversial. Yet Johnson’s aim in improving relations was to allow him to focus on Vietnam. Nixon wished to use Moscow to disengage from there. He understood that it was impossible to convince the Soviets to jettison their ideological and political objectives, but he hoped to contain the superpower competition to minimize confrontation in peripheral areas and establish means of negotiating contentious issues in areas that mattered. Getting both sides to agree on what was crucial and secondary was easier said than done. Moreover, Nixon would find that securing a mandate at home was

1053 Jussi Hanhimäki, who is perhaps the administration’s most unrelenting critic, argues Nixon and Kissinger’s objectives and strategy were not extraordinary when placed in a U.S. Cold War strategy continuum: “An Elusive Grand Design,” in Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969-1977, eds., Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 25-44. 355 difficult, and both East and West would eventually discover that in trying to stabilize the international system, they had in fact discredited the Cold War and thus their competition with one another.1054

In the meantime, though, Nixon sought to revolutionize U.S. diplomacy. He would do so in relative solitude with Kissinger. Together, they steered the ship of state throughout Nixon’s presidency, successfully cutting out the State Department from playing a meaningful role in forming policy until Kissinger became Secretary of State in

September 1973. As National Security Advisor, Kissinger attempted to bring a realist perspective to U.S. diplomacy by applying nineteenth-century statecraft to a nuclear world, modeled after Metternich’s balance-of-power system that he had studied during his doctoral work.1055 His scholarship on defense planning and nuclear issues and his previous experience as a special advisor to both Eisenhower and Kennedy on Berlin matters gave him a unique perspective of the city in 1969, as well as unprecedented access to prior administration’s thinking on Berlin planning.1056 One of his more substantial contributions to the Kennedy White House’s thinking on the city was a May

1961 study on contingency planning. He judged all current plans vague or deficient, and called for a complete overhaul of the U.S. Army’s contingencies on the basis that they

1054 Nixon, RN, p. 941. Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985), pp. 24-27, 1107. For the latter two arguments: Jussi Hanhimäki, The Rise and Fall of Détente: American Foreign Policy and the Transformation of the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2013). 1055 For the most complete work on the Nixon-Kissinger relationship, see Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power (New York: Harper Collins, 2007). Discussion of Kissinger’s doctoral work and his contemporary views can be found on pp. 45-46. See also Jussi Hanhimäki, The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 7-8. 1056 Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper, 1957). His suggestions on nuclear weapons can be found in: Memorandum, Kissinger to Kennedy, February 28, 1961, “HAK-5 folder,” box 462A, National Security Files, Kissinger Series, JFKL. 356 were halfhearted. The primary argument that Bundy took away from the “powerful document” was the suggestion to take the offensive on German reunification.1057

Kissinger had foreshadowed his strategy of linkage that would later prove so successful during Nixon’s presidency when he argued that linking reunification with Eastern security could solve the current diplomatic situation. In practice, that meant demanding free elections in the GDR, or dangling a guarantee of existing frontiers to Poland and

Czechoslovakia in hopes of highlighting the differences of national interests between the

Soviet Union and the satellite nations, either of which could place Moscow in a compromising position.1058 Kennedy never acted on the paper’s more profound suggestions, but Kissinger’s prior experience contemplating the Berlin Question prepared him to tackle the same issues in 1969.1059

Unlike the two preceding administrations, Nixon was not interested in promoting democracy to contain communism when he took office. Rather, he and Kissinger faced the daunting task of regaining control over the tail-spin that American power was experiencing due to Vietnam. In some ways, the duo, like Johnson, were willing to create a Soviet-American condominium in Europe to achieve that objective.1060 The superpowers had a mutual interest in such an arrangement, since neither were the only players with predominant concerns and power. For the Americans, Europe and Japan had

1057 Memorandum for the President, Bundy to Kennedy, June 10, 1961, “Berlin,” “Germany, Berlin Subjects Aide Memoire 6/4/61 – 6/16/61” folder, box 86, Country File, National Security File, JFKL. 1058 Memorandum, Kissinger to Kennedy, May 5, 1961, “Berlin,” “HAK-26” folder, box 462A, National Security Files, Kissinger Series, JFKL. 1059 For Kissinger’s pre-Nixon White House years, see Niall Ferguson, Kissinger: 1923-1968: The Idealist (New York: Penguin, 2015); Jeremi Suri, Henry Kissinger and the American Century (New York: Belknap, 2009). 1060 Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe, pp. 171-72. 357 economically recovered from World War II and now directly competed with U.S. production. For the Soviets, China had emerged as an alternative leader of the international communist movement. Relations with the Soviets and the European allies were paramount in Nixon’s strategy for confronting this new multipolarity. While the

United States had been committing its attention and assets in Southeast Asia, Brezhnev had stabilized the Soviet economy and attempted to close the strategic gap with the

Americans.1061 In the wake of the Warsaw Pact’s crackdown in Czechoslovakia and the lack of an American response, the Kremlin had created an ideological framework in the

Brezhnev Doctrine that viewed Eastern European stability as integral to the security of the Soviet Union.1062 Meanwhile, U.S. relations with Western Europe were at their lowest point since the end of World War II, and there was an impending decision on NATO’s future. By rule in the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, members could leave after twenty years. France’s exit from the command structure three years prior to that date, combined with détente changing the complexion of the East-West competition, meant NATO proponents had to find a new future for the alliance if it was to survive another twenty years.1063

1061 Philip Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy: An Economic History of the USSR from 1945 (New York: Routledge, 2014). Mike Bowker, “Brezhnev and Superpower Relations,” in Brezhnev Reconsidered, eds. Edwin Bacon and Mark Sandle (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2002), pp. 90-109. 1062 Matthew J. Ouimet, The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003). 1063 Luke A. Nichter, Richard Nixon and Europe: The Reshaping of the Postwar Atlantic World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). For a survey of Nixon’s détente, see Robert D. Schulzinger, “Détente in the Nixon-Ford Years, 1969-1976,” in The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. II, eds. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 373-94. A good survey from a more Soviet perspective can be found in Vojtech Mastny, “Superpower Détente: U.S.-Soviet Relations, 1969-72,” in American Détente and German Ostpolitik, 1969-1972, eds., David C. Geyer and Bernd Schaefer (Washington, D.C.: Supplement No. 1 to the Bulletin of the German Historical Institute, 2004), pp. 19-25. 358

In a press conference on July 25, 1969 on Guam, Nixon unveiled his policy doctrine. The United States would keep its treaty commitments, but it would no longer mobilize its own forces everywhere to defend against aggression anywhere. It would, however, still provide a nuclear umbrella over allies vulnerable to an enemy nuclear attack. Allied nations also would continue receiving material assistance, but Washington would not dictate defense, political development, and economic affairs. Nixon’s comments on Guam are traditionally seen as U.S. policy toward Asia generally and

Vietnam specifically, but there was little in his message that differed from what he had been telling the Europeans, since it outlined his thoughts on burden sharing writ large.1064

Nixon’s strategy for Europe was to draw the Soviets closer, which would require the two sides in some cases to spurn their allies and avoid a third rail in superpower relations. While such actions had the potential for charges of hypocrisy, Nixon’s invitation to European leaders to be more independent helped counterbalance criticisms.

The primary feature of the Nixon-Kissinger era was an intense flurry of direct negotiations with the East. Ironically, though Nixon was attempting to cast off the image of bipolarity, which the Allies now despised, and reconcile the military parity between the United States and the Soviet Union, his strategy in fact perpetuated the superpower system.1065 Still, as in the Johnson era, the biggest risk of a détente strategy, apart from congressional disapproval, was loosening transatlantic cohesion and risking the very

1064 For a contrast to Nichter, see Jeffrey Kimball, “The : A Saga of Misunderstanding,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 1 (March 2006): 59-74. For his comments to European leaders, see, for example, MemCon, April 11, 1969, “Notes on President Nixon’s Meeting with NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers,” FRUS, NATO, 1969-1972, XLI: 51-56. 1065 Robert S. Litwak, Détente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and Pursuit of Stability, 1969-1976 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 359 thing toward which Nixon and Kissinger were striving, the restoration of U.S. power. It was for this reason that the two men grew agitated when they looked across the Atlantic in fall 1969 and viewed a new West German government that threatened to undermine all that they had been building for nine months.

Détente with a German Accent

On October 21, 1969, Brandt took over the chancellorship from Kiesinger. The

Grand Coalition had crumbled after an internal dispute about revaluation of the Deutsche

Mark, followed by Brandt’s own exit to form a social-liberal alliance with the Free

Democratic Party (FDP). When he came to power, he hoped to set FRG foreign policy on a course that did not require the supervision of the Four Powers. He brought with him an influential advisor from his days in Berlin. From 1960 to 1966, had headed the city’s Press and Information Office, before going to Bonn to work at the Foreign

Office as director of the Planning Staff. With Brandt as Chancellor, Bahr became State

Secretary, a post the two men decided would allow him the most leeway in navigating what were sure to be difficult waters.1066

They sought to foster a feeling of West German self-reliance and a belief that, at least on the policymaking level, the nation had atoned for its World War II sins. They did so out of a conviction that past FRG policy and current Western plans did little to improve German relations. As governing mayor of Berlin, Brandt had confronted the human costs of Germany’s division daily, which spurred him to mitigate the suffering, as

1066 For Bahr on the Planning Staff: Egon Bahr, Zu Meiner Zeit (Munich: Karl Blessing Verlag, 1996), pp. 224-47. 360 he saw it, of his countrymen inside the GDR.1067 Though there is a disagreement in the literature about when Brandt began forming what would become Ostpolitik—either a variation of Kennedy’s rapprochement policy or a precursor to it—there is no doubt the foundation for a more assertive Germany was laid in the Second Berlin Crisis, a result of the loss of confidence Bonn felt toward the Western Allies’ earnestness about solving the

German Question.1068 Brandt began publicly articulating his view of détente while mayor, and unveiled a plan for coexistence and meaningful contact with the communist East in a lecture at Harvard on October 2, 1962.1069 Nine months later, he argued that the German

Question could only be solved with Moscow and not against it.1070

Brandt’s time as foreign minister and Bahr’s stint as Planning Staff director had also influenced their outlooks. The saber rattling over Berlin in summer 1968 and the relative silence from the Allies in the wake of the Czechoslovakia crisis had exasperated

Bahr. In a September 1968 memorandum, he argued that the West preferred not to solve

