CRITICAL WAR STUDIES Series editors TARAK BARKAWI Centre ofInternational Studies, Cambridge University SHANE BRIGHTON Birkbeck College, University of London War transforms the social and political orders in which we live, just as it obliterates our precious certainties. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the fate of truths offered about war itself War regularly undermines expectations, strategies and theories, and along with them the credibility of those in public life and the academy presumed to speak with authority about it. A fundamental reason for this is the frequently narrow and impov­ erished intellectual resources that dominate the study of war. Critical War Studies begins with the recognition that the unsettling character of war is a profound opportunity for scholarship. Accordingly, the series welcomes submissions from across the academy as well as from reflective practition­ ers. It provides an open forum for critical scholarship concerned with war and armed forces and seeks to foster and develop the nascent encounter between war and contemporary approaches to society, history, politics and philosophy. It is a vehicle to reconceive the field of war studies, expand the sites where war is studied, and open the field to new voices. ANTOINE BOUSQUET The Scientific Way of Warfare Order and Chaos on the Battlefields ofModernity Columbia University Press New York Columbia Universiry Press Publishers Since 1893 New York Copyright © 2009 Antoine Bousquet All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Bousquet, Antoine. The scientific way of warfare: order and chaos on the battlefields of moderniry / Antoine Bousquet. p. cm. - (Critical war studies) First published in the United Kingdom by Hurst Publishers, London, c2009. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-231-70078-8 (cloth: alk. paper) 1. Military art and science-Technological innovations-History. 2. Military art and science-Methodology-History.3. Science-Military aspects-History. 4. Technology­ Military aspects-History. 5. Military art and science-Philosophy. 6. Military history, Modern. 7. Military policy-History. 8. Military research-History. I. Title. II. Series. U39.B68 2009 355.02.01'1-dc22 2008048758 e Columbia Universiry Press books are printed on permanent and durable acid-free paper. This book is printed on paper with recycled content. Printed in India c 10 987654321 References to Internet Web sites (URLs) were accurate at the time of writing. Neither the aurhor nor Columbia Universiry Press is responsible for URLs that may have expired or changed since the manuscript was prepared. Contents Acknowledgements Vlll Introduction 1 l. Te chnoscientific Regimes of Order in Warfare 9 7he Technoscientific Regime of Order 13 Science, Culture, and Discursive Resonance 20 7he Po wer of Metaphors 25 7he Fo ur Regimes of the ScientificlVtty of lVttrfare 29 2. Mechanistic Wa rfare and the Clockwork Universe 37 From Mechanical Clock to Clockwork Metaphor 38 7he Clockwork Un iverse: 1he Ascendancy of the Mechanistic Worldview 41 7he Clockwork Heavens: Ne wtonian Mechanics and the Clockmaker God 43 7he Clockwork Body and Soul: Descartes, La Mettrie and Mechanistic Physiology 48 7he Clockwork State: Enlightened Absolutism 50 Mechanistic IVttrfare: Frederick the Great's Clockwork Army 53 3. Thermodynamic Wa rfare and the Science of Energy 63 7he Engine: the Industrialisation and Motorisation of Society 65 7hermodynamics: the Un iverse as a Heat Engine 67 7he Hu man Engine: 7hermodynamic Bodies and Minds 72 7hermodynamic IVttrfare: Prometheus Un bound 75 Clausewitz 'Translates' 7hermodynamics 85 v SCIENTIFIC WAY OF WARFARE 4. Cybernetics and the Genesis of the Computer 93 Electromagnetic Telecommunications and "War 94 The Computer: Genesis and Embodiment of an Abstract Ma chine 96 Bits and Ne gentropy : Information Becomes Physical 102 Cy bernetics: the Science of Control and Communications 107 Cy bernetic Organisms: Fro m Co mputerised Brains to Biological Computers 112 Sociocybernetics 115 5. Cybernetic Warfare: Computers at Wa r 121 The 'Closed World'of Cy bernetic "Warfare 123 From Co mmand to Co mmand and Control 128 Op erations Research and Systems Analysis: Solving the "War Equation 137 Vietnam and the Fa ilure of Cy bernetic "Warfare 154 6. A New Informational Regime: From Chaos Theory to Complexity Science 163 The Rediscovery of No n-Linearity: Chaos Theory and Positive Feedback 164 Complexity, Networks, and Emergence: Lifeat the Edge of Chaos 173 7. Towards Chaoplexic Wa rfare? Network-Centric Warfare and the Non-Linear Sciences 185 John Boyd and the OODA "loop" 187 Embracing Un certainty: The Chaoplexic Clausewitz 196 The Age of the Ne twork 203 Ha rnessing the Swarm: Of Ants and Men 210 Chaoplexity Goes To "War?In terrogating Ne twork-Centric "Warfare 215 Conclusion 235 Bibliograp hy 245 Index 259 VI Figures 1. The fo ur regimes of the scientificway of warfare 30 2. Geometric