Central Asia- Analyst, 15 April 2015 1

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst

BI-WEEKLY BRIEFING VOL. 17 NO. 07 15 APRIL 2015

Contents

Analytical Articles

CHINA AND PAKISTAN PREPARE TO ESTABLISH ECONOMIC CORRIDOR 3 Ghulam Ali

DAGESTAN’S INSURGENTS SPLIT OVER LOYALTIES TO AND IS 6 Emil Souleimanov

GEORGIA’S ECONOMIC CRISIS AND POLITICAL BRINKMANSHIP 10 Ariela Shapiro

THE CHINA-ARMENIA DECLARATION AND BEIJING’S PROSPECTS IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS 13 Eduard Abrahamyan

Field Reports

GEORGIA’S FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER BLAMES GOVERNMENT FOR DAMAGING STATE INTERESTS 16 Eka Janashia

ARMENIA-EU RELATIONS ENTER A NEW PHASE 18 Erik Davtyan

AZERBAIJAN AND THE IRAN AGREEMENT 20 Mira Muradova

KYRGYZSTAN MARKS FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF REVOLUTION 23 Arslan Sabyrbekov Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 15 April 2015 2

THE CENTRAL ASIA-CAUCASS ANALYST

Editor: Svante E. Cornell

Associate Editor: Niklas Nilsson

Assistant Editor, News Digest: Alima Bissenova

Chairman, Editorial Board: S. Frederick Starr

The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is an English-language journal devoted to analysis of the current issues facing Central Asia and the Caucasus. It serves to link the business, governmental, journalistic and scholarly communities and is the global voice of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center. The Editor of the Analyst solicits most articles and field reports, however authors are encouraged to suggest topics for future issues or submit articles and field reports for consideration. Such articles and field reports cannot have been previously published in any form, must be written in English, and must correspond precisely to the format and style of articles and field reports published in The Analyst, described below. The Analyst aims to provide our industrious and engaged audience with a singular and reliable assessment of events and trends in the region written in an analytical tone rather than a polemical one. Analyst articles reflect the fact that we have a diverse international audience. While this should not affect what authors write about or their conclusions, this does affect the tone of articles. Analyst articles focus on a newsworthy topic, engage central issues of the latest breaking news from the region and are backed by solid evidence. Articles should normally be based on local language news sources. Each 1,100-1,500 word analytical article must provide relevant, precise and authoritative background information. It also must offer a sober and analytical judgment of the issue as well as a clinical evaluation of the importance of the event. Authors must cite facts of controversial nature to the Editor who may contact other experts to confirm claims. Since Analyst articles are based on solid evidence, rather than rumors or conjecture, they prove to be reliable sources of information on the region. By offering balanced and objective analysis while keeping clear of inflammatory rhetoric, The Analyst does more to inform our international readership on all sides of the issues. The Editor reserves the right to edit the article to conform to the editorial policy and specifications of The Analyst and to reject the article should it not be acceptable to our editorial committee for publication. On acceptance and publication of the edited version of the article, The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of The Johns Hopkins University-The Nitze School of Advanced International Studies will issue an honorarium to the author. It is up to the individual author to provide the correct paperwork to the Institute that makes the issuing of an honorarium possible. The copyright for the article or field report will reside with the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst. However, the author may use all or part of the contracted article in any book or article in any media subsequently written by the author, provided that a copyright notice appears giving reference to the contracted article’s first publication by the "Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, The Johns Hopkins University, Nitze School of Advanced International Studies."

Submission Guidelines: Analytical Articles require a three to four sentence Key Issue introduction to the article based on a news hook. Rather than a general, overarching analysis, the article must offer considered and careful judgment supported with concrete examples. The ideal length of analytical articles is between 1,100 and 1,500 words. The articles are structured as follows: KEY ISSUE: A short 75-word statement of your conclusions about the issue or news event on which the article focuses. BACKGROUND: 300-450 words of analysis about what has led up to the event or issue and why this issue is critical to the region. Include background information about the views and experiences of the local population. IMPLICATIONS: 300-450 words of analysis of the ramifications of this event or issue, including where applicable, implications for the local people’s future. CONCLUSIONS: 100-200 words that strongly state your conclusions about the impact of the event or issue.

Field Reports focus on a particular news event and what local people think about the event. Field Reports address the implications the event or activity analyzed for peoples’ lives and their communities. Field Reports do not have the rigid structure of Analytical Articles, and are shorter in length, averaging ca. 700-800 words.

Those interested in joining The Analyst’s pool of authors to contribute articles, field reports, or contacts of potential writers, please send your CV to: and suggest some topics on which you would like to write.

Svante E. Cornell Research Director; Editor, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University 1619 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036, USA. Tel. +1-202-663-5922; 1-202-663-7723; Fax. +1-202-663-7785 Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 15 April 2015 3

CHINA AND PAKISTAN PREPARE TO ESTABLISH ECONOMIC CORRIDOR Ghulam Ali

Beijing and Islamabad have completed the groundwork for the implementation of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). A final decision with a clear roadmap is expected during Chinese President Xi Jingping’s much- awaited visit to Pakistan in May 2015. The CPEC is the largest project not only in the relationship between the two states, but also in Pakistan’s history. The future of Sino-Pakistan relations will hinge upon corridor’s success.

BACKGROUND: China and Premier Li Keqiang’s visit to Pakistan Pakistan claim to have an “all-weather” in May 2013, the two sides signed friendship. Their geographical agreements on the blueprint for the proximity adds geo-economic CPEC. In November 2014, China significance to their overall allocated US$ 45.6 billion for the relationship. To optimize the benefits project, including US$ 33.8 billion for of their shared border, the two sides in energy and US$ 11.8 billion for 1982 completed the legendary infrastructure development, including Karakorum Highway (KKH), US$ 622 million for developing the connecting China’s Kashgar to Gwadar Port. Informed sources state Pakistan’s Hasan Abdal, a town near that China’s actual allocation is more Islamabad, via the Khunjerab Pass. than double this amount, subject to During the 2000s, the highway was progress on the CPEC. expanded and modernized to make it This was the single largest foreign operational for all types of traffic, year- commitment in Pakistan’s history, round. An inland network of roads indicating the significance that Beijing connects Hassan Abdal with Pakistan’s attaches to this project. Moody’s has Gwadar and Karachi ports in the south termed the CPEC “credit positive” for of the country. Pakistan, as it will “spur investment The proposal to establish an economic activity, boost bilateral trade flows and corridor emerged in the 2000s, but help ease the country’s growing energy gained momentum with the advent of shortages.” Although China has “assertive” Chinese leadership under Xi established a number of Silk Roads, Jinping. It has since become a central including the 21st Century Maritime theme of discussion in Sino-Pakistani Silk Road, the CPEC is unique in its high-level interaction. In February 2013, short distance and the fact that it state-owned China Overseas Ports involves only one country, Pakistan, Holding Limited took “administrative” with whom China has cordial relations. control of the Gwadar Port. During Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 15 April 2015 4

