sign in sign up
<<
Home , Alexander Litvinenko, Aliaskhab Kebekov, Chechen diaspora, Dokka Umarov, Gimry, Gulmurod Khalimov

HOMO JIHADICUS in the former USSR and the phenomenon of the post-Soviet militants in and

Maciej Falkowski, Józef Lang WARSAW SEPTEMBER 2015

HOMO JIHADICUS Islam in the former USSR and the phenomenon of the post-Soviet militants in Syria and Iraq

Maciej Falkowski, Józef Lang © Copyright by Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia Centre for Eastern Studies

CONTENT EDITORS Adam Eberhardt, Krzysztof Strachota

EDITOR Halina Kowalczyk

Co-operation Katarzyna Kazimierska, Anna Łabuszewska

TRANSLATION Józef Lang

Co-operation Nicholas Furnival

Graphic design Para-buch

IllustraTion on cover Józef Lang dTP GroupMedia

MAPS Wojciech Mańkowski

PUBLISHER Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia Centre for Eastern Studies ul. Koszykowa 6a, Warsaw Tel. + 48 /22/ 525 80 00 Fax: + 48 /22/ 525 80 40 osw.waw.pl

ISBN 978-83-62936-70-0 Contents

Key points /5

Introduction /8

I. From the return to faith to : Salafism and militant Islam in the post-Soviet area /11 1. Soviet and post-Soviet Islam /11 2. Salafism in the post-Soviet area /15 3. Militant Islam after the fall of the USSR /19

II. Origins of the influx of volunteers to Syria /26 1. Ideological reasons /27 2. Exceptionality of Syria in the Muslim perception /29 3. Jihadist propaganda /30 4. Political reasons in the countries of origin /31 5. Solidarity with co-believers and religious duty /31 6. Personal motivations. Social causes /33 7. War as a way of life /35

III. Profile of the Post-Soviet militants in Syria and Iraq /37 1. size and ethnic composition /37 2. Main groups and leaders /41 3. Role in the ecosystem of jihad /48

IV. Methods of operation of the post-Soviet militants in Syria and Iraq /53 1. Recruitment and arrival /53 2. Combat /57 3. Other areas of operation /61

V. The influence of war migration on the post-Soviet area – Jihad in the and threats for the region /65

VI. Actual Islam-related challenges in the post-Soviet area /73 1. Northern /73 2. /78 3. /82 4. /86 5. /88 6. /90 7. /92 8. /95 9. Crimea /96 10. Volga region /99 11. Other regions /101

Conclusions /103

MAPS /105 3. 2. 1. points Key Jihadi volunteers for the Middle East (and the likelihood that they will not will they that likelihood (and the volunteers East Middle forJihadi the of departures the post-Soviet short-termof the the perspective in states, media and governments by the disseminated forecasts alarmist Despite the zone. ,the and conflict of theaccessease to Asia Central finally and the between and Syria and Caucasus the between ties close the for Islam, – has Levant more the broadly –and Syria on-line), meaning (mainly ists special the by Jihad propaganda large-scale including: important, also are factors Other Azerbaijan. and states, Asian the Central in primarily Salafists, against repressions and of origin countries the in poor socio-economic situation the The leave to by decisions aided Syria. are in war of the durable character the (closely Spring followed Arab post-Soviet by the by the sparked and ) East Middle the events in by the caused directly being are The departures professed of the ideas. name the in borders its beyond join jihad and ready leave to country but also is his Ummah, global Homo jihadicus became part, viet identity.element of their Homo sovieticus main the form became radical its in for Islam which them, within group of creation aspecific led USSR, the to collapse of the the after underwent Muslims which changes ideological and economic, social deep political, The Islam. local of the globalisation and internationalisation the as well as Islam, militant and of Salafism growth the post-Soviet primarily the area: in Islam place inside taking changes dynamic the in roots have their East Middle the to former USSR states the from migration war The of causes the ecosystem. jihad local role the in play important and an own of their have commanders strong, hundred up often to several ones, are own which their create or groups they militant local join They the states. either Soviet thepost- offrom foreign fighters thousands several are of there Iraq, extent alesser to and of Syria, territory on the Currently Caucasus. of the case the in visible phenomenon. becomeparticularly is it amass This has that Syria in However, war civil ). the and it during only is in fighting militants Asian Central the been (it mainly borders states’ has their outside of conflicts armed in haveformer USSR states participated from emigrants time Muslim first not is the This militants. ofers” Islamic „export global Western have , and become one main of the Africa North East, Middle of the countries the The post-Soviet along with area, – who not only identifies himself with the with –whohimself not identifies only , without fully eradicating his So his eradicating fully , without - - -

5 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 6 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 4. 5. years, is symptomatic. is years, recent during stability a relative contributed to establishing to Syria cruits of re stream of the shift and of some militants of the departure where the Caucasus, Northern of authorities. The the of case the interests the with phenomenon This de is facto individuals. mostradical of the exodus the is result its since of origin, countries the stabilising is return) demands of the radicals. of the demands of the critical rather are which societies, countries’ their from inside port count on sup wide cannot Jihadists returning the etc). Furthermore, , , (, regimes Eastern Middle the butstates, rather notor is one former Russia USSR of the Jihadists international enemy of the collapse ofmain onethe post-Soviet of finally, the not is and, evident, states of perspective the years, coming over the East Middle the in situation the impossible it to stabilise seems likely: from far seems scenario ever, this at Currently, present. how than more dangerous them make could gained, they which terrorism international with contacts and experience the while would return, indeed or Russia). some militants of mean could the stan This one post-Soviet in of the (for occur states Uzbeki example destabilisation serious should only increase can East Middle the in jihad in USSR countries of former of citizens participation the to related challenges The security Asia. for Central threat Afghan the and IMU of the case the in been itas has West), the with relations its or just states, in particular with ties security need of power closer playgeopolitical the (for by Moscow example justify to or opposition) to combat in rights the and civil limit to excuse (aspolitics an internal both in factor ascare authorities as by the utilised certainly be will abroad fighting of issue militants the of this, Regardless materialised. never it has raised, being constantly is returning of them possibility the that fact Despite the jihad. global joined the where they stan’s Waziristan, on later Paki to and Afghanistan, to 2000’s Asia Central from migrated of (IMU), 1990’s Movement who turn of Islamic at Uzbekistan the the and of militants phenomenon the are this The precedent illustrates which that. implies exactly them with Syria to families their taking who are militants of numbers world. Muslim Increasing the in hotspot move on another to rather will but homeland, their to notreturn will they end, to conflict the –even were migration it leaving, apermanent of is for those amajor part show, long-term either. signs the in at Many perspective, least area that post-Soviet the in threats security in lead to a rise not necessarily will Iraq and Syria in phenomenonThe jihad ofto the impact of volunteers departing in accordance accordance in - - - - - 6.

within them. regionally also but countries, particular notbetween only vary nificantly problems, one sig Islam-related of which and many area, this in reality socio-political of phenomenon the part aminute –only ever, amarginal It is,how dimension. security the in aproblem, including does constitute radicalism post-Soviet of the Islamic states, all almost In region. Asian tral Cen of the case the in especially ground, on the reality the proven match to utility, have never political been their and gain they attention media the post-Soviet despite the in area, radicalism Islamic regarding forecasts cal The apocalypti in particular. Islam militant and Salafism with associated those and general, in former USSR states the in threat Islamic the gerating exag in consists trend This Iraq. in Syria in jihad to volunteers travelling from stemming post-Soviet threat on to overplay the focused the area ports re analytical the as well as media the and politics both present is in which region’s the in trend (and beyondregion) countries the acurrent There is ------

7 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 8 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 establishment of separate militant groups. militant of separate establishment the through is itself it one which expresses way and in states, Muslim other of volunteers those from the from distinguishable acommunity create states, the USSRformer in Salafis the with as These example. militants, a further as serve can itself Iraq and phenomenon Syria in of post-Soviet militants The flowoccurs. people,information of aconstant and which inside ideas code, and cultural asimilar and language Russian of the community on the is based the states, USSR which former from network of Salafis informal an of existence the in seen be can of sub-region. Proof this civilisational and cal geopoliti adistinctive viewed be as still post-Soviet can the area that mean etc.), informational Russia’s in USSRmer states (political, field influence of the for all of forms, various the in presence, and ethnicities, different tween be franca alingua common heritage, as Soviet usage the of Russian immense The countries. Muslim other from militants post-Soviet the the and states volunteers the from between appropriate adistinction it draw to seems this, Despite diametrically. times at differs, republics former Soviet ation the in situ the of USSR and fall the since passed has of acentury aquarter Almost formerUnion. Soviet the in of situation Islam on the reflection at attempt ageneral an as well as phenomenon jihad, to travels of the of adescription the publication both is Therefore issue. this this with sociated as challenges post-Soviet the the in and states, radicalism, Islamic including Islam, with situation the overall as is necessary, as well classified be should they which within and from, originate they background political and ligious re social, of the post-Soviet examination A itclose which to the poses area. threats actual the verify to and phenomenon the analysed being understand to East Middle the in active groups It militant not is enoughthe simply to describe etc. methods cruitment re Syria, to of getting means routes formations, and position militant of the com ethnic and size about the leaders, data units, particular with dealing part adescriptive contains also The from. report originate militants these which probable the consequences states for as the well as scale and enon, forms its above of phenom the origin the is State. The of subject analysis Islamic ing includ formations, Jihadi of various on behalf war civil the in participate they where Iraq, and Volga Syria to the Crimea) Asia, Azerbaijan, region, Central of post-Soviet volunteers (the the Caucasus, from area involves departure the aphenomenon which 2011 since underway examine to is report of this The aim I ntroduction ------law and an 18 an law and Islamic of the of school interpretation historic existing acurrently is habism Wah reality ). In with also in some regions Islam, and folk official the with (associated Islam” “traditional so-called opposition in the to juxtaposed often is It Salafism. one), official the to not related form ofespecially Islam any means this (in practice independentIslam any stigmatise to propaganda in utilised is The not is term used. post-Soviet on Islam, the tion in discourse negative “”, connota ahighly term the has which report this In state). Islamic an establishing to equates this (in mostcases goals political orderachieve to in professed of the faith, name the in struggle Militant Islam/ overlap. oftentimes contemporary two the hence Islam, movements Salafi to fundamentalist of many roots the track it possible is to , of Sunni case the In Islam. Shia and Sunni in present is both fundamentalism Islamic Koran. on the system legal the basing as well as state Islamic an notion encompasses ofones the creating and secular over have priority factors It religious holds that westernisation. and ernisation to mod West, world’s reaction Muslim the it Muslims’ the is ter with contacts I state). Islamic an of the establishment for conflict, of armed means by including one (the struggle, militant and a political as well life) as religious the concentrated on communities (Salafi character peaceful and apolitical an and havephenomenon heterogeneous: is both can current very it as a Salafism don’t . which or the Koran traditions the tion of in have those abasis arejec and legalism of far-reaching it roots, consists the to for areturn calls Salafism existence. decades of first its the in practiced one was i.e. which the I Salafi ones are: mostimportant the Amongst ofsituation Islam. of the aspects various the to describe report this in used be will which tions defini stipulative need introduce to the create , of this currents ern mod the publications regarding academic the present in terms of the biguity am and multitude the as well as complexity of and Islam, The characteristics literations from the original with included translation. In case of the militants militants of the case In translation. included with original the from literations trans be will report the in appearing organisations of and groups The names for Saudi Arabia. slamic fundamentalism slamic – a religious current in inspired by the “pure” Islam, “pure” by the Islam, inspired Islam Sunni in current –areligious slam th century socio-religious movement which laid the foundations foundations the laid which movement socio-religious century – pursuing an armed and/or terrorist and/or armed terrorist an Islamic –pursuing radicalism – a political current in Islam which came to life af life to came which Islam in current –apolitical ------

9 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 10 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 subsequent verification difficult. verification subsequent their makes of often which – all prior registration some of require which rums, on blocked or fo embedded being are addresses, Internet their change often character, due their to materials, The latter themselves. post-Soviet militants the produced by the materials conductedauthors,to by studies field and cies news agen from presspublications, materials through reports, analytical and research of academic sources: from on abroad-spectrum based is The report kunya (: guerre de nom their leaders, their as as Iraq,well and in Syria fighting ) will be used and, if possible, their actual names will be provided. be will names actual possible, if their and, used be ) will - - practices Islamic authorities were not liquidating capableThe ofcommunist fully institutions. for religious typical purposes the serve not did thus they and communities control to role Muslim was main Their apparatus. security the by surveillance constant were under and state the with associated closely 3 2 1 exist did institutions Islamic evenit combated. Official was some periods during and obstructed was Islam Union Soviet practising the In 1. of Islam. name the in struggle armed in readyand to participate experience combat significant possessing milieus entire and generated which individuals Islam, of militant foundation, and ical ideologthe necessary created which of Salafism, rise Iraq:the and dus Syria to phenomenon the exo of the understanding keyto post-Soviet are the in Islam Two currents. tendencies,and ideas processes new Islamic the between clash process of the turbulent the community. activated Muslim This global of the apart post-Soviet became once the again in area living Muslims life, Islamic global from of decades separation After life. engagedwere actively political in which those groups, including and currents organisations, Islamic numerous of creation the to etc,but also practices of spread religious devout the Muslims, of number the in led took not place arise which to only there, life of religious The USSR. rapid collapse of post-Soviet the revival followingthe the in area took place which of Islam growth dynamic the in lie Iraq and Syria to states the of USSR former volunteersfrom influx mass of the reasons The primary I religious education religious of changes), system the dynamic completely to goingwas through dismantle world Union’sSoviet Islamic (which the of rest between the the and Muslims

. S and m and Fro for and Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan. and Asia for Central in and Caucasus South for the Baku in Caucasus, Northern for the in Siberia, and USSR of the part European for Ufa the –in of Muslims Boards Spiritual or the Uzbek part of the Fergana Valley. Fergana of the part Uzbek or the in Tajikistan areas rural the in Islam or brotherhoods Sufi Chechen the include ofples this Exam USSR. of the existence entire the during secret in practised was Islam areas some In Central Asia only one madrasa in all of the USSR existed (the Mir-i Arab madrassa in in madrassa Arab Mir-i (the existed USSR of the all in madrasa one only Asia Central In liquidated. was education Islamic of system the USSR the In importance. of significant it was framework, legal acomplete also constitutes areligion as which of Islam, case the In oviet post- and the return to f return m the 2 , but their fight against Islam was effective enough to sever the ties the effective enough sever to was Islam fight , butagainst their ilitant I ilitant 3 and to hinder public religious practices. All of this led to of this All practices. public religious hinder to and S oviet I sla slam in the post- the m in aith to jihad: S to jihad: aith S oviet area ala 1 , but they were, but they f is m - - - 11 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 12 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 Christians”, for example ethnic Armenians or Russians) Armenians for ethnic example Christians”, “cultural to post-Soviet followers on (similarly the the ofamongst area Islam dominant are Muslims knowledge. Despite cultural Islam’s intensive growth, anyreligious possess or Islam they practise of whether regardless definition, or Turkmens) by Muslims Azerbaijanis as (for groups nic Kazakhs, example eth self-perception and representatives of perception of particular the – the ethnicity with the professed identification faith of Its the essence is existence. USSR’s the formed during which Islam, cultural is form ofThe active Islam least fundamentalism. Islamic the and fism Su Islam, official folk Islam, Islam, post-Soviet cultural the present in area: of Islam on, later it possiblefollowingcurrents/forms is isolate to the scribed de are which Islam militant and groups).and/or Salafism terrorist from Aside militant brotherhoods, Sufi organisations, social communities, Salafi parties, political of Muslims, Boards Spiritual so-called the (amongst them institutions andgroups currents, Islamic development conflicting, often ofallel various, par and creation it simultaneous former USSR states, led the to the in religion of new,adapt the to renaissance general post-Soviet the reality. Combined with were forced to preachers and new followers adherents evolved, and their while (forgained Sufism) example currents Islamic “traditional” century. Also tieth world for Islamic twen mostof the were present in the which disputes logical ideo post-Soviet the the to it imported area span time ashort In etc. erature lit religious of foreign influx the enabled abroad, centres educational Islamic it USSR made possible in of customs). the study to and The fall traditions cal old lo the to referred also (but often inspiration for external searched which unintellectual Islam, yet not one lacking ritual, thought this is often limited to to limited often is thought this ritual, yet not one Islam, lacking unintellectual an is Islam aalso continuationIslam. Folk of Soviet are Islam Folk official and 4 a They form. to constituted government independentofstarting the stitutions in Islamic society, Soviet of first the led the to deep crisis the and restroika, influence of Pe the USSR, of the fall context of the These the conditions in traditions. folk/cultural as some only survived of which customs, former religious ofa reduction the

de Gender and Belonging, Hampshire 2007, pp. 2007, 141-165. Hampshire Belonging, and Gender Diaspora, Identities. of Muslim Geographies Mei-Po Kwan, Hopkins, Peter Aitchison, Cara Khalid, Islam after Communism. Religion and Politics in Central Asia, Berkeley 2007, p. 110. p. 2007, 110. Berkeley Asia, Central in Politics and Religion Communism. after Islam Khalid, Adeeb clerics. than officials state being as viewed be rather should alumni but its ),

facto new, non-traditional (in the Soviet understanding) kind of Islam, of Islam, kind new, understanding) Soviet (in the non-traditional 4 . ------Central Asia), YasawiyaCentral Asia) Kubrawiya (Central and (), (, Naqshbandi Qadiriyya are: former USSR area the in active Sufi orders most important the Amongst Tajikistan. Valley and Fergana the Kazakhstan, southern Dagestan, developed Chechnya, well in particularly is Sufism life. political the in participated traditionally and structure social elementthe of important an Sufi were Additionally,orders the God. and man between intermediaries leaders, who as act spiritual and of tradition portance im the as well as of God, discovery need of anon-rational, the sises mystical empha Sufi orders. Sufism of the activities by the expressed It externally is thepost-Soviet in area. present also is – Islam in current –a mystical Sufism 7 6 5 worship sic religious form of Muslim ba the was folk holy Islam of Soviet cult sites In etc. pork, the eating not holidays, Muslim circumcision, most important the celebrating as such and commandments, customs religious of particular practice unreflective the post-Soviet area. Its first occurrence was the establishment of the Islamic Islamic the of the establishment was occurrence post-Soviet Its first area. the in itself established also has Islam engaged,Politically fundamentalist forms of Islam independent from them, especially towards Salafism towards especially them, independentfrom offorms Islam any towards hostile usually are Islam Theerhoods. representatives of official Sufi broth by the dominated are institutions these Caucasus Northern of the part eastern the in while board, governed same by the formally are munities com Shia and Sunni both Azerbaijan) and (for Georgia countries in example some In of Islam. or current branch aparticular to belonging than rather ties, state the authori relation to subservient its is Islam The essencesia. of official Rus Tsarist USSR and the in functioned which institutions of similar heirs the are they or Kyrgyzstan); (for of Georgia of Muslims” example Dagestan, Boards “Spiritual called are latter). these post-Sovietcontrolled by the the In settings institutionally and even authorities (and created often is state the with linked apparatus, clerical Muslim propagated official by the Islam It the own. its is base of an intellectual isa with more complexIslam Islam, of form Official prayers in etc. participation more , to frequent pilgrimage the attending of possibility for elements, the example some evolution additional gained and

Ibid. of-Sufism-in-Chechnya.pdf pp. 42-62, and http://www.caucasus-survey.org/vol1-no2/downloads/The-politicization- York New 2007, Asia, Central Post-Soviet in Islam Louw, Everyday Elisabeth Maria Np. http://www.zakon.kz/4577601-agentstvo-po-delam-religii-rk-kto-takie.html 5 . After the fall of the USSR it of undergo did the fall the . After 7 . 6 . ------13 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 14 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 forcefully liquidated it liquidated forcefully authorities ultimately the and threat serious viewed as was organisation the titution). Despite Adolat’s authorities, holdthe to attempts negotiations with alcoholismand pros (thewith fight rules basic complianceforcing with public restore to order by en tried level and local took power over at the the Adolat (Justice) organisation Islamist 1990, Valley when in the Fergana of the Uzbek part the events in the include also fundamentalism ofrences Islamic bership in it punishable in is bership mem and it illegal is Georgia and except for but nities, everywhere ut-Tahrir Hizb commu Muslim area amongst enjoys considerable popularity area is the activity of the Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT – Liberation Party) organisation ut-Tahrir Hizb of the Party) –Liberation activity (HT the is area post-Soviet the in fundamentalism of Islamic occurrence main the Currently headquarters was located in (currently in Beirut) in London located (currently in was headquarters its of time period Union United for States, extended and and European an the inside legally it functions that fact the in seen be can as spectrum, political the within fit methods its as well as itself organisation the radical, rather being of use violence. ut-Tahir’s Hizb the Despite the decries which liphate and goal Ca the re-establish to is whose aim party ut-TahrirHizb apolitical formally is 12 11 10 9 8 formative experience important an it of was members its many role, not did playyet significant itself for any IRP the period later the In sharia. with legislation synchronise to was goal The party’s main Astrakhan. in 1990 June in intellectuals of Muslim Soviet summit (IRP) at the Party Renaissance of them (usually during their stay in prison) becoming radicalised and joining joining and radicalised becoming prison) in stay their during (usually of them

http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/info/ http://anhor.uz/society/v-uzbekistane-raskrili-religiozno-ekstremistskuyu-organizaci

starts-khujand yu-hizb-ut-tahrir or http://news.tj/en/news/trial-seven-alleged-hizb-ut-tahrir-activists- litical and yet actively pursues influence among the political elite). political the among influence pursues yetactively and litical apo it is declares which Kyrgyzstan in Jamaat Tablighi (for example of operations area ed limit have or Hijrah) wal Takfir (for role example amarginal play organisations The other taking place after the fall of the . Union. Soviet of the fall the after place taking processes political the in role active an play did Kebekov) Magomed and an’s brothers Abbas Dagest example (for activists individual and IRP) Tajik the all of (first branches of its Some społecznej genezy zjawiska, Wrocław 2006, p. 80. 2006, Wrocław zjawiska, genezy społecznej Problem Centralnej. wAzji islam” „Walczący Zapaśnik, Stanisław in: More followers. its of repressions brutal including force, by of Adolat liquidation ordered he position, his ened strength he as soon as and of Islam, role rising the by intimidated was Uzbekistan, pendent of inde president the already Karimov, 1991. December in place took Themeeting thority). au Karimov’s recognising while (all country of the rest the to of experience transfer the propose to and on sharia based order public establishing in achievements their him show to Karimov Islam SSR Uzbek of the leader then the 1991 April in invited Adolat’s leaders 9 . 12 . The persecutions of HT members result in many many in result members of HT . The persecutions 11 . In the post-Soviet the . In 8 . The occur 10 ------. post-Soviet societies, the lack of a real and available religious alternative religious available and ofpost-Soviet areal lack the societies, of the crisis identity the factors: social by several facilitated also was growth Salafism’s on Salafism. simple information and access the to fast edge, also and knowl religious necessary the possessing educatedleaders ligious and abroad world, emergence of re the Islamic the with area of this reintegration a partial possible thefactors: post-Soviet was in duearea several to ofThe Salafism rise 17 16 15 14 13 Islam folk traditional the both with conflict it in is post-Soviet similarly and states, the viewedtheis negatively authorities of by or even hostilely fer to. Salafism re theSalafis which Islam, theprimary pure, to i.e. superfluities traditions, rejection as a of Hadith),and as well the Koran by justified be must actions (all legalism and puritanism far-reaching include characteristics its Islam, Sunni inside current post-Sovietextreme It an the is in area. of independentIslam current growing the most dynamically and important the most is Salafism 2. organisations Islamic of militant ranks the properly in the post-Soviet reality. It is also important to bear in mind how mind in bear to post-Sovietproperly the important in reality. It also is society, and of function of state which neither mechanisms the of substituting It a form is inspiration. external of an than authentic considerations, rather and processes social internal the of result therefore a is Post-Soviet Salafism remedy forthesesome problems. instant of an as works Salafism communities, local small and level authorities. of At of the individual corruption the and tice injusthe finally, and, state of the weakness the poor socio-economic situation, towards Hizb ut-Tahrir, as it criticises jihad and uses peaceful methods ut-Tahrir, Hizb peaceful uses and towards jihad it as criticises

S http://www.jundurrahmon.com/jundulloh_filmlar/rus_tili/obrashenie_1.avi at: 1, available Obrashcheniya release IMU’s in Yuldashev of Tahir on statements Based Afandi Chirkawi in August 2012. 2012. August in Chirkawi Afandi Said Sufi of the the For example Dagestan. in seen be can attacks) rorist ter and violence of the form in (often conflict severe extremely Islam, Sufi with of all First grimages to Mecca (the cost of the pilgrimage reach several thousand dollars). dollars). thousand several reach pilgrimage of the cost (the Mecca to grimages pil the organising with linked corruption the and groups of independent surveillance da, propagan anti-Salafist in engaged are institutions Islamic official the that means settings post-Soviet in which the authorities, of control strict the under remains still Islam Official Official Islamic institutions, endorsed by the authorities, exist in all the former USSR states. states. USSR the former all in exist the authorities, by endorsed institutions, Islamic Official biz/index.php/filmlar http://www.jundurrahmon. at: available IMU, the by published on materials Based IMU. the joined they released being After of this. proof as serve can for that sentences prison served and ut-Tahrir members Hizb where who formerly members, IMU of the Statements alafism in thepost- in alafism 15 and official Islam official and 16 . S oviet area 13 which paradoxically are hostile hostile are paradoxically which 14 . 17 , the , the ------15 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 16 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 there are still a minority amongst the local Muslims) Salafi organisations and organisations Salafi Muslims) local the amongst aminority still are there they though communities (even mosques). Salafi are where there cities In pray places at they homes mosques, other Sunni in (more rarely, Hanafi, in 20 19 18 ofsity jihad neces for Koran the the setin do requirements not meet the settings current aduty, is the hold jihad hold majority Emirate) that the that Caucasus while the as such organisations, militant around (concentrated post-Sovietof the Salafists “folkSalafism”. Some theso-called and view the on jihad Salafists: sation of the systemati of criteria main two derive only can One Salafists. are villagers and poor, agglomerations uneducated and the urban of residents and large wealthy and the educated both – exists Salafist profile ofa social single No Salafists. viet post-So diverse and divided internally among the rifts one main is ofjihad the viewarmed the on – militancy into translate does not automatically Salafism do exist. themselves followers who leaders leadership, gather around although movement movement.multi-sided asingle without It religious agrassroots is and amorphous, decentralised an constitutes post-Soviet Salafism the In area worldwide Europe). in (including Salafism’s in importance rise ageneral in such). as results This treated be can post-Soviet all Muslims (almost faith to returning for individuals and converts is Islam) themost orthodox pure, viewedas is often (which Salafism attractive regions where they dominate they where regions afew post-Soviet are but the amongst there Muslims, aminority them makes people. This thousand hundred several at around however estimated be it can thepost-Soviet in area, of Salafists number exact pinpoint to the It hard is waging jihad. of supporters be can educated folk Salafists and both –for example exist variations many since exact, are criteria ofNeither these etc.), aspects. not ankles on and theological its not the covering trousers beard, (long of Salafism signs external on the focused above all are sion. Its adherents dimen theintellectual lacking and is superficial which fied version Salafism, of profess simpli a Salafists folk community),theso-called Salafi the ones within their religious knowledge religious their thepost-Soviet enrich to in area), try and of ofguage communication Salafists lan the is are Russian fluent in (which some post-Soviet ofWhile the Salafists

