After Georgia: conflict resolution in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood EPC Issue Paper No.57

April 2009 By Amanda Akçakoca, Thomas Vanhauwaert, Richard Whitman and Stefan Wolff

EPC Issue Papers reflect the views of the authors and not necessarily those of the EPC.

EUROPE IN THE WORLD ISSN 1782-494X PROGRAMME The EPC’s Programme on Europe in the World

The EPC’s Europe in the World Programme focuses on the EU’s growing role in international affairs and the broader challenges it faces, addressing issues ranging from security, justice, human rights and global governance to the EU’s relations with countries in its neighbourhood and with Asia.

Born as a primarily internal project, European integration has gradually become a reference model and point of comparison for other regions and continents. The EU has turned into a global player, both in trade and development aid matters as well as in foreign affairs and security policy ‘proper’. To a certain extent, the Union’s external policies (including the extensive ramifications of its internal policies) are its most dynamic ones today.

This programme, which is chaired by Dr Hans Blix and run in partnership with the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, focuses on these core themes and brings together all the strands of the debates on these key issues. It also works with other programmes on cross-cutting issues such as the possible creation of an EU Foreign Service and international migration.

For details of the EPC’s activities under this programme, please visit our website: www.epc.eu

4 Table of Contents

Maps of conflict regions 6

Foreword 8 by Antonio Missiroli

Introduction 9

I. The geostrategic significance of the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood 11

II. The current state of play of the conflicts 12

III. Status of negotiations 19

IV. External actors 23

V. The role of the EU 34

Conclusions 37

Annexes 40

Endnotes 54

About the authors

Amanda Akçakoca is a Policy Analyst and Programme Executive at the European Policy Centre; Thomas Vanhauwaert is an independent researcher; Richard Whitman is a Professor of Politics at the University of Bath; and Stefan Wolff, Professor of Political Science and Director, Centre for International Crisis Management and Conflict Resolution, University of Nottingham.

The authors would like to thank all those who gave their time for interviews and exchanges of views for this paper.

5 Maps of conflict regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia April 2009

Transnistria

6 Source for all three maps: International Crisis Group. www.crisisgroup.org Group. Crisis International maps: three all for Source Nagorno-Karabakh

7 April 2009 8 April 2009 EPC hopesthatthesewillcontributetoadeeperunderstanding oftherequirementsandfeatures worked asateamformonths,collectingdata,comparingviews,andconverging onthefinalresults. The well beforethewar inGeorgia,butbecame even morerelevant inthewake ofit. The authorshave The originalideaofcarrying outthisresearch projectcameupintheEPC’s EUNeighbourhoodForum from anEUperspective andwithakey rolefortheUnioninmind. Antonio Missiroli is Director ofStudiesattheEuropeanPolicyAntonio MissiroliisDirector Centre. international actorthattheEUisbecoming. despite theirdifferences weight ofthe27MemberStatesandsteeringapaththatwas eventually acceptedby allMemberStates, member oftheUNSecurityCouncil–andasPresidentEU,thusbringingtobearcollective of France –acountryconsideredcredibleinterlocutorby bothMoscow and Tbilisi, andapermanent President NicolasSarkozy, inparticular, managedtoplay several roles,actingatthesametimeasleader Co-operation inEurope(OSCE)andFrance’s Presidency oftheEU. quickly andeffectively, makingthemostofFinland’s chairmanship oftheOrganizationforSecurityand question itsvalues, aswellitsinterests,intheregion.But,foronce,itproved capableofreacting The EuropeanUnionfounditselfparticularlyexposedasthewar unfoldedinitsvicinityandputinto regions thatwerealready quiteunstableintheirown right. ‘melting’ ofonethoseconflictsriskedspillingover intoothers,triggeringalethaldominoeffectin wake-up call. What punditsusedtocall“frozenconflicts”werenolongerinhibernation. Worse still,the When thenewsofwar inGeorgiabroke,on8 August 2008, theworld was confrontedwitharude Missiroli Antonio By Foreword conflict resolution conflict these conflictsremainunresolved andhighlightwhat needstobe donetotryactually This IssuePaper, however, does notfocusonEU-Russiarelations.Itsmaingoalistoendeavour toexplainwhy among theEU-27. resolution today requiresdealingwithRussia–thatis,thepotentiallymostdivisive foreignpolicy issue a legacy of thecollapseofSoviet Empire. Their rootsoftendatefurtherback intime,buttheirpossible What thefourcasesaddressedherehave incommonisthattheyall constitute,albeittovarious degrees, Western Sahara athird,althoughthereisstrongreluctancetoacknowledge itassuch. the MiddleEast:toacertainextent,Kosovo couldalsobeconsideredone,NorthernCyprusanotherand They arenottheonlyones,ofcourse,even withoutconsideringthequintessentialunresolved conflictin Transnistria andNagorno-Karabakh. This IssuePaper takesintoconsideration, analysesandcomparesfourofthem:SouthOssetia, Abkhazia, There isnoshortageofunresolved conflictsintoday’s world, andintheproximityofenlarged EU. necessary toequipittackle (andhopefullyprevent) similarevents inthefuture. from theexperienceofsummer2008andputtinginplaceprocedures,structuresknow-how total absenceoftheUN–arenoteasilyreplicable. The challenge fortheEUliesindrawing therightlessons that madeitpossibleinthefirstplace–startingwithimpotenceofa‘lameduck’ USPresidentandthe That kindoftroubleshootingandcrisisdiplomacy may wellremainauniqueepisode. The circumstances as adistinctive dimensionofcrisismanagementandforeignpolicy, especiallyforthe vis-à-vis Russia. solve them –asseen The EU’s newEasternPartnership towards itsEastern Neighbourhood. needs todevelop acoherentstrategy thatissharedbetweenallthe EUinstitutionsandMemberStates have recognisedKosovo have gonetogreatlengthsarguethatit isa principles ofself-determination,sovereignty andterritorial integrity. Although thoseEUMember Stateswhich The caseofKosovo hasreigniteddebatesabouttheinteraction betweenthefundamentalinternationallegal of EUMemberStates. face ofvehement oppositionfromSerbiaandRussianotable disquietinChinaandahandful than 50UnitedNationsmembers,includingtheStatesandmany EUcountries,butinthe Parliament’s Unilateral Declaration ofIndependence. This was subsequentlyrecognisedby more In February 2008,thesefoursecessionistconflictstookonanewdimensionwiththeKosovan of influencebetweenRussiaandthe West. Eastern Neighbourhoodhasassumedgrowing geostrategic importanceandbecomeacontestedsphere underestimating thepossibilityofrenewed,large-scale,cross-borderviolence.Over thesameperiod, For more than 15years, theinternationalcommunityhasallowed theseconflictstosmoulder, as its‘EasternNeighbourhood’. (Moldova) andNagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan/Armenia)–alsofallwithintheregionEUhasdefined days, andsubsequentcollapse,oftheSoviet Uniontwo decadesago. The othertwo – Transnistria South Ossetiaand Abkhazia areonlytwo offourunresolved territorialconflictswhich datefromthedying attempting toresolve conflictsthroughmilitaryforce. conflicts over SouthOssetiaand Abkhazia, wereasalutaryreminderofthehumanandpoliticalcost already largenumbersofInternallyDisplacedPeople (IDPs)andrefugeescreatedby thelong-simmering The events of August 2008,inwhich several hundredpeoplewerekilledandmany moreaddedtothe Warsaw to Washington. It alsosparkedafurtherdeterioration inrelationsbetweenMoscow andmajor Western capitalsfrom post-Soviet peripherytothreatensecurityandstabilityintheEuropeanUnion’s EasternNeighbourhood. The Georgia-Russiawar in August 2008vividly illustrated thepotentialof‘frozenconflicts’in Introduction After Georgia: conflict resolution intheEU’s Eastern Neighbourhood role basedonasharperdefinitionofitsinterests Within thiscomplexweboflocal,regionalandglobalsecuritydynamics, theEUneedstoclarifyitsown support itsown recognitionofSouthOssetianand Abkhaz independence. precedent forsecessionistconflictsintheirown territories. This isalsoanargumentnow usedby Russiato common positionamongallEUmembers,someofwhich fearthatrecognisingKosovo createsamuch-feared commit themselves totheUNPrinciple oftheNon-useForce againstsovereign countries inthisregion. states toseekcloserintegration with theEU,andsetdown someguidelinesandpledgesfromeach sideto This Agreement shouldfocusonthe ‘sharedneighbourhood’,reaffirmthesovereign rightsofallex-Soviet Partnership and Cooperation Agreement currently beingnegotiatedbetweentheEUandRussia. This isanurgentpriority notjustbecauseoftherecentevents inGeorgia,butalsobecause ofthenew support it,oratleastdonotactively seektoopposeorundermineit. provided thatall27MemberStatesandtheEUinstitutionscanmusternecessarypoliticalwillto currently lacks. Such astrategy would enable theEUtoincreaseitsinfluenceandroleinregion, foundations foranEasternNeighbourhoodConflictPrevention andResolutionStrategy thattheUnion 2 3 and therecentreviewofEuropeanSecurityStrategy areimportant vis-à-vis the EasternNeighbourhoodasawhole. Italso sui generis sui case, thisisby nomeansa 1

