Airpower Journal

COMING... in our winter edition

• Counterrevolution in Namibia • Air Battle 2000 • SDI—A Historical Perspective Secretary of the Air Force Edward C. Aldridge, Jr.

Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Larrv D. Welch

Commander, Air University Lt Gen Truman Spangrud

Commander, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Educatíon Gol Sidney J. Wise

Professional Staff Editor Col Keith W. Geiger

Associate Editor Maj Michael A. Kirtland

Contributing Personnel Hugh Richardson, Associate Editor John A. Westcott, Art Director and Production Manager

The Airpower Journal. published quarterly, is the professional journal of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for presenting and stimulating innovative thinking on military doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other national defense matters. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permis- sion. If reproduced, the Airpower Journal re- quests a courtesy line.

JOURNAL WINTER 1987 88, Vol. I, No. 3 AFRP 5 0 - 2

Position Update Col Keith W. Geiger, USAF 2 Air Battle 2000 in the NATO Alliance: Exploiting Conceptual and Technological Advances Maj Gen Perry M. Smith. USAF, Retired 4 Hogs in the Rear: A-lOs in Rear Operations Maj Darrel D. Whitcomb, USAFR 1 6 Sowing the Seams: Strategic Bombers Versus Follow-on Forces Col Martin T. Daack, USAF 2 2 US Air Force Operations and Intelligence: Getting It Together Capt Brian P. Tice, USAF 31 From Project Thumper to SDI: The Role of Ballistic Missile Defense in US Security Policy Dr Daniel S. Papp ^ 4

Counterrevolution in Namibia Maj Robert C. Owen, USAF 5 2 Female Air Force Pilots and Combat Aircraft: “The Right Stuff” Has No Gender Maj Sandra L. Bateman, USAF 6 3 Better Writing: A Heretic’s View Col Samuel E. Riddlebarger, USAF, Retired 7 5

Net Assessments 6 1 Reviews of Current Literature Notams 9 1 Notices of Interest Index 9 2 Contributors 9 5 This still leaves too diffuse a focus for a EDITORIAL______single professional journal. Sharpening the focus is an action with which not all agree, but sharpened it must be for the reasons Position Update identified above. If we concern ourselves with the application of military power, then we may leave aside questions of whether or ITH THIS, the final issue of volume I, not military power should be applied and it seems appropriate to look at what concentrate on how best to apply it. This Wthe Air Force’s professional journal should means the bulk of the geopolitico-military be and at what it offers its readership. Three questions can be relinquished to other jour- aspects of the Journal warrant considera- nals with reputations for credible and bal- tion. each important in its own way and anced treatment. Another area of inquiry each of which, we hope, will be of interest must also be forgone if the Airpower Journal to you. is to hold the interest of the entire target au- Every periodical must have some focus to dience. Issues of expert functional concern guide its editors in selecting material, its are also left to the excellent functional jour- contributors in adopting a Creative ap- nals available. Remaining to the Airpower proach, and its readers in deciding whether Journal is the middle ground, the concern to spend valuable time reading. The Air with integrating multiple functions into power JournaTs focus, in simplest terms, is cohesive military operations. In short, we the effective application of combat power. are about the “operational art” in its broad- Combat power can be defined as a military est sense. force’s ability to develop, field, generate, Another aspect of the Airpower Journal and maintain appropriate combat pressure deserves mention. You will note in this is in given situations. This is not an additive sue a volume index, something our ances- process but an interactive, synergistic one. tor, the Air University Quarterly Review, The failure to “field” appropriate power printed on occasion. We will publish, both does not simply decrease the available com in the Journal and separately, volume Ín bat power, it may well negate it altogether. dices by author and subject matter with This suggests that any journal concerned each winter issue. Every five years. we plan with effective combat power must entertain to publish separate, cumulative indices of the myriad activities that result in the end all Airpower Journals to that point. We hope product. To- some, that will mean opera- they are useful to you. tions; to others, effective logistic support; Finally, the many inquiries about the Ira and to still others, research and develop- C. Eaker Essay Competition deserve an an- ment or perhaps manpower/personnel con- swer. We are pleased to announce, as noted cerns. Each of these areas is appropriate for elsewhere in this issue, the reemergence of the Airpower Journal, and yet, each can also the competition, effective with the Spring be inappropriate. The key is whether or not 1988 issue of the Airpower Journal. You the lens through which each of these areas will note some changes to the competition. is viewed is concerned with improving the but its original purposes remain: to honor end product—the effective application of General Eaker and to encourage you to con- appropriate combat power. An issue fo- tribute to the professional dialogue in these cused on something else has little value in a pages. One $500 award will be made for a professional military journal. feature in each issue. Only US military

2 EDITORIAL 3

members or US Government civilians be- All in all, it was not a bad year, but we cer- low the rank of colonel or the grade of GS- tainly expect the coming one to be even bet- 15 are eligible to compete. We hope to see ter in terms of presenting your professional your feature article soon. military concerns for consideration and providing a useful service to you. KWG

The Ira C. Eaker Award Airpower Journal proudly announces that the Ira C. Eaker Award will reap- pear as a part of the Air Force’s professional journal beginning in the Spring 1988 issue. The purpose of the award remains as before: to honor General Ira C. Eaker by promoting professional military writing in the pages of the Airpower Journal. Its format has changed. Instead of a separate competition, there will be an award given for the best feature article in each issue. The winning author will receive $500 in recognition of his or her contribution to the advancement of professional military thought. All US military personnel below the rank of colonel or equivalent and US Government civilian employees below the grade of GS-15 or equivalent are eligible to participate. This includes active duty, reserve, and national guard forces as well as precommissioning programs. Only feature-length articles will be considered. Anyone desiring further information on the Ira C. Eaker Award or on how to submit an article may write to the Editor, Airpower Journal, Walker Hall, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532. AIR BATTLE 2000 IN THE NATO ALLIANCE Exploiting Conceptual and Technological Advances

M ai Gen Per r y M. S mit h , USAF, Retired HE PURPOSE of this essay is to arena, as well as a series of books on warfare stretch the mind of the reader in two (2010 and beyond) which will be written by important related areas. First. I wish individual authors under my general to contemplate future air technology editorship.* Tand the impact of this new technology on The potential for major improvements in potential conventional battle in Europe. NATO's conventional capability over the Second. I vvould like to address other more next few years is quite high. particularly in general aspects of both technology and the air environment. Much of that improve- planning in hopes of encouraging the reader ment relates directly to technological ad- to think more deeply about the long-range vances, but advances in doctrine, tactics, future of the NATO alliance. I have pur- and training can and should also play an posely kept this article short in hopes that it important role. It is most important that mil- will be read and discussed. It is a small part itarv leaders of all NATO nations keep of my efforts, which include two new books that deal with the important issues of lead- "Taking Charge: A Practical Cuide for Leaders (I986J and Toivards a National Security and Long-Honge Planning (1987). ership and planning in the national security both published by the National Defense University Press.

9 6 AIRPOW ER JOURNAL W1NTER 1988 abreast of the changing battlefield environ- bureaucratic barriers are removed in comments and that they actively pursue im- partmentalized programs that a weapon provements in technology, doctrine, and system that normally would take a decade tactics. or more to develop can be fielded in five or The close coordination of land and air six years. will be even more important in the years These advantages must be weighed ahead than it has been in the past because against a number of signifícant disadvan technology is moving so fast and barriers to tages. The air force of an individual nation good coordination are actually becoming in NATO may be developing a radically greater. In the past eight or nine years, com- new system that may help solve a major partmentalization of classified programs problem its army or navy is facing. If, how- has become an important phenomenon in ever, the leaders from the other Services and the research and development world. If from the other nations are not informed of present trends continue, the operational this program, they may waste money and ef- world could also be signifícantly affected by fort on an inferior system to address the compartmentalization. Although there are same problem. In addition, there is often a many advantages to controlling access to “doctrinal lag” in incorporating into the very sensitive programs, there are some ma mainstream of the operational world the jor disadvantages. Leaders from each of the new operational systems that were devel- NATO countries with major research and oped very rapidly through compartmental development programs must carefully ization. This doctrinal lag can become weigh these factors when developing and particularly acute when the officials re- implementing weapon systems, programs, sponsible for developing doctrine are not and policv. These issues relating to com cleared for the program either during the re partmentalization are so important, both to search and development phase or after the the air-land battle in the twenty-fírst cen- system becomes operational. tury and to the future of the alliance, that This problem of doctrinal lag is further they deserve a few paragraphs in this compounded when service lines are discussion. crossed, and the problem becomes more severe when national lines are crossed. For instance, getting an officer from the German Innovation Through navy to share closely held secrets from a tightly compartmentalized research and de Compartmentalization velopment program with a US Army officer One of the evolving truths of compart (or vice versa) is just plain tough. mentalization is that innovation is considerably easier in a closed, or “black,” program than in an open, or “white,” one. Autonomous Systems In my judgment, this fact is even more im portant than the advantages of hiding the Perhaps the most important technological technology from potential enemies, since development that will have a signifícant im- doctrinal and conceptual innovation is so pact on the air-land battle in the early part of difficult in the white world. Another advan- the next century will be the deployment of tage of compartmentalization is the rapidity autonomous systems in large numbers. One with which a radical technological idea can example of such a system would be a very turn into an operational system. So many small pilotless aircraft with a very efficient AIR BATTLE 2000 IN THE NATO ALLIANCE 7 small engine, an airframe made of plastic or tical problems, particularly when it tries to composite material, a supersensor in the concentrate the elements of the force. Move- nose, and a very small warhead. The super ments of ground vehicles, for instance, will sensor, using one or more of a number of create noise, heat, and other observable techniques, could be programmed to target phenomena that can be picked up by tiny a very specific tvpe of enemy vehicle, air- but very discriminating sensors in airborne craft, radar, or other system. This airborne vehicles loitering over the battlefield and vehicle vvould have a very long loiter time over other areas of high interest such as air- (many hours to a fevv days) and could pro- fields and logistics areas. The enemy vide a considerable capability in both the ground force commander will face a num deterrence and warfighting realms. ber of bad choices. One choice would be to The deterrence value of this vehicle could destroy the vast majority of these autono be its most important quality. The Soviets mous vehicles in order to avoid suffering have historically had great respect for, and massive losses in the first few hours of ma fear of, Western systems based on high tech- jor ground force movements. But the de- nology. At times, they have overestimated struction of these systems will be difficult the capability of these systems. This fear, because they should be very small, very admiration, and overestimation could be stealthy, and very agile. In addition, those very helpful in causing Soviet decisionmak- that will be destroyed could be easily and ers to forgo contemplated offensive opera- rather cheaply replaced by others. tions if they thought the alliance had large Another choice for the ground force com numbers of these autonomous vehicles de- mander would be to deceive these sys ployed and on alert status in Europe. Some- tems—that is. to spoof them in some way. time in the future it may be helpful to lift, This could have some very positive results, ever so slightly. the dark veil of compart- but it could also be very expensive. For in mentalization to enhance the deterrence stance, to produce the exact sound, heat, value of some of these systems. and shape of a Soviet truck may be almost as Autonomous systems that depend heav- expensive as creating the truck itself and ily on high-technology sensors, engines, bringing it to the battlefield. In short, decoys and airframes are likely to be better than only make sense when they are consider- similar Soviet systems because the Soviets ably cheaper than the real thing. will probably continue to lag behind in A third choice for the ground commander these important technical areas. Hence, if would be to concentrate the ground forces Western civilian and military leaders are in such a way as to overwhelm these auton particularly prudent about how they man- omous systems with too much data. This age compartmentalization, they can have approach could fail, and fail massively, if the best of both worlds. In other words, the commander underestimated the capa technological leakage to the Soviet Union bility and the number of these autonomous can be restricted, while defense and deter vehicles. rence can be enhanced. A fourth choice for the ground com To further develop the point about auton mander would be to accept the losses that omous systems, let me speculate about how these systems will cause and hope that the they may change the face of the air-land bat- opponent will run out of such systems. This tle. An enemy land force, facing a myriad of can work against an adversary who has not autonomous systems, will have to deal with procured large numbers of these systems or real doctrinal, operational, morale, and tac- developed the logistical, transportation, and deployment systems to ensure that launching of aircraft could still take place at enough of these vehicles are available to night, in marginal weather, and in between launch and relaunch into the battlefield enemy air or missile attacks. In the future, area where the enemy is contemplating an however, a commander of an air base will attack. have to deal with air attack by aircraft, glide Enemy airfíelds will also face the devas- bombs, missiles, and autonomous systems. tation that these autonomous systems can In the past, attacks on air bases were of short cause. Turning on externai power units. duration, and airfíeld repair and the re- towing airplanes, and taxiing aircraft may commencement of launch and recovery of all become verv risky operations if autono aircraft could take place after each attack. mous airborne systems are loitering over But by the year 2000, even the rapid runway key enemy airfíelds. In the past, airfíelds repair vehicles may be programmed as tar- have been vulnerable to attack, but the gets of these overhead autonomous systems,

8 The RF-4C lleftl has served lhe needs of lhe Air Force for over livo decades. The Air Force and Navy are uorking on unmanned aircraft as a possibJe jollow-on reconnaissance vehicle to meei lhe needs of lhe nexl cenlury. The manned aircraft, like this A-10 close-air-support aircrafI /ahove) ivill alivays be needed. Bul /usl as ils performance is enhanced bv ils ability Io carry (hese Maverick missiíes, lhe overall performance of air poiver may be enhanced by better lechnology and lhe inclusion of remoteiy piloled vehicles IfíPVJ used in concerl wílh manned aircraft

and the repair of runvvays and taxiwavs may of their size and stealthy characteristics. Of become much more hazardous than in the course, there will still be many aircraft that past. must operate off hard surfaces. Dispersai will become increasingly important, and technology, if properly exploited, can help The Twenty-first Century a great deal in this area. Expert systems that provide help to maintenance technicians Air Base in Europe liave excellent potential liere. If each air Autonomous systems vvill not require air craft mechanic and each avionics techni- bases of the traditional size and scope. but cian has a small Computer containing the planners must be Creative in the deploy- knowledge of some of the very best and ment. launching, and recovery of autono most experienced maintenance supervi- mous systems in order to take full advantage sors. the overall manpower needs could be

9 10 AIfíPOWEfí JOURNAL WINTER 1988 reduced and the ability to disperse aircraft bases. There are many things that an air base in small numbers to diverse locations commander will be able to do to make the vvould be enhanced. air base very difficult for the enemy to find The great emphasis on the very high re- and, once found, difficult for him to identify aliability of aircraft systems will begin to the “real” targets. pay off by the early part of the next century, and there will also be a modest decrease in the need for spare parts and for supply peo- Exploiting NATOs ple to provide and manage the spare parts. These factors will help in enhancing the Technological Advantages ability of an aircraft squadron to disperse Over the course of the next few decades quickly and to operate out of austere loca there will be a technological race of extraor- tions. Tactical deception must become a dinary proportions. The United States and high priority for commanders of fixed air its NATO partners should be able to win

This YQ M -94A prototype strategic reconnaissance vehicle fleiv as early as 1973. demonstrating the validity of remotely piloted systems to loiterfor up to 24 hours, considerably longer than the manned RC-135 aircraft it was designed to replace. AIR BATTLE 2000 IN THE NATO ALLIANCE 11

this race. The Soviet Union and Eastern Eu- computer-aided design can all make impor ropean nations have deep, abiding prob- tant contributions to air warfare. In short, lems with the relationship between the societies that have the most computer- vvidespread public access to high technol literate populations and the populations ogy and the need to maintain control over with the most highly developed innovative their populations. These problems will in- and entrepreneurial skills should be the hibit exploitation of high technology suffi- winners of this important technological ciently to give the West an advantage that race. prudent public policy can exploit. Micro- The real challenge for the alliance, how- computers, software engineering (the ever, is not the development of these new "hacker” role here can be most important if systems. The challenge is how to share this the defense communities of the West can at- technology between and among NATO na tract some of the best of the hackers), mini- tions and how to develop the doctrine and aturization, expert systems, and intelligent tactics for the optimal use of these systems.

These US Navy Pioneer RPVs are depJoyed on board the battleship USS Iowa. providing over-fhe-horizon targeting and reconnaissance, up to 110 mi/es mvay. The Pioneer uses a rocket-assisted takeoff technique and is recovered using a net recovery system aboard the battleship. & *■’' * 12 AÍRPOWER JOURNAL W1NTER 1988

This coordination of technology, doc- matured materially in recent years, should trine, and tactics should be accomplished help in the difficult but important divesti- prior to the operational deployment of these ture process. For instance, it is likely that new systems. Since changes in doctrine and both the A-10 aircraft (the primary Ameri tactics come quite slowly in the NATO en- can close-air-support aircraft) and the RF-4 vironment. it is encumbent upon the lead- (the primary tactical reconnaissance aircraft ers in the United States, Great Britain, West of a number of NATO nations) will not be Germanv, and other nations who are deve- replaced by manned systems when they be- loping exotic new systems to share the basic come obsolete in the early part of the next technology and the operational capability century. These aircraft will probably be re with the leaders of the NATO operational placed in large part by autonomous systems commands. This sharing of information that have a low unit cost and a very consid- should take place at least a year before each erable mission capability. A great advantage new black program becomes operational. of these autonomous systems that was not Individual nations must take the initiative discussed earlier in this article is their po- to disclose this sensitive information be- tential to accomplish a multiplicity of mis- cause the NATO operational commanders sions with only modest changes to the will, in many cases, have insuffícient back- sensor software. In other words, a lethal au ground or insight to ask for it. It is clearly tonomous system could be designed to do not enough that the research and develop- all of the following missions: close air sup- ment chiefs of each Service and each nation port, battlefíeld air interdiction, interdic- share this information; the NATO opera tion, counter-SAM attack, and airfíeld tional commanders must be briefed in some attack. A single weapon system should be detail. capable of being changed from mission to mission by changing a small software package in the vehicle itself. The Changing Operational A significant impediment to rapid de Environment ployment in this area is a residual “Lud- dite” mentality, or opposition to The battlefíeld of the twenty-first century technological change, that exists within the will be dramatically changed by the ground defense communities of all the NATO na and air systems that are being developed tions. In fairness to those who are skeptical now and that should be deployed over the about the magic of exotic technology, there course of thç next 10 years. Periods of bud- have been many unfulfilled promises in the getary austerity may even accelerate this last few decades. In addition, the Clause- trend toward exotic new systems because witzian concepts of the “fog of war” and many of these systems are considerably less “friction" must be kept in mind when plan- expensive than traditional systems such as ning for the use of military forces in the de- manned aircraft, helicopters, tanks, and ar- manding and confusing battlefíeld tillery pieces. As Service programs in each environment. Hence, thoughtful skepticism of the nations of the alliance are developed must be the order of the day when contem- during upcoming austere budgetary years, plating the long-range future. The long- decision analysis, mission area analysis, range planner must. however, try to avoid and systems analysis should highlight the putting blinders on and losing the opportu- value of these new systems. In addition, nity to grasp the technological. doctrinal, these analytical techniques, which have and tactical importance of the recent dra- AIR BATTLE 2000 IN THE NATO ALLIANCE 13

matic improvements in the reliabilitv and part of the twenty-first century, considera- capability of miniaturized systems. ble training costs will be saved through re The •‘technological slingshot.” the accel- alistic simulation. Hopefully, these cost eration of the exploitation of particularly savings can be translated into more and bet- promising technology, is a reality in the ci- ter systems. vilian world. It could become a reality in the Mission planning using small personal military world, particularly if the advan- computers will also be much improved. Al- tages of development in the black world can ready the hackers are showing us how much be fully exploited. Whereas it took decades can be done on a small Computer. A recent to take the concept of a telephone, a radio, example is the very realistic and sophisti- and a television and turn them into fully op- cated Computer game licensed by the Na erational and reliable systems, it has taken a tional Football League called NFL much shorter time to do the same thing for Challenge, which uses over 120,000 lines of the transistor, the semiconductor, and the code but can be played on a personal Com laser compact disk. Although the military puter (PC). Just before a pilot walks out to has generally not taken full advantage of his airplane to fly on a combat mission, he this ‘‘technological slingshot,” recent initi- will be able to glance at his portable PC, up- atives such as the US Air Force Project Fore- date it with the very latest intelligence data, cast II were designed to do just that. All the and replan his route to and from his target in nations of the alliance should consider em- an instant. By the year 2000, he will be able ulating the Project Forecast II effort since to do this again when he is en route to his only by determined, sustained, and inno- target as he receives updated intelligence vative methods will the right technologies information. be given the proper emphasis and sustained As long as the alliance has to face a me- support. dium-tech enemy, its ability to offset quan- Another major aspect of high technology tity with quality will remain strong, that will have important military applica- especially if strong research and develop tions and that should be exploited over the ment programs are in the defense budget of course of the next decade will be in mission each of the major NATO nations. Com- planning and training. Mission simulation pressed research and development cycles, has finally become both reasonably realistic institutionalized innovation, and long- and a lot of fun. Tank crews, fighter pilots, range planning in each nation and in the al and manv others can novv learn a great deal liance as a whole, as well as close coordi- by driving or flying in simulators. Leaders nation among nations, should be the must understand that simulators will not be guidelines for the alliance over the next 15 useful until the crews actualiy want to use years. them and learn from them. As new modifi- In the years ahead, the alliance should fo- cations are made to individual weapon sys cus more attention on concepts and doc- tems, the sim ulator should get the trine and should develop institutional modification first. In that way, the crews can arrangements whereby new conceptual learn how to use the new capability of the ideas can be shared, debated, and, in some weapon system before that capability is cases, incorporated into NATO doctrine placed in the actual aircraft, tank. or heli- and procedures. Let me cite an example. In copter. This procedure will also ensure an 1986 Col John Warden of the US Air Force interest by the crews in climbing into the wrote a seminal paper at the National War simulator on a regular basis. By the early College in Washington, D.C. It won a major 14 A1RPOWER JOURNAL W1NTER 1988 research award, and yet there was no easy the planning process. Two or three alterna- way to ensure that strategists and planners tive ‘‘Soviet Unions” in the year 2005 might in the alliance were exposed to his ideas. A provide the planner and the decisionmaker clearinghouse for new conceptual ideas with a better understanding of future oppor- should be established in every major NATO tunities and possibilities. It seems quite headquarters and in every ministry of de- clear that the Soviet Union is going through fense. If each major national and interna- some important internai change right now tional headquarters had a small (five or six and a straight-line extrapolation of the people should be adequate) long-range Brehznev period into the twenty-first cen- planning division with direct access to the tury would not seem prudent. On the other top commander or leader, the alliance, over hand, it is too early to make definitive judg- time. could develop a better strategic vision. ments about the Gorbachev legacy for the In addition, these long-range planning di- next century. If the alliance is to thrive in visions could be the place where bright the future, it must think clearly about its young people (from throughout each of the major adversary. The use of the altemative commands) with fresh ideas could interject futures approach may be helpful. them at a high levei. As far as military planning is concerned, The military chain of command, for all of radically new concepts are worth examin- its strengths, is an impediment to innova- ing even if the only purpose they serve is to tion. It is time that leaders of the alliance stretch the minds of planners and decision- recognize this fact and take action to solve makers. John Warden may be correct when this problem. Conceptual thinking based on he looks into the future and sees air superi- a solid understanding of operational factors ority as the primary mission in the air-land has been largely lacking in recent years. Our battle. Others with equally innovative con concepts must keep up with our technol- cepts should be encouraged to come for- ogy. Better still, our concepts should stay ward and advance their ideas with little or ahead of our technology if the advantages of no risk to their military careers. our technology are to be fully exploited. If the alliance is to win the air superiority battle and be the ultimate winner of the war of the twenty-first century, therefore, major Radical reconsideration of Army and Air Force (as Conceptual Approaches well as Navy and Marine) doctrine needs to be undertaken between now and then. The Let me close this short essay with a dis- further the nations of the alliance are re- cussion of the need for long-range planners moved from the last war, the harder they to go beyond conventional wisdom and to must work to ensure that their military think radical and heretical thoughts. So forces and doctrine are relevant to the next much planning done in the alliance is not war. The fact that most innovators are un- much more than the extrapolation of cur- comfortable in large bureaucratic organiza- rent policy and programs into the distant fu tions means that there will always be a ture. Long-range planning must avoid fiscal, shortage of ideas and innovators within the conceptual, organizational, technological, military Services. If the civilian and military political, psychological, and economic bar- leaders of the alliance recognize this very riers to clear thinking. For instance, there is natural tendency, they can compensate for much to be said for the use of the “alterna- it in a number of ways. A sênior and very ex- tive futures” technique in thinking through perienced analyst, a trusted member of for- Alfl BATTLE 2000 IN THE NATO ALLIANCE 15

mer Secretary of Defense Caspar an alliance must be able to discuss issues to- Weinberger’s staff, has pointed out that gether; and if the leader from a high-tech na- some of the very best intelligence work is tion is constantly “ dazzling” his being done by individuais and organiza- counterpart with the esoteric terminology tions outside of government and that one of of high technology. the communication bar- the great advantages of contracting out more riers will only become more troublesome. It work is that fewer people remain inside will be the task of all leaders to nourish the government to provide bureaucratic bar- alliance by understanding the barriers to riers to the implementation of new ideas. good communication and coordination and In addition. very influential individuais breaking down these barriers on a regular like Senator Sam Nunn are not only asking basis. the tough questions but also are showing a The air battle in the early part of the greater discomfiture with the answers they twenty-first century may well be the deci- are getting to questions relating to strategic sive battle and, as a result, demands our at- planning and institutional innovation. The tention, our time, and our best intellectual military must reach out for help to over- efforts. Too much time is being spent by come the personal and institutional imped- leaders on current problems and too little iments to innovation. time is being reserved for long-range think- Another serious problem the alliance will ing and planning. If this paper can, in a face in the years leading up to the twenty- small way, be a catalyst for better planning first century will be the widening differen- and better thinking, it will have served its tial in military capability between the high- purpose. tech nations of the alliance and those nations that for economic or other reasons do This essav vvas developed from a paper presented at the Na not move forward rapidly as far as military tional Defense University. A somewhat similar address was delivered to the Future of the Royal Air Force Conference in 'technology is concerned. Military leaders in London in 1987.

OMEBODY ONCE said that an army against enemy forces not yet in contact and traveis on its stomach. This was not are designed to influence the conditions in a reference to a mode of transporta- which future close operations will be con- tion but recognition of the important ducted. Included are such things as attrition roleS that logistics play in military opera- of enemy follow-on units or the deep ma- tions. The US Army is keenly aware of this neuver of friendly units to shape future bat- fact. Additionally, it realizes that its logis- tles. Their purpose is to deny freedom of tical tail is vulnerable to enemy action and action to opposing commanders and to dis- that combat operations may be necessary in rupt their tempo of operations. They would rear areas. These rear operations will be include Air Force interdiction, reconnais- joint affairs requiring close integration of sance, and jamming operations.4 ground and air action.1 The purpose of this Rear operations comprise those activities article is to examine the concept of rear op rearward of our own units in contact that erations and to propose the use of the A-10 are designed to assure our freedom of main this area. Rear operations will be defined neuver and continuity of operations. They as one part of the overall air-land battle, and include such things as command and con- possible threats will be examined. This will trol and all of the logistical assets and ac- be followed by a discussion of the capabili- tions necessary to sustain combat. To a ties of the A-10 and some considerations for division commander, they could include its use as a close-air-support asset in the rear such things as fuel sites, transportation, and area. medicai units. To a theater commander, The US Army’s current basic fighting doc- they could mean securing support airfields, trine is called AirLand Battle. As laid out in nuclear sites, major lines of communica- Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, it re- tion, and so on. Needless to say, to an ad- flects the structure of modern warfare and versary our rear areas represent target-rich the application of the classical principies of environments.5 war to contemporary battlefield require- The Army, in its FM 90-14, Rear Battle, ments. It is inherently three-dimensional in recognizes three leveis of threat to the rear nature and requires close coordination and area.6 Levei I threats are generally seen as synchronized operations with other Ser small teams of enemy-controlled agents, vices. Additionally, the doctrine recognizes terrorists, or enemy sympathizers. Their ob- that commanders from theater through di- jectives could be political disruption, assas- vision levei must actually conduct three sination, or sabotage of key sites and lines of types of operations in support of overall communication. campaign plans: close, deep, and rear Levei II threats have two forms. One con- operations.2 sists of unconventional forces skilled in in- Close operations comprise the current ac- filtration. The other is conventional tivities of major committed combat ele- company-size airborne or heliborne as- ments. They are sometimes referred to as saults. Their objectives would be to destroy the main battle, where Steel meets Steel. key installations such as airfields and nu They are sometimes violent and can be clear sites, logistic sites, and reserve forces. highly dynamic, and they are marked by They would also collect intelligence and high consumption of materiel and heavy create disruption and confusion in support casualties. Close combat is frequent and in- of a front/army main attack. cludes Air Force close air support (CAS).3 Levei III threats are considered to be as- Deep operations comprise operations saults by units of battalion or larger size.

