Fall 2008 Volume XXII, No. 3 AFRP 10-1

Senior Leader Perspectives The Transformation of Air Forces on the Korean Peninsula ...... 5 Lt Gen Stephen G . Wood, USAF Maj Christopher A . Johnson, DM, USAF Airpower Imbalance: Nuclear Pakistan’s Achilles’ Heel ...... 13 Air Commodore Tariq Mahmud Ashraf, Pakistan Air Force, Retired

Focus Area Redefining Air, Space, and Cyber Power ...... 25 Lt Col Paul D . Berg, USAF, Chief, Professional Journals

Features The Strategic Role of Airpower: An Indian Perspective on How We Need to Think, Train, and Fight in the Coming Years ...... 56 Air Commodore Arjun Subramaniam, Indian Air Force Rethinking the Combined Force Air Component Commander’s Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Approach to Counterinsurgency ...... 67 Lt Col Michael L . Downs, USAF Revisiting South African Airpower Thought: Considering Some Challenges and Tensions in Southern Africa ...... 77 Dr . Francois Vreÿ Dr . Abel Esterhuyse Strategy and Cost: A Gap in Our Military Decision-Making Process ...... 89 Lt Col Lawrence Spinetta, USAF Go Pills in Combat: Prejudice, Propriety, and Practicality ...... 97 Dr . John A . Caldwell

Departments Prelaunch Notes Selecting ASPJ Focus Areas and Presenting the Latest Chronicles Online Journal Articles ...... 18 Ricochets and Replies ...... 19 Ira C. Eaker Award Winners ...... 26 The Merge Reply to “A New Form of Air Warfare” ...... 27 Col José C . D’Odorico, Argentine Air Force, Retired The Mission Matters Most ...... 29 Lt Col Graham W . Rinehart, USAF, Retired Know Your Enemy ...... 31 Col Thomas E . Snodgrass, USAF, Retired

2008-3 contents.indd 1 7/28/08 7:17:15 AM Planetary Defense: Potential Mitigation Roles of the Department of Defense ...... 34 Lt Col Peter Garretson, USAF Maj Douglas Kaupa, USAF Cyber Flag: A Realistic Training Environment for the Future ...... 42 Maj Andrew P . Hansen, USAF Maj Paul D . Williams, PhD, USAF Lt Col Robert F . Mills, PhD, USAF, Retired Lt Col Mark A . Kanko, PhD, USAF, Retired

PIREPs Chinese Airmen Stepping through the International Gateway ...... 49 Ma Dezu Yang Chunyuan Embracing the Joint-Training Enterprise ...... 53 Dr . William M . Rierson

Book Reviews The Jedburghs: The Secret History of the Allied Special Forces, France 1944 ...... 105 Lt Col Will Irwin, USA, Retired Reviewer: Dr . Matthew R . Schwonek Guderian: Panzer Pioneer or Myth Maker? ...... 106 Russell A . Hart Reviewer: Dr . David R . Mets A Continent for the Taking: The Tragedy and Hope of Africa ...... 106 Howard W . French Reviewer: Ashley Lowe Striking First: Preemptive and Preventive Attack in U.S. National Security Policy ...... 107 Karl P . Mueller et al . Reviewer: 1st Lt Kevin M . Hullihan, USAF Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy ...... 108 William C . Martel Reviewer: Col Chris Wrenn, USAF The 360 Degree Leader: Developing Your Influence from Anywhere in the Organization ...... 109 John C . Maxwell Reviewer: Col Aldon E . Purdham Jr ., USAF Roaring Thunder: A Novel of the Jet Age ...... 110 Walter J . Boyne Reviewer: Dr . Frank P . Donnini, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, Retired Making Twenty-First-Century Strategy: An Introduction to Modern National Security Processes and Problems ...... 111 Dennis M . Drew and Donald M . Snow Reviewer: Dr . Charles E . Costanzo, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, Retired A War of Their Own: Bombers over the Southwest Pacific ...... 112 Capt Matthew K . Rodman, USAF Reviewer: Col Warren G . Ward, USAF A Pilgrim in Unholy Places: Stories of a Mustang Colonel ...... 113 Thomas D . Phillips Reviewer: Cadet Benjamin Mauldin, USAF

2008-3 contents.indd 2 7/28/08 7:17:15 AM Blood Stripes: The Grunt’s View of the War in Iraq ...... 114 David J . Danelo Reviewer: Maj Rodney D . Bullard, USAF The First Heroes: The Extraordinary Story of the Doolittle Raid—America’s First World War II Victory ...... 114 Craig Nelson Reviewer: 2d Lt Brad Holt, USAF America Won the Vietnam War! How the Left Snatched Defeat from the Jaws of Victory ...... 115 Robert R . Owens, PhD Reviewer: Maj James F . Palumbo, USAF Saturn V: The Complete Manufacturing and Test Records plus Supplemental Material ...... 116 Alan Lawrie and Robert Godwin Reviewer: Roger D . Launius America the Vulnerable: How Our Government Is Failing to Protect Us from Terrorism ...... 117 Stephen Flynn Reviewer: Col Michael D . Hays, USAF Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning ...... 118 Cynthia M . Grabo Reviewer: Paul Younes Death at a Distance: The Loss of the Legendary USS Harder ...... 119 Michael Sturma Reviewer: Lt Cdr Mark R . Condeno, Philippine Coast Guard Auxiliary Policy Analysis in National Security Affairs: New Methods for a New Era ...... 120 Richard L . Kugler Reviewer: Dr . David A . Anderson, Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, Retired Testing Aircraft, Exploring Space: An Illustrated History of NACA and NASA ...... 120 Roger E . Bilstein Reviewer: Rick Kamykowski Força Aerea 50 Anos ...... 121 Coronel António Tello Pacheco, POAF, retired; Maj Adelino Cardoso; and Nuno Esteves da Silva, eds . Reviewer: Lt Col Paul D . Berg, USAF Airpower Leadership on the Front Line: Lt Gen George H. Brett and Combat Command ...... 122 Lt Col Douglas A . Cox Reviewer: Capt Gregory W . Ball, USAFR The Development of Jet and Turbine Aero Engines ...... 123 Bill Gunston Reviewer: Will Kissel Airplanes: The Life Story of a Technology ...... 124 Jeremy R . Kinney Reviewer: Maj Kurt Rouser, USAF

Mission Debrief ...... 125

2008-3 contents.indd 3 7/28/08 7:17:16 AM Air and Space Power Journal Board of Reviewers

Col Ronald K. Bartley, USAFR Dr. Tom Keaney Air University Johns Hopkins University Lt Col Eric Braganca, USAF Col Merrick E. Krause, USAF, Retired Naval Air Station Department of Homeland Security Patuxent River, Maryland Col Chris J. Krisinger, USAF, Retired Dr. Kendall K. Brown Burke, Virginia NASA Marshall Space Flight Center Dr. Benjamin S. Lambeth Col Steven D. Carey, USAF, Retired RAND Daphne, Alabama Mr. Douglas E. Lee Dr. Clayton K. S. Chun Air Force Space Command US Army War College Dr. Richard I. Lester Dr. Mark Clodfelter Eaker College for Professional Development National War College Mr. Brent Marley Dr. Conrad Crane Redstone Arsenal, Alabama Director, US Army Military History Institute Mr. Rémy M. Mauduit Col Michael D. Davis, USAF Air Force Research Institute Air Force Research Institute Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, Retired Col Dennis M. Drew, USAF, Retired West Chicago, Illinois USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Dr. Daniel Mortensen Maj Gen Charles J. Dunlap Jr., USAF Air Force Research Institute The Pentagon Dr. Richard R. Muller Dr. Stephen Fought USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies USAF Air War College (professor emeritus) Dr. Bruce T. Murphy Col Richard L. Fullerton, USAF Air University USAF Academy Lt Col Derrill T. Goldizen, PhD, USAF, Retired Col Robert Owen, USAF, Retired Westport Point, Massachusetts Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Col W. Michael Guillot, USAF Lt Col Brian S. Pinkston, USAF, MC, SFS Air University The Pentagon Dr. John F. Guilmartin Jr. Col Bob Potter, USAF, Retired Ohio State University Air Force Research Institute Dr. Amit Gupta Dr. Steve Rothstein USAF Air War College Colorado Springs Science Center Project Dr. Grant T. Hammond Lt Col Reagan E. Schaupp, USAF Dean, NATO Defence College Air University Dr. Thomas Hughes Col Richard Szafranski, USAF, Retired USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Toffler Associates Lt Col J. P. Hunerwadel, USAF, Retired Lt Col Edward B. Tomme, PhD, USAF, Retired LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education Sci-Ops Consulting Col Mark P. Jelonek, USAF Dr. Christopher H. Toner The Pentagon USAF Air Command and Staff College Col John Jogerst, USAF, Retired Lt Col David A. Umphress, PhD, USAFR, Retired Navarre, Florida Auburn University Mr. Charles Tustin Kamps Dr. Harold R. Winton USAF Air Command and Staff College USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies



2008-3 Board of Reviewers.indd 4 7/28/08 7:17:51 AM The Transformation of Air Forces on the Korean Peninsula

Lt Gen Stephen G. Wood, USAF MAj ChriStopher A. johnSon, dM, USAF

oday nearly 28,000 american warriors stand shoulder to shoulder with our republic of Korea (roK) allies defending freedom along the Tdemilitarized zone. This is the most visible as­ pect of our commitment to a strong roK-US alliance, born in blood when the United States came to the republic of Korea’s defense in 190. like any enduring relationship, the alliance has evolved since the signing of the armistice in 193. a good example of this evolutionary change concerns the command relationships within the alliance. When the United States en­ tered the war, the roK president, Syngman rhee, placed all roK forces under the com­ mand of the United nations Command and Gen douglas Macarthur. This command and control (C2) arrangement remained unaltered until 1994, when the two nations agreed that the republic of Korea would assume operational control (oPCon) of its own forces during armi­ stice, with the commander of Combined Forces Command (CFC) authorized oPCon only dur­ ing crisis and war. This evolutionary change was appropriate at the time, based on the threat and the republic of Korea’s capability. Today, the al­ liance is in the midst of another evolutionary change that will see the most remarkable trans­ formation in its 8-year history. In February 2007, the defense chiefs of the two nations agreed that on 17 april 2012, the republic of Korea would assume responsibility for its own defense and retain full oPCon of its own forces during armistice, crisis, and war.



1-SLP-Wood Johnson.indd 5 7/28/08 7:18:24 AM  AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2008

Since 1978 the war-fighting command on the Current and Future peninsula has been CFC, commanded by a US general officer—currently Gen Walter l. Sharp, Command Relationships who is leading the transformation that will re­ The current CFC headquarters may appear sult in several monumental changes in the al­ to achieve unity of command, but in reality liance structure. First, CFC will be disestablished. the US commander of CFC exercises unified at that time, the republic of Korea will as­ command in wartime only, with continuing sume responsibility for its own defense. Simul­ concurrence of the two allied nations. In fact, taneously, the United States will activate US as is always the case in multinational opera­ Korea Command (USKorCoM), which will tions, both nations maintain command of serve in a doctrinally correct supporting role their forces, authorizing the CFC commander within our alliance. Importantly, a key impera­ to exercise oPCon of those forces within se­ tive is that CFC will remain ready to fight to­ lected parameters and reserving the right to night and ensure the defense of the republic modify missions or withdraw forces at any time of Korea until the moment that CFC’s flag is (fig. 1). lowered for the last time. The evolution of the In the US supporting-to-supported con­ security partnership adds further strength to struct of 2012, the USKorCoM commander the two-nation alliance that will serve US in­ will exercise national oPCon over US forces terests in the stability of the asia-Pacificregion in the same way the present commander of US for many years.1 Forces Korea maintains national command.2

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1-SLP-Wood Johnson.indd 6 7/28/08 7:18:25 AM THE TRANSFORMATION OF AIR FORCES 7

The USKorCoM commander will then ap­ Based on agreements reached during secu­ propriately place committed US forces in sup­ rity consultative meetings, each component is porting roles to Korea Joint Forces Command currently led by either a US or an roK com­ (KJFC), with command relationships ranging ponent commander reporting directly to the from supporting to tactical control (TaCon) CFC commander. The Seventh air Force com­ and with selected levels of administrative con­ mander, lt Gen Stephen G. Wood, leads aCC. trol, while maintaining US oPCon. Specific after the republic of Korea assumes wartime USKorCoM command relationships with US oPCon in 2012, both nations agree that the higher authorities will be determined in ap­ C2 of US and roK air forces will remain under propriate consultative processes and agree­ US leadership in an integrated fashion, much ments within the alliance and ultimately de­ as it is today. The major difference lies in the scribed in a revised Chairman of the Joint 3 future supporting-to-supported command re­ Chiefs of Staff Instruction 130 (fig. 2). lationships (fig. 4). Presently, air forces of both nations operate under the wartime oPCon of the CFC com­ mander, which he or she delegates to the com­ Alliance Capabilities mander of air Component Command (aCC). The organizational structure of CFC and its The alliance’s capability and will to defend subordinate combined commands is straight­ the republic of Korea from north Korean ag­ forward, resembling a traditional organization gression has never been stronger. Well known to with a vertical chain of command (fig. 3). the reader are the advancements in US military

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1-SLP-Wood Johnson.indd 8 7/28/08 7:18:26 AM THE TRANSFORMATION OF AIR FORCES 9

capability over the last two decades. less well sponsibility, the aCCe director can help known is the fact that the republic of Korea has KJFC understand how to support the air placed tremendous emphasis on modernization scheme of maneuver. a robust, integrated and military competence. The republic of Ko­ aCCe team, representative of the skill sets at rea is now the 13th largest economy in the world, the Korea air operations Center (KaoC), will spending approximately $24.3 billion—about support the aCCe directors. This team will 2. percent of its gross domestic product—on be matched one for one with roK counter­ defense each year. Its military comprises 77,000 parts of equivalent rank and expertise. active duty personnel, equipped with the most The emphasis on a US air- and naval-centric modern military technology. For instance, nearly approach in 2012 creates a need to evaluate the 40 percent of the roK air Force’s (roKaF) 00 current joint composition within USKorCoM fighters are F-1K and F-1 aircraft.4 However, headquarters. The opening days of crisis or the bedrock of the roK military is its ground war require that the right composition of forces, with 41,000 active duty personnel and skills be available within USKorCoM to sup­ an additional 2.9 million trained soldiers in re­ port a major air effort. as an absolute re­ serve. The leadership of the roK army is also quirement, experts in air, space, and cyber­ top notch, as proven during exercise vignettes in space power from the USaF, along with air which the CFC commander cedes control to his experts from the other components, should roK counterpart. Consequently, from an alli­ provide these skills. Today, joint manpower ance perspective, the roK military is capable of at Headquarters US Forces Korea is generally leading the ground campaign. Thus, under the weighted more towards the army than the CFC transformation plan, the US military’s con­ other components due to the legacy organi­ tribution to the alliance will become more air- zational structures that required such empha­ and naval-centric in the future. sis at the time. The activation of USKorCoM When fully transformed, USKorCoM in 2012 will present an opportunity to re­ will be in a doctrinally correct supporting- structure the organization to meet twenty- to-supported relationship with the roK war- first-century needs, and plans are under way fighting command, and the transformed al­ to propose that the service mix in the future liance will place a premium on air, space, USKorCoM staff comprise a higher percent­ and cyberspace power. Flawless execution of age of USaF joint officers. the integrated tasking order will require The combined roK and US air forces, placement of air, space, and cyberspace formed as the aCC during crisis and war, power advocates within the future KJFC provide the critical capability for deterring headquarters. The heavy emphasis on air re­ any aggression and are a decisive compo­ quires that the doctrinal concepts of the air nent for victory. our strong relationship component coordination element (aCCe) with our roK counterparts reflects Seventh be fully adopted not only for the United air Force’s deep commitment to the peace States but also in an integrated fashion with and stability of the Korean peninsula. In the our roKaF allies. KJFC, leading as the sup­ future, Seventh air Force will continue to ported organization, will benefit greatly lead through the KaoC in executing the from the collocated presence of both a master air attack plan. after 2012, however, USaF and roKaF senior officer who can the CFaCC will operate in a supporting-to­ advocate on behalf of the combined force supported relationship to the future KJFC air component commander (CFaCC). These instead of the subordinate relationship that senior officers, acting as the aCCe direc­ currently exists with CFC. The US CFaCC tors, can explain how the roKaF and USaF will still receive commander’s guidance from can best support land and maritime opera­ the future USKorCoM commander on the tions with air, space, and cyberspace power. best way to fulfill the supporting role but More importantly, because of the strong em­ will primarily follow KJFC’s strategic guid­ phasis on air operations in this area of re­ ance and intent.

1-SLP-Wood Johnson.indd 9 7/28/08 7:18:26 AM 10 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2008

Air Forces in Supporting-to- roKaF efforts to forge an intradependent air force. Intradependency, a mutually reinforc­ Supported Relationships ing and redundant situation, adds increased The United States and republic of Korea will capability, self-reliance, and flexibilityfor both evolve from a combined command structure to air forces. two separate but complementary commands With the disestablishment of aCC in 2012, that will operate in a supporting-to-supported it will no longer exercise oPCon over roKaF relationship, designed to be both responsive and forces. Instead, the doctrinal concepts of the flexible. This relationship permits each nation CFaCC will provide definition for new com­ to adapt in a better way to future changes in the mand authorities and relationships. By joint roK-US alliance. However, use of supporting- and USaF doctrine, the CFaCC will exercise to-supported command structures may pose TaCon over those air forces offered in support. unique challenges that do not presently exist. In Korea the CFaCC is also the commander, Unity of effort, the bedrock of an effective com­ air Force forces and thus retains oPCon over bined organization, will have to be preserved USaF service component forces. The future with coordination mechanisms. The boards, bu­ KJFC will provide TaCon of roK air forces to reaus, centers, and cells that USKorCoM and the CFaCC for combined air operations as exe­ its components will establish as coordination cuted through the KaoC. Fortunately, TaCon mechanisms with the commands they support of roKaF forces and of those provided by the will preserve unity of effort in the future com­ other services is all the authority required mand relationship. Fortunately, the supporting- when compared to the oPCon presently re­ to-supported relationship is not a new concept tained by the aCC commander. on the peninsula. Commanders frequently place US forces in supporting roles to roK forces and test them through exercises Ulchi Freedom Intradependent Air Forces Guardian and Key resolve, which will offer tougher challenges to this construct in future In an intradependent relationship, each air years. Unlike the CFC commander, the future force would not depend entirely on the other USKorCoM commander will not have wartime for the successful accomplishment of a particu­ oPCon of the roK forces with which he or lar task. of course, self-reliant nations still have she establishes these supporting relationships. unique strengths that, when brought together, each nation will retain oPCon of its respec­ create synergies otherwise nonexistent. This is tive forces, and the USKorCoM commander why the alliance between our two nations is so will remain the executive agent for all US forces special. The roK defense Ministry continues on the peninsula in all phases of conflict. to forge intradependence in its air force with The air forces represent one unique excep­ plans to increase spending on arms acquisi­ tion related to the evolution from combined tion by 19.8 percent for fiscal year 2008. This to supporting-to-supported relationships as it effort will make defense-acquisition spending pertains to the KaoC. This organization will a total of 29.7 percent of the total defense remain integrated, with both nations working budget. Three projects included in this bud­ within the same hardened facility. The KaoC get increase are essential to the roKaF’s self- will also stay under the leadership of the USaF reliance and force modernization: the surface- with a roKaF deputy, both lieutenant generals. to-air missile (SaM-X), the fighter-X (FX), and The United States will continue to lead the the early warning aircraft-X (eX). KaoC because of its premier air- and space- a critical force-improvement plan for re­ centric C2 and planning capabilities, which placing 40-year-old nike SaMs, the SaM-X complement what is still a predominantly project calls for the roK defense Ministry to ground-centric roK military. However, there procure modern SaMs from Germany.7 This will come a time when the roKaF will be effort will significantly modernize air-defense ready to lead, and the USaF fully supports capabilities and roKaF intradependence as

1-SLP-Wood Johnson.indd 10 7/28/08 7:18:27 AM THE TRANSFORMATION OF AIR FORCES 11

well as bolster the republic of Korea’s ability the roKaF’s self-reliance and enables the to defend against an air attack now and a long- country to complement the much-in-demand range missile threat from north Korea later. US e-3 Sentry airborne Warning and Control To improve roKaF self-reliance, this project System aircraft. opportunities may exist over should continue on an annual basis with the the long term to expand the eX program with goal of expanding coverage into unprotected other systems such as C2 platforms based on areas as a means to reduce reliance on the US the moving target indicator (MTI). In april Patriot system. 2007, Seventh air Force gained approval to fly The FX project, which has received much several roKaF senior leaders on a rare but press coverage with the debut of the F-1K, insightful e-8 Joint Surveillance Target attack reflects a tremendous success story for the radar System (JSTarS) mission from the 11th roKaF’s pursuit of intradependency. In 2002 air Control Wing over the republic of Korea the republic of Korea signed a contract to to impress upon them the value of the MTI purchase 40 F-1Ks from Boeing, which has and JSTarS C2 capabilities. With MTI tech­ delivered 28 so far. The remaining inventory nology and robust C2, the roKaF will be able is due by the end of 2008. These aircraft re­ to provide theater ground and air command­ place portions of a significantly aged roKaF ers with ground surveillance to support attack inventory and will allow our alliance partner operations and targeting that contribute to the to perform long-range, precision-strike mis­ delay, disruption, and destruction of enemy sions day or night, in any weather, and without forces. Self-reliant surveillance, reconnaissance, escort. Some observers worry that these ad­ and C2 capabilities are within reach, should the vanced fighters are not replacing older air­ republic of Korea follow up on the success of craft fast enough. Fortunately, the republic of the eX program with the acquisition of MTI- Korea’s defense acquisition Program agency based platforms and completion of plans to completed negotiations with Boeing to buy 21 purchase four unmanned surveillance aircraft. more F-1Ks before the end of 2012, when CFC disestablishment takes place. This agency also has a long-term vision to acquire about 0 Ready to Fight Tonight stealth fighter jets, such as the F-3, by 2019. Seventh air Force and the republic of Ko­ This modernization effort, especially if ex­ rea’s air Force operations Command are truly panded to include advances in fighter weaponry ready to fight tonight, and we will be ready to and weapon-targeting technology, indicates adapt our integrated operations to a supporting­ the republic of Korea’s commitment to the to-supported construct by 2012. our robust FX project as a critical component of roKaF exercise schedule will challenge us to perform intradependence.8 under the new construct while optimizing our another program synchronized with the re­ relationship with the supported KJFC through tention of wartime oPCon by the roK mili­ inclusion of an integrated US and roK aCCe. tary in 2012 is the eX project. of all the roKaF Force-modernization efforts for both nations modernization efforts, the ability to provide will play a significant part in our transformation robust C2 with airborne early warning and agenda as we approach the disestablishment control aircraft will represent another signifi­ of aCC. The SaM-X, FX, and eX projects pro­ cant advance for roKaF intradependence. vide only a few examples of how the roKaF is Boeing will deliver the first 737-model early movingtowardsintradependence.TheroKaF’s warning aircraft in 2011 and three more in continued pursuit of self-reliance and the strong 2012, along with a full complement of flight- friendship between our two nations will assure and mission-training systems and mission sup­ the foundation for sustained peace and stability port.9 This advance in C2 capability increases in northeast asia. ❑

1-SLP-Wood Johnson.indd 11 7/28/08 7:18:27 AM 12 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2008

Notes

1. For details on the meeting between the US secre­ 4. 2006 Defense White Paper (republic of Korea: Minis­ tary of defense and the roK minister of defense, see US try of defense, 17 May 2007), http://www.mnd.go.kr/ secretary of defense to commander United States Forces mndeng/defensePolicy/Whitepaper/index.jsp. Korea, memorandum, subject: US Forces Korea Transfor­ . For details on the aCCe construct, see air Force mation Guidance, 4 July 2007. doctrine Center Handbook 10-1, The Air and Space Com­ 2. See Joint Publication (JP) 0-2, Unified Action Armed mander’s Handbook for the Joint Force Air Component Commander, Forces (UNAAF), 10 July 2001, chap. 3, “doctrine and Policy 27 June 200. for Joint Command and Control,” http://www.dtic.mil/ . Chin Tae-ung, “defense Ministry Seeks 20 Percent doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp0_2.pdf; and JP 3-1, Multi­ national Operations, 7 March 2007, http://www.dtic.mil/ Hike in Purchase,” World News Connection, 30 May 2007, 1. doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_1.pdf. 7. Ibid. 3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 8. lee Chi-dong, “Seoul’s Plan to Buy More F-1K Jets 130.01C, Relationships between Commanders of Combatant remains despite F-1 Grounding,” World News Connection, Commands and International Commands and Organizations, 1 8 november 2007, 1. February 2008, outlines specificrelationships and defines 9. “Boeing Holds e-X Conference in S. Korea,” UPI authorities. Security Industry—Briefs,  november 2007, 1.

1-SLP-Wood Johnson.indd 12 7/28/08 7:18:28 AM Airpower Imbalance Nuclear Pakistan’s Achilles’ Heel

Air Commodore TAriq mAhmud AshrAf, PAkisTAn Air forCe, reTired*

he overT nuclearizaTion of india and Pakistan in May 1998 dras­ tically altered the military landscape of South asia. Military planners on Tboth sides now had to grapple with the addi­ tional strategic doctrinal dilemmas and con­ siderations of deterrence, first use of nuclear weapons, counterforce versus countervalue targeting, nuclear thresholds, and so forth. conventional imbalance in the military do­ main has been a constant, defining characteris­ tic of South asian defence dynamics ever since india and Pakistan achieved independence in 1947. understandably, the greater size, popu­ lation, and resources of india have enabled its military to stay ahead in conventional might, with Pakistan continuing to play the “catch­ up” game. needless to say, apart from the resources available to them, the military po­ tential of both countries has also been shaped significantly by what their respective superpower allies or other friendly countries have been willing to provide them in terms of military wherewithal. one irrefutable legacy that the indian and Pakistani militaries retained from the British colonials was their rigid adherence to and un­ shakeable belief in the somewhat outdated tenets of continental warfare. This led both countries to adopt army-centric military doc­ trines and resulted in the diversion of more resources towards their respective armies, to the neglect of their navies and air forces. This proved truer in the case of Pakistan, where the army has ruled the country for almost half of its total existence.

*i am thankful to Dr. rodney Jones, president of Policy architects international, reston, virginia, for his invaluable support and help in collecting data for this article.

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The chronic inferiority in the conventional fact, naTo has not issued any such declara­ military realm that Pakistan has continued to tion to this day and remains ambiguous on face led its army to a doctrine of “Strategic De­ this matter, just as Pakistan has opted to do.2 fence and Tactical offence.” although Pakistan in any military conflict between two nuclear- undoubtedly has remained militarily inferior armed adversaries such as india and Pakistan, to india, one must realize that indian conven­ one could safely conclude that the chances are tional military superiority has never reached a much higher of the conventionally weaker stage where one would categorize it as having country (Pakistan) opting to use nuclear weap­ a “decisive edge” over the Pakistani military. ons first. This is precisely why india has dis­ The truth of the indecisive nature of this con­ avowed first use in its draft nuclear doctrine; ventional military imbalance was borne out by Pakistan, however, continues to maintain a the indecisive stalemates that occurred during semblance of ambiguity regarding its first-use 1 the wars of 1948 and 1965. posture while simultaneously continuing to im­ The situation that i have depicted in the ply that such employment remains a possibility. preceding paragraphs remained valid until Since any future South asian conflictwould the conduct of nuclear tests by india and Paki­ start in the conventional realm before escalat­ stan in May 1998, an epochal event that drasti­ ing to nuclear dimensions, and because Paki­ cally altered the South asian military scene. stan is the more likely of the two adversaries to First of all, one needs to understand the es­ opt for the first use of nuclear weapons, it is sential motivation that drove Pakistan and india vital for us to study the possible course of to go nuclear. in my reckoning, Pakistan’s ba­ events that could make Pakistan move up the sic objective in its quest to acquire nuclear conflict-escalation ladder by opting to go nu­ military capability has always been the desire to be able to counter india’s conventional su­ clear. in my opinion, one could better de­ periority. india’s motivation involved, among scribe this decision point—commonly re­ other things, its desire to emerge as a regional/ ferred to as the “nuclear threshold”—as the global power, the need to balance china, and, “nuclear-escalation threshold.” of course, the wish to gain a decisive military Because of Pakistan’s continuing nuclear advantage over Pakistan, which india had ambiguity, we have heard little discussion of failed to achieve in the conventional realm. such key issues as what its nuclear-escalation From this it flows that although Pakistan has threshold actually means. one significant ex­ designed its nuclear arsenal primarily to deter ception to the silence of the Pakistani leader­ the launching of a conventional attack by in­ ship on this matter occurred when a group of dia, india is likely to employ nuclear weapons italian journalists interviewed lt Gen Khalid for the projection of political power and to Kidwai, the director general of Pakistan’s Stra­ obviate the chances of any other country’s em­ tegic Plans Division. in a marked departure ploying nuclear weapons against it. elaborat­ from earlier statements and interviews, which ing on Pakistan’s nuclear posture, two commen­ ignored this vital subject, General Kidwai out­ tators write that “nuclear weapons are perceived lined the limits of Pakistan’s nuclear-escalation in Pakistan as an instrument to countervail a threshold: manifest conventional inferiority.” explaining it is well known that Pakistan does not have a further, they describe how the Pakistani nu­ “no First use Policy.” Pakistani nuclear weapons clear posture is strikingly similar to the north will be used, according to Gen. Kidwai, only “if the atlantic Treaty organization (naTo) doctrine very existence of Pakistan as a state is at stake.” of extended deterrence during the cold War. This has been detailed by Gen. Kidwai as follows: This doctrine also made constant reference to the possible use of nuclear weapons to counter­ “nuclear weapons are aimed solely at india. in vail conventional inferiority vis-à-vis the War­ case that deterrence fails, they will be used if saw Pact military forces; furthermore, it re­ a. india attacks Pakistan and conquers a fused to issue any no-first-use declaration. in large part of its territory (space threshold)

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b. india destroys a large part either of its at this stage, we would do well to conduct a land or air forces (military threshold) brief comparative overview of the respective c. india proceeds to the economic strangling armies and air forces of india and Pakistan of Pakistan (economic strangling) since these two military arms would play a ma­ jor role in determining the outcome of any d. india pushes Pakistan into political desta­ conventional war between those countries. bilization or creates a large scale internal regarding the two armies, the indian army subversion in Pakistan (domestic destabi­ has a better-than two-to-one advantage in per­ lization)”3 sonnel, armour, and artillery. it has always Since domestic destabilization and economic been an accepted fact amongst military strate­ strangulation are not relevant to the subject of gists and practitioners that in order to ensure this discussion, i will focus on the space and success, a land force on the offensive must military thresholds. regarding the territorial have a three-to-one advantage in numbers or space threshold, i have previously written over the defending force since the latter oper­ the following: ates from well-dug-in and reinforced positions generally located in terrain very familiar to its in conventional terms, the occurrence of any of personnel. The indian army does not by itself the following events could warrant Pakistan re­ sorting to the nuclear option: possess this decisive advantage over the Paki­ stan army. if it were to operate jointly with Penetration of indian forces beyond a certain the might of the indian air Force (iaF), how­ defined line or crossing of a river. ever, the balance does definitely tilt in favour imminent capture of an important Pakistani of the indians. city like lahore or Sialkot. . . . Salient comparative aspects of the iaF and PaF show that the former enjoys almost a 2.6:1 indian crossing of line of control . . . to a advantage in combat aircraft, purely in numerical level that it threatens Pakistan’s control over 5 azad Kashmir.4 terms (see table). however, the iaF’s exclusive possession of beyond visual range (Bvr) weap­ although the denial of Pakistani territory to ons and air-to-air refuelling capability, as well the indian military would jointly fall into the as superiority in unmanned aerial vehicles domain of the Pakistan army and the Pakistan (uav), further accentuates its advantage. This air Force (PaF), the former would bear pri­ edge would increase further once the iaF in­ mary responsibility for it, with the latter operat­ ducts the Phalcon airborne early warning and ing essentially in a supportive role. control (aeW&c) platforms that it has con-

Table. Comparison of IAF and PAF combat assets and potential

Capability IAF PAF Analysis Manpower 170,000 45,000 3.78:1 Combat aircraft 852 331 2.57:1 Transport aircraft 288 27 10.59:1 Air-to-air refuelling Yes No IAF enjoys exclusiveness Airborne Warning and Control System On order No IAF will enjoy exclusiveness BVR air-to-air missiles Yes No IAF enjoys exclusiveness UAVs Yes Yes IAF enjoys superiority High-tech combat aircraft 132 32 4.1:1 Compiled from Anthony H. Cordesman and Martin Kleiber, “The Asian Conventional Military Balance in 2006: The South Asian Military Balance,” working draft (Washington, DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 26 June 2006), http://www.csis.org/media/csis/ pubs/060626_asia_balance_south.pdf; and Rodney W. Jones, Conventional Military Imbalance and Strategic Stability in South Asia, SASSU [South Asian Strategic Stability Unit], Research Paper no. 1 (United Kingdom: University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, March 2005), 15, 29–33, http://www.policyarchitects.org/pdf/Conventional_imbalance_RJones.pdf.

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tracted to acquire from israel. The PaF has able to deploy operational assets at a greater been able to induct a few uavs but has still number of operating locations is an obvious not finalizedany plans for the induction of an corollary of this edge. having illustrated the aeW platform despite having evaluated the gross imbalance that exists between the two Swedish erieye system. if one also factors into air forces, i now move on to the implications the equation the number of combat aircraft that imbalance would have in any future con­ operated by the opposing navies, the disparity ventional war between india and Pakistan. increases even further. To a great extent, modern land warfare de­ The iaF’s technological edge is also evi­ pends upon establishing a favourable air situa­ denced by the disproportionately large num­ tion over the battlefield, which entails the ber of high-technology combat aircraft that it friendly air force’s fully supporting its own possesses vis-à-vis the PaF.6 This qualitative ad­ army while simultaneously preventing the ad­ vantage has shifted to the iaF because of its versary air force from interfering with its op­ unrestricted access to russian and israeli tech­ erations. The iaF-versus-PaF comparison in­ nology while Pakistan has been denied any ad­ dicates that the iaF is much more capable of ditional aviation assets other than a handful of achieving a favourable air situation over the upgraded F-16 aircraft from the united States. area of the land battle, so it can contribute sig­ china, Pakistan’s main provider of military nificantly to the success of an indian land of­ aircraft, does not currently produce any com­ fensive. Moreover, the strong iaF, with its ex­ bat aircraft comparable to the Western high- clusive access to aeW aircraft and Bvr missiles, technology variety. although this ratio might could neutralize the PaF by mounting a con­ improve slightly after the initially ordered certed counterair-operations campaign against batch of 24 F-16c/D aircraft enters service the latter.7 adequate neutralization of the PaF (Pakistan has taken delivery of the first two would absolutely open the path to an indian aircraft), the iaF will again gain the edge with victory on the ground, and the offensive for­ the induction of an additional 126 advanced mations of the indian army would be virtually combat aircraft that it is in the process of ac­ unstoppable. This could well create a state of quiring from the West. The most significant affairs, mentioned above, in which, as General disparity lies in the number of high-technology Kidwai put it, “the very existence of Pakistan as combat platforms that the two air forces possess. a state is at stake.” although the iaF has a 2.6:1 advantage in over­ an analysis of the comparative strengths of all numbers, its advantage in high-tech aircraft the indian and Pakistani militaries clearly exceeds a factor of 4.1:1, which will probably identifies the air force as the weakest link in continue to grow as more Su-30 MKi aircraft Pakistan’s military—especially when compared and the additional 126 advanced combat air­ directly with the much more powerful and craft join the iaF and enter operational service. better equipped iaF. one must not underesti­ The iaF has a large fleet of transport air­ mate the significanceof this weakest link since craft that bestows significantmilitar y-airlift ca­ the destruction of the PaF emerges as the pability. its advantage of over 10:1 in this area quickest way to make Pakistan contemplate the gives the iaF a strategic level of airlift capability, undesirable escalatory step of turning a con­ but one could best describe the PaF as having ventional, limited war into a nuclear holocaust. only modest airlift potential. viewed from the This conclusion has lessons not only for Paki­ perspective of the iaF’s substantially greater stan’s government but also for the major global pool of trained manpower, india’s enormous powers. The Pakistani government must em­ air-transport potential adds significantlyto the bark on a crash program to suitably reequip its flexibility of operational mobility in terms of air force, but the major global powers must also rapid deployment and redeployment. understand that enhancing the level of stability The iaF possesses more than twice as many in South asia requires that Pakistan’s nuclear- total aircraft as the PaF, as well as a 3.78:1 ad­ escalation threshold be raised and not allowed vantage in manpower. The freedom of being to drop any further. as i have indicated, the

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means for doing so lie in strengthening this military wherewithal vis-à-vis india and address weakest link in Pakistan’s military chain. these immediately lest a limited conventional as the Kargil conflictof 1999 demonstrated, conflict in South asia turn into a nuclear holo­ the advent of nuclear weapons in South asia caust with terrifying consequences, not only for has not rendered limited conventional wars in the region but also for the entire world. the region impossible. in fact, as Michael Kre­ in this context, one must concentrate spe­ pon argues in his discussion of the stability- cificallyon the serious imbalance between the instability paradox, small-scale, limited con­ air forces of the two countries since the weak ventional conflicts might even become more air force currently fielded by Pakistan might frequent in South asia.8 all international and well prove to be its achilles’ heel by becoming regional measures aimed at promoting and the prime reason for escalating a limited con­ achieving nuclear stability in South asia must flict to the nuclear dimension. Paradoxically, focus on ensuring that the nuclear-escalation therefore, it appears to be in india’s national threshold of the militarily weaker country— interest to downplay the increasing strength Pakistan—does not drop. consequently, the and potential of its air force so as to preclude global community must remain alert to any a further lowering of Pakistan’s perceived nu­ weaknesses emerging in Pakistan’s conventional clear-escalation threshold. ❑

Notes

1. i have intentionally not included the 1971 war here and MiG-29, while the only PaF platform that merits in­ since it was more of a civil war for the Pakistani military. clusion in this category is the F-16. See anthony h. although it did result in the fall of east Pakistan, the situ­ cordesman and Martin Kleiber, “The asian conventional ation on the western borders at the end of the war was Military Balance in 2006: The South asian Military Bal­ once again a stalemate, with neither side making signifi­ ance,” working draft (Washington, Dc.: centre for Strate­ cant gains. gic and international Studies, 26 June 2006), http://www 2. Paolo cotta-ramusino and Maurizio Martellini, .csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060626_asia_balance_south “nuclear Safety, nuclear Stability and nuclear Strategy in Pakistan” (como, italy: landau network-centro volta, 21 .pdf; and rodney W. Jones, Conventional Military Imbalance January 2002), [6], [6]n11, http://www.mi.infn.it/~landnet/ and Strategic Stability in South Asia, SaSSu [South asian Doc/pakistan.pdf. Strategic Stability unit], research Paper no. 1 (united King­ 3. ibid., [5]. readers should note that General Kidwai dom: university of Bradford, Department of Peace Stud­ mentions the destruction of Pakistan’s army and air force ies, March 2005), 15, 29–33, http://www.policyarchitects but makes no mention of Pakistan’s navy. .org/pdf/conventional_imbalance_rJones.pdf. 4. air commodore Tariq Mahmud ashraf, Aerospace 7. The iaF would retain exclusive possession of aeW Power: The Emerging Strategic Dimension (Peshawar, Paki­ capabilities until the PaF inducts a similar platform. how­ stan: Pakistan air Force Book club, 2002), 152, http:// ever, the iaF’s advantage in Bvr missiles might not re­ www.pakdef.info/aeropowerfinal.pdf. main once the PaF inducts the additional batch of 24 5. in terms of pure numbers, the advantage that the F-16c/D aircraft since they are reportedly capable of us­ iaF has enjoyed over the PaF has gradually been narrow­ ing advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles (included ing. according to The Story of the Pakistan Air Force: A Saga in the total delivered package). of Courage and Honour (islamabad, Pakistan: Shaheen Foundation, 2000), 469, the iaF enjoyed an almost five- 8. Michael Krepon, “The Stability-instability Paradox, to-one superiority in strength over the PaF during the Misperception, and escalation control in South asia,” in 1971 war, with the PaF having only 22 percent of the iaF’s Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia, ed. strength. Michael Krepon, rodney W. Jones, and ziad haider 6. The combat aircraft included in the category of (Washington, Dc: henry l. Stimson center, november high-tech aircraft include the iaF’s Su-30, Mirage 2000, 2004), 1–24, http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?iD=191.

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Selecting ASPJ Focus Areas and Presenting the Latest Chronicles Online Journal Articles

ir And SpAce power Journal (ASpJ ), ute. Therefore, publishing the list helps us so­ the professional journal of the US Air licit material for upcoming issues. ASpJ-English Force, publishes thought-provoking readers are welcome to send their suggestions articles about flying and fighting in for topics to us at [email protected]. Aair, space, and cyberspace. Military activities in All ASpJ editions promote professional dia­ our service’s three operational domains are logue among Airmen worldwide so that we diverse, so we focus each quarterly ASpJ issue can harness the best ideas about air, space, on a subset of them. The ASpJ staff selects and cyberspace power. chronicles Online Journal these focus areas based on what Airmen are (cOJ ) complements the printed editions of doing and what our senior leaders say is im­ ASpJ but appears only in electronic form. Not portant. For example, the ASpJ-English issue of Summer 2008 focused on “Expeditionary subject to any fixed publication schedule or Operations,” a topic of perennial interest to constraints regarding article length, cOJ can all Airmen. The current issue examines “Re­ publish timely articles anytime about a broad definingAir , Space, and Cyber Power” because range of military topics. Gen T. Michael Moseley, our former chief of Articles appearing in cOJ are frequently re­ staff, identifiedthat topic as a priority.1 We pe­ published elsewhere. The various ASpJ lan­ riodically repeat some focus areas, but others guage editions routinely translate and print are one-time events. Because our selections them. Book editors from around the world se­ evolve in response to today’s fast-changing op­ lect them as book chapters, and college pro­ erational environment, we announce planned fessorsusethemintheclassroom.Wearepleased ASpJ-English focus areas on our Web site at to present the following recent cOJ articles http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/ (available at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af airchronicles/QtrlyFocusAreas.html. The Ara­ .mil/airchronicles/cc.html): bic, Chinese, French, Portuguese, and Spanish ASpJ editions independently select their own • LT Benjamin Armstrong, USN, “Reaching focus areas based on the interests of their re­ Translational Lift: The History of the Heli­ spective global audiences. copter and Lessons for 21st Century Tech­ Few other military journals plan focus areas nology” (http://www.airpower.maxwell.af as far in advance as ASpJ-English does, but we .mil/airchronicles/cc/armstrong.html) find this long-range perspective beneficial. Merely announcing these topics does not guar­ • Fleming Saunders, “The Smart Way to Win antee that we will receive enough articles to sup­ the Vietnam War: Modern Guided Bombs port them; however, many authors who send us Take on Ho Chi Minh” (http://www.air articles mention that seeing the list of proposed power.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/ focus areas influenced their decision to contrib­ saunders.html)

18

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The ASpJ staff seeks insightful articles and .maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/bookrev/ book reviews from anywhere in the world. We bkrevguide.html. ❑ offer both hard-copy and electronic-publication opportunities in Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Portuguese, and Spanish. To submit an article in any of these languages, please re­ Note fer to the submission guidelines at http:// 1. Gen T. Michael Moseley, The nation’s Guardians: America’s 21st century Air Force, CSAF White Paper (Wash­ www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/ ington, DC: Department of the Air Force, Office of the howto1.html. To write a book review, please Chief of Staff, 29 December 2007), 5, http://www.af.mil/ see the guidelines at http://www.airpower shared/media/document/AFD-080207-048.pdf.