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April 2009 and thuscontributetosecuritystabilityinitsEasternNeighbourhood. EU policiesandapproaches toenableitplay astrongerroleinresolvingthesedecades-olddisputes set ofrelationshipsaroundthesefourconflicts,andmakesaseriesrecommendationsformoreeffective role ofexternalactorsinthesettlementprocess.ItthenexaminesEU’s positionwithinthecomplex outlining thecurrentstateofconflicts,examiningobstaclestoresolvingthemandassessing significance totheEU.Itthenfocusesonfourunresolved conflictsinthepost-Soviet periphery, This IssuePaper startswithabriefanalysisofwhy theEasternNeighbourhoodisofgeostrategic under theauspicesofOrganizationforSecurityandCo-operation inEurope(OSCE). pan-European securityarchitecture. This istobediscussedby EU,RussianandUSleadersinJune 2009 “privileged interests”initsneighbourhood,andPresidentDmitryMedvedev’s proposalforanew This principlehasspecialimportancegiven theRussianleadership’s recentassertionsoftheKremlin’s the 20 ancestors, (andretiredmilitaryofficers)weremoved tothe CrimeafromRussia‘proper’inthesecondpartof associate itselfwiththeRussianFederation, themajorityofthoseinCrimeado,asmostthem,ortheirdirect population outsidethebordersofRussia. Although thegreaterpartofthisminoritypopulationdoesnot numbering about8.5million–around18%oftheUkrainian population andthelargestRussianminority nationality. Nevertheless, themajorityofpopulationinUkraine’s CrimeanPeninsula isRussian-speaking, the needarises.However, atthesametimeunderUkrainian Constitutionisitillegaltohave asecond minority population,withMoscow continuingtostateithasalegitimate righttodefend“itsown citizens”if In addition,asinGeorgia,RussiaisabletomaintainastrongfootholdUkraine throughthecountry’s Russian the CrimeaPeninsula toitsown, much smaller, facilitiesonitscoastlineadjoiningtheBlack Sea. Russia would have toredeploy allitsnaval assetscurrentlybasedintheUkrainian town ofSevastopol on Russia islosingitsmilitarypreponderance intheBlack Sea.IfMoldova andUkraine werealsotojoinNATO, countries fromjoiningNATO, amidconcernsthatsinceRomaniaandBulgariabecameNATO members, Moscow isseekingtokeepbothMoldova andUkraine withinitssphereofinfluence, andtoprevent both for thoseinvolved arenonethelesssignificant. The Transnistrian regionmay beoflessgeostrategic importancethantheSouthCaucasus,butstakes Europe (OSCE)andtheShanghaiCooperation Organization(SCO). interest structures,liketheUnitedNationsEU,NATO, theOrganizationforSecurityandCo-operation in of internationalandregionalorganisations,which have partiallyoverlapping membershipsandoftendisparate players like Turkey andIran andglobalonessuch astheUS,RussiaandChina.Itnow featuresontheagenda This hascontributedtoacomplex,yet volatile andconstantlyshifting,power configuration involving regional region andimpededitssocial,politicaleconomicdevelopment andintegration over thepasttwo decades. Yet conflictswithinandbetweenthecountriesof,neighbouring,SouthCaucasushave divided the markets which avoids Russia,andavitaloutpostforthewar againstterrorism. bridgehead tocontrolandpressureIran, analternative oilandgastransit routetoEuropeanandglobal greater MiddleEast, Turkey, Iran andRussia. This areaisavitalcrossroadsfromCentral Asia toEurope,a 15 millionpeoplethatlinkstheCaspianBasintoBlack Seawhich liesatthejuncturebetween This phenomenonisparticularlyobvious inrelationtotheSouthCaucasus,aregionpopulatedby some for positioninandaroundtheregion. and Georgiain August 2008was onlyasymptom,albeitsignificantone,ofthisbroaderstrategic jostling West –mostnotablytheEU,NATO andtheUS–RussianFederation. The clashbetweenRussia The EU’s EasternNeighbourhoodisincreasinglythevenue foratug-of-war forinfluencebetweenthe I. Thegeostrategic significance of theEU’s Eastern Neighbourhood th century andremainloyal toRussia.

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April 2009 deemed illegal economic activities intheregion,includingenergysuppliesandconstructionofgaspipelines,have been together withdirectRussiandonations,have yet tohave asignificantimpact.Moreover, Russia’s economy untilrecently, andanOSCE-managedEU-funded economicrehabilitationprogramme, recover. Itisanextremelypoorregion,even by Georgianstandards,withhardlyany investment inthe South Ossetiasufferedsimilarlyextensive war damageandhasbeenfarlessablethan Abkhazia to relations, hasalsocontributedtoitseconomicrecovery. electricity. to rebuildingtheregion’s economy. Moreover, Abkhazia isrelatively self-sufficientinfoodand Over thelastfewyears, theEUhasmadeamoresignificantpoliticalandfinancialcontribution stopped enforcing it. worsened, andwith theoutbreakofsecondChechen war, theCISembargocollapsedafterRussia which hadaseriouslydetrimentalimpacton Abkhazia. Butby 1999,Russian-Georgianrelations economic aidembargoon Abkhazia inexchange forGeorgianneutrality inthefirstChechen war, January 1996,Moscow agreedtoaCommonwealthofIndependentStates(CIS)militaryand recovery, if any, hasbeenslow andinitiallyalmostentirelydependentonRussia.However, in The economicdamagecausedby theviolencein Abkhazia isestimatedat$11billion, Georgian-Russian relations,areparticularlyimportant. violence intheCaucasusregionasawhole, especiallyinrelationtoChechnya, andthe deterioration of of theGeorgianstateandturbulenttransition ofpower duringtheRoseRevolution, theinstabilityand agreements –inthecontextofbroaderGeorgianandregionaldevelopments. Within this,theweakness the subsequentsporadic flare-upsofviolencethroughoutthedecade-and-a-halfafterceasefire It isimportanttoseetheeconomicandpoliticalimpactofwars inSouthOssetiaand Abkhazia –and extremely unstable. Even beforetheRussia-Georgiawar of August 2008,thesituationinSouthOssetiaand Abkhazia was Abkhazia and Ossetia South populations facedifferentsocio-economiccircumstances. internal politicalprocessesandgovernance arrangements have distinctive characteristics, andtheir within each oftheseterritories.However, theyhave involved differingdegreesofarmedviolence,their the historyandtimelinesofeach conflict). They arealsosimilarinthatbreak-away regimeshave emerged There iscurrentlyastalemateinallfourconflictstheEasternNeighbourhood(see Annexes 1and3for II. Thecurrent state of play of theconflicts opposition partiesandthemedia. in thewake ofdemands forPresidentMikhailSaakashvilitoresignand a government crack-down on position thatinsistsonGeorgia’s territorialintegrity. Moreover, politicalinstabilityinGeorgiaincreased infrastructure; moredifficultrelations betweenMoscow and Tbilisi; andanequally entrenched Western Russian militarypresenceontheground;asignificantly largerdisplacedpopulation;destroyed complex negotiatingenvironment which iseven lessconducive toconflictsettlement,withan increased As aresult,thesituationisessentiallysameasitwas beforetheoutbreakofviolence–butinamore these territoriessofar, andRussiahasfailedto resolve eitherconflict. them asindependentstatesin August 2008. Onlyoneothercountry–Nicaragua –hasrecognisedeitherof Russia anopportunitytoassertfullmilitarycontrolover bothbreak-away entitiesandtoofficially recognise Ossetia, theGeorgianinvasion ofSouthOssetia–inclearviolationtheexistingceasefire agreement–gave After adangerousescalationofviolenceinthespringandsummer of2008,firstin Abkhazia andtheninSouth Georgia ‘proper’hasbeenafurthersource oftensions. 5 Revitalising tourism,especiallyafter1999andinthecontextofimproved Russian-Abkhaz 6 by theInternationalCrisisGroup.SouthOssetia’s dependenceonwater suppliesfrom 4 and economic authorities andkeptits14 towards Moscow. The Kremlinhasalsoextendedfinancialandpoliticalsupporttothe Transnistrian For thetimebeing,allpoliticalforces in Transnistria continuetoorientatethemselves politically for anotherterm. minimum internationalstandards.Unsurprisingly, MrSmirnov hasbeenre-electedevery timehehasrun exercising any realpower. Although electionsareheldonaregularbasis,theynotconsideredtomeet government andpersonallyappointsothergovernment ministers,who actmoreashisadvisors rather than Moldova. Power iscentralised andconcentrated aroundPresidentSmirnov, who isboththeheadof It hasestablishedparallel institutionsandmanagedtofunctionasastate-likeentity, independentfrom under PresidentIgorSmirnov. the conflict,aseconomiccalculations remainthemaindriving force behind Transnistria’s secessionism. This relatively significantchange in thebalanceofpower opensupnewopportunities forsettling questioned PresidentSmirnov’s political agendaofachieving independentstatehood for Transnistria. They aredemandingmore politicalopennessandeconomicliberalisation, buthave not(yet) seriously business communityandisorganisedpoliticallyaround Yevgeny Shevchuk, theparliamentaryspeaker. Transnistrian parliament,which isnow controlledby ‘opposition’forces closelylinkedtothe Transnistrian Moreover, PresidentSmirnov’s controlover Transnistria hasbeenincreasingly challenged inthe in theregion,arenow registeredasMoldovan companiesinordertobenefitfromthe ATP concessions. cooperate withMoldova. Some450 Transnistrian companies,accountingfor95%ofalleconomicactivity reintegration between Transnistria andMoldova, hasalsoprovided Transnistria with newincentives to 12,000 Moldovan productsandcreatingnewincentives foreconomic cooperation andsomedegreeof The EU’s decisiontogrant Autonomous Trade Preferences(ATP) toMoldova, abolishingtariffsonabout forcing itsleadershiptoaskforadditionalfinancialsupportfrom Russia. aggravated by theglobalfinancialcrisisandhasbrought Transnistria tothebrinkoffinancialcollapse, with soaringbudgetdeficits,risingdebtsandhighinflation. This bleakfinancialsituationhasbeen borders hassignificantlyreducedtherevenue available tothe Transnistrian authorities. This hasleftthem new Moldovan-Ukrainian customsregimeandhaltsmugglingtrafficking alongthe Transnistrian The successoftheEUBorder Assistance Mission (EUBAM) launched inNovember 2005 tosupportthe primarily asaresultoftwo EUinitiatives. However, theeconomiccaseforindependencehasgradually butsignificantlychanged inrecentyears, alternative tothepopulationofrelatively moredeveloped Transnistria. a compellingreintegration policy fortheregion.Moldova’s weakeconomy failedtoprovide anattractive state hasbeentoofragile andparalysed by thepainfulreformsof1990stoformulateandimplement The Transnistrian independenceagendahasbeenaided,atleastindirectly, by thefact that theMoldovan dimension inthisconflict. able toreturntheirpre-war homes–anotherindicatoroftherelative insignificanceoftheethnic Refugees andIDPsfromtheinitial Transnistrian conflictintheearly1990shave, by andlarge,allbeen process which, forexample,discriminatesagainstschools which teach intheMoldovan language. all threegroups,aswellothersmallerminorities,co-existpeacefullydespiteanongoing‘Russification’ one-third of Transnistria’s population,donotplay amajorroleinthe Transnistrian conflict.Membersof Tensions betweenethnicMoldovans, RussiansandUkrainians, who each makeupalittlelessthan of theself-proclaimed‘Transnistrian Moldovan Republic’( Since theendofshortwar ofspring1992,theregion Transnistria has beenruledby theleadership Transnistria th army (currentlyaround1,200troops)stationedin Transnistria. Pridnestrovskaya Moldavskaya Respublika Moldavskaya Pridnestrovskaya ),