17 A-JO aircraft (above) regularly Irain witb US Army units. fntegration of A-lOs into reararea de/enses would not be a difficult task.

The firepower of the A-10's 30mm guri (above right) would provide significant airborne firepower for action over the wide areas of rear operations.

The A-10 ’s (lower right) ability to carry a wide variety of ordinance on multiple weapons stations means it can attack different types of targets with the right kind of munitions.

20 AIfíPOWEfí JOURNAL WINTER 1988

These could be airborne, air assault, am- positioning over the battlefield, it provides phibious, infiltration, or reconnaissance an ability to observe the enemy. units or operational maneuver groups Additionally, the A-10 is equipped for (OMG) up to army size. Their objectives this mission. The inertial navigation system would read as above but on a larger scale. provides a means for quick and accurate They could include the seizure of national navigation. It can be programmed with the capitais, economic centers or ports, or the universal transverse mercator (UTM) grid encirclement of major friendly ground map coordinates used by Army units. Com- units. munication equipment includes a UHF- Our ground commanders must give due AM, a VHF-AM, and a VHF-FM radio. The consideration to these threats when plan- VHF-FM radio is common with FM rádios ning their operations. Operations plans and used by Army units. This gives the A-10 orders will direct that a specific unit head- pilot the ability to talk to anyone in the Air quarters be directly responsible for con- Force tactical air control system (TACS) or ducting operations in the rear.7 This Army control channels.10 Ordnance loads headquarters is usually the rear area opera will always include the 30-mm GAU-8 tions center (RAOC). Additionally, combat gun, a highly lethal, accurate weapon not and combat-support units will be identified conducive to collateral damage. The A-10 with, at the very least, on-order missions to can also carry the Maverick missile and conduct rear area operations under RAOC many types of free-fall ordnance. This spe- control. They will probably include avia- cifícally includes the CBU-89 Gator mine, which could very effectively be used to bot- tion. artillery, air defense, military police, tle up larger type units." Finally, the A-10 engineer, and possibly even infantry units. is equipped with the Pave Penny laser iden- The ground commander may also plan to di- tifícation system, which, when used with a vert some allocated CAS sorties for use in laser designator, facilitates accurate target this area. visual identification.12 But the commander must be careful in his The A-10 would be optimal for such op allocation of combat power to the rear. He erations because its primary mission is cannot allow units to be siphoned away close air support.13 However, A-10 pilot from the main battle or from reserves being training to date has focused primarily on the marshaled for offensive operations. He main battle at the forward line of own must practice economy-of-force operations, troops (FLOT), where large formations will initially using his combat Service support be in contact. Training scenarios generally elements and CAS sorties to detect, delay, call for an alert scramble with immediate and destroy intruding forces.8 tasking to a contact point where a forward The A-10 could be a most satisfactory as- air controller (FAC) is contacted for final set for this operation. It possesses all of the control for a high-threat run in. Considera capabilities necessary for theater air tion of rear operations close air support re- power.4 It is highly responsive and can react quires a broadening of horizons. Alert theaterwide to rapidly changing situations. scrambles could obviously be used, but It is highly mobile and can quickly concen- tasking would be less clear. Aircraft could trate or disperse as necessary. Self-protec- be sent into areas far from the FLOT. Mini- tion capabilities malte it highly survivable mum-risk routes of contact points may not in the rear area. It can establish presence by be available. Only target UTM coordinates bringing force against weakness. By its very might be provided, and a FAC may or may HOCS IN THE HE AH 21

not be on the scene. In the absence of a FAC, fense assets.'5 This makes them low-threat initial contact could possibly be with the air targets susceptible to air attack. The excep- support operations center (ASOC), vvhich is tion to this, of course, would be the larger that element of the TACS collocated with an OMG units of division-plus size that could Army corps headquarters. The ASOC be expected to possess normal divisional air would probably pass the flights off to the defense capability. These would have to be RAOC, vvhich would provide an initial brief- handled as high-threat targets.lh ing and then pass them off to a US Air Force The A-10, then, could provide the Security Police air base defense team, an ground commander with an excellent asset aviation commander, or ground com- to employ in rear operations. It is equipped mander for final control. However, non- to be optimally used in that area, and its pi- FAC control is considered for emergencies lots are trained for the mission. It gives the only. The ground commander involved commander the ability to react to a potential must accept the increased risk and de- threat quickly and lethally without initially creased probabilitv of mission success.u drawing upon his main battle strength. As seen earlier, the targets themselves The threat to our rear is real. The Army could vary. Levei I threats may not be suit- has a saying that the priority of support able targets warranting the expenditure of should always go to the main effort. By re- air sorties. However, Levei II and definitely acting quickly with highly lethal A-lOs Levei III threats would be valid A-10 tar against any incursion in a classic economy- gets. Additionally, since these enemy forces of-force role, we can perhaps ensure that the (be they airborne, air assault, or mechanized rear operations do not have to become our forward detachments) are designed for main effort. speed. they are lightly armed with air de-

Notes 1. TACPTJSAFEP/PACAFP. AACP 50-36. foint Concept 10. TACP/USAFEP/PACAFP/AACP 50-36, A-l. Procedures for Close Air Support in the flear Battle. 8 July 11. TACP 50-27. /oinl Operational Concept and Procedures 1986.1-1. of Air Delivered Mines (/-Mine). 26 September 1984. 4-2; Capt 2. FM 100-5. Operations. May 1986. 19. Jack Kearney, "The Gator Mine." USAF Fighler Weapons He- 3. Ibid. vietv. Fali 1986, 6-9. 4. Ibid. 12. TACP 50-25, /oinl Laser Designalion Procedures. 11 De- 5. Ibid . 20. ceinber 1985. A-68. 6. FM 90-14. Rear Battle. )une 1985, 1-2. 13. TACM 3—1. Mission Empioyment Tactics: Tactical Em- 7. Student Text 100-9. The Command Estimate (Fort Leav- piovment A-10. 31 Januarv 1986.1—1. enworth. Kans.: US Armv Command and Ceneral Staff College. 14. TACP/USAFEP/PACAFP/AACP 50-36, 6-2. July 1986). 4-11 15. FM 100-2-3, The Sovief Army. 16 July 1984. 4-131. 4- 8. FM 90-14. 2-5: TACP/USAFEP/PACAFP/AACP 50-36, 132.4-136.4-140. 3-4. 16. Ibid., 4-59. 9. AFM 1-1. Basic Aerospace Doctrine. 16 March 1984, 2- 3. Sowing Seams Strategic Bombefs Versus Follow-on fÕrceS^

C ol M artin T. D aack^* OR THE foreseeable future, the most battle. placing Army and Air Force doctrine dangerous adversaries facing the at odds. United States and its allies are likely This paper proposes a way to redress this to be “organized, equipped, trained. doctrinal mismatch by employing strategic tacticallyF schooled in Soviet military con- bombers in the ground-attack role to delay, cepts.”1 A basic tenet of Soviet-style vvarfare disrupt, detour, and destroy follow-on ech- is the employment of massed, mechanized. elons of enemy armor and infantry during combined arms units of armor, infantry, ar- the first few criticai hours and days of a ma tillerv, and integral air defense. Airborne jor conflict. Since tactical air forces initially and airmobile forces, as well as offensive will be engaged in the air superiority battle, and defensive air forces, round out the com the use of bombers in a theater role against bined arms team. the closest follow-on forces will afford the The Soviet operational model depends timely application of firepower required to upon mobility, mass, maneuver, and mo- dovetail interservice doctrines. This pro- mentum. Its theoretical tactics revolve posal capitalizes on the strengths of bomb around superior numbers and firepower, ers while working within survivai gaining and maintaining offensive momen- limitations in the lethal environment of a tum to advance 30 to 50 kilometers a day.2 Soviet-style combined arms attack. This Momentum is sustained by multiple eche- proposal is designed using only conven- lons that can “pass through or around the tional munitions, with no tactical or stra first echelon, join the fight with fresh forces, tegic nuclear weapons employed by either and press on to achieve and maintain con- side. tinuous operations.”3 The US Army doctrine for countering this Soviet-style threat is outlined in Field Man ual (FM) 100-5, Operations. Called Air- Why the Land Battle doctrine, the concept focuses Heavy Bomber? on destroying the momentum, tempo, and coherence upon which the Soviet model re- The thought of enemy armored divisions lies.4 To accomplish this, the US Army de crashing echelon after echelon against US pends heavily upon air power. Air strikes and allied defenders is sobering. However, help to “feed the enemy to the Army in bite- armored units are not omnipotent. Accord- sized chunks" by delaying, disrupting, or ing to Field Manual 100-5, “They are vul- destroying the uncommitted enemy eche- nerable in close terrain, such as forests and lons while isolating committed forces so cities, and in limited-visibility conditions. they can be destroyed.5 Targets range from They cannot cross most rivers and swamps just beyond friendly artillery range to deep wúthout bridging, and they require substan- interdiction. tial logistical support.”7 For instance, there On the other hand, Air Force doctrine is a substantial problem involved in trying States that “the first consideration in em- to refuel and rearm tank columns, espe- ploying aerospace forces is gaining and cially while fighting in urban areas. The ju- maintaining the freedom of action to con- dicious use of air power can capitalize upon duct operations against the enemy.”6 This these limitations to create a favorable tempo priority counterair mission will leave fewer in the battle while denying engagement to resources initially dedicated to the ground the enemy by destroying bridges, fords, rail-

23 The effectiveness of air support from strategic bombers vvas clearly shovvn in Vietnam, where B-52 aircraft ivere often used to support tactical ground operations.

vvays, and roadways to force him into difficult or impassable terrain; by mining ad- vantageous avenues of approach and chokepoints; and by destroying as many enemy forces as possible before they can close with friendly ground forces. The most judicious use of air power while tactical fighter aircraft conduct the initial airspace control battle is to use strategic bombers to “sovv the seams” to isolate enemy follow-on echelons from friendly forces and from each other through the use of gravity bombs, air-scatterable mines, and standoff munitions. This concept is consistent with the first dictum of antimechanized operations: “to destroy the combined arms integrity of the enemy at all leveis while keeping the combined arms integrity of your force intact.”H The concept is also in keeping with Air Force doctrine calling for employing aerospace power as an indivisi- ble entity.9 Traditionalists initially would use bomb ers strictly in deep-interdiction missions against strategic logistics bases, railroads, highway networks, and economic targets. However, the time-critical nature of the immediate ground threat and the potential re- quirement to resort to tactical nuclear weapons should a follow-on attack succeed dictate that these limited, high-leverage

Long-range bombers, like this B-52H. can provide theater support from safe areas aivay from the battle area or can loiter for Jong periods of time to be used as needed.

24 SOWING THE SEAMS 25 bombing platforms be used more flexibly and closer in. Bombers envisioned in this proposal include the B-52G/H, the B -lB , and the advanced technology bomber (ATB). These aircraft have inherent advantages in area- denial missions and in attacking massed formations. In the first place, their radars and terrain-following equipment allow for ingress, strike, and egress day or night in all weather conditions at low altitude (below 300 feet), thus reducing or eliminating de- tection from ground-based threats. Self-contained electronic countermeasures also allow the bombers to jam enemy radars, screening the bombers’ approach. In addition, the low radar cross section of the B -lB in a head-on, nonradiating mode—about the same as an F-16 (one square meter)— and the stealth characteristics of the ATB further enhance the survival of these new systems.

By carrying large amounfs of standoff munif/ons, bombers can remam outside of lethal air defense range and still create and exploit enemy “killing zones." 26 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1988

Perhaps the greatest attributes of strategic ATBs. Incorporating these bombers into bombers are their range and payload. B-52s theater operations will require peacetime are capable of low-level attack at 390 knots, practice between tactical aircraft, bombers, vvhile the B-1B can exceed 500 knots. These and command and control entities. The risk aircraft can deliver 60,000 to 70,000 pounds of not having all bombers available for the of general purpose bombs, cluster bombs, nuclear single integrated operational plan mines, and standoff munitions at unre- (SIOP) will be offset if their implementation fueled ranges of over 6,000 nautical miles. A in a theater conventional war will keep the single B-52 can carry a combined internai conflict from going nuclear. and externai load of twenty-seven 500- or Planners must be intimately familiar with 750-pound bombs and twenty-four Gator both the characteristics of combined arms mine pods. A B -lB can carry thirty-two Ga forces and the theater terrain—where the tor mines or up to eighty-four 500-pound enemy armor/mechanized forces cannot go bombs internally.10 ATB specifications are and where they must go. Planners then can classified but are assumed to equal or ex select optimum target areas to block, detour, ceed the B -lB . and set up the advancing forces for These characteristics theoretically enable destruction. a single bomber to carry what could require Natural barriers afford the most efficient up to an entire squadron of fíghter-type air obstacles. Combined with man-made bar craft. Further, their range allovvs the flexi- riers, these channel the enemy where and bility and security of deep-rear basing or of when you want him. For instance, if an ad tlanking enemy defenses. When vve con- vancing force must cross a river, bombing sider forward-based bombers, range equates all bridges and cratering and mining fords to long loiter time, which could translate to will create impassable barriers and force the immediate strikes on lucrative targets by enemy to halt and mass into a desirable bombers orbiting just outside lethal areas. “killing zone.” Knowing the prime avenues When flown in concert with air-to-air and of approach, bombers can strike prior to the air-to-ground suppression of enemy air de enemy force advancing on the Crossing fenses (SEAD). bombers can enhance their rather than having to overfly a heavily de- probability of success and survivability. fended site. The enemy also can be detoured to a place of our choosing by not destroying or mining selected bridges and fords. He Campaign Planning would then be forced either to move to the area we elect or to delay his advance to re- and Execution construct destroyed Crossing sites. In either ln order to use bombers effectively in a case, his momentum and timing would be formally planned, conventional scenario, adversely affected. commanders and planners must be certain A valuable lesson in delaying tactics can that the bombers and crews will be available be learned from Allied attempts to cross the to the theater/joint forces commander. The Roer River in February 1945. German engi- best way to ensure this is to assign the neers destroyed the floodgates on river bombers to the operational command of the dams and created a flood lasting two weeks, theater commander at the outset of the war preventing Lt Gen William Simpson’s US by means of a change of operational control Ninth Army from fording the river. Accord- (CHOP). These can be either dedicated con ing to Gen Ornar Bradley, this “slow-leak” ventional or dual-role B-52s, B-lBs, and technique was much more effective than The B-l (a ba ve) cun ca rry up fo eighty-four 500-pound bomhs or various quantities of standoff vveapons and air-deiiverable mines. This abilitv to deliver large quantities of weapons gives each B-l sortie (lie striking power o) up to un entire squadron of fighter aircraft. Although actual capabilities remoin classified. it is assumed that advanced technologv bombers such as (his flying wing concepl (left) would have similar capabilities.

27 28 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1988 blasting entire dams and causing a violent tle while bombers simultaneously strike the but brief torrent.11 This same technique can close-in second echelon. Tactics must be be employed today to create a barrier to en- practiced often on ranges in the continental emy bridging and fording attempts by using United States and, where possible, in the rnunitions that are either delivered by air proposed theater of operations to develop with precision guidance or put in place dur- and hone the composite strike force con- ing Ranger-type operations on the ground. cepts. Additionally, bombers must develop These rnunitions also can be used to cre independent tactics for those missions ate chokepoints. Valleys between steep where range or weather prevent composite hills, mountain passes, routes flanked by operations. Bomber attrition is a vital con- impassable terrain (rivers, bogs, etc.), and cern, but the cost of not employing these urban areas can form natural chokepoints or systems may well outweigh combat losses. become chokepoints with the delivery of The key is to reduce attrition to an accept- air-scatterable mines and the bombing and able levei throughout the campaign. cratering of roads, railroads, tunnels, and so forth. A few bombers can sow minefields hundreds of meters wide and long, denying Think Crecy, Survival, access to advancing columns. Even with mine-clearing techniques, the enemy will and Self-Defense be forced to funnel through, gather behind, Due to the carnage and confusion envi- or detour around the chokepoints. In the sioned along the forward line of troops least case, he will lose the momentum and (FLOT), no aircraft—fíghter or bomber, timing of his attack. In the best case, he will friend or foe—will survive for long flying di- present a lucrative “killing zone” to be ex- rectly over the FLOT. Likewise, flying di- ploited further by bombers delivering wide- rectly over the enemy follow-on echelons, area rnunitions. In the meantime, each especially for more than one pass, will prob- minefield crossed should cause more en ably be terminal for the aircrew. Therefore, emy attrition. the problem is how to solve the time-criti- Before enemy follow-on forces can join cal. follow-on echelon dilemma using stra- the battle, they must maneuver from rear tegic bombers without committing suicide. echelon locations into an attacking posi- A lesson can be taken from the Battle of tion. For their own protection, enemy forces Crecy in 1346, when English archers using will not willingly ‘‘bunch up” in "killing the longbow with its cloth-yard shaft (37- zones” that are easily identified and at- inch arrow) defeated the “combined arms tacked. The bombers can aid in forcing the armv” of the day, crossbow-wielding Gen- enemy to congregate in numbers and areas oese infantry and mounted French knights. not of his choosing. This can be accom- English bowmen rapidly fíring long-range, plished onlv by carefully planning and pre- accurate missiles prevented closure be cisely executing w ell-rehearsed, tween the forces and spelled defeat for a su coordinated bomber attacks on follow-on perior French force.12 In a similar vein, echelon targets. bombers launching accurate, wide-area, Integrating bomber missions with SEAD standoff rnunitions can "sow the seams" missions will ensure the mass, economy of and wreak havoc on massed enemy eche force, and surprise necessary to overcome lons from outside lethal air defense range. sophisticated, Soviet-style air defenses. Used in this way, bombers can safely create This frees fighters for the air superiority bat and then exploit "killing zones.” SOWING THE SEAMS 29

If a serious airborne or ground-based de- march. Bombers striking staging areas and fense threat is anticipated, bombers should criticai rail and road networks can also pre- be part of a composite strike force. However, vent or delay the linkup of enemy units. bomber tactics away from lethal defenses Early identification of these targets can lead can include direct overflight of the target to preplanned, deeper strikes at the outset of employing either single aircraft or several hostilities, complicating enemy command aircraft striking nearlv simultaneously from and control. Psychological disruption and multiple axes. Survival can be enhanced by confusion can be as crucial as physical de- low-level, terrain-following air strikes and struction when enemy success depends bv passive self-defense (fiares, chaff. and upon the timing and mass of their attack. electronic countermeasures). An alterna- Once located, individual units can be fur- tive, consistent with independent bomber ther isolated using bombing and mining strikes. is to equip the bombers with lethal techniques to create barriers and self-defense. including antiradiation and chokepoints. air-to-air missiles. These additions to the Integrated tactics using composite forces bombers’ arsenal can enhance survival, es- of fighters and bombers to simultaneously pecially when the bombers are flown be- strike enemy air threats and the follow-on yond fighter coverage. such as in Southwest echelons can close the interservice doc- Asia. trinal gap and support the Army’s doctrine. Further, bombers can operate singly or in cell, independently from fighters if weather Conclusions and or range prohibits composite operations. This capability is especially important Recommendations when the only alternative might be for the Faced with a determined, powerful com- allied forces to resort to nuclear weapons to bined arms enemy force. US and allied halt the onslaught. ground commanders need immediate sup- Current munitions, command relation- port against the echeloned follow-on forces. ships, and tactics need to be refined for Currently, Air Force doctrine gives priority bombers to be effective against Soviet-style to air superiority missions. This may leave forces. We must develop new generations of the Army “naked” against the close-in accurate standoff munitions for use when threat. The range, payload, and munitions lethal air defenses prevent target overflight, menu of bombers make them an ideal as well as new air-scatterable munitions ca- choice to destroy Soviet-style tactics, pable of halting armor, mechanized artil- tempo, and troops. Bombers employing lery, and personnel. Finally, bombers low-level tactics and carrying precision should be modified to carry self-defense standoff, gravity. or air-scatterable muni weapons and tactics should be developed tions can effectively delay, disrupt, detour, for their use against enemy air and ground or destroy the attackers before they can threats. close with friendly forces. Command relationships that place bomb As indicated, the Soviet model of warfare ers under the operational control of theater stresses attacking with massed combined commanders for timely execution and con arms units. These units must come together trol must be developed and agreed upon be in rear assembly areas and move forward in fore bombers can be thoroughly integrated concert to attack. One or two bombers can into conventional warfighting plans. Then wreak havoc on enemy columns on road planners must develop target packages and 30 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1988 strike tactics for use in lethal and nonlethal required to conduct composite air strikes. In conventional environments. Both fighter this vvay, the B-52s, B-lBs, and ATBs can and bomber units must practice tbe new tac accomplish the mission of halting follow- tics and operations together, under realistic on forces and can correct the mismatch be- conditions, to perfect the skills and timing tvveen Air Force and Army doctrines.

Notes 1. FM 71-100, Armored and Mechonized Division Opera |Ft. Leavenvvorth. Kans.: US Army Command and General Staff tions, 29 September 1978. 2-1. College. September 1985). 71. 2. lbid.,2-3. 9. AFM 1-1. 10.11. 3. Ibid. 10. LI Col |ohn E. Frisbv and Maj Grover E. Myers, Strategic 4. FM 100-5. Operations. 5 May 1986. 14. Forces in Transition: A Doctrine/or índivisible Aerospace Ap 5. US Army Forres (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University plication (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press. 1985). Press. 19851.5-1. 138—40. 6. AFM 1 -1. Basic Aerospace Doctrine nf the United States 11. Gen Ornar N. Bradley and Clay Blair. A G en erais Life Air Force. 16March 1984.2-11. (New York: Simon and Schuster. 1983), 395-96. 7. FM 100-5.42. 12. Lynn Montross. War Through the Ages (New York: Har- 8. Christopher R. Gabei, "Seek, Slrike, and Destroy: U.S. per & Row. 1960], 167-72. Armv Tank Doctrine in World War II." Leavenworth Papers NE OF the most important prior- ities for the military latelv is the US AIR FORCE emphasis on “jointness.” We stress the need for better coop- erationO between us and our allies and also OPERATIONS between our own Services in order to make the most of our limited resources. Based on AND personal experience, I firmly believe an im portant issue for those of us in Air Force intelligence is “jointness” between ourselves INTELLIGENCE and the people we support—those in operations. Cetting It Together A good operations/intelligence interface is criticai in peacetime because it is criticai in wartime. Such an interface provides op erations people with the intelligence sup port they need to fight effectively in a war. It C apt Brian P. T ice

31 32 AIRPOWEfí JOURNAL WINTER 1988

also gives operations a good "feel” for the to think about (in a more structured way) type of information that intelligence can what they really want from their intelli realistically provide them during a conflict. gence people. Third, to correct the experi- At the same time, it makes intelligence more ence shortfall at the wing, intelligence responsive to operational needs while cre- personnel should be highly encouraged by ating more knowledgeable and credible in the Air Force to serve two wing tours before telligence personnel. The resulting trust promotion to lieutenant colonel or master between both parties will serve us well in a sergeant. Fourth, when a new intelligence future confrontation. person arrives at a wing, he or she should However, there are two obstacles to good start a training program that emphasizes interface that must be overcome if we want three areas: the threat, our forces, and to make the most of our limited resources. exercises. First, junior intelligence people at the wing The threat should be learned first and in levei often lack job knowledge, and this depth. Knowledge should go beyond enemy sometimes results in a lack of credibility. force capabilities to include enemy weak- Second, the lack of unity between opera nesses and how he intends to use his capa tions and intelligence results in unrealistic bilities against our aircrew. In other words, expectations from both parties because one we need to know enemy operating doctrine. side does not know how the other side does Next, wing intelligence people should learn business. The following ideas are proposed all they can about our aircrew and aircraft, Solutions to help overcome these obstacles. along with their capabilities and weak- The lack of job knowledge on the part of nesses. They should be briefed by opera junior intelligence people at the wing levei tions on how our aircrew are selected and can be corrected in several ways. First, as- trained, the capabilities of the wing’s air signment selection procedures must em- craft, and how we plan to use them (our op phasize picking the best students from the erational doctrine). They should be given a US Air Force Academy, the Reserve Officer walk around the aircraft as well as an op- Training Corps, or Officer Training School portunity to sit in the cockpit and to ask who are entering the intelligence career questions. Systems on the aircraft that deal field for wing assignments. These positions with the threat (i.e., radar warning receiv- deinand people who require the least super- ers) should be highlighted. Finally, within vision, yet who are closest to the cutting six months of arrival, new intelligence per edge of the Air Force. Second, operations sonnel should be sent to an exercise similar people should be sent TDY to the intelli to Tactical Air Command’s Red Flag. This gence school to orient future wing intelli allows them to see how their wing works gence officers on what operators need and with other units as part of the “big picture." do not need from their intelligence people It also allows them to work with the aircrew before the latter arrive at the wing. Since away from home station, which should fa- students at the school already know where cilitate relations between operations and they are being assigned, the appropriate intelligence. Tactical Air Command, Strategic Air Com- A second obstacle to achieving good in mand, and Military Airlift Command oper terface is the lack of unity between opera ators could orient the appropriate students tions and intelligence. This results in to make them smarter faster. This would be unrealistic expectations because one “spe- especially helpful in short-tour areas like cialty” does not know how the other does Korea. This step would also force operators business. For intelligence, knowing the air- AIR FORCE OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE 33

crew, aircraft, and the mission is just the be- from the cockpit concerning the enemy. ginning. To break down this barrier, the This experience will also give them a squadron intelligence officer should not greater awareness of the physical and psy- merelv be attached to the squadron but chological stresses an aircrew must endure. should be assigned to it. He or she should The Air Force constantly emphasizes that live at the squadron, wear a flight suit, take there is no substitute for an aircrew “being an occasional flight, attend aircrew meet- there” in a simulated combat environment. ings. and have his or her officer effective- Is not this also true of intelligence people ness report written by the squadron who must support them in a war? And yet commander or director of operations. In you would be surprised how tough it is for short. he or she should actually be a part intelligence people to fly even one such of the squadron. By living with squadron mission. One example from my own expe mates, he or she will have a much better rience comes to mind. Our wing was sub- idea of hovv operators vvork and what is rel- ordinate to an air division commander who evant to them and what is not. This would thought such flights were strictly joy rides. result in much more interesting and inform- He believed that any Air Force officer who ative aircrew intelligence training and mis needed an "incentive ride” should be sell- sion briefings. Similarly, operators would ing insurance for Prudential. This sênior know what intelligence can do for them in operations officer clearly did not under both peacetime and wartime. The two "spe- stand the intelligence business. Otherwise cialties" will become closer because each he would have known that such flights will understand on a regular basis how the would improve the chances of his crews liv other side does business. ing to fight another day. Although opera For example, one of the ways intelligence tions people are beginning to gradually supports operations is by extracting infor- accept this idea, we still have a long way to mation from the aircrew during flight de- go in this area. briefings to learn more about the enemy. By In summary, good operations/intelligence accompanying operations personnel on interface is criticai, and there are many simulated combat missions, intelligence things we can do to improve this interface. people can learn what type and how much Although the recommended proposals are information an aircrew can reasonably be not all-inclusive and some of these meas- expected to provide. These simulated mis ures have been adopted in piecemeal fash- sions—especially those in which the air ion, they can serve as standardized craft is flying at low altitudes, evading guidelines for improving relations between simulated ground threats, and getting the two parties throughout the Air Force. “jumped” by aggressor aircraft—will help Working together better will make maxi- give intelligence personnel an idea of what mum use of our limited resources and give crewmembers can and cannot see or hear us the edge we need to fly, fight, and winln