1067 For an insightful essay on the Berlin Wall’s role in Ostpolitik and détente, see Hope Harrison, “The Berlin Wall, Ostpolitik, and Détente,” in American Détente and German Ostpolitik, 1969-1972, eds., David C. Geyer and Bernd Schaefer (Washington, D.C.: Supplement No. 1 to the Bulletin of the German Historical Institute, 2004), pp. 5-18. 1068 Kara Stibora Fulcher, “A Sustainable Position? The United States, the Federal Republic, and the Ossification of Allied Policy on Germany, 1958-1962,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Spring 2002): 283-307. 1069 For the argument that Brandt adopted Kennedy’s détente policy, see Diethelm Prowe, “Die Anfänge der Brandtschen Ostpolitik in Berlin 1961-1963: Eine Untersuchung zur Endphase des Kalten Krieges,” in Aspekte deutscher Außenpolitik im 20. Jahrhundert, eds. Wolfgang Benz and Hermann Graml (Stuttgart: DVA, 1976), pp. 249-86. For the argument that Brandt’s ideas predated Kennedy’s, see Wolfgang Schmidt, Kalter Krieg, Koexistenz und kleine Schritte: Willy Brandt und die Deutschlandpolitik 1948-1963 (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2001). For a more nuanced argument, see Arne Hofmann, The Emergence of Détente in Europe: Brandt, Kennedy and the Formation of Ostpolitik (New York: Routledge, 2007). 1070 Brandt quotes from and expands on his Harvard lecture in Willy Brandt, The Ordeal of Coexistence (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963). For the Tutzing speech, see Willy Brandt, Governing Mayor of Berlin, speech at the Evangelischen Akademie Tutzing, edited by the Bundesministerium für innerdeutsche Beziehungen, Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, 1963, Vol. IV, No. 9 (Frankfurt am Main: Alfred Metzner Verlag, 1978), pp. 565-72. 361 the German Question to keep the Federal Republic a deferential ally, for which Berlin served as an “admirable genuine argument.”1071 The cumulative result of these experiences was the new government’s willingness to break from policies that had formed the foundation of Bonn’s relationship with the Western Allies and the Warsaw

Pact, effectively ending Adenauer’s conception of West Germany’s place in the postwar world. Rather than challenging the status quo in Europe, Bonn would now accept it.1072

Ostpolitik was based on two stages, small steps (kleine Schritte) followed by change through rapprochement (Wandlung durch Annäherung).1073 Brandt and Bahr understood that overtures to the Soviets were necessary since German reunification would only occur if Moscow allowed it. To show good faith, Brandt’s first government declaration as chancellor was to de facto recognize the GDR, which occurred on October

28, 1969. The move signaled a fundamental shift in Bonn’s outlook, as it was a clear rejection of the .1074 Since 1955, FRG policy had been to disavow any country that diplomatically recognized the GDR in a bid to isolate the communist government there and bring about reunification. The policy had instead isolated Bonn, as more countries recognized the East German regime by the mid-1960s. To mitigate the

1071 Memorandum, Egon Bahr, September 11, 1968, AAPD, 1968, II: 1132-33. 1072 For Brandt’s thinking on détente before he became chancellor, see Arne Hofmann, The Emergence of Détente in Europe: Brandt, Kennedy, and the Formation of Ostpolitik (New York: Routledge, 2007); Gottfried Niedhart, “The East-West Problem as Seen from Berlin: Willy Brandt’s Early Ostpolitik,” in Wilfried Loth, ed., Europe, Cold War and Coexistence, 1953-1965 (New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 285- 96. 1073 Bahr had outlined these steps in his own speech at the Evangelical Academy in Tutzing, a day before Brandt’s: Egon Bahr, Head of the Press and Information Office for the Land of Berlin, speech at the Evangelischen Akademie Tutzing, edited by the Bundesministerium für innerdeutsche Beziehungen, Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, 1963, Vol. IV, No. 9 (Frankfurt am Main: Alfred Metzner Verlag, 1978), pp. 572-75. 1074 For a particularly scathing assessment of the Hallstein Doctrine, see William Glenn Gray, Germany’s Cold War: The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 1949-1969 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003). 362 damage, Brandt accepted the existence of two German states, but he did so by claiming that both existed “within one German nation,” rather than recognizing the GDR as a foreign state in international law.1075 Two weeks later, he announced the Federal

Republic would hold renunciation of force talks with the Soviets. Brandt and Bahr understood how historically significant the previous war was to Moscow. Before he became chancellor, Brandt had signaled that he understood the “realities,” as the Soviets put it, of the German defeat, and even devised his own phrase, “clearing away the debris.”1076 Part of this rubble removal was acknowledging the existence of two German states, but also recognizing Yalta’s redrawing of Germany’s eastern border on the Oder-

Neisse line.

Ostpolitik’s grand design was to undermine the communist hold on the East through peaceful means, particularly in the GDR.1077 When he was governing mayor,

Brandt had supported Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder’s policy of “knocking at the kitchen window,” a phrase that fancifully described the plan to isolate Ulbricht and the communist government in East Germany. Yet Brandt had argued that the West should also “knock at the front door” of Berlin to incrementally solve the German Question, and

1075 Statement by Chancellor Brandt before the Bundestag on the Goals of the New West German Government, October 28, 1969, Documents on Germany, 1944–1985 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State Publication, 1986), pp. 1049-1050. For U.S. views, see Telegram, Rush to Rogers, October 28, 1969, “Country Files – Europe – Germany Vol. III – July 1969 – 11-69” folder, box 682, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, RNL. See also, Memorandum, Kissinger to Nixon, March 25, 1970, “Consequences of the Recognition of East Germany,” “Country Files, Europe, Germany Vol. IV 12/69 – 9 Apr 70” folder, box 683, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, RNL. 1076 Memorandum, State Department to Kissinger, October 6, 1969, “Political Consequences of SPD-FDP Coalition in the Federal Republic,” “Country Files – Europe – Germany Vol. III – July 1969 – 11-69” folder, box 682, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, RNL. 1077 For the levels and timing of Ostpolitik, see Gottfried Niedhart, “Ostpolitik: Phases, Short-Term Objectives, and Grand Design,” in American Détente and German Ostpolitik, 1969-1972, eds., David C. Geyer and Bernd Schaefer (Washington, D.C.: Supplement No. 1 to the Bulletin of the German Historical Institute, 2004), pp. 118-36. 363 he had made that pitch to the Americans in May 1964 meetings.1078 The Western Allies then, as always, had been willing to wait for a cataclysmic collapse of Soviet power, which they believed would ultimately facilitate German reunification. Assured that a communist downfall was inevitable, they preferred not to run significant risks in the service of reunification. Brandt was less patient. By opening trade across the two states and institutionalizing German-German contact, Brandt and Bahr hoped to deny East

Berlin’s ability to demonize the West and thus erode the regime’s hold on East

Germany.1079 There was a difference in scale between the American and German plans, too. Nixon and Kissinger’s grand strategy was global, but Brandt and Bahr’s was regional, intended to promote peace and stability in Europe as a means of reunifying their country. As an Eastern policy, then, it was closer to Johnson’s bridge-building than

Nixon’s détente.

If all went according to Bonn’s plans, recognition of East Germany would ensure

Berlin’s security. Brandt had always contended that the city was militarily secure—even more than towns like Lübeck and Hof—because of the presence of American soldiers.1080

That security only existed for as long as U.S. units were based there, however. The concept had come from Peter Bender, an influential Berlin journalist who had articulated many of the details of West German détente that Brandt and Bahr would adopt. Bender

1078 Telegram, State Dept to U.S. embassy Bonn, May 20, 1964, FRUS, 1964-1968, XV: 94-96. 1079 Gottfried Niedhart, “Ostpolitik and its Impact on the Federal Republic’s Relationship with the West,” in The Making of Détente: Eastern and Western Europe in the Cold War, 1965-75, eds. Wilfried Loth, Georges-Henri Soutou, (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 120. Mary Elise Sarotte, “The Frailties of Grand Strategies: A Comparison of Détente and Ostpolitik,” in Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969-1977, eds., Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 148. 1080 MemCon, Brandt and Çağlayangil İhsan Sabri, October 9, 1968, “Gespräch des Bundesministers Brandt mit dem türkischen Außenminister Çağlayangil in New York,” AAPD, 1968, II: 1294-98. 364 argued for Bonn to recognize the GDR in exchange for a communist guarantee of rights for the Western Powers in Berlin. If the East Germans demurred, an offer of accommodation from Bonn to Moscow could provide a level of linkage to ensure that the

GDR would guarantee West Berlin’s security. It was a crucial concept, and one that the

State Department’s German experts recognized as the “single most effective factor” in bringing about the eventual Four Power negotiations.1081

Brandt and Bahr crafted their policy to work within détente, not against it.1082 The problem was that Ostpolitik attempted to work within a system that involved six governments, with nearly as many competing policies. Moreover, their strategy was directed at the Eastern Bloc, but it was not monolithic. Bonn could not confidently look east and hope for a brighter future without warily looking west and fret that the Western

Powers would quash the policy before it was even instituted. Brandt contended that his policy did not conflict with his allies, but instead required them.1083 Indeed, this is why

Bahr met with Kissinger in the White House two weeks after the FRG election, before the new government was installed. In their October 13 meeting, Bahr unveiled the issues that the government would tackle first and warned the Americans that they should “expect less of a guilt complex in Bonn” and a “more self-reliant and not always compliant

1081 Peter Bender, Offensive Entspannung: Möglichkeit für Deutschland (Cologne and Berlin: Kiepenheuer and Witsch, 1964), pp. 147-48. Sutterlin and Klein, Berlin, p. 83. 1082 Werner Link argues Ostpolitik was evidence of German dependence on Western policy. “Ostpolitik: Détente German-Style and Adapting to America,” in The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945-1990: A Handbook, Vol. II, Detlef Junker et al. (Washington, D.C.: German Historical Institute, 2004), pp. 33-39. 1083 Holger Klitzing, “To Grin and Bear It: The Nixon Administration and Ostpolitik,” in Ostpolitik, 1969- 1974: European and Global Responses, eds. Carole Fink and Bernd Schaefer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 82. 365 attitude.”1084 Ostpolitik was thus divided into four policies, and not solely about the

East.1085

The response from both East and West toward Brandt’s alternative approach to

FRG foreign policy was mixed.1086 East Berlin and Moscow were aware of Bonn’s ultimate objective, but they reasoned their system could rebuff Ostpolitik’s assumptions.