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April 2009 particularly foritseconomicsurvival. The currentpopulationisestimatedtobearound130,000 has establishedparallel institutionsandfunctionsasastate-like entity, yet remainsdependenton Armenia, different Presidents,withBakoSahakyan, itsformersecuritychief, thecurrentincumbent. This ‘Republic’ Since itwas createdin1994,theself-proclaimed‘Nagorno-Karabakh Republic’ hasbeenruledby three Sadly, thisproblemhasgoneunnoticed–andmoreorlessunattendedtoby theinternationalcommunity. Most IDPsalsoremaindependentongovernment assistanceastherearefewemployment opportunities. and Armenia. The occupiedarea(some 17%of Azerbaijan’s totalterritory Of these,Lachin isparticularlyimportantasitformsthecruciallandcorridorbetweenNagorno-Karabakh Kelbajar, Lachin, Zangelan,Gubadly, Djabrail, Fizuli and Aghdam –remainoccupiedby districts – Armenia. Following the5May 1994Russian-brokeredceasefire, Nagorno-Karabakh andseven surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to settletheconflictandagreeonafinalstatusshortofindependence. crucially oncontinuedsupportfromRussia,sothathecanresistgrowing internalandexternalpressure President Smirnov’s abilitytodictatetermsofengagementwiththeMoldovan government depends equal partnerinnegotiations.Having identifiedhimselfpersonallywith Transnistrian independence, one priorityandrefusestotalktheMoldovan government unlessthelatterrecognises Transnistria asan President Smirnov remainsweddedtoaninflexibleindependenceagendafor Transnistria asthenumber leadership andpeopletoseekany formofcloserpoliticalties withChisinau. post-election violence,however, hasnotdoneanything toincreasetheincentives forthe Transnistrian new incentives tocooperate morecloselywithMoldova have notyet translated intopolicy changes. Recent However, mountingfinancialandeconomicpressureonthe Transnistrian leadershiptogetherwiththese depends onexports. With nearlyallofMoldova’s industrylocatedin Transnistria, theregiongenerates significantGDP and areas duetodiplomaticdifficulties. Furthermore,boththe Azerbaijani and Armenian governments have territories outsidethecapital, Stepankaert,asvery fewofthoseinofficialpositionshave visitedthese The internationalcommunityknows littleaboutthesituation intheconflictzoneandoccupied camps, transferring IDPstosettlementswithimproved living conditions,butithasbeenaslow process. resettled morethan90,000peoplesince2001,andin2008thegovernment closedthelastofitsemergency world –570,000 people(15%ofitseight-million-strongpopulation). to theUNRefugee Agency (UNHCR), Azerbaijan hadthefourth-largestnumberofdisplacedpeoplein The conflictitselfalsocreatedahumanitariancrisis,includingmassive populationdisplacements. According buildings andlandmines. seven occupieddistrictsremainatotallydevastated, largelyunoccupiedwasteland fullofdemolished lives. than 30peoplewerekilledandMarch 2008saw theworst violationinyears claimingmorethanadozen across a175-kilometre‘lineofcontact’withapproximately 30,000troopsoneach side.In2008,more The 1994ceasefirehasremained mostlyintact,albeitpunctuatedby sniperfireonanalmostdailybasis (although many hadalready beenexpelled),andRussian andKurdish minorities. 1989, when theterritoryhadapopulationof189,000madeup76% Armenians and23% Azerbaijanis figures aregiven out)–afallofaboutone-thirdcomparedtothefiguresinlastofficialSoviet censusof violation oftheceasefireduringapre-arranged monitoring mission. this proceduredoesnotguarantee thesafetyof officials given thaton26February 2009therewas a unannounced, which makesitvery easyforeithersidetoconcealwhat theyaredoing.Furthermore,even Their mandateisvery weakasOSCEmonitorsmustinformeithersideofplanstovisit and cannotarrive observers ledby Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk,who monitor thelineofcontactonanirregularbasis. 11 There arenointernational peacekeepers–justasmallgroupofsixunarmedOSCEinternational 12 8 The Azerbaijani government has 7 ) aroundthiscorridorandthe 10 (no official 9 in peacetalks.Nagorno-Karabakh insiststhattheonlyway forward isfullindependence anddoesnotview in negotiationsfollowing the Azerbaijani refusaltoallow delegates fromNagorno-Karabakh toparticipate and insiststhat Yerevan’s rolehasbeensolely toprotectNagorno-Karabakh Armenians andtorepresent them For itspart, Armenia argues that Armenians inNagorno-Karabakh shouldhave therighttoself-determination autonomy) andaccuses Armenia ofhaving anexpansionist foreignpolicy agenda. Nagorno-Karabakh mustremainpartofitsterritory(while proposingtogive itthehighestdegreeof (49/13 and57/298)refertoNagorno-Karabakh asaregionof Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan maintainsthat Three UNSecurityCouncil Resolutions(853,874,and884)two UNGeneral Assembly Resolutions territory, fearinginternationalcondemnation. have resistedbothinternalpressureandfrom itspowerful diaspora community tounitewiththe No country–noteven Armenia –hasrecognisedNagorno-Karabakh, andsuccessive Armenian governments up withoutever having hadany contactwitheach other. Nagorno-Karabakh, especiallyamongtheyounger generations ineach countryorentity, who have grown conflict. Unsurprisingly, thishascontributedtopopularradicalisation in Azerbaijan, Armenia and from operating freely. Hatepropagandamaintainsanddeepens simplisticanddistortedimagesofthe Civil societyorganisationsareweakandthosekeenonworking towards reconciliationareprevented they returnhome. may makeprogressondetailsinconfidentialtalks,theyrevert tousingnegative languagewhen fail tomakeany meaningfuleffortstopreparetheirrespective populationsforconcessions.Sowhile they governments may arguethattheycannotjustifytherequestedconcessionstotheirpeople, propaganda onbothsideshasallbuteradicated any publicsupportforacompromisedeal. While both Furthermore, thelack ofcontactbetween Armenian and Azerbaijani citizensandintensehate of militaryactionsuggestthatitisplanningtoreclaimNagorno-Karabakh by force. to makecompromises. Armenia alsocontinuestomaintainthat Azerbaijan’s militaryspendingandthreats it to‘seduce’theNagorno-Karabakh Armenian populationwhile furtherisolating Armenia andpushingit believe that Azerbaijan hascontinuedtoplay fortimein thehopethatitsrapid economicgrowth willallow two presidentsreturnedhome,where theyencounteredfierce opposition. accepting adealbasedonterritorialexchange. This (almost)breakthroughquickly crumbledoncethe President Heydar Aliyev and Armenian PresidentRobertKocharyan seemedtobemoving towards of missedopportunities,particularlyduringtalksintheFloridaKeys in2001when thethen Azerbaijani At thesametime,both Armenia and Azerbaijan seemtohave preferredtomaintainthe Overall progresshasbeenvery slow. Between1994and2004,three‘official’plans has nodirectaccesstotheprocessandrelyonFrench co-chair tokeepitinformed. debate onproposalsisextremelylimitedandinvolves onlyahandfulofofficials. The EU,forexample, between bothcountries’presidentsandforeignministers. The processishighlyconfidential,asthewider France andtheUS–hasactedasintermediaryforpeacetalks,includingregulardirecttalks For thelast15years, theOSCEMinskGroup–working predominantlythroughitsco-chairs Russia, CIS integrated air-defence systemattheRussianbaseinGyumri. Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia isalsoabletobuyweaponsatreducedcostsfromRussiaanddraws onthe accused ofbreakingthembecauseitmaintainsunknown quantitiesofunmonitoredweaponryin Azerbaijan exceedsthetreatyquotasandalthough Armenia stays withintheseitsborders,itis which isalready onitslastlegsafterRussiawithdrewinJuly 2008. engaged inaseriousarmsrace (see Annex 4),violatingtheConventional Forces inEurope(CFE) Treaty, Azerbaijan continuestoassertthat Armenia wants a principally becauseofafailureby bothsidestoseriouslyengageinthetalks. de facto de situation tobecomea 15 14 There werealsoanumber de jure de 13 one. Armenians were rejected status quo status .