1 FROM PROJECT THUMPER TOSDI The Role ofBallistic Missile Defènse in US Security Policy

D r Daniel S. Papp

ONALD REAGAN’S 23 March 1983 call to the American scientifíc and technical community to undertake Ra “comprehensive and intensive ef- 35 36 AlfíPOWEfí JOURNAL WIN TER 1988 fort” to define a long-term research and development program designed to “achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles’’ revived a debate over ballistic missile defense that had slumbered since the signing of the ABM Treaty in 1972.' In the years since President Reagan reopened the debate on the public levei, disagreement over strategic defense has been one of the dominant defense issues both in the United States and abroad. To a surprising extent, the strategic de fense debate of the 1980s is similar to ballis tic missile defense (BMD) debates of earlier decades. In the three preceding decades, concerned citizens ranging from defense in- tellectuals and military officers to house- wives and religious leaders debated the wisdom and feasibility of defending against, rather than responding to, a ballis tic missile attack. And the questions so fa miliar in the late 1980s were asked during that earlier period also. Was BMD technically feasible? Would it be too costly? VVould it be too dangerous and perhaps send the other side the wrong signal, a signal that the United States intended to attack first? Would BMD weaken Western alli- ances, and would it make war more likely rather than less likely? Could offensive weapons penetrate it easily, and could of fensive weapons be added to arsenais less expensively than could defensive capabilities? The technologies of today’s strategic defense debate are different from those of exchange ratio, interservice rivalry, and po- earlier debates, but many of the issues are tential Soviet responses to BMD. Before the same. turning to this examination. however, we The purpose of this article, then, is to should look at SDI's predecessors. lend a degree of historical depth to the Stra tegic Defense Initiative (SDI) debate of the 1980s by examining the precedents of that American Ballistic Missile debate. Put simply, it will examine the role Defense Programs: that ballistic missile defense has played in US defense policy. Particular attention will Nike-Zeus and Nike-X be paid to past discussions about the objec- The origins of US interest in ballistic mis tives of ballistic missile defense, the cost- sile defense may be traced to September Despile extensive research and development. debate o ver the feusibility of ballisti t missi/e defense resulted in the deployment of only antiaircraft systems. such as this BO M ARC missile (leftldesigned to intercept supersomr targets and the bullistic missile earJy warning syslem radars like these at Thule, Greenland fabave)

1944. when Nazi Germany began launching Electric Company from pursuing work on V-2 roc:kets against Allied targets. Within a Project Nike. also designed to serve as a year. the General Electric Company’s Proj- high-altitude antiaircraft defense.3 Both ect Thumper report conduded that defense Thumper and Nike were íunded by the US against V-2 rockets was not possible given Army. the state of then-current technology.1 This Project Nike evolved from Nike-Ajax, the pessimistic conclusion about the possibility antiaircraft project. to Nike-Zeus, the first of defense against rockets did not deter Proj- true US antiballistic missile project. But ect Thumper from pursuing its primary mis- this evolution was a slow process, both be- sion of developing a high-altitude cause of the uncertainties of the technolo- antiairr.raft defense. nor did it deter Bell gies evolved and because of the slow growth Telephone Laboratories and the Western during the early 1950s of the Soviet ballistic 38 AIHPOWEfí JOURNAL WINTER 1988

missile threat. Indeed. despite Germany’s World War II successes with V-2s, several noted American scientists, including Dr Vannevar Bush, were skeptical about the feasibility of an intercontinental ballistic missile.4 The move toward BMD accelerated significantly in 1955 as evidence accumulated that the USSR had begun to devote extensive resources to intermediate-range ballis tic missiles and ICBMs. In November 1955 the Army let a contract to Bell Telephone Laboratories for a feasibility study on ballis tic missile defense, and the following year the Army Rocket and Guided Missile Agency funded Bell. Western Electric, and the Douglas Aircraft Company for basic research on BMD. In 1957 the US Army established the Nike-Zeus Guided Missile Defense System Project, and in 1958 the Army authorized Nike-Zeus as a full-scale BMD development program.5 Even before this, however, the Air Force and the Navy had initiated air defense programs désigned to cope with their own concerns. These programs gradually took on BMD potential and eventually led to interservice rivalry in BMD. The Air Force, in conjunction with Boeing, began work on a ground-to-air missile, which the Navy recommended for BMD purposes in 1959.6 The Nike program of the 1950s and 1960s brought tre- mendous increases in the capability of interceptor Army-Air Force rivalry over BMD devel missiles. The Nike-Hercules (right) opment was particularly intense during the antiaircra/t missiles were deployed. but the middle and late 1950s despite the efforts of Nike-Zeus antimissile version (above) remained in the test and development mode. two consecutive secretaries of defense to re solve this and other Army-Air Force conflicts. For example, on 26 November 1956 Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson issued a directive that gave the Army responsibility for developing and deploying surface-to- air missiles for point defense; the same di rective gave the Air Force responsibility for area defense. Although the directive never An outgrowth of the Nike-X program, the Sprint missile Ifar right) explicitly defined the threat as aircraft or was the point defense weapon for the Sa/eguard missiles, the Army and Air Force pursued bnllistic missile defense system. The system achieved both tracks, the Army with its Nike-Her- operatianal status but was deactivoted in 1976. 39 The latest version of ballistic missile defense is lhe Slrategic Defense ínitiaíive. including such concepts as this neufra! particle beam iveapon (abovej and Chemical laser vveapons (far rightj, that are designed to destroy IC B M s in spuce. Othersyslems would defeat enemy warheads as they reenlered the atmosphere. such as these Soviet MIRV vvarheods from an S S -9 test launch frightj.

40 since the latter would be ‘'premature.”B The Air Force, meanwhile, launched a rear- guard action to revive the Wizard project, arguing that the Zeus did not have an ability to be upgraded to meet a threat environment that included enemy evasion, decoys, and countermeasures. Increasingly during late 1958 and throughout 1959, the technical feasibility of BMD in general and Nike-Zeus in particular became an issue of contention. The Army argued for development, production, and deployment funding for Zeus, requesting $1.3 billion for fiscal year 1960. This request was eventually funded at $300 million.9 ARPA, meanwhile, stressed that a deployed BMD had to be technically feasible, be able to respond to all types of missile threats in all types of environments, be economically affordable, and be operational as soon as possible. Other commentary from ARPA officials made it clear that ARPA questioned Nike-Zeus capabilities on all counts, partic- cules and Nike-Zeus programs and the Air ularly its ability to destrov warheads.10 Force with its Bomarc and Wizard efforts.7 It The Air Force position was even more fas- was not until January 1958 that new Secre- cinating. By 1959 the Air Force had aban- tary of Defense Neil McElroy effectively doned its earlier arguments for missile curtailed the Air Force’s Wizard project bv defense and had begun to argue that monies ordering that Wizard develop only early previously targeted for defensive research warmng radars, tracking and acquisition ra- and development would be better spent on dars, and Communications links that would more and better offensive capabilities." be compatible with Nike-Zeus missile and This was a fundamental alteration in the Air launch system components. Equally impor- Forces position. At the same time, it further tant, in January 1958 the Advanced Re legitimized the Air Force’s continued em- search Projects Agency (ARPA) was formed phasis on long-range bombers and growing and given responsibility to direct all other interest in ICBMs. BMD research. This ARPA-directed effort Other voices outside ARPA and the Air was known as Project Defender. Force had also begun to question the intel- Despite McElroy's preference for Nike- lectual basis of BMD. Edward Teller, for ex- Zeus, he still had doubts about the system. ample, argued that while BMD might be Appearing before the Senate Preparedness technically feasible, the increased cost to an Subcommittee on 22 January 1958, McElroy enemy of penetrating a BMD screen would emphasized that the $195 million he was re- be less than the cost of strengthening the questing for BMD would be "devoted pri- screen to prevent penetration.'2 (This argu- marily to research and engineering instead ment has been resurrected in the SDI debate of actual production and development” under the concer* of the cost-exchange ra-

41 42 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1988 tio.) And in December 1960 Jerome Wiesner sile boost intercept (BAMBI) program. Ad- argued at the Sixth Pugwash Conference ditionally, even in the early 1960s, the Air that BMD was destabilizing; indeed, he Force was also studying ways to destroy even suggested that ballistic missile defen- ICBMs from space-based defense ses be banned by an international agree- platforms.15 ment while offensive weapons be based in During 1961 an additional factor became invulnerable basing modes.13 increasingly important in the BMD debate By the advent of the Kennedy administra- as intelligence sources indicated that the tion. then, Nike-Zeus as a program and BMD USSR was proceeding apace with its own as a concept were increasingly open to ques- antiballistic missile programs. Indeed, tion. The pros and cons of Nike-Zeus and sometime during 1961 or 1962 the USSR BMD as a concept as understood in 1961 successfully intercepted and destroyed two were succinctly summed up by Secretary of ICBMs during a Soviet atmospheric nuclear Defense Robert S. McNamara in his 4 April test,lb and at the 22d Congress of the Com- 1961 testimony to the Senate Armed Ser munist Party of the Soviet Union in October vices Committee: 1961, Soviet Minister of Defense Malinov- skii proclaimed that “the problem of de- Successful development [of Zeus] may force an aggressor to expend additional resources to stroying rockets in flight has been increase his ICBM force. It would also make successfully solved.”17 The specter thus accurate estimates of our defensive capabili- emerged that unless the United States pro- ties more difficult for a potential enemy and ceeded with BMD, the USSR could gain an complicate the achievement of a successful at- immense strategic advantage. American tack. Furthermore. the protection that it would provide, even if for only a portion of our pop- concern over Soviet progress in BMD was so ulation. would be better than none at all. . . . intense that when President John Kennedy There is still considerable uncertainty as to its announced on 2 March 1962 the resump- technical feasibility and, even if successfully tion of US atmospheric nuclear testing, he developed, there are many serious operating specifically tied that resumption to ballistic problems yet to be solved. The system, itself, is missile defense and defense penetration.18 vulnerable to ballistic missile attack, and its effectiveness could be degraded by the use of While feared Soviet strides in BMD more sophisticated ICBMs screened by multi- heightened the United States’ sense of a ple decoys. Saturation of the target is another need for its own BMD, concern over the ca- possibility as ICBMs become easier and pabilities of Nike-Zeus remained. It was cheaper to produce in coming years. Finally, it somewhat ironic that this concern escalated is a very expensive system in relation to the degree of protection that it can furnish." even as the system for the first time proved in tests that it could work against small- As a result of these considerations, Mc scale unsophisticated ICBM attacks.19 The Namara and Kennedy opposed production Army pointed to these successful tests as of Zeus but supported continued develop proof that Nike-Zeus should be procured ment expenditures for Zeus ($270 million and deployed, but Secretary of Defense in fiscal year 1962). Other BMD projects also McNamara and Director of Defense Re continued. notably Project Defender at search and Engineering (DDR&E) Harold ARPA. Interestingly, despite the Air Force’s Brown continued to have reservations, par- stated preference for strategic offensive over ticularly over Zeus’s ability to discriminate strategic defensive systems, the Air Force between decoys and warheads.20 As a result, had itself reentered the BMD arena, this the Department of Defense opposed pro- time under the auspices of its ballistic mis curement and deployment of Nike-Zeus, al- FRÜM PHOJECT THUMPEfí TO S Dl 43

though it again requested continued Sprint missiles used nuclear weapons as development funds for fiscal year 1963.21 kill mechanisms. Nevertheless, the continued refusal of As in the past, however, McNamara sup- McNamara to support deployment of the ported only research and development, not Nike-Zeus clearlv indicated that the Zeus procurement and deployment. He argued was for all practical purposes a program of that while deployment of a BMD, perhaps the past. even the Zeus, could reduce US casualties But the concept of BMD survived and in the event of a small Soviet attack and even flourished. McNamara often empha- would complicate Soviet attack planning, sized the need for active defense against bal- deployment should not take place because listic missiles,22 and Brown of DDR&E target discrimination work still needed to declared that BMD research should con be significantly improved. Additionally, tinue ‘‘even if we think it will never be sat- McNamara argued, more had to be learned isfactory” since research would yield data about the effect of nuclear detonations from that could lead to “possible deployment of defensive missiles on other parts of the other systems.”23 It was amid this aura of BMD system.25 Equally noteworthy, Mc technical skepticism about then-present Namara stated he would “never” recom- BMD capabilities and technical optimism mend deployment of a BMD system unless about future BMD capabilities that Nike- it were accompanied by an adequate civil Zeus faded into the past and Nike-X was defense program, including an extensive born. fallout shelter program.26 He took this posi- Although classified discussion of and tion because of the threat to the population work on Nike-X had begun during 1962, generated from radioactive fallout from the public revelation of the new program did explosion of defensive nuclear weapons. not occur until 1963. when McNamara tes- Throughout 1963 and on into 1964, Nike- tified before the House Armed Services X and the concept of BMD were inextricably Committee. Citing the heightened and more bound to the debate over the nuclear test sophisticated threat environment that ban treaty and the strategic doctrine of dam- would exist in the late 1960s and beyond, age limitation.27 The debate over BMD’s re- McNamara proposed to take advantage of lationship to the test ban treaty of 1963 new advances in radar technology and mis- centered around whether the risk of con- sile technology to create a layered defensive cluding a treaty was acceptable: no dis- system.24 In simplest terms, whereas Nike- agreement existed over whether the test ban Zeus employed a single type of low-accel- treaty would slow BMD research—it would. eration missile armed with an atomic war- At the same time, the strategic doctrine of head and was guided by a vulnerable radar damage limitation broached by McNamara system, the Nike-X employed two types of during 1964 provided rationale for the missiles: the Nike-Zeus for intercepts at 70 United States not only to develop an im to 100 miles and the new high-acceleration proved strategic offensive retaliatory force, Sprint missile for intercepts at 20 to 30 but also to move forward with research and miles after the atmosphere had filtered out development on the Nike-X and to pursue decoys. Newly developed phased-array ra- new programs in civil defense. Indeed, to dars were also to be incorporated in the McNamara, civil defense remained a higher Nike-X system. enhancing both survivabil- priority than BMD. Given these contending ity of the radar subsystem and the accuracy pressures, then, it was little surprise that US of the missile intercept. Both Nike-X and BMD decisions during 1963 and 1964 with 44 A1RPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1988

Nike-X were much like they had been before and on the nature of the Chinese threat.2” At vvith Nike-Zeus: research and development the same time, the United States was con- would be continued, but procurement and cerned lest a US deployment decision be deployment would be deferred. viewed by the Soviets as a threat to the The relationship of BMD to the test ban USSR. This concem existed despite uncer- treaty and to civil defense also made it in- tainty about the direction of the USSR’s creasingly evident that BMD was more than own strategic rocket program and despite a technical issue. It was a political issue as growing intelligence that the USSR had be- well, and one that extended beyond the con gun to deploy its own ballistic missile de fines of interservice rivalry between the fense system."’ Army, Air Force, and Navy. Harold Brown The layered nature of Nike-X also raised made this exceedingly evident in testimony questions about the wisdom of area defense before a Senate subcommittee in 1964: versus point defense. The upgraded Zeus The decision on Nike-X will not be made, or gave proponents of area defense and a light should not be made, merely on the basis of defensive shield ammunition for their ar- technical capability. That is, even though the guments, while proponents of point defense system does vvhat we say it will do, that does or a heavy shield turned to the Zeus-Sprint not mean necessarily that we should deploy combination to buttress their case. Indeed, the system.28 with the Zeus-Sprint combination, a variety Despite the political content of the debate of different defensive systems was possible. over BMD and Nike-X, technical progress Key questions emerged. What sorts of threat continued on the system. New radars and environments were expected? Which po- radar nets were developed and tested, and tential targets should be defended? How the Zeus missile received a new aerody- much money should be spent on BMD, es- namic profile, new propellants, and new peciallv in light of escalating costs of social third-stage components—all of which made programs at home and the war in Vietnam? Zeus a credible exoatmospheric interceptor These uncertainties led different observers wfith a range of 400 miles. Successive itera- and analysts to different conclusions. In- tions of improved performance capabilities deed, during 1966 the Joint Chiefs of Staff led to the evolution of Zeus into DM15X2 recommended production of long lead-time and eventually Spartan. At the same time. items for eventual Nike-X deployment. and Sprint improvements proceeded apace, the House Armed Services Committee vvith the First successful Sprint launching agreed. However, McNamara remained op- from an underground silo taking place on 15 posed to production, arguing that the cost of November 1965. Nike-X would be too high, that Soviet reac- Increasingly, however, the uncertain stra- tion would be uncertain, that the Chinese tegic environment of the mid-1960s led pro- threat was not well-enough defined or de ponents and opponents of BMD alike to ask, veloped. and that civil defense was a against whom and what would Nike-X, or needed adjunct to any BMD program. De any BMD, defend? Such questions became bate also took place in the Senate over the more acute as China moved closer to attain- wisdom of Nike-X production.31 ing ICBMs and as the US-Soviet “détente” But the debate that truly mattered was the of 1963 and 1964 continued. By May 1965, one that President Lyndon Johnson engaged íeports circulated that any US decision to in with himself over Nike-X deployment. In deploy Nike-X would depend on the speed January 1967 Johnson indicated on at least of Chinese ballistic missile development two occasions that he had serious reserva- FROM PROIECT THUMPER TO SDI 45 tions about ballistic missile defense,32 and that the United States should move forward other administration spokesmen indicated with a light BMD deployment that they felt that a BMD freeze vvith the Soviets would be would provide damage limitation capabili- pursued. At the same time, however, John ties against a Soviet attack, complicate So- son indicated that he had not excluded viet attack planning, stabilize the nuclear BMD deployment in the near-term future if balance, demonstrate to the Soviets that the negotiations with the Soviets failed. Thus, United States had no first-strike intentions, in his 1968 budget message, Johnson ob- and deny the Soviets an “exploitable capa served that if discussions vvith the Soviets bility.”35 Additionally, reports circulated proved unsuccessful, “approximately 375 throughout 1967 that the USSR was making million dollars has been included in the substantial progress in BMD research and 1968 budget for the production of Nike-X development. Congress remained internally for such purposes as defense of our offen- divided over BMD deployment. At the same sive weapons systems.”33 time, it quickly became evident that the Re- Throughout 1967 Johnson was buffeted publican party intended to make nonde- by a succession of arguments opposing and ployment an issue in the 1968 presidential supporting deployment. Secretary of De campaign as two leading Republicans, fense McNamara remained an ardent oppo- Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan, both nent of BMD deployment, arguing that a called for BMD deployment.35 “mutuality of interests” existed between Political pressures on Johnson to move the United States and USSR in “limiting the forward with BMD deployment were fur- deployment of anti-ballistic-missile de ther heightened as it became evident the So fense systems.” McNamara remained con- viets no longer were interested in reaching vinced that the USSR sought an assured an agreement with the United States to ban destruction capability and would increase or limit BMD.37 Having argued for standby the number of ICBMs it had deployed to monies in the 1968 fiscal year budget for maintain this capability if the United States BMD production if negotiations failed, moved to deploy BMD. He therefore as- being confronted with evidence of Soviet serted that all that BMD deployment would progress in and deployment of BMD capa- accomplish would be ‘‘to increase greatly bilities, having the US military leadership our respective defense expenditures, with- support BMD deployment. and being faced out any gain in real security for either with Republican criticism in the upcoming side.”M presidential campaign over nondeployment At the same time, McNamara believed decisions, Lyndon Johnson finally autho- that the United States had ample time to rized BMD deployment. Robert McNamara, make a future decision to deploy BMD for long an opponent of ballistic missile de defense against a Chinese ICBM threat. fense, announced the decision on 18 Sep- Other sênior Defense Department civil- tember 1967 in San Francisco.38 ians—including the secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force—agreed with Mc Namara but made it exceedingly clear that From Sentinel and should negotiations with the Soviets fail, they favored deployment of a light BMD Safeguard to SDI screen. McNamara listed four “ marginal Significantly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff dis- grounds” that legitimized the administra- agreed with McNamara. The chiefs asserted tion’s decision to pursue a “light deploy- 46 AIRPOWEfl IOURNAL WINTER 1988

ment” of ABMs designed primarily to butions to US security; and (7) SentineFs protect against a future Chinese threat. effectiveness and technical feasibility.39 First, it would be “relatively inexpensive” The debate over each of these issues was and would have “a much higher degree of heated and extensive, and it was not satis- reliability” than a heavy screen designed to factorily resolved in any of the issue areas. thwart a possible Soviet attack. Second, it Throughout late 1967 and 1968, debate would serve as an indication that the United over the wisdom of the Sentinel deploy States intended to “deter China from nu ment decision, land acquisition, site sur- clear blackmail.” It would therefore dis- veys, construction of missile sites, and courage nuclear proliferation, McNamara procurement of long lead-time system com- asserted. Third, a thin shield could also be ponents proceeded. In the eyes of many, used to defend Minuteman silos, thereby Richard Nixon’s 1968 election to the presi- enhancing the survivability of the US offen- dency guaranteed that Sentinel deployment sive missile force and lessening the need for would proceed despite questions about the its expansion. Finally, a light ABM system system and lack of resolution of the issues would also provide protection of US cities under debate. It was a rather surprising de- against an accidental launch of an ICBM. velopment, then, when on 6 February 1969 The decision, then, had been made. A new Secretary of Defense Melvin- Laird or- thin Nike-X system would be deployed be- dered a halt to the entire Sentinel program ginning in late 1967. It would cost about $5 for one month during which the program billion. The deployed system, to be called would be reviewed.40 It was widely as- Sentinel, would be oriented against China sumed that the halt resulted not only from and have 17 sites, 15 in the continental Laird’s and NixoiTs desire to acquaint United States and one each in Alaska and themselves thoroughly with the program, Hawaii. All sites would have Spartan and but also from Nixon’s desires to build Sprint ABM missiles, with the exception of bridges to the Democratic leadership in Hawaii, which would have only Sprints. Congress and to send a friendly and accom- Despite assurances that Sentinel would re- modating signal to Moscow. main a thin BMD system, the fact that 10 of On 14 March 1969 Nixon announced that the 15 continental sites were near major ur- the Sentinel program would be scrapped ban areas gave Sentinel the appearance that since it could not respond to the growing it could at some future time be upgraded to Soviet threat to US strategic offensive a heavy defensive system whose orientation forces. At the same time, a defense against a could be changed to defense against the large-scale Soviet attack was not yet possi Soviets. ble. Even so, research and development on As might be expected, the Sentinel de- BMD systems by themselves were not suffí- ployment decision evoked considerable re cient to answer the many remaining ques sponse both pro and con. Benson Adams, a tions about BMD; hence deployment of a noted analyst of ballistic missile issues, has new revised BMD system must take place.4' identified seven distinct areas of debate • Nixon named the new program Safe- over the Sentinel deployment decision: (1) guard. The primary objective of Safeguard the validity of the deployment rationale; (2) would be to protect US ICBMs, but it could impacts on international affairs, including also defend US urban areas against a limited *he cold war and alliance relationships; (3) Chinese nuclear threat or against accidental impacts on arms control; (4) cost; (5) impli- launches from any country with missile ca- cations for domestic programs; (6) contri- pabilities. Original deployment of Safe- FROM PROjECT THUMPER TO SÜI 47 guard would start with protection of two But by mid-1970. with the Strategic Arms ICBM fields, with periodic reviews and re- Limitation Talks between the United States visions of the program to determine and the USSR making progress, the strong- vvhether deployment should be accelerated, est and most pressing rationale for Safe altered, or stopped. When completed, the guard had become its role as a bargaining entire Safeguard system was projected to chip with the Soviets. And indeed. through- have 12 sites and to cost about $7 billion. out late 1970 and 1971 up until the time that But Nixons rationale for Safeguard de the 1972 ABM Treaty was signed,44 the most ployment was not the onlv rationale. Sec- effective administration argument for con retarv of Defense Laird asserted that a BMD tinued deployment of Safeguard was its system had to be deployed to protect cities utility in arms control negotiations. and people from a large-scale Soviet attack, The rest of the Safeguard saga need not be to protect retaliatory forces from a Soviet at detailed here. Suffice it to say that one site, tack, and to defend cities and population at Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Da- from a Chinese attack. He also maintained kota, achieved operational status but was that an ABM system would protect against placed on inactive status in 1976. A proto- accidental ICBM launches and against a col to the original ABM Treaty was signed “demonstration launch.”42 The Joint Chiefs in 1974 that further limited ABM deploy of Staff meanwhile continued to argue for a ment to only one site in the United States thick BMD defense to protect US cities from and the USSR, either defending the national a large-scale Soviet attack.43 Obviously, capital or an ICBM field.45 As a result of the within the Nixon administration itself there ABM Treaty, interest in and concern over was no consensus over the rationale for BMD for all practical purposes disappeared Safeguard deployment. during the 1970s. One indication of this dis- Debate over Safeguard deployment was, appearance of interest and concern was the if anything, more intense than debate over funding levei of ABM expenditures. During Sentinel. For the most part, the same seven the late 1960s, US ABM expenditures aver- issue areas served as focuses for debate. aged approximately $1 billion per year (in Again, none of the issues of debate were 1980 dollars), but by 1980, expenditures on ever resolved. A series of congressional at- ballistic missile defense had fallen to $100 tempts to delete Safeguard funding from the million per year.46 fiscal year 1970 budget failed, and the pro Nevertheless, by the early 1980s, US in gram eventually was funded at $1.5 billion terest in BMD had been revived by a com- for 1970. bination of technical advances, the collapse Meanwhile, as a result of faster-than-ex- of détente, and a changed political leader- pected Soviet deployment of large SS-9 ship. Technical breakthroughs in radar, ICBMs, the Nixon administration began to high-speed computers, boost technologies, argue that Safeguard expansion was re- command, control, and communication (C3) quired immediately, with one more Minute- capabilities, and lasers increased the feasi- man site to be defended. Additionally, four bility of BMD; and the growth of US-Soviet other sites were to be prepared for defense, hostility in the late 1970s and early 1980s including one more Minuteman site, Wash removed many of the political constraints ington, D.C., and two other cities. The in- on renewed BMD emphasis. By fiscal year creased emphasis on city defense implied 1982, then, US BMD expenditures had that the rationale for BMD was once again grown to $462.1 million, a fourfold increase changing. from only two years before.47 And with Ron- 48 A1RPOWER JOURNAL W1NTER 1988