Some areas of Dagestan, Gorge in Georgia. in Gorge Pankisi of Dagestan, areas Some Jihad in Syria is different in this regard – see chapter II. chapter see – regard this in different is Syria in Jihad For example: http://salaf-forum.com/ 18 . The second criterion is the degree of knowledge of Salafism itself. of knowledgeitself. degree . The the is second of criterion Salafism 19 and actively engage in ideological disputes (including (including engage actively disputes ideological and in 20 . In such regions Salafists often have their own own havetheir often Salafists regions such . In ------tion from the authorities – in Ukraine (Crimean Tatars) (Crimean Ukraine authorities –in the tion from a negative with reac not meet does Salafism region of the states two in Only the above actions on the international arena international on the above actions the of all andto legitimise grip society on afirm position, combat opposition, retain their strengthen to states of governments these by the utilised instrumentally being is Islam radical from stemming of issue threats the that mind in bear to important It also is by them. undertaken being activity terrorist in even results this Kazakhstan) times in (for example At communities. Salafi isation of entire radical the cause they Salafists, potential of discouraging instead desired: those opposite to lead results to Gorge). authorities usually the from The persecutions 25 24 23 22 21 to proselytise new technologies more young people are (there whose among Salafists), followers actively utilise movementgrowing is a dynamically Salafism numbers, spite small relatively De manner. informal in a more act Salafists cities other –in Makhachkala and include Moscow, of Salafism Suchcentres active. St. Petersburg are institutions Salafists are persecuted with mixed intensity as potential/alleged terrorists potential/alleged as intensity mixed with persecuted are Salafists Turkmenistan) Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, by law, Kazakhstan, (Russia, others in is generally negative. In some countries (Tajikistan, Uzbekistan) negative. (Tajikistan, some In countries generally is thepost-Soviet in area of Salafism authoritiesoccurrences to ofThe the reaction

them migrating (for example the emigration of 200 Salafists to the Czech theCzech to of Salafists 200 (foremigration the example migrating them law-enforcement local exploits ofofficers). the the merely in resulted This or policy state planned it whether was determine to authorities (it hard is the from persecution to subject were Salafists Kazakh visible. are Dagestan from Salafists the with where ties part, western its also and country the thesouth of in Kazakhstan, in burgeoning was Salafism quences of this. the conse as of as the well authorities, by taken dueto actions of Salafists process of of radicalisation the illustration a vivid as serve 2012 and 2011 in took Kazakhstan place in that attacks The of unprecedented terrorist series T some Salafi publishing houses exist, for example: http://www.ummah.ru example: for exist, houses publishing Salafi some Even etc. http://vk.com/salafteam) and http://vk.com/club10146481 (for example media For example Salafi internet sites, such as: http://salafportal.ws/ or http:// as: http://salafportal.ws/ such sites, internet Salafi For example For example: http://tajikta.tj/news/detail.php?ID=6108 See the box below “The radicalisation of Salafists in Kazakhstan”. Kazakhstan”. in of Salafists radicalisation “The below box the See It is especially true in the case of Uzbekistan. of Uzbekistan. case the in true It especially is The situation has changed diametrically after the of Crimea by Russia. Russia. by of Crimea annexation the after diametrically changed has The situation alafists in Kazakhstan in of Salafists he radicalisation 21 . 25 . 24 and in Georgia (Pankisi (Pankisi Georgia in and 22 саляф.рф it is forbidden forbidden is it ), social ), social - 23 - - - . 17 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 18 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 http://ansar1.info/showthread.php?t=36968 http://www.sehadetzamani.com/haber_detay.php?haber_id=2498

http://www.rferl.org/content/Kazakh_Salafis_Face_Deportation_From_Czech_Repub

a death toll of toll 40 ata death least in resulting of Almaty) vicinity country, the of in the but also part western the in (mainly forces took Kazakhstan place in security at the aimed tacks first terrorist attack in Kazakhstan) in attack terrorist first (the Aktobe in (KNB) Committee Security National of the headquarters the tacks new at launch to for threatened it, and ) took responsibility the (the Soldiers of Jund al-Khilafah organisation apreviously unknown tack at first the after Soon benefit. for their Kazakhstan exploitto events in the attempt did organisations terrorist Islamic international the Nevertheless, manner. grass-roots an atomised, in who acted Salafists, radicalised local, but by the organisation byterrorist any were not perpetrated The attacks Republic 2009 in of the IMU and IJU – the Jihad Islamic –the IJU and IMU of the legalism) extensive (which shows their sharia compliant with was Kazakhstan in jihad waging that to ensure Emirate Caucasus representatives of the the with contacts their used theSalafists At of first 2010 2011. and turn the purposes for advantage propaganda wave of the of order to take attacks in al-Qaeda, of behalf on the Union acting Jihad entity, Islamic by the created a virtual Board of Muslims of Kazakhstan (SBMK) and the utilisation of peaceful of peaceful utilisation the (SBMK) and of Kazakhstan of Muslims Board the in of Spiritual form structures Astana’s engagementIslamic of official (aboutrorism people). 500 observe one can long perspective the term In of ter suspected of convictions individuals and arrests by mass situation jund_al_khilafah_emi.php –http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/10/ Qaeda al with linked descent, sian of Tuni citizen aSwiss Garsallaoui), (Moezeddine Moez Abu by led was The organisation lic/1380886.html mic-terrorism http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2012-10-17/kazakhstan-combating-isla Analyses OSW terrorism, Islamic combating is Kazakhstan Lang, Józef in: Further zakonnosti-voennyx-dejstvij-v-kazaxstane/ fatva-o-dzhixade-protiv-kazaxstanskoj-policii/ and http://hunafa.com/2011/03/vopros-o- http://hunafa.com/2010/09/ Emirate: Caucasus of the website Ingush on the inquiry Sharia http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1305649920 31 . All evidence available, however, suggests that Jund al-Khilafah was was however, available, evidence Jund al-Khilafah . All that suggests 28 32 . The Kazakh government was capable of quickly stabilising the the stabilising capable government of was quickly . The Kazakh . On 17. On 26 th of May 2011 they conducted the first on suicide attack first conducted of the they May 2011 or the appearance of Kazakh volunteers in the ranks ranks volunteers the in of Kazakh appearance or the 30 . 29 . During the next year a number of at anumber year next the . During 27 ). at The changed situation , 17.10.2012, , 17.10.2012, ------­ conflict in the post-Soviet area in which Islamic radicals had participated. The participated. had radicals Islamic thepost-Soviet in which in area conflict first the it was economic Nevertheless, and factors. political by asetof social, off sparked state, newly for the power established in struggle clan a regional butrather conflict ideological not an mostpart for the was Party, ic Revival 34 33 Tajikistan in war The civil way around. other not the militancy, Islamic of radical establishment the enabled that USSR), of the wars it were and these fall the took placewhich after many (two of above conflicts on the superimposed was that factor Islamic the words, it other post-Sovietwas In the in area. Islam radical ment of militant, however, The (Tajikistan). conflicts, diddin the establish playrole akey in mujahi legend the to of areference Afghan as serve and opposition members anti-government the unite could idea (Chechnya)or which as identity ethnic of the part important an as instrumentally, rather Ittreated was role them. in not did play religion asignificant organisations, presencedespite of Islamic the yet Tajikistan), in war the (especially state the and militancy Islamic tween be struggle as a portrayed are often conflicts of these Both Chechnya. and in wars Tajikistan the were appeared Islam militant where conflicts The first Iraq. and Syria in then and Pakistan, and Afghanistan in –at borders first countries’ outside of jihad their the in lims of post-Soviet participation Mus the is of example which mostvivid the tion, globalisa and internationalisation phenomenon gradual its of was this aspect important An organisations. terrorist Islamic internationalised modern, the theto theUSSR, collapse of after took place which conflicts armed local the in character Islamic a declared with of organisations participation the from along evolution through post-Soviet underwent the in – area Islam Militant 3.

attacks in Kazakhstan) but uncommon practice in the post-Soviet the in but area. practice uncommon Kazakhstan) in attacks have there been terrorist no then effective out (since an to be turned This Salafi leaders who are respected throughout the Russian-speaking sphere the Russian-speaking throughout respected are leaders who Salafi Militant I Militant area, resulting in the death of about 100,000 people and generating 1.2 million refugees. refugees. million 1.2 generating and people 100,000 of about death the in resulting area, post-Soviet the in conflict bloodiest the 1997. It in was ended and 1992 in started The war portive towards the government, http://salaf.kz/?p=870 government, the towards portive sup is message, his in fundamental while and area, post-Soviet on the jihad waging against is Zaynullin sphere. the wholeRussian-speaking in popular is who preacher, Salafi based Almaty- an Zaynulin), (Rinat Kazakhstani al abu Rinat is of this example An slam after the fall of USSR the fall the after slam 34 , one of the sides in which was the Tajik Islam the was , one sides which of in the 33 . ------19 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 20 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 strumentally, and whose main goal was the independence of independence Chechnya. the was goal whose and main strumentally, in leaders, Islam who positively treated Chechen viewed was by the Khattab) presence ofly afew the foreign volunteers (forabove mentioned the example Similar worldthe Muslim secured. be of to financial) (mainly for support the allowing aplatform someas to ideology degree, and, national addition the to an as role.kind) all playedabove Sufi butsecondary served aIt rather mental, (mostly not of afunda Islam which in independence for national awar It was didcharacter. have not also religious a in Tajikistan, conflict the coverage than (1994-1996),war Chechen The first received international which more much Waziristan). to (mainly areas tribal Pakistani the forcedwas andto flee to casualties movement heavy suffered the war the During US forces Afghanistan. the in and Alliance Northern the against fought side IMU of on 2001 the the In al-Qaeda. and stan) Afghani northern haven the (which in asafe provided it with Taliban Afghan the with ties strong had it has of existence its beginning the from sation and organi aterrorist as movement This recognised is Uzbekistan. in state Islamic of an establishment the was Its goal region. entire but the from Uzbekistan, not from only ranks its in radicals Islamic had IMU the IMU. Despite name, its war, as well as the so-called “Batken crises” (in 1999 and 2000) (in 1999and crises” “Batken so-called the as well war, as Tajik of civil the veterans Valley and Fergana the from fugitives by1998 the in (IMU) Movement of Islamic Uzbekistan of the establishment These were the region. the in militancy Islamic of authentic radical establishment the showing events witnessed Asia Central Tajikistan, in war civil of end the the After 36 35 for left so Chechnya and character Islamic not did have astrictly Tajikistan in war the that who recognised stan, Afghani aformerin Saudi foreign fighter led by Khattab, unit the – primarily foreign ones –and Namangani of Juma command the Valley under Fergana bek Uz the from fugitives the as –such post-Soviet both included militants latter

oriesOfAmirKhattabTheExperienceOfTheArabAnsarInChechnya/Memories.pdf https://ia601209.us.archive.org/0/items/TheMem at: available memoirs, on Khattab’s Based Sharif, at that time controlled by the Taliban. Taliban. the by controlled time at that Sharif, Mazar-i and of Kunduz cities Afghan the to resettled permanently being IMU the in sulted re they and IMU, for the defeat with ended raids of the Both later. a year strong 600 about and 1999 in strong 300 about were forces TheIMU’s terrain. mountainous in place took Thefighting of Sokh. exclave Uzbek the seizing Valley, though Fergana the in ic revolution Islam an initiate to was militants of the goal Thedeclarative of Uzbekistan. territory on the place took fighting further 2000 in and province, Batken Kyrgyz on the raids militant IMU 35 . 36 , caused by the by the , caused ------

38 37 services security Volgodonsk), , Russian by the were mostprobably which organised (Moscow, Russia in attacks of terrorist aseries and on Dagestan, militants ani Dagest and of Chechen of(autumn incursion 1999). were the causes Its direct war second Chechen the initiate to gave excuse Moscow crime the organised presence of the as well as radicals, Dagestani and Chechen of the The activities goals. these achieve to weak too power was his butgangs, criminal the and combat radicals the influence of the curb to ideology, independence president, national he tried elected the was resenting rep politician Maskhadov, asecular pendence movement. 1997Aslan When in inde Chechen the discredit to aimed which services, intelligence Russian the by were supported whose and activities Chechnya, chaos-torn in scale a large on operated groups, which of a cover criminal numerous for actions came the be slogans fundamentalist the hand others). other and Aliyev the On Adallo Kebedov, Bagauddin (such as radicals Dagestani with as well as missionaries, and foreign fighters yoke. both They Russian with cooperated the from estan of Dag “liberation” the and state Islamic into an of Chechnya transformation the propagating slogans, Islamic voice to radical started calculations, litical Yandarbiyev), po and reasons ideological Zelimkhan dueBasayev and both to Shamil around gathered those (mainly warlords and politicians Chechen the overlapping, yet at some times processes took place. of one On hand parallel, two time arena). At that international Moscow, on the recognition but lacking (1996-1999), (not aquasi-independent state was controlled by when Chechnya inter-warperiod the during significance political its gained Islam Militant Republic of Ichkeria and establishment of the in 2007 in Emirate Caucasus of the establishment and Republic of Ichkeria Chechen of liquidation the the was evolution ideological of the militancy of the etc.). The culmination Kabardino-Balkaria , (Dagestan, region of the republics encompasses other which day and this to lasts that jihad ence the to independ for national struggle Chechnya-only morphedthe from Caucasus the Northern in the conflict while fighting, the lead in the take to began cals radi Islamic followingyears the Over warfare. guerrilla to forcedand turn to

www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/praceosw-47-rosyjski_kaukaz_ang-net.pdf Studies OSW war, alocal amid Olympics TheWinter Caucasus. sian - Rus the in change No Górecki, and Wojciech pl/sites/default/files/punkt_widzenia_13.pdf January View, of Point OSW 2007, separatism, ‘hidden’ http://www.osw.waw. and Jihad sian a Cauca Between Chechnya: Falkowski, Maciej in: evolution mentioned above on the More killed by Russian intelligence services in 2005 in London. London. in 2005 in services intelligence Russian by killed was who Litvinenko, Alexander officer FSB former the by revealed was ascenario Such 37 . The Chechen forces were crushed within several months months several within forces. The were crushed Chechen , January 2014, http:// 2014, , January 38 . ------21 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 22 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 42 41 40 39 1999 September in army Russian by the attacked being after only struggle armed to zone resorted Kadar the of The inhabitants solved fundamentalism. be could believed many by Islamic of inhabitants), persecution which the seton entrepreneurship, limits ruption, problems (cor social the in lie , those authorities from Dagestani of the representatives of the expulsion the and ofterritory”, sharia introduction the Islamic “free of establishing origins the reality In Chabanmakhi). Karamakhi, Kadar, including district, Buynaksk the in villages zone Dargin (several Kadar so-called –the 1990s the in Islam of militant acase as regarded often also is of Dagestan part central the in quasi-state Islamic of aminiature The existence bekistan and Islamic Jihad Union Jihad Islamic and bekistan Movement of Islamic Uz the in gathered radicals Islamic Asian Central the and Caucasus Northern the (IK) in Emirate Caucasus forces two –the around centrated con was militancy Islamic post-Soviet Syria, in radical war eve civil of the the On

including ethnic Russians who have converted Islam to Russians ethnic including of Russian, parts volunteers other from ranks its in has IK Caucasus, the present in divisions). ethnicities rial Besides representatives of various territo –virtual vilayats particular (operating groups within guerrilla comprisedautonomous of loosely anetwork associated is organisation IK Dagestan. forces Buynaksk, in security Russian by operation the a special in killed who was Muhammad, Abu Kebekov aka estan’s Aliaskhab Dag was 2015 April this until It emir; headed by is Caucasus. an the tive in ac militancy Islamic clandestine the unites dimension ideological the in which entity it avirtual is reality occupied In by Russia. currently state, Islamic an is Emirate Caucasus the propaganda, militants’ to the According T militants also actively engage in propaganda, mainly through the use of the of use the the through mainly engage actively propaganda, in also militants The Russia. inside attacks terrorist perpetrated militants Caucasian the the Caucasus, but later joined the IK militants and was killed in 2010 in Ingushetia. Ingushetia. in 2010 in killed was and militants IK the joined but later Caucasus, the in the jihad against advocated who at first Islam, to convert Buryat, half Russian, half cally ethni Tikhomirov), (Alexandr Buryatsky Said – leader Salafi well-known the For example Organisation created as a result of a split in the IMU in 2004. 2004. in IMU the in of asplit aresult as created Organisation More in: Enver Kisriev, Islam i vlast’ vDagestane ivlast’ Islam Kisriev, Enver in: More Report Asia, of Central militants Islamic The radical Lang, Józef in: IJU and IMU on the More lamic-militants.pdf he C aucasus E aucasus , November 2013, http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/report_the-radical-is mirate 40 39 , fighting in Pakistan and Afghanistan and Pakistan in , fighting . , Moscow 2004. 42 . At several times times . At several 41 . OSW OSW ------48 47 46 45 44 43

northern Afghanistan in combat side Taliban of on engaged actively the the armed in are they to Islam’s fundamentalist currents Islam’sto fundamentalist who do not adhere radicals Islamic also are there members its amongst and ideology,religious does not have IMU aunified the organisations, terrorist rear elements, training camps etc.) in Pakistan’s Northern Waziristan Northern etc.) Pakistan’s camps in training elements, rear (leadership, infrastructure terrorist possess organisations of these Both present there. organisations terrorist network of into the Islamic tegrated in and strength its where it regained areas, tribal Pakistani the to resettled IMU 2001 the in Afghanistan in regime Taliban of the fall the After 2004. in IMU the split Union, from which Jihad Islamic the 1998, and in created stan Movement of Islamic Uzbeki – the organisations terrorist international two concentrated around are Asia Central from militants Islamic Radical T state. aseverely weakened in currently State), is leader of Emirate Islamic to the oath Caucasus an the swearing combat of groups the part a substantial and emir to the loyalty (renouncing 2015 and of 2014 took turn place which on the schism the as well as units, Chechnya’s Kadyrov’s and services president Ramzan security Russian the Internet rorist attacks in the and Europe United States and the in attacks rorist still remain a serious security threat security aserious remain still these organisations yet decreased, significantly has IJU the and IMU the to recruits of on-going influx Syria in the 2011, since war civil of the a result As targeted at Western audience website – http://kavkazcenter.com/eng/ –http://kavkazcenter.com/eng/ website Center Kavkaz audience at Western targeted or the http://vdagestan.com/ http://hunafa.com/, as: such websites are of this Examples As can be seen for example in the IMU’s attack on Karachi airport on 8 airport on Karachi attack IMU’s the in for example seen be can As -80474.html http://www.rferl.org/content/uzbekistan_united_states_obama_islamic_movement/ situation in the previously peaceful north of the country. country. of the north peaceful previously the in situation security the in deterioration asignificant in resulted Taliban of the side on the gagement en TheIMU’s Turkmen. and , by mostly inhabited of Afghanistan, parts ern north the in successfully of operating incapable were movement, aPashtun as The Taliban, sult of the attack 36 people were killed, and the airport itself severely damaged. http://www. damaged. severely itself airport the and killed, were people 36 attack of the sult op. cit. op. Islamic, Theradical in: More the-tug-of-war-over-kunduz/ rity situation in this province. secu the in https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-next-round-of- adeterioration to leading province, Kunduz Afghanistan’s to numbers large in relocating also are organisations of these Members destroyed. was infrastructure IJU’s and IMU’s the some of Waziristan, the Northern in fighters foreign the at combating aimed and of 2014 summer the since underway forces of Pakistani operation military of the aresult As he I slamic Movementslamic of U 43 . As a result of the brutal antiterrorist measures undertaken by undertaken measures antiterrorist brutal of the aresult . As 45 , and in the past have conduct to attempted past ter the in , and zbekistan and the I the and zbekistan 47 . 48 . 46 . Contrary to most Islamic mostIslamic to . Contrary slamic J slamic ihad U ihad th of June 2014. As are As 2014. of June nion 44 ­244 - - - , - - - - 23 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 24 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 51 50 49 theCaucasus in present rarely foreign fighters were the world,of while parts the other in conflicts armed in notdid participate ) (especially militants Caucasian –the character alocal had Caucasus world), Arab in the or in war the movements (in Afghanistan Jihadi other with movement. Jihad Despite proximity ideological global the in Emirate Caucasus worldwide, impossible it the recently jihad include to was in ly interest until alive and Caucasus the State in Islamic an of of goal its establishing Regardless conduct terrorist attacks in Western Europe in attacks conduct terrorist to attempted also organisations of these (both conducted scale onactions alarge pioneers the of such and Europe from radicals Islamic recruiting organisations ist terror Islamic main were the IJU and IMU the Syria in war civil –prior the to tant impor especially is for centre foreign Jihadists operations). role Their atraining as of atheatre than rather of asource recruits, as only Asia Central (treating al-Qaeda and thesidethe Taliban on of andPakistan Afghanistan in on fighting focused and character Asian Central lost their organisations these Asia, Central in state lamic Is of an establishment the remained goal declared their and Uzbekistan, from militants the were leaders still their While Pakistan. and work Afghanistan in net terrorist international into the integrated organisations of these – both path adifferent chose IJU and IMU the in gathered radicals Islamic Asian The Central and ethnic Germans who converted Islam) to had Germans ethnic and countries, Muslim from –migrants citizens German (both Germans dominantly pre ranks, volunteers fought hundred Europe from their several in as many as –at Europe peak, its in radicals at Islamic targeted propaganda Jihadi producing in world of at least a part of post-Soviet Muslims, hence also their participation in in participation world of their post-Soviet hence of also apart at Muslims, least Islamic the to reintegration the in fiveresulted twenty years last the during area this place in taking The Iraq. changes and Syria in Jihadists for the ground post-Soviet become to the enabled arecruitment above of factors area the All

op. cit. op. Islamic, cal The radi in: More 2012. in Toulouse in 7people killed Merra Mohammad trained IJU while 2011, in airport Frankfurt inside IMU the by perpetrated attack the by inspired ic radical Islam Albanian An Europe. of Western countries several in 2010 in and in 2007 In land, the and several other European states were also present. Ibid present. also were states European other several and Kingdom United the land, Switzer Spain, Holland, of , citizens Germans Besides Germans. 200 around total In amaliyot-borasida-bildirish jundurrahmon.biz/index.php/text/bayonot/456-karochi-tayyoragohiga-bolgan-fidoiy- http:// and .com/article/2014/06/11/us-pakistan-militants-idUSKBN0EM14L20140611 gruppyi-255570/ kz/crime/kazahstanets-osujden-v-dagestane-v-sostave-diversionno-terroristicheskoy- http://tengrinews. this. to exception an are Kazakhstan from volunteers the For example 50 ). The IMU and IJU were also active active were also ). IJU and The IMU 51 . 49 . . ------bled the phenomenon of mass departures of volunteers to Syria and Iraq. of and volunteers Syria to bled phenomenon the departures of mass ena also post-Soviet role modern –this of model the jihad acultural as mainly but recruits, of asource potential They as not beliefs. served only Islamic radical IMU), the also Caucasus, the in (militancy some in cases and combat experience, possessing of group individuals USSR generated of apeculiar the fall the after took place which conflicts armed Additionally, the jihad. with ones associated radical world, the including Islamic the present in currents processes and the - 25 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 26 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 large scale phenomenon yet never this became Taliban, the and IMU, al-Qaeda of the ranks joined who the have also converted Russians to Islam) ethnic butCaucasus, also Northern of the inhabitants and Tatars (mainly Muslims of Russian A number 54 53 52 volunteers. of individual departures the enon and phenom described the both behind lie which motivations personal and tions condi general of it the possible is Nevertheless, produce to acatalogue Jihadist. profile post-Sovietof a it impossible typical asingle, create to for make jihad, the volunteers leaving guiding motivations diametrically, times at differing, as well as regions, and former USSR states of the each in circumstances political phenomenon. socio- for Varying this are reasons what the answer to attempt for an calls for chapter statistics) (seenext jihad for the the Muslims Soviet post- of the (counted thousands) the in The phenomenon departures of mass more frequent) are Syria to departures (currently Movement of Uzbekistan Islamic of the ranks the mainly, in jihad, in participate to countries their left late 1990’s the since Turkmens Azerbaijanis, have and also alesser to extent and Kyrgyz, and Caucasus). of Tajiks, Uzbeks, Kazakhs Hundreds Northern the in volunteered for also jihad of militants number (a small destinations migration war- chief being Pakistan and Afghanistan with Azerbaijan, and states Asian Central of involved the citizens not itis anew one,mainly the past but the in The phenomenon jihad of in post-Soviet going participate to abroad Muslims II chy hierar positionthe in their and of numbers terms in (both dominate clearly sus Cauca Northern motivation). the from the as served Now, militants the though, that brethren Caucasian the with but solidarity religion, not it the though was side of on the , war Abkhazian-Georgian the in Caucasus Northern 1992-1993 in volunteers of the the from participation was rule this exception to (an homelands their outside of conflicts the in not did participate Georgia and

. Russia (2004-2013) he joined the jihad in Syria. Syria. in jihad the joined he (2004-2013) Russia in years several spending After of . Bulgarsky Salman aka Ayrat Vakhitov was prisoner Russian famous Themost prison. Bay Guantanamo the in held were 2001 to prior Taliban the side of the on Afghanistan in fighting Federation Russian of the citizens Eight State – he is the organisation’s top military commander in Syria. in commander military top organisation’s the is –he State of Islamic ranks the in Batirashvili) (Tarkhan Shishani of Omar high-rank the For example op. cit. cit. op. lamic, - Is Theradical see: of Uzbekistan Movement Islamic on the as well as Pakistan, and istan Afghan in fighting states Asian Central the from volunteers about information For further 54 O ) amongst the post-Soviet Jihadists in Syria and Iraq. and Syria in post-Soviet the ) amongst Jihadists rigins o 53 . Excepting individual cases, Muslims from the Northern Caucasus Caucasus Northern the from Muslims cases, individual . Excepting the in f the f lux o f volunteers to S yria 52 - - - - - . vietness, they can effectively influence the post-Soviet Islamic communities, post-Sovietthe communities, influence effectively Islamic can they vietness, So their Simultaneously, retaining international. terrorist Islamic the inside navigate world, can they Islamic of the part be to themselves Considering ties. post-Soviet the communi and Muslim Islam radical global the between a link Homo jihadicus This it deem whereverjustified. be to they jihad the pate in world need partici to the includes Islamic group, the to belonging of this bers the mem For post-Soviet among the group Salafists. of creation apeculiar the self-identification in enabled worldchange This the of with Islam. community of sense the it with intertwined rather mentality, they Soviet but that their shed world. entirely they That not Islamic did mean entire the in also extent but former USSR, some to the in above all into anetwork, operating dimension) not ideological, organisational (in the transformed technologies, munication com of modern or region’scountries’ availability due the to mainly borders, beyond does not their which extend amindset with communities, acting cally community. Muslim Lo global – the Ummah of to the belonging sense to the one’swith group Soviet-system identification the based –from derwent ethnic playedkey role evolution un was by the communities those of which identity the Iraq, and Syria in jihad for the volunteers the to departing regard With amongstcurrent younger the generation. Islamic main the is evenbecoming Salafism or Pankisi, Dagestan as such gions, 56 55 structures state the from repressions less harsh face more or occupation, Salafists Russian prior the to Crimea and Georgia in Gorge Pankisi exceptfor the everywhere, Despite this, by Muslims. inhabited the USSR former of areas all in autonomouscommunities ment of strong, Salafi chapter, establish previous led the to the in detail greater in cess, described The pro globalisation. and internationalisation their as well as area, Soviet thepost- in communities Salafi of the development the growth is and exist, to phenomenon described not could come the which cause, without The primary 1. without substantial external financial or organisational support or organisational financial external substantial without endogenic basis, on it an happens mostcases in –furthermore, dynamically

I rently, even if such actions do take place, they play a marginal role. role. amarginal play they place, take do actions such if rently, even Cur area. post-Soviet the in active were USSR the former of outside from activists Salafi when the 1990s, in place take did support organisational and financial ideological, Such cult or even impossible to enforce (for example effective blocking of Internet services). services). Internet of blocking effective (for example enforce to impossible or even cult diffi are Salafists the discriminating the legislation some of Also periods. different during varies and states post-Soviet the of all in different is of repressions strength and The scale deological reasons deological 55 . The movement developing is 56 . In some. In re is is ------27 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 28 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 argument for a military intervention). military a for argument an gain republic and the in situation the orderdestabilise to 1996-1999, in in Chechnya groupsin militant gave Salafi the to services security Russian the post-Soviet (forde the facto in the area and example domestically both power playsthepolitical of in it utilisation fluenced by Russia’sinstrumental in extent, acertain to at also, least was Islam ofmension. The militant rise di this in significance of great was jihad) to independence for national a war ate), evolution ideological and scale (from due long-lasting its to character, Emir theCaucasus for struggle conflict (the evolved Caucasian North into the gradually which conflict, The Chechen combating dimensions. experience) (gain movement) military independence the Chechen of and the Islamisation the the (forplayedideological example These a role both conflicts in formative wars). Chechen of the both Tajikistan, in war present (the civil nevertheless component was Islamic but factors, motivated the by other was participation their Asia). others In Central in (forIMU’s raids the Islam example militant of fought banners the Muslims some under In of them to jihad. tator of travels facili important an equally also thepost-Soviet in area were conflicts Armed 57 years twenty last of course the over the militancy Chechen the place in taken has –that to nationalism from evolution possibleideological made by the was This groups. – joint militant of ranks the in representatives ethnicities side with of fighting sideby other post-Soviet of Iraq, the spearhead upand volunteers the now Syria in make and Turks and inferior, as Afghans , viewed the and distinctive, and unique being as themselves regarded had who traditionally Chechens, of the case the even (and more at so). times tries in symptomatic evolution This especially is home coun their in those as important as just are place there events taking the while world, post-Soviet for becomeeign ahomeland the has Salafists, for unfamiliar, an as previously viewed by Muslims Soviet East, The Middle numbers. large in Iraq and Syria to departing phenomenonof the of Homo jihadicus establishment code. the It was have acommon cultural whom still they with

http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/pw_46_ang_kaukaz-polnocny_net.pdf November View, of Point OSW 2014, of stabilisation, illusion the Caucasus: TheNorth jihad. global of periphery the On Falkowski, Maciej and sites/default/files/punkt_widzenia_13.pdf January View, of Point OSW 2007, separatism, ‘hidden’ http://www.osw.waw.pl/ and Jihad sian aCauca Between Chechnya: Falkowski, Maciej in: evolution mentioned above on the Further which directly enabled the volunteers the enabled directly which 57 . support support ------caused by the by the caused also is of worldwide The of Syria uniqueness restoring. dream fundamentalists Islamic which state, Islamic idealised – the caliphate hosted the that turies) Syria also has close ties with the Northern Caucasus. In the 19 the In Caucasus. Northern the with ties close has also Syria Sasitlinsky). Omar of supportive it (for preachers Dagestan’s example by radical and there Abu fighting organisations volunteers by the both for jihad, at recruiting aimed propaganda the in emphasised deliberately is Syria in jihad of the character historic special and transcendence the that Judgement. importance It of is real Day of place, the preceding take second will of coming prophetthe (Jesus) Isa 59 58 world). (7 Islamic Damascus It was of the aremoteperiphery is Afghanistan lens, this (viewedMedina through holy Mecca to and only and places, subordinated mostimportant among the as by Muslims regarded are worldwide. states of Muslims these Both set of Sunni mind hold the Palestine) in and Jordan Lebanon, encompassing Syria, region Sham (more specifically Syria especially and Iraq place that not if special for the character, would not haveEast large-scale its achieved Middle in conflict of the former USSR volunteers in The the from participation 2. for jihad. tures foundation phenomenon for the the depar as of served mass base social of this The existence East. leaving for Middle of those the for recruitment es base the resourc the human created post-Soviet of the veterans conflicts, Islamic ened battle-hard of the existence the Word, as well as Islamic the with of solidarity sense strong with communities Salafi The development of globally–thinking period of the advance of Islam will begin will of advance Islam of the period anew here from country, also and this in awar be will times apocalyptic the amongst the Caucasus’s youth, is also of great importance. The reasons for that for The that reasons Caucasus’s importance. of great the amongst also youth, is abroad for studying destinations one mostpopular of was the Syria that The fact present day. the to survive Caucasus, the with links and communities, Their Caucasus. Russian-conquered the from ejected or being voluntarily after pire Em Ottoman of the part this in settled Dagestanis) and Chechens, muhajirs so-called of the of thousands

