ISSUE 149

September 2013

Some Influences on Current Chinese Naval Strategy in the South China Sea The Royal Malaysian Navy in the Midst of Modernisation Indonesia’s Fast Attack Craft Acquisition: Toward a “Balanced” Fleet? Americans in Darwin Submarine Trends in Asia Pacific K-IX Australia’s only WWII submarine

Journal of the Visit us at pacific 2013

US Navy 127m Littoral Combat Ship

AustrAliA’s prime defence contrActor [email protected] www.austal.com

ACBPS 58m RAN 56m Cape Class Patrol Boat Armidale Class Patrol Boat Issue 149 3 Visit us at pacific 2013 Letter to the Editor Contents

Dear Editor, This not only denies natural justice Some Influences on Current Chinese In line with Dr Lewis, I was for those who made or risked the Naval Strategy in the South China Sea 4 dismayed at the recent announcement ultimate sacrifice in the most gallant by Navy that the pursuit of the award circumstances but flies in the face of of Victoria Crosses to Naval personnel those Navy Signature Behaviors where The Royal Malaysian Navy in the involved in past actions would not we value Navy’s history, identity, and Midst of Modernisation 24 longer be undertaken. reputation. To suggest that in the last 113 years The past and serving men and LIGHTNING 28 where the Nation was involved in women of the RAN deserve better. conflict and significant Naval battles There is an obvious wrong to be that no single action of gallantry righted. The continued adroit pursuit The Barrow in Furness Australian achieved the levels required for the of the appropriate awards should be Submarine Memorial 30 award of the VC is nonsense. made with the courage and loyalty Now we are accepting and setting demanded of those who serve in the a precedent, through political RAN and in the memory of those World Naval Developments 36 expediency, that in the past and shipmates whose gallant actions are arguably into the future that no now part of Navy history. A Navy ANZAC Day or Naval personnel serving in ships Lieutenant Commander Michael Remembrance Day Speech 39 will qualify for award of the VC but Edwards, OAM, RAN(rtd) for an alternative collective award. Donnybrook WA US Navy 127m Littoral Combat Ship Indonesia’s Fast Attack Craft Acquisition: Toward a “Balanced” Fleet? 42

AustrAliA’s prime defence contrActor Americans in Darwin 44 [email protected] www.austal.com German Navy - a capable submarine fleet 46

Submarine Trends in Asia Pacific: Air-Independent Propulsion A Game Changer? 48 F ront page : HMAS Choules’ K-IX Australia’s only Standing Sea Fire WWII submarine 51 Party prepares to fight a fire as part of a Damage Control German Navy Corvette Exposé 56 Exercise during Exercise Sea Lion 2013. Book Reviews 58 A ship’s signal lamp captures the image of ABIS Chantell Bianchi as she photographs an LCM8 and a “suspect vessel” as part of Exercise Sea Lion 2013. Visions from the Vault 67 Issue Number 149 SPONSORS: Printed in Queensland Australia - DMS Maritime - Lockheed Martin - Austal - Saab Systems - Style Notes for Headmark 69 - QinetiQ - Australian Defence Credit Union - Raytheon Australia - ISSN 1833-6531 - ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems Australia - Thales Naval Group - ANI Membership Application Form 71 Design & DTP by Diane Bricknell [email protected] ACBPS 58m RAN 56m Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Cape Class Patrol Boat Armidale Class Patrol Boat 4 Some Influences on Current Chinese Naval Strategy in the South China Sea By W. Steen Anderson

n a recent article published in the and naval capabilities of the 1 Naval Review magazine, the Author Chinese Peoples Liberation Idescribes a series of surprise attacks. Armed Forces over the These were against Pearl Harbor in last decade, and China’s Hawaii and Darwin in Australia by the desire to exercise control carrier aircraft of the Imperial Japanese over most or nearly all of Navy. These attacks instigated World the South China Sea. This War II in the Pacific in 1941 and 1942. is particularly so, in view The th7 December 1941 attack of the surprise attacks by on Pearl Harbor damaged the port Al Qaeda using passenger infrastructure. Battleships and other planes on the east coast units of the United States Navy Pacific cities of the United States at fleet were sunk or damaged on that the start of the last decade. 2 Sunday morning. By luck United However, there are States aircraft carriers were at sea and other episodes in World escaped destruction. This intelligence War II that should give failure by Japan was to have far- modern strategists even reaching consequences. more cause for concern. Darwin was attacked in two air Any weaker power trying raids on the 19th February 1942. A to achieve severe damage coast watcher on Bathurst Island on an enemy, or war aims radioed a warning to the authorities against a stronger power, on the mainland as the 71 Japanese would probably employ a dive bombers and 81 torpedo surprise attack against some bombers, escorted by 36 Zero fighters, important target. It would A ircraft Carrier USS passed overhead on their way to happen where the opponent least resulted in the complete destruction of Theodore Roosevelt, Darwin harbour. This warning was expected it. their governments and military forces. background, joins a dismissed by the military authorities. But according to the thinking of This was accompanied by constant multinational battle group formation They mistook the planes for a flight the philosopher on war, Carl von battlefield attrition, networked linked including a People’s of United States Army Air Corps Clausewitz “surprise of itself is not a warfare, global positioning systems Republic of China 4 Kittyhawk P-40s. war winning strategy.” It is equally true (GPS) targeting and unmanned aerial Navy multi-role The second raid arrived about lunch that, by its very nature, surprise can vehicle (UAV) missile strikes on missile destroyer time. Two waves of Nell and Betty rarely be outstandingly successful. It terrorist targets from the Yemen and Guangzhou and the Pakistan Navy bombers attacked the Royal Australian would be a mistake therefore, to regard Sudan on the one hand, to Afghanistan frigate PNS Badr Air Force base south of Darwin. One surprise as an element of success in and Pakistan on the other. The United came from the north-east, the other war...... “Basically surprise is a tactical States has, with its allies, put the from the south-west. Again there were device”..... “Therefore in strategy, terrorists and their protectors almost failures of intelligence, this time by surprise becomes the more difficult, out of business and certainly very much the local defences. Broome was also the more it approaches the higher on the defensive. attacked in March of that year, with 86 levels of policy.” TheNaval Review author argues lives lost, the second deadliest air raid The attacks on the Twin Towers that given the rise in Chinese military of the war on Australia. All together, in Manhattan, New York City, and on and naval air, ship and missile power 3 5 107 raids took place over two years. the Pentagon in Washington DC are over the last 15 years, the South TheNaval Review article argues illustrative. These led to a ferocious China Sea area could be the focus that a surprise attack could be and sustained military reaction by the for a Chinese surprise attack of some relevant given modern strategy. This is Government of the United States. Two sort. Chinese policy aims to regain especially relevant to the rise in military limited wars in Iraq and Afghanistan sovereignty of Taiwan and exercise Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 149 5

undisputed sovereignty over that sea would be contained by the Royal Navy ORKNEY ISLES and its mineral deposits. blockading offshore, as it had often NORWAY been during the Napoleonic wars. CONTAINMENT. 1 Their ability to extend naval power GRAND FLEET “The act or condition of containing, across the world’s oceans to their (Jellicoe) especially of restraining the overseas territories would be limited ideological or political power of a or blocked. This school of thinking has SCOTLAND hostile country or the operations of a strong similarities to many of present BATTLE AREA Jutland hostile military force.” Collins day naval articles written on littoral DENMARK In the 20 years leading up to the and asymmetric warfare. In the event, Edinburgh BATTLE CRUISER FLEET (Beatty) year 1900, political relations between Britain and France were never to come Kiel Britain and France were often tense. to outright hostilities before World HELIGOLAND GERMAN FLEET French naval thinkers were trying to War I. (Von Scheer) develop a naval strategy that could British naval containment of a Wilhelmshaven succeed in wearing down the might of continental power did however come ENGLAND the Royal Navy in the event tensions about in World War I. But it was escalated into conflict. exercised against the fleet of Imperial HOLLAND GERMANY 0 100 miles This “jeune ecole”, (young school), Germany, not France. It was to lead, in of naval thinking had two elements time, to the Battle of Jutland on 31 May to it. One agreed that fleets of small, 1916. to serious discussion and challenge as well-armed fast torpedo boats, The aim of the German naval to relevance in a fast moving, modern operating in the English Channel, strategists was to have a naval fleet battle at sea. could pose a severe threat to British that could seriously damage or weaken How to manoeuvre lines of heavy 7 merchant shipping, and so damage the Royal Navy in a battle of attrition. naval ships at high speed in battle in 6 British commerce. The more radical The Germans could never surpass, or order to obtain the best advantage was thinkers took the idea further. They even equal, the power of the British a real problem. The previous series of believed torpedo boats moving at high North Sea Fleet, and at the same time naval battles during the Russo-Japanese speed would be a severe threat to the maintain huge continental sized army War had been of the pre dreadnought battleships and cruisers of the Royal forces. The strain on the German era. In these new circumstances 8 Navy fleet, especially in narrow seas. economy would have been unbearable. the normal “fog of war” had been This was an idea that could use the A weakened Royal Navy Fleet, it was increased enormously. latest technology to tip the balance argued, would have to loosen its grip Commanders and in particular, more in favour of France in the event of on the blockade of Europe. This was a Admiral Jellicoe, the British Naval naval conflict. more aggressive form of containment Commander at Jutland, were very The British, it was argued would specifically aimed at the German concerned not to have their heavy units be reluctant to use their valuable economy. The weakened grip would led into a trap. Submarine torpedo expensive capital ships in littoral allow German maritime access to the ambush and mines were a formidable waters, where the threat of mines and oceans of the world to obtain essential threat. Destroyer torpedo attacks out of torpedoes was so high. French torpedo supplies. smoke, rain or bad weather fronts were boats with swiftness of manoeuvre at Jutland took place at a time of also a real added risk. sea, low water line silhouette, produced great technological change. Aircraft, From 1905 the Admiralty believed at relatively low cost, with easy to airships, submarines, torpedoes, mines, commercial blockade of Germany produce marine components, were the the telegraph, radio transmissions would form the main thrust of the key. It meant it was, for the French, a and reception, steam turbine engines, war effort. Written by Admiral Jellicoe much less expensive but potentially range-finding techniques for naval the Royal Navy battle fleet orders ran much more effective form of warfare gunnery, munitions technology and to 70 pages. They were first issued in 9 for the weaker naval power of those knowledge, were all subject to rapid August 1914. Given his wariness about times. rates of progress and innovation. Naval ambush, attacks by enemy flotillas were The French fear was that their battle drill manuals were becoming to be met by turning away. This action merchant marine and naval operations obsolete, not quite redundant, but open mitigated against a quick decision Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 6 Some Influences on Current Chinese Naval Strategy in the South China Sea in battle and also against the taking commander on the spot. The battle sanctions. By 1939 its government was of the tactical offensive. The actual cruisers’ armour was weak. Armour faced with shortages of essential raw 13 composition of the Royal Naval battle piercing shells failed when German materials, especially oil. The hard fleet was one of a combination of speed ships were hit. There were faults in line nationalist government decided and enormous firepower. This mix munitions handling. Other faults were it had to react to this increasingly of fast battle cruisers and battleships exposed through the actual experience disadvantageous situation. It decided was required for its basic offensive of battle. there was a limited opportunity to tactical role. It aimed to destroy as Strategically, however, it was a invade neighbouring territories and effectively as possible, an enemy fleet British naval victory. It maintained the established an inner area defensive trying to escape. So, to some little British fleet in being. It also contained perimeter of captured islands. They had extent Jellicoe’s battle fleet orders stood the German surface fleet for most of to do this in the western Pacific, before 14 against the purposes of the main fleet, the rest of the war. The Battle of Jutland oil reserves gave out completely. and how it was composed. showed how Admiral A T Mahan’s In order to gain time to carry out 12 During the battle Admiral Jellicoe ideas were best pursued. Had the this policy and strategy, Japan planned was faced at a couple of points with German fleet been destroyed it would and executed the Pearl Harbor and critical decisions. His training, tactical have been by far the better outcome. Darwin air raids. These surprise attacks and strategic senses acted together Greater command of the seas would had two very different purposes, 15 with his long experience. As a result have resulted and the bulk of the Royal however. he was brought to the point in time Navy battle fleet would have been The raid on the U S Navy base and place where deploying his ships released to pursue other possibilities. at Pearl Harbor on Hawaii on 7th to starboard would have brought on However, containment was maintained. December 1941 was a strategic surprise a major battleship action with the Germany was now faced with attack. It aimed to cripple United States 10 German Fleet. breaking this containment by a war naval power in the Pacific. This force On the other hand deploying to port of attrition, using the submarine was the only real obstacle to Japan’s was much more cautious, delayed the offensively, by means of unrestricted Imperial ambitions. Japan aimed occurrence of a major battle, but was submarine warfare. The submarine to destroy the Pacific fleet, giving much less risky. This was the decision was then the “asymmetrical” form of Japanese forces enough time to invade he took. It has been criticised by some war. It was the latest technology in and capture the ring of islands it had later commentators as being not the very early stages of development earmarked as part of the perimeter offensive minded enough. The battle used by the weaker power. It involved of its new economic zone of control. was therefore delayed until much later attrition of allied merchant ships on a The Japanese Government could then in the day. By then the light was fading great scale. Eventually it forced Britain proceed to negotiate from a position fast. Despite the offensive nature of his to reintroduce the convoy system. Only of strength with the United States. It fleet therefore, tactically this decision after the submarine was defeated did would, by then, have gained its essential was far less offensive and therefore far command of the seas return to the raw materials and strengthened its less risky. allies, albeit not completely. defence in depth. The United States The Battle of Jutland was a The allied armies on the continent would have needed years to rebuild its 11 “tactical failure” for Jellicoe. The had their western flanks protected naval power. Royal Navy lost more ships, more by naval power in the channel and The Darwin attack on the 19th of men and sustained more damage the North Sea throughout the war. February 1942 was, by contrast, as part than the German Fleet. There were These armies were also supported of an overall strategic offensive strike lots of good lessons to be learned and supplied by allied naval power. against what is now Indonesia. This and absorbed from the battle. There This resulted in the defeat of Imperial aimed to secure the mineral rich islands. had been problems connected to Germany in 1918. The aim here was to shut down communications within the fleet and Darwin as a base of supply, hence to the fleet from Naval Headquarters. CONTAINMENT 2 logistics support to allied forces There were problems over how Japan in the 1930s felt increasingly operating in what was then the Dutch intelligence was used, about where constrained by the economic forces East Indies. It was part of a three- it should be generated, assessed and generated by the world depression pronged attack to deter the allies from how should it be passed to the fleet and the effects of United States trade resisting Japanese invasions of the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 149 7

chain of islands. This had three axes of had made plain to its advance, towards Java, Bali and Timor. people could never Success in securing Bali and Timor happen. The militaristic 20 helped secure the success of Japan’s government lost face. 16 invasion of Java from the east. Clausewitz did Rapid Japanese conquests followed. not say that war has In the east these were from the its own logic. He did Philippines down to Guadalcanal in the say that it had its own 21 Solomon Islands. To the west the arc “grammar” however. of outer defence aimed for was from Did this theory support central China and Burma down to New this second phase of Guinea in the south. They achieved the Japanese strategic 22 their strategic aim through surprise offensive? attacks and rapid advances using naval power to check and destroy any naval THE GRAMMAR interference from the western allies. It OF WAR AND THE the Coral Sea had very many similar HMS Dreadnought 23 had achieved “Hakko Ichiu” (the eight BATTLE OF THE CORAL SEA characteristics. It was the first carrier (Lewis collection) corners of the world under one roof), (MAY 1942) versus carrier battle in history. Given 17 for the first time in Japanese history. The Battle of Jutland was a confused the euphoria in the Japanese Naval The original plan, when drawn up, battle. The Commander was critically and Military High Command, from had assumed it would take six months short of accurate information up to the success of the first phase of island to reach the final island objectives, with and during the battle. It was fought at invasions, they had no hesitation in 18 losses expected to be 30%. By the first a period of great technological change. extending their island invasion strategy of May 1942 they found their conquests Tactics were open to question because further into the Western Pacific. had come a lot quicker and with far the capabilities of the new weapons One of these planned naval thrusts Dramatic shot of fewer losses than expected. Japanese were relatively unknown in war. Tactics was around the South Eastern end of the detonation of a naval planners, as a result, argued that therefore were exercised conservatively. New Guinea towards Port Moresby, 1,000-pound (450 kg) bomb on Shōhō they should extend the perimeter of Systems were untried in battle. Jutland the Capital. This aimed to land ground during the Battle of the defence out further, to a line of was a strategic victory for the Royal forces near there, and capture it. the Coral Sea islands further east. This included the Navy if a tactical defeat. The Battle of Another part of this same thrust was (US Navy) Aleutians, Midway, Hawaiian Islands, and South Fiji, Samoa, and New 19 Caledonia to New Guinea. Logically it made sense. It would give even greater space for Japan to consolidate its defences and to manoeuvre inside the intended perimeter. The logic was solid enough. It meant the Japanese had to destroy what was left of United States Naval power in the Pacific in 1942. Otherwise it would be subject to sustained counter offensives. It may have been logical. It was sustained by euphoria from the initial successes. The logic was reinforced by the USAAF Doolittle raid on Tokyo on 18 April 1942, another complete surprise attack. This Tokyo raid was something the Japanese Government Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 8 Some Influences on Current Chinese Naval Strategy in the South China Sea

27 to capture Tulagi Island and use it as understanding. This has lessons for side, the carrier Lexington was sunk a seaplane base in order to exercise commanders of combined operations and carrier Yorktown badly damaged. control further south, down the and captains of ships in the present The United States lost more men Solomon Island chain. It was a logical century and the South China Sea today. and ships of quality. It was a Japanese extension to the original one phase So Japanese naval and support tactical victory therefore, similar to plan. groups came to be dispersed across the the German position after Jutland. With air and seaplane bases at Port north Coral Sea and in the island area Strategically the Japanese failed to Moresby, Tulagi and military influence to the north east. capture Port Moresby, though they did south to Noumea, Japan could cut United States and allied support capture Talagi. They were, however, the supply route to Australia from groups were also scattered for various forced back. Never again were Japanese the United States. It could begin to reasons. From the time of Lord Nelson ships beyond, to the south and west isolate Australia from United States and probably before, fleet commanders of the Luisades Islands. Their strategic 29 supplies and reinforcements. It could have bemoaned ships being dispersed objectives had been thwarted. Phase “Darwinise” the Australian ports and from the main fleet for whatever two of their expansion was halted. air bases in Queensland and along the reason. In this instance United States Admiral Frank Fletcher, at the Coral Queensland Coast. ships were refuelling, some were Sea, made essentially correct tactical But there existed a fundamental running before bad weather, some had decisions during these battles. Yet flaw in Japanese naval strategy. “ been sent to meet Japanese forces but tactically they lost, because attrition Whenever the Japanese planners had been given the wrong chart co- took place, and each lost more naval disposed of sufficient strength, they ordinates for target interception. units and men than the enemy. This divided forces and drafted an elaborate Indeed on 7 May 1942 opposing may seem like a contradiction in terms. plan, the successful execution of which carrier forces were only 70 nautical Although Clausewitz noted that “war required a tactical competence rare at miles apart and neither side was aware has its own grammar” he was not 24 any time in any navy.” of the other’s position. The “fog of war” writing about naval warfare. He was The plan also required the enemy was again making its presence felt. As experienced in land warfare. But he forces to have a passive role. If the in the case of Jutland there was a delay was writing about war in general. Japanese had concentrated on just one in action. Had they known each other’s Perhaps the internal dynamics of the three aims outlined above the position they would have fought on the of strategically defensive sea battles, 28 odds they would have succeeded. But 6th and 7th. fought to preserve containment, at a they did not. Basically they divided On the 8th May aircraft from United time of rapidly developing technology, their large naval forces into four groups States carriers Yorktown and Lexington have a tipping point of some sort or with subsidiary missions as outlined found the heavy Japanese carriers other. above. There is a contradiction here. Zuikaku and Shokaku. In turn Japanese This may dictate that the rate Japanese naval thinking had been planes found the United States carriers. of attrition on the forces doing the very much influenced by the ideas In this first carrier versus carrier containing is greater than those doing 25 of Admiral Mahan. He believed battle all losses were inflicted by the attacking. But at the same time in that concentration of the fleet was enemy air action. No ship on either the battle, the strategic momentum of essential. The Japanese division of side sighted a surface enemy ship. The the attacking forces is lost and is never forces may have arisen because of Japanese light carrier Shoho was lost regained. If this is correct, then one overall command decisions of the with some other small ships. Shokaku difference between the two battles is Imperial Army which had a tight grip was heavily damaged and out of action that the mass concentration of forces on national strategy, or there may for two months. Zuikaku lost most at Jutland was far superior on the Royal have been other reasons. The military of the attached planes and was out Naval side compared to the mass on hierarchy and government in Japan of action until 12th June 1942. Had the United States side at the Coral Sea. at that time may not have understood these two carriers been active in the This was partly because capital ships the flaws in these fleet dispersals used Battle of Midway, 4th June 1942, the in 1942 were now aircraft carriers for multiple ends. They could not United States Navy might have not had compared to battleships. They were grasp some of the essentials of naval sufficient margin of force for victory in not needed in a concentrated form in 26 thinking. Naval commanders of the that supremely important battle. order to generate mass firepower. Their operation should really have had more At the Coral Sea, on the allied planes did that. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 149 9

Asymetric strike This may have profound - the carrier HMS implications for a modern naval battle Formidable after fleet contending with land based a kamikaze hit missile power. The modern idea is (Lewis Collection) that firepower concentration does not have to originate from forces which are themselves concentrated. In turn this has probably serious implications for unit positioning in any modern naval battle. So Gray’s law certainly applies to Jutland. This says that “Average Statecraft, strategy and operational and tactical skills can be blended to achieve success reliably when they function in a fault tolerant environment provided by 30 friendly superior mass.” But whether it applies to carrier operations in the more modern planes, ships, weapons the job, morale was not good in the same way around the time of the Coral and supplies, backed up with trained service and most torpedoes were duds 33 Sea battle may require more analysis. manpower and replacements, kept or at best unreliable. Restrictive and Certainly the fact that Admiral Nimitz, these and other World War II battle anti offensive rules of operation were the overall US Naval Commander, fronts going. the norm. As the year 1943 progressed had access to good intelligence about Japanese industrial and defence these problems were largely resolved. Japanese intentions, provided a large policy had not envisaged, or planned The United States submarine fleet 31 degree of comfort. for a long war of attrition. Japan began to inflict more and more damage The Coral Sea battle affected the failed, unlike Germany, in World War on the Japanese merchant and naval Battle of Midway. Midway proved the II, to develop advanced weaponry as marine forces. Japanese Army garrisons Japanese could not afford to lose the the war progressed. Even Germany did on various islands were left cut off from time bought by their tactical victory not produce enough ground to ground supplies or supplies were reduced to at Coral Sea. Midway was another missiles like the V and V2 , Hydroxide a trickle as more and more Japanese island target on the phase two outer powered submarines and jet aircraft for supply ships were sunk. perimeter element of the extended example, or enough in time, to make a original Japanese plan. At Midway significant difference. IWO JIMA AND OKINAWA - Japan lost four fleet carriers and over Japan did have a considerable CONTAINMENT TIGHTENS 200 front line planes along with their lead in technology in some respects. - ATTRITION ON A GRAND pilots of great experience. Japanese Its torpedo technology and zero SCALE carrier offensive naval power was fighters were superb and they had The Japanese Army, Air Force and destroyed by attrition. The balance built up enormous experience in Navy used suicide pilots in these of naval power slipped back, more in carrier operations. There were some battles. Executed with standard navy favour of the United States. subsequent technical advances but aircraft, packed with bombs and Time had been gained for American these were no match for what the explosives these pilots, (Kamikazes) industrial power to be geared up United States was to produce. flew their planes directly into their and brought to bear on this Pacific Time gained at Midway also allowed targets. Inevitably most of these pilots War, indeed on the war as a whole. the United States to solve some of perished. These were essentially Command of the sea allowed United its serious naval and operational very accurate guided missiles, with States war material and manpower to problems. Its submarine arm, for extremely accurate terminal guidance flow on a scale sufficient to support example, suffered from restrictive onto their targets. This has serious 32 Australia and also the United States operational tactics and practices. lessons for those naval strategists at island hopping strategy across the Many of the submarine commanders present assessing how to respond to western Pacific towards Japan. New, were poor, quite a lot were too old for the growth in the Chinese Peoples’ Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 10 Some Influences on Current Chinese Naval Strategy in the South China Sea

