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A Chechen Al-Qaeda? Caucasian Groups Further Internationalise the Syrian Struggle

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A Chechen Al-Qaeda? Caucasian Groups Further Internationalise the Syrian Struggle Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik ments German Institute for International and Security Affairs m A Chechen al-Qaeda? Caucasian Groups Further Internationalise the Syrian Struggle Guido Steinberg Co SWP In April 2014 government forces defeated a rebel offensive in the north of the Syrian province of Latakia. Although they initially reached the coast, the insurgents were un- able to hold their positions there. The rebel forces included many Chechens and other Caucasians, who had previously been seen fighting exclusively in the Caucasus. Their strong presence in Syria is a completely new turn in international jihadism, and a warn- ing to be taken seriously, as many arrive from the Georgian, Turkish and European diasporas rather than from their original home republics. While their goal remains to “liberate” the Caucasus from Russian rule, they are now struggling to topple the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria and there is a risk that they will continue terrorist activity after returning to Turkey and Europe. The arrival of the Chechens in Syria makes a joint anti-terrorism strategy with Turkey even more urgent, and forces Western states to cooperate with Russian security agencies. The issue of Chechens fighting in jihadist almost exclusively to liberate their own movements has been debated for years. region from Russian rule. While “Chechens” fighting with the Taliban That has changed in the past two years. or the Afghan insurgency have featured Syria in 2014 has at least four different since the 1990s in the academic literature, insurgent formations led by Chechens and media and public discussion, convincing composed of Caucasians and other foreign evidence for these claims has never been fighters. All belong to the jihadist side of provided. Russian citizens from the Cau- the spectrum and together might account casus have occasionally been detained or for up to 1,500 fighters. The civil war in killed out of area, but these were never Syria therefore stands out as a reorientation ethnic Chechens. Instead it appears that of the hitherto strongly nationalist jihadism observers frequently confused Caucasians of the Caucasians, and its increasing with Central Asians, especially Uzbeks, integration into the transnational scene. who have at times been present in large That impression is confirmed by the con- numbers in Afghanistan and Pakistan and spicuous presence of Chechens in the Syrian also speak Russian. Until recently, Che- fighting. They have been involved in several chens and other Caucasians have fought spectacular and sometimes successful oper- Dr. Guido Steinberg is a Senior Associate in SWP’s Middle East and Africa Division SWP Comments 31 June 2014 1 ations against government forces. They latter quickly grew in strength as Basayev also appear to possess substantial military worked closely with the foreign fighters experience and frequently train other who flowed into the republic from 1995, foreign fighters, including many Euro- led by the Saudi Thamir al-Suwailim (alias peans. Only their fragmentation prevents Khattab or Ibn al-Khattab) until his death in them from playing an even larger role. 2002. In the years between the two Chechen wars Khattab set up training camps where Chechens and foreign fighters trained The Origins of Chechen Jihadism together and established the first jihadist The jihadists in Chechnya and the North groups. Caucasus are considerably weakened since When the Second Chechen War broke their heyday between 1995 and 2006, and out in 1999 the Islamists placed themselves their activities within Chechnya itself have at the forefront of the fighting, and the dwindled since the de facto end of the republic attracted young jihadists from Second Chechen War (about 2002). Their Arab countries, Turkey and Europe. But focus since then has shifted to neighbour- their numbers remained limited because ing republics where they regularly con- prior military training was a precondition ducted attacks, although much less fre- for joining the fight in the Caucasus. quently after 2010. Since 2007 the jihadists Despite their great professionalism the in the region have been led by the Islamic insurgents quickly came under pressure, Emirate of the Caucasus (or Imarat Kavkaz), and Khattab and numerous other leaders but this is no more than a loose alliance were killed. From 2002 Russian forces of individual local groups (referred to as succeeded in largely cutting off the rebels’ “jamaat” after the Arabic word for “group”). supply and escape routes in the south. The strongest and most influential of the Basayev and his supporters responded with jamaat is the Dagestani, which has for years devastating attacks within Russia itself. One been responsible for attacks on security of the worst was the hostage-taking in the forces, judges, civil servants, non-militant Dubrovka Theatre in Moscow in October religious scholars and supposed collabora- 2002, where more than 900 hostages were tors, and represents a serious threatens to taken and 130 