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(1907). Howison Lecture in 1927, and the Mills Liverpool Addresses on the Ethics of Social Lecture in 1928, both at Berkeley. In 1939 he Work (Liverpool, 1911). gave the Paul Carus Lectures for the American The Political of Burke (1913). Philosophical Association. In these lectures he began putting together the views he had been WJM developing for many years. His written account of the lectures was never completed; in 1956 it was published posthumously with a number of previously published essays as Towards a Perspective Realism. McGilvary was President of the Western Philosophical Association in McGILVARY, Evander Bradley (1864–1953) 1911–12, and the American Philosophical Association (now Eastern Division) in Evander Bradley McGilvary was born on 19 1913–14. July 1864 in Bangkok, Siam (now Thailand). Unlike Descartes’s metaphysics, which begins His father Daniel McGilvary (Princeton class of with an attempt at doubting all common sense, 1856) and mother Sophia (Bradley) McGilvary McGilvary’s metaphysics is an effort to preserve were Presbyterian missionaries to Siam. In 1867 as much of common sense as possible. the family went to the northern Siam province McGilvary described his own philosophy as of Chiang Mai in 1867 as founders of the Laos “perspective realism.” Insofar as perspective Mission, where McGilvary grew up. He realism is a metaphysics, it is to be conceived as returned to the United States at the age of nine an integration of physics and psychology. to live in North Carolina and attend Davidson Visual perspectives provide the most intuitive College, where he received his BA and gradu- examples of what perspectives are, although ated valedictorian of his class in 1884. After McGilvary would eventually extend the notion studying theology at Princeton Theological of a perspective to every aspect of reality, going Seminary, where he received an MA in 1888, he so far as to consider even beauty a property returned to Siam for three years of service objects have from a certain biological perspec- during 1891–4 as a translator to his father’s tive. In the visual case, an array of “objects Presbyterian Seminary in Chiang Mai. Upon sensibly perceived by an observer from any one returning to the US he obtained his PhD in phi- of the positions his eyes may occupy is his per- losophy from the University of California at spective from that position, and any object in Berkeley in 1897, writing a dissertation on that field is ‘in that perspective’” (1956, “The Principle and the Method of the Hegelian p. 156). Dialectic: A Defense of the Dialectic Against Its In 1907, before adopting perspectivism as Critics.” McGilvary also taught philosophy at his central philosophical tenet, McGilvary pub- Berkeley, first as an instructor during 1895–7 lished his first major work, “Pure Experience and as an assistant professor during 1897–9. In and Reality,” in which he alleged a “crisis” in 1899 he became Sage Professor of Ethics at John DEWEY’s system. In particular, he alleged Cornell University. In 1905 he became profes- that at the very least Dewey was “anti-realist” sor of philosophy and head of the department and, perhaps, even an idealist. Dewey replied at the University of Wisconsin, holding these energetically, denying McGilvary’s numerous positions until his retirement in 1934. claims without, however, explicitly rejecting McGilvary died on 11 September 1953 in idealism in the precise terms that McGilvary Madison, Wisconsin. demanded. McGilvary was given “a page and McGilvary was frequently invited to lecture a day” to reply. Perhaps realizing that his at several universities. McGilvary delivered the response had been weak, one year later he pub-

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lished “The Chicago ‘Idea’ and Idealism,” properties, McGilvary tells us only that the which straightforwardly invited Dewey to deny latter “grow” from the former “like branches that he was an idealist. Dewey in a compli- grow from a tree” (1956, p. 35). mentary and sometimes even flattering rejoin- Physical objects and their properties are real, der to McGilvary stated explicitly: “I deny I am not ideal, according to McGilvary. But the an idealist.” Henceforth, McGilvary spoke in properties a thing has are not had absolutely laudatory terms of both Dewey and his phi- but rather are had from a perspective. This is losophy. true of both primary qualities (for example, Pragmatism exerted considerable influence shapes) and secondary qualities (for instance, on McGilvary’s thinking, particularly in his colors). Colors, in fact, become properties of rejection of what he regarded as the dogmatic objects “from the perspective of the eye.” Such approach of past . His rejection relativity to perspective is a distinguishing char- of dogmatism resulted in his acceptance