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it, such a step would have posed dangers of its own. es. At the very least, Kadyrov’s departure would usher Th e hundreds of Chechen guerrillas who accepted in a period of uncertainty in and give an Kadyrov’s proposal to change sides in 2006 might de- opportunity for radical elements to regroup. On the cide in his absence to turn back to violent anti-govern- other hand, if Kadyrov remains in power indefi nitely, ment actions. Indeed, several dozen have already done the cruelty and intolerance of his government might precisely that, rejoining the several hundred Chechen eventually precipitate a backlash. Even if large-scale fi ghters who are still operating, mostly in the south- fi ghting does not recur, Chechnya will continue to ern mountains. Moreover, the , if suddenly be a highly volatile and dangerous component of the deprived of their long-time leader, could easily wreak Russian Federation for many years to come. havoc in Chechnya and clash with other security forc-

About the author: Dr. Mark Kramer directs the Project on Cold War Studies at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University. He is the editor of the peer-reviewed Journal of Cold War Studies.

Analysis

Separatism and Islamic Extremism in the Ethnic Republics of the North Akhmet A. Yarlykapov,

Abstract Th e ethnic republics of the remain a headache and source of alarm for ’s central government. Moscow’s eff orts to improve the political climate and the economic situation have not pro- duced the desired results. Today Moscow must support a signifi cant number of intelligence, military, and police personnel in this strategically important region. As the federal government cuts the number of its troops in Chechnya, the number of forces subordinate to Chechen President is growing. At the same time, the successful eff orts to forcibly remove the separatist fi ghters from Chechnya during the past few years, has pushed them outside the borders of the Chechen republic. Th e drop in the number of separatist military operations in Chechnya has been accompanied by a growth in such operations in other North Caucasus republics, particularly and Ingushetia, which border Chechnya.

Th e Separatist Underground Currently, we are witnessing a major restructuring he suppression of the separatist rebel fi ghters in of the separatist underground in the North Caucasus TChechnya has forced them to move to other re- that is taking place under the pressure of changing publics in the North Caucasus. Today they are creat- circumstances. Th is restructuring includes the dis- ing and expanding their own networks in Dagestan, tribution of forces across a maximally wide territory Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Karachayevo- and the creation of a network structure, in which Cherkessia. Th e main centers of these networks are the nodes are formally autonomous, but are able to not only the mountainous regions, as one would ex- communicate with each other to coordinate their pect, but large cities, such as , Khasav- actions using various agents and electronic means yurt, , , , Karachaevsk, and of communication. In setting up this network, the others. Th e recent actions taken by the Russian force fi ghters are focusing on disgruntled local residents, ministries against these separatists, including the use especially those who have been abused by the local of heavy weapons in the mountainous parts of the law enforcement agencies. Unfortunately, the repub- region, provide evidence that these confl icts have yet lican police in Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino- to disappear. Balkaria in the 1990s and early 2000s carried out 6 rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical russian analytical digest 22/07 ddigestigest

