Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

A Chechen al-Qaeda? Caucasian Groups Further Internationalise the Syrian Struggle

Guido Steinberg Co m mentsSWP

In April 2014 government forces defeated a rebel offensive in the north of the Syrian province of Latakia. Although they initially reached the coast, the insurgents were un- able to hold their positions there. The rebel forces included many Chechens and other Caucasians, who had previously been seen fighting exclusively in the Caucasus. Their strong presence in Syria is a completely new turn in international jihadism, and a warn- ing to be taken seriously, as many arrive from the Georgian, Turkish and European diasporas rather than from their original home republics. While their goal remains to “liberate” the Caucasus from Russian rule, they are now struggling to topple the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria and there is a risk that they will continue terrorist activity after returning to Turkey and Europe. The arrival of the Chechens in Syria makes a joint anti-terrorism strategy with Turkey even more urgent, and forces Western states to cooperate with Russian security agencies.

The issue of Chechens fighting in jihadist almost exclusively to liberate their own movements has been debated for years. region from Russian rule. While “Chechens” fighting with the Taliban That has changed in the past two years. or the Afghan insurgency have featured Syria in 2014 has at least four different since the 1990s in the academic literature, insurgent formations led by Chechens and media and public discussion, convincing composed of Caucasians and other foreign evidence for these claims has never been fighters. All belong to the jihadist side of provided. Russian citizens from the Cau- the spectrum and together might account casus have occasionally been detained or for up to 1,500 fighters. The civil war in killed out of area, but these were never Syria therefore stands out as a reorientation ethnic Chechens. Instead it appears that of the hitherto strongly nationalist jihadism observers frequently confused Caucasians of the Caucasians, and its increasing with Central Asians, especially Uzbeks, integration into the transnational scene. who have at times been present in large That impression is confirmed by the con- numbers in Afghanistan and Pakistan and spicuous presence of Chechens in the Syrian also speak Russian. Until recently, Che- fighting. They have been involved in several chens and other Caucasians have fought spectacular and sometimes successful oper-

Dr. Guido Steinberg is a Senior Associate in SWP’s Middle East and Africa Division SWP Comments 31 June 2014

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ations against government forces. They latter quickly grew in strength as Basayev also appear to possess substantial military worked closely with the foreign fighters experience and frequently train other who flowed into the republic from 1995, foreign fighters, including many Euro- led by the Saudi Thamir al-Suwailim (alias peans. Only their fragmentation prevents Khattab or Ibn al-Khattab) until his death in them from playing an even larger role. 2002. In the years between the two Chechen wars Khattab set up training camps where Chechens and foreign fighters trained The Origins of Chechen Jihadism together and established the first jihadist The jihadists in Chechnya and the North groups. Caucasus are considerably weakened since When the Second Chechen War broke their heyday between 1995 and 2006, and out in 1999 the Islamists placed themselves their activities within Chechnya itself have at the forefront of the fighting, and the dwindled since the de facto end of the republic attracted young jihadists from Second Chechen War (about 2002). Their Arab countries, Turkey and Europe. But focus since then has shifted to neighbour- their numbers remained limited because ing republics where they regularly con- prior military training was a precondition ducted attacks, although much less fre- for joining the fight in the Caucasus. quently after 2010. Since 2007 the jihadists Despite their great professionalism the in the region have been led by the Islamic insurgents quickly came under pressure, Emirate of the Caucasus (or Imarat Kavkaz), and Khattab and numerous other leaders but this is no more than a loose alliance were killed. From 2002 Russian forces of individual local groups (referred to as succeeded in largely cutting off the rebels’ “jamaat” after the Arabic word for “group”). supply and escape routes in the south. The strongest and most influential of the Basayev and his supporters responded with jamaat is the Dagestani, which has for years devastating attacks within Russia itself. One been responsible for attacks on security of the worst was the hostage-taking in the forces, judges, civil servants, non-militant Dubrovka Theatre in Moscow in October religious scholars and supposed collabora- 2002, where more than 900 hostages were tors, and represents a serious threatens to taken and 130 died after the security forces the republic’s internal security. Caucasian pumped toxic gas into the building before jihadists also occasionally conduct deadly storming it. Even more dramatic was the headline-grabbing attacks on transport incident at a school in Beslan in North Osse- infrastructure (airports, railway stations, tia in September 2004, where the insur- trains and buses) outside their home region gents took about 1,100 adults and children in Russia proper. hostage. Three hundred of them, mostly The First Chechen War of 1994–96 was children, died when Russian security forces still largely a matter of Chechen national- stormed the building. ists seeking to force Russia to grant their By 2006 the Chechen uprising had been republic independence. But they accepted crushed and Russian forces and their local the assistance of foreign (above all Arab) allies controlled the republic. But by this jihadists, who regarded the struggle in point the armed struggle had already spread North Caucasus as part of a “holy war” to the neighbouring republics. Initially being fought wherever Muslim territory Ingushetia was most affected, but the focus was “occupied” by non-Muslims, and this of jihadist activity lay in Dagestan, where started to internationalise their struggle. the strongest sub-group of the Emirate The end of the war saw a power struggle still operates today. Doku Umarov (alias break out between the secular nationalist Abu Usman) founded and led the “Islamic President Aslan Maskhadov and the Islam- Emirate of the Caucasus” in an attempt to ists commanded by Shamil Basayev. The tighten coordination between independent-

