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8-1-1960 The : A study of Russo-Finnish diplomacy 1938-1940 Richard William Condon University of Nebraska at Omaha

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Recommended Citation Condon, Richard William, "The winter war: A study of Russo-Finnish diplomacy 1938-1940" (1960). Student Work. 415. https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork/415

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t r Rleharti William Condon

August I960 UMI Number: EP73053

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ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346 It i s the purpose of th is study to shod soise ligh t on tho diplomacy Which took place between and the Soviet >Mon from 193$ to 1940* That the Finn# successfully mot end blocked Russian efforts to make Finland # part of the !!*$*S*fL I# ® fact* Stow i t is for tho historian to seek out and evaluate h m and why this vu# p o ssib le. Because o f th® propinquity of Finland to Russia and her century o f axl&tfmoi as a Grand Duchy of Cserlet Russia, th® Flm s h#va coasc to know and understand th® Russian mind and thought* Herein lies th# validity of a study of this nature for in th® present world situation there is & need on the m rt of th# West to understand and evaluate &i#olan Foreign policy* through the study o f the manner In which t'm conducted and s t i l l conduct# it# relations with the the Western Fewer# ®ay wall .find a clue to a means of meeting an Aggressive and dynamic Busman policy* Tki® author wishes to thank the staff of the Gene Employ library for their valuable assistance rendered during th# mo?'the required to complete this project. Appreciation is also oxtresaed to Mrs. #uth KonttSnon of Suomi College and thm Firc:i#h-^»erlc&n library, Hancock, Michigan, for the invaluable aid rendered in securing many of the sources used in thi s study* T'fepeclal thanks ere due Dr* A. Stanley Trieketi, Qmirmn of tin® frpartHiert of History of the University of Omaha, for the continual interest, patience, and lnruner*ble constructive criticisms extended during he preparation of this study* Without the assistance of above- mentioned persons, the completion o f this work would have beer lnflnietely more difficult*

R*W.C. c m p t m fa c e x* mjmmcfm •*«#«•**«**••*••*«»••• 1 Finland before 1X55 ««»«»«®«o*®®»«*«oo 1 Grand Bushy of Finland* Swedish Rule oo««»e9®o 3

Grand Dueby of Finland* R ussian Mt« 3 and C iv il lawr • *»•*•«*•««•*•• 1? Chapter Conclusion 29 II* fUCISC TFT-: STOHH H Eusso-Fiitnlsh Non-aggression Treaty® »®«®e®®®®© Mi ftilltaxy Appropriation# c,®®®®*®®*# *««»«* A Reorganisation of the Art^r 36 Scandinavian Orientation »••••••♦***•*••« 33

Coaler A ttitu d e Toward# Germany 1*1 Finnish neutrality Policy e®**®®*®®®**®®* Ms

Aaland Island Question **««**•*#* 1*5 Chapter Conclusion «»**•••»«*•»•»••*«* h? m . m t ctoow gather **********.*.*** 0 ®* 1*9

Conversations with Yartaev «••««**« »9ft*«9« 1*9

Cottvaraaiiotta in (Deeesher 1933) ••«*«•«» 61 f^oeeoi? C larifies Its Demands (Hereto 1939) ® * » • « ® ® 63 Boris Stein Presses Russia1• Case *»«»«»•<.*«« 65 Aagl ©*Freneh<*Rttesi*n Kegotlatlone • •*«•»«*••<> 70 fttteso^Gersaan n egotiations and Treaty 71 Russo-Gemm Attack m 73

C h ap ter Conclusion ««»#»« «««»#*« 71* i v

CHAPTER PAG® IV* MOSCOW WSOOTIATOTS . . . * * ...... 77 Russian Demands cm the Baltic States • • + 77 Moscow Turns to Finland • »•*•**««*••»* + • ?? Instructions to Finnish fte&otiators •••••««»«» 79 First Trio to Moscow (October 9# 1939) • ••••***« SI Ha turn to and New 'Instructions «•««*«. • 39

Second Trip to Moscow (O cto b er 23? 1939) «•*«««« 90 Appeal to 0 . <»..«.».»»«...... 92

He*»examina tion of th e Finnish Position »*««.««* 9h

Third Trip to Moscow (October 31$ 1939) •««««*•• 96 Breakdown o f the Moscow negotiations •••««••«» lOli Chapter Conclusion *«.•*•».»*•«»»»«•« 106 V* UST BATS 0? PEACE ABB UNSECURED WAR * * * ...... 108 "Hainila Incident** , ...... t o 108 Russian and Finnish Proposals for Settlement of Border Incident • *»•*»****««•#•«»«• 109 Moscow Severs Relations with Finland 110 Attack Without ^ami.ng *»**#■•**■###*«*«* H I Outside Offers to Mediate »*»*•«*•**••«» 112 The Dispute Taken to the Xeagus of Nations * » • * « 113 Aid from Various Rations *•*«««*•**»«•»• 113 Chapter Conclusion »•»«.*««• »»•«»»«•»« H 5

VI. THE TOtTOBf PDA I) TO PPACK...... 116 Finland’s Bisadrsvttages and Advantages in War » « « » * 116 Various Offer® of Mediation »»«.»«« ««»»««» 117 chapter H&3R

Qemm ifferts 3l2.^ Mrs, Wsoli^oki Offers to Contact, '%n>, Kollcmtal * * * » 122 The Soviet Qomrmmnx Agrees to ?$e®otiate

s i t h the Ckwmsaewt • *«*«**««•• X2li Termer*s First f t e it to Stockholm (February li# 19h0) Q « 126 .Mltain and franc® Consider Aid to Finland » « « » • « ® 12? Kaanerhetw and ffts Staff Consulted m

Possible Territorial Concessions • •••*«••••« 1 3 0

Divided Opinions in the Cabinet 1 3 1 Termer fs Second V isit to Stockholm {February 12* 19b£) » 133 Gar*ftanry Suggests a Mediation Plan 13k

Finland 4sks Sweden to Mediate *••»•••»•«#••136

the B,S»S«R» Clarifies Its Position * # • * ...... #1 3 ? Tanner *e Third H a lt to Sfockholn (February 2?, I9k0) » liil Finland Beeides to Hafee Peace (February 29$ X9h0 ) « • « Hi3 Benewed Offers of Aid from Britain and franco , « » « « lilt Finland Subnlta to Russian feme *•»••»«#•*•* 1UB 4 Final Anglo-French Offer of Aid (March ?f 19l*€> « • • 11*9 Moscow f;fak®s Additional Beeeads »«#*«»»«#«« # 11*9 The Peace Treaty Is Signed ,«»«•«*••»« «*«« 151 Finnish Territorial losses •«»*««»*<>»«»««<» 151 Ratification of the Peace #•»«•,# 152

m u m m ' j s r m ...... 1 5 3

APPfFMlI A • • « • ...... 159 kPWM^lt B,#,***,#**.**#*******#**** 161* n w i.w m h ^ n # -, 168 ■mFTBR I

Somewhere about the beginning of the Christian era there appeared

in a land of lakes and forests, borderso by the Baltic Sea m the south an" southwest, Sweden and Morway m the west and northwest, and Russia

on- th e e a s t, a p e o p le idiom T a c itu s c a lle d th e Ferns 1. T hese w ere th e

ancestors of the presmt-day , the inhabitants of Finland or in

Finnish, 3y<^i« Many conjectures have been made concerning tlu origin of these people, but it is generally conceded by contemporary scholars

that they originally aade their home in the vicinity of the Oral mour**

tains and along the Volga Elver* This does not mean, however, that they arc related to the Teutons, Slavs, or .Mongols. They are ethnologically

relate,; to the VotjakS, Oherais, and Ostjak® in Central 'Russia while

linguistically, Finnish belongs to the Finno-Uric language group ana

is relate, to hstoniau ana, sore distantly, to Hungarian, “This liagistie affinity, however, has had no influence on the development of

Finnish institutions. More recent ami prolonged contacts with In-o-r.uropean peoples, notably Seanaanaviana, arc today dominant in Finnish culture.**2

For the first mSHenium >* of their occupation of the present

*The following chapter is based mainly on Mantere am.! sarva, K^Sfcikoulua Suooea ^l^tprla. (Porvoq, Finland: Berner Soderstrom Gsakcyhtib, 1951), pp. 1-344, and Aaatole Mazour, bstw.gfn hast g|^ l£l£« (Princeton: c. Van Nostrum Co.., Inc,, 1956), pp. 1-93, unless otherwise n o te d .

2 Hcikki Baris, institutions is PiTlftflti- (Minneapolis, Minn, s University of Minnesota Press, 1958), p. 196. 2

area called Finland, the Pin m lived a primitive life. The Roman

historian Tacitus described then as . . squalidly poor; neither arms

nor homes have they; their food is herbs, their clothing skins, their

bed th e ea rth . . * *"3 But in one sense they could not be blamed for

this, for the land they came to settle ms far from salubrious; w ith a

harsh climate, poor soil, and a su m er season too short for much serious

farming.4 The rigorous climate and their precarious e x iste n c e se rv ed to

harden the n ature of the Finns and did much to mold th e ir character to

what it is today. This ch aracter m s well summarised by the nineteenth

century Finnish historian and n o v e l i s t , Zachris Topclius, in th e fo llo w *

ing m anner i

The general traits of their character are: hardened, patient strength; resignations parscrvaraacs allied to a certain obstinacy; a slow, eoKitesaplative way of thinkingt unwillingness to become aa$ry, but a tendency wh m anger has been aroused, to indulge' in unmeasured wrath; coolness in deadly peril, but caution afterwards; inclination for waiting, deferring, living for the day, interrupted sometimes by unseasonable haste; adherence to the old and well-known, an aversion to anything new; attention to duty; law-abiding habit of mind) love of liberty* hospitality; honesty; a predeliction for religious meditation revealing itself in true piety, which, however, is apt to have too much respect for the mere letter. . . .”5

The Finns had meed of such characteristics in the course of th e ir

h i s t o r y . As a n a tio n s itu a te d at the crossroads of two c i v i l i s a t i o n s ,

it was the meeting ground of conflicting ideas and ideology, in a word,

Finland lias been th e c o c k p it in which R ussia and Sweden have met to s e t t l e

^Ehs iiiisejLis.sui&M a t XssUas. Sseessx as. *r«n. a. j . , :»«« • u and w* J. Brodribb, (Hew York: Random House, i n c . , 1942).

^Finland is situated between 59® 39* 10” and 70* 05* 30” north latitu c with approximately one-third o f her total area lying above the Arctic Circle. She- has 60,000 lakes occupying nine per cent o f h e r t o t a l 3

t h e i r a i f f e r cuet&.

THE GRANT) ^UCHY OF FTKTAKD s SVT.BXffil RtfLB

Orr" of the most decisive events in th e h is to r y of Finland o c c u rre d ir, 115? when King Brik (St. Erik* the patron saint of Sweden) w ith H m ry, an Englishman appointed B ishop o f Uppsala, s e t fo r th on a cru sad e to subdue the h e ath e n F in n s. Ilis aim was to .convert them to

Christianity, and in c i d o n t a l l y , t o epqpaau h i s own domains now forestall further Russian inroads into the area. In 1172 th e f i r s t F in n ish historical document ap p eared in the form of a Bull addressed by Pope

Alexander i l l t o th e Bishop of Uppsala complaining o f th e d i f f i c u l t y

In containing th e Finns and their refusal to remain tr u e to th e

C h r is tia n f a i t h ,6 This points up a t t h is early date that r e s is ta n c e to innovation which T opeix u s was to remark on many centuries later.

in 1211 the first Bishop o f Finland was appointed with the diocesan seat at (Jkabo). Strained relations between Sweden and the Russian state of Novgorod resulted ana reached such a state th a t in 124,;> tiio Bishop dispatched an army composed of Swedes and

area, while 71 per cent of the land area is forested, thirteen pet cent is arable anti ten per cent is waste Jana, (Based on Jukka Uiesman, m m i sistiag* Paul Sjoblom, traa. (Helsinki * Otava Publish­ in g C o ., 1 9 5 $ ), p p . 3—1.

"’quoted in J. Hampden Jackson, ftifriend (New York* Macmillan * | JU > K * vc 3 ^ jp^ « ■■J *

Hinshaw, ££&£&*& York a G. P. Putnam's Sons 1952), p. 5. 4

Gtraan K n ig h ts of the Sword against Novgorod, The effort proved

f r u i t l e s s smd left the Russians in control of where they

remained until 1293 when Torgils Knutson, a Swede, led a crusade to

convert the Karelians to Roman Christianity, His efforts were crowned

with success, western Karelia was occupied and Y iip u ri (Viborg) Castle

was built as the easternmost outpost of the Swedish domains. Success

did not mean peace, however, for the two states continued to clash

sporadically until 1293 when the Peace of F&hkin&saari (KQteborg o r

Schlttsselhtirg) mas co e eluded by King Magnus E rikson with Novgorod,

The peace treaty for the first time delineated the Finnish

borders by establishing an eastern demur ca tio n line between Swedish

and Russian claims in finland* The first period of Swedish conquest

in Finland ended with the western part of Viipuri province as part

o f the Swedish kingdom known as Finnish Karelia w h ile the eastern p o r tio n mm called Russian or Outer Karelia. From this time on, most of modem Finland was to remain under Swedish rule and to develop

as a nation sharing as part o f its inheritances the massive tradition

that belongs to the West* Under the auspice# of a benevolent Swedish

administration, while at times neglectful, the Finn# were to be

inculcated with the con cep ts of the inherent dignity of m:nt in d iv i­

dual freedom, and political independence. Though atm was an integral part of the Swedish kingdom, Finland always stood apart as a special

i ffld or province, free to live by her own customs and laws as passed

by h e r m n l o c a l assemblies*

Despite the fa v o ra b le conditions under which she was Incorporated

into Sweden, a l l was not well in Finland, A small group of dominating, arbitrary, and privileged Swedish nobility came into being, who took

little or no interest in the country, other than to mulct it of

Whatever they could* The situation was aggravated by the distance

between Finland ana Sweden a&u the dlff iculty of traversing th a t

d is ta n c e , a s w e ll a* by th e dec entrails ed nature -of the Swedish

government during the late Middle Ages, It had always been th e

practice of the Swedes to elect their kings, and such leaders melded real power only during the time of war. Central, royal,

authority was a negligible factor during pea.: 2- time and each ^aq,^

or province had its own assemblies and was governed by its awn Imm

and custom with little interference on the part of the elected mon­

arch. In addition, while a privileged nobility existed, the nobles were never able to make serfs of the common people* These segments

©f society remained essentially free people throughout the whale

history of Sweden and Finland where the peasant always enjoyed the

r i g h t o f h o ld in g lan d i n h i s own name-.

Many clashes occurred an Finnish soil during the period from

1323 to 1523 whan Gust&f I Vasa ascend so the throne of' Sweden to end

the Kalmar Onion an-a initiate the meteoric rise of Sweden to a pre­ dominant position in Europe. An eminently capable statesman, able

soldier, and incoaparable ruler, Gustaf Vasa consolidate^ his domains

into a nation in the truest sense of the word, brought the Lutheran religion from Germany to his people, an_. stabilised the government by staking the crown hereditary* In regard to Finland, he began a program of colonisation in her eastern parts, established Helsinki in 1.350 a s p a rt o f th e same program, and d ecla red F i n l a n d a Grand 6

Duchy under his son John in 1506.

During the ne*l two centuries Finland gave her young men, her money, and her heart t o th e fwediah k in g s as they s tr o v e to complete Swedish ascendency in the Baltic* Finnish soldiers made- the backbone of the Swedish armies a s they marched back and forth a c r o s s Europe until that fatal day in 1718 when the brilliant but erratic Charles III met his death after having seen Sweden humbled by d e fe a t* By the Peace of Uusikaupunki (Hystart) all the terri­ tory that had been gained in Karelia by the earlier Peace cf Stolbova

(161?), i.e. Kakisalmi (Kexholm) and Inkeriro&a (1'ngria), p lu s Fiipuri, were lost to the Hus elans, the c e s s i o n of tfiipurl was considered

©specially necessary by the Horaanov Crar, Peter the Great, for the defense of his newly founded capital city , St. Petersburg, or the

Heva.

Though Finland remained a pert of Sweden for another century, the die had been east and it was only a matter of tine until Russia should decide that tho anomalous situation of Finland threatened her position on the Baltic. Sweden, however, had not forgotten h e r former glory and twice during the ensuing century attempted to wrest the lost territories back from the Russians. These were but the death convulsions, however, of a once powerful nation and both w ere destined to fail. The first occurred in 17kl and la s t e d until 17k3 when the Peace of Turku was signed and with the signing went the rest of ^iipuri province. Again in 1788 Guetef I I I th rew his netion into war in an effort to regain what had been lost. Hie attempt ended in failure, but proved that a considerable part of the

Finish nobility desired to separate Finland from Sweden, even if 1

this were only. possible under the .sponsorship of Russia. The dc.«lr,: for Finnish independence found expression in the efforts of sane of the Finnish nobility to exploit the Anjaia League episode.7

The plotters9 motivating factor was the retehtioh oi t h e i r p r iv ile g e d s t a t u s in Finland which had become threatened by the increased author- ity of the king after 1772. They also hopeo th a t an independent

Finland might prove valuable enough as a buffer between Sweden and

Russia to prevent further conquest and. desolation at the hands of the stronger northern powers. Among the leaders o f this group were

J. A. J%c urhorn, Kli ;k, an<' General Sprengtporton. These* men journeyed to the court of Catherino II to seek her aid in the establishment o f a Finnish republic. Gatherinc evad.ee the issue, stating that Such a proj^. • t oul*.: os undertaken only by duly appointed authorities of the

Finnish p.-ople. Disappointed, the men returned to Finland, where the plotting was soon expose.i. They back to Russia to Seek prot-'••'tion and remained there u n til IbOV, when Csar A1 chancier i assumed the role of Gratis ;.)ukc of Finland. pt.&-o was restored in

17'X), with neittnr side having gained or lost any territory as a result of the episode.

during the tw ilig h t oi Dwe-.ii.sh rule, there was only one other d^-velopwent of any importance, the confinsat.ion by Gustaf III of the

7 The- s o - c a lle d An j aim League was healer! by I. H. Klick and others who claimed. that Gustaf 111 haa acted unconstitutionally by going to war wif hout the M dkaoagls consent, Tfvy planned. to kidnap the king and bring about an independent settlement with Russia themselves. fundamental laws of the kingdom consisting of two acts: the "Form of

Government of 1772" and the "get of Union and Safety of 1709"• Both of these acts were of especial importance for Finland in that they

served as the basis of Finnish law down to 1917* The "Form of Govern­ ment" kept the power of the purse in the hands of the Riksdag but the king retained the power to summon and dismiss the parliamentary body.

It also provided that the three non-noble Estates could outvote the

Estate of Cobles. The "Act of Union and Safety of l?09n was designed

to place the power over foreign affairs entirely in the hands of the monarch while s till delegating the Hlkgdag power to control finance*

THE GRAND PUCHI OF FINLAND RUSSIAN RULE

During the Napoleonic wars the French desire to complete the

Continental Blockade by excluding the British from the Baltic led to an alliance with and to open negotiations with Sweden*

Sweden for her part adamantly refused to take orders from the Emperor or to Join him in his grandiose schemes to conquer her northern neighbors* Napoleon then turned to and con­ cluded the Treaty of T ilsit (180?) to which was appended several secret clauses, one concerned with Finland* By it, Russia was granted the right to annex Finland as compensation for the war which the Czar agreed to wage against Sweden to punish her for her perversity*

In February of 1808 the Czar's armies Invaded Finland in conjunction with those of Denmark which attacked Sweden from the south*®

o Jackson, op* cit*. p* h6. a short tin"- the* Swedish am u’S f e?t tho onus of .lofoat as Suonealiwiti

th:.* "Gibraltar of tb: North" fell without a short bring fired. For

all practical'purposes thr fail of this vital fortress sealed the fate of Finland, although the rank and file of the Finnish populace, lung

innoculated with a hatred for anythin Russian, continued the uneven

struggle* Fighting for heme and field, the small force of 12,000 p ea sa n ts under the leadership of Adlercretxts, i'ffibtm ana Sand els

fought on against some 35,000 Russian troops for five months longer.^

Finally, on September 17, 1809, the Swedes and Firms capitulated and

th e P eace o f Haraina (Fretiriks& aaa) was d r a m u p , whereby, Sweden surrendered all of Finland to th e O sa r.

Alexander had anticipated the final peace by about six months when he summoned a Finnish rump Parliasusit to meet at (Borgaa)

and d eclared his intention to incorporate the nation into his empire a s m autonomous Grand auchy. F inland was to become "a self-governing part—the only self-governing part—of the empire* Its constitution,

law s, courts, church, and religion (Lutheran), educational system and

economic life were left almost wholly unchanged. Thus, autonomous Finland was able to carry on, after 1309,

10John Ivuorincn, ed,t fln jLana and the ftgqgnd World War—1939— IMlfNcw York: The Ronald Press Company, 1948), p. 5." foreign policy was to rest in th e hands of the Imperial government o f R u ssia.

The Finland that was annexed to Russia In 1809 was economically p oor w ith a predominantly agrarian population th a t had not as y et modernised its methods of cultivation. At the tim e th e p op u la tio n stood sit about 363,00'.). In 13.U the flgurv reached 1,053,000 wb*»

Kftkisalni and isifccriaaa in Karelia were restored to Finland. Of the total population o n ly 40,800 >;*.re urban dwellers with the largest

city being Turku which included just over 10,000 p e o p le .* *

Throughout tile century that preceded World liar I, Finland aadu ii.re.at strides in the direction of modernization; faming began to be con hints- • scientifically at ter the opening of several schools of agricultural industrialsnation began after 1170 when textile mills

W'tf' •-stabiigfced at Tarap.'re and when the increased us* of the circular saw ^roimdeu the lumber industry. In 1*166 laws were enacted establish* ing a pr imary school system an ; by 1875 public sc ~ond ary schools were operating. Steamships mus their appearance about the middle of th e century and by 1870 railroads began to ease transportation problems.

After ibdO the t'Tcphofit came into omnion uc-e, having been preceded

IT the teles {faph about ;iii• i«»century• By the on-:5 of the r, fntury, the population ha*. increased to 3,250,000 with wore than 500,000 urban

«* dWWtt — ■ « nu Will r m m 11 John iraoi gSl£SEEMSB 12 (Hew York; University P r e ss, 1931), p . 2 9, 1 1

duellers available t o meet the demands for industrial iabor.^

F o r a ll t h a t th e y enjoyed a special status in the Empire*

and though their own customs, laws, and culture s t i l l obtained, there

was a good, d e a l o f u n r e s t among th e i n t e l l e c t u a l s in th e Grand duchy*

'This wee in part due to the retention by the old Sweee-Fian n o b i l i t y

of the control of government and their insistence of retaining Sw edish as the only legal language in courts, schools, Diet, Senate, and for

all official documents* The intellectuals who centered around the

University of Turku^ were the first to realise the anomaly of the

situation and longed to change it* They believed with Adolf I v s r

A rvidsson that: "Swedes we a re no longer} Russians we cannot be;

therefore, we must become Finns.* In order to achieve this end the

iauantaina Spura (Saturday Society) came into being to promulgate the us® of the Finnish language as a literary medium* Its leaders were men l i k e Johan Ludvig Huoeberg, writer of the Finnish national anthem,

"Ksemm© Laulu* ( wOur land*), and Elia® LBnnrot, the collector o f th e songs and rhymes which he edited to form the Kalevala, the national

epic of Finland* "Tiff ©ring widely in outlook, training and tempera­

ment, they [the members o f th e taueotaina Searaj were united in the

faith that the future of the country lay with the peasants."^1

12 wourinen, Finland and the Second world War, p. 6.

*3fhe University of Turku was founded In 16L0 and remained there until the disastrous fire that destroyed most of the city in 1627* The University was moved to Helsinki In that year and has sine® been called the University of Helsinki. 1 1 Jackson, op. c i t . , p. 51*. 12

to© late to belong to th e Im ffl& M m ***t still influea-

tial figure in the e f f o r t s to make Finnish sore than the language o f

th e p easan try was A le x is KJLvi, d r a m a tis t, and n o v e l i s t . Jo h an V ilhelm

Snellm an, professor, senator, reformer, and one o f th e forem ost o f nineteenth century nationalists, also looms large as one o f th o s e who recogn ised the importance of a n a tio n a l language as a distinct

necessity for the propagation of national unity. It was due to his unstinting efforts that Finnish was raised to e q u a lity with Swedish

in all areas of national life. By causing it to become a part of all

s c h o o l c u rricu la and making it incumbent upon all officials to be

able to use Finnish as well as Swedish, he ensured the Finnish language

its deserved position in the l i f e o f the nation.

During the liberal reign of Alexander II CIS55-1&81> Finland

fared well, her economy was boosted and for the first time in f i f t y

y e a rs a n e stin g of the Diet was summoned in 1863. It was during his

reign that most of the nineteenth century improvements is life were

effected and that Finland was allowed considerable autonomy in national

a f f a i r s , With his assassination in 1881, however, hi® son, Alexander III

(1881-1894), took a less benevolent view of Finnish nationalist

aspirations* In 1891 the first overt violations of the Finnish constitu­

tion occurred with direct Russian interference in the Finnish postal system, customs regulations, and financial policy. Alexander III, however, was sensitive to Finnish feeling and when vehement p r o t e s t s were voiced, he allow ed the matter to drop. Hot so his successor,

Nicholas II <1894-191?), who under the guidance an ad v ice o f h is m en to r,

K. p . PobC'donostscv, began a policy o f harsh measures to o b v ia t : any 13

nationalistic aapira'. ions or. the part o f the minority g ro u p s in th e empire* With r-’obedonostaev as a motivating factor, there v tt initiated a vigorous c^irpaigr to crush out all forms of nationalism, except, of

c o u r se , G re at Hessian*

the Russification program soon gained Impetus] Russian was made

the official language in sen? areas of Finnish government* and appoint*

ment of Russian officials in the Finnish civil service became (?®on.

O il me poured on the fire in 1196, when in February an Imperial

Manifesto declared that henceforth all Finnish Parliamentary acts

must be approved by the Governcr-General, then forwarded to the

B u eslsn Bums for final approval* As If this were not bad enough, the

Dam was delegated authority to pass bills that concerned the internal

affairs of the Grand Fuchy, something which had been expressly denied

the 'imperial Cevermaeat by Alexander 1* To wake natters w orse, in

August of the same year, $• I* Bobrikov was appointed Governor-General*

The historian A n a to le Mmtmr says o f hint Bobrikov1s stamina was as admirable as hi® p o litica l acumen m*i deplorable. Flexible as a concrete block, imaginative m the proverbial Tsarist bureaucrat, blindly loyal, to the imperial idee, and totally void cf any insight into the true nature of the issues at stake, the new governor general met out with a hard-fisted policy immediately to administer the Grand r’uchy of Finland in a wanner of a colonial satrap*^

Further interference in Finnish affairs followed* The was Incorporated ini© the imperial eray In 1901# A declaration in IS 99 stated that al matters of imperial concern, would be decided by

15 Faaour, op* clt»* p* 1?* 14

the pisyfr and that its pronoun:meats would be effective throughout the

aspire, including Finland, in the future* only matters clearly and exclusively concerned with Finland could be acted on by the Planish

.diet and the power o f deciding what those m atters might be was vested in a specially appointed committee that would meet in S t, Petersburg.* thus, almost in an instant Finnish autonomy was swept away.

The initial reaction in Finland was mie of passive resistance and non-* coop oration as urged by asst political leaders, clergyman, and scholars* However, when repeated attempts to have the situation recti** fieb by petitions t© the Cmax proved useless and allowed that Bobrikov*® policies had the imperial government*® full approval, resistance began to stiffen. Bobrikov on his part had not been idle* he placed a stringent censorship m all paper® that advocated passive resistance or that attacked hi® policies, jailed those who dared to oppose him, me! sought in every way possible to stem the tide of popular opinion* A R u ssian language newspaper m s established in Helsinki, Russian-born subjects were givm the right t© hold property in Finland, the use of Russian was m&^e maaoa-tory in the Senate, and. the teaching of Russian in the schools was intensified. Freedom of assembly was abolished in 1901, and in 1902f Bobrikov was granted virtual dictatoriai powers, including the right to dismiss judges, civil servants, and police officers, a ll of whoa were* of course, replaced by R u ssians* Such measures only served to infuriate the populace until finally the earlier attitude of passive resistance and sullen submission gave way to violence. 15

his policies, jailed those who dared to oppose him, and sought in every way possible to stem the tide of popular opinion. A Russian language newspaper was established in Helsinki, Russian-born subjects were given the right to hold property in Finland, the use of Russian was made manda­ tory in the Senate, and the teaching of Russian in the schools was intensified. Freedom of assembly was abolished in 1901, and in 1902,

Bobrikov was granted virtual dictatorial powers, including the right to dismiss judges, civil servants, and police officers, all of whom were, of course, replaced by Russians. Such measures only served to infuriate the populace until finally the earlier attitude of passive resistance and sullen submission gave way to violence.

In June, 1904, Bobrikov was assassinated, and in 1905, concur­ rent with the in Russia and Russo-Japanese War, the Finns also struck. The result was the repeal of the Manifesto of 1899, the

Russian language no longer required in the schools or in the Senate, disclaiment of Russians from entry into the Finnish civil service, and the reduction of the powers of the Governor-General. In keeping with the general improvement of her position in the empire, the Finnish

Constitution was revamped in 1906. The Diet was made unicameral, with the Senate serving as a court, the Estates were abolished, and universal sufferage was initiated for all men and women twenty-four years of age or older. At the same time freedom of speech, press, and assembly, were constitutionally assured.

For a time all went well for Finland as the Czarist regime

16 Finland was the first nation in Europe to enfranchise women, and the second in the world after New Zealand. 15

&** June, 1904, Bobrifciv was assassinated, and in .1905, concur-* rent with the general strike .in Russia aavl Ruaso-Japanesc War, the Finns also struck. The result was the repeal of th" Manifesto of 1399, the

Russian language no longer required- in the schools or in the Senate, tii*«l#iaant of Russian# from « n tx f into the Finnish civil service, and the reduction of the powers -of the Ota*anior""Oetteral, In keeping with the general. Approvement of her position in the empire, the Finnish

Constitution was revamped in 1906* The Oiet was made unicameral, with the Senate sorting as a court, the Bat at eg were abolished, an:., initiates! for all men ane women twenty-four years of age ox olv.,-er,i^ At the same time freedaa of speech, press, and assembly,

Whre constitutionally assure;,**

For a time all went well for Finland as th e C z a r ist regim e recuperated from the blows i t had received. But another period of

Russification was to follow with the advent of Peter A, Stolypin, a reactionary who hate-.; all liberal sad socialist movements* In 1903,

P. A. Soya was appointed 0ovornor-G-«*ieral of Finland and th e q u estio n o f the ultim ate p o s it io n of Finland in- the "npire was again raised.

Under S*yii, Russian-born subjects were once mo* * ©ade equal, to the

Finns in Finland, Russian m s to be taught in all schools, and all laws' passed by the Finnish diet had to be approved by the gang and the

R ussian State Council* These measures'met w ith spirited resistance from Finnish legislators an,., judges. The Russian answer was to deport to Siberia those who oppose the changes. But neither repeated dissolution

16 Finland m s the first nation ia Europe to enfranchise women, and the second in th e w orld a fte r Mew Z ealand. ©f th e D ie t nor th e deportation of legislators, newspaper etitors, sod others, served to -mxrto the mounting resentment of the Finnish p e o p le .

Several y^are were to "lapse before the breaking point was reached. This was ©e easier* ed by th e F irst World war which brought unprecedented economic prosperity tc Finland as she fed the insatiable appetite of the Russian, wax machine. Or. the surface the situation appeared cairn and serene, but beneath the surface there was a ceep- seated unrest an'' feeling of disaffection that only awaited the proper moment to manifest Itself. T h at .moment a rriv e d in M arch, 1917, when Alexander Kerensky and His followers toppled the Caarist regime

and established & new social and political order. Although concerned w ith the. multitude of questions connected with the conduct of th e w a r.

Settlement ©f the age-old problem of land reforms, ana the imm ediate problems of establishing the new government, one of the first th in g s the provisional government did was to restore to Finland her constitu­ tion and to repeal the oppressive laws of the preceding decade. Acts o f political, amnesty brought back many of the Finnish exiles, who aided the cause of Finland during th e trying months ah ead .