Liberation Army, Navy, (PLAN) such a problem, but a real problem supersonic rocket ramjet has a range capabilities. never the less. A policy of “sea denial” of over 100 nautical miles. Given these Although the Japanese Kamikazes is well on its way to being achieved. modern unmanned “Kamikazes” were subsonic, they give a clear Their existence begins to pose a serious therefore, reaching out from the indication of the course of possible threat to United States naval forces Chinese mainland in such numbers, future naval battles. Large numbers there and perhaps also in the western what doctrine or theory of use could be of planes were flown on these suicide Pacific. If missile accuracy is not 100% used? Could, as the Naval Review article missions. At present Chinese land they certainly have the numbers. Mass argues, they be employed according to based artillery forces and their naval matters. Attrition on a large scale the ideas of the Chinese thinker on war 40 equivalent have built up large numbers therefore, again threatens the United Sun Tzu? Perhaps they might be used of mobile land based ship destroying States fleet’s presence in the South at the start of any outright hostilities missiles. They are, however, having China Sea areas as at the end of the rather than as a last act of desperation extreme difficulties with terminal Pacific War in World War II. It is the as in the way the Japanese employed 34 guidance problems. new asymmetrical form of warfare for their Kamikazes. Perhaps they could An analysis of the Kamikaze attacks the weaker naval power. be used as part of some surprise attack shows that they were responsible in the These missiles are to be supported as happened with Pearl Harbor and ten months in and around when these by 36 Backfire bombers, (TV-22M3). Darwin? battles took place, for more than 48% The engines have been purchased This thinking is, in some respects, of all US Naval warships destroyed, and from the Russians and air frames built akin to the British strategist Basil Liddell 21%s unk during the entire course of under licence. Designated H10, these Hart and his strategy of the indirect 35 World War II on all fronts. give a range of operations well beyond approach idea. There is an indication in In the 12 weeks battle for Okinawa, the chain of islands off the Chinese their thinking to try to achieve victory 38 United States forces lost heavily. mainland. “Few armies in the region by avoiding a battle or battles, to use 41 However, Japanese forces lost 3, 800 operate defensive systems likely to strategic surprise . Neither was a naval aircraft and 117, 000 personnel. Overall counter the missiles carried by the man. Sun Tzu refers to water in only 16 over 250, 000 people lost their lives in Backfires.” Only the United States Navy of his 380 three tenets on war. He does these battles. has the fighters able to shoot down however, write a whole section on the Here then is a good instance of the these planes. Failure to shoot these way of “The Attack by Fire”. The fifth so-called asymmetrical technique in down means they are free to return to way for instance, in this section, is to war. Untried, relatively inexpensive base, re-fuel, re-arm, attack again and lure dropping fire amongst the enemy. equipment, ideas and tactics were so on until the defence is exhausted. Modern land based missiles certainly fit used by the Japanese to fight a The Backfire bombers are much that category. superior opponent at a period of rapid more likely to be able to track and Sun Tzu was writing around 512BC 36 technological change. Again attrition target United States carrier escort when China was rife with feudal set in and led to horrendous losses in groups more precisely than can the armies and regional chiefs struggling men, planes and ships. This was total Chinese land-based anti-ship missiles, for power and land. Both writers war. at least at present. Each bomber has emphasise surprise, outflanking or 42 The Chinese are currently faced its own sea search radar. So these may out manoeuvring the enemy. Every with perfecting the terminal phases of augment Chinese over the horizon effort must be made, it is argued, to their anti-ship missile trajectories so radar and satellite tracking precision. attack command and control centres, or that targeting of United States carriers The missile, fired from the bomber, render the leadership of enemy forces 43 can be assured. This is an extremely is data linked to it. The bomber crew, useless, confused or ineffective. Enemy difficult task to achieve. Quite a once the missile is locked on directly to strategic leadership and coherence is proportion of their tracking equipment the target from over the horizon, can therefore lost. So the effectiveness of 39 for longer range missiles is sea based, fire it. It is at that point of firing that front line forces is crippled. Speed of with all the attendant problems that the bomber may be vulnerable to fleet execution is also important. It is vital to 37 brings about. defences. outpace the enemy in any counter moves But for shorter range missiles aimed The current main anti-carrier missile that may be made. However, these at ships, fleets and targets within the is the Russian supplied AS17 (KL-31) events in World War II bring home South China Sea, this may not be quite anti-radar, or anti-ship version. This some serious lessons. In the strategy of Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 149 11

containment by naval powers, surprise attacks and asymmetrical use of forces have led to attrition and battles on an enormous scale.

CONTAINMENT AND ESCALATION Escalation also took place in World 44 War I. The “quick” strike of the German Army using the Schlieffien Plan to outflank the French defences and go through neutral Belgium, failed 45 and stalled. The Imperial German Army was faced by a build up of French Forces and British and Commonwealth Forces carried across the Channel by sea power. It was slowed and halted by fortifications, leaving those to be fighting China and against the Far Backfire bomber and missile graphic the Belgian Government flooding their captured later. This was based on the East forces of the Soviet Union in (Courtesy SimHQ) vast dyke area. A couple of gunshots ideas of the theorists about warfare, Manchuria in the mid and late 1930s 46 in Sarajevo had dragged the Austro- JFC Fuller and BH Liddell-Hart. before the outbreak of the Pacific War. Hungarian Empire into a false strategy. They were matured and practiced Nazi Germany aimed to knock the Once mobilised, Austria had to be endlessly in secret during the 1930s United Kingdom out of the war by supported by Germany. More support by the German Army. This technique concluding a peace before turning to was needed when Russia mobilised in destroyed French and British Army attack the Soviet Union. support of their Serbian kinfolk. Forces on the continent in a very short Imperial Japan aimed to destroy In the end almost the entire period in 1940. United States Naval power in the continent of Europe was engulfed But escalation took place. Soviet Pacific, after which the government in total war. On the Western front Russia was attacked next. Japan’s aspired to hold onto these newly stalemate existed on the entrenched military government used this controlled territories and negotiate battlefields across northern France opportunity to attack in South East from a position of strength. Success 47 and Belgium, because defence was Asia. It took advantage of the fact would have given the government stronger than offence. The technical that Soviet Forces were heavily engaged freedom to continue their continental developments of armaments favoured in European Russia against the German war against China. the defence over offence. The quick Army. World War II finally ended in In each case the limited war “knock out” blow by German forces, the dropping of the atom bombs on strategy failed. Strategic goals-i.e. designated by the High Command to Japan. peace negotiated from strength and achieve a quick victory and avoid a However, “For many of the same lightening surprise military and naval two-front war, descended into attrition reasons that great amphibious strikes, eluded both governments. The on a great scale on two fronts. enterprises tend to exhaust the military means employed failed to produce the In World War II, Nazi Germany imagination of their planners with ends required. The political situation aimed for a quick knockout blow the securing of a beach head, so great that both governments tried to attain using massed tank forces backed by enterprises in continental conquest internationally never materialised. dive bombing and artillery. Rapid and have a way of running out of capital in Protracted total war developed with deep breakthroughs of defended fronts strategic imagination when they reach whole nations and continents involved. 48 took place once weakness had been the water’s edge.” Destruction and attrition of military found. These panzer group tactics Imperial Germany, Nazi Germany, and naval forces, along with whole aimed for military head quarters and Imperial Japan all aimed to fight societies resulted. Their political and and communications junctions, short limited wars. Surprise was a military strategies had failed to produce behind enemy lines. The fast-paced key component in their respective the ends required. tank groups bypassed formidable strategies. That is except for Japan Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 12 Some Influences on Current Chinese Naval Strategy in the South China Sea

CONTAINMENT tactical and strategic naval influences. THE INFLUENCES DRIVING OF CHINA 2012 The United States is trying to curb or CHINESE NAVAL STRATEGY The People’s Republic of China deter the rise in power of the Chinese Sun Tzu did not write anything about 53 Government maintains it is the target People’s Liberation Army-Navy escalation as modern strategists of a United States containment policy. (PLAN). The Chinese are acting on know and recognise it. But he was very The US Government denies this. the tactical offensive and strategic aware that it was better to fight and Certainly the Chinese Government defensive. The United States is acting win a war with methods that caused aspires to exert far greater control over on the strategic offensive and tactical the least damage or destruction to the 54 the South China Sea and their waters. defensive. However, the United States Feudal Kingdom. Also the costs had There are sound strategic reasons extends its influence right to the 12 to be kept as low as possible. It was for this policy. Greater, or indeed total mile Chinese costal limits. This makes also better, he wrote, that wars should control, means control of undersea the Chinese Government uneasy. not be prolonged. In a way he was a raw materials, oil, gas, metals and The line of island barriers hemming limited war analyst and supporter. He fish. These are needed to power in Chinese naval influence from the recognised the inherent dangers to a its economy and fulfil the rising greater Pacific would be broken once state in a prolonged and costly war. He economic expectations of its 1.3 billion Taiwan was fully regained. Wake Island did not write specifically about fighting 55 population. It also aims to be able is then the only island barrier left. Here on the oceans. to exert enough military and naval again therefore, like Japan in World He is neither a theorist nor pressure to prevent the United States War II, the islands round the Western philosopher of war in way the way Navy and its allies from moving aircraft Pacific littoral perimeter become the thoughts, theory and philosophic carrier and heavy escorts through the important in geo-strategic politics method of Carl Von Clausewitz Straits of Taiwan. and naval strategy. Japan is an island approached the subject. Sun Tzu’s’ texts The United States Navy did this maritime power. China is a continental are very prescriptive. There is a fair in the Taiwanese crisis of 1995-1996 power with maritime and naval amount about morale, training, terrain when Taiwan threatened complete ambitions. So-called asymmetrical and the cost of armies. But he did not 49 independence. At present certainly, warfare, surprise attacks, trying to expand in detail as much as did Baron the gradually escalating threat to put the enemy off balance, we have Jomini in developing a set of rules of 56 United States Navy carrier escort seen from World Wars I and II have war. Tzu’s’ influence has been traced, groups from these land based and led to attrition and destruction on an and developed considerably in recent 52 Backfire launched rocket forces, makes enormous scale where great power strategic analysis about China, its Navy, 57 it much more insecure for the United interests were at stake. and how China might fight a war. States Navy to carry out a similar Escalation has always taken place in There are however, other influences at transit in the event of a crisis. China twentieth century warfare. At least that work on Chinese strategy. is compelling the United States to is up to that period in history where reduce its China Sea naval activities nuclear weapons were used effectively. THE COMMUNIST INFLUENCE through increasing land, air and sea After that point the threat of use of OF CHINESE STRATEGY IN THE 50 based threats. It has become true that nuclear weapons kept escalation from SOUTH CHINA SEA carrier groups would be so focused on going all the way to total war. However, Sun Tzu may well be an influence. defence that their potential influence in all those limited wars of the mid and But combined with it are Communist for offensive operations has been late 20th century, battles and attrition legacies from the Soviet Union and significantly reduced. This in turn were often considerable. Great losses Mao Tse Tung, legacies rooted in their weakens the United States’ ability to took place. more, “scientific lessons of history”. support allies in the region, not least The Cuban missile crisis was very Mao Tse Tung for example had a Taiwan. nearly the exception. Indian-Pakistan great interest in campaigns and their China also aims to over-awe the relations have at times been extremely importance in war. Chinese strategists countries in the area with which it has volatile. Both are now nuclear armed. are rooted in the “science” of war. disputes. It is pushing outwards its North Korea is reputed to be nearly or Operational art and rules form a 51 58 general political power and influence. actually nuclear armed. high priority. They examine the sea China is compelling the United States, campaigns of the past very carefully for in the South China Sea, to give up its their “lessons”. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 149 13

They also examine very carefully the capability. The situations where western politicians Soviets did not and strategists give commanders surface their freedom to make decisions. In submarines but conformity with their scientific submarines are approach they try to establish texts an essential anti- and doctrine for these tactical decision carrier battle making situations as well. Warfare to group element. their way of thinking is far less an art. It However, at is much more a science. other times, A South China Sea denial campaign during the Cold is perhaps more akin to this way of War, the Soviets encouraging strategy. Their policy is did surface their composed of a series of incremental submarines to and consistent tactical offensive moves. show they were T he 4,000km-range These are designed to progressively there and ready influence in any Taiwan crisis will be Dong Hai-10 (DH-10) deny access to or inhibit the operations to be used. severely curtailed. land-attack cruise of the United States Navy and other In these four cases the non- The (PLAN) is also developing missile naval marine assets near the Chinese appearance of submarines was a clear surface craft, heavily armed, small (Public domain image) coast and offshore. Strategically signal that the threat to the United with high speed, which would be defensive but tactically offensive it States carriers was present. The threat similar in purpose to those older units is the stronger of war according to could be used in the event the United confronting the United States Sixth Clausewitz. It is a policy pursued in States interfered directly to support Fleet in the Mediterranean. conjunction with and use of the legal Israel. In these cases the threat was Essentially they are human treaties of the International Law of the limited. It had not reached the higher controlled, self sacrifice units. Their Sea. This doctrinaire scientific process stage on the escalation index which mission is to destroy United States of sea denial is therefore likely to be a submarine sighting would have naval ships which are much heavier in somewhat along the lines indicated by indicated. weight and purpose and are very high Admiral Gorshkov of the Soviet Navy So, submarine sightings are an technology naval capital assets. These in the last two decades of the Cold War. indication to the carrier battle groups craft are there in sufficient numbers to The Soviet Navy was able to develop that the threat to them has gone up a “swarm” against an enemy force and tactics to influence United States Navy notch. Chinese submarine sightings destroy it by sheer numbers of craft and 62 battle groups during the Cold War. have already taken place in the South missiles. They are naval Kamikazes. 60 Hence they influenced political and China Sea. Therefore the view The thinking goes right back to the diplomatic behaviour. They did this that submarines are inherently ill French “Guerre de course” and “Jeune 59 four times in crises up to 1981. suited to the exercise of limited naval Ecole” torpedo boats idea. Traditionally In the Middle East crises force “is unsound, at least in certain it is a tactic to be used by a weaker 61 surrounding the Yom Kippur War of circumstances”. power against a stronger. This may be 1973 the Soviets brought four anti- In effect the Chinese are now telling traced through Soviet influence. carrier groups to bear on United the United States something new. That This was a naval tactic planned for States Sixth Fleet operations in the is, that unlike when the carrier escort by the Soviet Navy during the Cold Mediterranean. They shadowed each group passed through the Straits of War in regard to denying their close of the United States attack carriers and Taiwan, during the 1995-6 crisis over shore waters to hostile naval units or United States amphibious groups. that island, the next time the United groups. These craft were heavily armed These anti-carrier forces were States Fleet passes through the straits with long range anti-ship missiles. appropriate for their mission. Their the threat level has been raised. The “Soviet small surface combatants surface ships were older units, so more group could suffer serious damage. represent a potent force often expendable. With formidable firepower At the very least, it will have to devote disregarded in the west in enclosed using anti-ship cruise missiles and six so much of its efforts to self defence, sea theatres, especially when strongly inch guns they had no anti-submarine surveillance and prospective threats, its supported by naval attack aircraft Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 14 Some Influences on Current Chinese Naval Strategy in the South China Sea and protected by land based fighter may be used against radars or targeting and tracking are difficult to 65 interceptors.” (Admiral Gorshkov). command and control centres. achieve. They are escalatory by nature. Basically, because these fast missile This is something Sun Tzu would However, assuming for the present craft are best dealt with by airpower, surely approve of. But incoming that these problems have been solved, they have to be defended from the air. conventional missiles of this calibre do and that is a huge assumption, then Their usual combat unit is to operate in not distinguish themselves from ones China can launch large numbers of pairs. They combine to attack from two which are intended to sink ships. The these missiles from land. Offence will sides, usually on the port and starboard potential for escalation is therefore have become stronger than defence 66 quarters. This is tactically offensive. very high indeed. A warning shot at sea. China’s strategic strength It is significant that the early or the blinding of ships’ radar may and ability to destroy carrier escort Chinese PLAN was very proficient not be recognised as a deterrent to groups will have been considerably in smaller boat operations at the further encroachment or escalation. It enhanced. The range, speed, accuracy end of the civil war conflict between may more probably be read as a very and sheer numbers impose the threat communist and nationalist Chinese. significant naval and world event which of attrition on Allied Navies and on an In these operations small craft threatens further conflict at sea at the enormous scale similar to the effects 67 were handled with “some flair and very least. A United States Navy ship of the Kamikaze attacks in World distinction” in engagements with the is United States sovereign territory. War II. The weaker naval power is Nationalists. They also, accompanied So any attack would be viewed in the following in a long tradition in trying by mine operations, “in which the gravest way. to impose its will and control the sea Chinese are traditionally skilful,” China has invested much economic by asymmetrical means and from the contribute “a formidable threat intellectual and technical capital and Continental shore. 63 in inshore operations.” This core many resources on developing its Indeed these missiles create other strength has been developed. It is now mobile, land based, anti-ship ballistic problems. The Anti-ship Ballistic upgraded, increased and extends a lot missile. A lot of the writing in the Missile (ASBM) development by further out to sea. literature, in the English language China may undermine the 1987- These craft are supported by a outlets has Chinese analysts exploring 88 Intermediate Range Nuclear formidable force of mobile land- all these developments. They are Forces Treaty, (INF-1987), between 70 launched anti-ship missiles. There are therefore readily open to foreign Washington and Moscow. This also considerable numbers of anti-ship nationals and can easily be followed. treaty “prevents the United States and air and land-launched cruise missiles. But perhaps this is deliberate. Russia from possessing conventional The quality, strength and depth of Sun Tzu has plenty to say about and nuclear ground launched ballistic 68 fighting power of the rest of the PLAN confusing and misleading the enemy. and cruise missiles which have ranges surface and submarine units are also Perhaps this writing aims to shape the of five hundred to fifty five hundred rapidly developing. The whole fleet is perceptions United States Department kilometres.” covered by even more sophisticated of Defence and Defence Departments Furthermore the Chinese ASBM’s fighter forces including the latest th5 and analysts of the other powers. There are controlled, not by the Navy, but generation of very long range stealth is almost nothing written in Chinese or by the Second Artillery Corps of fighters. These fighters are capable of English about the Chinese anti satellite the Army. The Army was originally 64 being air refuelled. weapon. This was launched successfully given control of the Navy when naval The PLAN is also developing on the 11th January 2007. Perceptions morale plummeted at the end of the 71 other tactics. Sub munitions of very are certainly being shaped to some Chinese Civil War. This was after the 69 high power could render a United extent. Nationalists had escaped to Taiwan, States carrier or missile cruiser There may be a disinformation having been forced out. ineffective without sinking it. They campaign at work. There is a strong There is a situation here rather may believe they could achieve the school of thought inside China that similar to that prevailing in Nazi same tactical end without too great a takes the view that the mobile, land Germany and Imperial Japan where risk of escalation. However, whether based anti-ship ballistic missiles are a military hierarchy has some control this is really useful is very debatable. “arrows without bows.” over naval strategy. Naval strategy is Anti radiation sub munitions or There are very many technological not something of which a continental electromagnetic pulse sub munitions problems with them. Accurate focussed military is likely to have a Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 149 15

72 deep grasp. Julian Corbett accepted this view claims, then apply UNCLOS, with the While the Navy has been elevated to begin with. But he extended the two hundred mile fishing and mineral in status and power recently, the Army ideas on the influence of sea power. He rights exclusive limits around the badly needs reforming and brought up began, in his later works, to explore islands. This tactic pushes, or attempts to date. This will lead to competition how the intelligent application of to push, the Chinese territorial with the Navy for resources, the sea power to awkward diplomatic or contiguous controlled ocean further Navy, by nature, being heavily capital defence issues could bring results far out. China interprets the United intensive and requiring a manpower beyond the actual war making potential Nations Law of the Sea rulings on with advanced skills. This competition of the fleet. scientific research as including military is likely to pose serious problems for He then progressed to qualifying his and naval research. senior Chinese policy makers and their earlier views by noting that “our best This is an interpretation the United 73 power bases. minds must not cramp their strategical States does not accept, though the Continental powers, Imperial view by assuming unconsciously United States is not a signatory to the Germany, Nazi Germany and Imperial that the sole function of a fleet is to UNCLOS treaty. China is pushing the Japan in China, with splits between the win battles at sea”, “though it is the legal boundaries and interpretation as 77 80 Navy and Army over attack by sea or supreme function of the fleet”. Other far as possible to claim sovereignty. deeper involvement in the Continental possibilities are being opened up It is then reinforcing these boundaries wars have failed to exercise naval therefore. with a military and naval interpretation 74 strategy effectively. Continental Recognising this, China is defined in and through its research. focused policies and security have supporting its additional naval sea Julian Corbett, a lawyer by training, vastly different requirements from battle forces with legal “tactics” would surely have admired this naval those for sea operations and maritime using UNCLOS, the International policy in support of Chinese tactics and strategy – diplomacy. Aggression at sea Law of the Sea Treaty. It is a policy this interpretation of the strategy of sea in the past did not produce the ends similar in character to the Chinese power. desired. generated Strategic Group of Nations It is consistent. Means are limited Agreements. This policy has been to the ends. Strategically defensive THE INFLUENCE OF THE instituted and pursued around the land but tactically offensive, it is a strong WESTERN NAVAL STRATEGISTS borders in Central Asia and with states form of strategy in support of policy. ON CHINESE MARITIME therein. It aims, through the policy Should an incident at sea escalate it, in AFFAIRS of “no outside power interference in theory therefore should be able to be 81 However, Chinese naval scholars are internal affairs”, to exclude United contained. also studying the earlier western naval States influence in the new Continental theorists Admiral AT Mahan and Julian Asian states that came into existence PROBLEMS – ESCALATION 75 78 Corbett. Both had much to write after the collapse of the Soviet Union. ENHANCED about the exercise of sea power and These States have oil, mineral deposits For the loyal reader who has managed the use of fleets in naval warfare and and communications links to markets to make it this far, and who has not diplomacy. beyond. This continental heartland suffered the MEGO effect, (my eyes Admiral Mahan wrote much policy has been relatively successful so glaze over), there are other problems. about keeping the naval battle fleet far in its short life. There now exists, as there did concentrated and using it to destroy A parallel policy is being employed at the time of the Battle of Jutland, 76 the enemy battle fleet. By so doing at sea in a similar way. China explains, and again at the time of the Battle command of the sea could be gained or claims its historical links with of the Coral Sea, a period of rapid and held. After a victory command various islands offshore. It institutes or technological change. The power and could not really be disputed thereafter, consistently references and reinforces range of weapons is greater than ever though that did not mean there could the claim by every means short of war, and is expanding. Supersonic anti-ship be no more ship to ship actions or but up to and including minor and missiles and rockets, wake homing 79 battles and sinkings. Once command potentially serious naval incidents. It super fast and rocket torpedoes, of the sea had been gained it had to be rigorously disputes counter claims by “clever” sea mines, stealth aircraft, maintained by constant patrolling and other Asean nations around the South drone technology, satellite capability, action. China Sea. It can, if successful in its electronic intelligence gathering, Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 16 Some Influences on Current Chinese Naval Strategy in the South China Sea electromagnetic weapons, long range and high definition radars, all encourage much longer range ship to 82 ship and ship to shore engagement. All are escalatory in nature, but some are deniable: “it wasn’t one of our mines your ship hit”. Weapons threaten, through their high engagement velocity, long range, increased kinetic and explosive power, deadly accuracy and their automatic or semi automatic engagement and defence systems to accelerate and develop low level incidents into ones that cannot be controlled at a local level. Speed of decision, thoughtfulness of decision, awareness of risk, historical, political and tactical 9:11 attack as the perspective are all the more important strategically defensive but tactically its people, remains to be seen. There second aircraft is now for ship commanders, than they offensive posture may not be as stable are some similarities between the about to strike the Twin Towers target were at the time of Jutland and The as some analysts indicate. present position the Government finds (Public domain) Coral Sea. itself in now compared to the rigid Indeed the high speed and longer OTHER ESCALATING governments of Imperial Germany in range of these rockets and missiles ENHANCING DYNAMICS World War, Imperial Japan in World blurs the distinction between land The Chinese calendar is replete War II and Nazi Germany. and sea warfare. Their potential for with “humiliation days”. On these All faced rising economic linkage and inter change has developed days the state expects the people expectations, global international and is now much more intertwined. to remember the period in the past financial, economic and resource Actions at sea may now be more than when China was occupied by foreign problems, and as certainly in the ever influenced by decisions taken by a powers. Destruction wrought by these case of Nazi Germany, a feeling of commander on land and the opposite powers is well remembered each year. being wronged in the past. Extreme is also true. This justifies the present Chinese nationalism, with heavy militaristic Furthermore, the link and Government’s policy stance on defence. influences was also to the fore. connection between tactics and Museums reinforce the message. Increased access to minerals, resources strategy has been tightened. The Especially remembered are Japan’s and wider markets were demanded by dialectic between the two is more invasion in the last century and the all three governments. The relationship intense, perhaps even squeezing the vicious nature of that occupation. between China and Japan at present 83 operational level of war in a linked Saving face and dignity internationally, is particularly fraught with tension. land sea land battle down to near with redressing those wrongs are Furthermore, China also views the insignificance. Decisions have to be important to China. The Chinese United States and its containment taken more quickly and the political mainland government at present is strategy with considerable concern for overview becomes as a result more possibly closer to the rigid Taiwan its security both as a government and important. The technology influences Governments of the 1980s than it for its people. tactics and therefore perhaps strategy is to the cruel communist period of much more quickly. So the need for Mao Tse Tung. It has been changing THE DETAILS good quality ship command decisions up to the recent elections at the 2012 Strategically China has only very is all the more essential. Party Conference. But how this new recently acquired a mature sense of A number of other problems exist. smaller party central committee security. It is not, however, a maturity These, when analysed further, give manages these nationalist forces and of quiet ease and tranquillity. Rather some clues that indicate the Chinese the rising economic expectations of it is one of anxiety and concern. The Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 149 17