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April 2009 the controlofEduardKokoity, aone-timewrestlingchampion who holdsRussiancitizenship andwon in business andorganisedcrime, andeasilydominateallbranches ofgovernment. SouthOssetia isunder In both,power isconcentrated inthe handsoffewpoliticianswho have closelinkstosecurity forces, Russia, afteritsmilitaryconfrontationwithGeorgia,recognised theindependenceofbothentities. emerged northereferendatheyconducted,wereinternationally recognisedpriorto August 2008,when legitimacy intheeyes ofthelocalpopulation.However, neitherthey, northeelectionsfromwhich they The regimesin Abkhazia andSouthOssetiahave always enjoyed atleastalimiteddegreeofpolitical for itsclaimsthatactionsduringthe August war 2008wereindefence of itsown citizens. increased emigration toRussia,especiallyamongSouthOssetians.Inturn,thisprovided Russiawiththebasis Ossetia wereallowed toacquireRussiancitizenshipandpassports,which, atleastinpart,contributedto use theRussianroubleinalmostallcommercial andprivate transactions. Residentsof Abkhazia andSouth Above all,theyremainedpolitically, economically, andmilitarilyentirelydependentonRussia, continuingto was driven asmuch by personalpoliticalaspirations asby organisedcriminalactivity. Nagorno-Karabakh, inparticular, hastheworld’s highest The regionisalsoconsideredoneofthemostheavily landminedareasoftheformerSoviet Union. crime, which alsohave adirectimpactonneighbouring countriesandontheEU. four break-away statessufferfromarms,drugsandhumantrafficking, moneylaunderingandorganised which –withoutpropergovernment controlandwithweaklaw enforcement –corruptioncanthrive. All created opportunitiesforvarious localandtransnational crimenetworks, andfosteredanenvironment in The combinationofwar-time economic devastation andpoliticaluncertaintyinstabilityhave also in amassive lack oftrustandunderstanding. large-scale displacementduringtheviolentphasesofeach conflictintheearly1990shasalsoresulted part ofacountrywithwhich theyhave hadnothing incommonsinceSoviet times. The blood-lettingand particularly inthecasesofNagorno-Karabakh, SouthOssetiaand Abkhazia, thereisnoappetitefor being in theregion(see Annex 7). This means thatfinancialincentives forreintegration have littleappealand, The average monthlysalaryinthesebreak-away statesisalmostidenticaltothatintherestofcountries Annex 6),allstronglyfavour independence. carry thepassportsofnationsthatsupportthemand,accordingtoresultslocalreferenda(see entities have significantexternalmilitarycontingentsontheirterritories(see Annex 5),theirpopulations South Ossetiaand Abkhazia) or Armenia anditsvast diaspora community(Nagorno-Karabakh). All the However, theirsurvival dependsonongoingpoliticalandeconomicsupportfromeitherRussia(Transnistria, have managedtofunctionasstate-likeentities. structures. All fournow have theirown government institutions,legalsystemsandsecurityforces, and In allcases,thebreak-away regimeshave madeskilfuluseofthelast15years tobuildparallel state Functioning of thebreak-away regimes policy towards otherminoritiesinitsterritory. autonomy asadesirable option,notleastbecauseofthecurrentlack ofdemocracy in Azerbaijan andits de facto de Even beforetheGeorgian-Russianwar of August 2008,SouthOssetiaand Abkhazia haddeveloped into Abkhazia and Ossetia South cases, recordsofminefieldlocationswerenever createdorwere lost. Committee oftheRedCross,atleast50,000antipersonnelmineswerelaidduringwar, butinmany explosive remnantsofwar states, albeitrelatively weakones. This process,stretched out over thepastdecadeandahalf, 17 – surpassingeven Afghanistan andCambodia. 16 per capita per casualty rate fromlandminesand 18 According totheInternational Transnistria isnoworse thanintherestofMoldova, gained somelegitimacy amongstthepopulation. This stemsfromthebeliefthatoverall situationin Despite itsnon-democratic character anditsstronggripontheeconomy, the Transnistrian leadershiphas freely trafficked. territory intoasafe-haven forsmugglerswhere humanbeings,drugs,weaponsandotherproductsare these provisions have notbeenenforced since 1995. The government controls many ofthebroadcast including mediacensorship and thebanningofpublicdemonstrations, althoughtheauthorities claim Nagorno-Karabakh alsoofficially remains undermartiallaw, which imposesrestrictionsoncivil liberties, recognised internationally, Freedom Houseassessedthemasbeing“partlyfree”. home andremainsexcludedfromtakingpart. While recentpresidentialelectionsinJuly 2007werenot and Azerbaijan, wereitnotforthefactthatitsentire Azerbaijani communityisunabletoreturn Indeed, Nagorno-Karabakh couldclaimitselectionsareatleastasdemocratic asthoseinboth Armenia may endearittotheinternationalcommunityandthereby enhanceitschances ofrecognition. match internationalstandardsfordemocracy andholdingfreefairelections,inthebeliefthatthis Nagorno-Karabakh’s leadershiphastriedtoimbuetheterritorywithdemocratic values by seekingto Nagorno-Karabakh revenues. Considerable profitscomefromitsexports, is themostimportant,accountingforroughly60%oflegalexportsandaroundhalf Transnistria’s tax control theindustrylocatedin Transnistria. This isprimarilyheavy steel,ofwhich theRibnitsasteel plant and oftheSlavic minoritiesliving in Transnistria. The Smirnov-led executive usesitspoliticalpower to He rosetopower inthelate1980sasdefenderofinterests ofthe Transnistrian businesscommunity and localpoliticalbodiesundertightcontrol. The Transnistrian politicalsystemisdominatedby PresidentSmirnov, who keepsparliament,judiciary Transnistria as hissuccessor, who heldtheofficeuntil October2004elections. previous government experience–MrBagapshasPrimeMinisterfrom1997to2001andKhadzhimba the January 2005re-runofthepresidentialelections.Bothcurrentpresidentandvice-presidenthave After furtherriotingandviolenceacross Abkhazia, theformerrivals agreedtostand onajointticket in decision, butwas intimidatedby mobssupportingMrKhadzhimbaintochanging itsmind. Kremlin-backed rival, RaulKhadzhimba. The Abkhaz SupremeCourtinitiallyupheldthecommission’s after allegedwidespreadirregularities,adivided electoral commissiondeclaredhimthewinnerover his January 2005afterthreemonthsofturmoilfollowing hotly-disputedelectionsthe previousOctoberwhen, Abkhazia hasachequered historyofdemocracy. ItscurrentPresident,SergeiBagapsh,was electedin across theformerSoviet Unionwhich have long-established‘diplomatic’tieswithoneanother. enjoy any internationallegitimacy orrecognitionotherthanfromRussiaandbreak-away regimes the presidentialelectionsofDecember2001andNovember 2006.Neithertheelections,norMrKokoity, Russia, Ukraine andeven Moldova. ‘opposition’ aroundMrShevchuk hasfailedtoofferanalternative courseofaction. self-serving agendaisnotnecessarilyatoddswiththeviewsofpopulationlarge,andthat independence. Although theresultswerealmostcertainlyfalsified,theyindicatethatauthorities’ independence, with97%ofthosewho voted intheSeptember2006referendum Transnistria backing A largeproportionofthe Transnistrian population appearstosupportthe Transnistrian authorities’fightfor economic performanceandayoung population,many ofwhom areemigrating. 20 Moreover, the Transnistrian authoritiesdeliberately turnedthe 19 21 thanks toanextensive weboftrade linksacross a countrywithfragile statestructures,aweak 22