E For example Bukhari 6592, Tirmidhi 2243, Ibn Majah 4088. 4088. Majah Ibn 2243, Tirmidhi 6592, Bukhari For example Islam’s main basis for legal norms and traditions. traditions. and norms for legal basis Islam’s main are they Koran the with –along Mohammad Prophet of the life the recalling texts Religious xceptionality of S 58 , according to which one of the many signs forecasting forecasting signs one many of which to , according the yria in the Muslim perception Muslim the in yria th -8 – Caucasian emigrants (predominantly (predominantly emigrants –Caucasian th centuries) and Baghdad (8 Baghdad and centuries) 59 . Similarly, it is in Syria or Iraq, that or. Similarly, that Iraq, Syria it in is – the Levant – the –the Levant –the th century tens tens century th -13 th cen ------29 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 30 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 sia and Central Asia are also well-connected with Turkey. with well-connected also are Asia Central and sia Rus Caucasus, the transportation, to regard With opposition Syria. in Islamic radical the put to towards policy it has, mildly, and ambiguous an Syria, with policy, border its visa crossing does not hinder liberal It state. has transit the of Turkey post-Soviet mostof the with countries, lem inhabitants for being the not is aprob there Getting Syria. to departures the aid also issues The logistical 60 propaganda This militants. of „glory” successes, the and of heroism the boast other the and on regime, Assad people the by Syrian the on inflicted suffering depict websites). the one onhand the Islamic published there sian The materials YouTube,example Rus (including Twitter media, online etc.) abundant is social technologies (for of duemodern which utilisation efficient to propaganda, hadist influence of Ji the under made most often are for Syria The depart to decisions 3. capabilities his to cording ac pious by every Muslim, supported be to is “pure” which and jihad, a “true” milieus, of Salafi perception most of the the in became, longed Syria in war West. dependence its on the The and pro centuries-longit stagnation the from world’s rousing of Islamic awakening, beginning the viewed as was Muslims, by closely post-Soviet revolution watched the was Tunisia which in with and began couple which Spring, last over The of the years. Arab East Middle the in place events taking of the character dynamic unprecedented and doubtedly the phenomenon described un is of the scale for alarge such reasons ofOne the 2003). in Iraq in war of the beginning the after especially Syria, via Saudi to Arabia travelled often Dagestan, from mainly pilgrims, with buses Hajj (the the forgaged during example low-level Syria, in in smuggling and trade en frequently also Caucasus of the The inhabitants them. from originated jihad volunteers the whoCaucasian first is thejoined why which character, a Salafi had Somecommunities . of and these ones), Damascus in estani mainly Dag and Chechen the being (the largest Syria in diaspora Caucasian strong sand of a new,thou the establishment several to study.was there this The of effect go to wishing those not authorities did obstruct Russian hence the dominant, is where moderate Islam viewed by Moscow acountry was as which Syria, ruled Assad- with relations Russian, later good and were, Soviet, paradoxically, the

J ities, there is general consent regarding the validity of the jihad in Syria. Syria. in jihad of the validity the regarding consent general is there ities, author religious the by supported unanimously so not was Caucasus the in jihad the While ihadist propaganda ihadist 60 . ------62 61 circles, yours”. and freedom our “for Salafi many In version struggle of the Islamic an conflict, of the victims civilian and jihadists the with solidarity the is Syria to amotivation for as serves departure which factor important An 5. new volunteers and depart to militants active both inclines cy militan Caucasian of the degradation the as well as Caucasus the in struggle prolonged for of the The perspectives lack armed stabilised. being situation the and marginalised being methods), propaganda militancy and led the to which (aof political Chechnya’s Kadyrov combination of military, president Ramzan policies forces the and security conducted repressions Russian by the brutal caused by in part was snuffed out, being which itself Caucasus the in jihad the of result the mostly are region this from for Syria departures Frequent casus. Cau Northern of the case the in above all true is which situation, political the in some to also, extent, lie Syria in jihad for the departures of the The origins 4. former USSR. of the inhabitants by mostof the understood still alanguage sian, Rus speaking code and cultural Post-Sovietother a similar possessing states, the from or Jihadists countrymen, their either authors its are because standable, under andeasily volunteersclear – is thepotential it on effect strong avery has nels social unrest and frustration into Islamic (mainly Sunni) radicalism Sunni) (mainly into Islamic frustration and unrest social nels chan –intensifying example aclassic is Azerbaijan cruits. re for future basis social necessary the creates which Muslims, of radicalising effect have the rather they departures, of cause the direct the rarely are tions Caucasus). The Northern persecu of republics the the especially Russia, and Azerbaijan as as well Uzbekistan, mainly states, Asian Central (the Salafists the groups, above all independentMuslim the against repressions includes some post-Soviet in of also the which states, systems political authoritarian the are departures the fuels one indirectly a broader sense, conditionIn that supports). Russia which al-Assad’s regime Bashar fighting through Russia, against struggle the continuation of (the significance of some also is Syria in war of the dimension anti-Russian the of Chechens,

http://carnegie.ru/eurasiaoutlook/?fa=56032&reloadFlag=1 S P op. cit op. Illusion…, Falkowski, Maciej in Further olidarity with co-believers with olidarity religious and duty olitical reasons in the countries the of in olitical reasons origin . 61 . In the case case the . In 62 . ------31 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 32 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 65 64 63 mandatory) as theCaucasus in the jihad views (for Salafist not branches example every their or even currents level at of the particular settled a problematic usually issue, is of this or Muslims) amajority at least by all, respected of authority asingle lack Islam (the of structure the Dueto of jihad. status the has conflict ticular or notwhether apar defining is keyissue but the dutyMuslim, of every the as regarded is jihad armed that remember to It important asin. is sentially is es it fulfil to failure commandment), and areligious as (jihad ly important equal duty is religious of legal sense ones, the radical extremely the especially http://alisnad.com/?p=834

http://nohchipress.info/2012/11/6995 tion of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the caliph (June 2014) caused dissent in the the in dissent caused 2014) (June caliph the as al-Baghdadi tion of Bakr Abu nomina the and by ISIS state Islamic of the Similarly, proclamation the D important for the residing in Europe) in refugees residing Chechen for the important leave especially he can (the for decision was then Syria Caucasus, the in jihad the support to does not possibility have Muslim the aCaucasian if that stated ruling The final supporters. eyes of the their in credibility lose their order not in to ban, explicit the to revise had they Syria, to new recruits and ture to the Middle East Middle the to ture forbade and scholars) of depar selected by verdicts supported they (a claim importance of is greater homeland their in jihad the Caucasus, of the ants inhabit for Umarov) the held that Dokka deceased already the (above all leaders The militants’ Caucasus. ongoing the in an is war when there Syria to leave in for jihad permitted the are they whether regarding a dilemma who considered volunteering those faced as well as Emirate, Caucasus the of this). militants The and leaders regarding consensus was (there jihad but “actual” nor Caucasus, it it did an whether the concern is in militancy clandestine Islamic not did omit the Syria in jihad The about dispute the sion concerning participation in it is de it is facto in participation concerning sion deci the and Muslims, by inhabited lands in only place take can Thelatter defensive. and state) entire the of name the in Caliph the by (declared offensive exist: ofTwo jihad types ligatory. ligatory. ob not it is case this but in of jihad, status the have not does which awar in participate can aMuslim that mind in bear also must however One opinions. contradictory) (often on their based also is status mandatory of jihad’s issue –the matter this in importance of key are ties authori Thereligious important). is group the within view dominant the reality in viously ilemmas of the J of the ilemmas 63 . ihadists in the C the in ihadists 64 . Later on, facing the massive exodus of militants of exodus massive militants the on, facing . Later aucasus individually considered by every Muslim (ob Muslim every by considered individually 65 . ------67 66 ubiquitous violence etc.) or children, abandoned orphaned suicide, alcoholism, of family,divorce addiction, a high rate, drug (crisis dimensions catastrophic people), has thousand ten crisis where social even up hundred to several from vary (estimates Russia in especially creasing, of life)phenomenon of or tragedies.The the scale (conversion in is Islam) to formeaning the search of the values, (a crisis dilemmas existential in seen be mostoften for can reason which the Islam, to orby returning converting decision leave to the preceded often is cases such In for Syria. depart and life decide to previous leavetheir who nevertheless parents, influential or rich, professional career asuccessful families, with individuals wealthy to regard with the decisive, especially are they someIn cases importance. nificant of is sig issue ideological context the process before leaving. this In making decision- decisive play role which motivations the the in personal the amine ex to it necessary makes Syria to departures of the character The individual 6. ranks of IS ranks Units), joined 2015 Militia the and who for April left in Syria (Special-Purpose of Tajikistan’s –commander OMON of Khalimov colonel actions Gulmurod the in seen be can apost-Soviet in jihad life join to the state leaving aprosperous http://www.avesta.tj/security/32994-polkovnik-gulmurod-halimov-obyavlen-v-mezh

swearing allegiance to the leader of . leader of Islamic the to allegiance swearing Chechnya and Dagestan in groups militant of the part asubstantial with (November-December 2014) Emirate Caucasus the inside aschism was this The outcome East. of Middle the in groups Caucasian the between divisions of the led adeepening to and Caucasus the in militants among the thority au his of moderation cost him lack and rulings categorical explicit, His Jabhat al-Nusra). al-Qaeda-linked the and ISIS –between (in reality Syria in fighting groups the between disputed the in notpendent interfere and inde volunteers to remain Caucasian for the about calling ISIS, critically spoken Kebekovhad Aliaskhab Emirate Caucasus leader of the the tion, proclama prior the to Immediately issue. on divided this being Iraq and in volunteers Syria fighting Caucasian even the with of militants, ranks

P dunarodnyy-rozysk.html samara.orthodoxy.ru/Smi/Npg/051_12.html and http://www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=news&div=17618 http://www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=news&div=17618 and samara.orthodoxy.ru/Smi/Npg/051_12.html http:// estimates. are these cases of the both In converts. 10,000 are there claim ganisations or Islamic while people, 300 about it is data Church’s Orthodox Russian the to According ersonal motivations.ersonal S 67 . During his professional career he held a number of high-ranking of he high-ranking held anumber professional career his . During ocial causes ocial 66 . One example of example aperson . One ------33 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 34 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 against her father’s will against kayev, Chechnya’s head of the office,her fiancé migration with wholeft 70 69 68 Islam to return preceded by his was for Syria departure his while USA), the and Russia in (including abroad training in participated and posts ly, leave zone also forconflict the but men, not the frequent so who countries, like their from Islam radical the followers widows, or female of women, militants’ local marrying either Iraq, and Syria in families Turkey. start from and to also smuggling Jihadists Many or by conquered territories, the in of estates ofseizure war, the spoils the as means such through riches gain to opportunity an is also jihad mendous risk, or even hostility). tre open Despite the dislike people, with whoreligion treat Soviet-raised most often are parents their since of new to Islam converts case in important especially is avoid to (this desire generation the clash the also is one’s factor obedience towards important and schemes tions, Another elders. of tradi by amatrix caused settings family and oppressive the from social self one to liberate achance also is For jihad many of is importance. utmost this Caucasus), the in (especially of developed manhood cult ahighly with cieties, so world, glory,the gain prove to one’s courage. patriarchal and In manhood see to achance is dangerous, extremely being forwhile jihad, The departure Turkey. and Europe or Turkey), Russia in migrants refugees in labour Chechen as well Asian as tral (for Cen the big to example cities) foreign migrants and areas rural (from the internal the are risk of groups increased the regard, this In children). and wife provide to for his aman allowing status asocial preceded be must by achieving marriage Asia Central and Caucasus of the societies (in traditional own their of family money saving a goodcareer, or job, even starting asuccessful having of finding chance little stand they to lose, other have on the little they hand peopleis young It often of ity self-fulfilment. who decideto theleave. one On impossibil by the poverty,tion caused of perspectives, unemployment, alack frustra volunteers of rather the is part motivation of asubstantial The actual

(including in Islamic State’s capital – the Syrian city of Raqqah). of Raqqah). city Syrian –the State’s capital Islamic in (including them by seized areas the in Russian in teaching schools establishing are states USSR mer for the from Jihadists the –for example scale on alarge place take must The phenomenon www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/10/27/the-secret-life-of-an-isis-warlord.html http:// al-Shishani. of Omar wife the became Dudurkaeva Seda husband of her death After Khalimov’s statement after joining IS, available at: https://sendvid.com/priqxge4 https://sendvid.com/priqxge4 at: available IS, joining after statement Khalimov’s 70 ). According to the Salafists’ interpretation of sharia, sharia, of interpretation ). Salafists’ to the According 69 (for example the daughter of Asu (fordaughterDudur of the Asu example 68 . to Syria Syria to ------71 become for away of The has whom life. choice war militants, Chechen sional” “profes of the case the in mainly It true is activities. militant previous of their it a continuation is Iraq and to Syria categorydeparting of those For a certain 7. fighting the during prisoned slaves non-Muslims) sex (including acquire –women im can also militants the

in Chechnya during ’s dictatorship. Ramzan during Chechnya in situation of the astabilisation and there militancy Islamic the weakening contributed to also jihad Caucasian Northern the Abandoning Caucasus. Northern the in jihad the in participate to impossible Kists for the virtually etc.), passes it made mountain which along the mines land planting posts, of amount border the by border increasing Russian-Georgian the (sealing side Russian of the actions by the caused part in was which inhabitants, for of jihad Pankisi’s destination main the became which Syria Ittion. was younger among the genera visible role there).especially process was This not did play important an Islam Chechnya; isolated from Georgia in munity began (since the beginning of the 19 of the beginning (since the began Kists Georgianised and secularised of the Islamisation and Chechenisation process re-of 1999).the (after dynamic influence, war UnderChechen their second the forces during Russian for looking the refuge from militants en Chech and refugeesthe of influx amass along with region the in peared ap first It Pankisi. in prior developmentpossible the without of Salafism would not be departures older the generations). regions, other the in As the and youth Salafi the (between a severe generation as clash well it, as of young sector),people by caused frustration the undeveloped agriculture of (a employmentsituation unemployment lack large rate, outside the the economic people), (100–200 difficult the is issues, ideological the from aside jihad the in have population participated of Pankisi’s proportion a large why such (Kists). The Chechens understanding keyto eightto thousand by about six inhabited Georgia, Gorge in Pankisi problems the is social by the mainly caused are for Syria departures mass where region the One T

War away as of life c481biq-magazine-9e280b3.pdf. sue IX), available at: https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2015/05/the-islamic-state-e2809cd –Dabiq journal State’s online Islamic in at length justified) (and discussed is The issue he case of Pankisi he case 71 . th century, Kists made up a small com up made asmall century, Kists (is ------35 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 36 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 72 motivation, however, such place.ing Those with aminority be to seem tak is conflict world where Islamic asimilar ofably the leave part other any to would prob – they reasons ideological by the not dictated was Iraq and of Syria

serving in the units subordinate to Chechnya’s president Ramzan Kadyrov). Kadyrov). Ramzan president Chechnya’s to subordinate units the in serving militants, former often side (Chechens, Russian the and of Salafists) comprised Battalion sour Man Sheikh Usmayev, the and Adam by led Munayev, Isa currently commander famous the by established Battalion” Dudayev “Dzokhar so-called side (the Ukrainian the both on fight they where Donbas, in end up also different, slightly were paths life whose war, the by shaped Individuals wars. Chechen the of the “products” are in Syria fighting Jihadists Not only 72 . - - - 81 80 79 78 77 76 75 74 73 • • • • following: as countries into individual down breaks This 4,000. around post-Soviet at entire area the from militants of the number of the estimation an allows for toverify.data A thecompilationavailable difficult of also are mates Suchesti credibility. their doubtsregarding certain are analysts), there and journalists post-Soviet, orgovernments, Eastern by the Middle Western and providedoften are (eitherofby the someestimates unofficial and official both Iraq. and While in Syria fighting currently former USSR states the from itants mil of number exact an toprovide reasons, todue obvious difficult, It highly is 1. III http://www.rferl.org/content/turkmenistan-achilles-heel-central-asian-security/25265841.html

http://www.vb.kg/doc/288117_s_nachala_2014_goda_vyiavili_28_vyehavshih_v_siriu_ http://ca-snj.blogspot.com/2014/03/blog-post_2701.html http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42674&no_cache=1 http://www.uznews.net/ru/politics/26288-uzbekov-zovut-na-dzhihad-i-k-modzhahedam-v-siriju S . -suspected-jihadists-syria-iraq/26616794.html –http://www.rferl.org/content/tajikistan- village Chorqishloq of the case the For example kyrgyzstancev.html news.tj/ru/news/gknb-v-sirii-voyuyut-primerno-300-grazhdan-tadzhikistana http:// (GKNB): services intelligence Tajik of the head Amonov, deputy Akram by Statement deystviy-v-sirii-gknb/ http://kyrtag.kg/news/bolee-200-grazhdan-kyrgyzstana-nakhodyatsya-v-zone-boevykh- (GKNB): services intelligence Kyrgyz of the spokesman Suleymanov, Rakhat by Statement http://rus.azattyk.org/content/kyrgzystan_sirya_central_asia_juhad/25150081.html

less than that; less than and Uzbeks) and Turkmenistan – no official data, unofficially up to 360 to up people unofficially data, –no official Turkmenistan following data is presented: 50 people in the Jabhat presented:people 50 al-Nusra is group the in following data significantly, the vary estimates unofficial data, –no official Uzbekistan 200 –officially Kyrgyzstan people300 –officially Tajikistan battalions ize and ethnic composition ethnic and ize P ro f ile o ile 78 , 500 76 the P f the ; 79 or people even 3,000 ost- 75 S , probably more than that (both ethnic Kyrgyz Kyrgyz ethnic (both that , probably more than oviet m 73 , unofficially higher unofficially , 80 ilitants in S in ilitants ; 74 ; yria and I and yria 81 , probably 77 raq , two , two - - 37 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 38 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 96 95 94 93 92 91 90 89 88 87 86 85 84 83 82 • • • • • http://contact.az/docs/2014/Want%20to%20Say/011100065006ru.htm

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=41136&cH http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/international/2013/11/131120_chechens_syria_georgia

http://eaworldview.com/2014/02/syria-testimonials-russian-speaking-jihadis-crimean- http://rus.azattyq.org/content/kazakhs-syria-youtube/25143647.html http://www.jamestown.org/regions/middleeast/single/?tx_ttnews[pointer]=2&tx_ http://slonus2012.livejournal.com/129359.html http://www.zerkalo.az/2014/zaderzhanyi-eshhe-dva-modzhaheda-vernuvshihsya-iz-sirii/ http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303795904579431290464167718 http://www.contact.az/docs/2013/Politics/102900055545ru.htm ash=d873c9e97210acb9b505cdadb5ffd5b8 en-isis-fighters-under-omar-alshishani-threaten-to-take-fight-to-putin-9787809.html ea71818#.VGO40mNnCZE; http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/chech ttnews[tt_news]=41861&tx_ttnews[backPid]=49&cHash=1a9cd3c6400175a9b81a8268c tatar-suicide-bomber/ id/1206831/ http://newsland.com/news/detail/ Dagestan; in of FSB head Konin, Andrey by Statement kz/ru/archive/article.htm?id=10376986@egNews http://knb. (KNB): services intelligence Kazakh Abykayev, of the head Nurtay by Statement state-russian-nationals-syria-iraq/26869105.html http://www.rferl.org/content/islamic- of FSB: head Bortnikov, Alexander by Statement Information Centre – http://www.civil.ge/rus/article.php?id=26473 For example propaganda film about 150 Kazakh jihadists: http://www.alalam.ir/news/1526261 jihadists: Kazakh about 150 film propaganda For example unofficially probably about 500 to 1,000) and Ingush (50-70 probably about Ingush and to 500 1,000) unofficially probably 100 people around ing many militants who depart with their families their with who depart militants many ing ing in Europe who remain Russian citizens), Dagestanis (officially 200 (officially citizens), Dagestanis Russian who Europe remain in ing tary data about 40 people only from the towns of Jezkazgan and Satbayev and of Jezkazgan towns about people 40 the data from only tary Crimea – no official data, unofficially from around dozen a from unofficially data, –no official Crimea 50 from unofficially data, –no official Georgia 107to people add up districts various from statistics police data, –no official Azerbaijan people –officially 1,700 Russia people300 over – officially: Kazakhstan Northern Caucasus, Tatarstan, ); Tatarstan, Caucasus, Northern of republics the (the remaining regions other the from cases individual mainly Chechens (up people Chechens 1,000 to mainly 89 , according to unofficial data from 100 data unofficial to , according 96 . 85 , unofficially much higher much (over 2,000),, unofficially 86 82 , including Chechen refugees resid Chechen , including , unofficially probably includ , unofficially more, 92 to 200 people 200 to 83 (for example fragmen example (for 90 to 250 to 94 to 400 people 400 to 91 93 ; 88 ; ), as well as 84 95 87 ); - - - - , ; 97 Turkey as such 223), of countries ahead (13)dan but or still Indonesia (0.5) Jor and 83, 200, Tunisia Saudi Arabia France 272, United Kingdom350, 214, the Norway in it people about is million, 400 per (for higher in example are indicators where Maghreb, these the and East Middle Western the Europe, people– 57 million). of It per region’s countries places the many behind states Kosovo to (similar Muslims people million per 50-60 to equal is which jihad, in participate states of particular inhabitants Muslim of 0.005% the more than Usually, not Azerbaijan. and countries Asian to Central regard with pecially problem, es it conclusion amarginal regions, wouldis leadand the to that states particular in population Muslim overall the with of militants number the phenomenon. of the one If scale juxtaposes it the possible evaluate to make still at some they point 2011, from ranks ofber people Jihadist’ who the were in the num Iraq, and butrather in Syria fighting currently of militants number the notso reflect much often and inaccurate usually are estimates the While people. fourthousand five to around at post-Soviet of the of oscillates volunteers number states all from the total In

links.html?_r=0 http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/17/world/europe/europe-arrests-terrorism- as well as foreign-jihadis/, http://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2014/09/syria- and: calculations own on authors’ Based C United Kingdom United ountry/ Former USSR Former Saudi Arabia Saudi Germany Tunisia Turkey France Jordan R egion http://www.rferl.org/contentinfographics/infographics/26584940.html http://www.rferl.org/contentinfographics/infographics/26584940.html 4,000-5,000 Militants 3,000 1,000 2,500 1,200 1,500 600 600 D of Muslim population Muslim of epartures per million million per epartures 50-62 200 140 272 223 214 83 13 97 . - - - 39 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 40 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 the foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq Iraq and (about 15,000-20,000 in foreign fighters Syria the of number overall of the (about estimates rope at the 3,000-4,000). Looking 6,000people (around Western to each), Eu Maghreb and equal East Middle the however,If, only behind awhole, Post-Soviet as the treated is it ranks area Iraq. and Syria in post-Soviet the militants of all athird almost them at 1,500,numbers making 99 98 ny Germa from 600 and Holland, and 250 from , from dom, 440 United the from 600 Libya, from 600 France, from 1,200 Lebanon, from Turkey, from 1,000 1,500 Jordan, from 2,500 Saudi Arabia, and from 3,000, 900 at above Tunisia from estimated is of militants number For the comparison, awhole) separately). as (each state treated USSR is list of bottom the or at the former (if the middle the in region puts the countries other from ofber those Post-Soviet num the from with states of militants number of the Juxtaposition 0.01% people 160 million). and per (about significant is of Dagestanis participation worldwide.nities the Also commu Muslim all amongst indicator highest It the is million. 12,500 per or hypothetically –about 1.25% Pankisi the in residing comes Chechens to when even it higher are The numbers jihad. in participate ple million per peo or 0.05%, East), about 250-500 Middle around the Europe, Russia, casus, (the Cau population Chechen strong, million two When it entire, comes the higher. significantly are numbers where the Georgia, Gorge in Pankisi the and Dagestan Chechnya, of case the completelyThe is in situation different all the countries of the region. An exception to that are Chechens (regardless of (regardless Chechens are that exceptionto An region. of the countries the all one in amarginal population, Muslim overall the to compared still, is for Syria phenomenon the however, of This, Iraq. that leaving fact the does not change and in Syria fighting over-representedclearly foreign militants the amongst are post-Soviet phenomenon the of the Jihadists scale described: real of the for evaluation an allows kind 5–6%). Muslims, ofbillion a comparison this Only 1.5 from million 80 (around of people number globally professingoverall Islam of the post-Soviet in share Muslims over-represented, the are with compared up who former 15–20% USSR, to constitute the from of them, militants the that http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/09/cia-triples-number-islamic-state-

98 com/world/2014/oct/30/foreign-jihadist-iraq-syria-unprecedented-un-isis islamic-state-50000-fighters-syria-2014819184258421392.html; http://www.theguardian. fighters-201491232912623733.html; Ibid . Here again the fighters from the Northern Caucasus stand out, with their their with out, stand Caucasus the Northern from fighters the . Hereagain . http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/08/ 99 ), stated be it can ------basis, but rather due to their leaders’ ambitions and aspirations. They are not They are aspirations. and leaders’ ambitions due but their to basis, rather or not ideological ethnic were created much Suchgroups so on groups. an own their establish to and importance size sufficient have one gained they other unit),the the inside (whichon communication effective enabled units tional opera into language-based militants need organise to the one hand on the is none there of Arabic, Asia, whom speak Central and Caucasus the Europe, of volunteersfrom influx the With units. Arab-speaking the in serve could they so of Arabic some command having mostof them that meaning Syria, in diaspora Caucasian the from mainly were recruited post-Sovietthe militants period, initial the thatduring fact, the affiliate). was by caused Al-Qaeda It ian al-Nusra Jabhat all (Syr of first factions, and groups local of the ranks the in fought militants the most of in Syria war civil the of period first the During ones. larger the by sponsored mostoften and interconnected are which own, ofgroups their State) militant Jabhat of (such as al-Nusra or several and Islamic organisations large both of members are TheIraq and post-Soviet in volunteers Syria fighting 2. Iraq. and Syria from as well as states, Muslim other the post-Soviet of fight the fromside those area side,by also ethnicities but various the from not militants group:only mostof in them ethnic of one particular members on only the basing created hermetically no units are there thermore, Caucasus). in Fur wars the formed during of –abrotherhood arms Chechens of some case home the country, in the and. with contacts and communication of ease on kinsmen, formationbasing (natural reasons duemostly practical to were howeverpresent there, de facto units Many East. Middle the in militants the between relations to regard in role, significance it of political is little plays important an traditionally factor ethnic post-Soviet on the the others). that area and fact Despite the Bashkirs Tatars, Kazan and (Crimean scale present on who asmaller are ethnicities, Muslim largely Turkmens), other the from those as well Kazakhs, as Kyrgyz, (Uzbeks, Asia Azerbaijanis), Central Dagestan, from minorities ethnic Ingush, (Chechens, Caucasus the present in of ethnicities members are them Amongst the diversityUSSR. former of the ethnic reflecting amosaic, diverse constitute Iraq and post-Soviet the in volunteers dimension, Syria fighting ethnic the In phenomenon. social important an as described be can for Syria whose departures Dagestanis, scale, place of residence)their on asmaller and, Main groups leaders and Main formed along ethnic lines, but this was was but lines, this formed along ethnic - - - 41 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 42 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 103 102 101 100 − clude: in present, are post-Soviet the which militants groups, in The mostimportant basis. regular on a occur leaders their between conflicts personal and rifts – arepermanent not affiliations State. form Their and al-Nusra or Islamic either have –mostoften sponsors usually –they independentsovereign fully − https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tbdcidmum30

http://www.rferl.org/content/islamic-state-kazakhstan-child-militants-video/26752339.