Government is worried about the It is easier to deter than to compel. overwhelming weight, power and Without credible assurances an island range of the United States conventional in dispute, with a population, has little and nuclear arsenals arrayed against incentive to comply with compellence. it. Deterrence is the corner stone or The Falkland Islanders in the Falklands bedrock of the United States defence war are an example. If the island has policy and underpins United States no population different tactics apply. support of allied forces in the South The question then is if some or all China Sea. participants in the South China Sea For this reason China is developing believe they are defending the status and deploying its more secure second quo. strike strategic nuclear capability. This This is a situation rife with the risk is the ability to retaliate with force and of conflict and escalation, at least at sea. accuracy if China is attacked first, its China does not believe in the status strategic rocket forces and deterrent quo. Change therefore has to take having sufficiently survived that place and uncertainty creeps into the attack. The possession of this second situation. This creates risk, which has strike capability should, in theory, to be managed by diplomacy. If not, 86 make it more secure in protecting its escalation results. Skilful diplomacy population and more confident in its in this instance consists in arranging pursuit of its policy towards greater things, so that it is one’s opponent who 84 control of the South China Sea. is embarrassed by having the last clear Greater confidence may make chance to avert disaster, by abstaining Sonar Technician the Government more aggressive in from what he wanted to accomplish or The Soviets had two types of (Surface) Seaman its tactics offshore. It may make it turning away. weapons in forward deployed Apprentice Joseph Barnes reports more inclined to take risks and to use China has declared a “no first use of positions. Formidable numbers of 1 simulated mines compellence in its tactical moves. The nuclear weapons”. Except for China, the conventional weapons and missiles during an under- use of cohesiveness, assurances and status quo in the area is more accepted and nuclear missiles overlapped sea warfare provocative naval tactics, from China’s by all participants. Also, as time significantly on the ground. The training scenario point of view, are needed to change the passes, the status quo becomes more Soviets may even have used the same in the sonar room status quo. However, to try to alter the entrenched. This is a more fraught and command and control systems for both aboard the Arleigh 88 Burke-class guided- status quo is fraught with dangers. risky situation therefore compared to on occasions. missile destroyer Compellence is more difficult than the quality and character of the status The battlefield doctrines which 85 87 USS Kidd (US Navy) deterrence. China is building its quo in Europe during the Cold War. guided their potential use saw them new deterrent capability at a strategic Then the status quo was not really as part of the same arsenal. They were level. It is using compellence on a accepted by any state. The “Iron intermingled in a way not appreciated tactical level. This is supported by its Curtain” 1947 to 1989, as it was called, or controlled by the western powers interpretations of the Law of the Sea, split Europe into two. But all nations and the United States. so carrying forward a tactical maritime had reasons for change. Germany In the west it was recognised offensive. This is more risky than wanted to be reunited. Poland and the that a real firebreak existed. There deterrence. Deterrence accepts the Eastern European countries yearned to was a much greater awareness of, status quo and defends it with threats, return to independence. United States doctrinal appreciation of, and policy implicit or otherwise and assurances. nuclear missiles and conventional difference towards these weapons. It uses tactically robust and defensive cruise missiles arrived in West Deterrence worked. Strategic stability measures. It is the stronger form of Germany and the United Kingdom in was maintained while political policy and war. Time is on the side of the decade of the 1980s. These new change took place. Because the status those doing the deterring. missiles were the counter balance to quo was never really accepted once the massive ground forces the Warsaw politics re-engineered the underlying 1 Compellence is the situation in which an actor ceases or reverses actions because Pact had built up in Eastern Europe situation sufficiently, strategic stability the costs imposed by other actors are or will and deep into Eastern Russia. was maintained. Throughout the soon outweigh the gains of those actions Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 18 Some Influences on Current Chinese Naval Strategy in the South China Sea period of change the reconfiguring is to sustain the rising expectations China continue to use its aggressive of the political boundaries in Europe of its one point one billion people. interpretations of the Law of the Sea did not test the core security of the The People’s Liberation Army badly Treaty? Each has importance. key interests of the major powers. needs reforming. Corruption in it and The mix is further complicated by Deterrence worked. The experiences elsewhere is rife. The Chinese Navy the fact that a continental power is of the Berlin Crisis and Cuban will continue to demand more skilled trying to exercise power and strategy missile crisis had given politicians the labour and capital investment if it is to beyond the high tide line. History has confidence and experience to manage continue down the paths indicated. shown that continental powers do not 89 93 the situation. The pressure on the Communist do this very successfully. Battles at The situation in the South China Party to reconcile these forces and sea, war and attrition usually results Sea therefore, indicates the Soviet- to keep its control is enormous. The in their defeat. Even island sea powers Communist influence on China’s Land Chinese Government spends more on like Japan have failed on occasions. based forces of the doctrine of inter controlling and on internal security, Britain did so in the American War of mingling conventional and nuclear watching its population, than it does on Independence and in the Anglo Dutch 91 weapons, perhaps using the same defence. Wars of a much earlier period. command and control links. These The People’s Liberation Army Furthermore, should an incident may not be very resilient or have operates under a tight Communist in the South China Sea become 90 redundant systems. The new sense Party Control. Little of the struggles for dangerous, threatening to escalate of security based on possession of a power and advantage come to public rapidly, have the protagonists the growing second strike capability is not attention. The People’s Liberation experience and knowledge to defuse very strong. China faces overwhelming Army is a mass army, much in need the situation? They say that you only conventional and nuclear capability at of reform to bring it up to modern need diplomats when things become sea and on land rather like NATO did standards. Considerable investment insecure. in the early 1980s. is needed. Traditionally it controlled Have the politicians the skills to Moreover, the status quo regarding the Navy. The top Command of the manage the situation and prevent the ownership of islands in the South PLAN have recently been elevated to escalation? Just because the Cold War China Sea is accepted in general terms the supreme committee that allocates has ended and it has been decades by the rest of the Asean Nations. It resources to the armed forces. It now since the Cuban Missile crisis and the makes therefore, for a more unstable is more able to access these resources atom bombs dropped on Japan, it does political strategic situation if a change than before. not mean that strategy, with or without or series of changes is attempted nuclear weapons, can be neglected. It through compellence. CONCLUSION should not be and cannot be a lost art. How the various strands of historical The existence of nuclear weapons does THE ECONOMIC strategic influences indicated evolve not mean strategy is redundant. Far BACKGROUND and interact in the South China Sea from it. It is more important than ever. The older more mature economics of situation posses a series of dilemmas The speed, range, and power of the world are under extreme stress. for Chinese Political leaders and the weapons now links warfare on land and Overwhelmed with debts they are Peoples’ Liberation Army and PLAN sea like never before in naval history. 92 advised to seek “growth” out of which top commands. Which strategic Politicians and naval commanders need interest on the debt can be serviced and influences can best yield success, in wisdom, awareness and knowledge of the debt paid off. However, the growth China’s policy of compellence in its naval and military history like never model has become unsustainable, search for great control over that body before if escalation is to be stopped except for the new developing BRIC of water? or managed. A surprise attack is countries, Brazil, Russia, India and Will it be Mahan or Corbett? Will likely to promote retaliation on a China. Perhaps this is true also Sun Tzu - Liddell Hart, or Soviet scale commensurate with the attack. of Africa in the future. The world Marxist Communist interpretations Attrition, at a very fast rate could economic situation is as bad as the of strategic doctrine hold sway? Is suddenly result on any naval fleet. nineteen thirties. It is highly likely compellence or deterrence better able China is more likely to prefer a to get a lot worse. China needs eight to force the western and ASEA nations strategy of compellence, island by percent annual growth or more if it sea powers out of that area? Will island, over time to deny access to Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 149 19

6 Marder, Arthur J. “From Dreadnought except for oil, was consolidated against the South China Sea. But if internal to Scapa Flow.” Vol 1. “The Road to War.” Japan on July 27th 1941. Japanese assets had th pressures on the government in China Oxford University Press. London 1961. been frozen on July 25 in the United States. Ch Xll. Evolution of Pre War Strategy and rise to destabilising levels, then they Tactics. Part 4. “The Guerre de Course 14 Willmott, H.P. “Empires in the Balance.” Bogey.” P358 Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies to may be forced into a different strategy. April 1942. London Orbis 1982. Chapter However, it has been shown that 7 Grove, Eric. Dr. “Fleet to Fleet Three. The Japanese Situation. Pages 67-71 Encounters.” Arms and Armour Press. especially. use of asymmetrical war in the past London 1991. Only the most extreme 15 IBID Willmott. Pages 71-75 and 79-82. has led to attrition. The submarine in exponents of the “jeune ecole” school thought torpedo boats could sink capital World War I, the Kamikaze in World 16 Van Der Vat, The Pacific Campaign, ships. Mostly the thinking was to attack Dan. London, Hodder and Stoughton 1992. War II, the suicide terrorist in recent merchant ships and so damage the trade of Chapter Three. Japan Attacks, Page 129. the enemy. “Guerre de Course” (Running wars, have not stopped attrition, nor War). But the Imperial German Navy did 17 Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United have they led to success in battle. Cyber use torpedo boats in an aggressive, offensive States Naval Operations in World War Two. fashion, in naval battles in the North Vol Three. “The Rising Sun in the Pacific attacks also have to cause attrition on a Sea, including Jutland. Pages 69-70 for 1931-April 1942. Chapter One. “Hakko grand scale if they are to be significant. torpedo boat use and chapter 4 for tactical Ichiu. Pages 3-6. composition and deployment of opposing However, retaliation is highly likely, 18 History of United States Naval forces. Operations in World War II. Vol IV. Coral if not escalation, which switches to 8 Howard, Michael., Paret, Peter. “On Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions, May other forms of counter attack. Mass War” Clausewitz, Carl Von. Book One, 1942-August 1942. Chapter One, South from Rabaul. Page Five. endurance in defence, knowledge Chapter Three, “On Military Genius”. Page 101 (quote). Ranft, Brian. (Ed.) “Technical of the theorists, knowledge of past 19 Stealth at Sea. The History of the Change,and British Naval Policy 1860-1939. Submarine, Van der Vat, Dan. London battles, and campaigns matter. Never Hodder and Stoughton. London 1997. Orion Publishing, 1994. Scene III. America Chapter Two, “On the Theory of War.” Page before has the premium on wise and versus Japan. Page 251. For the strategic 140 , also Clausewitz, Book Two, “Third significance of this raid for Japan see knowledgeable political and naval Property: Uncertainty of all Information”. Willmott Empires. Page 447-451. Chapter Seven, Page 131. Intelligence leadership been so high or been of such failures, confusions, and false information 20 Van der Vat, D. The Pacific Campaign, 94 importance. Too often it is lacking. t led Jellicoe to distrust Fleet Headquarters Chapter Four. The Giant Awakes. Page 153- information. He had to rely on reports 158. received from his own fleet and these were 21 Howard, M. And Paret, P., Clausewitz often confused or not forthcoming. But no Books, Chapter Six B, “War is an Instrument operational orders were in place for this of Policy.” Page 605. “Its grammar, indeed, contingency. Given modern tendency for may be its own, but not its logic.” W. Steen Anderson took a degree in Naval Headquarters to rigidly control naval units at sea, this could be a similar problem 22 Asada, Pages 102-103. This push Economics (BA) from TCD in1969, for any modern Commander in a naval was probably enhanced by the internal battle. background of “The General Plan for in War Studies from Kings (MA) in Strategy.” This accompanied the new 9 Marder, Arthur J. Vol Three. Chapter Japanese National Defence Policy reflecting 1971, special subjects: Technology of Three. “Battle Fleets in Action.” P86 to 95. the obsession of Kato Kanji, the new head Weapons and Missiles and Economics 10 IBID “Many had been the critical of the Naval General Staff from 1923. His situations which British Admirals in the obsession was “quick engagement, quick of Defence. Worked for the RAN 1972-3 past had been called upon suddenly to showdown.” His whole strategic idea ran solve, but never has there been one which counter to research papers after World War in Darwin, taught Economics later, and demanded higher qualities of leadership, I indicating the national need to endure a is now retired. He is a member of the ripe judgement and quick decision.” Corbett, prolonged war. This rationale of his ran deep J. Sir. Quoted Page 86. through Japanese Naval Command until USNI, ANI, RUSI, The Naval Review and the late nineteen thirties. See also, Men, 11 Schurman, D. M., “The Education of a Organization, and Strategic Visions 1931- the Naval Records Society. Navy.” The Development of British Naval 1941, Chapter 7. Strategic Thought. 1867-1914. Chapter Six. Richmond, Herbert Sir. Page 113. 23 Morison, S. E., Vol IV, Page 63. “It was (Endnotes) a tactical victory for the Japanese but a 12 Schurman, D.M., Chapter Four, The strategic victory for the United States.” Van 1 Slogett, Dave. Dr. “Back to the Future.” American, Admiral Alfred Mahan, Page 79. der Vat, Dan, The Pacific Campaign, P177 This Mahanan influence was to carry on The Naval Review. May 2012. Vol 100. No 2 th and P179- Admiral Nimitz, the man who into the Washington Naval Conference, (12 could “lose the war in an afternoon,” as the 2 Slogget, Dave. Dr. IBID. Paragraph 20. November 1921). It was inherent in United British Admiral Jellicoe could have done at States –Japanese Naval rivalry of that period 3 Lewis, Tom. “A War at Home.” Darwin: Jutland. despite official reports into World War One Tall Stories, 2007. Lewis, Tom, and Peter that a protracted war was more likely in 24 Morison, S.E., Vol 4. Coral Sea, Midway Ingman. “Zero Hour in Broome.” Adelaide: future. See Asada Sadao, “From Mahan to and Submarine Actions. May 1942-August Avonmore Books, 2010. Pearl Harbour.” “The Road to Washington.” 1942. Chapter One, South from Rabaul. 4 Howard, Michael. and Paret, Peter. (Eds.) Page 60. Annapolis Maryland, Naval Page 13. “The Influence of Sea Power upon “On War” Clausewitz, Carl Von. Princeton Institute Press 2006. History 1660-1783.” Lomdon, Sampson University Press. 1984. Book 3. “On strategy Low, Marstow and Co., Ltd, 1889. Pages 13 Asada Sadao: Chapter Ten, “The in General.” Ch. 9. “Surprise.” 132 and 137-8, on combat fleet superiority Southward Advance and the American in battle, not commerce destroying is 5 Slogett. Paragraph 21. Embargo.” The total western embargo, what is important. The fleet must be kept Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 20 Some Influences on Current Chinese Naval Strategy in the South China Sea concentrated, Pages 495, 513, 514, 519, 588 The “fault tolerant environment” at The Model 63 of the Zero-Sen Japanese Naval and so on for the original Mahanian ideas. Coral Sea Battle may have been supplied Air Force carrier fighter, Zeros of all kinds by the fact that the United States and its were used in the Kamikaze attacks. 25 Asada, Ch2, for Mahan’s influence on Allies knew the outline of the Japanese Japanese Sea Power, P26-44. Morison, Vol 4, plan thorough being able to decipher the 37 Erickson, Andrew, and Chang, Amy. Ch1, P6. Japanese code. The normal “fog of war,” “China’s Navigation in Space-what new approaches will China’s space tracking 26 Vigo, Milan. “Thinking between Strategy could so easily have been made a lot more obscure. The battle was fought across and take?” Proceedings USN Institute, and Tactics.” Regardless of success, wars Annapolis, Maryland. 2012. P42. at sea are won or lost at the strategic near the junction of two different command and operational levels.” Proceedings, areas. One was General McArthur’s S. 38 Friedman, Norman. “Back to the Future.” Annapolis Maryland, U S Naval Institute. E. Asia Command Area. The other was Proceedings USNI. August 2012. P90. Feb 2012. P63, puts the Japanese failure Admiral Nimitz, S.W. Pacific Command at the Coral Sea down to the Japanese Area. (160 degrees E-17degrees S, through 39 IBID having no operational art. However, in to 165degrees E-10degrees S). Admiral 40 Sloggett. The Naval Review. P158. the case of this battle there was a failure Fletcher’s force had to cross this boundary to understand Mahan and his theory, after refuelling. But there were other 41 Handel, Michael I. “Masters of War.” despite his importance to Japanese Naval problems, most notably the flawed and Classical Strategic thought. Frank Cass. Staff in the nineteen thirties. There was inaccurate interaction of land and sea based London. 1996. P19 for a table comparing also an underestimation of the opposition, airpower and ship location intelligence Sun Tzu and Clausewitzian approaches to with intelligence failures. The “fog of supplied to the local commander. One must war. consider the vast areas of ocean needing war” intervened as it always does. The 42 Clavell, James. The Art of War. Sun Tzu. covered here. But land based airpower was question arises therefore as to how these London, Hodder and Stoughton. 1981. not up to the job, and land based pilots often two conditions interact. There will always Section Five. Out of twenty three tenets in mistook what ship types they spotted. be the “fog of war,” by extension therefore, this section: numbers 3,4,5,11,12, are on the “operational art” can never be perfected. Also code breaking intelligence was handled relationship between direct and indirect Vego states without Operational Art “war at by United States Army deciphers on even methods of fighting a battle, basically they sea consists of randomly fought major and days of the month and by United States mean, “disguise the main thrust.” Section minor tactical actions, with relative attrition Navy deciphers on odd days. See Aldrich, 6, on “Weak Points and Strong”. Out of 33 as the only measure of success or failure.” Richard J. “GCHQ” the uncensored story of tenets, numbers: 7,10,29 apply,-basically P64 . Britain’s’ Most Secret Intelligence Agency. they mean “search out the weaker points”. London, Harpers Press-2011. P40. Also This assumes no direction whatever from 43 Luvaas, Jay. The Education of an Army. Bamford, James.- “The Puzzle Palace,” above. But in both these battles, allies British Military Thought 1815-1940. P397- America’s National Security Agency and its suffered more attrition than the enemy 400. Here Liddell Hart uses his study of special relationship with Britain’s GCHQ. forces. They also lost tactically. However, Sherman’s Campaign in the American Civil London, Sidgewick and Jackson. 1983. P42- strategically they won. That might not be War to illustrate his approach to battle 3. Admiral Nimitz reckoned the intelligence down to better “operational art,” but to other and strategy, “The purpose of strategy, he was worth “a whole battle fleet.” This cut factors like leadership, morale or intelligence contended is to diminish the possibility of throat competition between American information. Carl von Clausewitz had resistance by exploiting the elements of Intelligence Agencies continues today. It has much to say about these as did the Chinese movement and surprise.” For his thoughts also led to lack of forewarning to the United Military theorist, Sun Tzu. on battles: Liddell Hart: “Thoughts on War.” States Government about the attacks on th 1944 Faber and Faber, London. Chapter 27 Livezy, William E. “Mahan on Sea 11 September 2001. See London Times. th three, “The Military aim.” P50. “Battles-their Power,” Oklahoma. University of Oklahoma July 20 2010. “Intelligence failures caused Limitations in Experience.” Press, 1981. Sea power here and always by overload of spooks.” For example-They includes not only naval strength afloat, missed The Times Square car bombing by 44 Escalation defined as “An increase but equally, the peaceful commerce and Faisal Shahzad in May 2010 and perhaps in scope or violence of a conflict, in merchant shipping of a nation. P45. Mahan missed the 9/11 attack itself since the FBI international crisis situations, deliberate was influenced by the Swiss theorist of had not shared intelligence with the CIA. or unpremeditated.” Herman Kahn of The war, Baron Henri Jomini’s dictum that, “the Hudson Institute think tank, in the nineteen 31 Willmott, Empires, P454-456. organised forcse of the enemy are ever the fifties , and sixties, would have pointed out chief objective”, P43. Willmott condems 32 Van der Vat, Dan, “Stealth at Sea,” the that it involved an increase in violence but Admiral Yamamoto’s strategic ability.“ He History of the Submarine. Orion, London also competitive risk taking between the seems to have been incapable of adhering 1994. Pages 245-250. antagonists. Not so for the large nuclear to the fundamental principal of war-the powers but may be for the smaller ones concentration of force to achieve the 33 IBID. The US Gato class submarines like Pakistan and North Korea. Chambers objective.” See “Empires,” Pages 456 and 459. were the best of all Allied submarines. The dictionary definition is: “To increase rapidly See also Till, Geoffrey, “Seapower, a Guide United States Submarine Service had the nd in scale or intensity”. On containment: to the Twenty First Century,” 2 Edition, worst torpedoes of any belligerent nation “The act or policy of preventing the London, Routledge, 2009. P42-43. in world War Two and there were serious spread, beyond certain limits of a power commander and morale problems. 28 Morison, S.E. History, Vol IV, Page 31. or influence regarded as hostile, by means For five fundamental questions to ask about 34 Erickson, Andrew S. and Yang, David other than war.” maritime strategy. D. “On the Verge of a Game Changer:- A 45 Cimbala, Stephen J. “Clausewitz and Chinese anti ship ballistic missile could Escalation: Classical perspectives on 29 IBID, P63, “It was a tactical victory for alter the rules in the Pacific and place the Japanese but a strategic victory for Nuclear Strategy. London. Frank, Cass & United States Navy carrier strike groups in Co., 1991. P3. the United States.” This battle, rather than jeopardy.” Proceedings Annapolis Maryland. Midway, may have been the real turning 2009. P27-32. 46 Friedman, Norman. Dr. “Nationalism point in the Pacific War, rather than the Unleashed.” Proceedings USNI. Annopolis, bigger battle of Midway. Van der Vat, Dan, 35 Munson, Kenneth. Fighters, Attack and Maryland. Nov 2012. P91. Bond, Brian. “The Pacific Campaign,” P177. Hodder and Training Aircraft. Blandford Press, London. Liddell Hart – A Study of his Military Stoughton, London, 1991. 2004. P15. Thought. London, Cassell and Co. Ltd. 30 Gray, Colin. S. The Leverage of Sea 36 IBID. P116. Though Mitsubishi built 465 1977. Chapter two, “The Strategy of the Power,” London. The Free Press 1992. P259. special Kamikaze versions of the A 6m7, Indirect Approach 1925-1930”. Luvaas, Jay. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 149 21