The provisional government regardless of its good intentions and to e f r ie n d ly attitude of Kercnaki, vascllated m th e issue as to w here th e v a n ish e d power o f th e crown sh o u ld r e s id e . Finnish states­ men p ressed f o r &n answer to this question and, when none was forth- co o in g , th e y s i t re d the initiative in July, ivl7t and declared tost henceforth the power o f the crown in Finland resided in toe Finnish d ie t* They further -icc Jared that a i l m a tte rs pertaining to F inland w ould be decid ed by to e d i e t in keeping w ith the concept o f n a tio n a l 17

self-determination, although m ilitary natters and foreign policy were? left in the hands of the Russian provisional government* This amounted to a virtual declaration of Finnish independence and has since come to be known as the Independence S ill.2-?

Independence and C i v i l War

The decision of the Diet to declare Finland independent -xcept for control of the army and foreign affairs was flatly rejected by the provisional government. Kerensky ordered the dissolution of the Diet and called for new elections to be held in October to determine the atti tude of the nation. At the tine tho Social Democrat Party had a clear majority in the Diet, holding 103 of the 200 seats, and con­ trolled the government. It was their desire to maintain a link with

Russian that had led to the clause leaving control of the army and foreign affairs to the Russian government. When the election results be-raise known, the Social 'democrats had lost eleven seats, reducing their number to 92, which portended ill tor the future relationship between Finland and Russia.

The election results reflected the uneasiness of the more conservative elements In the nation over the alarming number of strikes

Mil eh had been calle,,, by the radicals and the tendency toward violence throughout the summer and autumn. As they had campaigned on a platform of autonomy within the Russian state, the Social Democrats were compro-

17 imonnen, is ffixflcrn P. 219.

18 Jac k so n , qq pp* 85-67. nised by the Bovcrber Revolution .in Russia and thr advent of the

Bolsh-'vilts. Nationalist aspirations in Finland were advanced by this event and bourgeois parties wasted no tin ip in setting the tAtels of tho in notion. On November 15, the Diet proclaimed that by virtu e of the Constitution of .1772. supreme power resided with it. Then in keeping with the Finnish •'■‘haraeteristie of waiting and watching, a couple of ueeks elapsed as •'the Diet Members and the people of Finland waited with fear and an&ety for the heavens to fall. When the skies c^ntinii■■'•* to r**natn in ttaei.r insaKtaorial place and no threat of retribtfc* tion .:aae from St. Petersburg, tho !>i*t took tho momentous step on

■''.cosher 6, 1917, and Draftee a Declaration of in*? spend*nc« which formally proclaimed. Finland to be a sovereign state.**2-9 Recognition by the Soviet government was accorded on January 4, 19IS, and most of the outside world followed suit in short order.

That Russia accorded recognition was clue to political necessity.

She was too weak, to oppose the Firms and internal problem* preoccupied the Soviet leaders. The had hoped that a revolution in

Finlan; led by the Social democrates, might ultim ately have created a regime in the former Srrnl buehy friendly to the Soviets and recogni- tion did not mean that Benin and Trotsky hub given up hope for * proletarian revolt in Finland. As Masour so succinctly states:

Soviet .recognition was granted in principle; that is, it stated that Finland’s declaration of independence was la conformity with the principle of the right of selfW etermlnation declared by the Bolshevik*} it did not imply approval of the “bourgeois government’1

^Hinshaw, &&. &UU, p. 37. JK

qos co u iu i t t>* interpreter &» a pledge to honor such a government as ’’bourgeois international la*f* prescribes. At mx opportune moment revolution Bight co»c as. llxc bolshcviics ivoui,ii feel t s ce to ectonc a h e lp in g band t o th e rightful claimant to power.

In keeping with their hopes of a revolution in Finland, the Russians made littl: or no effort to withdraw their troops from Finnish territory as they had agree.t to do earlier. This left a contingent of about 40,000 undiscipl*««'•! and revolutionary inflamed troops in the country who wore to ho a source of tremble in the months to follow.

Meanwhile, the tensions already ear la te n t between the socialist and middle-class elements in Finland were heighttoed by the presence of armed groups known as the Red Guard and . The $hite Guard had been organised as a Civil defense corps during th- summer of 1917 to maintain or ier in Helsinki and to restrain the Russian troops, klsewtiere in thr nation the White Guards were organised under the guise of fire brigades and sports clubs. Suspicious of the motives behind these groups and suspecting their political affiliations because of their middle**class and peasant composition, the Social democrats organised a couuter-organiaation among, the laboring-class, with the first units formed in the industrial city of Tat^ere. Simitar groups were soon formed throughout the nation with the avowed aim of protecting the interests of the working-class and defending them against attacks from th*ir Social foes. By Dec ember the Red Guard had expanded its activities and came to be header' by a small revolutionary committee on mxefi th e same order as that in control in Petrograd.

with the passage of time it became clear that the Red Guard

20 Mar our, gg. *£!** P* 4 6* 2 0

was bent on revolution of the Soviet type w ith the aid of the Soviet

government. For their port, the middle** class parties hoped to maintain

th e status quo with the aid o f th e 8h.it e Guard,and, if necessary, with

the help of Germany. To p u t an end to the impasse, Svinhufvud, th e

P r e s id e n t of the Senate, decided to open negotiations with Germany and

to e n a c t a conscript law for the country. As a first step, he initiated

negotiations to have the 2 7 th J% er Battalion, a group of about 2,000

H e ls in k i University s tu d e n ts who bad h e m clandestinely sent to Germany

fo r m ilitary training between 1914 and 1916, returned to .Finland to

serve as the core of the new conscript army.

The stage was now set for a decisive struggle. Chi 28 J a n u a ry ,

1918, the Red# Struck, seising the g&v&cimmt buildings in Helsinki

and ordering the local Red Guard units in other cities to take sim ilar

action. The coup accomplished, Finland was proclaimed a

Socialist Workers* Republic diff©ring in only one respect from that of

Russia: in Finland the parliamentary fom of government was retained.

Instead ©£ creating a workers* republic, however, the Social

Democrats had plunged the nation into & civil war which later became

known as the War of Liberation. Marshal Earl 6. Manaerheim in his

Memoirs defends the use of the term War of Liberation when be states:

The action which I started was directed against the Russian troops that had remitted in Finland despite the recognition-, of the Soviet Governttsat. Th* open warfare now begun was, therefore, a war of liberation. The fact that subsequent operations were directed against Russians as well as against our own rebels [sicj did not alter this fact, for which neither the legitimate government nor its army was responsible. The guilt rested solely on the leaders of the rebels.2*

21Karl Gustaf Manner helm, Memoirs, tran. Brie I,ewenhaupt, (London: Cassell and Company, Ltd., 19531 F. 141. 21

Bvent® moved quickly as the government headed by Sviahufvuci f le d to Vaasa to prepare for the coming struggle* Luckily, they had the services of General Mannerhain around which the Civil Guard could rally and to give their army the leadership requisite to -arty it to victory* The first thing that needed to be unaertaken was the expulsion of the Russian troops trow Southern Ostrooothaia (February, IV17), m&c th e White government feared would join up with the insurgents and supply them with the arms and equipment they needed, Mannerheua decided to

Strike quickly, although he was seriously handicapped by the lack of arms and trainee- officers. Moving swiftly, the Whites disarmed the

Russians in the Southern Ostrobothnia in four days and then proceed®6 to. secure the gain® they had staee.22

Armed with the captured weapons of the Russians and reinforced by the end of February with the returned Jttger Battalion plus the timely arrival of a contingent of Sw edish, b a n is h , ana Norwegian volunteers as w e ll a s 84 officers of the Swedish army, Manner!* dus p re p a re d to a tta c k

Tampere, the center of the Red resistance. 23 On April 3, the attack was begun and after three days of furious fighting, during which the

Red forces put up a valiant effort, fell and the way was opened for the conquest of the rest of Finland.24

in the meantime, much to Manner!*eim's displeasure,2^ the

Finnish government had enlisted the aid of the Germans, who agreed to

22 21 Ibid., pp. 141—143 Ibid., pp. 147*152.

2 .Ib id ., p p . 162—170. 23Ibid.. p. 155. 22

Send ait expeditionary force to help in the liberation* The first

German forces landed at Hank* under the leadership ef Major General

Rttdiger W i der Colts and proceeded to inarch on Helsinki from, th e southwest while the Finnish forces sieved in from the north. At the report of the approaching forces the U*-\i government fled the capital which fell with hardly any resistance. A few days after the arrival of von der Golts, a second German force landed at Lovisa and advanced inland anti aided in cutting off the in the cast, h’ithin a short time all of Finland was in tin31 hands of the White forces, the

Red government having fled to R u s s i a26 .

The war over, the government now faced problems of organ issatsn and a basic de.-J.sion regarding the form of government to he established.

It was Svinhufvud*s desire to establish a monarchy in Finland cm th e

Swedish model. To facilitate these plans, the Finnish government name1 Svinhufvud regent* at the same time revesting Kaiser William to name one of his sons King of Finland, The Kaiser declined the offer for his sons hot graciously suggested his brother**in**law, Prince Friedrich

Karl of Hesse, for the honor* The Diet elected hi® and the Prince accepted, but when the German cause was lost in the fall of 1918, he very diplo­ matically asked to be relieved of the honor. These events led to the fall of SvlnlmCvud as regent and the summoning of Nannerheim to fill the position.

From th e beginning Maatierheim realised the necessity of connect­ ing the F in n ish cause with the victorious A llie d powers and proceeded.

26Ibid.. pp. 171-176. 33

to •teer Finland towards republicanism ana on 1? June, 191, the Diet proclaimed the state th e Republic of Finland. During th e su cceed in g months the government was faced by a congeries of problem s, dom estic and foreign that appeared almost insurmountable, The economy was prostrate, the problem of the prisoners taken during the war remained to be t r ie d , food was. in g r e a t sh o rta g e, While there was the problem of

Karelia and the settlement of border problem s with Russia, The first problem th e government had to grapple with was o f the food supply. This was met by the shipment of grain from the United States, An amnesty b i l l relea sed some 43,000 interned prisoners from the internment camps in December, 1919, but it was several years before all o f them f i n a l l y w ere relea sed * Before the final groups were set free seme 135 were put to death for their part in the Civil War.^7

foreign problems, especially the future of Karelia, plagued th e new government. It had been the hope o f Manuerheim and o th e r F innsh nationalists that the land of the lalevala would ultimately be restored to Finland. A half-hearted war-time effort cm the part of th e B r i t i s h to utilise this desire as a means o f stopping German penetration into

Finland, as well as to keep Russia in the war through the quashing of the Bolshevik government,had yielded no final result. After several fu rth er desultory attempts, all was g iv e n up and in 1920 the Finns ami

Russians sat a own to negotiate a treaty to delimit the boundaries be­ tween the two countries. The negotiators met at

37 Jackson, gp« g4|a. pp. 101-102. 2^

For h e r p a r t , Finland received Western Karelia, e x cep t to r th e f r o n t i e r p ro v in ces o f ftepoia and Forajhrvi which were given to the

Soviet Union la order to assure the m ilita r y defense of Leningrad,

In tdi north, the Finns received the ice-free .port of

Jretsaa© (Ffiheaga) HFor ev er to be o w iei by Finland with f u l l r ig h ts of sovereignty, and Russia renounces in favor of Finland all her rights and title over m e territory thus - 13dat*"23 it -was farther agreed, that the islanUB belonging to Finland in the Gulf of Finland should be neutralised* Ssraerx, Marvi, Feninsaasri, lavaasaari, Suur Tytftaaari,

Float Tythrsaari, and hodsIc3?l

The Treaty of Tartu was to prove of great legal value to

Faaiaau when the Kremlin prea.-atsU i t s demands for concessions in the

Chili of Finland and the in 1939* it provided the basis fo r m ay of the Finnish rejections of the Soviet demands for concessions arc. later served as a basis for the Finnish negotiators during viu: armistice talks in March, 1940. {See Appendix A, p. 15^ *

Apart from these boundary problems with her eastern neighbor, the Finnish government was in v o lv ed with Sweden in d isp u te over th e

Aaiand Islands. It bau been Sweden*® desire to incorporate th e archipelago in to Sweden on the grounds th a t th e population was alm o st entirely Swedish speaking and d e s ir e d union with Sweden rather than to rem ain a part of Finland. However, since 1609 th e is la n d s had, been an a lo in i 3 trative unit within Finland auo after declaring hex indepOTdence,

"^ZSSSSZ SI Tartu rep rin ted in f u l l , Appendix I , Mazour, bp. cift., p. 214.

” a t o . . p . 2 1 s . z$

Stic inzlu-'-cc the A&iaao Islands as part of Finland. This was of rather

great concern for Sweden, as the islands in uaiiieaaly hands posed a

threat to her security. After the Crimean tfar the islands hau bean

c cmilitarisen imt# ^nring the first lor Id War, Russia had gained the

assent of the A llie s to f o r tif y them* A bwe^ish m ilita ry expedition

was dispat cacu to the islands in February, 191$, for the ostensible

purpose of preserving or^or sad saving lives. Finnish chagrin ould

not change th? situ a tio n * but the la te r a r r iv a l of German tro ops in

May did* and tin Swedes were forced to evaluate*

bncii the war crUe.':. the question was s till unsettled. The

islanders sent a dagutation to the Paris Peace Conference to request

that tasy dc allowed to d*.„iv.o th a ir own p o l it i c a l fu tu re by p le b is c ite .

Too many natters of greater important, facer the delegates at the Peace

Conference to allow them to take up the question. It was promised that

the matter would he given careful consideration, but nothing was bone.

Pin land sicasc! the initiative in May, by enacting a

d e c r e e g ra n tin g t h e islanders a

enough for the local population and a deputation was sent to Sto -kholm

to urge that Sweden anaes: the Archipelago. The Finnish government

replied by sending an armed occupation force into the is 1 anils am!

sir res ted the delegation when it returned froci Stockholm. For a time

i t appeared as though the matter would lead to war b e t w e e n ?\*nden and Finland, but th ly iiit^rvutttion of the B ritish Govurnraent re* suited, id tlic matter being referred to the Council of the Lea#vc of

N ations in late summer* 1>19,

A eonnittcc was anointed f© investigate the situation and it was decided that it was within the competence of the League to adjudicate M

the naffer, Mjmife sovereignty w m recognised tm i the proviso m s inserted that the islands he ssstirfe an autonomous status in the

PiaaiSti Mcpiblic* Sweden, m s forthe* pacified in the fall of Ifcai*

»h*» the demilitarisation of the. archipelago m s considered, Orest

B r ita in , Sw& im , Italy* , Latvia, Estonia, N U sl, and PiaiMkti a ll signed a Convention to guar ant ae such status, although Russia* a vitally intercaffe party in the Aalaad question, m s a&ithsr .mviied to the Co«f crease, *tko£ tar an opinion, or invite,,: to bectwe a sigxt*» tar/ to the Convention, 11ms, a potential threat to $we.-.an m s obviated, autonomy mid. cultural freedom m s assured the inlander a an::. & possible

Nor th-'fe w averted.

Gu the .lamest ic sccn.5- ,atri»g tit® tm m itxm many at the problems that vejusb the nation fcef'ox® independence s t i l l rottiaeu, On® of til® most important of thcse ms the emu it ion of the- peasant papulation largely coastsitug of tenant farmers wife snail homing* wsose csratence m s at tde *aer&y of the ijm.dh»lU«xa, 2* ssfev land holuxngs aore equity able, the governsieai passed fee ^aillo , xn i "££&» to i&pama the basis of Isrsc vw a snip, it pxoviate: for gover&Mit purchase oi Ism* tro* the larger hi©ifeofe.ets. ana it® reMuc to the peasants uouer iong»t«m s a le s ..gtrcr*c i s ,

Another ioneaiate problem ior the government m s the rapid revival a* the PuMiisii coatmsnlst party alter xts be*eat xa i^lo, an i^ao fee gcmaruwint w* j granted legal ri:..,opixtioa to the party by all*** ing it to Uofe a constituent meeting ua^er the name of 1 inland*a socialist barker** lasty, in -fee election of it#!, fee ccssaKxutts retassel hasty* seven rcp*escatafive# to fee t?iet, most of who© nets elected at fee espouse 27

of the Social Democrat**30 Throughout the first post-war decade th e

Communists kept up their political agitation, propaganda, and terrorist tactics, infiltrating the labor unions and in general attempting to upset the established social o r d e r . With the difficulties encountered/in the latter part of the period because of the world wide economic depres­ sion, a reaction set in and the usually level-headed Finns became increasingly violent in their opposition to the Communists.

Increasing discontent auu indignation at the paralysing p a rty parrels, but most of ail at the barefaced treachery of Communist agitation, with its terrorism and hooliganism among the workers had pr^ared the ground for a reaction which grew little by little until it became an overwhelming popular movement, known under th e name of the lapua Movement . A Communist-engineered disturbance in Lapua at the end of November 1929 provided the signal for a local manifestation of popular anger, which was followed by numerous local meetings and expressions of opinion all over the country. The fears anti wishes expressed at these were laid before the government and Riksdag, which still, however, could not bring themselves to a lt e r the course on which they were set.32

Led by clergymen and peasants, and taking on a Facist tone, the movement slowly gained momentum and became more violent and terror­ istic. Communist newspaper plants were invaded, the presses wrecked and th e ed itors and staffs roughly handled. Prominent Communist leaders were often kidnapped and driven to the Russian borders and thrown across the boundary into the Soviet Onion, In July, 1930 conservative peasants marched on the capital and forced the government to succumb to th eir anti-communist demands.33 As a consequence, the government pro-

30lfugh Shearman, Flnlapti—1 4 4 1 ^ 1 tOTff g£ § IffeM pWe£ (New Yorkj Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1950), p. 80.

3IMannerheim, cit., pp. 242-243. 32JkisU, p. 243.

33 Mazour, o$>, c it.» pp. 85-86. 28

hibitea the publication of Communist newspapers and Svinhufvud formed a n m government which was amenable to the Lapuan demands.

Svinhufvud began by placing the twenty-three Communist members of the Diet under arrest. He then turned to the business of legisla­ tive reform. Included in his program was the suppression of the

Communist party, the gagging of its press, and the passage of enabling acts to allow rule by special emergency ordinances. Since these were in the nature of constitutional amendments, a two-thirds majority of the diet would be necessary for passage, plus new elections and passage in the nan Diet by a similar two-thirds majority. Knowing that he could not get the necessary support for such action, Svinhufvud utilised another form of parliamentary strategy, i.e . he requested the Diet to adopt the legislation as an emergency act, rather than a constitutional amendment. This required a five-sixths majority, but did not necessitate the holding of an election* However, when this attempt failed, there was nothing left to do but dissolve the Diet and call for an election.34

In a state of high excitement and hysteria, punctuated by acts of violence, abductions, and illegal administrative proceedings, the election campaign of October 1930, took place. Following the elections the Social Democrats lacked by one vote the necessary strength to block Svinhufvud*s legislation. In November the program was pushed through the new Diet and the Communist Party was outlawed, le ftist

34 I b id ., p . 8 6 . 29

labor unions were suspended, and the freedom of the Communist press d en ied .

Unappeased by these tritu^phs, the Lapua movement prepared to carry their program to ultimate goals. Lei by General Wallenius, the movement undertook a program to restrain representative institu­ tions and replace them by a Papistic government* 35 Plans were laid for a £ojig S$Sl the early spring of 1932, in support of which, the lapoa leaders sought to enlist the aid of the C ivil Guard, When

Wallen ins ordered a march on Helsinki in March, Svinhufvud decided that the developments made necessary a refusal to bow to the demands of the movement and refused to take additional steps to erradicate communism by fu rth er lim itin g th e c o n s titu tio n a l r ig h t s o f th e n a tio n .

Negotiations followed the stronger stand of the government and, after some persuasion, the Lapuans were induced to lay down their arms and resume their normal life. Wallenius surrendered a week later and the attempted revolution ended. Some of the participants were tried and sentenced, but prison terms were light and most participants escaped any punishment whatsoever* th e following March, however, legislation was passed which banned a ll iapua organisations,

k successor to the Lapua movement, known as the .^f»iw>fa l44*|^|

Kansan 14lfe or IEX (National Patriotic League), was organised and took part in the general elections of 1933 but had only small success*

33 Shearman, op. cit,, p. 82. In the elections of 1936 the 1KL won only fourteen seats, indicating that Finland had regained her political equilibrium and that the trial by terror of the tapuans was over*

In surmi.-d; up t h is movement Hugh Shearman has s a id «

the most significant thing about that extremist movement, with its faciat characteristics, is not th a t it arose but that the Finns rejected it, a response which was unhappily all too rare among European nations at that period of history faced with similar tempta­ tions to unbalance* The extremist tendencies took their rise and re a ch e d their greatest strength during th e period in «fcich Finland was suffering most from the effects of the World-Wide economic depression*36

Tinas, after leaning both towards the left and the right, and almost falling into a Facist dictatorship, the Finnish government was stabilised about the middle of the thirties along moderate lines*

Thereafter, political orientation was towards neutrality and associa­ tion with the S andanavian countries* In the years immediately prior to 1939, the government pursued a policy neither overtly pro-German nor anti-Russian, but one which if hoped would preserve Finnish independence. CHAPTER I I

RACING T E 3T0RM

Vtien Svinhufvud was elected president in 1931 with the aid of the Lapua agitators, i t had appeared as though Finland were heading down the road leading to a fascist dictatorship. This was not to be, however, for though Svinjufvud agreed with many of the tenets of the movement, he was too temperate to allow such a course to be pursued to its ultimate end. This became clear in his actions to suppress the uprising projected by Wallenius and the fact that upon his elec­ tion he asked Mannerheira to become Commander-in-chief of the Finnish armed forces. Mannerheim declined this post but agreed to become Chairman of the Defense Council and to assume the role of Commander- *i in-chief in the event of war.

At the time of the worst agitation on the part of the Lapuans when the Communist Party was outlawed and its activities curtailed, there was great dissatisfaction expressed in Soviet circles. So much had this action disturbed Russia that at the time of the big Lapua demonstration in Helsinki in 1930# the Soviet Union had prepared for war. 2

Fortunately, nothing resulted from this and once the Lapuan threat was removed in 1935 by the Supreme Court, Finland was approached

^Marmerheim, op. c i t . , p. 265*

^Wuorinne, ed ., Finland and World War II, 1939-1914*, p. 38. 32 by Russia on the matter of a non-aggression pact. Hie Russian pro­ posal was in essence the proposal with which Finland had broached Russia in 1927# only -o have i t refused because the Finns had desired to include a clause requiring arbitration in case of disputes*3 tta January 21# 1932, the treaty was concluded and was ratified on August 9# 1932. the treaty guaranteed the then existent boundaries between Finland and the Soviet Union as determined by the Peace of Tartu in 1920, which was to ”• • * . remain the firm foundation of their relations • • • *w^ It was further agreed that neither party would in any way undertake aggressive action directed towards the other or enter into agreeraents or treaties with a third party which would be openly hostile to the other contracting party *£ It was the fifth article, especially, upon which the Finns based their faith that Russia would not attack after negotiations broke down in November 1939# and i t is of interest to quote i t here in order that an understanding of Finnish attitude might be reached* The High Contracting Parties declare that they w ill always endeavor to se ttle in a sp irit of justice any disputes of whatever nature or origin which may arise between them, and w ill resort exclusively to pacific means of such disputes* For this purpose# the High Contracting Parties undertake to submit any disputes which may arise between them .... to a procedure of conciliation before a joint conciliation committee * • • •l,° Besides the non-aggression pact in April# the Finns agreed to

^Mannerheia, op* c it* , p. 279# and Wuorinen# Finland and World tar II# p. 39* ^Treaty of Non-Aggression, and Pacific Settlement of Disputes between the U*b*S*K*n# reprinted in fu ll in dasour# op* cit*# p* 227 ff*

^Xbid.# p. 228. 6Ibid. 33 a convention of conciliation as part of the same treaty* Under this convention the two contracting parties agreed to "submit to a Conciliation Commission for atsicable settieiaent • • - • all disputes of whatsoever nature which may arise between thorn on account of circumstances occurring after the signature of the Treaty of Uon- Aggresaion and Pacific Settlement of Disputes * * * • In 193k the non-aggression pact was renewed until 19it!>, although the pnct of 1932 was not due to expire for almost another year* Yet signing an agreement such as this with the Soviet Union was to have little or no ‘.value in the ensuing years. Russia was by 1933 sufficiently strong to begin to look about her to see whom she might consume as the im perialistic urge began to grew. The Commissar for Foreign Affair®, early in that year, proclaimed that the independence and neutrality of the Baltic nations and Finland waa to the advantage of the soviet Union and stated the! the U.B.b.Ii. was also concerned lest the internal policies of those governments should obviate their independence. In Uovaiabar 1936, a farther pronounceujsnt in th is same connection waa made by the Commissar of Leningrad, A« A* Zhdanovs We people of Leningrad s it at our windows looking out at the world. Right around us lie small countries who dream of great adventures or permit great adventurers to scheme within their borders. he are not afraid of these small nations. But if they are not satisfied to mind only their own business, we may feel forced to open our windows a bit wider, and they will find it disagreeable i f we have to ca ll upon our Rod Army to defend our country*^

7WC vention of Conciliation between Finland and the U.B.B.R.1 reprinted in full in Basiour, op. cit.. p. 230.

^Quoted in Wuorinen, Finland and World ■^ar II, p. 39* A

Statements like these were not conducive to the efface?

75 a l l l ion marks were earmarked for 1931-32 when i t was estimated that the naval fleet should be completed. After that 125 M illio n marks per year were to be spent for indlspensible replace «mbs in the a ray and air force*^° In the following year (1932) when the budget was again debated and passed, the result was a ten per cent reduction in defense expenditures?, mainly for capital appropriations for material replacements* This reduced the share of defense in the total national budget from nineteen to seventeen per cent, ostensibly

9Marmerheiffi, op* cit* > p* 26?*

10Mtunnarheio, og. c iU , p. 269 ££} and Julh Muikkanen, falvlsodan Puolustuaa&nisteri Kortoo (Porvoo• Finland! Werner Soderatroa 1551)7 35 because of th© non-aggression treaty with th© Soviet Itoion and the idea of collective security provided by the

For such comer-cutting tactics by the Parliament Marmerheim had very l i t t l e sympathy. Looking back as he wrote h is Memoirs he said that, n'tfe could do without many things in the program of other Ministries, but w© could not afford to compromise our security* As a result of the economy-minded Parliament’s failure to appropriate su fficien t funds to the armed forces only limited maneuvers were conducted in 1932* This waa regarded in m ilita r y circles as a great loss, as n* . * * only an expert could estimate its full implications* Nothing except extensive maneuvers can prepare the troops for the many demands of war • . • • large maneuvers are of extreme importance money used for that purpose i s never wasted. ”13 But with what resources were available Finnish military leader® began to prepare for what they recognised as inevitable* Modest preparations were begun on th© Karelian Isthmus to block any aggres­ sion from that approach. The so-called Marmerheim Line consisting of concrete-fortified machine gun nests and trenches were constructed as well as anti-tank traps composed of stones and concrete* In order to accomplish this work as cheaply as possible, the government u tilized some 100,000 unemployed*^ It is interesting to not© her© that Mannerheim

^Mannevheiut, op* c it* , pp. 271, 275-276* 12Ibid., p. 271. 13Ibid.

—Marmorheiia, op. c i t . . p . 272} and Miukkanan, op. c i t . . p . 26. 36 was dissatisfied with th© fact that only a part of th© appropria­ tions for coribating unemployment war© allocated for th is purpose while Miukkanan seemed to feol that they were almost sufficient# To support his stand he gives a table of figures to show how th© money was allotted for the three categories the Defense Council had established according to urgency# Total for fortifications 360,Qo0» Total for work on 11 roads 6»6hO»OOOt For repairing 7 piers 1,5>IiQ,QQQs For reconditioning of 5 drill grounds ljf 2 a000t

Total y,112,000i ___ &

With theso modest beginnings, Finnish dofonsea to tho east were grad­ ually made more secure, although even when war broke out their adequacy was questionable# The next problem which necessitated attention was the matter of army organization. Since the War of Independence the array had been organized on a cadre system and neither mobilization nor deploy­ ment could be carried out with th© safety and speed requisite for effective defense* Mobilisation was reliant on a few garrisons which, because of the overflow of m n, equipment, horses, carta, and other material, made good targets for air raids# Perhaps th© most disquiet­ ing fact about the whole matter waa that only a small port5,on of th© peace time army was ready for mobilization and deployment# To counter this precarious situation th© Defense Council decided to reorganize the whole military on a territo ria l basis which would permit creation

^Miukkanen, op# c it* , p# 27* The figures quoted are in Finnish marks# 37 of a larger Held army than could th© cadre system* Instead of incorporating called-up reserves, under th© new plan, divisions could march as units on a war footing from their own territories* It was felt that in this way a fuller utilisation of the nationt resources could be made in a more suitable and quicker way*^ During the following years a more realistic attitude on the part of the government towards defense expenditures was evident, ©specially, after the ©lection® of 1936* At the end of 1937 a review of th© armed forces of the nation was made, upon which a ll future recommendations for appropriations were based* for practical reasons th© suggested program was divided into two parts i (1) concerning armements and equipment, and (2) industrial products, machines, raw materials, semi-manufactures, buildings, fortifications, stocks of war requirements, and fuel* Th© to ta l amount asked for to implement this program was set at 2,910 million marks but, whon the Diet had finished with it in February 1931, 200 million marks were pared off, reducing th© suit to 2,710 million marks* It was also determined that th© program should be carried out over a period of seven years, l*e* through 19h$* Defense appropriations in 193d were twenty-three per cent of th© total national budget as against only sixteen per cent in 1937 and in 1939 the proportion for defense rose to thirty per cent of the total *^ The important thing to be noted from these figures is that there was a definite change in attitude on th© part of th© Diet

^Mannerheim, op* c it* , pp* 273- 14i Miukkanen, op* c it* , p* 16 ff* ^Mannerheim, op* c it* , pp* 289-291* 36 members* ©specially those of the Left, who had always been averse to defense appropriations• They gradually caae to realize with Mennerheim and th© Defense Council that the needs >>f defense could no longer be ignored. This change of atmosphere in government circles can be traced back to the early part of the decade preceding the outbreak of war. At the beginning of the thirties th© world-wide economic depression h it Finland hard and her *xwas hard put to maintain it s e lf . Wien independence from Kueela was declared, the nation had almost a century of experience in conducting her domes tic affairs as an autonomous Grand Duchy, whereas no such experience had been gained in th© areas pertaining to external affairs. Matters had been further complicated by the -roubles with Sweden surrounding the Aaland Islands question which had only served to widen th© gulf be­ tween th© two nations. Moreover, the ideal of collective security had been dealt another serious blow in th© Twenties by the German- Russian agreements of 1926* Following th© War of Liberation, the young nation based her hopes for remaining outside my future conflict upon th© collective system of the League of hations. When the League abdicated its responsibility for protecting small nations against aggression by failing to halt th© Japanese invasion of Manchuria and did nothing about Mussolini*a invasion of Ethiopia, Finnish faith in the League began to falter. Finland began to seek around her for other taeans of security and to th is and she turned to Sweden, when th© la tter began 39 to draw up a now schema of defense in th© face of th© League’s failure* Sweden * a preparations were regarded in Finland as a sign of a tourer defensive policy *&;ich might open the way for defensive alliance between Finland and bweden*^ In keeping with this hope Prim© Minister Civiafiki on Decotaber 5* 1935 , m

As had been stated in th® declaration, it was the hope of Finland that Sweden would accept the proffered hand and set about strengthen­ ing tho defenses of the North in collaboration with Finland* These hopes found barren ground in Sweden, however, for in 1936 Sweden’s representatives to the League of Nations declared that th© Swedish government was disinclined to enter into any commitments outside those

18 Mennerheim, op* c it* , p* 285*

^Quoted in Mannerhoira, op* cit* , p* 235* ho stipulated by th© League, even i f th® coiaraitiaonts war© regional in nature*20 On her part Russia did not regard Finland*8 Scandinavian orientation as posing a threat to Soviet interests in peace tiiae but she expressed the opinion that war conditions sight change this* In the ©vent of war, there was a danger that another Great Power mig^ht attack Russia through Finland without her consent or that of bcandanavis* PI Finland sought to secure her neutrality through closer colla­ boration with the Northern Countries by coordinating her defense with theirs, ©specially with Sweden* To this end the Finnish government undertook with th© other Scandanavian sta tes, to free it s e lf from th© obligation of sanctions declared by the League of Rations* On July 1, 1936, it was declared on behalf of the Finnish government that as a result of the manner in which th© sanctions had boon applied to Italy, Finland would reserve her position* Then on May 29, 1933, Finland, concurrently with Sweden and H or way, declared that henceforth every eas® where sanctions w©r® advocated by th© League would be decided on Its own raerits with Finland reserving judgment as to whether she would abide by the sanctions ordered* The reason given for th is action by the Finnish representative to the League was the anxiety and desire of Finland to increase her collaboration with th© Northern Countries for th© strength®! .ng of coarsen neutrality*22

20Ibid*, p. 2 >6$ and Herbert Tingsten, The Debate on the Foreign hiPolicy ■ of Sweden-1913-1939, ittiiif 1 ...... wiwi|iiiii u 11 -«i nFim 11 tran* Joan Bulaan Tendon ^ i Qjcforcf tJniversity v Press, T?1j9} !>• 2 2 0 f .