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April 2009 and through, Armenia andusesthe Armenian currency, the native andheadeditsmilitaryduringthewar. The territoryisdependentonimportsandexportsfrom, completely ethnic Armenian. The current Armenian President,SerzhSargsyan, isaNagorno-Karabakh Nagorno-Karabakh ismoreorlessanextensionof Armenia andits130,000-strongpopulationisalmost contrast, thereisvirtuallyno Azerbaijani diaspora. community provides opportunitiesforthepresidentofNagorno-Karabakh andotherofficialstospeak.In Armenian Embassies),includinginParis, Berlinand Washington, where the Armenian diaspora Nagorno-Karabakh hasestablishedanumberofoverseas representationoffices(usuallyextensionsof openly criticisingthegovernment. and thepeaceprocess. The printmediaismorevibrant, with publicationssuch asthebiweekly media outletsandmostjournalistspractice self-censorship,particularlyonsubjectsrelatedto Azerbaijan models forthepopulation’s independenceaspirations. pressing forreunificationwith Azerbaijan, andKosovo andMontenegroarefrequentlycitedaspossible member working orstudying overseas). A smallcivil societyexists,butthereisnoorganisedgroup many peopledependonmoneysenthomefromabroad(almostallfamilieshave atleastonefamily the groundiskeptsecret. The average monthlysalaryis$220and,withconsiderable unemployment, Around halftheannualbudgetisspentonarmedforces –althoughtheprecisenumberofsoldierson which isabiginvestor intheregion. budget isfundedby government loansfrom Armenia, taxrevenues, exportsandthediaspora community, 23 24 Dram . Nagorno-Karabakh’s $250million Demo two conflicts. the internationalcommunity’s seriouscommitmenttoachieving a negotiated settlementofthese by allparties,may well give thenegotiationsanimportant impetus.Itwillalsodemonstrate to co-chair ofthe settlementnegotiationsandwithamoresignificantpresence ontheground–asagreed that ofmediator/peacekeeper, asitclaimedpreviously. The strengtheningoftheEU’s role–fromobserver Moreover, Russia’s roleinthenegotiationsisnow unambiguouslythatofaconflictparty, rather than before theRussia-Georgiawar in August. discussed simultaneouslyandinthesameformat,mustbe consideredprogresscomparedtothesituation concerned (includingdelegatesfromthetwo break-away entities)andthatbothdisputesarebeing The very fact,however, thatinternationally mediatedtalksarebeingheld,thattheyinvolve alltheparties Russia willonlydeepenandintensifyastheGeneva Talks continuewithoutmeasurable progress. the working-group negotiations,alltheindicationsarethatlinksbetweenseparatist regionsand Even though Georgiahasdroppeditsobjectionstoincluding Abkhaz andSouthOssetiandelegationsin recognition ofGeorgia’s territorialintegrityinitspresentborders. and theinternationalcommunity(andimportantlyco-chairs ofthetalks)continuetoinsiston Georgia andRussiaremainfarapartonthecentral issuesofGeorgia’s futuresovereign statusandborders, the statusof Abkhazia andSouthOssetia,orthatitwilldeliver anegotiatedagreementintheshortterm. It isdoubtfulwhether thisformatwillresultinany settlementofthenow-internationalised disputeover humanitarian aidtothepopulation. the separatist territories. The mechanism alsoincludesagreementsdesignedtoensurethedelivery of under controlandinvestigate ‘incidents’,especiallyintheregionsclosetoadministrative borderswith mechanism’ tokeepthesituationinGeorgianbreak-away regionsof Abkhazia andSouthOssetia However, on17-18February 2009someprogresswas made,withthecreationofan‘incidentprevention A furthermeetingtookplaceon17-18December, but didnotresultinany concreteagreements. included delegatesfromSouthOssetiaand Abkhazia. and discussedthesituation.Moreover, despiteinitialresistancefromGeorgia,theworking groups significant becauseitwas thefirsttimesince August war thatGeorgianandRussianofficialshadmet This was, however, moreconstructive andeven thoughtherewas nobreakthroughonsubstance,itwas was toholdtalksonafortnightlybasis,butsecondmeetingwas postponeduntil18November 2008. delegates from Abkhazia andSouthOssetia,eventually brokedown over procedural issues. The initial plan The firstsessionofthese‘Geneva Talks’ tookplaceon15Octoberamidcontroversy over theparticipationof and stabilitytheotheronIDPsrefugees. US. Subsequently, thepartiesinvolved agreedtoestablishtwo working groups,onefocusingonsecurity agreement thattalksshouldbeheldinGeneva, chaired by anEU/UN/OSCEtroikawithsupportfromthe and Moscow on12 August 2008. Then, on8September, aspartofongoingnegotiations,itbrokeredan After two roundsofmediation,theFrench EUPresidency securedaceasefireagreementbetween Tbilisi Abkhazia and Ossetia South status in August 2008,while Transnistria andNagorno-Karabakh have ongoingconflict-resolutionprocesses. (see Annex 3forthehistoryoftheseinitiatives). SouthOssetiaand Abkhazia underwentanabruptchange of These conflictresolutionprocesseshave beenintermittentandarange ofdifferentactorshave beeninvolved the conflictsover Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia andSouthOssetia. Since theinitialceasefiresinearly1990s,therehave beenseparate formatsfornegotiationstosettle III. Status of negotiations