ald Reagans March 1983 call for a “compre- technical capabilities so that future BMD hensive and intensive effort" to “achieve deployment would be warranted. Through- our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat out the Nike-Zeus and Nike-X programs, posed by strategic nuclear missiles,”4B more similar decisions were made to pursue re growth would come. By fiscal year 1987, search and development, to forgo current funding for strategic defense had grown to deployment, and to improve technical ca $3.5 billion. pabilities so that future deployment might be pursued.511 Only in the case of Nike-X un der the auspices of Sentinel and Safeguard were deployment decisions ever autho- The Role of Ballistic rized, and only in the case of Safeguard did Missile Defense in deployment actually proceed. The recurring phenomenon of positive re US Security Policy search decisions and negative deployment If this brief survey of the evolution of US decisions bears further examination, if only ballistic missile defense programs has illus- because of the inevitable question, if de trated anvthing, it is that there has rarely, if ployment never (or almost never) occurs, ever, been a consensus on what role BMD why pursue research? Two answers are im- should play in US defense. Although the mediately apparent. The first is the prevail- ideal objective of all BMD programs was to ing fear that if US research does not provide a perfect and impenetrable shield proceed, the USSR may attain a technical for all potential American and allied targets, advantage. perhaps even the defensive the recognition of technical, economic, po- equivalent of a “breakout,” and as a result litical, and other limitations of deployable gain a decisive military-strategic advantage BMD system continually forced proponents over the United States. The second is a con- of BMD to provide a variety of rationales for tinuing sense of technical optimism that why BMD should be deployed. This was leads political, military, and scientific-tech- true of Nike-Zeus. of Nike-X, of Sentinel, nical leaders alike to believe and argue that and of Safeguard. And it is true of those de- a credible defense against ballistic missiles fensive technologies being developed under is possible. This technical optimism is the rubric of the Strategic Defense Initiative couched in a variety of scientific, strategic, as well. President Reagan is prone to de- and even moral terms, but at its root the ar- scribe SDI as intended to provide eventu- gument is always the same: a certain per- ally a perfect or near-perfect shield for the centage of attacking ICBMs will be United States and its allies, while Gen eliminated by BMD, and the elimination of James Abrahamson, the director of the Stra that percentage will justify the economic tegic Defense Initiative Office, frequently cost of deploying BMD, whatever its objec argues that SDI will enhance the survivabil- tives. The combination of a fear of a Soviet ity of US strategic offensive forces, compli- defensive breakout and US technological cate Soviet attack planning, and strengthen optimism has consistently provided suffi- US deterrence.-™ cient rationale for BMD research even if de This disagreement over the objectives of ployment was, in most cases, not seriouslv SDI is not unique to that particular BMD ef considered. fort, and neither is the Reagan administra- But at the same time, one should not over- tion’s decision to pursue research into BMD look the role that strategic doctrine has with the hope of sufficiently improving played in influencing American attitudes FROM PROJECT THUMPER TO S 1)1 49

toward BMD. Before the era of mutual as- tory of BMD. Under early BMD programs, sured destruction. US emphasis on damage nuclear weapons were the preferred BMD limitation made BMD seem a desirable pol- kill mechanism, and only a few visionaries icy alternative. especially when coupled such as those who worked in early 1960s vvith a counterforce targeting posture and projects such as BAMBI contemplated civilian civil defense. Acceptance of mutual space-based defense. The changes in the po assured destruction as a strategic concept litical environment that rendered nuclear during the late 1960s and throughout much defense unacceptable significantly height- of the 1970s led to decreased emphasis on ened the technical requirements needed for counterforce targeting, civilian civil de BMD; proximity was no longer sufficient for fense. and BMD. target destruction, but exact accuracy was Nevertheless, as American nuclear strat- needed. This, in turn, heightened the cost of egv began to move away from assured de BMD, which reduced the political accepta- struction and toward a modified damage bility of BMD. limitation posture in the 1980s,51 BMD and The cost factor has been and continues to other earlier aspects of damage limitation be one of the most significant draivbacks to once again became feasible, logical, and BMD from three different perspectives. The even inevitable subsets of nuclear policy. If fírst drawback relates directly to absolute a nation contemplates fighting and surviv- expenditures. How much will BMD cost, ing a partial nuclear exchange, it must ob- and what other societal opportunities will viously seek to limit damage in order to not be achieved because of BMD survive to the greatest extent possible. And expenditures? so, the Carter administration in 1978 pro- Closely related to opportunity cost is the mulgated Presidential Directive (PD) 41, second drawback, cost benefit. As we have which committed the United States to a pro- seen earlier, proponents of BMD have rarely gram of population relocation during crises. been able to agree on the objectives of a de- This ivas carried to a higher levei under the ployed BMD system, and thus the benefits Reagan administration with National Secu- of such a system have been difficult to iden- rity Decision Directive (NSDD) 26 in 1982, tify specifically. Cost benefit advantages of which stressed the importance of civil de BMD in general and SDI in particular have fense. Carter’s emphasis on counterforce been rendered even more questionable in a targeting put forward in PD 59 ivas carried perceptual sense by the currently popular further under Reagan with NSDD 13, which political perception that any nuclear ex argued that the US strategic posture was to change regardless of size will lead to cata- deter at all leveis but, should deterrence fail clysmic destruction of unprecedented at the nuclear levei, prevail in a conflict. All proportion. In many instances, then, BMD that was left was for the Reagan administra proponents who admit that BMD systems tion to reemphasize BMD, a step taken with will be less than perfect are placed in a clas- SD1. A historian might be excused for hav- sic dilemma: if BMD is not perfect, then cat- ing a sense of déjà vu; in some ways, Ronald aclysmic destruction will result, so where is Reagan’s strategic posture is similar to that the cost benefit in deploying a less-than- of Robert McNamara. perfect BMD? But one cannot overlook the technologi- But the third drawback is perhaps the cal changes that have taken place. nor the most problematic for BMD, the so-called changes in political and economic environ- cost-exchange ratio. From Nike-Zeus to SDI, ment that have transpired during the his- there has been concern that additions to of- 50 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1988 fensive forces will be able to enhance pen- maintained by mutual assured destruction, etration of defensive systems less in which case SDI is not needed, or must de expensively than additions to defensive terrence be maintained by warfighting ca- systems will be able to prevent that penetra- pabilities, civil defense, and BMD? tion. Hence, from all three perspectives— This essay has offered few answers, but it opportunity cost, cost benefít, and cost ex- has raised many questions. Few of these change—BMD and its proponents have questions are new. Nevertheless, unless failed to present convincingly persuasive these questions are answered and answered cases. convincingly, history implies that propo Even so. the attractiveness of BMD re- nents of SDI will be no more successful in mains immense. Who can deny the desira- moving toward deployment of their pre- bility, the vvisdom, and even the morality of ferred BMD systems than earlier BMD pro a weapon system that defends against de- ponents were in deploying their preferred struction rather than destroys? And that re- systems. mains the core of attractiveness for SDI, While a perfect defense is a laudable ob- even as it has for all earlier forms of BMD. jective, the technical, economic, political, Nevertheless, problems remain. BMD ad- and strategic difficulties that SDI propo vocates have never reached consensus on nents face are immense. The chances are the purpose of SDI or on the purpose of ear great that a perfect defense is not attainable. lier BMDs. Is it to defend cities? Is it to de- And if SDI and its proponents fail in their fend strategic offensive forces? Or is it to do effort to achieve a perfect defense, SDI pro both? And against whom, at what costs, and ponents must put forward alternate ratio- at what leveis of attack? nales to legitimize SDI, even as proponents The variables are many, but until they are of earlier BMD systems sought to legitimize answered it is probable that no BMD will be their own less-than-perfect BMD programs. deployed, at least if history is a teacher. So, despite whatever technical marvels SDI First and foremost, BMD is a technical ques- may achieve, it is probable that the fate of tion: what is the future threat environment, SDI will be much the same as the fate of and what success rate may a deployed BMD Zeus, Nike-X, Sentinel, and Safeguard. system be expected to have against it? The While some limited deployment may occur, technical question merges rapidly with eco- SDI—and BMD—will remain a technology nomic, political, and strategic concerns. of the future. It is too attractive to ignore but What levei of strategic defense can be ac- not yet sufficiently advanced to cope with quired for a given dollar total, and what is the projected threat environment. Hence, the cost to the opponent of penetrating that research will continue, but deployment will given levei of defense? Politically and stra- be deferred. With only a single exception, it tegically, who and what should be de- has been that way from Project Thumper to fended, and why? Can deterrence be SDI.

Notes

1. For the transcript of President Reagan's 23 March 1983 H. Arnold on behalf of the Army Air Forces Scientific Advisory "Star W ars" speech. see the New York Times. 24 March 1983. Group by Theodore von Karman, December 1945, 73-75. \20. Most of Reagan's speech was devoted to m ilitary 9pend- 3. Senate. Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the ing, not strategic defense. Committee on Armed Services, The t/niled States Cuided Mis- 2. See Scien ce: The Key to Air Suprem acy, the introductory sile Programs. prepared by Charles Donnelly. 86th Cong.. lst volume of Toward Neiv H orúons. a report subm itted to Gen H sess.. 1959, 4. FROM PROJECT THUMPER TO SD1 51

4. Vannevar Bush. Modem Arms and Free Men (New York: 28. Senate. Department of Defense Approprialion 1965: Simon and Schuster. 1949), 83-87. The Army Air Forces Sci- Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Department of De- entific Advisory Group also expressed doubl about ICBM fea- fense of the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee sibilitv in Toward New Horizons. on Armed Services. HBth Cong.. 2d sess.. 1964. pt. 1:397. 5. Benson D. Adams. Ballistic Missi/e De/ense (New York: 29. "Chinese Nuclear Threat Pushes of Nike-X Options," American Elsevier. 1971). 20. In addition to Nike-Zeus. the Missiles and Hockets, 31 May 1965, 17. See also the New York Army also began work on a mobile field BMD systems named Times. 15 May 1965, 2: and the Washington Post. 26 May 1965. Plato. initiated under the auspices oí Sylvania Electric Com- A9. pany. The project was canceled in 1958. See Aníi-MissiJe De- 30. This was the Tallin Line, w'hich bv the early 1970s had fense (Washington. D.C.: Government Data Publications. come to be viewed by US experts as an advanced antiaírcraft 19651.59. system with some potential for upgrade to BMD capabilities. 6. Adams. 18. 31. For details. see Adams. 125—42. For a totally different 7. For the text of the directive. see The United States Guided perspective of the same period. see Ernest ). Yanarella. The Missiie Programs. 114. Missiie Defense Controversy [Lexington: University of Ken- 8. Secretary of Defense Neil McElrov. as quoted in Adams. tucky Press. 1977), 102-42. 28. 32. New Y'ork Times, 11 (anuary 1967. 1: and 18 February 9. US Library of Congress. Legislative Reference Service, 1967.1. 6. United States De/ense Policies in 1959. 86th Cong., 2d sess.. 33. Ibid.. 25 lanuary 1967. 17. 1969. H. Doc. 432. 24. 34. US DepartmentofDeíense, Staternent of Secretary of De 10. See "Nike-Zeus May Be Inadequate. Top Defense Sci- fense fíobert S. McNamara Before a /oint Session ofthe Senate entist Warns," Aviation VVeek and Space Technology 69 (10 Armed Services Committee and lhe Senate Subcommittee on November 1958): 33. Department of De/ense Appropriations on the Fiscal Year 11. FY 1960 De/ense Appropriations. 164-74 1968-72 De/ense Program and 1968 Defense Budget. 23 lanu 12. US Library of Congress. Legislative Reference Service. ary 1967. 44. as cited in Adams. 147—48. United States Defense Policies in 1960. 87th Cong.. lst sess.. 35. Senate. Committee on Armed Services and lhe Subcom 1961. H. Doc. 207. 57. mittee on Department of Defense of the Committee on Appro- 13. See Jerome Wiesner. "Comprehensive Arms Lirnitation priations. Military Prucurement Authorizations for Fiscal Year Systems." Con/erence Proceedings of the Sixth Pugwash Con- 1968. 90th Cong., lst sess . 1967, 251- 52 ference. 1960. 247. See also the special arms control issue of 36. New York Times. 15 Septernber 1967, 9. Daedalus. Fali 1960. 37. See the Washington Post. 26 |une 1967, A ll. 14. House. Department of De/ense Appropriations for 1962: 38. For the text of McNamara's speech, see the New York Hearings Before a Subcommittee on Appropriations. 87th Times, 19 Septernber 1967, 18. Cong.. lst sess.. 1961. pt. 3:16-17. 39. Adams, 182. 15. Adams, 44. 40. New York Times. 7 February 1969, 1. 16. New York Times. 5 February 1967, 76. 41. Ibid.. 15 March 1969. 1. 17. 17. Ibid . 24 October 1961. 1. 42. House. Safeguard Antiballistic Missiie System Hearings 18. |ohn F. Kennedy. "Nuclear Testing and Disarmament.” Before Subcommittees of the Committee on Appropriations. Department of State Bulletin 46. no. 1186 (19 March 1962): 91st Cong.. lst sess., 1969, 16-17. 445. See also the New York Times. 8 February 1962, 15. for an- 43. See the New York Times, 18 March 1969, 1,9. other Kennedy comment linking atmospheric nuclear testing 44. For the treaty text. see Army Control and Disarmament and BMD. Agreements (Washington. D.C.: US Arms Control and Disar 19. On 21 December 1961. a Nike-Zeus successfully de- mament Agency. 1982). 139-42. stroyed another missiie in flight. On 20 )uly 1962 a Zeus mis- 45. For the protocol text. see ibid.. 162-63. sile fired from Kwajaleín destroyed an Atlas ICBM that had 46. E. C. Aldridge, )r.. and Robert L. Manst. |r.. “SALT Im- been launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif. See US plications of BMD Options." in U.S. Arms Control Ob/ectives Library of Congress. Legislative Reference Service. United and the Implications for Ballistic Missiie Defense. ed. Michelle States Defense Policies in 1961. H. Doc. 502. 87th Cong.. 2d Marcouiller (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for Science and Inter sess.. 1962. 161: and the New York Times. 20 |uly 1962, 1-2. national Affairs. 1980), 55-56. Adams reports (p. 240) that the 1961-62 Zeus tests resulted in 47. Senate. Department of Defense Authorization for Fiscal 10 hits out of 14 attempts. Year 1984: Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, 20. House. Department of Defense Appropriations for FY 9Bth Cong., lst sess.. 1983, 337. 1963: Hearings Before u Subcommittee on Appropriations. 48. New York Times, 24 March 1983, A20. 87th Cong.. 2d sess., 1962, pt 5:85. 49. See. for example, Gen James A. Abrahamson. "An Over 21. The final request was forS272.1 míllion. Ibid.. pt. 2:348. View of the Strategic Defense Initiative," in The Strotegic De 22. Ibid . 43. fense Initiative: New Perspective on Deterrence, ed. Dorinda G. 23. Ibid.. pt. 5:85. Dallmever (Boulder. Colo.: Westview. 1986). 3-6. 24 House. Committee on Armed Services. Hearings on Mil- 50. Decisions under Zeus and X were “similar" rather than itary Posture and H.B. 2440. 88th Cong.. lst sess.. 1963. 324- "idêntica!" to the Reagan administration decisions on SDI in 25. that Zeus and X decisions were to proceed with "research and 25. US Department of Defense, Staternent of Secretary of development" while lhe SDI decisions have been to proceed Defense fíobert S. McNamara Before the House Armed Ser with "research." SDFs elimination of "development" is a di- vices Committee on the Fiscal Year 1964-68 De/ense Program rect result of the 1972 ABM Treaty. which forbids either side and 1964 De/ense Budget. 30 lanuary 1963. 48. "to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components 26. House. Department of Defense Appropriations for FY which are sea-based. air-based. space-based. or mobile land- 1964: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on based." See Artide V of the ABM Treaty. in Arms Control and Appropriations. 88th Cong., lst sess.. 1963. pt. 1:439 Disarmament Agreements. 140. See also ibid., 49. 51. This movement began publicly in 1980 with |immy 27. For detailed discussion of this period. see Adams. 76- Carter’s Presidenlial Directive 59. 91 COUNTERREVOLUTION in NAMÍBIA

M a ) R obert C. O wen

The American view of vvar is generally incompatible with the characteristics and demands of counterrevolution.

—Sam C. S arkesian

Ruacana Ovambo Kavango Tsumeb •

Windhoek

Walvis Bay

Luderitz HE SOUTH African counterrevolu- leaders decided in 1961 to begin prepara- tionary experience in Namibia merits tions for armed struggle.1 attention for two reasons. First, The ensuing war has had two phases, through careful coordination of an ef- both militarily unsuccessful for SWAPO. Tfective military strategy with political re- Phase one began when a small group of form , the South A fricans have SWAPO soldiers infíltrated into the fundamentally altered the direction of Na- Ovambo area of north-central Namibia in mibian politics. They have militarily con- August 1966. Despite their training and tained the principal revolutionary force in preparations, the members of this first the countrv, the Marxist-oriented South group were quickly discovered and were West African People’s Organization killed or captured by the South African po- (SWAPO), and they have established a mod- lice.4 From that time until 1975, SWAPO erate political movement that may be able to continued a sporadic infíltration of small govern Namibia successfully despite SWA- guerrilla units from Zambia into the ex PO's still-considerable political power and treme northern parts of Namibia, mostly resistance. Second, the Namibian conflict into the remote Caprivi Strip. Inexperience offers indirect insight into American capa- and the presence of Portuguese colonial bilities in this sort of struggle. Unfortu- forces in Southern Angola kept SWAPO’s nately for American military thinkers operations limited to mainly a police prob- concerned with counterrevolutionary war, lem for the South Africans. The second the unique social and political conditions phase began in 1976. when the Marxist Pop making South Africa’s successful efforts ular Movement for the Liberation of Angola possible suggest more about American lim- (MPLA) ousted two other Angolan nation- itations than strengths in counterrevolu alist movements from the coalition govern- tionary war. ment of newly independent Angola. With MPLA support, SWAPO moved its bases of operations from Zambia to locations in Background Southern Angola. SWAPO’s military wing, the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia South África's continued presence in Na (PLAN), quickly increased the flow of polit mibia is most effectively challenged by ical cadre and soldiers into Ovamboland. SWAPO. There are several other political PLAN also began to launch annual “inva- groups antipathetic to continued South Af sions” of 500-1,500 troops into northern Na rican rule in the country, but they all have mibia. The South Africans countered by limited constituencies and none have un- reinforcing the South African Defense dertaken armed resistance. SWAPO’s Forces (SADF) already in the area and origins lie in the Ovambo People’s Organi soundlv defeating any significant PLAN zation. which was formed in the late 1950s force entering or approaching Namibia. to provide social support and political rep- Consequently, while PLAN has never resentation for the Ovambo people of Na threatened the SADF’s control of Namibia, mibia.2 The organization’s name was the liberation army’s continued presence in changed in 1960 to reflect its intention to Angola has forced the South Africans to represent all of Namibia’s ethnic groups in continue costly military operations. the struggle for independence from South PLAN’s persistence has also earned África. Frustrated with South African re strong domestic and international support sistance to less-violent protests, SWAPO’s for SWAPO. SWAPO is the only political

53 The South African Defense Force is se 1 u p w i t h c o u n - terinsurgency in mind. This South African clesigned armored personnel carrier (rightj includes armored side screens and a wedge shape to disperse the blast from mines. Northern Namíbia is open and sparsely vegetutedlfar right). fíather than aftempt to control all of Namibia, South África has concentrated its anti- SW APO activity on limiting their political in/luence and ensuring that SWAPO does not have military control over any particular area.

entity in Namibia with something close to national political support in Namibia. The Ovambo people, comprising nearly half of Namibia’s 1.2 million population, strongly support the movement. SWAPO’s president, Sam Nujoma, and most of the movement’s key leaders are Ovambo. SWAPO also has limited followings in each of Na míbia^ 10 other ethnic groups, including vvhites. Internationally, the United Nations General Assembly has declared SWAPO “the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people.’’5 Various UN agencies, along with a number of countries and church groups, are SWAPO's main sources of nonlethal aid." Military equipment, in cluding tanks and antiaircraft missiles, comes mainly from the Soviet Union and its allies.7 Although regionally powerful on paper, South Africa’s resources for fighting the Na the increasingly sophisticated defenses of mibian war are more limited than generally SWAPO and the Angolan military (along recognized.' With a reserve-heavy structure with its Cuban and Eastern-bloc allies). of 83,000 active and 320,000 reserve troops, SADF counterinsurgency operations within SADF probably fíelds a permanent force of Namibia require weapons, vehicles, and about 20,000 soldiers in Namibia." SADF equipment well within the capacity of troops are generally well trained and armed South African industry to produce. How- for counterinsurgent duties. But due to the ever, since offensive cross-border strikes are international embargo on arms sales to a criticai part of South África’s overall strat- South África, SADF high-technology weap- egy for dealing with the insurgency, re- ons, particularly aircraft and helicopters, duced conventional capabilities threaten are aging and in short supply.9 Thus far, the countrys ability to “stay the course” in SADF's declining technological and logis- Namibia. The South African economv may tics base only threatens their ability to con- well be unable to both fínance the war in duct punitive cross-border strikes against Namibia and sustain SADF conventional

54 strength.10 It is suffering a recession brought tional elections of 1980, President Pieter K. on by the strains of falling gold prices, the Botha has focused more power in the pres- war in Namibia, the economic inefficiencies idency, replacing a government character- of apartheid, and strained relations with ized by what have been called “ feudal most of the world. ministries” to bring the maximum of gov ernment resources to bear on the country’s security problems. The political infighting and realignments involved in these pro Policymaking cesses have tended to increase the influence and Policies and presence of military officers in a broad range of government m inistries and South African national security policy is committees.11 made by a very small, cohesive group of These developments do not portend in- leaders, a group increasingly dominated by stability, weakness, or significant policy military officers. Since winning the na changes in the South African government.

55 56 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1988

What pressure there is toward instability is largely counterbalanced by the ideological consistency and quality of civil service and military leaders. Political and military leadership in South África is almost exclusively the domain of white, Afrikaans-speaking men. Few members of the English-speaking white community hold significant political povver, though they control the bulk of the economy. Nonwhites, except when they strike or riot, still do not wield decisive po litical influence. Because they usually attend the handful of Afrikaans-medium universities in the country, are usually members of the Dutch Reformed Church, and share a carefully vetted commitment to white power and the cultural preservation of the Afrikaaner volk, South African leaders are a remarkably uni- fied group politically and ideologically. Promotion within the political and military power structure emphasizes merit, thus as- suring quality and consistent leadership.

South African De/ense Forces have succeeded in keeping SVVAPO guerrillas away from svch strategi- cally imporlant areas as lhe porl at Walvis Bay (right) and the capital at Windhoek (below). COUNTERREVOLUTION IN NAMIMA 57

Thus, to a degree that many would envy, South African policy is prepared and executed by a cohesive group of technically proficient experts, and it remains consistent over the long run. Of course, the long-term wisdom of an effort to preserve the nine- teenth-century agrarian social institutions of apartheid in a twentieth-century indus- trialized nation is in some dispute.12 Reflecting the focus and general consistency of other government policies. South African policy in Namibia has, above all else. served the fundamental objectives of security and white power. From its assump- tion of rule in 1915 until the early 1970s, South África treated Namibia as a political and economic extension of itself and re- jected international and domestic demands for reform or independence. International criticism of the South African presence in Namibia included an International Court of justice decision in 1971 declaring South Áf rica^ rule illegal. In 1974 the South African government apparently reversed itself by acknowledging the “inevitability” of inde pendence and authorizing the creation of political parties to participate in elections for a constitutional assembly.13 But subse- quent developments revealed the continu- itv of South African objectives. Although SWAPO was offered the opportunity to par ticipate in South African-sponsored elec tions (SWAPO refused), South African sponsorship and financial support clearly focused on the moderate political alternative to SWAPO. the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA). The DTA was a coalition of small, mod erate, and ethnically based political parties formed in late 1977 to participate in South

The Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA j. created by South África as u moderate alternaiive in Nami bia, once appeared to be the ansiver to the political prob/ems in the area. Laek of bolJi popular support and international recognition resulted in South Á f rica seeking other Solutions to the insurgency. 58 A1RPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1988

African-sponsored elections for an ínterim stated conviction that the war would be government prior to independence. The won at the conference table rather than on DTA advocated a “multiracial” constitution the battlefield. Thus, they have apparently that would define politics and establish po- sought, or at least been satisfied, only to litical representation on the basis of racial limit PLAN’s ability to dominate Namibian rather than ideological or economic group- politics militarily, not to destroy the guer- ings. Under such a constitution, each ethnic rilla army in the field. The recognition that group in Namibia would vote for, and only restricting a revolutionary army’s political for. local and national politicians from that influence is not necessarily the same as de- ethnic group. stroying it reflects a subtle appreciation of For the South Africans, a DTA govern the political-military interrelationhips of ment would enhance security because DTA liberation wars. The issues in these wars are moderates would not make Namibia a pos- human loyalties and time, not military sible haven for Soviet influence and proxy victory. troops. A multiracial constitution could This political-military strategy also al- also protect the interests of white Namib- lows the South Africans to conserve their ians through disproportionate representa limited military resources. Since political tion and by restricting the kinds of laws a protection is their goal, they can avoid the presumably black majority national govern costly war of annihilation that a purely mil ment could impose on ethnic groups.14 Fi- itary solution would require. Instead, the nally, multiracialism is more in keeping SADF has limited PLAN’s political impor- with South African concepts of ethnic sep- tance through raids against PLAN installa- aration in society and government. tions and formations in Angola, backed up Creating a viable moderate political by a relatively thin occupation of the areas movement from the confusion and animos- of northern Namibia exposed to PLAN infil- ities of Namibian politics of the 1970s was tration. What the South Africans have in obviously going to take some time. Few fact done is use maneuver war to keep whites were prepared to relinquish their fa- PLAN forces off balance to make the costs of vored position, and few blacks could toler- protracted counterrevolutionary war logis- ate any plan involving continued South tically and politically bearable. African presence or one so obviously serv- The essence of maneuver war is to use ing South African interests. Significant eco movement, surprise, and deception to bring nomic and political reforms were necessary concentrated force against an enemy’s cen- to pursuade the small number of middle- ter-of-balance—that part of his military class black Namibians to give credibility power that, when destroyed, most seriously and leadership to the moderate political degrades or dislocates his fighting ability. movement. Providing the time and protec- The aim is economy of force and minimum tion required to create the moderate move casualties by applying maximum force ment was the SADF’s job. against criticai targets. SADF strategy has focused on restricting PLAN's ability to dominate Namibian politics and on reducing the liberation army’s credibility as a mil A Strategy of Maneuver War itary force with a reasonable hope of liberating the country or of even protecting The strategies and operations of South Af SWAPO followers from SADF retaliation. rican military leaders reflect their often- Between 1978 and 1985, the South Afri- COUNTERREVOLUTION IN NAMIBIA 59 cans launched at least seven major cross- area of about 60,000 square miles with border raids, and many smaller actions, about 40,000 troops, counting South West against SVVAPO forces based in Southern African territory forces. The thinness of this Angola.15 These "sanctuarv-deniar opera- occupation is clearer when compared to the tions amounted to raids in force. They em- 1.5 million allied troops required to occupy phasized shock. surprise. aggressive South Vietnam’s 66,000 square miles in advance. intelligence, and maximum dis- 1970.22 ruption of the PLAN forces engaged. Raid- It is important to understand that the ing units usually were about brigade size or South Africans apparently do not pursue an smaller. These strike forces were supported airtight occupation of northern Namibia. by artillery and multiple rocket launchers, SWAPO cadre do infiltrate and operate co- and a limited number of close-air-support vertly, especially among the Ovambo. As strikes. Airborne and air mobile assaults one South African official told this author in were also normal features of these a conversation in Windhoek, the so-called operations. internai wing of SWAPO is even allowed to Few risks were taken to pursue PLAN conduct "legitimate” political activities units beyond the battlefield, and onlv a few throughout Namibia to “keep it out in the strategic points in Angola, such as the Rua- open, and keep the faint-hearted from going cana Dam. were occupied for any length of to Angola." In the early 1980s firefights be time. As part of the February 1984 ‘‘disen- tween SADF and PLAN patrols were fairlv gagement agreement” between South África frequent occurrences, especially during the and Angola, SADF troops were pulled out of lanuary-to-March rainy season. Hostile con- Angola in April 1985.11 But even as SADF tacts are less common now, although troops left Southern Angola. South African SWAPO does maintain a presence. The covert intelligence-gathering and sabotage South Africans seem willing, or at least are operations continued in northern Angola.17 resigned, to live with a certain amount of The casualty rates inflicted on PLAN by SWAPO activity so long as it does not these operations were extremely high. In amount to overt political or military control 1978, for example, the SADF lost three sol- of any Namibian territory. diers and killed about 1,000 PLAN soldiers and civilian supporters during Operation Reindeer.18 Operation Super cost PLAN 201 soldiers in exchange for three SADF com- Allies mandos.1'1 These casualties plus those of The South Africans appreciate the mate other raids reduced PLAN’s combat rial and moral value of allies in the struggle strength from some 14,000 troops in 1980 to against SWAPO. They currently receive about 8,000 in 1984.20 PLAN s ability to military support from the South West Afri send troops into Namibia declined dramat- can Territory Force (SWATF) and the Union ically when cross-border raids forced re- for the Total Independence of Angola moval of its base camps about 300 (UNITA). These forces contribute impor- kilometers farther into Angola after 1980.21 tantly to SADF military success and reduce PLANs reduced capabilities allowed the war’s human and material costs for SADF troops in northern Namibia to deploy South África. for efficient occupation rather than for de- South África created SWATF in August fense against large-scale attack. Conse- 1980 to mobilize Namibians more effec quently, the SADF effectively Controls an tively and eventually provide the country 60 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WIN TER 1988 with a national army.-‘ SVVATF draws dissolve without new elections. The Multi- troops and officers from all Namibian ethnic Party Conference (MPC), a new coalition groups. By 1984 SWATF fielded about that included remnants of the shrunken 11.000 troops, generallv equipped and DTA, is now the officially approved and trained for local defense and counterinsur- supported moderate alternative to SWAPO. gency operations. Current strength is over Although international recognition is still a 20.000 personnel. By 1984 SWATF carried problem, the South Africans gave Namibian about 60 percent of the occupation burden moderates a chance to form another interim in northern Namibia and participated in government in June 1985. Called the Tran- cross-border operations.-4 sitional Government of National Unity, the As one of the Angolan liberation move- moderate coalition remained organized and ments ousted from the Angolan coalition active in December, but it was also “beset government in 1976, L1NITA is at war with with internai dissent and threats of defec- the MPLA. SWAPO forces, as MPLA allies, tion” over constitutional issues.28 come under frequent LIN1TA attack. The ability of moderates to form a stable SWAPO and Angolan forces and camps are government in Namibia remains murky. often intermingled for mutual protection.25 Many observers would agree that “any fair SWAPO camps attacked during the SADF’s elections would almost inevitably bring to Operation Daisy were found laid out as power SWAPO.”29 But extensive Namibian much for defense against UNITA as for de participation in the national elections of fense against the SADF.26 The South Afri- 1978 and the local elections of 1981, despite cans estimated in 198 5 that UNITA SWAPO demands for boycotts, may suggest occupied the defensive efforts of 65 percent that SWAPO's support stems from its posi- of SWAPO’s troops. South África remains tion as the vanguard of the liberation strug- UNITA's principal source of arms and gle, not from a popular acceptance of its (occasionally) direct militarv support. Marxism, militancy, or multiethnic politi UNITA's president, Jonas Savimbi, and cal platform. Another indication of the un- South Africa’s president. Pieter Botha, certain extent of SWAPO’s power base was maintain coordination through occasional indirectly revealed when some 13,000 peo meetings.27 ple gathered in 1986 to "attend the libera tion movemenfs first legal meeting in many years.”30 One wonders what the other The Political Front 120,000 Namibians living in the area who were “solely represented” by SWAPO were As anticipated, the creation of a viable, doing at the time. multiracial, moderate political alternative The dogged survival of the moderate to SWAPO in Namibia has been difficult. movement suggests SWAPO is not the shoo- The Democratic Turnhalle Aliiance’s prom- in for political power that the movement ising start, winning 85 percent of the vote and its supporters assert it to be. Perhaps fora National Assembly in 1978, foundered the end of liberation as a political issue on its inability to develop a new constitu- would see SWAPO’s political base shrink to tion or to gain international recognition as a an awkward coalition of committed radicais legitimate representative of the Namibian and Ovambos. Then again, SWAPO might people. In January 1983 the South African retain its political strength and continue the administrator-general of Namibia allowed ideological struggle. American militarv the DTA-dominated National Assembly to planners considering our own involvement COUNTERHEVOLUTION IN NAMÍBIA 61