2^4Jannorhoio, op« c i t . , p. 2136. 22;ianrierhein, op. c i t . • pp. 291-292} Tingston, op. c i t . , pp. 19$, 210-211} and fiuorinonTTlnla^d in World War IX, p. Ul. 1(1

J%at Flrin.©«-0©r*aafi relations during th© early part of th© Thirties when the Lapua Movement was at it s peak war© vary cordial was In part due to th© aid rendered by th© Dorsums in th© War of Independence and th© cultural affin ity existent between th© two nations* German was ccamonly used aaong tlie educated classes, both in speaking and writing, while many students studied in German schools and universities* The fact that a considerable nunbor of the cook missioned officers in the Finnish arsqy ware trained in th© German forces and that many of the Finnish military concepts imru copied from those of Germany also helped coraent good relations between th© two nations because of the President1® ©iron*: pro-German nentitaants* but with the Mas! system and its excesses Finland slowly began to withdraw from close German relations in keeping with the Finnish policy of neutrality and collaboration with the Northern States* By 193? Finnish relations with Germany were becoming definitely cool, if an© is to 'believe the German ambassador, &lficher*8 dispatch to on October 15 of that year* In that dispatch Blticher suggests a nuofoer of things which might bn spoken of on. Finnish foreign Minister Holts!*s visit to Berlin* Among thoaowsr© Holtsi's trips to Josoow, Stockholm, Copenhagen, London, Paris, Geneva, arid Hsval, and Hi© attendant efforts to normalise relations with ttusala, to place relations with owedon, Denmark, and Borway on a basis of constant cooperation, to cultivate good relations with Britain and .ranee, to form th© closest ties to the League of Nation®, and to deepen relatt ns with Estonia*

At Hie sum® tine Finn^-Germon relatione were neglected, v#iieh was surprising to Blticher since Finland was a Baltic power and had to h2 consider both the Grant Powers in the area* i*e* Germany and the

1I*S * G • li* ^ Further reading of this m m dispatch indicates that Germany was concerned about ©conog&c relations with Finland for mention was made of the eoncession granted for English nickel agin in# in the Petaama region when t he Germans were refused consent to build a fish-meal factory in th© saaa area* Ihe Germans war in the nain sa tisfied with other economic matters but disliked th© purchase of Air Force materials from Britain and were hopeful that better treat* tasnt eight be expected in th© future*^ Ijpon th© arrival of Holtsl in Berlin and this subsequent conversations with the German Foreign Minister Konstantin von Maura th* th© former was assured of Germany fs beet wishes for Finland* Heurath stated that Germany hud only one interest .in Finland a "that Finland's independence be preserved, m well as her ability to maintain neutrality under any circumstances that might arise* "35 He went on to say that Finnish foreign policy was determined by her geopolitical position, 1*#* rtusaia as a neighbor in the east and th© Baltic on the other side ithere Germany occupied a dominant position* therefore, Finland must reckon with ‘two factors and Russia posed the greater threat to her security and independence than did Germany* "Bo i t would be to Finland’s own best interest to cultiva’-e good relations with th© country that not only was well disposed toward hor but that also had

^Documents on German Foreign Policy* 1913-19ii£. Herlea D, VTol. V

a certain interest in the maintenance of her independence, namely Germany*tt^ Germany’s concern over Finnish coolness was w ell founded for the Nazi system came in for acute criticism in Finland* Partly in consequence of that criticism , the position of the German language in Finnish culture came to bo considered too prominent* bo much so that just before the outbreak of war in 1939* Prism kinistor Cajander, who had assumed that office after the 1936 elections, delivered several speeches in which he stated that too much time was devoted to the study of the language and that it occupied a disproportionate posi­ tion in Finnish cultural life*2? For a ll her aHedgedly good intentions and expressions of consideration for Finland’s political well-being, was not th® example nhich Finland chose to follow* hhen in th© spring of 1939» Germany proposed a mutual non-aggression -met to the bcandanavian countries including Finland, the Finns in conjunction with Sweden and rejected the proposal* At first the Finns stated that they agreed in principle to the non-aggression treaty, but after further study the Finnish envoy to Berlin, A* Wuoriaaa, waa instructed to issue a written communique to th© Berlin government stating that the Finnish government declined to enter into such an agreement with anyone* t;ted as the reason behind th is was that Finland didn’t wish to bocosae a pawn in t © p o litics of Great Power combinations and therefore she did not desire to change the then

— 2?huorinen, Finland in World War XI, p. 12. bh

existent treaty system*^

It me the Itvmte fear of Russia that caused the Finnish government to seek a middle course during the last years before the war and to avoid too close a relationship with Germany-* The Finnish desire to foe accepted in the Scandinavian bloc also influenced her attitude t ©ward Russia and Germany* In a summary report to Secretary

of Stp-te, Hull, on September 1* 1937* the it. S* envoy to Russia, Joseph Pavies, stated that! In all these states Scand&navia and Finland the great concern of foreign policy Is to maintain a balance m between Russia and Germany. It is significant that Finland was not accepted in the Scandinavian bloc until Sweden was assured that the relations between Russia and Finland were p acific and friend* 3y. It is their constant effort tc maintain strictly correct and formal relations with both countries#^

With this in mind Foreign Minister Holt el had travelled to Moscow in February, 1937® in an effort to eount€awhel&nce the criticisms to the effect that the Finnish government was pro-German *30

While there it became evident that there was a peculiar!/' deep-seated distrust of Finland in the Kremlin* Above @11 they suspected that Finland ms in cooperation with Germany, and that Germany1© objective was to attack Russia through Finland* It war claimed, for instance, that the Germans had established poison gas factories in Finland and were building air­ ports in Finland for military purposes* It was naturally Impossible to ascertain whether these claims wore due 4 o the stupidity of Russian sgiea, or whether they were arguments invented for the occasion *&

28rc-FP, Series T>#, Vcl* FI, p* U08, $131 and Vftin0 Tanner, The Winter War (Stanford, Calif* s Stanford University Press, 19$?), p7~T6. 29 Joseph K* Davies, Mission to Moscow (Garden City, ft# I* * Garden City Publishing Co, , "Trie#7 19C3 ), pp* 133-13U*

^ P# ■^’Wuorinen, Finland and World M r II, p. bO. us

On her part, Finland gave every indication and assurance th&. she was not pro-German but was rather determined upon neutrality ©long with the other nations of the Scandinavian bloc* It was de­ clared that Finland would view any encroachment on hur territory as an unfriendly act, especially if it should cause Finland to become the battleground between Great Powers* On the whole, H oltsi*s v is it produced, little of value as no major issues were discussed, and it is doubtful i f the Soviet leaders understood that Finland indeed deter­ mined to follow a course of neutrality* One positive result was that the Seandanavlan bloc became convinced of Finland*© desire to remain neutral and maintain amicable relations with her Great Neighbor*32

While trying to s tab!Use relations with her neighbors, the increasing tenseness of the world situation called Finnish attention to the vulnerability of the demilitarised island Islands in the Gulf of “Bothnia* Should the islands f a ll into the hands of a Great power .Finland1 s neutral position would he Jeopardised and wo-Id probably become untenable* Mannerheira realised the peril to Finland and Sweden by the defenseless situation on the islands when he stated* Unfortified and defenseless, the archipelago obviously offered a temptation to the Great Powers on the Baltic* And A aland in the hands of a Great F&tier carried with i t the risk , both for Finland, and Sweden, that their strategic position would be rolled up from insidc.33

Recognising their mutual danger, negotiations were begun In the spring of 1933 between Finland and Sweden concerning the fo rtifica tio n of the islands* From the beginning the negotiator® realised that they

32Ibta. 3%annerheim, op* cit* , p* 2 9* 1* would haw to obtain permission from the signatories of th© A&lend Convention* and that Russian must also be consulted as an interested party, although she was not a signatory* They decided, however, to come to an agreement first and then broach the question to the other nations concerned afterwards* % the t la© the Munich crisis came in September the F1nno-3w©dish discussions had advanced to the point where co-ordinat ion of military defense of Aaland was decided on* The plan in the main was concerned with the dispatch of troops to the islands in the vent of overt action on the part of any Great Power* At the time the Russian Baltic fleet had teen sighted off the coast of Finland from Hanteo, probably as a warning to Oomany* Development of M s situation could have required the manning of the islands in keeping with the Aalarsd Convention, i.e . in the event of surprise attack, Finland could undertake t© defend: the archipelago.^* Sweden agreed to an even broader plan of defense for t he is ­ lands inOetoher, namely that Finland b© permitted to make military preparations on a number of islands in the Aaland group* These islands lay south of a line corresponding approximately t© 60 degrees north latitude upon which the inhabitants in the future would be liable for military service on the islands. Finland also reserved the right t© request Swedish aid in event of* an emergency*3$ About the same time, it became known in diplomatic circles that Sweden's reason for consenting to the fortification of the Aaland..; was the

*^DGFP, Series T, Vol. V, pp* ®>9h, 596* end Mannerheim, op* c lt* , pp. 295-296*

^%GFP, Series M, Vol. V, pp. 600j and Mannarheim, op* c l t . , pp. 293*299* hi fear that Dermamight attack her, rather than fear' of such an act on part of Ru8sia*3&

Early In 1939 the Finns and Suedes submitted their proposed amendment s to the Aaland Convention to be known as the Jtockholm Flan, to the other signatory pothers end Russia with a request for their concurrence* tihenthe signatories and Russia had assented, the matter was then to be referred to the League of Nations for final approval. The sain points of the final proposal was that neutrality of the islands w- s to be maintained but demilitarisation was to be considerably curtailed. On the southern islands ’"inland was to have a free. hand to in stitu te defensive measures while on the northern sone she was to have the right to take defensive measures for a period of ten years# The latter proposal called for military training for island population, s taliening troops from other areas of the country, artIX* ler? installations on the southern islands, and anti-aircraft positions on the mainland.3? Concurrence w s rendered bv all the signatories to the finish-- S/edish demarche without any objections. It was the Soviet Onion, however, that voiced objections and ultimately defeated the Stockholm Plan. Russia’s negative response resulted from her declared fear that some third power mlg$it slcse the islands and thus gain the advantage in the Baltic. The Russian goverment also hinted that though she had no objections to the fortification of the islands she had a greater

3&DOFP. Series T, Vol. V., p. 601.

^ BGFP, Series Ts, Vol. VI, pp. 150~3 j and Mannerheim, op. c it.» p . 29B . interest in them thm did Sweden* So Russia felt that she should be kept m fu lly informed on the work of fo rtifica tio n s as Sweden* In

July* 1939* Molotov at la st clarified the Soviet * b wishes regarding the A&land Island question* Th© Soviet government at t hat time formal­ ly claimed equal right® with Swedenf i*e* th© right to give active assistance in their defense should Finland request it *3$ As the Soviet objections being of paramount consideration for th© Swedish government* Sweden becked out of the Stockholm Flan* Th©

Finns for their part refused Molotov* s demands and began preparing th© defenses of the islands without the aid of Sweden* Thus with Russian opposition th© first concrete move for action of th© Scandanawian neutrality policy fe ll through*

3%GF?f Series B* fol* ?T* pp* ? 27* Slilj Manner helm* op* eit*» P* 299* and Wuorlnen, Finland in World War II* pp* lil«4i2* 20c 30 ° 40 °

SCALE FOR THE DECREES OF LATITUDE 0 60 120 180 240 miles 60 50 70 RYBACHI PENINSULA _ ^ 60 Ceo:;rt-iphicj! Miles ' of Equator (HffUdSTft vnstittfteV'O) EqiufnnjJ Sc.-j/e I 1 . >3,000 v

\ KANTALAHTI o • KUOLAJARV! V

Cl v I

I

s ' >s S'S-#^s ■ j'-KEKSHLXl.M l a h f.-. ■' , I, U S S R

•\JTr N-NONAO \ #/Wft NPVA A / <~s" l 9 3 Boundaries ’i / • Mh.jAMAA " i '; t C'i VII PUR/ SO 100 VIROL AHTt /^(UURAS ^ KOIVISTO KIVENNAPA /'A O'A,IAPt SUURSAAfi!n Pf NIN3AARI^^y-r^JERIJOKI I NO n a <3 Sf SKA ft!- LENINGRAD A vA Y IV 4 An"i (KRASNAY*to?,,,. KRONSTADT 7 7 rT&RSAARi / \ J O O E k A SSAARJ 'Sc

J J I t J i. J. 20c 30 ° 40 * CHAPTER I I I

WAR CIDUX'3 GATHER

Turing the period o f conversations concerning the Stockholm Flan for the fortification and defense of the Aal&nd Archipelago the inner circle of the Finnish government wcs engaged in © secret negotia** tions with the Soviet Union® Those discussions which began with © strange phono call to Foreign M in iste r Holtsi from a second se c r e ta r y of th® Sovier legation, Boris Y a rtsev , urgently requesting an opperw tu n ity to speak to him# Unusual and as clearly a violation of accept­ ed protocol as the request ms, Holts! agreed to an appointment for

April lit, 1938.1 Yartsev was quite well-known in Helsinki and acquired margr friends among extrem e leftists in the F in n ish capital* A story was commonly circulated that he represented th© G#P#U# (Soviet State

Police) in the Legation# ^ Whatever his function, Y a rtsev called at the Foreign Mnistxy and asked for the privilege of discussing some h ig h ly confidential, matters with Holt si# He stated t h a t , some week® before when he had been in Moscow* the Soviet government had delegated to him exceptionally broad powers to discuss the means of improving relations between Finland and th© U#S#S#R#, and requested that all such discussion® be kept entirely secret, even from the Soviet envoy,

V ladim ir Terevyanski#3

^Tanner, o£# c it* , p* 3 ,

2IMd. it bid,, p. I). $0

Upon Holt s i ’s b id d in g him speak, Yartsev launched upon a rev iew of the European scene in general and th© fu tu r e position of

Finland, in particular. He then proceeded to assure Holt si th a t the Russian, government wished to respect the am! her territorial in t e g r it y but that Moscow fim ly believed that

Germany had e x te n s iv e schemes for aggrandizement at the expense of

Russia* To facilitate th e s e plans would involve the landing of the extreme north wing of a German attacking force in Finland, prior to an allout invasion of Russia. What would the Finnish at itu d o be i f such a contingency should arise? If the Finns were to remain p a s siv e and allow th© German armies a free hand, Russia would not remain on the 'border awaiting the ct- ack but would enter Finland from 1-ajajoki to do bottle. But if Finland were to offer resistance, Russia would gladly render ©11 the economic and m ilita r y assistance p o s s ib le , binding herself to withdraw her forces when the wa ended . f a Yartsev then went on to observe that the F.S.S.R. was prepared to of fer * in*, land economic concessions of alm ost any magnitude since Russia, had virtually insatiable capacity to purchase Firv ish industrial pro­ ducts, especially cellulose and agricultural pro acts. Yartsev fu r th e r stated th a t Moscow was aware of German plans to assist

F in n ish racists in a coup d’etat if the present Finnish government refused to cooperate.^

II /lannerheln, op. c i t . , p. 293; Tanner, op. cit., pp. and Wuorinen, Finland amflTprld ^ I I , pp. Ui-p.

farmer, op. cit*, p. $. 52.

In concluding his ta lk , l a r t mvr mkml H o ltst i i ho would bo saen&hle to discussing those mattes*® with him a lo n e , as tereyyanskt,

S o v ie t Minister t o Finland, and Austria, the other le g a t io n secretary, hr/ m mmm mast knew what was transpiring* On this point a F lrn leh constitutional problem arose? as Boltsi pointed out, it was incumbent on him to receive and consider any lnfortHati.cn or proposal that m ight com to his attention bat in th e f i n a l analysis, the President of th e

Hepatitic deteradned the nation’s fo r e ig n policy i n it#entirety* So without th© President*s authorisation, irregular discussions soeh m thee® sttggosted eo/ld not be entered into* Coital also em phasised

■ r'.;:, nlam?1 s p o lio . • of Scandinavian eoepcvctloft, the ml® pompom of which was to preserve peace as far as Finland was eoncemad# Be further stressed the firm political position of th© novmmneat of which he m® a part by referring to th e fa ct of i t a support hy three* fo u r th s of th® representatives in th© Diet and sta tio n : that th e popu­ lace would .follow the reg im e1 a pacific p o lic y

Holts! nest queried Y artaev regarding' the nature o f 'Soviet aid,

1*©# would it include sale of © m s to F inland ? T© t h i s Yartsev gave an affirmative reply with condition attached, namely th a t th e aid would include this, along with other forms of economic s>.?pp©rt, i f Finland guaranteed to the Russians th a t Qmtmr%? would m t be a s s is t e d in war against the h*S*S*H* t o Holts!*© natural question ©f what was meant by guarantees, Yartsev very easily r e p lie d that th a t could wait until there should be assurances tlmt F in la n d sincerely desired t o stay out

^Tanner, ©£* cit** p* 5* 52

of Great Power con flicts and would resist a German iimsioru On th is

note the first of many in t e r e s t in g meetings betw een Holtsi, and other

government officials, and Y a rtsev ended,?

From th is rather unorthodox approach to negotiations and the

sec r ec y that surrounded them, i t is apparent- that the S o v ie t Union anticipated war and was seeking to secure her frontiers in collabora­

tion with Finland, It also appears that the Russians had l i t t l e faith

in Finland's repeated declarations of neutrality or in their own non-

aggression pact with Finland, Apparently they felt that Finland was Incapable of resisting an attack without outside aid and they wanted to be sure that help came from the right direction, namely from Russia,

!!o more discussions took place until after fart s©v returned from a v is it to Moscow, from where he proceeded to Stockholm 'before

r e tu r n in g to his duties in Helsinki* In the in te r im , however, he spoke

to a number of private individuals. To such persons as th e Prime M inister's secretary, Arvo Inkils, General Aarne Slhve, and Mrs,

Hells Wuolijoki, he spoke more frankly than he had to Holt s i* I t was especially with Inkila that the Russian w&s most open, Through

him Martsev managed to g e t an interview with Fri®® Minister Calender

in June w h ile Holts! was absent in Geneva* Of that first m eeting

betw een the Prime Minister and Soviet representative nothing is recorded as the conversation was of a general nature,9

^Hsnnsrhsim, op, cit,, p* 2931 &md Tanner, of>« c i t , , p* 5, %ano@r, op, c it,., p* 6, 53

A second meeting between Caj&nder and Kartsev took place on July 11, when the discussion again centered on possible Gorman aggres­ sion against the U.S.3.R* When Yartsev suggested that Finland might be occupied as a base of German military operat■ons, Cajander said that that would be impossible as it would violate Finnish neutrality and jeopardize Finnish territorial integrity, neither o which Finland would permit* How Finland m s to defend her neutrality effectiv ely against such © superior force as th© German aray Cajandor could not m y as the exigencies of war are such that it is impossible to guar­ antee the outcome* But in the v-vent, Finland would do her best* Cajander added that he hoped thi t even as Finland made every possible effort to avoid becoming a pawn of a Great Power, so toe would the Soviet irdcn respect the inviolability of Finnish territory* Kartsev*s reply to this was much the same as he had given to Holt si, i*e* if Finland would furnish guarantees that Germaoy would get no bases in Finland, Russia would undertake to insure Finnish in violab ility*5

Later in the conversation Ca lander Introduced the subject of trade as an important facet of Finao-Russian relations and mentioned the repeated failures of numerous earlier negotiations of this kind* Apparently Russian diplomacy had more than one way of enticing ''in­ land into her ceap, for Kartsev said that first a political basis of agreement would have t o be reached before trade © grceracnts could be considered. Yartsev seemed to be angling for a treaty between t he

W , p . 6 two nations, the content of which he was not then prepared to disclose* On this not© the conversation cam© to an end, but not before Kartsev once more impressed on Cajander the need for utmost secrecy*^ It was at this juncture that FJ.iier.tce Minister ?&lad leaner was fo r the f i r s t tits© informed of what ves taking place* lajander was mystified as to th© exact demands that the S oviet government was making and therefore, requested th a t fanner see k to draw Yartsev o at on the p o litica l matter* The fir s t meeting between fanner and X&rtsev occurred o n July 30, but nothing of any gr

10Xbld. ^ -Iblri., p. 7. “ Tanner, cp. c i t . . p. 71 a::- V-’uorinen, Finland and rforld Way..XI.; P* hk» ^Wuorinen, Finland and World War IX, p* uiu As always, the Finns wished to improve their commercial and trade relations with the Soviet* Tanner expressed the hope that the Russians would take a raor- understanding attitude in the matter* Once more* as he had to Holt si, the Russian declared that improved trade rela lens would have to be precede•• bv a political agreement as poli­ tics were also involved* To speed up the negotiations and bring about an amicable settlement he suggests- that i t would perhaps be better i f th© discussions were to take place in Moscow* Tanner objected to this, on the grounds that if the negotiations were held in Moscow, the secret would be- out, and with th© distance involved, the Finns would be handi­ capped by not being in close enough contact withtheir government* Yartsev promisee to see what could be done about the matter of the border violations and closing of the Neva and also to sound out Moscow on the feasibility of holding the negotiations in Helsinki.^* nothing more took place for five days, and when at their meeting on August 10, Yartsev proposed nothing, new, Tenner reported the i act to Cajander* The latter joined down the following proposal for a treaty draft to be read to Yartsev the next days fJhile always adhering to the neutral policy of the northern countries, the government of Finland will at the same time permit no violation of Finnish territorial integrity nor consequently the acquisition b/ any gr^at power of a foothold in Finland for an attack against the Soviet Maion* The government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, while undertaking to respect th© territorial integrity of Finland at every point, w ill on the other hand not oppose Finland*a proceed­ ing even in time of peace to undertake in the Aalane Islands such military measures as the most perfect possible safeguarding of the

Tanner, op* cit* , p. 7. %

Integrity of Finnish territory/ and the neutrality of the A&lend Islands ussy require #13 fipon hearing the above proposal Yartsev merely repeated the suggestion that the negotiators woarfc In Moscow* From the to tier of the Finnish proposal It i s obvious tUct the ^ovosmaent was desirous of securing Soviet consent to the fortification of the Aaland Archipelago* Ilseussiciis with Swadan concerning it® fortification had been in progress since early In the year which reinforces the statement made above (see page U5 3 that Sweden applied on Finland to secure the consent of th e !.'#S*S#R« tothe altera­ tion of the status of'the islands, and mad© continued negotiations contingent on Soviet consent# Mot until their fifth raeeting (August IS) did Yartaev present d e fin ite proposal® and a statement of the guarantees that he tad so long been vague about# The Russian proposal began by holding out the bait of a ■'rede agreement in return for certain political concessions# In essence th© demand® stated th a t i f inland felt herself unable to en ter into a secret military agreement, Russia w ild be satisfied, m th a w ritten understanding on "inland1 a part whereby ah© agreed to re sist any Goman attack and to c a ll on Russia for aid i f she were uneblo to do so successfully# Hussion aid meant not so much the stationing of Soviet forces in Fii&end but rather Finnish procurement of Soviet arms and protection of the m& frontiers#^ Regarding the fo rtifica ­ tio n o f th© Aaland lulands* the Russian® indicated they would welcome

p# 31 c f • Msnn©rh©i% op# cit# # p# 293# ^Termer, op# cit## p# 8# 5?

being p erm itted to assist in arming th an fey supplying arsis, stationing a secret observer to survey and help supervise the work, and fey having a part in the control oi the installs- ions* All that m& desired in r etu r n for this favor was Finnish assent to the construction by the

Soviet Union of a fo rtified a ir and .naval base on Su ursaari I aland (Hogland) in order to protect the approaches to Kronstadt and

Leningrad. The u.s.S.R. was prepared in th a t event to s ig n a treaty guaranteeing Finnish territorial integrity and sovereignty and to conclude a. trade agreement most advantageous and fa v o r a b le to ' inland. 2*?

These proposals were then brought before the Finnish governraent in a secret session* The gravity of the situation could not help but impress itself on the F in n ish statesmen as the rapid change in the international scene brought the imminence of war* Finnish fears of war had not been alleviated ty th® Austro-German a nachlusa of th© previous March and th© expansionist p olicies of th© Great Powers (especially Germany) had even induced the Leftists In the Diet to support a more ©actensiv© program for military preparedness as mentioned above (page 3? ). Yet with the characteristic ambivalence shown by most pre-war governments, many Finns in responsible positions continued to regard Germany as the only possible a l l y in the event of a Russian attack, although th© official government policy under Holts! was on© of coolness toward Germany. It ms not e asily .forgotten in Finnish

Mannerheim, op* c i t . , p. 29h$ and wuorinen, Finland and I , pp. hU f f * 58

eirrles that an earlier R ussian envoy, Assmus, had once declared to

Brim© Minister KivimaM. that, ?RXn case of war, R u ssia could not avoid

occupying Finnish te r r ito r y * Though divided in opinion as to whether

Germany or Russia, presented the greater threat the Finns were still

determined on a neutral policy oriented towards peaceful Seandsnavia*

The upshot of the governmental session was a negative attitude toward the Russian proposals* Prime Hinlster Cajander stated it as

followss "The p ro p o sa l tends to violate F in la n d 's sovereignty and is

in conflict with the policy of neutrality which Finland follows in

common w ith th e nations of Scandanavia* This reply, which was a

long way from being what lartsev m s instructed to obtain, was tendered to the Russian; on August 29*

Shortly after the Finnish reply was received, the Soviet p ress

began a campaign of aaii«*Fiahieh propaganda which was eetmonjy assumed

to be a r e s u lt of th e attitude of th© Finns* lartsev lo a o e lf did not

l e t matters rest e it h e r ; he entered into further conversations with

Tanner in September demanding a clarified and more detailed answer than

that received in August* Tanner explained, that the Finnish sfcai ament

e n ta ile d a ref usal to per it Russian bases on Suursaari and that no

help was needed In preparing d e fe n se s on th e Aalands* As for the* arms

needed, Finland was reacty and w illing to purchase them from Russia i f

TO Quoted in Alvin f* Anderson, "Origins of the Winter Warj A Study of Russo-Fimlsh Pirlomacy , n World P o litics, Vol* T t, Mo* 2* (January 19510, P* 171* 19Tanner, op* c i t ., p* 10* 99

th e price and quality were right# With this fist refusal, and no counter-proposal, which Yartsev had asked for, being made, Tanner's part ,-n the negotiations ©ndcr' for the moment .20'

During October Yartsev had further conversations with H o lt s i, in a fu r th e r attempt to b rin g th© matter t© © head# numerous meetings were held, w ith th© talks fo llo w in g a well-established cycle# Both sides reiterating earlier proposals and neither was willing to give ground. Toward oldUOetober holts! handed Yartsev a le n g th y written statement containing an analytical report of his government's attitude in th© matter* While in Geneva he and Swedish foreign M in iste r, Rickard

Sandler had together seen Russian Foreign Commissar Litvinov and related to him how plans were progressing for t hi..- Joint defense of the Aaland Archipelago# With th is i n mind Holtei suggested that It would perhaps be better if decisions on th© Russian proposal waited until after th© diplomatic demarches with regard to the A aland s, which were t o be presented in a few months to the signatories of th© Aaland

Convention and the tI.S*5#R.^

At a la ter meeting, Yartsev disavowed his a b ilit ie s as a diplomat and requested the privilege of speaking in ordinary language#

He then proceeded to clarify what Russia desired, f.»e» a military alliance and the tu rn in g over of Suursaari to Russia to defend in event of war# If Finland could undertake 1.0 do so in collaboration

^°Ibid., p. 11.

21XWLd. 60 with Russia and 1f, in case of war, Finland eould not defend them* the r e sponsibility for their defense would be assumed fey Russia*

Once more the Finns declined on the same grounds as before**^

This latest Russian proposal was probably due in great part to the 0 seehoslovakian c r is is which had just preceded It# With th e

Germans taking over the SudetehXand, and with the resultant weakening of Chechoslovakia, the ‘J.S*3#R* had lost an ally* V&th the cooler atti­ tude of Fngland and France toward her and their seeming reluctance to oppose Germans, the Soviet Union felt isolated and suspicious of the

Hist# Finland too was su sp ect because of her activities in th© A&l&nds and, in th© R ussian view, fear pro-German attitude* The Russian belief th a t Finland was pro-German want back t o the e a r ly 1920*s# The R ussian view had p e r s is t e d despite @11 Finnish assurances and actions to th© contrary, e»g# thenon-aggression pact, trad© negotiations, H o lt s ! fs v is it to Moscow, and Finnish declarations of neutrality#

negotiations took a mu tw ist when Holts! resig n e d in November,

1938 and M ini ?oicnmaa became interim Foreign m in ister# The tenor of th© discussions rem ained much th© same as they wore to do throughout the ■■’•ear, but not# they deliberated on means of best carrying the d is ­ c u s sio n s to fructification* From the Tartsev-Foicmaa conversations on Hovember 21* i t was determined that a trade delegation should he sent to Moscow and that two political negotiators should ©company It* It was ultimately decided that the negotiators should go ostensibly to

^KsnnerheiiB9 op* e lt* , ftp* 29h~29$| and Tanner, op* c it# , pp* 11-12* attend the dedication of th© new Finnish Legation Building cm fteomriber ?f 1938* ^

Discussions in Moscow were headed by the F in n ish envoy in

Moscow, Tr.jo-Koskinen, and th© acting bureau chiefs Urho Toivola and

Aaro Pakaalahti* When the delegates appeared for their a u d ien ce, they found th a t Coramieear for foreign Trade, Anastas Kifcoyan, was to receive them* At th is Yrjo-Koskinen decided th a t his position as diplomat did not permit him to take part as the Commissariat for Foreign Affair® was not aware of th e political discussions# Hence, only* Toivola and Pakaslaiiti were present for th© first session, which they began by broaching the subject of trad® improvement between Finland and Russia, as was a pertinent subject for discussions between a trade delegation and Commissar for Foreign frnde* This, however, was not quite what

Mikoy&n desired, sod said it was n ic e to talk to Finnish trade repre­ sentatives but there were certain prerequisites to arriving at a satisfactory commercial treaty* M ilitary problems were involved, and the question of leasing Suursaari and providing for the defense of Leningrad must be considered* 2k Hikoyan noted with some satisfaction the Scandinavian orientation of F inland's foreign trad© policy but stated that frankly that this was not an adequate guarantee that the nation would be able to ward off a violation of her neutrality* When the Finns emphasised that there was no spot as weak in Finnish defenses as the AaXand Islands and that it was hoped, t ore- fore, th a t Russia would agree to the Finns building fortification s

23 Tanner, op* p it * , p. 12; and Wuorinen, Finland and World War I I , p . h h . ^Tanner, op. elt.. p. 12. 62

on the islands, Mlkoyan changed the subject and asked if Finland could not c ©d© Suursaari t o Russia* The Finns declared that S u ursaari remained unfortified in accordance with the provisions of the dorpst Treaty of 1920, feat if the conditions of the treaty w© c to fee chan., ed, Finland could erect th® fortifications h erself*25

After about two hours of conversation in this vein, Hikoyan retu rn ed to what the audience was ostensibly concerned with* trade* It was a; reed that a number of representatives of Finnish commerce and industry should meet with him that evening to discuss what the Firm® hoped for in improved commercial relations* He emphasised th© fact that politics would not enter into the conversations, since in his view, the time to bring up political questions would come when the necessary foundations for encouraging trad© had been la id , dis­ cussions o f border q u e stio n s had been initiated, and. other Items of immediate practical concern had been taken care o f*26

Th© evening discussions were attended, also, by Minister

Yrjd-Koskinen and the Finnish Minister of Communications, W ind

Salovsara* Hikcyan i n these talks merely reiterated what he had said earlier, emphasising the- importance of political relationships as a precondition to c^snereial discussion* Upon those matters no decisions war© reached*2? This meeting can be considered as the end-point in th© first phase of Flnno-Ruaslan negotiations* It is noticeable that throughout th© conversations covering most of 1938, the R u ssian s would not consider

^fuorinen, Finland and World War I I , p* 1*6* 26 "Tanner, op. c it* , pp* 12-13*

^ Ib id . 63

any aspect of Plrmo-Eussian trade relations without first arriving a t

definite politics®! am! m ilitary errangawaafca# Using trade as a lever,

the Buaaians policy sowed designed to fo r c e the Fitms into agreements

th a t would, i s the F in n ish view, have violated their neutrality,

territorial Integrity and independence# It aay he orgaed that had the

Finnish government, at th is sta g e of the negotiations seen fit to

compromise while the Hessian demands were s t i l l at a minimum, war

raight have been ©voided* Bat in view of what afterwards battened to

th e other B a ltic states, I t is difficult t o argue that the Finnish

policy was incorrect# For the next few months Fiano-Hssaian diplomatic estchsnges were rather routine, while Finland continued negotiations with Sweden for the joint defense of the Aalands# However, os March !>, 193?# Idtvinov handed trjd^Koski»ma eeiamftndun cotscorning trade relations and the fortification of the Aalonds* Is order to create a favorable atmosphere for the reaching o t an agreement, the U#S«S#R# now pro* posed that Finland lease her Sutsraoarl, Lsvonsaart Island (hovskar), the two lytdsaari Islands {Tytor Skerries), and Soiskari Islam! Oksit skar) in the Golf of Fir,land for a period of thirty years (sec map facing page 19 )# It was not Hustle*a purpose to fo r tify the

islands, the m m rm v tlim stated, bat to uss them as observation posts to influence the security of the? Leningrad Passage# I f those demands were met, the Soviet Union would guarantee batter relations between

the t m countries, a most favorable, for Finland, trade agreement, and the solution of tne Aalsnrls problem in a sstisfoetexy 614

manner# The Soviet Union received the Finnish rerly on March 8# It was written by Eljas Erkko, the Finnish Foreign Minister since Dec­ ember 8, 1938. Erkko made it plain that the Russian demands exceeded what Finland considered it safe for her to grant in position as a neutral. Therefore, Finland could, not consider leasing to a foreign power the islands referred to because they were an integral part of Finland, a sovereign territory which the Soviet Union had confirmed and acknowledged in the Treaty of Tartu, He pointed out that the islands had been neutralized at that time on Soviet insistence, and stated that no defense preparation had been initiated on ary of them# 29 Litvinov was dissatisfied and disappointed with the Finnish reply since in the Russian view, leasing the islands would not be a violation of Finnish neutrality, more especially since the Soviet Union did not propose to fortify them# But Litvinov had been pre­ pared for just such a reply and he proposed thrt rather than lease the islands, they might be exchanged outright for compensation in ^astern'1 Karelia north of , Once again the Finnish reply of March 13,was in the negative, Litvinov, however, refused to consider this as a final decision and in Russian eyes the matter was not closed.