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April 2009 proposed for7-8October2008never happened,as Transnistrian officialsrefusedtoattend. continue talksifMoldova agreestohisproposedFriendship andCooperation Agreement. A meeting second Voronin-Smirnov meetinghasnottakenplacetodate,withMr Smirnov insistinghewillonly Smirnov toresumenegotiations,afterhaving promisedeconomicsupport to Transnistria. Nevertheless, a abroad” inapeacefulmanner. PresidentMedvedev decidedtoputadditionalpressureonPresident After thewar, Russiafelttheneedtodemonstrate thatitwas abletosolve thefrozenconflictsinits“near this, bilateral negotiationsagainwentintohibernationuntilthe August War inGeorgia. if Moldova recognised Transnistria asan“equal”partner;i.e.asovereign entity. As Moldova refusedtodo and Cooperation Agreement, statingthat Transnistria was onlypreparedtoinitiateadiscussionontheCBMs discussion ineightseparate working groups.However, MrSmirnov camewithhisown planforaFriendship confidence-building measures(CBMs)onsocio-economicissuesanddemilitarisationtocontinuethe Transnistrian counterpart,PresidentSmirnov. Duringthismeeting,Mr Voronin hopedtodiscusshis ‘capital’, exemplifiedby the11 April 2008meetingbetweenMoldovan President Vladimir Voronin andhis These effortshave ledtoarapprochement betweentheMoldovan government and Tiraspol (the Transnistrian who hasalsoplayed asignificantandpositive mediatingroleintheconflict-settlementprocess. acting astheunofficialmediatorbetweenbothparties,andhasengagedwithEU’s SpecialRepresentative, possibility toconsolidateitsinterestsinMoldova andthewiderregionby settlingtheconflict.Ithasbeen negotiations. After multiplepledgesfromMoldova toremainneutral andstay outofNATO, Russiaseesa Recently, Russiauseditsleverage over the Transnistrian regimetochange thelatter’s stubbornapproach tothe into theEU. Moldova, althoughBucharest insistsitisonlyfosteringtieswithMoldova toassistthelatter’s integration opportunities. These two issueshave raised concernsthatRomaniaistryingtoextenditsinfluencein passport issue,asRomaniaoffersRomanianpassportstoMoldovan citizensseekingbettereconomic official languageisRomanian,notMoldovan. This continuinglanguagedisputeisexacerbatedby the former accusesthelatterofunderminingMoldovan state’s nationalidentity by insistingthatMoldova’s Relations betweenMoldova andRomania,itscloseneighbour, have alsocooledinrecentyears, asthe and the2005‘Yushchenko Plan’,have beenvetoed by oneorotheroftheparties. proposals madesofar, includingthe2003‘Kozak Memorandum’ (anditsvarious subsequentiterations) mutually-acceptable agreementandinternationaleffortshave notachieved abreakthrougheither. All the have frequentlybeendeadlocked. The partiesthemselves (Moldova and Transnistria) failedtoreach a Since Transnistria’s proclamationofindependenceon2September1990,negotiationsasettlement Transnistria future EU-Moldova relations,astheformer repeatedlyannouncedthatMoldova’s conductwould be on 15 April. This didnotchange theelectionresults. These electionswerealsoanimportanttestcasefor and demonstrations turnedviolent, theMoldovan ConstitutionalCourtdecidedtorecountthevotes the areaofequalmediacoverage andadministrative interference.However, asprotestsgrewin Chisinau met many internationalstandardsandcommitments, thoughfurtherimprovements hadtobemade in OSCE andEuropeanParliament preliminaryfindingswas moderately positive, statingthattheelections passed thethresholdof6%andeach gained between9and12%ofthevotes. The toneofthejoint The CommunistParty of outgoingPresident Voronin received 49.95%ofallvotes. Another threeparties On 5 April 2009,parliamentaryelectionswereheldinMoldova. Voter turnout was high,with59.5%. its population’s humanrights. its neutrality; andthatthe Transnistrian leadership democratises, recognisespropertyrightsandprotects demanding that Transnistria demilitarises andthatforeigntroopsleave itsterritoryinordertoconsolidate within thecurrentunitarystateprovided itrespectsMoldova’s sovereignty andterritorialintegrity. Itisalso status of Transnistria. As thingsstandnow, Moldova ispreparedtogrant Transnistria wideautonomy Despite enhancedinternationalefforts,bothsidesstillappearirreconcilableontheCBMsandfinal 25 27 26 in 10-15years’ time. decided. The BasicPrinciplesenvisage thatitwillbedetermined by areferenduminNagorno-Karabakh The biggeststicking pointremainstheeventual statusofNagorno-Karabakh andwhen thisshould be forces would needtobecarefullyconsideredandbalanced. behaviour inotherconflictzones,thismay notbewelcomedby Azerbaijan, sotheinclusionof Russian such operation given thatitcurrentlyconsiders Russiaasvitaltoitssecurity. Given Russia’s history and something theEUcouldtakeon, Armenia willalmostcertainlyinsistthatRussiantroopsbe part ofany Nagorno-Karabakh. The compositionofthepeacekeepingforce isalsoimportant,andwhile thisis status ofLachin remainsaproblematicissuefor Armenia, asitisregardedalifeline linking Armenia to occupied territories.For theNagorno-Karabakh Armenians, itmeanssecurityguarantees, althoughthe This approach offersbothpartiessomeofwhat theywant. For the Azerbaijanis, itmeans thereturnof confidential, theircontentisnow widelyknown. on which theyareincreasinglyreaching consensus. Although theBasicPrinciplesaresupposedtobe table. Itincludesanumberofpointswhich thetwo partieshave agreedover thelastfewyears andothers Summit inDecember2007andproposesastep-by-step approach tosolvingtheconflict,remainson The ‘DocumentofBasicPrinciples’,which was formallytabledby themediatorsatMadridOSCE of theEU’s EasternPartnership Summit. Zurich on28January 2009,withthenextmeetingsettotakeplaceinPrague inearlyMay onthefringes both Armenia and Azerbaijan. The latestroundofdiscussionsbetweenthetwo presidentstookplacein 2008 was alostyear forresolvingtheNagorno-Karabakh conflictbecauseofpresidentialelectionsin Nagorno-Karabakh this development couldnow beunderthreat. considered a‘benchmark’ forthedevelopment ofanewandenhancedpartnership.Given recentevents Principles furthersuggestedthefollowing commitmentsby bothparties: status ofNagorno-Karabakh isamatterfornegotiationbetween thetwo parties. The Basic integrity of Azerbaijan mustbeupheld,while, atthesametime,itacknowledges thatthefuture The fundamentalprinciple,asagreedby theMinskGroupon19March 2008,isthattheterritorial I I I I I I Nagorno-Karabakh; return ofthe Azerbaijani population,conditionalonprogressindeterminingthefuturestatusof a phasedwithdrawal fromKelbajar, thesixthofregions,atalaterstage,withsubsequent these regionsduringthewar; Nagorno-Karabakh; andimmediatereturnof85%the Azerbaijani populationdisplacedfrom immediate withdrawal of Armenian troopsfromfive oftheseven occupiedregionssurrounding determine thefinalstatusofNagorno-Karabakh. a popularvote (detailsstilltobedetermined)willheldatanunspecifiedfuturedate citizens someinternationalstatus,butfallsshortofrecognition; Nagorno-Karabakh istobeprovided withan“interimnationalstatus”which willallow its maintain stabilityalongtheborderofterritoriesandprevent renewedconflict; the entirepost-conflictzone,particularlyinstrategically-important Kelbajar Province, to the deployment ofupto10,000internationalpeacekeepers between Nagorno-Karabakh and connection between Armenia andNagorno-Karabakh; the entire,orpartofthe,Lachin regionistoserve asacorridortoensurepermanentland Basic Principles Basic

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April 2009 the firsttime,signingjointdeclaration it didreiterate thatdialoguewould continuebetween Armenia and Azerbaijan withthetwo presidents,for meeting inMoscow didnotdeliver abreakthroughinthepeaceprocessorbringanything newtothetable, Moscow atwhich theypledgedtointensifythesearch foramutuallyacceptablecompromise. Although the brought togetherthe Armenian and Azerbaijani presidentsataspecialNagorno-Karabakh summitin Russia hasalsosteppedupitsroleasamediatorintheconflict.On2November 2008, PresidentMedvedev reconciliation andCBMs. status issuehasblocked theentireprocess,notonlyofconflictsettlementbutalsoallforms of participation ofethnic Azerbaijanis who wereexpelledfromNagorno-Karabakh. Disagreementonthe number ofpriorsubstantive issues. These includethelegalforce oftheproposedreferendumand territorial integrityandsovereignty withinitsinternationallyrecognisedborders–avote itselfraises a Nagorno-Karabakh’s annexation,andthe Azerbaijani sidekeentoachieve anaffirmationof Azerbaijan’s However, asthetwo partieswant differentoutcomesfromany plebiscite–withthe Armenian sideseeking (particularly inlightofevents inGeorgia). increases effortstobringthetwo societiestogether;andinsistsonagreaterroleinthepeaceprocess on theground,includingformulatingaclearposition(asithasdonewithotherregionalconflicts); the EU–moves away fromitssomewhat complacentapproach totheconflict;becomesmoreinvolved and fightingcouldresumeatany time.Itisthereforevitalthattheinternationalcommunity–particularly However, despitetheserecentdevelopments, theNagorno-Karabakh conflictremainsextremelyvolatile For Russia,itdemonstrated thattheKremlincontinuestoplay akeyroleinconflictresolution,while atthe 4. The ongoingcommitmenttotheMinskGroupispositive for Armenia given thatithasaccused Azerbaijan 3. For Azerbaijan, agreementonthecontinuingnon-participation ofthe‘Nagorno-Karabakh Republic’inthe 2. Itdemonstrated theongoingcommitmentofallsignatoriestosolve theconflictbased on Azerbaijan’s 1. a regionalpeace-maker. same timeimproving thecountry’s image,moving itaway frombeingan‘aggressor’(inGeorgia)to Azerbaijani President Aliyev hasreverted totalkingaboutmilitaryaction. being atleast,ithasnointentionofusingmilitarymeasurestoresolve theconflict–althoughinrecenttimes Azerbaijan’s commitmenttoresolve theconflictthroughpoliticalmeans,which indicates that,forthetime of tryingtodoaway withtheGroupasaframework forsettlement. Armenia shouldalsobereassuredby Sargsyan to hishomelandon14-15November 2008. Armenia prompteddeepangerinNagorno-Karabakh, mostvisiblyexpressedduringavisitby President package deal,withstatusdecidedatthesametimeasliberalisation, etc. However, thisconcessionby deal) andinternationalguarantees forallaspectsandstages. Armenia hadpreviouslyalways insistedona talks was positive, aswas theagreementby thepartiestoastep-by-step approach (rather thanapackage territorial integrity. 28 . Italsohadsomeotherimportantsymbolicimplications: its alliesinNATO and the EUhave backed seeminglypro-Western forces, even atthepriceofre-escalating prevented GeorgiaandMoldova, inparticular, fromforgingclosertieswiththe West. The USandsomeof Russia (seebelow) hasbenefited fromlow-level, ‘managed’instabilityinitsneighbourhoodwhich has political survival oftendependsontakingahardline. Local parties(statesandseparatists) have founditdomesticallydifficultto argueforconcessions,astheir actors toblock –oratleastimpedeprogress towards asettlement. permanent settlement.Rather, the conflict created,hasreducedthepressureonallsides to makethecompromisesrequiredreach a significant Russianmediationandpeacekeeping),in managingthehumanitariancrisesthateach The relative successoftheUNandOSCEinfacilitatingmaintaining ceasefires(bothwith of leverage othershave toimposeasettlement. concessions becauseofthesupporttheycontinuetoreceive fromsomeoutsidersandbecauseofthelack in theconflicts(thestatesandseparatist entities)have beenunwilling tomakethenecessarymutual been relatively ineffective infacilitatingadurable politicalsettlement. The partiesimmediatelyinvolved impose onfurtheringtheinterestsofeach oftheplayers, helptoexplainwhy theUNandOSCEhave These complexstrategic configurations ofpower, andtheopportunitiestheybringconstraints they (Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia)orindirectlyaffectedby theconflicts(Ukraine). locally betweenpro-Western andpro-Russianforces incountriestheneighbourhoodthemselves within regionalorganisations(such astheOSCEandCommonwealthofIndependentStates:CIS); (represented by organisationssuch asNATO andtheEU,aswellindividual states,such astheUS); area hasbecomethesceneoftug-of-war games:onageo-politicallevel, betweenRussiaandthe West Given that Western andRussian‘zonesofvitalinterest’overlap intheEU’s EasternNeighbourhood,the Soviet statesandtoeffecttheirintegration intoEuropean andtransatlantic structures. Western membersofthetwo organisationshasbeentoconsolidatetheindependenceoftheseformer and democratic societies,butwithlittlesuccess.Furthermore, theunderlyingobjective of(atleast)the At thesametime,UNandOSCEhave alsoattemptedtofurther thepoliticaltransition toopen To assistin effortstoreach durable politicalsolutionstothese conflicts. 4. To prevent furtherconflicts. 3. To bringactive hostilitiestoanend. 2. To dealwith thehumanitarianconsequencesofconflicts. 1. They wereguidedby fourobjectives: Ossetia, theOSCEandUNweremostsignificantexternalmediatorsinvolved inany oftheconflicts. For mostoftheperiodafteroutbreakviolencein Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, andSouth The Organization for SecurityandCo-operation inEurope (OSCE)andtheUnited Nations their own interests,nonecanbringaboutasolutionontheirown. settlements. While theymay allhave thepower individually toblock solutionsperceived ascontrary to Iran, and Turkey (see Annex 3),allofwhich areimportantplayers inthesearch forsustainableconflict Europe (OSCE)andtheUnitedNations–anumberofstatesforexample,Russia,US,Romania, They includeinternationalorganisations–such astheOrganizationforSecurityandCo-operation in separate conflictsintheregionsinceearly1990s. In additiontotheEU,thereareanumberofotherexternalactorswho have played aroleinthefour IV. External actors status quo status has served many moreinterestsandprovided incentives for