Meanwhile, they would benefit from the concessions that the West Germans were willing to give.1087 The West was more apprehensive. Due to Bahr’s White House visit, the

Americans were prepared for what an SPD foreign policy would look like. Their new autonomy, according to Bahr, meant the West Germans would not inquire every two months whether the Americans still loved them. “Thank God,” Kissinger had replied, and he reassured Bahr that Nixon wanted to deal with Germany “as a partner, not a client.”1088 Despite the assurance, the West Germans’ sudden shift made Washington anxious. The day after Brandt’s Bundestag speech, Kissinger summed up Washington’s

1084 Memorandum, Kissinger to Nixon, “Visit by Willy Brandt’s Emissary, Egon BAHR,” October 20, 1969, “Country Files – Europe – Germany Vol. III July 1969 – 11-69” folder, box 682, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, RNL. Bahr’s report to Bonn can be found in Memorandum, Bahr, October 14, 1969, “Gespräch mit Kissinger am 13.10.69,” AAPD, 1969, II: 1114-18. Bahr’s recollections are in Zu Meiner Zeit, p. 271. 1085 For a range of arguments about Ostpolitik’s intended audiences, see , In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (New York: Random House, 1993), p. 38; Irwin M. Wall, “The United States and Two Ostpolitiks: De Gaulle and Brandt,” in The Making of Détente: Eastern and Western Europe in the Cold War, 1965-75, eds. Wilfried Loth and Georges-Henri Soutou (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 133-50; Sarotte, “The Frailties of Grand Strategies,” p. 146. 1086 For an excellent survey of the Allied responses, see Niedhart, “Ostpolitik and Its Impact on the Federal Republic’s Relationship with the West,” pp. 117-32. 1087 Bonn’s initial approaches to the East complicated GDR-Soviet relations in a way that was strikingly similar to what was occurring in the West, see Mary Elise Sarotte, Dealing with the Devil: East Germany, Détente, & Ostpolitik, 1969-1973 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), pp. 30-36. 1088 Memorandum, Kissinger to Nixon, “Visit by Willy Brandt’s Emissary, Egon BAHR,” October 20, 1969, “Country Files – Europe – Germany Vol. III July 1969 – 11-69” folder, box 682, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, RNL. Study, “Polices of Putative Brandt Government,” October 13, 1969, “Country Files – Europe – Germany Vol. III July 1969 – 11-69” folder, box 682, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, RNL. Bahr, Zu Meiner Zeit, p. 272. 366 skepticism when he wrote, “We will come to regret German ‘flexibility.’”1089 The Nixon

Doctrine was inherently defensive. It sought to protect whatever power the United States still enjoyed. Brandt’s policy could allow the Federal Republic to operate outside of channels Washington controlled. When the White House took stock of Bonn’s policy, they concluded it would impact U.S. force levels in Europe, a European security conference, East-West force reductions, and Western unity itself. Thus, the Nixon presidency, despite its differences with the previous administration, found itself guarding the same issues that Johnson had.1090 The Federal Republic, though, had replaced France as Washington’s primary antagonist within the alliance.

The implications of Ostpolitik worried the Western Allies for three specific reasons. First, Bonn’s policy had the potential to disrupt the variables that could lead to a solution for the German Question, which might undermine Allied rights in Berlin. For two decades, the East-West confrontation over Germany was perpetuated because neither side could proceed or retreat without endangering their own objectives and security.

Under Kiesinger, the Federal Republic had flirted with being an outside factor that could break the stalemate. With even more robust attempts now from Brandt, it appeared

Bonn’s gains could come at the short-term expense of the Western powers.1091

1089 Hand-written note on Memorandum, Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, “Brandt on Vietnam: Neutral; On the US: More Independent,” October 29, 1969, “Country Files – Europe – Germany Vol. III July 1969 – 11- 69” folder, box 682, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, RNL. 1090 Klitzing, “To Grin and Bear It,” p. 83. For the assessment: Memorandum, Kissinger to Nixon, April 6, 1970, “Your Meeting with Ambassador Kenneth Rush (Bonn), Tuesday, April 7 at 4:30 p.m.,” “Country Files Europe, Germany, Vol. IV 12/69 – 9 Apr 70” folder, Box 683, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, RNL. 1091 Gottfried Niedhart, “Ostpolitik and its Impact on the Federal Republic’s Relationship with the West,” pp. 117-28. 367

Second, Brandt’s newfound ability to maneuver within East-West relations could make the containment of Germany difficult.1092 Despite evidence of a reformed Germany,

France mistrusted Bonn’s ultimate objective. If the Federal Republic decoupled from the

Allies, Paris worried, it could quickly turn into a runaway train, one with an amoral foreign policy that increasingly looked east and had growing nationalism, a standing army, and a revitalized economy. Kissinger worried that Germany would, “in less scrupulous hands,” transform into “a new form of classic German nationalism,” harkening back to when the country would “maneuver freely between East and West.”

For him, there were uncomfortable similarities between Ostpolitik and Rapallo. 1093

Third, a more independent Bonn could complicate Western security.1094 NATO’s cohesiveness depended upon its members coordinating their Eastern policies. That cohesion had been tested when France left NATO’s command structure in 1966, and U.S. officials worried that the Soviet Union would use an independent FRG policy as a wedge to drive apart the alliance.1095 Rusk fretted that possibility in Kiesinger’s policies in 1968, and Nixon had confronted German officials about the same issue the next year. “The era of John Foster Dulles [is] over,” he told Chairman of the FDP . With new international realities, Nixon argued that “new ways may have to be tried” when finding a

1092 Gottfried Niedhart, “Ostpolitik and its Impact on the Federal Republic’s Relationship with the West,” pp. 117-28. 1093 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 409. Bernd Schaefer disputes Kissinger’s argument that he worried about German nationalism during Ostpolitik. Bernd Schaefer, “The Nixon Administration and West German Ostpolitik,” in The Strained Alliance: U.S.-European Relations from Nixon to Carter, eds. Matthias Schultz and Thomas A. Schwartz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 61. 1094 Jean-François Juneau, “The Limits of Linkage: The Nixon Administration and Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik, 1969-72,” The International History Review, Vol. 33, No. 2 (June 2011): 277-97. 1095 Hanhimäki, The Flawed Architect, p. 85. For the best analysis of Brandt’s policies and their intended and unintended effects on NATO, see Schoenborn, “NATO Forever?” pp. 74-88. 368 solution to the German Question. Yet, he advised Scheel, who would become foreign minister four months later, “not to pay a price which might impair the forces built up in the FRG.”1096 West German officials claimed that Ostpolitik was compatible with NATO, and even strengthened the alliance’s technological and economic ties. The contention of some historians that Kissinger worried more about the Kremlin gaining leverage than the

German role in détente overlooks the intertwined ways in which Bonn could disrupt tripartite-FRG relations and policies as well as Nixon’s grand design.1097

Much like Johnson and Rusk, Nixon and Kissinger were earnest about West

Germany taking a more active role in its own affairs and they saw no incompatibility between Western unity and FRG normalization of relations with the GDR, so long as that assertiveness did not disrupt transatlantic and U.S.-Soviet relations. In their estimation,

Ostpolitik could do both. On a personal level, the two men were dismissive of Brandt and

Bahr’s abilities, which lead them to reject the existence of any shrewd grand design from

Bonn. They understood that the West Germans had honest intentions, but they also feared that Ostpolitik could open Pandora’s Box, and FRG officials would not have the skills to close it again. As far as Kissinger was concerned, the policy had no good outcomes, primarily because communists, not Bonn, controlled the process. Failure “could jeopardize their political lives”; success “could create a momentum that may shake

Germany’s domestic stability and unhinge its international position.”1098

1096 MemCon, Nixon and Walter Scheel, June 13, 1969, “Country Files – Europe – Germany Vol. III July 1969 – 11-69” folder, box 682, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, RNL. 1097 Hanhimäki, The Flawed Architect, p. 87. 1098 See a February 16, 1970 Kissinger memo to Nixon, on which Nixon wrote in the margins, “A very perceptive piece.” Memorandum, Kissinger to Nixon, February 16, 1970, “Brandt’s Eastern Policy,” “Country Files Europe, Germany, Vol. IV 12/69 – 9 Apr 70” folder, Box 683, NSC Files, Country Files- Europe, RNL. 369

Nonetheless, there was little Nixon and Kissinger could do about Ostpolitik.

Much of that was because of a change of momentum within the Alliance. Whereas

Erhard found it difficult to disagree with his ally’s Southeast Asia policy in 1964, Nixon and Kissinger now found it difficult to disagree with Bonn’s Eastern Europe policy in

1969. With war still raging in Vietnam and American power waning, Washington could not expend the energy to make Bonn rethink their strategy. Moreover, nothing about

Ostpolitik publicly threatened détente—it, like the American plan, was a call for peace.

Nixon and Kissinger ultimately judged it unlikely they could kill Ostpolitik. Instead, they would co-opt it, and Berlin would be their vehicle to do so.

After several months of relative silence between Moscow and Washington, the second phase of the Berlin negotiations began in December 1969 with the Western capitals’ reply to the Soviets’ vexing September 12 note. The greatest significance of the exchange was that all parties agreed to start Berlin talks in January 1970. Much had occurred between September and December 1969, though. By the end of the year, Nixon and Kissinger’s careful moves toward a quadripartite understanding on Berlin had run into the Brandt government’s eagerness for results in the first stage of Ostpolitik. To make matters worse for Nixon, the Soviets had sensed an easier path toward their objectives and pivoted their focus from Washington to Bonn to secure guarantees that the

FRG would abandon claims to Berlin. Brezhnev and Gromyko were also keen to expand foreign policy in Europe for their own influence among the Soviet elite and to control 370 bilateral exchanges between the Federal Republic and the Eastern Bloc countries.1099

With this new variable in their otherwise calculated approach to improving access, Nixon and Kissinger had to protect their interests and somehow insert themselves between the

Bonn-Moscow channel.1100

That task appeared difficult, if not impossible, in November. When Bonn approached Moscow on November 15 about beginning negotiations on a renunciation of force agreement, they had done so unilaterally. The move angered the Americans, and

Ambassador to the Federal Republic, Kenneth Rush, criticized Brandt for not coordinating his advance with the already ongoing tripartite approach to Moscow. After all, the two sides had agreed in Bahr and Kissinger’s October 13 meeting that they would coordinate the West German renunciation of force offer with another Western Powers’ initiative on Berlin. For months, the Americans had been resisting offers from Dobrynin to have bilateral talks on Berlin to present a united front; now the Germans had undercut that effort.1101 In replying to Rush’s demand for an explanation, the German foreign office “made some rather lame excuse,” Kissinger reported to Nixon. The excuse: The

Assistant Secretary forgot to remind the Chancellor; moreover, the Soviet response to the

West German démarche was “unexpectedly rapid.” The Americans were incredulous.

They assumed Brandt had made a calculated risk, thinking it was worth weathering the

1099 Andrey Edemskiy, “Dealing with Bonn: and the Soviet Response to West German Ostpolitik,” in Ostpolitik, 1969-1974: European and Global Responses, eds., Carole Fink and Bernd Schaefer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 16-18. 1100 German historians, who rely almost exclusively on FRG documents, incorrectly assert that Brandt led while Nixon followed on Berlin. For the best example of this position, see Schaefer, “The Nixon Administration and West German Ostpolitik,” pp.45-64. 1101 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 408. 371 storm of angry allies if he could guarantee that his first offer to Moscow did not get bogged down in quadripartite wrangling.1102

Perception mattered more than reality for the Nixon White House. Brandt and

Bahr were not sidestepping Berlin talks. The West German officials had designed their attempts at normalizing relations in Europe to include a quadripartite agreement on

Berlin. Bahr had presented this linkage to the Soviets in their discussions on a renunciation of force agreement in Moscow, telling Gromyko on January 30, 1970 that

Berlin should not remain “an island of the Cold War.”1103 The Soviets were receptive to making a Four Power understanding on the city conditional to any renunciation of force agreement because they could then use quadripartite machinery to ensure the West

Germans would not assert political rights to the city. In that regard, ironically, Nixon and

Kissinger had an ally in the Kremlin.

With a quadripartite agreement on Berlin a prerequisite to a renunciation of force agreement, the Americans were now able to referee the FRG-Soviet rapprochement.