in counterrevolutionary situations would other divisions they may have, South Afri probably prefer more concrete and declara- cans. including many blacks, are deeply tive terms than may suggest. coulcl, and concerned with the growth of Soviet influ- might. But such terms reemphasize that ence in their region. The same is true in Na there is no certainty in counterrevolution mibia. The SADF’s freedom to attack ary war except that it is usuaily protracted SWAPO’s sanctuaries in sovereign Angola and expensive in blood and treasure. and take full advantage of all available a!lies greatly enhances its ability to fíght the war effectively. The proximity of the Namibian war certainly enhances South African motivation to fíght. Some Comparisons The United States also has some potential Namibia is obviously unique. In addition strengths in this type of conflict. Unlike to the usual problems of a counterrevolu- South África, whose motives are more self- tion, the South Africans were obliged to cre- serving and better articulated, American ob- ate an “incumbent” government to benefit jectives in counterrevolutionary wars have from moderate reforms and give the South been more balanced between self-interest African part of the conflict a logical place to and concern for the uncoerced desires of the end. Historically, other colonial powers left local people. Awareness of the American their colonies in the hands of a political position could reduce the damage done to party with at least some sort of popular le- the credibility of a host government by our gitimacy, if not actually in the hands of the support. This, in turn, would bring about a revolutionary party. Namibia’s moderate potential reduction in the degree of Ameri coalition is clearlv the creation of the South can involvement needed to stabilize the sit- African counterrevolution. Whether a gen- uation. Moreover, the United States is less eration of political and social reform can likely to be in the position of having to cre- overcome the barrier to legitimacy remains ate and support a political entity as initially to be seen. But the viability of the incum artificial and narrowly supported as the bent government can never be really tested moderate movement was in Namibia. Last, until the sponsor has left. Whether in Viet- American resources for fighting counterre nam, Malaysia, Namibia. or El Salvador, at volutionary war, or any war, are certainly some point the sponsor government must greater than South Africa’s. withdraw support for the incumbent gov Of course, as America learned in Viet- ernment and hope for the best. There are no nam, an abundance of force can be more a guarantees of success, and little possibility hindrance than a help in limited wars. At- of reintervention if the incumbent fails. tempting to hurry the political process The South Africans enjoy significant ad- through intensive military operations is vantages in the conduct of counterrevolu much like overwatering a plant. A little tionary war. Policv and strategy-making are water is good. but too much only rots the disciplined. coordinated, and answerable to roots and defeats one’s purpose. In counter far fewer interests than in the United States. revolutionary war, no more military force The South African government is relatively can be usefully employed than the slow rate less sensitive to international moral and po of political and social change can accom- litical criticism than is the American gov modate. During 21 years of active conflict in ernment. Public opinion in South África is Namibia, the leaders of South África have strongly behind the war effort. Whatever shown the cohesion and patience to under- 62 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1988 take this kind of protracted conflict. They that Gen George Marshall said could not have also made their job easier by taking full fight a seven-year war, can ever generate advantage of good strategy and the avaiia- this same levei of endurance and national bility of allies. A moderate govemment has consensus in a counterrevolutionary con yet to stand alone in Namíbia, but condi- flict. Any national policy for such war tions for its success are certainly better now should begin with a clear answer to that than only a few years ago. One wonders if question. the leaders of the United States, a country

Noles 1. Sam C. Sarkesian, "Lcuv-lntensity Conflict: Concepts, fare?" ISSUP: Bulletin of the South African Institute of Stra Principies, and Policy Guidelines," Air University Review. tegic Studies. Pretória, June 1981,4. lanuary-Februarv 1985, 15. 15. They wereOperationsReindeer (May 1978), Smokeshell 2 Department of Information and Publicity. SWAPO of Na ()une 1980). Protea (August 1981). Daisy (November 1981), míbia, To Be Born A Nation: The Liberation Struggle for Na- Super (March 1983). and Askari (December 1983). míbia (London: Zed. 1981), 176. 16. "Remaining SADF Members Withdrawn from Angola," 3. Ibid.. 172-78. Johannesburg Domestic Service. Foreign Broadcast Informa 4. Michael S. L. Morris. Armed Conflict in Southern África tion Service. 18 April 1985, U2. Hereafter cited as FBIS. (Capetovvn: leremv Spence. 1974). 3-15. 17. "Captured RSA Commando Reveals Mission. Tactics," 5 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3111. De- Luanda Domestic Service, FBIS, 29 May 1985, Ul; "The Threat cember 1973. from the South," África News. 23 September 1985, 7. 6. International Defenseand Aid Fund. Namibia.The Facts. 18. Government of South África Fact Sheet, "Operation London. 1980 44. Reindeer (4 May 1978): The SADFs Most Successful Opera 7 "Interview with MrTheo-Ben Gurirab. SWAPO’s Perma- tion Against SWAPO to Date,” undated. nent Observer to the United Nations." Third World Diplo- 19. "Operation Super: Crushing Defeat for Terrorists," mocy. VVinter 1982. 86. Puratus, April 1982. 5. 8 International Institute of Strategic Studies. The Military 20. John Reed. "Frontline Southwest África." Armed Balance 1984-85 (London. IISS. 1984). 82-83: John Reed. Forces. January 1985,19. "Frontline Southwest África." Armed Forces. February 1985, 21. Ibid., 20. 60. 22. Guenter Lewy. America in Vietnam (New York: Oxford 9. Dora Alves. "The South African Air Force in the Early University Press. 1977). 147 and 455. Eighties," Air University fleview, July-August 1983, 72-79. 23. International Defense and Aid Fund. Apartheids Army 10. Christopher Coker. South Á frica's Security D ilem m as. in Namibia, London. 1982, 33. Washington Papers: No. 126, Center for Strategic Studies, 24. “Van Niekerk Comments on Military' and Economic Sit- Georgetown Univ (New York: Praeger. 1987). 28-29. 48-62. uation.” Johannesburg International Service. FBIS. 11 Febru 11 Robert 1 Rotberg discusses recent alterations in the gov- ary 1985. Ul. ernment and bureaucracy in "Decisionmakingand the Military 25. "Operation Protea." Paratus, October 1981. 69. in South África," South África and Its Neighbors: Regional Se- 26. Arnold Kirkby, “Life and Death in Operation Daisy,” curity and Self-lnterest (Lexington. Mass.: Lexington Books. Cape Argus. 7 December 1981. 1985). 13-26. 27. “Van Niekerk Comments," Ul. 12. This paragraph is based un an excellent discussion of 28. “Namibia: Dissent Threatens Coalition." África News. the workings of.the South African govemment in Leonard 23 September 1985, 26. Thompson and Andrew Prior, South African Politics (New Ha- 29. George W. Shepherd. Jr.. "Breaking the Namibia Im ven: Yale University Press, 1981), 107-16. passe." África Today. July 1982. 27. 13. Departm ent of Inform ation and Publicity, 214—15. 30. John A. Evenson. "Namibia: The Question Still Stands." 14. "SW A Nam ibia: Political Settlem ent or M obile W ar- África Reporf, September-October 1986. 65. V3

Female A ir Force Piloi and CombettAíra

‘The Right StufT Has No Gender

M aj Sandra L BatemaI

THE HIGHT STUFF HAS NO GENDEfí 65

OMEN HA VE volunteered to stand what this article is not about. It is not serve their countrv in combat a discussion of whether women should be throughout history and have drafted. It is not about females fíghting in displayed numerous examples hand-to-hand combat. It is not about Wof courage, heroism. and combat skills.1 Yet women serving on combat vessels in the vvomen are still faced with disbelievers in Navy. This article is specifically restricted their combat abilities. Jeff Tuten, an opera- to those women who have volunteered and tions analyst specializing in manpower mo- have been selected to serve in the United bilization, States, “Women’s unsuitability States Air Force as pilots, navigators, and for combat is made apparent by the fact that aircraft crewmembers. These women, they have never engaged in it. Thus . . . though fully trained and capable, have been women are unsuited for combat. ”2 This con- excluded from operating certain aircraft tinuing problem is best exemplified by fe- that are considered combat related. One male pilots in the United States Air Force must remember that the Air Force is a who are still prevented from flying aircraft unique Service. It fights its battles in the air that could be engaged in combat missions. in combat engagements requiring skill, cun- The question that begs to be answered is ning, courage, and that evasive quality why. known as “the right stuff”—and not one of Before addressing the question of combat these qualities is restricted to one gender. A exclusion, the reader should first under- seemingly harmless protective measure for

In a timeof pilot retention probJems and as more female officers complete pilot training. the Air Force will need to address the issue of how to best use its pilot assets. With more and more combat oriented ca- reerfields. such as security police. open to women. the justifications for keeping ivomen ouf of fighterand bomber aircraft will become continually less defensible. 66 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1988 females becomes, under close scrutiny, the female nurses were an integral part of an ef- very core of inequality and discrimination fective medicai Service. So, when the war based on gender. ended in 1865, the Army reverted to the In the search to understand how this sit- practice of using enlisted men for patient uation could exist in America today, we care and sent the females home.3 During the must look at Title 10 US Code, section 8549, Spanish-American War, more than 1,500 fe of the Women’s Armed Services Integration male nurses volunteered to serve at home Act of 1948. Section 8549 made it unlawful and abroad. Opposition to granting military for Air Force females to fly aircraft on com- status to nurses was again strong. Surgeon bat missions regardless of their capabilities, General George Sternberg was reluctant to training, or time in Service. In trying to un have women with the troops in the field, ex- derstand the reason Congress included the pressing concern that women would prob- combat-exclusion provision in its legisla- ably need luxury items not necessary for tion and vvhy it remains today, this article men. In spite of his concerns, he soon found vvill explore the history of female pilots who female nurses were invaluable in the field volunteered to serve their country. Next, it and requested commissions for female doc- vvill revievv section 8549 of the Women’s tors. Congress responded that only persons Armed Services Integration Act in depth to “physically, mentally and morally quali- determine if such a provision is discrimi- fied” could be commissioned, and women natory in relation to current social attitudes. were obviously not physically qualified.4 It vvill then examine the law’s constraints on That was accepted as fact in 1917. In 1948 mission readiness and vvill dispel prevail- Congress exempted Air Force female medi ing myths on vvhy Air Force women should cai personnel from the combat exclusion so not fly combat missions. Finally, the article they could serve aboard aircraft flying into vvill revievv the present environment within combat areas and in war zone field the lOOth Congress and the possibility of a hospitais.5 discriminatory law enacted 40 years ago Ironicallv, female pilots are still excluded being repealed or revised. from flying those same aircraft that could carry female nurses to war zones. This could lead one to the dubious conclusion Those Who Have Served that Congress no longer sees a need to protect all females from serving in combat areas In exploring the history of female pilots, but only certain females such as pilots and one should bie aware that congressional op- crewmembers. The question is why. position to women serving their country in It is not surprising to find that the evolu combat was also evident during the formation of women pilots in the Air Force tion of the nurse corps, which is now com- closely resembles that of the nurse corps. It pletely accepted as being indispensable. It was not until late November 1941. as we is interesting to compare the beginnings of faced World War II with severe manpower the militarv nurse corps to the evolution of shortages, that Gen George C. Marshall, the female militarv pilots. Army chief of staff, told Congress. “Women The record of Civil War nurses provides certainly must be employed in the overall one of the fínest examples of dedication, effort of this nation.’’6 In August 1943 an ability, and simple courage to be found in auxiliary unit named the Women Airforce American military history. Yet military Service Pilots (WASP) was formed, and leaders were not ready to accept the fact that more than 1,070 WASPs served their coun- THE RJGHT STUFF HAS NO GENDER 67 try through 1944. Thirty-seven WASPs that Congress granted the WASP veterans were killed and 36 injured while perform- status so they could receive the military ing duties as pilots, copilots, and students. benefits they so richly deserved. In all. women ferry pilots completed 12,650 Ironically, just four years after the deac missions, encountering similar flying con- tivation of the WASP program, women were ditions and problems faced by male pilots. fully integrated into the military by the They sometimes guarded their own planes Women’s Armed Services Integration Act of at understaffed airfíelds and írequently tlew 1948. During the hearings on the Integration open-cockpit aircraft in subzero weather.7 Act, Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Air Force In Januarv 1944 Gen Henry H. Arnold and chief of staff, testified emphatically that the the Armv Air Corps had sought congres- new Air Force, while it wanted women, had sional approval of full military status for the no intention of using them as pilots. The Air women pilots, but in June 1944 the bill was Force policy decision to exclude women defeated on the House floor and the WASP from flying duties denied even those program was deactivated in December. On 7 WASPs who had logged thousands of war- December 1944 General Arnold. command- time hours in military aircraft the opportu- ing general of the Army Air Forces, stated to nity to fly.10 Could it be that the WASPs the last graduating class of WASPs: carne too close to proving women had “the right stuff” to compete with men in the air You. and more than nine hundred of your sis- and therefore were restricted from flying Air ters. have shovvn that you can fly wingtip with your brothers. If ever there was a doubt in any- Force aircraft? Not until 1975 was this gen- one’s mind that women can become skillful der discrimination overcome, but Congress pilots, the W ASP have dispelled that doubt. It still restricts female pilots from flying com- is on the record that w om en can fly as well as bat-related aircraft. m en.. . . If the need had developed for women to fly our aircraft overseas, I feel certain the W ASP would have performed that job equally well. A Closer Look at the Act Certainly we haven't been able to build an airplane you can't handle. ...» To find the reason why Congress included the combat exclusion provision in At the time of deactivation, 916 WASPs the 1948 act and to determine if it is still ap- were on duty with the Army Air Corps. It is propriate today, one first needs to be aware interesting to note that during the 1944 de of the exact wording of section 8549 as bate for full military status, Congress was amended in 1956: deluged with letters from male pilot train- ees, male civilian instructors, and their Female members of the Air Force, except those designated under section 8067 of this Title. or friends protesting the militarization and in- appointed with a view to designation under struction of women pilots while the men that section, may not be assigned to duty in air were being put in the “walking Army.”9 Ap- craft engaged in combat missions. [The section parently, the decision of Congress was in- 8067 exceptions pertain to medicai personnel, fluenced by these male pilots, and it ignored judge advocates, and chaplains.]" the WASP’s flying capabilities and devoted There was debate in Congress in 1948, but Service to her country. Once again women the issue was not whether women should be had been used by Congress to alleviate a allowed to serve in combat; that was never manpower shortage and were soon forgot- seriously considered. It was instead how ten. It was not until 33 years later, in 1977, best to ensure that women would not be em- 68 AJHPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1988

ployed as combatants. Congress felt that de- Equal employment opportunity in the Federal lineating womerTs noncombatant position Government prohibits discrimination based in the Air Force and Navy was a simple mat- on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in employment with the Federal Government. ter—jusí ban them from combat aircraft and The law requires a federal agency to provide to ships. But because the Army was unable to all persons an equal opportunity to be hired come up with an adequate definition of and promoted into all types of jobs.15 combat, Congress elected to leave the com bat matter to be cleared up by the secretary While Title VII does not apply to military of the Army through Army policy, not law.12 personnel, this law is extremely important Therefore, women in the Army are not pro- to female Air Force personnel who remain hibited from combat by law as they are in in the Service for extended periods of time both the Air Force and Navy. because of what it implies about prevailing In actuality, the law provided the Services attitudes toward women. The 1984 Inter- with a convenient device for excluding University Seminar on Armed Forces and women from any skill, position, or organi- Society pointed out that zation merely by declaring it combat or combat related. The prohibition from duty the Service, as it is currently structured, benefits men more than women. Although women in “combat aircraft engaged in combat mis- have the potential to earn salaries in the mili sions" was initially interpreted by the Air tary equal to men, they remain barred from oc- Force to mean that all pilot jobs should be cupational specialties that are associated with closed to women because a pilot should be combat, which remain important for promotion to the highest ranks.16 available for dutv in any type of aircraft on any tvpe of mission at anv time. This restric- The combat-exclusion legislation sup- tive interpretation of the law automatically ports the continuing discrimination against excluded women from participation in the females in the Air Force, and it is outdated primarv mission of the Air Force, thus as- based on the Equal Employment Act of suring their second-class status.13 As Maj 1972. Many social values and attitudes Gen Jeanne Holm, USAF Retired, saw it: changed between 1948 and 1972, which is

Viewed in the context of the 1980s, Public Law why Congress passed such strong legisla 625 (Women’s Armed Forces Integration Act) tion for equal opportunity. For unknown vvould be classified as a classic sexist Iegisla- reasons, Congress cannot accept that these tion. But the law accurately reflected the pre- societal changes also encompass the idea of vailing cultural attitudes of the postwar period Air Force females in combat. All female pi- concerning.women's roles and legal status.14 lots in the Air Force today are volunteers. Does the law accurately reflect current and for the first time in history, they are cultural and military attitudes concerning joining without a national wartime emer- women and their legal status today? Women gency in the making. Today women join the have made great strides in their role as equal Air Force for the same reasons other females citizens since 1948, and Congress needs to become policewomen or fire fighters—sim- accept the fact that there is no turning back ply because they have the ability to do the the clock. For example, Title VII of the Civil job and want to serve their country. They Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal are not blind to the possible consequences Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, and of war or police action. But Congress contin Executive Order 11478, as quoted in A ues to stick to the tired story that “society” Guide to Federal Laws and fíegulations Pro- will not accept its “daughters” coming hibiting Sex Discrimination, states: home in body bags.17 When will Congress THE RIGHT STUFF HAS NO GENDER 69

stop thinking of vvomen who devote 20 merits of women flying combat aircraft and the need for flexibility in the utilization of Air years of their life in training to defend their Force personnel, the congressional subcom country as someones daughter instead of mittee allowed the hearings to degenerate into the military professionals they are proud to a heated, emotional debate over women in be? combat with emphasis on ground combat and A recent national tragedy is a stunning ex- the horrors of war in general.19 ample of Américas acceptance of female Why the congressional subcommittee equality even when death is involved. would even allow testimony pertaining to When Christa McAuliff and Judith Resnik ground combat (Army) when the combat- Challenger vvere killed in the disaster in exclusion law only pertains to the Air Force 1986, the country mourned their deaths and Navy poses an interesting question. equally with their five male crewmembers. Could it be that there just was not enough It was interesting to note that Christa re- credible opposition to females flying in ceived a great deal of attention because she combat and that listening to the horrors of was a civilian observer, while Judith re- ground combat gave the subcommittee a ceived virtually no special attention for clearer conscience when they tabled the being a female crewmember. Despite the proposal? known dangers, "society’’ has not called for Instead of allowing the emotional appeals restrictions to be placed on future space concerning war in general, the subcommit launches requiring male-only crews. tee should have directed its energies toward VVhy Co ngr es s b e l i e v e s s o c i e t y vvould the main issues involved. The first issue react differently to trained, capable, volun- that was discussed by General Holm ex- teer female pilots and crewmembers is still plained that a mystery. For example, in 1983 a sample of Maryland residents were asked, “Do you the restrictive laws enacted in the post-WW II think that young women should be allowed period had outlived their usefulness and had become counterproductive to the develop- to volunteer to fíght in combat in the armed ment of an optimum fighting force in the event forces, or not allowed to volunteer to fíght in of war. She argued that the Service secretary combat in the armed forces, or don’t you should have the widest possible flexibility, have any opinion on this?” Sixty-five per- particularly in time of war, to make personnel cent—considerably more than a majority— policy. The Service secretaries should not be hamstrung in peacetime by laws they may not answered that women should be allowed to be able to live with in wartime.20 volunteer for combat.lfl In addition, even though the Equal Rights Amendment Under Secretary of the Air Force Antonia (ERA), which would have allowed women Handler Chayes also testified in support of in combat, fell short of being ratified by the repeal due to a second overriding issue: required three-fourths of the States, 36 States Moreover, there is the question of equity— of did ratify the amendment by 1982. equal opportunity to fight and die for country Even the Department of Defense (DOD) as opposed to the risk of death women have al- sent a proposal for repeal of the combat-ex- ways faced in roles as nurses and other sup clusion law to Congress as earlv as May port functions during wartime. .. . It is also a matter of equity for men who should not be 1979: forced into greater danger than the women who take the same oath and wear the same uni- In November, 1979. the Military Personnel f o r m . . . . W h a t w e a c h i e v e b y b a r r i n g w o m e n Subcommittee of the House Armed Services from combat roles is an obstacle to career ad- Committee held hearings on the DOD pro vancement, and little advancement in posal. but rather than being a debate on the protection.'’’ 70 AJHPOWEfl JOURNAL WINTER 1988

Lawyer Diana A. Steele reminded the country’s combat readiness. Even the words congressional subcommittee that “men do combat and combat support are ambiguous. not have a monopoly on patriotism, physi- For example, a woman cannot tly a fighter or cal ability, desire for adventure, or willing- a bomber, but she can fly a tanker to refuel ness to risk their lives. Until both share in them. ‘‘In some cases, support positions the rights and responsibilities of citizen- may be more tempting enemy targets than ship, women will continue to be considered the frontline posts,” stated Lawrence Korb, less than full-fledged citizens.”22 past assistant secretary of defense for man- It is also interesting to look at the argu- power. “Now let’s have an intellectual ex- ments against repealing the combat-exclu- ercise. You are a Soviet fighter pilot and sion legislation. The Moral Majority you’ve got one missile. What do you shoot testified that "leadership and authority are down? You get the tanker, you got the male attributes ordained by God and bombers!”27 women in combat roles violates the order of No one expresses more frustration with creation, will of God.”23 Retired Rear Ad the combat restriction than military women mirai Jeremiah Denton said that “it would themselves. “Don’t train me for a job and be moral and social insanity to subject then tell me I can’t do it because Fm female; women to war.”24 Retired Brigadier General that’s a waste of the taxpayers’ money and a Elizabeth P. Hoisington felt that mixing waste of my time.” says Lt Diane Mills. She men and women in units in close situations is an air weapons controller trained to direct gave rise to “man-to-women relationship” fighters to intercept enemy aircraft. and she problems that could cause “costly distrac- performs her job while flving in an airborne tions” in combat.25 And retired General Wil- warning and control svstem (AWACS) liam Westmoreland summed up the aircraft.28 testimony against repeal by stating that ‘‘no Supposedlv, the Air Force is totally inte man with gumption wants a woman to fíght grated except for combat, but female pilots his battles.”26 flew troop- and cargo-carrying missions to This author’s assessment of the above Grenada during the initial phases of the statements both in favor of and opposed to 1983 invasion. They landed on the Carri- the 1948 combat-exclusion law is clear. The bean island aboard C-141 aircraft when US present law is outdated. and discrimina- paratroopers were still fighting Cuban tory, and does not reflect the present atti- troops. Said a male pilot who flew to Gre tudes toward women held by a large portion nada, “The significant thing is that they of the American population. Congress must went in, did the job alongside us, carne out, accept the fact that today women have a and nobody made a huge fuss about it. No- new role in society that includes volunteer- body made a special effort to include them ing to defend their country. and nobody thought for a moment about excluding women."251 In addition, Maj Gen William Mall, who commanded the first wave of air forces to hit the island, said, “To Mission Constraints have excluded an aircraft from the mission Today numerous women have volun- simply because there was a women on teered and are now thoroughly integrated board would have lessened our response into the Air Force. In fact. they have ad- and reduced our effectiveness.”311 vanced so far in key specialties that with- Another example of how reality lias over- drawing them could seriously hamper the come an outdated law is the counterterrorist THE RJGHT STUFF HAS NO GENDER 71 attack the Air Force flew against Libya in times a night, bombing railways, bridges, sup- 1986. Seven women—six officers and one ply depots and troop positions that were heavily fortified with antiaircraft guns. The planes enlisted—served in the raid. One of the were unheated and we suffered from frostbite women was a backup pilot on a KC—135 and exposure. I could see burning planes tanker, and four served as copilots—three crashing with my girlfriends in them ... .** on KC-lOs and one on a KC-135.31 Secre- tary of the Air Force Edward Aldridge, Jr., The Soviet Union formed two bomber regi- stated, “Women flew on these aircrews as a ments and one fighter regiment in which natural evolutionary growth of the contri- women filled all aircrew and support posi bution of women members to the Air tions. “During WW II women participated Force."32 with their male counterparts in every resis- Congress cannot continue to use women tance organization in occupied Europe; to alleviate manpower shortages and at the they were captured, tortured, and executed same time impede mission readiness in the by the Nazis in the same manner and pro- form of combat exclusion. In her book portion as men.”35 These combatants may Women in the Military: An Unfinished Rev- not have been American but they were olution, General Holm States: women and they fought as well as the men. It is time to end this charade and recognize that Another frequently heard belief support- the entire defense establishment is a combat ing female combat exclusion is that females organization whose mission is to deter war in fighter units will impede the “bonding and, when required, to fight. It is time Con cohesiveness” of the unit, which will de gress accepts that modern wars are “fought” grade mission effectiveness.36 The fact that not just by an elite class of people categorized as "combatants,” but by all who serve.” this has not happened in squadrons where females have flown for the past 10 years does little to discourage the myth. Many fe male pilots have said once the men realized Some Myths the women could fly as well as the men, the There are many myths confusing the is- discrimination evaporated. Astronauts sue of why Congress cannot bring itself to have to work closer together and under repeal the portion of section 8549 that pro- more extreme conditions than the average hibits female pilots from flying aircraft en- pilot, yet they have exhibited no problems gaged in combat missions. Let us look at “bonding" with their female crewmembers. some of the more prevalent reasons given And dare we try to remember the ludicrous for excluding women from combat that may statements made concerning black pilots be preventing Congress from acting on this when the Air Force was forced to integrate issue. their flying squadrons? Lt Gen James Doo- First and foremost is the quote at the be- little made a statement concerning integra- ginning of this article stating that women tion of flying units that is as appropriate for have never fought in combat. Nadya Po- women today as it was for blacks 40 years pova, a Russian bomber pilot during World ago: “I don’t like to be naive about this but I War II, would probably disagree. In a recent am convinced that the solution of the situ- interview, she sounded like she knew ex- ation is to forget they are colored.”37 actly what combat was: Another principal theme is that women