numerous mistaken repressive actions against a wide legislators at the republican and local levels employ range of practicing Muslims, instilling them with a these fi ghters. Public offi cials in the executive branch desire to protest. Th e separatists have been able to ex- have also found use for them. ploit these mistakes by the local authorities to recruit additional numbers of active fi ghters and agents. In Islamist Jamaats particular, they succeeded in attracting to their he organizational structure of the separatist side one of the infl uential leaders of the Jamaat of Tsocieties, jamaats, does not coincide with the Karbardino-Balkaria , who is now structure of traditional Muslim societies in the re- known as Emir Seifullakh. gion, which are also called jamaats. Th e traditional Th e separatists’ underground network is extreme- jamaats are organized along territorial principles, in- ly mobile. Th e separatists frequently change their corporating the population of a village or city district bases, carry out terrorist acts, and then quickly re- grouped around a mosque. Th e separatist jamaats are group elsewhere. Th is mobility gives each unit a high extra-territorial and dispersed. One jamaat can en- degree of autonomy. At the same time, it is clear that compass many small groups, united in one or sev- there is a certain logic to the separatist actions in all eral networks. One example is the Dagestani jamaat of the North Caucasus republics, which suggests that “Shariat.” It was created on the basis of loyalty to the there is some kind of coordinating structure. Rather ideology and practice of the separatist movement. In than being a type of “general staff ” of all the separat- principle, these jamaats do not represent any kind of ists located in one place, this structure is also spread united association. Th eir structure includes de facto out over space so that it would be impossible to de- autonomous groups, made up of a small number of stroy it in one operation. Th e wide distribution of members who frequently are not acquainted with the resources makes it extremely diffi cult for the authori- members of the other cells. It is particularly diffi cult ties to eff ectively subdue this movement. to unravel such a network since fi nding one cell usu- Th e strong opposition put up by the North ally does not lead to uncovering others. While it is Caucasus separatists and their ability to infl ict great diffi cult to manage such a network, its advantage in pain by their terrorist acts demonstrates that the the current situation is clear: this kind of organiza- movement is well equipped with arms. Th ey are able tion helps the entire network to survive. to acquire fl ame-throwers and explosives to carry out Th e membership of the separatist jamaats is di- acts of intimidation. One of the basic goals of their verse. Th eir base is the Muslim youth of the region leaders is to preserve the movement; therefore they and recently there has been an alarming trend in this do rarely militarily attack the federal troops, which regard. With greater frequency, young intellectuals enjoy superiority. Th ese military acts have propagan- are joining the Islamist movements. One example distic goals and seek to show the federal authorities is the Dagestani Abuzagir Mantayev, who defended and local population that the underground is alive his candidate’s degree in Political Science on the and able to wage an armed struggle. Th us, the reb- topic of Wahhabism in Moscow and then turned up els speak about various “fronts” where they conduct in the ranks of the extremists. Mantayev was killed “battle”, but, of course, there are no such fronts in a together with other extremists by security forces geographical sense because there is no ongoing and in Makhachkala on October 9, 2005. Another ex- direct military confrontation between the Russian ample is Makhach Rasulov (better known as Yasin). forces and the fi ghters. Th e fi ghters are essentially Rasulov, born in 1975, graduated from Dagestan using partisan methods. State University (DGU), knew French and Not all of the armed rebels squeezed out of well and studied for a time as a grad student in the Chechnya are working to set up an underground department of religious studies at DGU, though he in neighboring republics. Many of the rebels are did not fi nish his degree. He worked as a religious Dagestanis, returning to their native republic. In columnist for the newspaper Novoye delo and then contrast to their Chechen colleagues, they cannot anchored a religious show on Dagestani television. legalize their status utilizing the amnesties that are Over the course of a year, he became an extremist announced from time to time. With their ability to and earned the title “Emir of Makhachkala,” hav- fi ght, they do not remain without work. Instead they ing participated in several audacious attacks on become the core of “personal armed groups” working Dagestani policemen. On April 10, 2006, the au- for various important people. Such units can be used thorities announced that they had killed him in the in a wide variety of situations: as body guards to set- course of a special operation in a building on Engels’ tling scores with competitors. In particular, several Street in Makhachkala. 7 rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical russian analytical digest 22/07 ddigestigest