The CPEC also provides a bridge Islamabad hopes that the CPEC will between land and maritime silk roads. provide inter and intra-regional In addition, the CPEC offers more than connectivity and facilitate the flow of mere road connectivity. It is a goods and energy. Two proposed west- comprehensive concept aiming to east pipelines, the Turkmenistan- integrate Pakistan economically and Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) strategically with China in the long and the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) term. China offers to restore Pakistan’s pipelines, intersect with the CPEC at “glorious” past by economic assistance. different points. The CPEC can benefit This is a long-term task that will be landlocked Afghanistan and some implemented gradually. Currently, the Central Asian states. two countries are upgrading existing Pakistan’s Prime Minister has stated roads and building new ones to that the CPEC could be a “game consolidate land connectivity. They changer” for the region. It serves key have also completed studies to Chinese economic and strategic construct railways, oil and gas interests. Over 70 percent of China’s pipelines, and fiber optic lines along trade and energy transit the Indian with the corridor. At Gwadar, they will Ocean and the Malacca Straits. This construct an international airport, area is infected with pirates and storage facilities, and oil refineries. patrolled by the U.S. and Indian navies. Pakistan will establish industrial and Any conflict could choke off China’s economic zones with tax incentives at energy supplies. The CPEC provides a Gwadar and along the corridor. short and safe alternative. It can become a gateway for trade between China and the Middle East, Africa and beyond. Oil shipments originating in the Middle East could be offloaded at Gwadar for onward transport to China, via roads, railways and pipelines. This will reduce time, distance, freight cost, and is above all safer than the Malacca Straits. In addition, the CPEC will (Source: Moign Khawaja (Flickr.com)) complement China’s drive to IMPLICATIONS: The significance modernize its Western regions, and to of the CPEC stems from Pakistan’s address separatism in Xinjiang through geographical location and that of the economic and trade activities. Gwadar Port, which is at the heart of this project. The country is at the The CPEC and the Gwadar port is a crossroads of Central, South and West cause of concern to especially the U.S. Asia and in close proximity of China. and India, who consider it part of Gwadar, a natural deep seaport, is China’s “string of pearls” strategy located close to the Strait of Hormuz, aiming to encircle India. Alongside the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. Gwadar, China has assisted the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 15 April 2015 5

Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka, been quite modest in the past, but was Chittagong in Bangladesh, Kyaukpyu coupled with China’s observance of the and Sittwe in Myanmar, and a “dry principle of non-interference in port” at Larch in Nepal. These Pakistan’s internal affairs. Observers developments, along with China’s argue that after such huge investments, construction of a blue-water navy and China could change its behavior and its activities in the Indian Ocean raise take positions on domestic Pakistani concerns. While the current structure policies that affect its interests. of the CPEC and Gwadar is economic CONCLUSIONS: Given the and commercial, these facilities could historically close relationship between be utilized for military purposes if China and Pakistan, the CPEC could needed. indeed become a game changer. If Aside from the CPEC’s stated implemented successfully, it could economic and strategic implications, serve China’s economic, energy and the project faces daunting challenges at strategic interests on the one hand and this stage. Pakistan’s chronic security boost Pakistan’s moribund economy on situation is the primary hurdle to its the other. It cannot be ruled out that implementation. The corridor passes the CPEC could be used for military through the unruly Khyber purposes if either side requires it. Roads Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan and ports built for economic purposes provinces, which face a low-scale can be equally useful for defense insurgency. Some Baluch tribes also purposes. However, aside from this this oppose the development work in their potential, the CPEC faces several province. Potential spillover from challenges, mostly originating in Afghanistan could add to the Pakistan. Until these are addressed, the instability. It will take a long time for CPEC will remain a dream. In the Pakistan’s government to establish its context of rapid changes in the region, writ in those areas. Moreover, the especially China’s gradual rise from a country is divided along political lines, regional to a great power and growing which prevent consensus on the project. Sino-Indian rapprochement, Pakistan A conflict over the change in the has lost some of its traditional corridor’s route recently divided the importance in China’s calculation. The legislatures of different provinces, success of the CPEC is therefore crucial exposing these fault lines. for the future of Sino-Pakistan ties. Furthermore, aside from Pakistan’s AUTHOR'S BIO: Dr. Ghulam Ali is fanfare, the CPEC is only one of a Postdoctoral Fellow at Peking China’s several new Silk Roads. If University, Beijing. The views Islamabad fails to address its domestic expressed in this article are his own. He challenges to the CPEC’s can be reached at: implementation, China could decide to [email protected]. focus on others projects. Finally, China’s investment in Pakistan has Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 15 April 2015 6

DAGESTAN’S INSURGENTS SPLIT OVER LOYALTIES TO CAUCASUS EMIRATE AND IS Emil Souleimanov

Recent months have been hectic for Dagestani jihadists. Since mid-2014, this hotbed of the North Caucasian insurgency has witnessed a gradual split, with numerous Dagestan-based jihadist commanders pledging oath (bayat) to the leader of the Islamic State, Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi. In response, the Caucasus Emirate’s formal leader, Aliaskhab Kebekov, himself a Dagestani, criticized the disloyal commanders for splitting the ranks of the local insurgency. In mid- February, the newly appointed amir of the Dagestani Vilayat, Kamil Saidov, joined Kebekov in his condemnation of those submitting to Baghdadi’s authority. Given the North Caucasian and Dagestani jamaats' weakening capacity, the ongoing developments in Dagestan could break the unity in this last bastion of the regional insurgency.