of the acteristic of McGilvary’s “perspective realism,” method of postulates. Postulates he viewed not a term he coined to distinguish his own position as dogmas but, rather, as useful assumptions in from that of earlier perspectivists such as guiding his own inquiry. One postulate central Russell, A. N. WHITEHEAD, Samuel Alexander, to his philosophy was that every relation is a and George H. MEAD. For the most part, earlier relation between terms that are not analyzable perspectivists had concentrated on space and into relations, suggesting familiarity with the spatiality, but McGilvary attempted to extend central arguments of F. H. Bradley’s perspectivism to memory and even the physical Appearance and Reality. It is likely that and physiological conditions that determine McGilvary’s postulational approach was to a the attributes an object possesses. His realism, degree inspired by the American postulate theo- however, was less radical and merely acknowl- rists. These were philosophically aware math- edged that the world given to experience is the ematicians, mostly at Harvard University, real world as “common sense” would have it. whose interests were closely tied to another McGilvary cited William JAMES as the perspectivist philosopher, Bertrand Russell. greatest single influence on his own work. Among them were such luminaries as Oswald There were, however, two important respects VEBLEN, an influential topologist and a relation in which they differed. James had held that of Thorstein VEBLEN, and E. V. HUNTINGTON, consciousness was not a thing but a relation. who had authored a widely read introduction This position appears to have had an enormous to the mathematical theory of continuity. effect on both McGilvary’s metaphysics and McGilvary’s postulational approach implic- his theory of knowledge. But the influence did itly defined the strength and limitations of his not endure unqualified. Although for a number ontology, which relied in large measure on two of years McGilvary held that vision was a fundamental distinctions, that between two relation, much like the relation being a grand- kinds of properties: dynamic and nondynamic, father, rather than an action, he later came to and two kinds of individuals: things and sub- maintain that it involved both an activity as stances. Dynamic properties constitute the well as a relation. This activity he identified as subject matter of physics and provide the basis a brain activity, an activity that gives rise to the for nondynamic properties, such as secondary nondynamic relation of consciousness: “We qualities. While substances are the sorts of indi- are now in a position to define the perspec- viduals that consist in dynamic properties, tivist’s mind as an organism whose dynamic things consist in substances combined with the brain action is conditioning, or giving rise to, a nondynamic properties to which the sub- nondynamic conscious relation of which it stance’s dynamic properties give rise. As for thereby becomes a term.” (1956, p. 67) the relation between dynamic and nondynamic Despite this introduction of dynamics to his

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relational theory of consciousness, McGilvary by Henri Bergson as well as C. Lloyd Morgan’s retained relations as basic ingredients of his “emergent evolution.” Such descriptions, ontology. Historically, they have always been McGilvary avers, place insufficient emphasis on of paramount interest to perspectivist philoso- novelty as an essential consequence of emer- phy. McGilvary’s radical perspectivism was no gence. Because of this, he prefers the expression exception. “Things” become little else than the “innovative evolution.” It is not to be ignored “entireness” of their relational characters (for that perspective, also, enters into the production example, “being the grandson of T. H. of epiphysical qualities and, therefore, innova- Huxley”), while relations themselves depend on tive evolution. terms for their being, since their being is merely McGilvary regarded consciousness, consid- “being between.” Nothing on this view either ered as an epiphysical relation dependent on exists or is known to exist independently of its nerve activity, as the defining feature of his relation to other things. Notwithstanding own “perspective realism.” Consciousness is a James’s enormous influence on McGilvary, it nondynamic relation, which “supervenes” would be a mistake to characterize his philos- upon a dynamic process under dynamic neu- ophy in the broadest of terms as “philosophi- rological conditions. While it is tempting to cal psychology.” Even though consciousness view McGilvary’s position as epiphenomenal- occupies center stage in a great number of ism, he is careful to distinguish his own epi- McGilvary’s published works, discussion very physicalism from epiphenomenalism, a