Th is alarming trend demonstrates that extrem- Krai. This situation is not unique, since there ist views are spread among the intellectual elite of are other jamaats that are even stronger than the Dagestani youth. Some young intellectuals in the Shelkovskoy jamaat. North Caucasus republics, particularly in Dagestan, are convinced that in the current conditions, when Th e Separatists’ Ideology injustice and corruption are rampant, the best re- oday the secular nationalism of Dzhokhar Du- sponse is the introduction of law. It is not Tdayev is a distant memory. Th e main ideology of only the uneducated who support these ideas, as ear- the separatist movement in the North Caucasus is re- lier, but also those who are intellectually astute and ligious and is frequently called “Wahhabism” in the have received a good secular education. Of course, North Caucasus. Th e fundamental belief of the Wah- this phenomenon also refl ects social-economic and habis is the demand for the implementation of the political problems. It is distressing that some young principle of tawkheed (monotheism). Th is demand North Caucasus intellectuals have sought to solve leads to a literal interpretation of this principle with these problems in the religious sphere. very strict limits. Th e ideology of Wahhabism gives Th e jamaats bring together members of diff erent high priority to , understood as an armed battle ethnic groups and countries. Usually their mem- for faith against the enemies of Islam. Th e Islamists bers are from the diff erent ethnic groups of the of the region take serious their right to declare jihad North Caucasus, but there are also representatives against other North Caucasus Muslims who do not of other countries, including Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, support the separatists. As a result, there is extensive Pakistan, and the countries of the Middle East. use of force against ethnic Muslims who serve the Offi cial Russian statements usually describe these Russian power ministries. Policemen in Dagestan, foreigners as mercenaries, but many of them came Chechnya, Ingushetia, and the eastern parts of Stav- for ideological reasons. Th ose who have extensive ropol Krai are among the chief targets for the ter- battlefi eld experience work as instructors. However rorists. When the separatists carry out terrorist acts, the instructors are not always foreigners; sometimes there are many victims who have no relationship to they are just rank-and-fi le fi ghters. Th rough the for- the authorities. Th e Islamists believe that it is accept- eigners, the groups often establish ties with donors, able to kill family members of policemen and other typically from Islamic countries. Delivery of fi nanc- representatives of authority since these people stay es and other aid to the separatists is often criminal- with them and therefore presumably support their ized: for example, through these channels counterfeit position and work. A true Muslim, in their view, money is laundered. Other types of fund-raising are should disown such relatives. Th ey also believe that also employed, such as donations from various sup- any innocent by-standers killed during a terrorist act porters and ransoms collected from the relatives of go straight to heaven. hostages. Th e ideology of the separatists is an enormous For propagandistic reasons, the separatists problem for the Russian authorities. Th e secular are divided into specific “battalions” organized nationalists could have compromised with Moscow, along ethnic lines. There are for example the agreeing to some level of autonomy for their people “Nogai,” the “Karachai,” and other ethnic battal- and region. With today’s separatists in the North ions. In reality, no such battalions exist. Military Caucasus, it is practically impossible to agree on this attacks and terrorist acts attributed to one or an- basis, since the separatists’ ideology does not allow other battalion are carried out by the members of compromise with the “infi dels.” Th e state, which is separatist jamaats of the corresponding nation- the basis of human laws, should be destroyed, from ality. The “Nogai Battalion” typically includes their point of view. Everyone should obey God’s law. members of the Shelkovskoy jamaat, which is While Muslim fundamentalists see Western democ- based in the Shelkovskoy Raion of Chechnya and racy as useful, making it possible through honest bat- the Neftekumsky Raion of Stavropol Krai. The tle to convince the population about the correctness Shelkovskoy jamaat has conducted large-scale of their vision for the further development of society, actions against the federal troops, including the the militant extremists see democracy as an evil, a recent clashes in the village of Tukui-Mekteb of human construct, harmful from the start, since it Neftekumsky Raion. Its activity receives wide does not agree with the clear God-given instructions attention because raids often take place beyond about the construction of society. the borders of the ethnic republics, angering the Understanding the Islamist basis of the current federal government and the residents of Stavropol ideology of the North Caucasus separatists is very 8 rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical russian analytical digest 22/07 ddigestigest

important in understanding the goals of this move- Th e level of infl uence for the traditional struc- ment. Today they are not fi ghting for the indepen- tures is not the same in all North Caucasus repub- dence of Chechnya, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria lics. Th ey are strongest in the Eastern part of the or Dagestan from Russia, but for the destruction of region: Dagestan, Chechnya, and Ingushetia. Today, the “infi del empire,” as they call Russia, and the cre- Dagestan’s religious leaders are actively asserting ation of a Sharia-ruled territory that would ultimate- their infl uence over the authorities at all levels of ly serve as one of the bases for uniting all Muslims government, violating the secular character of the around the world in a single political space. Th e political system in the republic and the interests of nationality of a person is not signifi cant for them; the federal center. Th e most obvious intervention they recognize only Islam. Ethnic identity is defi - into the political sphere is the rising infl uence of the nitely subordinate to religious identity. Th eir picture Sufi shaikhs in Dagestan. Th e intervention is felt of the future has no place for national governments; at all levels, from local to republican. For example, instead there should only be a united Muslim society, many bureaucrats in the Dagestani government based on the brotherhood of all Muslims. are disciples of one of the most infl uential shaikhs, Said-afandi Chirkeevsky. One-third to one-half of Structures of “Traditional Islam” the members of the republican parliament are also o-called “traditional Islam” is often opposed to disciples of Sufi shaikhs. In addition to Chirkeevsky, Sthe Islamists. What do its structures represent? there are several other infl uential shaikhs. Th e Spiritual Board of Muslims (the muftiat) One sign of the growing infl uence of the religious offi cially represents traditional Islam in the North lobby on the authorities is the recent abolition of the Caucasus. Today it exists in all republics of the Dagestan government State Committee on Religious North Caucasus, and the muftis of Adygeya and Aff airs. Th is committee tracked the overall ethnic Karachayevo-Cherkessia also control the Muslim so- and religious situation in the republic, registered re- cieties in the corresponding krais – Krasnodar and ligious organizations, evaluated religious literature Stavropol. Th e muftiats are formally united in one and publications, and issued its own handbooks and structure: the Coordinating Center of Muslims in religious studies literature. Th e committee managed the North Caucasus, which today is led by the muf- to preserve parity between various religious organiza- ti of Karachayevo-Cherkessia and Stavropol Krai tions and groups, not allowing one to grow too strong Ismail-khadzhi Berdiev. However, in reality, these while making clear to the key players that Dagestan offi cial structures do not control all Islamic societies. is a secular republic in which secular Russian laws Th e Spiritual Board of Muslims (DUM) as a set of of- take precedence. fi cial structures is suff ering a deep crisis across Russia Unsurprisingly, practically all Muslim organiza- and the North Caucasus in particular. tions were dissatisfi ed with the work of the commit- Many Muslim societies exist autonomously tee, particularly the Dagestani DUM, which wanted of the DUM, sometimes creating influential to have more infl uence on state policy. Former em- parallel structures. For example, in Kabardino- ployees of this committee told the author of this ar- Balkaria during the 1990s, a significant fraction ticle that there is evidence showing that the DUM of the Muslims, particularly the youth, created the actively lobbied for the closing of the committee. Jamaat of Kabardino-Balkaria, which was orga- Following the closure, the DUM placed its people nized much more effectively than the Kabardino- as imams in several areas, particularly the mosque Balkaria DUM and competed for spiritual power in the village of Shamkhal, which is under the ju- in the Muslim society of the republic. Likewise, risdiction of the city of Makhachkala. In place of the Karachayevo-Cherkessia and Stavropol Krai the former committee, there is a new department DUM does not control some of the societies in the in the Dagestani Ministry of Nationalities Policy, republic and many societies in the krai. As a result, Information, and External Ties, which naturally the krai authorities have even suggested separat- cannot conduct an independent policy in the area ing the Stavropol societies from Berdiev’s muftiat of regulating relations between the state and religion, and creating a separate DUM in Stavropol Krai. as the former committee once did. However, this idea proved unworkable because of Th e Dagestani DUM’s attack on the secular a variety of problems, including the lack of uni- character of the state is a serious problem. Its lead- ty among the krai’s Muslims and their inability ers frequently announce that in Dagestan it is neces- to choose a leader capable of uniting the various sary to control the media since television broadcasts Muslim societies in the region. pictures of “uncovered women” and it is diffi cult to 9 rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical russian analytical digest 22/07 ddigestigest