BACKGROUND: In 2014, known as zachistkas (see the 04/16/2013 insurgency-related violence decreased issue of the CACI Analyst). in Dagestan – after continuously rising It is in this context that a number of since the mid-2000s. The capacity of the Dagestani jihadist leaders, among them Chechen insurgency became debilitated influential amirs, have since mid-2014 particularly because broken their oath to Kebekov, nom de deployed lethal violence against guerre Sheikh Ali Abu-Muhammad, insurgents’ relatives and supporters (see and instead pledged an oath to the the 02/06/2013 and 12/10/2014 issues of leader of the Islamic State. Among the CACI Analyst). Instead, Dagestan them is, most importantly, the former became the epicenter of the North amir of the Dagestan Vilayat Rustam Caucasian insurgency (see the Asilderov (in charge of Central 09/29/2009 issue of the CACI Analyst). Dagestan’s Kadar sector), followed by Dagestani jamaats have been on the the amir of the Shamilkala sector defense ever since the eve of the Arsanali Kambulatov (in charge of the Winter Olympic Games in Sochi towns of Karabudakhkent and Gubden (2014), due to increasingly intense of Central-Eastern Dagestan), the amir counterinsurgency operations. Among of the Aukh jamaat Suleyman other things, tens of thousands of Zaynalabidov (in charge of Central- Russian troops and police have been Western Dagestan), and some other redeployed to the republic (see the South and Central Dagestani amirs. As 11/12/2012 issue of the CACI Analyst) yet, the amirs of the Mountainous and the increasingly frequent (Central-Western Dagestani), deployment of mop-up operations, Khasavyurt, and jamaats, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 15 April 2015 7

alongside the chief judge, qadi, of the virtual theocracy’s hierarchy, the Aukh jamaat, remain true to their released his own video statement initial bayat to Kebekov. criticizing the decisions of Asilderov and others to switch allegiances on political and theological grounds, followed by a similar statement from Saidov. Even before the massive defection of late 2014, a rift had emerged between North Caucasian jihadists deployed in their homeland and in Syria (see the (Source: Wikimedia Commons) 08/05/2014 issue of the CACI Analyst). IMPLICATIONS: Kebekov and For instance, as early as in 2012, the those loyal to his authority appear Caucasus Emirate’s previous leader seriously concerned over the shifting Doku Umarov lamented that “no one loyalties of Dagestani jihadists. Several provide[d] help to the jihad in the days after Asilderov’s public oath to al- Caucasus,” urging his fellow Chechens Baghdadi, Kebekov released a video in and North Caucasians to “do the jihad” which Asilderov was accused of treason in their home region instead of and of instigating a dangerous split traveling to Syria. Ultimately, Umarov among North Caucasian mujahedeen. ex post facto half-heartedly supported According to Kebekov, if someone the mounting involvement of North wishes to fight for the Islamic State, he Caucasians in the remote jihad – in should leave for the Middle East and let simple recognition of the fact and in the North Caucasians fight their war. order not to contradict the mainstream Kebekov called on the “brethren” to view of jihad among his fellow fighters remain loyal to the Caucasus Emirate as a divine duty superior to ethnic, and refrain from supporting the national, and racial divisions. “defectors.” Aside from practical Since then and until Umarov’s death in considerations, Kebekov also early 2014, Dagestani and particularly questioned al-Baghdadi’s perceived Chechen jihadists engaged in the North status as a caliph, pointing to the Caucasus have frequently been accused ongoing discord between al-Zawahiri, of nationalism and non-Islamic al-Baghdadi, Mullah Omar, and others. particularism by North Caucasians In addition, Kebekov referred to the participating in Syria. Umarov’s negative stance taken by renowned successor Kebekov was also unwilling Islamic scholars on al-Baghdadi’s to accept the trickle of fighters to Syria. authority as the leader of a self- While the North Caucasian insurgency proclaimed Islamic theocracy. Soon has been on the defense, with jamaats thereafter, the qadi of the Caucasus in Kabardino-Balkaria and Ingushetia Emirate Magomed Suleymanov, nom virtually non-existent, Chechen de guerre Abu Usman and second in jamaats confined to a few dozen, and Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 15 April 2015 8

Dagestani jamaats facing increasingly the jihadists’ cause, even in the region’s high casualties, around a thousand most Islamicized republic (see the natives of the region are involved in a 02/18/2015 issue of the CACI Analyst). war thousands of kilometers away from Simultaneously, the Islamic State has their homeland. However, Kebekov’s proven capable of taking over huge appeals to North Caucasians involved swathes of land and controlling it, in Syria have been met with ridicule. In running a de facto state with a budget 2014, soon after his “appointment,” of hundreds of millions of dollars and Kebekov was advised by the Syria- being feared for its military capacity. based North Caucasian jihadists to “eat For at least some jihadists, prestige leaves” rather than comment on Umar appears to play a role; associating al-Shishani, an influential Chechen themselves with a successful commander of the Islamic State with organization feared worldwide may rigorous combat experience and a help raise their profile, either in terms reputation as a fierce fighter. This of recruitment, financing, or self- illustrates the depth of the chasm esteem. In contrast, the North between jihadists based in the North Caucasus insurgency – as a matter of Caucasus and Syria, and the superiority fact, the Dagestan Vilayat – is a rather complex of the latter who have come to loose network of jamaats operating on regard themselves as those “writing their own rather than a unified military history” instead of hiding in the organization with hierarchical mountains. command. For the amirs of the jihadist The declining capacity of the Dagestani groups on the ground, whether they insurgency and the weak position of the submit to Kebekov’s authority or not is North Caucasian jihadists’ leadership of little practical relevance as they rely in general, and of Kebekov in upon themselves in terms of particular, have made the regional recruitment and financing. insurgency essentially inferior to the CONCLUSIONS: In this context, jihad waged by the Islamic State in pledging an oath to al-Baghdadi may Syria and Iraq. In 2014, unlike previous help increase recruitment from among years, the North Caucasian insurgency young frustrated Dagestanis, some of proved incapable of inflicting any whom sympathize with the Islamic serious blows to the enemy, in the State as a strong and intransigent region or in ’s interior, perhaps organization, while increasingly with the exception of the de facto skeptical of the Caucasus Emirate. In suicide attack on in early addition, given the wealth of the December. In the North Caucasus, few Islamic State, this move may be currently believe that the insurgency explained by the “treacherous” will ever stem the tide of the local low- commanders’ hope to attain financing scale conflict, given the immense from the Middle East, given the drying superiority of Russian authorities – and out of their local fundraising as local perhaps even more importantly, the sources of money have increasingly local population’s ambiguous attitude to Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 15 April 2015 9