theory quickly turns to either what neurologists had that enjoyed considerable popularity among uncovered or to metaphysical discussion of the philosophers of the period. Whereas epiphe- relations of mind and matter. In regards to the nomenalism maintains that a cognitive mental former, McGilvary was particularly taken by event, say, occurs at the end of a causal the extraordinary work of the British neurolo- sequence beginning at one’s sensory surface, gist, Charles Sherrington, whose “masterly epiphysicalism holds that the mental event guidance” he frequently acknowledged. while in some sense the “result” of physiolog- Particularly towards the latter part of his philo- ical processes is not an “effect” of those sophical life, McGilvary integrated what he processes in the way our understanding of cau- took from the neurologists into an under- sation in physics would have it. standing of the relation of mind and matter. As Notwithstanding this important difference he did so, his thinking became at once richer between effect and result, inasmuch as con- and more original. sciousness supervenes on neurological Consciousness, secondary qualities, and processes, we are told that were there no such visual objects induced by cortical stimulation thing as consciousness, the nature of the are described as “epiphysical,” meaning that physical world would not be what it is. This they are the result of physical events without characterization anticipates the more general themselves being physical events. Further, features of contemporary “supervenience” coming into consciousness no more transforms approaches to the philosophy of mind, cham- the biological organism than entering into the pioned in particular by Jaegwon KIM. Earlier, relation of matrimony transforms the groom. McGilvary had distanced himself from epiphe- Epiphysical phenomena are the byproducts of nomenalism by rejecting the notion that mental emergent nonphysical relations which give rise events had no causal consequence on the to mind – a mind being any “conscious bio- physical world, a common objection to epiphe- logical organism.” Although McGilvary relies nomenalism, which denied the possibility of on the concept of emergence, he is careful to such two-sided interactionism. distinguish his own position from “creative While his reliance on perspectives in his treat- evolution,” a theory brought into prominence ment of problems of the relation of mind and

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matter is sometimes difficult to discern, this is cal remarks on the nature of time and the less so in the case of his examination of present in particular retain a degree of impor- problems of space and time. On matters of tance that cannot be ignored. space and time McGilvary assumed a largely McGilvary incorporated past events into orthodox point of view. But on the philosoph- present perspectives. Moreover, memory per- ical matter of how perspective space is to be spectives, for example, include what is percep- regarded, he took a somewhat different view tually past. Unlike perceptual perspectives than other perspectivists who had fallen under where the past is merely inferred, past per- the spell of what was then the “new physics.” spectives may be given in present memory per- In a paper written in 1930, “A Tentative spectives. The objects of awareness from the Realistic Metaphysics,” he rejects the idea that perspective of a memory will have properties there are different spaces associated with our differing from the original, owing to the occur- various senses. This view had been upheld by rence of new experiences and relations that Russell but rejected by Samuel Alexander. intervene between the time of one’s original McGilvary sides with Alexander but is drawn experience of the object and the time of the to the somewhat startling conclusion that the occurrence of the memory itself. This charac- objects of our dreams hover about our heads in terization, although somewhat different, bears the very same space. a striking resemblance to the very conception McGilvary’s perspectivism, as well as that of McGilvary had alleged, years earlier, to exist as those of his predecessors he acknowledges, part of what he regarded as Dewey’s idealism. owes a great deal to the revolution in physics McGilvary accepted the idea that the present initiated by Albert EINSTEIN. Philosophers had, has duration and is not instantaneous. For this since Leibniz, been familiar with the general reason it has frequently been referred to as the features that define a perspective. The idea, “specious present.” Acceptance of such a however, had remained largely dormant until notion necessitated on his part a reconsidera- Einstein applied a relativity principle to all tion of the meaning of the word “past” which, physical phenomena, not just dynamic ones, given his