Dr, “The Education of an Army.” P352-363. September 2003. 63 Martin, Laurence. Professor. “The Sea in For Fuller’s Ideas on Tanks and Mechanised Modern Strategy.” London: The Institute for Warfare. Also read Brian Holden. 54 Clavell, James. Sun Tzu. Chapter Strategic Studies, 1967. P80, for a farsighted “J.F.C.Fuller. Military thinker. MacMillan in Two. Tenets 2 and 3. “If the campaign is glimpse of PLAN and USN interaction as it Association with King’s College, London. protracted the resources of the state will not seems in 2013. 1987. P228. be equal to the strain.” Also Tenet 5, “have no stupid haste but also clever enough not 64 McCartney, Jane. and Evans, Michael, 47 Asada. Chapter Ten. Specifically the to have long delays!” “Stealth Fighter is obvious warning to sub section. “The German Soviet War and United States about Beijing’s military Japan.” P250-252. 55 IBID-only 12 Tenets mentions water, ambitions. London. The Times. 12th marshes, river flooding and so on. Numbers November 2011. Its maiden flight on 11th 48 Gray. P226. “Leverage of Seapower”. 29,31,32 refers to how tactics (on land), November 2011, coincided with a visit by should follow how water flows from one United States Secretary of Defence, Robert 49 Friedman, Norman. Dr. “Nationalism place to another. Unleashed.” Proceedings. Nov 2012. P90. Gates to Beijing to discuss defusing tensions This superb article analyses the dynamics 56 Swiss Theorist of War, who unlike Carl between the two superpowers. of the Chinese-Japanese relationship in von Clausewitz, had developed a quite 65 Erickson and Yang. Proceedings. U.S.N.I. considerable depth, past and present. This formal and prescriptive set of rules. Born May 2009. Page 29 for various scenarios for is a fair way removed from the South China 1799, died 1869, as a Russian General. use of the Chinese Anti-Ship Missile. Sea problem, but relevant. China: Coast to Antoine-Henri Jomini, perhaps most Taiwan: 220KMS; China to Japan across famous for: “All Strategic combinations are 66 Friedman, Norman. Dr. “Back (fire) to E. China Sea - 890KMS; South China Sea faulty, (vicieuses), if they do not conform the Future?” in World Naval Developments. to Japan: 1990K; Taiwan to Japan: 1000K; to the basic principle of operating with the Proceedings. U.S.N.I. Maryland. August North Korea to Japan: 500K; Siberia to greatest possible force in a combined effort 2012. In the paragraphs on “The Outer Air Japan: 910K. against the decisive point.” Paret, Peter. Battle” section, paragraph two, he argues (ED) . “Makers of Modern Strategy from stealth attacks like this might not risk When attempting to analyse warfare, Machiavelli to The Nuclear Age.” Oxford nuclear retaliation. nationalism and the forces at work see also: Clarendon. 1991. Jomini. P152. Proceedings. April 2012. Erickson, Andrew. 67 Holloway III, James. L. Admiral. (Ret’d). and Chang, Amy: China’s Navigation in 57 Sloggett, Dave. Dr. The Naval Review. “If the question is China.....” Proceedings. Space. P47. “Unexpected GPS disruption U.S.N.I. Maryland. January 2011. P56. He probably caused the Army , (PLA), to lose 58 Erickson, John. “The Development argues China may not use small nuclear track of the second and third of a three of Soviet Doctrine: The Significance of weapons near a United States Carrier if missile salvo fired in March 1996 into the Operational Art and the Emergence of Deep missile terminal guidance is not great. East China Sea, 11.5 miles from Taiwan’s Battle.” In Strategic and Combat Studies However, any type of like action would be Keeling Naval Port. It was part of a larger Institute. Occasional Paper No: 30. “The very serious indeed. It would be well up the effort to deter what Peking perceived to be a Origins of Contemporary Doctrine.” Gooch, scale of escalation, if not at or near the top. pro Taiwan independence move.” John. The Strategic and Combat Studies In fact, a war would in all probability be Institute U. K. 1997. P81-112. very close to beginning. Things could well 50 How history repeats itself? “ Made in be much more serious than in the Cuban Taiwan-Lost Colony: The Untold story of 59 Dismukes, Bradford and McConnell, James. Ed. New York. Pergammon Press. Missile Crisis of October 1962. Admiral China’s first Great Victory over the west”. Holloway III was Chief of Naval Operations, Androde, Antonio. 2012. Princeton, New 1979. Chapter Five. “Super Power Naval Confrontation”, Roberts, Stephen. S. Ed. 1974-78, with long experience of dealing Jersey- tells the remarkable story of how the with Chinas Military hierarchy. See Also: Chinese recaptured Taiwan from the Dutch Especially P211. “Naval Confrontations during Crises.” Hooper, Craig and Albon, Christopher. “Get in the late sixteen sixties. off the Fainting Couch,” Proceedings. April 51 For current developments see eg: 60 A Chinese attack Submarine of the Song 2010. O42 on “soft kill,” warheads. Class, (2200 tons displacement), surfaced Proceedings, USNI. April 2012 for five 68 This is happening in more ways than articles on the rise of Chinese Naval Power. within nine nautical miles of the United States aircraft carrier, Kitty Hawk, (80,000 one. Friedman, Norman. Dr. “Blocking 52 Clavell, James. The Art of War. Sun Tzu. tons), and Escort Group while on exercise the Path.” Proceedings. Maryland U.S.N.I. “The Nine Situations,” in the Art of War. between Japan and Taiwan on 26th October January 2011. P88 indicates how the 1988. Hodder and Stoughton. Tenets No: 54 2006. It was reportedly not detected before Chinese may have “captured” information and 55, indicate the Chinese approach to the surfacing but also, reportedly, the Escort from American Chilean Internet Servers for South China Sea problems. Group had its Anti-submarine Warfare twenty minutes. Included were addresses detection systems off at the time. and information on United States Military 53 Wars of Independence, civil wars, and Personnel, which were presumably copied. wars of nationalism against colonial power 61 Dismukes, McConnell. P212. Submarines It casts doubt on the idea that the internet is have all been limited. Korea, Vietnam, are an essential element of any anti-carrier so universally valuable that no nation would Malaysia, Oman, Dhofar, Biafra-Nigeria, warfare group. (AWC). vandalise it for national ends, for example South Africa-Angola, India, Pakistan, (three 62 Soviet Naval Tactics. Vego Milan. to distort or jam the Global Positioning wars so far), Arab Israeli Wars, Iraq- Iran, System, (GPS). There have been numerous st nd Maryland, U.S.A., U. S. Naval Institute. 1992. 1 and 2 Gulf Wars, Soviet-Afghanistan, Chinese cyber attacks on many other NATO-Afghanistan to mention but a few. Chapter 16. “Joint Tactics against Surface Ships.” Missile Craft,Torpedo Craft, P 254- internet sites, for instance on Google and They may not have been limited to those th 267 – especially P265, 266, and 267. Patch, Japanese sites. London Times, 4 August involved, but they did not escalate beyond a 2011. China accused over “biggest ever” certain limit. Carl von Clausewitz’s insights John. Admiral Retd. Proceedings. U. S. Naval Institute, April 2010. “Thoroughbred cyber hacking campaign. McAfee Web apply to them all as it does to World Wars Security reported seventy two groups One and Two. His insights still apply. See Ship Killer.” P49. The Twin Hull Houbei Class, (Type 022), at 225 tons, carries long attacked over a five year period including Gray, Colin. S., “Clausewitz, History and six United States Government Agencies, 13 the Future Strategic World.” University of range fourth generation, anti ship, cruise missiles, (ASCM’s). These craft have a range defence contractors. The Governments of Reading. England. June 2003 paper prepared Taiwan, India, South Korea, Vietnam and for the “Strategic and Combat Studies of 140 nautical miles and are based on the Australian Twin Hull Catamaran design. Canada. Hackers also penetrated the U. N. Institute Conference-“Past Futures.” Royal Secretariat in Geneva in 2008, and quietly Military Academy, Sandhurst 3-4 July, 2003. Estimates are that there will be 100 of these in commission by 2015. stole two years worth of secret data. Also and Marine Corps Command and Staff The Times London 8th May 2013, “Chinese College, Quantico, Virginia, USA. 9TH-10TH Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 22 Some Influences on Current Chinese Naval Strategy in the South China Sea hacking on the Brink of Cyber Warfare”,says P130-134, P136-138. (Combat superiority of 83 The imes.T London. April 23 2012. “Japan beefs up its defences United States Pentagon Spokesman. the fleet in battle not commerce destroying as territorial tensions grow amid neighbour’s war games on Tokyo’s is important), P495, (keep the fleet new surveillance planes.” The Times. London. September 21 2011. 69 Skelton, IKE. The Honourable. concentrated, also P513,514,519 and “Hackers (i.e. Chinese), breach the defences of Japan’s biggest “The Future of the U.S. China Security 538. weapons maker.” Proceedings: “Watching the Chinese”, Paul Giarra Relationship.” Proceedings. April 2010. P8. Commander, (Rtd) May 2009. P12 See also The London Times. August 26th 77 Corbett, Julian. “Some Principles of 2011. China also launched a long range maritime Strategy.” London. Longmans, 84 Christensen, Thomas J. “The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution.” interceptor rocket from the Xiang Satellite Green and Co., 1918. Ch11. P150. He says China’s Strategic Modernisation and U S –China Security Relations.” launch centre in western China on 16th May “the sooner this is done the better.” But The Journal of Strategic Studies. Vol 35. No 4. Oxfordshire UK. 2013. Described as a DN2 high earth orbit he goes on to write that blockade, naval Taylor and Francis-Informa, August 2012. P449 and 473 especially. attack missile, it did not have a target to hit or commercial or both may also be a unlike the previous anti satellite launch. means to the same end. P165. It forces the 85 Schelling, Thomas C. Arms and Influence. New Haven, China described it as “studying the earth’s enemy naval fleet to come out and protect Connecticut. Yale University Press. 1966. P71. Deterrence:” to magnetic field”. It had a liquid fuelled fourth the nations’ commercial lifelines at sea. prevent from action by fear of consequences.” Compellence: requires stage giving a high energy thrust. Thereby a battle may result. Corbett’s subtle some movement, pressure is administered, until the opponent acts, analysis may be very easily not quite fully the pressure is irresistible. Chambers Dictionary. See Schelling, 70 Erickson, Andrews, and Yang, David. understood. See Armstrong, J., “The Battle Chapter 2, for a detailed analysis of both and their interaction. D. “On the Verge of a Game Changer.” for the South China Seas: World War Two Proceedings. May 2009. P32. 86 IBID. P101. The Cuban Missile Crisis was resolved partly because Today and into the Future”. Headmark, the Americans established a naval blockade. This allowed the 71 Martin, Laurence. Prof. “The Sea in Journal of the Australian Naval Institute. Soviets the chance to order the Soviet Merchant Skippers to reduce Modern Strategy. London. Chatto and Issue 147, March 2013 Page 39. Paragraph 2. revolutions and slow down as they approached the blockade line. Windus for the Institute of Strategic Studies. Attack of merchant marine is a means to an This gave everyone more time to think and work out what to do to 1967. P80. This book despite its early end not an end in itself. resolve the situation to mutual satisfaction. However, more than publication date, continues to yield valuable one example of friction entered the crisis even though it had not st 78 Bell, Coral. Dr. “Canberra Papers insights in the 21 Century. on Strategy and Defence. No167. 2001. quite reached a full conflict. A United States Air Force spy plane was shot down by order of the local Soviet Commander. Washington 72 Gray, Colin. S. Leverage. P231, 232 and Canberra. ACT. Australia. P35. leaders thought it was on Moscow’s orders and prepared bombers to 236 for Hitler’s problem with a Maritime 79 Dutton, Peter. A. Commander. “Through retaliate. Also the Soviet’s already had nuclear missiles in place and Strategy, (a continental power comes up a Chinese Lens,” with Sino-centric visions ready to fire at the United States from Cuba. So if the United States short at the water’s edge). Also, “It may be of International Law and Treaties, China had invaded Cuba, the end result could easily have been a disaster, pointed out in the first place, that if a nation has essentially claimed the South China Sea especially since local commanders in Cuba had permission to open be so situated that it is neither forced to as its own.” Proceedings. USNI. Maryland. fire on their own initiative in that instance. Ury, William. “Getting to defend itself by land, nor induced to seek April 2010. P25. Commander Dutton, a Peace.” London. Vicking, 1999. Pages 81-82. extension of its territory by way of the land, retired Navy Judge Advocate, is an associate it has by the very unity of its aim directed Professor in the China Maritime Studies 87 Christensen, Thomas J. P 452-3. upon the sea, an advantage as compared Institute at the U.S. Naval War College in 88 Freedman, Lawrence: “The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. nd2 with a people, one of whose boundaries is Newport, Rhode Island. continental.” For Japan’s Naval Commands Edition.” The Macmillan Press Ltd. The International Institute for desperate struggles to organise sensible 80 Lewis, Leo. The Times. London. 25th July Strategic Studies. London 1989. Ch17. “The Soviet Approach to operational plans see Asada. P266-268 and 2012. “Beijing christens City in the Sea but Deterrence.” P266. “In Soviet plans, nuclear and conventional forces 271-275. few see cause for celebration.” Sausha City, and civilian and military targets appeared intermingled.” population 1,100 were settled on a rugged 89 That is not to state that managing a crisis, the way the Cuban 73 Li, Nan. “Scanning the Horizon for rock with sand bars and shoals. This rock New Historical Missions.” The Peoples missile crisis was handled, is by any means a blue print for the future. “Yongxing” is 220 miles from the nearest A guide, perhaps, a blueprint, no. Liberation Army Navy, (PLAN), is the Chinese Island of Hainan. China is using special beneficiary of its Governments Island colonies where possible to establish 90 Christensen, Thomas J. P 452-3. embrace of “externalization.” Maryland. and maintain sovereignty. This process 91 Tsang, Steve. Review of “Great Leap Backward.” Toombstone: Proceedings. USNI. April 2010. P19. The has been set back by the recent Japanese PLA was reduced in size by 500,000 in 1997 The Untold story of Mao’s Great Famine. London Literary Review of purchase of Diaoyu, (China), or Senkaku , Books. November 2012. P31. and again by 200,000 in 2002. This echoes (Japan), south west of Okinawa which both Premier Kruschev’s efforts to reduce the size nations claim. The Chinese protests, which 92 Hurd. P366. Here the retired United Kingdom Foreign Secretary of the Red Army in the late nineteen fifties resulted, took place on the anniversary of indicates all too clearly, how the Bretton Woods Trade Agreements and concentrate on rocket forces. Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931. Also that powered the post war economic developments, the NATO Gray, Colin. S. “Strategy and History, Essays Ben Macintyre, “Can Profit beat Pride in the Treaty, that built security for the West, and the U. N. and Financial st on Theory and Practical. London. 2006. Asian Falklands?” The Times. London. 21 Institutions that framed international affairs, peace and justice, are st Routledge. Page 63, quoting Mahan. Sept 2012. all no longer fit for purpose in the 21 century world. 74 Gray, Colin. S. “Strategy and History, 81 Goldstein, Lyly and Knight, Shannon. 93 Grey, Colin S. “Strategy and History, Essays in Theory and P65. “Overall the problem of composing “Coming without Shadows, leaving without Practice.” Routledge, London 2006. “Holding the Strategy Bridge.” and executing military strategy suitable for Footprints.” Proceedings. April 2010. Page 4. “On the evidence of performance, strategy tends to be a assault upon the strategy of an essentially P30. For examples of Chinese Undersea, bridge too far for many policy makers and military professionals.” Unmanned Vehicle Progress. maritime enemy, has proved beyond 94 Gray, Colin S. “Strategy and History – Essays in Theory and solution by continental statesmen.” That is 82 Here the attack on HMS Sheffield, Practice.” Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, Oxford 2006. Pages not to say it has not happened in the past. Tuesday 4th May, 1982 in the Falklands 51-55 – For how theory can help the practitioner. 75 Sherman, Donald. “The Education of a War, is worth remembering. This was Navy.” London. Cassell and Co., Ltd. 1965 accomplished by Argentina’s adaptation is perhaps the best initial introduction to ofa French Exocet Missile fired from land. these two theorists of Naval Strategy and Sheffield was ill equipped against low Diplomacy. level attack anyway, but missile watch and communication transmissions had 76 Mahan, Alfred T. “Influence of Sea Power blocked each other at a critical juncture on History 1660 – 1783. Sampson, Low, in an offshore patrol, and made the ship Marston & Co., Ltd. London 1890. On the vulnerable. necessity for concentration of the fleet, Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

24 The Royal Malaysian Navy in the Midst of Modernisation Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe

he Royal Malaysian Navy is one of Southeast Asia’s most significant Tnaval forces comprising a fleet of submarines, frigates, corvettes and a number of medium to smaller-sized vessels of varying capabilities. The Navy operates in a complex security environment and is a key security provider to the region. It is in the midst of modernizing some of its aging capital assets to adapt to a new era of challenges.

Maritime Security Challenges As a seafaring nation located astride the congested Malacca Strait and the volatile South China Sea, the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN), beholden by Sailors from the the motto ‘Ready to Sacrifice’, has a cables that link major international concerns among RMN officials. The Royal Malaysian formidable responsibility to secure a communication networks.” incidence of piracy in Southeast Navy and soldiers vast region that includes the waters Safeguarding Malaysia’s territorial Asian waters, particularly in the from the 9th Royal off peninsular Malaysia, and its two waters and EEZ therefore remains a Malacca Strait, remains another major Malay Regiment aboard Utility western provinces of Sarawak and significant responsiblity for the Navy. concern for Malaysia. According to Landing Craft LCU th Sabah located on the island of Borneo. As the 28 largest oil producer in the the International Maritime Bureau, 1651 during CARAT Malaysia has a maritime area that is world, the nation’s oil and gas industry in 2012, pirates conducted 84 attacks (RAN photo) twice the size of its land area with a contributes to 20% of Malaysia’s GDP with a further eight attempted attacks 334,671km2 Exclusive Economic Zone and consists of 163 oil fields and 216 in Southeast Asian waters. In order (EEZ) and a 4,675 km long coastline: gas fields, 186 offshore structures and to mitigate the threat of piracy the 2,068 kilometres on peninsular over 7,400 km of associated pipeline RMN has strengthened navy-to-navy Malaysia and a 2,607 km coastline with infrastructure. cooperation with Indonesia and Sarawak and Sabah. Another significant industry Singapore, which also have strong The fact that over 90% of Malaysia’s deemed of national importance is vested interests in ensuring that trade is dependent on access to the sea Malaysia’s fisheries industry which maritime commerce continues to was recently underscored by Deputy comprises 2% of Malaysia’s GDP thrive in the region. Defence Minister Datuk Wira Abu and employs over 90,000 fishermen Another major threat is infiltration Seman Yusop, who said: “Malaysia is who operate over 36,100 vessels. The by terrorist organisations that operate essentially a maritime nation. Given protection and management of the in Southeast Asia. Indeed, fear of a its geographical setting, it is inevitable nation’s fisheries from marauding spillover from the Islamist insurgency that Malaysia’s national interest and Indonesian, Thai, Vietnamese and in the Philippines into Sarawak and security concerns are closely related Taiwanese fishing trawlers, which Sabah has been a longstanding concern and associated with the sea.” He added: regularly encroach into Malaysia’s for Malaysia, and has for many years “Within this span of water lies rich waters, also remains a major ongoing led to a heavy naval deployment near maritime resources and minerals challenge for the Navy. Malaysia’s maritime boundary with that increasingly contribute to the However, the impact of, and the the Philippines. Memories of the six country’s economy. On the seabed threat posed by, piracy, terrorism heavily armed Abu Sayyaf operatives lies underwater piping that transport and ongoing territorial disputes with who, in the year 2000, entered an island our oil and gas ashore, as well as neighbouring countries dominate resort off Malaysia’s Borneo coastline, Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 149 25

kidnapping 20 hostages and taking shown a level of them back to the Philippines, is a commitment to constant reminder of the threat. addressing the Equally concerning are the issue, as seen in lingering and unresolved territorial January 2012, disputes between Malaysia and some with the signing of its neighbours. For instance, there of a MoU on has been an ongoing dispute with Maritime Issue Indonesia over the Tanjung Datu Management and Camar Wulan border regions in Guideline for Borneo, and the maritime boundary Fishermen on concerning the Ambalat Islands, the Indonesia- which may have untapped subsea oil Malaysia reserves. While tensions periodically Border. Malaysia KRI Sultan arise when fishermen and coast guard While territorial disputes over intractable territorial disputes, made Nuku (photo by personnel are detained, they have Malaysia’s claim on the southern worse by claims that the region’s seabed Michael Nitz) seldom escalated into a confrontation. Spratly Islands overlap in some areas contains potentially large untapped However, in March 2005, a minor with the Philippines, Vietnam and oil and gas reserves. Moreover, the skirmish action took place in disputed China, there haven’t been any incidents modernisation and expansion of the waters between the RMN and the that have led to a confrontation with People’s Liberation Army (Navy) and Indonesian Navy. But such incidents the RMN. However, the South China the development of Sanja on Hainan are rare and both countries have Sea remains a volatile region marred by Island into a major naval base has

West Malaysia Maritime Zone (courtesy MMEA) Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 26 The Royal Malaysian Navy in the Midst of Modernisation

increased regional tensions. deploy to the South China Sea and Malaysia has grown concerned indeed throughout the Southeast Asian about the potential for a territorial archipelago. dispute in the South China Sea to escalate into confrontation, especially N aval Cooperation between China and Vietnam, Much like its other ASEAN neighbours Philippines, India and the US, the Malaysia has used a number of forums consequences of which could seriously to promote regional dialogue and destabilise the Asia Pacific region. manage bilateral tensions. Indeed, The ongoing dispute over the Malaysia has even maintained a sovereignty of the Spratly Islands commitment to extra-regional has already seen China use its maritime security, as seen since 2009, military to either contest or occupy by the RMN’s ongoing commitment territory. For instance, in 1988, the to anti-piracy in the Gulf of Aden People’s Liberation Army (Navy) as part of Combined Task Force sank two Vietnamese Navy ships in 150 (CTF-150). An insight into the a confrontation near Johnson South RMN’s contribution was provided by Reef; while in 1994, China militarily Malaysian news agency, Bernama, occupied and wrested control of which in February 2010, claimed Mischief Reef from the Philippines. that a RMN warship on deployment There has also been a raft of other escorted 33 convoys and 45 Malaysian less significant, yet notable, incidents commercial vessels during a six-month Vessels sail from involving what appears to be aggressive rotation in the Gulf of Aden. the Philippines Navy dubbed Darwin harbour for Exercise Kakadu. conduct by China. Nonetheless, while extra-regional ‘Malphi-Laut’, which is partly RSS Valiant (91) Malaysian authorities have deployments such as the RMN’s initiated due to concerns of spill Malaysian Vessel responded to the growing tensions by involvement in CTF-150 is important; over from the Islamist insurgency KD Jebat (29) HMAS stationing naval and military forces both from a practical point of view in the Philippines; and Ballarat (155) to secure its claim over parts of the in protecting Malaysia’s commercial • the provision of an annual joint Ardasier, Mariveles and Swallow shipping, and from a geopolitical exercise dubbed ‘Hornbill’ with A mphibious assault Reefs. Similarly, in May 2009, both point of view in projecting its regional the Brunei Navy. vehicles transporting Malaysia and Vietnam made a joint influence; the RMN tends to strongly U.S. Marines and submission to the UN Commission focus on using naval diplomacy within The RMN also has a close cooperative soldiers from the on the Limits of the Continental Shelf its own region. relationship with the US Navy as seen Malaysian Army 9th Royal Malay Regiment arguing their respective claims over The utility of naval diplomacy is in August 2012 with the focus on pass the amphibious the southern Spratly Islands: a gesture regularly used by the RMN which Cooperation Afloat Readiness and dock landing ship USS which angered China and prompted an participates in port calls and bilateral/ Training; with the Royal Australian Harpers Ferry (USN official protest to the UN. multilateral naval exercises with Navy through its participation in photo) Although Malaysian officials countries throughout the remain circumspect in making public region and beyond. Some key comments over tensions in the examples of RMN engagement South China Sea, it is likely that the include: development of the Navy’s first ever • regular joint exercises submarine arm, with the acquisition with the Thai Navy code- of two French-built Scorepene-class named ‘Seaex-Thamal’ to diesel-electric submarines in 2009 counter piracy, smuggling and 2010, was in part due to concerns and human trafficking, over Malaysia’s ability to defend its and to check possible sovereignty in the South China Sea. Islamist insurgent activity Based at the Navy’s Kota Kinabalu base near southern Thailand; in Sabah, the submarines can rapidly • an annual exercise with Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 149 27

bilateral naval exercise Mastex; and with both the Indian Navy and the Pakistan Navies. Yet, while navy-to-navy dialogue and training exercises is central to fostering improved bilateral and multilateral ties, the RMN is also attempting to maintain an edge over its neighbours through modernisation and acquisition programmes.

