Cold War Capital: the United States, the Western Allies, and the Fight for Berlin, 1945
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Cold War Capital: The United States, the Western Allies, and the Fight for Berlin, 1945- 1994 A dissertation presented to the faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy Seth A. Givens May 2018 © 2018 Seth A. Givens. All Rights Reserved. 2 This dissertation titled Cold War Capital: The United States, the Western Allies, and the Fight for Berlin, 1945- 1994 by SETH A. GIVENS has been approved for the Department of History and the College of Arts and Sciences by Ingo W. Trauschweizer Associate Professor of History Robert Frank Dean, College of Arts and Sciences 3 ABSTRACT GIVENS, SETH A., Ph.D., May 2018, History Cold War Capital: The United States, the Western Allies, and the Fight for Berlin, 1945- 1994 Director of Dissertation: Ingo W. Trauschweizer This dissertation focuses on U.S. Army forces in Berlin from 1945 to 1994 and on broader issues of U.S. and NATO policy and strategy for the Cold War. It seeks to answer two primary questions: Why did the U.S. officials risk war over a location everyone agreed was militarily untenable, and how did they construct strategies to defend it? Much of the Berlin literature looks at the city only during the two crises there—the Soviet blockade in 1948 and 1949 and Moscow’s periodic ultimatum between 1958 and 1962 that the Americans, British, and French leave—and maintain that leaders conceived of Berlin’s worth as only a beacon of democracy in the war against communism, or a trip wire in the event that the Soviet Union invaded Western Europe. This dissertation looks beyond the crises, and contends that a long view of the city reveals U.S. officials saw Berlin as more than a liability. By combining military, diplomatic, political, and international history to analyze the evolution of U.S. diplomacy, NATO strategy and policy, and joint military planning, it suggests that U.S. officials, realizing they could not retreat, devised ways to defend Berlin and, when possible, use it as a means to achieve strategic and political ends in the larger Cold War, with both enemy and friend alike. This research is broadly concerned with national security, civil-military relations, and alliance politics. It focuses on the intersection of the military and political worlds, and tries to 4 answer how governments analyze risk and form strategy, and then how militaries secure political and military objectives. Ultimately, it is a study of deterrence in modern war, an examination of how leaders can obtain objectives without harming friendships or instigating war. 5 DEDICATION For my second mother, Paula Romans 6 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS For several years, this project has been a constant companion, whether I liked it to or not. Its omnipresence meant finding time and places to write other than the comfort of my own home, like the south rim of the Grand Canyon or my sister’s couch in Connecticut. Researching it also meant traveling to cities and towns to which I had never been, from sprawling Los Angeles to humble Abilene, Kansas. Throughout, I have learned that it is folly to think you can separate your professional and personal life, and perhaps it is best if you not try. Without one, you cannot have the other. The places this dissertation have taken me would not have been the same without the people. I must give primary thanks to Ingo Trauschweizer, who is the model adviser to which all young professors should aspire. Through no master plan of my own did he come to Ohio University, where I already was, only months after I had read a journal article of his, which had led me to comment to my brother, “I wish I could study with him.” Thanks to my committee—Professors Steven Miner, Chester Pach, and James Mosher—for their comments and suggestions, and for taking time out of their schedules to serve on my committee. Any mistakes in this dissertation are my own. Thanks also must go to Professor John Brobst for his championing of graduate students in his role of graduate director, and for his general suggestions to me in pursuing my degree. Endeavors in history often require subsidization; without them, this dissertation would have been impossible. At Ohio University, thanks to the History Department for several research grants, and the Contemporary History Institute for awarding me the 2014-15 Baker Peace Fellowship. Thanks, also, to the Graduate Student Senate for an 7 Original Work Grant and the Office of the Vice President for Research for a Student Enhancement Award. Like the National Archives, the presidential libraries located throughout the country are a treasure, as are the people who work in them. Without the grants that several of the libraries offer, this dissertation would not be as document-rich. Thanks to the Eisenhower Foundation for a Travel Grant, the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library for a Moody Research Grant, the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library for a Ford Presidential Research Grant, and the Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs and the George H.W. Bush Presidential Library’s O’Donnell Grant. The U.S. military history community is also a great graduate student benefactor. Thanks to ABC- CLIO Publishers for an ABC-CLIO Research Grant, as well as the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center for a Gen. and Mrs. Matthew B. Ridgway Research Grant. It would have been far more difficult to finish this dissertation without unwavering support and understanding from my parents, Chris and Pam Givens. Thanks to Adam Givens, who is still the best research companion I have found, for being willing to talk about my dissertation when he would rather talk about his. Thanks also to Nate and Lauren Givens for their support and genuine questions, and to Kristin and Andy Klatkiewicz, who supplied room and board as well as encouragement. Special thanks go to Sarah Finley for keeping me from slipping too far into the doldrums, and for always trying to help. Last, I am indebted to everyone at the Monuments Men Foundation, especially my boss and friend, Robert Edsel. His understanding allowed me time to write while he also crossed the finish line with his own book, and his boundless encouragement have made the last two years rewarding beyond measure. 8 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract ............................................................................................................................... 3 Dedication ........................................................................................................................... 5 Acknowledgments............................................................................................................... 6 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 9 Chapter 1: Conquer and Divide ........................................................................................ 21 Wartime Planning ......................................................................................................... 22 Military Policy and the German Question .................................................................... 49 Chapter 2: The First Crisis ................................................................................................ 64 Prelude to Tension in Berlin ......................................................................................... 66 Decision in Berlin ......................................................................................................... 85 A Military Strategy for a Diplomatic Solution ........................................................... 109 Chapter 3: “Eat, Sleep, and Drink Fear” ........................................................................ 122 An Uncertain Victory .................................................................................................. 123 The View of Korea from Germany ............................................................................. 143 Berlin and European Security ..................................................................................... 156 Chapter 4: A New Look at Berlin ................................................................................... 164 Early Challenges for Eisenhower ............................................................................... 166 The Eisenhower Administration and the Uprising ..................................................... 174 Aligning Berlin and National Policy .......................................................................... 190 Chapter 5: “Munich Stares Us in the Face” .................................................................... 200 A Crisis on a Crisis ..................................................................................................... 202 Road to a Double-Barrel Approach ............................................................................ 229 Road to Geneva ........................................................................................................... 242 Chapter 6: Managing the Alliance Crisis ........................................................................ 250 Shaping a Strategy ...................................................................................................... 252 Building Allied Consensus ......................................................................................... 272 American Unilateralism .............................................................................................. 291 Chapter