counter the attacks of the Wahhabis and their ac- Within the framework of conducting a battle cusations of cooperating with the “godless state.” In with Islamic extremism, the Russian authorities have their opinion, it is necessary to create a centralized placed serious limits on many Muslim institutions. system of religious education in the North Caucasus To block fi nancial fl ows to radical Islamists, the ac- and introduce the fundamentals of religion in the tivities of almost all Islamist charitable organizations state schools. were closed. Th is practice led to a deterioration of Th ere is a deep divide among the “traditional” the fi nancial situation of Islamic societies and ended Muslim societies of Dagestan, and no unity among many charitable and educational programs. Th ere the Sufi s, called “tarikatists” in this part of the were sharp drops in Muslim book publishing and Caucasus. Shaikh Said-afandi Chirkeevsky and his many regional newspapers and journals closed. Th e disciples are seeking a monopoly of power. Today authorities shuttered scholarly associations where they control the Dagestan DUM and claim that the there was open propaganda of Islamist extremist other shaikhs in Dagestan are not authentic. As a re- ideas, but in Kabardino-Balkaria and in Karachayevo- sult, the other shaikhs do not recognize the DUM or Cherkessia, the local authorities at the end of the stand in opposition to it. Th ese shaikhs are uniting, 1990s closed all non-offi cial scholarly institutions, which could lead to the creation of a serious coali- the maktabs and madrasahs. In the beginning of tion of Sufi s opposed to the DUM. Additionally, the the 2000s, the Kabardino-Balkaria authorities also followers of Shaikh Israfi lov Serazhutdin Khuriksky began to close the mosques. After the departure of of represent another major power in the re- the hated Kabardino-Balkaria Minister of Internal gion. Aff airs Khachim Shogenov and the appointment of Th us traditional Islam in the North Caucasus is Arsen Kanokov as the president of the republic, these being politicized and organizational structures like mistakes were slowly corrected. However, the tension the Sufi brotherhood are presenting an alternative to in the republic’s Muslim society has not declined. Wahhabism, but this alternative is also based on im- Th e military actions conducted by Russian spe- posing Sharia on local society. While the Wahhabis cial forces are often focused and eff ective, especially are conducting armed battle to introduce Sharia in in discovering specifi c groups of fi ghters. At the same the region, the Sufi s are gradually Islamifying soci- time, they are sometimes directed against Muslims ety, ever more actively trying to infl uence all spheres who think diff erently but have committed no crimes of life, including politics. with the goal of removing them from the mosques or removing the possibility that they will become Th e Authorities’ Policy Wahhabis. While the number of such operations has olving the problem of separatism, an integral part dropped drastically, they are still taking place. It is Sof the Islamist movement, is one of the top pri- obvious that in the complicated religious situation of orities of Russian authorities in the North Caucasus. the North Caucasus today, it is very diffi cult to de- Let us examine how they try to solve the problem of termine the loyal groups and separate them from the religious extremism. ones that are not loyal, much less the ones capable of Th e authorities today are placing their bets on armed rebellion. traditional Islam as described above. However, in Imposing order in the system of Islamic religious the North Caucasus, traditional Islam takes various education has taken on great importance for the forms. In Chechnya and Ingushetia, there is a spe- Russian authorities since the beginning of the 2000s. cial form of Sufi sm where there are no living shaikhs, Today there are 22 Islamic higher institutions of edu- only scholarship left by shaikhs who lived in the past. cation functioning in the North Caucasus – 19 in In Dagestan, there is the Sufi sm of various tarikats Dagestan, one in Cherkessk, one in Nazran, and one and non-Sufi Islam; in the other parts of the repub- in Nalchik. Th e problems with the education system lic, there is the typical “Islam of the mosque” (not have attracted the attention of presidential envoy to related to Sufi sm). Th is mosaic of forms of “tradi- the North Caucasus Dmitry Kozak. His staff deter- tional Islam” makes it diffi cult to choose one which mined that the state should provide extensive support could be the standard form. For the time being, the to develop a system of Islamic education. In June offi cial DUM has support, but its failings are obvi- 2006, Kozak held a meeting with Caucasus muftis at ous – it does not control all Muslim societies in the which they decided to found two Islamic universities republic. Occasionally the state comes into confl ict in the near future – one for the North-East Caucasus with a much stronger and cohesive structure, as in with an emphasis on the shafi ite school, the other Kabardino-Balkaria’s local youth jamaat. in the North-West Caucasus with an emphasis on 10 rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical russian analytical digest 22/07 ddigestigest