Modernisation Commenting on the state of the Navy, in January 2010, the RMN’s Region II Commander, Admiral Anuwi Hassan, provided an update on the state of the Ship (MPSS) project has not been acquisition of more submarines, is an E urocopter Dauphin RMN. “Operating aging vessels is a allocated funding to date. Similarly, indication of the changing regional AS365 N3 of the MMEA (Courtesy Eurcopter challenge for the navy but RMN was there was also no funding provision, strategic environment and the need Malaysia) able to put 70% of them into service,” he as of yet, for the purchase of six anti- for the Navy to maintain a credible said. “They are not too old to operate submarine warfare helicopters as part deterrent. This indeed echoes the and have not exceeded their lifespan, of the Navy’s efforts to strengthen its sentiment of Malaysia’s current Prime but the cost of maintaining them is air wing. Minister, Najib Razak, who said in unsteady and we are able to repair and Conversely, the Malaysian 2007, while the deputy PM: “It is put them back to service. We hope government has allocated funding crucial for Malaysia to have a small but to acquire new assets to back up the for the acquisition of the six new credible and effective naval force to present fleet under the 10th Malaysia indigenously build Littoral Combat not only safeguard its sovereignty and Plan 2011-2015.” Ships in a deal worth MYR 9 billion maritime interests but also contribute This timeframe, however, is likely (US$2.8 billion). The Malaysian to the region’s maritime security and to be unrealistic given the electoral shipbuilding company Boustead Heavy safety.” pressures in the lead up to the Industries Corporation is expected contested 2013 national election. to deliver the first ship by 2017, with The Malaysian government has the remaining five to be delivered dramatically cut the 2011-2012 thereafter at six month intervals. defence procurement budget, and In addition, there are also credible has allocated the funds to other areas. indications that the major upgrade According to Defence Review Asia, the and service-life extension for the two Navy absorbed major cuts in its 2012 aging Lekiu-class frigates will go ahead: procurement budget and received only enabling the two frigates to remain MYR759 million (US$243 million) of operational for another 20 years. the MYR4.39 billion (US$1.4 billion) it Nonetheless, despite the recent requested. defence procurement cutbacks it The reduction in the Navy’s should be noted that these reductions procurement budget has had an are likely to be only temporary, as the impact on many of its ongoing and changing strategic environment and Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe is a planned modernisation projects. For growing tensions in the South China security analyst, defence writer and example, although the Navy lost its Sea will drive increased interest in only amphibious operations capable developing the capabilities of the RMN. Visiting Fellow at the National Security ship, the Newport-class LST KD Sri The recent inference by RMN chief, Institute, University of Canberra. Inderapura, to an accidental fire: the Admiral Jaafar, who said in April 2012, replacement Mutli-Purpose Support that the Navy was considering the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 28 LIGHTNING he U.S. Navy’s Strike Fighter flexibility, power projection, and strike Launched Airborne Surveillance and Squadron 101 received the US capabilities of carrier air wings and Strike (UCLASS) air vehicles, MH- TNavy’s first F-35C Lightning II joint task forces and will complement 60R/S helicopters and Carrier Onboard carrier variant aircraft from Lockheed the capabilities of the F/A-18E/F Super Delivery logistics aircraft. Martin recently at the squadron’s home Hornet, which currently serves as the Squadron 101, based at Eglin Air at Eglin Air Force Base. Navy’s premier strike fighter. Force Base, will serve as the F-35C Fleet The F-35C is a fifth generation fighter, By 2025, the Navy’s aircraft carrier- Replacement Squadron, training both combining advanced stealth with based air wings will consist of a mix of aircrew and maintenance personnel to fighter speed and agility, fully fused F-35C, F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, EA- fly and repair the F-35C.t sensor information, network-enabled 18G Growlers electronic attack aircraft, operations and advanced sustainment. E-2D Hawkeye battle management The F-35C will enhance the and control aircraft, Unmanned Carrier

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 149 29

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 30 The Barrow in Furness Australian Submarine Memorial

Memorial commemorating the meet each other for the first time. At 100th Anniversary of the ‘Launch’ 1415 the Unveiling Party and Guests Ain 1913 of HM Australian Submarines proceeded to Ramsden Square for AE1 and AE2, the first two Submarines the Ceremony. Mr. Terry Spurling, to be built for the Royal Australian the Project Manager of the Memorial Navy, was unveiled by Admiral Committee, acted as Master of the Lord Boyce – Lord Warden of Ceremonies. the Cinque Ports and Patron of the Submariners Association; and Lord The Unveiling Ceremony James Abinger in Ramsden Square in Barrow in Furness on Saturday 18 May The Worshipful Mayor of Barrow, Memorial colours dipped (Michael Valance - BAE Maritime 2013. Councillor Colin Thompson was (Submarine Solutions) Ltd) The weather forecast for the day was introduced by Terry Spurling. for torrential rain during the afternoon Councillor Colin Thompson then with up to 50-mm of rain likely. In the welcomed everyone to Barrow, and event, although it rained heavily until said: 1415, the rain then eased off and it ‘Admiral Lord Boyce, Lord Abinger, remained dry but heavily overcast for Distinguished Guests, Members of the duration of the ceremonies. the Submariners Association and Prior to the Unveiling a ‘Meet and Barrovians. I am honoured to be Greet was held at 1330 in the Bluepole here today, as the Mayor of Barrow, Offices above the old Fire Station to welcome you all to Barrow in Building in Abbey Road. This was an Furness on the occasion to honour opportunity for the invited guests to those who sailed from Barrow meet the VIPs and, particularly for on what would be a remarkable Memorial unveiling (Michael Valance - BAE Maritime (Submarine the descendant family members to journey for submarines at that time. Solutions) Ltd)

Memorial close-up (Michael Valance - BAE Maritime (Submarine Solutions) Ltd) Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 149 31

Few Submarines of this era sailed They did not create so far without breaking down. The the legend - that voyage to Australia took 83 days, 60 honour belongs to days being spent at sea, sailing from the troops on the the UK on the 2nd March, arriving beachheads. But in Sydney on the 24th May. they are honoured as the silent Anzac. This is a tribute not only to the The Anzac legend crews but also to those skilled remains today, employees of the yard whose skills respected nearly a and expertise made this possible. hundred years later A cold day for the Memorial unveiling (Michael Valance - BAE Maritime (Submarine Solutions) Ltd) throughout the Those Submarines were Commonwealth if constructed in what was then not the world. known as Vickers Ltd Shipyard. It is fitting that the Today it is BAE Systems, but to first Submarine many in the town it will always be memorial in known as Vickers or the Shipyard. Barrow should be for the combined These E-Class boats were Australian and themselves a major technical British trail- advance in submarine construction, blazers for those something that the yard has submarine exploits excelled in over the hundred years that followed in the since these boats were built. Gallipoli campaign. Memorial unveiled (Michael Valance - BAE Maritime (Submarine Solutions) Ltd) For the first time the hull was Neither should sub-divided by traverse watertight we forget the role bulkheads. In addition to of many local improving safety, this added to (Northwest) the hull strength, enabling greater regiments during diving depths to be achieved. This this period, the may have been a contributory fact that one beach factor for the success of the other at Gallipoli is Barrow built E-class boats in the known today as the Dardanelles. Lancaster Landing is a measure of What these crews achieved their achievements. is something that the Royal They too Australian Navy is rightly proud remember the of. The exploits of Lieutenant deeds of AE2. Commander Stoker and his crew AE1:2 Article/Memorial detail (Michael Valance - BAE Maritime (Submarine Solutions) Ltd) are an integral part of the ANZAC Many Barrovians tradition. It being celebrated on living here today would be fourth, Thank you. We will remember them. the day, the 25th April, that the fifth or sixth generation of shipyard AE2 broke through the Dardanelles worker. They are proud of their The Guest of Honour, Admiral the Lord Boyce, thanked the into the Sea of Marmara, raising heritage, proud too of their Mayor for his welcoming speech. He said: the morale of the Australian and ancestor’s roles in creating that Mr Mayor, Lord Abinger, Ladies and Gentlemen. New Zealand Army Corps. milestone of Australian history.

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 32 The Barrow in Furness Australian Submarine Memorial

In October this year, Australia up until the 1970s. routine exchanges of Submarine Commanding Officers is staging an International Fleet So, for example we had 6 ‘J’ Class – until the decision in the 1990s that the Royal Navy Review to commemorate the first Submarines gifted after the War would discontinue the employment of Conventional entry of the RAN Fleet into Sydney – again with mixed crews; but Submarines and to concentrate solely on nuclear in October 1913 and I am glad to they did not see much service. powered Submarines. say that I understand that the RN And they were superseded by will be proudly taking part – glad two ‘O’ Class Submarines named Since then contact has been maintained with the because the RN and I have had a Oxley and Otway, ordered exchange of ideas on various aspects of submarining, and long association with the Aussie from Vickers at Barrow on there is still a great affinity between the two submarine Navy – especially the Submarine 31st March 1925 and during services. Service. Indeed my first visit to WWII a considerable number of Australia was in a Submarine – Australian Officers served in RN So that is why it is appropriate that representatives from HMS Anchorite. And to say that Submarines. They were variously both our countries are here today to remember the brave we were well looked after by our Members of the Royal Navy, Australian and British submarines who crewed AE1 and Australian counterparts is a serious RAN and Reserve Forces from AE2 and who set the trend of our sharing for decades understatement. both Navies. Several Australian the dangers of warfare from under the sea. And binding And I still have a close friendship Officers served in X-Craft as well us together we should remember the words of Winston with some of the Submariners as in full size Submarines of all Churchill who in WWII said – and his words can just that I grew up with from the time Classes. Although there were no as easily apply to WWI as they do today – ‘of all the I joined the RN and I know this is Submarines in the RAN (except branches of the men in the forces there is none which the case for lots of other colleagues, Submarine K-IX) several Australian shows more devotion, and faces grimmer perils, than the many of whom enjoyed exchange Officers also completed the submariner. Great deeds are done in the air and on the appointments in each other’s Commanding Officer Qualifying land; nevertheless nothing surpasses your exploits’. services. We shared training and Course and commanded Royal the same ethos, an ethos that Navy Submarines. And a number Ladies and Gentlemen: it is fitting that this memorial is started in 1910 and was firmly of Australian Ratings also served here in the birthplace of AE1and AE2 to commemorate forged in 1913. in Royal Navy Submarines during the memory of those submarines and their crews a When, one hundred years ago, in WWII: especially in late 1944 and century on. May 1913, Submarine AE1 was in 1945 when RN Submarines launched here in Barrow; and AE2 were based in Fremantle, Western And I feel enormously privileged and honoured to have in June; and the two Submarines Australia for patrols in the Far East. been asked to be involved with its unveiling.’ were then commissioned into February 1914 with crews of RN After the War, Royal Navy A ‘Service of Dedication’ then followed - led by Mr. Officers and a mix of RN and RAN Submarines returned to Australia Alan Jones, the Lay Chaplain of the Barrow in Furness Submarine personnel. in late 1949 to be based in Sydney Submariners Association: forming the 4th Submarine Flotilla The Memorial was revealed by a Chief Petty Officer And, as I’ve said, the bond between and then in the 1960s, the RAN and a Leading Seaman from HMS Artful – currently under the two Submarine Services was decided to re-establish an RAN construction in the BAE Shipyard - and two Sea Cadets from firmly forged then, and it is one that Submarine Service with Oberon TS Sovereign - Barrow in Furness Sea Cadet Corps who lifted last until this day – as evidenced by Class Submarines again with many the Royal Navy and the Royal Australian Navy Ensigns which having an RN Submariner standing of the personnel manning these had been concealing the Memorial. here today. Submarines being transferees from Mr Tom Tribe of AE1 Inc. U.K. (a descendant family the Royal Navy but the bulk were member) and a member of the Australian Memorial After WWI and those first AE RN personnel. Committee then spoke about the AE1 families: Submarines, the RAN Submarine Tom Tribe told of Lieutenant the Hon. Leopold Scarlett service continued to receive boats Submarine co-operation between who joined the Royal Navy and became a Submariner in built here in UK; and Submariners the Royal Navy and the Royal ‘B’ Class Submarines. He later developed tuberculosis continued to cross-exchange as a Australian Navy Submarine and was invalided from the Navy. Leopold Scarlett series of different classes of boats Services continued with regular then went to Australia where he hoped the dry climate were developed over the decades exchanges of personnel – including would help him recover. In 1914, after the arrival of Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 149 33

the AE Submarines and, after war involved in this ceremony and the of the Barrow in Furness Branch of the Submariners broke out, additional Officers were memorial honouring the men of Association, Ladies and Gentlemen – it is indeed a great needed to crew the Submarines AE1 and AE2. honour to be here today to represent Australia and the and Leopold Scarlett volunteered. Australian people at the unveiling of this memorial. As Apparently cured of his Yours sincerely a fellow submariner, I can say that submariners world- tuberculosis he was accepted and Vera Ryan (Convenor), Robyn wide are a special breed, rarely understood by mere he was appointed to Submarine Rosenstrauss (Secretary) mortals and never by skimmers – those who deem to AE1 as the 3rd Hand. Two weeks spend their lives on the surface. later Submarine AE1 was lost Finally Tom also spoke about the sad with all hands in mysterious situation of Emma Elizabeth Thomas - Submariners of all nations understand this and share a circumstances off Papua New the wife of Able Seaman James Thomas mutual respect, knowing the hardship and danger that Guinea. of AE1. She had embarked in England each has faced to achieve membership of that elite club for passage to Australia with her young to which submariners belong. And today is such an Tom then read a letter which had been children and arrived in Australia not occasion to recognise the close submarine bond that received from the AE1 Descendant knowing that Submarine AE1 had been exists between our two nations – one that is near on Families’ Association in Australia: lost. On arrival she was met by a lady now 100 years strong and also it is an opportunity to To the AE1 and AE2 UK who was to be her new neighbour and salute you for honouring the family members of those Memorials Committee who had intercepted a telegram from who served in AE1 and AE2, present today from both the postman that morning. Realising countries. Dear Tom, Terry and Barrie what news the telegram contained she rushed to the jetty to meet Emma and Following on from previous speakers, today I will take On behalf of the Descendent break the news. Emma decided to stay the opportunity to talk about Australian submarines that Families Assoc. in Australia we in Australia and became good friends proceeded AE1 and AE2, and the closer relationship that would like to send a greeting with her new neighbour. One of has continued between our countries since. I will also and express appreciation on the Emma’s daughters was living in a care look to our future relationship in respect of Australia’s occasion of the unveiling of the home in Australia when the Memorial future submarine programme. memorial to AE1/AE2 Submarines in Sydney was unveiled in 2011 and and their crews. attended that ceremony. After the loss of AE1/AE2 the remaining Australian Lord James Abinger – related to submariners served in a number of British submarines. When AE1 was lost, it was the Lieutenant the Hon. Leopold Scarlett Several lost their lives, including Rear Admiral Creswell’s first naval casualty for the new then said: son when XO of E47 on 20th August 1917- although Australian Navy, and the Navy has ‘It is a great honour for me to born in Australia he was actually Royal Navy. One always been faithful in honouring be here today, with my wife and Australian born submariner – Reuben Mitchell – won the memory of her crew. However children, to mark this very historic a DSM in the Dardanelles in E14, the CO of E14, the loss of 35 men on an island far occasion. Lieutenant Commander White, won a posthumous VC distant from battlefields of Europe For me personally, it provides the in the same action. was completely overshadowed opportunity to talk about the many by the catastrophic losses of tragic events that took place nearly During the Zeebrugge raid in 1918 the CO of C3 was Australian troops there over the 100 years ago.’ awarded the VC. His XO, Lieutenant Howell-Price following four years. was Australian born but Royal Naval Reserve and later The next speaker was Commander transferred to the RAN. We also lost PO Kempster, In many ways our family members Gustaaf Henri Nord-Thomson from DSM, RAN in G8 on 3rd Jan 1918 and one of the first mourned alone. To now have their the Australian High Commission RAN College entrants, Midshipman E S Cunningham sacrifice and grief acknowledged in London – representing the Royal in K17 on 31st Jan 1918. A relationship that began with and their son and brother Australian Navy. He said: AE1 and AE2 was continued throughout the War, forged honoured by the community in Admiral Lord Boyce, Lord Abinger, in action and sacrifice. the place where AE1 was built is your Worship the Mayor of Barrow treasured by their descendants. - Councillor Colin Thomson, After the War the UK gave Australia surplus J relatives here today of those who Class submarines in thanks for our wartime efforts. Our heartfelt thanks to all those served in AE1 and 2, Members Commander Boyle (who won a VC in the Dardanelles) Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 34 The Barrow in Furness Australian Submarine Memorial

came out from UK to take charge Onslow (December 1969) ‘evolved Collins’ and new design options that are likely of them. We also still had RAN HMAS Oxley’s arrival in Sydney to best meet Australia’s future strategic and capability personnel in British Submarines in coincided with the commissioning requirements. the inter war years like Lieutenant of the Submarine Base, HMAS R C Casey, RAN who was lost in Platypus, at Neutral Bay, Sydney. The Government has also directed that new land-based the submarine M1 in 1925. In 1977 and 1978 two more submarine design facilities be established directed to submarines were commissioned – research, integrate, assemble and test the propulsion and In the late 1920s Australia bought HMAS Orion and Otama. energy systems of the Future Submarine. two ‘O’ Class submarines. Again all our training was done with the Collins Class Submarines The implementation of the project will require a British. When we could no longer sustained and co-ordinated national effort harnessing afford them we gave them back to To the present day the Collins Class the knowledge, skills, expertise and lessons-learned over the UK and they served in WWII. submarines are a key element of the last fifty years of Australian Submarine ownership. Australia’s Defence Force, both as The success of the project will depend critically on close During WWII several Australians an intelligence-gathering platform collaboration with Commonwealth and State Agencies, served in British Submarines, again and as a forceful opponent and strategic partners which already includes the UK. some were lost. One of our most during times of war. The names famous submariners was Max of the Collins Class Submarines I conclude with acknowledgements and particular Shean who participated in the commemorate the memory of six thanks to Admiral Lord Boyce, Lord Abinger and X-Craft raids in European waters members of the RAN who served Councillor Thompson. I thank all the Submarine and South East Asia. their country with distinction – Associations that have worked together to make this being HMAS Collins, Farncomb, Memorial a reality – Barrow in Furness has and always Post-war Anti-Submarine Warfare Waller, Dechaineux, Sheean and will have a very special link with Australia and its training in Australia relied on the Rankin. They achieve an optimum Submariners. Finally, I thank you all for attending this presence of British Submarine match between innovation and event to honour our first submarine – AE1 and AE2 and Squadrons in Sydney until we got proven technical prowess. their Officers and Crew. our own Oberon Class boats in the late 1960s. F uture Submarines Centenary of Submarines 2014

O beron Class Submarines Finally moving on to Australia’s In order to mark a century since the 1914 arrival in future submarine programme – Australia of HMA Submarines AE1 and AE2, the Post-war Oberons were built in UK the 2013 Defence White Paper Submarines Institute of Australia has established a and we relied on British officers highlights the strategic value Submarine Centenary Project. to get everything up and running. and importance of Australia’s I think we had an exchange CO submarine capability and confirms Australia’s Submarine Centenary will commemorate programme for most of their life. the Government’s commitment to submarine plus important places and people in Indeed I served in HMS Onslow replacing the existing Collins Class Australia’s submarine history. Celebrations will which was built in UK and I must fleet with an expanded fleet of 12 culminate in late 2014 with activities, conferences say it was a fine submarine! conventional submarines, to be and commemorative services in Fremantle, Western It wasn’t until four initial built in South Australia. Australia – raising the submarine profile continuously Oberon Class Submarines were The Future Submarine Project will through to 2014, other submarine history items are being commissioned that we began to be the largest and most complex promoted and pursued at every opportunity. So if you build a strong submarine fleet. Defence project ever undertaken by can make it along, you will be most welcome. t While the Oberons were not Australia. It is a national challenge involved in any conflict while of unprecedented scale and in service, their presence was complexity, and will span decades. invaluable to the Navy. Four boats were commissioned initially: Oxley The Government has now taken (March 1967), Otway (March the important decision to focus 1968), Ovens (April 1969) and resources on progressing an Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

36 World Naval Developments b y DR Norman Friedman

arlier this year it was reported that some of them discover upon returning among many different organizations. Qinetiq had become the latest US that someone has, and that their The current mantra of information Edefense contractor to be hacked by the computers are now gateways into their sharing, which has real and important Chinese military. A security problem companies’ secure data. This type of advantages, makes such splitting identified some months beforehand penetration affects business deals (the difficult at best. had not been repaired. Considerable Chinese make little distinction between Cyber espionage is potentially far information had been extracted from economics and defense), trade secrets, more damaging than the older kind the company’s computers. and also defense. of spying because the take can be so The author of one account expected The best defense against penetration much larger. It is currently estimated the United States to protest this via the Internet is to create physically that the Chinese have extracted tens unfriendly action, and he seems to have separate computer systems ‘air or hundreds of terabytes of data from imagined that the end result of protests gapped’ so that nothing that happens the United States, to the extent, for might be some sort of anti-hacking on the Internet can affect them. example, that the stealth features of agreement. If instead of hacking Such networks are expensive, and the F-22 may have been compromised one called the attack on Qinetiq an are apparently rare. They impose so that it may no longer be capable of example of cyber-espionage, it would operating problems. The US Navy penetrating Chinese air defenses (as be clearer that there will never be an tried to create one in the form of the opposed to making it possible for the agreement against such penetration, Navy/Marine Corps Intranet, but its Chinese to develop stealthier aircraft). just as there has never been (and can manifold problems led to its nickname: That probably applies to other stealthy never be) an international convention ‘No More Computing Infrastructure aircraft, such as the B-2. As described which stops other forms of espionage. Here.’ Even then social engineering can publicly, the new concept of Air-Sea Cyber-espionage is on a par with other be effective. For example, the Iranians Battle relies on the ability of stealthy kinds of communication intercept, air-gapped the control systems for their aircraft to penetrate Chinese air space but it is more active, like conventional centrifuges. Yet it was still possible to at will. What happens to that strategy espionage. It is also much safer: no one insert the Stuxnet virus, by the simple now? How serious is the compromise? sitting behind a computer monitor in expedient of putting it on memory One terabytes is equivalent to Shanghai risks having the FBI break sticks left in Iranian control rooms. millions of pages. Think of the way down the door. The computer operators had to find spy movies have changed. Once Presumably the United States out what was on the sticks, so they upon a time, the spy broke into some has made some attempt to penetrate inserted them into their computer – secret place with his Minox camera. Chinese computer security, but the and inadvertently uploaded the virus. He photographed a few pages – the Chinese have less worth stealing and All that can be said is that anyone camera did not hold more than 30 or so they almost certainly do not rely nearly trying to loot an air-gapped system shots – and then got out. You almost as much on computer networks. As has to remove the results physically never saw a spy reload his camera long as the United States leads the (unless he can connect the system to – woe to the spy faced by a hundred- world in defense system development, the Internet). Physical security can be page document. The spy also risked it will remain the single most attractive effective. In an Internet system, it may mis-exposing or mis-focusing and thus target for cyber-espionage, not only by be irrelevant. wasting his time altogether. In later the Chinese. The current trend towards cloud- movies you watched James Bond break We can and do invest in computer based solutions seems to invite cyber- into the enemy’s lair, slip a disk into his security, but the most effective way attack, because a single server company computer, and download the contents to break that security is to corrupt may collect data from many possible of his hard drive – millions of bytes of individuals or to get at their personal target companies. Each cloud provider data – thousands of pages – with no computers – what is called social claims that it provides state-of-the- risk at all of ruining it by mishandling engineering. For example, executives art security, but no form of cyber- a camera. Bond was still limited by who travel to China for business may based security is proof against social the size of the disk or disks he was imagine that no one would dare to engineering. The only defense raised using (and he risked compromise if touch their personal computers, but in the past was to split sensitive data the disks were found on him). The Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 149 37