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ly operating groups in Chechnya, Dages- The Jihadists tan, Kabardino-Balkaria and Ingushetia. The jihadists, whose strength is broadly Although his influence on the individual estimated at 10,000 to 30,000 fighters, com- groups appears to have been limited, prise only one part of the insurgency, but Umarov was nonetheless able to create the their influence has expanded since 2012. outward impression of leading a powerful What sets them apart from all other insur- organisation conducting attacks across the gent organisations is that they treat the war entire Caucasus and even in Russian cities. in Syria as only the first step in a larger con- After Umarov was killed in 2013, the Emir- flict that would continue after the fall of ate’s leadership appointed its religious Assad. They aspire to establish an Islamic thinker and sharia judge, the Dagestani state in Syria and carry the armed struggle Aliaskhab Kebekov (alias Abu Muhammad), to neighbouring Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq as his successor, but waited months before and Turkey, and ultimately attack Israel to confirming his death in March 2014, prob- “liberate Jerusalem”. Over and above those ably because of disagreements over the more obvious goals, many jihadists also succession. explicitly want to fight the Assad regime’s foreign supporters, of which Russia is second only to Iran. This motive is especially strong Chechens in the Syrian Insurgency among the Caucasian fighters and is one Caucasians have been identifiable partici- reason for their heavy presence. pants in the armed struggle against the Assad regime since mid-2012. Their first visible appearance in Aleppo in the sum- Conflict between Nusra Front and ISIS mer of 2012 coincided with shifts in the Although the Caucasians represent a strong structure of the Syrian rebel movement, contingent, the overwhelming majority of whose Islamist currents strengthened insurgents are Syrians, who are also strong- during the course of the year. In 2012, ly represented in the jihadist groups. If they jihadist groups in Syria became increas- wish to operate in Syria, Chechens must ingly powerful and prominent, and nu- therefore join Syrian organisations or work merous foreign fighters entered the coun- closely together with them. For this reason try. The Chechens and other Caucasians, hostility between the Nusra Front (and other like their compatriots from the Arab world insurgent groups) and the Islamic State in and Europe, almost without exception Iraq and Syria (ISIS) also led to polarisation joined the jihadists. among the Chechen groups within the The Syrian insurgency has no central country (see SWP Comments 19/2014). command, operating instead as a conglom- Fighting between the Nusra Front and erate of at least several dozen notable groups ISIS broke out at the end of 2013 and quick- of different size and strength. Despite con- ly affected all their main areas of opera- siderable ideological and strategic differ- tions in the north (Aleppo and Idlib), along ences, changing alliances and frequent the Euphrates Valley (Raqqa) and in the east splits, for a long time the rebels managed (Deir ez-Zor). Although the Nusra Front and to pursue their shared objective of toppling ISIS both emerged out of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Assad without serious infighting. Most esti- their conflict is also ideological. Whereas mates put the total number of insurgents at the Nusra Front cooperated with non- 80,000 to 100,000, including at least 8,000 jihadist groups and avoided unnecessary foreigners in early 2014. Others put the violence, ISIS espoused a very much more number of foreigners at up to 17,000, most radical jihadist ideology and tolerated no of them Arabs. The largest non-Arab group deviation from “pure” Salafi-jihadi doc- is the Caucasians, who are said to number trine. From January 2014 the Islamic Front between several hundred and 1,500. (an alliance of non-jihadist Islamist and