2%annerheim, op. c it# , p. 299; Tanner, op. c i t . , pp. 13-Hi and Wuorinen, Finland and World War XI, p. 1*6.

29 Mannerheim, op. c i t #, pp. 299; Tanner, op# c i t . , p. Hi;» and Wuorinen, Finland and'World War I I , p. ii6. 3%anne>'bcim, op. c i t . , p# 299-300; Tanner, op. cit., p. lii; and Wuorinen, Finland and World War II , p. 1*6. 65

%&mn the Firmlah reply ©f Karsh 13 m m given to Titvimv,

he rm m rken$ that the foiw r Soviet envoy to Finland, Bori® -^tei n,

then scoredlied to Home, would bo ssnt to Helsinki to press the

Russian m m * h& early as March 11* Stein had contacted :'.:..irfefco and presented essentially the eaae plan as Idtvtnov* He amplified it

to Include a lease a®re*,iaetifc, for a stated period o f t ir e , ^ which Finland would have received extensive exploitation rights to forest area® in Rtsssia Karelia.31

S t e in argued that Finland1® neutrality would test toe s enured

te the cession ©f the islands to R o ss is and th a t the area Buitsia was

prepared to cede to Eastern K a relia (183 square kiletactsrs) was greater

ilia n the oceitoiTied arena of t t e ialam ein q u estio n # bhren a written

stetsnent, he said, by Fiat®ad that she would resist any attempt

at violation of her neutrality was worthless in Russian ayes unless

backed up tr practical measures.32 Rrkfcc** reply w that, unrior

the constitution* Finnish territory?’ m s inalienable am? such an

exchange wrs not discussable. Me enphf.sised i h?*t Finland fea red ihr*t i f a precedent for ee^ in g te r r it o r y was e s t a b lis h e d , Gsrniafly too

edgh* rank© sim ilar demands* to such Finland would never assent#33

Stein expressed dissatisfaction tilth th e finriisb resp on se and requested th a t the Finnish ^ovsrtissiit study ths proposals fwihar*

3*Tannsr, oft* c i t « , p* lb *

^^tetinerhsis* ej>* elt-.* p#. 300*

^Tanner# op* c i t * , p* I k i end tfuorine!*, Finland and OorfLd *-fer I I , p* !*?♦ ~ After cm&i&mMMan# tlie OototsmsiMo saauer to® doliverod to X&iv&xftrte# in © mmmm$x%m txwmttltotadl ly T rjS^sl& ijm m i-tecti RO* i t rasa»Hfc*M rtlnjiiK a® **.*!* itf^iihi' leubXMsi iMif iMIHh Jk The Fi®®dA gororrom^ aaggptdttto ragarding a »ib&or which iii m w or another i moStmm th® m m im of part® of the tevrttefy of th® otote to amolter power* ttdo m ^ s M m reply 1® not to to© TOdorotool in the m n m Hist the Feretga Kl&totar w ild be trillin g to eootiare sn «ehai^o of r%mm w&fM. ttoo p & p o m of m m M m & aolutlm to tbe questions rsiped by ttoo S oviet tM on TOgMw&iig gasflMMafcee# to it® # m mitgr#3** Si© Soviet tJhloiit# roseate'! danooiSo of Fis&juvl «m tatleoilTO o f tho foiXoBco o f th e Rusidssi lo s to fs to Qqdorstwvf the ifotldb.^® o f o oenatltutlonail doaoearaey* Or* if they understood m b TOtter% ttoeir looletem %&wm that they to ts so a^TOtoosd to cjwa&tngt with s minimum of f^pular epgsioltion Hist they fottod to realise that in « free nation to TO«?tO!$Iy disgrepsri pmtoiio opinion too to court political oaidblo* Finnish {pmraTOxEb* especially a t i t enjcyed a © tear m jerity in the F4®t# too not ustHlng to vrntestik® a ctio n tirnt wosQUS hmw r a h diro o<»mqqono«9 «nd ia«faanpod to p m m tise .sotnrls^vtes. oriantation, dch ;itrOHtyjs end pacific poSUoioo in ftorolgn 'imlnHkw* tltvlm r^o yoaotftm too w of wsgrot* & dedarai. that it too . not u§5 to BUtftond to propose ©©ncrot© enggpsettauu Easels had: taetfe hart when sh© had mqa#sted the MXbmSb in the M f of Fti&aad* M to to ® told th at new Ftnflteatf s ra t eposfe* toot too s t i l l y«®itsod etoedfaet in hie defense of the Finnish poalitai* Be tiwiod the m w w a draft of a not# that too to to® delivered to the Soviet fjerowwent In ohlcfi. FitA isif m m

AQuotoO in fmmmr$ ©g# e lt* , pp* Ub*45 6?

more rciisraisd her dsteralaetlon t o defend her neitoallty under arjy and a ll eSreuiastan©©© end against any and aw ;/ aggressor*-^ Before leaving Helsinki on A p r il f, Stein froakly Insisted that the dtaenaslcm shodd not be considered at an tnd* The 3ovlat

"nlen m s not prepared for e ft nil reply to lie dsmrtd© as th®

Islands requested ware of strategic significance to Soviet sriC'irity*3&

This* however, ended the last phase o f the preliolnaxy negotiations, which had ojrtandcd over a year, eo«irnifig Finnish guarantees of

Russia's security* Much criticism ms subsequently directed at the Finnish state#* sisn for their InflasdhiH ty in meeting th# Russian dono&h to 1m m the islands in the Calf cf Finland* KaratutiL ftaitfia*toaiai, for aaca^pla, .felt that no claaagt to Finnish 1 (wSspenderiea ©r a©v*rol|jnty would have been involved had the- Finn® met th© demand©# In his Hemolra* the Marshal statess

X mo of th® definite opinion that us m m bo and to meet the R u ssia n s in acme way i f th ia m s l i k e l y t o lead to improved r e la ­ tion® with our mighty neighbor * * * * I said that i c is la n d s were of no us© to th© couiifcsy and that wo had no u at of dafend~ ing them* as thi* war© neutralised* Or* the oilier han 9 the islands wore of real importance to th© Russians, as t*tcy ©emended th© entrance to their naval baa© at tr&c Bay of Logs, and ty loosing them we should draw adventsc© frs«s one of th© few truaps wo hold*

But X fast with m understanding* It m s pointed out to me that a government which dared to propose scything of t m sort would imM&ataly fall, and that no politician would agree to challenge public opinion in this manner# T© this 1 replied that if there ware really no one m io m s willing to risk his popularity in a

3*> ^fanner# op* c i t * , p# 15$ and *torlm m « F inland and ' t o l d r * apmwiwtii » » » mwnwiio^ *• * w v*mmu' MgjMwwswirii^ mBUM* m m * I I , p . L?. 36 Tenner, eg* c it * , p* 15? and Wuorinen, Finland m d t o l d II, p. Is?. 68

matter 00 vital to the country, X was prepared to place ayoelf at the disposal of the government, convinced as X was that v& honest opinion would be understood. But X vent s till further and expressed the opinion that It would be to Finland's advan* tags to offer to move the frontier nearest to Leningrad westward by five or six miles, against a reasonable compensation*??

On the other hand fanner defends the policy of the government on the grounds that if the Russian demands were met then, later on more demands might a r is e . In h is book he s ta te s that* These negotiations showed that the Soviet Uhion tena­ ciously sought to have Finland assent to certain lim itations on its right to make os* of its territory and that Finland with equal tenacity opposed the suggestions put forward, Subsequently-^when Finland was obliged, on the basis of peace treaties made after the wars in which it was engaged, to cede much larger areas—criticism was directed against Finland’s negative position at the time, Xet under the circumstances of that period a different approach to the case would hardly have been possible. There s till existed trust in International law and In the binding character of signed and sealed treaties. It was not considered possible that a great power would seek by force to assume possession of territories which it had Itself ceded to Finland through an express tr e a ty , Under no circumstances would the D iet have been disposed to approve proposals of this sort if the government had presented them for consideration. Moreover, it is uncertain whether concessions made at that stage would have prevented the presentation of fresh demands. Indeed, It is conspicuous that while the negotiations were under way tiie Soviet demands tended to increase and did not by any means come closer to the Finnish position as might properly have been expected.38 Whatever criticism s are leveled at the Flimlah government, the fact remains that at the time, it was felt that no such concessions could be made. It might have been a far better thing, had the n et been informed of the negotiations. Throughout, the Finnish government

37kann0rfcei», op, c lt,, pp, 300- 301 ,

3%azmsr, op, c lt,, pp, l£«l6. respected the Soviet desire that they he kept secret# In any case, i f the Ile t had been iafoxraod of the conversations, the nation might have been better prepared to meet the crisis that was to come* It i s useless, however, to speculate on such matters • The breakdown in the conversations resulted in a discontinu­ ance of trade negotiations and the refusal of Russia to assent to the revision of the AaXaud Convention proposed by Finland and Sweden# Thereafter, the Swedes became increasingly hesitant concerning the Stockholm Flan and when on Hay 31 Molotov announced that Russia had as much to say, or mor% on the Aaland question as any other country, Sweden withdrew the question from before the Riksdag# That the pro­ posal was to be debated at an extraordinary session of that body was the reason given# Bat by June, the matter was dropped alt©c©th©r#3F In the meantime, Finland had been approached by Germany on the matter of a non-agression pact# Finland declined to accept the offer as impinging on her neutrality and Scandinavian orientation. Russia was dissatisfied with Finnish c-declarations of neutrality* To Mannerheia, neutrality only mad© Finland fs position more untenable as it only served to lim it Finland1® freedom of action that much more end Finland was not in a position to antagonise the two great Baltic powers#^0

The Soviet Onion had not even been consulted on the matter of the Munich agreements In the preceding September which had aroused

3$aannerheim, o£# c l t ** p* 3O0L#

fcOlbld., pp. 302-303. 70 m feelia g of in. Russia iosfiirds the tfsst* When Gemajy seised the mmt of C sechodXovakia in March 1939$ Ruselati apprehei** dona and suqplaloae deepened# H&mer$ m ike throat of m r increased, Russia wm recognised bf the Qre&t Powers as a adlitarr factor to b© reckoned with# Hems both and the A llies began t© iso© aertoual^ the 3#S#S*R# and to mol: Russian aid in bB t event of an armed conflict* In March the British end French initialed Joint rogetlettona aimed at &*vicoXXeborstiiNti against Genaaiy* Russia demanded, as a to &w s«®h accord, that the resbl* tant treaty would guarantee the Bailie states (Latvia, Retonla and Zdthoania) and Finland add in the contingency of thair being attacked* T© be Included in the agreement was ^indirect aggression*, t*e#» the ansts^tion of a pro^Qertaan attitude on the part of the gowennwts to b§ guaranteed* Thus Russia, under the guise of benevolent guardian* ship of their independence, would have obtained the right to interfere in the Internal affairs of those nations, even to the point of provi* ding a d lita x y aid, without their first requesting At f ir s t the British and. Frenah mmmd inclined to accept the Russian conditions, which sent a (M R of apprehension through the sabers of the flm&dki government* In coneequenee, strong Fimifili demarche* supf^rtad the Swedish gcnmrnemt were nede In London and

Koeoow, The result wm th a t th e SfcitUh and French goronwents

XWP# Series B, ?ol# FI, p Wuorlm1SwTl^ te i in w

As astute diplomats# the Russians also allowed Gesmangr to court them* Discussion began in May* 1939# but i t was not until August that serious conversations w e initiated* On the Russian side the m m was engineered to counterbalance the Anglo-French negotiation© and to get the most advantageous offer fro© both sides# then to accept that which would best &taem Russian interest® *^

After the breakdown of Anglo~Preneh»Rusaian c onvcrsations# discussions between Geraary and Russia rapidly reached a conclusion in the Kolotov-Hibbentrop non-aggression pact on August 23* Both parties to the pact vociferously denied that the Baltic states had hem. divided into spheres of influence,^ but the evacuation of Baltic

Gexm&n* in September and October o f 1939 seemed to indicate other­ w ise*^ In 19lilj Rlbhentrop admitted that i t was agreed in the August pact that Finland should be relegated to the Soviet sphere of Influ* enee*^ After the war the secret protocol pertaining to the spheres of influence was published* It stated that* On the occasion of the signature of the iionaggression Pact between the German Belch and the U.S.S.R., the undersigned

’■'■gpQFP, Series E ., Vol. VI, pp. 58, 727,810., and Tanner, 0£ . c l t . . P* 18* k3Kannerheim# op* c l t ** p* 30$.

%BFP. Series B, Vol. VII, pp. 33% U91. **5wuorinen, Finland and World War IX. p . 51. k^Ibid. 72

l^jsnl^potentiariaa* « * discussed in stricter confidential conrar-* n t i m tbs q u e stio n of the bm»iA«qr of their mapeetim spheres of iafltiem in- Swtem lump©. 'Those conversation© M to the ■ftajiiwiiHg conclusions t 1# in the event of a toirltorlal and -political rc£^anceeont in the area© belonging t© the Baltic States (Finland, Kstoni&, Latvia, 34thoaftilft)# the northern boundta^r o f Lithuania i^saXX rspresent the bcKsndonr of the sphere© of inflaefic© of ftovnsHGr and the S .S .S .R . . Within a seek it beeaao dear shat the f o i l inport of th© pant it opened the for the Qmnn lim sioii of ^nXend on September 1 and the Eosslan dod&refcion of war against the defeated nation on September 17. i t f i r s t the poet m s received with aim ©Mscwnt in Finn©»Seiaidia*-*tho tee sw m enanieo mhraeing one another m s 3 M m $ ^ Tot in Finland them m e l i t t l e r o d concern at first ever the Grnwmm Soviet treats in fact, it me thought to be s s k illf u l ceunterMfaove to the p o licy of the tfeatmi Pemere*^ Fcrdgn Minister Brito told the German envcy to Finland, Wipert von Hl&tor, th a t for the mooent i t appeared t© give advantage to Finland in that the Baltic Sea asm would be ©sceltsded from hostilities since the two Great Powers wore now a llie d , thus* ho ©aid, the danger o f Finland hocceati^ in v o lv e in war ms lessened hot, nevertheless, he did express doubts about th e future, veiet struck: Brito wm th a t the t m em of the ftuseo^atrtt&n Pact differed from those that Ctansetip had proposed to Finland a short time

^Docunents on International Affstre. W39&$k&» Vol. I . Koral InstitutTW 'lHEirmlBSI^rFiSSs TLomlbns ^Efor^OElversity Press, 1951), p* 1*09. ^ T a n e r , og# d t . 9 p . 18. MjPQF?, Berios B, Vol. VII, p. TO. 73 before. They also differed from any that Russia had concluded with other nations* For Rr&ko th is portended something unusual, but at the moment he was not exactly sure what.k?

Former Finnish Foreign Minister Aottl Hackaell oppressed the thought that Russia in the Fall of 1939 did m t present ary danger to Finland but conceded that th is situation could change i f Russia were to be built up by Germany* lie thought that Russia might stand aside from the war and await the exhaustion of the warring powers and enter at the moment most advantageous to her* The consequences from such an event would be grave for Finland for she would be the first to f e e l the effects of an expending Russia*

The Holetov-lUbberrbrop agreement was the starting signal for iferld War II* Within a week of the signing of the pact, the Reich declared war on Poland* Immediately on receiving the report of the German action the Finnish government, singly and in conjunction with the Scandanavian countries, declared her intention to remain entirely neutral and is^artial in the conflict#^* In this manner the Fima expressed their aim of abstaining from any involvement in the inter­ national conflict# Germany, on the day of her attack on Poland, declared that, In accordance with the existing friendly relations between herself and

^Ibld., p. 3l»3* 5°Ibid.t p. 3liU.

^■Tanner, op. ctt.. p. 19;195 PGFP, FGFF> Series I, 7ol* F ill, p. 12$ _ - .-J t .... "IT** ' H -•* . * r t ____ ■Id** ^ War III 111 I 1S» i g f p* 52# Ik llerway* Sweden and Fib!end, she would in no nise injure the inviolabi­ lity of the three and would at all times observe a respectful attitude fo r their territorial integrity# the same token Germany suspected a policy of strict neutrality towards her* and would take an ©specially adverse view of breaches of their neutrality by iiiird parties*?^

Russia gave at least lip service to the idea of neutrality throughout the f ir s t h a lf of September* As late as u&d-Sept amber* the press chief of the Comlssarlat for Foreign Affairs declared that the hed Aray would not be led by aiy excuse, e* g* a revolt in Poland* into crossing the Russo-Polish boxder#£3 le t on September 17* the Bed Array did invade an already badly defeated Poland and took part in the divi­ sion of spoils. Upon entering the aeraam-Polish fray* the Soviet Onion issued a declaration of neutrality to ©11 nations* including Finland and her neighbors in .^eaiiDanavia*^1 The Russian proclamation served to strengthen the confidence of government circles in Helsinki that the Finnish nation would be able to maintain its position oi neutrality. For a time yet Finland was to maintain her position of neutrality* but not for long. Soviet alms* guaranteed by the HolotovwRibbenfcrop Pact* were soon to become apparent* At th is point* however* i t would

FP, Series D, V'ol# VII* p. £02* It was probably meant by third party intervention any action by Britain and France in Finno-Scandia. ®Wuorlnen* Finland and World War XX* p. £2.

^^©imerheia* op* cdt** p* 307j and Wuorlnen* Finland and World XX* P* £2* 7$

s©m td.se to review event o to see if Finland could have don© more than she did to assure her weH-being as a small independent state caught between ambitions Great Pmmm * the anonymous author of

Wuortnen1© volum© argu es th a t!

It is possible today to argue, with the aid of hindsight, that a more far-sighted policy on Finland*a pert would have prevented Finland from b ©coming the subject of the Molotov* Ribbentrop agreements. This soems, however, very unlikely* If either Power had. considered it to bo in her own interests to protect Finland in these negotiations, Finland would alrea^r have had to fee—-by August, 19$$w"*«~the vassal of the Power "protecting» her. That is to m p 9 she would already have had to be in the position to which the negotiators sought to assign her. The Soviet Union obviously had a clear-cut program which it was carrying out without bothering about the small obstacles in its path. The Germans later argued that if Finland had not rejected the n©n**&ggression pact proposed by Gerasry in May, 193% she would not have- fallen Into the Bueai&m sphere of influence. At the time, however, nothing was said of wtuxt Finland’s position would then tm m become, or of how the non* aggression pact would have strengthened Finland’s position. Later, whoa i t was seen how l i t t l e a non-aggrosalon p a c t s a fe ­ guarded Denmark against the a tta c k by G enaai^. such arguments were no larger presented, even to th© Finns*hb

To say that Finland might have avoided the disaster by reaching an agreement with Hassle during th® preceding April, has boon dealt with above* It is, however, well to reflect that had.

Finland surrendered her neutrality at thct point, perhaps she would not have been able to maintain herself, a s she did, on. the periphery of the Great Powers1 struggle* Had she been allied with Russia, as proposed, there is great likelihood that she would tmve been, d r mm into the fu ll maelstrom of the struggle between Bast and west. In the end, the nation would undoubtedly have been occupied tgr Russia,

^^uarinsn, Finland and -forld War H , pp. $1-52# 76

without a chance of protect, and suffered ultimately the same consequences a© other nations bordering on Russ!%!*©• the loss of her independence# Justas debatable is the argument that the islands demanded should hare been ceded. Regardless of the sitna­ tion, the Diet undoubtedly would have balked, and nothing would hare been accomplished. Furthermore, as the author of the Vuorinen book states in this connection, "It must he kept In mind that at the time a to ta l war had net yet lowered international p o litica l morals to the present level where Qrect Powers but not the small ones have the right to defend themselves. Thus, did Finland stand at the threshold of an entirely new experience in foreign affairs, adamantly maintaining a policy of neutrality and assuming that there was still extant in the world a concept of justice for all* i%en in the ensuing months, Moscow*s demands became evermore pressing, Finland was to stand in need of all the sisqffi her people possessed*

Ibid., pp. U7-18.

Slau is e terra connoting integrity, intestinal fortitude, determination, vigor, vitality, courage, an unwillingness to give up despite all oddsj in the vernacular sense, it might be defined as "nuts” combined with sheer determination* CHAPTER Vf

THE MDSCOW NEGOTIATIONS

Upon the successful partition of Poland, Russia turned her attention to the lesser Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and

Lithuania* The Foreign M inisters of these countries were summoned to Moscow to discuss the conclusion of treaties of friendship and reciprocal aid with the Soviet Union. Under pressure of Russian military actions on her borders, Estonia granted naval and air bases to Russia on September 28} on October 5 Latvia concluded a treaty of the same genre; and on October 11 Lithuania completed negotiations that resulted in her regaining ?ilna, which Russia had just wrested from Poland, in return for military bases given the Soviet Union*^

Helsinki was seriously distressed by the Soviet demands on the Baltic States and realized that sim ilar concessions would probably be demanded of her* The Finnish government, however, was determined to resist such pressures, come what might *^

The Finnish expectations were confirmed on October 5, when Soviet leaders were reaching a successful conclusion in negotiations with the Baltic States* Molotov requested the Finnish Minister to

Moscow to v isit the Kremlin* There he was informed that, in view

^Winston S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Bostons Houghton M if f lin Co*, 191*8), p« 1*8$; Marinerheim* QP* c i t . , pp* 307-308; and Tanner, jog. c lt** p. 21*

2CGFP, Series D, Vol. VIII, p. 11*8 78

of the war situation* the Soviet 'Jrd.cn now wished to exchange views with Finland regarding -'’certain concrete questions of a political natisre”#-* Bolotov further suggested that the Finnish Foreign Minister Journey to Moscow for the conversations* or that another plenipotentiary be appointed* When pressed for elucidation on the nature of the proposed conversations* Holotov refused to go into details* He did, however, express the hope that discussions might be initiated as soon as possible and requested an answer within a few d ays/1

in Helsinki, Molotov*s indefinite reply and invitation caused anxiety* It was clear, though, that no alternative to acceptance was given* Scant attention, however, was paid to the urgent request for speed* On October 8 Cerevyanskl called on Erkko to inform him that Moscow was irritated because the Finnish reply was delayed, that Finland was not treating the matter as the other Baltic States had, and that this might be detrimental to course of affairs#- Erkko retorted, WX have m knowledge as to how the Baltic States were Invited to Moscow j Finland has dealt with the matter as a normal a ffair and in the normal course* "6

Erkko was loath to go to Moscow as he felt that his place

was with the government* It was, therefore, decided that J* K* Paasikivi, Finnish Minister to Stockholm, should be sent as

3The Finnish Elue Book; The revelopraent of Yiraifsh-Soviet Relations during the Aututan of 1939 9hereafter cited as FBfe’) YfieS Tories J* EU’'Xipponcott '^o'*,”19118)7 P« ^2*

^Tanner, 0£* c lt* , p. 21* %BB, pp. Ii3*4iiu

I b i d . , p . Mu 79

Finland's chief representative at the Moeeov discussions* General

instructions were drafted directing the Finnish representatives to point oat that Finland's relations? with the Soviet Union sere regulated by the Tartu Peace Treaty and the Treaty of Non-agression arid to reiterate Finland's declsionf in conjunction with the other

Northern Powers to renaln neutral and at peace. Any proposals that mi#it Infringe on the neutral policy and free political status of

Finland were to be rejected. Finland's else was to be emphasised

as a footer preventing her from aggressive action toward any nation*?

In witness of her w ill to remain at peace and neutral Finland notified the world of her decision to defend her position even to the point of taking up arms* Moreover, Finland wished it known that she would not allow anyone to use tor against anybody* In addition, if proposals affecting Finnish territorial inviolability or sovereignty were advanced by the Kremlin, the delegates were to declare that none of them were authorised to promise anything that violated the Finnish Constitution* Any such cessions would necessitate approval by the government and Piet*®

More specific instructions forbade the negotiators to discuss the establishment of Soviet m ilitary bases on the Finnish mainland or in the Aaland Islands! the same stipulations applied to boundary adjustments on the Karelian Isthmus and to the opening of Finnish

ports to Soviet forces* Only on certain Islands in the Gulf of

Finland—Selskarl, Lavansaarl, Tytfrsaarl—except Suursaarl

? I b id ** pp* U6-U7*

ftlbid,* p. 1*7* sc

(s e e map fa d in g page h 9 ) were they empowered to make concessions

and then only under extreme pressure, Discussion of these concessions

was permitted on condition that any cessions be reciprocal and that

the compensation given Finland appear reasonable In the eyes of the w o r ld .9

If the Russians suggested the conclusion of a mutual assistance

treaty* the negotiators were Instructed to point out that this would

be incompatible with Finland's neutrality policy as the Helsinki

government feared such arrangements would involve her in war. In

this regard* it was pointed out that the Soviet government had

alreac$r sap re seed satisfaction with the policy of neutrality pursued

by Finland and* therefore* it should be suggested that a mutual

aid treaty was unnecessary**®

Evidence of Finland's aim ers desire to remain neutral

and on good terns with the rest of the world is to be found in

the measures that were undertaken during duly and August. The budget for the ensuing year was drawn up in August in the usual

fashion**- and despite the imminence of war the foreign debt was

reduced**^ Another indication of the Finnish belief that continued

peace was possible is to be found carxying on of plans for the

Olympic games scheduled for Helsinki in 1$|0«*3 But when Polish war

broke out and the Western Powers declared war on Germany in

September* Finland also assumed a realistic attitude toward the

^Ibld. * p. Ul • *®Xbld*. p. ii8* H?anner* c£. c lt.. pp. 19*20*

*^Wuorinen* Finland and World War XX. p. h2* *3lbld* altered circumstances by recalling some reservists to the colors*

At the end of September officers and non-commissioned officers on leave-of-absence since 1938 were called up for refresher courses and on October 6 the advance troops were mobilised and dispatched to the Karelian Isthmus to give military support to the negotiations in Moscow* At th e same tim e c iv ilia n s were evacu ated from th e frontier areas of the Isthmus.*®* These actions amounted to virtual mobilization and on October 19 the German Minister to Helsinki reported to his government that Finnish mobilization was complete**^

On October 9 Paasikivi* accompanied by Johan ffykopp, a department head in the Foreign Ministry and Colonel Aladar Paasonen, departed for Moscow. The party arrived there on the eleventh and began the first round of talks on the twelfth. Representing the

Kremlin were Stalin* Molotov* V. P. Potemkin* and Derevyanski*

An oral statement of the Soviet demands was made referring to the general situation in Europe and stressing the necessity for closing the Gulf of Finland to any enemy who proposed to attack Leningrad and the Soviet Onion* On the south shore the G.S.S.R. was said to be secure by the bases in the Baltic States but no such security existed on the north shore controlled by Finland. It was therefore suggested that Finland conclude a treaty of mutual aid relating to the security of the Gulf of Finland. Mention was also made of the

^Mamerheim, op. c it., p* 309} and Niukkanen* op. c it., pp. 98-101*

lgpGFP. Series D., Vol. VIII, p. 31* * i4A -I i* 1 « . „ , 'Ladoga « © LAHTI 1 1 VIIPURil? KKOLAVUQKSEL V HEINJCJ tCAMA&jfc) ' JAIPALE »EZ V H A A ’f REV0NSAW1 H ,i © 'f “ KJV EN N A PA « / / / > P1ISAARI J-1,| O lV IS T O

T e RIJOK

HELSINKI

LENINGRAD

■lera^iVoc^- C itrin e* : jn n l^h rj.g;ryffi ( xvr i ' iddj.^& -.:t9 '■ ri-;;3a-'\tis * enguin *>oc&* Ltd.* j# need for a military base cm the mainland of Finland* with Hanko Cape mentioned as a desirable location. In Petsamo the Finns were asked to cede the western part of Kalastajasaarento (Fisherman's Peninsula)* For the security of Leningrad the Kremlin suggested that the border between the two nations should be moved to the Kholemanjlrvi-Kyyr8l8-Muolaa-Lipola line (see map facing page 82)• 2n the Gulf of Finland the Finns were called upon to cede some small Islands including Koivisto and Suursaari* At the same time the Soviet government declared it s e lf prepared to compensate Finland be cedirg territory in the Eastern Karelia many times the size of the areas requested from the Finns* In conclusion the Russians stated that they did not want to discuss the Aaland problem in Hi is connection in order to avoid difficulties.16 Dismayed by the Russian demands, Paasikivl replied that a mutual aid treaty was impossible because of the Finnish policy of neutrality and stated that Finland could not renounce her terri­ torial inviolabilty by agreeing to the geographical demands. Upon this note the first meeting adjourned with Paasikivl premising to secure further instructions from his government*^ Hew directives were immediately issued from Helsinki* The Finnish delegates were instructed neither to assent to any mutual aid treaty nor to agree to the granting of territory for military purposes. Kalastajasaarento was Important to Finland and it was

^Mamerhelm* op. c l t . , pp. 310-312} and Tanner* op. cit., p. 25* I?Tanner, lo c. c it . f c f. Wuorinen, Finland and World War II, pp. $$-S6 » B3

Finland’s aim to m k for ffciaeta’a half of the peninsula. a*

eotapensatlon for concession® elsewhere* Beg&rding Suursaari* the

delegate© ware 'to consider it «© a separate question to be discussod

after the outcsosa of 0 0 worse tiers on the outer islands* As for the

to u r o f S m^rmnpSS on iBslrlsto Island, it m m not to he •Hseuased* m

^ r e **:# islands of .^pssero ursd *%rvi. ^ both of which i had been included in the Bosnian danitnde* Hie proposed boundary ra©tifle#tiem on th e