Chinese have done far better, breaking engines worsen the in remotely and roaming apparently at situation because will in large libraries of data. Are we they can get into more or less transparent to the Chinese the content of and probably the Russians, but not to items rather than others? merely the titles. At one time anyone using a This is not too classified library had to ask for specific bright a spot. documents, access to which was Perhaps we usually tied to a specific need to know. should accept that Much of that restriction vanished our secrets, at least when classified libraries went online. those generated Protection moved to passwords and during the firewalls, but all of them seem to be computer era, have flawed. There is a constant battle limited lifetimes. between attacker and defender, and At one time most the Qinetiq example suggests that classified US defenders sometimes do not receive documents were sufficient priority. A cynic would marked with suggest that company management declassification puts its money where it earns the most, deadlines (typically and that the penalties – if any – for 12 years for failing to repair reported breaches are Secret). The not steep enough to attract the needed deadlines should attention. It may be that enumerating have reminded all known security breaches (in order anyone using to penalize those not repairing them) those documents would reveal just how poor security that unless is overall, and thus attract further something new penetration. It may simply be a matter was developed, reminder that secrets go stale would of avoiding embarrassment. whatever was being described would induce us to rethink our development The one bright spot in all of this lose much of its value after time cycle. Perhaps in our quest for truly may be that the computer also invites elapsed. The Reagan Administration remarkable results, we have forgotten massive production of redundant and viewed automatic declassification as a the time factor. At the very least, even useless material. Documents are foolish invitation to the enemy, and the we may want to rethink the balance rewritten again and again, because idea was dropped. Perhaps it is time to between money spent on development each rewrite does not cost much. In revive it, not as a gift to anyone, but as and money spent to safeguard truly many systems, rewrites are in effect a reminder to us. vital developments from cyber-spies. added to the original file. Since data We rely heavily on a research and Not everything can be protected; we storage is now so inexpensive, there is development system designed to should be thinking about what matters no incentive to neck down the results. maintain superiority by producing most. Anyone penetrating a file is presented revolutionary systems. Unfortunately We may want to change systems with lots of data -- much of which is we develop and buy systems rather (or system parameters) periodically so not terribly useful. The bloat is also sluggishly, for a whole series of that knowledge of their details, gained fed by stored video, which takes up reasons. A revolutionary system by cyber-or other espionage, goes stale. many bytes, but which again offers little whose secrets leak out before it can Knowledge of the detailed waveform content per byte. It is not clear that be fielded is unlikely to remain truly of some secret radio, for example, does data mining techniques help a cyber- revolutionary, because someone else an enemy no good if, after X years, attacker winnow the chaff to get at may copy it (or counter it) before it that waveform is changed. This type what he wants. Many modern search ever enters service. Perhaps a constant of planned change (not improvement) Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 38 World Naval Developments

becomes easier and less expensive twitter that the White House had been as we move to devices which use attacked and the President injured. software to generate their waveforms Later the ‘Syrian Electronic Army’ (as is currently the case). Of course, claimed responsibility, though it could because the change is produced by new also have been a group of investors software, news of the change is also planning to short stocks. vulnerable to cyber-espionage. All we The real defense against such attack can do is recognize the new conditions is deterrence. We may be inclined to of cyber-warfare, and adapt to them. treat a cyber-attack just as we treat a If the Chinese are aware of some flaw physical attack, and deliver either in we have identified in the F-22, can we retaliation. The key to such defense modify the airplane so that a weapon is an ability to identify the attacker exploiting that flaw becomes useless? so that he can be held responsible. It Ought we to develop weapons with an seems important to distinguish this Norman Friedman’s latest book is The eye to making them more changeable? kind of action and potential reaction Naval Institute Guide to World Naval All of this is apart from the risk to from cyber-espionage. There will never the U.S. infrastructure and economy be retaliation against cyber-espionage Weapon Systems from cyber-attack rather than cyber- simply because we will already be espionage – say, from crashing engaging in it, just as much as our the stock market. We are certainly enemies. The only issue is whether we vulnerable. Readers will remember can do as effective a job as they seem a plunge in the stock market when to. t hackers inserted a false claim in the AP

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 149 39 A Navy ANZAC Day or Remembrance Day Speech LCDR Desmond Woods looks back…

n 2011 the Royal Australian Navy celebrated the centenary of its change Iof name from Commonwealth Naval Forces to Royal Australian Navy. That happened in 1911 by Royal decree. In 2013 the RAN will celebrate the centenary of the arrival in Sydney of its first fleet of new ships including the battlecruiser HMAS Australia. In those hundred years the RAN has been an essential component in the defence of Australia in peace and war. The nation and the Navy paid a heavy price for keeping the seas free for those who pass upon it on their lawful occasions. Today we reflect on those sailors, who while fighting for freedom, were lost with their ships, or who have no grave but the oceans and seas where they fought. Seventy years ago the perceived Ship’s company threat to Australia became very real neighbourhood. torpedoed Repulse five times below the escaping Prince of when the Japanese Empire suddenly British Admiral Tom Phillips, waterline. No ship was designed to take Wales (Public Domain) attacked the British colonies in Malaya commanding the Task Force in Prince such punishment and she rolled over and Singapore. To try to prevent this of Wales, saw it as his duty to try to and sank in just 11 minutes trapping attack the British Government had prevent this invasion and took his fleet many of her crew below decks. sent to their naval base in Singapore to sea looking for the Japanese landing After Prince of Wales was also two capital ships. One was the old ships. His ships were detected from the crippled by torpedo explosions and was battlecruiser Repulse and the other air and targeted by waves of Japanese dead in the water, Admiral Phillips and was the new battleship Prince of Wales. aircraft, based in Vietnam, attacking Captain John Leach both waited on the These were both magnificent warships with bombs and torpedoes. Vampire bridge wing, watching men enter the armed with heavy guns for fighting also came under attack. water from their listing ship and waving other battleships. Admiral Phillips found himself in to them, wishing them good luck. Prince of Wales had been fitted an impossible position, on the cusp of They may have believed that could not with batteries of anti-aircraft guns but naval history, watching lethally effective honourably try to save themselves while Repulse had not been and they were torpedoes dropped by skilful pilots men were still trapped alive onboard. Prince of Wales after both still underprotected against the destroy his capital ships. Captain Bill They left their own departure too late. commissioning new, fast torpedo bombers the Japanese Tennant handled his ship, Repulse, like Their bodies, recovered from the sea, (Royal Navy) had sent to South East Asia. With these a destroyer. His huge capital ships was the much smaller and battlecruiser was elderly Australian destroyer Vampire. doing 25 knots and Her task, along with other British heeling hard over to destroyers, was to scout ahead of the port and starboard big ships and to provide (mainly anti- as he avoided 19 submarine, Ed.) protection for them. torpedo attacks. Then Within a week of this fleet arriving the next wave of in Singapore the Japanese attacked Japanese aircraft came the American fleet in Hawaii and in simultaneously started to invade across the beaches of from all points of northern Malaya. War had come to our the compass and Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 40 A Navy ANZAC Day or Remembrance Day Speech

showed how they were fatally injured as whether Davies should the ship sucked them under. They died receive the Victoria with 513 men from Repulse and 327 Cross for Australia from Prince of Wales who were trapped – the highest award at their action stations in terrifying possible for bravery in darkness below hatches jammed shut as the face of the enemy.1 their ships buckled and flooded. As men were Among them was Prince of Wales leaving Prince of New Zealand Chaplain, Reverend Wales the escorting Wilfred Parker. He was tending a group destroyers acted of wounded, burnt and dying sailors without orders and who could not be moved. He was came alongside the Prince of Wales and told that if he did not leave them and listing ship in time to was Lieutenant Hays. He had been Repulse under attack come onto the upper deck the hatch rescue over 1000 men before the great the Repulse’s Midshipmen’s divisional above him would have to be closed and battleship sank. The little destroyers officer. He was told by a Medical he would sink with them. He calmly were dangerously top heavy with so Officer that one of his seriously replied that he understood that, but many men crowded on their upper wounded young Midshipmen, aged just could not leave his men to face their decks. 17, wanted to see him. Hays later wrote fate without him. He refused to save The Australian destroyer Vampire, about this very young man: himself. He saw his duty as staying was under command of her Captain, Among his thirty gunroom with his men to the end. He could have Commander William Moran, of colleagues this Midshipman had scrambled to safety and lived. Instead Fremantle. He was a career officer who appeared the least developed. he met his death with them as he led his had joined the Navy at the RAN College Immature for his age and often in sailors in prayer. Greater love hath no in 1917. Vampire played a magnificent trouble he had seemed and looked man than this, that he lay down his life part in the rescue, and at great risk to a near child. He had been hit at for his friends. herself, saved more than 200 of the his action station by a machine An Australian Midshipman, Robert 800 men not killed when Repulse went gun bullet from the last strafing Davies, recently graduated from the down. These were men drowning in the run by a Japanese aircraft. I asked RAN College, was serving in Repulse fuel covered water with only minutes to be alone with him and took as a gunner. He was seen by many to live. The two sunken ships had been his hand. He gave me a brave witnesses as he fought to the end. He carrying 2921 men of whom 2031 were smile, which knifed into my heart was at his action station, strapped into saved by the destroyers. and conscience for the previous his Oerlikon anti-aircraft gun firing At the end the bows of the Prince admonishment I had to bestow on at attacking Japanese aircraft and of Wales reared high into the air, the him. He held onto my hand with a cursing in fluent Australian anyone great torpedo holes below the waterline firm little grip as though trying to who got in the way of his gun sights. clearly visible to men watching from the express his last tangible feeling in He went down with his ship as his destroyers and in the water. Then there the young life he must have known gun mounting was submerged. He was a terrible noise as machinery broke was slipping from him. I have never too could have chosen to save himself loose inside and the battleship slipped before, or since, seen death, or the but decided to almost literally stick to under the sea. She took five years to awareness of death, in that moment his guns. He was definitely an “Aussie build and two hours to sink. One officer of truth, so transform youth to man. Battler.” His name and his raw young up to his chest in water in a float was Suddenly he was adult, brave and courage should be nationally known seen to salute his ship as she plunged silently perceptive of the tragedy in and be remembered. He was just 18 to the sea floor, to the amazement of a which we were both enmeshed. He when he was killed. Davies is among nearby stoker who thought: “that sort died that evening. 13 candidates whose names have of thing only happened in books !” The valiant Vampire and her gone forward for consideration for In the British destroyer Electra, courageous commanding officer had posthumous honours along with other covered in fuel oil from the water, only three months left to live. On 9 Australian heroes. A recommendation 1 At the time of going to press the decision April 1942 Vampire was attacked to the Government will be made as to had been made not to award any of the 13 while escorting the old British carrier posthumous decorations. Editor) Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 149 41

Hermes near Ceylon. Japanese carrier LCDR Desmond Woods RAN has divebombers caught the vulnerable ships. First Hermes was sunk and served in the navies of New Vampire tried to fight off the attackers Zealand, Britain, and Australia. with her anti-aircraft guns and survived two near-misses. But then a bomb scored a direct hit in the boiler room and the ship was brought to a dead stop. Now a sitting duck, she suffered four more hits in quick succession. H MS Repulse, possibly in Singapore (Lewis Collection) Commander Moran was last seen as he ordered his men to abandon ship and take to rafts and floats. Then another hit broke the destroyer’s back; the bow quickly sank, followed by the stern a few minutes after 11 a.m. Commander Moran and seven sailors perished. A British hospital ship, was fortunately able to pluck 590 survivors from both ships out of the sea and brought them to Colombo. By then Vampire had disappeared into a deep trench so far down that she Repulse survivors as photographed from a recovery ship (Lewis Collection) has never been dived on or seen again. Her wreck is an Australian war grave. Seventy years after these tragic events our remembrance today is not about the rise and fall of Empires, British or Japanese. It about the pity of war and the particular and the personal losses of young men who might have lived to be our fathers and grandfathers and who were lost with their ships far from home and the land they loved. ANZAC Day is about the men and women of the Commonwealth of Australia and the Dominion of New Zealand, both those well remembered HMAS Vampire (AWM) and those lost to our national memory. They gave their tomorrow, in so many theatres of war, so that we might be born into our brighter and safer today. Those young lives were lost in Freedom’s Battle and their legacy has been our life-long liberty. We owe them remembrance.

Lest we forget.

HMAS Vampire Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 42 Indonesia’s Fast Attack Craft Acquisition: Toward a “Balanced” Fleet? By Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto Synopsis which Indonesia is also The Indonesian Navy recently trying to develop. received its second locally- In addition, the made fast attack craft with a Navy has ordered four plan to procure 14 units until 130-tonne trimarans 2014. This is part and parcel from a local shipyard, of its plan to have a ‘balanced’ with four anti-ship fleet capable of performing missile launchers in each wide-ranging naval tasks. hull, to be delivered by 2014. The FAC and anti-ship missiles will 705 in launch mode Commentary (Public domain) Indonesia is also developing its further bolster Indonesia’s sea denial SOUTHEAST ASIAN navies have indigenous naval missile technology capabilities. Together with naval mines been developing their ‘asymmetric to reduce dependence on foreign and submarines, the FAC will support capabilities,’ judging by their recent suppliers, and increase the FAC the TNI-AL’s Archipelagic Sea Defence procurements. These range from lethality. Strategy (Strategi Pertahanan Laut submarines and mine warfare vessels In March 2011, Indonesia and Nusantara, SPLN), which seeks to deny to fast attack craft (FAC) armed with China signed a Memorandum of the enemy fleet access to Indonesia’s advanced anti-ship cruise missiles Understanding (MoU) which paved archipelagic waters. (ASCM). the way for closer defence cooperation, Operationally, they are suitable Indonesia, too, is investing in these including joint missile production. for Indonesia’s complex maritime assets. Having recently secured a Indonesia has acquired and tested a geography, with many gulfs, deal for three Type-209 Chang Bogo substantial number of Chinese C-802 bays, estuaries, coves, and islets submarines from South Korea, Jakarta missiles and installed them aboard scattered across the archipelagic now plans to acquire 14 new FAC by Todak-class FAC and Ahmad Yani-class landscape. This operating 2014. This plan, however, should not frigates. Regarded as more lethal than environment will also enable easier obscure Jakarta’s intention to have the C-802, Indonesia now aims for force dispersion and concealment a ‘balanced’ fleet to perform wide- C-705 and has become its first overseas when deployed against a larger ranging naval tasks. customer. adversary fleet. They will be effective With a range of 75-170 km and to patrol maritime choke-points, such Indigenous Fast Attack Craft smaller than the C-802, the C-705 is as the Malacca, Singapore, Sunda, On 17 February 2012, the Indonesian appropriately fitted for the smaller and Lombok-Makassar Straits; and Navy (TNI-AL) received its second KCR-40 FAC. Based on the MoU, disputed waters in Sulawesi Sea. locally-made KCR-40 FAC, KRI Indonesia would build a plant to Costing over Rp. 73 billion (approx. Kujang, after commissioning its first, manufacture the C-705, although this is US$8 million) each, the KCR-40 FAC KRI Clurit, in April 2011. Assistant for not only related to the FAC project. provide a cost-effective means for the Planning for The Navy Chief of Staff, In addition, the country recently TNI-AL to, on one hand, increase its Rear Admiral Sumartono, said the bought an undisclosed number of presence in the strategically vital, but boats would be deployed in the western Russian SS-N-26 ‘Yakhont’ supersonic criminally-prone, maritime areas, as part of Indonesia and North Sulawesi. anti-ship missiles for US$1.2 million well as maintain its naval warfighting They further augment TNI-AL’s apiece to replace Harpoon missiles on orientation, on the other. fleet of FAC which currently numbers its frigates. In April 2011, the Yakhont around 18 boats (four Todak-class, was successfully tested and destroyed a A ‘Balanced’ Fleet four Kakap-class, four Singa-class, designated target over 250 kilometres Although the FAC might be sufficient four Mandau-class, and four Selawaku away. to maintain sea denial in Indonesia’s (ex-Waspada)-class). The FAC’s Jakarta also aims to manufacture narrow seas and archipelagic waters, asymmetric leverage will also increase 1,000 RHan 122 indigenous short-range they are certainly not a leverage Jakarta when they are fitted with ASCM, ship borne missiles starting from 2014. can exploit to expand its maritime Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 149 43

KRI Clurit For these (Public domain) reasons, the FAC are unlikely to become the backbone of TNI-AL’s force posture. Rather, this is only part of Jakarta’s efforts to have a ‘balanced’ fleet capable of carrying Secondly, as a out various naval tasks, ranging from Yakhont missile (US Navy image) net oil importer maritime anti-crime patrols to coastal since 2004, defence. t Indonesia’s energy security hinges on Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto is a research an uninterrupted analyst with the Maritime Security supply of oil Programme at the S. Rajaratnam from the Middle School of International Studies (RSIS), East. Growing seaborne trade Nanyang Technological University. He with South and is also a former researcher at the Centre East Asia further for East Asian Cooperation Studies interests. Large and versatile naval raises the stake of having a secure (CEACoS), University of Indonesia. platforms, like frigates and destroyers, regional maritime environment, are still largely relevant for Indonesia including and especially, the South for the following reasons. China Sea. Indonesia is now Originally published in RSIS Firstly, sandwiched between respectively the world’s third and Commentaries. Reproduced with the Indian Ocean and Western second-largest exporter of liquefied permission. Pacific, Indonesia’s three designated natural gas (LNG) and coal, bound archipelagic sea lanes (ASLs) are the mainly for China, India, Japan, South linkages of South and East Asian Korea and Singapore. This should maritime economies. Being a coastal make Indonesian defence and naval state, Indonesia has a responsibility to planners start thinking about having an ensure that its ASLs are safe, secure, externally-oriented TNI-AL. and open for global shipping. Thirdly, with over five million While welcoming the rise of migrant workers overseas, some of regional powers, particularly India and them currently residing in volatile China, Indonesia is also very concerned regions like the Middle East; Indonesia with their naval developments. must begin to seriously make naval Indonesian waters are where Indian non-combatant evacuation operations and Chinese naval expansions meet. (NEOs) a priority for the TNI-AL. Misunderstanding and miscalculation This also includes active promotion between them in these waters of good order at sea in places beyond will inevitably generate adverse its horizons, like participating consequences for Indonesia’s maritime in multinational counter-piracy and national security. operations in the Gulf of Aden. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 44 Americans in Darwin By Dr Tom Lewis

he World War II American Alliance was founded in blood and Tsacrifice in Darwin. Recently the Darwin Military Museum unveiled a new display – the American Alliance in the Top End. It outlines the partnership that began when the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) flew the only defending aircraft on 19 February 1942: ten P-40 Kittyhawk fighters against the 188 incoming attackers of the Japanese Navy, launched from four aircraft carriers. In the harbour, and outside it, US ships fought against the enemy aircraft. A poor image of But in what other ways did that escaping the onslaught to land later. amongst those working for Uncle Sam probably British alliance manifest itself. The answer is in Fourteen men died on board were incurred on two freighters which Motorist on the left, sacrifice of the ultimate nature – blood, another Clemson-class destroyer, the had been contracted by the American and Peary down by and to an extent of over half of those USS William B Preston. Converted to a government at the time: the Florence the stern on right killed on the day. seaplane tender and carrying a full load D and the Don Isidro. Those who died (Darwin Military Of the attackers, the following of fuel, the Preston was less able to fight on board these ships, both attacked Museum) American personnel died. but was able to slip her anchor unlike following the morning raids, on the Eighty-eight men of the US Navy the Peary. She was hit heavily in the afternoon of the 19th, were Filipinos. were killed on board, in the water stern but managed to escape through Eleven American-contracted nearby, or of injuries received, while manoeuvring. seaman died on board the Don Isidro, “fighting their ship” USS Peary, a One US Navy member who was and three on board the Florence D. Clemson-class destroyer. Peary was hit crewing a US Catalina flying boat died This gives a total of 128 United by “Val” dive bombers and was sunk after the aircraft was shot down by States citizens and men contracted by probably at 1010, within 12 minutes of Zeros of the incoming force before it the US who died in the 19th February the raid commencement. reached the target town. attacks. The precise figure for the total Two US seamen died on board the Four members of the US Army fatalities of the day is hard to determine, freighters SS Portmar and USAT Meigs, 148th Field Artillery Regiment died on but the Northern Territory Library Roll under bombing and strafing attack. board the freighter Tulagi while it was of Honour, which has done a sterling Four pilots from the USAAF under attack on the harbour. job of revising the total list of those Kittyhawks of the American 49th One US Army man, a part of the killed on that day, now1 stands at 235. Pursuit Group were killed in action. ship’s defence team, died on board the Over half of those who died Five of these aircraft of the United freighter Don Isidro as part of the ship were fighting for the USA. The States Army Air Forces were airborne defence team when it came under American ally paid a high price when and five were on the ground refuelling attack outside the harbour. for the first time in WWII it stood when the enemy arrived. Those on the This gives a total of 114 US shoulder to shoulder with Australia. airstrip valiantly tried to take off to servicemen Killed in Action. A geographically huge continent – little avail. Those pilots who survived However, further around the same size as the mainland either parachuted out of their aircraft casualties states of the USA – Australia USS William B Preston (Courtesy or survived the crash of their had a much smaller Peter Ingham) machine, with one

7

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 149 45

population, and was unable to defend itself completely. The fighting men of the States and their compatriots gave their all, but it was the beginning of a fruitful union which eventually saw Allied victory in the Pacific – and which continues today. t

Lieutenant John Glover’s P-40 Kittyhawk, brought down during the battle (Courtesy Bob Alford)

Dr Tom Lewis OAM is the author of 11 military history books and a former naval officer, in which capacity he commanded a US team in Baghdad in the Iraq war of 2006. He is the Director of Darwin Military Museum and the editor of Headmark.

References Sources for this article are contained generally in Carrier Attack, by Dr Tom Lewis and Peter Ingman, Avonmore Books, 2013, but acknowledgement is paid particularly to: Alford, Bob. Darwin’s Air War. Northern Territory: Aviation Heritage Centre, 2011. Don Isidro, beached and burnt out (Lewis Collection) Rosenzweig, Paul A. “Darwin, 50 Years On: a Reassessment of the First Raid Casualties”. Sabretache, XXXVI, April/June 1995. NT Library. NT Roll of Honour. http:// www.ntlexhibit.nt.gov.au/exhibits/show/ bod/roh/location Accessed December 2013.

(Endnotes) 1 This does not reach previous figures such as 243 and 251 because it leaves out some that are uncertain. For example, an Survivor Lieutenant aboriginal called “Cahoon” is included in Herb Kriloff of the some stories, but reliable evidence showing Preston, in uniform he was there, or existed, is scarce. In other lists people have also been counted twice, as a Commander on and some have been included who died Anzac Day in 2013. from wounds and sickness not received on Herb lives today in 19 February. The figure of 235 seems an Melbourne.(Courtesy accurate tally of the deaths. Alix Bradfield) Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 46 German Navy - a capable submarine fleet By Michael Nitz

he Naming Ceremony of the Both batch 2 submarines will be A great benefit for the submarine German Navy class 212A almost identical with their sisters of the will be the installation of a hoistable Tsubmarine (second batch), FGS first batch. FGS U35 and FGS U36 are mast with a towable antenna bearing a U36, recently took place at the also equipped with an Air Independent buoy to enable communications from ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems Propulsion System on Fuel Cell Basis the depths. Both submarines of the shipyard in Kiel, Germany. (AIP). second batch have a tropicalisation for FGS U36 is the second submarine In April 2013 the sister-boat FGS world-wide operations. of the second batch of class 212A U32 showed the capabilities of the AIP After commissioning in 2014 FGS submarines for the German Navy. Fuel Cell Propulsion System, when U36 will be based in Eckernfoerde Four submarines of the first batch were conducting a permanent submerged Naval Base with the First Submarine commissioned for the force between transit of 18 days without snorkeling Squadron. 2005 and 2007. When the second batch on a transit between Germany and The Italian Navy also has decided to is commissioned by spring 2014 the the United States East Coast. This procure a second batch of class 212A German Navy will have six class 212A represents a new world record for non- submarines, constructed by the Italian submarines in its inventory. nuclear submarines. FGS U32 then shipyard Fincantieri under a licence The contract for building a operated off the US East Coast in a agreement. The Italian Navy will second batch of two additional 212A number of naval exercises. operate four class 212A submarines in submarines was signed between To meet changes in operational the future. Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft scenarios and to take technological FGS U36 has a length of 57 meters, (HDW) shipyard in September 2006 advances into account, the submarines a hull diameter of seven meters, a and the-then German Armed Forces of the second batch were fitted with height of 11.5 meters including the sail Defence Procurement Agency BWB, an integrated Sonar and Command and a displacement of 1.500 tons. The which is today BAAINBw. and Weapon Control System, as crew consists of 28 persons. Construction of FGS U36 was well as a Network Centric Warfare conducted at the TKMS shipyard communication system. Michael Nitz, correspondent, Kiel premises in Kiel and Emden. The A lateral sonar antenna has been (Germany) Emden-based shipyard provided the installed and one periscope replaced rear section for FGS U36, while the with an optronic mast. A lock system Kiel based shipyard supplied the fore for Special Operation Forces has been section. Both parts were joined in Kiel. fitted. FGS U36 FGS

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 149 47 FGS U36 FGS

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 48 Submarine Trends in Asia Pacific: Air-Independent Propulsion A Game Changer? By Michael Raska

he contending strategic realities With changing strategic realities, of the Asia-Pacific region compel Asian navies aim to become Tstates to adopt innovations of their increasingly flexible, and capable rivals. This is the case for new classes of of varying mission profiles: from conventional submarine designs, which countering traditional coastal defence incorporate an array of innovative missions to protecting sea-lanes and technologies in order to maximise their communication lines. Simultaneously, survivability and lethality in diverse submarines are increasingly valuable maritime operations. strategic resource for both electronic While Europe and North America and signal intelligence. To enhance remain key submarine markets, China’s the varying operational capabilities, ongoing military modernisation increase submerged endurance AIP overview coupled with contending international and stealth, installing viable air- electric) submarines AIP is a key (Kockums) relations in the Asia-Pacific will independent propulsion systems is thus emerging technology that essentially increasingly drive submarine becoming a strategic necessity. provides a “closed cycle” operation procurement in the region over through a low-power electrical source the next decade. In 2011, the total Advantages of AIP supplementing the battery, which may submarine market in Asia-Pacific was systems extend the submarine’s underwater A gosta-90B estimated at US$4.4 billion, and for the endurance up to two weeks or more. class submarine PN HAMZA was next decade, submarine expenditures Designed to enhance the performance AIP systems close the endurance launched on 10 Aug are projected to US$46 billion. of modern conventional (diesel- gap between nuclear and conventional 2006 (RAN photo)

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 149 49

Singapore submarine submarines, and mitigate increasing continued to develop and rely on There is a variance, however, in the RSS Archer (Lewis risks of detection caused by advanced conventional diesel-electric submarine procurement of AIP systems in select Collection) anti-submarine warfare technologies – fleets, given their lower cost and Asian navies. For example, the only from modern electro-optical systems operational relevance for coastal AIP steam-turbine system currently and surface radars to magnetic sensors, defence. Traditionally, however, these available is the French “MESMA” active and passive sonars, and airborne submarines were highly vulnerable to (Module d’Energie Sous-Marine surveillance radars. Advanced AIP various types of sensors – acoustic, Autonome) module, operational on technologies thus promise significant visual, thermal and air – particularly Pakistan Navy’s two Agosta 90-B class operational advantages and tactical when running on engines. submarines. flexibility. Swedish-Kockum designed In theory, there are four primary AIP systems in Asian Stirling AIP technology is installed on AIP designs currently available: (1) navies Singapore Navy’s two Archer–class closed-cycle diesel engines; (2) closed- submarines, and Japan’s new Soryu- cycle steam turbines; (3) Stirling-cycle On the other hand, when running on class submarines. The Chinese PLA heat engines with external combustion, batteries, these submarines became Navy’s Type 041 Yuan and Type and (4) hydrogen-oxygen fuel cells. very quiet and difficult to detect, yet 043 Qing class submarines are also Each provides a different solution their battery capacity, discharge rate, reportedly using Stirling technology. with particular advantages as well as and indiscretion rate (the ratio of diesel Meanwhile, the Republic of Korea limitations in relation to performance, running time to total running time) Navy has ordered nine Type 214 safety, and cost factors. substantially limited their underwater submarines with German HDW AIP Since the early years of the Cold endurance. To overcome these baseline fuel cell technologies. Three first batch War, while major naval powers shifted limitations, naval innovation in models of the new Son Won-Il class to nuclear propulsion, smaller navies propulsion technologies over the past have entered service since 2007, and six – particularly in Europe (Germany, two decades has shifted toward AIP second batch models began entering Sweden, Spain, Italy and France) systems. service from 2012. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 50 Submarine Trends in Asia Pacific: Air-Independent Propulsion A Game Changer?