html and https://archive.org/details/HMC_race ia/26869379.html Syria; to there from and for Austria, left probably he which after 2013, January in Tbilisi in court in but acquitted authorities, Georgian the by arrested was he Subsequently explained). un still are of which causes the forces, security Georgian and militants Chechen between (skirmishes Georgia in 2012 in incident Gorge Lopota the involved in He was Gorge. Pankisi the in lived he of time period extended but for an of Chechnya, a native is Chatayev Akhmed More in chapter 4.3 Other areas of operations. of operations. areas 4.3 Other chapter in More them. financing directly than rather families, their and militants for the supplies Providing availability of supplies equipment and provided by IS availability State, the Islamic victorious the to belonging with prestige associated the on based partly is Its strength capabilities. military its as well as militants of number of the terms in group, post-Soviet both strongest the militant is group Shishani’s Omar al-Baghdadi. Bakr Abu caliph the to allegiance swore he later also months State, several while to Islamic (JMA) porters Sup and of Emigrants Army the from followers, of his transferred part tial a substan along with Shishani, November 2013, in IS when in Omar peared Kazakhstan) (mainly Asia amajority), Central from but still also are (though they ranks their present in are ofnot Caucasus IS,volunteers only and the from part are they Formally Syria. and north-eastern in northern fighting are groups Battalion led by Akhmed Shishani (Akhmed Chatayev) (Akhmed Shishani led by Akhmed Battalion –Yarmuk command mostprobably Batirashvili’s under also are groups Two Batirashvili). militant –Tarkhan smaller name (real Shishani Omar Chechen al-Aqsa, Georgian led Katibat by the strong thousand side the is IS in group militant The most important Unionformer Soviet ranks. its in I Battalion headed by Khattab Shishani (real name unknown) name (real Shishani headed by Khattab Battalion recruits, as well as against the ideological and political adversaries (for adversaries ex political and ideological the against as well as recruits, potential the towards both multiple in dimensions, undertaken is activity latter This propaganda. effective and Shishani, leader Omar well-known slamic S slamic ihttp://www.rferl.org/content/russia-lopota-gorge-incident-islamic-state-syr tate (formerly ISIS 102 and other Muslim states. The states. post-Soviet Muslim other contingent and ap ) . It has over a thousand volunteers from the volunteers the from over. It athousand has 103 , its charismatic and and charismatic , its 100 , and Mujahidin Mujahidin , and 101 . All of these of these . All ------108 107 106 105 104 − −

http://www.chechensinsyria.com/?p=22253 http://eaworldview.com/2013/12/syria-salahuddin-shishani-new-leader-jaish-al-muhajireen- the-islamic-state-22uncovering-an-enemy-within22_dvd.mp4 http://videos.videopress.com/UwXee3Hs/ For example: audience. post-Soviet the out to ing reach facilitates which Russian, voiced in usually are militants post-Soviet the portraying Materials craftsmanship. professional unprecedented with produced are IS by produced materials audio-visual but the worldwide, organisations terrorist of Islamic most in exist units Similar Russian). and French English, Arabic, (including languages several in terials ma of propaganda distribution and production the in engaged is which unit, propaganda IS ment and arrival. arrival. and ment of Jihad Propagators textbox in Atabiyev. Further Islam name Real watch?v=rWN8XfpGJZ8 https://www.youtube.com/ JMA. into merged of 2014 October in which Iraq, and ghanistan Af in of wars veterans of Saudi group small al-Khadra, Katiba al and ) from hadists of Ji mainly (comprised al-Islam Sham Aleppo), Harakat from organisation Syrian pendent (inde al-Islamiya Fajr ash-Sham Harakat include: of alliance members the for JMA Except wal-ansar-enmity-isis/ Starting from July 2014, JMA along with three other groups other three along with JMA July 2014, from Starting Dagestani. Omar is deputy his and Khorasani, sation led is Ibrahim by Abu spite being affiliated with it) and IS and it) with spite affiliated being al-Nusrathe (debetween conflict the from themselves distancing groups of independent (Supporters al-Din of alliance Front) Religion –an Ansar the main medium is the www.fisyria.com website www.fisyria.com the is medium main the dia Centredia Hayat Me Al State’s –the by aided Islamic is group department propaganda –Shishani’s professionally manufactured are The materials propaganda competition). its as regarded is which Emirate, Caucasus the ample against (Feyzullah Margoshvili) became the group’s the became Margoshvili) leader (Feyzullah Shishani for November 2013, in IS Salahuddin departure Shishani’s Omar Following Khattab. Katib and Muhammad groups: Jaish smaller two and (Migrant’s al-Muhajireen Brigade)– Katibat ni’s formed earlier group a year Shisha merger of of 2013 Omar the aresult as March formed in was group group, however State. The it doesIslamic not combating engage in overtly Shishani’s Omar with in conflict is JMA on operations. influence any its Caucasus), of the emir but the to does not have of by allegiance oath bound formally are militants (many Emirate Caucasus of authority the holds the up it simultaneously and Jabhat al-Nusra organisation, the with linked is JMA organisations. of United Statesterrorist on by included list the its was State it Islamic with As Balkans. the Westernand Europe and Asia, tral Cen Caucasus, the from militants up includes group athousand to This J aish al-Muhajireen wal- aish 104 . The group’s main propagandist is Abu Jihad Shishani, while while . The group’s Shishani, Jihad Abu is propagandist main A nsar ( nsar J M 108 A; . The main combat operations’ area combat area operations’ . The main A rmy of Migrants and and rmy of Migrants 105 106 . . Currently the organi the . Currently in Chapter 4.1 Recruit 4.1 Chapter in 107 forms Jabhat Jabhat forms H elpers). ------43 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 44 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 − 116 115 114 113 112 111 110 109 − − −

http://www.chechensinsyria.com/?p=22563#more-22563

http://www.chechensinsyria.com/?p=21901#more-21901 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ue2Jn7LkmU0

http://www.akhbarsham.info/ http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/03/chechen_al_qaeda_com.php nuds_ru Junud ash-Sham’s Twitter page: https://twitter.com/junuds and https://twitter.com/ju thread.php?t=9443&page=7 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pt93qBr_DeU and http://www.adamalla.com/show naShishaniVSvjaziSPoezdkojVGorodRakka/jma_emir_explanation_raqqa_visit_2014.mp4 For example: https://ia802604.us.archive.org/5/items/RazjasnenieAmiraDmaSalahuddi ya for Syria in 2013 in forya Syria Gaziyev, to loyal who Chechn militants left by Chechen created was group the likely militancy. Most Chechen the of one of figures most prominent recently Gaziyev –until led by Tarkhan and organisations two previous the

number of Syrians are present are of Syrians number even asmall but and states, volunteers includes Caucasus, other from the ample JMA uses IK’s uses ample JMA flag) (for Emirate ex Caucasus the to allegiance its and organisations Jihadist the fightbetween internecine the in of participation lack its is propaganda of JMA’s theme recurring oft An out new to recruits. reaching facilitates which media, on Levant), active social ofis the and –The Strength Sham training infrastructure da efforts: it has a websitehas it efforts: da of own its engaged actively propagan authority).where in it also is constitutes JMA villages, (the controls several group surroundings its and Aleppo is of JMA in fighting governorates, where it participates Latakia and Aleppo the include erations of op areas Its main Jabhat JMA. al-Nusra and with aligned 2012, in lished J proximity of Aleppo of proximity refugees in Europe refugees in Chechen the amongst and Caucasus the in popular very er, who remains lead displaying its and infighting internecine for their organisations other criticising – Gorge. The engaged efforts actively is group propaganda in Pankisi anative of and the wars Chechen of both –aveteran Margoshvili) “ unud al- T arkhan’s G S 111 ham ( ham . Junud al-Sham’s Emir is Muslim Abu Walid Shishani (Murad . Junud al-Sham’s Walid Abu Shishani Muslim is Emir – a small group of several dozen militants aligned with with aligned dozen militants ofroup” group several –asmall S 112 115 oldiers of the L oldiers of the 116 . The group takes part in fighting in Latakia and in the in and Latakia in fighting in part . The takes group . In its ranks, Junud al-Sham hosts mainly Jihadis from from Jihadis mainly Junudhosts al-Sham ranks, its . In . It is not active in the propaganda dimension. propaganda . It the not is in active 114 110 . . 113 . The organisation also possesses its own own its possesses also . The organisation – an independent group estab group independent evant) an – 109 , a propaganda film centre (Akhbar (Akhbar centre film , a propaganda ------− − 128 127 126 125 124 123 122 121 120 119 118 117 − − − − http://www.chechensinsyria.com/?p=22664#more-22664 http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=55066

http://kavkazone.com/testkit/index.php?tab1=hashtag&query=%D0%A8%D0%B0%D0%B https://twitter.com/khilafa_org http://iswsyria.blogspot.com/2014/04/rebels-reopen-latakia-front.html https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t7ZfpBD0uDU http://www.chechensinsyria.com/?p=21582 http://khilafa.org/

http://www.chechensinsyria.com/?p=22380#more-22380 whvLt9b-Dn5r7SINv-bA the on YouTube profile Sabri’s https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCiC website: Jamaat C%D0%B5&lang=turkish http://eaworldview.com/2014/02/syria-brief-guide-chechen-north-caucasian-factions-syria/ http://www.chechensinsyria.com/?p=22950 militant wing is a Chechen – Abu Musa Shishani (real name unknown) name (real Musa Shishani –Abu aChechen is wing militant group’s of the The supreme commander al-Jamila. Omar –Abu ghanistan Af in war of the aveteran and entrepreneur by alocal Latakia in 2012 in for medical treatment, and then departed to Syria to departed then and treatment, for medical abroad whenleft 2008 he atknown), first who until fought Chechnya in group al-Sham Ansar of the part it was governorate. Initially Latakia the ates in and engaged efforts and propaganda in of own its infrastructure developed training has side JMA, al-Nusra and along environs and Aleppoits in fighting in participated has Sabri Jamaat unknown). name (real Khalid headed by been Emir has organisation the and Idlib governorates Idlib and ItLatakia engaged is the combat in in most of operations whomSyrians. are militants thousand ahalf and two as many as The may number group A Ahad coalition (Group coalition Single) and One ofAhad the 90 people)90 tive in social media social tive in death in the beginning of 2014 (during an attempt to storm Aleppo prison) Aleppo storm to attempt (during of an 2014 beginning the in death al-Tashkenti. Following Abdullah’s Uzbek –Abdullah by 2012 an in lished J November 2013. in established Front) alliance militants being post-Soviet, the group has awebsite post-Soviet, Russian has being group in the militants amaat Khalifat ( Khalifat Jamaat – a small group (between one and two hundred people) hundred two one and estab (between group – asmall Sabri amaat nsar al- nsar 119 , while currently it is most probably part of the Jamaat Ahadun Ahadun Jamaat of it the mostprobably is part currently , while S 117 ham ( ham under the command of Abdul Hakim Shishani (real name un name (real Shishani Hakim of Abdul command the under H elpers of the L ofelpers the C 125 aliphate aliphate . The group is part of the Jabhat al-Islamiya (Islamic (Islamic Jabhat of al-Islamiya the . The part is group 123 . Despite only a small fraction of Ansar al-Sham’s of Ansar fraction . Despite asmall only C – a small Chechen group (80- group Chechen – a small ommunity) evant) 128 . In March 2014 the group, through its its group, through the 2014 March . In – a Syrian militant group formed group militant – aSyrian 120 . 118 . Jamaat Khalifat oper Khalifat . Jamaat 124 and is ac is and 122 121 126 127 ------­ , .

45 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 46 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 or military leaders, but also play an important propaganda role, being magnets role, magnets propaganda being play important leaders, but an also or military Gelayev). Basayev or Ruslan of political not They Shamil as only serve case the for in example Chechnya, in place earlier taken (as had them amongst leaders known well and charismatic of many appearance the in it in resulted states former USSR from of militants participation the and Syria in war The civil 134 133 132 131 130 129 − − http://albuxoriy.com/Video_v6929.html http://albuxoriy.com/

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m-01LOFCiAc in Waziristan. http://sodiqlar.info/rus/index.php?newsid=1790 present conditions financial/living poor to due in Syria fight to who left of militants a group of spoke Afghanistan, and Pakistan in who remained organisations, of these Members www.youtube.com/channel/UCE2mx4rmfqoSRuei0RkBzwA on YouTube: as well as https:// https://twitter.com/albuxoriycom, website: Twitter On http://www.rferl.org/content/islamic-state-uzbek-militant-faction-syria-tali 992.html probably aligned with Jabhat al-Nusra with probably aligned environs, its and Aleppo in active members, hundred up several to with more prospective jihad in Syria in jihad more prospective joined the and organisations these left Waziristan, Pakistan’s conditions in who, due worsening to militants IJU and on IMU based ably established ganda ventures (the group has awebsite Uzbek (the has group in ventures ganda governorate, engages Aleppo actively multiple and the in in propa own its of infrastructure atraining possesses Kyrgyzstan), and Uzbekistan from Uzbeks (mainly Asia of volunteers Central from training and recruitment lished in accordance with him with accordance in lished estab was –and Omar –Mullah Taliban Afghan leader of the the to oath by bound is Jamaat Salahuddin, to According Pakistan. and Afghanistan in of clashes aveteran unknown), name (real Salahuddin Uzbek, Sheikh an Union). Jihad Islamic Its leader is the and Movement oflamic Uzbekistan Is (the Afghanistan and Pakistan in fighting organisations Asian Central group’s of the the of while Uzbeks, of former militants consists backbone its independence within the organisation the within independence its joined IS, retaining Shishani, Jihad Abu and Shishani Omar with contacts J of volunteers number Western from Europe. asmall as well as Sunnis) Lebanon’s (mainly countries Arab the Dagestan, Tajikistan), (mainly states Asian Central other from militants Uzbek group, also an but are it members media amaat I amaat 134 ). mam Bukhari ( Bukhari mam I mam Bukhari’s C Bukhari’s mam 131 ; this seems unlikely (the group was prob (the was group unlikely seems ; this 132 ). Jamaat Imam Bukhari is active in the the in active is Bukhari ). Imam Jamaat 130 . It is almost exclusively made up exclusively made . It almost is 129 . Jamaat Sabri is predominantly predominantly is Sabri . Jamaat – an Uzbekommunity) group –an 133 and is active on social on active social is and ­ban ­/ ­266 ­86 - - - -

− include: Iraq and Syria in post-Soviet of leaders the militants portant − a threat long after the conflict they initially took part in endedin took part initially they conflict the long after a threat constitute can individuals such shows 1980s that, the in Afghanistan in ing volunteers of fight Arab case the new volunteers. Furthermore, for attracting 142 141 140 139 138 137 136 135 − −

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28217590 http://syriadirect.org/main/36-interviews/1733-chechen-militants-more-prestigious- http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303309504579181962177007316 http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/249731/ http://chechen.org/archives/1845 http://www.akhbarsham.info/2014/01/16/11/ http://www.rferl.org/content/georgian-killed-fighting-with-islamic-state/26731657.html Algerian veterans of Afghanistan in the war in Bosnia. Bosnia. in war the in of Afghanistan veterans Algerian of the participation but also of them, some by established was which Al-Qaeda of all First to-fight-for-islamic-state (1999-2002) he was in contact with them with (1999-2002) contact in he was gorge the were in Gelayev’s Ruslan aKist). While mother militants his and Georgian, is father (his family Gorgelage into amixed Georgia’s in Pankisi O of the Caucasus Emirate Caucasus of the ranks the in Caucasus Northern the in jihad the in He took part Georgia. in S Salahuddin he was the emir of JMA emir the he was June 2015 Until Helpers. He into ISIS. opposedand integration its Migrants the fight the for Kobane of forces, its for charge during in example was and Syria leader in military and imprisoned by his militants. by his imprisoned and was arrested for the illegal possession of firearms illegal for the arrested was 2010 in he and due to tuberculosis army the from dismissed he was war the After 2008. in war Georgian-Russian the in took part and unit naissance soldier. army, arecon acareer in on He later becoming served Georgian in a split in JMA a split in in resulted which ISIS, to left Batirashvili him, to subordinated of militants Helpers (JMA) he became its leader its he became (JMA) Helpers and of Migrants Army of the establishment bat group. al-Muhajireen After Kati for the herole where left 2011 he Turkeycreated in Syria, to then and pa Following Salafist. aradical he became sentence that aprison serving mar S mar hishani ( hishani – native of Pankisi Gorge –native of Pankisi Margoshvili) (Feyzullah hishani 139 . While in ISIS and IS he became the organisation’s the he IS became chief and ISIS in . While T – born in 1986 in Birkiani vil Birkiani 1986in in –born Batirashvili) arkhan 140 . 142 141 . For unknown reasons he was ousted from power from ousted he was reasons . For unknown . After migrating to Syria he joined the Army of Army he joined the Syria to migrating . After 138 . In 2013 along with a substantial part part asubstantial 2013. In along with 136 . In 2006 he was drafted into the into the drafted he was 2006 . In 137 . It was probably. It was while 135 . The mostim ------47 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 48 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 − − 148 147 146 145 144 143 between leaders, conflicts personal the as such examine, to difficult are which of settings array groups) by an and particular between ation or rivalry open situ military the (forexample to verify easy relatively factors by both affected is opaque shape –its and dynamic is of jihad, ecosystem apeculiar as scribed de be can which of it. The in correlations, system participating ganisations or and groups the between alliances tactical and animosities links, of mutual acomplex ongoing created environment Syria has in 2011 since war The civil 3. − − − − http://politkovskaya.novayagazeta.ru/pub/2006/2006-16.shtml http://www.akhbarsham.info/2014/03/02/15/ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pt93qBr_DeU https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iPBGvwkSibw http://www.chechensinsyria.com/?p=22051 http://jihadology.net/2014/06/04/the-clear-banner-the-clash-over-real-jihad-in-syria- R isis-vs-the-caucasus-emirate/ nounced his oath towards Eemir of IK Dokku Umarov of Dokku IK Eemir towards oath nounced his re 2010 In Gaziyev, commanders, Emirate. IK Caucasus other the along with of service security head of the the also 2007 in south-western and front, the of commander appointed he the was second war the During wars. Chechen T former USSR states the from Jihadists include which organisations of leaders the the amongst Tatar, one few commanders of non-Chechen and the oned. He aCrimean is impris also currently Ansar, (naib) wal al-Muhajireen of Jaish emir uty A In 2012 he left for Syria, where he established the Junud group ash-Sham the where he established for he 2012 left Syria, In but success. without Caucasus Northern the in re-join to jihad he the tried most probably along with his unit, and formed a militant group of his own of group his formed amilitant and unit, most probably his along with tioned in Mongolia. He took part in both of the Chechen wars Chechen of the both in Mongolia.tioned in He took part sta defence unit air an in Army Soviet the Gorge. in He served Pankisi A Muslim stances 2006 stances circum unclear under by of Supreme Ingushetia acquitted but Court was 2003 in arrested commander. He was a local he was war second Chechen the During Khattab. theSaudi Jihadist unit of thehe foughtwar in first the ole of ecosystem jihad the in arkhan G arkhan – until June of 2015 –until dep unknown) name (real Krymskiy Karim bdul bu Walid S – born in 1965 in Chechnya. He is a veteran of the both both of the He aveteran is Chechnya. 1965in in aziyev –born 145 . After his release Margoshvili left for Pankisi from where from for left Pankisi Margoshvili release his . After 143 . – born in 1972 in in 1972 in –born (Murad Margoshvili) hishani 147 . In 2013 he left for Syria, 2013. In for he left Syria, 144 . During . During 146 148 ------. . der their own name (for example Azerbaijani Jamaat (for Azerbaijani name example own their der 152 151 150 149 factors) due financial to (mainly activity further option enabling identity, losing their of but possible only them it risk the is the creates eration coop this groups For control over them. smaller total almost taking patrons the in results this some In cases them. with themselves ones, aligning smaller of the actions govern groups the larger that it means responsibility). reality In of area (for assigned an activities example of their legitimisation acertain and support financial) and (infrastructural receive groups material smaller while of militants, training and recruitment foreign volunteers receive the in and aid comprised of new units by gaining themselves strengthen organisations tron the pa – beneficial mutually jectivity. are The relations patron-subcontractor sub their limiting without groups conditions for volunteers smaller better and player, provide much Stateamuch more is it powerful can –Islamic therefore not equal are organisations of these State. The potentials Islamic and Nusra Jabhat al- rivalling outside from the actors); support are these enjoy minimal and enough large territory control a financial, including resources, adequate role play of the (i.e. patron possess they currently can organisations two Only group’sthe finally, latter,proving ofand, needs the meet to the ties usefulness. group’s the adjusting organisations, larger possibili among the from a patron choosing as: such elements, of several process consists This of jihad. ecosystem the in own their niche of market a find must such) as regarded be can groups post-Soviet Iraq and (all Jihadist in Syria fighting group smaller any of all, First post-Soviet the from states. tants mili above the mentioned the groups, including between interactions during place taking mechanisms general certain describe and possible determine to time, is it thesame At animosities. outside or influence local alliances, covert yet enjoys significant freedom of actions yet enjoys significant structures, does not have distinct nominally former USSR which the from tants of group mili alarge both: are State there Islamic or Jabhat Within al-Nusra. State Islamic –either have patrons Syria in of groups post-SovietAll Jihadists

of its own (Emir Mohammad): emir an but having IS, http://www.chechensinsyria.com/?p=21872 within operating Jihadists, Azerbaijani by established group Small 01LOFCiAc https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m- ISIS: it joined of 2014 March In group. Uzbek Small hence the need to align with one side. side. one with align to need the hence polarised, becoming Iraq and in Syria fighting groups Islamic radical smaller in results also groups large between rivalry – the factors these to limited not However, obviously it is First of all the group led by Omar Shishani. Shishani. Omar by led group the of all First 150 , and several groups functioning un functioning groups several , and 151 , Jamaat Sabri , Jamaat 149 . 152 , Jamaat , Jamaat ------49 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 50 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 ple between Omar Shishani’s group within Islamic State and the Jaish Ansar Ansar Jaish the State and Islamic within group Shishani’s ple Omar between them (forexam between conflicts to leads Caucasus). from also This militants (especially above tensions the in participate naturally own, ofgroups their or form factions various across spread either whoPost-Soviet are militants, Army. Syrian Free the and latter the between as well Jabhat as al-Nusra, and State Islamic between includetensions conflicts of Examples these ence etc. influ over spheresfighting of conflicts, Caliphate), personal the as well as State’s of of Islamic proclamation validity putes of (forissue the the example dis political and theological by groups, ideological, caused militant various between even clashes often and tensions, rivalry, constant the is Iraq) in than (to Syria amuch lesser extent in of jihad feature Thirdly, acharacteristic it). in took groups part when several abattle success in group/leader claims (for achievements when one example and strength their exaggerate they when and insubordination of their occurrences leaders, in and groups ticular par between rivalry the in shows itself it also Besides propaganda, etc. of war spoils the in share the of volunteers,financing, influx the to translates return group’s the in which need secure to power balance, local the position inside the by all of first caused are These actions dimensions. propaganda tion and informa the in visible especially is This organisations. patron and groups tant mili other the to relation in independence and individuality their at stressing aimed actions undertaking they that is strength, and importance actual their of regardless groups all almost present in mechanism, The second important IV). (more chapter in Syria controlled in ofmanagement territory –the some –in cases and organisation, by patron chosen areas the in tions and combat ac new volunteers, efforts, propaganda recruiting in active are al-Nusra under patronage those of and the IS under operating groups the Both Junud and al-Sham. Supporters and of Emigrants Army the is groups of The these patron. largest their from tinct governorates), Idlib and dis more independentand are (Aleppo, Latakia Syria north-western in mainly Jabhat operating al-Nusra, with The aligned groups 153 IS’s present in are (council) shura Shishani) Omar (including leaders their notState’s have on much influence howIslamic and noneis policy formed, of do they rest, the more than active being post-Soviet the and militants Syria, for northern commander IS’s being military Yarmuk). Shishani Despite Omar http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2014/11/profiling%20islam ic%20state%20lister/en_whos_who.pdf 153 ------. It shows both the level of hostility between al-Nusra and Islamic State (the lack State (the lack Islamic al-Nusra and between levelIt of the hostility shows both State) (for Islamic (for Shishani Jabhat Omar al-Nusra) Shishani and huddin JMA’s sides wereby represented Chechens: both emir, Sala talks the During 155 154 these organisations between conflict the end to was of2014), which aim the al-Nusra (November State and of Islamic between negotiation attempts failed the is of example this One of communication. achannel as organisations tron pa by their used at is times of post-Soviet community Jihadists The informal of origin. country the in group ethnic propaganda’s the reinforce to audience message aspecific is target when the mainly amuch to lesser extent, utilised or Tajik, are Uzbek, Azeri Chechen, as such languages, Other in Russian. are media thesocial websitesin profiles and of the all Almost of origin. countries the for with contact allowing cruitment, re and Arabic),have in noof language proficiency propaganda the also but post-Soviet of (the the majority Iraq volunteers and Syria in communication of It language of not is jihad. the only language the is and franca alingua as serves area, the USSR former in of Salafists case the in as just –which language Russian oftem the mutually-comprehensible Soviet-based also and references, code, sys mentality, the cultural similar the is of which community, basis the informal an constitute former USSR states the from Jihadists groups, the tron pa their between engaged despiteand rivalry divided in being Furthermore, jihad. ideologyglobal of the nationalist inter the unity, on is based amore widely,which as Muslim defined peculiarly aswell “infidel”), the (fighting solidarity Jihadi and organisations) particular (within agroup ofin being feeling the as well as dominant, is of community The feeling regions. other from post-Sovietthe militants volunteers the and Dagestanis), and or or between Chechens Kyrgyz, and Uzbeks ample between (for ex other each with conflict in often are home countries whoties, their in post-Soviet various ethnici the from militants the between tensions ethnic or infighting of fratricidal no reports There are scale. place on alimited take thepost-Soviet units between Emirate), Caucasus conflicts the in remaining groups the and Caucasus State’s the from Islamic between example militants sphere (for informational the in disputes and fierce Despite grave differences Caucasus). of the emir of authority the the recognises which Muhajireen, wal https://ia802604.us.archive.org/5/items/RazjasnenieAmiraDmaSalahuddinaShishaniVS

vjaziSPoezdkojVGorodRakka/jma_emir_explanation_raqqa_visit_2014.mp4 http://www.beladusham.com/0798.html 154 155 ------. . 51 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 52 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 156 Karachay ethnic who an is Shishani, Jihad –Abu aide or his (whose Georgian) is father himself Shishani (for Omar example tants mili other amongst authority their (Chechen) pseudonym orderincrease to in “Shishani” the use Chechens, ethnic being without Caucasus, the from tants mili many positive that connotations, such carries and popular so is brand” proximity). its and The “Chechen Aleppo in (mainly attacks successful direct group’s Jihadist They present among the often are Syria. in leaders Chechens many that authority. of importance of Chechens’ great rise It also is the to ing were followed worldwidewhich bywars, Muslims lead Chechen of the a result world is Islamic the in of perception Chechens This braveened, ruthless. and battle-hard experienced, exceptionally being as of perception them the rather authorities) religious but or popular no acclaimed widely are there Europe, and Caucasus the East, Middle the in those including (amongstority Chechens, superi or ideological intellectual on not their based held are are Chechens the which in esteem high for Reasons the milieu. jihadist entire but the militants, of post-Soviet not the only vanguard the themselves) as view how they with line in is perceived They (and this are militants. other perceived by the are they self-perception of (the uniqueness), how sense their as both to well as regard with true is This former USSR states. volunteers of the rest the from the from out stand Chechens Syria, in jihad of the character internationalist Despite the have for they post-Soviet of amount trust Jihadists. large the intermediaries), and need to employas negotiations, the of Chechens direct https://chechensinsyria.wordpress.com/2014/02/18/syria-umar-shishanis-right-hand- man-slams-jabhat-al-nusra-treachery/ and http://kavkazpress.ru/archives/67349 156 . - - - - - 159 158 157 origin) of countries their to did who returning noton plan (Salafists, reasons ideological to due usually university, from Syria, in decided stay to graduating who after those or universities, Syrian the in studies theological or Islamic Arabic studying either people thousand counted several Dagestanis), conflict and prior the to which Chechens (mainly Syria in diaspora Caucasian Spring).the Northern Thevolunteersof Arab first members ofwere the wereopposition, part which Syrian of suppressed the protests month of brutally two after of 2011, spring the in there began (which war civil the of months first the since Syria in jihad the have formerjoining USSR states been the from Migrants 1. . IV possibilities to continue the fight, or due to fearing possible fight, repressions continue to or the dueto possibilities fearing of lack due who decided leave to the –either to had among them, Chechnya tants mili many former there were and the 1990s, in in Europe appearing began first refugees, who They were mainly Syria. in arriving started Europe in diaspora en Chech of the members on Asians).workers also Later Turkey in Central (mainly 2014), migrant February and in prison of Aleppo storming the during killed was and Syria Turkey, northern in groups leader of one Caucasian became of the then from Syria to who arrived Sayfullah, Emir aka Machalikashvili Ruslan example (for states East Middle the in living 2012), August in migrants Aleppo Chechen in fighting during killed was Rustam Gelayev; Ruslan commander Chechen son of Gelayev,and well-known Egypt in Rustam astudent example who was (for Turkey, as were students such they countries, Most often Egypt. and Jordan were post-Soviet resident neighbouring in ofMuslims group The recruits next there. families started home and countries, their from Syria

R Empire at the turn of 19 turn at the Empire Ottoman then of the territory the in settled which Muhajirs, Caucasian so-called of the ants descend –the Chechens) thousand 4,000 and 7,000 Dagestanis Circassians, (about 100,000 assimilated extent alarge to and strong thousand ahundred old diaspora, the Not including amongst them is in Egypt. Egypt. in is them amongst one biggest –the Arabia Saudi and , Egypt, in also exist diasporas Similar al highlander rebellions by Russia. Russia. by rebellions highlander al and Denmark (1,000). Denmark and France (about 30,000), Austria (25,000), Belgium (17,000), in reside most which amongst (10,000), strong, 100,000 about is Norway Europe in (10,000) diaspora The Chechen

ecruitment and arrival and ecruitment Methods of Methods m ilitants in S in ilitants 158 . Many of these people also arranged for their wives-to-be for to travel to their arranged people of also these . Many operation of operation th and 20 and yria and I and yria th centuries after the and the quelling sever quelling the War and Caucasian the after centuries 157 . It was comprised mainly of students, who of were students, comprised. It mainly was raq the post- the S oviet oviet 159 . - - - - 53 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 54 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 through the social media websites media (Facebook social the through delivered including propaganda, Internet is The tool basic for recruitment Turkey connections). bus numerous (including route to aland is there Vody Azerbaijan and Additionally, etc. Georgia from Mineralnye , as such cities but states, even with Makhachkala, Asian or Central Caucasus of Southern capitals the with not include those only tions the connec region, the while of the countries to flights all from direct Turkey post-Soviet There are the and area. country work this developed between that net communication by the Turkey via facilitated Syria to also is Travelling regime. theDamascus volunteers fight to for bound aiding Syria Turkey of occasions actually on accused several been has tries). Furthermore, home to coun family, travelling with (meetings for or private business reasons rest, to Syria, recruits to Turkeyling supplies, order to replenish transport in Syrian-Turkish the cross weapons,freely travel border, their without albeit quite militants there: from returning or those Syria, in jihad to travelling als for TurkishAdditionally, individu the authorities do not obstructions cause it impossible control to makes them. which amount an annually, through pass of people millions which East, Middle the and former USSR area the between as well as East, Middle the and Europe hub between transport important an by it Turkey being facilitated through also is Travelling required. is id passport 162 161 160 of territory enter to the a visa obtain must of Armenia citizens only former USSR states, (from among the policy visa liberal avery has Turkey to of origin countries the itself. from of theease getting by also and open, remains conflict, despitewhich, the Turkish-Syrian border the across of getting ease by the both caused is This Turkey. via Syria post-Sovietin volunteers the arrive from states all Almost of on-line decided leave. to propaganda influence communities) the who,under Salafi of the members (not necessarily people reasons Federation. motivated by religious TheyRussian were mainly the working in Asia, Central from mainly volunteers migrants, were labour of amount the Asubstantial scale. on alarger Caucasus) begin Northern the all above Russia, and Crimea Georgia, Azerbaijan, states, Asian (Central area viet thepost-So of volunteersfrom influx 2013 of and 2012 the did turn at the Only https://twitter.com/junuds_ru http://vk.com/syriaru https://www.facebook.com/jihad.sham.muaskar Turkey), have only borders its aval cross to and 160 , Twitter , 161 , Vkontakte , 162 ) and ) and ------165 164 163 YouTube name unknown). name (real (Ayrat YusufShishani Vakhitov) Abu Bulgarsky or Chechen Salman born Tatarstan Khalid, Abu Nadir and Ahmednabayev) (Asrapil Sasitlinsky Omar ones Dagestan’s include mostimportant the at them it. hint Amongst or they sermons their war join to the for Muslims call openly Theytion of either jihad. no of the popularity the increases former reside USSR) outside also rently the post-Soviet (most the from of area whom preachers cur radical well-known, of The post-Soviet activity the Chechens. from mostly states, migrants are Iraq and Syria in active groups of leaders many that fact the is recruits many tracts themselves. What at thepost-Soviet producedby militants chiefly are which website), (for www.fisyria.com on the of example keyimportance are Russian in published materials propaganda Salafists), post-Soviet (including Muslims decision leave. to poor knowledgethe the to Due among prevalent of Arabic make to Muslims intendedpersuade to are which films) articles, tographs, (pho there post-Soviet orEurope, even the states) upload materials various zone, (who conflict jihad’s supporters the as in well may reside either Turkey, State), Islamic in as Shishani Jihad Abu Atabiyev (forgroups aka Islam example http://fisyria.info/2014/12/09/

lamic State, and is responsible for propaganda released in Russian in for responsible released is State, propaganda and lamic Is the within militants the spokespersonCaucasian of unofficial hethe is he joined ISIS; currently Shishani Omar with together afterwards porters, and Sup Army Emigrants of the of ranks the fought atin first Jihad Abu Shishani; Omar with where he for aligned he left 2011 Syria, in released ing be after prison; sentenced in to a year and 2009 in Karachay); arrested and Balkaria of Vilayat Kabarda, (the so-called Emirate Caucasus of the tures struc involved helocal became the in upon returning Cairo; University in al-Azhar at the he studied 2006 and 2003 between Karachay-Cherkessia; A P Emirate Caucasus the criticises and East Middle the in jihad join to the Muslims for post-Soviet author ofmessages, video the numerous he calls which in in the Emirate in late 2014). in Emirate the in https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCE2mx4rmfqoSRuei0RkBzwA M.in. poprzez portal www.fisyria.com portal poprzez M.in. ropagators of J of ropagators bu J bu ihad Shishani ihad 163 165 . Militants, individuals responsible for propaganda in particular particular for responsible in propaganda individuals . Militants, (he was probably a co-organiser of the schism which took place which schism of the probably (hewas aco-organiser ihad (real name Islam Atabiyev, Islam 1983) name in (real –native born of Собаки-лают-караван-идет / 164 ; he is ; he is ------55 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 56 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 166