We flew combat missions each night. With up ought not to suffer the ordeal of being a pris- to three hundred kilos of bombs strapped to oner of war, the implication being that our wings we took off an average of fifteen women will suffer sexual abuse as well as 72 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1988 the customary abuse of that status.38 One ery and heroism in order to save a buddy’s wonders why Congress is so concerned life. In many cases these feats have resulted with the possible sexual abuse of at most in the award of the Medal of Honor for plac- 400 rated female personnel (assuming they ing one’s life at risk above and beyond the all were taken prisoner of war), when in call of duty. For example, on 7 January 1945 1974, 55,000 rapes occurred in the United over Los Negros Island, Maj Thomas B. States.39 By 1985 the number of forcible McGuire, jr., was killed while trying to save rapes had increased to 87,340.™ In addition, a comrade from attack by an enemy fighter. a study done in 1978 concluded that in any Would his bravery have been viewed as pro- one year about 1.8 million wives in the tectiveness if the comrade had been female? United States are beaten by their hus- Or consider the feat of Maj Bernard F. bands.41 These figures are so telling one Fisher, who observed a fellow airman crash- must conclude that any testimony concern- land on a damaged airstrip. “He believed ing the physical abuse of women as prison- the downed pilot was seriously injured and ers is for sheer emotional impact. If faced capture. Although aware of extreme Congress is so concerned about the physical danger and likely failure, he landed, taxied well-being of American women, they do not the length of the runway littered with battle need to wait for a war to protect them. debris, and effected the rescue.”45 Soldiers A related argument is that men are really have always risked their lives for each other more worried about how the sexual abuse of in war; hopefully. they will continue to do a female prisoner will affect the judgment of so for their female comrades as well. other military personnel.Will a male pris One of the final arguments the critics oner really react differently when a female make is that there is no need to change the is tortured than he would if it were his best law at this time. “While true as far as it goes, flying buddy for the past five years? Not it misses the point. It is precisely at this time líkely! These people are military proíes- when no emergency exists that action sionals who are well aware that “war is should be taken to carefully plan and imple- hei 1 ” and are prepared for the conse- ment measures that can be applied in an quences. It must also never be forgotten that emergency.’’4'’ It is now that Congress needs women are no strangers to prison camps. to allow the secretary of the Air Force the During World War II at Ravensbrück con- fiexibility to utilize his pilots in the most ef- centration camp alone, over 65,000 civilian ficient and cost-effective manner possible to women died from starvation, disease, the adequately prepare for future conflicts. gas chamber, and medicai experimenta- tion.'3 The next war will spare no one, including civilians, from its horrors. The question remains, why does Congress con- The Outlook tinue to “ protect" female m ilitary In fact, there is new hope that section professionals? 8549 could be repealed or revised during Another reason given to keep women out the lOOth Congress. In late 1986 Senator of combat aircraft is that the flight leader William Proxmire of Wisconsin said: would be more protective of a female on his wing and possibly get shot down himself.44 Current assignment policies do not really pro tect women from combat and are a waste of tal- It is well known that leaders always feel ent. The range and effectiveness of modern protective of their men and vice versa. weapons make it impossible to isolate female There are numerous stories of untold brav- soldiers from the danger of combat. The sup- THE HIGHT STUFF HAS NO GENDEfí 73

port jobs they are allowed to take are often as in consonance with society’s attitudes to- dangerous as the front-line jobs they are now ward women and. in fact, represents blatant prevented from taking. VVomen in the military discrimination against women. Numerous is no longer an experinient, it is a reality that our assignment policies should reflect.47 examples are cited that show that women are already fully integrated into the Air Senator William Cohen of Maine said that Force and that mission readiness will be de- every position should be available to every in graded by continuing to exclude women dividual who possesses the necessary experi- pilots from flying combat aircraft. Finally, ence, qualifications, and m otivation— this article has exposed the critics' excuses regardless of gender. Women and men who for what they are—myths propagated have chosen to devote their lives to serving their country deserve their nation's commit- against a minority group to ensure exclu- ment to ensure them equal opportunities.4* sion from the most prestigious positions. So the questions remain, with the only These statements are welcome in light of plausible answer being the same one that the Reagan administration's opposition to has plagued mankind for centuries: resis- removing the combat restrictions on tance to change for no real reason at all; re- women. On 3 September 1983, White House sistance to a modern military where smarts spokesman Larry Speakes said, “The Presi- and skills are more important than biceps; dent strongly feels that women should not resistance to the fact that brains do not have be sent into combat. That’s bedrock Reagan- gender and great leaders can be male or fe ism.’M9 But we now have a Democratic Con- male; resistance to the fact that the last bas- gress. It has been a full eight years since tion of male chauvinism, flying combat DOD sent its first proposal to Congress for aircraft, is slipping away; and resistance to repeal of section 8549. During those years, the fact that “the right stuff” has no gender. female pilots and crewmembers in the Air As the lüOth Congress debates this issue to- Force have continued to meet all challenges day, it would do well to keep in mind the and to perform superblv. words of economist John Stuart Mill more As the lOOth Congress charts the course than a hundred years ago: for the future of our country, we must con Is there so great a superfluity of men fit for high tinue to ask the question, why are female duties, that society can afford to reject the Ser pilots excluded from combat? We have seen vices of any competent person? Are we so cer- not only American women but women of all tain of always findinga man . . . for any duty or nationalities who have a rich heritage in de- function of social importance which falis va- cant. that we lose nothing by putting a ban fending their country. It has become ob- upon hall of mankind and refusing beforehand vious that section 8549 of the Women’s to make their faculties available, however dis- Armed Services Integration Act is no longer t i n g u i s h e d t h e y m a y b e . . . ? 50

Notes 1. Kenneth P. Werrell. "Should Women be Permitted in 4. lbid.,8-14. Combat? Yes." Air Dniversily Review. july-August 1977. 66. 5. Gongressional Research Service, Women in the Armed 2. Jeff M. Tuten. "The Argument Against Female Combat- Forces. CRS-9 (Washington. D.C.: Library of Congress. 25 Sep- ants."in Fem ale Soldiers—Combotunls or Noncombalonts? teinber 1985). Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, ed. Nancy L. Gold 6. Holm. 23. man (Westport. Conn.: Greenwood Press. 1982). 239. 7. House. To Provide Recognition to the Women’s Air Force 3. Maj Gen Jeanne Holm, Women in lhe Military: An Unfin- Service Pilots for Their Service During World Wur II by Deem- ished fíevolulion (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press. 1982). 8. ing Such Service Io Have Been Active Duty in the Armed 74 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1988

Forces of the United States for the Purposes of La ws Admin- 31. )im Garam ore, "W arner Praises W om en's Role in Libya istered by the Veterans Adminislralion. Hearings Before the Raid," Air Force Times. 12 May 1986, 15. Committee on Veterans' A/fairs, 95th Cong., lst sess.. 1977. 32. Sharon Young, "A.F. Opens 1,645 More Positions to 262-63. Women,” Air Force Times, 29 December 1986, 4. 8. ibid., 310. 33. Holm, 396. 9. Ibid., 264. 34. Shelley Saywell, Women in War (New York: Viking Pen- 10. Holm. 316. guin Inc., 1985), 144. 11. 10 U.S.C.. section 8549. 35. |oe Poyer, " 'G.I. Jane': Should Women Be Allowed to 12. Holm, 118. Fight?" International Combat Arms, November 1986, 55. 13. Ibid., 126-27. 36. Judith H. Stiem, "Women and the Combat Exemption," 14. Ibid., 127. Parameters, June 1980, 53. 15. US Commission on Civil Rights. A Cuide to Federal 37. Bernard C. Nalty. Strength for the Fight (New York: The Laws and Regulations Prohibiting Sex Discrimination. Clear- Free Press, 1986), 233. inghouse publication 46. July 1976,16-17. 38. Stiem, 52. 16. Nancy H. Loring, ed.. W om en in the l/nited States 39. National Institute of Law Enforcem ent and Criminal Armed Forces: Progress and Borriers in the 1980s (Chicago: In- /ustice. Forcible Rape: A National Survey of the Response by ter-University Sem inar on Armed Forces and Society. 1984), Prosecutors (W ashington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 12. 1977). 17. lennet Conant et al„ "Women in Combat? Withdrawing 40. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Them in a Crisis Could Hamper Readiness," Newsweek, 11 No- Uniform Crime fíeports for the United States. 1985 (Washing vember 1985. 38. ton, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 1986), 13. 18. Loring. 45. 41. Forcible Rape, 1. 19. Holm, 339. 42. Stiem, 52. 20. Ibid. 43. Saywell, 61. 21. Ibid., 340. 44. Louise Thistle, “Women in Combat: Aground on Tradi- 22. Ibid., 342. tion," Equal Opportunity Current News. 1 April 1980. 17. 23. Ibid. 45. The Orientation Group, United States Air Force MedaJ 24. Ibid. of Honor, 1918-1968, USAF Hall of Heroes, Headquarters 25. Ibid , 341. ÚSAF. Washington, D.C. 26. Ibid., 397. 46. Werrell, 66. 27. Conant. 37. 47. Rick Maze. "Bill Would Let Women Work Closer to 28. Ibid. Combat Zone," Air Force Times, 13 October 1986, 3. 29. Paul Dean. “More and More Women Are Finding the 48. Ibid., 3. Skys Friendly in the Air Force," Equal Opportunity Current 49. Women in the Armed Forces. CRS-9. News. 1 Aprií 1986. 36. 50. As quoted in Holm, 397. 30. Ibid.. 31. BETTER WR1TING A Heretic s View

C ol Samuel E. Riddl ebar g er , USAF, Retired

N RECENT years most of the guidance on better writing in the Air Force has articulated a common theme: make it simple. Write with small words. Keep sentencesI short. Write the wav you speak. Be informal. Write for your audience. Baloney! (Is that sufficiently short and simple?) Get the fire ready; I’m a heretic. If the nation and the Air Force want better writers, I believe they need a different approach. The current game plan is taking us in the wrong direction. Our society is losing the keys to advanced civilization: Progres sive reading and writing skills. Now, if you’re not interested in what I’ve .got to say on this subject, stop here and read something else. No one reads anything unless he wants to (pleasure, curiosity) or needs to (profession. trade, business, personal welfare), a point Eli return to later. After pushing a pencil for the Air Force from the mid-1950s to the mid-1980s and from the squadron swamps to the Pentagon peaks, Eve seen lots of briefings and bro-

75 76 AIRPOWER JOURNAL W1NTER 1988 chures on how to write more effectively. has three letters and best represents what Much of that guidance stressed simplifíed you want to say, use it! But if a bigger word writing. And much of that advice carne from more precisely or more powerfully com- ivory-tower types with little “combat time” municates your thought, use it! Using the when it comes to writing. My scar tissue shorter word just because it’s shorter is los- says it ain’t necessarily so; simpler is not al- ing sight of your writing objective. Compli- ways better. cated subject matter isn’t going to get simple Why must we continue to write down? by being addressed via a bunch of one-syl- What’s wrong with writing up? If grade- lable words—it’s only going to get screwed level literacy is declining, why should we up. steadily retreat instead of fighting to gain A good writer also needs a synonym now ground? As we continue to downgrade vo- and then to avoid repetition. cabulary, grammar, formality, accuracy, A healthy vocabulary equals power, com- and other aspects of good writing, we can municative power. Just as a great painter look forward to communicating with grunts uses a variety of colors and strokes to create and sign language. a meaningful image, the writer well armed Consider where the nation is now. “We with words and phrases can convey mes- are creating a new nation of illiterates,” says sages that move the reader. The dictionary a federal Department of Education official is fu 11 of evocative words, and we ought to in a recent issue of Time.1 In an article en- use them! titled “The Illiteracy Blight,” Publishers Using a more precise word can save time W eekly calls the situation a national crisis.2 by taking the place of a phrase or sentence, One observer claims that nearly 60 million thereby making the communication both Americans can’t read or write adequately.3 sharper and shorter. If I write “anorak” in Evidence abounds, and there is a consensus stead of ‘‘a heavy jacket of a bulkv material, that we are in trouble. with a hood, worn in very cold climates,” Why? haven’t I saved words? As to the argument Experience and logic tell me that we are that a reader may not understand the word emphasizing the wrong things. Why must anorak, let him look it up! Better commu writing be aimed at the fourth-grade levei, nication is a two-way Street. Readers have or the sixth, or whatever? Why set limits? responsibilities, too. Why are we so quick to Why create ‘‘fog count" directives that stul- blame the writer when a reader doesiTt tify efforts to properly express ourselves? know a word’s meaning? Anorak is used in (The Air Force.says, “Aim High,” but don’t a novel by an author who sells books just as try that with a pencil in your hand.) Elvis Presley sold records.4 Or how about Let's get serious. If we want good writing, the eminent news magazine that wasn't we will have to go about it the old-fashioned afraid to use the term morganafic recently to way—by working for it! describe the marriage of Wallis Simpson to By now some of you think I’m arguing the the Duke of Windsor?5 pedanfs view: big words, fancy sentences, Just as short, simple words aren’t always and lots of ostentatious obfuscation. best. staccato sentences areiTt always going Wrong! I’m calling for a return to freedom to get the job done right. Sentences may and progress in writing. need to have more than three or four words. I believe in using the right word, not nec 1 don’t like to read something written with essarily the shortest or longest. The most ac- short, choppv words and sentences; it often curate term is usually the best. If the word resembles a telegram or a Computer print- BETTEfí WfílTING 77 out. with the loss in subtle human commu- material is pertinent to his job or personal nication characteristic of such transmission life, he ought to know the terms and con- modes. Complex objects and thoughts often cepts. We may have our thinking backward require complex words and sentences. Why when we insist the writer is wrong because should that surprise or aggravate us? the reader doesn’t understand. Society and the Air Force are becoming Before you light the íagots at my feet, let increasingly sophisticated. Do we really me say that I’m not advocating overwriting. think that complicated equipment and Sys What I’m suggesting is that we shouldn’t tems can be managed with rudimentary lan- undervvrite, either. Furthermore, I do not guage skills? If our people can’t read and deny that some Air Force writing needs to write adequately, how can we handle F-15s be simplified, only that all of it can or and advanced logistics systems? Legal doc- should be. uments concerned with subtle points of law To cite just one example, an Air Force are written the way they are because they writing manual (a good one, for the most must be as precise and unequivocal as pos- part) criticizes the following sentence: “Re- sible, not because lawyers and jurists are quest this office be notified when your activ- playing games. ity’s supply of paper clips falis belo»v the The long and the short of the writing 30-day levei.” The manual suggests that function ought to be articulated as follows: “Let us know when you need more paper use the right words and sentences—even if clips” would have been better.6 they’re long rather than short. 1 don’t agree. First, the original sentence The chiefs, colonels, and generais know is close enough (see Rule 2 in the attached that. When the hucksters tell you that you guide). Rewriting a memo concerning paper have to straighten out the sênior folks and clips is wasting time. There isn’t that much get them to write at the fourth-grade levei, wrong with the original version. (Don’t call just remember that the general got to be a me a pedant if you are the kind of nitpicker general by writing the way he or she does. who would revise a reasonably comprehen- We also are advised to write for our au- sible sentence!) dience. Well, as Fve already asserted, read- Second. the revision doesn’t pass the stu- ers need to hold up their end, too. There are pidity test (see Rule 1). Do we actually be- only two reasons why you or I have ever lieve that folks won’t ask for more paper read anything: interest and need. In neither clips when they need them unless we send case must the writer compromise his mean- them such a memo? The revised memo is ing because of possible deficiencies in po- rhetorical, a waste of time, because it only tential readers. The writer’s primary States what the reader already knows. allegiance is to his subject, not his readers. Thus, the third problem with the rewrite (How’s that for heresy?) If the author is pre- is the most serious and clearly illustrates paring a nursery rhyme. common words are my point. The revision significantly consistent and appropriate. If the subject is changes the message, making the commu- the m etaphysical connotations of nication less precise and therefore less in- Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, grab your refer- formative (see Rule 4). Who defines “need” ence books. in the second version? Sergeant Bilko may My experience is that good writing re- order a two-year supply of paper clips, just quires a degree of loyalty to the subject. to be safe or for trading, even though he has As for the reader, if he picks up some- enough on hand to last six months. The thing for pleasure, he’s on his own. If the point is that the original version said some- 78 AIHPOWEfl IOURNAL WIN TER 1988 thing, contained useful information, and Having criticized some of the current therefore was worth preparing. By trying to guidance on better writing, I have included be simple and informal, the revision lost with this article some suggestions of my sight of the message to be transmitted. own for improving Air Force prose. Another so-called good vvriting tip that Good writing, I believe, has three charac- disturbs me is the suggestion that we should teristics: substance (important information, write the way we speak. I don’t enjoy con- serious statements—worth); clarity (orga- versations laced with “you know,” “like, nized, sequential words and sentences, us- man," and “I mean,” so I certainly don’t ing precise and meaningful words—com want to read such drivel. If many of us were munication); and force (style, originality, to write the same way we speak, the written format—impact). And you won’t acquire word would constitute a new Tower of these writing skills by trying to reduce your Babel. prose to the “see-)ane-run” levei. Speakers use mannerisms, tone, body As for winning the paper wars in the Air language, inflection, and other devices to Force, the attached guide briefly outlines help convey the message. Writers function some tips (learned the hard way!) that I’ve in a sterile environment. The two modes of used and added to over many years of blue- communication are distinctly different. As suit writing and teaching. These 10 rules the eighteenth-century French naturalist may help you. Try them; you’ll like them. Buffon observed, “Those who write as they And concentrate on the subject when you speak, however well they speak, write write. We need readers who are more eru- badly.”7 dite, not writers who are less literate!

The Heretic’s Guide to Better Air Force Writing

1. I s this Paper Ne c e s s a r y ? • Avoidovercoordination. (Dontaskforopin- ions you don t need.) • Does it pass the "stupidity test"? • Late can mean useless. • Don't contribute to the "paper mill.” • Pick up the telephone or walk down the 4. Audiences Arent First hall. • Readers have responsibilities, too. • Avoid CYA files. (Most MRs are sissy.) • Concentrate on the subject. 2. Use the “Close Enough” Rule • Say what you mean. • “ KISS" with care. (Cavemen aren't good • All paperwork is not equal. writers, either.) • If it's routine, dont sweat grammar, spell- • Use the right words (even if they aren’t the ing, neatness; and longhand may be okay. smallest ones). • Speed may be more important than perfection. 5. Get to the Point • Make the first sentence count. 3. Clocks, Chiefs, and Colonels Won't Wait • You are not writing a murder mystery. • Don t waste time arguing about the suspense. 6. Longhand Shouldn't be Shorthand • Forget the old clichê "Do you want it right, • Scribblers never win. or do you want it on time?” (The boss wants • Reasonable penmanship saves every- both.) body's time. BETTER WRITING 79

• Learn to write legibly or go to medica! 9. Avoid the Common, Telltale Mistakes school. • Who, which, that—use the right one, • Principal/principle, affect/effect, farther/fur- 7. Get a Dictionary and Use It ther— learn the difference. • Experience the sweet spell of success. • Promiscuous pronouns—they will get you • Don’t guess; look it up. in trouble. • lt's the writers best friend. • Misplaced modifiers—they confuse the reader. 8. Proofread or Perish 10. Keep Learning; Keep Trying • Double-checking isn't sissy. • Writing is the most important skill in getting • Dont develop good prose and then submit ahead. trash. (To win the race, you must take the • Vou build walls and literacy brick by brick lest stap.) and word by word. • A tight paper builds credibility. • Develop a positive attitude, a striving to be • Don t blame the typist: if its your paper, its better. your responsibility. • Read!

Notes On the “Rules” 1. Don t create paper that isn't needed, or to tell people ments so generalízed and simplified that they’re more things they already know. or to cover your behmd. Maybe stupid than simple. a phone call will suffice. And most memos for record just clutter files. 5. Don't beat around the bush. Tell your reader quickly 2. Treat paperwork according to its importance. A state- what your paper is all about. Don t make him read it all to ment for the base commander to promulgate on Memo find out. The first sentence should be short, simple (but rial Day needs to be worded precisely and typed accurate), meanmgful, and in active voice. The body of impeccably. On the other hand, a note to the boss re- the document can then etch with more detail, rationale, minding her that today i s her hus b a nd s birthday does n’t background, and precision. Don t go overboard on have to be Shakespearean in composition or prepared by length, but don't underwrite either; remember, you can the word Processing center on its best letterhead; it s the underwhelm readers as well as overwhelm them. basic message that matters here, not the nuances or ap- 6. Take the time to write legibly. The chicken-scratching pearance. Save time for important writing by not dawdling that Air Force secretaries and horseholders have to pon- over routine stuff. der over is disgraceful. You are a worthless writer and a 3. Respect suspenses. Sometimes they re not reason- sorry supervisor if your penmanship is poor. able, but don t waste half your time arguing about the time 7. Let a dictionary help you. You will be a better writer if, limit. The boss usually (not always) has a valid reason for as you compose, you verify meaning, check spelling, and the short fuse (maybe someone else didn’t produce). If seek synonyms (to provide variety). You are not in a you must complam, do s o after you get the job done. If the spelling bee; it's fair to look up the word. If you ensure that wing commander needs the paper in two hours, and you youve used the proper word and spelled it right, youve don t come through, you may never get another chance. saved time and avoided possible grief. (Did you use And don t try to get everybody to agree with your words "principa/" when you meant "princip/e"? No one will know unless you have to, remember, coordination often means if you checked it to be sure. but everybody will know you only to alert certam offices, not necessarily to get their didn't if you mess up the usage and the secretary doesn't concurrence. catch your carelessness.) 4. Consider your subject. Don't become so engulfed in 8. Read what you sign. The refusal to proofread is a se- "Write for your audience," "Check your fog count," and rious problem in the Air Force and in our society. The "The paper is no good if the reader doesn‘t understand it" boss isn't going to blame the typist if there's a glitch in that you forget what you re trying to accomplish. Good your paper. If the document is important (remembering writers get good by making their prose (words, sen- Rule 2), don't weaken the impact of careful composition tences, style, length) fit their subject. Don t ignore your by careless proofreading; if the words are spelled wrong audience, but think about your topic and objective. Use or put together poorly, the reader may conclude that your the proper word! Those who read for pleasure are on their thinking and message are just as error-filled. If the paper own; and those who read for professional or personal reflects meticulous preparation, the credibility and repu- reasons have an obligation to learn the pertinent terms. tation of the writer are enhanced. (And if you found three The clichéd admomti on " Keep it simple, stupi d," known typos in Rule 8, you’ve got a good eye.) as the "KISS" rule, if overworked can produce docu- 9. Don t continue to make the typical mistakes that brand 80 A1RPOWER JOURNAL W1NTER 1988 the poor writer. Pick one problem or weak area each of these points, but once you learn it, consider the time week (or even one each month) and take the time to learn you will save over a career— and the rewards. the correct usage. Vou will enjoy the increased respect 10. Never stop trying to be a better writer. If you do, don t your writing will receíve. Those who know when to use expect promotion. Writing is the one skill indispensable to "affect" instead of “effect," or that "consensus" is proper advancement. The effective writer is the individual who (not "concensus" or "consensus of opinion"), will get realizes that there is always more to learn, and goes for more opportunities to use, and benefit from, their writing it! □ skills. Sure, you may need an hour or more to check one

Notes t. Robert Barnes. quoted in “Losing the VVar of Letters," Berkley Publishing Group. July 1986), 33. Time. 5 May 1986, 68. 5. "The Woman Who Cost a Kingdom," Time, 5 May 1986, 2. "The llliteracv Blight," Pubiishers IVeekly, 24 May 1985, 39. 27. 6. |ohn C. Smilh and Maj |.ohn R. Grellman, )r.. Plain Eng- 3. Jonathan Kozol. "Dehumanizing the Humanities: Schol- lish. Please! (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University, 1982), 43. ars and Adult llliteracy." The Eilucation Digest. December 7. Georges Louis Leclerc de Buffon, quoted in The Age of 1985, 6. Voltaire. by Will and Ariel Durant (New York: Simon and 4 Lawrence Sanders, The Fourth Deadly Sin (New York: Schuster, 1965), 574. net assessment