been clenched by the authorities. It comes as no surprise then that relatively weaker – in terms of financing, profile, and recruitment – jamaats dominate the list of jihadist groups who have recently switched allegiances, while more established jamaats have remained loyal to the Caucasus Emirate. AUTHOR’S BIO: Emil Aslan Souleimanov is Associate Professor with the Department of Russian and East European Studies, in Prague, . He is the author of Individual Disengagement of Avengers, Nationalists, and Jihadists, co-authored with Huseyn Aliyev (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), Understanding Ethnopolitical Conflict: Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia Wars Reconsidered (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), and An Endless War: The Russian-Chechen Conflict in Perspective (Peter Lang, 2007).

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 15 April 2015 10

GEORGIA’S ECONOMIC CRISIS AND POLITICAL BRINKMANSHIP Ariela Shapiro

Since November 2014, Georgia’s national currency, the lari (GEL), has devalued an estimated 28 percent against the dollar, measuring at 2.23 to 1 dollar as of April 10, 2015. This currency crisis has severely impacted local Georgian consumers and the operating capacity of Georgian businesses while undermining foreign investor confidence. The current crisis was externally catalyzed by falling oil prices, the Russian ruble’s harsh inflation and regional political and economic destabilization due to the Ukrainian conflict. Domestically, the economic crisis has been exacerbated by the Georgian government’s ambiguous, often ad hoc, economic strategy. Amidst the failing economy and falling domestic confidence, the Georgian political landscape remains deeply fractured and no party has demonstrated political willingness to create a multi-partisan solution to the economic crisis.

BACKGROUND: The external export-based businesses, such as factors negatively impacting Georgia’s grocery stores, are facing critical economy are protracted and will not be financial shortfalls as all imported resolved in the short-term: the Russia- goods are purchased in dollars or euros Ukraine crisis, the deepening recession but sold to local consumers in GEL. in Russia, both of which create ripple- While food prices have increased only effects through the region, and currency marginally, many Georgians are devaluations in key trading partner struggling not to default on mortgages countries. and small business loans. Domestically, as of March 15 Georgia’s In order to stave off an economic exports were 26 percent lower than one recession, the national government is year ago while remittances from reportedly reducing administrative Georgian workers abroad have spending and focusing on social decreased an estimated 22.4 percent to programs and infrastructural projects, US$ 157.4 million. In reality, Georgian the latter of which are intended to citizens often do not report received increase employment. In late February, remittances to avoid taxation, and local the government announced its decision analysts estimate that the real decrease to privatize key Georgian state owned in remittances is closer to 50 percent. In assets, which aims to raise an estimated addition, large asset bank loans are US$ 300 to 350 million. Depending on fixed to a dollar value while most the strategic value of the asset in Georgian citizens are paid in GEL, question, the privatization will either which has resulted in many loans be full or partial, as is the case with 230 increasing in GEL-based value by MW Combined Cycle Thermal Plant almost 30 percent. In another instance, in Gardabani. Additionally, in an effort Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 15 April 2015 11

to stabilize the GEL, the Georgian public opinion survey, Georgian Central Bank has intervened four times confidence in the GD coalition has between February and March by decreased to 36 percent compared to auctioning US$ 120 million. 50.8 percent in June 2014. Per the The international community and survey, two of the ruling government’s donors have been passively supportive greatest failures are inflation and the and apolitical, and has continually economic crisis, 64 percent felt the emphasized the need to “implement economy was worse compared to June reforms” as a guaranteed mechanism 2014 while economic issues were the for economic future growth. Following most critical for every household a recent mission to Georgia, an IMF polled. delegation stated that the “(Georgian) The economic crisis has further Central Bank was doing a good job … polarized the already deeply fractured while Georgia is well placed to Georgian political landscape. The overcome the current challenges (as United National Movement (UNM), long) as it continues to accelerate the main opposition party, has worked reform and ease restrictions on foreign to exploit the economic crisis to regain businesses.” voters’ confidence by publicly calling for the ruling coalition’s resignation. On the other hand, the GD coalition has not tried to create a constructive dialogue with members from any of the multiple opposition parties. In addition, former Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili’s statement that the head of the Central Bank and UNM appointee Giorgi Kadagidze’s “wrong actions” (Source: Wikimedia Commons) which led to the “crisis” may have IMPLICATIONS: While the resonated with voters but did not gain government’s tactics may work to any points with the international stabilize the economy, they are reactive community. and not integrated into a long-term national and larger economic and On March 21, UNM representatives governmental operational strategy. held a Tbilisi based street rally, which Critically, the actions of the ruling was attended by an estimated 40-50,000 Georgian Dream (GD) coalition and people, calling for the ruling relevant ministries are viewed as government’s resignation and ineffective by the Georgian business promising future protests. On March community while the government has 23, UNM attempted to launch lost considerable confidence among the proceedings for a no-confidence vote voting public. against the ruling coalition but lacked the necessary votes as Irakli Alasania’s According to a March 31, 2015 party, Free Democrats, refused its International Republican Institute Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 15 April 2015 12