Naberezhnye Chelny, a town in Tatarstan where a Salafi community exists; exists; community where aSalafi Chelny,Naberezhnye Tatarstan in atown 1980) Ayrat in anative of –is born name Vakhitov; (real Bulgarsky Salman IS. to migrate to supporters for his called and State leader of Islamic the to oath he swore an Syria; in Medetov appeared circumstances May 2015 in unclear under house arrest; under put him forces); court days the security later byably the several on planted him prob were (which possession of firearms illegal of the accused and rested ar he of was 2014 October in former USSR; entire the in popularity ing increas gained among young and people Dagestan, in popular were very sermons Internet); uploaded the his to and statements them recorded his la, Makhachka in mosques one Salafi (delivered in of the sermons preaching engagedhe where toDagestan, in returned he studies his finishing after Saudi Arabia; and Egypt in studies sharia he attended then dino-Balkaria, Kabar in institute (Dagestan); Islamic he education receivedkala an in his A N work. charity and preaching his continuing diaspora, ofleaders Caucasus one of where he the became for he left , due of2014 fear to arrest the public in Dagestan and, as aconsequence, volunteers to as departing and, public Dagestan in the amongst country this in situation level about of the interest increased an to led which about Syria, He sermons fervent delivered anti-Shia times. eral Turkey visited refugees, sev and for aid Syria Syrian and for humanitarian funds raising he started began, Syria in war civil the After Caucasus. the in struggle armed authorities. He support does not, though ofnition secular for a calls he radical: extremely are views His conflicts. help forsolving family in his example as well opinion, as and council his of people sought thousands knowledge and authority of his to sharia, Due activities. other and ing engaged fundrais in non-governmentalorganisation Islamic an tablished es and home village his in republic. amadrassa He built the in preachers Salafi popular and one Novosasitly mostactive of in and the community leader of aSalafist the where he became Dagestan, to he returned 2000s of the second half the During Egypt. and Syria in universities ied at Islamic He anative ofis stud Novosasitly, Dagestan’s to close avillage . http://vk.com/abuumar_sasitlinski network social VKontakte on profile private on his found be can sermons Akhmednabiyev’s bu O adir A adir (real name Israpil Ahmednabayev, born in 1980) Ahmednabayev, in Israpil – born name (real Sasitlinsky mar (real name Nadir Medetov) Makhach in Nadir 1984 in –born name (real bu Khalid de facto non-recog 166 . In . In - - - - - ­ - - - - - tions, the emissaries can operate more operate easily can emissaries the tions, to abide regula by legal services need forsecurity the the and states ofter the charac in the democratic where, Europe dueto different be to Western appear does however (the etc. situation services security by the dismantled structures recruitment local having of arrested, being risk or the costs additional curring remotely, It simply is recruit to risk. easier in without unnecessary carry and would redundant be actions such recruits, potential with communicate rectly di to but post-Soviet also masses, the to delivered for be to Muslims jihad call not the enables which only Internet, access the to oflikely. universal times In State) post-Soviet on does not the (forIslamic group seem area the example aparticular to belonging or networks cells recruitment organised ence of an post-Soviet However exist states. about oft-seen the the information media the volunteers probably in who directly, are operating recruit emissaries, Lone 168 167 Jihadists to forces government hostile forces Kurdish or the Syrian the against combat in part active an above of mentioned the take groups All there. ing arriv of goal militants main the as well as Iraq, and Syria in groups Jihadist form of post-Soviet of operation the mostfundamental combat the is Armed 2. them cross the Turkish-Syrian border. the cross them groups, who help particular of the volunteers emissaries the joined by the are Turkey to remotely.travelling issues by themselves on logistic after teers Only new volun instructing mostcommon is procedure the suggest that Syria in of accounts militants Numerous Iraq. and Syria to departures to structures Emirate’s Caucasus of the hostility the is activity this to obstruction additional

2011 for Syria, where he is engaged in online jihad propaganda jihad where engaged he is for2011 online in Syria, in and for he left Afghanistan, Tatarstan) in attacks terrorist organising of accused (he was due of fear 2000s to arrest of the second half the during Russia; across preacher Salafi aknown and Chelny Naberezhnye leader in aSalafi he became Tatarstan to returning Bay; after oned Guantanamo in impris was 2003 and 2002 by US forces between and there arrested he was side Taliban; of on the the 2001 he fought 1999and Afghanistan between in C Austria-arrests-suspect-for-Syrian-war-recruitment.html the local : http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/06/05/ from Jihadists future recruited of 2014, June in arrest his to who, prior of Graz city Austrian the from imam Chechen of the case the is avolunteer recruiting emissary of an example One For example https://twitter.com/salmanbulgar ombat 168 ). In the Northern Caucasus an an Caucasus ). Northern the In 167 . ------57 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 58 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 sab town during the so-called al-Anfal offensive in March 2014 offensiveMarch in al-Anfal so-called the during town sab (ISIS’s units support Kes successes or Junud seizing rear its without al-Sham advancing mobile motorised, units utilising operations, warfare manoeuvre JabhatThese Aleppo. encompass al-Nusra) in both operations with aligned ISIS’s spectacular successes in 2014 successes in ISIS’s spectacular groupin Shishani’s Omar of the participation categoryincludes The first activity. engage and terrorist operations, in asymmetric or other guerrilla combat, regular placesymmetrical in take Post-Sovietof methods: militants diversity their is trait Adistinctive combat actions. their in groups militant Islamic radical other to tactics and methods similar use Post-Soviet Jihadists 172 171 170 169 June 2014) in Mosul seizing in participate did they (yet Iraq in (peshmerga) militants and government forcesKurdish against fighting on Kobane), assault the in among others, rarely (they took part, Syria eastern north- in above stationed all are Shishani Omar to loyal State units Islamic while environs, its and Aleppo in warfare urban the in mainly part takes ample JMA controls; for latter ex the which territory the and patron dependent on their is battle in groups of particular The Kobane. participation capture to attempts and base air the Aleppo,theMenagh siegeassault and of in fights the cluding ones in largest the with Syria, northern were in foughtthey took place mainly which in The Iraq. battles in operations several and Syria in skirmishes merous State). nu in Islamic have Post-Soviet participated against (especially militants (above all the Free Syrian Army – supplied and aided by the West Jordan) by –supplied the aided via and Army Syrian Free the (above all opposition there groups role non-radical Syrian of larger the ones –the military political/ and frontline) southern to the Turkey Syria with border northern in the from travelling of (the difficulty aspects logistical both include forsons this took place. The war rea civil Syrian of the battles some mostintense of the or SuwaydaDaraa governorates),(Quneitra, Syria southern of tlefields where not ofpresent howeverbat are war) period the in initial at the (excluding those

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-22285555 http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/ginger-jihadist-mosul-omar-al-shishani-chechen-gener report/islamic-state-counter-strategy-counter-state http://www.understandingwar.org/ forces Sunni radicalised local, the by supported it is where Iraq, in fighters foreign use to State’s reluctance Islamic show to It seems al-1452232; dle-east-policy publikacje/osw-commentary/2014-07-30/crisis-iraq-and-twists-and-turns-turkish-mid Commentary policy, OSW East Middle of Turkish turns and twists the and Iraq in Thecrisis Strachota, Krzysztof in: on ISIS’ssuccesses More Executed by Jabhat al-Nusra in Latakia. in al-Nusra Jabhat by Executed 171 and JMA’s and groups’ smaller (and other , 30.07.2014, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/ 30.07.2014, , 169 . Post-Soviet militants militants Post-Soviet . 172 ), as well as 170 ------. ly by Islamic State, but also by the forces aligned with al-Nusra (Chechens have al-Nusra (Chechens with forces State, by the aligned butly byalso Islamic groups), armed Kurdish conducted of soldiers, main the or members Iraqi and (Syrian of of war prisoners executions for mass example crimes, form of war the take actions of or these perceived Many enemies. real against operations out punitive carrying chapter) and next the in further (discussed area an such of administration limited the includes over at territory. times trol seized This con at maintaining aimed engaged actions in also are The post-Soviet Jihadists tions – with suicide bombers used as battering rams battering as used bombers suicide –with tions institu or government outposts military enemy positions – sault of fortified as the is target) of the nature (depending on the tactic asymmetric/terrorist widespread One targets. military ple bombings) conducted suicide against are (for exam tactics of use terrorist make which attacks yettion, most of their popula civilian the aimed at out attacks carry Iraq and in Syria fighting tions Undoubtedly organisa on scale. the awide tactics terrorist and asymmetrical guerrilla, use post-Soviet volunteers the also The from with groups countries maps. satellite online from imagery, satellite available for good example quality organisations, rorist ter to were not recently available until which technologies, digital as well as reconnaissance, ground on from the –it intelligence uses armies regular employed is one which resembling by planning, and assessment operational conduct outoperation apre an prior carrying to former USSR states the from 175 174 173 Aleppo in prison the seize to tempts (for JMA’s example settings urban Sabri’s in at Jamaat and position warfare a JMA suicide bomber suicide a JMA base’s ofdriven the by gate by destruction explosives-filledtruck the with gan be Aleppo, which near Menagh in a year-long base air siege) Syrian on the by (preceded assault the be can conducted post-Soviet by the actions militants fightruthlessness). one’sshowing by and example such One of determination to will the breaking and morale enemy his (lowering on the pressure logical positions etc.), of negativeliquidation enemy fortified psycho exert to also but alocation, the objective (securing military immediate not an is achieve to only http://www.rferl.org/content/umar-shishani-military-prowess-islamic-state/26677545.html

http://www.chechensinsyria.com/?p=22428 akhbar.com/node/22775 tion.cnn.com/2014/09/09/world/meast/uk-syria-suicide-bomber/ http://edi and country. http://english.al- of the part eastern the ez-Zor in Deir in base Syrian on the State’s attack or Islamic of 2014, September in prison on Aleppo attack the include: of this Examples 175 . 173 ). Similar to other groups, the militants militants groups, the other to ). Similar 174 . The aim of such actions actions of such . The aim ------59 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 60 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 or the armed forces of the countries of origin (for example Omar Shishani) (for of forces Omar origin countries example of armed the or the Emirate’s of Chechnya) one Caucasus in of sectors commander the was years Gaziyev, (for Tarkhan example who for militancy clandestine of the either ans Pakistan pertise in using various types of weapons, to live-fire tactical training, the training, of weapons, live-fire to tactical types various using in pertise ex through physical exercises, and (from drills training placed on military typically is emphasis but the indoctrinated, are recruits training the During months up several to lasting training followed by specialised sic training, month-long undergo must combat volunteers units the prior joining to ba All armies. regular in those resembling methods using new recruits who train the militants who previously fought Caucasus the in militants the of domain the is training Military groups’ activities. armed ofelements the important supplies weapons are and securing and combatConducting training the Damascus authorities) Damascus the agents of execution alleged of and JMA’sexample arrest –the Aleppo in actions (for territory on seized population regime’sAssad civilian spies the amongst the exposing objective both being their out, with carried also are operations 182 181 180 179 178 177 176 of of war prisoners executions mass IS in participated and killing of two Russian spies in Omar Shishani’s group Shishani’s spies Omar in of Russian two killing and (forarrest of agentsthe origin example countries of services by the intelligence

http://www.akhbarsham.info/2015/02/10/108/

perience. ex military prior no with volunteers to comparison in value, added an constitute still they high, very not usually is countries these in training of military level the obviously – while countries their in service military compulsory who underwent service), military to drafted rarely are Caucasus of the (inhabitants states Asian Central the from volunteers all Above warsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/386-feitt.pdf http://small on: Based Taliban. the than enemy dangerous more a much were equipment and tactics their due to Pakistan, in movement’s camps the in trained militants IMU stan, Afghani in Northern fighting soldiers forces special of American accounts to According chive.org/details/HMC_race https://ar For example: Syria. in militants post-Soviet by published on materials Based within22_dvd.mp4 http://videos.videopress.com/UwXee3Hs/the-islamic-state-22uncovering-an-enemy- children: militants’ for post-Soviet school IS of an –astudent boy Kazakh ateenage by shot were Both Shishani). Omar all (above leaders their as as well Iraq, and in Syria fighting volunteers post-Soviet the about information gather to was of which objective the sion, - amis performing and services intelligence Russian the by recruited being to who admitted respectively, Kazakhstan and of Russia citizens Mamayev, Jambulat and Ashimov Sergey . Chechen first the during Gelayev of Ruslan command the under unit special Chechen the For example http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/03/isis_executes_civili.php 180 . The core of the post-Soviet militant groups is comprised of is groups . The veter post-Soviet core of the militant 177 and preventing the infiltration of their own ranks ranks own their of infiltration the preventing and 179 176 , or in Afghanistan and and Afghanistan , or in ). ). Counterintelligence 178 ). 182 181 ------. , and it is they who make up the organisation’s up the who it make core they is and Sunnis on Iraqi above all Statebased is –Islamic group of the character Iraqi the but former USSR states, volunteers rather the the from towards of trust show alack does not This necessarily basis. on apermanent it them to transfer Statenot did Islamic post-Soviet among the weaponry militants, such operate to experience and skills required the with presencedespite of individuals the 185 184 183 above of groups, and the functioning for of the They no less are importance or territories. control seized over the families) their with Syria in arrive which (some of militants the for infrastructure rear the organising financing, curing se as: such dimensions, other several in active are groups militants’ Soviet post- the training), and it to (recruitment related Besides activities combat and 3. Arabic and speak who battlefield the on who skills have proven their militants among experienced from recruited usually are –they do training not receive additional commanders rank Low units). future the cohesion and develop to is of within which coordination aim carriers or tanks (most often manned by Arab crews) by Arab (most manned often or tanks carriers personnel armed for howitzers, example at disposal, its weaponry military grouphad heavy on first Kobane) assault the (forfailed the battles example the some –of during groupsthepost-Soviet of from other Jihadists differs group Shishani’s Omar aspect this In mortars). (chiefly artillery lightand firearms large with equipped additionally are in Syria fighting The post-Soviet militants guns. machine with armed trucks SUVs and civilian tion –usually of transporta means and Iraq) from (war trophies helmets proof Kevlar vests, goggles, equipment, vision night bullet communication modern possess also The above mentioned systems. groups anti-tank and anti-aircraft portable ing lightand includ weapons, State’sarms Islamic during offensivesmall in 2014) army Iraqi fleeing by the (left made American and warehouses) army Syrian of range awide includes (from Soviet arsenal Their groups. by other used that to similar is former USSR states the from militants by the used The weaponry http://www.understandingwar.org/report/islamic-state-counter-strategy-counter-state

O Based on materials published by IS and groups linked to it taking part in the assault on Kobane. on Kobane. assault the in part it taking to linked groups and IS by published on materials Based mentioned groups. groups. mentioned above- of the of members statements and biographies short in present on information Based ther areas of operation areas ther 183 . 185 . 184 . It is noteworthy that . It that noteworthy is - - - - 61 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 62 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 lies. This is true also in the case of Islamic State, which possesses the largest largest the State, possesses which of Islamic case the in also true is lies. This fami their and militants supporting and continue to for fighting them sary goods neces the with groups by supplying and the aid material done through resources; rather is it financial with them providing directly mean necessarily does not groups Jabhat the al-Nusra). with aligned Financing groups smaller of case Turkey and the in Syria people goods between smuggling (mainly and to linked is group, mostoften of which the activities business the and of war of IS), case the spoils in the (especially organisation patron the from directly sources: comes groups several from post-Soviet for the militants’ Financing death. or absence their during families for militants’ care providing as well families), as the example forforhousing (also infrastructure, required the and financing securing militants: for the rear the involved are organising in aspects Several of existence). its (or them them persuade to at least orderattract to in unteers for new vol infrastructure this need to establish organisations terrorist the and important, is militants for the infrastructure rear required the organising of issue the that means State. This to Islamic linked those especially Iraq, and post-Soviet the amongst mayobserved be in volunteerstendency Syria fighting 187 186 important equally –is lawland of the is where sharia territories to persecuted being are where Muslims countries from motivated migration motivation. The religiously Hijra of – the their only one is part jihad Syria, in volunteers of the arriving part for asubstantial that remember to important is It ranks. their in fighting militants for the infrastructure rear organising consequences is mostfar-reaching the one with the potentially and groups of non-combat area above of mentioned and the operations The mostimportant Syria. in et militants phenomenon the of post-Sovi understand to necessary is them characterising that a new generation of Jihadists has been raised there raised been has anew generation ofthat Jihadists Pakistan, and Union haveJihad stayed for long so (since 1999) Afghanistan in Islamic and Movement of Islamic Uzbekistan the from –militants area Soviet It not is anew phenomenon post- along settlement. as the term in country this viewing families, their why along with reason volunteers Syria to the migrate

More in the next chapter. chapter. next the in More karachi-airport-siege-militants/ http://tribune.com.pk/story/720324/uzbek-fighters-involved-in- of 2014: June in airport Karachi on the attack the for example, in, part took militants of IMU’s children The adult 187 . Currently a similar asimilar . Currently 186 . That is - - - - lion and Iraq can marry or bring their wife-to-be from their countries of origin only only of origin countries their wife-to-be from their or bring marry can Iraq and Volunteers marry. to in plans whomSyria woman fighting sites) the Jihadist, network web (via social place upon apreviously acquainted from invitation takes The migration Kyrgyzstan. and Caucasus the It in mostwidespread is militants. of lone Syria to women, ordermarry to who in go there departures the is groups militant A new phenomenon Islamic post-Soviet amongst radical rites). by religious dictated is militant, of afallen wife the a widow, especially (marrying quickly again marry of, but care widowsusually taken still is ily fam his of death, amilitant’s case the In or organisation. group patron armed provided by aid the material the through sustained are families Militants’ migrations. of such scale –shows the State –Raqqah of “capital” Islamic the in rarer amongst those from the Caucasus the from those amongst rarer significantly and Kazakhstan) (mainly states Asian Central the from unteers their families their with arriving militants were of lone JMA cases (although there families their without Syria in travel whose members independentorganisations, of smaller, 194 193 192 191 190 189 188 former USSR states from militants of the for children drassa ma language Russian a special that The fact training. military undergo basic and texts Islamic basic taught Arabic, are group, bywhere they the run schools attend women at stay home, children and training, in located. Menparticipate is group particular of the base main where the town the in quartered are teers million US$ 425 from (estimated city the capturing after of Mosul the banks from assets dueseizing to in part resources, financial for all Muslims to migrate to the territories of the Caliphate) of the territories to the to migrate Muslims for all calls State actively Islamic (which of the banner under of fighting groups case the in It more is important organisations. patron the with coordination strict in done is families their and for militants infrastructure necessary the Securing

http://www.akhbarsham.info/2015/02/05/107/

http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/06/12/isis-just-stole- http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/16/terrifying-rise-of-isis-iraq-executions http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6c269c4e-5ace-11e4-b449-00144feab7de.html Ibid More in the next chapter and footnote 211. footnote and chapter next the in More 425-million-and-became-the-worlds-richest-terrorist-group/ tails/HMC_race https://archive.org/de for example: materials, organisations’ mentioned on above Based 189 ) .

and revenueand Turkey to generated oil by smuggling 192 ). The migration of entire families is more is common among vol ). families of The entire migration 193 . After arriving in Syria the volun the Syria in arriving . After 188 to as much as US$ 2bil much as as to 190 . 194 191 than in the case case the in than was established established was ------63 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 64 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 enforcing their loyalty), rather than using foreign militants for this purpose for this foreign militants using loyalty), than their rather enforcing and control over them (securing personnel and arrangements local existing of use the make preferto administration local maintain to willing groups that shows Syria, in longer operating been than State has of where Iraq, Islamic The example aid. humanitarian distribute former USSR also the from Jihadists 197 196 195 battlefield on the achievements combat in for for ayear, at significant least areward or as participating after is used by for example JMA in the proximity of Aleppo) proximity the in by for used JMA is example group’s to of loyalty oath or forced an swear to persuaded tactic (this leaders are population’s the inhabitants obedience, the orderguarantee to in At times etc.). executions population, the (terrorising methods brutal using including areas, these of controlling consist mostoften and not comprehensive measures arrangements). These local are existing on the relies usually IS (in Iraq Syria in have seized they territories on the engaged administration basic in also are ists agroup’s securing to needs,post-Soviet linked logistic Jihad Besides activities for or simply achievements, areward sold. as militants the amongst tributed IS) in –non-Muslim captive.(especially dis women They who are were taken http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30573385

org/sites/default/files/Defeating%20ISIS_0.pdf http://www.understandingwar. see: 2014 in Iraq in seized territories of the ministration IS’s, ad later and ISIS’s, For about more etc. plants power electric waterworks, as such ture, infrastruc strategic with dealing those especially institutions, apolitical –local, tioning func continue to administration Iraqi of the some allows IS Iraq, in territories seized the In com/?p=22368 Based on: http://www.chechensinsyria.com/?p=21230 and http://www.chechensinsyria. 195 . The same is true in the case of slaves sex case the in true is . The same 196 basis, basis, hoc ad an . On 197 - - - - - . the entire Caucasus” entire the and of Chechnya liberation “the with Putin Vladimir threatened and Arabic in al-Assad’s (delivered weaponry regime), by Moscow Bashar to Russian spoke seized presented the militants uploaded Islamic they which in factor; avideo ascare State as of issue Islamic of use the the illustrates that example as serve of town Tabqa can Syrian the in base government military the seized militants ther, who lives in the Pankisi Gorge ther, Pankisi who lives the in fa conversation his in with voiced supposedly Shishani was which by Omar of militants”, by on“thousands Russia attack alleged about an information the spreading while used tone was Federation. Asimilar Russian the to warning State’s Islamic presented as being “official” was militant Arab ment by an made 200 199 198 “American project”) an as (IS aimed at of effect destabilisation an as Washington’s actions deliberate America’s policy, East Middle of or mistakes even aresult as State –all Islamic of establishment the as well as Iraq, and Syria in war civil the is theme curring re A frequently militants. of the return hypothetical the with associated risks alleged the comes underlining to and down alarmist always almost is ments –SCO). Organisation Cooperation The tone state of or the Shanghai CSTO – the Organisation Treaty Security (forCollective dimension the example security the in active those especially organisations, of regional forum on the raised being also The is issue media. local the in as well as Asian) Central and sian Rus brought ofoften government up representatives(mainly statements in is Iraq and of post-Soviet Syria to Muslims departures mass The of subject the V. a threat to security in the post-Soviet area, it even stabilises the situation in in situation the post-Soviet it the even in stabilises area, security to a threat phenomenon constitute to described not fails only Paradoxically,the clusions. con different leads, however, of origin countries the uation in to diametrically sit the and phenomenon migration the war of post-SovietAnalysing Jihadists’ http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mZc3etLP-38

http://www.aif.ru/society/safety/1357241; http://www.km.ru/world/2014/10/09/islamist

channel is one example of this narrative, for example the 19 the for example narrative, of this example one is channel Nedeli Vesti programme news The popular ng.ru/cis/2014-10-21/1_asia.html available at: http://vesti7.ru/archive/index?edate=19.10.2014#21181. See also: http://www. skie-ekstremisty-i-terroristy/749443-polevoi-komandir-igil-prigrozil-rossii T on the post-on the and threats f threats and he in he f luence of luence 199 S . In the Russian media this unremarkable private state unremarkable this media Russian the . In 198 oviet area –J oviet area . The hysteria which began in the Russian media after after media Russian the in began which . The hysteria or the regionor the w ar m ar 200 Rossiya television state Russian the by broadcast . igration igration ihad in the Middle E Middle the in ihad th of October 2014 programme, programme, 2014 of October ast ast ------65 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 66 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 prove that he acted against the interests of the Russian Federation Russian of the interests the against he acted prove that to it necessary is jihad, in part for taking individual orderconvict to an in sia in (forRus example crime as a abroad conflict armed in participation not treat prison sentencesprison in resulting often trials, and of arrests consequences (frequent cases harsh face East Middle the in war the in of participation or suspected jihad from turning 203 202 201 departing from prevent to them methods seeks desperately avolunteer’s from appeals after only family, intervene to which ment services border). the when crossing law for interrogated It enforce and not the is rare controlled much less thoroughly and much less often are arriving, those to posed op as (those departing, area this to departing on those focused attention little with Turkey from East, Middle the and returning on individuals services curity concentration se of the the in seen be can for Syria volunteers departing wards region’s of authorities of the of many the relation The to neutral at states least State. of Islamic territory the to families their along with tle reset to Muslims all for volunteerscall also forbutnot recruit to only fighting, is aim their authorities –as of the ally unexpected an as serves also propaganda Jihadists’ rivals. main ideological their as Islam viewed whoby official and are young amongst people, growing, is whose especially popularity, power and communities, Salafist to is ideologically,weaken effect milieus immediate its some strengthen can jihad in participation long perspective, the term in While them. with collaborating apparatus clergy Muslim official the authorities and de is facto –and valve role of the playing asecurity therefore is strongest, are Islam radical and where Salafism those from especially states, former USSR the from War militants). active migration –also Caucasus ern North of the case the (and in Muslims mostradical of exodus the the is East Middle the in the conflict of effect term short The main of origin. countries the ures, aimed for example against opposition activists in Central Asian states or states Asian Central in opposition activists for against example aimed ures, meas on Turkish similar logistics territory. Meanwhile and for recruitment responsible or groups those of leaders of armed liquidation the the ple through for exam Jihadists, from stemming threats alleged the to neutralise attempting post-Soviet of the services states intelligence the regarding no information also http://izvestiya.az/nov/9650

interests of Russian Federation. the against conducted state, of that viewpoint legal the from illegal state, of aforeign ritory on ater group armed an in participation code: penal Federation Russian of the 208 Article http://www.doshdu.ru/novosti/v-rossii-osuzhden-uchastnik-siriiskoi-voiny http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/250956/; 202 ), despite the fact that the legislation of some of the states does of does legislation some states of the ), the that fact despite the http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/236388/; 201 beneficial for the for beneficial . Individuals re . Individuals 203 ). There is ------204 refugees) there Chechen (from among the Europe and Caucasus the from of recruits stream of the arerouting and Syria to of it exodus militants led an to Chechnya, tion in improvement economic an Kadyrov, of as situa the well as president Ramzan forces Chechnya’s and conducted repressions federal by the success, brutal for military no chances combination with not. In Caucasus one the in the while apriority, being as East Middle the in jihad of perception the radicals’ Islamic is for this reasons main of One the decreased. tangibly has region the in clashes of frequency and however former USSR, of region intensity the the unstable most place (when the years). previous to compared remains The Caucasus took astabilisation Caucasus, Northern of the case the etc.) in protests and armed attacks, (terrorist Islam radical with associated of threats no rise was there Iraq, and Syria in instability alongside deepening It that symptomatic is scholars). of amajority Muslim to according circumstances, particular in jihad on launching ban explicit even an or of amandate (the lack reasons due religious to paradoxically states their of territory on the activity or terrorist armed from refrain also of them Many minute. not mention to are it succeeding, starting, of jihad chances the years several next the where in countries, their in situation of the diagnosis accurate an and pragmatism radicals’ the from stems This Syria. to migration but rather domestically, actions armed/terrorist involveof it do not undertaking usually the consequences views, of radicalisation does to a lead conflict the in interest the While East. Middle the or towards region country their in Islam around situation the from focus their have shifted –communities more Muslim widely and – Salafists that fact the is in Syria the jihad of effect stabilising Another Caucasus. the in of militants agents for the amongst active years network the use to possibility the as well as regime, Syrian the from support and diplomatic Syria docontinuing to include so presence in Russia facilitate which Factors Caucasus. the in militancy clandestine the with case the is as similarly groupsthe comprised the of USSR, former volunteersfrom infiltrate to tempting ligenceare most probably agencies Russia) at post-Sovietall of the of (first states 2015). intel the March in that obviously fact This does not the exclude Istanbul in Quvvatov agents, by or Russian of Tajik Qatar Umarali oppositionin figure Yandarbiyev 2004 in leader Zelimkhan Chechen of the ample the (for past ex the in leaders, havemultiple used been times separatist Chechen

op. cit. op. Falkowski, Maciej in: More 204 . - - - - 67 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 68 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 detain them detain to excuse an opponents or finding at discrediting aimed services, special the to showto one’sterrorism in combating –effectiveness –alleged and Islam militant from of atmosphere threat an it create to is of disseminating goal the rather credible, called be hardly can information This Tajikistan. and Turkmenistan with border the near Afghanistan in militants of these tration concen alleged the and Asia Central wage to in jihad plans about militants’ IS texts publish also media Asian Central visits). and Russian international tant of post-Soviet eve or of onof impor the heads state summits (usually attacks or foiled militants of returning arrests on the information ample by releasing for ex Statereal, is Islamic from threat the prove to that try Tajikistan) and of some post-Soviet of services the (for states Kyrgyzstan The example special mission emissaries to various post-Soviet countries and establish cells there cells post-Soviet establish and various to countries emissaries mission to is comIS that severe conflict),and in are organisations two these (in reality of militants exchange for the basis the is which exists, Emirate Caucasus the State and Islamic between agreement unwritten an that even sources claim, Some international. terrorist the with contacts and experience training, their using of origin, countries their in jihad initiate to is goal whoseunteers, actual 208 207 206 205 attacks or terrorist militancy launch to militants of the possible of return the prospect the is Syria in the jihad influence of proof destabilising of the main The stated mostoften partures and the foreseeable progression of the situation in the Middle East East Middle the foreseeable in situation the of progression the and partures de of the not is character likely, former USSR states the the to while masse en returning Iraq and in Syria fighting of militants perspective reality, the In the opposition rally in Baku (12 Baku in opposition rally the or 2014) during September (on in centre Tashkent one bridges city of the the in flag in IS the – flying concerned with media the in discussed widely incidents

http://www.rferl.org/content/uzbekistan-islamic-state-flag-tajikistan-syria-iraq/26565807.