Being part of the discussion on Berlin allowed Nixon and Kissinger the ability to control

Ostpolitik’s pace and reach. By default, it also meant that they could protect what they originally feared about Brandt’s policy, the erosion of American rights and the potential for Moscow to tempt Bonn with an offer that would undermine Western security.1104 The

West Germans might not have a seat at the discussion table, but the very framework

1102 Memorandum, Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, “Brandt’s Letter to the President and Bonn Approaches to Moscow,” November 25, 1969, “Country Files – Europe – Germany Vol. III July 1969 – 11-69” folder, box 682, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, RNL. For Rush’s report, see Telegram, Rush to Rogers, November 21, 1969, “Country Files – Europe – Germany Vol. III July 1969 – 11-69” folder, box 682, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, RNL. 1103 MemCon, Bahr and Gromyko, January 30, 1970, AAPD, 1970, I: 108. 1104 Kissinger discusses this paradox in Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 405-06. 372 constructed for the negotiations allowed them room inside which to develop and improve their relationship with the GDR. It did not hurt, too, that failure in the negotiations would be the fault of the Four Powers and not Bonn. For all the efforts to carve out a piece of détente that could serve German interests, their plan was entirely dependent on the Four

Powers.1105 Thus, the paradox of West Berlin—a city whose freedom was only guaranteed through its continued occupation—ensured that the East-West competition would remain and threaten Ostpolitik in its early stage. That paradox was an advantage for the Americans, but only if they could ensure that Bonn’s policy did not erode Four

Power rights.

Linkage, Berlin, and Co-opting Ostpolitik

Nixon and Kissinger’s strategy to simultaneously secure U.S. objectives, control

Ostpolitik, and create an escape route in Four Power negotiations was built around close relations with the Soviets. With the Four Powers on the cusp of discussing an issue in which all parties had vested interests, Nixon and Kissinger could expand negotiations with the Soviets into other areas and usher in a new phase of Berlin talks. Close personal relationships allowed Kissinger to circumvent a bureaucracy that he viewed as prone to inefficiency and susceptible to self-interested politics, while also giving him the ability to speak frankly and garner trust with his negotiating partners. For Nixon, they were a political firebreak. Direct, unofficial, and confidential communication with officials

1105 Research Memorandum, Ray S. Cline for Rogers, April 7, 1970, “West Germany/USSR: The Bahr- Gromyko Talks,” “Country Files Europe, Germany, Vol. IV 12/69 – 9 Apr 70” folder, Box 683, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, RNL. For Bahr’s explanation on these points, see MemCon, Kissinger and Bahr, April 8, 1970, “Country Files Europe, Germany, Vol. IV 12/69 – 9 Apr 70” folder, Box 683, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, RNL. 373 shielded his policies from a potential domestic backlash, while also blocking the third rail of allies. Rational explanations aside, the predilection for secrecy was mostly due to

Nixon’s paranoia. His and Kissinger’s plan to sidestep the built-in checks and balances on the executive’s power to make policy was undemocratic. Still, simplifying the process of negotiations allowed for an increase in complexity in the negotiations.1106

The strategy could be implemented only through secret channels.1107 In the Berlin talks, Kissinger had three primary lines. The most important channel was with Dobrynin, which the two men arranged during a luncheon on March 3, 1969.1108 The White House’s secret communication to the Kremlin was dissimilar from previous administrations in that it was not set up with the intent of managing crises.1109 Instead, Nixon and Kissinger used it as a means for détente. In the Berlin negotiations, Kissinger used his close contact with

Dobrynin to cut out the French and British from U.S.-FRG-Soviet deal making.

Kissinger established the administration’s direct line with the West Germans through Bahr. Knowing how important communication with Bonn would be, but also knowing how important secrecy was, Kissinger had waited until the State Department’s representative, Martin Hillenbrand, had left the room during the important October 13

1106 Hanhimaki, Flawed Architect, pp. 36-37. For a succinct discussion of direct discussions with Moscow, see Bundy, A Tangled Web, pp. 57-59. For Nixon’s paranoia, albeit a polemic, see Rick Perlstein, Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America (New York: Scribner, 2008). 1107 For details, see David C. Geyer, “The Missing Link: Henry Kissinger and the Back-Channel Negotiations on Berlin,” in American Détente and German Ostpolitik, 1969-1972, eds., David C. Geyer and Bernd Schaefer (Washington, D.C.: Supplement No. 1 to the Bulletin of the German Historical Institute, 2004), pp. 80-97. 1108 Memorandum, Kissinger to Nixon, March 6, 1969, “Conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin, Lunch, March 3,” “Berlin and European Security (Tabs 1-56) Vol. I March 3, 1969 – June 14, 1971 [1 of 6]” folder, box 57, NSC files, HAK Office Files, Country Files, RNL. For Bahr and Brezhnev’s secret line: Sarotte, Dealing with the Devil, p. 34. 1109 For secret communications and Kennedy, see Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars, pp. 56-57. For LBJ’s secret diplomacy during Vietnam, see George C. Herring, ed. The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983). 374 meeting and then met Bahr in the White House basement to float his idea. Kissinger’s relationship with Bahr stretched back to his days with the Kennedy administration, and it had always been rocky. Kissinger tended to view Ostpolitik and its authors in

Metternichian terms. Distrustful of nationalism and wary of allies who operated freely within the great-power system, he was leery of Bahr. Regardless of their personal views of one another, both men benefited in the deal, since they could sound off ideas while also sharing information. It only took a few days, however, for Kissinger’s arrangement to become an open secret in Washington and Europe.1110

Rush was Nixon and Kissinger’s vital third channel. As the chief U.S. negotiator in the Berlin talks, he gave the White House almost daily reports when negotiations were under way, often before Rogers and the State Department knew what had transpired. His loyalty to the White House was due to a personal relationship, as he had been one of

Nixon’s law school professors at Duke.1111 Rush, Nixon, and Kissinger avoided using the embassy’s communications because they feared Foggy Bottom would limit their room to negotiate, and possibly pass on information to West German officials. Captain

Rembrandt Robinson, a member of the NSC staff, established the link through a naval officer in Frankfurt. In Washington, Rush’s messages reached the White House through

1110 For Kissinger’s recollection of the White House lunch, see Kissinger, White House Years, p. 411. For Hillenbrand’s: Fragments of Our Time: Memoirs of a Diplomat, pp. 286-87. For the memcon, see Kissinger to Nixon, “Visit by Willy Brandt’s Emissary, Egon BAHR,” October 20, 1969, “Country Files – Europe – Germany Vol. III July 1969 – 11-69” folder, box 682, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, RNL. Hanhimäki, The Flawed Architect, pp. 87-88. 1111 Biographic Sketch of Kenneth Rush, enclosure to memorandum for Kissinger from Robert C. Brewster, Acting Executive Secretary, April 2, 1970, “The President’s Meeting with Ambassador Rush,” “Country Files, Europe, Germany Vol. IV 12/69 – 9 Apr 70” folder, box 683, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, RNL. 375 his friend, Attorney General John Mitchell.1112 Kissinger was unaware that his system was not air tight, nor was it a secret across the Atlantic, much like the Bahr channel.1113

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, was spying on the

Kissinger-Rush communications as well all other issues, thanks to a young Navy stenographer on Kissinger’s staff who was pilfering thousands of documents on his superiors’ orders to circumvent the White House’s secrecy and familiarize themselves with Nixon and Kissinger’s plans.1114

Apart from secret backchannels, Kissinger’s strategy on Berlin, just as in all détente negotiations, was built on linkage.1115 It was here that the nature of the city as a local, regional, and international problem offered the superpowers the ability to mix and match issues of mutual interest. The first opportunity for Kissinger to link Berlin with a

Soviet interest was Moscow’s long-held desire for a conference on European security

(CSCE).1116 The Kremlin had made their initial proposal for collective security at the

Four Power conference in Berlin in February 1954, which effectively had been a follow- on from the Stalin Note of March 10, 1952, when the Soviet Union dangled reunification and rearmament in front of the West in exchange for German military neutrality. From

1112 Hillenbrand, Fragments of Our Time, p. 287. 1113 Sutterlin and Klein, Berlin, p. 110. 1114 Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005), p. 324. The first studies to reveal this so-called Moorer-Radford Affair were Seymour M. Hersh’s, The Price of Power: Kissinger in the White House (New York: Summit Books, 1983). In the wake of the affair, Nixon used the leverage of not punishing the chairman to ensure the JCS continued to keep Secretary Laird in the dark. Richard A. Hunt, and the Foundation of the Post-Vietnam Military, 1969-1973 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2015), p. 550. 1115 For linkage and the Vietnam peace negotiations, see Pierre Asselin, A Bitter Peace: Washington, Hanoi, and the Making of the Paris Peace Agreement (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002). 1116 Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 412-16. 376 the Western perspective, Molotov’s offer had been a poison pill, meant to kill NATO and the fledgling French-led European Defense Community, guarantee German division for decades, and undermine U.S. leadership and military presence in Europe.1117 From the

American perspective, a mutual retreat of the Four Powers’ military forces would mean an ocean between the United States and Europe while the Soviets only had dry land.

Moscow pushed for collective security several more times, but the differences of opinions between East and West eventually led Moscow to establish collective security in its own sphere, with the founding of the Warsaw Pact in 1955. Despite the division,

Moscow still periodically proposed dissolving the blocs.1118

Détente convinced the Soviets to make proposals once again. Rapprochement meant that East and West could now pursue collective security in a broader context than before, and a conference on European security became Moscow’s principal offer.1119

Their official proposition came through the Warsaw Pact in July 1966.1120 Along with calling for a conference and cooperation across the social and political systems on the continent, the Bucharest Declaration on Strengthening Peace and Security in Europe

1117 For text of the original Soviet proposal, see Proposal of Soviet Delegation, “On Ensuring European Security” and “General European Treaty on Collective Security in Europe,” February 10, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954 Germany and Austria, VII: 1189-92. U.S. record of the Allied exchange: Telegram, United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to State Department, February 11, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954 Germany and Austria, VII: 1018-23. Secretary of State Dulles’ statement to Molotov: Telegram, United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to State Department, February 10, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954 Germany and Austria, VII: 1024-27. 1118 Vojtech Mastny, “The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Warsaw Pact in 1955,” in Mechanisms of Power in the Soviet Union, eds. Niels Erik Rosenfeldt, Bent Jensen, and Erik Kulavig (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), pp. 241-66. 1119 Janie Leatherman, From Cold War to Democratic Peace: Third Parties, Peaceful Change, and the OSCE (Syracuse: University of Syracuse Press, 2003), p. 57. 1120 Douglas Selvage, “The Warsaw Pact and the European Security Conference, 1964-69: Sovereignty, Hegemony, and the German Question,” in Origins of the European Security System: The Process Revisited, 1965-75, ed. Andreas Wenger, Vojtech Mastny, and Christian Nuenlist (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 85-106. 377 proposed disarmament, the of the alliances, and recognition of two German states. The declaration was a dead letter for the West, given U.S. involvement in

Vietnam, questions about NATO’s future, and there being no substantial changes from previous offers.1121 By 1969, the evolution in East-West relations over the previous three years meant that the circumstances for a potential CSCE had changed even more. The

German Question had been the largest reason why the attempts at a conference were ill fated, but the disagreements seemed to be less severe by the end of the 1960s, mostly due to Bonn’s tentative approaches to the East.1122 Moreover, Soviet leaders now believed that they could use collective security as a tool to normalize relations with the West

