DOCSLIB.ORG

North Caucasus

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
North Caucasus No. 238 22 July 2019 russian analytical digest www.css.ethz.ch/en/publications/rad.html www.laender-analysen.de NORTH CAUCASUS ■■ANALYSIS Radical Islam in the North Caucasus 2 By Sufian N. Zhemukhov, George Washington University ■■ANALYSIS Chechnya under Ramzan Kadyrov 5 By Ekaterina Sokirianskaia, Conflict Analysis and Prevention Center ■■ANALYSIS The Reintegration of the Balkars and Intercommunal Peace in Post-Soviet Kabardino-Balkaria 9 By Ian Lanzillotti, Bethany College, West Virginia ■■MAP Regions (“Subjects”) of the Russian Federation in the North Caucasus 13 Institute for European, Research Centre Center for Center for German Association for Russian, and Eurasian Studies for East European Studies Security Studies Eastern European Studies East European Studies The George Washington University University of Bremen ETH Zurich University of Zurich RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 238, 22 July 2019 2 ANALYSIS Radical Islam in the North Caucasus By Sufian N. Zhemukhov, George Washington University DOI: 10.3929/ethz-b-000355527 Abstract After the Chechen wars, the North Caucasus and other regions of Russia were shaken by numerous terror- ist attacks. Most of them were committed by the Caucasus Emirate, founded in 2007 and based on a rad- icalized version of Salafism and al Qaeda terrorism tactics. Russian security measures, internal tensions and above all the rivalry with the Islamic State (ISIS), which from 2014 had the backing of many North Cauca- sus fighters in the Middle East, have led to a loss of importance for the Caucasus Emirate. Violent Upsurge Anzor Astemirov, the leader of the Kabardino-Bal- Russia’s North Caucasus experienced an upsurge in vio- karia insurgents, first proposed to unite all the anti-Rus- lence after the fall of the Soviet Union. After the hun- sian religious groups in the North Caucasus in early dreds of thousands of casualties from the two Russian– 2005, however, the president of the Chechen Republic of Chechen wars of the 1990s, the emergence of a jihadist Ichkeria (ChRI), Abdul-Khalim Sadullayev, rejected the insurgency in the 2000s brought with it numerous ter- proposal. After the death of Sadullayev in Summer 2006, rorist acts. Jihadists expanded the geography of vio- the new president of the ChRI, Doku Umarov, accepted lence from Chechnya to most North Caucasus regions Astemirov’s offer and created the Caucasus Emirate. The and beyond. Two violent jihadist movements adopted CE included six vilayats (administrative divisions). The radical Islam as their ideology. The Caucasus Emirate new ideology, based on radical Islam without national- established a network of jihadists in each region and ism, was established as the foundation of the Caucasus organized terrorist acts beginning in 2007. Pro-ISIS Emirate in October 2007. Umarov became the execu- jihadists emerged in the North Caucasus on the eve of tive leader (Emir), and Astemirov became the ideologi- the 2014 Sochi Olympics. The Caucasus Emirate leaders cal and judicial leader (Kadi of the sharia court). denounced the pro-ISIS movement in the North Cau- CE existed as a decentralized structure both institu- casus. However, many insurgents and would-be fighters tionally and ideologically. Each vilayat could have its went to the Middle East and joined ISIS. With the Cau- own independent structure and policy. When Umarov casus Emirate under pressure, pro-ISIS jihadists gained announced that the CE should increase its activities dur- more popularity in the North Caucasus. ing the run up to the 2014 Sochi Olympics, some other vilayats pursued differing goals, including the Ingush The Caucasus Emirate vilayat’s decision to prioritize nationalist goals and stop The Caucasus Emirate (CE) proclaimed its authority on targeting local police officers and the Kabardino-Bal- the territory of most North Caucasus republics in 2007, karia-Karachai vilayat’s decision to intensify targeting establishing radical Islam as its political ideology. The “hypocrites, idolaters, and necromancers,” alongside the CE carried out terrorist acts in Ingushetia, Dagestan, law enforcement structures. Chechnya, and Kabardino-Balkaria, as well as outside Despite the differences among the CE branches, tar- of the Caucasus. The establishment of the CE brought geting the Sochi Olympics remained the main strategy with it a radical version of Islam, though radical Islam of the insurgents. CE terrorist activities became the big- had existed since the end of the First Chechen War as gest challenge facing Russia’s domestic security forces. a marginal movement. The CE transformed radical Thanks to extraordinary security measures, the Rus- Islam into a political force, crystallizing the extrem- sian authorities managed to prevent any terrorist acts ist trend. in Sochi and the overall numbers of terrorist attacks While the First Chechen War was fought mostly dropped starting in 2010. However, the CE organized by local recruits and was based on a nationalist ideol- a number of terrorist attacks in other parts of Russia, ogy, the insurgent leaders of the Second Chechen War including two explosions in Moscow, in 2010–2011, sought to expand the insurgency across the North Cau- a series of explosions in Volgograd, in 2013, and a ter- casus, using religious radicalism as their ideology. The rorist attack in the capital city of the North Caucasus cooperation between local extremist groups started in Federal District, Pyatigorsk, on New Year’s Eve 2014. Kabardino-Balkaria and Chechnya, though no formal After the 2014 Sochi Olympics, the Russian security structure existed until 2005. services interrupted the CE network infrastructure and RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 238, 22 July 2019 3 killed the leaders of CE one by one, including the foun- in spite of the fact that Umarov announced targeting der of the CE, Doku Umarov, in April 2014, the sec- the Sochi Olympics as a priority. Instead, an unknown ond leader Aliaskhab Kebekov, in April 2015, the third insurgency group released a video taking responsibility leader, Mukhamed Suleimanov, in August 2015, and for the attacks and threatening to conduct more attacks the fourth leader, Zalim Shebzukhov, in August 2016. during the Sochi Games. The new insurgency group was not connected to the CE and named themselves Radical Islam as a Version of Salafism Ansar al-Sunna, after the terrorist organization fighting Different branches of the CE developed specific tacti- against the United States in Iraq. The split between the cal skills, like targeting civilians, law enforcement offi- CE and Ansar al-Sunna became the first indication of cers, and the Sochi Olympics. However, the disputes a split between the pro-al Qaeda jihadists and pro-ISIS among the different branches over the tactical prefer- jihadists in the North Caucasus. ences remained ideological/theological. The ideology of In September 2014, ISIS threatened to begin a war in radical Islam in the North Caucasus was based on Sala- the North Caucasus as retaliation for Russia’s help to the fism from the beginning. Although Salafi Islam is not Syrian regime of Bashar Assad. On 21 November 2014, necessarily radical, the CE adopted a radicalized ver- the first insurgent from the North Caucasus, Suleiman sion of Salafism, suggesting that all spheres of society Zainelabidov, openly pledged his allegiance to ISIS. CE should be based on the law and spirit of Islam. The CE leaders announced that Zainelabidov was not an official brand of Salafism also practiced intolerance, extremist member of the CE and accused him of causing a split behaviors, and hostility toward Muslims with differ- among the insurgents. ing beliefs, labeling them “hypocrites.” The founders of More importantly, on 19 December 2014, the leader the CE shared a common ideological ground, agreeing of the CE’s Dagestan branch, Rustam Asilderov, pledged both on terrorist measures against Islamic leaders who his allegiance to ISIS’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. worked with the Russian state and toward Russian law The leader of the CE, Aliaskhab