Limitations and Malaysian Scorpene- vulnerabilities in storing oxidizer/fuel, Michael Raska is a Research Fellow at class submarine KD Tunku Abdul constraints as well as their maintenance regime. the Institute of Defence and Strategic Rakman (Photo by Notwithstanding the diverse AIP At the same time, new anti-submarine Studies, a constituent unit of the S. Chris Sattler) technologies, the overall effectiveness warfare sensor technologies may of each system will depend on how provide viable AIP countermeasures. Rajaratnam School of International well it is integrated with other critical Ultimately, AIP-related Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological systems that ensure optimal submarine technological innovation and University in Singapore. This article functions: power systems, sensors breakthroughs may not guarantee courtesy of RSIS Commentaries. systems, safety systems, navigation operational success – strategy, systems, command, control, and operational concepts, tactical communication systems, weapons development, leadership, training, systems, and climate control systems. and morale will continue to play In this context, any critical failure as important role as emerging of an AIP during a combat mission technologies and their operational or contested areas will mitigate capabilities. t survivability factors as well as tactical options. Indeed, each AIP system design comes with an array of technological limitations, vulnerabilities, and risks, particularly in submerged operations – from the specific acoustic signatures produced by select AIP systems in specific operating regimes, to technical Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 149 51 K-IX Australia’s only WWII submarine b yTom Lewis

ustralia’s only WWII submarine lies buried under the sand of Aa NSW beach. Its 64 metre length is sometimes uncovered, to show any visitor the vessel has been extensively salvaged. In a few weeks the surf and storms cover the wreck once more. It is a strange resting place. This mystery submarine is K-IX, abandoned in 1945. She was officially His Majesty’s Australian Ship for a while, but never saw Australian operational service. But K-IX can at least lay claim to being Australia’s only WWII submarine, for due to some government offered strange thinking before the war, the K-IX to the Royal RAN never possessed a submarine arm Australian Navy for

during the world’s biggest conflict. use in anti-submarine MYALL LAKE Seal Rocks K-IX was a refugee from the fighting warfare training. The in the Asian islands to Australia’s north. boat journeyed to The colonial powers, including Britain, Sydney where she was Treachery Head France, Portugal, and Holland, all to undergo repairs. On

owned land there before the Japanese the night of 31 May the MYALL LAKE NATIONAL PARK Submarine Beach onslaught. submarine was alongside

Then designated K-IX, this big fleet the wharf of the Navy’s TASMAN OCEAN sub was based in the Netherlands East Garden Island base, Indies from 1924. By the outbreak of near the converted ferry 0 1 km the war in late 1941, K-IX was out of HMAS Kuttabul, when The position of the commission but she was returned to the Japanese attacked the harbour with engines off of their beds and damaged K-IX wreck site (1945) active service in March 1942. Following three midget submarines. A torpedo the aft batteries. The forward part and the steamer Fiona (1882) are marked. the fall of the Netherlands East Indies fired at USS Chicago missed the of the superstructure was crushed Nearest landmark the boat escaped to Australia, arriving American cruiser, and struck Kuttabul, when the Kuttabul sank and hit the is Seal Rocks, NSW, in Fremantle on 13 March 1942, along killing 19 Australian and two British submarine. Australia. with two other boats, K-8 and K-12, naval ratings asleep on board. The officer of the watch was and a minesweeper, the Abraham K-IX was damaged by the explosion. wounded when he was blown off the Crijnssen. The shock waves rolled the submarine submarine in the explosion. In May of that year the Dutch onto her beam-ends, lifted her diesel TheK-IX was towed to the dock on Garden Island. Following repairs the Top: K-IX under Dutch boat was commissioned a year later, colours (Courtesy Dutch on 22 June 1943. But the vessel, now Submarines.com) known as HMAS K-IX, was in poor overall condition and spent most of her time in repair. K-IX was badly damaged by a battery explosion on 22 January 1944. K-IX (right) and K-VIII in Manila, 1926. In the Historian Geoff Vickridge RANR background K-II (left) wrote: and K-VII (Photo © E.G. At 0832 a major battery explosion Tall EM2(SS), Collection occurred in the after section of D.E. Tall ET1(SS)) Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 52 K-IX Australia’s only WWII submarine

T orpedo tubes as photographed by salvage team 1945 (Courtesy Norm Peters)

K-IX and sister boats the main battery of HMAS K-IX.... search for the submarine. Shortly after the auction the buyers in early service The explosion was attributed The submarine was found on Fiona arrived in the area to strip the vessel (Courtesy Dutch Submarines.com) to a defective starboard motor Beach, Seal Rocks, on the central of all valuable metals. Special vehicle interacting with the poorly coast of New South Wales. Abraham tracks were laid down through the ventilated main battery. Although Crijnssen tried to tow the hulk off the bush and over sand dunes to reach the the dockyard had installed the beach but because of adverse stormy stranded submarine. Below left: View of battery, nobody carried out any weather this was unsuccessful. Locals had stripped some of the conning tower during exercises (Courtesy tests on it to see if it was safe Because of the high cost involved internal hull of copper pipe, but the Commodore Bryan for installation. Because of the the Dutch Navy did not attempt again new buyers managed to take a lot of Cleary) explosion, 35 battery cells were to get the hulk afloat. metal and fittings from the wreck. damaged beyond repair, the tops In July 1945 the Commonwealth H.Batt later wrote colourfully of his Below: K-IX Sub/ of 29 other cells were cracked as Disposals Commission sold the wreck buy. Wreck from the sea well as battery tank plates being (still on the beach) of K-IX for scrap Re enquiry from Navy News, c. 1962 (Courtesy buckled, and fittings damaged. iron to Messrs Humphrey & Batt 22 July, about what became of Gordon Lindsey) of Sydney for Due to a lack of spare parts the the sum of 985 submarine was decommissioned on 31 pounds. Locals March 1944. had already Following her decommissioning started pumping K-IX re-entered Dutch service as an the diesel engine oil lighter. While being towed out of out manually. Sydney by the Dutch minesweeper The new owners Abraham Crijnssen on 8 June 1945, recovered the rest heading for Darwin, the tow broke. The of the fuel but not loss of the tow was not noticed by the the hull as it was Abraham Crijnssen crew until sunrise buried too deeply at June 8. A plane was called in to to move. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 149 53

K-IX in the Netherlands Courtesy Dutch uncovered as storms and other weather great deal of Submarines.com) moves the dunes. The full length of the exposure to the deck was visible in 1969, and partially wreck. Submarine K-IX, I am the bloke in 1984. The beach is known locally as K-IX seems who can tell him. That tin opener “Submarine Beach” destined to you cook with during mum’s In July 1999 the buried wreck of be regularly absence could well be part of her K-IX was located by a team from buried and foc’sle ladder; likewise part of her the NSW Heritage Office. Team exposed. It’s a deck plating became the paddles member Tim Smith recalls: “We very unusual on a stern wheeler that transported covered different areas using a Ferex ending for timber from Bungwahl to Port Magnetometer, and checked a position Australia’s Stevens. Some of her stop valves marked on a coastal chart of the area only WWII are still irrigating citrus orchards which was derived from earlier aerial submarine. t in Gosford. Two-tons of her lead photography. We detected the wreck ballast were boiled down in one of site beneath the sand of the beach. It the first Australian’s drinking tanks is buried in three meters of sand and at Kirkness’ sawmill in Gosford and lies approximately at 35 degrees to the cast into a keel for the ketch John shore, with the bow pointing south and B. Setree which is now trading in inland. The site is too deeply buried the Pacific Islands. My garage is full to inspect further. We will have to wait of K-IX including the teak hatches until heavy seas next expose it.” Submarine for sale (Courtesy Norm Peters) from the battery compartment... The following year the wreck was slightly uncovered in May, and in 2001 Over the years the vessel has been a commemorative plaque was unveiled covered by sand but occasionally at the site. That year king tides gave a

Sources: A erial shot of K-IX “Special Historic submarine K IX found.” taken off Broken Bay, http://www.dutchsubmarines.com/ Sydney, during sea Report by maritime archaeologist Tim trials (Bryan Cleary, Smith. July 1999. Commodore RAN rtd The Daily Telegraph. “Historic submarine and former Acting Sub- found.” Angela Kamper. 4 Aug 1999. Lieutenant of K-IX) Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 54 K-IX Australia’s only WWII submarine

Boat K-IX

Type Patrol submarine for the Dutch colonies Class name Named after first of class. “K” stands for “Koloniën” (colonies) Ordered 27 June 1917 Laid down 1 Mar 1919 Launched 23 Dec 1922 Commissioned 21 June 1923 Design Electric Boat Company, U.S.A. Shipyard Koninklijke Maatschappij De Schelde, Vlissingen, the Netherlands

Displacement 520 t / 715 t standard, and 583 t / 810 t full load Engines Two 8-cyl. M.A.N. 2-stroke diesels Batteries 132 cells Propellers 2

Speed surf/subm 16 kts / 8 kts Range surf/subm 3500 nm at 11 kts / 25 nm at 8 kts Diving depth 50 m Complement 31

Armament 10 torpedoes type III 45 Guns 1 x 8.8 cm (multi purpose), 1 x 12.7 mm mg Torpedo tubes 2 x 17.7” bow, 2 x 17.7” stern. K-IX’s aft torpedo loading hatch, note the aft torpedo room 2 x external-traversing planned. Because the construction was hatch in the back ground, Seal Rocks (Australia) 17 Sept 2001 delayed the design could be adjusted according to the latest World (Photo © Tim Smith) War I experiences. Therefore external-traversing tubes, which meant an extra danger during depth charge attacks, were not installed

Armour 1 band amidships Periscopes Two periscopes with 4 m stroke Listening gear Possibly none

T im Smith at the bow of the K-IX wreck, Seal Rocks (Australia) 17 Sept 2001 (Photo © Tim Smith) K-IX unidentified section, SealR ocks (Australia) 17 Sept. 2001 (Photo- © Tim Smith) Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 149 55

T he wreck of K-IX seen from the dunes, Seal Rocks (Australia) 17 Sept 2001 (Photo © Tim Smith)

K-IX’s anchor, Seal Rocks (Australia) 17 Sept 2001 (Photo © Tim Smith)

K-IX’s engine room hatch rim, actually the hatch itself is missing, Seal Rocks (Australia) 17 Sept 2001 (Photo © Tim Smith) Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 56 German Navy corvette FGS Magdeburg, recently fitted amidships with its main weapon system, the RBS15 Mk 3 missile system. Photo s by Michael Nitz – Naval Press Service

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 149 57

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 58 Book Reviews

an interested Member of Parliament which provided a new outlet for the collective urge to for over 50 years. Churchill had a reclaim the offensive – an urge that would probably have continual association with the Navy been satisfied whether it was in Turkey or elsewhere and during an era which saw the British whether or not Churchill was a member of the war cabinet. fleet aid allied victory in two World With regards to seapower, Bell uses the Dardanelles Wars only to ultimately relinquish its campaign to highlight Churchill’s impatience with the dominance of the seas. defensive nature of Royal Navy operations during the early Thoughtful Australian readers stages of the war, an impatience that, according to Bell, grew will be especially interested in Bell’s into fervent doubts about the utility of sea power alone to treatment of Churchill’s strategic serve British interests. The patient imposition of blockade and political involvement in two was anathema to Churchill’s disposition and his enthusiastic particularly noteworthy events in search for offensive fleet action and combined operations led Australian history; the Gallipoli to creative and at times rather absurd campaign ideas. campaign and the fall of Singapore. Generally cabinet members become increasingly For many Australians Churchill has parochial about the relative importance of their own come to typify the strategic naivety and portfolios. But Churchill seems to have reversed this Churchill and imperial indifference of the British high tendency and by 1915 when he was forced from the Seapower command during both world wars, the Admiralty he appears to have held the sanctity of British excesses of which were supposedly paid seapower in much lower esteem than when he had arrived for with a disproportionate share of four years earlier. He believed that only by defeating the By Christopher Bell Australian blood. The image of Prime German army could victory be assured and that the navy (Oxford University Press, 2013) Minister John Curtin wresting the fate was squandering its decisive advantage by concentrating Reviewed by LEUT PS Waring, RAN of Australian troops away from the on a blockade which had only an indirect impact on whims of Churchill’s buffoonery has events in France. The results of this changed view of formed into something of an article of seapower manifested itself in Churchill’s attacks upon naval Christopher Bell’s Churchill and patriotic faith. expenditure whilst Chancellor of the Exchequer in the 1920s Sea Power adds yet another book to Bell is fair in his treatment of and with his restless but mostly unfulfilled insistence on a very long list of biographies and these episodes and rightly argues that combined operations during World War II. other studies of Britain’s wartime although Churchill came to “own” these Bell provides similar context to Churchill’s Far East Prime Minister. It could certainly be failures he was merely one member, policy during the early stages of the war. He convincingly argued that there is little left to write albeit a strong minded one, of a group challenges orthodoxy in his treatment of the dispatch of the or say about the life and career of of decision makers, a majority of whom ill-fated Z-Force to Singapore in late 1941; a seemingly token this iconic, yet at times controversial supported the decision to act. Churchill gesture that has come to exemplify Churchill’s indifference figure. This mass of material has not was not originally the instigator of to the Far East and the defence of Australia. But by adding diminished with the passing of time the Gallipoli campaign, nor was he explanatory layers to his narrative, the obvious product of but has continued to flourish as access its only architect and advocate. But impressive research, Bell does much to salvage Churchill’s to archives has broadened and the he was temperamentally predisposed reputation. He claims that while Churchill underestimated whims of historical fashion have armed to support offensive action and so the prospect of war with the Japanese his decisions were historians with fresh perspectives. soon became a firm supporter of the otherwise reasonably sound. Churchill believed that the best Bell’s work, as the title suggests, is Dardanelles campaign, eventually way to deter Japan was success in Europe and to this end he limited specifically to Sea Power and wearing the bulk of the political was unwilling to dedicate scarce resources to a theatre of war with a strong naval history pedigree damage for its failure. Bell argues that that was, until the attack on Pearl Harbor, only a possibility. the Canadian academic is well placed the genesis of the Gallipoli adventure He also assumed, rightly as it turned out, that a war in the to examine a man whose involvement lay more in the frustrating stalemate on Far East would almost certainly involve the United States with the Royal Navy spanned half a the western front than from any innate and that American resources and assets could be used to century. Churchill served twice as First callousness or strategic foolhardiness help deter Japanese aggression and defend British interests Lord of the Admiralty during both on the part of Churchill. The growing in the event of war. What he did not foresee was the rapidity the World Wars, as Chancellor of the dissatisfaction with the indecisiveness of the Japanese advance through South East Asia and the Exchequer during the 1920s, Prime of operations in France coincided with destructive success of the raid on Pearl Harbor; factors Minister during the World War II, and Turkey’s entry to the war, a situation which together stripped bare his strategy and arguably led to Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 149 59

the disaster which befell Singapore in None of his decisions, especially February 1942. as Prime Minister, were made in The deployment of HM Ships a vacuum but rather generally Prince of Wales and Repulse (Force Z) reflected unhappy compromises. was part of Churchill’s attempt to deter It may seem ironic that it takes a Japan, a policy which included renewed work of naval history to reveal just efforts against Germany together how inconsequential navies can at with encouraging the appearance of times be, but even while focusing on Anglo-American cooperation. Viewed seapower Bell manages to show just from the perspective of deterrence how peripheral the Royal Navy often the deployment of Force Z appears was. Bell’s thorough treatment of the less of a blunder than commonly pre-WWI bureaucratic wrangling over believed. Not even its destruction at the composition and disposition of the the hands of Japanese aircraft can be Grand Fleet nicely demonstrates the used to support claims of Churchill’s half measures that often result from strategic naivety as the decision of the clash of intellectual dogma and Pa cific 360: Australia’s Battle for Force Z commander Admiral Phillips political necessity. Churchill seems to Survival in World War II to sail from Singapore and contest have not forgotten the obstinacy and the Japanese landings was made political ineptitude of the Admiralty By Roland Perry without consulting London. The during this episode, a fact which may Hachette Australia. 500pp classic conclusion from this episode have further dampened his enthusiasm has been that the dispatch of Force for seapower. Reviewed by Desmond Woods Z with staggeringly inadequate air At times the flow of Bell’s prose cover confirms Churchill’s naive suffers from the effort of accurately Roland Perry is a prolific writer of Australian popular underestimation of the threat aircraft representing the fruits of painstaking history. His work is highly readable and he paints on a posed to capital ships. But while he research. Churchill and Seapower is broad canvas for readers who are not historians and are certainly underestimated the likelihood the work of a serious academic who new to an understanding of Australia’s past. Recent books of war in the Far East, Churchill never seems willing to sacrifice style in order are The Changi Brownlow and The Australian Light Horse. intended Force Z to hold back the tide to portray the depth and complexity He is also a biographer of Keith Miller, Monash and of of a Japanese advance – rather it was of an important subject. The book Bradman. intended to help prevent a war with is full of figures and laden with the This book contains a biography of Curtin as wartime Japan without unduly weakening Allied minutiae of bureaucratic manoeuvre, Prime Minister and in particular his relationships with forces in Europe. all of which is perhaps necessary Blamey and MacArthur. Unsurprisingly Perry identifies Beyond the obvious interest of to flesh out and engage the grand Curtin’s demand for the return of Australian troops Australian readers in Gallipoli and generalisations and over simplifications from North Africa directly to Australia as being Curtin’s Singapore, Churchill and Seapower that attend Churchill’s career. But in finest hour. There is no question that this was a wise and contains a great deal of interesting parts the balance is tilted too heavily necessary defiance of Churchill, which saved an Australia and relevant insight into the dynamics toward detail and analysis affecting the Division from capture in Rangoon, where Churchill wanted of civil-military relations and the book’s appeal and making it perhaps them landed. politics of war. While the book is unnecessarily esoteric. Nonetheless, In making this decision Curtin saved Churchill from the ostensibly a work of naval strategy, a for those willing to persist there is a ignominy of another military disaster, involving Australian reoccurring theme throughout Bell’s wealth of insight into the politics of troops, following on from Greece and Crete and Singapore, work is the manner in which naval seapower along with a fair treatment of for which he would have been held responsible. None of and national strategy are inextricably Churchill’s record which, according to this material is new or controversial and is well covered intertwined. Any effort to separate the historian Eric Grove, will ensure that recently in Graham Freudenberg’s 2010 book, Churchill two will inevitably lead to unhelpful ‘even Churchill’s greatest critics will and Australia. abstractions and the kind of myopic have to make some revisions of their Perry’s most contentious argument is contained in analysis that has perhaps helped poison opinions’. t chapter 20 where he makes clear his belief that all of Churchill’s legacy in the eyes of many continental Australia was considered a viable option for historians. invasion and capture by General Yamashita, the tiger of Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 60 Book Reviews

Malaya, and that the Japanese High purpose of the Pearl Harbor attack to die together resisting Japanese aggression. There most Command briefly entertained this was to eliminate a US fleet capable certainly was a Battle for Darwin. as a viable option for an operation of interfering with the free hand that The best part of Perry’s book is his battle by battle after the fall of Singapore. Yamashita’s Japan needed to seize first Malaya and description of the campaign in Malaya and the epic events plan according to Perry would have then the oil rich Dutch East Indies, on the Kokoda track in 1942 and thereafter. They have of involved a thrust south from Darwin without which Japan’s oil-sanctioned course been extensively covered elsewhere in recent years using bicycles to Alice Springs and economy would have ground to a but Perry encapsulates much of this material and provides narrow gauge trains through the halt. Attempting to seize Australia a fresh perspective on some of the personalities on both centre of Australia to capture Adelaide in an unsupported pincer movement sides. and Melbourne from the landward without those bases and resources He interleaves with these accounts of the battles and side. Brisbane was to be taken from would have been a massive overreach the progress of the campaign his account of the triangular the sea and then Sydney in a land for Yamamoto and the Japanese Navy. relationships between Curtin, MacArthur and Blamey. thrust southwards in a simultaneous Such an attack would have taken Neither Blamey or MacArthur come out of this book operation. weeks to achieve and entirely lost the well, and neither should they given their records of But the reality is that the Japanese vital element of surprise and would vanity and ambition combined with egotistical leadership High Command rejected all plans have alerted the Americans to the peril styles. MacArthur surrounded himself with US Army for taking just coastal centres of in which the Philippines were placed. staff officers, based in Brisbane, who were generally population by the Navy in December It would have brought the USN into contemptuous of the Australians Army in general and 1941 and deferred to the General the war with a full fleet of battleships. Blamey in particular. They never sought to understand Staff’s understanding that the capture The Japanese High Command would the scale of the opposition that Australian and later their and holding of Australia was a have bitten off far more than they own American troops were up against fighting in New logistical impossibility. The Army could chew logistically, with no bases Guinea. They failed to comprehend or educate themselves wanted to take British India from behind them from which to operate. of the scale of the Japanese defences at Buna, Gona and Burma. Perry’s assertion is in the realm of Sanananda on the New Guinea north coast. MacArthur Ross Fitzgerald, emeritus professor speculation and the ‘counterfactual’, repeatedly claimed premature victories when the fighting of History and Politics at Griffin not history. and the dying were still far from done in order to boost University, reviewing this book in The Perry wants there to have been his credentials in Washington so that he would be able to Australian in January 2013, wrote of a serious Japanese threat to invade justify his calls for a swift return to the Philippines. Perry’s claim that there was a Battle Australia, as Curtin and the Australian Perry believes that the gravest charge that Australians for Australia, saying ‘It is not based population genuinely believed there can make against MacArthur is his decision to land on real evidence. The fact is that early was in early 1942. But the fact that Australia troops in Borneo in 1945 at locations which in 1942 the Japanese high command an existential ‘Battle for Australia’s had ceased to be of any significance to the Japanese war rejected the idea of invading Australia. Survival,’ as he titles his book, did not effort. Perry claims that while these protracted landings Two of our finest historians, David take place and was not planned, does were being planned it was known many Australian POWs Horner and Peter Stanley, have not detract at all from the valour of were still just alive and hanging on for rescue elsewhere on persuasively punctured the invasion those Australians who fought and Borneo. No Australian troops were detached to deal with myth drawing on Japanese records.’ died in 1942 holding the Kokoda track their captors and save diggers’ lives. That should have been If Perry has been able to find back to Owen’s Corner, outside Port the point and purpose of the Australian landings in Borneo, new and conclusive evidence in the Moresby, and then forced the Japanese according to Perry. Japanese defence archives, which he to retreat to the northern beaches In 1945 MacArthur sent specially trained units ahead cites as a source, to demonstrate that where they were eventually largely of his main force to liberate the American POWs he had invasion and seizure of the whole of destroyed in 1943. left behind in the Philippines in 1942. The last 600 of the Australia was ever contemplated by Nor does it deny that Darwin Australians POWs died on the second Sandakan death Tojo, who dictated Japanese strategy, was the target of a massive and march starting on 29 May 1945, a month after Australian then he needs to reference that source ruthless air campaign because it troops had landed at Tarakan. The last Australians were so that his assertions can be tested. was fast becoming the indispensible shot by the Japanese 12 days after the war ended in early Perry is also of the view that port in the South West Pacific for August. Perry has a point but he needs to provide more Japan should have invaded Australia American operations. Americans evidence of what was known, who knew it and when, before attacking Pearl Harbor. This and Australians were killed in that in order to make his case that tragedy could have been ignores the fact that the point and onslaught, the first but not the last averted. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 149 61