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April 2009 states andthroughNATO. engagement, inparticularby theUS,bothinitsbilateral relationshipswiththe successorstotheSoviet and itsinfluenceacrosstheEU’s entireEasternNeighbourhood.Moscow hasresisted increasing Western the conflicts (asinGeorgia).Inaddition,transnational organisedcrime(which hasstronginterestsinmaintaining weaknesses afterthecollapse oftheformerSoviet Union, Today’s Russiaisinaself-confidentandassertive mood,believingthatthe West soughttoexploitits because ofthetwo countries’closepolitical,economic andsecurityties. political survival. InthecaseofNagorno-Karabakh, Russiahasconsiderable influenceover Armenia in Transnistria, SouthOssetiaand Abkhazia, becausetheyalldependonRussiafortheireconomicand relevant OSCEorUNinstrumentsbutalsobilaterally, usingthedirectinfluenceithasover theauthorities Moscow istakingatwo-pronged approach, working bothwithinthemultilateral framework aspartofthe very paradoxical role,given thatitisbothpartoftheproblemandalsosolutionineach case. certainly dependtoalargedegreeonacknowledging andrespectingitsinterests.Indeed,Russiaplays a Russia isby farthemostimportantplayer inalloftheseconflictsandsecuringpeacedealswillalmost Russia negotiations is‘permitted’,regardlessofwhether ithasborneany fruitorhasany prospectofsucceeding. them offagainsteach other. Ithasalsocontributedtostalematesinwhich onlyoneformatfor settlement processes withoutsufficientcoordinationandcooperation hasgiven localpartiesopportunitiestoplay The way agrowing group ofconcernedthirdpartieshave monopolisedtheseconflict-settlement hope thattheywilleventually beabletoreturnhome. political process,orwhether theyshouldmerelybeprovided withbasicservicesinIDPcampsthe them intotheir‘host’communitiesby helpingthemtorebuildtheirlivelihoods andparticipateinthe comes torefugeesandIDPs,therearedisagreementsover whether effortsshouldbemadetointegrate sufficiently coordinated,andattimestheirobjectives have beencontradictory. For example,when it Unfortunately, theeffortsofUN,OSCEandrespective keyplayers have notalways been who arekeentocontributesettlingtheseconflictshassteadilyincreased. very late.Secondly, despiteUNandOSCE‘protectionism’,the numberofexternalactorsontheground reconstruction andreintegration andassistingwithcivilian policeandbordermanagementhasbeenused not have, ordonothave enoughof.For example,theEU’s proven experienceinfacilitatingeconomic ways. First, ithasdeprived thoseactorsinthedriving seatfrombenefitingcapacitiesthattheydo Excluding thirdpartiesfromthecoreconflict-settlementprocesseshaslimitedtheireffectiveness intwo to seeawrittenversion oftheproposal–ithadtobereadhim. has beenkeptsosecretthatnoteven theEU’s SpecialRepresentative fortheSouthCaucasuswas allowed process inNagorno-Karabakh has,attimes,beenbizarre.For example,thelatestproposalforasettlement The way inwhich theco-chairs oftheOSCEMinskGrouphave monopolisedtheconflict-settlement bay in Abkhazia. maintained itsleadroleinSouthOssetiaand Transnistria, theUNhasbeenkeentokeepotheractorsat successfully prevented amoremulti-track, multi-actorapproach. Inthesameway thattheOSCEhas Both organisationshave beenextremelyprotective of‘their’conflict-settlementprocessesandhave the conflictandself-interestedagendasofexternalactorsthemselves doesnottelltheentirestoryeither. conflicts ontheUNandOSCE.However, seeingthemasvictimsof theintransigence ofpartiesinvolved in It would thereforebeunfairtolay alltheblameforlack ofsustainablesettlementsinany ofthese Moldova, Transnistria andUkraine. status quo status ) hasbecomedeeplyentrenched, especiallyinGeorgiaand itsbreak-away regions,andin 29 and itisdeterminedtomaintain astrongrole example, inthecontextofarms controlinthe Treaty onConventional Armed Forces inEurope(CFE) appears tobetryingrenegotiate agreementsinordertoavoid someofitscurrent commitments.For It isclearthatRussiaattempting topushtheUSoutofEuropeansecurity structure.Italso strategic significance. that thePan-European SecurityInitiative proposedby RussianPresidentDmitriMedvedev acquiresits insist onitsspecialrole number ofRussianpassport-holdersintheEasternNeighbourhood’s break-away regionsasleverage to Moscow hasusedthepresenceofethnicRussianandRussian-speakingminoritiesincreasing its militarypresenceinCentral Asia, areevidencethatitispursuingapolicy ofRussiancontainment. Kremlin believes thatthe Alliance’s strongbacking forthemembershipaspirations ofGeorgiaandUkraine, and It isalsovehemently opposedtoEasternNeighbourhoodcountriesbuildingcloserrelationswithNATO, asthe for themodernisationofUkraine’s gastransit systemwhich excludedRussia. Furthermore, theKremlinwas furiousabouttherecentJoint Declaration signedby theEUandUkraine the EU’s newEasternPartnership asatooltogaininfluenceover theEasternNeighbourhood. about greaterEUinvolvement intheregion,withRussianForeign MinisterSergeiLavarov recentlyciting with Iran) thedevelopment oftheBaku-Tbilisi-Ceyhanpipeline;andis,atbest,somewhat ambiguous Russia didnotwelcomethe‘ColourRevolutions’ thattook placeinUkraine andGeorgia;opposed(along first timeisyet anothersignofMoscow’s desiretokeepatightgripontheregion. on 4February tocreatecollective rapid reactionforces betweentheseformerSoviet republicsforthe The recentdecisionattheCollective Security Treaty Organisation(CSTO) SummitinMoscow keep theminasortofRussian‘greyzone’,away from Western influence. is clearlytomaintainasmuch directinfluenceandcontrolover thesecountriesaspossibleinorderto This hasalsoallowed theKremlin tomaintainastrongmilitarypresenceacrosstheentireregion.Itsaim good faithandrespectallstates’sovereignty, territorialintegrityandpoliticalindependence. Lastly, PresidentMedvedev talkedofacommitmenttofulfillobligationsunderinternationallaw in Weapons ofMassDestructionproliferation, terrorismanddrugtrafficking. construction, andwould buildcooperation inproceduresand mechanisms inareassuch as The treatywould establishbasicarms-controlparameters andsetreasonablelimitsonmilitary stability inEurope. state orindividual internationalorganisation can have exclusive rightstomaintainingpeaceand replaced by asingleEuro-Atlanticspaceextending from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Inaddition,no It statesthat‘Atlanticism’ asthesinglebasisforsecurityhasexhausteditself,andshouldbe military allianceswhich couldharmthesecurityofothertreatysignatories. new treatywould guarantee equalsecurityforallpartiesandwould prevent thedevelopment of force orthethreatofitsuse”.Inwhat isobviously aclearreferencetoNATO, itspecifiesthatany Firstly, theparticipatingpartieswould committotheprincipleof“inadmissibilityuse documents orblueprints,thesespeeches give ussomeinsightsintoRussianthinking. and elaborated inanotherspeech inEvian,France inOctober. The proposalwas firstputforward by President Medvedev inaspeech inBerlinon5June 2008, vis-à-vis Medvedev Pan-European SecurityInitiative other ex-Soviet states,especiallythoseengulfedinseparatist conflicts. 33 Although therearenoconcrete 31 32 It isinthiscontext 30