Isthmus we# Impossible in the Finnish elev as Finland then would

be pieced- in Jeopardy by suoh a m m io n of territory#^

On the fourteenth the next round of nmm&.onm m m m ttm d with

Ba&sikivi reeding a memorandum d r a fte d by Colonel ftaaaonen which

endeavored to prove that no danger threatened the security of

Leningrad* According to th e th e Finns deemed i t

possible to cede the island of lsv»nsaarl9 Seiaksri t and fenla

s e e r i # which could be integrated into the Soviet defense system in

retu rn for adequate comps rm&* • ion. ^ The Kremlin declared theaa

©one ssaions too trifling to be- worthy ©f consideration*

Concession* wars desired, on th e Iethmi»9 especially mm the

frontier there was located t'-o near Leningrad (32 tap*) and the

fsoviet srmieo already possessed cannons capable o f f Irlng 50-60 Jg* It was argued that Finland might secure sim ilar ones

end th en Xsidngred would be directly threatened. The R ussian

demands ultimately aimed at th e restoration o f th e boundaries o f Feter the Oro«t, to seeure the !?.%$.&• against attack*^*'

l £ 10 Jm m m , o&. £&£•* pp* 25^36* IMsU * P* 26 ?CD»td. m

sss©s*t®Q that on gxosniis tQj&w$ the Umst&m c to m s m m bat -taXAa r^tortad that the ttUliscsp ck>@s not th&nlc Am t o n s of ote&ln thsu p&iM&d o*at that the po.^lbAlA.%’ of an attack frew «ltho^ the iiXlies or Qmmxxf cattaod her to mite iheao d®»ntl% eopeeisiDy f-fio? iioln l^ d baaesi* I f ^Xoft&ad teas afraid to groat Hadteo a boa$ bucao??e it ma on tfcn M&laiidf 3tii5JUi prepared to dig e oiiimL dsmn fiarta M ; to w i* the Capi iron $ihl£sxU

She delngpKfeas axguod cm jsaridieaX grosmde ani in aompdaaoe wttn their taxi to m mmKU2^ At am point -%m Iho SteX&n noted the p a rtia l rot&lieBiion of f% m & m £ m m m and pototod not that RomAb too Ml trocgw to its© Isthnu** Sadi a otcwlMl eitaeiloG* in his view* eeuftd not long o-btsdn ulthoot r&tsfc. of nnr* Xu rmmnUag t&is port of the oaroorofttlMet fanner pedMa mat thot tho full nip^lfiwaee of this etattittent was not realised in irtli it woe too late ,22 tlpm m&Xaaftwi ©f the fmMMM mmmmom M s fteeislen to rettwn to ItaXainki for further iMstrnstions end soNfjsarfeed a written mmmSan fro* the Buaslsns -tor ref-csreaeo there* Haet mmMxm# the i^ooaiod aid® mm

jg* ctt»» p» JU | end teaser*

^ sx zzm * jg* J||*t p* t 8 85 delivered.^ It read in parti In the negotiations with Finland the Soviet Union la mainly concerned with the settlement of two questional (a) Securing the safety of Leningrad; (b) Becoming satisfied that Finland w ill maintain firm, friendly relations with the Soviet Union. Both points are essential for the purpose of preserving against external hostile agression the integrity of the Soviet Union coast of the Gulf of Finland and also of the coast of Estonia, whose independence the Soviet Union had undertaken to deffend. In order to carcy out this undertaking, the memorandum stressed the importance of Russian bases on the north sid e of the Gulf of Finland, which, in conjunction with those in Estonia, would close the Gulf. To achieve this, Hanko Cape and surrounding territory were to be leased to the Soviet Union for a thirty year period for the establishment of a naval base provided with artillery supplementing the coastal artillery at Baltischport (Paldiski), to defend the base the Russians proposed to garrison it with one infantry regiment, two anti-aircraft battery groups, two air force regiments, and on® battalion of armored cars, with a total of not more than 5,000 men. Finland was also to grant Lappohja Bay (Lapvik) as an anchorage for the Soviet fle e t. The islands of Suursaari, Seiakari, Lavansaarl, Tytlrsaarl, and Koivisto, were demanded together with part of the Karelian Isthmus from Llpola to the southern border of the town of Koivisto (see map facing page 8 2 )• In exchange for th is territory, the Russians agreed to cede

23Ibid. gljFBB. p. 1*9. C6

tli® communes o f Repola and Forajarvl (see map facing page k?)* In

Pets&mo, the we stem part of Kalastajasaarento was to be also ceded. ^

All Finnish cessions would have amounted to 2,761 sq. ]o§* for which they would have received 5 ,5 2 9 sq* km* of undeveloped territory la exchange* the demand for a reciprocal aid treaty was dropped in favor of strengthening the existent non-agression pact by inoluding a paragraph whereby neither party would Join any alliance hostile to the other* Finally, fortifications on both sides of the Karelian frontier were to be destroyed* In return Russia would not have any objections if Finland alone fortified the Aaland Islands.2^

V/hen the Finnish delegation read the Russian memorandum,

Paasikivl said the cessions would have to be approved by the

Finnish Diet and since the demands were of constitutional impor­ tance, they would require a 5/6* s majority for approval* Stalin expressed firm b elief that the proposals would get 99 per c e n t support.2? His statement is a good indication of the lack of understanding by dictators of how republican forms of government operate. Paasikivi also asked how the Russian demands recon­ ciled with Stalin9s famous slogans *We do not want a crumb of foreign territory, but neither do we want to cede an inch of our own territoiy to anyone*®2® Stalin** rejoinder was to the effect that in Finland's case it would be a matter of exchange*2^

2*Ibid., p. 50. g6Ibid., pp. 50-51.

g'K»nnerhel*, op. c it.« pp. 312-313, and Tanner, op. c lt.. P. 30.

g^uot«d In Tamer, loc. d t. g%bld. .Q?

The Finnish delegation ihen returned to Helsinki to confer with the government and receive further instructions* In Helsinki

(October 16) Paasikivl reported to the Council of State which discussed the Russian d cm aids in some detail* Diversity of opinion was manifest on most points, but a ll were agreed that Hanko could not be ceded*30 Especially regarding cessions on the Karelian

Isthmus there was a wide range of opinions* Marshall Marmerheim urged the government to compromise by ceding the city of Ino, which he recognised as having as great a strategic value to the Russians a s Hanko* He th ou gh t th a t perhaps in t h i s way th e l a t t e r m ight be saved* 31 Among the p olitical leaders there was an uncompromising attitude towards cessions on the Isthmus which was to decisively influence the tenor of later Instructions issued to the negotiators#32 H On October 20, President Kyosti Kallio and Foreign Minister

Erkko went to Stockholm to attend a meeting of the heads of the four Horthem States* The Finnish delegates went with the intention of sounding out these states on their attitude towards the Russo-

Finnish negotiations* Much had been expe cted by Finland from this meeting but such was not to be the case* From the outset it was plain that these states could not be counted on to aid Finland m ilitarily in the event of war because of their fear of German intervention* 33

3°Ibld., p. 31. 3lMamerheim, op. clt.. pp. 311*-3155 cf. Niukkanen, op. c it.. pp* 90-91* ^Tanner, loc* cit* 33wuorinen, Finland and World War II* pp* 56-57* Finland felt that her position was strengthened by a l e t t e r from the President of the United States, Franklin B*

Roosevelt to President Mikhail I* Kalinin of the U.S.S.R*, expressing the hope that friendly relations might prevail between

Finland and the B*S*S#R* The Seandanavian Ministers to Moscow had also endeavored to aid Finland diplomatically by seeking an audience with Molotov to express the sans sentiment as the

American President* They were unsuccessful as Molotov refused to see tbem*3U The importance the Kremlin attached to Roosevelt's message may be gauged by Molotov's speech before the Supreme Soviet on October 31 ltien he advised the American President to concern him self with the Philippines and Cuba rather t ban with Finland.35 On O ctober 21 Erkko drafted new instructions for the Finnish delegation calling for a refusal to cede Hanko and Lappohja Bay*

Only the southern part of Suursaarl could be ceded, although if necessary the whole of the Island might be surrendered to keep

Hanko out of jeopardy. There was to be no yielding on Kalastajasaarento and no reciprocal aid treaty was to be entered into* According to the instructions three alternatives were cited for a rectification of the Isthmus frontier! (1) the Khokkala bend mif^t be straightened to place the frontier about 1*5 km* from Leningrad instead of 32 km** thus eliminating the threat of long range artillery) (2) Ino cou ld

3b)fannerhelm, o£. cit., p* 313* 35James W. Ganterbeln, ed*, Documentary Background of World War II* 1931-19bl (hereafter cited as PRJBJ' "(Mew iork* Columbia University W esi; MB t7 pp. 570-581* be granted as an isolated fortress to ward off seaward danger) (3) if the Soviet Union demanded that Ino be attached directly to her territo ry , th is might be accomplished by a connecting strip lying between the line Ino-7anmeljoki-Lintulanin$ki-Jappinen and the Gulf of Finland.3& At the Cabinet meeting held that day the new instructions were presented for discussion but only on the three Isthmus alternatives was there contention. Because of opposition by some Cabinet members to the last two alternatives, the instru­ ctions were redrafted to empower the delegates to eliminate only the Kuokkala bend. Before the Cabinet adjourned Faasikivi requested that someone in the Cabinet accompsny him to Moscow, or he would not go. He then demanded that Finance Minister Vaino

Tanner be the o n e * 37 That same day the Finnish delegation set out for Moscow and arrived theie on October 23. The firs t round of discussions con­ vened that same evening with Faasikivi reading the Finnish memorandum in which Finland declared herself desirous of remaining on friendly terns with the U.S.S.R* To this end the Finnish government was prepared to cede the islands of Seiskari, Feninsaari, Lavansaari, and the two Tytarsaari islands, i f given adequate compensation, and willing to discuss amicable arrangements regarding Suurs&ari in

36Tamer, o£. c i t . , p. 3bj cf. Niukkanen, o£. c i t ., p. 90* 37Tanner, op. c it., p. 3b* 90 keeping with the interests of both na tions* On the Karelian Isthmus, the Finns declared themselves prepared to straighten 1he Khokkala bend by moving the frontier to a line running fro® Rajajokl, east of Haapala, straight to the Gulf of Finland at a ft point east of fCellcmaki church (see map facing page Up )• The other Russian proposals were rejected as prejudicial to Finnish neutrality, except that the Finns were read^ to redraft part of the non-agression pact of 1932 so that neither party would aid another state that attacked one of the contracting powers*3® Stalin*s response was that the Finns were not conceding enough* He emphasised that his former demands were minimal and, hence, could not be reduced by bargaining* A long harangue followed, diring which he spoke of the war and the possibility of an attack on Leningrad* For this reason, he claimed possession of Hanko Gape which was absolutely necessary to the 0.3.S.R*, as were the Islands in the Gulf of Finland. He scornfully reacted the offer to efface the Kuokkala bend as totally insufficient and too confined should the Red aimles have to deploy in the area to meet an enemy* In an effort to enhance his offer, Stalin drew a line on a staff map which would tens inate at the village of Koivisto* Since no authority had been delegated to the Finnish representatives on this matter they declined to discuss it* 3? Suddenly in the middle of the discussion Stalin pointed to Porajarvl and Repola and inquired what the Finns thcu$it of tie territo ry offered in exchange by the D.S.S.R* The Finnish reply

3?tfiukkanen, og* c lt** p* 91 j and Tamer og* c lt** pp. l*0*4il* was that this was m m thing to ha taken up after it was seen if agreement could ha reached regarding the reas demanded by Russia* When the Finns asked why the demands were made anyway* since the frontier had been established as recently as 1920* it became clear that the Soviet government was thinking of the possibility of war in the vicinity of the Gulf of Finland and along the ahorse of the Arctic Ocean* In this connection Stalin frequently mentioned England and France* but he also alluded to Germany* From this the Finns concluded that i t was really Germany th at he feared*^ After several hours of fruitless discuss!on* during Which the Fiims incessantly repeated their position on the basis of the Peace of Tartu and the non-agression pact of 1932 and 19A# the session was broken off* Before departing the Flims expressed th eir regrets because of the failure to accomplish anything specific and then made their adieus* So mention was made of further meetings and Molotov seemed astonished at the Finnish departure* According to Tanner* Molotov asked* “Is i t your intention to provoke a con­ f lic t f** Paasikivl retorted, “We want no such thing* but yon seam to."1*1 Back at the Finnish Legation* the delegates decided that* as no further discussions seemed possible* to return to the Helsinki the next day* That evening, however* Molotov*s secretary arrived at the Legation to request the Finns appearance for another parley that same night* Upon arriving a t the Kremlin they were once more closeted with Molotov and Stalin* who resumed the conference as

^Tanner, op* cit** t>* bis and Wuorinen* Finland and World War H . pp. 57-5&T ^Tanner* og« cit** p* 1*2* 92 though there had been no interruption#^ jn a written statement, Molotov stated that the Soviet Union would be willing to reduce the force she proposed to station on Hanko Gape (from 5,000 to i*,000) and to reduce the te rrito ria l demands on the Karelian Isthmus# He s t i ll , however, was adamant in demanding that the Russo-Finnish boundary should terminate at Koivisto. At the same time he accepted the Finnish proposal for expansion of the Non-agression Pact#^3 At the conclusion of the conference the Finns informed th eir hosts that the y would have to return to Helsinki to consult their government and Diet# Before departing from Moscow, Tanner and Paasikivi decided that a le tte r should be dispatched to Stockholm to ascertain the Swedish attitude toward Finland in the event of war. Tanner undertook to write the le tte r to the Swedish Prime Minister, Per Alb in Hansson, in which he inquired of Hansson how much material assistance and military aid Sweden was prepared to render Finland if negotiations broke down in Moscow# Hansson replied on October 27 that Finland diould not count on any direct Swedish intervention in case of war, although Sweden would be willing to continue supplying arms, munitions, and equipment as well as food to Finland# Beyond this Sweden was unwilling to make promises other than to give the Finns as fully diplomatic support as possible in Moscow# Hansson Indicated that the Swedish attitude derived from the fear of German reprisals if Sweden violated her neutrality by

**g Ibid. **3fbb, pp# 5U-56# 93 giving Finland military aid*^ A Finnish Cabinet member, Karl-August Fagerholm, actually delivered Tanner1 s letter to Hansson and at the same time discussed the Finno-Russian negotiations with the Swedish Cabinet* He fe lt that a difference of opinion existed in Sweden on the matter, with the left-wind parties supporting the policy of non-intervention and the right-wing parties supporting more favorable aid for Finland* Opponents of an intervention policy were more determined and articulated their views more lucidly than did the proponents of intervention* Part of the problem for the supporters of an inter­ vention policy was their lack of information concerning the Russian demands, which had been kept secret by the Finnish government, and the fear of German invasion of Skane if Sweden leaped into a con- f lic t on Finland's behalf Swedish fears of German reaction were well founded; Germany coveted Swedish iron ore and would have been severely affected by any interruption in ore shipments occasioned by Swedish action in Finland* Germany also feared that in aiding Finland, the Swedes migfct make concessions to France and Great Britain for bases in Sweden from which they could control the Baltic6 German views regarding Allied bases In the Baltic were possibly justified as Hansson expressed to Fagerholm the view th at, i f Norway could manage to permit transit of Allied troops across her territory to Finland, so could Sweden* ii7 Such action, in the German view, would

kkfamer, o£. c it., pp. U$-1a8* Ibid. t pp# 1*9. 5 0 .

k^DGFP§ Series D, Vol* F ill, p. 252* ^Tanner, loc* cit* permit the British and French a foothold in Sc and ana via that could he used a g a in s t Germany*

In Finland, for the first time the Diet was informed of the negotiations (October 28) when the Speaker Vaino Hakkala, and the chairmen of the various Diet party groups were invited to meet in a joint session with the Council of State* After being briefed on the negotiations in progress, the party chairmen were requested to consult with the policy committees of their parties and to reconvene later* On October 29 another session of the Council of

State convened at which the Diet party group chairmen approved the conduct of the negotiations to date and expressed satisfaction with the counter-proposals of the government. All groups were adamantly opposed to the cession of Hanko Cape and to giving way on the

Karelian Isthmus, but they did express readiness to support some compromise action to preserve peace**4®

In consequence of the assured support in the Diet, a reply was drafted for presentation to the Kremlin. Finland*s desire to preserve her national integrity and neutrality was once more reiterated and it was said that the cession of Hanko Cape was impossible* On the other hand, Finland agreed to cede the islands of Seiskari,

Peninsaari, Lavansaari and both Tytarsaari Islands, in the Gulf of

Finland* Regarding Suursaarl, Finland thought that an amicable arrangement could be arrived at that would take into account the security of both Finland and the city of Leningrad. As for the Koivisto-Lipola line on the Karelian Isthmus, that was called

impossible as it placed the Soviet frontier too close to Viipuri,

Finland1s main export harbor* As an Indication of her goodwill,

Finland now offered to cede, in return for commensurate compensation

elsewhere, the territory south of the Fammeljoki-Lintulanjoki-

Kaukjarvi line, considerably more than had been previously offered*

In the Petsamo region Finland expressed her willingness to cede

the western part of Kalasta jasearerrto up to Pummanki Fjord in

return for reasonable compensation, although the only reason cited

for the Russian demand had been that the line was Inconveniently

and artiflcally drawn**4^ In the instructions it was stressed that

the areas to be ceded were of primary military significance, as had been repeatedly emphasised by the Soviet Union, whereas the territory offered in exchange was of little strategic importance*

Moreover, the territory Finland was to cede was densely populated

and would necessitate extensive financial compensation for the losses suffered by Finnish citizens.^ Finland could not agree to the demolition of the frontier fortifications on the Karelian

Isthmus "as the measures which the Finnish Government has adopted

on the frontier are solely due to considerations of defense and

security * * * * But she is also obliged to provide for the safety

of her frontiers by the strict neutrality on which the policy of her Government is based*

**9rBB, pp. 61-63. S°Ibld. . p. 6U.

51Xbld.. p. 65. 96

October 31, the day that the Finnish representatives departed

on their return journey to Moscow, Molotov, in a gross breach of the

secrecy which until that time had been observed by both sides,

delivered a speech to the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union

exposing all the details of the negotiations. In the course of

his speech Molotov emphasized the necessity of obtaining military

security for the Soviet Union and especially for the city of

Leningrad* He declared that the Soviet Union had a right to make

the demands of the Firms for her own security and that ths Soviet

Government "was especially interested in the Gulf of Finland, that

approach to Leningrad from the sea, as well as in the frontier,

which was at a distance of only 32 km. from Leningrad.®^ In this

connection he also mentioned that the population of Leningrad almost

equalled that of Finland, i.e . about 3,500,000 to Finland's 3,650,000.

In his opinion the properulo by ths Soviet Union were modest and

confined to the minimum for Russia's security. After describing

the Soviet demands in detail, Molotov declared that an attempt to prevent the conclusion of the proposed treaty would be harmful to

Finland. He therefore expressed the hope that no third parties, e.g. Britain, France or the United States, would pressure Finland to refuse the Soviet proposala.^3 He criticized President Roosevelt

for his statement in Finland's behalf and, in an endeavor to prove how munificent was the Russian attitude to Finland, saids

52DBWW. p . 578. 53lbid.. PP‘ 578-579. 97

Of its own free w ill the Soviet Union insured the separated and independent ea& stence of Finland. There can be no doubt that only the Soviet Government, which recognizes the principle of the free development of nationalities could make such a step* It must be said that none but the Soviet Government could toler­ ate the existence of an independent Finland at the very gates of Leningrad.5u

Constemat ion prevailed in Helsinki at this breach of secrecy,

especially since the Finnish representatives had just set out for

Moscow. In a telegram delivered to the negotiators at Viipuri,

Erkko urged them to return to the capital for new instructions.

By the time the wire was delivered, however, it was obsolete and

new instructions were issued by telephone. Over the phone Erkko explained that the Cabinet had decided to leave up to Tanner and

Paaslkivi the decision as to whether the trip should be continued

or not. At Rajajoki another phone c a ll w&s aaade in which Tanner and Paasikivi informed the government of their intention to go

They decided to continue because they felt that "the purpose

of the speech was . . . to make of the demands a fait accompli

which we could no longer avoid.*56 Another consideration was

Finnish public opinion and world opinion; not to have done so might have been taken as vascillation at best and retreat at worst*^?

That same day the Finnish Foreign Ministry issued a communique referring to the speech. It stated that the publication of the views of the Soviet Union at that moment had created a new situation and

jeopardized the continuation off the conversations. Finland, on her part, had "in an independent and unbiased maimer, not being subject

^Ibid., p. 578. ^Tanner, op. cit.. pp. 58-60.

56Ib ld ., p. 59. 57Ibid. to the Influence of any foreign power, endeavored to find a solution

to the questions submitted to her, however difficult they mi#it be,

for the sake of the neutral policy she had adopted.**^ In this manner

Finland sought to assuage Soviet fears of attack fro® the west

throu#i Finland and to prove her willingness to arrive at a reason­

able arrangement that took into consideration the security of both

n a tio n s .

Wien the Finnish party arrived in Moscow (Movamber 2 ) i t was met by the Swedish Minister, Otto W* Minther, who told the delegatee

that he was trying to see Molotov to present Sweden1® demarche in

Finland1® case* Ultimately the demarche was never presented as Minther

was not received a t the Foreign Commissariat. He also informed the

Firm s that American Minister Laurence Stalnhardt had expressed th e

op in ion that the Finnish b u sin e ss would and in an acceptable agreement

At the Finnish Legation a wire from Erkko awaited the delegate®•

I t stated*

Molotov’s speech is regarded here as a ta ctica l oaneurver to frighten us. The same tactics were used successfully against Estonia. We are calm. The Russians must be shown a fir ® front. , They a re shaken to a degree by the impression made by the speech.

That evening the Estonian Minister to Moscow, A. Rei, called on

Tanner. Their talk was of a general nature at first but finally Rei

stated bluntly that Soviet-Eatonlan treaties were disadvantageous to

his state. Even the trade agreement® were not operating properly—

Soviet good® were priced too hl$i mid prices paid to Estonia were too

low. Moreover, the Soviets had not refrained fro® trying to influence

pp. 6 0 - 6 1 . ^Tanner, op. c it.. p. 62.

quoted in Tanner loc. c it. 99

Estonian domestic affairs. 61 It is possible to infer from this that the Finns were led to believe that if they ultimately submitted to the Russian demands, they would suffer the same interference that Estonia did. The first round of the new conversations began the next evening (November 3) with Stalin absent and Molotov and Potemkin present. Paasikivi read the Finnish memorandum but it made little impression on the Russians. From the views exchanged, it was obvious that the Russians were thinking along the same general lines as in the earlier sessions. Tanner states, "It was plainly evident that the intelligence with power to decide was absent from the group and that it was for this reason we were bogged down.**^ Molotov finally flatly described the Finnish proposals as unsatisfactory and repeated that the Soviet demands were minimal. For their part, the Finnish representatives declared that they had gone to the maximum limit that Finland*s security would permit. As the session was breaking up Molotov said, 11 We civilians can see no further in the matter; now it is the turn of the military to have their say." 63J It is possible that he meant the military was about to present its case but it is more likely that he meant the events that were to come in December. Negotiations resumed the next day with Stalin present, who stated that it was now time to discuss details. Though Russia tolerated an independent Finland, s till certain guarantees were required for Soviet security. Therefore, Hanko and Lappohja were required and

6 lIbld., p. 65. 6 2 Ib id .. p. 6 6 . 63 Ibid. 100

Finland could put their cession in any juridical terns she chose— lease, sale, or exchange. Finnish rejection of this proposal was countered by a proposal that the islands of Hermans5* KoB, and HIstB- BusB just west of Hanko Cape be ceded instead of the Cape itself. As no instructions had been issued on this point, the Finns declined /I to discuss it. u On the other demands the discussion followed the sen© cycle, without definite resu lt. It should be noted, however, that the tone of the conversations was reported as friendly enough. A speech made by Foreign Minister Erkko (November) was brought up by the Russians who desired to attack its content. In his speech Erkko had said that the Finnish Government was backed by a united nation and that Molotov* s speech gave a one sided view of the negotiations. He added that Finland would continue to take her stand on the principle of neutrality and the right of self-defense. Finland would also carry on negotiations on the basis of treaties s t i l l in effect between the two s ta te s .^ In their discussion of the speech, Stalin and Molotov stated that the text as published in Finland was purged of its worst parts. They claimed that they had both the unexpurgated and purged texts when the Finns expressed displeasure with the distortions that appeared in the Soviet press. 66

It was at this juncture that the second session ended with the Finnish representatives promising to contact Helsinki on the

A) Tanner, op. c i t . , pp. 67 5 and Wuorinen, Finland and World War II, p. 59.

6 %BB, p. 17. b a n n e r , op. c i t . , p. 6 8 . 101

Hanko islands proposal• The next day Tanner telephoned Erkko, who informed him that the Governor of Vlipuri province was in Helsinki to furnish information necessary to calculate the value of the property in that part of the Karelian Isthmus which the Russians wished Finland to cede. The Soviet Union had promised to pay, above and beyond the territo ria l compensation, such surns.^ That the Finnish government was already preparing for cession of Isthmusian territory indicates that Finland believed that a peaceful settlement of the matter was still possible.

New instructions arrived from Helsinki on November 8 forbidding any discussion of exchange, lease, or purchase of Hanko Cape. The same directives applied to the islands west of the Cape, and even the mention of Jussarb was unconditionally forbidden. On the Karelian Isthmus, the cession of Ino was not to be discussed as it was believed an extensive hinterland would be required also. This was tempered, however, by the p o ssib ility of discussion i f the Russians abandoned their demands for Koivlsto and Hanko Cape. In the Petsamo region the Finnish government would agree to only the northern part of Kalastajasaarento being ceded.

Both Paasikkvi and Tanner were deeply disappointed with the new directives as they left no ground for discussion, ^anner wired Helsinki for permission to break off negotiations if the Kremlin refused to accept the latest concessions. Erkko wired back that they were free to do so since Finland had agreed to cede the maximum that her security and independence would allow. Paasiklvi was especially

PP* 68-69. ^Tanner, op. c i t ., p. 73 1,02 averse to the new instructions «nd said, ®*^ow If ever would toe the time to fi^ht. But since you of the artsy (turnip to Pa&aonen) can do nothing, it is necessary to ©void war m d back up* Iona of 69 the army people but Kannerbeim understand anything*” 7 Paasiktwi had reference to Kamerhei®1© ©dirice at an earlier stag# to neke the concessions required in order to avoid war since the military was not prepared to wage a fu ll scale war*

fanner ale© expressed severe chagrin at the ten o r of the new instructions which had been approved by the Cabinet and Piet party groups* Especially was he unhappy over a statement by Hauno Pekkala, Chairman of the Social Democratic group (Tanner*s party), who had declared that the party approved the instructions 'but desired that the negotiators be directed to manage th e conversations in such a way as to avoid war* In fanner’s words, "This was truly a comfortable fashion of conducting b u sin e ss! issue strict Instructions tr m which there was to be no divergence, but still tell your men to avoid a conflict*w?® In light of Helsinki’s instructions, the delegates decided immediately that they should refuse any demands for bases at tha western end of the Gulf of Finland* I f that caused a break-down of negotiations, than they would return to Helsinkij if not then they could go on talking about territory on the fCareltan Isthmus and Suursaari* On the basis of compensation figure® received from the government in Helsinki, they drafted a memorandum concerning property to be ceded on the Isthmus and calculated tha sum required in compensation for property losses

69Ibid. 70lb ld .. p . 71. in the areas* The sum required totalled about 800 m illion Finnmarks. Armed with the latest directives, the Finns returned to the Kremlin on November 9 for another parley* When the Finnish refusal to cede the islands near Hanko Cap© was read, the Russians showed great surprise. They apparently had expected the Finns to accept th is proposal* When nothing more was said about Hanko, the Finns pointed to Suursaari on a map and proposed ceding the southern portion of the island* Stalin said that two masters on the island would never d o .^ It is d iffic u lt to understand Stalin*s position on Suursaari, for even had Finland retained possession of the northern half, the Soviet Union, with its military establishments there, would have been able to defend it s e lf from attack* Stalin then pointed to the narrows opposite SeivastB and declared that the aperture necessitated a fortress on both shores (Finland and Estonia) or it would remain unclosed* The islands Finland proposed to cede, he said, were so tiny as to be impractical for the purpose* He next slewed on the Ino question and observed that for defense purposes 20 km. of hinterland would be required, thus bearing out Erkko*s prediction* Pointing to the map, Tanner again stressed the southern half of Suursaari as the reasonable limit of Finnish concessions on that Island. If, however, the Soviet government would abandon it s claims on Hanko Cape and other western bases, the Finnish government wo’ild undertake to satisfy the Soviet demands in the ©astern part of the Gulf of Finland and on the Karelian Isthmus*^3

71Ibid., pp. 7U-75.

7 Tanner, op. c i t ., p. 75} and Wuorinen, Finland and World War IX, p. 60* ^Tanner, loc* cit* 104

Refusing compromise, the Russians stoutly maintained their original demands, thus creating an impasse. The Finnish delegation was not, In any case, empowered to meet the Soviet demands. After an hour of fruitless discussion, Tanner secured Stalin’s agreement to adjourn. The termination of the conversation recorded no satisfactory agreement.*^

A dispatch cabled to Helsinki from the Finnish Legation surmised the complete break-down of negotiations. It advised, however, that a ll public announcements be withheld pending further developments, Stalin, it was reported, seemed to be earnestly seeking an agreement This p o ssib ility was dispelled at about 12i30 a.m. of the following day (November 1 0 ) with the appearance at the Legation of Molotov’s secretary bearing a le tter referring to the Finnish aide-memoire of November 9. As the memoire had contained the sentence, wFinland cannot grant to a foreign Power military bases on her own territory and within the confines of her frontiers,* the Finns were accused of misrepresenting the Soviet position. Molotov asserted that "if • . • a piece of territory situated in the vicinity of the port of Hanko [ornearby islands] should be sold to the U.S.S.R., • , • fit} would mean that the objection that such a piece of land formed part of the territory of Finland would cease to apply, since, after being sold to the U.S.S.R., it would, ipso facto, become Soviet territory."

In view of th is claimed "misrepresentation 11 the aide-memoire was returned. That same day a letter in reply to Molotov’s was drafted which

7l*Ibld., p. 76. 7^1 bid., p> 77- 76FBBi p< 6?> reviewed the last phase of the negotiations and asserted that the Finnish negotiators had not misrepresented the Soviet proposals* It was also made clear that, even If the territories demanded wears ceded in toto* they would s t i l l r mmin within Finnish boundariee* Finnish reasons for not assenting to the Soviet demands were reiterated as was their declared willingness to satisfy the Soviet Union elsewhere* In conclusion the sincere desire of the Finnish government to conclude an agreement on the basis of the concessions proposed by Finland and the demands of the N.S.S.H* were emphasised* 77 Mo reply was received to the Finnish letter but the Soviet press launched an attack of invective on Finland, accusing her of being the ploy of warmongers* the concluding paragraph of an editorial in Krasnyl Flot, a Moscow mid-day paper, is a good example of the type of propaganda employed? Provocateurs, warmongers, and their henchmen ©re trying to represent the Soviet proposals as a threat not only to the independence of Finland but also to the security of Scandanavia, particularly Sweden* the Soviet people repudiates with loathing these filthy Insults of the International political sharpers* We know that our government1s sole motive is and has ever been a concern to restrict the war rone and to underwrite the life and peaceful work of the states which are neighbors of the Soviet peoples* Unshakably faithful to the principles of its pacific policy, the Soviet government w ill find ways and means to guarantee the security of the extreme north western land and sea frontiers of our fatherland* Taking this as a cue, the Finnish delegates sent a letter to Molotov (November 13) thanking him for the friendliness shown them during

77 a Ib id ., pp* 66-69* ^ Quot @c3 ±n Tanner, op* cit* , p. 79. 106 their stay and expressing regret that the negotiations had proven unfruitful. They continued by expressing the hope that at some later date, and under more auspicious circumstances, the negotiations might be resumed. With that the Finnish delegation departed for hom e,

It is obvious from the instructions that were first issued to Paasikivi on October 9 that Finland assumed a negative attitude toward Russian demand before they were even clarified. Such an attitude did not derive from stubbornness or lack of realism but rather from a deep and sincere desire on the part of Finland to remain apart from any conflict and to maintain her national integrity and territorial inviolability • It is deceptively simple in the light of subsequent events to say that the Finnish government should have made concessions at the time and, thus avoided the war and the territorial amputations consequent on i t . However, the general context of European power politics left the Finns little reason to hope that prompt concessions would not be met with further demands. To the exploitation of the Baltic States might be added the unencouraging spectacle of the dismembered Czechoslovakian Republic, the victim of Russia's Molotov-Ribbentrop partner. Weighing these fa cts, detachment might yet favor a policy of settlement. In the final decision of the Finns, however, experience might be said to have cast the deciding vote. It hardly strains the facts to note the similarity of Stalin in 1939 to Alexander I in 1808, Finland's dilemma is the perennial one of small states. Confronted by a Great Power that takes opportunity rather than responsibility for its rationale, it must look to history

79Ibid., p. 80. 107 for ju stice, The plight of Melos in the path of an expanding Athenian Empire, finds its just expression in the timeless account of Thucydides? If we yield now, all is orerj but if we fight, there is yet hope that we may stand upright. • . It may be your interest to be our master, but how can it be ours to be your slaves?^

Thucydides, The Pelopermesian War, tran. Benjamin Jowett, in C. A. Robinson, J r., ed ., Selections from Greek and Roman Historians (Mew York: Rinehart and <3o•, Tnc•, I 9?9J, pp. I 6l , 103. CHAPTER ?