Perry is not an admirer of Blamey. with MacArthur, he was quickly Perry claims that Mt Ainslie in Canberra, where Curtin He was not a strategic thinker nor a disillusioned with the way in which famously disappeared from view for a few vital hours in man able to empathise with his men Australia was treated by the US 1942, was, ‘on the other side of Lake Burley Griffin from or to support his best senior officers. military and the President. His visit Parliament.’ Well it is now but it wasn’t in 1942! [There was Though not mentioned by Perry it to Washington in 1944 did nothing no lake in 1942. The lake was inaugurated by Menzies post- has been noted elsewhere that in to reassure him. Curtin knew that war. Ed.] 1943 Blamey, as the ground force Americans, from Roosevelt down, The vast majority of Australians know little or nothing commander, ignored the obvious saw Australia as a very junior about the War in the Pacific other than that Singapore fell, option of naval gunfire support to partner, essentially Britain’s colony, Pearl Harbor and Darwin were bombed, Weary Dunlop soften up Japanese bunkers on the and not one which would be of any operated on POWs on the Burma Railway and there was northern beaches of New Guinea significance in the post war settlement a battle at a place called Kokoda. Given this huge hole in before he ordered his troops into of the South West Pacific. Australia’s the national memory for these recent events, this book, frontal attacks against well dug value to the United States would cease full of character and narrative, and which draws so many in defenders. The use of a few at the end of the war, when it was no interesting threads together, serves a useful purpose. It is inadequate Stuart light tanks, easily longer needed as a base. a 360 degree introduction to Australia’s land war in the knocked out, was a futile substitute for A permanent military alliance with Pacific and the politics going on in Canberra, London effective well directed medium calibre Australia was not remotely on the US and Washington which dictated how the battles were naval gunfire. If before every assault horizon during the war. This was a fought. It has little to say about either the RAN or the at Gona and Buna and Sanananda an very condescending, cold, realpolitik, RAAF’s contribution to victory. The loss of HMAS Sydney hour of high explosive shelling from approach for a great power to take is well covered and also the attack on Sydney Harbour, correctly fused six or eight inch naval to a smaller one. It was far removed but the Battle of the Bismarck Sea is mentioned only once guns from cruisers and destroyers from the generally warm relations in passing and the RAN’s operations in support of the had pounded the Japanese defenders, within the imperial family of self campaign in New Guinea not at all. many Australian and American lives governing Dominions which, for all As an introduction this book is recommended as an could have been spared and grinding their disagreements with the ‘mother easy and rewarding way for people to gain an overview battles of attrition made less costly. country’, understood themselves to be of the political and military history of Australians at war There is a certain irony in the linked by ties of race and history and in Malaya, New Guinea and Borneo. Australia’s military fact that the Australian Defence within which Australia was a major history in the Pacific has never been given its proper place College’s main theatre, where joint member. As early as 1943 Curtin in the curriculum of Australian secondary schools. This operations are taught, is named for was calling for a post-war revival of very readable book would be a good place for young people Field Marshal Blamey. He had served the British Empire’s role in the world who, unaccountably, will learn nothing about these events well under Monash in World War I and for greater Australian influence in their school history lessons, to at least make a start on and did well in the Middle East. But within the corridors of powers in their self-education. he was himself certainly no Monash, London. This part of Curtin’s story is That recommendation comes with a caveat. The book’s a great commander who faced with not remembered when his early 1942 title asserts that there was a “Battle for Australia and its the Hindenberg Line used every speech about turning to America survival in World War II.” That needs to be put into its true innovative combination of artillery, without any pangs as to Australia’s historical context before new myths spring up. In reality tanks and airpower to save his relationship with Britain is cited as this book describes the political battles that Curtin fought soldiers’ lives in 1918. being a definitive shift in Australia’s and the war his fellow Australians waged to liberate our Perry makes it clear that Curtin, view of itself in the world. The break part of the Pacific from brutality and military despotism. despite his Irish-Australian origin, and was not as clear-cut as popular That is the great achievement of Curtin and a generation of his disagreements with Churchill, was history has drawn it. His speech Australians, whose few remaining members are still among far from being opposed to Australia was a requirement of the perilous us. The history of the successes and the failures of those continuing its traditional support situation which Curtin saw his nation who commanded them and their own heroism deserves to for Britain and the Empire. In his entering into after the failure of the be much better known. This book helps with that task. It speech to the nation in December British Singapore strategy which is a good starting point, but not a conclusion to a study of 1941 he said that Australia would successive Australian governments Australia’s Pacific war. t hold its territory for the ‘British had supported for two decades. speaking race.’ Notwithstanding his There are strengths to this book warm, even deferential, relationship but a few odd oversights. For example Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 62 Book Reviews

to the rare opportunities of life The Forgotten Cruiser is an ashore and the occasional ‘pomp and Aladdin’s Cave, filled as it is with circumstance’. enchanting images of colourful and Officers and men come alive stimulating graphics of diverse intent; on the page, whether in the course a copy of the SECRET Sailing Orders of grinding routine or exceptional of 2 September 1914, a reminder duty, at times of achievement, or that boys served on Melbourne during the frank accounts of crime with a copy of a coloured diagram and punishment, of desertion, to the illustrating the correct layout of ‘1st previously unsung heroes, exemplars, and 2nd Class Boys Kit’; a copy of the and ‘everyman’, to the stimuli of SOS that led to the extraordinary reinforcement and relief, to the never rescue, under the most extreme The Forgotten Cruiser ending cycle of duty, refurbishment of conditions, of the 18 crew and - HMAS Melbourne 1913-1928 and training and response to new passengers of the sinking schooner technology such as the aircraft, the Helen B Sterling; the careful By Andrew Kilsby and Greg Swinden submarine and the mine. placement of long hidden records and Longueville Media, Woollahra, NSW, 2013 The reader is thoughtfully photographs of men, ship and events; introduced by way of continuing the detailed nominal roll of the Reviewed by Dr Jim Wood emphasis throughout the book to the original commissioning crew in 1913, On 26 March 1913, HMAS Melbourne, Australia’s first realities for the individual of naval life and finally a comprehensive and light armoured ‘Chatham Class’ cruiser, commissioned and service, to the ‘wear and tear’ of enlightening bibliography, footnoting at Birkenhead on 18 January 1913, and lay alongside Port constant alertness to the proximity of and informative captions. Melbourne’s Town Pier, on completion of her maiden death in many guises, to matters of Congratulations to Andrew Kilsby voyage. On 4 October 1913, Melbourne, along with leadership at every level, to discipline, and Greg Swinden for bringing this Australia, Sydney, and the other modern and capable to death or injury by enemy action, or treasure chest onto public display and standard bearers of the Royal Australian Navy, entered accident, or illness, or sea conditions, on the quality of the detailed research Sydney Harbour as part of the inaugural RAN Fleet to the belated ‘war deaths’, and the and technical command of their Review. comparisons and contrasts between subject. Alistair MacLean, as author Less than a year later the nation was at war and peace and war service. In all these of HMS Ulysses, would say ‘welcome Melbourne deployed as part of the joint force to seize diverse circumstances the ship and aboard’. t German territories to Australia’s north and as the RAN’s the crew are one, totally dependent formidable sword and shield against the powerful German for their survival and health on the East Asiatic Naval Squadron. On 8 November 1914 actions and capacities of each other Melbourne assumed command of the Australian-New sealed within a cocoon of mutual Zealand 36 ship convoy, including her sister ship Sydney interdependence. and the Japanese battle cruiser Ibuki, on the day before Yet as the authors vividly reveal, the historic Sydney-Emden engagement off the Keeling chance is a fickle companion. This Islands Group in the Indian Ocean. is evident in incidents such as the This belated and welcome book is about much more decision by the Captain of the than a pioneer warship, it is about people – the crews who Melbourne to protect the Australian/ sailed in her from her commissioning in 1913 until she New Zealand convoy, or pass the was finally ‘paid off’ in 1928. honour and glory to Sydney; or the 40 An engaging and compelling feature of The Forgotten foot near-miss by a German torpedo Cruiser’s narrative is the effective use of a range of in the English Channel en route to material to describe the daily lives and personal Plymouth – there to have the first circumstances of the many individuals who comprised the leave since the war began; to the crews of Melbourne, as she moved from times of peace other near misses as seen in the fate to war to peace, across the seas of contrast, from the of other ships, or a member of the extremes of weather and sea states, through the vagaries RN’s ‘Suicide Squadron’ on convoy and complexities of challenging operational conditions, duty in the North Sea. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 149 63

The reviewer worked as a fellow generation of US-manufactured jet aircraft, which had only volunteer alongside the elder Doug recently entered full-scale production. in the Photographic Section at the The Forgotten Few is well-crafted in an engaging and Australian War Memorial from 2001- conversational style while remaining intelligent for any lay 2003. The late Wing Commander reader. Was it VS Naipaul who once wrote that: “We are Dick Cresswell, DFC had donated living in a land without heroes”? But that was fiction, as we his Korean service photographs to had more than enough heroes in 77 Squadron throughout the memorial and your reviewer was the Korean War. To that pantheon, add the officers Spence, tasked to caption them. As a former Cresswell, Adams, Susans, Steege and McNamara. I was naval type, it was both a mystery and privileged to meet all – but the first, for Spence was killed a challenge but big Doug patiently in action in the early days of the war. We should not steered staff through the project. forget all who so served at any and every level in whatever A few other former aircrew helped capacity – senior or junior. Any unit is merely the sum of make the job easier. Some of those its many parts. Moreover, we should also remember those photographs feature in this book. RAF Meteor pilots who augmented the squadron’s ranks. The Forgotten Few As a title, The Forgotten Few mantle Whether as NCO pilots or as officer pilots know that they has been claimed before. General Sir lived and died alongside our own. We needed their prior 77 RAAF Squadron in th William Slim’s 14 Army in Burma aviator experience to fly operations in combat, whether in Korea earned that appellation earlier. Not to Pohang, Hamhung, Kimpo or Pusan, over time. be outdone, the Royal Navy’s British The book has a driving narrative thrust and a compelling By Doug Hurst Pacific Fleet was ascribed as another sense of foreboding tension therein. While the author Allen and Unwin, Crows Nest, 2008 forgotten formation. In accepted footnoted that jets needed longer runways for takeoff and ISBN: 9781741755008 parlance, “the few” was a well-earned landings that was the least of their problems. The ebb (paperback) tag given to the RAF pilots who and flow of the war ran the entire gamut of the Korean saved their country in the Battle of peninsular as 77 Squadron staged through several bases Reviewed by Mike Fogarty Britain – also during WWII. But in North and South Korea during that so-called “limited no matter, for as the author attests, police action”. The Australian Archives holds a file which “The flying could be physically Australia was one of the few countries lists all air bases in North Korea by name, coordinates, demanding as well as emotionally to immediately commit combat runway length and width, as well as their composition – challenging.” aircraft at the outbreak of the Korean concrete or dirt. Hamhung is also known as Hungman. War in June, 1950. The piston-driven Korea was a “come as you are” war and the logistical Group Captain Douglas Philip Hurst, Mustangs would later be replaced by chain soon proved its shortcomings. As always, the MBE (not to be confused with the Meteor jet aircraft. Americans were a generous ally and there was much late Group Captain Douglas Charles There is little space to adequately unofficial scrounging of gear and equipment to keep Hurst, DFC) is a former RAAF deal with all the variegated themes the our aircraft aloft. The author compares and contrasts navigator whilst the latter was a author so competently handles. It is the respective air platforms. As a former aircrew officer, former RAAF fighter pilot who served enough to merely address some of the he writes with an informed understanding about the in Korea with 77 Squadron from points without discussing them in the restrictions and limitations he does not shy from 1952-1953. Doug Senior (1923-2007) longer detail they demand. Besides, confronting. He discusses individual aircraft performance, features in this book. He was a WWII any aviation enthusiast would be better combat tactics, ground control aids, weather conditions pilot who also served in Malaya in the equipped to assess the points made and a respect for the Soviet MiG jet fighters which could Emergency. Doug, Junior joined the on reading this useful book. For the safely retreat across national borders whereas political RAAF in 1960 and retired in 1993 on author has covered all the bases as he considerations severely hampered any reasonable right of completing 33 years of service. The skillfully moves between the strategic, pursuit. author, the younger Doug, continues tactical, technical, administrative The RAAF can be truly proud of this book, for it adds a fine record of military scholarship and logistical layers. He also shows to the legacy of the late Group Captain George Odgers, having previously written several a sophisticated grasp of political who did his own pioneering work on Korea – among other highly acclaimed books; including: history and the public policy outcomes conflicts our air force was heavily committed to. Many The Fourth Ally and Magpies in which saw the RAAF choose the pilots, past or present, will earn a fond admiration for the Vietnam. British-designed Meteor over the new Korean generation, certainly for those few aviator POW’s Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 64 Book Reviews who were mistreated in captivity. learned in Korea. Decision-makers special areas of interest were those aspects of the RAN Some pilots had considerable air need a realistic acceptance of attrition and its predecessors that had been inadequately examined combat experience in WWII whereas levels. An itemized list would show in the past, and this book, his final contribution to our others were young men in their first that flying accidents, among other historiography, stays with that theme. flying war. The stress of battle is well incidents, also culled the squadron There has been very little researched and presented documented. These pilots gained inventory as much as combat on the RAN and its vicissitudes from the return of the valuable operational duty which would operations. The author Doug Hurst Fleet from overseas in 1919-20 to the outbreak of World acquit them well for their future roles has written an epic history of some War II, in comparison with more ‘exciting’ periods in its in Malaya, Borneo and Vietnam. Many very renowned people – names which history. The outline is familiar, but Bob’s careful research went on to senior command positions will never be forgotten in any review of and insightful prose demonstrates how little we have in the RAAF and ADF. Australia’s record in the Korean War. understood about the machinations that accompanied Doug Hurst has presented his No, these few people will always be the decline of a proud and powerful Fleet to a small research in an orderly manner and the remembered by many Australians. t and unbalanced Squadron, barely worthy of the term text is not cluttered with unnecessary ‘operational’, in the depths of the Great Depression. The detail. It is not known whether it will Australian navy’s climb out of these depths back to a be re-published in later editions. But modicum of operational respectability in a few short years if it is, then perhaps a few points can is a remarkable one which has not previously received its be made in the interim. A few more due regard from historians. suitable annexes would complement Bob is unrelenting in laying the blame for the difficulties the book. For example, in comparison which confronted and confounded the RAN between with the other services, the RAAF the wars on the inadequacies of the Naval Board and its in Korea were hardly forgotten – if too-easy resort to advice and assistance from the British the scale of decorations awarded Admiralty. What the Board needed to do was to study is compared. That is not to detract and develop a corpus of thought on an Australian naval from any individual service. US viewpoint, which took due account of the practicalities awards were also deserved. Such a of the naval defence of the nation 12, 000 miles from composite annex would disprove that Whitehall. The threadbare nature of the ‘Singapore 77 Squadron was really “forgotten”. I strategy’, with its dependence on the successful passage of a doubt if the Koreans themselves have British battle fleet to the Far East should a Japanese threat ever forgotten. They have a heartfelt to British interests – and those of the Dominions – emerge, gratitude for our overall contribution, was recognised and acknowledged by Australia’s naval for they remember free men came War to War: planners, but they failed to come up with an alternative from afar to aid their party. Australia strategy. Perhaps they had little imperative to do so, as now hosts many Koreans in its wider Australia’s Navy British senior officers seconded to the Australian navy, citizenship. 1919-1939 arguably not a career-enhancing prospect at the time. That Mustangs segued to Meteors by Bob Nicholls The personnel issues that bedevilled the RAN in is past history now. The politics the immediate aftermath of the Great War, leading to of acquisition are well explained. Australian Military History several instances of indiscipline ashore and afloat, are The Meteor itself was handicapped Publications, Sydney, 2012. unflinchingly described. These were concerning enough to in a jet interceptor role, for many ISBN 9780 98077451. prompt the RN to consider whether the agreed exchange reasons, which also included: of Midshipmen should proceed lest their young officers speed, maneuverability, ceiling and Reviewed by Ian Pfennigwerth become contaminated by it. There was certainly enough armament. In its ground attack role, it for the lower deck to complain about, but the incidents outfitted itself to optimal advantage. Bob Nicholls died in 2010. After were unconnected and limited to a few individuals: unlike It would have been helpful to list serving for 23 years with the Royal the RN, the RAN would not suffer the ignominy of a the entire inventory of Mustang Navy, Bob joined the RAN only in Fleet-wide mutiny in 1931. By then the development of an and Meteor aircraft but that detail 1968, but nevertheless managed to Australian naval ethos and improved leadership from an is readily available in other more produce a series of excellent books increasingly Australian officer corps had brought the causes technical publications commercially on his adopted navy, beginning with of grievances under effective control. available. There was one thing we Bluejackets and Boxers in 1986. His Bob observes, however, that the other aspect of this Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 149 65

dependence on the Royal Navy was the RAN, Bob has included some display its skills with great distinction in all theatres of war. overwhelmingly beneficial for the comparisons with the state of the It was a very different and more professional service than fledgling Australian navy. Its officers other two services in these difficult had straggled home from Europe in 1919. and men received the same specialist years. The Navy might have felt under War to War has some editorial shortcomings, but it training as their RN counterparts and pressure, but it was immeasurably an entertaining read for expert and layperson alike and a many applied and developed these better off than the Army and Air valuable addition to our knowledge and understanding of skills in complement billets within Force in organisation, equipment and a crucial time in the development and history of the RAN. the larger navy. On the rare occasions personnel in the lead up to World It can take its place with pride with the other outputs of when it was possible for a ‘cruiser War II. Sound decisions made in the remarkably inquiring and insightful mind of Robert exchange’ to be effected, Australian plenty of time would ensure that the Michael Nicholls. t ships served and trained within Australian navy was ready to fight the ambit of a larger British fleet – on 3 September 1939 and went on to frequently acquitting themselves well – and developing the abilities and competence which would soon be called upon from 1939 onwards. Throughout this period of peace, the graduates of the first entries to the RAN College progressed towards positions in command of Australian ships, and the cadres of senior sailors who would provide the backbone of the Navy developing after 1933 and who would train the wartime expansion force were also being nurtured within the British system. Satisfactory though these developments were, there were other less positive events. The RAN’s two flirtations with submarines in the period 1919-1930 were ill-conceived, poorly-planned, short-lived and expensive. The RAN chronically dragged its feet in providing its agreed oil fuel stocks for Imperial use, and Cockatoo Island Dockyard’s inability to meet its delivery schedules for ships was a serious concern to the Navy and the government. This didn’t SMARTER AND SAFER stop the politicians ordering the seaplane carrier Albatross to keep UNDERWATER SOLUTIONS the yard afloat, a bizarre expedient which worked, however, to ensure that Cockatoo was there when it was ...Since the beginning needed in the coming years. The onset of the Great Depression was to make matters worse for all, and Squadron training and exercising virtually For more information, please contact: [email protected] ground to a halt. www.thalesgroup.com.au And while this is a book about Photograph © Australian Department of Defence Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Is Your CAreer TreADIng water?

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Police DogS

n 5 December 1976 a deliberately duties, and negotiated various training Training Centre at Toowoomba. By lit fire in a hangar at HMAS programs with the RAAF. The selection 1978, ten Police Dog teams were fully OAlbatross damaged or destroyed 12 S-2 of handlers was originally made from operational in supplying an effective Tracker aircraft. As one of a range of the fleet with a standard Naval Police source of security to Albatross additional security measures, the RAN course to follow and then trainees were internally and externally. In this decided to introduce police dog teams, teamed with a recruit dog to start the photograph, the Naval Police members something the RAAF had been doing final leg of their overall training – that of the first course receive a short for more than 20 years. of police dog handlers. burst on dog anatomy from Corporal Chief Inspector RJ Hannan was In June 1977 the first Naval Police Maslen, RAAF, with the aid of a involved in developing the policy Dog teams graduated from a six-week German Shepherd skeleton. t associated with introduction and basic course at the RAAF Police Dog

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 68 ANI On-line: A guide to the new website.

O ur new website is now on-line! In addition to the features available on the Changing your details previous site, the new site also features a library of past journals, a discussion When your account is created, only your member ID and password are stored in the system for privacy reasons. However, you may provide forum, a news section and member list. This short guide is designed to help other details that are visible to other ANI members. In order to change you take full advantage of the new features. your details, login and click the “Change Your Details” menu item (figure 5). Then select the “change” link (figure 6) next to either your personal details or password. Change the text appropriately and click the “save” button (figure 7). F igure 1 The personal information that you provide will be visible to other Obtaining an account members of the ANI but will be hidden from members of the general In order to access the new features of the site you must have a user public. You may provide as much or as little detail as you wish but account for the website. If you have a current subscription to the ANI, none of the fields are compulsory. However, you may not change your navigate to the website www.navalinstitute.com.au using your web member ID as it is the link between the on-line database and our off- browser (figure 1), click the “Members Login” menu item (figure 2), line records. then click the link to download an application form. Fill in the form, then fax or post it to the ANI Business Manager. Once your account has been created, you will receive an email that outlines your member

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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 149 69 Thinking of Making a Contribution? Style Notes for Headmark

In general, please present your work So: the end of the article, please supply full honours - Lieutenant with the minimum of formatting. Adkin, Mark. Goose Green. London: Commander Bill Crabbe, CSC, RAN - unless you would Paragraphs: Leo Cooper, 1992. prefer not to use them. Then please supply a paragraph Don’t indent, and leave left justified. Adler, Bill (Ed.) Letters from Vietnam. on yourself, to a maximum of 50 words, including any Separate paragraphs by one line. Single New York: EP Dutton and Co., 1967. qualifications you would like listed, and any interesting spacing only. Use one space only after Articles use quotation marks around biographical aspects. If possible please supply a colour or stops and colons. their title, which is not in italics. greyscale head and shoulders e-photo of yourself for use Conventions: If citing web sites please use the alongside the article title. Use numbers for 10 and above, words convention: Illustrations: below. Ship names use italics in title Australian Associated Press. “Army Do not embed graphs or figures in your text without case; prefixes such as HMAS in capitals admits mistakes in SAS investigation”. sending a separate file as well. If supplying photographs use and italics. Book and Journal titles use 17 February, 2004. Forwarding your article: Citations: So, web site name. Article title. Full Please send to the Editor on Endnotes rather than footnotes. Use date of accessing the site. Full URL. Editorial considerations: footnotes to explain any points you want Bylines: The Editor reserves the right to amend articles where the reader to notice immediately. Book Supply your everyday title for use at the necessary for the purposes of grammar correction, and to titles follow Author surname, first name, beginning of the title, so: Lieutenant delete tables or figures for space considerations. title if any. Title. Place of publication: Commander Bill Crabbe, or Jack publisher, year of that edition. Aubrey, or Reverend James Moodie. At

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 70 Australian Naval Institute

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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute A Lighter Amphibious Resupply Cargo Craft approaches HMAS Tobruk’s stern door off the coast of Wewak, Papua New Guinea.