involvement. Adding further fuel to the but voters may change their minds if fire, Ivanishvili in March launched a the ruling coalition does not develop a reality television show called “2030”, clear economic plan with tangible which is intended to provide an results. alternate view on politics to Rustavi CONCLUSIONS: In conclusion, and Imedi television stations, both of Georgia’s economic crisis and the which Ivanishvili views as supportive GEL’s tremendous devaluation are due to UNM. to protracted external regional factors Currently, this political brinkmanship as well as the dollar’s international has produced no victor and the country appreciation relative to all major still lacks a clear economic strategy, currencies. At a domestic level, the while no opposition party has GEL devaluation and the resulting recommended constructive tactics for economic slowdown negatively impacts economic growth. The Central Bank’s the operability of most Georgian decision, on March 25, to keep its key businesses as well as many households. rate at 4.5 percent may encourage At present, the ruling coalition’s public-private-partnerships with statements and tactics have been foreign investors but the constant GEL reactive and have produced no tangible fluctuation may be perceived as too results. The opposition parties have high a risk for potential investors. In moved quickly to exploit the failing another example, the ruling voter confidence and further polarized government’s decision to privatize key the Georgian political landscape. At state assets, such as the Partnership this juncture, it would be wise for the Fund’s 49 percent ownership of the international community, represented Gardabani Combined Cycle Thermal by the World Bank and or the IMF, to Plant, may potentially be intended to develop with the Georgian government attract funds and a joint operating an immediate mechanism to inject company. capital into the Georgian economy in However, the ruling coalition has not the form of active projects, such as publicly communicated to the general further infrastructural development. By public, the Georgian business publicly supporting the Georgian community, foreign investors, and the government at such a critical time, the international community how this international community would gain a activity and other tactics are integral great deal of trust from the Georgian pieces in a countrywide economic plan. people and help ensure the country’s As a result, the ruling coalition is facing transition to a western democracy. a voting public with failing confidence in its ability to rule, a wary business community and tentative foreign investors. Currently, none of the opposition parties have enough political support to win a parliamentary election, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 15 April 2015 13

THE CHINA-ARMENIA DECLARATION AND BEIJING’S PROSPECTS IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS Eduard Abrahamyan

The visit of Armenia’s President Serzh Sargsyan to the People’s Republic of China on March 24, following his moderate criticism of Russia’s arms deliveries to Azerbaijan, emanated in the signature of a bilateral comprehensive declaration signed between Armenia and China. One of the document’s significant pillars is Armenia’s enrollment in China’s “Silk Road Economic Belt.” Another is an accord to cooperate in the defense and military sphere, emphasizing mutual “military support.” The declaration combined over ten special agreements, involving various ministries of both states, and a preferential loan for adapting and modernizing custom services. China’s agreements with Armenia, coupled with its interest vis- à-vis Azerbaijan and Georgia, heralds China’s economic and political penetration in the South Caucasus.

BACKGROUND: China has in plan. Geographically, trade routes recent years become a dominant actor through the South Caucasus could in Central Asia in terms of economic connect Central Asia to Europe, investments in infrastructure, railways providing an alternative to and pipeline projects. Beijing has unpredictable Russia and avoiding the methodically enhanced its geo- currently unstable Middle East. economic presence in region, gradually Beijing’s interest in the South Caucasus excelling its regional competitors, should be seen primarily in the context particularly Russia, despite the stark of its ability to connect with Europe. differences in the strategic approaches Contemporary relations between of these powers in Central Asia. Armenia and China were established in In September 2013, China’s leader Xi a common communiqué signed in 1996, Jinping put forward the grandiose opening for the first mutual declaration economic project “Silk Road Economic between Armenia and China on Belt” as a permanent and substantive economic, political and defense trade-economic initiative to connect cooperation in September 2004. Over a China to Europe via Central Asia. decade later, and as Armenia faces an With an initial funding of US$ 40 increasingly tense international billion, the project will provide a situation, China’s Embassy diligently considerable share of China’s economic initiated the visit of Armenia’s investments in Central Asia, laying the president to Beijing. Via its new ground for involving the South declaration with Armenia, Beijing seeks Caucasus in China’s geo-economic to define its functions, political Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 15 April 2015 14

disposition and political-economic Beijing cannot afford to ignore in its agenda in the South Caucasus. calculations. These recent Chinese efforts represent However, Beijing’s recent activity in an attempt to engage Armenia and the the region and the political accents of South Caucasus in general in the “Silk its declaration with Armenia makes Road Economic Belt,” in order to clear that Beijing grasps the region’s employ existing or potential transit geopolitical realities and looks to slowly capacities. Chinese investment in the but persuasively boost its political South Caucasus on par with Central influence and economic presence. Asia could transform region into a From Armenia’s point of view, a trade corridor, integrating it both with boosted relationship with China is a the EU and with Asia. tangible chance to restore the foreign policy balance that was disrupted as a consequence of Russia’s policy of coercion against Yerevan since September 2013. In addition, Armenia’s deplorable economic situation and the growing public discontent towards its political elite favored the decision to join the Eurasian Union, calling into IMPLICATIONS: In its approaches question country’s sovereignty and to Central Asia, China has not development. prioritized the geopolitical aspect of its After this decision, Armenia’s policy in the region, instead pursuing opportunities are limited, whereas it largely geo-economic objectives. In only three years ago had a substantive comparison with Central Asia, the option to integrate closer with Europe South Caucasus is a small region, through an Association Agreement consisting of three internationally with the EU. The developing ties recognized states with different between Armenia and China are likely political orientations and frozen favorable to the EU as well, as they conflicts, affected by the competing contribute to diminishing Russia’s political activities and interests of the predominant influence over Armenia’s EU, Russia, Iran, Turkey and the U.S. politics and economy, which could in The realism in Beijing’s economic turn stimulate more independent objectives in the South Caucasus negotiations with the EU. therefore hinges on its willingness to become engaged in the regional China is first and foremost interested geopolitical game. The South Caucasus in expanding its economic and with its geographical and geopolitical geopolitical interests to the South specifics is far beyond China’s Caucasus, viewing Armenia as a traditional spheres of influence, which convenient target for the first political and economic approach. Suffering from economic and political decline, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 15 April 2015 15