Flight of the Old Dog by Dale Brown. New York the Kamchatka. he sends B -ls to do it. 10016: Donald I. Fine. Inc., 352 pages. $18.95. Just when we think our heroes will be watch- ing from the sidelines, the base at Dreamland Dale Brown has given us quite an exciting yarn comes under attack. As the attackers are charging with his first novel. Flight of the Old Dog. Brown, across the base, a collection of aviators and en- a former Air Force captain and SAC navigator, gineers who have been testing Old Dog fire up the tells the storv of a modern-day raid on the Soviet engines. They blast their way out of a hangar and Union usinga motley collection of crewmembers take off seconds before they would have been and one old B-52. blown up by the attackers. barely getting air- There are two apparent messages in the work. borne in front of the attackers' charging vehicles. The first appears to be that the B -5 2 . despite its Once airborne, the crewmembers discover the age, is still a good old warhorse. The bomber he B-ls could not complete the mission, and they describes is an old H-model B-52 that has been take their old and somewhat battle-scarred (from taken out of Service and outfitted with what Hans the escape) aircraft and assume the mission to Solo of Star Wars fame would describe as “spe- destroy the laser themselves. cial modifications.” The airplane is then sent to This book has some notable strengths. Among Dreamland, a test site in the Nevada desert, them are the fun and the engaging, though far- where it serves as a test plane for new avionics, fetched, story line. The action seldom stops, and stealth technology, and whatever else the whiz when it does slow down, it is to humanize Pat kids in the desert can dream up for it. Because of McLanahan and the book with a pleasing love its age and the ugliness of the airframe, it earns story. While most B-52 crewmembers would the nickname “Old Dog.” think that a radar navigator who falis in love with Brown‘s second message is that the Air Force his crew ’s electronic warfare officer, or EWO. has navigator, an often unsung hero, is the indis- been living far too long at the local alert facility, pensable glue without whom SAC’s flying oper- in this story it is all right. T h e EW O is a pretty ations could not succeed. While each of the six young engineer named Wendy Tork. The ro crewmembers performs admirably in this tale, mance between Tork and McLanahan provides a the protagonist and hero is the crew ’s radar nav rest between the action scenes and is well done. igator, Capt Patrick M cLanahan. Another of the book's strengths is the easy ex- The author wraps these messages up in a planation of technical equipment. The story re pleasing package of a tale that, if not always be- volves on high tech, and w ithout a good lievable, is consistently fun. We start with a look explanation of what all lhe Old Dog’s equipment at the threat: a super laser situated on the Kam- does, the reader would get lost. Brown provides chatka Península that can destroy aircraft in that explanation and, while most of that equip flight, ships at sea. or satellites in orbit. After the ment is not now on any know n B -5 2 . its descrip- Soviets knock out a series of important US assets. tion is credible and adds to the story. the president decides it’s time to stop fooling As enjoyable as the story is, it does have its around and to destroy the laser before it's too weaknesses. The most prominent is the tremen- late. dous stretch of the imagination required to swal- This is where Old Dog and Pat McLanahan low the plot line. For example, as the Old Dog come in. Captain McLanahan. fresh from win- escapes from its hangar at Dreamland during the ning SAC‘s annual bombing and navigation com- attack, its left wingtip catches on the hangar petition. is asked to go on a “sp ecial” TD Y. A door, ripping off the left externai fuel tank. It brief cloak-and-dagger interlude later, he finds damages the landing gear on takeoff roll, putting himself at Dreamland testing new equipment a hydraulic system out of commission. The pilot mounted on the aged B—52. The crew at Dream is killed in the attack, and the second pilot breaks land is charged with getting the equipm ent that his leg getting into the airplane. And then the air wili go on the new B -ls ready for Service. In fact, craft and crew proceed to tty a 30-hour mission to when the president decides to attack the laser in the Soviet Union with no charts of the area. R-i-

81 82 A1RPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1988 i-i-g-h-t! They do not have enough fuel to com Daniken was listed as the author. The verbiage is plete the mission, so they lure an aerial-refueling overgrown with hyperbole: tanker into the air. The Óld Dog’s pilot. who recognizes the voice of the tanker pilot as an old ln vvargaming stadiums there are no bleachers. The buddy he has not heard from in years, has no re- public is never invited to the games that help to de fueling coordinated between the two airplanes. termine how the Cold War will be waged, how He therefore convinces the tanker pilot to pass events could kindle World War III, and how that nu clear war would be fought. the gas by threatening to tell everybody what happened vvhen the two of them were TDY when I am left to conclude that it is the author's opin- they were both lieutenants. R-i-i-i-g-h-t! ion that the Washington Post should sit in on Despite these weaknesses in realism, the story these games. is fun. If the reader is looking for a realistic novel Chapters are full of anecdotes and homilies, that accurately portrays the way a B -52 is likely the meanings of which are left unclear. The au to be used in coinbat, this is not it. But if an ex- t h o r t e l l s m e t h a t “ m o d e l s . . . a r e to w a r g a m e s citing novel with a dash of high tech and a little what solitaire is to bridge," but I am left wonder- rom ance thrown in for good measure is what is ing just what that is supposed to mean. I kept required, Flight of the Old Dog is sure to please. having the feeling that I was reading a book re- Maj Clayton P. Bowen, USAF view in which segments made no sense because Loring AFB, Maine they had been taken out of context, except I was reading the entire text. There is some worthwhile information about War Games by Thomas B. Allen. New York war games and their uses in this book. The au 10020: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1987. 402 thor rightly points out that pages, $19.95. no one . . . can predict with any degree of confidence Having more than a passing interest in war what the U. S. or the Soviets will do in any crisis. So games myself. I was intrigued with the possibil- we don't build escalation models to see what will ities of War Games, a new book by Thomas B. happen. But we put down what strategists worry Allen, a former editor for National Geographic about. We acquaint people with issues and interre- lationships rather than predictions. Books. With its author having such credentials, the book promises much. Unfortunately, it fails Elsewhere in discussing repetition and repeat- to deliver on its promises. ability of war games he points out that The book is subtitled “The Secret World of the Creators, Players, and Policy Makers Rehearsing it takes hundreds—thousands—of runs. just to have W orld W ar III T o d a y ,” and the jacket in clu d es some feel for your basis of uncertainty. If there is one ticklers such as "Designers of hobby store war thing about a war game or a simulation about war, games often design games for the Department of it's not going to be the way you have it in your sim ulation. That is the certainty. Defense.” Tom Clancy is trotted out to say, “To- tally fascinating. This book will be the standard Finally. in discussing models that underlie work on the subject for the next ten years.” Un war games and the wide variety of formulations fortunately, there is too little substance behind that are possible for a particular situation, Allen the ti ti 1 lation, and such substance as is present is cites a particularly apropos report by the Govern buried in misinformation and errors. For exam- ment Accounting Office that States: ple, the Janus war game from Lawrence Liver- more National Laboratory is identified as a Different analysts, with apparently identical knowledge of a real world problem.. . . may develop plau- relabeled version of the US Army War College’s sible formulations that lead to very different McClintic Theater Model (MTM) when, in fact, conclusions—none of which are verifiable or refut- the two models have virtually nothing in com- able. To expect such models to produce objective, mon. When the author States that “there seems to scientifically valid results is no more reasonable be no precise date on w hich the SAGA [OJCS than to expect that a particular brush will produce Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency] became fine paintings, or a particular knife fine carvings. JAD [OJCS Joint Analysis Directorate]." he loses a great deal of credibility with me. There are a number of irksomely irrelevant A s I rea d th is b o o k I f o u n d m y s e l f c o n s t a n t l y portions here. For example, Allen cites an incre- tempted to recheck the flyleaf to see if Érich von dible tale of purported military folly: NET ASSESSMENT 83

When the Nixon administration tookoverin 1969 ali the best of its kind, but it suffers from the au- the data on North Vietnaro and the United States was thor's freely adinitted biases. fed into a Pentagon Computer— population. gross Hansell begins with a discussion of the Air national product. manufacturing capabilitv. number Corps Tactical School (ACTS) in the 1930s. In an of tanks. ships. and aircraft. size of the armed forces, excellent chapter. he describes how the theories and the like. of strategic bombardment found in the writings The Computer was then asked, ‘When will we win?" of Guilio Douhet and Billy Mitchell evolved at It took only a moment to give the answer: “You won ACTS and became doctrine by 1939. Hansell in 1964.” then served on General Arnold's staff and helped The author makes no apologv for glossing over write AW PD-1, the plan that guided the bomb- such inexplicable details as just how such a ing effort against Germany. He describes A W PD- question as “When will we win?” was posed to l ’s genesis— the steps taken to define the prob- the Computer or what constituted “winning.” In lem, collect data, and devise a solution. The de- discussing the classic Lanchester Law, the au scription is important, since few of those serving thor mangles the presentation into nonsense on Arnold's staff in the crucial years from 1939 with *‘r and b representing the numerical tol942 have written memoirs. strengths of Red and Blue and N and M repre The contentious aspects of this book concern senting the fighting value: Nr- = \lb-.” the author's view of how the air war was VVhy Allen erroneously States that total Red fought— or more precisely, how it was not strength must equal total Blue strength is un- fought. AWPD-1 stated that the object of stra known. The Lanchester Law in reality makes tegic bombardment was to destroy the enemy's Red attrition proportional to Blue strength and capabilitv and will to fight. To achieve that end, vice versa via a set of differential equations. planners designated specific target systems: air I cannot recommend this book for wargaming craft and engine factories, oil refineries, electri- novices because they have no basis for judging cal power stations, and transportation centers. which portions are irrelevant. Nor can I recom The Casablanca Conference of Januarv 1943 of- mend the book for experienced wargamers since ficially endorsed this concept. although it was their experience obviates the need for them to disappointingly vague on details. But political wade through the morass of debris in order to and military considerations prevented the im- pick out the few gems of information present. plementation of the plan. Hansell refers to these War Games is a book without an audience. It considerations as “distressing diversions” and provides more questions than answ ers, the first States that the failure to follow through on the question being, what is the point of this book? blueprint articulated at Casablanca was a griev- ous miscalculation that lengthened the war and Lt Col Daniel B. Kox, USAF greatly increased its cost. Maxwell AFB, Alabama This is the crux of the issue. Although genu- fiecting toward civilian control and the primacy of politics in war, it is apparent that Hansell ac- tuallv rejects such notions. With his gaze fixed firmly on the destruction of German factories, he The Strategic Air War Against Germanv and spurns the necessity of air support elsewhere. fapan by Haywood S. Hansell. Jr. W ashington. Yet the use of the heavy bombers in a support D.C. 20422: Office of Air Force History, 1986, role was absolutely essential. For example, the 300 pages. $14.00. need for coming to grips with the German army was acknowledged by Allied leaders. North Áf rica was chosen as the initial venue, but chances Maj Gen Haywood S. Hansell has written a of success were slim. To help ensure victory, controversial memoir of his experiences as a staff maximum air support was necessary. Over the officer and combat commander during World objections of Carl Spaatz and Ira Eaker, units War II. Hansell believes absolutely in strategic from England were sent to África. What was the air power and argues that if airmen had been al- alternative? Would the bomber advocates have lowed to fight the war by their own lights, the left the infantry to land on the beaches and fight conflict would have been shorter and less their campaign alone, thus condemning it to fail bloody. This volume, a revision of two earlier ure? Or would they argue that Torch, or any sim works, is a lucid and forceful memoir, perhaps ilar landing, not take place at all? Stalin argued 84 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1988 passionately for a second front, and the Allies, Reaching for the Stars: The Story of Astronaut perhaps recalling Russia's separate peace with Training and the Lunar Landing by Dr Stanley Germany in World War 1, were loath to refuse. H. Goldstein. New York 10175: Praeger, 1987, In the Pacific, General Hansell, arriving as a 208 pages, $35.95. wise and seasoned European veteran, led the XXI Bomber Command. He had learned impor- Reaching for the Stars presents a multifaceted tant lessons over Germany and was determined history of astronaut training during the begin- toavoid mistakes. Hequickly realized, however, ningof the US space program and a primer on the that his European experiences seldom applied in basic theory of training and its applications to the Pacific, so he adopted new remedies. By the high-technology programs. Contained within end of the war there were few similarities be- this short volume are the underpinnings of the tween the air doctrine employed against Japan astronaut program as well as background into and that vvhich American airmen had so passion many of the management decisions that shaped ately advanced, defended. and executed over Eu- the US space program. rope. (Is there a lesson here regarding the value of Dr Goldstein’s credentials are impressive and military history to the serving officer?) lend substantial credence to the book: assistant In assessing the accomplishments of strategic personnel officer and director of university pro air power, Hansell insists that bombardment grams at Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JSC) could have won the war if not for the intrusions in Houston; former director of human resources of unenlightened nonairmen. This is arguable. management at NASA headquarters in Washing What is clear, however, is that the doctrine de- ton, D.C.; and 17 years as the director of em- vised by Hansell and his colleagues at ACTS was ployee development at JSC. His insight into the flawed. Air power was not a unique weapon that manned spaceflight program during the 1960s could bvpass the lengthy. bloody struggles on and 1970s is evidenced by his depth of research ground and sea by striking directlv at a nations and his use of personal recollections of col vital centers. On the contrary, airmen learned leagues involved in the development of training that they also had to overcome the enemy forces at JSC. first. C lausew itz was right— one first had to close Dr Goldstein’s brief introduction provides a with the enemy armv, destroy it, and then move historical background of man’s desire to reach to the vital centers. This preliminary struggle, beyond the earth. He introduces several of the shrugged off by ACTS theorists, was neither major questions encountered by the astronaut quick nor easv. In a two-year campaign against training program and relates them to training the Luftwaffe, the Combined Bomber Offensive theory and training for early NASA manned cost the British and Americans over 20,000 air- missions. craft destroyed and 120,000 crewmen killed or The author next presents a general treatise on captured. Hansell blithelv assumes the morality the history. philosophy, and theory of training. of the A m erican bom bing offensive. Recent This particular section presents an interesting works by Ronald Schaffer (Wings of Judgment: picture of the evolution of training theory and its American Bombing in World War II) and Mi- application in the developm ent of m odem chael Sherry (The Rise of American Air Power: technology. The Creation of Armageddon) would, however, Dr Goldstein then sets the stage for the devel dispute such a conclusion. opment of the space race and the US manned spaceflight program in the context of the cold In summary. General Hansell has written a war during the 1950s. He provides additional most articulate account of the development of historical insight into the development of rocket American strategic bombing doctrine and prac- technology and also into the political arena in tice. One can argue with his postulates and con- which many of the issues affecting spaceflight clusions, but the arguments are clear. Today’s were first raised. This chapter presents an excel- Air Force officers should read this book closely, lent perspective of the personalities and issues listen to its logic, and decide for them selves if it that molded the US and Soviet space programs in is valid. the 1950s and 1960s. Dr Goldstein then gives us the history of each of the NASA manned spaceflight programs cul- Lt Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF minating in the lunar landing of Apollo 11. Each US Air Force Academy of these program s (M ercury, G em ini, and NET ASSESSMENT 85

Apollo) faced impressive obstacles that had to be Ariel Levite’s Intelligence and Strategic Sur overcome before the next phase of the national prises examines the fundamental problem of in- quest for a lunar landing could begin. The gen telligen ce, the problem of furnishing eral lack of training theorv required the Mercury policymakers with timely warning of a serious training team to develop a training program in menace. A former Israeli military officer and cur- parallel with the technology. The result was rently a sênior research associate at the Jaffee what Dr Goldstein describes as a “shotgun” ap- Center for Strategic Studies in Tel Aviv, Levite proach emphasizing environmental training as does not presume to tell us how to prevent stra the Mercury 7 ventured into the unknowns of tegic surprise so much as he offers a closely rea- space. soned basis for understanding the human and As missions evolved into programs. it became organizational vulnerabilities that tend to reduce obvious to NASA management that the involve- or distort our perception of impending threats. ment of the astronauts in the actual development Drawing on his own research in the US Na of hardware and training program was essential tional Archives, Levite takes the work of other to the success of the overall mission. An integral students of the surprise phenomenon a step fur- part of this effort was the development of simu- ther by examining the conditions under which lators and simulator theories to allow each astro- strategic warning is (1) most likely to be available naut the opportunity to experience something and (2) most likely to influence the perceptions beyond his own realm and to practice to perfec- and response of policymakers. In the process, he tion outside of the costly real world of spacef- reviews, synthesizes, and critiques recent stud light. As Mercury progressed to Gemini and ies of strategic surprise and suggests an alterna- Gemini evolved into the Apollo program, train tive approach for analyzing the subject. (Not the ing became more and more complex as the com- least valuable part of the book, by the way, is plexity of the missions increased. Dr Goldstein Levite's bibliography, which serves as a selective has painted an admirable picture of the men who guide to the literature on strategic surprise.) flew these first missions and of what it took to get Levite's principal argument is that strategic to the moon. surprise occurs when and because reliable warn Dr Goldstein identifies several factors contrib- ing intelligence is unavailable. To test his hy- uting to the success of the astronaut training pro pothesis, he examines and compares the US gram: the "space race atmosphere” of the 1960s, disaster at Pearl Harbor with this country's stun- NASA’s role as a public agency, the research and ning success at the Battle of Midway only six development nature of spaceflight, the role of months later. Regarding the former. Levite builds training as a guarantor of mission success, the an arresting, revisionist case to show that signif- motivation and qualification of the astronauts, icant US intelligence on Japanese intentions (as and the mission-related decisions that drove the opposed to Japanese capabilities) was all but training program. These factors. coupled with nonexistent. The situation was reversed at Mid additional factors contributing to the successful way, where the availability of accurate and ex- management of the program, produced a highly quisitely detailed intelligence on enem y successful and innovative training program that intentions made all the difference. provided the basis for many similar programs In the case of Pearl Harbor, Levite also faults worldwide. existing accounts for employing an excessively The enjovable book should provide interesting broad definition of warning. Even Roberta reading to anyone involved in training or anyone Wohlstetter's highly regarded study. Pearl Har with an interest in space history. It provides new bor: Warning and Decision, does not escape re- insights into the development of a training pro buke on that particular score. Though estimable gram where few precedents existed. Dr Goldstein in many ways, Wohlstetter's book is criticized has shown us the precedents. It is up to the for failing to impose a sufficiently discriminating reader to apply them. standard on competing warning “signals,” es- Capt Stephen YV. Miller, USAF sentially treating each as though it had the same Falcon Air Force Station. Colorado degree of significance. The predictable result was an overloaded “target” (i.e., US intelligence) unable to distinquish the important “signals” Intelligence and Strategic Surprises by Ariel from all the irrelevant “noise.” Levite. New York 10225: Columbia University More broadly, Levite believes that a similar Press, 1987, 220 pages. $27.50. lack of discrimination has plagued virtually all 86 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1988

studies of strategic surprise. In his view, scholars tor, Dr Robert 0'N eill, and compiled to form this routinely have lumped every conceivable indi- book. cator of attack under the general rubric of "warn- The volume represents the rnost current thinking." Levite contends that a definition so all- ing on NATO doctrine from some of the finest encompassing is analvtically useless. In its minds in the American and European defense place, he calls for a more restrictive standard that policy arena. The thoughts of Gen Bernard Rog- measures the credibility of warning reports ers, Karsten Voigt. Ambassador Richard Burt, Dr against the known reliability of the source from Fritz Earmath, and others are included in the vvhence they come. work. Although limited in scope by the confer- Looking ahead as well as at the past, Levite ence’s topic, the discussions nonetheless tackle a contends that future prospects for strategic sur wide range of issues confronting the NATO alli- prise are problematical at best. not the least be- ance. Current and proposed NATO warfighting cause of emerging technologies that should ease doctrine, the possible impact of the Strategic De the collection and processing of warning intelli- fense Initiative on strategy, political and eco- gence. In the end, however, the preemption of nomic constraints on strategy, Warsaw Pact surprise will depend less on the collection of in- doctrine, and conventional force upgrades are telligence than on its effective analysis and swift but a few of the many topics covered here. dissemination to the policymakers who need it If there is a particular theme of the papers, it is the rnost. the problem the Western aliiance faces from an The analysis and transmission of intelligence increased Warsaw Pact military buildup coupled are. of course, key elements in the complex re- with the reluctance of aliiance members to sup- lationship between warning and response. Al- port the defense expenditures needed to keep though he exam ines them separately for pace. While the authors are not willing to discard analytical purposes, Levite argues that. in fact, the current doctrine of flexible response, they do warning and response coexist in a “dynamic- not hesitate to voice their opinions as to what is interactive" relationship involving receptivity to needed to enhance deterrence. There are the warning on the one hand and willingness to take usual calls for increased defense expenditures action on the other. In effect. the remainder of the on the part of the European allies. Unfortunately, hook is a further working out of these ideas and rnost authors are pessimistic that this could be of the author’s aforementioned case for a more accomplished given current economic and polit discriminating approach to the study of strategic ical constraints in the European community. As surprise. a result, many of the authors advocate other more One note of warning lest prospective readers acceptable alternatives. Som e of the more prom- themselves be caught unaware: Intelligence and ising ideas include the use of emerging technol Strategic Surprises is not particulariy easy going. ogies, better prioritized planning, and changes in The outgrowth of a Cornell doctoral dissertation, force employment and readiness. In that respect, it is long on theory, full of woolly passages, and the book represents some of the best in current written in language only a social scientist could thinking on NATO strategy. love. Turgiditv notwithstanding, Levite’s study If the book has one fault it is its omission of of warning, threat perception. and response is opinions from the European political left. With worth conjuring with. the notable exception of the paper bv Karsten Lt Col James Titus, USAF Voigt, a member of the Social Democratic Partv US Air Force Academy, Colorado of Germany (SPD). the book seems to ignore that important political faction. As a result, there is no serious discussion of European nuclear dis- Doctrine. the Aliiance, and Arms Control edited armament or of the adoption of a no-first-use nu by Robert 0 ’Neill. Hamden, Conn. 06514: clear policy and the strategic consequences that Shoe String Press. 1987, 232 pages. $29.50. those policies imply. W hile this omission mav Each year the International Institute for Stra stem from the largely conservative members who tegic Studies in London holds a major confer- attended the conference, it is nonetheless an ence for its members. This past year’s conference oversight that detracts from the work. dealt with NATO and Warsaw Pact strategic doc- On the whole, the book does an excellent job of trines and their effect on arms control and the examining the current issues confronting the al- Western aliiance. The papers presented at the liance. It provides scholarly analysis of current conference were edited by the institute’s direc- NATO strategy along with proposed alternatives. NET ASSESSMENT 87

Accordingly, this book is a must for any serious that war required the committal of all resources, student of doctrine and strategy. French leaders valued a large wartime army Capt Paul S. Raines, USAF more than a small, well-trained peacetime army. Fairborn, Ohio The realization that a large army made them more dependent on relatively untrained con- scripts who could be “very excitable" further reinforced their desire to fight methodical The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of battles. French Army Doctrine, 1919-1939 by Col Politics, economics, and geography also were Robert Allan Doughty. Hamden, Conn. 06514: important influences. The vulnerable location of The Shoe String Press, 1986, 248 pages, Paris and French natural resources and industry $27.50. mandated defending France at the frontier. One Reasons for France’s sudden and unexpected way to make frontier defense more feasible was defeat in 1940 are too often rooted in myth. Some through the use of underground fortifications. believe that the Maginot Line caused the defeat. Their great cost, however, limited where they Others find failures of political leadership and were built. Assuming geography made the Ar- decadence in society as satisfactory dennes easy to defend, the French decided they explanations. did not need elaborate defenses there. Having es- Novv Colonel Doughty has provided us with an timated that it would take the Germans nine days excellent opportunity to understand the funda to cross the Ardennes instead of the less than mental role French army doctrine played in the three days it actually took, the French believed tragedy. Using a variety of original source mate they would have plenty of time to provide any rial. he traces the development of French army necessary reinforcements. doctrine betvveen the tvvo world wars. Relying on firepower, few in the French army The doctrine of 1940 was greatly influenced by saw any role for the independent employment of the First World War. The French began that vvar tanks. Proposing such innovative concepts was with a doctrine emphasizing the offensive and made even more difficult by the French army’s morale. When firepower inflicted hideous losses, cumbersome organizational structure. The ar- the French gradually became convinced that my’s reliance on committee decisions rather they needed to change their doctrine. By the end than putting identifiable people in charge made of the war French doctrine was characterized by it m uch sim p ler to retain old con cep ts instead of its emphasis on carefully controlled, methodical adopting new concepts that would have threat- battles that were designed to achieve over- ened reliance on firepower. whelming superiority in materiel and firepower. Colonel Doughty has written a very important After the war the French army continued to book that should be mandatory reading for all emphasize the importance of the battle and fire Air Force officers aspiring to high-level com- power destruction of the enemy. To achieve the mand and staff positions. Reading this book will necessary massive firepower, the French re- help officers appreciate how complex the devel quired large, well-supplied units. These units opment of doctrine can be and how fundamental were centrally controlled, which increased the doctrine is to success in war. Learning about the complexity of planning and caused speed to be development of French army doctrine can also sacrificed in the quest for more firepower. help today’s Air Force officer understand why French military education contributed to these Soviet and US Army doctrine both stress speed trends. Believing that improper study of history and mobility. Finally, and perhaps most impor had contributed to their flawed prewar doctrine. tant, this book could lead to more effective Air the postwar French army applied a correction Force doctrine if it helps us identify factors that and attempted to balance the study of history can flaw our doctrine development process. with exercises. However, this approach created Lt Col Price T. Bingham, USAF distortions when it criticized prewar emphasis Maxwell AFB, Aiabama on mobility and audacity without questioning what impact new technological developments Soviet Strategic Deception by Brian D. Dailey might have on future combat. and Patrick J. Parker. Lexington, Mass. 02173: Besides education, a number of other factors Lexington Books, 1987, 560 pages, $49.00. such as manpower constraints influenced the de velopment of French army doctrine. Convinced The renowned French Sovietologist Boris 88 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WIN TER 1988