Kebekov, responded enforcement agencies (siloviki). As the executive leader condemning Asilderov as a traitor and of splitting the of the CE, Umarov organized planned terrorist actions insurgency. Kebekov replaced Asilderov, which did not against both “infidels” and siloviki, while as the judi- prevent a number of other senior CE commanders fol- cial leader of the CE, Astemirov issued ideological state- lowing Asilderov, including the leader of the Ingush ments against “traitorous Imams.” branch of the Caucasus Emirate, Beslan Makhauri, and Initially, the Caucasus Emirate did not have a uni- the leader of a suicide squadron, Aslan Byutukaev. fied approach toward non-Salafi Muslims. Some of the After Kebekov’s death, in April 2015, the third leader insurgency leaders, including Umarov, advocated vio- of CE, Mukhamed Suleimanov continued the pro-al lence against civilians, including non-Salafi Muslims Qaeda policy. At the same time, the number of pro-ISIS and argued for a broader definition of the enemy, beyond insurgents in the North Caucasus increased. In June those who attacked insurgents directly. Other leaders, 2015, Caucasus Emirate branches in Dagestan, Chech- including Astemirov, spoke against unnecessary vio- nya, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Karachai- lence against Muslims and for seeking the support of Cherkessia announced their support for ISIS. After that, the local population and for converting all Muslims to ISIS announced that it had established a branch in Rus- Salafism and radical Islam. Those ideological debates sia’s North Caucasus under the leadership of Asilderov. did not split the movement, but shaped differences in The North Caucasus insurgents organized a number of tactics between CE vilayats. terrorist attacks in the name of ISIS, including in Dage- stan, Chechnya, and Astrakhan. Clashes Between Different Trends of One of the main splits among the pro-al Qaeda Radical Islam and pro-ISIS insurgents took place in Kabardino-Bal- The leaders of the Caucasus Emirate initially announced karia, where the pro-al Qaeda political ideology ini- their loyalty to al Qaeda, following al Qaeda’s tactics tially emerged under the leadership of Astemirov.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Editions De L'universite De Bruxelles
    EDITIONS DE L'UNIVERSITE DE BRUXELLES Ordres et désordres au Caucase EDITE PAR AUDE MERLIN SILVIA SERRANO DANS LA MEME COLLECTION Sport et Union européenne, édité par Jean-Michel DeWaele et Alexandre Hustîng, 2001 Les fédérations européennes de partis, édité par Pascal Delwit, Erol Kùlahci et Cédric Van de Walle, 2001 Un diagnostic géopolitique de l'Europe du centre, Nicolas Bârdos-Féltoronyi, 2001 Fascistes, communistes, paysans. Sociologie des mobilisations identitaires roumaines (1921-1989), Antoine Roger, 2002 Libéralïsmes et partis libéraux en Europe, édité par Pascal Delwit, 2002 Le parti social chrétien. Mutations et perspectives ?, édité par Pascal Delwit, 2002 Démocraties chrétiennes et conservatismes en Europe. Une nouvelle convergence ?, édité par Pascal Delwit, 2003 La Pologne et l'intégration européenne, édité par Jean-Michel De Waele, 2003 Le gouvernement des colonies, regards croisés franco-britanniques, Véronique Dimier, 2004 Les partis politiques roumains après 1989, Sorîna Soare, 2004 Les clivages politiques en Europe centrale et orientale, édité par Jean-Michel De Waele, 2004 Expertise et action publique, édité par Steve Jacob et Jean-Louis Genard, 2004 Les systèmes électoraux aux présidentielles et aux législatives, Thanassis Diamantopoulos, 2004 Social Democracy in Europe, edited by Pascal Delwit, 2005 European Union accession référendums, edited by Jean-Michel De Waele, 2005 Parlement puissant, électeurs absents ? Les élections européennes de juin 2004, édité par Pascal Delwit et Philippe Poirier, 2005 Les partis régionalistes en Europe. Des acteurs en développement ?, édité par Pascal Delwit, 2005 Sport, politiques et sociétés en Europe centrale et orientale, édité par Jean-Michel De Waele et Alexandre Husting, 2005 Faire et vivre le postcommunisme.