LAST DAYS OF PEACE AMD UHDECIAEVD WAR

During the la st week® of Movenber matters on Finland’s part regained stable and quiet. Tbs populace of the capital was happy to ■think that a bad phase had passed and that the situation would tend to be easier, M ot so in the Soviet Union, however, for throughout the remainder of flovember, the Russian pres® continued to rain invective on Finland and Soviet planes repeatedly violated Finnish air space,* Events rapidly reached a climax cm flovember 26 with the fateful

"M alnlla Incident,* 1»®. the Soviet allegation that Red troops in th a vicinity of the village of MainlXa on the Karelian Isthmus were fired upon by Finnish a rtillery . Allegedly a ncm-commtssioned o f f i c e r and three soldiers were killed and nine others wounded, 2 Thereafter, events followed on® another in rapid succession. The Soviets demanded that

Finnish border troops be moved 'back a distance of 20-25 km, from the frontier. The F in n ish government refused to do th is and denied that

Finnish artillery had. fired the shot® on Mainila, It was suggested that perhaps the Soviet troops while practice firing, had accidently fired on the village since three F in n ish border guard® had reported that the shots came from south of Fainila,3

3&annerheljR, op. c i t , , pp. 31*-3l9f and Kiukkanen, op, c i t , , p, 1 1 2 , According to Fanmrheim, " Soviet planes had violated Finnish air space frequently since October 9* ^FRB, pp. 70-71. For the m ilitary’s view on the matter, c f. Fanner- helm, c i t , , pp. 319 and Hiukkanen, o£^ c lt» , pp. 112- 1 1 3 .

3 Ibid., p. 7 2 . xm

Aeturiily the flxa* aesiM m% hoae am to flrtei* «e the Harden elatod* m $M aldwOetotap had ordteed a il er££Ue*r w a d basic imm the f amtslftr hr * aifrto» greater ton to ir mz%m* 'Xm th e gone artier tha ftamJhftl tel d to ato that great mm be eawedeod in the of aircraft end avsgl ‘mmmX.®# le e t 3aat *&& sst im tdant be p w to d * ^ n iat t o Hal*die. abet* tieee a mwl® mmMmft&m m the part «£tha Soviet eaa regaled in ISA#t o o eeptoed Raaabm m lM ^ m m t^S M m d that to toddaee had beae arranged tgr the lade*^

fhe flm tah ^cemaencit *swd© e m z f endearne to r w d n at peaee* Their effort* to&titiM an appeal «e tSowattfeer 2? te the 0*S*a*B* for the af e jo ist eeaadttee te limetigs&e the nattcap In mms*&&nm %tth the w w lit frent&ar eenelrsdad on Sapteeber &* 1928*^ B&jdiftEi further deelarod itself ^rajsroii » * * to open v m m m m M & m with a r i s e to th e m t o l withdra^^ of traspe to a eartaiti dteheaeft f t* the frailer* *? mmm*m to the ntedati iisa a flat rojisoticm of a ll HmtiLtak effo rt to a-'j'stefc Use td&aet&en* Xa r^Ay M n to r abated that? the ftedJh ^ w w l 1! t*®fiy to the net# free the Ommmmfa of to fi*s*s*IU « i i is @ clee^wit idtleh reflate to deep he&tlllhy of t o Wkm&Mi Q-mrnmmmfc tmmM® t o ti*S#S*!t* and 1 m the ea«s# of t o mitmmm tmwi&m i n t o rnlMmm tw^mm t t m tm mmtrMm*. • * • bat a .l»lg mm aeaoirt for to ebtmpt dent bf a3 1 egin? f ir t o ^reetlee by .Miat #rtCO*€tr e» the setnaSL a&thlft eight of Ftoiah tawope*^

•0 n o

III rejected' t o Mm. of M itmt «ithdam& of tmop® imm the t e t e baoauao It mnM pat ttoo %d troops in tlaa of totegwl#: t e aafetsr muM be ia tiroa %mgmm/9 aid thdmsimm# tho Hoaoi&as m m m 0& * « d l^ a r a l t&toraiaX* If Finland f«He£ to aoafe tfrsm ^mmmim# m$M w&p acrotr^i i t to ®e«** that tha Flana £m&imA to throaton and ia vioo of' Fix&uxHa eo ac»lM tii® of a t a t # imflber of yogtHoar teoofpo ia t o iarodiabo id©laity of tasteprai! and siihjoetltig i t * ♦ * to a diiw t throat# t o Ita d sh Gooorswenfc ham* cmmItted a hootilo net .o^ainurt the !J*s»S#fl# a&Lefe is incojs^tlla£te nl&h tbo of ilosWtiisvoaoloti « « #£ therefore* to Unto isdta^soIJfer moosrieed to tractor* Bafom t o Fimioh Hli&oter to IUtmm m®M slata^ Ida pw a» »afc% m,pdy to to latent Soviet note* ib© t a t a ttetai oa Sicm»ber I f scmsroi tdplatsato zML@fcMm wMh Iditail* Xa it# note aapXsinto tbi® oetioo th© JOmlln ototod to t Flnalah txoqpa eosifetaiid to attach tho £qw&©t forea® and therefore the Soolet gmranosEt e©Xki a© longer ©nfipe &iq£i a eltuattonb Finland was hoM for all the terdor ^dbe^tetsjUma and m s saM -to bsvo prw sto , to r altoaftloa* For thio roaaots 3o*t©t a^fsc^lo and di|tom tlo rapr^setitetiim© to Finland -mm tlmmwtMMm# t o f%m&tfo l&ttlater datawsd tha Finnlsti note to the K&oall& t o t da^r* tn it to Fitndsfi gowmont m p m n m d a deair© to ©ste&tlafc a e^acdtatloa m m dM m to iiwostigate bronter 3m&6et&e and, ehouid that eourae fall* eug^aatod aubadtttliie the d&apt&o to a noatral partr for

95SS* 10X^3.« p. 7 5 , % ta4., p. 76. lit.

All attempt® to maintain peace failed and on November 30, tha Soviet Union without wanting or the issuance of a formal declaration of war eoomsneed regular military operations- on land, sea, and in the air along the whole Finno-Sovtet border.^ The Hod air attack was directed at industrial centers and cities, especially Helsinki* On Soviet news reports it was claimed that Finnish accounts of bo mbs being dropped cm civ ilia n centers were fabrications® The Had Air Force had merely dropped bread o n the starving masses of Helsinki 1 Hence the term “Folotev's bread-baskets.*13 At this point the full import of Kolotov*© statement that it was up to the military to have its say was brought forcefully home® Thus begin Finland9s ordeal by combat as the David of the North met the Goliath of the East in battle® Tim Finns could not turn to Germany for succor and support as the MolotoiMlibbsntrop Fact between the Heich szsd the O.S.S.E* prevented such aid on tha part of Germany* Hence, other aid was sought f ram the ttost, l*e# Scandanavia, France and Britain* In the meantime the Helsinki government turned to the task of conducting the war and endeavored to find a means of restoring peace* Immediately on the outbreak of h o s tilitie s i t was decided that the Helsinki government should be reconstituted for successful conduct the war and, if possible to continue negotiations with the Kremlin* The decision was based in part cm the feeling in Helsinki that the

x*Fartnerheim, op* cit* , pp.j pp. 320*321s 320*321} and and Fekka Tiilikainen, HedfogelostaJana Tuliffejolllaa (Provoo, Finland! Vferner Sdderstrdm dsaksyhli87" IvliO'V, pp. 30-31*

^^uorinen, Finland and World War II, p. 6 3 . 1 1 2

K rem lin tfo u ld n o t b® likely to pursue negotiation® with the g o v ern ­ m ent that had spurned its demands® From the outset of the war the continual policy of the Finnish government was to restore the p e a se by one m eans or another* Thus in keeping with its decision to resig n , th e existent government headed by Cajander tendered it® resignation to President K a llio on H evenber 30® The next day R is to

^yti agreed to head the new government a® Prime M inister w ith Tftind

Tanner assuming th e office of Foreign Minister and Juho Ka F e e sik iv i as minister without portfolio.^ As soon as word ©f the Russian attack was reported to the outside world, Sweden and the U*S* offered to act a® mediators*35 3©th these offers were gratefully accepted fey F in la n d but the Soviet Union r e f u s e d to accept them* tihen these efforts proved of no avail, the mm Finnish government turned to the league of Nations for aid (December 3) in settling the conflict* Russia refused to attend th e sessio n s dealing with th e matter. Molotov, in his reply to the invitation from the committee appointed by the league of Motions to investigate the Ruase-Pinnlsh conflict, in fo rm ed the ©owlttee th a t* The U.S.5.R. is not at war with Finland and does not threaten the Finnish nation w ith war • • * The S oviet Union maintains peaceful relations with the Democratic Republic of Finland, whose Government signed with the U.3.S.R* on December 2 Pact [s lc j o f Mutual A ssistance and friendship* This Pact s e t t le s f ill questions which the S oviet Government had f r u itle s s ly discussed with d elegates former CsicJ Finnish Government now divested of its power.3?

^Tanner, op. cit** pp. 97-98. ^Ihid** pp. 100-101*

l6£BB, p. 21. 17ibid.. p. 95. m

fid© mmtmomm* iafoMBd the wr&t im* the fteii tl m of the pugpet g«»rs«te©^aoh % t®? the its the fwaiter ta tita t o f T ortjoyu fid© p0im1o«l?iard©li iso w ram t mas heeded tgr Otto guaefjaety a Ftedei* eotUe ro sd teit la Busslm sirm® the defeat of the- So&g la the $li#sieh Her of £&3mettev Tim iftwians m :$M. m %& ragetiat® eith ttd© ^m raem t eteee tbnr eppmwifcafer ese* peseta a ©tdft vteteay m m T±pXtm& msl the ai^bliatsiaiit of 0 septet* tgrp© gownweait in fkm inz with unprecedented a laa rlt^ the Loegtii of Ilatioa® Ceune&Si eotedtted the estter to- the Aeaeu&ahr on Be©a®iber S> * On. T$®o$m» her 11 the belligerent* wee wgnd to wee* hoettdttte* ead m$k m^imiXnnm &m$M the 3o*iet @Qrim»isat ref *»ed on the mm- gmm$a m before* eodi on Beeewtoer Hi the Ammfflty pmm^ m rwc&e&len a» * 4mmXm? tho ilnsa&an wtstee aad orgteg xdl tongue mmtmm m& state© timt w not iwte© to roador IM te! hwa&tai&aa oni wterM L w s is te w poaotbte*. fhe A«eemt£lQr farther reeoteed tfcet saw dar to capped the M u fiw the laagno -of H&tigw#^ J&thootfi the wdld feed hew -urged to «td $&&ani» M tHo eere then. strong a^mrc!;^a deltwrod to Ramie m& mzpmmXom of egowther ^totssted to fMUrsi* f« f her pert swdoo rojoeted the appeal far ©Mbetmtlal eddltesqr aid and ©oatoiteI her#a£f i&tti not mldm a tcmmX dmlMmtion of Fp® the WLted state?# owie eegrewlen# of e@wp>etlor and* m m iawHmtt order#

1% W ., pp. 1CFJ-305. 3%Md„, pp. av»3 and 85WUU,

^!si»osticd% op. d t.# p. 37 I1* n i t curtailing export of essential raw materials and industrial products to the Soviet Union* This seriously haispered the U*S.$*R*'s ability to P i wag® e ffe c tiv e war* Of ©or© immediate importance to Finland, how* ever, was m American loan o f th ir ty m il lio n dollars to be used for 22 civilian purchases*

On th e other h an d , 0@rmmy9 one© a good friend of F in la n d 's , m wsm d a coldly cynical attitude towards her, and stated in effect t h a t the Finns had brought on th e war by not concluding a treaty of non-aggression with Germany when it was offered* In response to a Finnish appeal for German support in Hoscow to end the c o n flic t, the Wilhelms hrasse replied that it could do nothing in tte s e o w * ^ Further indications of Germany's attitude was manifested later in

D ecem ber when the le tc h r e f u s e d to permit tra n s it o f a rts and troop® t o Finland across Germany territory and prohibited German fir~® from s e llin g arms to Finland*^ In fa c t a sh ip m en t of Italian airplanes, w h ich had crossed th e whole o f Germany and w ere ready for shipment to' Finland from a north Gorman port were ordered shipped back to Italy*

During th e period German p-":" - and radio reports expressed no sympathy for Finland, and the ' >r.h government warned Sweden on a t l e a s t three occasions to rem ain neutral in the Finnish conflict or risk war with

Ckmnsny* *5

2*Ibid* 2% uorinen, Finland and World War II* p« 68*

23IMZ» ^ ie s D, Vol. VIII, p. h79. ^Tanner, op* cit* * pp. 13.7-118*

^Swuorinen, Finland and W orld War I I , p. 69* u s

Thus, for a ll practical purposes, Finland stood alone against

her giant adversary and could entertain little hope of ultimate

victory, the Finnish government realised that the only realistic

course open to them was to make peace at the earliest possible moment. This was an important reason for the change in government

In order that objections from Russia about the composition of the

government, would be lessened when, and if, peace negotiations should begin. CHAPTER V I

THE TORTUOUS ROAD TO PEACE

Every effort was made by the Finns to defend their independence during tha Winter War, although in the opinion o f Mannerheiat, the nations military preparedness was seriously deficient* In his Memoirs he quotes the following statistics to show the inadequacy of m aterials t Cartridges for rifles, quick fire guns and machine guns • •••••••*•• ...... ••• 2 months 81-MM. grenade projectiles • •••*•*•••••• 22 days 77-mm. shells for field guns 21 0 122-mm* shells for field howitzers ...... 2k " Shells for heavy artillers ...... *•*••• 19 n Fuel and lu b ricatin g o i l • . * .• ••••••««• 2 months Aviation fuels • • • • ...... 1 raonth^

The Marshal further points out that the ratio of Russian to Finnish divisions was nine to seven and that the Hussion advantage in artillery was a nlopsided1* two regiments to one* In addition, the Red d iv isio n s each contained an an ti-tank sectio n and armored b a tta lio n with from i*0 to 50 tanks, and an anti-aircraft company, while the Finnish units had no such corresponding complements* Regarding automatic weapons and grenade throwers, Kannerheia states that., on the average, the Soviet divisions were twice as strong as those of the Finns. Furthermore, the Red artillery strength, per division, was three times as great as that of the Finnish divisions* Despite these differences, the U.S.S.R. was able to place 26-28 divisions in the field against nine for the Finns

%annarheim, j£. cit.. p. 3&. 2Xbid., pp. 321*-325, 330. n ?

Hoi m il m s to Finland’s disadvantage# homv®rg for fro© childhood every f&m m s trained to co-operate with nature* Thi© now stood Urns 4a good stead# and ms the Furnish sns&m were In white to blond with t"c snow and placed on ski©# they had the advan­ tage of superior mobility and bettor scmceatant in winter warfare# To these advantage*© was added the tnialng the troop© had received in the fro n tie r mem© during October and Hpnrafcer* Buries those week© the troop© had been thoroughly fa m ilia rised w ith the terra in and country** sid e over which they were to fight* f ie ld fo r tific a tio n s had continued to be erected and win© fields laid* Moreover, the short winter day© handicapped the adversary* s superior air power *3 These preparations .proved their worth in nesting the in itial onslaught of the Soviet amies*

During December acid January the Finnish armies performed the impossible — they wMMged to h a lt the Had advance and destroy large cuMbers of troops* Thus the front w sta b ilise d and the Finnish govern* m n t m s ambled to s e e k peace on reasonable t e n s e * l a ea r ly me D eeetaber & wtliitud# of offers to mediate the conflict m m received in Helsinki*

Frota Denmark smm mn o ffe r to r e q u e s t Cksrwray to preach the Soviet Union on th e m ite r * At the m m t ism Sweden again offered it© good offices for the asm purpose# fo reig n M inister Halvdan ICoht o f norway#

in a personal not© to T enner# suggested that t * » Finn© surrender Kanko

Gape in return for neutrmlimatlou of the O u lf o f F in la n d * In the e v e n t

3Xbid„ p . 323, 326. 113

th at th is proposal mot Helsinki's a p p r o v a l* tm m& prepared to males m

demarche in Mq so o s«U

Vague reports sore also reooiwsd from Estonia t h a t the S o v ie t

Union realised i t had undertaken a misadventure* I t nos rumored that

t h a t t h e Soviet government e x p r e s s e d the hops that negotiations might be resumed I f Finland agreed to comply with certain conditions^ Later clsrifLoation of th is proposal stated that Ants Flip# the Etonian

Foreign M inister* had l^ard from the Gremlin that Finland could pur«

c h a s e peace by ceding Hanko and forcin g fa n n e r to r e s ig n * ^ *Xt was decided to answer th is announcement b y saying that Hank© could n o t b e c e d e d under any circumstances and t h a t i t d id not b eh o o v e the S o v ie t

U n i o n t o dictate how th e Finnish government was to t m composed***? After 3B2Ch debate in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Cabinet# i t wm finally decided that Germany provided the best hope for successful radiation* Therefore# Germany sms to be approached first on the m atter and# if tfsis failed# a nunter of other states might be asked to intervene on Finland's behalf* Warding the latter decision# it was considered best to approach the United States as a disinterested mediator* Prime M inister ftytl and foreign Minister fanner brought the matter up in a casual discussion with U« F* Arthur Sehoenfeld* the American Minister to fihland# in DeoeT&er* the latter elicited interest In the project but

Mannar, dU. pp. 1 1 5 -1 1 6 . 5jbM „ p. 1 1 6 . ^Xbid. 7Ibld. 219 expressed doubt if the moment mm propitious* On January 9 tin® Foreign JUTfa irs Committee of the Cabinet decided to request the United States* In conjunction with Italy* to approach tbs Soviet Union with a view of offering to mediate and bring an end to tlsa ho stilities* It was further suggested that the United States ask Italy to ®im£L* taneoosly urge both Genaaiy and Sweden to av o u ch Finland and the Soviet Haim with ths m am purpose* fh m by a Joint representation on the behalf of Finland* it was felt that a Just settlement might bo reached* Bespits tnc in terest aroused* nothing over earn© of bh® idea md i t ultimately m s dropped •& In keeping with their intention of first addressing m appeal to Germany* the Finns on Beeeriber IS sent Professor T* II* Eiyiaaki to B erlin to loam i f Germany would be agreeable to undertake such a role* ilia findings added little to shat was already known in Helsinki for i t m® Obviously too early fo r any agreement to bo reached in Moscow bhrou# tha offices of the Wilhelmtrass©W ith the cosing of the now year* however* Finnish suoee&M m t h© front created an air of in govermemt c ir c le s in The moment appeared suspi«* clous to press for German mediation and to this end Tanner Invited Wlpart von HLuohar* the German Minister to Finland* to the Foreign Ministry for a discussion on January h§ 1$*0« Tamer approached the 8 matter in an oblique manner by asking Blocker what advice Germany might

%bfcJ., pp. 116-11?.

9X bU ., pp. U T . la o

w o ffe r to a s s is t ti®r in withdrawing fro® tint war* Bluohetr coantomd lay asking w;is& Finland would suggestIn ©as© the possibility to tiisetw peace should arias* I© went on to say ill® « M t i w umfairam abl© fo r pesos discussions aim® the Eads had yet to Min a victory, but proadsod to inquire m to lb® attitude of his garermaent on'the matter*^ 4ttbougb thee© comrcrsaitons nor® supposedly ecm fid efiifa l, word o f thorn lodged out* Hi® Flemish M nistor to Gopeshagan, Paavo Pajula, reported to his t that the CtaroBi Minister to Moscow, Count 0* F* voo dor Soht&si&urg, had to ld tho Itonlsh Minister there th at Gernany hoped peace could bo matured between the two belligerents* BMme resorts bigm to appear In the world pros® to the effect that Germany bed already tresM ltted a peace proposal to Hereon* Bagardiag the new® report®, Harri fids®©, the Finnish Minister to Franc#, reported, that he was of the opinion th at Moscow had in stig a te d the rumors as a counter now® to A stern p imm to aid Finland#-^ a tttmm rmamm mm probably m U founded, for at Blusher*® ixmUmm Germany had already begum to explore the p o s s ib ility o f peso® in Moscow* » Do a dispatch t o Isis goeernoesKt dated January 11, 19b0# Bluehar u rg ed an alteration in German p o licy v ia ^ y ts . the !I*3*S*E«^and. urged sine# Soviet 'wmmkmm had been revealed, &tmmg®r mrnmmm to meter®' psaoe*^ Bespit© Me efforts, matters progressed slowly* On January 1?, Tapi©

^DQFP, Series D, ?

22iXW, Series 0, Vol. VIII, pp. 630-652. x a

P o r m m n t to Urn Finnish Foreign J^niatar* was bold by 0 w a r n hegatdon Counselor Seiner $£® vm m M that no reply to Blusher'a inquiry Had yet toon received fro® Berlin*3^ xt Is reasonable* therefore* to s u s p e c t that Oemany and the Soviet liklon war® seriously studying the matter of peace* Co dwsasry 19 Blubber appeared at the Foreign grinds try to report t h a t Hh© Oeraan Government i s of the opinion that at the moment there arc no pro®poets of putting an end to -the a® th o u g h © a d sa v o rin g to m it ig a t e the r e p ly * HL&her wondered out loud if * after a ll their victories5 tb© Finns would really bo disposed to make peace* Mhen fanner quickly assure# hi® that Finland sincerely desired p e so s* the German asked i f Finland had really expected Berlin to mediate peace la

« ^ Hoscor# Bluchsr aeeiiXrigly desired to giro fanner the torsssion that Germany had not made any m p m m m te M M m to the K rm & in and that# after meditating on the proposal to do so* had reached a negative decision regarding the' m atter*^ ghc o#rwn r e p ly and Blusher*® attitude w ou ld seem to Indicate that Qenaany did not wish to appear incapable of making har influence fe lt in Moscow* Another a tta in t to end the war throa^i Osman mediation was made after dsmary 2U when Biooher again called on fanner# BXuchsr started tammtlng that t m Q m m m negotiation plans had leaked, out and sought

Oronnor, eg. c it., p. 120. P3ff, Seriea D, Tea. TUI, p. 677. ISlancar, og. o lt.. p. 120. 1 2 2

to blame the Finns for the breach of secrecy. Tanner sharply refuted this by reading a memorandum recounting Pajula’s report of Sehulenburg’s talk in Moscow about hopes for peace. Thereupon the German brushed by this point and asked Tanner if he had any new proposals to make to Berlin* To this Tanner replied that, in view of Germany1 s negative answer before, wIt is unpleasant to knock on the same door twice .w^ On this note the attempt to use Germany as a mediator at Moscow ended until February 17 In the meantime other roads to peace were being explored by H elsin k i. On New Tear’s day, Mrs. Bella Wuolijoki wrote to Tanner suggesting that she might be assigned the task of ascertaining through her friend Mme. Aleksandrs Kollontai, the Soviet Minister to Stockholm, i f peace were p o ssib le . Tanner agreed to tr y th is approach and on January 8 Mrs. Wuolijoki came to Helsinki for instructions. On January 10 she departed for Stockholm, where the next day she reported having made contact with Mas. Kollontai, who thought the moment propitious for peace efforts. A few days later Mrs* Wuolijoki informed Helsinki that a pair of military men were on their way from Moscow to discuss the matter of peace. On January 21 the in itia l contact was mad© with the two men, who merely inquired about conditions in Finland and were other­ w ise reserved and uncommunicative. On the tw enty-sixth a phone c a ll to Erkko, the former Foreign Minister of Finland, in Stockholm disclosed that no details were yet available. Apparently the Russians wished to assure themselves that the Finns earnestly desired peace and were not just sta lling for time. At this point the whole matter cam© to a momen­ tary standstill.^

^%he foregoing se ctio n and quote are from Tanner, op. c i t . , pp. 121-123. 3*7lbid., pp. 1 2 3 -I 2I4. i a

That Ihissla was not yet ready to nak& peace* and tlm m tam did not wish to push the StooKhdUi oawera&tione too rapidly# is prowd by a iseoKsraadim coroerniiig a stateeaot by Bolster dispatched m January 2S U rn the Gorman B iw sy in lts@eoif to th® Qrnmm Foreign Ministry* The ^imoraiidoai pointed out that the Soviet territorial $&m m m statod in the plan. upon try th© tcmsiissxi gwmrmmnt* In tliia same regard* the esobimed* o • • the Soviet Ckmrmat could xunnr tolerate a hostile Flanlah £km&r*s»ht close to l^rdngrmd arid th@ r a ilr o a d # in ijuudorstgesding 'with th e Tanaer** %t± and with ttansitieim was entirely out o f the question*!-* It was further stated that m m i f Sviniuifmid wore to head a m ® g m m m m n k t there -'a© no likelihood of agraeiaent sins# ha was too moh 111®. Xaaoer and % tl* There was roen left* hm m & $ for e&psin- stem and eupplMKitatiea of &uusiniinfs goverzaMMxt when i t took over the gm easnt in Helsinki*3*^ itepsrontty this agent that B®m mztoer® of the Beleinkl government would be alloeed to enter feusimn*© puppet cabinet© Despite, th is peeelniatle nob©* which was evidently unknown in Finland* a significant break-through In the StoofchdUi discussions occurred on January Sonetlro before* whan the Swedish Foreign M inister* Gunther* had naked 3fne» lolXomi&i I f Sweden night mdlate between Finland and the f?»s«S«B** theoffer was turned down# He

*%3TP, Sarise D, Vol. VIII, pp. 703-709. X%M4., p. 709. IA again pressed the question an January and thia t im received a m afflrmtiw? amwer#^ Has* Kolleabal agreed to transoit the suggestion to Kcsoow# ami on the twenty «cdnth received an a*'iff«er £rxm Molotov station* in part# that# *The o*5*S*E* !ms no objection in principle to concluding an agreattmt 'with tbs % il-fanuer goeejmnsafe#11^* Xtim tfm abortive Kuuaiaon gevensaent was thrust unaarwmloosl^r aside by the Soviet Union arid tha way was opened for definite peace m m a U o tto * In lbs reply th© Kremlin made no mmfyim. of Hanks* Cape# but stated that since war had intervened# contrary to Soviet wishes* even greater guarantees far the securing at the Soviet borders acre necessary and required# Finland was also informed th at. If a detente nere readied* concessions larger then taose deoaaded la Qaibber~Hcrveii>©r 1939# weald haw to be xaade#^ the Flnoleh gowortssmsii drafted a reply stating that it mm pre­ pared to negotiate with the point of departure being the Moscow negotia­ tions of th© previous fall# It was also pointed out# however# that ^in­ land was not responsible for the m r and that she had on several different occasions expressed her ardent desire to end It# In order to find an m iiim ctam solution, the Plans stated they m m ready to code such territory as was dsesaed necessary for the security of Leningrad in return far- cennensarate compensation elsewhere# Helsinki considered i t s e lf -

gOtanmr. op. clt.« p. 125.

a S iM -

2%5awi9r!i»ia, op. o lt., pp. 373-379} and laaner, 0 £. alt., pp. 125-126. 125

e v id e n t i t m% monetary eottpene&ticn would be md® to llm dah eltisone for property losaott in any aroas ceded* Moreover* acntrhllaatlAa of tb® Qtalf of Finland by intonm tlcm l agreonont would bo considered*23

Whan the reply ooo reositw t in Stockholm for tff&rusel&alcn to

Mmmv on. February 2* oimter felt that It did not offer enough* He agreed* however* to forward. i t to Mono©*# th r o u g h Mm* K o llo n ia i*

B a tin g the day the Russian Minister called on oSnther and in f o m e d him that Moscow had a p p r is e d her of its us^illiiiipiocc to d ro p It® dewwid® regarding Sank© Cape* Since no amtlfiKi had. boon oonocr* t? ning Hunk® Oapo .in the telegram of January 29$ Ounther evinced s u r p r is e arid told ftae® Kbllmi&i that he- doubted if Finland would agree to their it aotm dem iioii* 4 abort ehile later Gunther gave M»* Kbliontal*® m w m g p to who th e n expressed doubt regarding t h e wisdom o f sending the

Finnish reply to Mqcggk* Beeenee of its positive nature* however*

O&titMir encouraged sending the etetenaot and the Finnish reply was given to Moo* KdHoixtni for deliverance to M om m later that dgy*«&

On F©brassy 3* htea* S o l l e n t a l again v is ite d Oaxftber in m ex te w c ly nervous state mid told the Foreign Minister she -sauted it recorded that

'jar acceptance of t h e reply did not ist&y hsr approval of i t s ©ardsesia*

She wm& on t o say that she had isssrely sen t i t an a m%tm o f iafaraotloa to the Krosilia* Turning to the Barsfe© Capa question* sb® asked if there

23x«fmr*j0g« olt** pp* 127-128i tm§ vtaorlam* F&afond mm World ffifle % h.m am r§ op* cit** p# 126* 126

®Sa&h«r

On th© b a sis of this iafermatlem It w decided, that Foreign Minister fanner shoold b© asked to v is it Stockholm to speak with Has* EoHmtai personally* arrived la the Smdieh capital m February !* wMr* he me immediately briefed by Mr a# k'uolljokl# Hi© la tte r told him th at Mm* KolXc&b&i was o f th© opinion 'that the Finnish rep ly w m m t a mtisfaotory basis for negotiations sine© i t did not include m g proposal for a Soviet baa© a t th© mouth of th© Oulf of Finland'* She had# tiorefora# sent a report m th© Fimish rsply m a matter of Inform* tlo n .26 On February fanner talked with ttan# who told him that I t would 'm in Finland*© best interest to m k® pm&m m the 3 *5 •£»•&* w m planning a massive military o tim m im in the Spring,* In Mr ©pinion# Itm k® Cap© wm %he c*m o f the matter* and she pressed fo r Finland's assent to irioaslan data&nda on th© question* Tsnmr finally proposed that# for th® ament# the offiolal attitudes of th e ir respective government# be set aside while thagr engaged in a frank and c^on discussion of tlm $ d m of both nations# It wm agreed to do this and Tamar said that# though Finland coaid not to ceding Hank© Cap## ha ms personally willing to consider cession of sons© tmspeoifiod inland at the month of the dolt

aglbld.. pp. 129-130. pp. Iii2-lii£. 1 2 ?

of Finland to th® H#3»$*it» I f such a proposal found fairer inMoses**

h© promised that he m ild give i t a c t i v e support in Helsinki* There m ild iim m to he territorial eospaiisatlan elsewhere to m m m g® Finnish public opinion, hut lamer thought that ftegx&a and PcrajSrvi m ild Suffice# ?fee# loH ontal seised cn th is suggest!*®* and asked i f th® island was so located m t o eorrespofsd to th® Soviet Union*® original needs# Tanner refused to m m the island but assured her that It would

Mne tte t?.S.3.a.*a p a r p o s : Hg further i* h > « her that tea Finn**

g a m m m n t m » read? to begin negotiations tiimedisibely# In this regard he suggested that Stookfetita sesnsd to bo the m m t suitab&s p lm o to MK4 them* Upm ttd® not® th® conversation closed with Hue* IcHm tal promising to transmit the suggestion to Hose**? by cable As a rssultt it was deaMod that Tamar shotild ronain. another day In Stock­ holm to await Moscow* s reply to his cujjjeslloru

The zm zt day (February 6) Molotov cabled that ?annar*a suggestions vm m insufficient as a basis for mgotiaticfi®* H m * KoSXesital asked Tamer to socetfu the inland fee proposed in c-h® hops that this night s©rvo as an opening to mgotiations# Tanner refused to do so and stressed that toe suggestion was his cmn arid he was not sure that it would find support in Helsinki# 2amodiat®!y afb*tr th is nesting with opt das# hallomial, Tanner returned to Helsinki#

In the Britain ant! T r a m e h&d bm a m actively interested in th® kuosc-Finnish War# Whenth® Finns had proven that they were

2hbld.. p. Xk:.~2Jk7. 28lt-id., pp. lk7«CU*2. i m

capable of stopping th® Hussion war machine, the A llies began to consider sliding substantial military aid to Finland via Noncagr and Sweden* Tbm 'League of Motions resolution of Becembar lii urging th© nations of the world to aid Finland provided the ideal rationale for Allied plans to bring Iforway send Sweden Into the 'Western camp# Sines a ll was q uiet m the french front, careful attention could b® given, to the northern conflict as a moans of opening a see and front against Germany at the expense of so Scandinavian. neutral tty * In aooordano© with these plans, the A llie s on B^jsribsr 2? and 26 had informed Sweden, that, in keeping with the League of fteticB* decision, they w@m ready to render indirect aid to Finland* 1*©* supply technicians and tiato-vimls* To implement their e fort#, they requested that Swe^ ©n agree to expedite the program by allowing transit of the Items* The Swedish govcitsMmt on 3 and it, 13b0, declared itself ready to

agree to such t r a n s i t , but said that it preferred that the supplies be sent in the *s© of fiimiish purchases from abroad* Shortly thereafter, Britain grantee Finland permission to recruit volunteers in th© British

Isles* Great Britain tn m requested permission for transit of such 30 volunteers across Swedish territory* Prior to the British action in December, the question of aid to Finland had come up in the Allied Supratu® Council (beeeraber 19) where ©am# diversity of opinion was manifest* ?riae Minister Baladier of France desired to dispatch an expeditionary force iisaedlately, but the British were hesitant because of the possibility that suoh action would

PQ ^Ohurcriill, o|j* £ i|* * ^9* 51$ if* ^% uoriuen, Finland and World vfer 1 1 , p* 70* 129 lead to a breach w ith th® Soviet Union, u e s p it e th® British objections,

Doladier, portly after th® o p e n in g o f th e Mew fear* ordered th e formation 31 of such a force to aid Finland. Regardless, th e final decision to aid

Finland wm n o t reached until February 5, 19140, and only after i t was decided to petition Homey and Sweden to grant transit right® for the expedition, The seal j u s effort® of the F in n is h Minister to Paris, H o rrl

Holma and Colonel Aladar Paasonsn, the Military attach© there, played 32 a la r g e part i n securing this decision.