warfare 55 3. Diagram of the von Neumann computer architecture 100 4. Shannon's schematic diagram of an abstract communication machine 104 5. Informati�n feedback loop in a cybernetic system 109 6. SAGE man-machine cybernetic loop 132 7. Command and control loop 137 8. Mandelbrot set fractal 170 9. Self-similarity in a Mandelbrot set fractal 171 10. Bifurcation diagram of a non-linear system 177 11. Complexity is highest in between the poles of order and disorder 179 12. John Boyd's OODA "loop" 187 13. Diagram of the fu nctional organisation of a complex adaptive system 192 14. From information to emergence 223 vii Acknowledgments Begun over five years ago, the writing of this book has been an intellectual journey which has taken me in directions and places I had never envis­ aged, but whose guiding compass has been an enduring fascination fo r the subject matter, some of which I hope will be conveyed to the reader. Obviously, no undertaking of this sort, however solitary it is in the main, can ever be brought to fruition without the help and support of many others. l owe special gratitude to Christopher Coker for his encouragement and diligent supervision of this work in its earlier incar­ nation as a doctoral thesis. Thanks are als� due to my examiners Colin Gray and Theo Farrell fo r their thorough probing and questioning of my argument as well as the constructive comments and advice they have offered. Neither can I overstate the importance of the friendship and intellectual companionship provided by my fe llow doctoral candidates at the London School of Economics and Political Science during those crucial years. I am thankful to Michael Dwyer and all at Hurst Publishers fo r their professionalism and backing, as I am to Tarak Barkawi and Shane Brighton fo r having selected this book fo r their new Critical War Stud­ ies series that I have no doubt will spearhead a renewed productive en­ gagement on questions of war and society. I also owe thanks to Michael Innes fo r his comments and unprompted enthusiasm fo r the book. I am grateful to Neil We lls fo r having read through an early draft of the book fo r any glaring inaccuracies or misinterpretations in my presentation and use of scientific theories. In this respect as in all others, any flaws with the present text naturally remain entirely my own. viii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Ultimately nothing would have been possible without the enduring support and belief of my family over the years and to whom I am fo rever indebted. Last but not least is the gratitude l owe Naoko fo r her love and patience. ix To my parents, Alison and Michel Every age had its own kind ofwar, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions. Ea ch period, therefore, would have held to its own theory ofwar, even ifthe urge had always and universally existed to work things out on scientificprin ciples. Carl von Clausewitz Introduction When Baghdad fe ll to the American army on April 9, 2003 after a lightening war of barely three weeks, military officials were prompt to pronounce it a spectacular early demonstration of the Pentagon's new doctrine of network-centric warfare. For the commander of Coalition fo rces General To mmy Franks, the experience was nothing short of religious: "I've died and gone to heaven and seen the first bit of net­ centric warfare at work!"! Although the reality of operations was still a fa r cry fr om the vision of swarming self-synchronised warfighting units expounded by the theorists of network-centric warfare, its advocates were keen to claim that the deployment of a vast network of surveillance and communication technologies had granted the Coalition fo rces unparalleled awareness of the battlefield and unprecedented military effectiveness. Following on soon after the similarly swift toppling of the Taliban in Mghanistan, the network-empowered American Leviathan seemed briefly unstoppable. Four years later, with the Coalition mired in a guerrilla war against the insurgency that soon erupted in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq, a very different assessment can be heard fr om the freshly retired successor to Franks at the head of US Central Command. "The enemy is in fact more networked, more de centralised, and operates within a broader commander's intent than any twentieth-century fo e we've ever met," General John Abizaid tells his audience at a convention on military transformation. "In fact, this enemy is better networked than Office of Force Tr ansformation, TheIm plementation of Ne twork-Centric Warfore (2005), p. 18. 1 SCIENTIFIC WAY OF WARFARE we are." Using mobile phones and the Internet fo r communications and operating within loose and diffuse organisational structures, it is indeed the insurgents which have appeared more adept at embracing the network fo rm than their adversaries. For Abizaid only one thing can still turn the tide: more of the same.