Germans while also asserting Soviet hegemony over the Warsaw Pact. Somewhat paradoxically, then, overtures to the West had become a component of the Brezhnev

Doctrine. It was in this context that Moscow proposed a conference on European security in April 1969, this time with a direct offer to Washington, a departure from the Bucharest

Declaration, which had not directly invited nor discounted U.S. participation. On April 3,

Dobrynin, on the instructions of the highest level of the Politburo, used his channel with

1121 In part, the Bucharest Declaration led NATO to respond with the Harmel Report, a reassertion of the Alliance’s principles and a dual-track approach of political détente and organized defense. See Helga Haftendorn, “The Adaptation of the NATO Alliance to a Period of Détente: The 1967 Harmel Report,” in Crises and Promises: The European Project, 1963-1969, ed. Wilfried Loth (-Baden: Nomos, 2001), pp. 285-322. See also, Andreas Wenger, “The Politics of Military Planning: Evolution of NATO’s Strategy,” in War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War: Threat Perceptions in the East and West, ed. Vojtech Mastny, Sven G. Holtsmark, and Andreas Wenger (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 165-192. 1122 For a study of the German Question and the CSCE, see Federica Caciagli, “The GDR’s Targets in the Early CSCE Process: Another Missed Opportunity to Freeze the Division of Germany, 1969-73,” in Origins of the European Security System: The Helsinki Process Revisited, 1965-75, ed. Andreas Wenger, Vojtech Mastny, and Christian Nuenlist (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 107-23. 378

Kissinger to inform the White House that a note would be presented to the State

Department the next day about a CSCE meeting.1123

The timing of Moscow’s new emphasis on a CSCE was important, since it occurred in parallel with the American and Soviet discussions on potential Berlin talks.

Kissinger sensed that he could use Moscow’s eagerness as leverage, and he practiced linkage with Berlin for the first time to block the Soviets from practicing what he called

“selective détente.”1124 The United States, Kissinger told Dobrynin, might consider a conference if the Soviets would “show their good intentions in Berlin.” The offer was as vague as Dobrynin’s reply was explicit, and he cut to the point of what it was that

Moscow truly wanted: U.S. recognition of existing frontiers.1125 Both sides had stated their intentions, but the loss of traction in the Berlin talks meant that there was also little headway made toward a security conference.1126

Nixon personally placed a new level of linkage onto Berlin in October 1970 when

Gromyko visited Washington. In a meeting in the Oval Office, Gromyko and Dobrynin reported to the Americans that Moscow was confused about why the administration was cool to the idea of a CSCE, and even accused them of sabotaging possible talks.1127

1123 Memorandum, Kissinger to Nixon, April 3, 1969, “Memorandum of Conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin, April 3, 1969,” “Berlin and European Security (Tabs 1-56) Vol. I March 3, 1969 – June 14, 1971 [1 of 6]” folder, box 57, NSC files, HAK Office Files, Country Files, RNL. 1124 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 410. 1125 MemCon, Kissinger and Dobrynin, December 22, 1969, “Conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin,” “Berlin and European Security (Tabs 1-56) Vol. I March 3, 1969 – June 14, 1971 [1 of 6]” folder, box 57, NSC files, HAK Office Files, Country Files, RNL. Nixon approved, writing, “K. Very fascinating!” 1126 That loss of traction might have also been, as M.E. Sarotte argues, because the Americans and Soviets were both trying to get a handle on their German allies opening up talks with enemies. Sarotte, Dealing with the Devil, p. 59. 1127 These were referencing noncommittal reactions from the Americans after three Soviet entreaties: Gromyko statement during a December 29, 1969 conversation with Kissinger that the Soviets wished to pursue a CSCE through their channel; Dobrynin complaint to Kissinger on June 10 that the United States was the main obstacle to a CSCE; Soviet note from Dobrynin to Kissinger on July 20 about a CSCE. 379

Rather than simplifying a path toward a CSCE and calming Soviet fears, Nixon linked an agreement on strategic arms as another precondition to a conference.1128 The Strategic

Arms Limitation Treaty thus became the third American provision to security talks. It added to the demand that there first be movement on Berlin and that some agreement be made about mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR), which the administration had proposed the previous summer and the Johnson administration had tried in vain to achieve.1129

Nixon had added the other level of linkage for several reasons. First, the administration had previously avoided CSCE discussions in the belief that an agreement to negotiate would be a sign of American weakness as well as a legitimization of the

Eastern Bloc and its contention that it had a right to participate in solving the division of

Europe. By tying tertiary issues to a CSCE, Nixon and Kissinger were attempting to bend the terms of the negotiations to their will, which could serve to alter the nature and purpose of a conference.1130 Second, practicing linkage allowed the Americans to overcome the largest complication in the Berlin talks thus far, the Soviets’ continued preoccupation with the Federal Republic’s political presence in the city. For over two years, Moscow had maintained that they would talk about access problems with the

Western Powers only if the FRG curtailed its activities in West Berlin. Now, Nixon and

1128 MemCon, Nixon and Gromyko, October 22, 1970, “Berlin and European Security (Tabs 1-56) Vol. I March 3, 1969 – June 14, 1971 [1 of 6]” folder, box 57, NSC files, HAK Office Files, Country Files, RNL. 1129 MemCon, Kissinger and Dobrynin, June 10, 1970, “Berlin and European Security (Tabs 1-56) Vol. I March 3, 1969 – June 14, 1971 [1 of 6]” folder, box 57, NSC files, HAK Office Files, Country Files, RNL. Much of the MBFR concept was of German origin. See Christoph Bluth, The Two Germanies and Military Security in Europe (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). 1130 Leatherman, From Cold War to Democratic Peace, pp. 61-62. 380

Kissinger were binding what the Soviets had desired since 1954 into agreements that the

United States wanted.

Berlin was now the keystone of the White House’s Europe strategy. It served the purpose of forcing concessions out of the Soviets while simultaneously taking control of

Ostpolitik. Moreover, the American support of a CSCE buttressed the European model of détente, since that concept was effectively an outgrowth of Bonn’s “change through rapprochement” strategy.1131 For two months, Brandt had been waiting nervously on the sidelines with a renunciation of force agreement that he and Kosygin had signed in

Moscow on August 12, 1970.1132 Though the Moscow Treaty had opened a path to FRG-

GDR talks, Brandt could not send it to the Bundestag for ratification without movement on quadripartite talks. Nixon was now able to use his opportunity to control the pace of

Ostpolitik in real terms. He could also report to Bonn that the United States was looking out for the West Germans’ best interests: making clear to the Soviets that “the umbilical cord between Berlin and the Federal Republic could not be cut,” and ensuring that quadripartite talks would proceed and ultimately meet the conditions for an FRG-Soviet treaty.1133

Though formal quadripartite talks on Berlin had begun on March 26, 1970—at the former Allied Control Council building, for added effect—they did not gain traction until

1131 Michael R. Lucas, “Creative Tension: The United States and the Federal Republic in the CSCE,” in The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945-1990: A Handbook, Vol. II, Detlef Junker et al. (Washington, D.C.: German Historical Institute, 2004), pp. 40-46. 1132 Julia von Dannenberg, The Foundations of Ostpolitik: The Making of the Moscow Treaty between West Germany and the USSR (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 1133 Personal Message, Nixon to Brandt, October 31, 1970, “Berlin and European Security (Tabs 1-56) Vol. I March 3, 1969 – June 14, 1971 [1 of 6]” folder, box 57, NSC files, HAK Office Files, Country Files, RNL. For Kissinger’s explanation of this process, Kissinger, White House Years, p. 416. 381 early 1971, once Moscow and Washington had offered each other incentives for negotiating earnestly. In a January 28 meeting, Kissinger and Dobrynin agreed to compartmentalize U.S.-Soviet discussions on Berlin by making agreements in principle between themselves, and then transferring their understandings to the American and

Soviet delegations in Bonn.1134 The arrangement utilized Kissinger’s back channels: he would discuss with Bahr what the West Germans would consider, then deliberate with

Rush before presenting a proposal to Dobrynin. Once an informal agreement was made on an issue, the quadripartite delegations could then discuss it in Berlin with the French and British, who would be none the wiser. 1135

Kissinger’s negotiating structure created considerable acrimony between State

Department officials and the White House’s inner circle. The diplomats took offense to a rumor in Washington and Moscow that Foggy Bottom wanted to foil a quadripartite agreement. To the contrary, Rogers and his German experts, from the mission in Berlin to the embassy in Bonn, had substantial experience on Berlin matters and worked to improve allied relations in the city. Indeed, the State Department had years-old formulas for the city fully outlined when Rush initially met his quadripartite counterparts in March

1970. To add insult to injury from the diplomats’ perspective, Kissinger did not qualitatively stray from what the German experts had formulated: unhindered civilian access on surface routes between the FRG and West Berlin; improved communication

1134 Memorandum for the President’s File, Kissinger to Nixon, January 28, 1971, “Meeting of Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Anatoliy [sic] Dobrynin in the Map Room, The White House, 1:00 pm, January 28,” “Berlin and European Security (Tabs 1-56) Vol. I March 3, 1969 – June 14, 1971 [3 of 6]” folder, box 57, NSC files, HAK Office Files, Country Files, RNL. 1135 MemCon, Kissinger and Dobrynin, February 2, 1971, “Berlin and European Security (Tabs 1-56) Vol. I March 3, 1969 – June 14, 1971 [3 of 6]” folder, box 57, NSC files, HAK Office Files, Country Files, RNL. 382 within Greater Berlin, with less restrictive travel and expanded telephone service; a recognized special tie between the FRG and West Berlin, including representation abroad of West Berliners and inclusion of the sectors in international agreements.1136 That reality, when combined with the lack of respect the White House paid to Rogers, has led diplomats to subsequently excoriate Nixon and Kissinger.1137 The officials, however, misread the White House’s meddling. Nixon and Kissinger did not believe the State

Department were scornful of an agreement—they believed that Rogers and company were incapable of seeing the larger picture, and often focused on insignificant details rather than the global scope of U.S. diplomacy.

When Kissinger and Dobrynin’s secret negotiations began in earnest in February

1971, that larger picture already included a CSCE, MBFR, and SALT. It then expanded in the final phase of talks from European issues to the hallmarks of the Nixon administration’s international détente efforts. On February 4, Dobrynin turned the tables on Kissinger and suggested that progress on a Berlin settlement could lead to their planned summit in Moscow that had been delayed in preliminary planning.1138 The summit was tentatively scheduled for September 1972, with SALT the topic of negotiation. Dobrynin’s mention had been casual, but Kissinger did not take it as such. “I blew my top,” he reported to Nixon several hours later. As far as the White House was concerned, no preconditions could be placed on the summit, especially complicated talks

1136 For the White House’s copy, see “Draft as of February 4, 1971, 3 p.m., Quadripartite Agreement,” “Berlin Vol. I [3 of 8]” folder, box 58, National Security Files, HAK Office Files, Country Files – Europe, RNL. 1137 See primarily Sutterlin and Klein, Berlin, pp. 108-49; Hillenbrand, Fragments of Our Time, pp. 26-351. 1138 Geyer, “The Missing Link,” p. 83. 383 like Berlin.1139 Two months later, the Soviet Union made the linkage even more concrete on Gromyko’s orders, since the foreign minister believed a quadripartite agreement was more important than a summit on ballistic missiles.1140 Annoyed that his own tactics were being used against him, Kissinger again warned Dobrynin in an April 23 meeting that the

Soviets should be careful about presenting Nixon with ultimatums.1141 The Kremlin’s emphasis on a Berlin solution was for a reason, though: Brandt and Bahr’s initial linkage of a quadripartite agreement as a precondition to ratifying the Moscow Treaty was finally working, and Gromyko wanted to cement the concessions that Bonn had given eight months before.