That th e A llie s w ere so suddenly' galvanised into action or* F in la n d 9a behalf undoubtedly fallowed th# la u n c h in g of a massive Soviet offensive on

February 1 which threatened to crush th e Finnish armies. It was in consequence, that th® overtures of peace to Moscow, via Stockholm, had b e en undertaken, Th® Eusso-Finnisk ^ar was advantageous to th® A l l i e s and, i f it should end quickly with a F in n is h defeat th e highly b e n e f i c i a l disturbance of Soviet economy would b® terminated, In that case, Russian a id to Germany would b® p o ssib le . Furthermore, m lo n g as th e northern

:%r continued the A llies had a d eq u a te reason for bombing the C a u c a sia n oil fields which supplied Germany with petroleum, and a rationale for 33 s to p p in g Swedish ore sh ip m en ts to the H e ie h ,

■On. February 3 Frkko wired that Molotov was interested to know what island Tanner had in mind in his discussions with Ito* fCollontai.

Thus & mw hope was aroused that p e a ce might yet be attained. A fte r a conference between E y ti, T a n n er, aw:! Major G en era l Rudolf balden, liaaon o ffic e r fo r Maamerhaim1® headquarters, i t was decided, t h a t in light of th e Allied offer®, no reply" would b© given regarding the island in mind

31 tiannertielB, oo. cit., p. 378.

^ farm er, od . c i t . , p . 11*9. ^Wuorinen, Finland and World War II, pp. 70-71, 1 3 0

a t th at tim e* Later that day Kra* Wuolijoki phoned Helsinki and also inquired about th® island* She said th© Soviet Union required Tanner*s advance assurance that th® cession would be mad® once it was proposed* To both frkko and Mrs* V uolilok i Tanner promised an answer by February

12* &

In light of these developments, th© Finnish Cabinet decided that Farmerheim and h is s t a f f should be consulted on trie matter o f what territory might safely b© ceded* A delegation of Cabinet Ministers was sent to Marshal Kann®rheimfs headquarters to corrrmnicat® the details of the latest developments (February 10)# At headquarters, Tanner outlined, in order of preference, three possibilities for future conduct of the war and diplomacyt (1) pursuit of peace;

(2 ) lim itation o f th® war to Seandanaviaj (3) if these plans failed to materialise reliance on Western aid* It was clearly stated that this course would undoubtedly draw F in la n d into th® world conflict* From the ensuing dicusslon it was clearly apparent that Maimrheln and his advisors preferred peace even at a sacrifice* 35 In h is resuRs o f the d elib era tio n s, Manmrhelm indicated th at the securing of peace was placed first among the alternatives because of the shortage of m n and artillery* Swedish aid wa® suggested as a second alternative and it was urged that such assistance be sought with great energy* In this regard th© Marshal thought that Sweden should be &®ked to send trained units since the recruiting and training of volunteers was too slow a process. Th© vague and inadequatetly

^Tanner, op. p it., pp. 150-151.

35Ibid., pp. 151-152. 131 prepared aid offered by the West was to be accepted only as a last resort* On. the question of what territory might safely be ceded, he stated that th© island of Jussard at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland ms least important to Finland since maritime traffic to Hank© Cape and Turku would not be Impeded by its possession by another power* On the Karelian Isttaas he suggested that a coastal strip about 10 km* wide, extending from Selvttstd to In©, b e ceded* The whole o f Suttrsaarl Island might also be ceded* If these augm ented cessio n s w ere accepted b y Moscow, the Marshal f e l t that the Russian demands for Ralest&j&s&arenio should be relinquished* In return for these cessions, he said that the S e p o la and PoraJSrvl communes would be acceptable compensation* ^ In Helsinki, a fte r the delegation of Cabinet Ministers returned from their meting with Kamerh#im4s staff a session of th© Foreign A ffairs Committee was convened on February 12 to decide upon which course to pursue* Tanner presented th# three alternatives he had outlined to th# military leaders* In the Committee there was no common consensus of opinion as at military headquarters* Defense M inister Hiukkanen f e l t that no re a l chance fo r peace was possible* He, therefore, favored a policy of seeking Swedish aid first and, that failing, suggested that Finland should then turn to the Allies* Pfcaeikivi was of the opinion that a peace policy should b© assiduously pursued a t a l l costs* His opinion was based upon Sweden*a incessant refusal to send military aid and the fact that the Western offers

^Ibid.. pp. 152-153 132 m m too vaguely formulated* Xlwao H a?mula* M inister o f Education, sided with Mukkanen and adamantly argued for a continuation of the war by calling in any and all outside aid offered* Ms believed that the Diet would never accept the harsh terms set by the Russians* Also in favor of continuing the war was Minister of Justice* J« 0* Sdderhjelm* His opinion was based m a conviction that the Finnish nation would not understand th® cession of a base at the mouth of the Oulf of Finland sin ce te la was the m ry thing they were fighting to prevent* lie did* however* fe e l th at te r r ito r ia l cessio n s on the Karelian Isthmus* plus an agreement to neutralise the Oulf of Finland* would be acceptable* Prime M inister Kyti pressed fo r peace, i f possible* I f n ot, he hoped that Sweden could be brought to make a public announcement that she would send auxiliary forces to Finland* To this end he suggested that Tanner once more go to Stockholm* President K allio* who was present* although not a member of the Committee* expressed his desire for peace* Earlier the President had opposed ceding a base near Hank© Cape* but he now felt that* if the island of JtiasarB were acceptable to the Russian** it should be ceded and believed that Finnish national pride and prestige could be satisfied* 3? Thus th® membership o f th® Foreign A ffairs Co-wdtte® o f the Finnish Cabinet was divided with swm favoring peace and others de­ termined to continue th© fight* Th© only positive decision arrived at was that Tanner should once again v isit Stockholm to seek further Swedish aid* At a private conference a fte r the session* however*

1? Ibid* * pp* 1^1-157* 133

Prime M inister Hyti* President K allio* and Foreign M inister Tanner decided that th® peace program should be pursued energetically* For this reason they decided to cofsmmicate immediately to (Htether th e ir information that Finland stood ready to cede th® island of

Jussaro t o th® C*S*S«R*38

Immediately following the conference farmer departed for Stockholm* Fnroute he received a wire from Erkko sta tin g th at the Soviet tlnion now demanded not only flank© Cape hot also th# whole Karelian Isthmus and th® entire western shore of lake Ladoga* Upon a rriv a l la Stockholm fanner went to see Gfinthor* who informed him that th® Finnish note offering to cede Jussaro had not yet been delivered* ffe also told fanner that tm had refused to transm it the latest Moscow peso# proposals as they were too far reaching in nature*^ Tanner m r t visited Prims Minister Ransscn t© inquire if more extensive military aid could be expected front Sweden* In this regard* he inquired if Sw eden could dispatch units of troops as volunteers as Germany had done in the Spanish Civil War* Tanner pointed out that if no aid were forthcoming from Sweden* Finland would be obliged to turn to Great Britain and France* Sa that event* serious consequences might follow for a ll the Rorthersi countries* H ansson said th at i t was im possible fo r Sweden to send units of her armed fem es to Finland as volunteers slim Germany and the U*S*S*R* would understand what these units really were* Serious reprisals on the part of both states could be

3 8 I b ld .» P. 157. 39Ibid., PP. 1 5 7 -1 5 8 . expected from «ny suoh action* th fact* the Swedish fromler stated Germany had warned the Swedish government on numerous occasions to remain out ©f th® Finnish ws r » ^ This w m contrary to what Finland had boon led to believe as SXffeher had inquired o f the WilhelBStrasae in Decem ber if they had g iv e n any such advice to Sweden® Berlin had replied that no warning had been issued**** T a n m r pointed this o u t to Hansson and said he doubted* therefore* t h a t Germany would m ount m attack cm Sweden oven if she were to give substantial aid t o Finland® The Finnish Foreign

Minister then informed Hansson of 1he Allied Supreme Council*® decision m & informed th e Swede o f the im m inent arrival of a

Western m ilitary e m m d mion in Finland® Us Inquired regarding the a t t i t u d e that Sweden would m m m if Finland appealed for

Western aid and requested transit right® for the ausiliaxy troops*

As before* Hans son replied that Sw eden would refuse**4** ^ view of this negative attitude* Finland was then fo r c e d to pursue her own course in accordance with this reply*

During the days immediately after Tanner1® return to

H elsinki no word was received from Moscow regarding the matter of the cession of Jussaro* However* on February 1? th# German

M inister* Blficher* called at the Foreign M inistry to inform Tanner that Germazy s till fe lt unable to mediate In the conflict as the moment was s till unpropitious* He then made a suggestion which

Berlin had instructed him to say was hi® own* The idea was that

5,0told., p. 158. Iflpcrp. Series D, Vol. VIII, pp. 558-559.

^Tanner, o£. e lt., p. 158. 135

Kibbentrop ir&^ht advanc® in Moscow a proposal that representatives from both sides meet in Berlin to negotiate end clarify their aims. In this regard he suggested that Faaolkivi would probably ha the negotiator most acceptable to Moscow* Two problems interposed themselves, he pointed out, i,e , would the Wilhelmstrasse agree to conduct the matter and would the Kremlin accept the proposal* For his part Tanner agreed to take up the matter with the Cabinet and inform Hlucher if an affiwaative decision were reached*^ The Finnish Cabinet expressed interest in SXucher’s suggestion and* on February 20, th* German Minister was asked to call at the Foreign Ministry, Tanner immediately pointed out m apparent contradiction in B&ficher's proposal# the Minister had said the moment was not propitious for German mediation, yet the new pro- posal envisaged action on the part of the German Foreign Ministry, which would ultimately sponsor the meeting if it could be arranged. How was this to be understood? la mmmr, Blflcher said that Germany fe lt she could not mediate! therefore he had advanced th® idea of a Berlin meeting on his own initiative in the hop® that a contact would be helpful* Jh reply to a further question from Tanner, th® German said he wm unable to guarantee that his plan would succeed. Tanner then said that he assumed that Blficher had talked to his superiors it# Berlin about the matter, but Blficher refused indicate by m mm m r if this were so0 When asked

U3E2L> S»rte« D, Vol. VIII, pp. 77U , 7 ? 8 j cf, Tanner, op, c it,, pp, 165-166, 336

ft what conditions Moscow might propose# Blueher replied that he had no idea* At this point Tanner thanked him for the information and terminated the conversation*^* Thus ended the last attempt at German mediation* [email protected] to hi® talk with BlSeher# Tanner conferred with Hyti ®nd Walden* Their talk resulted in a decision to ask Sweden* on their 01® responsibility* to initiate pear® negotiations which would include th® cession of Banko Cape* if necessary* It was further decided that Walden should go to military headquarter® to seek th® advice from the leaders of the army on the peace pro­ posal* While Walden was away the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Diet would be convened to ascertain it# views*^5 The D iet Committee met that day (February SO) and indicated that it favored reaching a peace settlement* With this support* the Cabinet decided on a peace course* To this end Tanner um directed to phone Srkko in Stockholm and instruct him to approach Gunther with th® suggestion that Sweden undertake to mediate to bring about an end to h o s tilitie s * Erkko was to impress upon Gfinther that i t would be in Sweden •# in te r e st to mediate* for i f

Finland turned to th© ifest for aid# the entire- Horth would be inexorably drawn into the war* A short while later Srkko reported that the Swedish Foreign Minister had gladly assented to the suggestion*^ At th® same tins# (February 20) Mannerhete received British

U *KJFP* S e r i e s D , Vol. V I I I , pp. 5 6 5 ~ £ 8 6 j ct . T an n er, 0£« Cit* # p* lw §

^tanner* c£. cit* pp* 16?-168* ^Ibid** pp* 168-170* 137

General Robert Ling and *reneh Colonel Geneva! at his headquarters*

B oth mem spoke of the proposed A llied aid but neither was able to

give exp licit information concerning the number of troops* the

time of their departure* or te ll whether Norway and Sweden would

agree to their being transported across their territory* They did make it clear to Mannerheim* however* that the fir st duty of the advance troops would be to counter expected German reprisal actions on the Scandinavian Peninsula***?

Walden returned from m ilitary headquarter® on F eb ru a ry 23 with the above information* Because of its vagueness* the Foreign

Aff airs Cotmaittee of the Cabinet was doubtful of the value of latestm m aid* Peace negotiations* even more than before, appeared to be the only reasonable course for Finland* Later In the day

Erkko reported from Stockholm that Molotov had communicated precise terms for the initiation of such negotiations* These included the cession of Hanko Cape* the Karelian Isthmus including Vlipuri* and the northeastern shore of Lake Ladoga including the town of Sortavala*

In return the Soviet tfolon was prepared to evacuate Beteams and other unspecified areas* Moscow also asked for a defense pact guaranteeing the Gulf of Finland be concluded between the U*S*S«R**

Finland and Estonia* If these term® were not accepted now* new and more stringent demands would be made Xater*k8

^Mannerheia* o£* cit** pp* J8l*382w

^Tanner* og* cit*, p. 172* That the Soviet Union after almost tm weeks of alien®* (sine* Februasy 6), mad* such extensive demands assy have been a result of th# success of the massive offensive of the Karelian fattens launched by th# Bed taay cm February 1» Another factor probably influencing the situation was a Swedish press report of February 16, corroborated by Prims Minister Wsm&m m& lin g Ouster V on February 19* that any form of Swedish m ilitary aid to Finland was out of th# question©^ These two developments probably contributed to the Russian belief that Finland was in ©position which mad# rejection of such terms almost impossible* Because of these new developments* th# Foreign Affairs Committee was convened fo r the second time that day* As on th© February 12 opinion was divided, but it was finally decided that all courses of action should be kept open until definite answers could be obtained to several questions* These weret (1) Could auxiliary military forces tr expected from Sweden? I f so , how many men and how soon would they arrive? (2 ) Would Sweden permit western force® to cross her territo ry ? (3 ) How so m would Astern aid reach Finland?50 When the session terminated, Tanner telephoned Erkks m d instructed him to submit the first two questions to Ofinthsr with th# request for a prompt reply* The next day (February 2!t)

50Ibid., pp. 1T2-173* 139

Gflftther** reply m a reported to Helsinki* I t sta ted th at Sweden ooul d only promise to intensify her volunteer program* tfcider no oircvmetanees would ’Western forces be permitted transit across 'Swedish te r r ito r y .^ - That day General ling arrived in Helsinki to confer with tbe Finnish Cabinet on tha matter of Astern support* It the first meeting Tanner gained the impression that the project was s till only vaguely formulated* Bet later that evening* at a meeting with Xing and the British Minister to Helsinki* Gordon Yexwfcer* more s p e c ific d e ta ils were revealed* i*a* men* arms* end ships* were even then ready for departure* Tha two Britons asserted that the expedition could depart on March 15 and reach Finland by April 15*^ During tha course of the conversation it was made clear that the A llies expected Finland to obtain the necessary transit rights from Horsey and Sweden* In light, of what was already known* T am er expressed doubt th at Sweden would permit such transit* ftmfcer suggested that the Finnish government first broach the matter to Sweden privately* This would allow time for consideration* Then* when Finland formally requested tseetera aid* a simultaneous request for transit rights could fee made to Norway and Sweden* with & statement that the request was to be made public* Xh this way Verekcr hoped it would be p o ssib le to coerce Norway and Sweden in to givin g an affirm ative

5*Ibid.. pp. 173-17U. g2P>ld.. pp. 175-176. 11*0

m m m r* Tanner expressed doubt that this m ild change the Swedish p o s it io n * To Vereker1® query whether Sweden might a»mmo a more positive attitude If given guarantees o f aid by the West* Tanner felt it was u n lik e ly th a t such prcsaiaes would change th® M odish position. 53

Whatever the Horwegian and Swedish attitude, however, it was impressed upon the Films that a prompt reply to the A llies was essential® The A llies desired an official request for aid from H elsinki by March $ at the latest* Sines a time lim it was set, Tanner inquired how extensive the aid would be that the

W o t proposed to send* Vereker listed several units totalling from 20,000*22,000 m m armed with automatic weapons* This it was said would make than equal to about twice that number of Finnish t r o o p s * ^ Jh this regard it is interesting to note that the number o f troops the kkstera A llies proposed to disp&teh had increased considerably over the mmber which they had at first suggested* According to the mcmomom a u th o r o f k%origten*s book, earlier estim ates regarding the else of the expeditionary force had been from 6,000 to 12,000

Armed with this new inform ation, Tanner requested m assembly* The Council of State was to report on the entire matter* As in the Foreign. A ffairs Committee, opinion was divided*

The result of the conference was a decision that Tanner should

53xbld.a IV. 176-177. &Ibid.. p. 177.

"Wuorinan, Finland and World War j l, p. 71. on m again v isit Stockholm* both to aseertaia the Swedish attitude to th® latest Wrat«ra proposela and to talk with the Russian

M inister to Sweden* ita« Kollcmtai® On February 2? Tanner crossed th® Oulf of Bothnia to Stockholm® Ih conversations with his Swedish counter-part* he revealed in general terms th® latest Astern proposals and inquired if Sweden would permit transit for the expedition® <3unther,a reply was that no transport of foreign force® across Sweden would he permitted and no m ilitary inter­ vention was to be expected from Sweden® B® did* however* promise to give Finland a ll th® economic aid possible* if she made peace®^

Tanner also had a conference with Prism M inister Hansson who told him that th® aid promised rather vaguely by Sweden on February 2k would consist of only volunteers® llmasoa could not estimate how many® Sweden s till refused to send direct m ilitary aid to Finland or to take any overt action in Finland*® behalf for fear of war® Upon hearing this* Tanner pointed out that Finland had m other recourse but to address an appeal for aid to Great Britain and France® Without specifying figures or dates* he outlined the Western proposals and asked if Sweden would be inclined to permit transit of the Allied troops®^ Bsassoa replied in th® following vordes

^Tanner* gg® cit® ® pp 172® ^Ibid»* pp® 181-182, The Swedish government has clearly expressed its position m this point* Sweden desire® to observe neutrality on this matter as well* Ho transit passage of forces can be permitted* Volunteers and small groups might be permitted to pass through*?8

Haneses!** la st remark seemed to leave open the possib ility of Swedish assent to passage for A llied forces in the guise of volunteers*

However, when Tanner asked hour many volunteer® might be granted passage, the Prime M inister9s rather vague reply was that the number would not be very large* 2b any case they would not be allowed to carry arms* Dr* conclusion Hansson declared that if the Western Powers attempted to force passage through Horsey and

Sweden, "Sweden would find itse lf in the war cm the Eussian side and against Finland*®^

Tanner also talked with Use* KeHontai that day* He inquired If Moscow9 0 demands of February 23 were canes that could be altered through discussion* Una* Kollontai was distressed and lamented that the Finn® should have mads peace when the terms were easier, i*e«« February 6* lbs term© now presented were firm and unalterable* B om minor changes might be made during negotiations but she fe lt this was rather unlikely* Termer explained to her that a Finnish reply could not be expected m too short notice since democracies needed more time to reach decisions than did dictatorships* With this the conference ended*

58Ib ld .. p . 183. 55>Ibld.

^Qlbid* * p* 185* On February 28 events began to move rapidly, forcing the Finnish Cabinet to make quick decisions* Moscow Informed

H elsinki, via StoekhoXm, that m answer to the Russian demands was expected within forty-eight hours* This was tantamount to an ultim atum . only a few days before the British M inister,

Vereker, had asked that the Finns make m official appeal for

A stern aid within a week and by March 5 at the latest* lash day the Finnish position became more precarious* On the Karelian

Isthmus the Red am iss were forging ahead against exhausted Finnish troops and the Russian terms were expected to became even h a r sh e r if their am iss had continued success® the first Vie stem aid could not be expected before April 15, and what was promised would be insufficient® Confronted by such a situation the Cabinet, on the advice of the Commander-In-Chief and his assistants and supported by the D iet, decided to seek peaee*^

On February 29 they agreed to a reply to the Moscow proposals r e a d in g s

The Finnish government, which for its part also aspires toward the termination of h ostilities and the conclusion of peace, consider® that it can in this sense regard the con­ ditions as a point of departure for negotiations, and accepts them in principle. The comprehensive scope of the proposal and the obscurity of some of its details make clarification and definition necessary, but these points can be cleared up in oral negotiations. The Finnish government awaits a statement as to when and where the Soviet government proposes that the negotiations begin* The Finnish government considers Moscow a suitable p l a c e *63

^ Ib ld o* p« 188* ^%fano6rh®i®, gg* c i t * , p* 383*

^^Quoted in Tanner, o%. c i t * * pp* 19U-195* This note m s sent to Srkko $m Stockholm with im truotiona to hoM

I t u n til he w as directed to deliver it to Mas® fCollQKital#

Hews of the Cabinet decision to make peace became known in

Helsinki during the day (February 29) and led to sw ift action on the part of the Vfeetero A llies# That evening the French M inister to Finland, Charles Magpy, sought an with Tanner in order to inform him that A llied plans to send only 12,000 m n to F in la n d had been revised to provide for a fem e of 20,000 Poles, Britons, and Frenchmen# They were even then being assembled and were roady for departure, despite Swedish refusal to permit transit of an y f o r c e s # 2ii MagB$r*$ o p in io n th e Sw edes and M orw sgians w ou ld ch a n g e their attitude once they were appraised of the fu ll details# More­ o v e r , i f Finnish forces could hold out for a fe w mom weeks, adequate aid would arrive In time and be followed by reinforcements# Magny w en t on to say that if Finland made peace, she would have to suffer whatever losses of territory the Soviet Union required m h e r own respofisibility#^1

During the night new information and further offers of aid arrived from London and Furls# The Finnish M inister in Perl®,

Hsrrl Holms, reported that Premier Baladier had definitely pro­ mised that A llied forces would arrive in Finland by the end of

March, with their departure date dependent upon London# The probably date wee March 12, but not sooner as France could hardly

^Churchill, 2 £ . o i t . , p . J>'73| m& Tamwr, c£. c it., p. 19!(. be »$^r any earlier* The A llies m m proposed to send 50*000

m m m l haw them in Finland before the end of March* Transit

problems would be solved by the >iest according to the report*

As a precondition the Finns were to break off negotiation® with

the Kremlin, or a ll preparations would be interrupted and the

shipment of a r m and equipment would cease*®

Thus on March 1, the day on which a reply to the Soviet Onion

w m required, the situation was complicated® Because of Usstem

pressure, it was decided that the reply in Erick©*® hands should

be held and a new one drafted in the hope of gaining tine* The

new reply read*

The Finnish government is anxious to bring about a cessation of h ostilities and the conclusion of a peace, but since the new frontier contemplated in the proposal is vagus, further particulars with regard thereto are requested* Sim ilarly information la desired as to what compensation Finland Is to receive*®®

At the same time the Helsinki govemnsnt inquired if the

A stern A llies could tansdiately dispatch $0,000 troops to F in la n d ,

t o arrive i n Karsh, and i f mom could he m n t later* It was also

r e q u e s te d that 100 fu lly manned and armed bom bers b e s e n t * ® An

an sw er to th e s e requests was received later that day premising the

desired $0,000 men by the end o f Karch* According to General Iron­

s i d e , the B ritish Commandter-in-Chlef of Home Force®, reinforcements

f o r these would be sent later as needed* He also informed the

F in n s that the figures Ling and O&navs! had quoted to Mammerhe&a

® ?«*sier, on* c i t * , p* 19** Q u o te d in Tanner, ©g® c i t * , p* 197®

^Mannerhslia,Mannerheln, o£* cit* , p* 3% | an<;> Wuoriwwi, Finland apgd W orld War | | * p* 71* 2J$6

m m incorrect and that full aid to Finland wm planned.^ In the meantime, the latest Finnish reply to Russia had been reported to the Swedish Foreign Minister, GBnther, II® expressed to Erkko his doubts of its efficacy as a point of departure. In his opinion an affirmative reply would have been better, fls felt that frontier question® could be dealt with more effectively in negotiations. At the same time h© reiterated his government1® refusal to permit A llied forces to pass through Sweden, fit also inferred Erkko that !%*e, Kollontai had told him that it was up to Finland to initiate peace negotiations by accepting the terms offered by the On this basis OSotber suggested that a positive phrase be added to the Finnish reply stating that ^Finland i s accordingly prepared in principle to accept the Russian demands* n?8 To this Tanner was not willing to agree before the .next day. On March 2 no word was received from Moscow* but Helsinki did not assume that negotiations were broken off despite the fact that the time limit set had expired. Sweden worked to secure better terns for Finland, but without favorable result, Keantime, Great Britain and France s till sought to keep the Finns in the war by announcing that the bombers they had requested would be sent at once.71 f A On the morning of March 3 Tanner requested that the Council of State be convened* Its deliberations resulted in another post­ ponement of the decision regarding an all out effort to end the

Tanner, og^ cit. p. 199. 9Xbld.. p. 198. 7M tld.. p. 199. 71fi|idt, p. 200201* n i l war* After the meeting Tanner, **yti, Walden, and Paasiklvt, con­ ferred in private and decided to assure the Freialin that the Finnish gomrmmnt was prepared to negotiate if Viipuri and Sortavala were emitted* T m j phoned G&nther to inform him of th is. He expressed himself as pleased to hear this and urged them to make peeea*^ During the day further specific information regarding British and French airport was submitted by Vfereker* H§ told the F l » i th at the troop® to he sent from B ritain would umber only 6*000* They would be dispatched on Kerch l l f instead of March 15 as reported the day before, if Finland requested the aid by March 5*^3 la lig h t of th is, the Connell of State was convened but the only decision arrived at wm to await further clarification of Moscowfs position*^* On March Jj there was s t i l l ne'm m m r from Moscow* A llied requests for an official appeal for aid fTosn Finland were again made*

That evening Colonel Ganeval called on F yti to infant Mb th a t a contingent of 18,000 Britons and 15,000 Frenchmen would leave in a week, i f the Finns would continue to fight* In addition, he said that the French Coaoxtnda** in-€hte£, Maurice Gamelln, had ordered f ift y British and twelve French bombers to Finland within a week* Any troop® needed in Scandinavia m the result of .an attack by Germany would not diminish the assistance planned for Finland* The troops could be expected by April 15 but thay might arrive m early as April 10. In conclusion, the Frenchman said that he had

^ Ibid*» pp. 201-M i. ?^annerheim, op* cit** pp. 38 ^-385 .

7‘*T*nner, 2£t. c l t »» P» 20?» HiS le*rn»d that Swdtn would not oppose transit by force of The disparity between the mere extensive French plans and the more .modest British proposals for aid to Finland led tha Council ©i Slat© to decide for peace on March £• At the same time the Western A llies were to be asked for an extension until March 12 before the Firms 'had to ask for aid# After the Council meeting Tanner telephoned QSnther to authorise hi m to forward the Finnish reply of March 1 to Moscow* While talking to Qt£ntherv Tanner learned that Moeeow had replied to the second Finnish note# Molotov indicated that the U#S#S«n* was s t i l l adamant in hisdemands for Fiipurl and Sortavala# As for the Finnish decision* Molotov said the Soviet Union would wait a few days for Finland's response'# CHSnther said that Molotov had remarked to Aaaaraaon* the Swedish Minister to Moscow* that perhaps i t might be well for the Kremlin to negotiate with Kuuslnen* Molotov had also repeated an earlier threat that if peace were not made now, greater demands would to made later# In the same conversation Ottnther told Tanner that contrary to what had been said In Helsinki, the Swedish Cabinet was unanimously opposed to allowing transit of Western forces to Finland#^ The Finnish reply was forwarded to Moscow that day with an added suggestion by Qdnther that hostilities cease on March 6# Moscow agreed to the initiation of peace conversations the next day (March 6) and suggested Moscow m the place where the discussion® should to conducted# The IT 3 #•$*?!*, however, refused to accept the

7gJbld., pp. 2C'-209. 76Ibld.. pp. 210-2X3. m

Swedish suggestion for m armistice, evidently because the Bed armies had not yet succeeded In capturing Viipuri. Later that morning the Finnish Cabinet and Diet were informed of Moscow *3 acceptance* Both groups gave assent to the initiation of negotiation®* .Appointed a® representatives to the discussions were Prim Minister Hyti, General Walden, Paasiktvl, and Representative VSinb Foioomaa. The delegation le ft that day for Stockholm and proceeded from there to Moscow on March ?•?? Britain and Prance still persisted in their efforts to kmp the Finns fighting by making a final, offer of aid cm March ?# According to figures transmitted by General Ironside a contingent of ??,?00 troops were to be dispatched -to Finland, a ll of which would be placed under Mannerhslsi's ocwMtsd*?^ Holding fa st to their determination to make peace, the Finns did not issue an appeal for such troops, but awaited word fr m Moseow. On March 9 the Finnish delegates m t the Soviet delegates for the f ir s t time to begin the negotiations for a peace settlement. The Soviet demand® were now found to exceed those they had presented through Stockholm* In addition to their other terms, the Hueslane now required that Finland cede certain areas in the Salla and Kuueamo coenmes a® well m agree to construct a railroad from Kemijirwi to the frontier yet to be delimited* ?? When word of the mm Burnt m conditions reached Helsinki, the government began to reconsider the offer of Western aid. Great Britain

^ Xbldti p?#

7 9 Karrnerheim, op. c it.. p. 3961 and Tanner, op. c it., p. 22?. Arctic Ocean Atlantic Ocean.