ticles/8283 and http://www.rg.ru/2014/09/26/sovbez-site.htmlFor example: http://www.aif.ru/politics/world/1357947, http://www.fergananews.com/ar isis/26635106.html html; been detained: http://rus.ozodi.mobi/a/26644567.html detained: been have Syria, in for jihad depart to then and road) –Khojent Dushanbe the along tunnels stroy de to (for example attacks out terrorist carry to planning who were people, thirteen that i.e. improbable, particularly was 2014) (October Dushanbe to visit Patrushev’s Nikolai FSB of of eve head on the of Tajikistan of Interior Ministry the by disseminated The information http://inosmi.ru/almadapaper_net/20140912/222959767.html http://www.pravda.ru/news/world/formerussr/other/06-10-2014/1229832-igil-0/ http://www.rferl.org/content/azerbaijan-islamic-state-extremism-demonstration- 208 . 205 . Through this lens, Syria is a training camp for the vol for camp the atraining is Syria lens, this . Through th of October 2014) – were also provocations by –were also 2014) of October 207 . Probably the . Probably the and 206 ------. them returning. them count to on it hard is case, this In Hijra. perform to commandment by the but rather jihad, in dutynot participate to so much by the guided are grants tory character of the travels to Syria to travels of the character tory migra shows the also leave East Middle for the families entire that The fact low. extremely is life a peaceful live to attempt and return unnoticed of an probability the situation, this In place there). in ofvisas or denunciation exit asystem (for through example control individual over an full exerting Uzbekistan, and of Turkmenistan case of the people in and, transfer the monitoring and of society surveillance effectively when it comesto function on experiences, Soviet based are which apparatuses, security problems,lenged their by awhole of internal array chal region’s of and corrupt the many weak, While states. are states Asian Central the and Azerbaijan Russia, in case the especially is this severe, and authorities were the consequences from –the prove that decided return to who The unlikely. of is stories militants life a to normal tive of returning probable sentence, authorities), prison repressions by the trial, perspec the (legal face could consequences they due the to that do realise they as ticket, 211 210 209 dominate ple peo young, inexperienced whose in ranks militants, the rate amongst tality fa high very the is unlikely is return scale large for that reasons ofOne the threat. asecurity constitute individuals such that expected be hardly It can breakdown. a mental or underwent by jihad disillusioned are place), who taking decide do to so but individuals already (which are returns That does not isolated exclude migration. atrue viewed be should as for Syria departures suggest that post-Soviet all the themselves, in countries as well as Islamic law is in force law in is Islamic where land to a impossible where is liveit to bysharia, to infidels, according governed territories from emigrate to necessity i.e. ), the and Koran the with line in be to communities Salafi accepted State by and many Islamic “Hijra” of the (propagatedby explanation theological by the caused is This join to them. of origin countries for or get wives their from candidates them,

http://kavkazpress.ru/archives/21687; http://news.nur.kz/286765.html For example the English language propaganda magazine of the Islamic State –Dabiq State Islamic of the magazine propaganda language English the For example com/doc/239137271/Dabiq-Call-to-Hijrah https://pl.scribd. 2014, August Hijra, to Acall Dabiq. matter: this to dedicated was edition The case of Azerbaijan. of Azerbaijan. The case 209 . For most of the volunteers departure for jihad is aone for is way jihad . For volunteers mostof the departure 211 . According to this interpretation, some emi of the interpretation, this to . According 210 . Many militants take their wives with wives with their take militants . Many – the 3 –the rd ------

69 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 70 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 into “failed” ones was predicted on numerous occasions on numerous predicted ones was into “failed” states”, whose and transformation “failing as described be can which gyzstan, Kyr and –Tajikistan states weakest of the case the even in notdid materialise Russia’s in tion was durability. have The interest) proven gloomy their forecast disintegra post-Soviet the USSR, (unless their of states the fall the since passed has which century quarter last the During goals. its ble achieve to of attempting would capa be Islam militant conditions that such it in only is and Tajikistan), or (even situation Uzbekistan in current of the conservation the than less likely seems chaos) still internal structures, state collapse of war, (civil the the threats existential causing crisis however, perspective, term internal medium an and one short post-Soviet in of situation the the of In the states. destabilisation ous of aseri case possible the in would by theoretically of return The scenario have1990s, not materialised. the since forecast Dagestan, Valley, and revolutions Fergana the in Tajikistan of Islamic predictions the Caucasus). also far society, So Northern the even in of the part by amarginal supported are slogans present (Jihadist base social doing so. in necessary Nor methods the is brutal use to prepared are they and Islam militant threat of the with competent sufficiently todeal are and vated, strong, moti sufficiently are states the perspectives: wider lacks region the in 213 212 post-Soviet for the Islam area militant and fundamentalism Islamic from stemming threat the other, ofon it overestimating the aresult is etc.), of powerface opposition,(combating in athreat consolidating the and goals political at realising aimed It one hand on is the materialise. to unlikely is media, the in resonant being while scenario, This attacks. conduct terrorist to and uprisings Asia), stir to Central and Caucasus the USSRmer (mainly for of the territory the to jihad the intention spread to their is of origin tries coun their to quoted when most often returning The motive militants which does not seem likely (nor can the pledges of allegiance to the caliph by some of caliph pledges to the (nor the does not likely seem can of allegiance State also by Islamic Asia or Central Caucasus the in a new “front” Opening

No. (12 162 Report Group, Asia Crisis International Failure?, to Road the On Tajikistan: For example: Caucasus Institute, July 2011. July Institute, Caucasus – Asia Central Independence, since Kyrgyzstan in Politics Powerand Failure. State with asia/tajikistan/162_tajikistan___on_the_road_to_failure.ashx; and Johan Engvall Flirting militant-islamic-threats osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/policy-briefs/2010-01-27/jihad-vs-new-great-game-paradoxes- January View, of Point OSW Asia, 2010, Central in http://www. threats Islamic of militant Paradoxes Game. Great TheNew vs. Jihad Falkowski, Maciej Strachota, Krzysztof in: More th of February 2009); http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/central- 213 . 212 . In reality jihad jihad reality . In ------will be possible only when a serious crisis occurs in the region. the in occurs possible be crisis when only aserious will it that it seems and materialise, to brought failed up, it has far so still is Asia tral Cen to return of their prospect the While jihad. global of the part became they where andPakistan, Afghanistan to migrating Asia, from fled Central 1990s the who of end at Movement the of Islamic Uzbekistan, of the involves militants the phenomenon well this post-Soviet illustrates A precedent which the from area one another. from to hotspot travel will forces Soviet Afghanistan) in the against war of the veterans as who (just professional to Jihadists, in manently, turning per East Middle probably the in stay will post-Soviet ofmajority the militants Therefore, the chaos. and descend into wars will region the and orate further probably deteri will East Middle the in situation the few years next the Over improbable. seems Moscow Raqqah and between conflict open For reasons these markets. global price on oil the the in a rise cause may additionally region Eastern Middle the in chaos Spreading East. dle Mid the to tethered forces strategically be to American for the a possibility creating post-Soviet and the from US attention area, diverting area, Soviet post-the from Salafists the active most forbenefits Moscow accumulating by: generate strategic can they furthermore threat, aserious does not constitute organisations) State (and similar Islamic perspective Russian the from Also State. Islamic to subordinated directly be will organisations these than rather deepen, State will Islamic and or IJU Emirate Caucasus the as organisations such between over recruits) by rivalry sions (caused mainly ten the that Caucasus). it more is the likely reason, from For this militants battle-hardened (including new recruits with ranks supplying own in only its post-Soviet Islam’s as the area periphery,State utility regards its views and Islamic East, West. Middle concentrated on the Being the also perspective later the etc.) in Jordan and in the (the Saudi Arabia, Sauds in regimes Eastern Middle Iran), (including the Shias include enemies State, whose main of Islamic adversary Moscow not is regime, astrategic Assad for support its the Despite not is for desirable which Jihadists. Russia, with confrontation a direct would post-Soviet mean liphate’s This the in area. a jihad to launch interest Ca it the which would in be in ascenario, imagine to it hard is East, Middle element of geopolitical the into alasting State morphs more, Islamic even if of it). Further administration and rent form (control territory over alarge world), cur its in remain it not is aforegone State will Islamic conclusion that Islamic the in popularity in (the increase achievements propaganda and ing build chapter).categories; state next present the moremilitary, Despite in the these in interpreted be Chechnya and Dagestan groups’ in leaders armed the ------71 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 72 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 214 East) Middle the in fighting Georgia Gorge in Pankisi the from Jihadists the from for stemming Russia threats of issue alleged the logic (for raising example abovethe fitinto propaganda media and politicians from statements actions, Russian threat). It even is more certain Islam probable, already since militant of face the Moscow the and in states particular between ties security tighter plays need for for for the control post-Soviet explanation of (as the an area power- geopolitical Russian tool in ahandy as serve They may also ernment. gov the independentfrom is which Islam combat opponents the and political authority, control over society, their increase neutralise order strengthen to in region’s regimes by the held abogeyman up be as authoritarian will issues above IMU, the of the case the in as post-Soviet Similarly role the in area. litical po play acertain will factors of minor, these both are State itself, Islamic and East, Middle the in fighting Jihadists the from originating threats the While

Russia: http://www.ng.ru/cis/2014-10-21/1_asia.html ade facto being as portrayed was turn in which State, Islamic the Gazeta Nezavisimaya in of 2014 October in published article an is propaganda Russian in issue above of the use of the example One , which suggested an array of threats to Russia from from Russia to of threats array an suggested , which American project aimed at aimed project American 214 - - . the region’s republics after the fall of USSR, is the consequent re-Islamisation consequent re-Islamisation of the is USSR, region’s fall the the after republics of all pace in at avaried underway been has process, which The mostimportant though. legislation, their in not ones. is reflected This Islamic called be should republics Caucasus Eastern the level oftion the Islam’sthat public it life, possible is the presence claim to in into considera Taking state. Russian the to concept alternative civilisational, or sole even socio-political, the and life, political and ofkey elements social one is of Chechnya), the Islam Ingushetia, (Dagestan, east Islamised heavily the In Russification. to subjected was and secularised is society and diluted, more is Islam Ossetia) Northern Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, west (Adygea, the In parts. western and eastern its between divide sider the con to it important is Caucasus Northern the in situation the When analysing conflicts). and disputes local in participate groups, which armed own have their Sufi brotherhoods (for dimension Dagestani example security the in gravity, also generate problems Islam of equal militant and Salafism than other currents that region). of the It part noteworthy is western the in Islam cultural and Islam, cial and offi folk Salafism, peaceful Sufism, (very strong subdivisions Islamic nal inter of the terms in – above diverse region all extraordinarily an is Caucasus Northern the dimension, ethnic the in sphere, as religious the In ground. the on reality the does not lens, reflect this one) through only region religious the in the (including situation the viewing Islam, Caucasian in current mostvisible the post-Sovietis wherethe Jihad area thein only place that is it fact the and Dagestan) in all (above Salafism growing the dynamically include Caucasus the Northern of Theformer USSR. specifics Federation,entire of the but Russian ofalso role the scale notical on merely the biggest plays the socio-polit where region Islam the is Caucasus The Northern 1. specifics. socio-religious the and situation internal the settings, geopolitical region’s thethe on that depending differs face challenges states and influence the of character regions. andandThe level states particular influencing factor important an is Islam, militant post-Soviet Howeverincluding the area. Islam, of stability and the security influence on have asignificant will East Middle the in problem fighting the of post-Soviet shows evidence that Jihadists Little VI N . orthern C in the post- the in A ctual I aucasus sla S m oviet area -related challenges underway. While militant Islam is is Islam underway. militant facto de While - - - - - 73 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 74 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 established in the 12 the in established a 19 a in political life, etc. life, political in milieus/groups religious and leaders informal and role of the official religion, to or even appealing accommodating (politicians politics the in ence of Islam Salafi-style beards and women wearing hijabs, which are thoughtSalafibe to are hijabs, and which women wearing beards Salafi-style of growing men persecution the Dhikr; rites,especially Qadiriya in participate to coercion or even combated limited (for present informal either the example: is is Islam place –Sufi in is situation Kadyrov, apeculiar byner PresidentRamzan man dictatorial ina ruled is which Islam). Chechnya, In official with nected areintercon groupslatter Sufi (theseand clergy Islamic official by the taken 217 216 215 authorities by the inspired where it was Chechnya, exceptin framework, the lawlegal into Islamic the of diffusion ous (a spontane shariatisation aprogressing element media),is and important its universities schools, of new mosques, Islamic (the establishment aspects tional institu common)the and increasingly becoming is rituals and mandments com religious (obeying the aspects of public Except for cultural/ritual life. the repressions (which vary in severity depending on time depending severity in repressions (which vary local place and despite federal of youth taking is The population. radicalisation million three its republic of with Dagestan the in strongest is intensity its and region, of the parts western and eastern the in place both process takes This amongst people. young especially region, entire the in is burgeoning Salafism

de facto ities’ ities’ author Chechen of alcohol, sale on the imposed limits substantial scarfs; head wear to versity at uni studying and institutions public in employed for women order informal the regions; republic’s of the all in operate disputes, law private settle which courts, sharia For example line with other radical steps undertaken in the security sphere prior to the Sochi Olympics. Olympics. Sochi the to prior sphere security the in undertaken steps radical other with line in moving afterwards, place took wave of repressions Anew Abdulatipov. –Ramazan cies poli of soft opponent aradical was of Magomedov, successor whose resignation forced and of 2012), August in militants the by executed probably attack an in killed (who was keyski Chir Effendi Said – Sheikh leader Sufi Dagestani of key death the following lin’s pressure due Krem halted It was Dagestan. in situation the calm partially to helped Thedialog bates. de theological and meetings reoccurring part took Scholars Sunna of Ahlus Association organisation Salafi SBDM and of the Magomedov. Representatives Magomedsalam leader Dagestani the by initiated was dialogue Sufi-Salafi formalised unprecedented, an 2010 In itual Board of Dagestan’s Muslims (SBDM). of Dagestan’s Muslims Board itual the Spir within clergy official the and (militants); wing armed own their with often selves, them around groups business and political religious, informal gather who leaders, Sufi the both include These role. political important an play also actors Islamic Other Islam. to fer re politicians Dagestani many there, active parties political Islamic no being there Despite Dagestan. in seen be can Islam political of influence strong especially an Chechnya, Besides th century Chechen Sheikh Kunta-haji Kishiev). Other forms of Islam are are Kunta-haji of forms Islam Sheikh Kishiev). Chechen Other century de facto the official Islam (a local branch of the Qadiriya order, which was order, which Qadiriya the of branch (aIslam local official the support of polygamy (which is theoretically penalised under Russian law). Russian under penalised theoretically is (which of polygamy support 216 th ). century in Baghdad, and initiated in the Caucasus by Caucasus the in initiated and Baghdad, in century 215 )

and an increasingly strong pres strong increasingly an and 217 ) and efforts under efforts and ) ------out. On the other hand, the militants are too weak to go beyond the tactic they they go to weak too beyondtactic the are militants the hand, other out. the On it root of impossible row group it followers entirely to family, seems that and by anar supported etc.) is and politicians local on from orders based attacks organising officials, and businessmen from ransom (demanding settings litical mafia/po thelocal in rooted some sufficiently in republics deeply and covert, region’s element of It the so is become landscape. alasting groups, has political State), Salafi the Islamic or the with as Emirate Caucasus of the banner the der un operating groups armed (the scattered militancy clandestine The Islamic 218 state) “infidel” the from benefits social other don’t they cases, even or accept (in extreme pensions state the with contacts de facto the is which legislation, state the than rather thesharia, is villages it these In Salafists. are inhabitants of or their amajority all republic, and entire the around spread villages are villages”. the form of “Salafi in is These present of Salafism dimension ditional ad an leader Dagestan or in mosque, local while aparticular around gathered at times villages, larger and towns concentrated in circles, form of informal the exclusivelytake communities Salafi the republics other the In Dagestan. in unique is especially Federation. theThe situation Russian from off breaking not, however, is This region. the in with synonymous rule sharia establishing of goal ultimate their Dagestan) in do not conceal (especially casus’s Salafists Cau Syria).or the in Caucasus Nevertheless, the in jihad ofthe joining case the in also character, individual have not evident (these an rather being tancy mili clandestine the to ties their with character, of apeaceful are Caucasus the Northern in communities Salafi mostof the persecutions, Despite the polytheists. and as heretics them regard Salafists the while tradition, ofselves defenders the as them perceiving with Sufis between generations, aconflict simultaneously is Salafists and Sufis groups. between Sufi The conflict the supporting visibly is state the conflict, violence to Salafi-Sufi on the multiple In sorting occasions. theboth re sides of with Salafists, and thebrotherhoods Sufi between conflict severe the is 1990s, place the since in situation, religious element of the during en An beliefs. their and forced to conceal persecuted being are etc.). Salafists

ruption, inefficiency of the authorities etc.). the authorities of inefficiency ruption, (cor factors socio-economic the and factors, ideological both due to established were nities commu Salafi These district). (Khasavyurt or Novosasitly district) (Karabudakhkentskiy Gubden district), (Untsukulsky Vremenniy , include villages of such Examples law of land. The inhabitants try to avoid to try any The law inhabitants of land. 218 . ------75 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 76 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 Chechnya and State Dagestan (about in groups Islamic to adozen armed pledging loyalty of region units the in appearance (end the of and 2014) militancy Islamic the took place which in rift the contextexamine to local the in important It also one Syria). in the versus Caucasus the in jihad of priority the caliph, self-proclaimed the to oath an swearing putes regarding (dis militancy clandestine Islamic the within divisions in result they since region, the in factor astabilising are currently they phenomena. Furthermore, these on influence do but not have they Caucasus, adirect the in Muslims to or, more broadly, militants the to of interest are Iraq and Syria State in Islamic of an establishment or the of exodus Caucasus volunteers the the from East, Middle vector of the development. or in on their come Jihad into existence they them word onbut final whether do have thenot world, affect can Islamic the in place taking events including influence, External region. the processes in socio-political logicof the the formedphenomena locally,with which line in are Caucasus the Northern in militancy Islamic the and Salafism the Both future. the in tactic this to return will they out that ruled be cannot 221 220 219 warfare guerrilla/terrorist have for of used limited years tions issued by the Caucasus Emirate’s leader in 2014 Kebekovin Emirate’s Caucasus leader by Aliaskhab the issued tions instruc (according the to scale on alarger attacks conduct to ceased terrorist state). militants the recently Islamic of While an establishment to rably linked insepa is themselves favourably. justice social for militants though, This, the fight for but their does view slogans, does not Jihadists’ support society of the (the majority support social of sufficient alack as well as militancy, combat the to methods of use brutal forces make which security local and Russian of the efficiency and of war), years many strength the the from leaders, exhaustion (a of experienced lack weakness militants’ bya given area). the caused is This control overexert (notto scale to mention larger on a attempts conflict armed

commanders (for example the influential commander Makhran Saidov). Makhran commander influential the (for example commanders Chechen several and Dagestan southern Kyzylyurt, Khasavyurt, of Makhachkala, Emirs Muhammad), Abu (Emir Asilderov Rustam of Dagestan commander supreme so-called the Byutukayev, Aslan of Chechnya Emir the include: Caliph the to oath an pledging Those https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8GTfot8hBEshttp://golosislama.ru/news.php?id=24196; brothels, exhorting ransoms from business people). business from ransoms exhorting brothels, and alcohol selling stores on attacks Islam’sclerics; official brotherhoods, Sufi of the ers lead administration, and forces security of the members (killing of terror acts individual of organising mainly –consist attacks out larger of carrying capable were ago, they when years several situation the to –contrary Caucasus the in militants of the operations Current 221 ). The renunciation of loyalty towards the emir of the Caucasus Caucasus of the emir the ). towards The of loyalty renunciation https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mtDHhSbTxFg; 219 , and launch an an launch , and 220 ), it - - - - 222 militants the of weakening lead afurther to will return, in which, Caucasus the in militancy the within divisions the of be a deepening will consequence point, beneficial) from Russia’s tangible (and, region. the only Its in viewthe events influence not will reality in and character, most probably adeclarative only caliph had the to of allegiance oath Pledging an Caucasus. the in jihad oring supporting State’s Islamic not is wag much evidence suggesting in there interest Russia, for threat above adirect mentioned the events constitute that claiming ties authori caliph). Russian homethe to Despite loyal region the their in units ing establish (by State’s Islamic structures position within own their strengthen ofhoping is to some –butrift, notthe decisive stoked –influence. These ranks IS’s within post-Soviet the from militants conditions. Inspiration worsening from stemming of have despair act for an successes, ISIS but also militants Caucasian fascination not of asign only the was caliph the to Pledging loyalty East). Middle the to of forces, exodus recruits the security Russian of the hands at the of it decimation militants the support, loss of ofity leaders, its the social the low author commanders, experienced of lack a financing, with (problems few for years going last been through has Emirate Caucasus the which crisis due but region, to a serious rather the in took of place actions IS not a result as Federation and attempts to solve the systemic socio-political and economic and socio-political solve to Federation systemic attempts and the Russian of rest the Caucasus’sthe due back the to with moving integration will twenty years last the there for havede-Russification)underway been which re-Islamisation, Russia, and Caucasus the gap between civilisational growing processes (the the and stabilising region the in situation seesthe scenario tic 1990s). the scene (as in optimis it was An political power plays Russian on the for instrumentally used be can Caucasus the that mind in when bearing cially of a probable violence, and escalation espe radicalism) explosion of Islamic an conflicts, (open ethnic Caucasus the in situation deterioration of the stant in an Kremlin’s would control of region spell over the the aweakening to ing lead Russia in and/or turmoil economic A serious political crisis instability). (the region’s Caucasus but controllable Northern permanent, the in situation current of the conservation the with synonymous be will regime, Kremlin the of continuity the as Federation, well as Russian the in stability political and economic Maintaining Caucasus. a much biggerthe Northern over influence has region the towards policy Russian the and itself Russia The in situation

in the Caucasus and the Middle East. East. Middle the and Caucasus the in those both State, Islamic and Emirate Caucasus of the supporters the amongst debate heated stirred militants of the part asubstantial by Caucasus of the Emir the to loyalty Renouncing 222 . ------77 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 78 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 a response to the ideological crisis after the fall of the USSR, Turkish USSR, of the (above fall the after crisis ideological the to a response is which phenomenon: Islamisation, for acontinuing this reasons several are There Azerbaijan. in growing is factor role Islamic of the the Nevertheless, ideology promoted state authorities). by the national the with line in is (this identity ethnic much more important of the one only part as Islam treating religion, to whole distanced is –on the society importance great of also is society of of by Azerbaijani use repressions. The often stance leash, on ashort them keep to movements and religious enough the control to and strong is simultaneously and elite, ruling of the and state of the stability the for a threat as Islam views which establishment by a secular country, ruled secular is a Azerbaijan settings. thesocio-political is this reason Thefor flicts. con by internal not is beleaguered Islam diversity,Despite such Azerbaijani communities. Salafi “Nursist”), radical to the as Azerbaijan in movement, Gülen known Fethullah by Turkey supported followers and the of the movements inspired and (mainly Sufi brotherhoods through organisations, Shia and communities radical from diversity: internal by extraordinary characterised be baijan’s can which Islam, 223 west and country’s the in north dominant are Sunni the while Peninsula, Absheron on the and country of south the the in dominate Shias observed. be can nities commu Sunni of the or even expansion, growth, adynamic USSR, lapse of the the col after negatively.Islam Furthermore, and Sunni Shia between conflicts and divisions the view to and simply Muslims, as being themselves declare to of them) majority (if not the ofitage Azerbaijanis aconsiderable caused part her Soviet but by the Shias, dominated was Azerbaijan Traditionally mate. esti unambiguously to difficult denominations two the between proportions with there, Sunnis and of Shias coexistence the is by Muslims, inhabited states post-Soviet from it other differentiates that trait, Azerbaijan’s distinctive 2. aplan. out such carry to resources and concepts will, impossible,of due political problems. seems though, lack to This

A in Azerbaijan, Baku 2004, page 310. 2004, Baku Azerbaijan, in Yunusov, Islam Arif in: More Sunni. 8.9% as and Shia being as 29.6% Muslims, simply being as themselves described questioned 57.6% of Yunusov, individuals that showed –Arif fender de rights human and activist social analyst, Azerbaijani by conducted survey Sociological zerbaijan 223 . The division between Sunnis and Shias is not the only one within Azer one only not within is the Shias and Sunnis . The between division ------an important Islamic group in Azerbaijan in group Islamic important an movement Gülen is The moderate Turkish Fethullah socio-political/religious negatively. view Azerbaijanis most which Iran—acolumn of country afifth as Shias regard of society part asubstantial authorities and the both institutions: and of organisations Shia growth the hinders that Iran or with perceived connection real It the precisely there). studied leaders of (several their Iran oriented clearly towards are which organisations, and Ibrahimoglu) (for Ilgar Azerbaijan example active Imams independentShia several are there authorities. Besides that, by the illegal declared it 2003 was In 1990s. the in established was of Azerbaijan Party lamic 225 224 schools) in head scarves on wearing ban over the Nardaran 2010 in protests the example (for issues socio-political in showed interest occasions on an numerous also law, not live to only sharia to but according tries has of society part pro-Iranian devout and traditionally This radicalism). for well-known who their are aran, on Nard centred villages, Shia (several Peninsula Absheron on the and south country’s the in developing are mainly communities and organisations Shia a government institution. Azerbaijan); to fact it in is limited reality in is which Caucasus, entire the in predecessor, Soviet its (which, as have to over just authority Muslims aspires low its authority and Caucasus of the of Muslims Board Spiritual the towards of of trust alack result the also is circles of independentIslamic The growth into religion. of hydrocarbons), export channelled often is the from elite the and society between of wealth distribution economic (the unequal situation negative the is of cause which main the frustration, social causes a police state conditions of ones). the pean protest under express to of The possibility lack pro-Euro and ones, democratic (not but also Islamic only milieus and groups independent all it accompanied by is against repressions importance; of great are tightened being principles). regime The authoritarian consequences of the democratic more than Baku with cooperation energy (valuing cynical being as West, the viewed whose by Azerbaijanis policies are with disenchantment activity, Iranian movement) Gülen alesser to extent, and, Fethullah the all 1990s (opening its own schools, business activity, financing the construction the construction activity, business financing schools, (opening own its 1990s

http://in.reuters.com/article/2010/12/10/idINIndia-53485920101210 point-view/2015-05-27/great-leap-turkey-under-erdogan dogan, Er leap. Turkey under Thegreat Matusiak, Marek movement: Gülen Fethullah on the More OSW Point of view of Point OSW 224 . Based on this community, and probably inspired by Iran, the Is the community, by Iran, probably and inspired on this . Based , June 2015 available at: http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/ at: 2015 available , June 225 . It developed dynamically in the the in . It developed dynamically - - - - 79 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 80 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 between 10-25,000 people across the country people the 10-25,000 across between at estimated with numbers dynamically, growing also are communities Salafi is another cause of the Salafism’s growth there Salafism’sgrowth of cause the another is zone conflict Karabakh the refugees from marginalised socially oftlement the The set times. Soviet during operating factories of petrochemical closures the unemployment).(forexample for Salafism bedrock caused These by the were are problems thesocial Here Azerbaijan. in of Salafism centre important other an is of Baku) north located about 30kilometres of inhabitants, (400 Sumgait people). young (mainly radicalism city The Islamic and Salafism to turn tions, motivated persecu ethnically and policy offace aforced Azerbaijanisation people total), in about who the 3-400,000thousand Avars, in Rutuls; Tzakhurs, (Lezgins, Azerbaijan north in living minorities problem the of and ethnic estan Dagof the proximity to closelylinked is Russia bordering regions in Salafism of Sheki). Quba, Qusar, The growth Khachmaz, Qakh, (Zaqatala, dominate where Sunnis Azerbaijan, north-western and northern manov), in as well as Suley leader Qamet mosque, led by charismatic Bakr Abu mosque and Lezgin called so mosques –the closed, two, currently the to linked (groups Baku in 228 227 226 Ankara from anegative reaction with thusdid meet not Theseerupted. actions and Gülen Erdogan between conflict ofend 2013 by the movement when Turkey in visibly increased open an itself Gülen the linked individuals and ment). institutions Repressions targeting Turkey move with Gülen the associated (including institutions the towards Turkey not but towards only also such, as animus of an rise the in resulted and agenda Azerbaijan, in Islamic AKP’s of the dissemination of bythe fears caused It was 2002. in Ankara power to in came AKP when the turn took adownward Azerbaijan, in activities cultural and religious Turkish social, towards erally Turkey. with operation movement, more gen the and Baku’s towards relations co authorities) by the towards also (shared Azerbaijan present in enthusiasm circles) the to due military and government officials high including porters, network of sup informal an creating schools, of religious new mosques and http://almanac.afpc.org/Azerbaijan

research/9864-the-gulen-movement-in-azerbaijan http://www.hudson.org/ Azerbaijan: in movement Gülen on the More NewsCatID=355. news.com/azerbaijan-shuts-down-gulen-linked-schools-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=67988& http://www.hurriyetdaily of 2014); (beginning Azerbaijan in schools Gülen-linked closing state the was movement Gülen Fethullah the against aimed actions of the The culmination state’s laws and view participation in the global jihad as mandatory). In 2013 clashes be 2013 clashes In mandatory). as jihad global the in participation view state’s and laws the recognise not do they example (for public Salafi general of the those than radical more much are views Salafi whose Harijis, so-called of the community a small also has Sumgait 226 . 227 228 . They are concentrated mainly concentrated mainly . They are . ------of Azerbaijan its goal is to pressure Baku into cooperation with Moscow (for intowith cooperation Baku pressure to is goal its of Azerbaijan case the in post-Soviet and positionthe its in rebuild to area, trying is Russia Azerbaijan. towards policy Russian with associated is risk large A particularly policy. foreign and/or Azerbaijan country’s influence in situation the destabilise to Iran) and Russia exploited be by outside can (mainly factor actors Islamic mension, the di external the unrest). In (caused for by social crisis example political ous 230 229 have foughtnis Afghanistan) in Azerbaija 200-250 around total in Afghanistan; 23 in and Caucasus, Northern the in fighting while were killed of Azerbaijan 20131999 and citizens 33 at least (between Pakistan and Afghanistan in as well as Caucasus, Northern the in fought 1999,have from also starting Muslims, Azerbaijani hundred Several apolice operation. during were dismantled but Sumgait, they Brothers) and Forest (the called so Azerbaijan northern in groups armed militants) Dagestani from assistance (probably with establish to tried Mollachiev). they gar 2008 In (for Il Caucasus example who previously fought Northern the in militants and Suleymanov Qamet formed group around the from who splintered by radicals 2008). in were perpetrated Baku Most of mosque in them Bakr Abu on the tack at country, of the agrenade north the in on them forces attacks and security the with (for clashes example country took the place incidents in nor armed mi several 2000s of the beginning the From Caucasus. Northern of the that to comparison in pales but scale its Azerbaijan, present in also is Islam Militant between the Shias and Sunnis and Shias the between (especially currents Islamic particular outbetween breaking conflict and lam) Is militant (including groups of Islamic activation destructive of the risk the dimension, internal the In nature. of apolitical derivedthreats from are they secondary, as are threats Islam-related jan’s Potential stability. and security for Azerbai challenge aserious It constitute doesnot regime. thus and state Azerbaijani of the character secular the and Islam active politically and cially so towards thesociety’s influence dueto distancing East), limited Middle has the in jihad in of Azerbaijanis participation the (including factor The Islamic http://jihadology.net/2014/01/28/guest-post-azerbaijani-foreign-fighters-in-syria http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/03/18/syrian-crisis-view-from-azerbaijan the Azerbaijani security by services: surveillance constant under are http://www.eurasianet.org/node/68341 They itself. Sumgait in attacks or terrorist armed any out carried not have Harijis however, far, the So Syria. in jihad the in of participating tus sta mandatory the regarding dispute on a based out, broke Harijis and Salafists the tween 230 229 ), aseri be to possibly seems were only there . ------81 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 82 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 destine activities. clan to shift their and communities of Muslim radicalisation lead the to they i.e.those desired movements)oppositeto effects independent Islamic bring an”, Turkey), and Iran preventive apply the policies they (repressions against aWest-inspired Russia, “Maid regarding (fears mentality embattled oflens an world the the through out viewing and breaking unrest, of fear social constant but, due their to above of threats the aware authorities seem The Azerbaijani Azerbaijan. to athreat does not constitute also thus and Caucasus the Moscow. State’s in situation of Islamic the do not goals destabilisation include less leverage has than Iran Azerbaijan, in situation internal the to regard with at developingAzerbaijan’s aimed over influence its actions Shias). However, of anumber undertaken has Iran past (in the latter by posed the threat the to Iran’sTo Baku’s maycommensurate be some extent, actions regarding fears 231 professing (Azeris), (Georgians Adjara Kvemo in live Kartli mainly Muslims post-Soviet Georgian the in one strongest is area. of the Orthodox) (Eastern religion influence of society, the and which a state in in function they thermore aminority. Fur constitute Georgia in exists). Muslims community Muslim where no local (excluding Armenia, Asia Central and Caucasus of the states er oth of the when all to compared unique is Georgia in The of situation Muslims 3. undertaking such measures by for territory contrary, own its Moscow threat would not aserious create problem the to (separatism). Lezgin held commonly belief Despite the the with factor Islamic the combining use, easily relatively could Russia atoolbe which can Islam of militant of renewed (provoking hostilities), threat issue the bakh of of range use Kara awide leverage.terms), the make Moscow with Along can Baku’son conflict Karabakh of forthe asettlement exchange in integration concessions (for beneficial example Eurasian of mutually proposals and sure pres political Besides the projects. integration Eurasian the in participate to –for Azerbaijan scenario sphere), maximum energy the in the and in example