    [Show full text]
  • The North Caucasus: the Challenges of Integration (III), Governance, Elections, Rule of Law
    The North Caucasus: The Challenges of Integration (III), Governance, Elections, Rule of Law Europe Report N°226 | 6 September 2013 International Crisis Group Headquarters Avenue Louise 149 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 Fax: +32 2 502 50 38 [email protected] Table of Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... i Recommendations..................................................................................................................... iii I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 II. Russia between Decentralisation and the “Vertical of Power” ....................................... 3 A. Federative Relations Today ....................................................................................... 4 B. Local Government ...................................................................................................... 6 C. Funding and budgets ................................................................................................. 6 III. Elections ........................................................................................................................... 9 A. State Duma Elections 2011 ........................................................................................ 9 B. Presidential Elections 2012 ......................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • ON the EFFECTIVE USE of PROXY WARFARE by Andrew Lewis Peek Baltimore, Maryland May 2021 © 2021 Andrew Peek All Rights Reserved
    ON THE EFFECTIVE USE OF PROXY WARFARE by Andrew Lewis Peek A dissertation submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Baltimore, Maryland May 2021 2021 Andrew Peek All rights reserved Abstract This dissertation asks a simple question: how are states most effectively conducting proxy warfare in the modern international system? It answers this question by conducting a comparative study of the sponsorship of proxy forces. It uses process tracing to examine five cases of proxy warfare and predicts that the differentiation in support for each proxy impacts their utility. In particular, it proposes that increasing the principal-agent distance between sponsors and proxies might correlate with strategic effectiveness. That is, the less directly a proxy is supported and controlled by a sponsor, the more effective the proxy becomes. Strategic effectiveness here is conceptualized as consisting of two key parts: a proxy’s operational capability and a sponsor’s plausible deniability. These should be in inverse relation to each other: the greater and more overt a sponsor’s support is to a proxy, the more capable – better armed, better trained – its proxies should be on the battlefield. However, this close support to such proxies should also make the sponsor’s influence less deniable, and thus incur strategic costs against both it and the proxy. These costs primarily consist of external balancing by rival states, the same way such states would balance against conventional aggression. Conversely, the more deniable such support is – the more indirect and less overt – the less balancing occurs.
    [Show full text]
  • Russian-Speaking
    NOVEMBER 2017 ‘RUSSIAN-SPEAKING’ FIGHTERS IN SYRIA, IRAQ AND AT HOME: CONSEQUENCES AND CONTEXT FULL REPORT Mark Youngman and Dr Cerwyn Moore Centre for Russian, European and Eurasian Studies Department of Political Science and International Studies University of Birmingham This report was produced out of the Actors and Narratives programme, funded by CREST. To find out more information about this programme, and to see other outputs from the team, visit the CREST website at: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/actors-and-narratives/ About the authors: Mark Youngman is an ESRC-funded doctoral student and Cerwyn Moore a Senior Lecturer in the Centre for Russian, European and Eurasian Studies at the University of Birmingham. Disclaimer: This report has been part funded by an ESRC IAA award and part funded by the Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (ESRC Award: ES/N009614/1). It draws on the existing work of the authors, and supplements their work with original research and ongoing data collection of Russian-speaking foreign fighters.www.crestresearch.co.uk The cover image, Caucasus Emirate, is a remixed derivative ofProposed divisions of the Caucasus Emirate by ArnoldPlaton, under CC BY-SA 3.0. Caucasus Emirate is licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0. by R. Stevens, CREST. ©2017 CREST Creative Commons 4.0 BY-NC-SA licence. www.crestresearch.ac.uk/copyright CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...............................................................................................................4 PART I: ASSESSING THE ‘RUSSIAN-SPEAKING’
    [Show full text]
  • Kadyrovism: Hardline Islam As a Tool of the Kremlin?
    Notes de l’Ifri Russie.Nei.Visions 99 Kadyrovism: Hardline Islam as a Tool of the Kremlin? Marlène LARUELLE March 2017 Russia/NIS Center The Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri) is a research center and a forum for debate on major international political and economic issues. Headed by Thierry de Montbrial since its founding in 1979, Ifri is a non-governmental, non-profit organization. As an independent think tank, Ifri sets its own research agenda, publishing its findings regularly for a global audience. Taking an interdisciplinary approach, Ifri brings together political and economic decision-makers, researchers and internationally renowned experts to animate its debate and research activities. With offices in Paris and Brussels, Ifri stands out as one of the few French think tanks to have positioned itself at the very heart of European and broader international debate. The opinions expressed in this text are the responsibility of the author alone. This text is published with the support of DGRIS (Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy) under “Observatoire Russie, Europe orientale et Caucase”. ISBN: 978-2-36567-681-6 © All rights reserved, Ifri, 2017 How to quote this document: Marlène Laruelle, “Kadyrovism: Hardline Islam as a Tool of the Kremlin?”, Russie.Nei.Visions, No. 99, Ifri, March 2017. Ifri 27 rue de la Procession 75740 Paris Cedex 15—FRANCE Tel.: +33 (0)1 40 61 60 00—Fax : +33 (0)1 40 61 60 60 Email: [email protected] Ifri-Bruxelles Rue Marie-Thérèse, 21 1000—Brussels—BELGIUM Tel.: +32 (0)2 238 51 10—Fax: +32 (0)2 238 51 15 Email: [email protected] Website: Ifri.org Russie.Nei.Visions Russie.Nei.Visions is an online collection dedicated to Russia and the other new independent states (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan).