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A HOUSE DIVIDED tions Doctrine” (Spring 2008), I’d say that the author takes most of 14 pages (including end­ I don’t entirely agree with what Lt Gen David notes) to tell us the blindingly obvious—that in­ Deptula and Maj R. Greg Brown say in “A House formation is not a domain. We can operate Divided: The Indivisibility of Intelligence, Sur­ veillance, and Reconnaissance” (Summer 2008). within all of the other areas we accept as do­ Studying the world wars leads me to the conclu­ mains, including the ground (although we sion that some intelligence sources are in fact spend most of our time on it instead of in it), strategic—namely, those based on cryptanalysis and these domains all include a physical ele­ and electronic exploits. Breaking an adversary’s ment that we can touch. (Even our virtually con­ secret code cannot be compared to other forms structed domain of cyberspace needs physical of intelligence gathering. I think there still is a hardware to exist.) Information, on the other very good reason to think of communications hand, is quite simply ideas. Although ideas can intelligence as something special and strategic. be stored and, to a degree, manipulated and Adversaries can detect radars, satellites, recon­ controlled, we cannot operate within them, nor naissance planes, scouts, and ships, but they do they need any physical architecture (except tend to believe in their “unbreakable codes.” what is already within us) in order to exist. Eavesdropping on “secure” communications Having said that, I still appreciated the au­ will always be the best source of intelligence, and thor’s effort to straighten the doctrinal con­ special handling of such eavesdropping will al­ struct to rectify the misconceptions he pointed ways be required. out. However, if he truly intends to properly Mr. Frank Gerlach shift the paradigm that shapes how we view in­ Fellbach, Germany formation, he might want to start with the name of the applicable doctrine document. He correctly points out that we attempt to af­ EXPOSING THE INFORMATION fect information through operations intended DOMAIN MYTH initially to control it and ultimately to achieve In response to Maj Geoffrey Weiss’s article “Ex­ the greater goals of information superiority or posing the Information Domain Myth: A New information supremacy. Like control of the Concept for Air Force and Information Opera­ air, space, cyberspace, ground, or sea domains,

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any type of force or operation may potentially making) to advance IO doctrine aimed at cre­ affect or control information. Therefore, the ating cognitive and decision-making effects! doctrine document should be renamed infor­ LCDR Grayson Morgan, USN mation effects of Operations. If we are speaking Offutt AFB, nebraska about an Air Force doctrine document, we could use the term “Air Force operations.” If A LOOK DOWN THE SLIPPERY SLOPE we are discussing joint doctrine, the term could be (perhaps superfluously) “joint opera­ Maj Bryan D. Watson’s “A Look down the Slip­ tions.” Nevertheless, this could be the starting pery Slope: Domestic Operations, Outsourc­ point for refocusing our efforts as we rewrite ing, and the Erosion of Military Culture” the doctrine to address this concern. (Spring 2008) is a great article, but I think it’s Jim Bemis rather misleading and ignores the real history Laurel, Maryland regarding what the author calls our “growing domestic role” (p. 94). Federal troops were I found Major Weiss’s article very encourag­ used for domestic operations more than 200 ing to read because it discusses information times between 1795 and 1995, and the intent operations (IO) in doctrinal rather than pro­ is to use them only in exceptional cases. Many grammatic or organizational terms. He pro­ may remember their use during the 1992 Los poses a slimmed-down version of the defini­ Angeles riots and the 1996 Atlanta Olympics. I tion of IO in Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, was surprised that Major Watson’s article did information Operations, 13 February 2006, as not even refer to the National Response Plan an essential component for a new Air Force (superseded on 22 March 2008 by the Na­ way forward, but the real paradigm shift is his tional Response Framework). As officials acknowledgment that “IO deals with effects” struggle to revise guidance, the intent of the (emphasis in original, p. 56) and not the ca­ guidance remains the same: to help all levels of government prepare to respond to any type pabilities or means from outdated policies of incident. The American people want us to that seem to keep us tied in knots. be prepared to help. Don’t forget that we His proposed definition moves IO away need to win their “hearts and minds” too. posse from the current Department of Defense / comitatus only forbids using federal troops service overemphasis on IO’s physical dimen­ without authorization from the president or sion (computers, communication systems, net­ Congress, originally because county sheriffs works, supporting infrastructure, etc.) and were abusing the privilege of using those closer to both the informational and cognitive troops, which distracted them from their fed­ dimensions of JP 3-13 that actually influence eral mission. In addition, posse comitatus ap­ the decision-making process. In fact, his defi­ plies only to law enforcement, not humani­ nition mirrors concepts from the preeminent tarian missions or other military roles. These situational awareness (SA) researcher Dr. Mica important points were left out of Major Wat­ Endsley and her graphical model of SA in dy­ son’s article. Aside from law enforcement, namic decision making (available at http:// we’d do well to follow the example of Lt Col www.satechnologies.com/Papers/pdf/SA Hap Arnold’s response to the 1933 earthquake Theorychapter.pdf). An academic version of in Long Beach, California, that claimed 112 the famed observe, orient, decide, act (OODA) lives. Rather than making quake victims wait loop, Dr. Endsley’s model of SA focuses on in­ for the nearest unit, whose commanding offi­ formation flow and decision-maker percep­ cer was unavailable, Arnold mobilized the Air­ tions of environmental information, rather men at March Field to provide immediate re­ than the physical systems themselves, to align lief. The National Response Framework won’t overall SA and influence decision making. cover every situation, nor is that the intent. What a novel approach: using the science Nothing can replace sound professional judg­ of human factors (cognition and decision ment and common sense. We need not be

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paralyzed by antiquated legislation. Flexibility Lorenz’s principles to the task at hand—re­ is the key to effective federal response. gardless of its size, complexity, or unique­ Capt Rick Rutowicz, USAF ness—can undoubtedly help all of us make cape canaveral Air Force Station, Florida the decisions that our rank or position re­ quires us to make. And sometimes a reminder by a general officer is just what we need. LORENZ ON LEADERSHIP Lt Col Donald G. Rehkopf Jr., USAFR Anyone who has taken the time to read rochester, new York “Lorenz on Leadership” (Summer 2005) and “Lorenz on Leadership: Part 2” (Spring 2008) is already following General Lorenz’s first TRUE CONFESSIONS OF AN EX­ principle: knowledge is power. That, of course, CHAUVINIST is the underlying premise for all educational I find Dr. David Mets’s reasoning and conclu­ endeavors. But knowledge is also the segue to sions in “True Confessions of an Ex-Chauvinist: his second core principle, “understand the Fodder for Your Professional Reading on mission.” Obviously, someone who does not Women and the Military” (Fall 2007) very en­ understand the mission is not going to be an lightening. While I and other students attended effective leader, but this principle has a corol­ Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell lary that everyone who has ever served AFB, Alabama, in 1992, we discussed in our knows—namely, that leaders must ensure that seminar the issue of women in combat, and I subordinates understand the mission as well. recall that I was the only one defending the po­ Collective knowledge is collective power. sition in favor of women. My point of view was Most Air and Space power Journal readers, re­ based on the fact that the combat aircraft that I gardless of rank, have experienced the staff flew for 10 years had been tested and accred­ meeting that begins with, “We have been ited by a woman—Jacqueline Auriol from tasked to do X, no later than 10 days from France. If a product like the Mirage III emerged now.” As the groans and moans subside and from the experienced hands of this woman, the discussion turns to devising a plan and undoubtedly our arguments against women in delegating tasks, it is all too easy for those in combat would have no support. charge—the leaders—to fail to ensure that their subordinates “understand the mission.” Col Raul A. Federico, Argentine Air Force Buenos Aires, Argentina If we think about what General Lorenz is teaching us—his mission-accomplishment principles (i.e., think “out of the box” when editor’s note: colonel Federico read the Spanish ver­ necessary, accomplish the mission with the re­ sion of that article, available at http://www.air sources at hand, never give up, and always “do power.maxwell.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/ the right thing”)—then we must by necessity 2007/4tri07/mets.htm. revert to his principle of “understand the mis­ sion.” How can any of us “lead” if we cannot or TRUE CONFESSIONS OF AN EX­ do not make the effort to ensure that our sub­ CHAUVINIST: THE AUTHOR RESPONDS ordinates understand the mission? Simply say­ ing, “General Smith directed us to do this” Thank you for your kind remarks about my arti­ may be the truth, but it will not eliminate the cle. Certainly your experience at Air Command quizzical looks of those who are being tasked and Staff College was not unique. Probably, the to do something that they may or may not un­ vast majority of males in the American military derstand. However, there will be some occa­ then and before opposed women in combat. It sions when detailed explanations are inappro­ is one of the glories of democracy, I think, that priate due to security considerations or other notwithstanding their personal feelings, the factors. Knowing where to draw the line is the ones in the Air Force loyally adhered to the tra­ challenge of leadership. Applying General dition established by Gen George Washington

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that the military must forever be subordinate to also be the first one to acknowledge that the the will of the civilian leadership in the Congress data analyzed for the article were examined and the executive branch. prior to the 2007 surge in US forces. However, Dr. David R. Mets when dispassionately looking at the calcula­ Maxwell AFB, Alabama tions, one finds that the most commonly en­ countered Nash solution was the one presented in the “Nash in Najaf” article. NASH IN NAJAF: Dr. Hank Brightman THE AUTHOR RESPONDS Jersey city, new Jersey I really appreciate Lt Col Peter Farney’s feed­ back (“Ricochets and Replies,” Spring 2008) THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS on my article “Nash in Najaf: Game Theory and Its Applicability to the Iraqi Conflict” (Fall Mr. Charles Kamps’s article “The Cuban Mis­ 2007). My article represents only a small por­ sile Crisis: Forty-Five Years in the Balance” tion of a two-year research project. As Colonel (Fall 2007) ends by saying, “The fact that we Farney quite correctly surmised, a number of were off balance for operations against Cuba other potential Nash solutions emerged when offers a lesson for the future” (p. 88). The au­ we entered our players, moves, and payoffs into thor meant to warn the US military to learn the Gambit extensive-form modeling program. from this event the lesson of how unbalanced While the majority of those solutions remained strategy and military developments could tightly correlated with the version presented in cause serious consequences in case of a US- the “Nash in Najaf” article, Colonel Farney is Soviet war. Fortunately, that war was avoided; wholly correct in noting that cooperation however, the author’s reference to “balance” among Kurdish, Sunni, and Shiite blocks did and “global responsibilities” (p. 88) reminds present itself as an alternative Nash solution. me of the broad global balance of power. However, even in this scenario, alignment with Since World War II, regional armed con­ US interests was not manifest as a Pareto im­ flicts have not stopped. From the Korean War proved strategy because the United States re­ to the Vietnam War, from the Middle East wars mains in the role of a strange attractor (as op­ to the Iraq-Iran War, from Afghanistan to the posed to the role of a player). In fact, short of Balkans, we find regional imbalances every­ the United States’ taking on the role of a player where even though the overall global balance by remaining in Iraq with large numbers of endures. Who then is “responsible” for restor­ forces for many, many years; the emergence of ing regional balances in order to keep the a far-greater sacrifice on the part of the Ameri­ overall balance from collapsing? can people through rationing; a war tax on The world witnesses the United States inter­ gasoline; and so forth (as I addressed in the ar­ fering with other areas at will, the European ticle), the probability of a cohesive Kurdish/ Union expanding vehemently, Russia actively Sunni/Shiite block aligned with US interests “recovering,” and China developing economi­ falls well below my prior Bayesian analysis with cally and militarily at an enormous speed. All of an alpha set at .01. (That is, there is less than a these powers appear to be working to maintain one in 1,000 chance that this solution would the world balance; however, I know that beneath come to fruition.) the surface, each big power is pursuing different Moreover, this probability is based on linear objectives. I believe that the relative balance be­ analysis, while the current Iraqi model is actu­ tween big powers may be more detrimental than ally a nonlinear, extensive-form hypergame, so beneficial because such a balance is based on the reality of a “unified” Iraq aligned with US arms races that seek new military advantages interests is even smaller than this Bayesian de­ and therefore pose a real threat to the world bal­ termination suggests. Again, as I noted in the ance. The Soviet-US race for military advantages article, there are likely many good humanitarian that almost triggered war during the Cuban cri­ and economic reasons to remain in Iraq. I will sis serves as good evidence.

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My view is that a few big powers alone cannot As Plato said, “Only the dead have seen the end maintain the world balance. Military interven­ of war,” but a well-recognized balance of power tion is no longer a viable solution, as demon­ can keep us from repeating the horrific experi­ strated by the United States’ inability to end the ences of the first half of the twentieth century. Iraq war. Whether it is the Cuban missile crisis, Charles Kamps which almost escalated into a nuclear war, or the Maxwell AFB, Alabama ongoing Iraq conflict, the application of military power may succeed in the short term but will never succeed in balancing the minds of people. DEVELOPING AIRMEN: EDUCATING It is the balance of the populace’s mind that pro­ AND TRAINING LEADERS vides the fundamental guarantee of world peace. I read with interest Lt Col Paul Berg’s article In essence, the big powers’ pursuit of balanced “Developing Airmen: Educating and Training strategic and military service development aims Leaders” (Summer 2007). The author asserts to gain military advantages and often results in that “professional Airmen require a flexible upsetting the world’s overall balance. This global balance between broad education, which balance, rather than the small balance discussed teaches them how to think in creative, theo­ in Mr. Kamps’s article, should make the author retical terms, and specific training, which think twice. teaches them how to perform practical tasks” San Jinsheng (p. 26). While this statement certainly talks to Jiangsu, china the point about the relationship between training and education, the whole article re­ editor’s note: Mr. San read the chinese version of flects the typical American way of technical that article, available at http://www.airpower thinking (i.e., developing officersthe way that .maxwell.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-c/2008/ a processing line makes products according to spr08/Kamps_07.htm. a fixed set of steps, which neglects the differ­ ences in human potential). Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, a German THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: Army leader in World War II, supposedly said, THE AUTHOR RESPONDS “There are only four types of officer. First, there My short piece was meant to highlight the im­ are the lazy, stupid ones. Leave them alone, they balance between strategic nuclear forces and do no harm. . . . Second, there are the hard­ operational forces in the specific case of op­ working, intelligent ones. They make excellent tions for Cuba, but I understand Mr. San’s per­ staff officers, ensuring that every detail is prop­ spective. However, history shows that a few erly considered. Third, there are the hard­ strong nations or alliances always provide the working, stupid ones. These people are a men­ balance of power in the world, without which ace and must be fired at once. They create there would be total chaos. irrelevant work for everybody. Finally, there are The four decades of the Cold War featured the intelligent, lazy ones. They are suited for the a nuclear arms race that, in essence, kept the highest office.” (See “Von Manstein’s 4 Officer world safe for conventional war—in particular, Types—Adapted for Managers,” en Avant: The very limited proxy wars. Additionally, the two Weblog of Jim donovan, http://jimdonovan.net major power blocs “kept a lid on” rogue re­ .nz/2008/03/06/von-mansteins-4-officer-types gional powers and movements such as virulent -adapted-for-managers.) The most important Islamist extremism, which today threaten un­ consideration here is personal qualities, and checked violence if not countered through inter­ Field Marshal von Manstein knew how to use dif­ vention by coalitions of concerned nations. ferent officers according to their different quali­ The “civilized” world is still seeking a post– ties. In Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, we read another Cold War “readjustment” of the balance of passage that discusses the human qualities that power. This may take some time to come to frui­ make a leader. Sun Tzu says, “By command, I tion and will entail different players than before. mean the general’s qualities of wisdom, sin­

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cerity, humanity, courage and strictness” (trans. well. I rated my own “level” as described by the Samuel B. Griffith [Oxford: Clarendon Press, article and tried to get other people to discuss 1963], p. 65). More recent Chinese sayings such which level they fit into. Just as I thought, the as “tutor people to bring out their best gifts” or brand-new staff sergeants didn’t even respond, “put the right people in the right places” further so they obviously fit into level one because they mirror this way of thinking that puts more weight saw little reason to do anything not required of on human qualities. them. When I approached my flight chief (a There is no doubt that in modern wars, mili­ master sergeant), he told me that this article is tary technologies and the knowledge of how to actually taught at the Senior NCO Academy. As use them play increasingly important roles. I said, this article can fit anywhere with any Even so, it is a pity that this article focuses on rank, and I feel that it should be considered for skill training and theory education only, men­ use in all formal professional military educa­ tioning nothing about educating people and tion. I was impressed with the article and found inspiring their different potentials. it to be quite an eye opener. Sui Feng SSgt Mark J. Adams, USAF Beijing, china Luke AFB, Arizona editor’s note: Mr. Sui read the chinese version of that article, available at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af

.mil/apjinternational/apj-c/2007/win07/Berg.htm. INTRODUCING THE CHINESE ASPJ Thank you for sending the Chinese edition of MY FATHER AND I AND SABURO SAKAI Air and Space power Journal to the Third Military Medical College. The journal discusses many I found Col Francis Stevens’s article “My Father topics that are highly interesting to Chinese ser­ and I and Saburo Sakai” (chronicles Online Journal, vicemen, such as leading-edge thinking, military 21 June 2006) quite moving. My father served in doctrine, strategy and tactics, armed-force devel­ the Pacific during World War II. When I was a kid, opment, leadership, military ethics, education, the Japanese were simply the bad guys until I read and so forth. Through this journal, we come to Sakai’s 1957 memoir entitled Samurai! That book know that there exists a high-level military aca­ humanized the common Japanese man and demic forum where interested professionals can made me admire Sakai for his bravery and excel­ exchange views. I look forward to reading more lence in many areas. I share Colonel Stevens’s excellent articles and wish this journal success in view that Saburo Sakai was a soldier doing his enhancing international military academic ex­ duty even if he did not relish it. change as well as promoting world peace. Steven Perry newnan, Georgia Zhou Yan chongqing, china

THE MASTER SERGEANT WATERSHED As a librarian at a Nanjing University, I am im­ I do not currently supervise other noncommis­ pressed with the overall quality of Air and Space sioned officers (NCO), but I do get to interact power Journal-chinese. University libraries like with many of them. After stumbling upon Capt ours will be delighted to offer such quality jour­ Raymond M. Powell’s article “The Master Ser­ nals to our readers. This one, in particular, will geant Watershed: A Practical Guide for Super­ help readers gain a very valuable perspective visors of the Enlisted Corps’ Critical Stripe” when judging the China-US relationship. Per­ (chronicles Online Journal, 24 April 2003), I sonally, I regard the lack of sufficient exchange quickly tried to disseminate it to other NCOs, as the major cause for numerous misunder­ specifically brand-new staff sergeants. To adapt standings and misconceptions. Your journal the article to my needs, I shifted its use of the certainly can play a positive role in this arena. master sergeant rank to staff sergeant and saw Mr. Li that Captain Powell’s principles worked equally nanjing, china

Prelaunch Ricochet 2008-3.indd 24 7/28/08 7:19:34 AM ASPJ

Lt CoL PauL D. Berg, uSaF, ChieF, ProFeSSionaL JournaLS

RedefiningAir , Space, and Cyber Power

he meaning of the term airpower corporating cyber power into the mix is even is expanding in ways that will affect more difficult. The five military operational tomorrow’s US air force. in 1925 domains may not be equally important, and gen Billy mitchell defined it simply their relative importance may vary. The air Tas “the ability to do something in the air,” but force sees cyberspace as fundamental not only the term now encompasses activities in addi­ to air and space operations but also to those tional operating domains.1 gen T. michael on land and at sea. although the details of moseley, former air force chief of staff, said these “cross-domain” interrelationships remain that “21st Century airpower is not merely the unclear, the air force is actively rethinking its sum but the product of air, space and cyberspace role in national defense.3 general moseley’s superiority” and that we must “redefine the redefinition of both airpower and the air air force for the 21st Century” (emphasis in 2 force seeks to capture synergies among air, original). space, and cyber power in a more comprehen­ general moseley’s definition reflects the air sive manner than previous efforts to blend air force’s mission “to fly and fight in air, Space, and space power. and Cyberspace,” a multidomain view that has emerged over time. When the US air force Time will tell whether our former chief’s was established in 1947, one could partition new definitions prove more convincing than the battlespace into air, land, and sea domains. previous attempts to link activities in different These domains clearly interacted, yet it was domains. at a minimum, his conception inte­ still possible to conceive of semi-independent grates rather than divides military activities in operations in each of them. Back then, the air various domains; therefore, it may promote force could focus on air operations while the better cooperation both within the air force army and navy concentrated on their respec­ and among all the services. if history is any tive domains. as long as each service’s contri­ guide, our views about how air, space, and cy­ butions fit together harmoniously, summing ber power interrelate will continue to evolve. their results might yield overall success. Air and Space Power Journal, the professional however, the mere summation of results journal of the air force, dedicates this issue to achieved in separate domains is no longer ade­ promoting dialogue about this vital topic. ❑ quate because today’s battlespace features ad­ ditional domains that interact in ways difficult to comprehend. Space power emerged about 50 years ago, and the air force’s understand­ Notes ing of the linkage between air and space has 1. William mitchell, Winged Defense: The Development fluctuatedperiodically since then. We have al­ and Possibilities of Modern Air Power—Economic and Military ternately perceived air and space either as (1925; repr., new York: Dover Publications, 1988), xii. separate mediums or as a single aerospace 2. gen T. michael moseley, The Nation’s Guardians: continuum. more recently, cyberspace has America’s 21st Century Air Force, CSaf White Paper (Wash­ ington, DC: Department of the air force, office of the emerged as another important military do­ Chief of Staff, 29 December 2007), 3, 2, http://www.af main. if grasping the linkage between air and .mil/shared/media/document/afD-080207-048.pdf. space power has proved challenging, then in­ 3. ibid., 2.

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Focus Area.indd 25 7/28/08 7:20:08 AM Ira C. Eaker Award Winners for the top Air & Space Power Journal articles of the past year

First Place Second Place Third Place Lt Col Bruce K. Johnson Maj Bryan D. Watson Maj Geoffrey F. Weiss “Dawn of the Cognetic Age: “A Look down the Slippery Slope: “Exposing the Information Fighting Ideological War Domestic Operations, Domain Myth: A New Concept by Putting Thought in Outsourcing, and the Erosion for Air Force and Information Motion with Impact” of Military Culture” Operations Doctrine” (Winter 2007) (Spring 2008) (Spring 2008)

Congratulations to this year’s winners! The award honors airpower pioneer Gen Ira C. Eaker and is made possible through the generous support of the Air University Foundation. If you would like to compete for the Ira C. Eaker Award, submit a feature-length article to Air and Space Power Journal via e-mail at [email protected] or [email protected]. All military personnel be­ low the rank of colonel (O-6) or government civilian employees below GS-15 or equivalent are eligible. If ASPJ publishes your article, you will automatically be entered in the competition.

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Eaker.indd 26 7/28/08 7:37:59 AM In air combat, “the merge” occurs when opposing aircraft meet and pass each other. Then they usually “mix it up.” In a similar spirit, Air and Space Power Journal’s “Merge” articles present contending ideas. Readers are free to join the intellectual battlespace. Please send comments to [email protected] or [email protected]. Reply to “A New Form of Air Warfare”

Col José C. D’oDoriCo, Argentine Air ForCe, retireD*

eAding the ideAS that the en­ ephemeral status, subject to changing hands thusiastic and creative French Air by means of legerdemain. A full roster of items Force lieutenant tim Larribau de­ sustains the side that exercises air superiority velops in his article “A new Form of over any other challenger. that roster includes RAir Warfare” (Fall 2007) prompted me to out­ doctrines, organizations, resources, and train­ line some thoughts derived from my own vi­ ing, all of which contribute to maintaining an sion of airpower and air superiority and the advantageous air situation over the long term. meaning of those terms in the air and space A fortuitous or surprising enemy deed does environment.† Lieutenant Larribau contends not in a single blow alter the very complex that the tragic events of 11 September 2001 combination of factors that frames the air su­ (9/11) in the United States led to a truly new periority situation. way to conquer a fleeting and unexpected de­ Conceiving of air superiority in this man­ gree of air superiority that allowed a small ner, i contend that seizing it by means of a group of terrorists to launch a horrifying at­ mere isolated action would be very difficult. tack against American targets in the home­ in the final analysis, just four commercial air­ land. But the author goes farther, presuming craft were involved in 9/11, and only three of that we face a new kind of aerial warfare whose them reached their unfortunate targets. Look­ procedures and rules of engagement diverge ing dispassionately at the outcome, one must from airpower’s historical fundamentals. i assess the attack as a coordinated act that en­ would say that Lieutenant Larribau believes joyed only partial success (one aircraft did not he is witnessing the revolutionary birth of a reach its target) due to two factors not always significant new way to dominate the air do­ taken into account: initiative and surprise. main. that is no small thing. however, the question is, did this premedi­ Let us do some analysis. When we judge tated, savage act put local American air superi­ that an air force achieves air superiority over ority at risk? Frankly, it did not. an opponent, we are in fact acknowledging We simply need to remember that preserv­ that the opponent enjoyed that advantage up ing a measure of air superiority does not pre­ until a particular moment when it then lost clude an opponent from undertaking suicidal superiority due to the opposing air force’s ac­ and unexpected attacks, as demonstrated by tions. nevertheless, air superiority is not an the Japanese kamikazes of World War ii. Yet

*Colonel d’Odorico has logged over 5,000 hours of flying time, has taught at the Argentine Air War College for nearly 40 years, and has written more than 200 articles about military topics. †editor’s note: Colonel d’Odorico read the Spanish version of Lieutenant Larribau’s article, available at http://www.airpower.maxwell .af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2007/4tri07/larribau.htm.

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whoever holds air superiority has the power to unsure about what to do in the face of a re­ exact a high price from those who make such fined manifestation of terror (the reason i reckless attacks. previously mentioned rules of engagement) Let me disagree with the young and vision­ wherein depraved minds patiently and per­ ary Lieutenant Larribau, whom i urge to con­ versely exploited those two factors—initiative tinue his research. these days, because un­ and surprise—that i hope no modern planner conventional wars are putting centuries-old ever forgets. theories to the test, our understanding of what neither should we mistakenly consider 9/11 is happening will require time, perseverance, only a police saga. no, it was an act of outright, and continuous effort. Once again, the events unconventional war. Sadly, therefore, i must of 9/11 did not inaugurate a new art of aerial warn everybody that this attack will not be the warfare. nor are we seeing the debut of a new last. We must keep initiative and surprise out concept of air superiority. the terrorists never of the enemy’s hands. ❑ placed American air superiority at risk. Rather, the Americans found themselves stunned and Buenos Aires, Argentina

1-Merge-Dodorico.indd 28 7/28/08 7:38:58 AM The Mission Matters Most

Lt CoL Graham W. rinehart, USaF, retired*

read wIth Interest randall schwal­ In disagreeing with a comparison I make be’s critique of my article “how the air between past quality-improvement implemen­ Force embraced ‘Partial Quality’ (and tation and what had been proposed more re­ avoiding similar Mistakes in new en­ cently, schwalbe makes another surprising Ideavors)” (winter 2006). his critique, “Lean statement that “tQM [total Quality Manage­ Is no Flavor of the Month” (Fall 2007), is well ment] has very little relevance in the service thought out but somewhat misses the point. sector” (p. 16). I have tried to point out in my First, I agree with his assertion that “design writings that the tQM name is unimportant defines quality” (p. 16), but I would add that to the issue of quality and in fact may have design does not determine quality: execution contributed to the frontline military’s rejec­ of the design determines the quality of the final tion of the improvement ethos; rather, quality- product or service. a well-designed widget improvement principles under whatever name that is poorly made could still be considered have always been relevant to the service sector low quality—think of a socket wrench that even if that sector was slow to accept them. won’t ratchet or that bends under a modicum schwalbe’s umbrage that the “ignominy” of of force—and a poorly designed widget that is tQM “drags Lean into the depths of ridicule” well made could be considered high quality if (p. 16) is understandable, but his attempt to it gets the job done. (Perhaps its quality level differentiate the two—in effect claiming they would be considered “high enough.”) are worlds apart—does not withstand close Mr. schwalbe makes the statement about scrutiny. at one point, he quotes something I design and quality as a means of saying that quoted as if I had written it myself, an indica­ the “fundamental flaw” of my article is that I tion that he may have confused my meaning. confuse “quality with process improvement” he writes that “the array of inaccurate or mis­ (p. 16). that my article deals with the way the leading statements in the name of Lean is one air Force implemented quality-improvement of the primary reasons that people disdain it” ideas in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and and then seems to prove his own point with attempts to show that the ideas themselves the cute statement that, contrary to his earlier were sound but the execution was flawed,does assertions, “Lean is the total absence of ‘ir­ not seem to come through: my execution, ap­ rashional’ policies and regulations” (p. 17). parently, was itself flawed. One area in which it becomes clear that schwalbe spends a large portion of his cri­ schwalbe has missed the point of my article is tique defending the tenets of Lean techniques, his reference to the toyota Production system. which have been proven effective and do not First, the phenomenon in which “production need his defense. In fact his defense is some­ analysts of major firmsstudy , analyze, fret over, times hard to follow. he tries to differentiate and mimic toyota’s system but continuously Lean from six sigma and then states that come up short” (p. 17) was actually predicted “Lean involves reducing process variability” by statistical consultant dr. w. edwards deming (emphasis in original, p. 16)—something that years ago. deming would say that these major the statistical process-control techniques of firms tried to copy what they did not under­ six sigma do. stand, which is a recipe for failure. second,

*the author is a writer and editor living in north Carolina.

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and more salient to this discussion, the com­ statistical techniques designed to ensure mercial success of toyota, Ford, Motorola, that repetitive processes produce uniform re­ and so forth, is not the best argument for con­ sults; continuous quality-improvement efforts vincing the military that these new tools and that seek to improve “form, fit, and function” techniques are germane to its mission. Obvi­ and customer satisfaction; and Lean initiatives ously I did not make that point clear enough that eliminate non-value-added effort and in my original article, so let me reiterate that, other waste are all highly effective, time- in order for members of the rank and file to proven ways to make organizations better. But see Lean or any other improvement effort as all too often they do not touch the military vital to their service’s continued success, these mission, and therefore they do not reach the efforts must be adapted to the core military military mind. ❑ mission as much as (if not more than) they are adapted to ancillary functions. Cary, North Carolina

The Airman’s Creed

I am an American Airman. I am a warrior. I have answered my nation’s call. I am an American Airman. My mission is to fly, fight, and win. I am faithful to a proud heritage, a tradition of honor, and a legacy of valor. I am an American Airman, guardian of freedom and justice, my nation’s sword and shield, its sentry and avenger. I defend my country with my life. I am an American Airman: wingman, leader, warrior. I will never leave an Airman behind, I will never falter, and I will not fail.

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Col Thomas E. snodgrass, UsaF, rETirEd*

ol William Darley’s article “stra­ sis that the war with a sharia-driven islam (i tegic imperative: The Necessity for refuse to use the term war on terror because it is Values operations as opposed to in­ so inadequate and misleading) is a cultural formation operations in iraq and struggle. mcGee denies that the jihadist ter­ Cafghanistan” (spring 2007) exactly frames in rorism the world experiences daily is born of a historic context our war arising from the ter­ the religion, arguing instead that it is only the rorism perpetrated by jihadists in the name of work of “criminals.”2 Unfortunately, mcGee islam. in laying out the historical framework provides no further explanation for the moti­ for war as a contest between cultures, Colonel vation of these islamic criminals but simply Darley accurately describes the context of im­ cites a facile statement in the Us National Secu­ perial warfare waged by rome, spain, Britain, rity Strategy for 2006: “While the War on Terror Czarist russia, manifest Destiny america, post– is a battle of ideas, it is not a battle of reli­ meiji revolution Japan, Nazi Germany, the gions.”3 But further pursuit of the question of stalinist soviet Union, and now islam, to cite terrorist justification in this document reveals the author’s examples. that the bottom-line “explanation” remains of course, imperial warfare, which pits cul­ unsubstantiated by fact. The Bush administra­ tures in conflict, must be differentiated from tion and, by extension, mcGee rest the case the landgrab border wars that plagued europe for criminal motivation on the following refer­ for centuries, the objective of which was cer­ ence to terrorist ideology: “an ideology that tainly not to replace the attacked nation’s royal justifiesmurder . Terrorism ultimately depends culture of kingship and aristocracy. in contrast upon the appeal of an ideology that excuses to the european wars between kings to settle or even glorifies the deliberate killing of inno­ limited and specific territorial or political is­ cents. a proud religion—the religion of islam— sues, Darley describes imperial warfare in terms has been twisted and made to serve an evil of imposing a foreign “civil religion” on the end, as in other times and places other reli­ country/population under siege. in this con­ gions have been similarly abused.”4 text of imperialist warfare, civil religion is an if we are to accept President Bush’s justifi­ amalgamation of “selectively remembered and cation, it means that the terrorists are moti­ embellished events, myths of origin, heroic sto­ vated just by murder for the sake of murder, ries, and proclaimed values” that provide a so­ while islam is only an excuse for their mind­ ciety with an “imagined community.”1 The task less killing. it stretches credulity to believe for imperialists is to impose their version of that osama bin laden has taken to Neander­ civil religion by spreading their imagined com­ thal cave living because he is a crazed, homi­ munity to the conquered in order to seal the cidal maniac. victory and preclude a renewed outbreak of astonishingly, this explanation of terrorist war. Darley’s description of imposing a civil re­ motivation ignores the words regarding jihad ligion on an unreceptive but subdued society contained in sharia, a theo-political-legal doc­ fits the practice of islamic jihad as it has been trine based on the Koran (the exact words of waged for approximately 1,400 years. allah as revealed to muhammad), the sunna However, in “We are at War with Terrorists, (“the way of the prophet” as contained in Hadith Not muslims” (spring 2008), lt Col michael and sira, collections of experiences and say­ mcGee takes issue with Colonel Darley’s analy­ ings of muhammad), ijima (the consensus of

*The author, who retired after 30 years in the Us air Force, including a tour in Pakistan, is currently the director, military intelligence and strategy, society of americans for National existence. He teaches military history at embry-riddle aeronautical University, Prescott, arizona.

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islamic scholars), Qiya (islamic scholarly rea­ • sura 5:51 – “o you who believe! Take not the soning by analogy), and centuries of clerical Jews and the Christians for your friends and debate, interpretation, and precedent. The protectors: they are but friends and protectors Bush explanation also ignores the statements to each other. and he among you that turns to them for friendship is of them.” (This friendship of the jihadists themselves, who have made makes any Muslim an enemy of his own people and clear their total commitment to implementa­ deserving of the same fate as that of the unbeliever. In tion of sharia worldwide. other words, Allah explicitly states that Jews and sharia encompasses the totality of religious, Christians are enemies of Muslims and that any political, social, domestic, and muslim private Muslim who befriends them is deserving of the pun­ life. although primarily meant for muslims, it ishment of infidels, which is usually death.) also applies to people living within a muslim of course, the suras above represent just a society as conquered, second-class citizens bare sample of thousands of jihad-related in­ called dhiminis (in Darley’s paradigm, the tar­ junctions in islamic theology about subjugating gets of acculturation by islamic civil religion). all of humanity to islam by waging religious- The authority of sharia is established in Ko­ cultural warfare. Throughout sharia’s juris­ ranic sura (chapter) 45:17: “Then We [allah prudential history, all legal schools (Hanafi, refers to himself in the plural when instruct­ maliki, shafi’iyah, Hanabilah, ashari, Zaydi, ing muhammad] gave you a sharia [divine law] and isma’ili) dating back to the earliest legal in religion, follow it, and follow not the wishes rulings on war 1,200 years ago cite these pas­ of those who have no knowledge.” What sharia sages and declare that the Umma (the world­ has to say about jihad is simple and direct: wide muslim community/nation) has a solemn “The sacred injunction concerning war . . . is duty to wage war against unbelievers not pre­ established as a divine ordinance, by the word pared to convert or be subjugated. of God, who has said, in the Koran, ‘slay the The sharia command to make religious- infidels,’ and also by a saying of the prophet, cultural war and the Koranic rules of engage­ ‘war is permanently established until the day ment for jihad fit very well in the context of of judgment.’ ”5 sample quotations from the cultural, imperialist warfare to impose an Koran (followed by parenthetical commen­ alien civil religion on an unwilling popula­ tary in italics) unquestionably illustrate the tion as laid out by Darley. mcGee’s failure to authority for this sharia injunction: confront sharia and the jihad suras in the framework of a cultural struggle between is- • sura 9:5 – “and when the sacred months are lam and all other belief systems on the earth passed, kill those who join other gods with suggests perhaps that more study is in order. God wherever ye shall find them; and seize i personally see no point in trying to argue them, besiege them, and lay wait for them with every kind of ambush: but if they shall and document further what is apparent from convert, and observe prayer, and pay the a cursory reading of the quotations above obligatory alms, then let them go their way, and from people such as osama bin laden for God is Gracious, merciful.” (Kill those who who claim to be sharia authorities. do not receive Islam as their faith, but spare those However, i would like to register my dis­ who convert to Islam.) agreement with both Colonel Darley and Col­ onel mcGee concerning the appropriate Us • sura 9:29–31 – “make war upon such of those response to the jihadists. although their for­ to whom the scriptures have been given as be­ lieve not in God, or in the last day, and who mulations are somewhat different, both offi­ forbid not that which God and His apostle cers call for a strategic response that occasions have forbidden, and who profess not the pro­ a basic change in islamic theology. That is, fession of the truth, until they pay tribute out Darley correctly identifies the core belief of of hand, and they be humbled.” (Fight unbe­ islam: “The Koran places the God of islam at lievers until they are destroyed or submit and pay the center of government and asserts that His tax to Islamic officials.) words as written in the Koran are unchange­

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able, especially by people, and certainly not eralization is something to be resisted, not through popular selection by majority vote.”6 embraced, by the society’s power brokers. But then in the next sentence he engages in a Whether mcGee realizes it or not, his rec­ leap of hope that causes his analysis to go off ommended strategy is flawed in the same man­ the rails: ner but is more confused. on the one hand, he quotes “Ten misconceptions about islam,” (Nevertheless, among fundamentalist muslims of all stripes exists the practice of ceding inter­ which correctly states that “the islamic state pretation of what the Koran means in practice must derive its law from the Qur’an and sunnah. to clerics and islamic scholars.) as a result, we This principle excludes certain choices from the Is­ must realize that we can successfully establish lamic state’s options for political and economic systems, democratic pluralism in countries that have such as pure democracy, [emphasis in original] never known it only if we broadly supplant cul­ unrestricted capitalism, communism, socialism, etc. tural values at a grassroots level that currently [emphasis added]”8 makes cultural acceptance of democracy virtu­ However, after setting out this absolutely ally impossible due to islamic literalism.7 correct characterization of the systemic resis­ even granting that clerics or contemporary tance to change and modernization in islamic sharia authorities are ceded the authority to society, mcGee inexplicably rests his strategy reinterpret the islamic law of jihad, Darley on changing islam! fails to explain why and how islamic scholars if we are to succeed in iraq (and the middle would reverse 1,400 years of cultural tradition east), we cannot simply dismiss those elements and totally change the basis of islamic society’s of culture and civilization with which we dis­ politico-religious organizing principle. Through­ agree. instead, we must acknowledge them, find out islam’s history, attempts to “liberalize” it means to discuss their application in new ways, have never enjoyed the type of success that and, finally, help muslim leaders and their popu­ lations use those new methods to solve real cul­ Darley projects. in fact, Turkey, probably the tural (social, economic, educational, etc.) issues greatest success in terms of islamic liberaliza­ throughout the middle east. The United states tion, thanks to mustafa Kemal atatürk’s brute should concentrate on helping to transition force, is currently in the process of sliding muslim culture into the twenty-first century.9 back into the grip of islamic fundamentalism. in other words, the hope of installing democ­ in view of the fact that islamic leadership op­ racy as a strategy to quell jihad rests on a non­ erates based on the consensus developed by existent historical foundation and is without sharia authorities over 1,200 years, to propose realistic prospects. Quite simply, islamic clerics that we are going to “find means to discuss are in the same position that the soviet no­ their application in new ways” is a flight of fan­ menklatura were in during the last days of the tasy. Hope cannot be our strategy. obviously, ❑ soviet Union, in that liberalization means loss our strategic thinking needs more work. of political and cultural control; therefore, lib- Prescott, Arizona

Notes 1. Col William m. Darley, “strategic imperative: The 3. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America Necessity for Values operations as opposed to information (Washington, DC: The White House, march 2006), 9, operations in iraq and afghanistan,” Air and Space Power http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf. Journal 21, no. 1 (spring 2007): 34, http://www.airpower 4. ibid., 10. 5. The Hedaya: Commentary on the Islamic Laws, trans. Charles .maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj07/spr07/spr07.pdf. Hamilton (New Delhi: Kitab Bhavan, 1985), 2:140–41. 2. lTC michael r. mcGee, “We are at War with Ter­ 6. Darley, “strategic imperative,” 36–37. rorists, Not muslims,” Air and Space Power Journal 22, no. 1 7. ibid., 37. (spring 2008): 21, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/ 8. mcGee, “We are at War,” 22. airchronicles/apj/apj08/spr08/spr08.pdf. 9. ibid.

3-Merge-Snodgrass.indd 33 7/28/08 7:39:50 AM Planetary Defense Potential Mitigation Roles of the Department of Defense

Lt CoL Peter Garretson, UsaF Maj DoUGLas KaUPa, UsaF*

arth’s orbit around the sun is automobile-sized asteroid hits Earth’s atmo­ a hazardous location, and our collec­ sphere, creat[ing] an impressive fireball.”3 us tive safety so far has been purely a missile-warning satellites annually record as matter of luck. despite the image of a many as 30 bolides (meteoroids that detonate Epristine “harmony of spheres” that we inherited in the atmosphere, otherwise known as fire­ from the ancients, the solar system is a cosmic balls), often releasing as much energy as a shooting gallery filled with leftover debris nuclear blast (see fig. 1, which includes several from planetary formation. this debris, includ­ years of data superimposed over Earth’s sur­ ing asteroids and comets, orbits the sun at face).4 Composed of ice-rock mixtures, these relative velocities of 11–25 kilometers (km) bolides range in size from a few meters in di­ per second or 10 times faster than a speeding ameter up to 50–60 meters. it is important to bullet.1 as our planet transits this dangerous emphasize that objects smaller than 50–60 ocean, we have established no worldwide secu­ meters seldom penetrate the entire depth of rity network to warn of or mitigate collisions the atmosphere to create impact disasters.5 with space debris. however, more massive objects occasionally both a position paper by the american in­ do so, causing greater concern. stitute for aeronautics and astronautics entitled We shouldn’t become complacent because “Protecting Earth from asteroids and Comets” even larger objects intersect Earth’s orbit. the (2004) and a 2007 planetary-defense confer­ surfaces of the moon, Mercury, and Mars show ence in Washington, dC, examined the issue that debris has hit with relative frequency. un­ of finding a home in government for asteroid like these heavenly bodies, Earth is an active defense, designating it a top priority.2 this ar­ ticle advocates establishing a lead agency, such as us strategic Command (stratCoM), for handling mitigation procedures, creating lines of communication, and defining planetary- defense policy for the united states and per­ haps for the united nations.

Background Data according to the national aeronautics and space administration (nasa), “Every day, Earth is bombarded with about 25 tons of dust Figure 1. Satellite-observed bolide atmospheric and sand-sized particles. about once a year, an entries. Image courtesy of Air Force Future Concepts.

*Lieutenant Colonel Garretson is chief, Future science and technology Exploration branch, headquarters usaF Future Concepts and transformation, Washington, dC. Major Kaupa, stationed at Edwards aFb, California, is an operational test pilot and test director for the chief of staff of the air Force’s top-priority acquisition program—the KC-45a.

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planet with tectonic and erosion forces that could produce tsunamis more powerful than largely obscure impact craters. nevertheless, the indian ocean earthquake of 2004, leaving geologists have now confirmed that asteroids thousands dead. based on lunar-cratering stud­ or comets have scarred Earth with 160 craters ies, local-damage asteroids collide with Earth (fig. 2), and they discover more each year. al­ every 200 to 300 years, on average.6 (other stud­ though we have found impact craters mostly ies indicate every few thousand years. a defined on land (fig. 2), bolides can occur anywhere planetary defense would refine such estimates on our home planet (fig. 1). of the danger of impact.)7 a city-killing asteroid this article divides potential Earth-impacting hit tunguska, siberia, in 1908, missing Moscow, asteroids into four categories. Generally, aster­ russia, by only three hours.8 this atmospheric oids with a density less than or equal to that of explosion flattened a forested area three times rock and less than .5 km across can cause “local as large as the district of Columbia.9 definitive damage,” defined as destruction of an area research published in Nature magazine indicates equivalent to a moderate-sized city, such as that the tunguska bolide had asteroid origins Kansas City, Missouri. these “city-killers” would and detonated approximately 10 km above the reduce most houses and buildings to rubble, ground with a force of 10 to 20 megatons of and any combustible material within 8 to 16 km tnt, making it over 1,000 times more powerful of the impact would burn. debris would scatter than the first atomic weapons.10 for tens of kilometers, possibly causing wide­ asteroids with diameters between .5 and 2 spread fires. if the asteroid fell into the ocean, it km, known as “nation destroyers,” can create

Figure 2. Locations of 160 impact craters on Earth. (From Lunar and Planetary Institute, http://www .lpi.usra.edu/publications/slidesets/craters/slide_2.html [accessed 10 January 2007].) Image created as an illustration for the Terrestrial Impact Crater slide set. Reprinted by permission from the Lunar and Planetary Institute.

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“regional destruction,” wiping out countries $IJDYVMVC such as the united Kingdom or india. having  the potential of killing and injuring a substan­ tial portion (up to 25 percent) of the human "MM
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:FBST taminate farming. the consequent elimination     of more than 25 percent of the human popu­ 'SFRVFODZ lation would greatly affect civilization, setting it back several decades. Figure 3. Megatons of TNT compared to impact frequency. (From NASA and National Resources Finally, asteroids more massive than 10 km of Canada, “Impact Hazard,” 10 February 1999, can become “planet killers,” imparting kinetic http://liftoff.msfc.nasa.gov/Academy/SPACE/ energy equivalent to 100 million megatons of SolarSystem/Meteors/ImpactHazard.html [ac- tnt—hundreds of times greater than all the cessed 17 January 2007].) Courtesy of NASA and nuclear weapons in the world (fig. 3).11 impacts National Resources of Canada. The Zhamanshin of this size would destroy the entire ecosystem crater formed nearly 1 million years ago from an and cause mass extinctions. Earth might have asteroid, leaving a bowl 14 km in diameter near suffered a few of these since life began. an im­ Zhamanshin, Kazakhstan. The Barringer or “Me- pact nearly 65 million years ago that created teor Crater” formed from a small, stony asteroid nearly 50,000 years ago in Arizona, leaving behind the Chicxulub crater off the Yucatan peninsula 12 a basin 1.5 km in diameter. After examining what might have eliminated the dinosaurs. was previously thought to be a volcano, renowned Zipping near Earth’s orbit, most of these geologist Eugene Shoemaker proved that it was potentially hazardous objects travel in predict­ in fact an impact crater, based on the presence able orbits, allowing us to spot them decades in of coesite and stishovite. These minerals are rare, advance. however, we have only begun to com­ dense forms of silica, found only where quartz- prehend the threat. Comets such as shoemaker- bearing rocks have been severely compressed. Levy 9 orbit too infrequently for us to charac­ They are not created by volcanic action; rather, terize them and arrive with very little warning. an impact event is the only known mechanism for creating these minerals. The Revelstoke fireball this particular one hit Jupiter in 1994, raining flashed across the British Columbian sky in 1965. down approximately 20 fragments several hun­ No impact occurred, but several people felt an at- dred meters in size and delivering several hun­ mospheric explosion. dred megatons of explosive power per frag­ ment.13 Furthermore, city killers can arrive without warning due to the spotty nature of ground-based telescopes and a meager bud­ our current surveillance. one such minimal get of $5 million/year) have catalogued over warning occurred on 18 March 2004, when an 4,000 near-Earth asteroids (nEa).15 the dis­ asteroid came within 3.4 Earth diameters or covery rate has increased each year during the 43,000 km from Earth, having been identified past decade (fig. 4). We predict that a subset only 48 hours prior.14 this distance lies just of the total nEas shown in figure 4—poten­ outside the geostationary orbits of satellites tially hazardous asteroids (Pha)—will come circling our home. within 750,000 km of our home, less than two since detection efforts began in the mid­ times the distance between Earth and the 1990s, nasa and supporting teams (using only moon. Phas are too massive to burn up in

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Figure 4. Discovered NEAs. (From Alan Chamberlin, “Near-Earth Asteroid Discovery Statistics,” NASA: Near Earth Object Program, http://neo.jpl.nasa.gov/stats [accessed 4 February 2007].) Courtesy of NASA/Alan Chamberlin. The gray area shows all NEAs, and the darker area shows only the large ones (those with diameters roughly 1 km and larger).