G of instability close to its borders as a threat to its internal security. security. internal its to athreat as borders its to close of instability zones view not does Russia that shows Donbas in actions of Russian case the Furthermore, Dagestan). in strong very is sentiment (anti-Azerbaijani Azerbaijan against inhabitants of its mobilisation and Dagestan in support enormous with Moscow provide would Lezgins Azerbaijani the to given support the contrary, the On Dagestan. in destabilisation increased threaten not would factor) Islamic the with interconnected (even if issue Lezgin the Raising eorgia 231 . ------(2012-2013) such conflicts visibly(2012-2013)intensified conflicts such power to rose coalition Dream Georgian the after Ittions. that noteworthy is celebra or public Islamic of amosque, minaret building over erupt the usually and Muslims Christians Orthodox theEastern between villages). Conflicts of entire mud were at risk which (which slides Adjara in threatened regions Adjara’s times Soviet the have from the since relocated been which Muslims to or (for Samtskhe-Javakheti), Guria example country of the parts other in villages selected in level, and, on a local Adjara in all problemof present is first first The Caucasus. theSouthern position in their strengthen to affairs ternal Georgia’s in intervene to in card Turkey Islamic (Russia, the playing Iran) and actors of external risk the and escalating, Christians and Muslims between of tensions risk the major challenges: two Islam-related are levelwide there anation On itself. generated by those Islam and face they those –both lems the prob as do above differs, mentioned the regions in The of situation Muslims 233 232 10% population of around to the equates which Georgia, in about 450,000 Muslims are there total, authorities. In Georgian by the trolled people) not is con thousand (several which of region Abkhazia breakaway (about Tbilisi present in 20,000 people) also the are and communities Muslim Avars). and Gorge, Azeris Small Pankisi the in (Chechens Kakheti and Islam) evidence that shows Jihadists from Adjara fighting in the Middle East. Middle the in fighting Adjara from shows Jihadists that evidence any credible there noris communities, noHowever, Salafi are there Adjara in of some them. radicalisation the USSR), with of the other on the and fall the ter af (the process began Adjara’s in one hand to Christianity converting Muslims the support communities).on for results Muslim This of financial lack the tion, posi authorities (theprivileged Church’s by the also aconcealed manner, in up 30% only approximately of Adjara’s make (Muslims jority and, population) ma Christian the Church, Orthodox Eastern Georgian by the Adjara in living

http://kavpolit.com/musulmanskaya-obshhina-gruzii-k-voprosu-upravleniya-i-religi ment_data/file/295315/March_14_Islam_in_Georgia_final.doc oznoj-praktiki/ and https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach cles/248998/). http://georgia.kavkaz-uzel.ru/arti stood: once Soviets the by destroyed amosque where aplace in centre acommunity building against who were of Muslims, (protests -Javakheti Samtskhe- in village Moha and http://georgia.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/248998/) drassa: ma of anew opening against (protests Kobuleti in also occurred Incidents in-batumi-60860. http://dfwatch.net/adjara-changes-its-decision-to-allow-new-mosque- problems: generate also Batumi in mosque new a build to Plans flict-in-chela-georgia-still-unresolved-23762. http://dfwatch.net/minaret-con For see: more 2013. in of Samtskhe-Javakheti village Chela the in minaret of a building the surrounding conflict the was sort of this incident biggest The 233 . Pressure is exerted on Muslims on Muslims exerted is . Pressure 232 . ------83 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 84 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 of the Muslims of Eastern and Western Georgia (which include both Shias and and Shias (which both include Western Georgia and of Eastern Muslims of the Boards Spiritual the 2011 in –creating community Muslim the of “managing” model aSoviet authoritiesestablish to took steps Georgian the Muslims, gian influence of the Geor limit to attempt on Azerbaijan Turkey, an and As Iran jani rivalry. the Azeri community in Georgia is ade is facto Georgia in community Azeri the schools). in language Therefore Azeri for support the Azerbaijan, from sations organi developing with population, contacts Azeri of the activation activities, (support for factor cultural ethnic on but, the based Georgia in minority Azeri the within operate to attempting is too Azerbaijan’s –Baku against interests activity, however, Iranian runs Muslims. cultural as regarded be can most part who in Azeris Georgian low due of level the the to of religiosity mainly results, derisory achieved far so has policy Azerbaijan). in Iranian ban hijab the against protests (for through populations example Azerbaijani local the activate cally politi to attempted also Azeris) Georgian of the capital (the informal Marneuli in organisations Pro-Iranian Mashhad). Qom and in (mainly Iran in study youth for to local provides scholarships and madrassas, of mosques and Shia construction the supports Iran Tbilisi, and Kvemohave in active been Kartli organisations pro-Iranian several 1990 of the beginning the From Georgia. ern east in Shias Azeri on the focused is place which in policy asimilar has Iran 234 Orthodox Christian) Eastern – of a Georgian (the stereotype identity oflens monolithic ethnic-religious the society, viewed through generally who are Georgian among in Muslims Adjara’s the of anti-Turkish towards rise attitude ahostile but also sentiment, the and Georgia) against claims for territorial early preparations of making (accusations intentions it overtions, not causes Ankara’s actual fears only ac these When Turkey’s via of Georgia. strengthened is positionGeorgia in whole the around spread communities vation of schools) Adjarian for the (forreno aid developmental the and example provides humanitarian also at Turkish propagatesschools, (and studying madrassas), and universities key’s of mosques, Turkey religious attention. building the constant supports object of an Tur live) of also where they (regardless are Muslims Adjarian

ing_Paper_57_En.pdf http://www.ecmi.de/uploads/tx_lfpubdb/Work Adjara, in Transformation Religious and Islam Liles, Thomas http://iseees.berkeley.edu/bps/publications/2004_04-sani.pdf, 2004, of Berkeley University Georgia, in Practices Islamic and W. Islam Walker, Edward kidze, Sani Giorgi tensions: Orthodox Muslim-Eastern the and Adjara in situation on the More 234 . battleground for Iranian-Azerbai battleground ------gest, that the Jihadists returning to Georgia (mainly the inhabitants of Pankisi, of Pankisi, inhabitants the (mainly Georgia to returning Jihadists the gest, that anysugto evidence there Noris develop to conflicts. into serious potential the do havenot Salafists) and (for Shias between them example between tensions the and state, the towards loyal are Muslims Georgian a minority,Being the count on support. its cannot it also Church, favoured orthodox the to contrast however, state; by imposed the in not restrictions to is subjected and tions enjoys freedom of ac Salafis) the (including Georgia in community Muslim the that fact of because the mainly state, of the security and stability for the generate to It endogenous threats does not Georgia possible in seem for Islam Georgia. in situation internal the does not influence of control republic, existence overits lack the but dueto Tbilisi’s Abkhazia, in community Salafi asmall also There is ties. communi those repressing authorities were begin to the if only change could country’s the to The stability. situation enough not achallenge cause to litical apo and Tbilisi), small are but they Kakheti, (for Kvemo in example Kartli, exist communities Salafi small other several exceptfor Pankisi, Georgia, In lamic terrorism. Is and hole” crime haven for –asafe into a“black organised transform could ment’s power, Pankisi scenario, took Rose Revolution. place prior the to this In govern central of the of aweakening case the in grow problem may further The dangerous. be can growth) demographic large combined with spectives, problemligious socio-economic ones onof (unemployment, the per lack the Georgia), however, towards re loyal of superimposition the are the Pankisi from (Chechens security state to athreat does not constitute enclave itself the de facto the be law will Islamic where gorge years, the several enclave in in of asharia establishment the be probably by more will not severe shocks) interrupted are (if they Pankisi in place taking processes thesocial The of effect important. being as religion gard the older and does notre generation, which Salafists the between divisions the deep are as majority) a character, are is a problem of a local young Salafists Gorge the (amongst thePankisi in community Salafi of alarge The existence results. limited yield etc.), efforts media their state, butmadrassas, despitethe from support (mosques, institutions and communities Islamic control of over all formal take to attempt boards Georgian of the Both Pashazade. ledtimes) by Allahshukur (a of legacy Soviet Baku in Caucasus of the of Muslims Board of the diction outside juris of the transfer to was Sunnis). consequences of of One this the , but not formal, legal system. The existence of The existence system. legal , but not formal, ------85 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 86 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 ed of terrorist activity; and also social actions, calculated to achieve along achieve to term calculated actions, social also and activity; ed of terrorist suspect applied individuals to of liquidation athreat, immediate the is which of aim the methods, “hard” both use they dimension: this in policy a two-speed authorities have Kazakhstan’s them. by Astana’s towards policy partially and Syria to departures by the neutralised currently is negativebut potential their Kazakhstan, in exists still Salafists, form of radicalised the in bedrock, social Astana’s from issue point of view.tant one –the The areal is problem itself mostimpor the is themselves repeating attacks of terrorist The possibility unrest. of social religion-based risk potential the Iraq), and and Syria to (mainly organisations terrorist of Islamic ranks the to fightin departing citizens Kazakhstan’s terrorism, of Islamic acts of of arenewal possibility the following problems occur: the Kazakhstan, in 235 Salafists radicalised local conducted by attacks of a terrorist series witnessed country when 2011, the in only The changed situation Islam. not militant to problems any face related did Kazakhstan independence of twenty years first the during states, other ut-Tahrir Hizb the region’s the to movement) contrary have In developed there. all (above fundamentalism Islamic and Union Soviet of Salafism the fall the Since radicalism. Islamic to problems from not related –is free Asia Central in developed country economically and moststable the –politically Kazakhstan 4. position. anti-Western, its and on Russia, anti-Turkish stance biguous anti-Islamic and am Church’s the is risk the increases evencountry. further which Afactor the in influence Russian Tbilisi’s pro-Western re-establish and derail course order to in Georgia in situation internal the exploited destabilise to by Russia potentially be problems,can or ethnic Pankisi in thesituation to similar flicts, con such that society. fact in elevated by Thethe timent being is level of risk sen anti-Muslim growing and Church Orthodox Eastern Georgian ofcies the aggressivepoli by the caused extent alarge to These are challenge. serious amuch more are Christians and Muslims the between tensions The growing stability. and security state’s the to threat aserious constitute can of Azeris) number asmall but also

Kazakhstan lam in the post-Soviet area in the textbox – The radicalisation of Salafists in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan. in of Salafists –Theradicalisation textbox the in area post-Soviet the in lam Is- militant and Salafism jihad: to faith to return the I–From Chapter in earlier Described 235 . Currently, in the context of Islam-related threats context of threats . Currently, Islam-related the in ------increased activity of official Islamic institutions Islamic of official activity increased to a deterioration of the security situation security adeteriorationto of the may lead return their that –despite speculations numerous Syria in war civil volunteers the in tively it abigger is phenomenon. of Kazakh The participation anew but quality, do not quantita therefore, constitute Syria, to Departures a stabilising factor (eliminating the most active individuals from the country). the from individuals most active the (eliminating factor a stabilising 243 242 241 240 239 238 237 236 only on (at dubious based evidence)of trace times terrorism suspected of convictions individuals and post-Sovietof arrests the mass states: forces the security used by methods traditional includes way first The effect. ing of the laws regulating the operations of religious communities of religious operations the laws regulating ofing the cal Islamic groups in the Caucasus the in groups Islamic cal radi of ranks the fightin to scale, on asmaller travel, did citizens Kazakhstan’s not is anew phenomenon This past the –in Pakistan). and Afghanistan to also extent, (and, amuch to smaller Iraq and volunteers Syria to of Kazakh tures depar the are Kazakhstan in radicalism Islamic to linked challenge The next state. the towards community this may antagonise which from measure refraining and public Salafi general the towards stance soft continuation of the the undertaken, coherence activities of onpend the the de success its will long perspective but the term in Kazakhstan), in no attacks have been (since there 2012 out successful be to turned far so by Astana chosen tion of individuals sentenced for extremism and terrorism and sentenced for extremism tion of individuals entire post-Soviet area, for example Rinat Abu Muhammad al-Kazakhstani Muhammad Abu post-Soviet for Rinat entire example area, (some the of on whomhavewider Salafists leverage of Salafists on ties peaceful activi the or even tolerating, supporting, as such radicalism), ofissue Islamic the with dealing institutions state main is the one (which of Affairs Religious Agency for by advanced the it possible methods is soft observe to hand other

http://www.rferl.org/content/kazakhstan_new_religious_law_islam_extremism/24341450.html http://news.nur.kz/288156.html

http://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/v-kazahstane-sotni-chelovek-sidyat-za-eks http://islamic.kz/tag/rinat-abu-muxammad/

op. cit. op. Asia…, of Central militants Islamic Theradical in: further See zakhstan. Ka in present ethnicities of other individuals and Kazakhs ethnic both people, 200 About -263687/ zakhstan_news/glava-mvd-rasskazal-pravdu-o-sostoyanii-spetsuchrejdeniy-kazahstana http://tengrinews.kz/ka leave prison: they after cause might individuals such that lems prob the of acknowledgement Astana’s show efficiency, of their regardless actions, Such Above all Chechens residing in Kazakhstan: http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/195407/ http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/195407/ Kazakhstan: in residing Chechens all Above Primarily of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Kazakhstan: http://muftyat.kz/ru http://muftyat.kz/ru of Kazakhstan: of Muslims Board Spiritual of the Primarily tremizm-i-terrorizm-229238/ 241 , as well as in Afghanistan and Pakistan and Afghanistan in as well , as 243 – as in other states, acts largely as as largely acts states, other in –as 239 and the intense socialisa intense the and 236 240 and a harshen and . The strategy . The strategy 237 . On the the . On 238 242 ), ), ------. ­ 87 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 88 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 creased role of Islamic fundamentalism. role of Islamic creased in lead an to would certainly which protest, ideologymay become of an social religion that outruled be it can Nor reasons. maydueto occur other conflicts 2011), December in similar it possible is that Zhanaozen events in the example (for workers in strikes mainly themselves expressing tensions, social based economic- above all are at present While these tensions. arbayev, social the are Naz succession PresidentNursultan ofunresolved issue the of power after stability, besides the for Kazakhstan’s challenges internal largest ofOne the cially in comparison with other challenges which Kyrgyzstan faces Kyrgyzstan which challenges other with comparison in cially state’s (espe the to security challenge However aserious do not constitute they 246 245 244 country’s the in south mainly occur which for Syria, departures numerous of issue the the raises often some politicians and The media militancy. Islamic for radical acounterbalance be can nature of apeaceful organisations radical, at independent, times functioning –legally Similarly decrease. them from stemming threats place, in the fundamentalists at Islamic aimed repressions no mass are when there shows that, country. Thethe of example Kyrgyzstan in operating organisations enjoyed of freedom relative action Islamic by the the is region of rest the the from Kyrgyzstan distinguishes The which factor 5. websites for used recruiting) block to the and extremist as organisation an neededprocedures recognise to the (for at simplifying them preventing example of aimed steps anumber ing authorities undertak the with by Astana, athreat viewed as being are tures depar these Nevertheless, organisations. of terrorist ously fought ranks the in who previ militants Kazakh not by Salafists, radicalised conducted by local 2011-2012 in were attacks –the unlikely rather is of terror acts ticipation in possible par their and such, as form Syria militants of Kazakh return the Both http://www.vb.kg/doc/284803_pravozashitniki:_v_sirii_vouut_primerno_170_kyr http://infozakon.com/authorities-and-policy/447-nazarbaev-podpisal-zakon-po-usileni

Kyrgyzstan to-moscow-clients-beijing-security-central-asia-role-west November 2014 Studies, OSW West diminishes, of the role the as Asia Central in Security of Beijing. clients Moscow, to Hostages Lang, Józef Falkowski, Maciej in: More etc. countries neighbouring with tensions conflicts, ethnic and social inefficiency, and state’s weakness the clude: in which challenges, and problems security of structural array awide has Kyrgyzstan gyzstancev.html yu-mer-protiv-ekstremizma-i-terrorizma.html , http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-studies/2014-10-28/hostages- 244 . 246 ). Nor do 245 ------. thousand members thousand several has organisation where the rule, that exceptionto the is Kyrgyzstan extreme part of the Muslim community Muslim of the part extreme the in it level lowers of the radicalisation individuals, active the together ering countries in Asia and Europe). In Central Asia Tablighi Jamaat is banned is Jamaat Tablighi Europe). Asia and Asia Central in In countries many (it in legally operates on proselytising mainly focusing instead struggle, example more frequent arrests of members) its arrests more frequent example it (for policies towards authorities have the tightened the time that since while ut-Tahrir,tion –Hizb and manner, semi-overt in prior operating 2010 to was organisa such The region. largest of the countries other the in than of action freedom have larger organisations fundamental illegal even the Kyrgyzstan In 252 251 250 249 248 247 Islam extreme to adhering while organisation, This one of example this. is Jamaat Tablighi Kyrgyzstan. in operation in organisations Islamic extreme many There are of structures. its weakness general the and state, ofter the charac democratic the to both related is which dom Kyrgyzstan, of in action enjoy considerable free organisations Islamic extreme and Fundamentalist those. of for neither factor, country. acatalyst as however, The the in serve Islamic will occur crisis asecurity and instability but serious if only Kyrgyzstan to a threat be potentially can militants Islamic Radical Pakistan). and Afghanistan in lier have fought volunteers (many ear Kyrgyzstan from form anew quality they Uzbeks amongst the Fundamentalists (for ut-Tahrir), Hizb in example ac Fundamentalists the the amongst Uzbeks of overrepresentation an to Due terrorism. combating enforcement structures law the as portrayed be can of which goal but it stage to the is time, actions to time from happen terrorists alleged as treated fundamentalists of Islamic Arrests Kyrgyzstan. place in taking no persecutions are there that not mean however, This, or does Tajikistan. Uzbekistan presentlevel in of persecutions actively seeking support amongst the political elite political the amongst support seeking actively http://www.vb.kg/doc/219086_myftiy_kyrgyzstana_otvel_podozreniia_ot_dvijeniia_ http://www.rferl.org/content/hizb-ut-tahrir-kyrgyzstan-arrests/25016322.html

http://www.islamsng.com/kgz/analytics/7471

http://www.azattyk.org/content/kyrgyzstan_religion_deputy_security_nov2013/25188524.html tabligi_djamaat.html Not Salafism, but the Deobandi school – established in the the 19 in established – school Deobandi the but Not Salafism, CSTO, whose members include Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan. include members whose CSTO, the by organisation aterrorist being as listed also is organisation the that It noteworthy is nental version of the 18 of the version nental 250 and is de is facto and th century Saudi Wahhabism. Wahhabism. Saudi century aiding to stabilise the situation –by gath situation the stabilise to aiding 251 . 252 , it still does not reach the the does not reach , it still th 248 century in , asub-conti India, in century , does not back armed armed , does not back 247 and and 249 ------. 89 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 90 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 terrorist organisationsterrorist there. of ranks orderjoin to the in Iraq, and Syria Pakistan, for Afghanistan, tures depar and more for religious) radicalisation country’s traditionally is south (the bedrock social existing already the increased turn in This communities. two of the coexistence peaceful the ideology ofby an some peace, allowing as perceived are which currents, Islamic extreme other and fluence Salafism of in the in rise also the toa led country’s in south The conflict conflicts. ethnic the exploiting to regards with Islam of radical limits shows the this ology; as their ranks include both Kyrgyz and Uzbeks and Kyrgyz both include ranks their as were recruited on-line while working in Russia or Turkey. on-line Russia working in while were recruited or Syria, Afghanistan in organisations terrorist of Islamic ranks joined the who volunteers Uzbekistan from all country, almost the and in active sations organi Islamic no radical are there immense, is control overservices’ society level security of – the the Islam of radical threat no is serious there Uzbekistan 255 254 253 long torture) (including sentences and prison persecution in result can and radicalism, as regarded is region, the to traditional Islam ofschool Sunni Hanafithe also of within butpiousness not of only Salafism, occurrence, every enemy. almost main its practice, as In Islam of radical views control which tus developed and appara strong avery with state authoritarian an is Uzbekistan 6. their goals to achieve not did exploit conflict Movement the of Uzbekistan, Islamic the as such organisations, Islamic radical oppositeof happening, the despite fears hand, other the On militias). Kyrgyz the from co-believers bek their Uz sheltering Salafists of place Kyrgyz were even (there cases taking pogroms or didclashes lived not see in compact neighbourhoods Salafists places where rare the conflict, into open erupted Kyrgyz and Uzbeks between animosities In 2010, June when ethnic Salafism. and Islam radical and ties animosi ethnic between interaction show the also The Kyrgyzstan events in Uzbek community. local the but also fundamentalism, Islamic not only targeting as interpreted be forces can security Kyrgyz of the tivities

U lence between Muslims in the Fergana Valley. Fergana the in Muslims between lence vio condemned movement the which in astatement issuing to reaction its limited The IMU its chief military commander was an ethnic Kyrgyz – Abbas Mansur. –Abbas Kyrgyz ethnic an was commander military chief its while Odil, – Usman an Uzbek was IMU’sEmir the south in Kyrgyzstan conflict the During uzbekistan?page=2 Human Rights Watch Report – http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/ zbekistan 254 – united by acommon ide –united 255 . In . In 253 ------, lar steps against the Uzbek radicals’ terrorist organisations terrorist Uzbek radicals’ the against steps lar simi moderately Islamic), and but not it undertaken has secular those (both opposition anti-regime at outside the of aimed aggressive actions borders its undertaking is –Uzbekistan itself Uzbekistan to athreat constitute rently do not cur of radicals Uzbekistan’s Uzbek government Islamic shows that policy Even the Syria. and Pakistan Afghanistan, in but rather Uzbekistan, place in does not IMU), take the but (above this all organisations terrorist of ranks the in have or fighting, the past, fought are in Uzbek citizens sand crisis (forsecond Batken the example radicalism of Islamic actions the fered from 261 260 259 258 257 256 organisations were Islamic there 1990s opposition. the In the combating with it interlinked independence, is and its gained Uzbekistan since underway been has Theof Muslims persecution can be qualified as extremism terrorism or extremism as qualified be can it controls, institutions the and state setby the outside norms ofof the Islam profession of the mentoccurrence Every of control over society) increased. instru an as serve repressions (which also the authorities. Despite this, the by were liquidated of these both country, period later the yet the in ing in ably orchestrated as provocations by the authorities provocations by the as ably orchestrated were prob attacks other the –all took place there terrorists by Islamic ised

foundation.org/file/FeaturedDocs/nefaijuoct08.pdf http://www.nefa 2004: in Tashkent and Bukhara in Union Jihad Islamic the by Conducted karimovoj net/ru/human-rights/26684-v-moskve-pohitili-uzbeka-kotoryj-mnogo-znajet-o-gulnare- sian Federation: http://enews.fergananews.com/articles/2789- Rus of the territory the from of people kidnapping refugee; apolitical as resided he where and http://www.uznews. , in 2012 in Nazarov Obidhon imam at opposition attempt assassination For example stan. Further in footnote 36. 36. footnote in Further stan. Afghani to withdraw to forced being IMU the in resulted and of fatalities dozens to led ing Thefight of 2000. August in all of Tashkent, proximity in region, Yangiabad and province Surxondaryo in Uzbekistan’s scale limited on a fighting and province Batken Kyrgyzstan’s on of Tajikistan, territory the from launched raids, militants’ –IMU crisis Batken Second op. cit. op. Centralnej…, wAzji islam” „Walczący Zapaśnik, Stanisław on: Based Lashkarlary. or Islam Tauba as organisations such Valley, also Fergana the in Adolat well-known the For example For example Muhammad Salih’s Erk (Freedom) party. party. (Freedom) Erk Salih’s Muhammad For example damentalist Islamic scholars: non-fun by even http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=1942 delivered of sermons or recordings literature Islamic of classical possession operates), of informers network awide which (in mosques of the outside praying For example 259 ), but during the last fifteen years only two attacks actually organ actually two attacks only years fifteen ), last the but during , pages 79-80. 256 and a secular opposition asecular and 258 . In the past Uzbekistan has suf has Uzbekistan past the . In 260 . Up to several thou . Up several to 261 . 257 operat ------91 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 92 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 ample the practice of religious rites is becoming increasingly popular increasingly becoming is rites of religious practice ample the 264 263 262 Uzbekistan. in than however, scale on society; grip on asmaller their tighten oppositionto combat to and the radicalism ofadvantage issue Islamic of the authorities take the while Tajikistan, in banned are currents, or even entire Simultaneously, region. organisations, the in of range awide Islamic highest probably is rites the level of of Islamic the practice and functions, ment, legally parlia in seats had recently until which party, political Islamic gion where an re the in state only It states. the is Asian Central other to role, contrast tant in most impor plays the Islam which in out astate, singled often as is Tajikistan 7. persecution scale Despite large of power. of abloodless to transition state the guide and situation this able cope to with would elite, be the and control over society total exert which services, rity the secu that office since in been 1991. who However, has seems currently it Karimov, PresidentIslam after powerof transition the over aconflict and elitethe within havesions suppressed which infighting for been or the years, ten economic social conceivableis based ofthe causes it both be could –the kind of this A crisis structures. state collapse of would the leadwhich the to there were occur to economic and crisis political aserious if is Uzbekistan in role play to important an start could radicalism and fundamentalism Islamic which in situation on society. grip its The tighten hypothetical only further place outside opposition ofto to combat borders its and the taking war the in of citizens its problem participation the exploiting of the authorities are Uzbekistan’s wouldpossible, face. Nevertheless, they repressions due the to im is to Uzbekistan or Afghanistan Syria from of Uzbek militants return the conditions, Under abroad. current are leaveto they while precisely for Syria (2.5 million people(2.5 million Russia to –mainly migration Uzbekistan’s is labour massive forreason this

T extremism: http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/uzbekistan?page=2 religious for alleged sentences prison serving currently are people 12,000 about Uzbekistan In tails/54891/ Russian Federal Migration Service data – http://www.fms.gov.ru/about/statistics/data/de 747 alja http://fletcher.tufts.edu/~/media/Fletcher/Microsites/praxis/xvi/Gaziev.pdf and http://www. ajikistan ­31 ­ze 24.html ­24.html ­era.com/indepth/features/2015/01/torture-death-uzbek-muslims-jail-20151 264 ), Turkey. to decide but and also radicalised are Uzbeks 262 , Islam in Uzbekistan is developing is (for ex Uzbekistan in , Islam 263 ­61 ). One One ). ­0254 ------­

actually enjoys larger popular support than it polls in the elections the in it polls than support enjoys popular larger actually dential election in 2013 in election dential presi the in running from banned was how is one of Kabiri examples which years, two forlast the rise on been the authorities has by the IRPT on the erted ex pressure the fact, government. forDespite this the athreat not constitute 270 269 268 267 266 265 stance moderate Islamic a very presents Kabiri, by Muhiddin led currently party, This state. the ruling in co-participate to was agreements, 1997Moscow peace the to according which, (IRPT) of Tajikistan Party sance Renais (1992-1997) Islamic war the sides civil pendence. of One of was the the of inde its beginning the since Tajikistan present been in has Islam Political fore it was a political decision,not agenuine outcomefore apolitical it elections was of the in parliament in 2015 in parliament in persecuted by the local authorities local by the persecuted often are activists more zealous IRPT’s level, the local country. the On entire the offices in it has and of parliament 63-seat lower the in chamber members two had of 2015 IRPT the played March role opposition of the a licensed – until between local warlords who controlled the situation in particular regions, and and regions, particular in situation who warlords controlled the local between disputes namely reasons, caused political by were conflicts these mostcases In agreements. peace the led who by not warlords did recognise character Islamic adeclared with groups government forces armed between and clashes witnessed regularly Tajikistan war civil of end the the it. to After related actually not usually of it are occurrences as portrays Dushanbe which groups events and the jikistan, Ta present in are radicalism and fundamentalism Islamic that it true is While level. local on active the those especially of some of activists, its radicalisation lead to the can future in and elite), ruling Kulob-origin the within runs currently fault line rivalry political opposition licensed (the the shows as adepletion act to party’s formula of the

http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/tajikistan/143306?download=true