acceptance of a specious present, and then went on to apply such a principle to requires disambiguation. McGilvary argued all frames of reference. It was the relation of that while an object in my room may be to the frame of reference to perspective that generated north of some other object in my room I cannot a new interest in the philosophical notion of a say of either object that one is to the north of perspective. McGilvary authored one paper my room. There may be other objects outside explicitly devoted in its entirety to the theory of my room that are to the north of it, but they relativity, “The Lorentz Transformation and cannot be said to be to the north of it in the ‘Space-Time’.” In explaining the negative same sense of “north.” results of the Michelson–Morley experiment, McGilvary takes this point to be analogous H. A. Lorentz had produced equations that to the fact that within a specious present one could be explained by assuming that the event is not “past” with respect to some other distance between two points on a solid object event within that same specious present in the moving parallel to the motion of the earth same sense that an event may be “past” relative would change if the object were rotated 90 to the specious present itself. In other words, degrees. Einstein had provided a derivation of events within a specious present precede one these results that made no such assumption. another in a different sense from that in which McGilvary suggested an alternative, albeit events outside a specious present may precede based in principle on Einstein’s postulates. that very same specious present. Just as Hume While an assessment of the value of this exercise had taken empiricism to whatever conclusion may be inconclusive, McGilvary’s philosophi- it led him, if McGilvary is to be remembered,

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he will be remembered as the philosopher who Schilpp (New York, 1951). once having accepted perspectivism, carried it as far as his realism would allow. Further Reading Bio 20thC Phils, Pres Addr of APA v2, Proc BIBLIOGRAPHY of APA v27, Who Was Who in Amer v3, Times, New and Old (Berkeley, Cal., 1928). Who’s Who in Phil “A Tentative Realistic Metaphysics,” in Dewey, John. “Pure Experience and Reality: Contemporary American Philosophy: A Disclaimer,” Philosophical Review 16 Personal Statements, ed. G. P. Adams and (1907): 419–22. W. P. Montague (New York, 1930), vol. 2, ———, “Objects, Data, and Existences: A pp. 109–32. Reply to Professor McGilvary,” Journal of Toward a Perspective Realism, ed. Albert Philosophy 6 (1909): 13–21. Ramsperger (La Salle, Ill., 1956). Murphy, Arthur E. “McGilvary’s Perspective Realism,” Journal of Philosophy 56 Other Relevant Works (1959): 149–65. “The Summum Bonum,” University of Stevens, Nathaniel H. “The Relativity California Publications in Philosophy 1 Paradoxes: A Footnote to the Lovejoy- (1904): 1–27. McGilvary Controversy,” Philosophical “The Stream of Consciousness,” Journal of Review 47 (1938): 624–38. Philosophy 4 (1907): 225–35. “Pure Experience and Reality,” Philosophical Steven Bayne Review 16 (1907): 266–84. “Pure Experience and Reality: A Reassertion,” Philosophical Review 16 (1907): 422–4. “The Chicago ‘Idea’ and Idealism,” Journal of Philosophy 5 (1908): 589–97. MACKENZIE, John Stuart (1860–1935) “The ‘Fringe’ of William James’s Psychology the Basis of Logic,” Philosophical Review John Stuart Mackenzie was born in 20 (1911): 137–64. on 29 February 1860 and died at his home in “The New Realism,” Philosophical Review Brockweir, overlooking Tintern Abbey, on 6 22 (1913): 57–65. December 1935. His family emigrated in 1868 “Time and the Experience of Time,” to Buenos Aires, but shortly afterwards both Philosophical Review 23 (1914): 121–45. parents died, and the children were brought “The Warfare of Moral Ideals,” Hibbert back to Scotland to be cared for by an aunt. Journal 14 (1915): 43–62. Mackenzie went in 1877 to Glasgow “Dialectical Arguments against Relative University (where he studied under Edward Simultaneity,” Journal of Philosophy 28 CAIRD), and then in 1886, encouraged by his (1931): 421–35. friend and contemporary W.R. SORLEY, to “Perceptual and Memory Perspectives,” Trinity College, Cambridge. It was here that he Journal of Philosophy 30 (1933): 309–30. formed a close friendship with MCTAGGART “Freedom and Necessity in Human Affairs,” which introduced him to the philosophy of International Journal of Ethics 45 (1935): Hegel. After his election in 1890 to a 379–98. Fellowship at Trinity, he became (at the same “Space-time, Simple Location, and time) assistant to Professor Robert ADAMSON Prehension,” in The Philosophy of Alfred at Owens College, until, in 1895, North Whitehead, 2nd edn, ed. Paul A. he succeeded Sorley as Professor of Philosophy

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