died after the security forces the republic’s internal security. Caucasian pumped toxic gas into the building before jihadists also occasionally conduct deadly storming it. Even more dramatic was the headline-grabbing attacks on transport incident at a school in Beslan in North Osse- infrastructure (airports, railway stations, tia in September 2004, where the insur- trains and buses) outside their home region gents took about 1,100 adults and children in Russia proper. hostage. Three hundred of them, mostly The First Chechen War of 1994–96 was children, died when Russian security forces still largely a matter of Chechen national- stormed the building. ists seeking to force Russia to grant their By 2006 the Chechen uprising had been republic independence. But they accepted crushed and Russian forces and their local the assistance of foreign (above all Arab) allies controlled the republic. But by this jihadists, who regarded the struggle in point the armed struggle had already spread North Caucasus as part of a “holy war” to the neighbouring republics. Initially being fought wherever Muslim territory Ingushetia was most affected, but the focus was “occupied” by non-Muslims, and this of jihadist activity lay in Dagestan, where started to internationalise their struggle. the strongest sub-group of the Emirate The end of the war saw a power struggle still operates today. Doku Umarov (alias break out between the secular nationalist Abu Usman) founded and led the “Islamic President Aslan Maskhadov and the Islam- Emirate of the Caucasus” in an attempt to ists commanded by Shamil Basayev. The tighten coordination between independent- SWP Comments 31 June 2014 2 ly operating groups in Chechnya, Dages- The Jihadists tan, Kabardino-Balkaria and Ingushetia. The jihadists, whose strength is broadly Although his influence on the individual estimated at 10,000 to 30,000 fighters, com- groups appears to have been limited, prise only one part of the insurgency, but Umarov was nonetheless able to create the their influence has expanded since 2012. outward impression of leading a powerful What sets them apart from all other insur- organisation conducting attacks across the gent organisations is that they treat the war entire Caucasus and even in Russian cities. in Syria as only the first step in a larger con- After Umarov was killed in 2013, the Emir- flict that would continue after the fall of ate’s leadership appointed its religious Assad. They aspire to establish an Islamic thinker and sharia judge, the Dagestani state in Syria and carry the armed struggle Aliaskhab Kebekov (alias Abu Muhammad), to neighbouring Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq as his successor, but waited months before and Turkey, and ultimately attack Israel to confirming his death in March 2014, prob- “liberate Jerusalem”. Over and above those ably because of disagreements over the more obvious goals, many jihadists also succession. explicitly want to fight the Assad regime’s foreign supporters, of which Russia is second only to Iran. This motive is especially strong Chechens in the Syrian Insurgency among the Caucasian fighters and is one Caucasians have been identifiable partici- reason for their heavy presence. pants in the armed struggle against the Assad regime since mid-2012. Their first visible appearance in Aleppo in the sum- Conflict between Nusra Front and ISIS mer of 2012 coincided with shifts in the Although the Caucasians represent a strong structure of the Syrian rebel movement, contingent, the overwhelming majority of whose Islamist currents strengthened insurgents are Syrians, who are also strong- during the course of the year. In 2012, ly represented in the jihadist groups. If they jihadist groups in Syria became increas- wish to operate in Syria, Chechens must ingly powerful and prominent, and nu- therefore join Syrian organisations or work merous foreign fighters entered the coun- closely together with them. For this reason try. The Chechens and other Caucasians, hostility between the Nusra Front (and other like their compatriots from the Arab world insurgent groups) and the Islamic State in and Europe, almost without exception Iraq and Syria (ISIS) also led to polarisation joined the jihadists. among the Chechen groups within the The Syrian insurgency has no central country (see SWP Comments 19/2014). command, operating instead as a conglom- Fighting between the Nusra Front and erate of at least several dozen notable groups ISIS broke out at the end of 2013 and quick- of different size and strength. Despite con- ly affected all their main areas of opera- siderable ideological and strategic differ- tions in the north (Aleppo and Idlib), along ences, changing alliances and frequent the Euphrates Valley (Raqqa) and in the east splits, for a long time the rebels managed (Deir ez-Zor). Although the Nusra Front and to pursue their shared objective of toppling ISIS both emerged out of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Assad without serious infighting. Most esti- their conflict is also ideological. Whereas mates put the total number of insurgents at the Nusra Front cooperated with non- 80,000 to 100,000, including at least 8,000 jihadist groups and avoided unnecessary foreigners in early 2014.
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