AREA TAKEN FROM FINLAND IN 1940 BV RUSSIA

PETSAMO M URM ANSK

KOLA

NARVIK PETSAMO AREA RICH IN NICKEL / SOVIET FORCED COVETED BY SOVIET FfNtANO ID BUttD AFTER. THE PEACE A STRATEGIC O f MOSCOW mm OPEHJNGI AN INLET TO N O R T H E R N SCANDINAVIA •T KANDALAKSHA

SALLA KEMUARV

r q v a n i e m i

1 ^ § ^ |A R L A TAKEN FROM A m FINLAND IN 1940

LULEA BY RUSSIA

9 J f c f oult^7 ‘Balk ktia.

UMEA

, . .. - AREA TAKEM f. 4 i jf I FROM FINLAND ^ . h s u m * ; :• A m i n 1 9 4 0 GPSfc*-" BY RUSSIA VARKAUS 3AMOMLirvtA ' /vk ■■

TAMPERE

“ LAHTI

^ H E L S IN K I LENINGRAD AAIAHD ISLANDS IN TERNATKXAUY NKOJ l EASED LAST YEAR TO SOVIET AND USED SOYIET FORCED DEMILITARIZED HAS TRAHSfT Of TROOPS BY RUSSIA A SA BASIS THE AIM O f FROM LENINGRAD AIR ATTACKS H ATTACKING FINLAND TO H A N K O

THE TREND OF THE SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE ATLANTIC OCEAN

He c -i :* et. on -ovi^t -o3 icy, " „ m w iR

and France were s t i l l prepared to give help as the following communique from Premier Daladier on March 8 shows* We have waited for several days for Finland to make her appeal* so that we can come to your aid with a ll the means at our disposal. It is difficult to understand why this request is still postponed, . . . If Finland does not now make her appeal to the western Powers* it is obvious that at the end of the war* the western Powers cannot assume the slightest responsibility for the final settlement regarding Finnish territory, Daladier had agreed orally to the Finnish appeal to be allowed to delay their request until March 12 but said that he preferred an earlier date* He said he understood Finland’s position but that the Finns should also appreciate his situation since he had crusaded so energetically against the Kremlin* Furthermore, i t was known that Finland could count on the arrival of British bombers with craws in a short time. Therefore* the Finnish delay only increased their own peril.^ On the other hand, many factors tended to force Finland to submit to the Kremlin’s terms, as harsh and unreasonable as they appeared to be. Sweden in particular had pressed for a settlement of the conflict to safeguard the Northern States from involvement in the European War. The determining factor, however, was Marshal Mannerhelm’s advice, given on March 9, to conclude peace. In his Memoirs the Marshal states that* In ,,/iaw of the uncertainty which attached to the expeditionary force, and with the conviction that our strength would be insufficient if the struggle extended beyond the spring, » . . I felt compelled to give the government categorical advice to conclude peace*82

^Quoted in Wuorinen, Finland and World War II, p* 78. 83-Ibid. 82Hannerheim, op. C it.> p. 3$7* 251

Under the circumstance©, and faced with such advice from the man best qualified to a ssa y the military situation, t he Finnish Cabinet was forced to conclude that no outside help could turn the t id e of war. therefore, on the morning of March 12 P r e sid en t Kallio signed the credentials granting power to the Finnish delegates to sign peace treaty. The credentials m m cabled to Moscow and that ev en in g the peace treaty v m signed* ^3

The peace treaty that Finland was fo rced to sign seemed most unjust to a r n m le th a t had only asked to be allo w ed to pursue it s cim peaceful life and wanted n o th in g but to be left out of the struggles of the European Great Powers. Despite her valiant effo rts in defence of her independence and integrity, Finland was forced to cede to the Soviet Union th e whole K arelian Isthnus along w ith her largest export center, V iip u rl* plus V ilp u rl Bay and i t s islands*

Likewise, on the western and north ern sh o res of Lake Ladoga extensive areas, including the towns of KfidLsaliai and Sortavala, and th e parish of Suojlrvi, were ©tripped from her. In the Gulf of F in lan d a nu&ber of Islands were also turned over to the U.S.8.R. In addition, F in lan d agreed to lease for a period of thirty years Hanks Cape and i t s surrounding waters a lo n g with the islands included in those waters.^

Finland was given ten days to withdraw her forces from the Hanko a r e a , while the Keds agreed to evacu ate their m ilita r y forces from the Fetsamo region, but deprived Finland of the right to maintain a naval base there. Furthermore, Finland was forced to agree to construct

^ T a n n er, o p. cit.. pp. 2h3$ 250.

8UZ2S, pp. a railroad across the center of the country from Kemijtrvi to the Soviet-Finnish border for the use of the Russians in their trade with Sweden.®-* Finally, hostilities war® to cease at noon on March 13 with Finnish troops to b® withdrawn from the ceded areas at a rate of not le ss than seven kilometers per day. The commanders of both armies were charged with the responsibility for seeing to i t that no damage was done to the towns, localities, and territories that were evacuated. c ° A For Finland the treaty meant the loss of an area totaling 25,000 square miles. The population of the lost territories was twelve per cent of the nation*s total inhabitant®, or about 500,000 people, All of these were given the right to move into the areas retained by Finland and most of them did so at the cost of leaving behind the homes, fields, and forests, that their ancestors had owned and cultivated for generations. Finland*s losses amounted to about eleven per cent of her total economic potential and included her natural defenses on the Karelian Isthmus and at, Hanko Cape. As a result the nation* s future freedom of action in foreign affairs was limited, but as a slight consolation, the Soviets did not force

O'*7 a military pact upon Helsinki.-'» President Kallio confirmed the decision of the Diet and ratified the peace on March 16, On March 18 Paasikivi and Voionmaa departed for Moscow to exchange the instruments of ratification and on March 20 final ratification was completed in Moscow. 35

8SSiSL> PP- 116-118. ,?6ibid., pp. 119-120.

^%ann®rheim, op. c it. 3 p. 388 . 00 Tanner, op. c i t . , p. 260. CHAPTER VII

m m w B iom

Clearly the foregoing discussion gives rise to several questions of grove import in the present system of international relations. It was Bertrand Russell who wrote« "The good Ilf# i s inspired by love end guided by knowledge. " The historian's task is to eorslruct art hypothesis that will make the Hnnish experience meaningful for the guidance of contemporary society. If the reality of history Is In the present, then our comem mist be the significance of historical experience for the ground and condition of our existence in the present. The common heritage of the dtisens of the United States and likewise to a lesser or greater extent, that of all democracies in the Western Tradition Is the- profound faith In the efficacy of the rule of law *to establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and to our posterity.” Within ' his framework must he mud# the herd decisions which w ill uphold or impair the pursuit of these ideals. It was in this frame­ work that President Wbodrov Wilson enunciated the doctrine of national self-determination. The considered ©pinion to which the facts constrain us is that the Finnish experience (1939-1940) implies the necessity for a careful reappraisal °f this doctrine. Rational self-determination was conceived in the bosom of English common law with its traditions of self-imposed Individual 154 responsibility, Prior to the outbreak of the Busso-Flnrdsh conflict national states enjoyed sovereignty lr the presence of m agency (the league of Nations) incapable of oonstra.iitl.ng thee, to responslhiltyv Ample proof of this inability to enforce International resjsonaibiliiy and law was the Japanese invasion o f Manchuria, Xtalyffs occupation of Ethiopia, and Germany’s siasitr© of Chechoslovakia and her attack on Poland for which the nor—aggression pact with the Soviet Tfoion was the necessary precondition* Objectively, it must be pointed cut that fibland also contributed to the sffeteness of the league of Nations by her resolution, in con unction with Sweden, to determine whether sanctions levied hr the International body would be observed. Thus in the traditional polarity of the Great Bowers the a s ll states resulting tram the Treaty of Versailles and guaranteed by the league o f Nations produced a power vacuum in an international situation (even by traditional Jtaropeafi standards) of greet complexity* If a flreet Bower finds ®ore advantage in over­ throwing a settlement than in maintaining i t , then i t i s not a peace, but an arm istice, Jfcusarotsrs examples illu stra tin g th is point might be drawn fro® the nineteenth century; perhaps the best of these is the great concern of Meiterrlch and Castlereegh, at the close of the Napoleonic Wars, to prevent even tbs suggestion of the dismemberment o f Franc#. Use seme principle induced Blsoaralr to oppose (unsuccessfully) the annexation of Alsses-Xorrsins st the condition of the Franeo- Frusslan. Mar (1871)j for, as was remarked at the tir o , the iwpact of th is event upon the French mind v«s meh that, If they must take Alsace- 355

Lorraine, they might m w ell ta k e fbrir»ndy while they were about it*

In X9£l th©r® was not on® but « tn n X ouch permanently dissatisfied

p o w s . F or t h e s e powrs th e m l® of form mm a f a c t and tin® rule

o f lav m more th a n H err von FMttattym^Tblvag1 s astonished "scrap of paper*" In these difficult circumstances, a® has been shown, the Finnish goverment mm not impervious to it® peril* Great faith was

placed in the security of the 1932 non-sggresolon pact with the Soviet

Uhlong the notion® of the Finnish Cabinet, especially Foreign M in is te r Mcko, o f what might be termed the Great Bower rstloraXa were noble to a point, bordering on the Ingenuous* Hor can th is be attributed

to a flew in Finnish logic* C le a r ly , the possibility of Finland

attacking t h e Soviet Onion seam ed remote indeed* t h i s judgment omitted ®t lest two consideration calculated to bear upon any decision

ta k e n in Moscow* The f ir s t i s s setter o f geography* Tn a comparable situation, the perennial interest of the in the affair® of the Low Gountrie® has frequently occasioned friction b u t not surprise*

Thu® i t domm not seem irresponsible to s u g g e s t that no Great Bower, given the opportunity to prevent it, could tolera-e ©. Iborlier within a r t i l l e r y range of I t s second largest c ity (Leningrad), and incidentally o f it® greatest navel base (Kronstadt)* The second consideration, though le ss tangible, i s p r o b a b ly the more important. A proverb warns o f the dangers of Judging other® by the me©aura of one*® s e lf.

In 1939 the Soviets had only begun in r ru d est way (P e to n i® , Latvia, and Lithuania) to demonstrate the extent 'to which they were the successors o f Peter the Greet and G e h te r in e II* Apparently the S o v ie t 156

!Jnior regarded th e « 1 1 e ta te e a a pawn* In the chess game of power

politics; this® the Kremlin*® addresses to Finland night be Interpreted

as the obvious m y * -m to f o r e s t a l l s t e l l a r action o n the pert of m t m

other power* Urns the .Firm..' sh government, though fully alerted to

t h e perils that confronted It, had made two rather serious mlscfilcuteiiors.

Since a decisionv properly so-called, cannot bo made in a vacuum , an

error of any consequence, or oven of s e s m in ly no consequence, Is apt

to display m expansive tendency*

3c i t p ro v ed fo r the Finnish c a b in e t* BeXying upon the n o n -

aggression p a c t wi th the Soviet U n io n , F inland painstakingly prepared

her antra to the Scandinavian orientation* this policy o f scrupulously

guraded neutrality pivoted upon the prestige o f Sweden *s u n b ro k en , o m hundred and twenty-four year reign o f peace in con fu n c tio n with her vital production of steal and th e care she took t o maintain the c o u n tr y 5 s rigid posture of defense. The a te o f the Finnish policy, then, was to secure an agreement with Sweden whereby S w ed ish prestige might s e r v e to guarantee the neutrality of Finland* Shua the s e r i e s of diplomatic moves, previously discussed, whereb y i t was hoped the cooling: of Finniah-Cema n .relations would serve- to r e a s s u r e the Swedes that

Finnish partnership would in no way compromise Sweden* a own neutrality. The first suggestion from the Soviet government that it desired to alter the s t a t u s of Finnish-Soviet relations C August 5, 193$) caught the Finnish government in the m id st of th is delicate maneuver* At this point the failure to correctly evaluate the Intentions of the

Kremlin lead them to a. course which m y well h sv e csompromised their 157

position* with tin* HuaaX&ns. ** the m-go tie lions v ith 3*.,«dor, to offer the be a. 'nope, the Ptnnish gow m iii's rospotses to the deMicreteXy mgm m r ly appro* class of ttm Soviets was framed in the rigidly correct posture of ln£l«*tlhle neutrali ty. Thus while etresaing i t s fomuX position, i t my well hove been take In Fbsoow for the preitonciory siato&icnt of & govermssnt imable to offer morn definite rreamirimoe, The writ* of the only alternative the situation offered ere ii%*o##ibX® to calculate* Had the Tlmiiah p m m n t attempted the hasArdeus policy o f a diplomatic equestrian performance between Sweden fend the Soviet Union, the reeu.lt must reawin on open question* Perhepa mdh m. elt4»t»tive presents itself only to the ©aim of lilnslght* The decisive point in the developing: c r is is must bo regarded as ihe failure of *he Aaland Islands negotiations with Sweden* Tho Swedish pr&ao minister ^Tsi cj? Hsnsss© belatedly admitted to Veino Tenner that i f the Sued!©h-H rrnish a liisu ss hod come about in time, Hassle probably vould not have boon so persistent in her demands and war might haw bean avoided.! The splendid courage end daring of the Firms in the fare of hopeless odds was to prove hut another In the l i s t o f swell states fttnislMMrin a world of national states that failed to observe and respect the very laws they themselves had enunciated. When the struggle became at last a fore© impossibility* the Finnish govern­ ment was compelled at la st to inquire through the Russian Minister at Stockholm the terns of pesos* They proved to be econos* m lly crippling

!*teaourf c i t ., p. 100* 158

cessiona of territory* fto m the settlem ent the Flnniah state emerged

In a qn»«i-^utorottou>«? condition which boded i l l for the future of m

Independent Hnrtlah policy* ikp^m n. a*

Tfi&ATf OF PfACK W^T'^r:Tf Tff? 0T

r r x iA m a w rm. mim wrr?*? c o c m ib t w m m .im

the f*o^ren»nt of the % -public of Finland, ©f the etm partf and

The Presidium of the Stsprasta C o u n cil of tha tlh loB o f ^oaiat Socialist Paptihliea, of the other part,

Bains desirous of bringing t© an and tit* h o stilities which hapfm broken cast batwaan the two State# and of creating parmemmt peaceful relation# between than,

.And being eonvlneed that the creation of definite ©©edition# for their smtnal security, including guarantees for the .aeeurlty of the c i t i e s of la n ln g ra d and Murmansk and tha *hiS3tan9k railway, i# in the Interrata of both Contracting Parties,

*?aw dec!dad that for this purpose the conclusion of a Fe»oe Treaty Is assent!*! and haw therefore apnolntad as their Flenlpfr* tenti ariast TO? OF HIP ^PfTFTjr

.^isto Priae *?lni*tar of tha fteptxfclle of ri«i«nd#

duho Kuatl Paaalkiri, Fftnlatar,

ftudblf Valdes, Q*rera3 ,

V8ln£ T/otorm a9 Professor*

1IS2, pp. US-1 1 *. 1 6 0

t hp. mEsmxim o f t f p sum armcxt nr union

OF SOVIET SOCIALIST IFPLM.ItSs

Vjatsheslav Fihailovitsh Molotov, P resid en t o f the C ou n cil o f

Cornmlftsars of the U.3*S,E. and Comud«««rfor Foreign Affaire,

Andrei A lakssndrovi ish Shdsnov, Member of the Presidium of

the Supreme Council of the

Alaksander M ihailcvltab fasilevskt, Brigadier!

who, having exchanged their credentials, found in due and proper

order, have agreed upon, the fo llo w in g provisions t ARTICLE I*

Hostilities batmen Finland and the U.S.S.H, shall be Immediately

c o n c lu d e d according to the procedure defined I n the .Protocol attached

to the p r e s e n t Treaty*

ARTICLE' 2* The frontier, between the Republic of Finland and the Tf*S.f,*3* shall follow a new boundary line by which shall be incorporated in the territory of the U.S.S.R. the whole of the Karelian Isthmus, the city of Viipuri am! Viipuri Bay with the islands thereof, the western tt and northern coastal area of take Ladoga w it h the towns of Kskisalmi

and Sortavala and the church village of StiojSrwi, a number of islands In the Gulf of Finland, the territory east of FarkSjarvi and the church

village of Kuola.larvi, and parts of th e Bybachl and Sredni Peninsula®-* in conformity with the map attached to the present Treaty* The exact delimitation and establishment of the frontier line shall be effected by a mixed committee of representatives of the Contracting Parties, which shall be appointed within ten day® of the signing of the present Treaty. 161

m ncm % loth Contracting Parties undertake to reirails from a ll acts of aggression directed against each other, and undertake not to

conclude any alliance or to become? parties to any coalition directed against either of the Contracting Parties.,* m tm m Is* The Republic of Finland agree* to lease to the Soviet Union far thirty years in consideration of m annual rent of eight tail lies n Finnish marks to be paid by the Soviet felon, the cape of Hango

arid the au.rroundlng water* within a radius of five nautical stile*

to the sou th and e a s t and thro# n a u tic a l mile* to th e west and

north thereof, and a r«bsr of islands situated therein, in con*

f am ity with the map attached to too pro sent Treaty—for the cstafe*

l±&hmnt of a naval base capable of defending the access to th e

Oolf of F in lan d against, agfresslonsf and in addition for the defence of toe naval base the Soviet Onion is gran ted the right to m ain tain

th ere a t Its own expense armed land and air force units of th e necessary strength* Ihe Government of Finland will, withdraw within ton days of too entry Into force of the present Treat r to# whole of i t s armed ff t? forces from toe cap* of ftogo, and toe caps of Hango with the islands appertaining thereto will pass into toe administration of toe 0*S*S*H* in. conformity with tots Article of toe present Treaty# ARTXCLK S# The U.^.S.R* undertakes to withdraw it s m ilitary forces from the Fwtsasso area which to# voluntarily ceded to Finland under the terms of the Feme® Treaty of 1^20* 162

F in lan d undertakes as provided in the Peace Treaty of 1920, not to maintain warships and other armed vessels in the waters adjoining the Artie coast belonging to it, with the exception of armed vessels of less than one hundred tons, which Finland may maintain there without l i m i t , and a mjocimum of fifteen war vessels or other armed Ships, the tonnage of which may in no case exceed four hundred tons. Finland undertakes, as provided in the said Treaty, not to main­ tain submarines and armed aircraft in the waters mentioned. Finland further undertakes, as provided in the said Treaty, not to eon s tru e t on t h is coast airy naval harbours, naval bases or naval repair yards, which are larger in size than is necessary for the said vessels and their armament.

ARTICLE 6 . The Soviet Union and its nationals, as provided in the Treaty of 1920, are granted free right of transit via the Petsamo area to and from Norway and the Soviet Union is granted the right to establish a Consulate in the Petsamo area. Goods transported via the Petsamo area from the Soviet Union to Norway, likewise goods transported via the said area from Norway to the Soviet Union, shall be free of all inspection and control, with the exception of the control necessary for the conduct of transit traffic; nor shall Customs duties or transit or other charges be imposed. Control of the above mentioned transit goods shall be permitted only according to the established practice in such cases in inter­ national traffic. Nationals of the Soviet Union who travel via the Petsamo area to Norway and from Norway back to the Soviet Union, shall be en titled to unhindered passage with passports issued by the due authorities of the Soviet Union. With due observance of the general provisions in force, unarmed aircraft of the Soviet Union shall be entitled to maintain air traffic between the Soviet Union and Norway via the Petsamo area. ARTICLE 7. The Government of Finland grants to the Soviet Union goods transit rights between the Soviet Union and Sweden, and for the development of th is tra ffic by the shortest railway route the Soviet Union and Finland regard as necessary the construction, each on its own territory, and if possible in the course of the year 29h09 of a tf railway connecting Kandalaksha with Kemijarvi. ARTICLE 6. With the entry into force of the present Treaty, trade relations between the Contracting Parties shall be renewed and for this purpose the Contracting Parties shall proceed to negotiate regarding the conclusion of a Trade Agreement. ARTICLE 9. This Peace Treaty shall enter into force immediately after it s signature and shall later be ratified. The exchange of instruments of ratification shall take place within ten days at Moscow. The present Treaty is drawn up in duplicate in the Finnish, Swedish and Russian languages, in the City of Moscow on March 12th, 19U0. Risto Kyti J.K. Paasikivi V. Molotov A. Shdanov R. Walden VlinB Voionmaa A. Vasilevski. APPENDXX B1

PROTOCOL ATTACHED TO THE TOEATT OF p ACE

CONCLUDED sbtWSEK FINLAND AND thf union of SOVIET SOCIAI.IST REPUBLICS ON MARCH 12TH, 19i»0

Translation The ex tra ctin g Parties establish the following procedure for the cessation of hostilities and the transfer of troops to behind the frontier fixed by the Treaty of Peace. 1. Both Contracting Parties shall cease hostilities on the 13th day of March, 19UC, at 12 o'clock noon Leningrad time. 2. With the object of ceasing hostilities from the prescribed hour onwards, a neutral zone one kilometre in breadth shall be arranged between the advanced positions of the troops, for which purpose the troops of that Contracting Party, which, with reference to the new frontier, occupies territory belonging to the other Contracting Party, shall be withdrawn a distance of one kilometre on the first day. 3* The transfer of military forces to the other side of the new frontier and the movement of the military forces of the other Contracting Party to that frontier, shall begin at 10 a.m. on March 15>th, 19ii0, along the whole of the frontier between the Gulf of Finland and Lleksa, and at 10 a.m. on March 16th, 191*0, northwards of Lieksa. The transfer shall be effected in marches of not less than 7 kilometres per day, the troops of the other Contracting Party moving forward in such order that an intervening distance of not less than 7 kilometres is maintained between the rearguard of the withdrawing troops and the advance guard of the other Contracting Party moving towards the new frontier. 16$

h. In accordance with Clans® 3* the following time lim its are fixed for the transfer of troops to the various sections of the frontiers— (a) in the sector comprising the upper reaches of the Tuntsajoki, Kuolajarvi, Takala, the eastern shore of Lake Joukamojarvi, the transfer of the troops of both Contracting Parties shall be com** pleted at 8 p.m. on March 20th, 191*0$ (b) in the Latva sector east of Kuhmoniemi, the transfer of troops shall be completed at 8 p.m. on March 22nd, 19l*0j (c) in the sector Lonkavaara, Vartsila,ft ft Matkaselka ftrailway

station, the transfer of the troops of both Contracting Parties sh all be completed at 8 p.m. on March 26th, 191*0$ (d) in the sector Matkaselka railway station, Koitsanlahtl, the transfer of troops sh all be completed at 8 p.m. on March 22nd,

191 * 0 $ (e) in the sector Koitsanlahtl, Enso railway station, the transfer of troops shall be completed at 8 p.m. on March 2$th, 191*0$ (f) in the sector Enso railway station, Paations&ari, the transfer of troops sh all be completed at 8 p.m. cm March 19th, 191*0$ 5. The evacuation of Red Army troops from the Petsamo area shall be completed by April 10th, 19l*0. 6. The Army Commands of both Contracting Parties undertake, during the transfer of troops to the other side of the frontier, to take the necessary measures, in the towns and localities to be ceded to the other extracting Party, to preserve Umm tr m damage m d t o take the asses* &my measures to pmm^rm tmmm9 loeallt&es, defensive md economic

estSblishseeiiie {b rid g ea, da&a, aerodrome, b arrack s, depots, r a ilw a y

junctions, industrial esiabl i®hzmnt&9 Urn tel®graph aystew, electric |sowr stations) froit dcna$s and destruction#

To All questions a r i s i n g out o f the cession by one Contracting

Party to the other of the areas, localities, towns or other objects wsntlofted in Clause € of t he p r e s e n t Protocol, s h a l l be decided on th e spot by representstiires of b o th extracting P ities for which purpmm the Amy Comands shall appoint special delegates on each of the main rentes utilised by both Amiss*

S* . The exchange of prisoners o f war shall be effected with the s& niwisa o f delay a f t e r the cessation o f h o s t l l t i e s in accordance w ith a Special airee^ent#

March m ta# 19ls0*

R ls to % t i f# Bolotov «J.K# P a a eik iw i A# Shdsnov t# Walden A. T a a ilersk i# Value Toioawaa BIBUOGiUrvrf

m t e . 9 m ®a -M M I 22L iJa*. &• *»»> * »*« Genain library of InfbrBtfitlon, 19/0. 65 pv. Although mani­ f e s t l y a propaganda book, in i t s essential facts it appaars ptiit#correct when oroee referenced with W inston S. Churchill*® *** 11® Gathering Stun®, J! %1. 1 of hi# history of *he Second IfesM He :*

Xteewymfrs 2 a Ceratti} IfejjjfljLqfl 2 bM b :» Series 0 and 1>, 10 vola. Printing Office, 19/$-1957. Vole. V ?I* VII, VXIX, vara used in th is study. Fif|i«>fttt «— *- «— ----- « ~------***"%. Hew IZbrkl e n te relefieed by th e Flimlaa g© varment in 19/1 to si*ow how Finland had boon drawn into the Second iforld War end why the n a tio n p u rsu ed the course i t d id .

«». Blue teoki fl» Pavalortaent of ?innlah-Spvl«t Halations daring the W ucti o£ 1 9 3 9 . Hew Ttorfcj J .P . U p p w jo o tt G o ., 1940. 120 ppm Contains a prefac© g iv in g a b r i e f rvmmo o f ib teso- Finnish relation® that la followed by selected documents and the tesct® o f speech#®*

Gantorbein, .Jen©® W., @d. Documentary background of i^arld war II. 1931-19/1. *3bw Xerkt Ooltiftbia Drivers!ty Frees, 19/8* 3oadii, 1122 pp* A compilation of war low# doetmnt® released by wmr^ tpvsrr^r-ta s ln m th e war. Ssmtag, Haymond ,t. and Jam#® S. Beddie, ads. flfr»l~gbvftet B#lationfu 1939-19/1. Ubehlrgtonf Oo'mrmmt .Printing O ffice, 19/8. Selected documents and diploma tl© dispatches alesed from the Get«is Sb reign Office after the war.

*oynt»e, Arnold, ed. fewwwwla m lAterratlonsl M felra. 1939-19*6. Vol. T. londom Oxford University !¥eas, 1951.

BOOKS

f mwJMmwrt. wmm xzrrizrjt*mitmst,* Wiesbaden, 1951. Thi® book, unavailebe to the author, la of value because of BXSehsr’fs position as Omrmm M in is te r to Finland i st before and throughout the Second World War 160

Garam* 8* Bay* S o v |e t Imps.rta llta i Euaa'a*© Drive toward tfcyld

lk?mt^^ai£ ^ m tiu zgion t ' Tu5li0 A fia& ’^masiTT^SS*' if? pp* TTHSTeSdoim^ of Soviet Foreign poliey that is only im ±*> dentally ooneomed with Russo~ltontoh relations*

OkMtQidXl, «'to#ton a* %km Second World ®&r# 6 vol.©* Only foi* i* •Xbe Gathering ^J^ITs ppm Hap*» apptioa#* in d ex) mm vmm in t h i s study* Boston* Houghton M lffiln Go#* 192*3* 19SJ* An axcellent porsoiml account of ©vents preceding the outbreak of war in 193? and the first year Of war with th* author's personal opinions and dbsorvations* Again* a vc&ora* only tootoontally ooneoroeri with Um Eusao*#imish situation# Citrine* Walter* Ity Itontoh Diary# uammdswarth* Middle#*^* England* fttnquto B o o S s 192 pp* the diary of a British X*apor p olitician who toured fto to 4 to 1939 and January 19li0# It oontatoe little of vain© for to© serious student sC th is subject*

SaHia* David

Bevies* Joseph E# M s s io o to Mjpaooif* S«w fork* Garden City Pub«* Xiahtog Go# /TGSST*'"138*3• at* 330 op# Contain® se v e ra l aooounts of prime significance for an understanding of Finland to situation yjs^a-vis Scandinavia to 1937*19JB# Dupoy, K. * » « * arw %««*r ••• Dupay. "■Silitary foritaga of Aa»rioa» !^ow fork* *%Graw*l'iill Book Go#, me** 19?5#'"Tnft *^9lTT^ * Kspe# Designed matoly for students of &*mri$m m ilitary history and giws only a brief account of the Eueso^imieh conflict# « Frietach* C* Q* EFtolarafs Qdasar# St^khoto* 294!?* Una-. aiXable to toe author out Stas ’rslsvaaco to the subject as a erlttoista of the policy pursued by the Finnish government in handling negotiations to Moscow#

Cleijsr* B# 0* YajvAsodaft Xatoale# Porvoo* Worrier Sotikareturai OsakeyhtiJ, i9*^# lEIpp#" A uorthiitiilo book for the student interested to the- military phases of tbs Roeeo-Ftonish War# hafsacrstaii# Jotrn* ad# lbs Second Great Wars A Standard History# 6 voto* -..D o r ^ o n s ^ r il^ g S r o a 'm s s T ' i f e o l Vol. I was referred to t o t h i s study# A good reference work to gain a perspective of the entire war#

Hanmia* Cfeerai J* 0* So Kapofte Pinnlandi Bar Ftoaisoho*SoirJ«tiacha Kri#.s, 1939UO. IfaFSInr ^ I E l grl!^ ^ ------brief account of th# war little concerned with diplc»»cy. iXLiiehaa* tferyjto £ 0 *^* 0*?, Putaasi* a $ooe# 1952* 306 pp+ sTfiSe^y "oiSpIits treatise ®r» Finland1® history* fin* niab Gxm%®m§ wad eoolal

Jaojcson* J* Salute* ^SfiiSESl* s#w Yorkt f&t I:ft«il3,«ii Co*f 2$kt>w# . Coa&aina a brlalHSirvaliia'liIe seee-ant of Flmtsfo history arid: atiltoxre and provides m m \% m % insight Into the ebaraetar of th e FUmUfo people*

Jakobs an* 8aau BiplcmaatMon falviaot&* 5uoetl MBsi3»®^oXltMW^s

S.958* '3?^ pp* yaamilabl# for uso in this study* b u t l a v a lu a b le foar I t s in te r p r e ta tio n of- fir & n *h diplocmor preoe&ing the Mintar Mar# JLat^don^Dsviee* «f#m* jfomtsioa i f tfc# S»gj* Seaton* .ilougrxtm ittJTMn Co* i Xml# 202 pp« An eSSsTESsit'account of the way la which the flans adapted their tag tin* to confers to eandittoiis during the 1939440 uar* tuofta* Charles X# Finland in the Second World War* Blecsaingtoi*, lnd*s University of^IHESia’Trsss *TS??T "W^'^SF’pp* A valuable source book .for a study of Finland in warM War II with an interpretive aeansnt oa the deeuassits available on the snfe3set« XneXudad i* an m tm m l'm MMIography listing »eet of the «ater~ lals ahallabla* both -in the United States and abroad*

Im n m rm iM f Earl Ouetaf* i^solraB tran* Srlo leiMiabaupt* London# O a a a a lt and Co-** !*%&* '* "ST*SfeO op. The personal aooount of the ia&a who iminly responsible for the independence of - Fij&and and ita greatest s^adom ftiH tary leader*

Fontere* x»&*ri ai^l Chrnnar Sarva* % ^tsX km %m ffeaaqa iiiatcaria* fbrvoo* Finland* itferner Tf^ ^ » 361 pp. I'iapa* U lu a t * A gmmr-mt t e x t mi Finnish hiatory* t'^sour* .&aa&c&<* G* v-inlapft beteaen Seat and % et* Frtnceton* K*0«f 15* Van HoeiraaS & * XHStTTSSSiT' xiv*1T5W fjp* Although tha chapter ok the Winter tfar is a^.parativoly brief* the booh ia a ¥alxM bla r»f«m»o« w k onth e biat-orr o f .FinXand* eapeoialX y ir* the twentietii oentury* ralkaen* Gregory* I he Ba£%&& Yorkt b*B* Fiaoher* 1910. «» 271 PP* T^orF^SvafSnS pi ooa nation of Coaesardat propa- ganda* Kieanttat uukka* ed* Faota about Fialand* tran* Paul Sloblum* Helsinki: ottsva PublishliJUo* * T?S5# SIT "pp. a practical, referenee guide- regard in g FiisXawd# 170

Niukfcsnen, Juho. Talvisodan Puolustuaministart Kertooe Porvoo, Finland; Wmfmr 'SSd#ri"&iE' *% pp. The Finnish Minister of Defense during the Winter War tail® his stopy. An Invaluable source of information on the military preparedness of Finland, Including pertinent statistics and charts. dhquisi, doharmes. Baa Kampfende Finland. Stuttgart* klemmmn Verlag, 19U1.39 pp. A shoS work that adds little to the knowledge of the Winter War. Palolampi, Erkki. KoUaa Kesigft. Forvoo, Finland; turner S

V u o r ln e n , John H.s ed. Finland and W orld War I I , 1939-19U 1*. New Yorks The Ronald Press BS~5WC~ 1 ^ 2 ^ . Y^lulKor of this book desired to remain anonosicmo and to do so sent the F in n is h manuscript to Professor Wiserinen to translate and publish. It is an incisive and analytical work based on sound research. ______• Nationalism in ’-odera Finland. New York* Columbia d iv e r sity xJ®3?W~pp. A general treatise dealing with the development of nationalism in Finland during the nine­ teenth and twentieth centuries. Of special, value for the treatment given Finnish nationalism as it manifested itself during the periods of Intense Russification of Finland.

ARTICLES

Anderson, Albin T. "Origins of the Winter Wart A Study of Ruaao-Fiiwiah Diplomacy.* World P o litics. Yol . V i, Ho* 2*T3JS.T&lSET^- ~ " War is, rfoikki. "Social Institutions in Finland," the Institutions of Advanced S ocieties. Minneapolis, ?*inn.* IM iwrsity' of '""'inneso ta W5s57^pfljr£T Serfss B. No. 1 (1953).