Souvarine once observed that everything about even in the military do not want to know or un- the Soviet Union, starting with its name, is a lie. derstand—or perhaps cannot bring themselves This penetrating observation has been reinforced to understand—the magnitude of the threat to over the years by the regime’s unedifying and un- our society posed by the systematic deception ending efforts to bend human reality to ideolog- and disinformation tactics of the Soviets. With ical formulas that obscure more than they this volume circulating in the public domain enlighten. Thus. deception and prevarication are there will be less excuse for such neglect. And among the fundamental attributes of the Soviet the quality of these articles, as well as the hope- regime, vvhich acts as an outlaw in world politics fully positive quality of the reflection and debate and sees itself at the center of conspiracies both that they trigger, makes it truly an indispensable stimulated by it and directed against it. piece of reading for those sectors of American so This conspiratorial and deceitful mode of ciety charged with deterring the Soviet threat. thought colors not just the entire political oper- Dr Stephen Blank ations of the Soviet State but all of its military ac- Maxwell AFB. Alabama tivities as well. For instance, maskirovka, a word that encompasses all forms of military conceal- ment and deception. is a cardinal principie of all The Never-Ending War: Terrorism in the 80s by Soviet military doctrine and planning. There- Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne. New fore, it is of great benefit to scholars, laymen. pol- York 10016: Facts on File Publications, 1987, iticians, and military planners alike to have this 356 pages, $18.95. collection of essays before us. The authors largely succeed in their attempt to present the The authors contend that terrorism is the hall- many worlds of Soviet deception activities—es- mark of the 1980s. A vast number of books and pionage, disinformation, political fronts (as in articles in the professional journals attest to this the Nicaraguan case), and the forms of military and to the fact that that situation is likely to con deception at the tactical. operational. and stra- tinue. Dobson and Payne have written a book tegic leveis. that keeps the reader’s attention despite the What emerges is a comprehensive and some- overload in print. what redundantly detailed picture of these sys- With all the coverage, the reader is swamped tematic policies of the Soviet Union across the with stories and analyses. The authors’ goal is to board of world politics and military affairs. As in make some sense of it all, to “sort out [the terror- any such collection, the quality of individual es ists) into categories according to the declared says varies: however. most are at a very high an- aims of their violence." (p. v) alvtical levei and some are better than that. For Basically, the book is divided into geographi- the military officers who read this journal, un- cal segments. About two-thirds of The Never- doubtedly the most valuable of these essays will Ending War is area-by-area analysis of national be those by Notra Truelock on the leveis of mil terrorist groups pervaded by strains of Marxism itary deception and the section on arms control and the Palestine issue. and strategic deception. Of particular signifi- A chapter dealing with the recent air strike cance is Brian Dailey’s piece on deception and against QadhafFs Libya culminates the first por- the ABM Treaty. which makes a convincing case tion of the book, which centers on the Middle for a US strategic defense system. However, read- East. The authors support the strike and heap ers who ignore the other essays will lose the un- criticism on those Western nations that failed to derstanding of the system, conduct, support US efforts and that have attempted ac- organizational network, and processes—not to commodation with terrorist organizations. Ad- speak of the goals—of the extensive deception mittedly, the attack will not stamp out terrorism system fielded by the Soviets. forever; it does, as the authors maintain, throw a The importance of this volume is that it forces new consequence into the considerations that to the forefront of discussion some unpleasant must be calculated bv someone contemplating truths about the Soviet Union's methods. In all sponsorship of a series of terror attacks. One likelihood, scholars and experts will be debating chapter shows that Syria's Assad has had a these findings. many of which are unpalatable to greater hand in terrorism than Qadhafi and an- many sectors of American opinion. Hitherto we other reveals the Soviets open to charges of aid- have averted our gaze from this subject, and even ing and abetting it. However, Assad hasn't been today many in the media, politics, and perhaps as visible as the more vocal Libyan leader. Qad- NET ASSESSMENT 89

hafi's style appears to focus attention on himself First Heroes: The POWs Left Behind in Vietnam and maíces for better reading. There is no discus- by Rod Colvin. New York 10003: Irvington sion of power relationships in the attack equa- Publishers, Inc., 1987, 355 pages. $19.95. tion. but they certainly will play a role if punishment is deserved by all involved. Few issues related to the war in Vietnam elicit There is an examination of the structure and the emotion aroused by the subject of this study. purpose of cells in various revolutionary and ter- Nearly a decade and a half has passed since our rorist groups. Necessity has forced many of these nation celebrated “Operation Homecoming,” organizations into using self-contained, isolated marking the liberation of American prisoners of cells and structure to assure the overall survival war. Yet, doubts linger as to whether the Viet- in the face of better intelligence. The same type namese indeed returned all of the Americans of cell organization is found today among radi they held. Despite continued claims that ‘‘no cais in Korea. which explains the difficulty the Americans continue to be held in Vietnam Korean police have had in quieting the turbu- against their will," many cling to the hope that lence on their university campuses. others are being held and w ill som eday be Some themes aren't developed. The authors released. mention the increasing amount of maritime ter- The book is written with two parts. The first 11 rorism. Violence at Sea, released by the Interna chapters represent a loosely chronological ac- tional Maritime Bureau of London, shows that it count of the postwar history of the POW/MIA is- is quite extensive and increasing, but there is sue. They outline ups and downs in terms of very little discussion here of this growth. public awareness and governmental interest. The reaction of rightists is touched on slightly The second portion of the book presents per- in the examination of the Red Brigades (Italy) sonal stories of 13 MIA/POW families. This ma and of the terrorist goal of causing a violent and terial is, by its very nature, much more illegal reaction. These topics should have been subjective. Nevertheless, it is educational to see developed at the expense of later Indian subcon- how these individuais view the past 14 years tinent material that seems so out of place, even if from their intimate perspective. Particularly per- the tactics and Marxist tones are similar. tinent for military readers are these fam ilies’ per- Certain flippant remarks and statements de- ceptions of how the military institution has tract from the book and contribute little. For in- related to them in their loss. stance, execution by being shot in the back of the That the title of this book reveals the perspec head isn’t “Russian execution style.” (p. 212) tive from which it is written should not deter po- The origin of this style of execution is lost in ob- tential readers. However, for those whose mind scurity and cannot be attributed to anyone. An- is closed, this book could prove quite unsettling. other such remark describes the storming of W hile influenced bv POW/MIA League of hijacked aircraft by military rescue teams as "a Families sources, the author possesses no per- manhood test of gung-ho chauvinism for any na- sonal ties to the issue. Colvin is a radio journalist tion ." (p. 290) introduced to the issue only in 1981. Prior to his The authors have done what they said they own investigation, he believed "like so many would. The reader sees the "ties that bind" Americans, that those who still carried the ban- through the examination of each group sepa- ner for MIAs were overly emotional and unable rately in terms of its ideology, key leadership, to accept the cruel realities of war.” typical techniques, and recent history. The ma The book presents an impressive amount of teriais can be found in many diverse newspaper material, ranging from records of various govern articles and feature stories. Here, the authors mental studies to information about historie have put them together and the chronology at the Communist treatment of POWs and their repatri- end is well done. The Never-Ending War is ation. Included are a helpful index and an ap- aimed at the shopping center market. Its price pendix listing those still m issing in action and hoopla cover design strongly hint that it is (including more than 40 civilians). aimed at the average book buyer. It meets the This book begins with the return of the POWs needs of the average reader and provides a fine in a chapter aptly titled “Taking Off the Brace- review for those with more than a casual interest. lets.” It describes renewed interest in the question arising from the numerous sightings related Peter C. Unsinger by Vietnamese refugees. Among important ele- San Jose. Califórnia ments of the story is the key testimony of a highly 90 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1988 placed North Vietnamese mortician who, as a could be held in remote areas.” Until the day refugee, resettled in America. He testified at a when something develops from this leading ad congressional hearing that while working in the mission, families of MIAs continue to be sus- official Graves Office of Hanoi, he assisted in Pro tained by faith and hope. In the words of Lynn cessing and storing the remains of well over 400 Standerwick, whose Air Force father’s plane was American soldiers. He described in detail their lost in 1971, “I operate on the premise that a storage in a warehouse and Vietnam’s ability to POW is Corning hom e tom orrow ." How'ever, the return them at any time. other side of the coin is noted by Vince Donahue, While primarily directed toward establishing father of an Air Force pilot lost three years ear- the case that Americans continue to be held as lier. He urges our nation to action with the POWs, First Heroes discusses possible reasons words, “The men who are left over there are for their continued captivity. One intriguing the- dying, one by one. Will we allow the American ory is that MIAs represent an ongoing "form of government to be co-conspirators in the deaths psychological warfare.” of Americans at the hands of the enemy?" Related to this psychological hypothesis is a The book’s title comes from a statement by disturbing impression that filters through rather Alexander Solzhenitsyn: consistently in the accounts of the POW/MIA If the government of North Vietnam has difficulty ex- fam ily m em bers. They generally feel short- plaining to you what happened to . . . American changed by a disinterested government. Al- POWs who ha ve not yet returned, I, on the basis of though they continue to love their nation, they my experience in the Archipelago, can explain this consider themselves victims. The mother of Maj quite clearly. There is a law in the Archipelago that Donald E. Shay, an Air Force pilot lost over Laos those who have been treated the most harshly and on 8 October 1970, speaks for many when she who have withstood the most bravely, the most hon- est, the most courageous, the most unbending, never savs, “ The most frustrating thing about the again come out into the world. . . . A part of your re vvhole experience is that I’ve had to fight my own turned POWs told you how they were tortured. This government." means that those who have remained were tortured While the picture of the American government even more, but did not yield an inch. These are your painted by the book is not comforting, First He best people. These are your first heroes. . . . roes ends on a positive note, citing an admission The plea made by First Heroes is that they not by the Vietnamese last year that “it was possible be forgotten. some Americans, of whom they were not aware, Chaplain (Capt) Robert C. Stroud. USAF Reese AFB, Texas notams

Notices of upcoming conferences. seminars, and can National Security, 1960-1968.“ at West other professional matters of a noncominercial Point, New York, 13-15 April 1988. Historians nature should be sent to: Editor. Airpoiver four- and political scientists will present papers on nal. VValker Hall. Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532. political, strategic. economic, and other aspects We reserve the right to edit material for length of American national security policy during the and editorial content. Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administra- tions. For further information contact: Lt Col National Space Symposium Charles F. Brower. Department of History. USMA, West Point NY 10996. The United States Space Foundation has announced its Fourth National Space Symposium. Army Aviation Convention scheduled for 12-15 April 1988. The symposium will be held in Colorado Springs, Colorado, at The Army Aviation Association of America will the Broadmoor HoteFs International Center. In- hold its 1988 convention 13-17 April 1988 in St quiries should be made to the US Space Foun Louis, Missouri. This years theme is "Army dation. National Space Symposium. PO Box Aviation . . . Near-Term Focus.” For further in 1838. Colorado Springs CO 80901. formation contact: AAAA, 49 Richmondville Avenue, Westport CT 06880-2000 or phone USAF Academy Military History Symposium (203)226-8184. The Department of History at the United States Air Force Academy has announced that its Thir- Mobilization Symposium teenth Military History Symposium will be held The Industrial College of the Armed Forces and 12-14 October 1988. The topic will focus on the National Defense University’s Mobilization Con- role of intelligence in military operations. The cepts Development Center will host their annual department has sponsored a symposium series symposium 14-15 April 1988 at Fort McNair. since 1967. and all but the first symposium pro- This year’s conference is titled “Human and Ma ceedings have been published through the Office terial Resources Policies: A New Look at Endur- of Air Force History by the Government Printing ing Issues.” For more information contact Office. For further information please write to: Mobilization Conference Committee, Industrial Capt Mark Clodfelter. HQ USAFA/DFH, USAF College of the Armed Forces, Washington DC Academy CO 80840—5701. Telephone inquiries 20319-6000. Phone numbers are (202) 475-1953 may be made at (303) 472-3230 or AUTOVON or AUTOVON 335-1953. 259-3230. Thirtieth Anniversary USMA History Symposium January saw the 30th anniversary of the first LIS The United States Military Academy, with the satellite in orbit. Explorer 1 was launched 31 Jan generous support of the National Endowment for uary 1958 by a Júpiter C rocket from Cape Ca- the Humanities. will sponsor a history sympo naveral. Explorer 1 weighed 30.8 pounds and led sium titled “The Theory and Practice of Ameri to the discovery of the Van Allen radiation belt.

91 AIRPOWER JOURNAL Volume I AUTHOR INDEX

Bateman, S. L., Female Air Force Piiots and Combat Knowles, B. M., Tactical Airlift, no. 2, fali 87, 41-47. Aircraft: "The Right Stuff" Has No Gender, no. 3. Krieger, C. R., Fighting the Air War: A WingCommand- winter 87, 63-74. er’s Perspective, no. 1, summer 87, 21-31. Bingham, P. T., Fighting From the Air Base, no. 1, sum- Mason, R. A.. The Decade of Opportunity: Air Power in mer 87. 32-41. the 1990s. no. 2. fali 87, 4-15. Buchanan, T. H . The Need for Battle Managers in the Owen, R. C., Counterrevolution in Namibia, no. 3, win Tactical Air Control Svstem, no 1. summer 87, 60- ter 87.52-62. 71. Page, K. M., US Air Force Special Operations: Charting Daack, M. T.. Sowing the Seams: Strategic Bombers a Course for the Future, no. 2, fali 87. 58-69. Versus Foilow-on Forces, no. 3, winter 87, 22-30. Papp, D., From Project Thumper to SD1: The Role of Donnelly, C. L., Jr., A Theater-Level View of Air Power, Ballistic Missile Defense in US Security Policy, no. no. 1, summer 87, 3-8. 3. winter 87, 34-51. Fryer. J. C., Jr.. A Challenge to Our Air Force (editorial), Riddlebarger, S. E.. Better Writing: A Heretic’s View, no. 1, summer 87, 15. no. 3, winter 87. 75-80. Geiger, K. VV , Buildinga Broad Professional Base (ed Smith. P. M., Air Battle 2000 in the NATO Alliance: Ex- itorial), no. 2. fali 87. 2; Position Update (editorial), ploiting Conceptual and Technological Advances, no. 3, winter 87, 2. no. 3, winter 87. 4-15. Gropman, A. L., An Airman's Quintet. no. 1, summer Smith, R. C.. Coalition Air Defense in the Persian Gulf, 87,55-59. no. 2. fali 87. 28-39. Hall, S. C.: ShortchangingOur Young Officers: Militarv Stroud, W. P. III, Use and Misuse of Conventional Tac Traditions Denied. no. 2. fali 87. 48-57. tical Air Power, no. 1, summer 87, 16-20. Hallion, R. P., Doctrine, Technology, and Air Warfare: Tice, B. P., US Air Force Operations and Intelligence: A LateTwentieth-Centurv Perspective, no. 2. fali 87, Getting !t Together, no. 3. winter 87, 31-33. 16-27. Trest. W. A., Scores of Piiots, Clouds of Planes, no. 1, Hosmer, B. C.. American Air Power and Grand Tactics, summer 87, 42-54. no. 1, summer 87, 9-14. Welch, L. D., A Message from the Chief of Staff (edito Kirtland. M. A.. End of an Era (editorial), no. 2, fali 87, rial), no. 1, summer 87, 2. 40. Whitcomb, D. D., Hogs in the Rear: A- !0s in Rear Op Kline, T. E., Ira Eaker and the Ear of Dionysius, no. 2, erations, no. 3. winter 87, 16-21. fali 87, 70-73.

TULE INDEX

A Challenge to Our Air Force (editorial). J. C. Fryer, Jr., End of an Era (editorial). M. A. Kirtland. no. 2, fali 87. no. 1, summer 87,15. 40. A Message from the Chief of Staff (editorial), L. D. Female Air Force Piiots and Combat Aircraft: “The Welch, no. 1. summer 87. 2. Right Stuff” Has No Gender, S. L. Bateman. no. 3. A Theater-Level View of Air Power, C. L. Donnelly, Jr., winter 87, 63-74. no. 1, summer 87, 3-8. . Fighting From the Air Base, P. T. Bingham, no. 1. sum Air Battle 2000 in the NATO Alliance: Exploiting Con mer 87. 32-41. ceptual and Technological Advances, P. M. Smith, Fighting the Air War: A Wing Commander’s Perspec no. 3, winter 87, 4—15. tive, C. R. Krieger, no. 1, summer 87, 21-31. American Air Power and Grand Tactics, B. C. Hosmer, From Project Thumper to SDI: The Role of Ballistic no. 1. summer 87, 9—14. Missile Defense in US Security Policy, D. Papp, no. An Airman's Quintet, A. L. Gropman, no. 1. summer 3, winter 87, 34-51. 87,55-59. Hogs in the Rear: A-lOs in Rear Operations. D. D. Whit Better Writing: A Heretic's View, S. E. Riddlebarger, comb, no. 3, winter 87,16—21. no. 3, winter 87, 75-80. Ira Eaker and the Ear of Dionysius, T. E. Kline, no. 2, Building a Broad Professional Base (editorial), K. W. fali 87, 70-73. Geiger, no. 2, fali 87. 2. Position Update (editorial). K. W. Geiger. no. 3, winter Coalition Air Defense in the Persian Gulf, R. C. Smith, 87. 2. no. 2, fali 87. 28-39. Scores of Piiots, Clouds of Planes, W. A. Irest, no. 1, Counterrevolution in Namibia, R. C. Owen, no. 3, win summer 87, 42-54. ter 87.52-62. Shortchanging Our Young Officers: Military Traditions Doctrine. Technology, and Air Warfare: A Late Twen- Denied. S. C. Hall. no. 2. fali 87. 48-57. tieth-Centurv Perspective, R. P. Hallion. no. 2, fali Sowing the Seams: Strategic Bombers Versus Follow- 87. 16-27. on Forces. M. T. Daack, no. 3, winter 87, 22-30.

92 INDEX 93

Tactical Airlift. B. M. Knowles, no. 2, fali 87, 41-^47. US Air Force Operations and Intelligence: Getting It ^The Decade of Opportunity: Air Power in the 1990s, R. Together. B. P. Tice, no. 3, winter 87. 31-33. A. Mason, no. 2. fali 87, 4-15. ^AJS Air Force Special Operations: Charting a Course for sThe Need for Battle Managers in the Tactical Air Con- the Future. K. M. Page. no. 2. fall 87. 58-69. trol System. T. H. Buchanan, no. 1. summer 87, 60- Use and Misuse of Conventional Tactical Air Power. 71. W. P. Stroud 111, no. 1. summer 87, 16-20.

SUBJECT INDEX

African Affairs Geiger, K. W., Building a Broad Professional Base. no. Owen. R. C.. Counterrevolution in Namibia, no. 3, win- 2. fall 87. 2. ter 87, 52-62. Geiger. K. W.. Position Update. no. 3, winter 87, 2. Kirtland, M. A.. End of an Era, no. 2. fall 87, 40. Air Base Survivability Welch. L. D.. A Message from the Chief of Staff. no. 1, Bingham. P. T.. Fighting From the Air Base, no. 1, sum summer 87, 2. mer 87. 32—41. Fighter Operations Air Defense Whitcomb. D. D., Hogs in the Rear: A-lOs in Rear Op Buchanan. T. H., The Need for Battle Managers in the erations, no. 3. winter 87. 16-21. Tactical Air Control System, no. 1. summer 87, 60- 71. Cr and Tactics Smith, R. C., Coalition Air Defense in the Persian Gulf, Hosmer, B. C., American Air Power and Grand Tactics, no. 2. fali 87. 28-39. no. 1, summer 87, 9-14. Air Force History Intelligence Trest, W. A., Scores of Pilots, Clouds of Planes, no. 1, Tice, B. P., US Air Force Operations and Intelligence: summer 87. 42-54. Getting It Together, no. 3, winter 87, 31-33. Air Force Organization Leadership/Managemen! Page. K. M.. US Air Force Special Operations: Charting Hall, S. C., Shortchanging Our Young Officers: Militarv a Course for the Future, no. 2, fali 87, 58-69. Traditions Denied, no. 2, fall 87. 48-57. Airlift Krieger, C. R., Fighting the Air War: A WingCommand- Knowles. B. M., Tactical Airlift. no. 2, fali 87, 41-47. er's Perspective, no. 1, summer 87, 21-31. Air Power Between the Wars Low-Intensity Conflict Trest, W. A., Scores of Pilots. Clouds of Planes, no. 1. Owen. R. C., Counterrevolution in Namibia. no. 3. win summer 87, 42-54. ter 87, 52-62. Ballistic Missile Defense Page, K. M.. US Air Force Special Operations: Charting a Course for the Future, no. 2, fall 87, 58-69. Papp, D.. From Project Thumper to SD1: The Role of Ballistic Missile Defense in US Securitv Policy, no. Middle East Affairs 3. winter 87. 34-51. Smith, R. C., Coalition Air Defense in the Persian Gulf. Defense no. 2, fall 87. 28-39. Kline. T. E.. Ira Eaker and the Ear of Dionvsius, no. 2, Military Education fall 87, 70-73. Fryer, J. C.. Jr.. A Challenge to Our Air Force (editorial), Doctrine no. 1, summer 87. 15. Hallion, R. P., Doctrine, Technology, and Air Warfare: Geiger, K. W., Building a Broad Professional Base (ed A Late Twentieth-Centurv Perspective, no. 2, fall 87. itorial), no. 2, fall 87, 2. 16-27. Geiger, K. W., Position Update (editorial), no. 3, winter Mason, R. A.. The Decade of Opportunity: Air Power in 87. 2. the 1990s, no. 2. fall 87. 4-15. Gropman, A. L., An Airman’s Quintet, no. 1. summer Smith, P. M., Air Battle 2000 in the NATO Alliance: Ex- 87.55-59. ploiting Conceptual and Technological Advances, Kline, T. E., Ira Eaker and the Ear of Dionvsius. no. 2, no. 3. winter 87,4-15. fall 87. 70-73. Riddlebarger, S. E., Better Writing: A Heretic's View, Editorial no. 3, winter 87, 75-80. Fryer, J. C.. Jr.. A Challenge to Our Air Force, no. 1, Welch, L. D.. A Message from the Chief of Staff (edito summer 87, 15. rial), no. 1, summer 87, 2. 94 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1988

Missile Operations Ballistic Missile Defense in US Security Policy, no. Kirtland, M. A.. End of an Era (editorial), no. 2. fali 87. 3. winter 87. 34-51. 40. Tacticul AirControI System Persian Gulf Conílicl Buchanan, T. H., The Need for Battle Managers in the Smith. R. C., Coalition Air Defense in the Persian Gulf, Tactical Air Contrai System, no. 1, summer 87, 60- no. 2, fali 87. 28-39. 71. Personnei Issues Tactical Air Power Bateman, S. L., Female Air Force Pilots and Combat Bingham, P. T.. Fighting From the Air Base, no. 1, sum Aircraft: "The Right Stuff" Has No Gender, no. 3. mer 87, 32—41. winter 87. 63-72. Buchanan, T. H., The Need for Battle Managers in the Tice. B. P-, US Air Force Operations and Intelligence: Tactical Air Control System, no. 1, summer 87, 60- Getting lt Together, no. 3, winter 87, 31-33. 71. Donnelly, C. L., Jr.. A Theater-Level View of Air Power, Planning no. 1, summer 87. 3-8. Smith, P. M„ Air Battle 2000 in the NATO Alliance: Ex- Smith, R. C., Coalition Air Defense in the Persian Gulf, ploiting Conceptual and Technological Advances, no. 2. fali 87. 28-39. no. 3. winter 87. 4-15. Stroud, W. P. III. Use and Misuse of Conventional Tac Professional Readings tical Air Power, no. 1, summer 87. 16-20. Whitcomb, D. D.. Hogs in the Rear: A-lOs in Rear Op Gropman, A. L., An Airman‘s Quintet. no. 1, summer erations, no. 3. winter 87, 16-21. 87.55-59. Technology Professionalism Hallion, R. P., Doctrine. Technology, and Air Warfare: Hall. S. C.. Shortchanging Our YoungOfficers: Military A Late Twentieth-Century Perspective, no. 2, fali 87, Traditions Denied. no. 2. fali 87, 48-57. 16-27. Remotely Piloted Vehicíes Mason. R. A.. The Decade of Opportunity: Air Power in Smith, P. M., Air Battle 2000 in the NATO Alliance: Ex- the 1990s, no. 2. fali 87, 4-15. ploiting Conceptual and Technological Advances, Theater Warfare no. 3. winter 87. 4-15. Bingham, P. T., Fighting From the Air Base, no. 1. sum Research and Development mer 87. 32-41. Hallion, R. P.. Doctrine, Technology, and Air Warfare: Daack, M. T.. Sowing the Seams: Strategic Bombers A Late Twentieth-Century Perspective, no. 2. fali 87. Versus Follow-on Forces, no. 3. winter 87, 22-30. 16-27. Donnelly, C. L.. Jr., A Theater-Level View of Air Power, no. 1. summer 87, 3-8. Specíai Operations Stroud. W. P. III. Use and Misuse of Conventional Tac Page. K. M.. LIS Air Force Special Operations: Charting tical Air Power, no. 1, summer 87, 16-20. a Course for the Future, no. 2. fali 87, 58-69. Whitcomb, D. D.. Hogs in the Rear: A-lOs in Rear Op Strategic Bombing erations, no. 3, winter 87. 16-21. Daack. M. T.. Sowing the Seams: Strategic Bombers VVomen in the Military Versus Follow-on Forces, no. 3. winter 87, 22-30. Bateman. S. L., Female Air Force Pilots and Combat Aircraft: “The Right Stuff" Has No Gender, no. 3, Strategic Defense ínifiative winter 87, 63-74. Papp. D.. From Project Thumper to SDI: The Role of contributors

A-10 flighl comrnander in lhe 303d Tactical Flghler Squadron. Rlchards-Gebaur AFB. Missouri. While on acllve duly. he served as a maintenanco oflicer. a T-3B instructor pilol. and two tours as a forvvard air controller in Soulheast Asia. Major Whitcomb is a graduate of Squadron Offiter School. Air Command and Slaff College, and the Army Command and General Staff College.

Capt Brian P. Tice is a sludent at the Defense Maj Gen Perry M. Smilh, USAF. Retired Intelligence College From February 1982 to lune 1984. he was wing intelligence officer (USMA: PhD. Columbia University). resides in McLean. Virgínia, and was commandant for lhe 35lh Tactical Fighter Wing (F^J| al of lhe National War College ai lhe lime of his George AFB, Califórnia, and was an inlelli- retiremenl in 1986. He was a command pilol gence analyst/current intelligence briefer with more lhan 3.000 flying hours. primarilv from |une 1984 to August 1987 al Headquar- in fighter aircrafl. including F-84s. F-lOOs. lers F'ifth Air Force, Yokota AB. fapan. Cap- F—Is, and F-15s. General Smith was a visil- lain Tice is a graduate of Squadron Officer School. ing professor at lhe National War College. has been a faculty member al the US Air Force Academy on three separale occasions. has held various command positions in West Germany. and has served al Udorn Royal Thai AFB. During his career, he served in a variely of posilions. ranging from Col Martin T. Daack |USAFA: MBA. Uni branch chief Io Joint Chiefs of Staff planner. versity of Coloradol is deputy comrnander General Smith is a graduate of National War for operations, 43d Bombardment W'ing College. (SAC). Andersen AFB. Cuam. A command pilot with 3,300 flying hours. including 670 combat hours. he has served as the assislant director of operations and chief, Facilities and Equipment Services Branch. Air Force Materials Laboratory, Wrright-Patterson AFB. Ohio; as a strategic oííense mission area operations research analyst with the Capabilitv Assessment Division. Directorale of Plans. Headquarters USAF-; and as commander, 97th Air Refueling Squadron. Blytheville AFB. Arkansas. Colunei Daack is a graduate of Squadron Officer School and Air War College and a distinguished gradu ate of Air Command and Staff College. Daniel S. Papp (BA. Dartmouth College: PhD. University of Miami) is professor of international affairs and director, School of Social Sciences. Geórgia Institute of Tech nology, Allanta. He has served as sênior re search fellow at the Air University Center for Aerospace Doctrine. Research, and Edu- cation; as research professor at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War Col lege, and as visiting professor of Western Australia Institute of Technology. Doctor Papp has published more than 4U articles on various issues on US and Soviet foreign and defense policies and is author of Vietnam The Vieiv /rom Moscoiv, Peking. Washing ton (1981) and Soviet Policies Toivard the Maj Darrel D. Whilcomb (USAFA) is an Air Developing World During lhe 1980s: TheDi- Force reservisl currently assigned as an lemmas of Power and Presence (1986).

95 fclmrndort AFB Alaska. Hamilton AFB. Cal- iíumia. Kglin AKB Florida; Tan Son Nhut AB Vletnam: and the Pentagon. Colonel Riddlebarger Ia a dlstinguished graduate of Squadron Offii er Schuol. AirCommand and Stafl Gollege and Industrial College of the Armed Force*.

Maj Robert C. Owen (BA and MA. Univer- sily of Califórnia al Los Angeles) has becn executive officer of the 34lh Taclical Airlift Training Group. Litlle Rock AFB. Arkansas. ( ol Samuel £. Riddtebarger, USAF Kclirmf since 1987 From 1975 Io 1981 he was a (Hs, lImvrrnliv of Murylunii. MPS Atibum C-130 pilot assigned tu Dyess AFB. Texas, Univnnitv). wa» eninmandani of lhe Air Maj Sandra L. Baleman is chiei. Protocol and Khein-Main AB. West Germany He was Force Manpower and Prnfessional Person- Seclíon. International Affaírs Divisíon. Of an assocíate professor of history at lhe US mil Management Sc himl I <*<•• l a r r s h 111 and fice of lhe Assistiuit Vice Chief of Staff. Air Force Academy from 1981 to 1985. and Mnuagouienl Developmenl Onler. Air llnl- Headquurturs USAF She ha» had assign- in 1985-86 he was an inslructor pilot with vnraity, Maxwell A PB. Alahama. .il lhe time ments as a ground control interr.epl control- the 16lh Taclical Airlift Training Squadron, of hls rellroment Whilc on activa dulv. !>«• ler al Mulmstrom AFB. Montana. a range Litlle Rock AFB Ma|or Owen is a distin- served as a pilai, personnel officer. adinín- <.nfet\ officer and a protocol officer al Clark guished graduate of Squadron Officer iatraliva officer war pl.cn» officer, and lufor- AB. Phiüppines, and cotnmander. 443d Ser School and a graduate of Air Command and mnlion officer wilh asslgnment» ut vices Squadron al Altus AFB. Oklnhoma. Staff College.

96 BOARD OF ADVISERS

Col Kennelh J. Alnwick, USAF, Retired, EAST, Incorporated Lt Col Donald R. Baucum, USAF, Office of Air Force History Dr Donald D. Chipman, Educationaí Adviser, Squadron Officer School Col |ames L. Cole. Jr.. USAF. Deputy Assistant for Joint Matters, ODJS Col Ravmond A. Hamilton, Jr., USAF, AFROTC, Universitiy of Alabam a Maj Gen I. B. Holley, Jr.. USAFR, Retired, Duke University Dr Richard H. Kohn, Chief, Office o f Air Force History

Address manuscripts to Editor, Airpower Journal, Walker Hall, Maxwell AFB, Alabama 36112-5532. Journal telephone listings are AUTOVON 875-5322 and commercial 205—293—5322. Manuscripts should be typed, double-spaced, and submitted in duplicate. Authors should enclose a short biographical sketch in- dicating current and previous assignments. academic and professional military education, and other particulars.

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