­ http://www.avesta.tj/goverment/31046-vybory-partii-kabiri-zoyirova-i-shabdolova-osta newsA.php?st=1343416080 http://www.centrasia.ru/ Khorugh: in structures of IRPT leader of the murder For example tent/vibory-prezidenta-tadjikistan-kandidat-bobonazarova/25116733.html Khait: http://tjinform.com/ru/news/20130422/06730.html – Makhmadali deputy on his attack the for example on Kabiri, authorities the by Pressure and http://rus.azattyq.org/con Secular modernisation of the state combined with the propagation of Islamic values. values. of Islamic propagation the with combined state of the modernisation Secular news.tj/en/node/108135 http:// OSCE: the by undemocratic as and http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/69061?download=true declared was Tajikistan in then place took which election the 35-40%, at around oscillated support the 2010 in himself, Kabiri to According lis-za-bortom.html 269 268 (the elections in Tajikistan were not democratic, there were not democratic, Tajikistan in (the elections , or how the party was not permitted to retain its seats seats its retain to not permitted was party , or how the 266 , and on the nationwide level, the party party nationwide level, on the the , and 265 ; for it years 267 and does and 270 ). This ------93 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 94 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 forbidding travelling abroad to receive religious education receive to abroad forbidding religious travelling places mosques (and of other entering worship) from minors and by banning ), of other (and also for of Islam example practice the hindered which approved legislation Rahmon of society. PresidentEmomali 2011 In lamisation such as Salafism, are illegal in Tajikistan illegal are Salafism, as such ut-Tahrir Hizb whole as and such groups currents, Jamaat, or Tablighi (both currents Islamic or extreme fundamentalism of Islamic not occurrences only which is more than the number of schools number the more is than which (3,809), country the in of mosques number operating the forvisible in example is This increasing. is Tajikistan in role of the Islam dimension, social the In poverty. form of structural the in in Tajikistan, exists forradicalisation bedrock social a because largely effective 277 276 275 274 273 272 271 2010 Valley in Rasht the in (forclashes over the trol them example con its extend to tried which Dushanbe government in central the that fact the labour migrants currently reside in the Russian Federation Russian the reside in currently migrants labour Tajik (about Russia million in stay 1.2 their during online of whomrecruited are of volunteers, most recruitment exclusively the to almost limited are activities but their Tajikistan, not in active are organisations terrorist Islamic that mean criticism from organisations defending the freedom of freedom belief the defending organisations from criticism actions of the Tajik security forces are of an ostentatious nature ostentatious of forces an are Tajik of security the actions the that suggests which Tajikistan, in attacks commit to conspiring ganisations or of terrorist members alleged of the of arrests case the in doubtsalso serious stan rather than launching the fight the at home. launching than rather stan Afghani or for Syria choose departure probablystill will individuals satisfied The dis small. authorities is of the above actions by the caused unrest of social possibility the individuals, mostactive of the migration mass due the to itself, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61971

http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=1553

http://islamnews.tj/banned.html and http://www.centrasia.ru/news.php?st=1236149580 2012 data: http://www.rferl.org/content/tajikistan_mosques/24488099.html - http://www.voanews.com/content/tajikistan-bans-minors-from-entering-mosq tails/54891/ Russian Federal Migration Service data – http://www.fms.gov.ru/about/statistics/data/de /news.php?id=17863 or http://rus.ozodi.mobi/a/26644567.html or /news.php?id=17863 2014/04/09/talco, http://ria.ru/world/20130921/964854932.html, http://lenta.ru/news/ For example: provinces. country’s in visits Rahmon’s President or Tajikistan, in http://www.fergananews.com dignitaries of foreign visits to prior especially attacks, terrorist conduct to of conspiring suspected of people) of people of dozens (at times arrests large-scale Regular ­126667408/168486.html 275 ), phenomenon the Is but of the also 274 . The combat authorities actively 273 ). These actions are ). are These actions 276 277 272 . This met with met with . This . In Tajikistan Tajikistan . In . That does not 271 ). There are ­---- ­ues ------

problems cals than Afghanistan and Pakistan Turkmen for the destination radi amore popular being Syria in result also Turkey with The forlinks Turkmen destination migrants. labour a traditional Turkey, in place usually abroad, takes is which radicalisation the or Tajikistan, 283 282 281 280 279 278 Pakistan Afghanistan, in organisations terrorist of Islamic ranks the in presence of byTurkmen seen the be can militants as there, doesexist ism Asia’s radical Central Islamic being state, Despite mostclosed Turkmenistan 8. active individuals active of emigration vast due the to increase–mainly will particular, in radicalism and fundamentalism Islamic and general, in role of the Islam that It unlikely is (which does consider athreat). Ashgabat self-organisation social example merely one butmorerather of threat, serious a being as ple Salafism, for authorities do not exam perceive the of independentIslam, which a result as phenomenonthis in of nature Turkmenistan, marginal the by all of first caused is This beliefs. do their not reveal they on condition general that in ety soci more not than persecuted are currents Islamic followersstate, of extreme Syria

http://www.fergananews.com/news/20863

T centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1019641560 centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1019641560 http://www.chrono-tm.org/2014/01/turkmenskiy-vsplesk-narkomanii/наркомания-в-туркмении-носит-масштабы-национального-бедствия and http://www. org/2012/02/v-turkmenii-okolo-50-naseleniya-ne-imeyut-rabotyi/, http://www.chrono-tm. portion): per 1dollar – about Afghanistan from brought heroin of the low price the and http://www.dw.de/ situation social appalling the by caused –it is higher even probably is now number this addiction, drug from suffered population country’s of 20% up the to even 2002 –in data of current (lack abuse drug or mass provinces) and areas rural the ly in especial 50%, as much as (reaching rate unemployment avast include, problems The social ly some of whom return home after finishing their studies. studies. their finishing after home ofly whom return some on annually, country leave the students thousand ten up to Turkmenistan, in studies begin to necessary of bribes costs high the and education of higher low level extremely the to Due org/content/turkmenistan-achilles-heel-central-asian-security/25265841.html http://www.rferl. Syria: in war the in participating are Turkmens hundred several Up to stan the access to the Internet itself is physically limited. limited. physically is itself Internet the to access the stan Turkmeni in Internet, the via happens often radicalisation the region of the states other the in –if place in is blockade information an country, the leaving with for problems Except stan fighting in Pakistan’s Waziristan: https://archive.org/details/QaboildaNimaGap3-qism Waziristan: Pakistan’s in fighting stan Turkmeni from militants portrayed which materials, propaganda IMU in for example Seen urkmenistan 279 . It is, however, a marginal phenomenon. As in the case of Uzbekistan of Uzbekistan case phenomenon. the in . It As is,however, amarginal 283 . 281 , the closed character of the state of the character closed , the 280 . Despite the totalitarian character of the of the character totalitarian . Despite the 282 , and immense social social immense , and /a-6363081, 278 and and ------95 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 96 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 movements form of inter-diffused, two, the at in times 1990s the since Crimea sent in pre been had Islam extreme Syria, in war the with only scale on amarginal community itself community the Tatar within conflicts religion-based were the there aspect Islam-related mostproblematic the 2014, March Russia’s to in Prior of Crimea annexation peninsula. of the annexation Russian widely, the towards above policy, the more towards and reactions Tatars’ fundamentalism, Islamic towards especially Tatars, the towards policy Russian volunteersan Syria, to of Crime departures the itself, community Tatar the inside tensions religious include: Crimea in issue The Islamic problematic of Tatars. elements the of the issue of the stability fragile the shattered Russia’s which of Crimea annexation after rose importance its and present is there, issue Islamic the Nevertheless, factors. by religious etc.), competition issue, Tatars from ership than rather (the socio-economic own factor (Slavic the factor vs. Tatars) and population ethnic the all by of first caused are school thetensions Sunnis), (Hanafi lims Mus are Tatars Crimean all peninsula’s society. of almost the While sections other by the detested Crimea, in group mostpro-Ukrainian continue be, to the 287 286 285 284 300,000) of Crimea’s population about 12-14% (250- of constitute USSR, fall the after shortly and period viet late So the during Asia Central in exile their from peninsula the to returned who Tatars, Crimean question. Tatar the with linked naturally is radicalism, and problem the of fundamentalism including Crimea, in issue The Islamic 9. state, nor did it cause serious conflicts within Crimea’s within community Muslim nor conflicts state, it did serious cause of the not did perspective generate problems the from activities its and spread, Ukraine). ut-Tahrir in Hizb post-Soviet legally of operated the wide area, was

C every member of the Hizb ut-Tahrir being a Salafist. aSalafist. ut-Tahrir being Hizb of the member every to translate not does ut-Tahrir,that Hizb of but sympathiser or member be a can A Salafist Mejlis was not supportive of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s growth, viewing it as a rival: http://www.ng.ru/ a rival: it as viewing ut-Tahrir’s of Hizb growth, supportive not was Mejlis crimean-peninsula. en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2014-07-02/crimean-tatars-after--annexation- Commentary OSW Peninsula, Crimean of the nexation Russia’s an after Tatars Crimean Olszański, A. Tadeusz in: Further Firka. Milli and Mejlis the between rivalry the example for place: took also conflicts political this to addition In %20%20%20%20%20&n_page=3 %20%20%20%20%20&n_page=3 select_51/?botton=cens_db&box=5.1W&k_t=01&p=50&rz=1_1&rz_b=2_1%20%20%20%20 http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/rus/results/nationality_population/nationality_popul1/ population): peninsula’s of the (12% people –243,000 census 2001 the to According rimea 286 : Salafists and Hizb ut-Tahrir (which in the contrary to the rest rest the Hizb to and ut-Tahrir the contrary in (which : Salafists 285 . Contrary to Islamic radicalism, which appeared in Crimea Crimea in appeared which radicalism, Islamic to . Contrary 284 . In the political dimension they were, and were, and they dimension political the . In , 30.06.2014, http://www.osw.waw.pl/ 30.06.2014, , 287 ------. on the Mejlis’ headquarters Mejlis’ on the raids include actions movements. of Examples such independentMuslim and cal of leaders of politi the community, Tatar of especially the led persecutions to has column”. Ukraine’s and “fifth This control peninsula, over the Russian to a threat whom Tatars, it as views Crimean the towards aggressivepolicy an has sians, Rus by Crimean occupation authorities dominated local Moscow, the also and Salafists). and fundamentalists of the (especially community Tatar of the actions re the general), as in (and well Tatars as Islam towards policy Russian the is issue Islamic the to regard key problem the with Russia’s Crimea of the After annexation ofof focus authorities’ attention. were not the the and in scale place on alimited took for Syria Crimea from post-Soviet other departures the to states, trary past). (as his Con is unknown is name whose al-Ukraini), real Karim Abdul – (alternatively al-Krymi Karim –Abdul Supporters and of Emigrants Army of the commander of former deputy the –the Tatar one Crimean was there ers ably murdered by the new Russian authorities new Russian ably by the murdered who were prob activists, Tatar of several circumstances unclear in death the several dozen and 150-200 people dozen and several it between is claim but estimates Syria, in organisations terrorist of Islamic ranks the in fighting Tatars Crimean of the number exact about no the is data There Syria. to departures limited of it the is occurrence Thelic. actual only repub the in radicalism of Islamic scale alarming evidence, aboutcredible the by unsupported information, circulate did media Russian the Despite this 292 291 290 289 288 2009) in Zhuravki the in clashes ple the violence theof they evenform took of acts even times (for exam At influence. the spheres of over of conflicts consisted mainly and itself, community Salafi the within also clergy. existed Tensions Hanafi traditional, the from resistance waswith met growth Its different. was thesituation of Salafism case the In http://www.khpg.org/pda/index.php?id=1414064636 http://www.rferl.org/content/crimea-tatar-killing-ukraine-russia-annexation-minori

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=41136&cH http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine-abroad/radio-free-europeradio-liberty-cri 2702303795904579431290464167718 2702303795904579431290464167718 and http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405ash=d873c9e97210acb9b505cdadb5ffd5b8 field/field_document/20141111TransnationalIslamMunster.pdf field/field_document/20141111TransnationalIslamMunster.pdf cis/2013-10-07/1_crym.html and http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/ mean-tatar-mejlis-raided-searched-by-police-photos-364800.html ty/25301602.html http://focus.ua/society/64741/ 290 , abductions and arrests of individuals arrests and , abductions 289 . Amongst the post-Soviet Jihadists’ lead post-Soviet the . Amongst Jihadists’ 288 . 292 . Russian policy towards Hizb Hizb towards policy . Russian 291 , and even , and ------­ - 97 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 98 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 of this stance can be the so-called “Crimea” battalion so-called the be can stance of this 295 294 293 Federation Russian combated ut-Tahrir of region Hizb the this in successfully and Bashkortostan in chief aformer FSB is –Palagan FSB Crimean of the chief of post the the to Palagan Viktor general decision nominate to the in ut-Tahrir. Hizb issue seen be for Moscowtion against can this of The significance of persecu campaign scale awide began Crimea, in of situation Tatars current the ignoring and legislation own law. by their authorities, guided The Russian by punishable is membership and organisation ut-Tahrir aterrorist as listed is people but were members). probably thousand Hizb Russia In several lacking, is data (exact community Tatar Crimean the amongst support enjoyed popular and ut-Tahrir Ukraine, noteworthy. in legally operated also is The organisation − include: for The unlikely. this reasons highly seems Crimea in militancy of Islamic The establishment Syria. including East, Middle the to cases individual in only Union and states, European to extent a smaller to to Ukraine, mainly – Crimea from emigration be firstly repression will the community’s to Tatar reaction Crimean the suggest that The trends observed in Syria in militants of ranks the join probablystill will Salafists The mostradical itself. Crimea place in not take it will case, the However, atgle all. currently is as strug armed any not undertake will Tatars Crimean that does notThis mean − − − − −

http://vesti-ukr.com/krym/49106-glavoj-upravlenija-fsb-v-krymu-naznachen-byvs

hij-glavnyj-chekist-bashkirii krym and http://vk.com/rotakrym https://www.facebook.com/sotnja. of acompany: size in maximally aformation reality In in Syria: http://www.akhbarshaam.info/2014/05/13/53/ all of first waged be to for jihad who called al-Krymi, Karim of Abdul statement the is stance of this example One actions. anti-Russian than important more being as jihad this Viewing Crimea in its foreign its policy). in Crimea of thesignificance is as overestimated, is (whoseoften Crimea in influence government, nor Turkey West, Ukrainian the the from –neither support external count on actual cannot they that realisation Tatars’ Crimean Hizb of ut-Tahrir;character struggle) armed (rejecting The pacifist by Moscow; apriority as treated is which peninsula, over the The surveillance control level and of Russian 294 , while others will fight on the Ukrainian side in Donbas. An example An sideDonbas. in the fightUkrainian on will others , while 295 , comprised mainly of , comprised mainly 293 . - - - Yakupov in August 2012 may serve as examples of examples this as mayYakupov 2012 serve August in Valiulla deputy his and Faizov Ildus on Tatarstan’s attempts sination assas The business/mafia-related orconflicts. by ideological caused rather were they whether However, determine to even occurred. it hard is attacks and Salafists, the and clergy Islamic official the between tensions witnessed Tatarstan former USSR. of the regions other in it has level ofthe importance the developedin has thebut notgained Volga1990s has regionsince it Salafism Russia. in economic and crisis political aserious be to were there especially region, tonomy of the for lead could adestabilisation to Tatarstan), for Volga au problems the in socio-political calls on the issue (including region Islamic phenomenon.of superimposition the The potential a marginal rather is nationwide media, and local Russian in information despiteism, alarmist fundamental Russia). in Islamic ut-Tahrir (which Hizb illegal is the and party Tatarstan), in of Chelny Naberezhnye city the onein being largest the (with communities few, form of in the Salafi yet mainly growing, there, present in are fundamentalism Islamic and currents Islamic Volgathe Extremist region. currence amongst the post-Soviet clergy) the amongst Islamic currence a common is oc to Mecca (this pilgrimages for bribes organising the regarding disputes business criminal to attacks the linking established, subsequently 300 299 298 297 296 Bashirs and Tatars mostly Muslims, – are Federation – 53.7% (7.9 million people, out million of4.24 which Russian the inside area Islamic Caucasus, Northern the after second largest, the is Bashkortostan, and The republics of Volga Tatarstan the mainly region, 10. duty areligious but apatriotic, also as only not Russia against struggle the view who Salafists), (including Tatars Crimean the Northern Caucasus). This can be seen for example in the presence of the presence of the the for seen Caucasus).be in example can This Northern the Volga for the example, in with, (in comparison widespread relatively is region blamed on members of the Salafi community Salafi of the on members blamed

http://www.apn.ru/publications/article26923.htm

http://argumenti.ru/society/2012/07/191259 73502175_00%2Frev 73502175_00%2Frev Battalion “Crimea” statement: http://vk.com/rotakrym?z=photo-73502175_341494695%2Falbum- pis 2010 census data, available at: http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/pe As a result of which Yakupov died, and Faizov was seriously wounded. wounded. seriously was Faizov and died, Yakupov of which aresult As

V ­_itogi1612.htm olga region 297 ). The Islamic issue is not the biggest not). is the problem issue of The Islamic 296 . 299 . A more realistic version was version was . Amore realistic 300 . Hizb ut-Tahrir’s. Hizb network 298 . These were initially . These were initially ­re - - - - ­ 99 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 100 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 central governmentcentral the and Tatarstan complicated between the authorities, relationship and cal appeal uploaded Internet appeal the to one video was (the for evidence only this individuals several numbering unit form of one the in 2012 in militancy clandestine of aminiature establishment alleged the on Tatarstan’s , above mentioned the include attacks cidents Suchin radicals. of Islamic activity the to them link unanimously to it hard is Nevertheless, Tatarstan. in incidents a few armed as well as Syria, and garsky) Bul (forSalman example Afghanistan to Salafists of radicalised departures Volga several to the in limited are region radicalism of Islamic Occurrences nic tensions between Tatars and Russians and Tatars between tensions nic above of Theproblems include: the mostserious eth Tatarstan). in (especially problems may region lead itofto more important socio-political the becoming on issue other Islamic of superimposition the the scale, in limited been has Volga the in region challenges Islam-related the date to that Despite fact of the FSB agentFSB were killed an and activity militant of suspected Salafists two of which aresult as of 2012, October in services), ashoot-out Kazan security in operation FSB the an during 306 305 304 303 302 301 attentions of their one results of sentences are the forprison members its long and arrests Frequent structures. security by local athreat as treated are celebrations. Thegroup’s organisation’s Islamic mass activities during symbols Chistopole in May 2014 (two suspects were killed during it) during were killed (two May 2014 suspects in Chistopole term perspective have a destabilising effect on the situation in this region. this in thesituation on effect have adestabilising perspective term long the may in separatism) controlled Tatar (forso-far the example challenges existing onto currently fundamentalism, Islamic of the rise the ple through

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42402&c http://www.gazeta.ru/social/2012/10/24/4823553.shtml https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=BH0_CVDy8oQ#! http://kazanfirst.ru/feed/20472

ies/2014-05-07/federation-without-federalism-relations-between-moscow-and-regions ies/2014-05-07/federation-without-federalism-relations-between-moscow-and-regions Study OSW regions, the and Moscow between Relations federalism. without Federation Rogoża, Jadwiga in: Further istan: http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/PDF/EN/en_lflts_pdf/2014_01_28_Russia_EN.pdf viewed Uzbek previously has (as it operations its for region adifficult as Tatarstan views self it organisation the also http://www.tatar-inform.ru/news/2014/10/15/426699/, For example: Hash=86821ff6fcb447555e1d548ef9a50c2a 306 303 . The superimposition of the Islamic problem, for Islamic exam . The of superimposition the , April of 2014, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-stud of 2014, , April , and also a similar operation of the security services in in services security ofoperation the a similar also , and 302 and it could also have aprovocation been it by also could and 305 , the authoritarianism of the lo of the authoritarianism , the 304 . 301 . ------jihad takes place takes jihad volunteers leaving for process of radicalising the face, that migrants labour problems of that the scale the ideology of and cow, the availability due to the It Mos Iraq. in is and Syria to departures for centres the one logistical of the but also Caucasus, is Northern the from terrorists Islamic by radical tacks at of not occasional atarget only Moscow ideas. currently is fundamentalist and of spread for radical the ground abreeding creates of Muslims tration construction of a new one regularly postponed of anew one regularly construction Moscow, in operation four only mosques in the are (for with there example 310 309 308 307 workand Moscow in alone live even to Muslims five two million Between interact. to have achance also themselves region entire followers other, the but each from their with clash post-Soviet present on the areas currents Islamic various not do only the cities these In life. of Islamic centres becoming are Caucasus, Northern the from migration internal as well as Azerbaijan, and Asia Central from grants mi labour of due influx to which, Petersburg mentionto Moscow and it important is list above. such any In described those in as manner terrupted unin post-Soviet of yetgions the nothistorically a concentrated in and area, re other the present in also is currents, fundamentalist its including Islam, 11. the role of Islam is also increasing there. Salafi communities are in operation in operation are communities Salafi there. increasing also is role ofthe Islam – scale place on asmaller processes take similar Asia, Central from migrants presence of due labour the to Federation, mainly Russian of the regions other In like of Muslims like population’s Russian dis ethnic the to oflinked range awide erates tensions other, on it the gen and, there) houses operate publishing and organisations (numerous Islamic life intellectual and religious of Islamic growth for the

http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/01/16/russia-letter-un-special-rapportuer-human-rights http://izvestia.ru/news/533219 ali_mergan_russian.avi –http://www.jundurrahmon.com/jundulloh_filmlar/ members IMU of the statements and security/29158-put-tadzhikskoy-molodezhi-v-siriyu-prolegaet-cherez-prospekt-mira.html http://www.avesta.tj/ Afghanistan: and Pakistan in IJU and IMU of the ranks the joined later and Moscow in radicalised became Asia Central from migrants labour Syria, in war civil the to prior Even states. Asian Central of the governments the by even noticed is This -migrants-and-un-independent-expert- act= http://inosmi.ru/russia/20121101/201651752.html and http://www.interfax-religion.ru/? O ther regionsther ­news&div=37816 308 310 , as well as institutional and infrastructural limitations limitations infrastructural and institutional as well , as . 307 . On the one hand this causes positive causes conditions this one hand the . On 309 ). concen Additionally, this ------­ ­ 101 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 102 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 enon – the most probable estimates hold mostprobable itenon at be –the to estimates alevel people of 3,000 is present in the socio-political life. socio-political the presentis in fundamentalism, and radicalism including issue, Islamic whereof the regions number the in increase an be will there suppose to prudent that it seems area, post-Soviet on the of acentury quarter last the place during taken has which in particular Salafism and general in of Islam growth dynamic the Considering forces 2010 Ingushetia. in in Russian with aclash in killed was and Emirate Caucasus of the ranks joined the then and Salafists, thepeaceful leaders of one most influential of became the to Islam, he converted Buryat, half Russian, half –ethnically Tikhomirov) (Aleksandr Buryatsky Said is convert to Islam ofThe example a Russian most well-known the Central Asian states live and work live states and Asian Central the from migrants of labour of thousands hundreds dozen several to several from where anywhere Siberia, central and western as well as of Russia, part ropean play an important role –for in example play important an not did traditionally Islam which in former USSR, of the countries other the in 315 314 313 312 311 place there takes process of radicalisation the and crisis of the family etc. family of the crisis the abuse, drug alcoholism, as such problems Russia, present in social the all asolution is for Islam themselves, converts the to According recent years. the in of model Soviet society, collapseintensified of it the the has and USSR and of the fall the during late 1990s, 1980s-early the in process began This lam. convert to Is occasionally Russia present in non-Muslim ethnicities tionally tradi of other members and phenomenon noteworthy One Russians that is

http://www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=news&div=17618

Ulan Ude 2013. Ude 2013. Ulan Sibiri), v Baykalskoy Azii Tsentralnoy iz migrantov (polozheniye sveta” „novogo v poiskakh vSibir, ili Azii Iz Varnavski, Piotr Siberia: in migrants labour Asian Central on the More manews.com/minbar/9148--l-r.html. alcoholism, drug abuse, or as prostitution: such society, of Russian problems the to solution the is http://www.aif.ru/incidents/18598, Islam that concluding Islam, to ed convert he prison in While East). Far (Russian and Krai http://um Primorsky the in 2010 in of attacks ries ase He conducted of this. example an provides Kovtun Aleksandr nationalist The Russian charter97.org/ru/news/2015/1/11/134768/ charter97.org/ru/news/2015/1/11/134768/ http:// http://news.tut.by/society/432820.html and authorities: Belarusian the from sions - repres continuous from suffering dozens, the in followers with community Salafi Peaceful siberia.html siberia.html arabskogo_yazyka_i_osnov_islama-15201.html i http://www.ng.ru/ng_religii/2015-02-04/4_For example: http://irkutsk.rusplt.ru/index/zachem_v_irkutske_otkryvayutsya_kursy_ 314 It is hard to pin down the exact scale of the phenom of the scale exact the down pin to It hard is 312 . Small Salafi communities also exist exist also communities Salafi . Small 313 . 311 . It is true mostly of the Eu of mostly the . It true is 315 ------. cus Homo cases many sovieti in processes. While socio-political role the in higher plays incomparably religion an which in civilisation, context of Islamic the in viewed be should Caucasus Northern or the Azerbaijan states, Asian Central the that though, does not This mean, by Muslims. inhabited USSRmer states for of the landscape political and social religious, element of the a permanent become has Islam, militant and fundamentalism Islamic with case the is as post-Soviet of the of states, citizens migration war the shows evidence that All awhole. as region and states ticular par logicof the political the in rooted be must Iraq, and Syria to migration war consequences of the future and of Islam’s current the analysis as role, well as Therefore the them. to events—notand reacting but rather them, generating processes socio-political the factor, one behind step asecondary most always al was Islam militant that fiveshow twenty years last of the experiences the Valley, Furthermore, Fergana avacuum. or in the Dagestan does not function places as post-Soviet such even in the in area, Islam context present there. cal economic politi and social, the in –place them them to proportions proper the post-Soviet the in one states, ascribe should phenomenon Islam the of radical and issue Islamic orderproperly to of in the judgeNevertheless, meaning the power plays. political in it instrumentalised being of aresult sphere), as and by itself security both the (including there situation political role shaping the in may play important an it actually circumstances, appropriate under and there, adoubt rise without on the are roleand of Islam post-Soviet ignored or be should played the in ism area The down. influence fundamental or Islamic problem migration the of war that does notThis mean overestimated. role often is of the USSR, which former the in general in even Islam and fundamentalism, Islamic Islam, tant of mili case the in place also in is mechanism post-Sovietthe Asimilar states. abovethe influence ofphenomenon the on regarding forecasts alarmist erates problem blown the to out being gen leads This and of proportion arena. tional interna on the and power struggles internal in both states particular of the exploited commonly authorities is which issue, by the of the usefulness litical po of because the also case West. the is the post-Soviet This and the area both from analysts and journalists amongst subject apopular is attractiveness, and potential dueThe media its to phenomenon Syria, in of post-Soviet militants C onclusions did in fact become Homo fact in jihadicus did , the inhabitants of the states formed on states of the inhabitants , the ------103 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 104 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 still remain halfway between the Islamic and the Soviet/Russian worlds. Soviet/Russian the and Islamic the between halfway remain still dimensions, civilizational and mental the in inhabit, they regions the and lims The post-Soviet predicted. be Mus currently they out, nor can ruled be cannot these While landslides. civilisational and geopolitical colossal buttions, also of multiple not genera atransition only place –requires ituation –if ever takes sit current the in change sphere. A Russia’sand civilizational the in influence theSoviet heritage influence of astrong under still USSR are rubble of the the Maciej FalMaciej The text was closed in June was 2015The text k o w s k i, J óze f L ang - - - Map 1. Map Map 2. Sochi Beirut LEBANON

Sufi influence Shia influence main Salaficentres ISRAEL Maykop Situation in Syria and Iraq and Syria Situation in Islam in the Caucasus the in Islam 37% Damascus ADYGEA ABKHAZIA Aleppo JORDAN 30% Sukhumi SYRIA -CHERKESSIA KARACHAY- Kobane ADJARA TURKEY Batumi Raqqa 69% Cherkessk TURKEY Free SyrianArmyandothers Iraqi government Islamic State Kurds Bashar al-Assad’s forces Al-Nusra Stavropol GEORGIA KABARDINO- 10% -BALKARIA 78% RUSSIAN FEDERATION KVEMO KARTLI S. O. 10−15% ARMENIA Tskhinvali 15% N. O. Tbilisi Rustavi IRAQ Mosul SAUDI ARABIA 99% ING. Pankisi CHECHNYA Erbil Bagdad Grozny 98% 10% 30% of theMuslimpopulation approximate share Makhachkala AZERBAIJAN DAGESTAN 95% KUWAIT IRAN 95% 105 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 106 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015 Map 3. Map

Helsinki capital of a state RUSSIAN FEDERATION Petersburg main Salafi centres 10 15% post-Soviet the in area Islam Tallinn approximate share 70% of the Muslim population

Volga Riga Tatarstan 31% * INGUSHETIA 99% Bashkortostan 38% ** CHECHNYA 98% *** DAGESTAN 95% Moscow VOLGA Vilnius REGION Minsk

BELARUS

Astana Kiev KAZAKHSTAN UKRAINE 70% 1% WESTERN KAZAKHSTAN Chisinau ROMANIA

Crimea 12% NORTH Bukarest CAUCASUS Almaty Bishkek * ** Sofia BULGARIA UZBEKISTAN GEORGIA10% Tbilisi *** 90% Adjara Tashkent KYRGYZSTAN AZERBAIJAN 80% Kvemo Kartli Erevan 95% Baku TURKMENISTAN GREECE SOUTHERN KYRGYZSTAN Ankara 90% Dushanbe TURKEY TAJIKISTAN Ashgabat 98% Athens

Nicosia SYRIA Tehran PAKISTAN CYPRUS IRAK Kabul Beirut Damascus IRAN LEBANON Baghdad AFGHANISTAN Islamabad Map 4. Map

Helsinki capital of a state

RUSSIAN FEDERATION Approximate number 300 of volunteers of volunteers number Approximate Tallinn 2000 ESTONIA * INGUSHETIA ‚ 50 ** CHECHNYA ‚ 1000 *** DAGESTAN ‚ 500 Riga LATVIA LITHUANIA Moscow VOLGA Vilnius REGION 50 Minsk

BELARUS

Astana Kiev KAZAKHSTAN UKRAINE 50 300

Chisinau ROMANIA

Crimea Bukarest 50

** Bishkek Sofia BULGARIA * UZBEKISTAN GEORGIA100 Tbilisi *** 300 Tashkent KYRGYZSTAN AZERBAIJAN 200 Erevan 200 Baku TURKMENISTAN GREECE Ankara 100 Dushanbe TURKEY TAJIKISTAN Ashgabat 300 CHINA Athens

Nicosia SYRIA Tehran PAKISTAN CYPRUS IRAK Kabul Beirut Damascus IRAN LEBANON Baghdad AFGHANISTAN Islamabad 107 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 09/2015