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Salafist groups led by the Free Men of Syria and ISIS held the base until the end of [Ahrar al-Sham]) spearheaded a large-scale February 2014. offensive that drove many ISIS units back It was probably during the course of to the east of the country. these events or in the subsequent months that Abu Umar al-Shishani and the JMA joined ISIS. Abu Umar is then reported to Four Chechen Organisations have been appointed ISIS’s emir for northern The conflict between the two leading Syria, but without any real clarification jihadist currents forced the Chechens to of the extent of his actual authority over choose one or other, if only because most Syrian and Iraqi ISIS commanders there. of the Caucasians operated in the city and Consequently, like all ISIS units, Abu province of Aleppo and in Idlib, where the Umar’s formation also came under attack Nusra Front and ISIS were both strong. In by the Islamic Front in early 2014 and had summer 2013 the Caucasian forces frag- to retreat eastward towards Deir ez-Zor. It mented into four groups of different sizes. remains to be seen to what extent the ISIS One joined the Nusra Front, another ISIS. offensive in neighbouring Iraq in June The other two remained independent but 2014 will affect the strength of Abu Umar’s cooperated closely with the Nusra Front contingent in Syria. There is some evidence and Ahrar al-Sham. – like a picture of Abu Umar in a Humvee – that the group acquired Iraqi army equip- ment, which might prompt it to go on the The Army of Emigrants and Helpers offensive in Syria again. By far the best-known of the Chechen groups is the Army of Emigrants and Helpers (Jaish al-Muhajirin wa-l-Ansar), The JMA Split and the Islamic Emirate which joined forces with ISIS in summer of the Caucasus 2013. Its predecessor, called “the emi- Abu Umar’s organisation joining ISIS trig- grants” (al-Muhajirun) or “the emigrant gered a sharp conflict among the Chechen battalion” (Katibat al-Muhajirin), made its fighters in Syria. Salahuddin al-Shishani, first public appearance in September 2012 an important commander in Abu Umar’s during fighting in Aleppo. Its leader was force, left in November 2013 to lead a Abu Umar al-Shishani (originally Tarkhan rival group that also used the name Jaish Batirashvili), a member of the Chechen- al-Muhajirin wa-l-Ansar, but with the addi- related Kist minority from the Pankisi tion of “Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus”. Gorge in Georgia who remains to this day As the reason for the split, Salahuddin the best-known Caucasian fighter in Syria. cited the incompatibility of the oath of Abu Umar remained the group’s leader loyalty to ISIS with his earlier oath to the when it merged with a number of smaller Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus and its formations in March 2013 and henceforth leader Doku Umarov. Umarov had initially operated as Jaysh al-Muhajirin wa al-Ansar been very sceptical about the Caucasian (JMA or JAMWA). In the following months presence in Syria because he thought they the JMA fought with several hundred men should be fighting in their own countries. largely in the city and province of Aleppo, But in the course of spring 2013 Umarov concentrating on capturing Syrian army accepted that his resistance was futile and bases. Its greatest military success was the revised his position. As a result, the Cauca- capture of the Minnagh air base near Azaz sus Emirate websites started to celebrate on the Turkish border in August 2013, the Caucasian contribution in Syria and jointly with ISIS. The assault succeeded Umarov appointed JMA commander Sala- after the jihadists blew open one of the huddin al-Shishani to represent the Emir- entrances with a car bomb. The Chechens ate in Syria. In this way, Umarov and the