    [Show full text]
  • The North Caucasus Region As a Blind Spot in the “European Green Deal”: Energy Supply Security and Energy Superpower Russia
    energies Article The North Caucasus Region as a Blind Spot in the “European Green Deal”: Energy Supply Security and Energy Superpower Russia José Antonio Peña-Ramos 1,* , Philipp Bagus 2 and Dmitri Amirov-Belova 3 1 Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, Universidad Autónoma de Chile, Providencia 7500912, Chile 2 Department of Applied Economics I and History of Economic Institutions (and Moral Philosophy), Rey Juan Carlos University, 28032 Madrid, Spain; [email protected] 3 Postgraduate Studies Centre, Pablo de Olavide University, 41013 Sevilla, Spain; [email protected] * Correspondence: [email protected]; Tel.: +34-657219669 Abstract: The “European Green Deal” has ambitious aims, such as net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. While the European Union aims to make its energies greener, Russia pursues power-goals based on its status as a geo-energy superpower. A successful “European Green Deal” would have the up-to-now underestimated geopolitical advantage of making the European Union less dependent on Russian hydrocarbons. In this article, we illustrate Russian power-politics and its geopolitical implications by analyzing the illustrative case of the North Caucasus, which has been traditionally a strategic region for Russia. The present article describes and analyses the impact of Russian intervention in the North Caucasian secessionist conflict since 1991 and its importance in terms of natural resources, especially hydrocarbons. The geopolitical power secured by Russia in the North Caucasian conflict has important implications for European Union’s energy supply security and could be regarded as a strong argument in favor of the “European Green Deal”. Keywords: North Caucasus; post-soviet conflicts; Russia; oil; natural gas; global economics and Citation: Peña-Ramos, J.A.; Bagus, P.; cross-cultural management; energy studies; renewable energies; energy markets; clean energies Amirov-Belova, D.
    [Show full text]
  • Russia's Strategic Mobility
    Russia’s Strategic Mobility: Supporting ’Hard Pow Supporting ’Hard Mobility: Strategic Russia’s Russia’s Strategic Mobility Supporting ’Hard Power’ to 2020? The following report examines the military reform in Russia. The focus is on Russia’s military-strategic mobility and assess- ing how far progress has been made toward genuinely enhanc- ing the speed with which military units can be deployed in a N.McDermott Roger er’ to2020? theatre of operations and the capability to sustain them. In turn this necessitates examination of Russia’s threat environ- ment, the preliminary outcome of the early reform efforts, and consideration of why the Russian political-military leadership is attaching importance to the issue of strategic mobility. Russia’s Strategic Mobility Supporting ’Hard Power’ to 2020? Roger N. McDermott FOI-R--3587--SE ISSN1650-1942 www.foi.se April 2013 Roger N. McDermott Russia’s Strategic Mobility Supporting ‘Hard Power’ to 2020? Title Russia’s Strategic Mobility: Supporting ‘Hard Power’ to 2020? Titel Rysk strategisk mobilitet: Stöd för maktut- övning till 2020? Report no FOI-R--3587--SE Month April Year 2013 Antal sidor/Pages 101 p ISSN 1650-1942 Kund/Customer Försvarsdepartementet/ Ministry of Defence Projektnr/Project no A11301 Godkänd av/Approved by Maria Lignell Jakobsson Ansvarig avdelning/Departement Försvarsanalys/Defence Analysis This work is protected under the Act on Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works (SFS 1960:729). Any form of reproduction, translation or modification without permission is prohibited. Cover photo: Denis Sinyakov, by permission. www.denissinyakov.com FOI-R--3587--SE Summary Since 2008, Russia’s conventional Armed Forces have been subject to a contro- versial reform and modernization process designed to move these structures be- yond the Soviet-legacy forces towards a modernized military.