Earth’s atmosphere. as of november 2006, we Policy Perspectives have detected 843 of them, 700 larger than 1 km and capable of regional destruction.16 the good news is that, unlike predicting no known asteroids target Earth now or for earthquakes and hurricanes, we can actually the next several years. however, this informa­ see most asteroids and comets arriving years tion can change rapidly. nobody knows how or decades in advance and do something long Earth will be spared. our planet has not about it. the technology required to avert a catastrophe lies within our reach, at a com­ been so fortunate in the past. With 843 Phas paratively modest expenditure. however, no and counting, we must seriously consider miti­ one is in charge, no one owns the problem, gation options. rather than debate whether we and no one has been assigned the mission— need planetary defense, we must determine not nasa, air Force space Command (aFsPC), when we will need it. From a policy perspec­ or the department of homeland security (dhs). tive, we know that at least 843 asteroids prowl­ We have no on-the-shelf contingency plans, ing our neighborhood could cause local, re­ tabletop interagency scenarios, interagency gional, or global destruction, so we have just memoranda of agreements, standard operat­ begun to understand the total threat. We ing procedures, or hardware available for a won’t comprehend its full extent until we mitigation mission. overcome the “giggle factor” and stop errone­ having a decade of advance warning might ously ascribing such thinking to science fic­ seem like plenty of time to construct these tion. We need to create contingency plans and policies and a mitigation operation, but it establish guidelines as an insurance policy—a isn’t. We would need most of this time to slowly far less expensive proposition than the conse­ affect the velocity of an asteroid with a low- quences of suffering a direct hit. thrust, high-efficiencytug. reaching a menac­

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ing asteroid will take several years of flight lem, yet who should assume responsibility for a time as well. Clearly, we need mission plan­ planetary-defense mission? readers might won­ ning, spacecraft development, and testing. der why the authors mentioned stratCoM Current department of defense (dod) sys­ as a possibility. Why not some other part of the tem development and procurement can easily dod? Why the dod at all? Perhaps nasa run longer than a decade. the F-22 fighter could handle detection, reconnaissance, and aircraft alone has taken nearly 25 years to mitigation missions while trying to replace the evolve from a list of requirements to initial op­ space shuttle and return to the moon. Maybe erating capability.17 the dhs or Federal Emergency Management asteroids and comets differ significantly. agency (FEMa) represent a better option since no two are alike. rotation rates will affect impacts might become a national disaster. docking techniques, and different densities both nasa and the dod have expertise in and surface compositions will call for varying space matters and operate space assets, but deflection tactics. Given a very short time until nasa’s core mission is space exploration. the impact, we may have only one option: use ex­ dod’s core missions are maintaining us secu­ plosives to reduce the inbound asteroid into rity, protecting american lives, and ensuring smaller pieces. however, the efficacy of this the security of our allies. Expertise aside, plan­ approach remains subject to technical debate etary defense is clearly a defense mission. Fur­ and might result in several smaller impacts ther, since the dod maintains a robust space scattered across the globe. Even if each mete­ mission, the proposed mission appears more oroid piece is small enough to burn up within closely aligned with the strengths and scope of the atmosphere, no nation wishes to have fire­ the dod than with those of the dhs. balls redirected to its backyard. before we need Within the dod, possible options might in­ these proactive approaches that anticipate such clude aFsPC, the national security space office, problems, we must research and document the Missile defense agency, and stratCoM. them. because we may have only one opportu­ several reasons make stratCoM the best nity to evade an nEa, we must be prepared. option. For one, stratCoM’s mission calls Planetary defense may seem an abstract for “provid[ing] the nation with global deter­ and unreal national security risk. however, it rence capabilities and synchronized dod ef­ fects to combat adversary weapons of mass proved quite a serious problem for the dino­ 18 saurs, who previously inhabited our planet, and destruction worldwide.” the command co­ it poses no less a threat today. no matter how ordinates dod capabilities to thwart weapons of mass destruction. We can consider an in­ remote some people might think the chances bound Earth-impacting rock a weapon, despite of having rocks fall on their heads, they should the absence of an adversary. a combatant at least be concerned that no government or command, stratCoM has the established dod contingency plan exists to counter an lines of communication and the authority to impact or mitigate its consequences. react to strategic-level threats. it already main­ tains global vigilance and space situational aware­ Policy Recommendations ness. the former us space Command has been dissolved and subsumed by stratCoM. since no us-assigned or -authorized plan­ through aFsPC, the command already main­ etary-defense missions exist, the dod, as an tains daily space surveillance for detecting organization, does not have any “impact de­ launches of ballistic missiles and tracking arti­ fense” operations. Few individuals in the dod ficialsatellitesandEarth-orbitaldebris.although perceive this lack of policy as a problem, and aFsPC maintains space assets, operational those few who do must contend with the giggle control falls under stratCoM’s authority. it factor. this train of thought suppresses any also controls all military nuclear capability, further acknowledgement or research. assign­ perhaps the only option in certain minimum- ment of responsibility would rectify this prob­ warning scenarios. Moreover, stratCoM is

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well practiced and competent with respect to plan. technologies that appear promising for disseminating rapid warnings to civilian lead­ planetary defense are also attractive for civil ership and civil defense networks. Finally, the and defense applications, which include rapid command has years of experience in negotiat­ and responsive high-capacity launchers, high- ing and executing collective security arrange­ thrust rockets, long-duration power supply, ments, such as that of the north american and autonomous docking. aerospace defense Command with Canada stratCoM already maintains a space- and those involving the north atlantic treaty surveillance system. Creating a robust and auto­ organization.19 mated system to survey the sky continually for some detractors have stated that a planetary­ asteroids or comets to complement current dis­ defense program is too expensive for the covery programs would likely improve space united states to bear alone and that it belongs situational awareness. such systems could use in the international arena. although they make existing military ground-based sites for electro­ a reasonable point, several considerations re­ optical, deep-space surveillance telescopes to main. First, for such a critical survival issue, provide follow-up tracking of newly discovered the united states should not find itself at the nEas. by having more resources and people mercy of an internationally delayed or incom­ examine the planetary-defense mission, we plete plan. second, international cooperation could develop better systems and solutions. would still imply using us resources but with although merely assigning the planetary- less us control. third, significant national se­ defense mission to stratCoM would not curity reasons exist for having the united constitute a complete fix,it represents the im­ states pursue this capability for the defense of mediate next step to address the issue. Follow­ others. america has an interest in preserving ing authorization and assignment of the mis­ its democratic civilization and maintaining in­ sion to one specific agency, we can start to ternational security. examine other milestones. one of these en­ the united states reaps significant eco­ tails conducting a tabletop scenario to assess nomic benefits by providing international se­ our reaction capability and reveal significant curity. We have the most to gain by maintain­ capability gaps in order to determine useful ing security and the most to lose if it fails. by directions for exploration and the develop­ visibly pursuing the capability to defend the ment of a concept of operations (ConoPs). planet, we make ourselves increasingly essential an exercise of this nature would expose a to international security. Furthermore, we will much broader level of designers to the prob­ likely have to pay the bill anyway. the humani­ lems of planetary defense and possible op­ tarian crisis that could ensue from an impact tions. it would also bring together key agen­ with a 300-meter asteroid could easily dwarf cies to begin a dialogue about how to pursue the asian tsunami of 2004. the humanitarian interagency communication and actions.20 supply, airlift, sealift, and rebuilding costs would although the central player, stratCoM be staggering. Economic losses to us inves­ would never be the only one. developing proper tors, huge costs to us insurers, and a possible interagency coordination—a necessary enabler recession or depression resulting from the for this mission—would help identify short­ loss of a city or nation would likely occur. comings, which might include notification despite concerns about the expense of de­ procedures for an inbound asteroid, methods veloping such a planetary-defense system, it and times for informing the press, and inter­ would translate into a competitive advantage national cooperation roles for altering the tra­ for the united states. solving difficult problems jectory of an Earth-bound asteroid. Proper would create us intellectual capital, industrial coordination between internal and external capacity, and new technical areas of leader­ agencies supporting mitigation (aFsPC, nasa, ship critical to maintaining our lead in space. a searching program, etc.) and those agencies the technology needed to protect the planet dealing with consequences should mitigation offers other advantages besides a contingency fail (FEMa, dhs, etc.) could be effectively ex­

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plored in the context of a tabletop scenario. such an effort to coordinate agencies for a massive event would likely bear significant fruit across the full spectrum of operations. We need to address many adequacy and funding issues. if stratCoM is tasked with the planetary-defense mission, the command needs to increase space situational awareness significantly in order to characterize the threat. not only do we need to assess adequacy by analyzing mitigation options, analyzing al­ ternatives, and establishing a contingency plan, but also we must create and execute scenarios Figure 5. Artist’s concept of a planetary-defense between interagency mitigation and disaster mitigation spacecraft deflecting an asteroid response to understand each other’s roles. the with Earth and the moon in the distance. (The initial effort need not be large in terms of per­ Asteroid Tugboat, painting by Dan Durda, in Rusty sonnel or dollars. one recommendation calls Schweickart, “Presentation to NASA’s NEO Study for establishing an office to create ConoPs Workshop,” 26 June 2006, slides 9, 10, 21, http:// plans. another involves commissioning studies, www.b612foundation.org/papers/AT-GT.pdf.) possibly from major universities, to examine Courtesy of Dan Durda, FIAAA/B612 Founda- tion. The B612 consists of a group of scientists alternative architectures for detection and and technical people concerned about the cur- mitigation similar to the Massachusetts insti­ rent lack of international or government action to 21 tute of technology’s Project icarus. a third protect Earth from an impact of NEAs. They seek would initiate efforts from the defense ad­ to “significantly alter the orbit of an asteroid in a vanced research Projects agency and the air controlled manner by 2015” and to establish pro- Force research Laboratory to help establish cedures and protocol in case an NEA is on a col- the best course of action to deflectan inbound lision course with Earth. “The B612 Foundation,” asteroid (fig.5). Further, a small military cadre http://www.b612foundation.org/about/welcome .html (accessed 30 October 2007). assigned to nasa and FEMa could aid plan­ ning integration and create lines of communi­ cation. Funding is less limiting than lack of both authorization and a clear mandate. Much doesn’t need a new dedicated agency or the can be accomplished with little investment, inevitable duplication of effort that it would which might amount to less than doubling the create. once we decide upon a lead agency, current $5 million budget utilized to search we would then turn to developing a ConoPs, for Phas.22 including the creation of interagency lines of communication. stratCoM will not be the lone actor because mitigation policies will de­ Conclusion mand capabilities found in other organiza­ the first and most important step in creat­ tions. after modifying existing search pro­ ing a planetary-defense plan is to finda home grams, we would identify the mitigation in the us government for such a program— options that need development and testing. preferably us stratCoM. other organizations Massive extinctions have occurred in the past would prove dysfunctional or suboptimal for and can certainly occur again. Earth is not im­ us security. We would enhance our national- mune to collisions with asteroids and comets, defense capabilities by working under strat- but we can prepare for these events by estab­ CoM auspices to pursue technology that might lishing a solid planetary-defense plan. ❑ not be available or easily transitioned if devel­ Washington, DC oped by another agency. the united states Edwards AFB, California

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Notes 1. Michael J. s. belton et al., eds., Mitigation of Hazard­ 96, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/ ous Comets and Asteroids (Cambridge, uK: Cambridge uni­ apj/apj97/sum97/nici.html (accessed 15 January 2007). versity Press, 2004), 167; and Maria Pereyra, “speed of a 10. Christopher F. Chyba, Paul J. thomas, and Kevin bullet,” in The Physics Factbook, ed. Glenn Elert, http:// J. Zahnle, “the 1908 tunguska Explosion: atmospheric hypertextbook.com/facts/1999/MariaPereyra.shtml (ac­ disruption of a stony asteroid,” Nature 361, no. 6407 (7 cessed 29 december 2006). January 1993): 40–44, http://www.nature.com/nature/ 2. “Protecting Earth from asteroids and Comets,” journal/v361/n6407/abs/361040a0.html (accessed 20 aiaa Position Paper (reston, Va: american institute of august 2007). aeronautics and astronautics, october 2004), http:// 11. bobrowsky and rickman, Comet/Asteroid Impacts pdf.aiaa.org//downloads/publicpolicypositionpapers// and Human Society, 211–13. asteroids-Final.pdf (accessed 22 January 2007); and 12. david E. Fastovsky and david b. Weishampel, The “White Paper: summary and recommendations” (2007 Evolution and Extinction of the Dinosaurs, 2d ed. (Cam­ Planetary defense Conference, Washington, dC, 5–8 bridge, uK: Cambridge university Press, 2005), 425–32. March 2007), http://www.aero.org/conferences/planetary 13. duncan steel, Target Earth: The Search for Rogue As­ defense/2007papers/WhitePaperFinal.pdf (accessed 17 teroids and Doomsday Comets That Threaten Our Planet (new august 2007). York: reader’s digest association, 2000), 40–41, 102–3. 3. “Keeping an Eye on space rocks, Part ii: size Mat­ 14. robert roy britt, “Earth safe from ultra-Close as­ ters,” NASA: Jet Propulsion Laboratory, http://www.jpl.nasa teroid Flyby today,” Space.com, 18 March 2004, http:// .gov/multimedia/neo/neo_flash2.cfm (accessed 29 oc­ www.space.com/scienceastronomy/asteroid_flyby_0403 tober 2007). 18.html (accessed 19 January 2007). 4. Peter bobrowsky and hans rickman, eds., Comet/ 15. belton et al., Mitigation of Hazardous Comets and As­ Asteroid Impacts and Human Society: An Interdisciplinary Ap­ teroids, 168; and alan Chamberlin, “near-Earth asteroid proach (new York: springer, 2007), 150. “satellite missile discovery statistics,” NASA: Near Earth Object Program, warning sensors show a significantnumber of asteroid im­ http://neo.jpl.nasa.gov/stats (accessed 4 February 2007). pacts in the upper atmosphere, well over 30 per year, of­ 16. “What is a Pha?” NASA: Near Earth Object Program, ten releasing in excess of 10 kilotons of energy in air­ http://neo.jpl.nasa.gov/neo/groups.html (accessed 4 bursts.” house, Statement of Brigadier General Simon P. Worden, Deputy Director for Operations, United States Strategic February 2007). Command, before the House Science Committee Space and Aero­ 17. david C. aronstein, Michael J. hirschberg, and nautics Subcommittee on Near-Earth Object Threat, 107th albert C. Piccirillo, Advanced Tactical Fighter to F-22 Raptor: Cong., 2d sess., 3 october 2002. Origins of the 21st Century Air Dominance Fighter (reston, 5. Clark r. Chapman, scientist, southwest research Va: american institute of aeronautics and astronautics, institute, boulder, Co, to the authors, e-mail, 23 July 1998), 1. 2007. 18. united states strategic Command, http://www 6. bobrowsky and rickman, Comet/Asteroid Impacts and .stratcom.mil (accessed 10 February 2007). Human Society, 286. 19. north american aerospace defense Command, 7. alan W. harris, “Evaluation of Present and Future http://www.norad.mil (accessed 30 october 2007); and Ground-based surveys and implications of a Large in­ “service Components,” united states strategic Command, crease in nEa discovery rate” (2007 Planetary defense http://www.stratcom.mil/organization-svc_comp.html Conference, Washington, dC, 5–8 March 2007), http:// (accessed 30 March 2007). www.aero.org/conferences/planetarydefense/2007 20. the air Force directorate of strategic Planning, papers/s1-3--harris-brief.pdf (accessed 20 august 2007). which has title X responsibility to conduct the air Force 8. William E. burrows, The Survival Imperative: Using Future War Games, could easily host such a war game at a Space to Protect Earth (new York: Forge books, 2006), 33. sufficiently high level. 9. Lt Col rosario nici and 1st Lt douglas Kaupa, 21. Mit students, Project Icarus, rev. ed. (Cambridge, “Planetary defense: department of defense Cost for the Ma: Mit Press, september 1979). detection, Exploration, and rendezvous Mission of near- 22. belton et al., Mitigation of Hazardous Comets and As­ Earth objects,” Airpower Journal 11, no. 2 (summer 1997): teroids, 168.

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Maj andrew P. Hansen, UsaF Maj PaUl d. williaMs, PHd, UsaF lt Col robert F. Mills, PHd, UsaF, retired lt Col Mark a. kanko, PHd, UsaF, retired*

Red Flag exercises, well known as training components of air warfare, will also become a staple of cyber warfare. —Former Secretary of the air Force Michael W. Wynne

he Red Flag exercise, held six States air Force as the lead service for organiz­ times per year at Nellis air Force Base ing, training, and equipping an air-minded (aFB), Nevada, and eielson aFB, military capability. likewise, we now find our­ alaska, routinely pits a coordinated selves in the infant stages of the cyber era, Tteam of more than 80 airplanes against numer­ wherein the addition of cyberspace is revolu­ ous, realistic air threats and a robust array of tionizing the way we will fight and win future surface-to-air missile (SaM) systems as partici­ wars. We face the significantchallenge of pro­ pants deliver weapons and air-dropped cargo viding a realistic training environment that on realistic targets and drop zones. Most par­ reflectsthis change. This situation differs con­ ticipants would agree that Red Flag provides siderably from the normal evolution of Red the ultimate peacetime test of joint and coali­ Flag over its 30-year history, but technological tion air operations, but the air Force must exe­ advancement represents a core element in the cute a fundamental paradigm shift if it wishes history of the air Force. air pioneers of the to meet former secretary Wynne’s vision of a 1920s could not have imagined how airpower significantly enhanced cyber-warfare environ­ would evolve, and the same holds true of to­ ment. This change is so monumental that full day’s advocates of cyberspace. In a letter to implementation would fundamentally detract airmen, former secretary Wynne highlighted from the critical objectives of Red Flag. In the incredible technological advancements that short, the time is right for Cyber Flag. are yet again transforming the face of war: The air Force grew out of technology and “Our adversaries realize the asymmetric op­ its employment (in conjunction with people, portunities of cyberspace. They attempt to ac­ processes, and doctrine) within the air do­ cess american industrial servers that contain main as a means of influencing the outcome sensitive data, exploit electromagnetic energy of war. Innovation early in the airpower era to try and jam or misdirect our precision weap­ helped solidify a new war-fightingdomain that ons, and use radio transmitters to detonate proved decisive in World War II, ultimately improvised explosive devices, killing americans, paving the way for the creation of the United Coalition allies, and innocent civilians.”1

*Major hansen is an Intermediate developmental education student at the air Force Institute of Technology (aFIT) (computer science master’s degree program), Wright-Patterson aFB, Ohio. Major Williams is deputy director of the Center for Cyberspace Research and an assistant professor of computer science and cyber operations in the department of engineering at aFIT. dr. Mills is an assistant professor of electrical engineering at aFIT. dr. Kanko is a senior defense systems analyst with Booz allen hamilton in San antonio, Texas.

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although the recent emphasis on cyber­ Cyber threats to the United States range space is a step in the right direction, US mili­ from nation-states to transnational actors to tary preparations pale in comparison to those organized crime, each with its own set of capa­ of other international powers, most notably bilities, resources, and objectives. The point is China. The Chinese have been restructuring that we must be ready to deal with all of their military for over a decade to transform them—and this requires building a force that their mechanized People’s liberation army not only can operate effectively in and through (Pla) into an “informationalized” force capable the cyberspace environment but also can inte­ of capitalizing on the asymmetric effects of cy­ grate capabilities across the various war-fighting berspace.2 The Pla now focuses on achieving domains. This monumental task requires that battlefield gains through the full spectrum of the department of defense (dOd) identify kinetic and nonkinetic capabilities. an analy­ and develop the appropriate skills and abili­ sis of Chinese doctrine and recent exercises ties of our people and then establish a Cyber reveals advanced information warfare (IW) capa­ Flag to exercise, exercise, exercise! bilities, such as computer network attack, on par with tanks, artillery, and aircraft in their effectiveness in countering an enemy advance.3 Cyberspace hardly a week goes by without some news In October 2006, the Joint Chiefs of Staff report about how Chinese entities (govern­ endorsed the following definition of the term ment, military, or individual actors) have com­ cyberspace: “a domain characterized by the use promised computers and networks in the of electronics and the electromagnetic spec­ United States. This series of coordinated at­ trum to store, modify and exchange data via tacks, beginning in 2003 and dubbed Titan networked systems and associated physical in­ Rain by the US government, is just one indica­ frastructures.”7 Nearly two years later, however, tion that the United States has already fallen we still have no published service or joint doc­ victim to offensive IW activity by the Chinese.4 trine that defines cyberspace, a situation that One need also look at the recent public re­ has led to differing views about what cyber­ lease of the aurora experiment to understand space comprises and what constitutes a force the effects made possible by cyberspace.5 al­ operating in that domain. discussions within though many details remain classified,a urora and across the services are complicated by the demonstrated how computer network attack lack of a common lexicon that clearly delin­ could destroy one of the most commonly used eates which forces and capabilities (such as power generators within the United States’ electronic warfare [eW]) fall within the cyber­ domestic electrical grid. during this test, the space domain. China has advanced far beyond generator responds to a series of malicious these discussions, having already established computer-control commands by shaking vio­ consistent doctrine—available through open lently and then grinding to a complete halt in sources—and an accompanying large-scale IW a cloud of smoke. exploitation of this same force. establishment of a tangible exercise en­ vulnerability across the nation would produce vironment that reveals these shortfalls would extended power outages and crippling eco­ enable development of a common language nomic repercussions. government economist out of necessity. Scott Borg summarizes the consequence of an important reality of the cyberspace do­ such an attack: “It’s equivalent to 40 to 50 main is that it encompasses far more than just large hurricanes striking all at once. . . . It’s computer networks. Cyberspace is a sphere that greater economic damage than any modern includes every element of both analog and economy ever suffered. . . . It’s greater than digital media, just as airspace includes every the great depression. It’s greater than the air molecule. One need only look at the control damage we did with strategic bombing on that these digital elements have over banking, germany in World War II.”6 power distribution, and personal communica­

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tions to realize the true extent of this domain. services regarding the IO mission, contend­ as former secretary Wynne wrote, “Cyberspace ing that these gaps exist primarily because is a domain, like land, where each of the prin­ previous attempts to define and build a dedi­ ciples of war applies. To grasp this concept re­ cated IO force proved unsuccessful.10 Cyber quires a major institutional and cultural shift Command establishes the leadership to build in war planning and operations.”8 a robust force encompassing the diverse mis­ The Chinese realized this long ago and sions, skills, and capabilities of IO, but, as dis­ capitalized on the fact that the United States cussed earlier, pitfalls remain. an effective has not emphasized the enabling capabilities training environment provides a springboard of operations within and through cyberspace. for avoiding these hazards. The conduct and resulting effects of informa­ While the air Force begins organizing, tion operations (IO) may not be as impressive training, and equipping a force for cyber­ as kinetic operations involving physical de­ space operations, it faces the fact that much struction, but an effective IO capability is just of the expertise rests with civilians. however, as important as the ability to hit targets with this was true of the air domain as well since bombs. In fact, due to our own dependence most air pioneers were civilian enthusiasts. on cyberspace, the United States is more sus­ leveraging the capability of computer hack­ ceptible to asymmetric attacks against our cy­ ers who so often try to penetrate govern­ berspace infrastructure than to conventional ment and civilian networks offers incredible attacks. Because the technology that makes potential. Consider that during the early our country so powerful represents a giant years of aviation, some of the most respected achilles’ heel, we must develop and train with pilots performed unimaginable aerial dem­ the most effective and cost-efficient techniques onstrations as stunt pilots and barnstormers. to protect it. Regarded as renegades, these same pilots pushed aircraft capabilities and performance to their limits, leaving such names such as Fighting Force Charles lindbergh indelibly stamped in the Keeping this vulnerability in mind, we ac­ history of aviation. In a number of respects, knowledged that the proper posturing of forces hackers test our information systems in to wage war in cyberspace is essential to the many of the same ways and represent an in­ future of the air Force and our nation. Thus, valuable resource as the air Force and dOd 18 September 2007 saw the activation of air seek the skills required to gain dominance Force Cyber Command (Provisional) at Barks- in the cyberspace domain. Cultivating the dale aFB, louisiana, under Maj gen William capability to defend against the best com­ T. lord.9 an associated force-development ef­ puter hackers in the world will enable the fort for this new major command will bring military to leapfrog the civilian sector’s cyber­ personnel from various career fields (such as space capabilities in much the same way that eW, communications, and space control) critical the air Force now dominates the air do­ to cyberspace operations. With respect to joint main. The overall goal calls for developing operations, Cyber Command complements overwhelming expertise, providing a strong both the Naval Network Warfare Command deterrent to potential enemies, and assur­ and the army 1st Information Operations ing that we have the means of taking deci­ Command. The air Force now fully embraces sive battlefield actions to minimize damage cyberspace as an operational domain, one in to US military and civilian personnel as well which we attack and defend targets, produce as their assets. We can integrate this cutting- effects, and hold adversary capabilities at risk. edge expertise most effectively into our rep­ a recent article titled “defining Informa­ ertoire by creating an environment that tion Operations Forces” examines the capa­ highlights, demonstrates, and improves the bility gaps between and within each of the enabling capabilities of cyberspace.

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The Cyber Flag Revolution ing military success of the United States in re­ cent conflicts.13 Based on this understanding, we can now Red Flag and Bulwark defender indepen­ move on to the task of integrating both civil­ dently provide key realistic training to aircrew ian and military forces to protect and defend and network operators but fall short in dem­ our nation from the pervasive threat enabled onstrating cross-domain capabilities and effects. through cyberspace. Preventing, containing, We now need to combine Bulwark defender and defeating attacks such as aurora are vital and Red Flag into an exercise emphasizing to the dOd’s objective of providing adequate cyberspace effects achieved both kinetically defenses for the nation’s critical infrastructure. and nonkinetically. This Cyber Flag exercise although an eye-opening demonstration, would preserve the effectiveness of existing aurora offers only one example of capabilities training while embracing the new domain of by means of cyberspace. The air Force Infor­ cyberspace and integrating capabilities drawn mation Operations Center at lackland aFB, from across the services and coalition partners Texas, created the Black demon exercise in into one coherent effort. Bulwark defender 2000 to test the defensive posture of our mili­ enables us to exercise key joint defensive capa­ tary networks.11 For many individuals, Black bilities within cyberspace, whereas Cyber Flag demon is the equivalent to playing out Red offers a training environment that integrates Flag on computer networks. Participants de­ both offensive and defensive cyberspace ef­ fend critical command and control (C2) nodes fects into the mainstream operational and tac­ from persistent attacks launched by trained tical planning effort. a joint force commander adversaries from the 57th and 177th Informa­ in Cyber Flag could call on IO options or ca­ tion aggressor Squadrons, the 92nd Informa­ pabilities as readily as he or she would select a tion Warfare Squadron, and the National Se­ bomb or other kinetic weapon. development curity agency. In 2006 the exercise, renamed of such an environment becomes more palat­ Bulwark defender, expanded by integrating able when divided into a three-year and 10­ forces from the army, Navy, and Marine Corps, year vision, fully focused on maximizing the focusing on computer network defense and, exposure of participants to effects realized as such, providing the best venue for joint inte­ within cyberspace. gration of forces dedicated to this mission area. It does not encompass the other ele­ Three-Year Vision: Best Practices and Worst Scenarios ments of IO (such as eW and psychological a starting point for the establishment of Cy­ operations) to any degree, nor does it provide ber Flag involves combining the best practices an environment that integrates cyberspace ef­ of existing training with the worst cyberspace fects with those achieved by air-breathing or scenarios, thus enabling a single exercise serv­ space-based assets. Therefore, to bring this ef­ ing as a proof of concept for the future. The fort to maturity, we must begin developing an Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR), the environment that combines effects of air, center of Nellis aFB’s Red Flag exercise, pro­ space, and cyberspace into one realistic train­ vides approximately 1,000 square miles for ing environment. participating aircraft to maneuver against re­ Pentagon staffers with a vision for realistic alistic air and ground threats. Similarly, the training first created the concept of Red Flag Joint Information Operations Range, the cen­ in 1975. after the commander of Tactical air ter of cyberspace exercises, offers an isolated Command, gen Robert dixon, approved it, network of geographically separated nodes ca­ the first Red Flag began in November of that pable of emulating a large number of real- year.12 The exercise continues to train joint world network topologies. This range isolates and coalition air forces to operate in a realistic cyberspace effects from the public Internet air-combat environment to this day. Red Flag while protecting tactics, techniques, and pro­ has also contributed directly to the overwhelm­ cedures from observation by potential adver­

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saries. In addition, it protects training events ing a relatively low level of sophistication, with from external influences, thus providing a no long-term damage, an adversary could perfect foundation for the Bulwark defender penetrate the network and cause various com­ exercise. Similarities between the NTTR and puters to display the adversary nation’s flag as Joint IO Range environments, as well as be­ the desktop background and screen saver. In tween the objectives of the Bulwark defender itself, this action is benign but requires access and Red Flag exercises, give us an excellent to the computer file system; successful access starting point for integration. adding the ap­ would also allow theft or modification of data propriate C2 infrastructure enabled by the that users would probably never discover. This Joint IO Range makes the defense of networks can and should result in a loss of confidence supporting a tactical exercise such as Red Flag in the data and information on the affected a critical concern as aggressors attack them. machines and the network as a whole. The re­ The operational-level communications infra­ action of the commander would likely range structure exists as part of Bulwark defender but from a simple incident response and forensic lacks ties to the tactical-level planning effort; analysis to momentary termination of plan­ however, the objectives of Bulwark defender ning activities. although the primary effect are an important part of evaluating network entails delayed production of the air tasking defenses. Thus, we can now take training to order, there exists a strong possibility of rip­ the next level by utilizing the information pling effects in the targeting cycle. This is just flowing on the network to realize tactical ob­ one of a multitude of scenarios that requires jectives. The fusion of the Bulwark defender training to ensure that we do not see these cy­ and Red Flag environments and scenarios into berspace effects for the first time during an a Cyber Flag would enable aviators and net­ actual crisis. work operators alike to see cyberspace effects The visualization component of this inte­ played out in real time. Since Cyber Flag em­ gration will pose a significant challenge. The phasizes cyberspace effects, there is no con­ Nellis air Combat Tracking System, the win­ flictwith existing training objectives, as would dow into the Red Flag battle, does little to be the case if a network attack affected Red demonstrate battlefield effects beyond the Flag’s flying training. Friendly network-attack conventional realm. during postmission de­ forces participating in Cyber Flag would play a briefing,the system allows for repeated replay critical role in attacking aggressor target ar­ of the air war on huge screens so that the hun­ rays, also enabled by the Joint IO Range. Vital dreds of participants have a true understand­ to creating realistic cyberspace targets is the ing of what transpired during the mission. Ini­ ability to replicate threat systems on an IO range tially, skillful use of debriefing slides could that, when incorporated with the physical Cy­ compensate for a lack of cyberspace-effects vi­ ber Flag target array on the NTTR, would cre­ sualization, but we must have a future vision ate an integrated war-fighting environment. for a more robust capability—to display the Cyber Flag scenarios and lessons learned would real-time effects of the air and cyberspace battle. then adjust to incorporate this enhanced ca­ Until this type of capability exists, warriors will pability. Consider the following example, which not fully realize the power of this new war- highlights the significant operational impact fighting domain and the fact that effects, resulting from an underlying distrust of the rather than the attrition of target sets, hold data feeding a network. the key to fighting and winning wars. The combined air operations center, which produces the air tasking order for Red Flag, Ten-Year Vision: Cutting-Edge Dominance uses an intranet to tie together the many com­ puters coordinating the operational-planning The next decade should focus on building Cy­ effort. This network contains several links to ber Flag into a mainstream training exercise. the outside world in order to enable access to With even a small-scale proof of concept for the Internet and global Information grid. Us­ Cyber Flag realized in the near term and a

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constantly improving visualization capability mance of the high-tech weaponry was like that over the next several years, cutting-edge domi­ of a “tiger with wings.” The force demonstrated nance in cyberspace requires multiple, large- new tactics of using live ammunition to hit enemy cruise missiles and computer technology to hit scale, annual events to maximize exposure to 16 this critical training. The Cyber Flag transfor­ information networks, links and points. mation strongly resembles the changes that The training and capabilities of the Pla eW brought to the fight, spawning the green have likely improved a great deal since 1999, Flag exercise. during the Vietnam War, em­ due in part to such credible training. Our fu­ ployment of low-altitude aircraft proved im­ ture vision for realistic training should rise to practical, so we developed medium- and high- meet this level of threat while breaking free of altitude tactics. Key to these tactics was the the geographic boundaries imposed by the suppression of enemy SaM systems. a training current exercise arenas. conflict developed when missile systems were Most people in the air Force are familiar electronically jammed during Red Flag, limit­ with the phase-two employment-exercise envi­ ing the participants’ opportunity to react to ronment, which simulates a base under attack. those threats. Many aircrew members saw ac­ Participation in a future Cyber Flag could tual indications of a SaM system for the first have the same flavor, with a base required to time at Red Flag. To preserve this critical train­ launch attacks from home station while under ing requirement, gen Wilbur l. “Bill” Creech attack from air, space, and cyberspace. Build­ developed the green Flag exercise in 1978 to ing on this premise, by 2018 we should have a emphasize the enabling capabilities of eW.14 realistic training environment involving a widely green Flag was the most robust exercise of distributed war involving multiple bases, con­ eW assets in the world. The breadth and revo­ ventional ranges, and computer networks. The lutionary nature of waging war in cyberspace continual growth of network and communica­ extend beyond the goals and objectives of Red tion capabilities makes this a realistic predic­ Flag, thus suggesting the need for a similar ap­ tion, given the proper emphasis and planning. proach. Realization of a cyber attack that brings Unlike the evaluation model of a phase-two all exercise operations to a halt would likely exercise, this one would provide training to drive home the point that we are fighting a participants, just as Red Flag has done for much different type of war. Such an exercise years. What better test of training and prepa­ would have the goal of demonstrating offen­ ration than an environment where operations sive and defensive cyberspace capabilities. are inhibited by compromises of e-mail serv­ This approach closely mirrors the way the Chi­ ers, degradation of mobile and public switched nese have trained since the late 1990s in their telephones (or their successors), as well as as­ transformation from a “mechanized Pla force saults by aggressor aircraft? The Chinese see to an informationalized force.”15 as Timothy this type of training as the way to exercise kinetic l. Thomas states in his book Dragon Bytes, and nonkinetic options by their informational­ In October 1999, the Pla conducted another ized force, as demonstrated in the exercise re­ IW exercise. Two army groups of the Beijing port mentioned above. In order to dominate Military Region conducted a confrontation cam­ air, space, and cyberspace, the United States paign on the computer network. Reconnais­ must do the same. experiencing such a robust sance and counter reconnaissance, interference combat environment at one’s home station is and counter interference, blocking and counter the ultimate goal of realistic training since it blocking, and air strikes and counter air strikes enables the maximum amount of training, us­ were practiced. The Operations department of ing the most realistic forces, in the shortest the general Staff said this was the firsttime that a computer confrontation was conducted at the amount of time, at the least expense. campaign level between a red army and blue although it is difficult to fathom what the army. actual fieldoperations of a similar nature world, much less the air Force, will look like were conducted simultaneously in the Jinan beyond this 10-year vision, we must strive for a Theater. according to one observer, the perfor­ cyberspace capability equivalent to the shock­

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and-awe campaign of Operation Iraqi Free­ them all together. Budget constraints and a dom. In order to do so, we must initiate a con­ failure to accept cyberspace as a decisive war- tinuing effort to keep pace with technology fighting domain could put the US military in and bring the realities of the cyberspace battle­ a disadvantageous position against future ene­ field into our everyday operations. mies. Cyberspace increasingly stitches together the diplomatic, informational, economic, and Conclusion military instruments of power. Creation of a dedicated Cyber Flag exercise would ensure In light of emerging technology, a perva­ the preservation of critical learning objectives sive threat, and the conflictwith existing exer­ in current exercises while preparing forces to cise objectives, the time is right for Cyber Flag. understand the important role of cyberspace There is no better training than the hands-on in attaining battlefield success. The US military realism associated with participation in an ex­ does not currently have the advantage in cyber­ ercise such as Red Flag or Bulwark defender. space. The future of the nation depends on Former secretary Wynne had a vision for domi­ our ability to harness the best practices in order nant operations in cyberspace “comparable to to achieve cutting-edge dominance and, ulti­ the air Force’s global, strategic omnipresence mately, shock and awe within cyberspace. ❑ in air and space.”17 This vision requires a com­ bination of joint coordination, skilled forces, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio and a realistic training environment to bring San Antonio, Texas

Notes 1. hon. Michael W. Wynne, “letter to airmen: Cyber­ 9. erik holmes, “lord to Oversee Cyber Command,” space Operations,” 7 May 2007, http://www.af.mil/library/ Air Force Times, 26 September 2007, http://www.airforce viewpoints/secaf.asp?id=320. times.com/news/2007/09/airforce_cyberboss_070924w/. 2. Timothy l. Thomas, Dragon Bytes: Chinese Information- 10. Maj Timothy P. Franz et al., “defining Informa­ War Theory and Practice (Fort leavenworth, KS: Foreign tion Operations Forces: What do We Need?” Air and Space Power Journal 21, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 53–63, http:// Military Studies Office, 2004), 1. www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj07/ 3. Ibid., 6. sum07/sum07.pdf. 4. Nathan Thornburgh, “Inside the Chinese hack at­ 11. 1st lt aaron hansen, “Bd06 Confirms Joint CNd tack,” Time, 25 august 2005, http://www.time.com/time/ Capability,” Spokesman Magazine, april 2006, http://find nation/article/0,8599,1098371,00.html. articles.com/p/articles/mi_m0QUY/is_4_46/ai_n16135398. 5. Jeanne Meserve, “Staged Cyber attack Reveals Vul­ 12. Maj alexander Berger, “Beyond Blue Four: The nerability in Power grid,” CNN.com, 26 September 2007, Past and Future Transformation of Red Flag,” Air and http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/09/26/power.at.risk/ Space Power Journal 19, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 46, http:// index.html. www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj05/ 6. Quoted in ibid. sum05/sum05.pdf. 7. Joint Net-Centric Operations Campaign Plan (Washing­ 13. air Force doctrine document 2-1, Air Warfare, 22 January 2000, 63, https://www.hqafdc.maxwell.af.mil/ ton, dC: Joint Staff, October 2006), 62, http://www.jcs afdcprivateweb/aFdd_Page_hTMl/doctrine_docs/ .mil/j6/c4campaignplan/JNO_Campaign_Plan.pdf. afdd2-1.pdf. 8. hon. Michael W. Wynne, “Flying and Fighting in 14. Berger, “Beyond Blue Four,” 46. Cyberspace,” Air and Space Power Journal 21, no. 1 (Spring 15. Thomas, Dragon Bytes, 1. 2007): 9, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/ 16. Ibid., 25. apj/apj07/spr07/spr07.pdf. 17. Wynne, “Flying and Fighting in Cyberspace,” 7.

5-Merge-Hansen et al.indd 48 7/28/08 7:50:42 AM Editor’s Note: PIREP is aviation shorthand for pilot report. It’s a means for one pilot to pass on current, potentially useful information to other pilots. In the same fashion, we use this department to let readers know about items of interest. Chinese Airmen Stepping through the International Gateway

Ma Dezu Yang ChunYuan*

Editor’s Note: Delegations from the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) visited Europe and the United States in 2007. china Air Force magazine published a commentary about the visits and graciously permitted Air and Space Power Journal to translate and republish an adapted version that focuses on the visit to the United States.

mPERcEPtIbly, thE concEPt of on 15 June 2007. outside the arrival gate multidimensional war covering land, stood several people in trim uniforms. they sea, air, space, and cyberspace is spread were the air attachés from the chinese Em ing into our sight and mind. the world bassy in the United States, the US Embassy in Iwe live in is becoming more and more linked china, and the public affairs staff of the US and transparent. Along with this trend, mili Department of Defense (DoD), and they taries have increased their normal contacts were waiting for a group of special guests—a and exchanges. military delegation from china’s PlAAF Soldiers exist for war. they try to approach command college. this delegation would and understand each other. but in the current stay for 10 days, visiting mcGuire AFb, new era, such contacts and exchanges are not Jersey; the Pentagon; Air University; and solely because of war. We see black-eyed Asian Randolph AFb, texas. From the unique per soldiers and blue-eyed European warriors sa spective of chinese soldiers, members of the lute each other; black-skinned war fighters delegation would examine, feel, and under and white-skinned servicemen exercise shoul stand US Airmen at close range. on the same der to shoulder. day, under the same clear, blue sky, another chinese delegation sent by the same college Go Out, and We Shall would land in Rome to visit the Italian Air Force. the motto “go out, and we shall em Embrace the World brace the world” has become the consensus the sky was clear and blue above new among the militaries of the world ever since york’s John F. Kennedy International Airport the first Gulf War.

*the authors serve on the staff of China Air Force magazine.

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According to various sources, the US mili and cultural conflicts among them, yet to the tary, guided by its global strategy, has consid surprise of the chinese visitors, such conflicts ered “going out” an important means of in were not visible. how does the US military creasing the power of its forces. the experience educate these culturally diversified soldiers? of overseas deployment is a must for US offi how do US soldiers come to understand such cers who desire promotion. From the very be questions as, why do you serve? and for whom ginning, these officers are told to keep the do you fight? Delegation member Sr col he strategic picture in mind and are assigned to meidong brought this question to the US different fields of study. Some focus on Asia, bases and asked it at every opportunity. he but others on Europe or other regions. the admitted that he was unprepared for the an US military also invests heavily in sending of swers. Almost all US Airmen who responded ficers out to study in various colleges around mentioned their education on their service’s the world. core values. “During the visit, I observed lots one PlAAF command college student of advanced weapons and brilliant demon who had visited other countries commented, strations,” said col he meidong. “What im “to understand a rival, you have to know that pressed me most, however, was this core-value rival’s culture because culture is something education for Airmen, which pulled me into that has a profound impact on everything.” deep thoughts.” his remark reflects the prevailing view of Another delegation member, Sr col chang modern militaries. As such, “going out” has Dingqiu, pondered another important and become an important means of developing related issue—the relationship between hu military professionals in all countries. man spirit and the power of a military force. In recent years, military-exchange activities What he observed from his US counterparts between countries have expanded to a new only reinforced his belief. he said, “to win a level. the US Air War college dispatches some war, weapons alone are not enough. the de faculty members and students to china every cisive factor is the human spirit—the national year. the PlAAF command college alone has spirit and culture that are embodied by its received more than 10 such delegations. the military forces.” PlAAF, as the most high-tech service, must In the notebook that colonel chang brought keep up with this trend. It must go out, with him, he wrote the English phrase “cAn broaden its view and mind, and embrace the Do” in big letters. chang explained that world and the future. this was the motto of the 305th Air mobility Wing at mcGuire AFb. the wing wanted all of its members to make these words their Books and Imagination Never most frequently used daily greeting. the US Replace Eyes and Thoughts escort officers even asked the chinese visi tors to remember this motto. In fact, on the this was the advice of a PlAAF command bus, one US officer led the chinese delega college professor after returning from his tion in reading it aloud several times. this foreign-study tour. Indeed, everyone who re “can do” attitude reminded chang of many turned from the US visit in 2007 echoed this similar scenes he saw in hollywood movies, remark. As one delegation member put it, as well as on posters and decorations lining “We were profoundly jolted by what we saw the corridors of US bases. this, chang be and heard. there was something out there lieved, was how the power of culture and hu that you would never believe or imagine until man spirit transformed into the power of a you saw it. our eyes and minds were just military force. opened that way!” late in his report, chang wrote, “Informa the US bases contain soldiers of various tionization is the mainstream of current mili ethnic backgrounds. one might take it for tary development. moving towards high tech granted that there must be sharp ideological nology and information is our main goal. but

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this is not all. to increase the force’s power, it Sr col Jiang bangsheng observed his US is equally important to inherit and magnify counterpart from yet another angle—person our heritage of human spirit.” alized development. he remarked, During the visit to Air University’s college for Enlisted Professional military Education, the situation on the battlefield changes every Sr col Zhang Zhiyong noted what he later re second. no two wars bear the exact same charac teristics. Without strong characters and person garded as the most “audacious” soldier in the alities, commanders and war fighters will rarely world. When delegation members entered the prevail. the US military puts great stress on per gate, they were firstgreeted not by the school’s sonalized development, encouraging each senior officers but by a lower-ranking chief member to make the best of his individual tal master sergeant named Sheila Knox, who then ents and potentials. As a result, soldiers are ea introduced the chinese guests to the waiting ger to demonstrate themselves to the best of senior officers.m ore surprisingly, in the meet their ability. It can be easily imagined that a ing room, this same sergeant chaired the force made up of these soldiers will be creative, whole meeting and gave the briefing while adaptive, and flexible—noteasily intimidated by those senior officers attended and listened. crisis. they will bring their potential into full “how could a mere chief master sergeant be play. All of these qualities will add to the chance so audacious and capable?” Zhang and the of winning the war. other delegation members felt puzzled. this mystery remained with Zhang through When scrutinizing foreign military devel out his US trip. Indeed, he found that all US opments, modern chinese soldiers know soldiers were equally “audacious.” For example, how to perceive not only strengths but also in the Air University school cafeteria, he wit weaknesses. Sr col luan Zhong did exactly nessed a soldier dutifully walking up to the that when visiting US Air Force bases. he commander of the college and charging him noted that “the seemingly powerful US mili three dollars for his lunch. Zhang recalled, tary, like the others, also possesses weak “this same soldier even came to each of us points. For example, it relies too heavily on guests and said, ‘Sir, please pay three dollars combined/joint operations, a habit which for the lunch.’ ” Another example happened erodes the capabilities of individual services. in the Pentagon when the US DoD assigned Also, it trusts too much in high technolo only two soldiers to accompany the entire chi gies, neglecting the conventional weapons. nese delegation, and they completed the mis It overemphasizes individualism and free sion beautifully. their professional attitude dom, causing numerous problems in its left a deep impression on Zhang because once bases. We therefore should learn from such the chinese delegation entered their sphere lessons and guard against them.” of duty, they immediately functioned as the having stepped through the international commander, diligently performing their du gateway, chinese soldiers obviously broad ties. the two sometimes even ordered the ened their field of view, gaining space and guests to do this or that but never created a courage for out-of-the-box thinking. Although feeling that they were low-ranking soldiers and that their guests were senior officers. this is certainly an important accomplish From the performance of these “auda ment from international military exchanges, cious” soldiers, Senior colonel Zhang distilled a more significant achievement is that these one word—duty. In his report, he noted that soldiers now feel more keenly the responsi “when each serviceman assiduously performs bilities on their shoulders. It can be expected duties within his or her scope of duty and does that, after returning from foreign visits, they not wantonly meddle with that of the others, will apply the new ideas to their duties and there is no reason to worry about low effi incorporate them into the chinese military’s ciency in the military.” force development.

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The Rewards of Visits gation to the Italian Air Force. looking at a thick collection of foreign-visit reports, he most of the PlAAF officers who have had continued, “We are living in an era featuring chances to see the outside world will submit not only transparency but also cooperation reports, hold seminars, and write papers in or and codevelopment. mutual understanding der to disseminate what they saw, heard, and between states promotes better development. thought to their fellow airmen. they serve as mutual understanding between militaries has the center point of a circle that spreads new deeper implications. Apart from trying to ‘know ideas, new spirit, and new culture. your enemies and know yourself’ and to make “Go out, and we will reap the harvest! What yourself more powerful, military exchange matters here is not only broadening our views has a more important mission. that is, to es but also generating effects in many more tablish friendship, to deepen mutual under areas,” said Wang Jianmin, the political direc standing and trust, and to better defend peace tor of PlAAF command college, who had in this world.” ❑ just returned from his visit as head of the dele

Twenty-first Century airpower is not merely the sum but the product of air, space, and cyberspace superiority. Loss of control in any one of these domains risks across-the-board degradation—if not outright failure. —Gen t. michael moseley

1-PIREP-Ma Yang.indd 52 7/28/08 7:51:18 AM Embracing the Joint-Training Enterprise

Dr. William m. rierson*

ow does our predominantly efficientlyand share it rapidly via a secure net conventional military defeat an work at all levels of command and across unconventional enemy who will boundaries. This information superiority, in ingly accepts huge losses and con turn, increases speed of command and oppor Hstantly adjusts tactics to counter or avoid our tunities for coordination across the battle- strengths? Clearly, we are fighting an adver space. It provides our forces the ability to get sary who resorts to asymmetric warfare; insur inside our enemy’s abbreviated decision cycle gents in Iraq and Afghanistan know they can and mitigate the advantages of hide-strike not defeat the us military on the conventional hide insurgent tactics as well as ad hoc com battlefield.T o overcome an innate lack of col mand and control architectures. It sets the laborative supporting arms, the irregular soldier stage to defeat the enemy piecemeal: cell by merely resorts to the most basic of warfare tac cell, leader by leader. tics: small-unit, decentralized, hit-and-run tactics; we are engaged on a nonlinear battlefield ambush; assassination; and simple sabotage. that demands resources beyond the tradi He looks for and attacks our weaknesses. He tional Cold war–era air-land battle planning blends into the civilian population and uses it and “combined-arms” operations. we face for cover and concealment. He manipulates the challenge of planning and executing information or generates misinformation that timely joint operations. Failure to provide can alter the economic, political, and societal and disseminate timely intelligence that sup landscapes which affect combat operations. ports surgical, effects-based operations will Time can also become our enemy. The result in our inability to counter a sophisti Vietnamese fought for 30 years; the sandinistas cated insurgent threat. our conventional for 18. Modern insurgents have an ample re ground and air forces must arrive in-theater serve of patience, thus giving them a potential prepared for this new asymmetric fight. To advantage over our conventional forces. In op do so, units down to the brigade-combat position to that advantage, our own political team and squadron levels must carry out in and domestic environments require us to find novative and realistic predeployment train a means to defeat the insurgency quickly or, ing that includes joint-training objectives. at a minimum, create conditions that permit The military cliché used during the Cold the host nation to assume the military lead of war era still applies: “train the way you fight.” the counterinsurgency fight. we need a new, interdependent joint-force Countering our adversary’s advantages and training model to take advantage of all the unconventional tactics means that us and coali combat multipliers available to the war fighter, tion ground-maneuver units must leverage the even down to the individual trooper. How joint application of service resources to bring does a 21-year-old infantry sergeant leading a to bear all available combat power in a full combat patrol gain immediate access to joint and coordinated response. widely distributed assets that can provide him the supporting forces, such as those we have in Iraq and Af firepower he may need to engage an immedi ghanistan, must be able to gather information ate threat? even more importantly, how does

* The author is lead analyst for the Joint Fires division, Joint Fires Integration and Interoperability Team, us Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia.

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that sergeant’s commander gain the actionable on down to help prosecute the tactical fight. intelligence provided by those same joint re The BCT A-GI emphasizes training in both in sources that may obviate engaging in close dividual skills and predeployment activities combat or delivering a kinetic response? re during home-station, collective-training events, moving insurgent threats without high-risk, culminating in a mission-readiness exercise at close-combat action or destructive power (which a CTC. At each step along the way, the ser increases the potential for collateral damage) vices’ training coordinators and force provid requires collaboration and interdependency ers include joint context, where appropriate, of intelligence resources. when we have no by synchronizing not only training scenarios passive solution and need a kinetic response, but also resources. or when organic weaponry proves inadequate The JFIIT conducts assessments of each or inappropriate, the maneuver commander training event, including home-station train should be able to rely consistently on immedi ing and CTC rotations, focusing primarily on ate and effective nonorganic “joint” fire sup the ability to create a realistic joint-training port. such a capability dictates binding service environment. Additionally, the assessments partnerships and integration of service resources measure the unit’s improvement in air-ground to provide joint-training opportunities. integration to determine the efficacy of the Joint training and realistic mission re training. Based on assessment results and hearsals are the key—not only for that ser feedback collected by the Center for Army geant and his commander but also for the Lessons Learned during training and in the supporting assets: the fighter pilots, intelli theater of combat operations, the JFIIT writes gence analysts, ground-surveillance radar op a collaborative report chronicling the entire erators, or coordinating staffs. In order for concept. rather than detailing the partici units to accomplish their missions, synchro pants’ strengths and weaknesses, this final nized tactical-training scenarios should both report determines whether the BCT A-GI permit and require joint-force participation. concept successfully created a joint-training establishing a persistent, combined-arms, inter environment and whether it increased the dependent joint-training model must become participants’ abilities to conduct joint air-to the standard, not the exception, for all service ground operations. combat training centers (CTC); equivalents; The BCT A-GI training initiative and other and home-station, collective-training events. synergistic initiatives, such as the joint intelli Innovative training must transcend traditional gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance inte service-training norms and leverage joint- gration for the western range Complex, are force capabilities throughout the depth of the equal parts of a holistic solution to import a battlespace. joint-training capability to the services—the we have a potential joint-solution template “Joint Training enterprise,” as coined by the in the form of the ongoing Brigade Combat Army’s Maj Gen Jason Kamiya, director of Team Air-Ground Integration (BCT A-GI) train joint training (J-7) and commander of the ing concept, a collaborative Army Training Joint warfightingCenter at usJFCoM. These and doctrine Command and Air Force Air collaborative efforts involve the usJFCoM J-7, Combat Command initiative supported by us usJFCoM Joint Capability development direc Joint Forces Command’s (usJFCoM) Joint torate (J-8), Training and doctrine Command, Fires Integration and Interoperability Team Air Combat Command, Army Forces Command, (JFIIT). It is a direct response by the services Fleet Forces Command, and Marine Forces to us Central Command’s request to reduce Command. rather than occurring as an proficiency gaps in operational planning and anomaly, a persistent joint-training routine will to use joint air-ground resources. Hopefully, help the maneuver and airpower command BCTs would better leverage joint close air sup ers coordinate the full application of joint port and joint intelligence, surveillance, and combat power and intelligence-gathering reconnaissance assets from the national level capabilities to facilitate a successful counter

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insurgency within the current operational or program it into occasional joint-training environment. we could apply this same joint- exercises. until senior leaders dictate joint training-capability “template” to any home training as a requirement rather than an op station, CTC, or collective-training event to tion, the services and subordinate tactical-level provide a viable joint solution to joint air- commanders at the street-fighting level will ground gaps identified in the Center for Army continue to focus on the immediate needs of Lessons Learned’s Joint, Interagency, Intergov­ individual and unit collective training. They ernmental, and Multinational Lessons Learned perceive their plates as full, with no room for Report-2007, Joint Context Training and Knowl­ another task—for most, an accurate percep edge Gaps, 16 March 2007. tion. There is only so much time for training To produce trained, integrated, and inter between deployments. Consequently, com dependent joint forces, commanders at the manders will often ignore joint training until major service and joint command levels must they findthemselves in-theater and then must formally mandate that joint training take place conduct on-the-job training under fire. em and must create opportunities for the services bedding joint-training tasks within currently to exercise joint tasks. service training venues existing service training is the only real op must embed joint training as part of the pre- tion—and BCT A-GI offers a start. ❑ deployment training sequence—not simply offer

To succeed—indeed, to avoid catastrophic failure—we must redefine the Air Force for the 21st Century. —Gen T. Michael Moseley

2-PIREP-Rierson.indd 55 7/28/08 7:51:43 AM The Strategic Role of Airpower An Indian Perspective on How We Need to Think, Train, and Fight in the Coming Years*

Air Commodore Arjun SubrAmAniAm indiAn Air ForCe

Editorial Abstract: Recent advances in precision airpower systems, hardware, and weapons have engendered an effects- based approach to conducting combat with increased speed as well as reduced attrition and collateral damage. The au­ thor posits that to enter this new realm, the Indian Air Force is now undergoing a radical change in mind-set and reori­ enting its force structure so that it will be capable of simultaneously influencing operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

The Indian Air Force has been focusing on “strategic reach” as a major factor of its transforma­ tional process. It has been acquiring the wherewithal for expanding that reach in recent years to trans-continental ranges not only with its transport fleet but also with its combat aircraft. —Air Commodore Jasjit Singh

*This article is derived from the author’s prize-winning article published by the Indian Centre for Air Power Studies in Air Power: Journal of Air Power and Space Studies 3, no. 4 (Winter 2006): 13–32, http://www.aerospaceindia.org/Journals/Winter%202006/02subramaniam.pdf.