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Islamic Emirate plainly hoped to preserve towards the Turkish border, where in the their control over at least one section of the following months he operated jointly with Chechen fighters in Syria. the fourth Chechen group, the Soldiers All that is known about Salahuddin of Syria (Junud al-Sham). In November or al-Shishani is that like most probably all December 2013 Saifullah swore allegiance four leaders of the Chechen groups he is to the Nusra Front, but without renouncing a Kist from the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia. his close cooperation with Junud al-Sham. He is said to command several hundred On 6 February 2014, an attempt by the fighters and in early 2014 was operating Islamic Front, the Nusra Front and their two in the villages north of Aleppo. The JMA– allied Chechen groups to storm Aleppo’s Islamic Emirate cooperated closely with central prison was repulsed by government the Nusra Front in fighting against regime forces. Saifullah was killed in the fighting. forces, but refused to join operations against In February 2014 his successor Mohammed ISIS on the grounds that they had not come Khorasani confirmed the group’s allegiance to Syria to fight against “Muslims” (a dis- to the Nusra Front. tinction based on the ideological belief that all their other enemies in Syria were apostates or unbelievers). Nonetheless, the The Soldiers of Syria (Junud al-Sham) fighting between ISIS and its insurgent Junud al-Sham is the only Chechen group rivals caused great uncertainty within the that has been able to maintain its inde- JMA. A number of reports suggest that some pendence, despite frequently cooperating of its members broke away in 2014 to join with Nusra and the Islamic Front. It owes Abu Umar’s group in ISIS. its reputation largely to its leader Muslim Abu Walid (originally Muslim Margoshvili). Muslim Abu Walid stands out among The Saifullah Group in the Nusra Front Chechen commanders because he served as The second split from Abu Umar’s JMA a leader under the legendary jihadist field was the group led by Saifullah al-Shishani commander Khattab in the Second Chechen (originally Ruslan Machalikashvili), which War in the early 2000s. That he is not the joined forces with the Nusra Front at the uncontested leader of the Syrian Chechens end of 2013. despite that record could be connected to Saifullah, also a Kist, left the Pankisi his spell in prison in Russia between 2003 Gorge and Georgia for Turkey in 2001 or and 2005. His unusually quick release awak- 2002. He is reported to have been involved ened suspicions in jihadist circles that he in criminal activities in both countries. might have done a deal with the authori- After arriving in Syria in late 2012 or early ties. While that cannot be ruled out, he sub- 2013 he joined Abu Umar’s Muhajirin, sequently rejoined the jihadists fighting in where he quickly moved through the ranks Dagestan. of the organization to become Umar’s right Muslim always wanted to operate in hand man, as reflected by his prominence the North Caucasus, and from 2009 made in JMA videos. repeated efforts to find a way from Georgia In July/August 2013 Saifullah fell out to Chechnya. Only after all his efforts failed with Abu Umar and left the JMA with did he decide to go to Syria after the upris- several dozen followers. The main reason ing began there. Junud al-Sham’s headquar- for the conflict was a power struggle ters and area of operations are in the north between the two ambitious leaders, but of the coastal province of Latakia, in the Saifullah is also said to have protested mountains near the Turkish border. In against the extreme brutality of the new August 2013 the group joined an offensive ally ISIS. Saifullah appears to have pulled against Alawi villages in the coastal moun- back westwards from the Aleppo area tains, but their assault was repulsed. In

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spring 2014 the insurgents made another that – if they survive – they will return with attempt to penetrate the Alawi heartland profound knowledge of guerrilla warfare and reach the coast – operating from Turk- and terrorist methods. Theoretically this ish territory according to press reports. In poses the greatest danger to Russia, because the interim Muslim and his fighters were “liberating” the Caucasus from Russian rule also frequently in Aleppo and its northern is the uppermost objective for all Caucasian surroundings, where Junud al-Sham took fighters. But since 2002 the Russian Federa- part in the early February assault on the tion has been very successful in restricting prison in Aleppo. the influx of foreign fighters back home to Junud al-Sham is not a large group, with the Caucasus or elsewhere in its territory. the number of fighters probably not exceed- So it must be feared that most returnees ing the low hundreds. But there is evidence will travel to Turkey and their European that they – like the other Chechens – are countries of residence. especially well-trained. The Chechens (and The Syrian conflict also appears to be Uzbeks) enjoy a well-deserved reputation as leading the Caucasians to establish new the elite forces of the jihadist movement, and closer transnational contacts, as the because their first generation served in the Arab fighters in Afghanistan did in the Red Army and their fighters can draw on 1980s. There are numerous indications long experience in guerrilla warfare. that the Chechen groups in Syria are train- ing other foreigners, including Germans of different ethnic origins. The latter are A European Problem following a long tradition of sympathy for The Chechens in Syria represent a domes- Chechnya among German jihadists. Mo- tic security problem in Europe and Turkey, hammed Atta’s Hamburg cell that supplied because many of the fighters in the four three of the four pilots for the 9/11 attacks groups originate from the diaspora. Con- in 2001 initially intended to go and fight siderable numbers of those now in Syria in Chechnya rather than join al-Qaeda in come from Georgia and Turkey, but there Afghanistan. The multicultural centre in are also dozens from Austria and France Neu-Ulm, some of whose users went to fight and rather fewer from Belgium, Scandina- in the Caucasus, became the institutional via and Germany. centre of enthusiasm for the Chechen cause The numbers of Chechens in Europe in Germany. Two members of the Sauerland have grown substantially in recent years, in group jailed for a plot to attack the US air- particular in the aftermath of the Chechen base at Ramstein originated from this milieu. wars. In certain countries these diaspora They initially attempted to go to Chechnya, communities represent important recruit- gave up because they lacked the necessary ment pools for jihadist groups. The biggest military training, instead travelled to Paki- problem appears to exist in Austria, as more stan and later attempted to carry out an than half of the about 100 fighters from attack in Germany. that country in Syria are Chechen in origin. This longstanding tradition continues From France about 80 young Caucasian to this day. The first indication of close men are reported to have travelled to Syria, contacts between German jihadists and while the figures for Belgium and Scandi- Chechens in Syria was supplied by Denis navia appear to be smaller. In Germany Cuspert, a rapper from Berlin who convert- only isolated cases have been reported to ed to Islam and travelled to Syria to join the date, but the true figure could be higher insurgency. In December 2012 he released given that the Chechen jihadist scene in a video containing a jihad hymn (nasheed) Berlin is substantial and high-profile. Because entitled “Chichan” (Chechnya), describing the volunteers join highly trained Cauca- the Chechen jihadists as models to be sup- sian groups in Syria, it must be assumed ported. At this point he may already have