    [Show full text]
  • Chechen War: Motivator for Military Reform?
    WARNING! The views expressed in FMSO publications and reports are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Information Warfare in the Second (1999-Present) Chechen War: Motivator for Military Reform? by Timothy L. Thomas, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS., 2002. This article was previously published in Russian Military Reform 1992-2002 Published by Frank Cass Publishers, 2003 Chapter 11, Page 209-233 During the past ten years, the Russian military has attentively studied the subject of information war (IW). The main catalyst for this interest was the successful use of IW by coalition forces during Operation Desert Storm. Russian military theorists watched coalition planes bomb Iraqi targets in real time with precision and understood that warfare had entered a new phase, one dominated by information-based equipment and resources. Two further motivators were the poor use of IW by the Russian armed forces during the first Russian-Chechen war (1994-1996), which contributed to the loss of Russian morale, and the successful use of IW by NATO during the conflict over Kosovo. The success of the coalition forces in both Desert Storm and Kosovo indicated that military reform would be bankrupt if the technical aspect of reform did not include information-based technologies. These technologies must be imbedded into new military equipment, from sensors and radars to jet fighters and cruise missiles. However, Russia was also concerned about the impact of information technologies on the brain and consequently morale.
    [Show full text]
  • Volume VIII, Issue 27 JULY 8, 2010
    VOLUME VIII, ISSUE 27 u JULY 8, 2010 IN THIS ISSUE: BRIEFS...................................................................................................................................1 JIHADI VIEWS ON GENERAL MCCHRYSTAL’s RESIGNATION By Abdul Hameed Bakier.........................................................................................3 PKK INTENSIFIES VIOLENCE TO BRING TURKEY INTO CONFRONTATION WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION Members of PKK By Emrullah Uslu..............................................................................................................4 SALAFI-JIHADIS AND THE NORTH CAUCASUS: IS THERE A NEW PHASE OF WAR Terrorism Monitor is a publication IN THE MAKING? of The Jamestown Foundation. By Murad Batal al-Shishani....................................................................................6 The Terrorism Monitor is designed to be read by policy- makers and other specialists yet be accessible to the general public. The opinions expressed within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of The Jamestown DEFIANT AQIM CHALLENGES NEW REGIONAL COUNTERTERRORIST Foundation. COMMAND WITH DEADLY CROSS-BORDER RAID Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) answered the formation of a Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution of this or any multinational counterterrorism center in the southern Algerian town of Jamestown publication is strictly Tamanrasset by ambushing a patrol of Algerian border gendarmes close to Tin prohibited by law. Zaouatine, roughly 40 km from the border with Mali
    [Show full text]
  • 'Muhajirun' from Austria. Why They Left to Join ISIS and Why They Don't Return
    Spring 2020 Nr. 22 ISSN: 2363-9849 ‘Muhajirun’ from Austria. Why they left to join ISIS and why they don’t return. Veronika Hofingera1, Thomas Schmidingerb aScientific Management, Institute for the Sociology of Law and Criminology (IRKS), bLecturer, Department of Political Science, University of Vienna Abstract Article History After the proclamation of the so-called Islamic State in June 2014 thousands of Received Feb 18, 2020 Europeans, including hundreds of Austrian residents, went to fight and live with Accepted Mar 23, 2020 ISIS or other extremist groups in Syria or Iraq. Austria is one of the European countries with the highest per-capita share of foreign fighters. The article gives a Published Mar 27, 2020 broad overview of the situation in Austria: Who are the different groups relevant in this field? How did young people who grew up in Austria become radicalised, and what is their current status? The data from two Austrian commissioned research projects and one EU-funded project are supplemented by the findings of recent research in northern Syria focusing on the current situation of Austrian foreign fighters and their families and supporters in the region. Keywords: Foreign Fighters, ISIS, Islamic State, Austria, Syria, radicalisation Introduction ISIS and other jihadist groups use an old Arabic term for migrant, ‘Muhajirun’, to refer to those who migrated to the ‘Islamic State’ or to other jihadi-controlled territory in Syria. In the self-conception of male and female activists, this term covers both armed foreign fighters, their wives, and various civilian supporters of jihadist groups. The region still has those Muhajirun who did not die in combat or return to Europe, many are detained by Iraqi, Syrian, or Kurdish forces.