Armenia will accept any even minor Simultaneously, Moscow should not economic or political initiative that will underestimate the threat that Beijing’s reduce its almost complete dependence gradual integration of Armenia into its from Russia and motivate its economic sphere poses to Russian integration with the EU – China’s main interests. A case in point is Russia’s partner in the Silk Road project. failure in Central Asia, where Moscow Armenia’s strategic and geographical no longer opposes Beijing’s economic properties also speak to a rapprochements with its Central Asian complementary Chinese interest. The partners and allies. Also in the South partnership with Armenia appears to be Caucasus, Russia over time risks important in terms of maintaining a becoming excluded by competing geopolitical balance in the region. economic and political projects. Regarding the energy sector, Beijing CONCLUSIONS: China’s during the meeting on March 24-26 declaration with Armenia is a first step demonstrated a conspicuous interest in in its approach to the South Caucasus. Armenia’s hydro-electric and nuclear The prospect for a nuclear deal with capacities, particularly highlighting the Iran has opened alternative avenues for importance of detailed discussion on China to implement its “Silk Road the construction of new nuclear power Economic Belt” across the Central plant. This initiative, which will likely Asia, through Iran and the South be elaborated soon, has the potential to Caucasus towards Europe, promoted by substantively reduce Armenia’s Xi Jinping. A favorable geopolitical dependence on Russia for its energy outcome in Armenia will boost China’s supply. motivation for regional projects with Beijing plausibly realizes that Russia Azerbaijan and Georgia, cultivating will react negatively to any new realities in the South Caucasus. international initiative with Armenia, As for Armenia, the new prospects as Russia seeks to strategically isolate raise the question of whether the the South Caucasus as its geopolitical country’s leadership may succeed in prerogative. Therefore, any shaping at least an economic independent international political equilibrium between Russia and China, activity by Armenia threatens to reduce bearing in mind its failure to establish a Russia’s influence in region, especially European foreign policy dimension in if such activities include geopolitical the aftermath of its decision to join the and geo-economic initiatives that imply Eurasian Union. integration with partners other than AUTHOR'S BIO: Eduard Russia. To this end, China’s extension Abrahamyan holds a PhD from of its Silk Road project to the South Yerevan State University. He is Caucasus can be viewed favorably by currently based at the University of the EU and to some extent by Turkey Westminster, and is a fellow of Policy and Iran. Forum Armenia, Washington DC.

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 15 April 2015 16

GEORGIA’S FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER BLAMES GOVERNMENT FOR DAMAGING STATE INTERESTS Eka Janashia

On April 3, former Defense Minister Importantly, the deal would be paid for Irakli Alasania claimed that Georgia’s through a long-term loan, which would government thwarted a crucially not have been painfully reflected in the important defense deal with France state budged, the former minister said. likely due to Russia’s objection to As Alasania refused to comply with the Georgia’s enhanced defensive “illegal instruction,” of the “informal capabilities. ruler [Ivanishvili],” the ministry’s According to Alasania, French general staff officials were arrested to President François Hollande agreed raise the pressure on him. Nevertheless, during his visit to Tbilisi last year to Alasania signed the document in order sell air defense capabilities to Georgia. not to lose the chance that “opened up The move marked the end of an arms for Georgia after many years of embargo informally imposed against embargo.” Georgia after the 2008 August war as Shortly thereafter, he was sacked from western partners hesitated to sell the post of Defense Minister and his defensive weapons to the country. Our Georgia-Free Democrats (OGFD) The government worked out party left the Georgian Dream (GD) subsequent proposals and tasked ruling coalition. Yet Alasania has not Alasania with striking an initial deal – disclosed the MoU-related sensitive a non-binding memorandum of details until now (see the 11/11/2014 understanding (MoU) – with the issue of the CACI Analyst). French side. He arrived in Paris in late The government made efforts to reject October, but was just before the signing Alasania’s allegations. On the same of the document deprived of his day, PM Irakli Gharibashvili indicted mandate to do so. Alasania asserts that him for exposing state secrets and the Billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili decided Ministry of Defense released an to prevent the deal under pressure from interview with the French ambassador the Kremlin. saying that discussions on military The MoU envisaged the conclusion of a cooperation between Georgia and final agreement at the end of March, France military, which started last year, which would aim to reinforce Georgia’s were still underway. air defense system and shield the However, it remains a fact that the country from attacks of fighter aircraft final agreement, allegedly envisaged in and even short and medium-range the MoU, was not signed at the end of ballistic missiles. The deal also foresaw March, 2015. OGFD requests the specific training to familiarize the formation of an ad hoc parliamentary Georgian servicemen with the system. Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 15 April 2015 17

commission with access to classified the respondents favor Georgia’s information to cast light on the issue membership in the EU and 78 percent and confirm or deny the assertions that support its accession to NATO. 76 Alasania made on April 3. percent of Georgians deem the Russian It seems that Alasania has been Federation as a threat to the country awaiting the government’s failure to while 88 percent think Russian meet the deadline to raise the matter. aggression toward Georgia is ongoing However, there could be another reason or likely to resume. why he raised the criticism at this time. Another striking trend disclosed by the On April 1, the U.S. NGO survey is the apathy and skepticism International Republican Institute that has been growing among the (IRI) published the results of public population since 2014. People are less opinion research conducted throughout optimistic about the future than a year Georgia on February 3-28, 2015. The ago. 55 percent of the respondents think survey mapped the foreign and Georgia is on the wrong track, and only 25 percent approve the country’s current domestic policy preferences as well as the ratings of political parties and their trajectory. leaders. Although GD, as well as some experts A clear trend unveiled by the polls is and politicians, expressed skepticism the waning popularity of GD. In local regarding the polls, it might be a elections held in June 2014, the coalition mistake to ignore the overall context garnered just over 50 percent of the that the survey has outlined. What is a votes, while according to IRI research, warning for the ruling coalition might the likely number of GD voters has be an opportunity for the opposition dropped to 36 percent. It is followed by parties. Talking about the air defense United National Movement (UNM) affair, while most Georgians fear with 14 percent, OGFD with 10 percent, continued Russian aggression, is Labor Party with 6 percent, Alliance of beneficial to Alasania and OGFD. This Patriots of Georgia and Democratic shift in opinion is also reflected in the Movement–United Georgia with 5 declining support for GD and the percent each. Alasania’s favorability growing popularity of Alasania. rating is 57 percent, with a disapproval rating at 34 percent, while the corresponding figures for PM Gharibashvili are 56/39 percent respectively. Alasania is the most favored candidate among the opposition leaders. In terms of foreign policy priorities, the poll showed that Georgians strongly support their country’s integration with Euro-Atlantic structures. 85 percent of Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 15 April 2015 18