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been in contact with Junud al-Sham in More broadly, European governments Syria, with whom he probably trained. and security agencies must prepare for the It is still not properly clear what new dangers presented by the Chechen groups alliances are being forged in Syria, but the in Syria and their European friends. The historical parallels to Afghanistan are un- Chechen diaspora is still a largely unknown mistakable. There, in the 1980s, far from phenomenon in Europe and the fragmen- home, Arabs from across the Middle East tation of the groups in Syria makes it still met and established the transnational ties harder to adequately assess the threat. In that ultimately led to the emergence of order to identify possible dangers at an al-Qaeda. In Syria a similar process is under early stage, for example, speakers of the way, but this time there are about two numerous and difficult Caucasian lan- thousand Europeans and hundreds of Turks guages must be recruited. That may sound among the foreign fighters. a banal recommendation, but it is key when one considers the problems European secu-

rity agencies (and armed forces) experience © Stiftung Wissenschaft und Counter-measures with much more widely spoken languages Politik, 2014 When it comes to countering the Chechen like Uzbek, Pashto and Urdu. A more effec- All rights reserved jihadists, the same issues apply as for the tive sharing of tasks within Europe would These Comments reflect European jihadists: without the full cooper- be pertinent. solely the author’s views. ation of the Turkish political leadership Difficult decisions will also have to be SWP and security authorities it will be difficult made about which governments, police Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik for Europe to protect itself from the poten- forces and intelligence services to seek German Institute for tial danger. But in a throwback to its past cooperation with, and to what extent. In International and Security Affairs policy in the Chechen conflict, Turkey the first place this means Russia, whose tolerates the activities of Islamist terrorists agencies have always been awkward part- Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 on its territory. In the 1990s and early 2000s ners but are the only ones with long experi- 10719 Berlin Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 it turned a blind eye to foreign fighters ence in combating Caucasian militancy. Fax +49 30 880 07-100 moving through its territory to the Cauca- Indeed, while not attempting to offer an www.swp-berlin.org [email protected] sus and failed to respond when several excuse for its unscrupulous Syria policy, hundred Turks joined the fighting against Moscow was undeniably aware of the ISSN 1861-1761 the Russians. Although Ankara renounced emerging problem in Syria much earlier Translation by Meredith Dale that policy in 2004/2005, it is doing the than Western governments. Therefore, (English version of same again today with respect to Syria. while it would be remiss to exclude all and SWP-Aktuell 40/2014) Chechen groups use Turkey as a rear base any cooperation with Moscow, the bounds and receive support from the Chechen should be tightly drawn. On the other hand, diaspora there without state interference. there must be no cooperation with the The Turkish government apparently believes regime of Bashar al-Assad, however long it can instrumentalise jihadist groups for he may survive. If Europe wishes to retain its own purposes, such as toppling Assad a last shred of credibility on Syria, after all and suppressing Syrian Kurdish currents that has happened during the past three close to the PKK. years, overtures to Damascus are out of the Ankara’s support for Chechen and other question. foreign jihadists, despite clear warnings from its European partners, endangers internal security within Turkey itself and in Europe. Germany and Europe must therefore work to convince the Turkish political leadership to refrain from aiding terrorist organisations and to improve co- operation with European partners.

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