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he APPlICATIon of airpower to airfields by the Israelis in 1967, target selec­ further a nation’s strategic objectives tion proved key to achieving strategic objec­ has gained momentum over the last tives.2 Conversely, poor target selection during few years, ever since it was used with operation Rolling Thunder from 1965 to tTelling effect in operations Desert Storm, 1968 led to the total failure of that operation. Allied force, Iraqi freedom, and enduring The strategy of targeting the ho Chi Minh freedom. The advent of sensors that provide Trail and centres of population in north Viet­ accurate target intelligence, coupled with nam proved to be blunders rectified in line­ precision-guided munitions (PGM), has led to backer II, which targeted only military and effects-based operations’ gaining predomi­ infrastructure elements of national power.3 nance in speedy conflictresolution, with mini­ next came the redefinition of platforms to mum attrition and collateral damage. The prosecute the strategic air campaign and the Indian Air force (IAf) is in the midst of a consequent understanding that the campaign radical change in mind-set and reorientation became better focused when one looked at of its force structure that will enable it to con­ the effect of destruction on a nation’s ability duct parallel warfare and simultaneously in­ or will to wage war rather than concentrating fluenceoperations at the tactical, operational, on the target and platform itself. The choice and strategic levels. In light of these develop­ of attack platforms today also represents a ments, we need to think, train, and fight with radical shift from the strategic-bomber con­ a strategic focus. cept. Role reversal of strategic and tactical air­ craft commenced in Vietnam, where B-52s carried out missions in support of ground op­ Conceptual Development erations while f-4s and f-105s flew against strategic-interdiction targets deep inside north The use of airpower to further a nation’s Vietnam. Years later, eight f-16s, primarily strategic aims and objectives has come a long considered tactical platforms by the United way since the pounding of nazi Germany’s States Air force (USAf) and Israeli Air force, ball-bearing factories by Allied bombers and destroyed the Iraqi nuclear reactor at osirak the obliteration of hiroshima and nagasaki, in a classic strategic strike.4 The final fillip to both of which events had a significant effect the case for strategic airpower is, without on the outcome of World War II. Subsequent doubt, the emergence of highly accurate aircraft such as the B-52 in the 1950s and the PGMs, coupled with real-time intelligence and Russian Tu-126 bomber in the 1960s could de­ just-in-time targeting, which enable a nation liver nuclear missiles and warheads. This capa­ to exert its will on another without commit­ bility added a new dimension to strategic air- ting ground forces, thus paving the way for power—that of deterrence.1 Barring the odd negotiated settlement of conflicts without un­ failure, the application of airpower to attain necessary collateral damage and loss of life. strategic objectives and engage in coercive di­ An apt example of this redefinition, perhaps plomacy has seen tremendous success over not palatable to the counterair purists, would the last 40 years. Without constantly harping be the destruction of Arab aircraft on the on the contribution of strategic airpower at ground in 1967 during the counterair cam­ hiroshima and nagasaki as the prime catalyst paign launched by the Israeli Air force. Were for the surrender of Japan, one can cite nu­ not the effects strategic in terms of breaking merous examples that cut across different in­ the Arab coalition’s ability and will to fight? tensities of conflict to push the case for reap­ enough has been written over the years about praisal of the swift benefits of the strategic air the spectacular success of the coalition air campaign. Whether in operations linebacker forces in Desert Storm, wherein an effects- I and II, which helped the United States draw based strategic air campaign, conceived by Col north Vietnam back to the negotiating table John Warden and executed by Gen Charles in 1972, or during the surgical strikes on Arab horner, helped achieve Pres. George h. W.

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Bush’s strategic objective of driving Iraq out of tation or dismemberment, and annihilation or Kuwait with minimum attrition.5 If one were to destruction—have always focused on achiev­ pinpoint one failure of the use of strategic air- ing a nation’s geopolitical goals in any dispute power in recent years, it would be that of the or conflict.W arfare in the twenty-firstcentur y USAf to eliminate osama bin laden and the is slowly moving towards using annihilation or top Taliban leadership—one of the main stra­ destruction as a last resort in legitimate war- tegic objectives of enduring freedom. If mass, fighting scenarios. That said, two airpower tonnage, widespread area bombing due to lack theorists from the USAf—Col John Boyd and of hard intelligence, collateral damage, and in­ Colonel Warden—propounded path-breaking discriminate loss of life were the prime charac­ theories of paralysing the enemy by strategic teristics of the strategic air campaign of yester­ application of airpower.6 While Boyd talked year, then stealth, precision, intense shock about paralysing the enemy psychologically effect, speedy capitulation of the enemy, and and weakening his will to fight, Warden em­ achievement of objectives characterize the phasized the need to paralyse the adversary twenty-first-century strategic air campaign. physically by attacking leadership, infrastruc­ Skeptics may say that the next few genera­ ture, communication links, and fieldedforces tions may not see a world war and that force as part of his now-famous “five-Ring Theory,” structures of developing countries like India based on Clausewitz’s centres of gravity, which need to focus on waging local wars under hi-tech formed the heart of the air campaign in Desert conditions, low intensity conflicts, and counter­ Storm. The cornerstone of this process is the insurgencies. They could not be farther from high probability of pounding an enemy into the truth because the coming years will see a submission without inflictingtoo many casual­ struggle for strategic resources, strategic points, ties and reducing the intensity of battles by and strategic markets, most of which are spread driving his leadership underground, blinding across the globe, thousands of miles from a him, rendering his senses (eyes and ears) inef­ country’s geographical boundaries. A threat to fective, and destroying his reserves as well as these assets would warrant speedy intervention, follow-on forces by carrying out deep precision something that only airpower in tandem with strikes. Although the strategic air campaign space-based reconnaissance, surveillance, target­ that aims at paralysis is based on the over­ ing, and acquisition capability can achieve. ob­ whelming asymmetrical technology advantage viously, all of these capabilities would have to be that US forces will likely enjoy in any conflict networked and secure—a difficult task without scenario, policy and strategy planners in India dedicated satellites and bandwidth for military must understand the tremendous advantages use. one cannot overemphasize the case for fur­ of creating an asymmetry vis-à-vis potential ad­ ther developing the IAf’s strategic air capability versaries by building up a potent strategic air in the coming years in light of India’s emergence capability built around technology, force multi­ as a potential economic superpower with global pliers, and multitheatre capability.7 That does energy interests and markets. only synergistic not mean that airpower and strategic air cam­ joint operations can provide swift, precise, and paigns alone can win wars, but by applying the decisive intervention in potential hot spots principles of asymmetry and paralysis, we can spread across continents, with airpower used as hasten the capitulation of an enemy by inca­ a springboard or launchpad for further inter­ pacitating him and reducing his military po­ vention by land and naval forces. tential, as mentioned earlier, rather than de­ stroying him. Airpower can do all this—and simultaneously support the surface campaign Understanding Paralysis, by conducting parallel warfare at the tactical, Asymmetry, and Parallel Warfare operational, and strategic levels.8 Building such an ability calls for a change in mind-set and The three main objectives of any military significant alterations in asset allocation. In campaign—coercion or intimidation, incapaci­ the Indian context, we cannot restrict build­

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ing up asymmetry to the acquisition of tech­ multinational forces. They also need to be nology, force multipliers, and space-based sen­ well integrated with elements of the surface sors, as many would believe, in order to justify forces involved in strategic interventions so as a leaner air force. We would need to supple­ to synergistically apply the principles of asym­ ment these factors with sufficient numbers of metry in conflict resolution. having broadly aircraft and platforms to conduct parallel war­ spelled out the framework, we can now turn to fare on multiple fronts. This obviously calls for the broad strategic roles and missions that the a strong case to progressively beef up the num­ IAf can take on with a force structure that uti­ ber of combat squadrons in the IAf from a lizes aircraft such as the Su-30 MKI, MMRCA, projected 29–30 by the end of 2008 to at least Mirage 2000 (M-2000), Il-78, Il-76, and Air­ 40 by 2015.9 The progressive induction of ad­ borne Warning and Control System (AWACS). ditional Su-30 MKI squadrons and 126 Me­ Although we could easily ape the USAf by for­ dium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) mulating a strategic air campaign and force will likely fill the void created by phasing out that emphasize centres of gravity, nothing platforms such as older variants of the MiG-21 would be more divorced from the reality of and -23. the Indian situation. The IAf would need to answer two major questions: Role Definition in the 1. Do we have the resources to prosecute Twenty-first Century such a campaign? 2. Are we likely to be faced with an Iraq- The emergence of invisible enemies, such like situation of waging war in a foreign as terrorists, and unconventional targets in­ land and over such a prolonged period? volving material and human resources will in­ crease the difficulty of classifying the roles The answer would obviously be no! Until now, performed by strategic air assets over the next people have viewed the IAf as a predomi­ few decades. Perhaps the most critical charac­ nantly tactical air force with limited deterrent teristics of airpower that might occupy centre capability. The advent of platforms such as the stage for the IAf in years to come would in­ Su-30 MKI, weapon systems such as the clude flexibility, reach, precision firepower, Brahmos cruise missile, and force multipliers and interoperability, with other characteristics that include aerial-refueling platforms, un­ such as surprise and shock effect serving as manned aerial vehicles (UAV), and AWACS age-old, time-tested corollary benefits. What creates a need to “think big” and “think far.” aspects of these four characteristics make We must replace conventional roles with those them the focus of a study to define the IAf’s that cater to the following scenarios: strategic-airpower roles for the twenty-first century? The ability of a platform to switch ef­ • power projection fortlessly from a tactical to a strategic role is an • strategic intervention over limited dis­ inescapable imperative, as is its reach in per­ tances and duration forming interventionist roles with appropriate combat-support elements, thousands of kilo­ • proactive strikes and elimination of threats meters away from its launch base. having • humanitarian intervention reached its target, the platform must be able to neutralise it with precision attacks and mini­ • peacekeeping/enforcement missions in mum collateral damage. The platforms and crews a lead role used for prosecuting the strategic air cam­ • protection of energy and economic re­ paign must operate in international airspace sources as well as the Andaman, nicobar, with varied sensors and possibly with aircraft/ and lakshadweep island territories aircrews of multinational task forces, espe­ cially in conflicts involving United nations or • antiterrorist and antihijacking operations

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• protection and evacuation of human re­ tremely quick and effective targeting without sources having to resort to repetitive attacks. The same, however, cannot be said of subconventional • enforcement of no-fly zones wars, which could last several years. one need In many of the scenarios and roles indi­ look no further than the conflicts in Jammu cated above, the navy and army would con­ and Kashmir, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The de­ tinue to form key components of a joint task mands on airpower to shift focus from con­ force, but airpower would provide immediate ventional strategic targeting to subconventional intervention. Although the tsunami-relief ef­ targeting at short notice would have to be met forts of 2004 highlighted the speed and re­ by leveraging the same strategic characteris­ sponsiveness of Indian airpower in terms of tics of airpower, discussed earlier in this article, providing succour to the affected areas at home and adapting them for irregular warfare.10 as well as in neighbouring countries such as Terrorist or insurgent leadership, communi­ Sri lanka, they also revealed the need for ad­ cation networks, and safe havens in sympa­ ditional resources such as heavy-lift helicop­ thetic countries would comprise typical strate­ ters and transport aircraft for disaster-relief gic targets in subconventional scenarios. The operations. This assertiveness and articulation USAf and Israeli Air force actively engage of the IAf’s strategic reach may not appear such targets, but the IAf has not yet done so, very large from a US perspective; however, primarily because the limited availability of one must view it in the light of India’s emer­ precision weapons hampers operations in gence as a responsible regional power and densely populated urban environments; the global economic powerhouse with expanding real-time intelligence needed to speed the markets and interests. sensor-to-shooter loop is unavailable; and the IAf realizes that most nonstate actors, actively aided by neighbouring states, operate in In­ Targeting for dian territory, mingling freely with the local Strategic Air Strikes population. These factors also help explain why Indian political leadership is hesitant to Targeting philosophy has also changed sig­ use offensive airpower to address subconven­ nificantly over the years, dictated mainly by the tional targets. We may have to reassess this nature and duration of wars, capability of plat­ mind-set in years to come if India has to effec­ forms, accuracy of munitions, and quality of tively prosecute the war on terror. Typical intelligence. The slow and sequential effect of changes in target profiles over the years in­ strategic bombing during World War II—and clude the following: to some extent during Vietnam—did contribute significantlyto the finaloutcome, owing to re­ World War II Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003 petitive attacks. This involved thousands of sorties against the same target sets without population centres enemy leadership worrying much about civilian casualties and industrial capability command, control, collateral damage. The main aim called for communications, and systematically undermining industrial capability intelligence (C3I) systems and sensors and psychologically numbing an adversary into submission. Closer to home, the surgical strike manufacturing fielded forces and reserves by IAf MiG-21s on the governor-general’s resi­ centres dence in Dhaka in December 1971 did make a hydroelectric and sites for nuclear weapons and significant dent in the morale of the east Paki­ power generation weapons of mass destruction stani leadership, ultimately resulting in its ca­ pitulation only days later. Conventional wars Thus, the targeting focus has shifted from and conflicts in the twenty-first century are people and the economy to leadership and likely to be short and swift, necessitating ex­ military capability.11 operations Desert Storm

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and Allied force greatly redefined targeting global aspirations, we need to address our for the strategic application of airpower, with force-structure requirements for strategic force significant additional refinements occurring projection, intervention, and even coercive di­ during enduring freedom in Afghanistan and plomacy. While delivering the Air Chief Marshal Iraqi freedom in 2003. The Gulf War of P. C. lal Memorial lecture in March 2006, Mr. 1991 featured a fairly rigid set of targets de­ Pranab Mukherjee, defence minister of India, fined by perceived centres of gravity and acknowledged the primacy of airpower in fu­ folded into a largely individualistic and much ture conflicts and linked the reorientation of publicised strategic air campaign. The “Shock the IAf to India’s rapid economic growth and and Awe” strikes unleashed during Iraqi free­ the need to protect its security interests ex­ dom, however, saw simultaneous engagement tending from the Persian Gulf to the Strait of of a number of strategic targets by platforms Malacca. he went on to highlight the need to as varied as the B-2 bomber and the f-16, emphasize strategic thinking, joint operations, armed with PGMs and a wide variety of smart and asymmetric warfare, all of which have weapons. The estimated 42,000 sorties flown been discussed in this article.16 Some of the during Desert Storm expended approximately essential ingredients for bolstering our strate­ 210,000 unguided bombs and around 17,000 gic air-war-fightingcapability include not only PGMs.12 This low percentage of PGMs (less tangible assets such as hardware resources and than 10 percent) stands in stark contrast to technology, but also intangibles such as leader­ the bombing during the initial part of Iraqi ship and political will. freedom, when PGMs made up more than 65 percent of the air-to-ground weapons used by Platforms coalition forces.13 Another interesting change in US strategy has lessons for the IAf; specifi­ Amongst the numerous aerial platforms pres­ cally, rather than tying the strategic air cam­ ently in use worldwide as part of strategic paign during the 2003 Iraq war to a traditional forces, the most important ones from an In­ timetable, as in Desert Storm, planners in­ dian perspective are fighter aircraft, heavy- stead fit it like a glove around simultaneous lift/medium-lift transport aircraft, multirole land and naval campaigns, giving more impetus helicopters, and force multipliers such as the to the importance of synergy and joint opera­ AWACS, air-to-air refuelling (AAR) platforms, tions.14 Another interesting lesson from Iraqi and early warning aircraft. We need to back freedom for the IAf concerns the role played up these platforms with providers of real-time by PGMs in reducing the size of strike pack­ information such as satellites with image reso­ ages and the number of revisits to a target system, lution of less than one meter and rapidly de­ as compared to related actions during Desert ployable UAVs with multiple sensors, adequate Storm. This resulted from improved weapon loiter time, and even limited firepower. Al­ performance and enhanced real-time battle though the Su-30 MKI, with its phenomenal damage assessment facilitated by advances in reach, awesome firepower, and multicrew/ space-enabled reconnaissance, surveillance, multimission capability, is an ideal platform to targeting, and acquisition technologies.15 prosecute a strategic air campaign, we must clearly understand that we can neutralise stra­ tegic targets by effectively employing essen­ Bolstering Indian tially tactical platforms such as the M-2000 and the MMRCA, 126 of which are in the pipeline. Strategic Air Capability even older platforms such as the Jaguar can The present IAf force structure offers lim­ supplement the Su-30, M-2000, and MMRCA; ited capability for strategic intervention. only however, their use in strategic air campaigns aircraft such as the Su-30 MKI, M-2000, and would require greater coordination, support, Il-76/-78 meet the various criteria laid down and precision. Strategic strike capability with­ for such intervention. Given India’s growing out strategic airlift capability leaves a gaping

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hole in a nation’s ability to project, sustain, re­ tation and void with additional platforms to inforce, and, if required, extricate strategic create an exclusive force that thinks, trains, forces over vast distances. The IAf’s only stra­ and fights strategically. The introduction of tegic airlift platform, the ageing Il-76, needs UAVs into the IAf and exploitation of civilian to be supplemented by a newer-generation space technology also add significant punch heavy-lift aircraft in the same or larger cate­ to our capability and require careful integra­ gory and a medium-lift aircraft with a payload tion into our intelligence framework. of 15–20 tons. As far as helicopters are con­ cerned, destruction of C3I nodes, elimination Intelligence Gathering to Support of leadership, insertion/extrication of special Strategic Air Operations forces, and interdiction of reserves and follow- Presently, sharing of intelligence between the on forces are all strategic tasks in the context military and other agencies leaves much to be of effects-based operations. We must quickly desired, and turf battles have resulted in less- address the yawning deficiency in this area. than-optimal sharing. no longer static, targets for strategic intervention range from elusive Force Multipliers enemy leadership to highly mobile tactical weapon systems whose destruction can break With the induction of the Il-78 AAR platform an enemy’s will to continue fighting. Classic ex­ and impending induction of the AWACS, the amples include the continued US air attacks IAf will take the first step to becoming a truly against mobile al-Qaeda leadership, with limited self-reliant air force with global-intervention success, in conjunction with special forces, and capability. however, this should not lull us the destruction of Serb surface-to-air-missile into a false sense of bravado that the journey sites during Allied force by airpower alone. ends here. A look at the geographical extent Too many agencies currently receive, process, of our country reveals that the number of re­ interpret, and disseminate intelligence, and a fueling and AWACS aircraft would barely suf­ pressing need exists for a lean intelligence fice to address tactical needs in multiple the­ structure to support strategic air operations. atres, leaving very little for any meaningful (See the figure for a broad requirement that strategic intervention. We need to fill this limi­ doesn’t dissect the structure too critically.)

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Figure. Intelligence network for strategic air operations

1-Subramaniam.indd 62 7/28/08 7:52:18 AM THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF AIRPOWER 63

With the phasing out of the MiG-25 strategic Communication Requirements reconnaissance aircraft, the onus of providing Transfer of real-time information between accurate intelligence for strategic targeting aerial weapon platforms and ground/airborne has shifted to space-based sensors. even in the sensors is essential to the successful execution absence of dedicated military satellites, capa­ of any mission. It assumes even greater rele­ bilities of civilian remote-sensing technologies vance in the case of a strategic air operation, like the Ikonos (US) and the Indian-technology wherein the flexibility to abort the operation experimental satellite permit resolutions as or assign a new target location minutes before low as one meter.17 With possibilities of further the time over target is imperative to the emerg­ improvement in resolution, the gap between ing concept of just-in-time targeting, which civilian and military capability is diminishing. significantly shortens the sensor-to-shooter (for typical resolutions required to examine loop. The ingredients of a secure, effective, possible strategic targets, see the table.)18 and flexible system include a satellite-based According to Prof. U. R. Rao, a pioneer of defence-communication system with encryp­ India’s satellite programme, the only way to tion and sufficientbandwidth, and a link 16– exploit space for strategic intelligence in the type of data link that gives aircrews and mis­ absence of a dedicated military satellite pro­ sion coordinators a clear picture or situation gramme is to foster greater synergy between report of both the tactical and strategic air the Indian Space Research organisation (ISRo) situations.21 This would involve elaborate link­ and defence users such as the three services, ing up of surveillance platforms, ground- the Research and Analysis Wing, and the In­ processing sensors, AWACS, other airborne telligence Bureau.19 he goes on to say that all platforms, and even special forces, who could requirements for strategic reconnaissance serve as terminal designators against mobile have to be met indigenously, with the ISRo and elusive targets such as enemy leadership capable of satisfying the need for enhanced in mountainous terrain. resolution. needless to say, the success of any strategic air campaign depends on the accu­ Political Will and Intent racy of intelligence and training in a realistic environment similar to that conducted by coali­ Prosecution of strategic air campaigns requires tion forces in Desert Shield, prior to Desert strong political will, clarity of intent, ability to Storm. Common sensor and communications gather domestic public support/approval, programs in UAVs, manned aircraft, and even and ability to absorb international criticism. satellites are vital to mission effectiveness, along The only way to gather public support in a de­ with a single processing, analysing, and dis­ mocracy like India is to encourage widespread seminating agency such as the aerial common- debates to make our strategic interests widely sensor programme being adopted by the US known and accepted so that when these inter­ armed forces.20 ests are threatened, we can easily make the

Table. Typical resolution requirements (in meters) for targeting

General Precise Technical Target Detection Description Identification Identification Analysis C3I Headquarters 3.0 1.5 1.0 .15 .10 Nuclear-Weapon Components 2.5 1.5 1.0 .15 .05 Missile Sites 3.0 1.0 1.0 .3 .05 Airfield Facilities 6.0 4.0 3.0 .3 .15 Bridges 6.0 4.0 1.5 1.0 .3 Radars 3.0 1.0 0.3 .15 .02 Supply Dumps 2.0 1.0 0.3 .03 .03 Reprinted from U. R. Rao, “Exploitation of Space for Conduct of Military Operations,” Trishul, Spring 2004, 3.

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decision to use force. This is a weak area in tegic significancein that it became the prover­ our country that we need to address at the ear­ bial nail in the coffin for Iraqi ground resis­ liest. The organisation for speedy decision tance in 1991.22 The concept of the strategic making exists, but we must exercise it more air campaign today focuses on attacking targets often in the assessment of our strategic inter­ that surface forces can subsequently attack or ests and potential interventions. Unlike the exploit with reduced forces and casualties. Cur­ United States, where a large number of ex- rent air force doctrines seek to serve the overall servicemen make up part of the political lead­ effort by leveraging the impact of strategic ership, India has very few politicians with mili­ strikes and interdiction, not by waging inde­ tary backgrounds. for this reason, airpower pendent wars.23 This in itself should be enough proponents must educate the political leader­ to assuage any apprehension amongst the sur­ ship on airpower’s strategic capabilities. face forces that airpower is trying to usurp their primacy. Such a belief—a total nonissue—only Changes in Philosophy and Doctrine undermines synergy and jointness. The key issue, however, involves fostering Probably the most difficult part of change en­ an understanding of the capabilities of strate­ tails altering a mind-set. Recent decades have gic strikes and interdiction. Despite the politico- shown that airpower has the ability to deci­ strategic procrastination over using airpower sively influence the course of any conflict by during the Kargil conflict of 1999, the IAf’s strategic application of force, be it in the Arab- “never done before” high-altitude interdiction Israeli conflict of 1967, the Bekaa Valley in air campaign did contribute significantly to 1982, or Desert Storm, Allied force, and en­ the strategic objective of evicting Pakistani during freedom. lebanon and Iraq have also regulars and mujahideen from the heights taught us lessons about the limited strategic that they had stealthily and audaciously occu­ impact of airpower in subconventional sce­ pied.24 The application of airpower against narios. It is time to embrace a doctrinal shift tactical targets such as dug-in troop emplace­ towards building up a Strategic forces Com­ ments and mountain supply dumps at eleva­ mand that recognises the need to develop tions of 16,000–18,000 feet created a strategic intervention capability across the spectrum of effect and forced the intruders to vacate all the conflict spearheaded by airpower. naval and dominating heights and retreat into Pakistan. land forces would complete a synergistic troika It also forced the Pakistani military leadership without needlessly engaging in turf battles re­ to reassess its apparent strategy of waging a garding command and control of theatre proxy war against India. offensive air opera­ forces, something that has so often stunted tions also silenced critics within India who felt the development of strategic doctrine within that airpower was essentially escalatory in na­ the Indian armed forces. We need to adopt ture. In fact, the introduction of airpower the techniques of parallel warfare, in which proved decisive in de-escalation and conflict the payoffs of strategic applications of air- resolution. With that as a template, nothing power, when applied simultaneously with tac­ prevents the formulation of a cohesive inter­ tical applications, act as a decisive force. lest diction campaign, even in subconventional the surface forces feel that strategic air strikes scenarios, provided that surface forces realise have no effect at the tactical or operational the tremendous payoffs of a well-planned levels of war, one need only travel a short dis­ strategic-interdiction campaign. tance back in history to see otherwise. The use of tactical platforms such as A-10s, AV-8Bs, and Training f/A-18s to destroy elements of the two Iraqi armored divisions that maneuvered offen­ The next logical step, after displaying political sively to influence the abortive Iraqi offensive will and changing existing mind-sets regard­ at Al-Khafji offers a classic example of a tactical ing the advantages of airpower in the further­ operation that ultimately had tremendous stra­ ance of India’s strategic objectives, calls for

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training and thinking to fight strategically. • encouragement and periodic exercising The present IAf training pattern for aircrews, of strategic airlift capability and helicop­ controllers, and support elements is heavily ter operations with special forces. skewed towards a tactical orientation and rather • Continuation of exercises with a few foreign defensive in nature due to our reactive doc­ air forces, with simulation of contingencies trine since we have never wanted other nations in mutually acceptable third countries. to see us as an aggressive and expansionist country. Without drastically altering our train­ • Creation of strategic task forces with cen­ ing methodology, we need to train continu­ tralised decision making, independent com­ ously in strategic roles. We can introduce a ponent commanders, and decentralised execution. strategic orientation at the training stage itself after implementation of the hawk advanced jet trainer, which we can use to expose trainee Conclusion pilots to AAR and long-distance missions in the finalphase of their instruction. Additional If a battle can be won without suffering training areas that demand immediate atten­ loss, surely this is the most economical, if tion include the following: not the most traditional, way of gaining the strategical object. • Creation of simulated target systems like —John frederick Charles fuller those in the negev Desert of Israel, which cater to scenarios ranging from evacua­ The IAf finds itself in the midst of a modern­ tion of personnel to destruction of key ization process likely to take 10–15 years, by installations and elimination of terror­ which time it will possess significant strategic ca­ ists. our aircraft should engage these tar­ pability in terms of platforms and force multi­ gets across the country in different sea­ pliers. The upgrading of infrastructure and com­ sons and terrains. munications requirements to support such operations is accompanying this modernization. • formation of a pool of aircrews specially The IAf’s mind-set is also shifting from that of a trained on varied platforms. Primarily, tactically oriented and proficient force to one they should have tactical proficiency but that has the confidence to influence strategy and should also undergo periodic specialist doctrinal changes. At a time when nations are capsules and training in execution of increasingly reluctant to commit ground forces strategic missions. This core group needs due to the likelihood of mounting casualties, the periodic exercising and frequent inter­ ability to engage strategic targets with minimum national exposure. collateral damage and maximum effect has made airpower a most preferred option in swift, con­ • Conducting of periodic exercises involv­ ventional conflict resolution. from the imprecise ing joint task forces at varied locations, aerial attacks of World War II to the precision ranging from deserts to hilly terrain and with which modern aircraft engaged targets in island territories. We should regularly plan Afghanistan and Iraq in 2003, the strategic air long-distance missions involving AAR as campaign has come a long way. having realized well as change in control zones, altitudes, that the strategic effects of airpower application and time zones. Such exercises should make themselves felt across the spectrum of con­ also introduce sleep deprivation and fa­ flict, ranging from limited and high-intensity tigue orientation at regular intervals.25 conventional warfare to subconventional and ir­ regular warfare, we know it is time for the IAf to • Introduction of multiple aerial refuelings put together a blueprint for building a credible and engagements spread across theatres strategic aerial-intervention capability over the at various levels of squadron training. next decade. ❑

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Notes

1. Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Knight, Strategic Of­ 52–72, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/ fensive Air Operations (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1989), apj/apj96/spr96/meil.pdf. 48–60. 12. Thomas A. Keaney and eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War 2. Duncan Bell, “The Seductive Promise of Air Power: Air Power Survey: Summary Report (Washington, DC: De­ Strategic Coercion in Vietnam (and Beyond?)” Royal Air partment of the Air force, 1993), 226. Force Air Power Review 3, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 38–53. 13. Anthony h. Cordesman, The Iraq War: Strategy, 3. Ibid. Tactics, and Military Lessons (Washington, DC: Center for 4. Mark J. Conversino, “The Changed nature of Stra­ Strategic and International Studies, 2003), 122. tegic Air Attack,” Parameters 27, no. 4 (Winter 1997–98): 14. Grant, “Redefinition of Strategic Air Power,” 36. 28–41, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/ 15. Cordesman, Iraq War, 196–99. 97winter/conversi.htm. 16. “honourable Raksha Mantri of India, Shri Pranab 5. Col Richard T. Reynolds, Heart of the Storm: The Genesis Mukherjee, Speaking at the Air Marshal P. C. lal Memorial of the Air Campaign against Iraq (Maxwell AfB, Al: Air Uni­ lecture on March 20, 2006,” Defence Watch, April 2006, versity Press, January 1995). 8–10. 6. Maj David S. fadok, John Boyd and John Warden: Air 17. U. R. Rao, “exploitation of Space for Conduct of Power’s Quest for Strategic Paralysis (Maxwell AfB, Al: Air Military operations,” Trishul, Spring 2004, 1–7. University Press, february 1995). 18. Ibid. 7. Jasjit Singh, “Strategic framework for Defence 19. Ibid. Planners: Air Power in the 21st Century” (paper pre­ 20. Robert Wall and David fulghum, “SIGInT Snarl,” sented at the Aero India 1998 Seminar, Bangalore, India, 8–10 December 1998). Aviation Week and Space Technology 164, no. 4 (23 January 8. Rebecca Grant, “The Redefinition of Strategic Air 2006); 24. Power,” Air Force Magazine 86, no. 10 (october 2003): 33–38, 21. The Warfighter’s Encyclopedia, s.v. “JTIDS—link 16,” http://www.afa.org/magazine/oct2003/1003strategic.pdf. https://wrc.navair-rdte.navy.mil/warfighter_enc/weapons/ 9. “Air force fleet,” Bharat Rakshak: The Consortium of Senselec/Sensors/link16.htm. Indian Military Websites, 23 April 2007, http://www.bharat 22. lt Col Price T. Bingham, “Revolutionizing War­ -rakshak.com/IAf/Units/fleet.html. The projected fig­ fare through Interdiction,” Airpower Journal 10, no. 1 ure in the site amounts to 38 combat squadrons that (Spring 1996): 29–35, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/ would reduce to 30 by the end of 2008 without immediate airchronicles/apj/apj96/spr96/bing.pdf. replacements. 23. Conversino, “Changed nature of Strategic Air At­ 10. Maj Gen Allen G. Peck, “Airpower`s Crucial Role tack,” 28–41. in Irregular Warfare,” Air and Space Power Journal 21, no. 2 24. Gen V. P. Malik, Kargil: From Surprise to Victory (new (Summer 2007): 11, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/ Delhi: harperCollins Publishers India, 2006). airchronicles/apj/apj07/sum07/sum07.pdf. 25. Knight, Strategic Offensive Air Operations, 48–60. We 11. Col Philip S. Meilinger, “Ten Propositions Regard­ took the idea for including this in our training pattern ing Airpower,” Airpower Journal 10, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 50, from the author’s reference to the subject in his book.

Since the air, space, and cyber domains are increasingly interdepen­ dent, loss of dominance in any one could lead to loss of control in all. —Gen T. Michael Moseley

1-Subramaniam.indd 66 7/28/08 7:52:19 AM Rethinking the Combined Force Air Component Commander’s Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Approach to Counterinsurgency

Lt CoL MiChaeL L. Downs, UsaF

Editorial Abstract: Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Iraq and Afghanistan generate unique and complex intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) requirements for lower-echelon commanders who face a multitude of different insurgent groups fighting with asymmetric means. The air component finds itself ill equipped to handle the ISR challenges of COIN since it still adheres to a doctrine of major theater war. The author provides his­ torical context, offers an alternative approach to managing ISR, and recommends changes to doctrine.

n the counterinsurgencies (COIn) in tion improves the probability of mission suc­ Iraq and Afghanistan, commanders of cess. Mission planning by COIn units relies brigades, battalions, companies, and spe­ heavily on intelligence to help answer certain cial forces all conduct daily missions in questions: Where is the enemy located? What Itheir respective areas of operation (AO) to se­ does he plan to do? Where does he plan to cure neighborhoods and seek out insurgents. act? Where might improvised explosive devices As noted by Lt Gen thomas Metz, former (IeD) be located? Moreover, intelligence pro­ commander of Multi-national Corps-Iraq, vided to units during execution helps them “From small unit to theater level, intelligence identify infiltration routes and possible am­ provide[s] the basis for every mission.”1 these bush locations, gives commanders one more missions range from cordon and search to di­ look at a target before moving against it, and rect action, but all require high levels of intel­ enables decision makers to monitor enemy re­ ligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) sponses to friendly actions.2 support to assist in target development, mis­ Although human intelligence (hUMInt) sion planning, and execution. Increasing the is a key source for much of this data, imagery amount of ISR available to conduct an opera­ and signals information collected from ISR as­

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sets such as unmanned aerial vehicles or U-2 Historical Context reconnaissance aircraft often complement in­ formation gleaned from hUMInt operations, In the post-Vietnam era, the Air Force dedi­ providing commanders with a multidimen­ cated a substantial effort to developing its ability sional intelligence perspective of the enemy to fightat the operational level of war through and the objective area. Maj Dan Zeytoonian the CFACC and attendant air and space opera­ and others write that “in COIn, intelligence tions center (AOC) constructs.6 Beginning in operations strive to fuse intelligence from the early 1990s, CFACC principles were devel­ nonorganic collection sources [multiple oped, based upon the threats of conventional sources] into a seamless picture of the insur­ wars in the Middle east and Asia. As “informa­ gency networks and to provide corroborating tion” increasingly became a significant war­ intelligence for targeting” (emphasis added).3 fare medium and as weapons became more the operational component charged with technology dependent, relying on precise in­ providing much of the ISR to support COIn formation to guide them, the Air Force placed operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is the a premium on fielding a robust fleet of ISR combined force air component commander assets that could locate the equipment that (CFACC).4 the CFACC provides thousands our conventional adversaries might possess.7 of hours of ISR support each month to joint From fixed enemy command and control (C2) task forces (JtF) and other component com­ facilities to mobile surface-to-air missiles, tanks, manders in US Central Command’s (US- and fighter aircraft, the CFACC construct CentCOM) area of responsibility, but the evolved to the point that the AOC could C2 a net effect of these missions, though helpful, constellation of ISR assets capable of detect­ is significantly less than it could be. Specifi­ ing enemy threats, while directing strike air­ cally, in the words of Col teresa Fitzpatrick, craft to destroy them day or night in all weather 548th Intelligence Group commander, “We conditions. “the rigid nature of these [con­ [the CFACC] have only one airborne ISR ventional] operations allowed our [ISR] systems [tactics, techniques, and procedures]: [ma­ and intelligence personnel to apply templates jor theater war].”5 Were the air component to po­ to probable [enemy] actions” and place our sition itself more appropriately for COIN opera­ collection systems over optimal points in the tions, the ISR it provides ground commanders battlefield to detect projected enemy activity.8 would prove more useful in helping maneuver to C2 this lethal force, AOC processes units accomplish their missions. to understand gradually developed into a carefully crafted 96­ the cause and extent of the CFACC’s defi­ hour air tasking order (AtO) cycle, complete ciencies in providing effective ISR for COIn with meetings, processes, checklists, and prod­ operations, we need to appreciate the histor­ ucts—all codified in joint doctrine and com­ ical context of the CFACC construct itself, monly practiced in each theater.9 We not only the nature of COIn operations in Iraq and created these processes based on a conventional­ Afghanistan, and the way that ISR required war assumption but also predicated them on for these operations differs from that in con­ the notion that we would direct friendly opera­ ventional operations. this foundation helps tions from the operational level. this level of reveal how the CFACC currently conducts focus essentially required the CFACC to have a ISR operations in support of COIn efforts in macroview of the ground scheme of maneuver. Afghanistan and Iraq and how we could re­ For instance, the combined force land compo­ tool these operations to increase their ef­ nent commander (CFLCC) would develop fectiveness. Although COIn operations are battle plans that employed large ground forces, incredibly complex and involve extensive dip­ such as corps and divisions, moving against lomatic, governance, information, security, similar-sized enemy units. the scheme of ma­ economic, and psychological efforts, this ar­ neuver for these ground operations could be ticle largely focuses on ISR support to secu­ visually depicted on a map by sweeping arrows rity operations in the COIn environment. indicating the friendly axes of advance. to plan

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for and conduct these operations, the CFLCC Iraqi Freedom, as well as the manner in which would request ISR, interdiction, close air sup­ these forces operate. COIn operations in Iraq port (CAS), and a range of other support mis­ and Afghanistan have many characteristics, sions from the CFACC. to plan an AtO, the but we can describe them as highly complex, AOC had to understand what the ground com­ unpredictable, and dynamic—generally dif­ ponent hoped to accomplish during an AtO ferentiated from conventional operations by period but did not need detailed information the nature of the enemy.11 As opposed to a about lower-echelon operations. conventional foe with all the trappings of a In addition to the focus on conventional modern army, insurgents in Iraq and Afghani­ war and the operational level, the AtO cycle stan often wear civilian clothes, do not use tra­ was based on a hierarchical request process ditional military equipment, and conduct a that involved long lead times to incorporate variety of irregular, small-unit actions. they requests into the AtO. In essence, if a divi­ do not operate from customary bases or in sion, brigade, or even battalion wanted its re­ large formations, and, like many insurgent quests for ISR or CAS from the CFACC ap­ forces, they blend in with the population for proved by higher headquarters, it had to protection. trying to detect this enemy with forecast that requirement 72–96 hours in ad­ ISR assets, therefore, differs considerably from vance, typically based on templating friendly looking for conventional weapon systems. and enemy movements. the CFLCC would Insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan conduct collate validated air-support requests and for­ a variety of missions to disrupt coalition opera­ ward them to the CFACC for injection into the tions. they rarely engage coalition forces in AtO process. the consolidated CFLCC list anything resembling pitched battles, instead would then compete against the JtF’s and using suicide bombings, sniper attacks, am­ other components’ requests for inclusion in bushes, and IeDs against military and civilian the AtO.10 Ultimately, the 96-hour AtO battle targets to inflict damage and create instability.12 rhythm worked well in a conventional frame­ Insurgents also conduct sabotage against key work since battle fronts, rates of advance, and infrastructure, such as oil pipelines and power enemy actions were relatively predictable. the lines, and smuggle contraband into Iraq and ground unit could forecast consequent re­ Afghanistan from countries such as Pakistan, quirements for CFACC ISR and other support Iran, and Syria. the ISR challenges associated with an acceptable degree of certainty. with detecting these types of activities are much Although this operational C2 approach to different than those in conventional war. air warfare, developed after Vietnam and per­ Complicating the task of fighting insur­ fected in time for Operation Iraqi Freedom, gents in Iraq is the fact that they are not a uni­ proved successful, it was designed to fightcon ­ tary enemy. Rather, coalition forces face multi­ ventional wars. Unfortunately, with regard to variate violence from dozens of insurgent ISR, for the most part we are applying the groups, all employing different combat tech­ same conventional AOC processes in COIn niques. As such, two enemy groups may differ efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan today, result­ in their employment of the same method ing in an ineffective use of CFACC ISR. against friendly forces (e.g., the use of IeDs). therefore, each brigade and battalion must become intimately familiar with the enemy in Counterinsurgency Operations its AO and develop a strategy to defeat that in Afghanistan and Iraq enemy. eliot Cohen writes that the “mosaic nature of an insurgency means that local com­ Understanding how the CFACC can pro­ manders have the best grasp of their own situa­ vide more effective ISR support to COIn op­ tions” and, as such, must determine how best erations demands an intimate understanding to deal with them.13 of the types of missions conducted by forces As a result, the true supported commander during Operations enduring Freedom and for COIn operations is not at the JtF or

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CFLCC level, as in conventional operations; forces conduct a variety of missions. they may rather, according to Col Kirk Mardis, former conduct cordon-and-search missions in a par­ intelligence-collection manager of Multi­ ticular village or area of town, looking for national Force-Iraq, “the war is being fought weapons caches, insurgents, or insurgent hide­ at the brigade and battalion levels.”14 this has outs. Prior to a mission, they may request ISR the effect of highly decentralizing coalition to surveil an objective area to locate enemy operations, with each unit conducting its ambush points or determine insurgent pat­ own—often independent—war in its AO.15 terns of activity. ISR may also provide over- Moreover, fightingthe war at the brigade level watch of a convoy as it heads into a village and below means that taskings to the CFACC searching for IeDs, ambushes, or other suspi­ for ISR support originate there. A quick pe­ cious activity. Further, ISR assets can give com­ rusal of any day’s CFACC ISR collection deck manders the situational awareness necessary reveals that the vast majority of requirements to defend against enemy operations or reac­ do not come from Combined Joint task Force tions to friendly missions, such as detecting 76 in enduring Freedom or Multi-national egress actions, reinforcing movements, or lo­ Force-Iraq in Iraqi Freedom, though these C2 cating sniper positions.19 these assets can also nodes validate and submit lower-echelon re­ monitor critical infrastructure for sabotage or quests for ISR to the CFACC.16 nor is the col­ surveil border passes for illicit activities such lection deck populated with targets from US- as transshipment of weapons or drugs. CentCOM or the CFACC, as it might be in a We task ISR platforms to image a spot on conventional war. Rather, maneuver units gen­ the earth for two primary reasons, one of erate the vast majority of ISR requirements.17 which involves detecting enemy activity. When Lt Justin Mahoney, who recently served as a a ground unit requests that an ISR platform collection manager at the combined AOC image a target, it does not just pick a spot in (CAOC) at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, estimates Afghanistan or Iraq and hope that an un­ that 80–85 percent of collection requests in manned aerial vehicle will find enemy activity Iraqi Freedom come from the battalion and there—something comparable to searching brigade levels and that in enduring Freedom, for insurgents through a soda straw. Instead, this same level initiates nearly 100 percent of the requestor increases the probability of de­ collection requests.18 tection by having ISR confirm activity identi­ Without a fundamental understanding of fied by other intelligence sources.20 For in­ who generates ISR tasking and who the true stance, a ground unit might receive a hUMInt supported commander is, the CFACC cannot tip indicating presence of the enemy in a cer­ fully optimize C2 of ISR to support COIn op­ tain location. to confirm the tip, a battalion erations. Ultimately, in the COIn fight, the may request ISR support from the CFACC to focus for CFACC ISR support—unlike that in locate that activity. AOC collection managers a conventional war—is not the combatant then use the initial hUMInt tip to cue signals- command, JtF, CFACC, or even the CFLCC intelligence and imagery-intelligence sensors but the company-, battalion-, and brigade- on ISR platforms for that purpose. Ground- sized unit. unit requests could include anything from lo­ cating an IeD, to confirming the presence of high-value targets, to monitoring border cross­ What Counterinsurgency ing points for insurgents. After detection of the enemy, ISR serves the Commanders Need from second purpose of facilitating action against Intelligence, Surveillance, and him. Intelligence gained from hUMInt or Reconnaissance ISR missions may result in the planning and conducting of friendly operations against tar­ to counter the insurgent threats in endur­ gets. General Metz writes that “in more cases ing Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, coalition than not, intelligence drives most of the bat­

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talion and brigade-level operations.”21 to be ground scheme of maneuver that is echelons- sure, much of this actionable intelligence in above-battalion level provides insufficient situa­ enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom ini­ tional awareness to the CFACC and his air­ tially comes from hUMInt sources. however, crews.”25 Moreover, for the CFACC to provide we then use these initial tip-offs to guide other value-added ISR support for COIn operations, ISR assets (signals intelligence and imagery it not only should have links to the maneuver intelligence) to further refinethe intelligence unit but also must have access to the ground picture. Ground-unit planning for the upcom­ unit’s knowledge about the enemy in its AO. ing operation thus requires additional target­ the AOC can then use this information to ing and planning data to conduct its mission. guide its ISR-collection efforts. For example, Intelligence analysts with the ground unit re­ Army major Charles Baker explains that “uti­ quest ISR support from the CFACC and fuse lizing [unmanned aerial vehicles] to find ex­ that intelligence with their hUMInt to “gain plosives or ambushes requires either luck or the best possible understanding of the insur­ good intelligence to direct the unmanned air­ gent network” and prepare for the upcoming craft, since the region is too large to maintain operation.22 thus, intelligence plays a key role constant surveillance.”26 By working with ground in both initiating friendly operations and then units to cull out their relevant knowledge supporting their planning and conduct. about the AO and the enemy’s actions there, the traditional paradigm for collecting in­ the CFACC can employ his or her ISR assets telligence in conventional operations is inversely more effectively to increase the probability of related to the collection approach needed in detecting priority information needed by the COIn operations. Whereas the requirements maneuver unit to conduct its COIn opera­ of the operational-level commander drive col­ tions. the CFACC must therefore understand lection in conventional wars, General Metz how to employ ISR appropriately to find enemy writes that “the intelligence effort in Iraq is activity, maintain connection with the sup­ 23 a ‘bottom-up’ process.” Vice Adm Lowell ported unit to understand the enemy that he Jacoby, former director of the Defense Intelli­ or she seeks to find, become adept at passing gence Agency, expands on this paradigm shift actionable intelligence in a timely manner to by noting, key decision makers at the battalion and bri­ there’s [an] issue that’s desperately important. gade levels, and remain highly responsive in We grew up in a world where the echelon above providing ISR to support resultant operations. us always had better information than we did, and it cascaded down. We need to be thinking about how we can have information flowup. to­ The CFACC’s Intelligence, day, the platoon or company that is on the ground in Afghanistan and patrols the same Surveillance, and Reconnaissance area regularly for an entire deployment has a far Support to Counterinsurgency better idea of what’s happening in that sector than someone who is further removed.24 Operations Admiral Jacoby’s point is clear—successful in­ Unfortunately, the current CFACC approach telligence operations necessitate close inter­ to providing ISR support to COIn does not action between the tactical and operational meet the requirements for this form of war. levels, which in this case means between the AOC ISR processes were developed so that CFACC and the maneuver units it supports at CFACC ISR assets could locate enemy equip­ the brigade and battalion levels. ment and report hostile locations to the AOC, Col James Waring, who served as the which, in turn, could direct air assets to destroy CFLCC’s chief liaison officer to the CFACC in enemy threats. Given the nature of the insur­ 2004, highlighted the need for CFACC inte­ gencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, the types of gration with the maneuver unit, stating that collection challenges presented by insurgents, “we have learned that the macro-view of the the variety of missions conducted by coalition