ARMENIA-EU RELATIONS ENTER A NEW PHASE Erik Davtyan

The second half of March saw several past.” The Co-Chairperson of the EPA, high level meetings and agreements Heidi Hautala, described the resolution signed between EU representatives and as “a very important decision.” This Armenian authorities. On March 16, resolution followed the European the Vice-President of the European Parliament’s March 12 call on the EU Investment Bank (EIB) Wilhelm states to recognize the Armenian Molterer and Armenia’s Minister of Genocide. Regarding the future of Finances Gagik Khachatryan signed an Armenia-EU relations, Hautala stated agreement, according to which the EIB that the parties are discussing a new will lend EUR 10 million to finance the bilateral agreement. construction of an electricity The fact that the EPA held its first transmission line and a high voltage session in Yerevan was of great direct current station to develop a link importance for Armenia. At the between Armenia and Georgia. Georgia opening ceremony of the EPA session, plays a crucial role in Armenia’s energy Armenia’s President Serzh Sargsyan security system; a fact emphasized both personally welcomed the parliamentary by Khachatryan and Molterer. delegation and called that week a Commenting on new cooperation in the European one, reiterating that while energy sphere, EU Ambassador Traian being a part of the Eurasian Economic Hristea said the EU confirms its Union, Armenia will “accommodate “willingness … to support the basic the EU’s deep and comprehensive needs of Armenian citizens and in agenda.” The EPA session was attended particular their access to sustainable by the EU Commissioner for European energy through efficient electrical Neighborhood and Enlargement networks.” In turn, Armenia’s Prime Negotiations, Johannes Hahn. In his Minister Hovik Abrahamian also meetings with President Sargsyan, welcomed the signing of the agreement. Prime Minister Abrahamian and The next important event in EU- Foreign Minister Nalbandian, Hahn Armenia relations was the 4th session welcomed the progress in Armenia-EU of the Euronest Parliamentary relations, especially in the context of Assembly (EPA) that took place in the Mobility Partnership. Yerevan. On March 18, the On March 18, President Sargsyan paid a Parliamentary Assembly adopted a working visit to Belgium, attending the resolution on the 100th anniversary of summit of the European People’s Party the Armenian Genocide. Though the (EPP). On March 3, the EPP had representatives of Belarus and adopted a resolution condemning the Azerbaijan were missing, the EPA Armenian Genocide. During the visit, “called on Turkey to reconcile with its Sargsyan held several meetings with Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 15 April 2015 19

EU high officials, including the Integration NGO, Karen Bekaryan, President of the European Council “the stage of uncertainty in Armenia- Donald Tusk, and German Chancellor EU relations is overcome.” He believes Angela Merkel. that a new agreement will be prepared The third important event in EU- at the threshold of the Eastern Armenia relations was the 15th session Partnership summit in Riga. of the Commission for Armenia- Summarizing the March negotiations, European Union Parliamentary the director of the Caucasus Institute Cooperation, held on March 19-20 in Alexander Iskandaryan believes that Yerevan. On March 20, the there is a great possibility that the Commission adopted a Final parties will sign a new document at the Statement, concerning the Riga summit. According to condemnation of the Armenian Iskandaryan, the EU is Armenia’s Genocide, the future of EU-Armenia biggest economic partner and, in any relations, as well as the Nagorno- case, bilateral relations will continue. Karabakh conflict. The Commission On the other hand, the head of the expressed its strong support for the Modus Vivendi Center, Ara Papian, efforts of the OSCE Minsk Group Co- thinks that considering Armenia’s Chairs in the peace regulation process membership in the EEU, its recent between Armenia and Azerbaijan. activities towards the EU will not During the session, a deputy of appear as credible to the EU. Armenia’s National Assembly, Stepan Margaryan said that there is no common position in the South Caucasus regarding international organizations, and that Armenia therefore needs a new agenda for its future relations with the EU. As to the economic aspect of relations, Armenia’s Minister of Economy Karen

Chshmaritian emphasized the EU’s role in supporting Armenia’s budgetary and economic policy. The fact that the Armenian Genocide was on the eve of its 100th anniversary recognized by various European institutions was highly appreciated by all political parties and scientific circles of Armenia. However, politicians and experts have different views regarding the future of Armenia-EU relations. According to the head of the European Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 15 April 2015 20

AZERBAIJAN AND THE IRAN AGREEMENT Mina Muradova

While it is too early to anticipate constructing the North-South Railway whether the April framework will be fulfilled intensively. So, there agreement between Iran and the six are prospects for improvement in the world powers will lead to a permanent trade and economic sphere.” deal, Baku expects business ties According to Ilham Shaban, head of the between the neighbors to grow after Center for Oil Studies, in 2010 trade international sanctions on Iran are turnover between the countries was lifted. about US$ 600 million, while in 2014 it On April 3, Azerbaijan’s Foreign was only US$ 220 million, as a result of Ministry expressed its belief that “this sanctions. political framework will provide an Baku and Ankara have already opportunity in furthering the peace, expressed their interest in developing security and stability in the region and economic ties between the three beyond.” countries, especially in transporting Fikret Sadykhov, a political analyst, Iranian oil and gas through their believes the Lausanne agreements with territories. The Iranian, Turkish and Iran will be beneficial for Baku, which Azerbaijani Foreign Ministers will soon was always against a military hold a trilateral meeting in Tehran. settlement of the conflict. “Over recent Rovnag Abdullayev President of years, Azerbaijan has been affected by Azerbaijan’s State oil company the military rhetoric of both the West SOCAR, claimed that Tehran was and Iran as well as blamed for interested in the Trans-Anatolian Gas becoming a so-called platform for Pipeline (TANAP) project, which will military attacks against Iran, all this carry gas from Azerbaijan to Europe via had a negative impact on bilateral Turkey. He noted that Iran closely relations between Baku and Tehran,” monitors the TANAP project. said Sadykhov. Speaking to the Azeri press, Rasim Musabekov, a member of Abdullayev said Iran wants to purchase parliament, told Vestnik Kavkaza that a share of TANAP, and that SOCAR, agreements will have a long-term effect which is the principal stakeholder in not only on bilateral relations between the project, intends to sell shares if they Baku and Tehran, but also in the receive a “proper” offer. Underlining region. “If anti-Iranian sanctions are that Iran’s need for this project will lifted, there are several projects that can increase, Abdullayev said Tehran will be implemented between Iran and produce more natural gas and it has no Azerbaijan. Trade turnover and other alternatives to TANAP to carry economic contacts with Iran will it to Europe. develop in a better way. The project of Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 15 April 2015 21

