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Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program (MonTREP) Monterey Institute for International Studies Islam, Islamism and Politics in Eurasia Report No. 19, July 28, 2010 CONTENTS: CAUCASUS EMIRATE (CE) TERRORISM STATISTICS FROM JUNE AND JANUARY-JUNE 2010 DAGESTAN’S MUJAHEDIN DISCUSS CONFIDENCE, DUAL POWER, AND PARALLEL STATE-BUILDING DAGESTAN VILAIYAT’S QADIS ACTIVIZED FIVE RADICAL RUSSIAN LIBERALS SUPPORT CE’S JIHAD ANZOR ASTEMIROV – SEIFULLAH: A PROFILE (PART 1) ANNOUNCEMENT: NEW NON-PROLIFERATION/TERRORISM STUDIES MASTER OF ARTS DEGREE AND TERRORISM STUDIES CERTIFICATE PROGRAMS * IIPER is written and edited by Dr. Gordon M. Hahn unless otherwise noted. Research assistance is provided by Leonid Naboishchikov, Daniel Painter, Fabian Sievert, and Daria Ushakova. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ CE TERRORISM STATISTICS FROM JUNE AND JANUARY-JUNE 2010 June 2010 saw at least approximately 66 terrorist attacks and jihad-related violent incidents in Russia. These 66 attacks/incidents have led to approximately at least 28 state agents killed and 40 wounded, 10 civilians killed and 33 wounded. This brings the total for the first six months of this year to at least some 213 attacks/incidents, the overwhelming majority of which were attacks initiated by mujahedin. These 213 attacks/incidents have led to approximately at least 104 state agents killed and 195 wounded, 66 civilians killed and 209 wounded. It remains unclear whether the May 26th car bomb explosion in Stavropol, which killed 7 and 41 civilians, was a CE operation; neither the mujahedin nor the authorities have thus far claimed so. According to non- jihadi Russian sources, some 42 mujahedin were killed in June. According to non-jihadi Russian sources, in the first six months of 2010 Russian security and police forces have killed 173-178, wounded 4-6, and captured 43-51 mujahedin. Nearly two hundred facilitators have been captured. The CE continues to show a capacity to carry out operations over a larger geographical area than in recent years. As noted in IIPER, No. 16, the CE expanded its activity in the Republic of Kabardino-Balkariya (KBR) to a new level, and that level remains inordinately high as compared to the past. The unprecedented number of attacks in Kabardino-Balkaria, the March 29th Moscow subway suicide bombings, possibly the first attack in Bashkortostan (March) ever, and possibly the first in many years carried out in Stavropol (May) all demonstrate this. Ingushetia, which lost its lead within the CE jihad in April 2010 in terms of number of incidents, still places second to Dagestan, with the mujahedin of the former having executed some 54 attacks and incidents to the Dagestanis’ 79 in 2010’s first six months. The fall off in attacks to some 39 in Chechnya so far this year and the increase in the KBR to some 38 are the most striking changes in the geographic distribution of jihadi operations this year. Dagestan continues to be most deadly for state agents, with approximately 52 killed there through June of this year compared to some 22 in Chechnya and 17 in Ingushetia. On the other hand, Ingushetia has seen nearly as many overall casualties among state agents this year, with some 94 (some 17 killed and 77 wounded), approaching Dagestan’s 125 casualties (52 killed and 73 wounded). The mujahedin in Chechnya have killed 22 state agents, the second largest number of state agents killed in any the four most jihadi-plagued republics; they have wounded 29 state agents this year. The Dagestani mujahedin have inflicted the most civilian casualties of all the regions in the North Caucasus, if one excludes the Stavropol car bomb attack, killing 12 and wounding 32. The March 29th Moscow subway suicide bombings remain the single most damaging CE operation, having killed 40 and having wounded 121 civilians. The month of June saw one successful suicide bombing as compared to three failed attempts in May. The successful male suicide bomber killed 1 and wounded 5 MVD militia and 2 civilians on June 30th (see IIPER, No. 17). Comparing the total jihadi terrorist activity for the first six months of 2010 to that of 2009, we find a decline in the approximate number of attacks and jihadi-related violent incidents from 236 in 2009 to 213 in 2010; a fall of 10 percent. The number of state agents killed has fallen from 173 to 104; those wounded have fallen from 244 to 195. The numbers of civilians killed and wounded have increased precipitously from some 14 to some 66 and from some 14 to 209, respectively. Regarding losses among the mujahedin, the number of killed has increased in the first six months of this year compared to the same period last year from some 124-150 to 173-178. The number of wounded mujahedin remains small: approximately five in both six month periods. The number