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forces, and the timelines they require to plan ISR assets can image. For example, units in for operations, how does the CFACC currently Iraq may put in requests for 900 targets for im­ approach ISR support to COIn? aging, but the CFACC may have the capacity For the most part, current COIn opera­ to image only 500. In this case, ISR assets will tions still use the timelines and processes em­ image the 500 highest-ranking targets. this ployed during the conventional phase of Iraqi collection-management method, known as Freedom. CFACC timelines for conventional “peanut-butter spreading,” divides ISR among wars necessitate that components submit their a large number of requestors by giving each a ISR requests approximately 48 hours prior to portion of the collection it asked for. this AtO execution. this deadline has not changed method has the advantage of supporting a sig­ for the COIn phase of either Iraqi Freedom nificant number of customers and imaging a or enduring Freedom.27 the CAOC at Al sizeable number of targets. this process works Udeid generally directs that the JtFs (Multi­ fine in a conventional fight, but it is woefully national Corps-/Force-Iraq and Combined inadequate for COIn, in which it is often pref­ Joint task Force 76) have their requirements erable to dedicate an ISR asset to a specific to collection managers 48 hours prior to AtO problem for a long period of time in order to execution.28 Simple math highlights the flaw detect activity more clearly. Admiral Jacoby in this system. the commanders of the 2d Bri­ noted that “we need to be in an environment gade Combat team of the 4th Infantry Divi­ where we can achieve persistent surveillance, sion in Iraq or task Force Devil in Afghani­ which means being able to linger on the prob­ stan, for instance, have to generate their ISR lem as long as it takes to understand it.”30 requirements at least 72 hours prior to AtO the CFACC’s current approach to persis­ execution so that the JtF has time to massage tence involves thinking of the problem in terms and approve them before sending them to the of space rather than time. Sprinkling ISR CAOC 48 hours prior to execution. Often, the around all of Iraq or Afghanistan rather than subordinate battalion must submit its require­ focusing it on a limited number of areas cre­ ments to the brigade level 96 hours out to give ates the illusion of persistence. For example, the brigade time to prioritize its own as well as daily ISR update briefingsto commanders de­ the subordinate battalions’ ISR requests be­ pict various colored circles representing an as­ fore sending them to higher echelons. Pre­ sortment of collection assets covering most of dicting what the enemy will do, knowing the the country.31 however, in a COIn, ISR must exact nature of the upcoming friendly mis­ often remain persistent over a single problem sion, and understanding exactly how ISR will set for an extended period of time in order to be employed that far in advance all pose a develop the intelligence picture and tease out challenge in the extremely dynamic COIn actionable intelligence. Clearly, the trade-off battlefield. Moreover, this burdensome pro­ with this type of approach is that the CFACC cess simply discourages many units from sub­ can image only a small number of targets. the mitting requirements and creates a mind-set litmus test for success is not the number of tar­ at the tactical level that CFACC assets, such as gets imaged but the actual intelligence de­ the Global hawk or U-2, are unavailable to rived from these missions and the resultant support them.29 impact on friendly operations. the CFACC also follows conventional pro­ not only has the AOC failed to change its cedures for determining targets for imaging. tasking timelines and collection-deck proce­ For instance, a collection manager in the AOC dures to meet the demands of COIn, but also will gather all of the ISR target requests from it has failed to adequately facilitate the inte­ Iraqi Freedom, rank them according to theater gration of ISR into coalition schemes of ma­ priorities, and then draw a “cut line” above neuver. As discussed earlier, many ground which assets will image the targets. this line is operations are time sensitive and driven by based upon a number of factors but depends intelligence. If, for instance, hUMInt indi­ upon the number of targets that a given AtO’s cates that taliban fighters will cross the bor­

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der from Pakistan into Afghanistan in the Recommendations next 24 hours, the ground commander will require ISR support to search for and locate Because the conventional collection- this possible activity. Because the tasking pro­ management processes now employed by the cess is so hierarchical, the responsible bri­ AOC undermine its ability to optimize ISR gade may not have its requests for ISR assis­ support to COIn efforts in Afghanistan and tance approved in time to support planning Iraq, the CFACC must reevaluate his or her for its operations.32 approach to this nontraditional form of war­ Additionally, no formal mechanism exists fare. Specifically, the CFACC should shorten to link the actual ISR units to the supported ISR-request timelines, change the tasking pro­ ground units. As mentioned earlier by Colonel cess, synchronize ISR collection with the Waring, this link is necessary so that the ground scheme of maneuver, and codify the ground unit can clearly tell the CFACC unit— changes so that the AOC can employ ISR in this case, the collection unit—how the across the range of military operations. enemy functions in its AO, how ISR can detect Changing the ISR request-and-tasking pro­ insurgent activity, and how ISR can integrate cess will result in the greatest improvement in into friendly operations. For example, a bat­ the CFACC’s ISR support to COIn. to trun­ talion planning for an upcoming cordon-and­ cate the timelines associated with requesting search mission might request ISR to search ISR support, the CFACC can adopt the same for IeDs and ambush locations. By linking the process used for CAS requests, whereby ground two parties (ISR unit to ground units directly), units submit air-support requests to the AOC, the collection unit can learn from the sup­ typically 36 hours prior to AtO execution.33 ported battalion where insurgents typically that is, the ground unit requests CAS support place IeDs (e.g., near street corners) in their for a specific mission during a block of time AO, which, in turn, focuses the search pat­ for a general area. the AOC prioritizes the re­ terns of the ISR unit on the areas most likely quests and determines which ones it can sat­ to contain IeDs. Again, in the multivariate vio­ isfy. however, the ground unit decides how to lence in Iraq and Afghanistan, each battalion use that CAS asset once it checks in with its knows best how the enemy in its AO operates. ground customer. Applying this methodology Because a typical collection unit will be tasked to collection not only would shorten the time- to flyover and support multiple units during a lines for requesting collection but also would single mission, it must be able to schedule the allow the tasking of ISR assets for imaging the collection so that it completes the data gather­ most current and important targets of the ing in time to support friendly operations. ground commander and put the asset in a Once again, the collection unit must stay in direct-support role. For example, a Global touch with the supported unit to facilitate this hawk could be assigned to support a brigade level of integration. for two hours during a given operation. Prior ensuring that such integration occurs is to departure, the aircraft’s team could contact the responsibility of the CFACC. As the pro­ the supported ground unit and receive an up­ vider of ISR, the AOC must meet the needs of date on its operation as well as additional in­ the requestor. to do so, the AOC tasks ISR formation about the enemy. Before entering units to perform collection in support of ma­ the brigade’s AO, the Global hawk pilot could neuver units. Unfortunately, the tasking check in with the brigade for a tasking update. mechanism is based on a conventional model the supported unit could then elect to have which largely assumes that ISR would sup­ ISR targets collected as planned, drop irrelevant port operational-level commanders, and, as targets, or add those required by changes in such, no mechanism exists to provide the enemy movements or friendly operations. em­ level of tactical granularity needed by ISR ploying the CAS air-support-request method units to execute effective collection in sup­ for ISR does not preclude the use of collec­ port of COIn operations. tion decks. Units and operational headquar­

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ters could still submit targets to the AOC for support to provide contact information and as standard collection. the AOC would simply much enemy and friendly information as pos­ have to determine the amount of time a plat­ sible. Doing so will integrate CFACC collec­ form would spend collecting deck targets ver­ tion with ground operations and move it from sus providing direct support to ground units. a target-centric to a mission-focused model. however, by adding the air-support-request Finally, changes to AOC ISR procedures that method and allowing units to submit requests reflect COIn requirements should be codi­ for direct support 36 hours in advance, ground fied in joint doctrine and in Air Force tactics, units could continuously update the targets techniques, and procedures documents to en­ they want collected. the AOC could thereby able operational commanders to request and ensure that the targets for intelligence collec­ use ISR according to the type of war they are tion were relevant to the situation on the fighting. Current joint and Air Force AOC battlefield as opposed to determining them documentation focuses solely on major theater 72–96 hours earlier. war.34 By providing conventional and COIn though some might argue that the CFACC methodologies for operational ISR, the CFACC would lose control of his or her theater assets will be able to support operations across the through the use of the air-support-request spectrum of warfare. method, the alternative is to peanut-butter­ spread them over large areas, imaging poten­ tially irrelevant targets in an attempt to service Conclusion as many collection-deck targets as possible. Al­ though for conventional wars, we must often Success in the COIns in Iraq and Afghani­ image large numbers of targets, doing so di­ stan is critical to securing our nation’s defense. lutes the effectiveness of ISR in COIn. Of Key to achieving victory are the synchroniza­ note, the AOC would still maintain direction tion and optimization of all resources the of the asset in the tasking process by determin­ United States commits to Iraqi Freedom and ing which units to assign it to and for what du­ enduring Freedom. the CFACC must also op­ ration. Furthermore, the AOC would keep di­ timize the effectiveness of the ISR provided to vert authority for the collection asset, retaining US forces as these troops pursue their goals in the ability to shift the platform to higher- the security arena of these COIn operations. priority operations during execution, when Unfortunately, the air component finds it­ required. In the finalanalysis, this air-support­ self ill equipped to handle the ISR challenges request method would greatly increase the flexi­ of COIn because it still adheres to its heritage bility and relevance of CFACC ISR by provid­ of major theater war, which emphasizes the ing current, direct support to COIn operations. detection and destruction of conventional tar­ the CFACC can also improve ISR support gets, a lengthy planning process, and support to COIn and optimize collection by facilitat­ to operational-level commanders. however, ing the integration of ISR units with the the COIns in Iraqi Freedom and enduring ground scheme of maneuver prior to and dur­ Freedom, centered around lower-echelon ing mission execution. the CFACC currently commanders who face a multitude of differ­ uses the reconnaissance, surveillance, and tar­ ent insurgent groups fightingwith asymmetric get acquisition annex, produced for every means, differ greatly from major theater war. AtO, to pass the collection game plan to ISR US ground commanders, therefore, need units. Unfortunately, this product has evolved flexible, time-sensitive ISR support from the into a generic, high-level document that com­ CFACC to assist them in combating an uncon­ municates very little information of tactical ventional enemy. the current CFACC collection- relevance. We should amend the annex to management system does not meet the COIn provide ISR units with contextual guidance needs of ground commanders, but truncating for their mission. the document should link request timelines, adjusting the ISR tasking collection units with the ground units they process to mirror the CAS-request process,

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synchronizing collection with ground opera­ land, and special operations forces compo­ tions, and codifying these changes in joint nents as they establish security in Iraq and Af­ doctrine would greatly increase the system’s ghanistan. Moreover, developing a successful utility. CFACC ISR methodology for COIn not only By revamping the ISR approach to COIn, will benefitthe current operations in Iraq and the CFACC will increase the value of the intel­ Afghanistan but also will serve the joint force ligence provided to ground commanders and well as it deals with the range of military op­ play a valuable role in assisting supported JtF, erations in the long war and beyond. ❑

Notes

1. Lt Gen thomas F. Metz, Col William J. tait Jr., and Iraq and Afghanistan (intelligence-collection managers Maj J. Michael Mcnealy, “OIF II: Intelligence Leads Suc­ and analysts assigned to tactical and operational-level cessful Counterinsurgency Operations,” Military Intelligence units) during trips to war zones there in 2004 and 2005. Professional Bulletin 31, no. 3 (July–September 2005): 10, 11. eliot Cohen et al., “Principles, Imperatives, and http://www.universityofmilitaryintelligence.us/mipb/article Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency,” Military Review 86, no. 2 .asp?articleID=172&issueID=12 (accessed 26 February 2007). (March–April 2006): 52, http://usacac.leavenworth.army 2. Ibid. .mil/CAC/milreview/english/MarApr06/Cohen.pdf. 3. Maj Dan Zeytoonian et al., “Intelligent Design: 12. Metz, tait, and Mcnealy, “OIF II,” 10. COIn Operations and Intelligence Collection and Analysis,” 13. Cohen et al., “Principles, Imperatives, and Para­ Military Review 86, no. 5 (September–October 2006): 33, doxes,” 49. http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/ 14. Col Kirk Mardis, collection-management chief, english/SepOct06/Zeytoonian.pdf (accessed 26 Febru­ Multi-national Force-Iraq, Baghdad, Iraq, July 2005–July ary 2007). 2006, discussion with the author, December 2005. A col­ 4. the CFACC in US Central Command’s area of re­ lection manager, potentially located at every level from sponsibility plans and conducts operations at the com­ tactical through strategic, is responsible for determining bined air operations center (CAOC) at Al Udeid Air Base, which intelligence problems commanders want answered Qatar. the CAOC at Al Udeid simultaneously supports and then matching the appropriate collection asset— Operations Iraqi Freedom, enduring Freedom, and Joint whether hUMInt, signals intelligence, imagery intelli­ task Force horn of Africa. gence, and so forth—to collect against that requirement. 5. PowerPoint briefing, Col teresa Fitzpatrick, 480th 15. Metz, tait, and Mcnealy, “OIF II,” 12; and Cohen Intelligence Wing, Langley AFB, VA, subject: Centralized et al., “Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes,” 52. Control, Decentralized execution of Airborne ISR, 1 June 16. A collection deck is a list of ISR targets compiled 2006. by the collection manager. 6. See Air Force tactics, techniques, and Procedures 17. 1st Lt Justin Mahoney, collection manager, US- (AFttP) 3-3.60, “Operational employment: Air and CentCOM CAOC, Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, September Space Operations Center,” draft, September 2006, 1-2. “the AOC is the operational-level command and control 2006–January 2007, interview by the author, 17 April (C2) center that provides the JFACC with the capability to 2007. Based on his experience as the collection manager direct and supervise the activities of assigned and attached at the CAOC in Al Udeid, which simultaneously supports forces and to monitor the actions of both enemy and operations in Iraqi Freedom, enduring Freedom, and friendly forces. . . . In a joint or combined environment, JtF horn of Africa, Lieutenant Mahoney estimated that the AOC will be designated either as a joint air operations 80–85 percent of collection requests in Iraqi Freedom center (JAOC) or a combined air operations center were generated from the battalion/brigade level and that (CAOC) and manned accordingly.” Ibid. nearly 100 percent of collection requests in enduring 7. the information in this section regarding the AOC Freedom were generated from this same level. is based on the author’s multiple years of service in AOCs 18. Ibid. in the Pacific, europe, and Middle east. the author has 19. Lt Col Ahmed hashim, 3d Armored Cavalry Regi­ served in a variety of AOC positions in the Strategy, Com­ ment, tal Afar, Iraq, interview by the author, 16 April 2007. bat Plans, and ISR divisions as well as in the Special Op­ 20. Metz, tait, and Mcnealy, “OIF II,” 13. erations Liaison element. 21. Ibid., 11. 8. Metz, tait, and Mcnealy, “OIF II,” 10. 22. Zeytoonian et al., “Intelligent Design,” 34. 9. AFttP 3-3.60, “Operational employment,” 1.4–1.5. 23. Metz, tait, and Mcnealy, “OIF II,” 11. the term 10. to determine which stage in the collection-tasking bottom up refers to the idea that actionable intelligence in process generated requirements, the author interviewed COIn is often collected at the lowest level (e.g., company) multiple JtF, Army, and special operations personnel in rather than at the corps level.

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24. Vice Adm Lowell e. Jacoby, “Intelligence Collec­ the Pacific, europe, and Middle east. the author has tion, handling and Analysis Undergo Fundamental served in a variety of AOC positions in the Strategy, Com­ Change” (lecture, Joint Warfare Conference, Arlington, bat Plans, and ISR divisions as well as the Special Opera­ VA, 25–26 October 2006). tions Liaison element and has been present in dozens of 25. Col James M. Waring, Lt Col Carl L. Giles, and daily update briefs to the CAOC director that include the CW3 John A. Robinson, “the 19th BCD in Counterinsur­ daily ISR game plan. gency Operations,” Field Artillery, July–August 2005, 17, 32. Units can submit an ad hoc request via the JtF to http://sill-www.army.mil/FAMAG/2005/JUL_AUG_2005/ the CAOC for time-sensitive, unplanned collection re­ JUL_AUG_2005_FULL_eDItIOn.pdf. quirements. the CAOC will accept some of these re­ 26. Quoted in Robert Wall, “Finding the needle: Pen­ quests, but it is hesitant to do so very often unless the pri­ tagon Intelligence Agency expands Fleet of Unmanned ority is extremely high. tasking an airborne ISR asset with Aircraft,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 159, no. 25 an ad hoc requirement generally means that it will not be (22 December 2003): 28. able to collect all of the taskings assigned prior to takeoff. 27. Mahoney, interview. CAOC procedures still re­ therefore, the CAOC must weigh the value of ad hoc and quire units to submit their imagery needs 48 hours prior preplanned taskings. Ultimately, the CAOC wants to dis­ to kickoff of the AtO. however, for full-motion-video as­ suade units from overusing the ad hoc tasking method. sets such as the Predator, ground units can change their 33. Maj John Vincent, chief, USCentCOM CAOC requirements up to 12 hours prior to AtO execution, Master Air Attack Plan night Shift Cell, Al Udeid Air Base, provided the change in tasking won’t affect aircrew or air­ Qatar, november 2007, telephone conversation with the craft timing or the overall route of the mission. author, 14 november 2007; and Joint Publication 3-30, 28. Ibid. Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, 5 June 2003, 29. Col Kirk Mardis, telephone conversation with the GL-3, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_ author, 12 April 2007. 30.pdf. 30. Jacoby, lecture. 34. Amy Ryder, to the author, e-mail, 12 April 2007. 31. the information in this section regarding persis­ Mrs. Ryder is a consultant working on the development of tence and the AOC’s approach to this requirement is training and documentation related to CAOC tactics, based on the author’s multiple years of service in AOCs in techniques, and procedures.

3-Downs.indd 76 7/28/08 7:52:59 AM Revisiting South African Airpower Thought Considering Some Challenges and Tensions in Southern Africa

Dr. Francois Vreÿ Dr. abel esterhuyse

Editorial Abstract: Known for its low-tech forces and unconventional wars, Africa lacks the financial flexibility to employ costly, information-based airpower assets. The authors contend that the support­ ing roles of airpower are most compatible with the evolving strategic landscape of Southern Africa. Within that region, the fundamental challenge involves keeping airpower in step with defense arrange­ ments and establishing stepping-stones for an airpower culture amidst ongoing integration.

radiTionally, Two clearly modern war-fighting environment, leading- identifiable precepts shape the use edge airpower technology lies beyond the of airpower—technology and conven­ reach of the second- or third-rated powers of tional war. without technology, there the african continent, given the extreme rise Tis no such thing as airpower. Technology was in its cost. even if they are able to purchase instrumental in the creation and development these air assets, these lesser powers are not al­ of airpower and to this day remains one of the ways willing to risk using them.2 primary drivers in its use—to the extent that Technology shapes the organisational as well small, incremental advances in technology as command and control (c2) ethos of air can still decisively influence the balance be­ forces in general. High technology requires tween offence and defence in aerial warfare.1 highly skilled, intelligent, and individually The love affair between technology and air- minded personnel for aerial war fighting.The power also gives rise to airpower’s being a need for highly skilled personnel not only costly instrument of military power. in the post- adds to airpower’s cost but also gives rise to a

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very elitist, discriminatory organisational ethos wards africa as its main area of interest and rooted in the ultimate idea of an air ace. in influence. This is a reflection of the extreme addition, the need for such personnel under­ political nature of armed conflict as under­ pins the intricate relationship between officers pinned by the clausewitzian notion that con­ responsible for fighting and other ranks who flict has its own grammar but not its own logic.6 serve as members of the ground crew. in most consequently, for an understanding of the cases, officers have minimal command authority grammar of airpower as part of South african over other ranks until they reach the level of military involvement in africa, one must con­ squadron commander.3 This stands in stark sider the political logic behind South africa’s contrast, for example, to the c2 arrangement emphasis on the prevention of conflict. of armies that are personnel-driven instruments a number of considerations shape South of power and, subsequently, c2 intensive. african political logic towards africa. South The centrality of conventional warfare in africa is the regional if not the continental airpower comes to the fore when one considers power in terms of its political stature, economic airpower’s counterproductivity in unconven­ power, and military capability. South africa, 4 tional wars. Stated differently, the contribution however, follows a cautious approach in deal­ of airpower in unconventional wars is primarily ing with africa in general and the Southern concerned with sustaining and supporting ter­ african development community (Sadc) in restrial operations through strategic and tac­ particular. The strategic plan of the South af­ tical transport capabilities. The use of airpower rican department of Foreign affairs clearly in “nasty little wars of the weak,” typical of afri­ spells out the principles that underpin this ap­ can conflicts, is a matter of debate. The counter- proach. it includes a commitment to africa as productivity of conventional airpower in un­ the focal point, to human rights and democ­ conventional operations underpins all the racy, to justice and international law, to peace different kinds of air campaigns, including and international mechanisms for solving con­ counterair and strategic bombing. The uncon­ flicts, to multilateralism, and to international ventional soldier either does not have any air- economic integration and cooperation.7 power or simply has no interest in getting in­ South africa does not configure its ap­ volved in symmetrical fights for air superiority. proach to dealing with africa around a tradi­ lengthy, low-intensity wars are normally fought tional realist paradigm with national interests in terrain that does not present strategic targets and power as the primary drivers—important with the enemy’s centre of gravity, located in as these may be. South africa’s historical, cul­ the hearts and minds of the people. tural, economic, and political predispositions, Known for its low-tech forces, africa lacks nonetheless, do provide some interesting in­ the financial flexibility to buy and employ costly, information-based airpower assets and sights about its involvement in africa. laurie is characterised by unconventional wars. How nathan, in particular, points out that under then should one understand the use of air- Pres. Thabo Mbeki, South africa’s foreign- policy outlook is shaped by three paradigms: power by Southern africa in general and South 8 africa in particular?5 democratic, africanist, and anti-imperialist. african solidarity and the assumption that the military is not the primary policy instrument South Africa, Africa, and the in dealing with africa’s problems are implicit in these paradigms. The example of the nego­ Utility of Military Force tiated revolution in South africa serves as the as long as no vital interests are compro­ blueprint for the government’s pacific or “si­ mised, preventing wars—rather than fighting lent” approach to conflict resolution and them—appeals to most societies the world peace building on the african continent—an over. conflict prevention also came to domi­ approach leaving little leeway for instruments nate the South african political agenda to­ such as airpower.9

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although the realist perspective cannot ad­ nent largely depends upon the availability of equately explain South africa’s involvement infantry-based forces and a need for air and in africa, it does serve a purpose in bringing maritime forces that can support these land the domestic agenda into consideration. That forces. or is this simply a testimony of the agenda shows a clear understanding of pov­ ability of the air Force and navy to mobilise erty, unemployment, and crime as the most support for their more domestically and defence­ salient political and security challenges con­ oriented roles—or a focus upon deterrence? fronting South africa. in the domestic political The South african military faces some seri­ environment, the South african government ous challenges in the conduct of peace mis­ has to contend with rising expectations of a sions on the african continent. on a political conflicting nature—balancing, for example, level, South africa is committed to a multi­ reconciliation, transformation, and capacity lateral approach. However, one can character­ building in state departments with the need ize some of the countries needed to coimple­ for increased delivery of public service. in ad­ ment such an agenda as reluctant partners at dition, balancing the budget between domes­ best. and one may link this reality to the tradi­ tic and foreign-policy agendas represents, to tional divide between the doves and hawks in say the least, a huge challenge for the South the Southern african political landscape, as il­ african government. lustrated in the impasse of political and other The foreign-policy context confronts the support and enthusiasm for the creation of an South african national defence Force with african Standby Force.13 on an operational some real challenges in its efforts to support level, african militaries in general and the government initiatives on the african conti­ South african military in particular have to nent. The most prominent in this regard is deal with very long lines of communications the absence of a coherent security strategy in characterised by a lack of infrastructure wher­ support of the government’s theoretical and ever military forces are deployed on the afri­ political paradigms and visions.10 in addition, can continent. compare that, for example, to the South african military has trouble opera­ the infrastructure available and the distance tionalising the notion of human security as over which the north atlantic Treaty organi­ the primary organising concept of govern­ sation had to deploy in Kosovo. mental security thinking.11 within South af­ airpower rests upon a strong technological rica, the idea of human security is firmly imperative, but utilising its conceptual under­ rooted in the 1996 white paper on defence as pinnings brings to the fore much of its value an example of a defence policy based primarily as a policy tool. emergent concepts act as the on the ideas of nonoffensive and nonthreat­ guiding intelligence and display a traditional ening defence in general and within the re­ nexus with the technological base of aerial gion in particular.12 war fightingas it has developed since the early However, the ideas of nonoffensive and twentieth century. The most spectacular de­ nonthreatening defence also brought to the velopments and progress in airpower are fore some anomalies in South african defence therefore located in the progress from a mere thinking and implementation. How, for ex­ recreational activity and reconnaissance role ample, does one explain the link between the to an instrument with strategic potential. This ideas of human security and nonoffensive de­ progress came about through both techno­ fence on the one hand and the procurement logical development and intellectual endeav­ programme of largely offensive conventional ours to interface technological systems in or­ weapon systems on the other? The nature of der to cover rising military needs and changes these weapons also led to some inconsistencies. in the conduct of war. Primarily, the offensive capability of the navy regional arrangements call for countries to and air Force benefitedfrom the recent arms have interoperable airpower capabilities. inter­ procurement. yet, the South african govern­ operable airpower evolves alongside politico­ ment’s agenda for peace on the african conti­ economic progress as patterns of amity displace

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enmity.14 advancement regarding regional in­ Taking Airpower to the tegration thus paves the way for and includes progress on military interoperability.15 within Southern African Region the integration continuum, airpower has to dennis drew noted that the essence of air- move alongside the political shift from enmity power is the ability to apply great power and threats, unilateral defence, and aggres­ quickly to any target on the planet or, in the sion, to amity, cooperation, and the rejection case of the Sadc, any target in Southern af­ of force to resolve conflict. Keeping airpower rica.21 The use of airpower in a particular envi­ in step with such regional dynamics includes ronment is rooted, drew argues, in under­ new technologies but relies largely upon norm standing the two key words in the definition, stretching and intellectual progress. namely quickly and power. neither land nor mari­ norm stretching refers to modifying con­ time power can compete with the reaction speed ventional behaviour dictated by established of airpower, especially in an infrastructure- norms but not breaking or ignoring the set deprived continent such as africa, so airpower norms.16 Therefore, is airpower in the South­ can make positive contributions in the non­ combat and peacekeeping realm, based on its ern african region business as usual, or does it ability to rapidly deliver humanitarian aid such call for altered structures, strategies, or opera­ as food, medical supplies, peacekeepers, and tions to satisfy new politico-strategic demands? diplomats trying to solve or avoid conflict. in any case, this necessitates some adjustments The contribution of airpower stems from in the Sadc of the traditional airpower para­ the swift employment of appropriate types digm. changes to an established norm result and numbers of air assets for the correct rea­ from responsiveness to politico-military threat sons.22 This represents a unique challenge to perceptions and, in addition, to (1) perceived Southern african air forces, which differ vastly benefits for the organisation, (2) pressures in terms of doctrine and air assets, and which from material or social conditions, and (3) do not exercise together regularly to ensure adapting to new demands, whether deemed tactical and operational interoperability. The appropriate or useful or both.17 in essence, swift employment of appropriate air assets is variations in threat responsiveness emanate rooted in access to timely and accurate strate­ from politico-military threat perceptions by gic and operational intelligence about what decision makers.18 in addition to norm stretch­ airpower should do and tactical intelligence ing, hard and soft technologies also play a role. about how airpower should do it.23 Material needs and physical systems drive airpower has become so valuable to so hard technology while soft technology relies many in so many different ways that the de­ 24 on the intellectual constructs of human beings.19 mand for it is virtually unlimited. in South­ in combination, hard and soft technologies ern african countries, with their scarce re­ underpin the diffusion and contributions of sources and small defence budgets, this simply means that airpower cannot be everything to technological innovations. However, airpower everybody. it obligates air forces to prioritise theorists have to contend not only with the their air assets, operations, and structures. technological imperative and the things that However, beyond the military realm, political air forces traditionally do but also with newly will remains the most important requirement declared politico-strategic demands. in this for the successful employment of airpower. regard, regional organisations have to resolve Political will is even more crucial when air- complex issues and infuse new rules and power has to contribute to conflictprevention norms to deal with, among other matters, the and peacekeeping. Such contributions origi­ void between technology-driven conventional nate in political conditions allowing for effec­ thinking on airpower and the political prefer­ tive strategic intelligence and early-warning ences and expectations emanating from re­ systems, effective cooperation and coordina­ gions such as the Sadc.20 tion of political will, and efficient c2 systems

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that facilitate effective multinational actions. patrol functions still characterise many Sadc The existence of a common political will in countries. The absence of a historic exposure the Sadc, however, is questionable because a to and embracement of the true role of air- common culture of bringing regional assets to power bodes ill for a mature airpower culture bear is either absent or effectively disrupted in the Sadc. in the absence of a mature secu­ by political bickering.25 rity community with a mature security culture Since its inception, and particularly during to direct the use of policy instruments, it is the twentieth century, airpower made regular perhaps unsurprising that airpower appears detours through the low-intensity-conflict en­ immature as well. Bjørn Møller avers that vironment. These detours lured both theorists Southern african armed forces are instru­ and military practitioners into reconsidering ments more of internal than foreign policy traditional thought on airpower. Several ar­ and that the postapartheid Sadc reflects a ticles attend to shifting the role, or at least ac­ limited need for national defence.29 diverse centuating the non-war-fighting roles, of air origins of Southern african militaries are im­ forces. one striking fact is the absence of lit­ portant as well, for they stem from colonial, erature regarding airpower in the Southern postcolonial, and liberation cultures, none of african region. which portrays any significant airpower pro­ in part, demands from the low-intensity­ files. colonial armies and guerrilla legacies conflict environment were (and perhaps still with a strong landward focus seem to domi­ are) viewed as aberrations, so they did not at­ nate, with only South africa and angola offer­ tract much attention from airpower theorists.26 ing noticeable islands of airpower.30 However, since the second half of the twenti­ Sadc airpower also falls victim to the reality eth century, an airpower domain dawned that that in the procurement of equipment, afri­ increasingly played out beyond the conven­ can armed forces often unduly emphasise tional confines.27 South africa and most of the technology appropriate for conventional war­ countries in the Sadc now have to contend fare. Mismatches develop because relatively with this conventional-unconventional inter­ low educational and technical standards often face of airpower, and political guidance is cru­ do not properly shape the eventual procure­ cial for its employment. ideally, policy directs ment and later employment of sophisticated the preparation and employment of the mili­ equipment. This is especially true of technology­ tary instrument, and South africa and the driven instruments of power such as air and Sadc are not exceptions. Multilateralism and maritime power. a mismatch between weapon cooperation within the Sadc and political systems and available operators is an obvious will direct much of what military decision consequence.inaddition,HerbertHowepointed makers have to adhere to, and this raises or out that service-determined instead of joint- lowers the role of airpower in the region. coordinated purchases often worked against Several academics emphasise the difficulty interoperability, standardisation, and regularity of building and maintaining airpower in af­ of supply in african militaries—and the Sadc rica. as early as 1968, ross Baker highlighted is no exception.31 Given the specialised char­ the dominance of ground forces in african acter of airpower, the aforementioned factors states as a stumbling block.28 The colonial give some indication of the Sadc dilemma or armies, from which many african armed inherent tension within the Sadc. forces stem, had no significantairpower assets that could instil a lasting airpower culture. even though later leaders introduced some Airpower in Southern Africa: high-tech airpower systems into new african Some Tensions, Some Progress states, they did not foster a systemic culture to raise and maintain this expensive and com­ airpower in the Sadc hinges upon two ques­ plex strategic tool. as a result, small air forces tions. Firstly, can airpower, with its technology- dedicated to transport, disaster control, and based, conventional war-fighting profile, be

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adjusted to suit the regional security agenda? mentation promote common thought. in this Secondly, can air defence in the region be “ev­ regard, Thomas Smith points to the planning erything for everybody” and satisfy expecta­ of air operations to remain within the ac­ tions from both the military and political do­ cepted parameters of civilian casualties and mains? in fact, what is the political requirement, destruction by limiting the lethality of muni­ or is it up to airpower theorists and military tions and their means of delivery.36 These ef­ decision makers to compile this profile?c lear forts are bound both to raise difficult ques­ political guidelines are of great use. However, tions and provide some answers regarding a such guidelines are rare and further eroded common airpower culture within the region. when they have to be operationalised in a re­ airpower in the Sadc also turns upon gional context where declaratory statements shared and integrated resources. in addition, of intent seem to rule. Bearing in mind the airpower rests upon centralisation as the best matter of norm stretching, one can formulate way to employ air assets in a theatre of opera­ a number of alternatives for configuring air- tions.37 Sadc leaders have to abdicate some power in the Sadc: sovereignty over the airpower instrument amidst a political culture that prefers a na­ • traditional airpower for the Sadc, stand­ tional hold on military resources. Given the ing as defence against aggression and in early stages of integrating Sadc military as­ support of the Mutual defence Pact, as sets and leaders who do not always share com­ well as the african Standby Force of the 32 mon approaches to security matters, ideas on african Union; shared and integrated resources need close at­ • traditional airpower providing limited tention. in this regard, soft technologies bring “residual capacity” for nontraditional about innovative thought, new institutions, contributions as located within certain and policies to loosen an undue national hold elements of airpower;33 on power.38 Sadc decision makers should comprehend that common defence is more • selection and exploitation of airpower ca­ important than unilateral efforts and that col­ pabilities that have a natural interface with lective, rather than national, capabilities pro­ the regional realities and demands and re- mote regional security.39 in this regard, the configuration of these capabilities to serve Sadc Standby Brigade is very immature but new roles; and (perhaps at the extreme) representative of an emergent regional path­ • corruption of airpower in order to fulfil way to pledge and validate military resources nontraditional roles in response to political (including air elements) for future contingen­ demands.34 cies. These national pledges are already vali­ dated as to their tenability if called upon. as new demands intrude upon the tradi­ However, very little is available on the specifics tional technological and war-fighting charac­ of air elements for the brigade whilst the ele­ ter of airpower, the more important soft tech­ ments should not be viewed as comprehen­ nologies can lessen the misapplication of sive. airpower elements in the Sadc remain airpower through uncoordinated regional de­ very limited.40 mands.35 Soft technologies are therefore im­ The Sadc cannot view airpower in isola­ portant to shaping airpower without losing tion from the role of the african Union, whose critical capacity amidst a culture of apprehen­ Peace and Security council views regional sion more attuned to continental strategic military capabilities as building blocks for con­ thought than the air and space domain. one tinental standby forces. However, moving from pathway for decision makers is to consider national to regional security corresponds with pooled intellectual and operational thought progress towards amity between member states. on the role of airpower in the Sadc region. in parallel, one is bound to also find progress institutionalisation, research and publishing, towards military cooperation and eventual in­ conferencing, training, schooling, and experi­ teroperability (see figure).41 although the Sadc

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has some way to go, migration to a mature se­ preference to avoid war fighting,would rather curity community is not simple and raises new opt for preventative and other, more construc­ demands to which conventional airpower also tive roles with humanitarian security as a pri­ has to adjust. Subsequently, airpower in the ority.44 in effect, the normative Sadc prefer­ Sadc has to remain in line with emergent re­ ence for a more pacifist approach to conflict gional needs, and we should consider some of inadvertently raises the non-war-fighting roles the following matters: of airpower, and it appears that these more humanitarian roles receive most attention. • are air forces in the Sadc mere army air wyn elder, as well as the Sac of Sadc, wings? points to several additional roles that stem • can a full spectrum of Sadc airpower from airpower.45 Surprisingly, air superiority capabilities be maintained? through the mature war-fighting profile of airpower is acknowledged to ensure safe air­ • How can we temper persistent obsoles­ space over a theatre—a capacity available in cence for Sadc airpower assets? the Sadc region if one considers the collec­ • How can we keep equilibrium in the dif­ tive regional air capabilities.46 However, un­ ficult supply, training, and maintenance less a conventional conflict erupts, airspace triad? control is more likely to be based on deter­ rence and ground-to-air systems than on other • which systems that fitS adc needs do we air assets in the region. nonetheless, given have to develop?42 the capability to maintain an aerial safe ha­ institutionally the Standing aviation com­ ven to offset local opponents, it becomes a mittee (Sac) of the inter-State defence and question of bringing to fruition the spectrum Security committee oversees Sadc airpower of nonlethal airpower capabilities within the cooperation. The Sac has two objectives: to soft security and humanitarian preferences promote regional stability through secondary of Sadc leadership. airpower roles and to defend against aggression airlift in the Sadc has to assume both hu­ that leans towards the primary war-fighting role manitarian and military faces. The cyclones in of airpower.43 inherently, the declared outlook Mozambique in 2000 and 2007 once again ac­ offered by the Sac covers the full spectrum of centuated the necessity to have sufficient airpower, albeit somewhat idealistically. How­ airlift to serve humanitarian security needs.47 ever, the Sadc, being quite explicit about its airlift contributes towards overcoming long

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3-Esterhuyse Vrey.indd 83 7/28/08 7:53:25 AM 84 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2008

distances amidst infrastructural voids, avoid­ communications are important between ing threatening groups, and securing lines of diverse Sadc actors spread across a large geo­ communications.48 if hostile groups deny ac­ graphic region. although satellite communi­ cess and mobility and thus threaten vulnerable cations are available, fixed- and rotary-wing societies, airlift offers alternative pathways to communications platforms within the Sadc counter or overcome such threats and vulner­ airpower environment feature as well.55 Mili­ abilities. air mobility is of crucial importance tary contingents operating amidst diversity re­ in a conflict domain without frontiers requir­ quire good tactical and operational communi­ ing infantry-styled forces to act as preventative cations as well as peace operations to stem and even fighting forces on short notice. Po­ internal conflictsthat challenge decision mak­ tential and current theatres of operations in ers. elder points out three communications the Sadc, such as the democratic republic of difficulties:interoperability due to equipment the congo, require an operational airlift capa­ diversity brought into the theatre, ad hoc com­ bility to serve both the military and humani­ munications arrangements to overcome the tarian agendas of decision makers. if pooled, lack of permanent facilities, and the need to civilian and military airlift assets of Sadc deal with deliberate disruption of the means 56 countries (such as the South african a-400 of communications. airpower can mitigate airbus orders) can contribute to both the hu­ these difficulties. locating communications in manitarian and military facets of Southern af­ the airpower domain also confers a sense of rican security.49 autonomy and protection against host inter­ The Sadc’s emphasis upon early warning ference and opposing parties. an air and and prevention rather than intervention high­ space communications regime provides ro­ bustness in theatres known for their com­ lights the importance of reconnaissance.50 al­ plexity and diversity. though traditional airborne reconnaissance is nonlethality and limited destruction form underdeveloped, new developments entail new part of a growing line of thought that ties in outlooks. Unmanned technologies now fea­ closely with the Sadc’s emphasis on human ture prominently but seem underutilised in security. Making use of both technological the Sadc region, with unmanned aerial ve­ artefacts and intellectual skills promotes non- hicles (UaV) available but perhaps blocked lethality. Beyond the combat roles of airpower, more by political apprehension than by tech­ 51 supportive roles such as transport, communi­ nological limitations. nonetheless, UaV pos­ cations, reconnaissance, and search and res­ sibilities are extensive since their sophistica­ cue offer nonlethal contributions. a range of tion offers multiple alternatives in a highly nonlethal munitions is also becoming avail­ unstructured and unpredictable Sadc strate­ able.57 in addition, new rules have to be ab­ 52 gic environment. in practice, UaVs offer op­ sorbed, especially in the war-fighting role. al­ portunities in the air, land, and maritime do­ though certain roles are inherently nonlethal, mains, with a low intrusive profile amidst the intellectual endeavours of laws, tactics, and tech­ political sensitivities and sovereignty prefer­ nical arrangements temper the war-fighting ences.53 reconnaissance and the unmanned roles.58 in the Sadc, international law and hu­ option serve several agendas: a pathway to­ man security remain central tenets, and these wards much professed early warning, less ex­ tie in with the international best practice of posure to harm, and, eventually, low political keeping the growing role of airpower within and financial costs. The explicit emphasis international legal limits. upon prevention and human security accen­ Speed is a factor closely associated with the tuates the benefits that UaVs offer for surveil­ airpower option; however, Steven Metz notes lance and reconnaissance. The overview of that speed is no longer only about the tactical Sadc air capabilities shows a limited recon­ and operational levels but about organisa­ naissance capability that the introduction of tional and conceptual adaptation in the short­ UaV capabilities can significantly augment.54 est possible time to deal with new insecurities

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and warfare forms through airpower.59 organ­ employ new technologies against this back­ isational change also has to keep pace with drop. one example is whether precision new strategic needs. The soft-technology triad bombing is in fact more humane if encased in of innovation, concepts, and diffusion, together legal stipulations. another is whether sophisti­ with acceptance or rejection of new systems cated surveillance interferes with individual and capabilities, produces new understand­ rights to privacy or whether the use of UaVs ings about how to deal with new insecurities. intrudes upon sovereignty. decision makers Speed on and beyond the battlefield under­ and experts have to accentuate the softer con­ pins the successful application of airpower. tributions of airpower assets. it is easy to be­ Mastering speed through organisational and come enchanted by the technological war- conceptual adaptation to fitthe regional need fighting profile of airpower, but this very is perhaps the single most important factor profile hardly contributes to the Sadc’s secu­ faced by airpower in the Sadc realm. if the rity agenda. Sadc is the eminent security arrangement The privatisation of even traditional mili­ with a military component, airpower needs to tary functions is a growth industry, and air- be adjusted quickly and appropriately. power cannot escape this encroachment. To Precision and airpower have become syn­ what extent therefore can airpower roles be onymous. Precision, however, requires an un­ outsourced to the private sector?63 The last op­ derstanding of physical and psychological pre­ tion is to outsource the primary war-fighting 60 cision. if we adapt Metz’s ideas, this implies role. However, privatisation also forms part of that airpower in the Sadc needs adjustment the air threat to the region through private to reflect a Sadc strategic culture, a certain and even rogue means. Merely buying air as­ level of technological development, and threat sets (including the aircrews) is possible. less perceptions. These aforementioned matters than a decade ago, ethiopia rapidly purchased involve much more than physical precision new aircraft and aircrews in its war with eritrea, and its technological basis. elder further em­ while angola used hired pilots to fightthe na­ phasises psychological operations through air- tional Union for the Total independence of power and its successes in peace operations, angola (UniTa) guerrilla group.64 augment­ but understanding their success depends even ing airpower through private means is quite more upon the psychological precision re­ 61 conceivable and can rapidly change the air- ferred to by Metz. airpower in the Sadc power balance within the region. However, needs to satisfy the almost diffuse threat per­ privatisation is a solution for some difficulten ­ ceptions of the regional leadership and, in deavours but an obstacle when moving closer conjunction, promote human security and de­ to the conventional airpower domain. The stroy aggressors when required. Sadc should consider public-private symbio­ airpower is also characterised by adapta­ ses to augment its secondary and more hu­ tion to technological shifts—a crucial domain manitarian and constructive contributions, as for soft and hard technologies to interact well as the new offering from outer space. and for norm stretching to cover the rising Some airpower roles such as airlift, communi­ need for uniquely styled airpower in the re­ gion. The choice lies between maintaining cations, and reconnaissance therefore offer traditional roles and thus limiting airpower, opportunities for private partnerships, but and stretching airpower to cover new regional there is a limit. demands. in the Sadc, nonmilitary policy in­ struments are partially successful and leave Conclusions room for airpower assets.62 if decision makers merely embrace new technological shifts, so- Tensions in airpower brought about by called second- and third-order effects in the modern developments in both technological political, ethical, and legal domains arise. one and strategic affairs formed the central focus should therefore always consider decisions to of this article. Traditional airpower thought,

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well developed and both conceptually and tech­ also understand that embracing high-tech air­ nologically diffused, lies at the heart of mod­ power would actually offer diminishing rewards ern military campaigns. However, the inher­ for the region. The Sadc is not a mature se­ ent optimism about airpower is not universal, curity community and therefore has to cope and airpower theory culminating in spectacular with difficulties as leaders slowly cultivate fer­ battlefield success has a less spectacular side. tile conditions for politico-military integration. Hence, airpower in unconventionally styled The supporting roles of airpower offer conflicts in africa, and the Sadc region in more compatibility with and utility for the particular, draws attention to ideas of high- evolving strategic landscape of the Sadc re­ tech airpower’s not being an instrument for gion and require close political and military all scenarios. attention. The fundamental challenge is to in the aftermath of the cold war, militaries keep airpower in step with regional defence had to transform themselves in one of two ways. arrangements and establish stepping-stones They could “go high tech” to capitalise on the for a regional airpower culture amidst re­ worldwide growth in information and com­ gional integration. whilst it is difficult to dis­ munications technology in order to improve pute the niche role that airpower can play in the conventional fightinginstrument of states, or “go low tech” to improve their capability to the Sadc, the political leadership is the pri­ deal with multiple threats emanating from the mary agent to move from a declaratory to an low-intensity intrastate environment through operational airpower in the region. airlift, counterinsurgency and peacekeeping capabili­ communications, reconnaissance, speed, and ties. airpower did not escape the dilemma of reach, as well as privatisation, now compete being competent at both levels, and neither with traditional preferences for the priority of did the airpower debate in the Sadc. as a be­ aerial combat and ground attack. Stretching nevolent hegemonic power in the Sadc, even airpower concepts to address the tensions be­ South africa is not sure whether it has the ability, tween conventional and unconventional stra­ luxury, and political latitude to do both. in­ tegic landscapes and using soft technologies herently, few if any countries in the Sadc have to embed more constructive aerial roles are a strategic culture that steers them towards now more relevant to maintaining security airpower in the first instance, and one must within the Sadc than ever before. ❑

Notes

1. andrew G. B. Vallance, The Air Weapon: Doctrines of countries are part of the Southern african development Air Power Strategy and Operational Art (new york: St. Mar­ community: South africa, lesotho, Swaziland, namibia, tin’s, 1996), 29. Botswana, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Mozambique, angola, 2. ibid., 34–36. Zambia, Malawi, and the democratic republic of the 3. George r. Mastroianni, “occupations, cultures, congo. and leadership in the army and air Force,” Parameters 35, 6. carl von clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael no. 4 (winter 2005–6): 77–79, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, nJ: Princeton Uni­ usawc/Parameters/05winter/mastroia.pdf. versity Press, 1976), 605. 4. See discussion of russian airpower in chechnya: 7. Strategic Plan, 2006–2009 (Pretoria, republic of Timothy l. Thomas, “air operations in low intensity South africa: department of Foreign affairs, n.d.), 7–8, conflict: The case of chechnya,” Airpower Journal 11, no. http://www.dfa.gov.za/department/stratplan06/part1.pdf 4 (winter 1997): 51–59, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/ (accessed 24 May 2007). airchronicles/apj/apj97/win97/thomas.pdf (accessed 26 8. laurie nathan, “consistency and inconsistencies april 2007). in South african Foreign Policy,” International Affairs 81, 5. within africa the tendency is to have a regional no. 2 (March 2005): 363. perspective based on regional structures (i.e., Southern, 9. we should note that some circles have doubts about western, eastern, and northern africa). The following this softhanded approach by South africa towards serious

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foreign-policy challenges. For example, South africa’s si­ tional relations conference, Turin, italy, 13–15 Septem­ lent diplomacy towards Zimbabwe is based on the notion ber 2007), 3–4. that the latter should solve its own domestic problems 21. col dennis M. drew, USaF, retired, “The essence without external pressure. one can challenge this ap­ of aerospace Power: what leaders need to Know,” Aero­ proach from an ethical perspective, considering the for­ space Power Journal 15, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 24–25, eign pressure mobilised by the ruling african national http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/ congress against apartheid South africa during the 1970s apj01/sum01/drew.pdf. and 1980s. 22. ibid., 25. 10. The office of the President is responsible for se­ 23. ibid., 26. curity coordination by means of the so-called Security 24. ibid., 30. cluster. This coordination takes place without any coher­ 25. nathan, “Sadc’s Uncommon approach,” 621. ent security policy or strategy. Since democratisation in 26. ian F. w. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter- 1994, the South african government, ruled by the african Insurgencies: Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750 (lon­ national congress, has not developed a national security don: routledge, 2001), 24. strategy. 27. Beckett also describes earlier experiments to use 11. rialize Ferreira and dan Henk, “Military implica­ airpower against unconventional opponents. ibid., 43. tions of Human Security: The case of South africa” (paper 28. dr. ross K. Baker, “The air Forces of Tropical af­ presented at the 45th anniversary Biennial international conference of the inter-University Seminar on armed rica,” Air University Review 19, no. 2 (January–February 1968): Forces and Society, chicago, 21 october 2005), http:// 64–67, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/ www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc/human_sec_henk aureview/1968/jan-feb/baker.html. See also Herbert M. _21oct05.pdf (accessed 5 october 2007). Howe, Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States 12. Defence in a Democracy, white Paper on national (Boulder, co: lynne rienner, 2001), 42. defence for the republic of South africa (Pretoria, re­ 29. Bjørn Møller, “raising armies in a rough neigh­ public of South africa: department of defence, as ap­ bourhood: The Military and Militarism in Southern af­ proved by Parliament on 14 May 1996), http://merln rica,” working paper, rev. version, March 2003, 16, http:// .ndu.edu/whitepapers/Southafrica1996.pdf. in his study www2.ihis.aau.dk/~bm/SariPS2001-rev.doc (accessed 19 of South african defence policy, evert Jordaan provides June 2007). an excellent exposition of the influence of nonoffensive 30. ibid., 36. defence and nonthreatening defence thinking on South 31. Howe, Ambiguous Order, 42. african defence since 1994. evert Jordaan, “South african 32. The Sadc is responsible to set up a regional defence since 1994: a Study in Policy-Making” (thesis, standby brigade for service with the african Standby Stellenbosch University, Matieland, South africa, decem­ Force of the african Union. during the august 2007 sum­ ber 2004). mit of the Sadc in lusaka, Zambia, the first elements of 13. laurie nathan, “Sadc’s Uncommon approach to this brigade were demonstrated to the Sadc heads of state. common Security, 1992–2003,” Journal of Southern African See david Masango, “Southern africa: Stand-by Brigade Studies 32, no. 3 (September 2006): 610. nathan notes to Maintain Peace in Sadc,” BuaNews, 17 august 2007, that by the late 1990s, the Sadc was polarized by incom­ http://allafrica.com/stories/200708170705.html (accessed patible pacificand militarist visions of the organ for Poli­ 22 august 2007). tics, defence, and Security. Botswana, Mozambique, 33. Providing air support during natural disasters and South africa, and Tanzania were known for their pacifist airlift during other crises is perhaps the most salient of view, while angola, namibia, and Zimbabwe had a more these roles. See col les weyer, “Peaceful application of militaristic orientation. air Power,” South African Soldier 10, no. 5 (May 2003): 24– 14. ibid., 608. 25, http://www.dcc.mil.za/sasoldier/2003/May2003.pdf 15. Francois Vreÿ, “eradicating african wars: From (accessed 17 May 2007). Political ambitions to Military leadership and construc­ 34. See arguments by emily o. Goldman and richard tive Military Forces,” African Journal on Conflict Resolution B. andres, “Systemic effects of Military innovation and 5, no. 2 (april 2005): 77. 16. Theo Farrell, “world culture and Military Power,” diffusion,” Security Studies 8, no. 4 (Summer 1999): 79–125. Security Studies 14, no. 3 (2005): 451. 35. Zhouying Jin, “Soft Technology,” 13. 17. Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, eds., The Sources of 36. Thomas w. Smith, “The new law of war: Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology (Boulder, co: legitimizing Hi-Tech and infrastructural Violence,” lynne rienner, 2002), 458. International Studies Quarterly 46, no. 3 (december 2002): 18. ibid., 459. 359–60. 19. Zhouying Jin, “Soft Technology: The essential of 37. a lesson again noted by the coalition forces dur­ innovation,” Futures Research Quarterly 18, no. 2 (Summer ing the 1991 Gulf war against iraq. 2002): 2, http://www.acunu.org/millennium/beijing-0702 38. Zhouying Jin, “Soft Technology,” 17. .PdF (accessed 9 May 2007). 39. Hussein Solomon, ed., Towards a Common Defence 20. Jurgen Haacke and Paul d. williams, “comparing and Security Policy in the Southern African Development Com­ regional arrangements: The Significanceof Security cul­ munity (Pretoria, republic of South africa: africa insti­ ture” (paper presented at the Standing Group of interna­ tute of South africa, 2004), 134.