The Kissinger-Dobrynin relationship was further complicated four days later, when the Soviet ambassador asked if the Americans were trying to blackmail Moscow by opening relations with China. The Sino-Soviet split during the Khrushchev era and

Beijing’s emerging status as a power had provided the United States the opportunity to practice , a counterpart to linkage.1142 Dobrynin warned that, if the

Americans were indeed planning on using relations with China as leverage against the

Soviet Union, the reaction would be “negative and violent.” Kissinger assured Dobrynin that “we were too realistic to believe we could blackmail the Soviet Union.”1143 Three

1139 Douglas Brinkley and Luke A. Nichter, eds., Nixon Tapes, 1971-1972 (New York: Houghton, Mifflin, Harcourt, 2014), p. 97. 1140 Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 218. 1141 MemCon, Kissinger and Dobrynin, April 23, 1971, “Lunch Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin, April 23, 1971, 1:00 p.m., Map Room,” “Berlin Vol. 3 [2 of 8]” folder, box 59, National Security File, HAK Office File, Country File – Europe, RNL. 1142 Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), pp. 238-76. 1143 Memorandum, Kissinger to Nixon, April 27, 1972, “Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin, April 27, 1971,” “Berlin Vol. 3 [3 of 8], box 59, National Security File, HAK Office File, Country File – Europe, RNL. 384 hours later, the White House received a letter from Prime Minister Zhou Enlai inviting the Americans to send either an envoy or the president to Beijing to discuss U.S.-Sino relations. With the invitation, Nixon and Kissinger believed they now had leverage over

Moscow in setting a date for the .1144

What followed was somewhat of a stalemate between the superpowers, as the

Soviets dragged their feet on SALT to force progress on Berlin while the Americans did the reverse. In their backchannel communications, Kissinger advised Rush to allow some progress on quadripartite discussions, but only enough to show good faith.1145

Meanwhile, talks in Bonn between Rush, Bahr, and Soviet ambassador to the Federal

Republic, Valentin Falin, picked up steam, so much so that it looked as if the agreement could be presented to the Four Powers in Berlin and signed within three months. Worried about the lack of an incentive for the Soviets to hold SALT talks in Moscow if that happened, Nixon asked Kissinger about the possibilities of sabotaging the Berlin talks if the Kremlin did not agree to a summit. Both men agreed that they would “be bastards,” though Kissinger did not give Dobrynin a blunt ultimatum when they met a week later.1146 The administration, therefore, did not actually use Berlin as a stick like it had planned.1147

With historic visits planned to both Moscow and Beijing, the White House began to actively modulate the pace of the confidential negotiations taking place in Bonn. By

1144 Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 713-14, 833. 1145 Secret Communication, Kissinger to Rush, May 24, 1971, “Ambassador Rush – Berlin Vol. I [3 of 6]” folder, box 59, National Security File, HAK Office File, Country File – Europe, RNL. 1146 Brinkley and Nichter, Nixon Tapes, 1971-1972, p. 153. Geyer, “The Missing Link,” p. 88. 1147 This stands in contrast to Kissinger’s emphasis of leverage in his memoirs. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 829. 385 the end of June, with no reply from Moscow about a date for a summit, they turned their attention to Kissinger’s upcoming China trip. Once again “disturbed” by the pace of negotiations, Kissinger instructed Rush to drag his feet until at least July 15, without offering an explanation except to say that the reasons would become apparent.1148 Those reasons were more political than diplomatic. Nixon did not want Berlin to detract from the surprise China visit, and he also wanted to ensure that the weight of triangular diplomacy could be used against the Soviets, both on the summit and Berlin.1149 On July

9, Kissinger landed in Beijing to pave the way for Nixon’s visit. In the meantime, Rush delivered on the White House’s request to delay, and even managed to extend his obfuscation. On July 19, Kissinger finally gave Rush permission to proceed, but not without asking for some moderation to sound out Moscow’s reaction to his “Peking caper.”1150

By the end of July, with work having been allowed to resume, the group in Bonn finished with a final tentative agreement on all issues. Over the following weeks, the officials who had negotiated the text in secret, effectively issuing a fait accompli at the talks in Berlin, moved “according to the script,” as Rush put it, and expended time and energy constructing a façade of negotiation and convincing those not in the know that the terms were agreeable.1151 For the Americans, this included Rogers, who instructed Rush to pause negotiations for the State Department and the capitals to review sticking points

1148 Secret Communication, Kissinger to Rush, June 28, 1971, “Ambassador Rush – Berlin Vol. I [4 of 6]” folder, box 59, National Security File, HAK Office File, Country File – Europe, RNL. 1149 Brinkley and Nichter, White House Tapes, 1971-1972, pp. 99-100. 1150 Secret Communication, Kissinger to Rush, July 19, 1971, “Ambassador Rush – Berlin Vol. II [1 of 3]” folder, box 60, National Security File, HAK Office File, Country File – Europe, RNL. 1151 Cable, Rush to Kissinger, August 13, 1971, “Ambassador Rush – Berlin Vol. II [2 of 3]” folder, box 60, National Security File, HAK Office File, Country File – Europe, RNL. 386 and have consultations. Kissinger ordered Rush to play along for no longer than two weeks, and assured him that “if State makes trouble we will force [the] issue.” Both messages arrived too late in the evening for Rush to follow either instruction, however.

The next morning, in an ebullient message, he told Kissinger that the “bureaucrats have been foiled” and reported that the quadripartite negotiations were finally complete.1152

After months of haggling, and many more months of impasses and delaying tactics, the agreement ultimately ended with a two-part trade: The allies received improved access procedures in exchange for a reduced FRG presence in the city, and West Berliners received FRG passports for the Soviet Union establishing a consulate in West Berlin. On

September 3, 1971, the Four Powers signed the Quadripartite Agreement.1153

Extraordinarily, all parties achieved their objectives in the city. The West

Germans finally had bound together Berlin and Bonn, not just in interzonal affairs but also internationally. The Soviets had guarantees that the FRG would curb its political activity in Berlin beyond what they prescribed. The Americans had the access guarantees that they always desired. It is also extraordinary that all parties successfully used Berlin and a quadripartite agreement as leverage to get something else that they wanted. Brandt needed it as the linchpin for Ostpolitik’s second phase, which culminated in the

December 21, 1972 Basic Treaty, formally establishing FRG-GDR relations. Nixon used it to stabilize U.S. power and influence, control Ostpolitik enough that it did not weaken

1152 Cable, Rogers to Rush, August 18, 1971; Special Channel Cable, Kissinger to Rush, August 18, 1971; Cable, Kissinger to Rush, August 19, 1971: all in “Ambassador Rush – Berlin Vol. II [2 of 3]” folder, box 60, National Security File, HAK Office File, Country File – Europe, RNL. For Kissinger’s take: White House Years, p. 831. 1153 See Honoré M. Catudal, Diplomacy of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin: A New Era in East-West Politics (Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 1977) and A Balance Sheet of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin: Evaluation and Documentation (Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 1978). 387

Western cohesion, and pave the way for SALT, which the United States and Soviet

Union signed on May 26, 1972 in Moscow. The Soviets used it to achieve their long-held desire for a CSCE, which occurred on July 3, 1973 in Helsinki. Berlin was therefore not just a prize but a bargaining chip.

388

CONCLUSION

Berlin after 1971 continued to reflect larger trends in the Cold War. For most of the 1970s, it was an “acid test,” as Kissinger put it, for détente in general and a host of negotiations in particular, from the MBFR and SALT talks to trade agreements.1154 The

Quadripartite Agreement had created the climate for such talks, since progress on Berlin was the West’s precondition to what Moscow had wanted in 1969, a conference on security and cooperation in Europe.1155 The city remained central to larger negotiations,

CSCE included, because of its role as a bellwether. Moscow focused on what the

Americans were doing and saying about Berlin because they believed U.S. actions there would telegraph what they would do elsewhere.1156 Bonn paid attention to how earnestly

Washington stressed Allied rights in the city when talking with the Soviets, and whether they would allow the communists to undermine the position there vis a vis negotiations.1157 Bonn was not immune from these suspicions, either. While the tripartite powers and the Federal Republic negotiated with the Soviets on CSCE, West Berliners began to fear that Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (1974-1982) and his government had

1154 Cable, State Department to Kissinger, May 26, 1975, “May 18-23, 1975 Europe to HAK (5)” folder, box 12, Kissinger Trip File, NSA Trip Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger,” Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library (hereafter GRFL). 1155 Statement by Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, before the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, May 6, 1975, “Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1975 (2) WH,” box 44, General Subject File, NSC Europe, Canada, and Ocean Affairs Staff Files, GRFL. 1156 Briefing Paper, Ford’s Visit to NATO, “Background Paper, Germany and Berlin,” May 29-30, 1975, Box 8, “5/28 – 6/3/75 Europe Briefing Book – NATO Background” folder, box 8, Trips File, NSA Trips Briefing Books and Cables for President Ford Files, GRFL. 1157 Meeting with FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, July 27, 1975, “7/26 – 8/4/75 Europe Briefing Book – Bonn Visit (1)” folder, box 10, Trips File, NSA Trips Briefing Books and Cables for President Ford Files, GRFL. Memorandum, Scowcroft to Ford, “Meeting with Opposition Leader ,” May 4, 1976, “Germany (10)” folder, box 6, Country Files, National Security Adviser Files, GRFL. 389 become complacent about the city’s security, and were even willing to sacrifice their interests for West German gain.1158

The city also reflected post-Vietnam and Watergate trends and power dynamics in the United States. In the wake of Nixon resigning the presidency in August 1974, the imperial presidency and its seemingly unfettered control of Cold War policy was blunted.1159 Nixon’s successor, , who had been to Berlin several times, the first as part of a congressional trip with Secretary of the General Staff Brig. Gen. William

Westmoreland in 1955, dealt with the city being wrapped up in the Church Committee’s investigations into intelligence gathering and executive overreach.1160 Hearings began in

December 1975 with inquiries into whether intelligence services kept ambassadors sufficiently apprised of operations, and then expanded by August the next year to include if the president had the authority to order U.S. Army wiretapping in Berlin.1161 In defense affairs, Ford had little choice but to continue pursuing détente as the military began a painful rebuilding after Vietnam.1162 He therefore needed to foster a peaceful city as the linchpin of U.S.-Soviet rapprochement.