of captured mujahedin has declined by nearly a factor of two, from 86-100 in the first six months of 2009 to 43-51 in the first half of this year. Comparing the four most active republics over the last few years, the decline in CE operations has been most precipitous in Ingushetia from 93 attacks/incidents in the first six months of 2009 to 54 in the first six months of this year. Chechnya saw the next largest fall, from 70 to 39. Dagestan saw a sharp rise in the number of attacks in the first half od last year as compared to the first half this year, from 61 to 79. The KBR’s numbers more than triples, from 12 to 38. Thus there has been a sharp shift in the geographical locus of CE operations from Ingushetia and Cehcnya to Dagestan and the KBR from 2009 to this year. SOURCES: www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, www.ng.ru, www.izvestia.ru, www.kommersant.ru, www.kavkazcenter.com, www.jamaatshariat.com/ru, www.islamdin.ru, and hunafa.com. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ DAGESTAN MUJAHEDIN DISCUSS CONFIDENCE, DUAL POWER, AND PARALLEL STATE-BUILDING Despite the loss of their amir (Umalat Magomedov, aka Al-Bara) on New Year’s Eve and their qadi Daud Dzhabrailov last month, the mujahedin of the self-declared CE’s Dagestan Vilaiyat (DV) are brimming with confidence. They are leading the CE’s vilaiyats in the number of operations carried out and casualties inflicted this year. A recent posting on their website ‘Jamaat Shariat’ (JS) - a title they use interchangeably with the title Dagestan Vilaiyat and inherited from a local jihadi jamaat established in 2005 by amir Rasul Makasharipov killed in 2006 – exuded confidence. It asserted that “real power is transferring to the jamaat ‘Shariat’ with the active support of the local Muslim population.”1 It claimed four initiatives undertaken to transform life in Dagestan are having their effect. One is a campaign against game halls. According to JS, Dagestan’s official authorities undertook its own campaign against game halls in response to the DV’s identical initiative implemented prior to that of the authorities. A second - the DV’s war against establishments of any kind selling alcohol - is forcing such establishments to cease this activity, according to JS. In connection with these first two policies, Jamaat Shariat and other CE websites published several DV warnings, and the DV and JS distributed leaflets across Dagestan in May warning their would be severe consequences for continuing activities that transgress Shariah law.2 The web portal of the human rights organization ‘Memorial’, ‘Kavkaz uzel’, reports that JS leaflets were being distributed in Makhachkala and other Dagestani cities containing threats against traders of alocohol and narcotics, fortune tellers, and game hall and sauna owners. The leaflets, many of which were posted and delivered on May17th, read in part: “The mujahedin of Jamaat ‘Shariat’ have declared war on you and your Satanic business, which you have made on the grief and tears of people, you sew perversion and multiple sins.” The recipients were warned that they had three days to shut down their ‘illegal’ activities, otherwise, the mujahedin warned: “(W)e will burn down your den, blow up your places where you are busy with sacrilege, and destroy your property, shoot up your stores and casinos, and blow up and shoot up your saunas where you are busy with adultery.” All Muslims were urged to stop those engaging in such activity and stay away from these kinds of establishments which could be attacked at any minute.3 There have been numerous attacks on the kinds of enterprises threatened by the mujahedin over the last few months, but their frequency increased to include at least ten such attacks in Dagestan during the month surrounding 1 “Perekhvat initsiativy,” Jamaat Shariat, 2 June 2010, 03:29, www.jamaatshariat.com/ru/- mainmenu-29/14--/834-2010-06-02-03-05-02.html. the period when Dagestan’s mujahedin issued their warnings.4 The mujahedin then reported that the locals in Untsukul’ district then pressured such enterprises to close down so as to avoid jihadi attacks.5 A third policy facilitating the rise of the mujahedin is its “information war” carried out on JS. The authorities are again said to be losing this war, as the Internet allows the DV to conduct a direct “dialogue” with the republic’s Muslims, “especially youth,” which is producing “tangible results.” According to JS, the number of visitors to the site “has grown more than ten fold recently and daily comprises 10 to 15 thousand.” Consequently, Dagestani youth are “studying Shariah law, understanding that on the territory of Dagestan in future only Islamic laws will be in force and the state language will be Arabic.”6 The DV’s fourth policy “seizing the initiative from the puppet authorities” is the collection of the obligatory Islamic tax or zakat.