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40. Senior South african national defence Force of­ Cooperation, Southern african development community, ficial, telephonic interview by the authors, 10 december 26, http://www.sadc.int/english/documents/sipo/sipo_en 2007. .pdf (accessed 17 July 2007). 41. Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for 51. lTc lim Kok Siong, cPT Stanley chua Hon Kiat, International Security Studies in the Post–Cold War Era (Boul­ and cPT Teh Hua Fung, “airpower in non-conventional der, co: lynne rienner, 1991), 218. operations,” Pointer: Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces 42. Mike Hough, “The challenge of effective air 30, no. 3 (2004), http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/ Power in Sub-Saharan africa,” in Protecting Sub-Saharan publications/pointer/journals/2004/v30n3/features/ Africa: The Military Challenge, ed. louis du Plessis and Mike feature4.html (accessed 22 July 2008); and Brig Gen John Hough (Pretoria, republic of South africa: HSrc Pub­ wesley, South african air Force, retired, council for Sci­ lishers, 1999), 124–25. entific and industrial research, electronic interview by 43. ibid., 136. the authors, 28 and 29 March 2007. 44. Maxi Schoeman, “developing an integrated ap­ 52. See elder, “role of non-lethal airpower,” 15–16, proach to Human Security,” in From Warfare to Welfare: Hu­ for new remotely piloted vehicle and UaV systems and ca­ man Security in a Southern African Context, ed. Mari Muller pabilities entering the surveillance domain. and Bas de Gaay Fortman (assen, netherlands: Van Gorcum, 53. nathan, “Sadc’s Uncommon approach,” 614. 2004), 71. 54. See the analysis in “audit of Southern african de­ 45. Maj r. wyn elder, “The role of non-lethal air- velopment community”; lTc lim Kok Siong, cPT Stanley power in Future Peace operations: ‘Beyond Bombs on chua Hon Kiat, and cPT Teh Hua Fung, “airpower in Target,’ ” research report (Maxwell aFB, al: air com­ non-conventional operations”; and wesley, interview. mand and Staff college, 2003), https://research.au.af 55. See airpower tables in “audit of Southern african .mil/papers/ay2003/acsc/03-1413.pdf. See also decisions development community,” 85, 97, 125. by the Sac during the Botswana meeting on secondary 56. elder, “role of non-lethal airpower,” 18. roles in “aviation response Most effective,” Daily News 57. ibid., 24. (republic of Botswana), 15 June 2007, http://www.gov 58. Smith, “new law of war,” 355–75. .bw/cgi-bin/news.cgi?d=20070615&i=aviation_response 59. Steven Metz, Armed Conflict in the 21st Century: The _most_effective (accessed 30 September 2007). Information Revolution and Post-Modern Warfare (carlisle, 46. See the chapter by african Strategic alternatives Pa: US army war college, Strategic Studies institute, titled “an audit of Southern african development com­ april 2000), xv, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army munity defence Policies” in Solomon, Towards a Common .mil/pdffiles/PUB226.pdf (accessed 13 June 2007). Defence and Security Policy, 85, 125. 60. ibid., xv–xvi. 47. M-net TV South africa, Carte Blanche, documen­ 61. elder, “role of non-lethal airpower,” 16–17. tary on the floods in northern Mozambique (cyclone Fa­ 62. Metz, Armed Conflict, xvii. bius), 10 March 2007. 63. ibid., 19–20. 48. ian van Vuuren, “The changing nature of warfare: 64. Tom cooper and Jonathan Kyzer, “ethiopian­ implications for africa,” African Security Review 7, no. 1 eritrean war, 1998–2000,” Central, Eastern, and Southern (1998),http://www.iss.co.za/aSr/7no1/VanVuuren.html Africa Database, air combat information Group, 2 Septem­ (accessed 2 october 2007). ber 2003, http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article 49. “South africa Facing Transition Problems in air _189.shtml (accessed 30 September 2007); and national Transport Budget,” Defence Industry Daily, 18 august 2005, Union for the Total independence of angola—UniTa, http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/south-africa-facing Standing committee of the Political commission, “1999— -transition-problems-in-air-transport-budget-01039 (ac­ year of Generalised Popular resistance: communiqué no. cessed 2 october 2007). 38/cPP/99” (angola: Kwacha UniTa Press, 2 october 50. See the emphasis on early warning in the Strategic 1999), http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/unita/ Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security en0510991.htm (accessed 30 September 2007).

The United States Air Force executes its missions globally. Its warfight­ ing domains cover the entire planet, offering a unique perspective. —Air Force Posture Statement 2008

3-Esterhuyse Vrey.indd 88 7/28/08 7:53:27 AM Strategy and Cost A Gap in Our Military Decision-Making Process

Lt CoL LawrenCe Spinetta, USaF

Editorial Abstract: The current structure of the military decision-making process assumes that end-state goals have been determined and that strategy is developed in isolation from cost considerations. The author proposes revamping this system by having military strategists develop a menu of options for civilian policy makers. With cost considerations factored into planning, this approach would enable elected leaders to better navigate the many competing demands for public resources.

War was no longer a matter of hoplite arms, but of money. —Thucydides

he presidenT and Congress are judgment of the generals; indeed, the president the ultimate arbiters of whether the frequently refers to the surge in iraq as Gen United states goes to war and how david petraeus’s strategy rather than his own.1 Tthe military conducts operations. at other times, civilian leaders take a more sometimes, civilian authorities entrust their controlling role in directing operations and military commanders with determining opera­ rely on military professionals for advice. either tional strategy (i.e., the selection of forces to way, military officers play a large role in influ­ employ, the way to employ them, and the timing encing policy options and shaping strategy. and tempo of operations). pres. George W. Bush, Unfortunately, the structure of the current for example, is proud of saying that he will con­ military decision-making process (MdMp) is tinue to defer critical decisions in iraq to the deficient in at least two major respects as re­

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gards preparing military leaders to fulfill that paign or war is often a function of economics. role (i.e., the role of determining or advising even a nation as rich as ours has finite re­ appropriate courses of action). First, it as­ sources, and the public has a limited appetite sumes the existence of an established objec­ for absorbing the costs of war.2 in fact, the ju­ tive or clearly stated end, when in fact this is dicious use of resources becomes even more often unsettled. When evaluating a course of critical during long, expensive conflicts. action (COa), the current MdMp often pre­ The administration’s war-funding request supposes the very issue to be decided: what do of $93 billion during fiscal year 2007 ap­ we want to accomplish? stated otherwise, it proached 20 percent of the total department presupposes consensus and direction when the of defense budget. The global war on terror very issue to be decided is what the objective (GWOT)—a conflict that president Bush and should be. second, the structure of the current others believe will last a generation—is poised MdMp encourages war fighters to develop to eclipse the cost of the entire war in Viet­ strategy in isolation from cost considerations. nam. so far it has cost the United states more Because the current MdMp focuses primarily than $672 billion.3 on how we can most effectively fulfillany given From an institutional perspective, the cost objective, war fighters produce robust plans of the war has been staggering. The air Force without considering expense. has been cutting personnel in an effort to Civilian policy makers, however, are inter­ fund both contingency operations and force ested in knowing more than just the most ef­ modernization. even with this manpower re­ fective military option. Because they must duction, air Force leaders expect to absorb manage disparate interests that compete for another $120 billion budget shortfall, roughly limited financial resources, these policy makers the equivalent of a full year’s budget, over the are most concerned with evaluating efficiency next six years. Commenting on the service’s and effectiveness trade-offs among various al­ budget crunch, Gen ronald Keys, head of air ternatives. They may opt for a less effective Combat Command, said, “i’m at a point when military option that provides better value for i can barely pay for meat and potatoes.”4 simi­ their investment, given other demands on larly, Gen T. Michael Moseley, former air public resources. Consequently, civilian policy Force chief of staff, remarked, “We face in­ makers need to know the likely cost before creasing financial challenges.”5 they set political objectives so they can better in theory, defense budgets are built around manage competing public interests. Our elected valid requirements. in practice, however, Con­ leaders would be better served by a new mili­ gress “come[s] up with an acceptable budget tary decision-making approach that provides a amount and expect[s] the armed forces to live range of options, including low-cost alterna­ within it.”6 Consequently, service budgets are tives to strategic challenges. squeezed in order to fund operations and the rising cost of other public services. retired general Barry McCaffrey told Congress that Why Neglecting Cost “the monthly burn rate of $9 billion a month Is a Problem in iraq and $[1] billion in afghanistan has caused us to inadequately fund the moderniza­ Military planners consider financial factors tion of the Us air Force and navy by diverting when deliberating matters related to organiz­ funds (as much as $55 billion) to support the ing, training, and equipping forces. But they on-going ground war.”7 ostensibly neglect the monetary cost of action War fighters should not necessarily shy when formulating strategy and employing mili­ away from a strategy simply because institu­ tary power. simply stated, war fighters view tional or other costs are high. Certainly, our cost-benefit and other financial analysis as nation would bear any burden to defend its budgetary tools rather than an integral part of survival. “no cost would have been too high if force employment. Yet, the success of a cam­ the United states faced an imminent threat

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from an iraq armed with weapons of mass de­ problem with this approach is that it narrowly struction, the war’s stated justification,” notes focuses on how to realize a given objective most Martin Wolk, MsnBC’s chief economics cor­ effectively rather than provide policy makers respondent.8 even so, incorporating cost con­ with a menu of choices. if the cost of pursuing siderations when thinking through military an objective is high, relative to other compet­ action helps frame the desirability of various ing public interests, policy makers may decide levels of effort. additionally, identifying the that the objective is not worth pursuing or costs of continued action may help decision may opt to change the objective in search of makers reevaluate their initial political objec­ an alternative COa that offers better value. tives, based on battlefield realities and the Current doctrine encourages commanders strategic situation. to mass all available combat power rather than The idea is not to suggest that we can mon­ explore less costly responses. For example, Us etarize all costs and benefits and therefore re­ army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, states duce the complexities of strategy into a simple that “when the time comes to execute, all ele­ mathematical ratio (i.e., select the COa with ments should have tasks to perform.”11 This the lowest cost-benefit ratio). it is impossible, doctrinal mandate to employ all available for example, to determine the dollar value of forces is rooted in the Clausewitzian notion a democratic iraq. Marine Corps doctrinal that unemployed resources are wasted in total publication (MCdp) 1-1, Strategy, aptly points war. according to Carl von Clausewitz, “if a out that, “given the nature of war, however, segment of one’s force is located where it is such cost-benefit analysis is more easily de­ not sufficiently busy with the enemy, or if scribed than accomplished. . . . [Further­ troops are on the march—that is, idle—while more,] it is often difficultto perceive the point the enemy is fighting, then these forces are at which the cost of fightingexceeds the value being managed uneconomically. in this sense of victory.”9 nevertheless, the challenge associ­ they are being wasted, which is even worse ated with valuing “victory” does not mean that than using them inappropriately. When the war fighters should summarily dismiss or ex­ time for action comes, the first requirement clude cost considerations when developing should be that all parts must act.”12 When less- strategy. aaron L. Friedberg, a former deputy than-vital interests are at stake, though, send­ assistant for national security affairs and direc­ ing a large contingent of forces into action tor of policy planning in the Officeof the Vice may not be politically acceptable, and/or the president, emphatically writes, “The first and cost may be prohibitive. most fundamental task of any strategic planning Citing a “requirement” for overwhelming operation is to develop alternative courses of force, commanders sometimes request more action and to assist policymakers in conduct­ assets than needed, thereby limiting political ing a systematic evaluation of their potential options.13 Mackubin Thomas Owens observes costs and benefits.”10 that “when the army did not want to do some­ thing—as in the Balkans in the 1990s—it would simply overstate the force requirements: A Deficient Military ‘The answer is 350,000 soldiers. What’s the Decision-Making Process question?’”14 The current MdMp structures strategy de­ Unfortunately, the current MdMp fails to velopment in such a way as to convert chal­ capture cost considerations adequately. The lenges to a force-allocation problem. Com­ process generally starts with the assumption manders are allotted assets for a campaign, that civilian leaders have established clear ob­ and they will use those assets if they marginally jectives and defineda desired end state. Then, contribute to the overall goal, regardless of strategy cells offer several alternative COas whether the marginal return of using those as­ for a combatant commander to consider that sets exceeds the cost. The situation is analo­ satisfy overarching political guidance. One gous to how a factory in a command economy

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uses resources. The government allots the fac­ yes or no evaluation. Financial information is tory certain resources, and the factory will em­ not included in any plan appendix, nor are ploy them even if the product does not add the relative costs of alternative COas pre­ much value. sented for review.20 Joint publication (Jp) 5-0, the document The limited consideration given to cost in governing joint operation planning, largely the current MdMp is reflectedin a number of neglects the issue of cost when it outlines steps other ways. Generic war plans contain 36 an­ in the joint planning process. Jp 5-0 fails to nexes, but none details the expected cost of include cost as a criterion of interest when executing these plans.21 Financial officers are commanders complete COa analysis and war nowhere to be found in military strategy cells gaming, COa comparison, and COa approval. such as combined air operations centers. air Moreover, it fails to require planners to com­ Force Operational Tactics, Techniques, and pare the relative costs associated with each procedures (aFOTTp) 2-3.2, the manual de­ COa. instead, it urges commanders simply to tailing aFOTTps for air and space operations select the “one [COa] with the highest prob­ centers, fails to include any discussion on how ability of success.”15 Commanders are encour­ cost factors should be included in strategy for­ aged to consider cost only as a subcriterion mulation. Giving planners only one tip when when evaluating the validity of a proposed it comes to cost considerations for employing plan. in that regard, a commander’s staff forces, aFOTTp 2-3.2 cautions that “Unmanned makes a binary judgment (i.e., yes or no) re­ aerial Vehicles do not have an aircrew onboard garding whether a COa is “worth the expected . . . [but] a fully equipped rQ-1 predator air ve­ costs” in terms of military effectiveness.16 hicle costs in excess of $3.2 million, and an rQ­ There is no recognition that civilian policy 4a Global hawk costs in excess of $12 million makers may choose to employ less optimal . . . [so] high-risk mission taskings into heavily military action in favor of employing the na­ defended areas where loss of the air vehicle is tion’s limited capital elsewhere.17 very likely should be approved by the JFaCC providing guidance similar to that of Jp 5-0, [joint force air component commander].”22 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff To battle insurgents in iraq, directors of Manuals (CJCsM) that address joint plan­ combined air operations centers authorized ning—CJCsM 3122.01a, CJCsM 3122.02C, $35 million F/a-18as flying from a carrier that and CJCsM 3122.03C—fail to direct staffs to costs $2.5 billion to drop $190,000 laser-guided consider the relative costs of proposed actions.18 weapons on the position of a single insurgent staff estimates, step three of the concept­ armed with an aK-47, while our enemy uses old development process, are meant to provide “key artillery shells and a cell phone to build an im­ estimates” of the suitability of proposed ac­ provised explosive device to destroy one of our tions, yet they do not require compilation or humvees, which cost $150,000 apiece.23 analysis of cost information. Likewise, the com­ Cost control during insurgencies or battles mander’s estimate, step four of the concept- against terrorism is particularly important development process, is supposed to compare since the enemy can deliver effects dispro­ the desirability of each proposed COa, yet it portionate to the effort. Lawrence Freedman does not direct an evaluation of the cost of ac­ writes that “car bombs are stealth weapons tion. Moreover, the chairman’s manual pro­ that are a cheap and operationally straight­ hibits the release of any estimates to other Us forward way of getting explosives to a target, government agencies.19 This provision discour­ and they make enough noise that they can­ ages cost transparency early in the concept- not be ignored. For these reasons, they are development process. The last step, the CJCs the ultimate in asymmetry.”24 estimate review, asks key players to examine defenses against improvised explosive de­ whether the proposed COa is “worth the ex­ vices and other asymmetrical attacks are pected costs,” but again, this is only in terms costly. The terrorist attacks of 11 september of its military effectiveness and calls only for a 2001 cost between $400,000 and $500,000,

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yet the hijackers were able to inflict billions try get in return for its sacrificesand expendi­ of dollars in direct damage and an exponen­ tures? at what risk? The key lies in varying the tially larger amount in indirect damages.25 scale of effort and outlining the associated additionally, the attacks caused the United cost of action so that civilian policy makers states to spend billions more on expensive can choose the best value. in other words, war homeland-defensive measures. fighters should identify and outline efficiency in Making Twenty-First-Century Strategy, prof. and effectiveness trade-offs among various al­ dennis drew and prof. donald snow worry ternative actions. For an estimated cost of X in that enemy strategists will devise asymmetrical terms of men, money, and materiel, we can ex­ ways to bleed the United states into expend­ pect to achieve certain effects. For a cost of Y, ing economic resources at politically unaccept­ we expect to deliver different effects. We may able levels.26 even though the “Us economy is be able to achieve a 90 percent solution for 10 much larger and more vigorous than it has percent of the cost. For instance, the price tag been in times past, fewer of the government’s for a democratic, well-functioning iraq may be economic resources are available for military astronomical, whereas a secure, relatively stable purposes.”27 The military portion of the eco­ iraq may be possible at a fraction of the cost. nomic pie has shrunk, relative to the nonmili­ The United states may be able to keep the tary portions of the budget. and that trend country from imploding for a tenth of the cost will likely continue as Congress looks for ways and commitment of other plans. to pay for skyrocketing entitlement payments, strategic guidance is not static. The presi­ especially as the baby-boomer generation re­ dent may choose to change his goals, based on tires. The “discretionary” defense depart­ opportunities or limiting factors that emerge ment budget will likely bear the brunt of fu­ after firstcontact with the enemy. strategy for­ ture cuts.28 mulation is an iterative process with the goal Our enemies today do not so much seek of creating a plan for continuing advantage.29 our military defeat as they do our internal po­ decision makers need to remain mindful of litical collapse and reluctance to continue the costs before they set initial objectives; they struggle. Unfortunately, our current MdMp’s also need cost visibility to evaluate whether to failure to take cost into account in determin­ continue with their initial strategic vector or ing strategy plays right into their hands. modify the objective and select an alternate game plan. accordingly, war fighters should explicitly include cost considerations when A Better Approach thinking through the COa comparison-and­ Civilian policy makers, who must arbitrate selection steps in the MdMp. Unfortunately, among competing public interests, would be many commanders are neither trained nor in­ better served if they had an improved under­ terested in the economics of action. Yet, cost standing of costs before they set political ob­ during long wars such as the GWOT is particu­ jectives. To support this construct, military larly important since it affects sustainability of strategists need to be prepared to offer a action and public support. strong mix of policy options, including inex­ pensive responses as well as more robust alter­ Learning from Churchill natives. This construct involves varying both the objective and desired end state as well as during World War ii, Winston Churchill the potential responses. in essence, this new famously remarked, “We shall defend our is­ approach would provide policy makers with a land, whatever the cost may be.”30 earlier in larger menu of choices. his career, though, when the stakes were less War fighters should frame for civilian policy vital, he recognized that the price tag (i.e., the makers what various military options “buy” in cost in terms of men and materiel) for pro­ terms of relative returns. What will the coun­ posed operations was more than just a second­

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ary consideration. after World War i, england force required £18 million a year, a sum the struggled to maintain its colonial empire at a War Office could ill afford to continue to pay. time when its treasury was more or less broke. “driven by a financialimperative [to cut costs], Then serving as the war minister, Churchill had Churchill now began to think along more to devise cheap, innovative strategies to main­ radical military lines,” notes david Omissi in tain control of england’s overseas territories. Air Power and Colonial Control. “Churchill per­ in 1919 the emir of afghanistan declared sisted in his attempts to findcheaper methods jihad against Britain’s forces in the northwest of holding Mesopotamia.”34 he mostly relied Frontier province. The British sent a single on a strategy that leveraged the promise of air- handley page biplane bomber to Karachi. power and employed a combined-arms ap­ The aircraft dropped four 112-pound and 16 proach. in iraq, Churchill “chose to save cash 20-pound bombs on Kabul, causing the emir by running the country through a puppet to sue for peace shortly thereafter. Basil Liddell ruler,” installing Faisal i as king in 1921.35 hart, a military historian and strategist, de­ Churchill’s efforts helped maintain the power clared that “this aeroplane seems to have of the arab kingdoms in Mesopotamia and achieved more than 60,000 men did.”31 dominate other populations under British sway. a year later, Mohammed bin abdullah The point of chronicling these historical hassan, the “Mad Mullah” of somaliland, re­ events is not to argue the merits of air polic­ emerged as a threat to British interests in the ing. On the contrary, British political hopes region. The fanatical mullah had been a thorn for the region were never entirely fulfilled. in the side of the British for decades. previ­ The Mad Mullah, for example, was never cap­ ously, the British sent four expeditions, the tured, and 700 of his followers escaped to fight last of which involved 15,000 troops, to so­ another day. rather, the intent is to show how maliland; all four failed. The mullah was able Churchill incorporated cost considerations into to regroup his forces and terrorize local tribes­ his strategy development and was able to con­ men who had accepted British rule. Ulti­ struct politically feasible and fiscally sustain­ mately, he slaughtered a third of the territory’s able COas successfully. inhabitants.32 The english parliament balked at repeating the expensive ground invasion, so Churchill Conclusion sent six small aircraft to east africa. They bombed the mullah’s fort for two days and instead of planning to employ all available brought the immediate crisis in somaliland to combat power automatically, war fighters should a conclusion. Churchill boasted that the previ­ explore ways of making our armed response ous land expedition had cost the treasury £6 less costly and more efficient. all too often, million—about £120 million ($220 million) commanders limit their aim to ensuring “over­ in today’s money—but the royal air Force did whelming combat power” and devoting “maxi­ the job for £77,000.33 mum effort” towards achieving primary objec­ Churchill also managed to maintain British tives.36 This is too one dimensional. War influence in Mesopotamia and other lands in fighters should focus more on the “judicious the Middle east and southwest asia using simi­ employment and distribution of forces.”37 larly cheap methods. in august 1919, he in Carnage and Culture, Victor davis hanson warned parliament that england’s large Meso­ states that “ultimately, war is a question of eco­ potamian garrison was prohibitively expensive, nomics, in which the options of all states are and he advocated drastic cuts. Churchill sug­ confinedby their ability to produce goods and gested that British power could be maintained services; thus every armed force calibrates the if he replaced some mechanized forces with greatest military power for the least cost. fewer foot soldiers. By early 1920, the previ­ armies in the dark ages and medieval era, ously 25,000-strong British garrison was cut like their classical predecessors, were not im­ nearly in half. even so, sustaining this reduced mune from such constraints, and so learned

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quickly that man for man, infantry could be that do more than just offer robust opera­ provided for at a tenth of the expense of tional solutions. That is, they should provide a mounted troops.”38 But incorporating cost menu of choices, including low-cost options considerations into strategy goes beyond sim­ that may produce a range of politically accept­ ply tinkering with the force mix. able outcomes, so that our elected leaders can While helping to preserve the British empire, better arbitrate among competing demands Churchill employed a combined-arms team to for public resources. This approach does not reduce cost. More importantly, he elevated necessarily demand that commanders employ cost considerations beyond an ancillary con­ their resources stingily, but it does require cern and presented policy makers with a range them to have a firm grasp of cost fundamen­ of employment options. since civilian policy tals, a willingness to think beyond narrow op­ makers are most interested in advancing and erational concerns, and the courage to pro­ managing broader notions of public interests, pose a broad range of measured applications military strategists need to present alternatives of power. ❑

Notes

1. editorial, “hiding behind the General,” New York 9. Marine Corps doctrinal publication 1-1, Strategy, Times, 9 september 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/ 12 november 1997, 43, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/ 09/09/opinion/09sun1.html. see also Lawrence Korb, jel/service_pubs/mcdp1_1.pdf. “Bush Must stop Blaming Military Leaders for Failed 10. aaron L. Friedberg, “strengthening U.s. stra­ strategy,” Huffington Post, 22 July 2007, http://www tegic planning,” Washington Quarterly 31, no. 1 (Win­ .huffingtonpost.com/lawrence-korb/bush-must-stop ter 2007–8): 49, http://www.twq.com/08winter/docs/ -blaming-mi_b_57317.html. 08winter_friedberg.pdf. 2. Martin Wolk, “Cost of iraq War Could surpass $1 11. Field Manual 3-0, Operations, June 2001, 4-13, Trillion,” MSNBC.com, 17 March 2006, http://www.msnbc http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/fm3 .msn.com/id/11880954. _0a.pdf. 3. The cost of $672 billion is based on a fiscal year 12. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Mi­ (FY) 2006 Congressional research service estimate added chael howard and peter paret (princeton, nJ: princeton to the cost of operations annotated in the FY 2007 federal University press, 1984), 213. budget. ann scott Tyson, “Bush’s defense Budget Biggest 13. The powell doctrine, for example, demands that since reagan era,” Washington Post, 6 February 2007, the United states use “every resource and tool” in the http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ country’s inventory to employ “overwhelming force.” see 2007/02/05/ar2007020501552.html; and John a. Tirpak, also Michael Gordon, “a nation Challenged: Military “The $120 Billion Cut,” Air Force Magazine 89, no. 10 (no­ analysis, a new Kind of War plan,” New York Times, 7 Octo­ vember 2006): 28–33, http://www.afa.org/magazine/ ber 2001, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html nov2006/1106cut.pdf. ?res=9C0Ce0d7123CF934a35753C1a9679C8B63&sec=& 4. Quoted in Tirpak, “$120 Billion Cut,” 33. Gen John spon=&pagewanted=print. Corley took the reins of air Combat Command from Gen­ 14. Mackubin Thomas Owens, “Failure’s Many Fathers,” eral Keys on 2 October 2007. Foreign Affairs 86, no. 5 (september/October 2007): 149, 5. Gen T. Michael Moseley, “The Future of air and http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070901faresponse space power” (address, air Force association’s air and space 86511/richard-b-myers-richard-h-kohn-mackubin Conference and Technology exposition, Washington, -thomas-owens-lawrence-j-korb-michael-c-desch/salute dC, 27 september 2006), http://www.af.mil/library/ -and-disobey.html. speeches/speech.asp?id=276. 15. Joint publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 26 6. robert s. dudney, “second Opinion,” Air Force december 2006, iii-33, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/ Magazine 90, no. 1 (January 2007): 2, http://www.afa.org/ jel/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf. magazine/jan2007/0107edit.pdf. 16. ibid., iii-50. 7. senate, Testimony of General Barry R. McCaffrey (USA, 17. When business leaders perform net present value Ret.), Adjunct Professor of International Relations, United States (npV) analysis to make long-term capital decisions, they Military Academy, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, do not pursue every opportunity that offers a positive 110th Cong., 1st sess., 17 april 2007, 6, http://armed npV (i.e., opportunities that offer benefits that exceed -services.senate.gov/statemnt/2007/april/McCaffrey estimated costs). rather, they recognize that firm capital %2004-17-07.pdf. is limited and choose to pursue only projects that maxi­ 8. Wolk, “Cost of iraq War.” mize value. Likewise, civilian policy makers do not neces­

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sarily make public policy decisions based on whether pro­ 26. dennis M. drew and donald M. snow, Making jected benefits exceed costs. public resources as well as Twenty-First-Century Strategy: An Introduction to Modern Na­ their own political capital are limited. Therefore, they tional Security Processes and Problems (Maxwell aFB, aL: air ideally seek to pursue only those policies that maximize University press, 2006), 198, http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil/ the collective good and/or their constituents’ interests. Books/drew_snow/drewsnow.pdf. 18. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff Manual 27. ibid., 196–97. (CJCsM) 3122.01a, Joint Operation Planning and Execution 28. “about 85 percent of all governmental expendi­ System (JOPES), vol. 1 (Planning Policies and Procedures), 29 tures were in three categories: entitlement programs september 2006; CJCsM 3122.02C, Joint Operation Plan­ (e.g., Medicare), national defense, and servicing (paying ning and Execution System (JOPES), vol. 3 (Crisis Action Time- the interest on) the national debt. all other government Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deploy­ functions comprised only 15 percent of the total. entitle­ ment Execution), 19 June 2006; and CJCsM 3122.03C, Joint ments are difficult to cut since they benefit a large num­ Operation Planning and Execution System, vol. 2 (Planning ber of constituents (voters) and are generally mandated Formats and Guidance), 17 august 2007. by law. One cannot fail to pay the interest on the national 19. according to CJCsM 3122.01a, “planning infor­ debt because of the need to borrow in the future, and mation is not authorized for release to other U.s. govern­ much of the ‘fat’ has been removed from the other 15 ment agencies at this point in the process.” however, the percent of the budget. That leaves the defense budget, manual does authorize the supported commander to which is particularly vulnerable because approximately “highlight issues for future interagency consultation, re­ two-thirds of it is appropriated annually and is somewhat view or resolution” in order to present them eventually to easier to cut than expenditures that are made automati­ the secretary of defense (C-9). cally (entitlements and debt service).” ibid., 69. 29. everett C. dolman, Pure Strategy: Power and Principle 20. ibid. in the Space and Information Age (London: Frank Cass, 21. prior to the war in iraq, the Congressional Budget 2005), 6. Office (CBO) tried to inform the policy debate when it 30. Winston Churchill, “We shall Fight on the Beaches” released a report on the expected cost of the war. But the (speech to the house of Commons, 4 June 1940), Churchill report failed to link that cost to various strategies. The Centre, http://www.winstonchurchill.org/i4a/pages/index CBO report listed critical cost drivers such as “strategy .cfm?pageid=393. employed” and “force size deployed” as “unknown.” “esti­ 31. Quoted in “an enduring illusion,” Economist 380, mated Costs of an iraq War: War in iraq Could Cost up to no. 8492 (24 august 2006), http://www.economist.com/ $9 Billion Monthly, says CBO,” About.com, n.d., http://us world/displaystory.cfm?story_id=7826962. govinfo.about.com/library/weekly/aairaqwarcost.htm. 32. ibid. see also James s. Corum and Wray r. John­ 22. air Force Operational Tactics, Techniques, and son, Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists procedures 2-3.2, Air and Space Operations Center, 13 de­ (Lawrence: University press of Kansas, 2003), 53. cember 2004, 4-41. 33. ibid. 23. Thomas Lienhard, letter to the editor, “The pen­ 34. david e. Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control: The tagon Crisis of 2015,” American Legion Magazine 163, no. 2 Royal Air Force, 1919–1939 (Manchester, UK: Manchester (august 2007): 5. University press, 1990), 20. 24. Lawrence d. Freedman, review of Buda’s Wagon: A 35. “Meddling in Mesopotamia Was always risky,” Brief History of the Car Bomb by Mike davis, Foreign Affairs Telegraph, 18 March 2003, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ 86, no. 3 (May/June 2007): 144, http://www.foreignaffairs news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2003/03/18/widip218.xml. .org/20070501fabook86325/mike-davis/buda-s-wagon-a 36. air Force doctrine document 1, Air Force Basic -brief-history-of-the-car-bomb.html. Doctrine, 17 november 2003, 24, http://www.au.af.mil/au/ 25. national Commission on Terrorist attacks upon awc/awcgate/afdc/afdd1-chap3.pdf. the United states, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report 37. ibid. of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United 38. Victor davis hanson, Carnage and Culture: Land­ States: Executive Summary (Washington, dC: Government mark Battles in the Rise of Western Power (new York: double- printing Office, 2004), 14. day, 2001), 165.

Redefining the Air Force for the 21st Century is an urgent national security requirement—not a luxury we can defer. —Air Force Posture Statement 2008

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Dr. John A. CAlDwell

Editorial Abstract: The military’s use of medications for operational reasons has traditionally garnered substantial, often negative, attention from the popular news media—and sometimes from the scientificcommunity as well. However, the author details how clear guidelines on the use of stimulants (and, by inference, other counterfatigue medications) in operational con­ texts optimize the safety, performance, and general well-being of US military combat-aviation personnel while preserving their rights to make informed decisions about their own lives.

he miliTary’s use of medications now accept the appropriateness of vaccinating for operational reasons has tradition­ us forces against germ warfare, in 1998 secre­ ally garnered substantial attention tary of Defense William Cohen’s mandate that from the popular news media and all personnel receive anthrax vaccinations Tsometimes from the scientific community as prompted numerous congressional hearings well. unfortunately, this attention often is de­ and legal disputes. meanwhile the media re­ cidedly negative. For instance, although we ported that significant numbers of personnel

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were “leaving the armed forces because they these compounds.7 The military’s use of “cog­ did not want to be vaccinated.”1 The use of the nitive performance enhancers” is ethical as nerve-agent pretreatment pyridostigmine cre­ long as (1) the decision to use a performance- ated a similar controversy following the Per­ enhancing/sustaining medication rests freely sian Gulf conflict of 1991 because of the medi­ with the individual; (2) the use of the drug is cation’s wide use for what is generally referred safe within the context in which it is used; (3) to as an “off-label” indication.2 although a later the manner of the substance’s use remains ruling permitted its appropriate administra­ consistent with its dosage and pharmacological tion following either presidential orders or function; and (4) in general, the military em­ individual informed consent, questions con­ ploys medication options only after exhaust­ tinued with regard to the safety and wisdom of ing nonpharmacological alternatives.8 policies concerning this prophylactic inter­ On these grounds, one might ask why any­ vention.3 more recently, the military’s use of one would consider physicians wrong to pre­ dextroamphetamine to sustain the perfor­ scribe amphetamines (or other stimulants) to mance of sleep-deprived pilots created con­ perfectly healthy, nonmilitary people so that cern after two pilots blamed a friendly-fire in­ they can get by with less sleep for the sake of cident in 2002 on their use of this medication.4 working (or playing) longer hours. a close ex­ Despite the fact that an air Force investiga­ amination shows that such a prescription tion ultimately failed to implicate dextroam­ would meet the firstcriterion and possibly the phetamine as a contributor to this unfortu­ third, listed above, but prescribing stimulants nate event, the general public knew nothing to healthy civilian workers violates the second of this fact; thus, many people continue to and fourth criteria. Failure to meet the second question the military’s use of dextroamphet­ criterion stems from the fact that, unlike military­ amine and other performance-sustaining aviation personnel closely monitored by medical pharmacological compounds. personnel, civilians walk out of the physician’s incidents such as these contribute to ongo­ office (or the pharmacy) with a multiday supply ing debates about the ethics of using medica­ of the drug, able to use it in the absence of tions to protect or sustain (or augment) our close medical supervision. This is potentially military personnel. These debates are particu­ unsafe, especially considering amphetamine’s larly pointed with regard to the military’s use potential for abuse and, in this case, the fact of counterfatigue medications—especially stimu­ that patients are free to modify the prescribed lants such as amphetamines. in fact, the issue dosage in any number of ways (some of them of the appropriateness of using counterfatigue possibly dangerous). Failure to meet the fourth drugs to augment combat safety and perfor­ criterion stems from the physician’s not hav­ mance has again become a topic of consider­ ing exhausted the nonpharmacological alter­ able discussion.5 some North atlantic Treaty natives. unlike military pilots who use the Organization members consider the us mili­ stimulant medication to perform a potentially tary’s use of prescription stimulants such as life-saving mission that they probably could amphetamines unethical, and this stance on not do effectively without the aid of the drug, the ethical ramifications of “performance­ civilian patients (who in this example do not enhancing drugs” may be largely responsible suffer from some type of alertness disorder) re­ for the fact that the united states currently is ally have the choice of remaining awake for a the only major world power authorizing the shorter period and choosing to sleep suffi­ operational use of amphetamines and some ciently rather than electing to take a drug in other counterfatigue medications.6 order to prolong wakefulness. little downside as a research scientist who has conducted accompanies this choice (to sleep) because numerous studies on the operational utility of although civilian patients won’t be able to work prescription stimulants in us aircrews, i find or play longer than normal without the stimu­ it difficult to understand why some people raise lant, they are unlikely to suffer harm as a re­ the question of ethics regarding the uses of sult. Thus, offering stimulants to healthy civil­

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ians for everyday use clearly presents a less however, since the use of pharmacological favorable risk/benefit ratio and a less favor­ compounds is a medical and/or behavioral- able ethical stance than prescribing them for sciences issue and since published standards military pilots, who have little choice except to outline the principles of ethical actions in engage in sustained combat operations. both of these fields, let us rely on these stan­ Do “morality” issues attach to the military’s dards to address the appropriateness of using use of “cognitive-enhancing agents”? That is a the medications that are the subject of this ar­ difficult question to answer since different ticle. i first present a brief overview of the ba­ people define morality in various ways. For sic ethical principles that guide the behavior some, ethical actions are also moral; for oth­ of physicians and psychologists. Then i discuss ers, morality refers to the concept of absolute as a primary example the military’s use of dex­ “rightness” or “wrongness”; and still others de­ troamphetamine as a safe and effective fatigue fine morality contextually. (That is, if the ulti­ countermeasure for combat-aviation opera­ mate outcome is “good,” with no intent to harm tions, explaining why our current stance on the another innocent human being, violate an in­ use of this medication—and, by inference, other nocent person’s rights, or cheat people of their rightful possessions, then the actions are counterfatigue (or performance-enhancing) moral.)9 The us military’s use of performance- drugs—does not pose an ethical dilemma for enhancing medications seems “moral” because the us military. it utilizes them to meet specific objectives upon which we as a nation presumably agree— Basic Ethical Principles and to do so in a way that improves the surviv­ ability of our personnel under less-than-optimal General ethical principles are designed to circumstances. We do not force our personnel inspire individuals to act in accord with the to ingest stimulant medications against their highest standards and ideals of their respec­ will; neither do we force our enemies to ingest tive professions. Caring for others, inspiring them. rather, we offer the medications, which trust, behaving honestly, treating people fairly, have been proven “safe,” in order to protect and respecting the essential worth of human 10 the well-being of our military personnel. For life are core characteristics of ethical thoughts all practical purposes, we as a nation have es­ and actions. ethical professionals strive to sentially agreed that this type of medical inter­ benefit those with whom they work and to vention is acceptable to achieve desired tactical minimize the possibility of doing harm. They outcomes (extant policies authorize such use). are trustworthy and mindful of their responsi­ yes, these medications may contribute to our bilities to others. They are truthful, accurate, ability to harm our enemies, but we already and honest. These individuals take care to use a variety of other strategies (technological, justly distribute their contributions among behavioral, etc.) for this purpose. The fact that cognitive enhancers provide a tactical ad­ those for whom they are responsible. and they vantage over our enemies is not considered respect the rights of every individual to pri­ cheating any more than the fact that our use vacy, general well-being, and self-determination. of superior night-vision technology offers a in summary, ethical professionals make every tactical advantage. also, i should note that in effort to treat others with the same fairness, strict terms of fairness, we publish informa­ dignity, and respect they would hope to re­ tion on our use of or intent to use pharmaceu­ ceive themselves.11 Given the basic tenets of tical performance enhancers in the open sci­ ethical behavior outlined above, let us exam­ entific literature, which our enemies are free ine the military’s use of dextroamphetamine to read and take advantage of. Thus, in my as an example and determine whether guid­ opinion, our use of these medications is both ance governing the use of this compound is moral and ethical. ethically appropriate.