1158 Memorandum, Kissinger to Ford, “Berlin,” March 27, 1975, “Germany (4)” folder, box 5, Country Files, National Security Adviser Files, GRFL. 1159 Robert David Johnson, Congress and the Cold War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 242-86. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973). 1160 Kathryn S. Olmstead, Challenging the Secret Government: The Post-Watergate Investigations of the CIA and FBI (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996). 1161 Cable, Kissinger to U.S. Embassy Berlin, “Church Committee Hearings,” November 29, 1975, “German Democratic Republic – State Department Telegrams” folder, box 5, Country Files, National Security Advisor Files, GRFL. Memorandum, Scowcroft to Ford, “NSDM 335 (Army Special Operation Field Office in Berlin),” undated, and NSDM 335, August 13, 1976, both in: “NSDM 335 – Army Special Operations Field Office in Berlin (3)” folder, box 67, NSC Institutional Files, GRFL. 1162 Ingo Trauschweizer, “Ford and the Armed Forces,” in A Companion to Gerald Ford and , ed. Scott Kaufman, (Malden, MA.: Wiley Blackwell, 2016), pp. 149-65. 390

Berlin was markedly calmer after 1971 than it had been for the two-and-a-half decades before, but it maintained the themes that had made it a Cold War hotspot. The

Soviets still periodically threatened it, warning that they could “tighten the screws” at a time of their choosing, to either stop what they saw as provocative policies or gain leverage in talks.1163 Most sparring between the Western Powers and Soviets’ was over their German allies, though. In spring 1974, the FRG announced its intention to create a

Federal Environmental Office in Berlin, which upset the Soviets, who viewed it as an attempt from Bonn to lay sole claim to Berlin. For leverage, Gromyko took up the complaint with Kissinger, and warned that Washington should block the plans or

Moscow would consider it a violation of the Quadripartite Agreement.1164 The British and French were angry with the West Germans for endangering détente, but nonetheless followed the American lead of supporting their ally.1165 Bonn opened the office in summer 1974, which led to Soviet and East German harassment of Berlin access. In reply, the State Department used diplomatic leverage and shelved their plans to recognize the GDR until the harassment stopped. When it did, the United States opened an embassy in East Germany on September 4.1166 Even into his last week in office, Ford was still dealing with communist threats of complicating Allied access after the GDR made claims

1163 Memorandum, Kissinger to Ford, “Berlin,” March 27, 1975, “Germany (4)” folder, box 5, Country Files, National Security Adviser Files, GRFL. 1164 Memorandum of Conversation, Kissinger and Gromyko, “Federal Environmental Office in Berlin,” March 27, 1974, “USSR – Gromyko File (14)” folder, box 35, General Subject File, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, GRFL; Memorandum of Conversation, Kissinger and Gromyko, April 12, 1974, “USSR – Gromyko File (15)” folder, box 35, General Subject File, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, GRFL. 1165 Honoré M. Catudal, A Balance Sheet of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin: Evaluation and Documentation (Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 1978), pp. 125-26. 1166 Robert P. Grathwol and Donita M. Moorhus, American Forces in Berlin, 1945-1994: Cold War Outpost (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1994), p. 152. 391 to East Berlin as their sovereign capital. From the Western Powers’ perspective, such measures would allow the GDR to exercise full control of East Berlin which was a violation of the Quadripartite Agreement.1167

Two things were clear by the time Ford left the Oval Office. First, the

Quadripartite Agreement had helped disarm Berlin as a Cold War powder keg, but it had not solved all the problems there. If anything, both sides saw it as the legitimization of their own presence in the city. Still, the agreement all but ended Berlin’s ability to influence the Cold War outside the city walls. The largest threat was rising domestic terrorism, which prompted Berlin Command to adapt to counterterrorism and use their sophisticated electronic listening stations on the and at on targets other than the East German state.1168 Second, Washington and Moscow, since they had tied Berlin to larger issues in the superpower contest, preferred to block out the third rails of the East and West Germans, whose own objectives could only negatively impact the superpowers’ shared objectives in détente. This had Nixon’s desired effect of simplifying the intractable issues that stemmed from the German Question and Berlin’s role inside of it, thereby making the rapprochement more predictable.

When the age of détente appeared over in late 1979 after the Soviet Union invaded , Washington wondered if the parlay in the city was as well.1169

1167 Memorandum, Brent Scowcroft to Ford, “Berlin—Allied Reaction to GDR Actions,” January 17, 1977, and Cable, U.S. Mission Berlin to State Department, “Allied Response to GDR Visa Measure: Draft Protest,” January 7, 1977, both in: “German Democratic Republic (2)” folder, box 5, Country Files, National Security Adviser Files, GRFL. 1168 Grathwol and Moorhus, American Forces in Berlin, p. 152. Stefan Aust, Baader-Meinhof: The Inside Story of the R.A.F., trans. Anthea Bell (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 1169 Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985). Jussi M. Hanhimäki, The Rise and Fall of Détente: American Foreign Policy and the Transformation of the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 392

Ford’s successor, Jimmy Carter, watched the Soviet actions with trepidation for Berlin, fearful that Afghanistan was part of a larger strategy to expand Moscow’s power. As with various times earlier in the Cold War, Washington believed peripheral tensions would pressure Berlin. The administration reasoned that if the Soviets were willing to do an about-face and invade an entire country despite détente, then they might try something in

Berlin. The U.S. embassy therefore saw most oddities the Soviets and East Germans were doing in the city as the communist strategy of death by small cuts, including severing communication cables, a Soviet demanding the that flag tours of the East be reduced, a series of unidentified flights over restricted airspace, among other things.1170

This worry increased when Carter responded to the invasion in his January 23,

1980 State of the Union Address by committing the United States to the defense of the

Persian Gulf. As well as leveling sanctions against the Soviets, the administration sent aid to Pakistan and arms to the mujahedeen.1171 In response, the Soviets warned the

Americans privately and publicly that, as Secretary of State Cyrus Vance reported, “they reserve the right to retaliate for our actions in Afghanistan.”1172 Estimates confirmed

Carter’s initial fears when they predicted that if the Soviets did something in retribution,

2013). Russian General Staff, The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost, trans. Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002). 1170 Memorandum, Zbigniew Brezezinski to Carter, September 15, 1979, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library (hereafter JCL), On-Site Remote Archives Capture Program (hereafter RAC), Document: NLC-SAFE 17 D-22-1-13-3. Memorandum for Special Assistant for Strategic Warning MG Faurer, “Soviet and East German Intentions with Respect to Berlin,” April 22, April 22, 1977, JCL, RAC, NLC-10-2-3-3-2. Memorandum, Cyrus Vance to Carter, December 23, 1977, JCL, RAC, NLC-7-19-4-15-4. Cable, U.S. Embassy Bonn to Cyrus Vance, February 1, 1977, JCL, RAC, NLC-6-24-2-29-6. Memorandum for Brzezinski, “Evening Notes,” March 31, 1977, JCL, RAC, NLC-1-1-3-84-4. 1171 Odd Arne Westad, Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 288-330. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind, pp. 234-337. 1172 Memorandum, Vance to Carter, “Possible Soviet Moves in Cuba; U.S. Responses,” undated, JCL, RAC, NLC-6-83-6-3-5. 393 it would be toward Cuba or Berlin.1173 Thinking that such a crisis could be on the scale of

1961, the White House took a historical view of the situation and saw themselves in a similar position to the Kennedy administration. They turned to the past for lessons, requesting documents related to the crisis and all communication that Eisenhower and

Kennedy had with Khrushchev about the city, all in a bid to understand how prior administrations navigated Soviet pressure.1174

Berlin also remained a symbol for the West, and U.S. officials continued using it to reassure allies. Carter traveled to the city in July 1978 as an attempt to emphasize U.S.-

German relations, reaffirm the American commitment to Berlin, and introduce himself.1175 As with previous examples of American leaders traveling to the city, it garnered an angry reaction from the Soviets, East Germans, and Poles, arguing that such a trip was provocative in the post-Quadripartite Agreement atmosphere.1176 The Warsaw

Pact’s anger toward Carter’s trip was paltry in comparison to their reaction to Ronald

Reagan’s speech on June 12, 1987. With the Brandenburg Gate behind him, he delivered a speech that framed the changing U.S.-Soviet relations, demanding tear down the Wall. In so doing, Reagan, like Kennedy before him, illustrated how the

1173 Memorandum, “Possible Soviet Reactions to U.S. Responses to Afghanistan Crisis,” no date, JCL, RAC, NLC-6-1-3-4-7. Memorandum, to Carter, “NSC Weekly Report #110,” September 21, 1979, JCL, RAC, NLC-SAFE 39 B-29-90-13-6. See also NSC Meeting Minutes, January 2, 1980, JCL, RAC, NLC-17-2-18-3-9. 1174 Memorandum, Robert D. Blackwill to Brzezinski, June 20, 1980, JCL, RAC, NLC-23-9-7-9-1. 1175 President’s Briefing Book, “7-13 – 7-18-78: Berlin Town Meeting Questions and Answers” folder, box 13, Trip File, National Security Affairs Brzezinski Material, JCL. Memorandum, Vance to Carter, “Your State Visit to the Federal Republic of Germany and Berlin, July 13-15, 1978,” July 2, 1978, JCL, RAC, NLC-23-24-4-70-9. 1176 Memorandum for David Aaron, “Evening Report, July 25, 1978, JCL, RAC, NLC-10-13-8-9-1. Cable, U.S. Mission Berlin to White House, December 20, 1978, JCL, RAC, NLC-7-59-6-1-3. Memorandum for Brzezinski, “Your Meeting with Polish Vice Foreign Minister Dobrosielski,” May 4, 1979, JCL, RAC, NLC-23-4-2-11-8. 394 city could be used rhetorically in the Cold War.1177 His message that day encapsulated his view of superpower relations, chiefly that he and Gorbachev could break out of their predecessors’ well-worn paths and transcend the Cold War.1178 He would use that conviction to great effect in negotiations with the Soviet leader.1179 A month later, the

NSC proposed a U.S. initiative called “Berlin without Barriers,” a four-part plan to remove the Wall by 1991, and intentionally designed to be a non-arms control component to the upcoming in December, where the Intermediate-Range

Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty would be signed.1180

It was Reagan’s successor, George H.W. Bush who watched the Wall come down on November 9, 1989.1181 Like a tidal wave, the accidental opening of the Wall swept up the GDR regime. On October 3, 1990, Germany’s two halves became whole once again, and Berlin reunited as a city-state, akin to Bremen and Hamburg, with a hosts of social and cultural challenges on the horizon.1182 Two days before, Berlin Command ceased to exist as an occupation force and became U.S. Army, Berlin.1183 On October 2, the

Washington Ambassadorial Group instructed LIVE OAK to cease operations. LIVE

OAK had continued after the Second Berlin Crisis, and routinely reviewed and modified

1177 James Mann, The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan: A History of the End of the Cold War (New York: Viking, 2009), pp. 156-58. Mary Stuckey, Playing the Game: The Presidential Rhetoric of Ronald Reagan (New York: Praeger, 1990). 1178 Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind, pp. 339-47. 1179 Robert Service, The End of the Cold War, 1985-1991 (New York: PublicAffairs, 2015). 1180 Memorandum, Steve Sestanovich to , “‘Berlin without Barriers’—US Initiative,” July 24, 1987, “Berlin Initiative” folder, box 6, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, White House Staff and Office Files, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. 1181 Mary Elise Sarotte, The Collapse: The Accidental Opening of the Berlin Wall (New York: Basic Books, 2014). For how the Bush administration dealt with German reunification, see boxes 1-2 of Condoleeza Rice Files, 1989-1990 Subject Files, George H.W. Bush Presidential Library. 1182 John Alexander Williams, ed. Berlin Since the Wall's End: Shaping Society and Memory in the German Metropolis since 1989 (Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Scholars, 2008). 1183 Grathwol and Moorhus, American Forces in Berlin, pp. 178-79. 395 their contingency planning.1184 The city’s reunification ended the occupation, but the garrisons remained until 1994. U.S. forces left on July 12, when visited the city and cased the Berlin Brigade colors, formally ending the U.S. military presence in the city.1185

When Obama was choosing a location for his foreign policy speech in 2008, he had misinterpreted Berlin’s worth as a rhetorical symbol in the twenty-first century, which accounts for why the address fell so flat. He had hoped that following in the footsteps of past Americans presidents would lead him down a similar path of leadership, but he failed to attach his rhetoric to a commitment that could be seen or touched.