the khanafi t school. Kozak gave instructions to necessary to conduct systematic reforms, something develop the curriculum of these schools and deter- that the federal government is having a hard time mined where they would be located. In this way, the deciding to do. state is trying to train loyal members of the religion, No less important is the development of a civil but most likely such measures will not resolve the form of identity: Muslim youth react very poorly to problem of Islamic education in the North Caucasus, the growth in Russia of an anti-Caucasus mood. Th e particularly the spread of extremist brands of Islamic integration of the Muslims of the North Caucasus scholarship. into the broader civil society is not moving forward Obviously, the problem of Islamic extremism with enough decisiveness and speed. and the closely related issue of separatism can only In sum, there has been a change of the ideologi- be solved in an all-encompassing way. Th e solution cal base of the separatist movement in the North must include the use of force, but also must deprive Caucasus. Starting as an overwhelmingly national- the extremists of a social base through the devel- ist movement on the territory of Chechnya, it has opment of the economy, improving the well-being transformed to a religious Islamist network. Today, of the population, and the development of normal the ranks of the separatists are fi lled not only with dialogue within the region’s Islamic society by en- Chechens, but representatives of other North couraging cooperation with a signifi cant part of the Caucasus peoples as well. Th ey are fi ghting against Muslim youth who reject extremism. To neutralize the current authorities in order to create an Islamist the protest mood, the authorities are trying to con- state. Th e federal and local authorities must address duct a change of elites in the republics and also show the socio-economic problems of the region as well as decisiveness in fi ghting corruption and the ineff ec- the spread of religious extremism, particularly among tiveness of the local economy. Replacing the leaders the youth. In doing this, it will be diffi cult for them of Dagestan, Adygeya, and Kabardino-Balkaria, de- to use the traditional Islamic structures of the re- monstrative actions against corrupt offi cials, and the gion, partly because they are weak (as in Kabardino- development of tourism and other economic projects Balkaria) and partly because of their politicization are well received by the local population. Given the (as in Dagestan). deep crisis this region is facing, cosmetic measures Translation from the Russian: Robert Orttung are clearly insuffi cient. In the North Caucasus, it is

About the author: Dr. Akhmet A. Yarlykapov is a senior researcher with the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology at the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow.

Further reading: • Neil J. Melvin, Building Stability in the North Caucasus: Ways Forward for Russia and the European Union, SIPRI Policy Paper No. 16 ( International Peace Research Institute, May 2007), http://www.sipri.org/contents/publications/Policypaper16.html. • Jeronim Perovic, Th e North Caucasus on the Brink, ISN Case Study (Zurich, International Relations and Security Network, 29 August 2006), http://www.isn.ethz.ch/pubs/ph/details.cfm?id=15316.

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