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History of the ficially sanction the use of dextroamphetamine for performance sustainment until 1960.17 Dextroamphetamine Policy subsequently, widespread use of amphetamines Fatigue from sleep loss and body-clock dis­ by military aircrews probably first occurred ruptions is a widespread problem in military during the Vietnam conflict.The policies con­ operations, particularly in recent high-tempo cerning stimulants evolved into air Force regu­ actions associated with the global war on ter­ lation 161-33 / Tactical air Command supple­ ror.12 such around-the-clock operations, rapid ment 1, The Aerospace Medicine Program, 1 time-zone transitions, and uncomfortable January 1984, which sanctioned the use of am­ sleep environments are common on the battle­ phetamines by single-seat pilots in particular field; unfortunately, these conditions prevent due to their susceptibility to boredom and fa­ personnel from obtaining the eight solid hours tigue during deployments and extended com­ of sleep required for optimum day-to-day bat air patrols. in 1996 air Force leadership functioning. sleep in the operational environ­ rescinded the long-standing approval to use ment often is fragmented for weeks at a time amphetamines in aviation operations. and sometimes totally nonexistent for days at The air Force suspended amphetamine au­ a stretch.13 Needless to say, such sleep depriva­ thorization even though the use of dextroam­ tion rapidly degrades reaction time, alertness, phetamine evidently played no part in mis­ attention, and mood, leading to seriously im­ haps during Operation Desert storm. (Fatigue paired safety and performance.14 Generally contributed to a number of them, however.) speaking, every 24 hours of sleep deprivation Furthermore, one survey collected during produces a 25 percent reduction in opera­ Desert storm noted the value of amphetamines tional performance, with higher-level cognition for maintaining alertness in flight operations, the most severely compromised of all capabili­ and one squadron commander described the ties.15 Thus, unsurprisingly, we have determined availability of the medication as a “safety of that fatigue exacts significantsocial, financial,and flight”issue. 18 These results, coupled with data human costs and that it has been implicated as a from four placebo-controlled aviation studies causative or contributing factor in numerous military- conducted between 1995 and 2000 led, in part, aviation mishaps.16 to the reintroduction of approval to utilize in an effort to counter fatigue-induced per­ dextroamphetamine in select combat air formance decrements, the military has invested Force operations in 2001.19 substantially in what is often termed alertness- management research. This research resulted in an array of strategies, including duty-time The Real Issues at the Heart of limitations, behavioral countermeasures, nap­ the Current Stimulant Policy ping interventions, and drug-based remedies designed either to enhance available sleep op­ all three us military services currently ap­ portunities or to sustain performance despite prove dextroamphetamine for the sustainment sleep deprivation. The strategy of periodically of combat-pilot performance under particularly using dextroamphetamine was one product of fatiguing circumstances. When considering the this research thrust, and i will use the proce­ ethical implications of using this prescription dures governing dextroamphetamine therapy medication for maintaining the alertness of as the primary example in this article. sleep-deprived but otherwise normal personnel, amphetamines became available for pre­ one must first consider a couple of points. scription in 1937, and by the time of World First, detractors of the current stimulant War ii, the German, Japanese, and British mili­ policy often describe the choice of whether taries used them to enhance performance on or not to use stimulants as one between hav­ the battlefield. although some reports indi­ ing well-rested pilots fly their missions drug cate that us forces used the drug during the free versus having sleep-deprived pilots fly Korean conflict, the us air Force did not of­ their missions on drugs. however, as i have

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already noted, military operations often in­ clear contingencies for such events. however, evitably entail unavoidably high levels of fa­ in a military context, already severely limited tigue. Thus, in actuality, the real choice lies by the number of available pilots, an aviator’s between having sleep-deprived pilots fly the decision to decline a mission will probably re­ mission with the aid of proven, alertness- sult in delaying or simply not flyingit. like the enhancing drugs versus having them fly the airline passengers mentioned previously, those mission while struggling to stay awake on scheduled to fly aboard the affected aircraft their own. Further, research has shown quite likely will be safer, but what about the soldiers clearly that attempting to self-sustain wake­ awaiting medical evacuation from the field? fulness in the presence of substantial sleep What about the units awaiting resupply of am­ pressure (fatigue) is a losing proposition. munition, food, and water? and what about second, detractors often like to draw com­ the people threatened by enemy fire? What parisons between civil-aviation operations, which about their safety after cancellation or delay do not allow stimulants, to military-aviation of a scheduled military mission? operations, which do permit them. They ask When considering the military’s position why the military allows these drugs when the on stimulant use, one must remember (1) that civilian world does not. in answering this ques­ combat is not a sporting event but an unpre­ tion, one should clearly understand that the dictable, life-threatening, stressful, and fatigu­ two situations are not comparable. ing endeavor calling for the employment of One major difference is that combat-aviation every reasonable aid to success, and (2) that missions are presumably significantly more in order to protect and defend the lives of our stressful than commercial air-transportation friends and allies, us military pilots must think operations. For instance, although airline- far beyond the most immediate ramifications transport pilots no doubt experience stress of their decisions regarding mission accep­ from their responsibility for the safety of up to tance and completion. it is within this context 400 passengers, they are rarely targets of enemy that we must consider the ethics of stimulant aggression. Combat pilots, however, routinely use (as well as the use of other performance- perform their duties under imminent and pal­ enhancing medications). pable threats to their own safety and, in fact, their very lives. additionally, military aircrews routinely find themselves subjected to the most Current Guidelines for arduous and continuous flight schedules— Amphetamine Use in sometimes requiring numerous, successive missions despite the absence of adequate crew Air Operations rest—in order to sustain the operational tempo, much careful forethought went into the us whereas stringent crew-rest and duty require­ military’s current dextroamphetamine policy, ments specified in Federal aviation adminis­ with the aim of protecting individual war fight­ tration regulations protect commercial crews ers—primarily aviators—and of fulfilling our from such circumstances. military objectives.20 moreover, as i will show another major difference is that the conse­ (primarily by citing air Force policies/proce­ quences of cancelling a commercial flight dif­ dures as an example), guidance ensures that fer markedly from those associated with call­ we can achieve these aims without compro­ ing off a military flight. if a fatigued airline mising professional ethical principles. The pilot declines a flightdue to concerns over his following tenets assure the appropriate use of or her impaired performance capabilities, the dextroamphetamine:21 airline may not like the decision, but, clearly, it jeopardizes no one’s safety. instead, the air­ 1. Clear guidelines dictate the circumstances line will replace the fatigued pilot with a rested under which one can utilize dextroam­ standby pilot, who will complete the scheduled phetamine in operational contexts; they flight. every major commercial air carrier has also extend its use to exceptional cir­

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cumstances. These guidelines specify mis­ and does not consider them a substitute sion durations and drug dosages. for planning adequate crew work/rest. 2. Prior to using dextroamphetamine, each 8. ultimately, with all options on the table, pilot must read and sign a detailed leadership, in collaboration with appro­ informed-consent agreement to ensure priate medical personnel, carefully con­ sufficient knowledge about both the posi­ siders the option of using stimulant tive and potentially negative effects of the medications in terms of the criticality of medication. Failure to obtain documented the mission, the potential for known informed consent precludes the opera­ hazards, and the ultimate safety of af­ tional use of the drug for that individual. fected personnel. 3. The population authorized to utilize Does this list of safeguards optimize the stimulant medication (military aviators) ethical use of dextroamphetamine (and, po­ is by nature young, healthy, and likely tentially, other medications) in operational free of any medical complications that aviation contexts? By following these guide­ would contraindicate the use of dextro­ lines, we mitigate the known dangers of fa­ amphetamine. military pilots must rou­ tigue with a scientifically proven method vali­ tinely undergo recurrent physical ex­ dated by laboratory studies and field testing. aminations in order to document the every individual receives a predeployment test necessary good health required to re­ dose to guard against idiosyncratic side effects. main on flight status. Therefore, we achieve the ethical principle of “doing no harm.” The decision to utilize the 4. in addition, since individual responses medication in support of an operational ob­ to any type of medication are difficultto jective is made jointly by the leadership, the predict even in the healthiest popula­ physician, and the individual war fighter to tion, the military requires a documented ensure that operational concerns do not over­ predeployment ground test, conducted under the supervision of a military phy­ ride the safety and health of crew members. sician, to guard against problematic idio­ Thus, the medical community demonstrates syncratic reactions. trustworthiness and responsibility towards our military personnel. Prior to administering the 5. in the operational environment, qualified medication (or making it available) to indi­ medical personnel control the supplies viduals, medical personnel obtain documented of dextroamphetamine, dispensing it in informed-consent agreement, the information appropriate amounts when needed and contained therein based on currently avail­ documenting its use in carefully main­ able scientific knowledge about the positive tained records. These personnel collect and negative effects of dextroamphetamine. unused medications upon mission com­ Thus, this process conveys truthful, accurate, pletion and secure them as appropriate. and honest information to personnel. upon authorization of dextroamphetamine, aviators 6. The ultimate decision regarding whether throughout the affected unit have access to or not to use dextroamphetamine dur­ the drug, making the benefits of this fatigue ing an operational mission always rests countermeasure equally and justly available to with the individual aircrew member. No everyone in the group. Finally, no individual one is ever required to ingest a stimulant. aviator is ever required to use dextroamphet­ 7. medical personnel authorize the use of amine, and, most often, when the time to de­ dextroamphetamine as a fatigue counter­ cide comes, the individual crew member does measure only after exhausting every other so privately, in light of his or her perceived nonpharmacological option. The mili­ needs during the actual flight mission (when tary never turns to drugs as the firstsolu ­ neither the flight surgeon nor the unit com­ tion to a fatigue problem in the field mander is present). Thus, the policy essentially

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respects the principle concerning privacy, gen­ mance sustainment, the military has developed eral well-being, and self-determination.22 a conservative approach designed to meet or­ ganizational objectives without compromising individual autonomy or well-being. as i have Conclusions shown in this article, clear guidelines on the The us military has the responsibility of use of stimulants (and, by inference, other balancing operational objectives and individual counterfatigue medications) in operational rights while protecting the health of the force. contexts optimize the safety, performance, and By its very nature, achieving this balance can general well-being of the us military’s combat- prove challenging, particularly during stress­ aviation personnel while preserving their right ful and fatiguing combat operations. however, to make informed decisions about their own the military has dedicated a substantial amount lives. recent survey data suggest that the cur­ of work to the development and implementa­ rent policy is working and that there is little tion of comprehensive fatigue-management perceived pressure to use stimulants if indi­ programs that employ administrative, behav­ viduals have personal misgivings about doing ioral, and pharmacological strategies. When so.23 This finding,in combination with the fact all else fails, the medication option offers an that untreated fatigue has cost numerous lives important counterfatigue intervention, but in throughout the years but that stimulants have today’s “just say no to drugs” climate, pharma­ never been implicated in a single air Force cological treatments often seem to create an mishap, makes a strong argument for the eth­ opportunity for spirited debate. however, with ics of continuing to employ counterfatigue regard to the use of medication for perfor- medications. ❑

Notes

1. randall D. Katz, “Friendly Fire: The mandatory 6. erich roedig, “German Perspective: Commentary military anthrax Vaccination Program,” Duke Law Journal on ‘recommendations for the ethical use of Pharmaco­ 50, no. 6 (april 2001): 1838, http://www.law.duke.edu/ logic Fatigue Countermeasures in the u.s. military,’ ” shell/cite.pl?50+Duke+l.+J.+1835. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine 78 no. 5, sec. 2 2. The Food and Drug administration approved pyr­ (may 2007): B136. idostigmine bromide for the treatment of myasthenia gra­ 7. John a. Caldwell, J. lynn Caldwell, and Kecia K. vis but considered it an investigational pretreatment medi­ Darlington, “The utility of Dextroamphetamine for at­ cation for organophosphate poisoning. although some tenuating the impact of sleep Deprivation in Pilots,” Avia­ media reports suggested that this medication was signifi­ tion, Space, and Environmental Medicine 74, no. 11 (No­ cantly associated with so-called Persian Gulf syndrome, vember 2003): 1125–34; and John a. Caldwell et al., “modafinil’s effects on simulator Performance and mood the actual incidence of untoward neurological side effects in Pilots during 37 hours without sleep,” Aviation, Space, was 1 percent. and Environmental Medicine 75, no. 9 (september 2004): 3. D. O. e. Gebhardt, “Off-label administration of 777–84. Drugs to healthy military Personnel: Dubious ethics of 8. russo, “recommendations for the ethical use,” Preventive measures,” Journal of Medical Ethics 31, no. 5 B123. The term safe within this context refers to the fact (may 2005): 268. that the medications have been tested in controlled labo­ 4. Tina-maire O’Neill, “us Pilots Blame Drug For Ca­ ratory environments as well as in clinical trials and have nadian Bombing,” Sunday Business Post Online, 19 January been determined not to cause physiological harm to the 2003, http://archives.tcm.ie/businesspost/2003/01/19/ individual. also, the claim of “safety” is based on the fact story437452528.asp. that controlled simulator and in-flight studies conducted 5. michael B. russo, “recommendations for the ethical on military pilots have produced evidence that cognition use of Pharmacologic Fatigue Countermeasures in the and performance are not adversely affected by the drug. u.s. military,” Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine in fact, results have shown that it improves performance. 78, no. 5, sec. 2 (may 2007): B119. lastly, we have evidence of “safety” across individuals

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since every pilot who uses a prescription stimulant in http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/ combat must have already satisfactorily completed a test apj97/spr97/cornum.pdf. dose of the drug under a physician’s supervision. 18. Kory Cornum, rhonda Cornum, and William 9. in the context of “war,” or a us-sanctioned “police storm, “use of Psychostimulants in extended Flight Op­ action,” or other military conflict, enemies of the united erations: a Desert shield experience,” in Advisory Group states who bear arms against us with the intent of causing for Aerospace Research and Development (AGARD) Conference harm are not considered innocent. Proceedings 579 (Neuilly sur seine, France: North atlantic 10. see note 8. Treaty Organization, October 1995), 37-1 to 37-4. 11. american Psychological association, “ethical Prin­ 19. Brig Gen Gary h. murray, commander, air Force ciples of Psychologists and Code of Conduct,” American medical Operations agency, to Department of the air Psychologist 57, no. 12 (December 2002): 1060–73. Force, letter, 26 June 2001 (policy letter on the implemen­ 12. John a. Tirpak, “The Force seeks a New Baseline,” tation of headquarters usaF/XO message on counter­ Air Force Magazine 86, no. 1 (January 2003): 36, http:// measures to aircrew fatigue in the combat air force). www.afa.org/magazine/jan2003/0103force.pdf. 20. Department of the air Force (maj stephen 13. s. elliot, “Chief of staff shares Views on Global moulten, point of contact), to air Combat Command, let­ strike Task Force,” Air Force News Archive, 31 October 2001, ter, 20 February 2001 (policy letter on aircrew fatigue- http://www.combatsim.com/memb123/cnews/arch/ management program). cnewsarc146.htm#chstff. 21. This same guidance applies to the use of modafinil 14. David F. Dinges et al., “Cumulative sleepiness, (Provigil), recently approved by the air Force surgeon mood Disturbance, and Psychomotor Vigilance Perfor­ general for certain air Force combat-aviation operations. mance Decrements during a Week of sleep restricted to (No doubt the other services will soon approve it as well.) 4–5 hours per Night,” Sleep 20, no. 4 (1997): 274, http:// 22. a couple of caveats deserve note here: (1) Of www.journalsleep.org/articles/200403.pdf. course, when the pilot is asked at the conclusion of the 15. Greg Belenky et al., “The effects of sleep Depriva­ flightto account for the medications issued, the flightsur ­ tion on Performance during Continuous Combat Opera­ geon will then know the in-flight decision that he made; tions,” in Food Components to Enhance Performance, ed. Ber­ however, this will occur after the fact (which would lessen nadette m. marriott (Washington, DC: National academy its influenceat the decision-making point). (2) No doubt, Press, 1994), 128. in some situations one crew member could feel “pres­ 16. Jeffrey s. Durmer and David F. Dinges, “Neuro­ sured” to use a performance-sustaining medication be­ cognitive Consequences of sleep Deprivation,” Seminars cause other crew members have decided to do so, but in Neurology 25, no. 1 (march 2005): 117; and Tom luna, survey data suggest that this is more the exception than “Fatigue in Context: usaF mishap experience,” Aviation, the rule (see note 23). Space, and Environmental Medicine 74, no. 4 (april 2003): 388. 23. sarady Tan and John Caldwell, “a survey of the 17. lt Col rhonda Cornum, Dr. John Caldwell, and u.s. air Force aviation Personnel on Flying, Fatigue and lt Col Kory Cornum, “stimulant use in extended Flight Fatigue Countermeasures,” Aviation, Space, and Environ­ Operations,” Airpower Journal 11, no. 1 (spring 1997): 54–55, mental Medicine 77, no. 3 (march 2006): 293.

The Air Force is redefiningair , space, and cyber power through cross- domain dominance—our effort to integrate all of our capabilities to exploit the natural synergies across these warfighting domains. —Air Force Posture Statement 2008

5-Caldwell.indd 104 7/28/08 7:54:11 AM as the Special Projects Operations Center (SPOC) for the Mediterranean theater but devotes most of its attention to the combat service of these Franco- Anglo-American teams. Irwin focuses on teams dropped in advance of the landings for Operations Overlord and Dragoon, omitting Dutch operations, and concludes with the termination of Jedburgh activity in Northwest Europe on 13 October as well as the closing of the SPOC on 12 September. Al though the author makes extensive use of docu ments from the Office of Strategic Services and personal testimony, many readers will be disap pointed because he raises important questions but then leaves them unanswered. Irwin mentions ac tivities of the British Special Air Service in Nor mandy and special-operations executive agents but fails to explain their relation to and coordination with the Jedburghs. The insertion of Jedburghs oc curred exclusively by air, but the text notes only that 4,000 sorties dropped 6,000 tons of supplies between July and September. One must look else where for the contribution of units like the famous “Carpetbaggers” of the 801st Bomb Group. In gen eral, the book relates the story of the Jedburghs The Jedburghs: The Secret History of the Allied without reference to any of the major or minor Special Forces, France 1944 by Lt Col Will Irwin, controversies in the professional or scholarly fields. USA, Retired. Public Affairs (http://www.public The overwhelming focus of The Jedburghs on the affairsbooks.com), 250 West 57th Street, Suite US part in the enterprise and its reliance on Ameri 1321, New York, New York 10107, 2005, 352 can sources further limit the book’s utility. Irwin’s pages, $26.95 (hardcover); 2006, 352 pages, evaluation of the program provides a good example. $14.95 (softcover). Based mainly on the praise heaped on special forces by Allied leaders, the author supposes that the Jed Special operations forces have come in for at burghs did indeed disrupt enemy movements to tention since they spearheaded the successful inva the beachheads. However, US sources cannot judge sion of Afghanistan in 2001. Although secrecy stunts the impact on German operations. Only German any analysis of current operations, historical inves sources can do this, and they were not consulted. tigation remains unfettered, as reflected in Will Ir Furthermore, the author’s breezy style, full of asides win’s contribution of an account of the Jedburgh on the length of the Loire and the soils best suited operations in France in 1944. The Jedburghs— to the Muscadet grape, will annoy some readers. teams of uniformed specialists dropped into enemy For deeper insights, historians and military profes territory to coordinate with resistance groups in ad sionals will have to look to the US Army’s official vance of major operations—offer ready parallels to history or collections of published documents. Al Afghanistan, making them an attractive case study. though the prize for writing the definitive study of Readers have their choice of new books by Colin the Jedburghs remains unclaimed, this will not pre Beavan and Roger Ford as well as Irwin’s, the latter vent interested general readers from enjoying this offering a straightforward history of the Jedburgh book, which offers a lively introduction to one of teams from their founding, through recruitment the most important ventures of special forces dur and training, to their deployment in France, start ing the Second World War. ing in June 1944. The book addresses the establishment of Special Dr. Matthew R. Schwonek Forces Headquarters in the United Kingdom as well Maxwell AFB, Alabama

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Guderian: Panzer Pioneer or Myth Maker? by Guderian knew of the plot to kill Hitler in July Russell A. Hart. Potomac Books (http://www 1944; although he did not directly participate, he .potomacbooksinc.com), 22841 Quicksilver Drive, was cagey enough to remain far enough on the out Dulles, Virginia 20166, 2006, 160 pages, $17.56 skirts to hide his culpability and escape execution. (hardcover), $11.16 (softcover). Hitler may have had his suspicions, but he did use Guderian after that. According to Hart and others, In all probability, there will never be another though, Guderian at least was able to openly dis war like Heinz Guderian’s. The clash of truly mas agree with Hitler and live to tell about it. sive armies equipped with thousands of tanks does One can hardly deem this short book a com not seem likely in the immediate future. Thus, if air prehensive biography, but it does yield some warriors are seeking practical lessons at the micro- thought on the dangers of careerism and the pit level, such as the nitty-gritty of how to run a future falls of “improving the truth” to get ahead or es tactical campaign or support it from the air, they cape blame. It is well written, and the prose is en should look elsewhere for guidance. However, if gaging. Readers may want to add it to their reading they want some general notions about the pitfalls list to balance out some other books that are too of developing oneself for military leadership, then worshipful of the fighting abilities of the German Russell Hart’s little book on Guderian might be a armies during the 1940s. worthy read. Hart claims that though Guderian had his strong points as a leader, his fatal flaws in Dr. David R. Mets cluded too much commitment to self-promotion Maxwell AFB, Alabama and a failure to grasp the principles of grand strategy and strategy. A professor working in Hawaii, Hart got his under graduate education in the United Kingdom and A Continent for the Taking: The Tragedy and Hope did his master’s and PhD degrees at Ohio State. of Africa by Howard W. French. Alfred A. Knopf Highly specialized in World War II, especially in the (http://www.randomhouse.com/knopf/home German dimension of it, he has also written a book .pperl), 1745 Broadway, New York, New York about the campaign in Normandy and has coau 10019, 2004, 304 pages, $25.00 (hardcover); thored several others having to do with armored 2005, 280 pages, $15.00 (trade paperback). warfare on the Eastern Front during World War II. According to Hart, the memory of Guderian is A Continent for the Taking gives insight into the much inflated because he is one of those who sur instability and corruption that have held Africa vived World War II, living until 1954. An exceed back from proper governance and sustainable de ingly industrious man, articulate in both English velopment since the era of independence. The au and French, he had translated some of the British thor, Howard W. French, argues not only that insta writings on war into German. Reputed to be one of bility is the result of poor African leaders but also the originators of the German armies’ armored doc that despite the United States’ intermittent involve trine before the war, Guderian was instrumental in ment on the continent, it has never had a sound the campaign in France in 1940 as well as in the open Africa policy. French contends that although Wash ing campaigns of the strike on the Soviet Union in 1941. ington isn’t culpable for most of Africa’s problems, Guderian had written a book about armored war “it would be dishonest to pretend there is no link fare in the 1930s and then wrote one after the war between what has perhaps been the least account that some, including Hart, considered self-serving. able and least democratically run compartment of Hart also thinks that Guderian was unduly con America’s foreign policy—African affairs—and the temptuous of the German navy and air force and undemocratic fortunes of the continent” (p. 107). was at fault in not being able to get along with his Catchphrases such as “Trade, Not Aid” and “Afri bosses. Some others at higher levels of the Army can Solutions for African Problems” were used dur thought he was too cozy with the Nazis—especially ing the 1990s to mollify critics—both domestic and with Hitler. He did accept a huge gift of money foreign—of America’s strategy (or lack thereof). from Hitler in 1942 and then took possession of a The author sets out to show how these glossy slogans large estate in Poland, evicting the family that had were a thin veil for the missteps of administrations owned it. According to Hart, both Guderian’s mem that did not truly understand or care about Africa. oirs and his earlier biographies improve the truth Having spent several years of his young-adult life in his favor too much; actually, he was not as deserv in Africa and then more years (1994–98) as the New ing as he appeared. York Times bureau chief, French is able to give a nu

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anced analysis of the role that indigenous politics, perils attendant upon working in an unstable and military forces, and foreign involvement play in the corrupt continent with shifting alliances and shaky stability of west and central Africa. Early in the infrastructure (whose very existence is question book, the author points out that trying to lump all able). Although more anecdotal than classically re of Africa together is to oversimplify; he therefore searched, A Continent for the Taking gives great per discusses only a portion of the continent. The title spective regarding the inextricable linkages that of the book is misleading for two reasons. First, the exist among the government, military, foreign and author’s in-depth analysis covers only Nigeria, Libe domestic economic interests, and international aid ria, Mali, and the Congo. Second, although he may agencies in any given country in Africa. French’s be able to reflect on his time spent in Africa in a writing style ensures an entertaining and easy read positive light, his book’s “hope [for] Africa” is only of this excellent book, which African experts will implicit (if it exists at all). French compensates for wish to add to their collection and which someone any lack of breadth in the book through insight into starting to delve into the continent’s conflictscould and access to pivotal events in the area covered. utilize as a fantastic primer. He argues that the United States’ steadfast sup port for corrupt and brutal dictators during the Ashley Lowe Cold War, motivated by our own strategic interests, Maxwell AFB, Alabama had nothing to do with African democracy. In fact it worked to the countries’ detriment: harsh rulers maintained the appearance of stability for a short while but simultaneously sowed the seeds for future Striking First: Preemptive and Preventive Attack in destabilization. American ties to leaders such as U.S. National Security Policy by Karl P. Mueller Yoweri Museveni (Uganda), Mobutu Sese Seko et al. RAND (http://www.rand.org/publications/ (Congo, at that time Zaire), Idi Amin Dada (Uganda), index.html), 1700 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Hastings Kamuzu Banda (Malawi), Samuel Kanyon Santa Monica, California 90407-2138, 2006, 344 Doe (Liberia), and Jonas Savimbi (Angola) left a disas pages, $30.00 (softcover). Available free from trous legacy of mutinous civil wars and corruption. http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/ French had incredible access to leaders at all RAND_MG403.pdf. levels of African government, and his interviews with them gave him a well-informed, strategic view of the In light of violent nonstate actors, prolifera situation. This strategic perspective is seamlessly tion, changing defense policy, and—for the US interwoven with the author’s anecdotes of interac military—an attendant shift to a more “expedi tions with the citizens he encounters during his in tionary” outlook, preemption seems an increas terviews and perilous travels throughout the conti ingly relevant doctrine. Events leading to the inva nent. French tracks groups of Hutu refugees as they sion of Iraq as well as the emergent Iranian and flee Rwandan Tutsi revenge killings. When he first North Korean nuclear crises seem to underscore interviews a Zairian Hutu doctor at a refugee camp this fact. The authors of Striking First, a broad yet in Tingi-Tingi, he never imagines that in tracking well-founded analysis, show that although an early the remaining refugees’ escape through dense rain offense can be a surprisingly flexible policy op forests of Zaire, he would encounter the same man tion, it is never a simple one. fivemonths and 1,000 miles later in Luokolela. The A solidly written work, Striking First aligns the pur devastation and killings that French witnessed pro posefully vague outlines of national security policy vide a poignant background for his narrative. This with the language and analysis of international- same perspective, however, colors the author’s criti relations scholars and historians, laying the ground cism of the Clinton administration’s failure to inter rules for further analysis. From the beginning, the vene in the slayings. For all of his intimately de authors immerse the reader in discussions on mak tailed discussions of the subversive politics in the ing decisions with incomplete information, consen Congo, Liberia, Nigeria, and Mali, French rarely sus building between nation-states, and cost-benefit ventures deeply into Washington politics and down- analyses as they pertain to preemptive attack. At plays the American public’s reticence to intervene times, these analyses take on typical characteristics in Africa after the debacle in Somalia. of RAND research: reliance on graphs, figures,and As the United States seeks to coordinate its vary frameworks with a somewhat detached attitude. ing economic, political, and humanitarian policy However, the authors quickly and consistently in objectives in Africa through the stand-up of Africa troduce current examples in order to place con Command, this book serves as a warning of the cepts in context.

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They also clearly define the advantages and dis Air Force. We share a stake in this fight with every advantages of attacking before the enemy does, il security-focused agency in the nation and those of lustrating the multitude of different factors that af our allies. Since this war began, arguably on 11 Sep fect how and when proactive conflicts could occur. tember 2001, strategies and plans have been writ This skillfully segues into a rather involved discus ten and rewritten at all levels. Through these itera sion of how international law interfaces with the tions, however, no one has defined victory. Few actions of nation-states on the battlefield, the dif need reminding of the significant expenditure of ference between legality and legitimacy, and the national prestige, treasure, and blood. Given the gap between de jure and de facto limitations on the nature and cost of the long war, why do we have no use of force. During this discourse on limits to pre clear concept of what it means to win? emptive conflict,the authors place the analysis in a Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy framework of consequences and outcomes for pres by William C. Martel, associate professor of inter ent and future planning/action. national security studies at the Fletcher School of The analysis in Striking First is solid and stands Tufts University, presents an engaging and thought on its own, but the work does not come ex nihilo; ful analysis of the concepts and questions encom isolated from real-world conditions, it has little passing a topic artfully captured in the book’s title. meaning. The dissection of preemption in interna Before turning the firstpage, one sees on the cover tional conflict is shot through with a hard-edged a highly recognizable picture that imaginatively realism appropriate to a political-science text. The frames Martel’s premise. The image of a large ban appendices—occupying more pages than the main ner prominently displayed on the USS Abraham body of the work—examine historical cases of pre Lincoln in May 2003 behind President Bush reads emptive and preventive attack by the United States “Mission Accomplished.” Since that day, over 4,000 and other countries in a wide variety of situations Americans have been killed, and almost 30,000 throughout the entire spectrum of conflict. The have been wounded in Iraq alone. authors use conflicts, ranging from those between The premise of Victory in War is straightforward. large nation-states (war) to military operations other No modern theory of victory exists, yet it should. than war against smaller nonstate actors, as sources The author poses pertinent questions and displays for dialogue. Specific policy prescriptions and keen analytical rigor as he rapidly moves through a courses of action lend credence and impact to the review of ancient and modern military strategists discussion by suggesting how to reach occasionally and theorists to arrive at chapter 4—the heart of unclear policy goals with several concrete steps. the book. Here Martel develops “four concepts— A concise, vital, and clear look at the complex level of victory, change in status quo, mobilization intersection of policy and war fighting,Striking First for war, and post conflictobligations—which jointly shows the factors influencing preemptive and pre provide the foundation for a pretheory of victory” ventive attack, potential outcomes, and the way (p. 94). Readers should not be confused since the ahead. It is of particular interest and importance to author successfully explains the definition and ra anyone with a role in the national security of the tionale for using the social-science term pretheory. United States and could not be more germane to Examining 12 American wars through the lens military operations and strategic planning for the of his theory, Martel first considers the American present and near future. theory of victory by using case studies of major wars from 1776 through 1975. His analysis leaves one 1st Lt Kevin M. Hullihan, USAF with a greater understanding of victory in the Malmstrom AFB, Montana American psyche. Next, he studies six cases encom passing American armed conflicts from the end of the Cold War to the present, determining the extent to which the pretheory presented in chapter 4 de velops a proper framework for understanding the Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military concept of victory. Closely tied to the analysis of Policy by William C. Martel. Cambridge Univer these six cases is an outstanding discussion of the sity Press (http://us.cambridge.org), 32 Avenue role of military power and victory. This treatment of the Americas, New York, New York 10013 includes an evaluation of the advantages and disad 2473, 2006, 432 pages, $35.00 (hardcover). vantages of air, land, and maritime forces in pro ducing victory. Fighting and winning the long war against global Clearly the author fulfillsthree key tasks: he pro terrorism are critical priorities of the United States vides a proper “framework for understanding vic

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tory, advances our knowledge of the meaning of spective. They see how any given issue impacts victory, and provides a foundation for criticism” (p. them, but they are also able to look up and down. 308). Other aspects of the text are exceptionally 360-Degree leaders make the most of this perspec noteworthy. The two chapters on strategists and tive to lead not only up and down, but across” (p. theorists offer an excellent, albeit abbreviated, 186). By the same token, he points out that leaders primer on these grand military thinkers. The case can misuse such a position just as much as they can studies, particularly those of the last 20 years stand optimize it. In fact, he declares, “To do nothing in alone as exceptional accounts of American military the middle is to create more weight for the top involvement in those conflicts. Additionally, the leader to move” (p. 7). Ultimately, the success that book is a classic example of how to conduct a study leaders achieve in the middle depends upon the with analytical rigor and integrity. Without excep degree to which they affect the influence associ tion, it presents the advantages and disadvantages ated with that position: “Good leaders will gain in of all key and controversial arguments and posi influencebeyond their stated position. Bad leaders tions. Professor Martel, a former RAND analyst, has will shrink their influencedown so that it is actually produced a superb work that will influence how less than what originally came with the position” current and future generations of military and po (p. 11). Throughout the book, he focuses on how a litical leaders understand the nature of war and leader can increase that influence by leading up, what it means to achieve victory. across, and down. Because of the lessons, historical perspective, Most leaders would likely agree that leading up and inherent knowledge to be gained from Victory poses the greatest challenge since they like to lead in War, I highly recommend that every military of but don’t like to be led. However, only limited lead ficerin the Department of Defense read it. Martel’s ership literature and training is available to navi study is the timeliest and one of the most important gate this difficultenvironment. On the other hand, books written on strategy for the profession of arms Maxwell offers very beneficial guidance in helping in the recent past. leaders excel in leading up. As he does so, he is quick to assert that one should not confuse leading Col Chris Wrenn, USAF up with “kissing up” for the purpose of getting Washington, DC ahead. Rather, he contends that leaders should fo cus on who they want to be—not on where they want to be. The former benefitsone’ s organization while the latter benefitsoneself. Maxwell states that when one combines this selfless mentality with a The 360 Degree Leader: Developing Your Influence willingness to go the extra mile and build trust—or from Anywhere in the Organization by John C. “relational chemistry”—with a leader, that person Maxwell. Thomas Nelson (http://www.thomas can provide optimum support and value to his or nelson.com), P.O. Box 141000, Nashville, Tennes her leader and organization. see 37214, 2006, 336 pages, $24.99 (hardcover). Regarding another very complex area of leader ship—leading across with one’s peers—Maxwell Much leadership training, including the Air opines that succeeding as a peer-to-peer leader re Force’s, historically has focused on leading one’s quires “giving your colleagues reasons to respect subordinates—not one’s peers and certainly not and follow you” (p. 159). Such respect comes when one’s superiors. Yet almost all leaders lead in “the leaders show their peers that they care more for middle” as often as they do at “the top.” For this them than the job those peers can do for the lead very reason, it is just as important to learn how to ers or the organization. Maxwell explains this pro lead effectively across (with your colleagues) and cess by noting that “great leaders don’t use people up (with your leader) as it is to lead down (with so that they can win. They lead people so that they your followers). Despite this importance, however, all can win together” (p. 167). Such a leadership today’s myriad material on leadership development approach promotes trust. As peers begin to trust a offers little, if any, guidance to assist one in excel peer leader, they give that person permission to ling in the two former leadership situations. John lead them. Maxwell’s 360 Degree Leader fillsthis void by offering The stereotypical aspect of leadership is leading insight into these very situations, which leaders at down with one’s followers. Although some leaders all levels must master to achieve success. may be inclined to dismiss this section for this very In describing the critical role of leaders in the reason, Maxwell offers valuable insights into this middle, Maxwell states that they “have a better per leadership environment as well by focusing on the

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people one leads: “Leaders who tend only to busi Roaring Thunder: A Novel of the Jet Age by Walter ness often end up losing the people and the busi J. Boyne. Forge Books, Tom Doherty Associates ness. But leaders who tend to the people usually (http://www.tor-forge.com), 175 Fifth Avenue, build up the people—and the business” (p. 218). New York, New York 10010, 2006, 304 pages, He emphasizes that the best way of doing this in $24.95 (hardcover). volves seeing and leading people as they can be— not as they are. To enable one’s followers to fulfill Many people believe that the age of jet aviation their potential, Maxwell emphasizes the obligation began in the final days of World War II when the German Luftwaffe produced a few new jet-fighter of leaders to mentor and develop their people, aircraft to patrol the skies over central Europe in a quoting Jack Welch, former chief executive officer final, desperate effort to hold off the massive of General Electric: “Before you are a leader, suc bomber raids of the Allies. What might have cess is all about growing yourself. When you be changed the course of the war proved too little and come a leader, success is all about growing others” too late, however. Actually, the race to be first in (p. 156). designing, testing, and flying jets began several In addition to addressing points applicable to years before the war and involved British designers leading up, across, and down, 360 Degree Leader of as well. Roaring Thunder, written by noted aviation fers further valuable leadership insights, three of authority Walter J. Boyne, captures the dramatic which are especially applicable to the current re story of the beginning of the jet age of aviation— source-constrained environment. Regarding the and then some. Boyne makes an imaginative choice first insight—servant leadership—Maxwell’s belief by using the novel form to lay out an accurate tale that leaders should serve the needs of their follow of actual events and achievements presented ers instead of expecting their followers to serve against a background of diverse personalities, both their needs parallels the Air Force’s second core real and fictional. value of “service before self.” The second insight— Very qualified to discuss this subject, the author a leader’s willingness to shift from what has always has written about aviation since the early 1960s been done to what should be done—lies at the heart when he served as a pilot in the US Air Force. After of the Six Sigma and Lean process-improvement retiring as a colonel with more than 5,000 flying concepts inherent in the Air Force’s new initiative hours, he later became director of the Smithsonian known as Air Force Smart Operations 21. Jim Collins Institution’s National Air and Space Museum. describes the third insight—the need for a leader Working since the mid-1980s as an aviation consul tant and novelist, the prolific Boyne has published to place as much importance on “stop-doing” lists five novels, 33 works of nonfiction, and over 500 as “to-do” lists—as a crucial element among the articles. He has entrenched himself in the exclusive “great” companies he identifies in his book Good to company of authors who have made both the fiction Great: Why Some Companies Make the Leap—and Oth and nonfiction bestseller lists of the New York Times. ers Don’t (HarperBusiness, 2001). One cannot over Roaring Thunder is the initial entry in a fictional state the criticality of each of these insights today, trilogy that encompasses the complete history of when each Air Force member is asked to do more. the air and space industry. This firstsegment covers Based on the above leadership principles, Max a three-decade period from the contested begin well’s 360 Degree Leader offers valuable insights that nings of jet aviation in the pre–World War II years, will assist Air Force leaders at all levels to lead up, through the US military’s involvement flying com across, and down. The Air War College’s Depart bat and support jet aircraft in the Vietnam War, to ment of Leadership and Ethics has incorporated a the beginnings of the commercial jet-transport in small extract from this book into its curriculum, dustry. The saga highlights the true pioneers re but including 360 Degree Leader at each level of the sponsible for the birth of the jet age, including such Air Force’s professional military education would notables as Sir Frank Whittle, British inventor of the benefit the service’s leaders of all ranks, both en jet engine; Hans von Ohain, designer of jet engines listed and officer. Such inclusion would befit the for the Luftwaffe during the war and then a success emphasis that Maxwell and the Air Force place on ful engineer who worked for the US government developing leaders. afterwards; Kelly Johnson, a famed American aero nautical engineer and designer; and fellow Ameri Col Aldon E. Purdham Jr., USAF can Tex Johnston, an early test pilot of great fame. Air Force Fellow Boyne blends the real-life adventures of these Alexandria, Virginia giants with the story of the fictionalfamily of Vance

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Shannon and his two sons, who serve as good coun that influence and shape the formulation and exe terparts to the actual movers and shakers of the jet cution of strategy: (1) determining national objec age. Their tale spans the formative years of the air tives, (2) formulating grand strategy, (3) develop and space industry, covering the successes, failures, ing military strategy (a level of inquiry some authors trade-offs, and complexities inherent in this com refer to as “national strategy”), (4) developing op petitive arena. erational strategy, and (5) formulating battlefield Aviation enthusiasts will find that Roaring Thun strategy (tactics). They conclude the chapter by of der makes for worthwhile reading. The story does fering a model of the strategy process, acknowledg become a bit stretched at times as it integrates the ing that many factors influencing military strategy Shannon family into the plot—impressive when in often reside outside the control of even the most volved in aviation matters but much less so with skilled strategists of war. (They discuss these factors their personal lives. More important, the rest of the in detail in chap. 10.) epic tale—the factual aspects—comes through Among the many superb sections in the book, loud and clear as it enlightens and entertains. Drew and Snow examine at length the inextrica Dr. Frank P. Donnini, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, Retired ble connection between the political and military Newport News, Virginia dimensions of war by devoting no fewer than seven of 14 chapters to this subject. Most books on mili tary strategy readily recognize this interconnect edness, but the authors examine every aspect of this relationship in a sharp, crisp fashion, leaving Making Twenty-First-Century Strategy: An Introduc no stone unturned. They explore the American tion to Modern National Security Processes and actors and institutions that define and shape strategy Problems by Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. and the instruments of national power used to se Snow. Air University Press (http://www.maxwell cure national objectives in a setting influenced by .af.mil/au/aul/aupress), 131 West Shumacher the unique characteristics of the American grand- Avenue, Maxwell AFB, Alabama 36112-5962, strategy process. 2006, 290 pages, $24.00 (softcover). Available Their discussion of the military dimension of free from http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/ strategy is notable for its inclusiveness. Drew and aupress/Books/Drew_Snow/DrewSnow.pdf. Snow provide a rich examination of the elements “The strategy process is, in its basic form, a of military strategy (force employment, force devel straightforward and sequential decision-making ex opment, force deployment, and force coordination), ercise. The simplicity of the process masks the dif combined and joint campaign warfare, and the in ficulty of the decisions and the dilemmas that be fluence of service views on operational strategy. devil strategists” (p. 191). In their latest publication, (They discuss service worldviews and doctrine at retired Air Force colonel Dennis M. Drew and Prof. greater length in chap. 11.) They also include in Donald M. Snow, recently retired from the Univer this discussion an interesting section about basic sity of Alabama, have scored another remarkable approaches for designing operational strategy that success in their long and distinguished collabora should prove useful as a starting point for students tion. They have met and surpassed the challenge to of campaign planning. Their chapter on strategies divine the difficult decisions and dilemmas facing for asymmetrical warfare is particularly insightful the people who develop and implement military in light of the many challenges facing the United strategy in the United States. States due to insurgencies: new internal wars, a sub The authors begin their book with a crisp sum set of insurgencies developed by Snow in an earlier mary of military strategy and war between the eigh book (UnCivil Wars: International Security and the teenth and late twentieth centuries to show that al New Internal Conflicts [Lynne Rienner Publishers, though the practices of warfare have varied across 1996]); fourth-generation warfare; and terrorism. time, the nature of war does not change. Thus the Although the end of the Cold War dramatically re fundamental functions performed by strategists— duced the threat of a nuclear holocaust, the au developing, deploying, and orchestrating the use thors have nevertheless included a chapter on the of military forces—have remained intact. This ob continuing relevance of nuclear strategy in the servation serves as a unifying thread throughout twenty-first century. That section addresses nearly the book. every major concept of nuclear strategy, but it may Drew and Snow turn quickly to an overview of be too basic for readers who have an intermediate the strategy process to examine five decision steps or higher knowledge of military affairs.

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The book concludes with three chapters which According to a Japanese proverb, “Vision with examine dilemmas that pose intriguing and at out action is a dream; action without vision is a times vexing questions for contemporary strate nightmare.” Although Major Rodman focuses pri gists. For whom and what do we prepare? How do marily on attack aviation, the important, thought- we deal with problems caused by the current opera provoking takeaway for twenty-first-century Airmen tions tempo and an all-volunteer force? How do ci is creativity. Because General Kenney had a vision vilian decision makers and military leaders deal for victory, he could inspire his command to create with an omnipresent news media that can either unconventional approaches for action that would rally support for military operations or turn public ultimately lead to victory. When Kenney assumed opinion against them? Why has the United States command of the sparse aviation resources in the had a historic lack of success with asymmetrical Southwest Pacific, he became Gen Douglas MacAr warfare? How can we better wage this form of war thur’s joint force air component commander before the fare? What desired outcomes do we seek from in term came into vogue. volvement in asymmetrical warfare? What interests The Southwest Pacific differed substantially merit US military engagement abroad? from the European theater. The great distances Drew and Snow have succeeded in examining a and lack of industrial strategic targets dictated a complex and difficult subject in a comprehensive different approach to countering Japanese forces. book that should be read by officercandidates and Because the Allies’ “Europe first”policy meant that officers attending both basic and intermediate de General Kenney’s forces generally got the “leftovers” velopmental education. Making Twenty-First-Century of available war materials, they had to adapt equip ment and tactics in order to be effective. Strategy is well written, logical, and timely. The nu Undeterred by these constraints, Kenney in merous historical examples cited by the authors to spired creativity and baffledthe experts. One of his illustrate concepts and ideas are readily accessible most trusted officers, Paul “Pappy” Gunn, had al and relevant. In this reviewer’s judgment, only one ready served a full career, had retired from the US area does not receive adequate examination: cyber Navy, and was running a civilian airline in the Philip warfare. Although Drew and Snow make note of it pines when World War II broke out. The Army in several passages, they do not explore the subject “drafted” him, and, because of his current location, in depth. Given the emerging importance of cyber Fifth Air Force “inherited” him. Just the type of creative space in twenty-first-century warfare, it warrants person whom General Kenney could genuinely in study along with the ground, maritime, air, and spire, Gunn had a special knack for mechanics and space arenas of war. flying;his “chemistry” with Kenney allowed them to Dr. Charles E. Costanzo, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, Retired try new and bizarre concepts for the battle at hand: Maxwell AFB, Alabama “Gunn . . . essentially redesigned the medium bombers and light attack aircraft in the [Southwest Pacific Area], giving them the forward firepower that transformed these planes into strafing ma chines” (p. 41). The modifications were made in- theater at field-maintenancefacilities. Gunn’s work A War of Their Own: Bombers over the Southwest led to such creations as a B-25 with 10 forward- Pacific by Capt Matthew K. Rodman, USAF. Air firing .50-caliber machine guns. Major Rodman University Press (http://www.maxwell.af.mil/ cites a humorous incident from the book General au/aul/aupress), 131 West Shumacher Avenue, Kenney Reports in which Kenney had the opportu Maxwell AFB, Alabama 36112-5962, 2005, 184 nity to silence the experts in Gen Henry “Hap” Ar pages, $14.00 (softcover). Available free from nold’s presence: http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/ One day, during a lull in the conferences, . . . Arnold Books/Rodman/rodman.pdf. told me to come to his office.On arrival there I found a battery of engineering experts from Wright Field Matthew Rodman, now a major, has written a who explained to me that the idea was impracticable. concise historical study of an inspiring leader’s ability They tried to prove to me that the balance would be to motivate a team to tackle seemingly insurmount all messed up, the airplane would be too heavy, would able challenges and prevail. This well-documented not fly properly, and so on. book focuses on Fifth Air Force under the leader I listened for a while and then mentioned that twelve ship of Gen George Kenney from December 1941 B-25s fixed up in this manner had played a rather im through September 1945. portant part in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea and that

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I was remodeling sixty more B-25s right now at Towns provide. His stories offer a very personal look at the ville. Arnold glared at his engineering experts and human side of the Air Force. practically ran them out of the office (p. 83). Divided into two parts, the book intersperses hu The author skillfully reminds the reader that morous tales of the stereotypical, grizzled, old-time unconventionally modified aircraft, low-altitude and sergeant among its chapters. In the first half, Phil skip bombing, and parafrag bombs and improvised lips chronologically recounts episodes of his mem “daisy cutters” are all part of the incredible history orable career, including time spent at basic train of Fifth Air Force. But twenty-first-century Airmen ing and Squadron Officer School as well as his tenure as commander of the Air Force’s 1141st Spe should recognize the creativity that General Kenney cial Activities Squadron in Stuttgart, Germany. The inspired in his team. Under his leadership, the ad second part deals more with the ideas and impor aptation of machines and tactics led to victory. Now tant lessons he acquired in the service. Although engaged in the global war on terror, our Airmen the turn of events that led to Phillips’s transition must lead with creativity to fulfill the mission. We from enlisted man to officerand the particular jobs must have the vision and willingness to take action he held is interesting, the lessons he learned and to find, fix, and destroy our enemies. Just as Fifth their accompanying anecdotes are the most moving. Air Force had to modify equipment and tactics to The author doesn’t hesitate to address such hot- meet the enemy between 1941 and 1945, so must button issues as (1) the Vietnam War, which he ex today’s Air Force adapt to meet an ever-changing, amines objectively, carefully peeling back layers elusive enemy in the war on terror. that I had not considered before; (2) the Air Force’s With A War of Their Own, Maj Matthew Rodman “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy and a commander’s has penned a great “quick read” for anyone inter role when an Airman discloses a homosexual orien ested in attack aviation in the Southwest Pacific tation; (3) sexual harassment and its horrendous theater of World War II. For a more in-depth study impact on individuals and units; (4) the best way of General Kenney’s brilliant staff inventor, I sug for a commander to get to know his or her subordi gest reading Pappy Gunn by Nathaniel Gunn (Author nates and immediately create a healthy working en house, 2004). vironment; (5) the beneficial impact of women in Col Warren G. Ward, USAF the military and his concerns about the treatment Barksdale AFB, Louisiana of female prisoners of war; (6) the issues and intri cacies involved in relieving a commander; and (7) the importance of family support and the unique challenges faced by children of military members. Of obvious importance to Phillips is the mili tary’s sense of “oneness” and how “in the Air Force, A Pilgrim in Unholy Places: Stories of a Mustang its essence is captured in the phrase, ‘The Air Force Colonel by Thomas D. Phillips. Heritage Books takes care of its own’ ” (p. 111). He recognizes that (http://www.heritagebooks.com), 65 East Main the good units in which he served over the years Street, Westminster, Maryland 21157-5026, 2004, “had an ‘all for one and one for all’ outlook: a Band 256 pages, $19.95 (softcover). of Brothers (and now, Sisters) who cared for and supported one another, exalted in the highs, an In A Pilgrim in Unholy Places, Thomas Phillips guished in the lows, and worked together towards a drives home the point that life is full of unexpected shared objective” (p. 226). A unit’s sense of pride events, especially in the military. He even manages and camaraderie always directly affects its produc to make readers feel comfortable with the unex tivity—an idea that civilian leaders and military pected. This interesting read welcomes civilians commanders alike would do well to remember. and veterans alike into its pages, presenting mili The book’s most memorable passage deals with tary life from the perspective of both commissioned how we could apply the lessons of Vietnam, especially and noncommissioned officers. Phillips’s experience with “casualty notification.” Con Here, the term mustang denotes not a car, horse, cerning the heart-wrenching experience of having to or World War II plane but an officerwho began his inform parents that their son had died in Vietnam, he career as an enlisted recruit and moved up through comments that “[he] came to wish that every decision the ranks. In this autobiography, Phillips discusses maker in a position to commit a nation’s sons and the various aspects of leadership in the clear, dis daughters to war ought to first be required to make a tinct fashion that only years of experience could casualty notification visit” (p. 149).