“It will be possible for Iran to take a of gas a year from its Shah Deniz II stake in the TANAP project as long as field in the Caspian Sea to Turkey and certain commercial conditions are on to Europe. fulfilled,” Turkish Energy Minister Economic analyst Ilham Shaban Taner Yıldız said on April 9. He added believes the decision to transit Iranian that other countries also want a stake in gas through TANAP will be political the project, following a signing rather than commercial. “TANAP ceremony in Ankara between Turkish might be used only for some small and Georgian authorities on energy. volume of Iranian gas as the pipeline is According to plans, TANAP will not designed for transit of huge connect to the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline resources. If we share capacity with (TAP) to bring the gas into Europe. Iran, then what happens to export of The cost of building TANAP is gas from fields like Absheron, Umid- estimated to between US$ 10 and 11 Babak and the deep-water section of billion. SOCAR owns 58 percent of the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli (ACG) to the project, Turkey’s Botas 30 percent, and European market in the future? Are we BP owns the remaining 12 percent. EU going to build another export pipeline? officials also support the idea of Iran … I think the issue of transit of Iranian joining to the project, which has the gas through Turkey will be discussed potential to diversify energy supplies only within the political context.” and decreasing Europe’s dependence on Iran’s gas resources are impressive. Russian gas. According to BP’s review, the country “TAP is open to new shareholders, has the world’s largest proven gas which can add strategic value to the reserves at 33.8 trillion cubic meters project,” Lisa Givert, TAP's (tcm). Russia's reserves are marginally communication head, told reporters in lower at 31.3 tcm. Shaban believes that Baku, commenting on the possible Iran will need to use alternative routes interest from Iran. The pipeline aims to to transport its gas to Europe. “The start transportation of gas from Nabucco-West pipeline with a capacity Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz II field in the of transporting 20 billion cubic meters Caspian Sea, one of the world’s largest of gas could be such an opportunity,” gas fields, in 2018-2019. The 870 the analyst said. kilometer (545 mile) pipeline will However, Tehran has already signaled connect to TANAP near the Turkish- through Deputy Oil Minister Ali Greek border at Kipoi, and cross Majedi that it is ready to supply gas to Greece, Albania and the Adriatic Sea Europe through Nabucco. Majedi stated before reaching southern Italy. “For that Iran was prepared to sign on as a any additional volumes that come on supplier and added that “two visiting stream, TAP will comply with the EU European delegations” had discussed regulation and relevant sanctions,” potential routes to bring Iranian gas to Givert said. Azerbaijan aims to Europe. transport 16 billion cubic meters (bcm) Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 15 April 2015 22

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani brought up the offer in a meeting with his Austrian counterpart Heinz Fischer in September on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. Rouhani told Fischer that “the Islamic Republic can be a reliable supplier of energy for Europe” and mentioned the Nabucco pipeline.

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 15 April 2015 23

KYRGYZSTAN MARKS FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF REVOLUTION Arslan Sabyrbekov

On April 7, Kyrgyzstan commemorated justice, to systematically tackle the fifth anniversary of its popular corruption and bring back the assets revolution that put an end to the highly stolen from the country. Indeed, none corrupt, criminalized and authoritarian of the high-ranking officials of the regime of the ousted President Bakiev regime accused of direct Kurmanbek Bakiev. Alongside a involvement in the killings during the number of high-ranking state officials, revolution are serving prison sentences. President Almazbek Atambayev took All are sentenced in absentia, including part in a solemn ceremony in Bishkek’s the former President himself, who is Central Square Ala-Too, at the site now residing in Belarus and leading a where nearly 100 demonstrators were comfortable life. His son Maxim shot dead by snipers on April 7, 2010. Bakiev, who has embezzled millions of In his emotional speech to the state funds, now resides in London. participants of the ceremony, President According to a recent journalistic Atambayev stated once again that his investigation by Global Witness, the predecessor established a highly corrupt son of the ousted President has regime, which robbed the whole purchased a house worth 3.5 million country and described the system of the GBP. Kyrgyzstan’s continuous demand day as “monstrous,” referring to a for their extradition has not been number of killings of politicians, successful. journalists and businessmen during The revolution’s anniversary was also Bakiev’s reign. The president went on met with other critical comments from to state that unlike a number of Arab political and expert circles. In the countries and most recently Ukraine, words of Edil Baysalov, former which have all toppled similar regimes, Minister for Social Development and Kyrgyzstan has in a short time an active participant of the April 2010 managed to recover and is “currently events, “after 5 years, the country’s on the right track of enhancing its ruling political elite have failed to keep democratic institutions, establishing their promises; the country still suffers justice and fighting corruption.” from widespread corruption, socio- Despite Atambayev’s positive remarks, economic challenges are growing, the ideals of the April 2010 Revolution commitments to establish are very far from being met. Even after parliamentary democracy with a the president’s speech, dozens of multiparty system have all been participants of the ceremony discredited.” Recent developments in demonstrated in front of the White the country tend to speak in favor of House accusing the regime of failing to these remarks. None of the political bring the perpetrators of bloodshed to parties, as driving forces behind a Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 15 April 2015 24

parliamentarian form of government, achievements of the past 5 years and have managed to evolve as formal the upcoming parliamentary elections institutions and continue to represent in the autumn will be a key test for the informal unions of individuals guided country’s further stability. by personal interests. The author writes in his personal Furthermore, the commitment to capacity. The views expressed are his address widespread corruption in the own and do not represent the views of aftermath of the April 2010 events the organization for which he works. features a selective rather than a systematic approach. Despite the arrest of a number of high-ranking officials, corruption remains present at all levels and the latest Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International clearly demonstrates this fact. Commenting on the anniversary of the April Revolution, the leader of the United Opposition Movement and MP Ravshan Jeenbekov noted that instead of carrying out democratic reforms, the country has on the contrary taken a big step back by adopting two controversial laws; one banning “gay propaganda;” another labelling foreign funded organizations as “foreign agents.” Both initiatives severely limit civil liberties and put the further development of civil society into great jeopardy. According to local civil society activists, this process of increasing authoritarianism is likely to flourish after Kyrgyzstan becomes a full-fledged member of the Moscow-led Eurasian integration project. Indeed, each anniversary of the April 2010 events generates public debate on whether the country has reached its ideals and where it is moving further. So far, one can name the downfall of family rule, prevention of a large-scale ethnic conflict and the overall socio- political stability as major