    [Show full text]
  • Chechnya's Status Within the Russian
    SWP Research Paper Uwe Halbach Chechnya’s Status within the Russian Federation Ramzan Kadyrov’s Private State and Vladimir Putin’s Federal “Power Vertical” Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs SWP Research Paper 2 May 2018 In the run-up to the Russian presidential elections on 18 March 2018, the Kremlin further tightened the federal “vertical of power” that Vladimir Putin has developed since 2000. In the North Caucasus, this above all concerns the republic of Dagestan. Moscow intervened with a powerful purge, replacing the entire political leadership. The situation in Chechnya, which has been ruled by Ramzan Kadyrov since 2007, is conspicuously different. From the early 2000s onwards, President Putin conducted a policy of “Chechenisation” there, delegating the fight against the armed revolt to local security forces. Under Putin’s protection, the republic gained a leadership which is now publicly referred to by Russians as the “Chechen Khanate”, among other similar expressions. Kadyrov’s breadth of power encompasses an independ- ent foreign policy, which is primarily orientated towards the Middle East. Kadyrov emphatically professes that his republic is part of Russia and presents himself as “Putin’s foot soldier”. Yet he has also transformed the federal subject of Chechnya into a private state. The ambiguous relationship between this republic and the central power fundamentally rests on the loyalty pact between Putin and Kadyrov. However, criticism of this arrange- ment can now occasionally be heard even in the Russian president’s inner circles. With regard to Putin’s fourth term, the question arises just how long the pact will last.
    [Show full text]
  • Republic of Tatarstan 15 I
    1 CONTENTS ABOUT AUTHORS 3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 INTRODUCTION 10 THE REPUBLIC OF TATARSTAN 15 I. POLITICAL ELITE 15 1. Vertical power structure 19 2. Governance model during the period of the President M. Shaimiev 20 3. Governance model during the period of the President R. Minnikhanov 22 4. Security forces as part of a consolidated project 27 5. Export of elites 28 II. PRESERVATION OF ETHNO-CULTURAL IDENTITY 30 1.The Tatar national movement 30 2. The Russian national movement 34 3. Language policy in Tatarstan 37 4. Results of post-Soviet language policy 47 5. Conclusion 50 THE REPUBLIC OF DAGESTAN 51 I. DAGESTAN ELITES AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 51 1. Birth of «clans» 53 2. Adaptation to the growing influence of Moscow 56 3. Mukhu Aliev: attempt to be equidistant from clans 58 4. Elite and the Caucasus Emirate 62 5. Return of the «levashintsy» and attempt at a civil dialogue 64 6. First attempt to eliminate clans 66 II. «EXTERNAL GOVERNANCE» 70 III. PRESERVATION OF ETHNO-CULTURAL IDENTITY 79 1. National movements and conflicts 79 2. Preservation of national languages 82 3. Conclusion 91 FINAL CONCLUSIONS 93 2 ABOUT AUTHORS Dr. Ekaterina SOKIRIANSKAIA is the founder and director at Conflict analysis and prevention center. From 2011 to 2017, she served as International Crisis Group’s Russia/North Caucasus Project Director, supervising the organisation’s research and advocacy in the region. From 2008-2011, Sokirianskaia established and supervised the work of Human rights Center Memorial’s regional offices in Kabardino-Balkariya and Dagestan. Before that, from 2003-2008 Sokirianskaia was permanently based in Ingushetia and Chechnya and worked as a researcher and projects director for Memorial and as an assistant professor at Grozny State University.
    [Show full text]