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A Pilgrim in Unholy Places is very informative, enter warrior leader—whether airman, soldier, sailor, or taining, and useful, especially to anyone consider marine—at the tip of the spear or in support of the ing a leadership role in either the military or civilian mission. Influenced by Steven Pressfield’s Gates of worlds. Using both enlisted and officer perspec Fire: An Epic Novel of the Battle of Thermopylae (Dou tives as well as effective anecdotes, Phillips shares bleday, 1998), Danelo’s story seduces the reader by crucial ideas on the challenges of leadership. I manly deeds and what he refers to as the Spartan strongly recommend this book. way. As recounted in Blood Stripes, Gates of Fire has become a must-read for all Marine NCOs, indoctri Cadet Benjamin Mauldin, USAF nating them into the belief that battlefield experi Air Force ROTC, University of Houston ence combined with the Spartan way represents the only conduit to the highest good. The living sacri ficeof these marines is not only instructive but also inspirational. Blood Stripes: The Grunt’s View of the War in Iraq Fittingly, the book focuses on missions rather by David J. Danelo. Stackpole Books (http:// than politics and people rather than prognostica www.stackpolebooks.com), 5067 Ritter Road, tion. Yet through the eyes of those closest to the Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania 17055, 2006, 384 struggle, we see the true difficultyof bringing peace pages, $29.95 (hardcover). to this region and receive a glimpse of the price we must be willing to pay to achieve it. Maybe the an In a dark, staccato writing style that chronicles swer lies in Danelo’s observation that “we will stay the exploits of real-life marines, Blood Stripes offers patient one hour longer, one day longer, one week a proud yet sobering tale of the war in Iraq—par longer than the enemy expects us to” (p. 65). ticularly the battle of Fallujah. About a year after combat operations seemed successful and after the Maj Rodney D. Bullard, USAF American people and their military cheered the Air Force Fellow pronouncement of “mission accomplished,” a Washington, DC hardy group of marines found themselves in the streets of the Iraqi city of Fallujah, locked in mortal combat. Largely seen through the eyes of Marine noncommissioned officers(NCO)—and to a lesser The First Heroes: The Extraordinary Story of the extent, their families, officers,and Iraqis—the story Doolittle Raid—America’s First World War II transports readers into the bloody events that Victory by Craig Nelson. Penguin Group (http:// marked Iraq in 2004 and still capture today’s head us.penguingroup.com), 375 Hudson Street, lines. These NCOs’ orders embody all one needs to New York, New York 10014, 2003, 448 pages, know, either in battle or foreign policy: do no harm, $16.00 (softcover). be no better friend, and be no worse enemy. Against this backdrop, we see the dynamic faces of peace The First Heroes relates the epic journey of the keeping operations and American diplomacy. Doolittle Raiders, offering a thorough and encom In the Middle East, “be no worse enemy” seems passing account of a daring mission to attack the unavoidable, and through the vehicles of plot and Japanese homeland. Including testimonies from prose, author David Danelo highlights the contrast American crew members, Japanese soldiers, and ing roles of diplomacy and destruction alongside civilians affected by this raid, this book presents the the battlefieldcontradictions of order and disorder. entire picture, unlike many other accounts. Chrono Adding to the fog, the story line flashes among logically outlining American and Japanese history characters, scenes, and situations, enhancing the since the end of World War I, author Craig Nelson drama. Even though the stories become clearer plots the course of both countries until their forces and at times overlap, readers are left disjointed, finally meet at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. working to keep every fact in order and every per Discussing the planning, coordinating, and con son straight. The cutaways and flashbackspermit us trolling of Lt Col James H. Doolittle’s top-secret to develop affection for these dynamic figures,add mission with painstaking detail, he provides bio ing to the suspense and allowing us to share, as graphical information about each pilot, navigator, much as we can, in the uneasy tension of patrol and bombardier, copilot, and gunner in this task the mania of battle. force—including an extensive biography of Doo Although the culture and tactics are predomi little himself. In the process, Nelson succeeds in nantly Marine, Blood Stripes is a great read for any giving readers a sense of personal attachment to

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these men; he also addresses the current attitudes volved in Vietnam by stepping in after the defeat of and emotions of the American public, military, and the French in order to maintain credibility with al government, as well as the circumstances and envi lies around the world. America was motivated by ronment in which these men lived and fought. the domino theory, which held that the fall of Viet The firsthalf of the book covers historical events, nam would lead to one communist victory after an training, and the mission itself, precisely and vividly other throughout the world. Dr. Owens adequately describing the odds overcome by the raiders in highlights how communist success in China and their effort to boost American morale and deliver a the Korean conflictstoked the United States’ belief blow against the Japanese Empire. Indeed, the crew that it had to defend itself against an aggressive of the USS Hornet, the aircraft carrier that would East. As Pres. Lyndon Johnson argued, retreating deliver the B-25s off the Japanese coast, gave the from Vietnam would just mean that the United pilots no more than an even chance at getting air States would have to fight somewhere else. borne, let alone successfully bombing Japan. The In order to convince the reader of the truth of second part follows the crews’ escape into China his thesis, Dr. Owens defines victory as prevailing and, for some, their finaldays as prisoners of war in on the fieldof battle and achieving goals set for the Japanese camps. Even more dramatic and spectacu military by the political leadership. The United lar than the raid itself, the China episode reveals States sought to contain communism by bringing the struggle to survive Japanese air attacks, disease, about a stable, independent South Vietnam capa infection, and gruesome injuries suffered from ble of holding off the aggressive North. The author crash-landing or parachuting from their B-25 completely ignores this fact, preferring to point out Mitchells. Concluding when every member of the that the United States completed Vietnamization Doolittle mission returns home, dead or alive, The and that North Vietnam signed the Paris Peace Ac First Heroes covers this amazing operation from start cords. Nevertheless, these actions did not contain to finish. communism, and South Vietnam fell. Owens con Today, we remember these men as great Ameri cedes that “since the conquest of South Vietnam can heroes, but time has dulled some of their lus marked the goal of North Vietnam, from its view ter. The author’s retelling of this great American point it did ‘Win’ the war. . . . The goal of the victory, executed with enthusiasm, exhilaration, United States . . . was instead to stop the invasion of and excitement, does much to correct that situa South Vietnam” (p. 220). tion. Timeless stories and lessons of heroism and The author seems to forget that the war was valor are important for every leader to understand fought between two countries. For America, this in and appreciate. For that reason, I highly recom cluded not only the military but also the executive mend The First Heroes. branch, legislature, media, and the public. Dr. Owens does an excellent job of highlighting how an antiwar 2d Lt Brad Holt, USAF Congress swept into power in 1974 because of Viet Naval Air Station Whiting Field, Florida nam and Watergate, cutting support to South Vietnam by passing the Case-Church Amendment, which forbade US military intervention in the South. This allowed North Vietnam to move forward with its in America Won the Vietnam War! How the Left vasion and defeat the South. The author attempts Snatched Defeat from the Jaws of Victory by to discount this fact by asserting that North Viet Robert R. Owens, PhD. Xulon Press (http:// nam never defeated the American military—but www.xulonpress.com), 2180 West State Road the North sought only to prolong the fight until 434, Suite 2140, Longwood, Florida 32779, Americans lost their will to continue. Ultimately, 2004, 408 pages, $21.99 (softcover). Vietnamization and the peace accords served as tools to allow the United States to extricate itself Dr. Robert Owens has turned his frustration from Vietnam. Dr. Owens’s argument fails to show with liberals’ interpretation of America’s defeat in how this fulfilled the American objective of con Vietnam into a book on how America Won the Viet taining communism by establishing a stable, inde nam War! A pastor and historian, the author has pendent South Vietnam. Given the failure of this published a number of other books, primarily on objective, one cannot reasonably state that America religious subjects. Unfortunately, this effort falls won the Vietnam War. well short of making a convincing argument. The reader encounters other problems as well. The study begins by presenting historical back An online publisher, Xulon Press leaves the editing ground about how the United States became in to the author, which in this case has resulted in a

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poorly organized book that contains grammatical liquid hydrogen, this stage could deliver 1 million errors, missing words, and unnecessary repetition. pounds of thrust. It was always behind schedule, re Owens also spends too much time criticizing the quiring constant attention and additional funding left and not enough time evaluating the policies of to ensure completion. By comparison, both the the administrations involved to determine whether first and third stages of the Saturn V development or not they could have succeeded. He also fails to program moved forward relatively smoothly. compare and contrast the political decisions made Representing a triumph of systems manage in Vietnam with those made today in the fight ment, the Saturn V program required that NASA against global terror. In terms of the book’s refer juggle prime contracts with Boeing for the S-IC, ence value, Dr. Owens does cite many policy docu first stage; North American Aviation, S-II, second ments from the Vietnam era, but these are readily stage; Douglas Aircraft, S-IVB, third stage; Rocket- available elsewhere—especially from the Internet. dyne Division of North American Aviation, J-2 and I do not recommend America Won the Vietnam F-1 engines; and IBM, Saturn instruments. These War! The author presents no new evidence and prime contractors, with more than 250 subcontrac eventually contradicts his own theory. Although he tors, provided millions of parts for use in the Sat may have demonstrated “how the left snatched de urn launch vehicle, all meeting exacting specifica feat from the jaws of victory,” he certainly doesn’t tions for performance and reliability. The total cost show how America won the war. There is nothing expended on development was massive, amount earth-shattering here. ing to $9.3 billion. Saturn V is an important story, deserving serious Maj James F. Palumbo, USAF attention from historians. An officialhistor y, Roger Naval Postgraduate School, California E. Bilstein’s Stages to Saturn: A Technological History of the Apollo/Saturn Launch Vehicles (Washington, DC: NASA, 1980; reprinted in 1996 by NASA and in 2003 by University Press of Florida), which offers an ex Saturn V: The Complete Manufacturing and Test ceptionally capable narrative history, is the appro Records plus Supplemental Material by Alan priate place to start any serious study of the Saturn Lawrie and Robert Godwin. Apogee Books, Col V moon rocket. Lawrie’s volume is a compilation of lectors Guide Publishing (http://www.apogee technical data, much of it reprinted from elsewhere books.com), 1440 Graham’s Lane, Unit no. 2, and some of it offering an important set of details Burlington, Ontario, L7S 1W3, Canada, 2005, about the program. The first item reprinted, the 308 pages, $27.95 (softcover). “Saturn V News Reference” of August 1967, in tended for the media and others seeking detailed Air and space engineer Alan Lawrie has com information about the program, remains a valuable piled a very interesting work. In Saturn V, he and source 40 years after publication. It has also been publisher Robert Godwin offer information on the available for downloading from the NASA Marshall development and manufacturing of the propulsion Space Flight Center on the World Wide Web for system that enabled Americans to reach the moon many years at http://history.msfc.nasa.gov/saturn in the 1960s and 1970s. The Saturn V, the most _apollo/saturnv_press_kit.html. Lawrie also reprints powerful rocket ever built, had capabilities both the “Saturn V Payload Planners Guide,” a docu awesome and awful to witness. Representing the ment from November 1965 intended as a source of culmination of earlier rocket development and test detailed knowledge needed by any organization programs, it stood 363 feet tall. The first stage gen that might launch a payload on a Saturn V. (At the erated 7.5 million pounds of thrust from five mas time, NASA anticipated that the Saturn would be sive engines developed for the system. This engine, come the launcher of choice for all manner of known as the F-1, represented some of the most sig spacecraft.) Because of this document’s rarity, it is a nificant engineering accomplishments of the welcome addition to the volume. Apollo program, requiring the development of new The most useful part of the book is Lawrie’s alloys and different construction techniques to compilation of manufacturing and test records withstand the extreme heat and shock of firing. concerning each of the stages built for the Saturn The second stage presented enormous challenges V, as well as for each of the engines constructed for to the National Aeronautics and Space Administra the moon program. Lawrie’s ferreting out obscure tion (NASA) engineers, very nearly causing the data from a variety of sources to construct this dis United States to miss its lunar-landing goal. Con cussion represents a decidedly useful contribution sisting of five engines burning liquid oxygen and to knowledge about the program. Finally, as is the

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case with many Apogee publications, Robert Godwin ernment as well as extensive interaction with the has found and offered on DVD a selection of en private sector. gine tests, assembly sequences, and manufacturing Raging pragmatism may best describe his ap film to round out the work. proach—the “rage” being directed mainly at bu Saturn V: The Complete Manufacturing and Test Re reaucratic inertia. Aware of budget realities and the cords plus Supplemental Material is a useful compila ineffectiveness of solutions issued from above, he tion of information about the rocket that carried uses a keen eye for incentives that cross the public- astronauts to the moon. It is not, per se, concerned private divide to keep his ideas within the achiev with the moon landings or any other aspect of the able realm. program. Even the discussion of the propulsion sys For example, he suggests that investments made tem ends with delivery of each stage to the Ken to better deal with a biological attack on our food nedy Space Center, where it was assembled for supply would also pay dividends in our ability to launch. This book’s greatest value lies in providing manage natural pandemics like severe acute respi technical details about the Saturn V’s systems, en ratory syndrome (SARS), West Nile virus, foot- gines, tests, and manufacturing. It is very much a and-mouth disease, or mad-cow disease. Similarly, work aimed at a technical audience that seeks con leveraging existing technologies to improve the in siderable detail about the rocket. As such, it will spection and tracking of cargo containers could serve as a useful addition to the literature of the benefit both security and the corporate bottom Apollo program. line. Published before Hurricane Katrina, the book also explains how improvements to terrorism re Roger D. Launius sponse, such as closer interagency cooperation, National Air and Space Museum could save lives in a natural disaster. On these and Smithsonian Institution a host of other concrete proposals, Flynn masters Washington, DC the details. His thinking on the larger issues seems equally sound. He advocates a call to service to mobilize Ameri cans’ innate resourcefulness and civic-mindedness. America the Vulnerable: How Our Government Is A better informed, engaged public, he argues, will Failing to Protect Us from Terrorism by Stephen willingly make reasonable sacrifices and hold its Flynn. Harper Perennial (http://www.harper elected leaders more accountable for inaction. perennial.com), 10 East 53d Street, New York, New With much originality, Flynn also proposes a Federal York 10022, 2005, 272 pages, $13.95 (softcover). Security Reserve System, organized on a regional basis and comprised of private and public-sector “America remains dangerously unprepared to participants. This idea, developed in depth in the prevent and respond to a catastrophic terrorist at book, at least deserves consideration as a way to tack on US soil” (p. ix). So argues Stephen Flynn in better attune federal agencies with local needs. a well-researched book that, while often scathing in Regarding public concerns about infringements its criticism, remains free of partisan axe-grinding. on civil liberties (due to surveillance or profiling, Flynn offers a wealth of creative, practical recom for example), Flynn makes the valid point that de mendations to better protect our people, ports, food liberate measures, debated and established in ad and water, factories, and transportation networks. vance, will be both more effective and better protect He brings strong operational, academic, and those liberties than policies hastily put into effect policy-making credentials to the subject. In addi in the emotionally charged aftermath of an attack. tion to a 20-year career in the US Coast Guard, he This book tackles many big questions, but read taught at that service’s academy, served on the staffs ers seeking a comprehensive treatment of US anti of the White House Military Office and National terrorism policy on a global scale should look else Security Council, and was a special adviser to the where. This is not about hearts and minds or 2001 Hart-Rudman Commission on National Secu foreign policy—the text stays focused on active pre rity. He has provided congressional testimony 17 vention and response at home. Flynn does briefly times since 11 September 2001 and is currently a acknowledge a role for preemptive, offensive ac Senior National Security Fellow at the Council of tions but remains generally pessimistic of their cost Foreign Relations. Flynn holds a PhD in inter and efficacy on any grand scale. He emphasizes national politics from the Fletcher School of Law that one day’s expenditure in Iraq approximates and Diplomacy at Tufts University. His policy what the federal government spends in one year on proposals reflect this broad experience in gov homeland security.

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Although America the Vulnerable is not specifically things to track or because they are the only things relevant to the Airman, any citizen wishing to be we can track? better informed on these issues need not look else The next three chapters deal with the intricacies where. For the homeland-security professional, the of political and military factors that provide indica book should be mandatory reading. tions of potential hostilities; they also examine these factors to provide “the totality of evidence.” Col Michael D. Hays, USAF Specific topics include weighting various factors, Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea assessing the meaning of evidence, and reconstruct ing an adversary’s decision-making process. The discussion of military and political indicators is par ticularly revealing. The reader gains an excellent Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warn sense of the actions we can and should monitor ing by Cynthia M. Grabo. University Press of when looking at intelligence. More to the point, the America (http://www.univpress.com), Rowman book raises the question of what indicators now in and Littlefield Publishing Group, 4501 Forbes development will offer insight into the future aims Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706, and actions of nonstate actors such as al-Qaeda and 2004, 184 pages, $30.00 (softcover). its franchise organizations. We developed technolo gies such as satellite imagery and electronic inter Originally written as a textbook for Cold War in ception of communications to monitor armed telligence analysts, the declassified book Anticipat forces of the Warsaw Pact. What technologies do we ing Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning speaks need now to monitor people who use commercial clearly to our current security environment. As au banking systems to provide funding, telephone and thor Cynthia Grabo points out, “The analytic prob Internet systems to communicate, and household lems of warning, and the nature of errors, are re goods available at Wal-Mart to hijack airplanes and ally little changed” (p. ix). Individuals who must manufacture explosives? collect, interpret, and use intelligence to prepare Obvious differences may exist between indica for conventional conflictsas well as stop acts of ter tors that a state may exhibit before it takes some rorism can look to this book for help in developing action and those noted in a nonstate actor or orga a framework. Grabo wrote Anticipating Surprise be nization such as al-Qaeda or Hezbollah. However, the strength of Anticipating Surprise lies in the clear cause of her perception of “several failures by the exposition of the author’s framework for assessing Intelligence community to produce clear warnings intelligence, permitting the reader to imagine and for policymakers of impending hostile actions” (p. develop new means of assessing current situations, vii). As an analyst during the Cold War, she was regardless of the topic under analysis. The final present for many of the surprises that occurred. chapters address such areas as surprise and timing, The book begins by defining warning intelli the problem of deception, judgments and policy, gence, discussing its role, and exploring the impor and improvements to warning assessments. tant question of whether the analyst should address Implicit in the book are such questions as how an adversary’s intentions or capabilities. The au intelligence will be interpreted and who deter thor then moves to the methods used by warning mines whether conflicting analyses should be for analysts. In several respects, this exposition is one warded to a decision maker. For example, the Cold of the most important in the book. Reading about War conflict between order-of-battle analysts and how warning analysts perform their jobs, we cannot warning analysts has clear implications for today. help wondering if they are developing new tools Different methods of analysis and interpretation, and indicators for the collection, organization, and together with the consequent differences in priori assessment of intelligence on terrorist organiza tizing potential actions, still constitute a serious tions. Electronic eavesdropping performed by the weakness in providing advance warning of conflict National Security Agency and the monitoring pro or attack. The treatment of indications and warn gram run by the Department of the Treasury have ings received by the FBI and CIA prior to 11 Sep attracted much attention. One must ask whether tember 2001 closely parallels the treatment of these programs are adequate to the task of provid warnings received by analysts prior to the invasion ing indicators of terrorist aims and actions. To of Czechoslovakia and the final North Vietnamese paraphrase the story of the drunk looking for his offensive against South Vietnam in 1975. keys under the lamppost, are we performing these Furthermore, in Grabo’s book we see only the surveillance activities because they are the best conflict between the warning and order-of-battle

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analysts. What if the number of participants in the Gato-class submarine skippered by Cdr Samuel process increases through the addition of local and Dealey, was credited with sinking 16 enemy ships, state law-enforcement agencies that must balance among them fivedestroyers, a feat that earned him the need for acting on possible terrorist threats the nickname “the destroyer killer.” As the war against potential economic and political conse neared its end, the entire submarine community quences, as well as the loss of credibility if the warn felt the loss of the Harder. ing proves incorrect? We saw a clear instance of this In Death at a Distance, Dr. Michael Sturma, chair dilemma when the Department of Homeland Secu of the history program at Murdoch University in rity raised alert levels due to ambiguous indicators western Australia, covers the submarine’s life, its of of a terrorist attack against the Brooklyn tunnels. ficers and crew, and their exploits during the war. Another implicit argument concerns the ana Beginning with the arrival of American submarines lysts themselves. By concentrating on military and in Fremantle, Australia, during the critical days of political analysis, the author identifies the types of the war, the author looks into the social and cul expertise that analysts should possess. When analysts tural impact of the submariners’ arrival and inter examine a terrorist organization such as al-Qaeda, action with the Australian people. He also examines what kind of knowledge, background, and skill do the Harder’s construction and commissioning in they need? December 1942, noting such aspects as boat design Finally, no one who has followed debate on the and weapons load—specifically, the torpedoes. recent and ongoing reorganization of the intelli Sturma then turns his attention to the life and gence community can fail to see the implications of character of Commander Dealey, discussing his life this book’s guidelines and examples. Rather than from birth to acceptance at the Naval Academy, reorganization, our intelligence community requires duty on surface ships, submarine service, and rela new means of gathering information on potential tionships with fellow officers, crew members, and threats and dangerous operations. Reorganization superiors. Portrayed as a resourceful, steadfast, and will not provide better warning if analysts cannot aggressive skipper, Dealey became known for his agree on the meaning of the indicators or if policy short-range attacks against Japanese destroyers. makers do not heed the intelligence. Next, the author’s blow-by-blow account of the The author has not updated this study to deal Harder’s six war patrols puts readers inside the sub specifically with the detection of terrorist actions, marine as it tracks Japanese convoy escorts, dodges nor does she deal with how political leaders should depth charges, and evades enemy aircraft. One par handle the political aims of extremists. However, ticularly notable episode involves the submarine’s Grabo does provide a framework for developing in role in the rescue of a downed pilot in enemy-held telligence systems that can function better than the territory, where two members of the crew exchange current process and organization. Furthermore, the fire with Japanese forces. Another describes the in guidelines found in this outstanding work apply to sertion of Australian commandos on the island of fields other than national security. Political scien Borneo to establish a coast-watch station and gather tists, economists, businessmen, trend watchers, and intelligence and their retrieval some five months competitive intelligence analysts all can benefit later. Readers also learn that the Harder’s and other from reading Anticipating Surprise. submarines’ tracking of Vice Adm Jisaburo Ozawa’s carrier divisions at the Japanese anchorage of Tawi- Paul Younes Tawi, Southern Philippines, played a pivotal role in Newport, Rhode Island the Battle of the Philippine Sea. The final four chapters further detail the Harder’s actions, includ ing its teaming up with the USS Haddo (SS-255) and USS Hake (SS-256) to sink several Japanese Death at a Distance: The Loss of the Legendary ships and escorts. Later, a clash with a Japanese USS Harder by Michael Sturma. Naval Institute minesweeper and destroyer off Dasol Bay would Press (http://www.usni.org/press/press.html), seal the fate of the legendary submarine, which was 291 Wood Road, Annapolis, Maryland 21402 eventually declared missing and presumed lost. 5034, 2006, 252 pages, $29.95 (hardcover). Well written and researched, Death at a Distance effectively chronicles the Harder’s action-packed On 24 August 1944, almost a year before the history. Especially noteworthy are the vignettes end of hostilities in the Pacificduring World War II, about other submarines and their skippers as well the US Navy lost one of its most famous submarines as the achievements of Allied officers.My only criti off northern Luzon. The USS Harder (SS-257), a cism concerns the fact that the book lacks photos

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of Japanese warships engaged by the submarine to the best possible decisions and outcomes in sup and maps showing the route of its six war patrols. porting US interests. Nevertheless, I thoroughly enjoyed and learned Chapter by chapter, Kugler effectively simplifies much from the book. This definitive history of the diverse, contemporary decisions faced by the US USS Harder would make a valuable addition to the government in formulating policy—some endur library of anyone interested in naval history and ing, some unique. These include evaluating strate the feats of US submarines during World War II. gies for multiple goals, forging national security strategy, promoting economic progress and democ Lt Cdr Mark R. Condeno, Philippine Coast Guard Auxiliary racy, developing methods of systems analysis, sizing Puerto Princesa City conventional forces, modernizing affordably, devis Palawan/Manila, Philippines ing methods of operations research, designing nu clear forces and missile defense, and carrying out expeditionary wars, to name just a few. The author then presents appropriate methodologies for as Policy Analysis in National Security Affairs: New sessing these decisions in an understandable man Methods for a New Era by Richard L. Kugler. ner, even those that normally have exceedingly National Defense University Press (http://www complex formulas and decision matrices. .ndu.edu/inss/press/nduphp.html), 300 Fifth Although Kugler has written Policy Analysis in Avenue, Building 62, Fort Lesley J. McNair, National Security Affairs for a professional audience, Washington, DC 20319-5066, 2006, 658 pages, he has taken pains to make the contents, presenta $55.00 (softcover). tion, and style accessible to graduate and under graduate students as well as anybody who wants to Drawing on his more than 30 years of working learn about policy analysis. A particularly appealing in the national security field, Department of De feature of this massive work is that one can read the fense, RAND, and academia, Richard L. Kugler has chapters independently of each other yet still draw written a comprehensive book that fills the gap in meaningful lessons and real-world application tools professional literature regarding the conduct of from it. I recommend placing this insightful, go-to post–Cold War policy analysis in national security reference source on the shelves of military college affairs. “The business of forging national security faculty, their respective college libraries, middle-/ policy has two main components: first,determining senior-grade military officers, and comparable em how the U.S. should use its powers abroad to pur ployees/staffs/agencies of the federal government sue its goals, and second, determining how the U.S. working within (or linked to) the beltway in Wash should spend money in order to build its military, ington, DC. posture, defense strategy, and related assets” (p. 5). Dr. David A. Anderson, Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, Retired His overarching thesis calls for the use of new meth US Army Command and General Staff College ods in adapting to the increasingly complex global landscape—methodologies that help the US govern ment make the wisest and most effective national security decisions possible: “The days are gone in Testing Aircraft, Exploring Space: An Illustrated which foreign policy, defense strategy, military History of NACA and NASA by Roger E. Bilstein. forces, technologies, and budgets could be treated Johns Hopkins University Press (http://www as separate domains” (p. 5). As such, Policy Analysis .press.jhu.edu), 2715 North Charles Street, Bal in National Security Affairs is a forward-leaning, multi timore, Maryland 21218, 2003, 256 pages, $42.95 disciplinary book. (hardcover). Within three categories of methods for national security analysis—strategic evaluation, systems analy As many of my baby-boomer peers have done, I sis, and operations research—the book’s chapters have tended to equate the National Aeronautics cover the application of analytical methods to both and Space Administration (NASA) with the devel foreign policy and defense strategy, as well as to opment of spaceflight and exploration of the uni specifics of plans, programs, and budgets. A practi verse. My memory of the space race in the late tioner’s book, written primarily for members of the 1950s, the 1960s race for the moon, and the space younger post–Cold War generation, Policy Analysis shuttle of the 1980s overshadows all the organiza in National Security Affairs seeks to help them choose tion’s other aeronautical activities during those the most appropriate analytical methods that lead years. This book did a good job of helping me un

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derstand the organization’s journey from the early follows the chronology of how this government National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics agency assisted in the development of the US air (NACA) organization to the current NASA agency. and space industry. Perhaps a future edition will of Testing Aircraft, Exploring Space is an excellent fer better photographs and illustrations—in color. starting point for someone with a general knowl More pictures and illustrations would help justify edge of aviation history and a desire to understand the $42.95 price suggested by the publisher. Until the origins and history of NASA in its current form. that time, if you don’t mind missing the last 15 This, the fourth edition of the book, is the first to years of NASA history, I recommend the online ver be published by the Johns Hopkins University sion of the third edition. Downloadable from Press. The third edition appeared in 1989 under NASA’s Web site, it contains the same history of the the title Orders of Magnitude: A History of NACA and early NACA and NASA years. NASA. Roger Bilstein authored both of those edi tions. The latest one includes more recent events Rick Kamykowski through 2002 (before the Columbia shuttle accident) Arnold AFB, Tennessee and carries a new title. As the early aviation pioneers of the 1910s ex perimented with flying machines, legislation for NACA slipped through Congress in 1915 on a rider Força Aerea 50 Anos edited by Coronel António to the Naval Appropriation Bill, which provided Tello Pacheco, POAF, retired; Maj Adelino $5,000 annually for an unpaid panel of 12 experts Cardoso; and Nuno Esteves da Silva. Comissão to pursue “the scientific study of the problems of Histórico-Cultural da Força Aerea Portuguesa, flight, with a view to their practical solution,” ac Portugal, 2002, 278 pages. (Not sold commer cording to Public Law 271, passed in March 1915. cially.) This simple start grew into the United States’ premier aeronautical research organization, leading the de Portuguese military aviation has a distinguished velopment of nearly all advances used by US air history, and this lavishly illustrated official publica craft during the two world wars and into the 1950s. tion of the Força Aerea Portuguesa (Portuguese When President Eisenhower established NASA Air Force [POAF]) celebrates that service’s heri in July 1958, that new organization absorbed NACA. tage on the occasion of its 50th anniversary in 2002. NASA’s charter called for working for both civilian The text is in Portuguese but includes an English aeronautics and space research, but, as described translation, thus broadening potential readership in the book, that gradually changed. The space race and helping those who wish to study both lan with the Soviet Union started shifting that focus guages. Presumably, the Portuguese text is primary, (and associated NASA funding) from basic aero but some English translations appear to paraphrase nautics to spaceflight. Bilstein’s chronology of ac the original text. tivities in the 1960s makes it very obvious why aero Like any official history or commemorative nautical research was taking a backseat as NASA book, this one tends to emphasize the positive and focused on reaching the moon. Funding for NASA’s is clearly designed to inspire national pride. State aeronautics programs today still struggles against ments such as “the skies were now open the world the early public focus and the organization’s internal over to Portuguese aviators, just like the oceans had priorities for its space operations. been to Portuguese sailors 400 years earlier” (p. 17) Despite the new title, this is not a pictorial his illustrate how aviation feats of the 1920s and 1930s tory of NACA/NASA. It includes very few pictures, recalled proud historical achievements. On the other all of which are of a rather poor black-and-white hand, the text says some surprising things. After quality. I could excuse this for the early aviation pic noting aviation’s effectiveness in the First World War, tures, but the lack of color in those depicting events the book remarks, “It was thus only natural that in of later years disappointed me, especially the ones 1924 a reorganization of Military Aeronautics es related to space exploration. I also found an error tablished it as a branch of the Army” (pp. 13 and in the caption of one photo in the chapter titled 16). One might expect a book commemorating an “Dress Rehearsals, 1965–1969,” which wrongly iden air force’s 50th anniversary to say that indepen tifies the HiMat research aircraft from the early dence should have come even earlier. To its credit, 1980s as the XB-70. the work frankly refers to painful events such as un Testing Aircraft, Exploring Space is a good, short successful colonial wars in Angola and Mozambique. book on the organization’s history but is far from Although the book covers a half century of his being an illustrated history of NACA and NASA. It tory, only the first 65 pages deal explicitly with the

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past. The remaining 200 address current or recent leadership, Cox applies a cluster of eight leader events and are divided into sections about mission ship characteristics that historian Forrest Pogue areas ranging from air defense to airlift and sup uses to assess Gen George C. Marshall in his monu port of flightoperations. A couple of these sections mental biography of the former US Army chief of are especially interesting. The technical and military- staff. The author also attempts to understand cooperation section describes how students from Brett’s knowledge of doctrine and whether or not former Portuguese colonies now attend training in he “was able to adapt his doctrinal preconceptions Portugal and how the POAF conducts training and rapidly enough to maximize his combat effective other support activities in Angola and Mozambique ness” (p. 3). as well as Sao Tome and Principe. These encourag Cox effectively uses primary-source material ing developments suggest that Portugal and its for throughout the book, especially in chapters on mer colonies are putting past conflicts behind them Brett’s early life and military career, arguing that and cooperating for a better future. The maritime- this period laid the “foundation for a study of his patrol section highlights Portugal’s substantial re brief experience in the crucible of combat in World sponsibility for providing security, search and res War II’s Pacific theater” (p. 5). The author high cue, and other vital services in the vast, heavily lights some of these early formative experiences, traveled ocean area extending from continental including Brett’s work with Billy Mitchell and his Portugal to the Madeira Islands and Azores. various assignments, culminating in his appoint Overall, Força Aerea 50 Anos is an attractive intro ment as chief of the Air Corps in 1941, second only duction to the POAF. Readers will treasure the to Gen Henry “Hap” Arnold. During this prewar beautiful aircraft photos and find the bibliography period, however, Brett received mixed performance useful for locating additional information, but they reviews on an assignment to Panama and had diffi will gain few insights into POAF operations or doc culty carrying out his assigned orders. trine. They will also enjoy the interesting vignettes The main part of this study focuses on the gen about aviation pioneers, paratroopers, and other eral’s brief experiences in the Southwest Pacific. topics. The only thing one might wish for is simple Cox has done a superb job of using archival sources maps of Angola, Mozambique, and POAF base lo to analyze Brett’s role as a member of the American, cations in Portugal. British, Dutch, and Australian Command as well as Lt Col Paul D. Berg, USAF his stormy and ultimately unsuccessful relationship Maxwell AFB, Alabama with Gen Douglas MacArthur and his chief of staff, Gen Richard Sutherland. As Cox points out, Brett had few resources at his command, and he failed to educate MacArthur and Sutherland on the use of Airpower Leadership on the Front Line: Lt Gen airpower as he understood it. A key point in ex George H. Brett and Combat Command by Lt plaining General Brett and his actions appeared in Col Douglas A. Cox. Air University Press (http:// a memorandum that Arnold wrote in December www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress), 131 West 1941: “He was not given the job to determine ways Shumacher Avenue, Maxwell AFB, Alabama and means for not doing it. The attached is a cable 36112-5962, 2006, 114 pages, $10.50 (softcover). full of ‘nots.’ I want to find out how to do, not how Available free from http://www.maxwell.af.mil/ not to do it” (emphasis in original) (p. 87). au/aul/aupress/books/cox/cox.pdf. The author concludes his work with a brief chapter dealing with Brett’s career in charge of the With his short biography of Lt Gen George H. Caribbean Defense Command until his retirement Brett, Lt Col Douglas Cox has added to our under in 1946 and an examination of him based on standing of a little-known Army Air Forces leader Pogue’s leadership traits and his combat execution. during World War II. Originally written as the au Of the eight leadership traits, Cox gives Brett a pass thor’s thesis at the School of Advanced Air and on four, which include the ability to learn, sense of Space Studies at Maxwell AFB, the work offers a duty, acceptance of responsibility, and compassion. brief but thorough examination of Brett’s career. The general fails to measure up in terms of self- Though not a complete biography of the general, it certainty, simplicity of spirit, character, and loyalty provides background for a perusal and apprecia (p. 84). The analysis of these leadership criteria as tion of his leadership abilities in the Southwest Pa applied to Brett, along with Cox’s examination of the cific during the war—the real focus of the work. In general’s ability to use and understand the “doctri order to determine the success or failure of Brett’s nal applications of airpower” (p. 88), is clear and

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concise, leading one to believe that Brett’s failings bines Work”) describes operating principles, func were in his personality rather than his ability. tion and configuration of major components, and Although Brett may not have been retained in materials used in construction. The second (“The command in the Southwest Pacific, it is true, as Historical Story”) starts with the pioneers (long be Thomas Hughes states in the foreword, that “only fore Frank Whittle and Hans von Ohain, by the the most cynical and uninformed observer would way) and characterizes the development of all jet judge his career a failure” (p. v). Thus, Airpower and turbine engines up to the present with update Leadership on the Front Line is essential reading for chapters for each edition. anyone who wants to gain a better appreciation of Though technical, part 1 is not as dense as a airpower and the history of the Army Air Forces in textbook. The author’s straightforward style should World War II. It is also useful to students of modern not be intimidating to anybody interested in the applications of airpower because, much like Brett, subject. In the introduction, Gunston suggests that today’s commander often finds that “the resources “if the casual reader does findit heavy going, skip it provided will always be less than a conservative mili and read Part II.” Those who do so will miss all the tary man would array for the task at hand” (p. 92). fun. Every component—from the compressor to the The Air Force has always asked its leaders to do combustor, turbine, jet pipe, nozzle, and auxiliaries— more with less. Studying how General Brett failed went through its own evolution of improvement to at this will benefit Airmen of today. get to an integrated machine that actually worked. If this work has any failing at all, it is that it is too Moving from that point (with really abysmal pres short. One hundred pages are not nearly enough sure ratios) to the mechanical masterpieces of to to tell the whole story. One is left with unanswered day makes for a fascinating trip that no reader wants questions and wishes that the author had under to miss. I’ve been in the jet-engine test business for taken an in-depth look at the relationship among 27 years, so descriptions of early test methods and Brett, Marshall, and Arnold. What role did Brett the iterative process of development are especially play in the rapid expansion of the Air Corps in interesting to me, but every chapter is full of chal 1940 and early 1941, beyond his trip across the At lenges that the engineers, designers, and craftsmen lantic? What else did he accomplish in the Carib met and solved, one at a time. Like any other great bean? Hopefully the author will have the opportu enterprise, the development of turbine engines is nity to expand on his work in the future and answer really a story about people making things happen, such questions. In the meantime, this brief exami and the author tells their story well. nation of Lt Gen George Brett and Combat Com Part 2 starts with a look at the earliest attempts mand is well worth reading, not only for its enjoy at designing and building a power-producing gas- ment but also for the insight it provides into the turbine engine. Of course, turbomachinery had fragile art of leadership. been in use long before World War II in the form of steam turbines for ship propulsion and electrical- Capt Gregory W. Ball, USAFR power generation as well as water turbines in hydro Denton, Texas electric plants. Gas turbines, using waste gas from steel production, drove blast-furnace compressors in the early 1900s. There was much interest in internal- combustion gas turbines and some early attempts The Development of Jet and Turbine Aero Engines, at development, but of course the ability to design 4th ed., by Bill Gunston. Haynes North America efficient compressors and turbines, together with (http:/www.haynes.com), 861 Lawrence Drive, the lack of materials able to retain strength at high Newbury Park, California 91320, 2006, 254 pages, temperatures, made turbine engines that were suit $22.95 (softcover). able for aircraft propulsion impractical. All that be gan to change in the 1930s when Germany initiated As the title suggests, The Development of Jet and development of gas turbines with full government Turbine Aero Engines offers a historical look at tur backing. In contrast, the Allies concentrated on op bine and other jet-type engines such as rocket, timizing piston engines and paid only marginal at pulse-jet, and ramjet. The primary focus, however, tention to turbines. Poor Whittle had to develop is on gas turbines, including turbojet, turbofan, his engine with little funding and support while turboshaft, and turboprop types. As in author Bill von Ohain and others had all the finances and en Gunston’s similar book on reciprocating engines, gineering support they could ask for. The hardware The Development of Piston Aero Engines, this book is and concepts that the Germans produced are truly divided into two parts. The first (“How Gas Tur amazing, even compared to today’s products. If

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they’d had more time and better materials, the serving as the Centennial of Flight lecturer at the war’s end might have played out differently. University of Maryland at College Park in 2003. Since then, the story of jet engines has been one Kinney opens the book by explaining his intent of constant evolution based on development of bet simply to tell a story, the good and the bad, with ter materials, improved control systems, and design minimal editorial comment. He also offers an ele of more efficient compressors, combustors, and mentary tutorial on airplanes and powered, con turbines. Gunston follows this theme through re trolled flight. The material does not require the views of products from all the major manufacturers reader to have an advanced degree; rather, it places and countries of origin up to the present day. His various technical concepts in everyday, widely fa more than 50 years in the business, authorship of miliar contexts. In fact, those with years of advanced more than 380 aviation-related books, and status as aeronautical education and experience should be editor of Flight magazine give him much credibility, forewarned not to overly scrutinize the book’s tech and the result is a very readable piece that anyone nical explanations. interested in aircraft and/or engineering history This brings me to my two lone criticisms. First, will enjoy. the story line omits several significant elements: the Bowling Commission of World War I, specific ac Will Kissel complishments between the world wars (e.g., speed Arnold AFB, Tennessee records of Cy Bettis and Jimmy Doolittle as well as endurance records of the crew of the Question Mark, which included Ira Eaker and Carl Spaatz), Ameri can acquisition of German ground-test facilities and Airplanes: The Life Story of a Technology by Jeremy the establishment of Arnold AFB after World War II, R. Kinney. Greenwood Press (http://www.green and jet-engine patents of René Lorin and Maxime wood.com/greenwood_press.aspx) (published Guillame dating back to the early 1900s. Second, in association with the Smithsonian National Air some of the technical descriptions, especially those and Space Museum), 88 Post Road West, West relating to jet engines, did not completely satisfy me. port, Connecticut 06881-5007, 2006, 184 pages, For example, the author refers to “thrust” from the $45.00 (hardcover). combustor powering the turbine, as opposed to “ex pansion” of combustion gases through the turbine Targeting a wide audience, author Jeremy R. powering the compressor (p. 80). He also describes Kinney documents the evolution of aircraft and re the J58—the SR-71 Blackbird’s engine—as a turbo lated technologies from their origins in the early jet rather than a combined-cycle turbo-ramjet (p. eighteenth century to present-day advancements. 97). However, these minor criticisms may simply re He speaks with great authority as curator in the flect my own overly critical point of view. In general, Aeronautics Division of the Smithsonian Institu I learned something new with each turn of a page tion’s National Air and Space Museum. Kinney tells and never dwelt on any criticisms. the story by intertwining threads of world economics, All that being said, I truly benefited from this politics, and culture with those of aircraft system book and do not expect it to collect any dust on my technologies (aerodynamics, propulsion, structures, bookshelf. Indeed, I began recommending it to my and stability/control). The scope includes com family and friends even as I was finishing it. Air mercial, military, and general aviation with empha planes is the sort of book that people will read more sis on development in the United States. Along the than once and use as a handy reference for class way, the book highlights assorted individuals and room and professional presentations. I highly com their significant contributions to the “technogra mend it to every Air Force Airman, as Kinney cov phy” of the airplane. It also features a useful time- ers the technological heritage of airpower without line, a brief glossary, an extensive bibliography, and plunging deeply into airpower doctrine. He does a a comprehensive index. superb job of documenting the link between the Airplanes will appeal to readers of varying levels development of aircraft technology and its applica of interest and subject-matter knowledge: the his tion in warfare. tory buff, budding engineer, experienced pilot, as piring entrepreneur, and more. It is an outgrowth Maj Kurt Rouser, USAF of lectures and ideas presented by the author while Arnold AFB, Tennessee

2008-3 Book Reviews.indd 124 7/28/08 7:54:48 AM ir and Space Power Journal, the US Air Force’s Web site http://www.af.mil/subscribe, selecting any Aprofessional journal, is published in English, of the Air and Space Power Journal language editions, Spanish, Portuguese, Arabic, French, and Chinese. entering your name and e-mail address, and then Each version is independent and has an editor—a clicking on the “submit” button. You will immedi­ native speaker of the particular language and an ately receive an e-mail asking you to reply in order to confirmyour subscription. You won’t receive your expert in the region of coverage—who selects its subscription unless you reply to that message. Elec­ content. We’re always looking for good, thought- tronic subscription is free. provoking articles up to 5,000 words in length, written in any of our published languages. All sub­ missions will be edited in accordance with the Is Your Organization standards set forth in the Air University Style and Author Guide (available online at http://aupress Receiving Its Proper Number .maxwell.af.mil/Resources/style/austyle_guide of ASPJ Copies? .pdf). For details, please see our guidelines for sub­ The following criteria guide the free distribu­ mitting articles at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af tion of Air and Space Power Journal to military and .mil/airchronicles/howto1.html. You can contact government organizations. These criteria are only us by e-mail at [email protected]; regular mail planning factors—not absolute limits. If your or­ at Air and Space Power Journal, 155 North Twining ganization has different needs, please contact Street, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6026; phone at DSN us at [email protected]. 493-5322 (commercial [334] 953-5322); or fax at DSN 493-5811. • One copy for each general on active duty with the US Air Force or Air Reserve Forces. • One copy for every five active duty US Air Force of­ Subscribing to ASPJ: ficers in grades second lieutenant through colonel. Both Printed and Electronic • One copy for each US Air Force or Air Reserve Forces Subscriptions Are Available office of public affairs. • Three copies for each Air Reserve Forces unit down Printed copy to squadron level. • The Journal is available free to all USAF organiza­ • Three copies for each air attaché or advisory-group tions as described below in the section “Is Your Or­ function. ganization Receiving Its Proper Number of ASPJ • One copy for each US Air Force or US government Copies?” Other US government and foreign military library. organizations may also receive the Journal for free by • Other US military, US government, or foreign mili­ contacting the editor at [email protected]. tary organizations wishing to receive the Journal should • Nonmilitary and nongovernmental organizations may contact us at [email protected]. receive the Journal by contacting the Superintendent of Documents by any of the following methods: writ­ If your organization is not receiving the desired ing to New Orders, Superintendent of Documents, number of copies, please contact us. c/o US Government Printing Office, P.O. Box 979050, St. Louis MO 63197-9000; calling (202) 512-1800 (voice), (866) 512-1800 (toll-free outside the DC area), Cumulative Article Index or (202) 512-2104 (fax); or visiting http://bookstore .gpo.gov/collections/military_ journals.jsp on the A cumulative index of ASPJ articles, listed alpha­ Internet. The Journal’s official designation is AFRP betically by the author’s last name, is available at 10-1, Air and Space Power Journal, stock number 708­ http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/ 007-00000-5. The cost is $32.00 ($44.80 for interna­ aspjindex.html. tional mail). Major credit cards are accepted. The Editor Free electronic copy • You can receive the Journal electronically by logging on to the “Subscription Center” at the Air Force Link

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Mission Debrief.indd 125 7/28/08 7:58:34 AM OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Lt Gen Stephen G. Wood (BS, University of Maj Christopher “CJ” Johnson (USAFA; MAS, Air Commodore Tariq Mahmud Ashraf, Paki Washington; Master of International Relations, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University; DM [doc­ stan Air Force, Retired (BSc, Peshawar; BSc, New Mexico State University; Master of Na­ tor of management], University of Phoenix) is Karachi; MSc, Islamabad), is the author of one tional Security Policy, National Defense Uni­ the lead transformation action officer for Sev­ book on air and space power as well as numer­ versity) is deputy commander, United Nations enth Air Force and Air Component Command, ous articles and papers. He served as the assis­ Command; deputy commander, US Forces Ko­ Seventh Air Force Commander’s Action Group. tant chief of Air Staff (Operations) during the rea; commander, Air Component Command, Previous assignments include assistant direc­ 2001–2 military standoff between India and Republic of Korea and US Combined Forces tor of operations, 621st Air Control Squadron, Pakistan. A distinguished graduate of the RAF Command; and commander, Seventh Air Force, Osan AB; executive officer, 607th Air Opera­ Advanced Staff Course, he has also served on Pacific Air Forces, Osan AB, South Korea. tions Group, Osan AB; flight commander, 128th the faculty of Pakistan National Defence College. General Wood was commissioned in the Air Airborne Command and Control Squadron, Force in 1974 upon graduation from the Air Robins AFB, Georgia; and chief of mission crew Force Reserve Officer Training Corps pro­ systems, 116th Operations Support Squadron, gram at the University of Washington–Seattle. Tinker AFB, Oklahoma. He is an air battle He has served in various operational and staff manager with more than 1,300 flying hours as assignments, including duty as an F-4 pilot, a surveillance officer on the E-3 and E-8 and AT-38 instructor pilot, F-16 weapons instructor, more than 1,800 hours as an air control squad­ and squadron operations officer. He has com­ ron instructor mission crew commander, in­ manded two fighter squadrons, an operations cluding 60 combat missions during Operations group, a fighter wing, and the Air Warfare Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Major Center. Prior to his current assignment, he was Johnson is a graduate of Squadron Officer deputy chief of staff for strategic plans and School and Air Command and Staff College. programs, Headquarters US Air Force, Wash­ ington, DC. He is a command pilot with more than 3,500 flyinghours in the F-4, T-33, AT-38, and F-16, including 49 combat missions dur­ ing Operation Desert Storm. General Wood is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, USAF Fighter Weapons School, Air Command and Staff College, and National War College.

Air Commodore Arjun Subramaniam, Indian Air Force (BA, Jawaharlal Nehru University; MSc, University of Madras), is a member of the air wing faculty at the Defence Services Staff College (DSSC), Wellington, India. An experienced fighter pilot with multirole ex­ pertise, he has completed two tours of duty in a Mirage-2000 squadron, commanded a MiG-21 squadron, served with an overseas military ad­ visory team in Zambia, and recently completed his tenure as chief operations officerof a large fighter base. A winner of the Scudder Medal for graduating with distinction in the 49th Staff Course in 1994 at the DSSC, he is also a recipi­ ent of a commendation by the chief of Air Staff. A prolific writer and doctoral candidate at the University of Madras, Air Commodore Subramaniam published his first book, Reflec­ tions of an Air Warrior, in 2007.

126

Bios - 2008-3.indd 126 7/28/08 7:59:05 AM CONTRIBUTORS 127

Lt Col Michael L. Downs (BS, Texas A&M Uni­ Lt Col Lawrence Spinetta (USAFA; MPP, Har­ Dr. Abel Esterhuyse (MA, Pretoria University; versity; MA, George Washington University; vard University; MAAS, School of Advanced PhD, Stellenbosch University) is a senior lecturer MPA, Troy State University; MA, Naval Com­ Air and Space Studies) is commander of the at the School for Security and Africa Studies, mand and Staff College) is the speechwriter 11th Reconnaissance Squadron, Creech AFB, Faculty of Military Science (South African for the vice-chief of staff of the Air Force. He is Nevada. He previously served as chief of safety Military Academy), Stellenbosch University. a career intelligence officerwith a broad back­ for the 1st Fighter Wing, Langley AFB, Vir­ Before joining the Faculty of Military Science, ground, having held assignments at the unit, ginia, as an F-15 pilot at Tyndall AFB, Florida, he served as an intelligence officer in several air and space operations center, major com­ and RAF Lakenheath, United Kingdom, and operational and training postings in the South mand, Air Staff, and Office of the Secretary of flew 65 sorties over Iraq (Operation Northern African Army, including tours of duty at 61 Defense levels. He has participated in 16 joint Watch) and the former Yugoslavia (Operation Mechanised Battalion Group and the South and combined operations and exercises in the Noble Anvil). He was also assigned to the African Army Combat Training Centre. US Central Command, US European Com­ Checkmate staff at the Pentagon and to the mand, US Pacific Command, and US South­ Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, ern Command areas of responsibility and has DC. An Air Force Fellow, Colonel Spinetta is a served in an array of capacities, ranging from a graduate of Squadron Officer School (distin­ joint special operations task force J2 in the Bal­ guished graduate), Air Command and Staff kans to the chief developer of the joint inte­ College, Marine Corps Command and Staff grated prioritized target list during Operation College, and Air War College. Iraqi Freedom. Colonel Downs also served as the director of operations, 13th Intelligence Squadron, Beale AFB, California, where he directed his squadron’s daily Global Hawk, Predator, and U-2 exploitation missions in sup­ port of Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Joint Task Force Horn of Africa.

Dr. John A. Caldwell (BS, Troy State Univer­ sity; MA, University of South Alabama; PhD, University of Southern Mississippi) is a senior scientist with Archinoetics, LLC, Honolulu, Dr. Francois Vreÿ (MMil, PhD, Stellenbosch Hawaii. He formerly served as a principal re­ University) is a senior lecturer at the School search psychologist with the Air Force Research for Security and Africa Studies, Faculty of Mili­ Laboratory, a senior fatigue-countermeasures tary Science (South African Military Academy), scientist with the NASA Ames Research Center, Stellenbosch University. He is the current edi­ and a research psychologist with the US Army tor of the academic journal Scientia Militaria: Medical Research and Materiel Command. Dr. South African Journal of Military Studies. Before Caldwell is the recipient of a number of awards joining the Faculty of Military Science, he for contributions to aviation safety, research served as an infantry officer in several opera­ and development, scientific and technical tional and training postings. achievement, writing, and civilian service.

Bios - 2008-3.indd 127 7/28/08 7:59:06 AM Subscription to the Air and Space Power Journal for People Not Affiliated with the Military or Government

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