Berlin’s strength as a symbol in the Cold War had been due to the linkage of three things: an unambiguous Western pledge to defend a position, the denial of the Soviets enjoying a closed bloc, and the showcase of Western political ideals within a sea of communism.

Without those similar connections, Obama’s words about the environment and defeating terrorism were empty.

Despite Berlin’s lack of symbolic value today, this dissertation has attempted to illustrate how it might offer lessons to current national security policy and strategy makers. American and European approaches to the city between 1945 and 1990 highlight four themes. First, deterrence can take a variety of forms, even in militarily-untenable positions. In the Cold War, U.S. containment policies served a grand strategy of attriting the Soviets.1186 Despite Berlin being a politically-intractable problem, it served a military

1184 For these voluminous plans, see boxes 1-2, Records Relating to the LIVE OAK Program, Berlin Desk, Office of Central European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Entry A1-5554, RG 59, NARA. 1185 Grathwol and Moorhus, American Forces in Berlin, p. 186. 1186 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment. Trauschweizer, “Adapt and Survive,” pp. 166-94. 396 function of containing Moscow. The two battalions in the city therefore punched above their weight since there was the explicit threat of bringing to bear Western military power if the Soviets engaged them. Effectively, they served as USAREUR’s forward defense.

Today, the United States faces the same objective of deterring state actors from acting with conventional weapons, but doing so with an even smaller force. In Eastern Europe,

Vladimir Putin is ostensibly following Stalin’s model of probing where he can to exert his regional influence and solidify a buffer between Russia and NATO for a variety of reasons growing out of unresolved issues after the Soviet Union’s dissolution.1187 This is seen best in Moscow’s 2014 incursion into , a country that finds itself stuck between two competing visions for integration: part of the traditional Russian sphere, or the potential eastern frontier of the European Union.1188

Washington reacted as it often did during the Cold War, wondering, especially in the context of the Russian-Georgian War in 2008, whether the Donbas region and was Moscow’s opening act of a larger land grab or the limits of its objective.1189 Either way, the question of what modern containment looks like had to be answered. If

USAREUR and NATO actions are any indication, it is similar to the Cold War. As part of Operation Atlantic Resolve, which was to demonstrate firmness to allies, the U.S.

Army has undertaken transits to the à la the armed convoy that Kennedy sent to Berlin in August 1961. In March 2015, USAREUR commander, Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges,

1187 Mikhail Zygar, All the Kremlin’s Men: Inside the Court of Vladimir Putin (New York: PublicAffairs, 2016), pp. 239-92. 1188 Serhii Plokhy, The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine (New York: Basic Books, 2015). 1189 Rajan Menon and Eugene Rumer, Conflict in Ukraine: The Unwinding of the Post-Cold War Order (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2015). Peter Conradi, Who Lost Russia?: How the World Entered a New Cold War (London, Oneworld Publications, 2017), pp. 247-60. 397 conducted a week-long exercise called Operation Dragoon Ride, a 120-vehicle convoy from the 3rd Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment that traveled from Estonia and through four countries—Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic—to its base in Viseck, Germany.

A year later, Operation Dragoon Ride II repeated the transit in reverse. Both exercises were intended to calm regional allies and illustrate U.S. and NATO resolve. While the transits antagonized Moscow, the United States was standing on perhaps firmer ground than in Berlin since they were not relying on a right won in war to justify their presence but an invitation from sovereign nations. Like Berlin, these actions, though relatively modest, serve an important role in deterrence. To view a small contingent as a trip wire or a token commitment misses the point of deterrence: the intention is to dissuade the enemy from acting, not to use military power as a fighting force. The difficulty, one that U.S. leaders recognized in Berlin, is the potential for brinkmanship, which can set decision- makers down a path of diminishing options and an eventual choice between retreat or war.

Second, where the lines between military and foreign policy are blurred, officials often err on the side of devising military solutions for political problems. In the Cold War and beyond, this was mostly a function of individuals equating defense policy with action, and diplomacy with procrastination. Moreover, segments of the national security establishment have tended to overlap one another since their in 1947, leading to not just a blurring of responsibility but also bureaucratic competition.1190 With Berlin

1190 Hogan, A Cross of Iron. Gordon Adams and Shoon Murray, eds., Mission Creep: The Militarization of US Foreign Policy? (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2014). For a study of this tension and the State Department’s Bureau of European Affairs, see Kenneth Weisbrode, The Atlantic Century: 398 policy and strategy, this arrangement worked for two reasons. First, military preparation was political messaging. This meant that the former actually reinforced the latter rather than undermined it. Second, neither East or West desired war nor believed the other one did. Crucially, this was a result of the stakes of war being equal for both sides due to mutually assured destruction, which, paradoxically, allowed room for somewhat safe competition over Berlin. Without this space, it would have been impossible for Clay and

Truman to call Stalin’s bluff in 1948 and Eisenhower and Kennedy to enact a dual-track strategy of projecting strength militarily to improve their negotiating positions during the

Second Berlin Crisis.

In contemporary problems, the same realities of war exist for both sides. The

United States, despite some skepticism in NATO, has projected military strength with

Operation Atlantic Resolve to convince Moscow it should not expand the war in Ukraine or threaten other Eastern European states. Russia responded in September 2017 with its largest military exercise since the Cold War, Zapad, though it understands that to probe too far endangers the very thing it is trying to protect, its security. Military power in diplomacy can be dangerous, however, especially when used for nation-building, or as a substitute for a lack of long-term strategy.1191 This was the case in the American limited- war forays in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq, where officials struggled to identify

Four Generations of Extraordinary Diplomats Who Forged America’s Vital Alliance with Europe (New York: Da Capo Press, 2009). 1191 Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). Robert R. Tomes, US Defense Strategy from Vietnam to Operation Iraqi Freedom: Military Innovation and the New American Way of War, 1973-2003 (London: Routledge, 2007). Gian Gentile, Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency (New York: New Press, 2012). 399 political objectives that military means could achieve. The crucial factor is the shared risk between both sides.

Third, seldom is there a decision made without there being an equal and opposite reaction from allies.1192 The fear of a loss of credibility, which could have had global consequences for the United States in the Cold War, kept officials wary of retreat in

Berlin, and often compelled them to act, from Truman and Acheson’s insistence that the

West defend the city to Nixon’s attempts to neutralize the Cold War competition there.

Those decisions usually antagonized the same groups officials were intending to calm, especially when it involved a threat of force to defend Berlin. Given the city’s centrality to the Cold War generally and the German Question specifically, there were myriad national interests at play whenever there was interallied discussion of any aspect of the city. Britain feared any decision that could antagonize Moscow, and France routinely attempted to leverage Germany to improve its position on the continent. Even U.S. actions outside of Berlin had an impact on the city, which was seen during combat operations in Korea and Vietnam, when Germans worried that American seriousness about Western collective security was waning.

Contemporary allied responses to U.S. actions regarding Eastern Europe mirror the disagreements over Berlin. Some NATO members have shown trepidation over Lt.

Gen. Ben Hodges and former SACEUR Philip Breedlove’s strategies for deterring

1192 Josef Joffe, The Limited Partnership: Europe, the United States, and the Burdens of Alliance (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1987). 400

Russia, much like occurred when Norstad outlined his own plans in the late 1950s.1193 To maintain Allied unity in a crisis while simultaneously signaling limits to an enemy, it is crucial for an alliance to identify the differences between core and peripheral interests.1194

In the case of Kennedy, the core interest was West Berlin while the peripheral was East

Berlin.1195 The former was the pressure cooker while the latter was the relief valve. For the sake of presenting an allied front, it is crucial that NATO identify these objectives and order them by importance. The failure to do so presents a competitor with the potential to drive wedges between allies, something the Soviets attempted throughout the Cold War, from leveraging German reunification against the European Defense Community in 1953 to dangling a European settlement if the Allies left Berlin in 1958. The Kremlin’s lack of success, however, was a product of their repeated utterances of threats, which glued back together any cracks that formed in the transatlantic alliance. Throughout the Cold War, transatlantic relations endured because there were more shared objectives than points of divergence, and because the security apparatus was so deeply integrated.1196 As such, though the Allies often complained whenever there was a lack of American consultation, they worried more about U.S. strategic drift than unilateralism.

Fourth, the benefit of contingency planning is its effect on guiding rather than dictating approaches to problems. More than academic exercises, plans are a key

1193 Spiegel Staff, “Berlin Alarmed by Aggressive NATO Stance on Ukraine,” March 6, 2015, Der Spiegel, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/germany-concerned-about-aggressive-nato-stance-on-ukraine-a- 1022193.html. 1194 Robert S. Jordan with Michael W. Bloome, Political Leadership in NATO: A Study in Multinational Diplomacy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979). 1195 Lawrence Freedman, “Ukraine and the Art of Crisis Management,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 56, Issue 3 (June-July 2014): 7-42. 1196 Seth A. Johnston, How NATO Adapts: Strategy and Organization in the Atlantic Alliance since 1950 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016). 401 component of a national security strategy: They prepare as well as define to subordinates and allies which situations are of primary and secondary importance, and what the limits are for achieving objectives.1197 As a result, these support allied unity and serve to alleviate tension within the alliance. Berlin is perhaps the best test case for the purpose and benefits of contingency planning, given the forty years of periodic drafting and reviewing that occurred. By nature, planning was multi-leveled, beginning with staff planners in the Pentagon and State Department conferring with one another and ending with aligning strategy at the foreign ministers and head-of-state level. At every level, means and ends had to be contemplated. Whether a specific plan could be taken off the shelf in a moment of crisis was irrelevant. What mattered was the discussion of objectives and establishing how far each party was willing to go to achieve them. It is for these reasons that the lessons of Berlin are hopefully useful in preventing a crisis, not managing one.

1197 Monica Toft and Talbot Imlay, eds., The Fog of Peace and War Planning: Military and Strategic Planning under Uncertainty (New York: Routledge, 2006). Steven T. Ross, American War Plans, 1945- 1950 (London: Frank Cass, 1996). 402

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Defeated Germany, 1943-1945.” Dissertation, American University, 1981). ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

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