25 April 2009 26

April 2009 in andtrading with Abkhazia, passports to Abkhaz residents,offeringfinancialsupportandtraining tothe Abkhaz military, andinvesting relations was adirectconsequenceofPresidentSaakashvili’s policy. not directlychallenge the accommodating approach ofEduardShevardnadse who, asGeorgianPresidentfrom1995to2003,did The way inwhich PresidentSaakashvilistepped up hisrhetoriccontrasted sharplywiththemore Bush’s publicandprivate commentsduringhisvisittoGeorgiain2005. Several high-level internationalinterventions wererequiredtodiffusethem,such asUSPresidentGeorge Ossetia in2004and Abkhazia in2006respectively wererejectedandtensionsgradually escalated. repeat thissuccessinSouthOssetiaand Abkhazia failed.Offersofautonomy andfederal status toSouth While hesucceededinestablishingGeorgiancontrolover Adjara, anotherseparatist region,effortsto full andunconditionalrestoration ofitssovereignty acrossitsentireterritoryapolicy priority. both conflictzones. After becomingPresidentofGeorgiainJanuary 2004,MikhailSaakashvilimade the Georgian-Russian relationshave, inalmostequalmeasure,driven andbeendriven by developments in Abkhazia and Ossetia South own futures,includingtheirown foreignpolicy. interests inthisregion,while makingitabundantlyclearthatthesestatesmustbeallowed todecidetheir with Moscow, andthe West shouldbesensitive toRussia’s long-standingsecurity, politicalandeconomic Europe needtodevelop acoordinatedstrategy towards Russiatobuildfriendlyandcooperative relations are valid andthereisnothingtobelostby openlydiscussinganddebatingalltheseissues. The USand has notbeenany fundamentalshiftinUS-Russiarelations.Nevertheless, Russianconcernsaboutsecurity have improved thefrostyatmospherethatexistedunderBushadministration. However, todatethere President Barack ObamaandMoscow develops. InitialcontactsbetweenObamaandMoscow seemto compatible remainsanopenquestion,andmuch willdependonhow therelationshipbetweennewUS Whether theviewsof West andRussiaonthetermsarrangements forsuch apactwillever be Ironically, Russiaalsoseemstobepromotingprinciplesthatitdoesnotitselfadhereto. Russia asagreatthreattosecurityinthesameway thatMoscow regardstheUSasaglobalthreat. Many ofthenewestNATO membersdonotshareRussia’s concernsaboutsecurity. They donotperceive Charter ofParis. Itisalsounlikelythatexistingstructuresandallianceswillbeabandoned. Russia stilldoesnotcomplywiththe1999Istanbulcommitments,northoseunder1990OSCE cooperation withthetwo separatist regions, andincreasinglytoughrhetoricactionagainst Ossetians togainRussian citizenship andpassports,intensifyingpolitical,economic, andmilitary war withChechnya forwhich itsoughtGeorgian cooperation. Enabling Abkhaz andSouth a cleardeparturefromthe Yeltsin era, when agenerally weakRussiafounditselfina prolonged President Putin’s policy on Abkhazia andSouthOssetia,by extensionGeorgia,marked predominantly Western andpro-Western countries. Declaration ofIndependenceinFebruary 2008,anditssubsequentrecognitionby alargenumberof This lineofargumentbecame officialRussianpolicy, andgainedlegitimacy following Kosovo’s Unilateral As GeorgiabegantoaccuseRussiaofa independence, why thenshouldwedeny itto Abkhazia andSouthOssetia?” of allpeopleliving inconflict-stricken territories...Ifpeoplebelieve thatKosovo canbegranted full conflicts, insisting:“We needcommonprinciplestofindafairsolutiontheseproblemsforthe benefit In January 2006,RussianPresident Vladimir Putin calledforuniversal principlestosettlethefrozen recognition of Abkhazia asearly2006. status quo status 35 Moscow, inturn,usedtheKosovo issueasaprecedent forinternational established intheearly1990s. The deterioration inGeorgian-Russian de facto de annexation ofitsterritoryby distributingpensionsand 34 36 would keepits enjoying equalstatusand Tiraspol wieldingfar-reaching powers ofveto. Insuch ascenario, Transnistria by Moscow and Tiraspol isaconfederation between Transnistria andtherestofMoldova, withboth Neither Russianor Transnistria want aquick settlementofthe conflict. The outcomecurrentlyfavoured NATO membership). Russia geo-politicalinterestsvery welluntilMoldova fullyandcrediblycommitstoneutrality (i.e.doesnotseek it cannotfullyintegrate into Western structures.Consequently, maintainingthe conflict over Transnistria remainsunresolved, Moldova’s sovereignty andterritorialintegrityareinquestion Transnistria anditsSmirnov-led executive areusefultoolsforRussiatoaccomplishthesegoals. As longasthe GUAM, analliancewithGeorgia,Ukraine and Azerbaijan designedtocounterRussia’s influenceintheregion. within itssphereandoutsideNATO’s sphereofinfluence.Moreover, Moscow isdemanding thatMoldova leaves Russia hassignificantleverage over bothMoldova and Transnistria, where itsmaingoalistokeepMoldova Transnistria Moscow’s policy member couldnotbutringalarmbellsintheKremlin. President Saakashvili’s rushtoestablishGeorgiaasaprospective NATO (andtoalesserextentEU) closer tieswithRussia.Georgia’s anti-Russianrhetoricwas boundtoevoke aresponsefromMoscow, and Russia topursueitsstrategy, asthetwo regionswereleftwithvery few, ifany, optionsotherthantoforge At thesametime,however, Georgia’s policy ofisolatingSouthOssetiaand Abkhazia madeiteasierfor arena morebroadly. Georgia, werepartlyareflectionofRussia’s renewedassertiveness intheCISandinternational deployment ofRussianpeacekeepingtroopsinMoldova, butthiswas rejectedby Moldova. Russia putforward such aproposal in2003theKozak Memorandum, which alsoforesaw along-term reunified Moldovan state. Geneva Talks –thenewinitiative onNagorno-Karabakh –andmoves tofindacompromiseover Transnistria. interests intheCIShasbeenfollowed by itswillingnesstobecomepartof the EU/UN/OSCEco-sponsored policy towards the‘frozenconflicts’initsneighbourhood. This escalationofthemeanstoassertRussian subsequent recognitionofSouthOssetianand Abkhaz independence,was anunprecedentedstepinRussian Russia’s invasion ofGeorgia, triggeredby thecountry’s violationoftheexistingceasefireagreementandits presence) tosimpleresentmentofGeorgiannationalists. instability intheNorthCaucasusregionandfearsoffurtherNATO andEUexpansionagrowing US (especially in Abkhazia, relatedtotourismandportinfrastructures) andsecurityconcerns(relatedto lending supporttolocalelites,didsofortheirown reasons. These varied fromeconomicinterests after the August 2008events inGeorgiathatitalsohas ‘softpower’ toolsandcancontributeto This alsoopensupnewperspectives forasettlement on Transnistria, asRussiawants todemonstrate to Russianinterests. would notpursueapolicy ofoutrightintegration intothe West andsowould representlessofachallenge to joinany militaryalliance. This hasbroadenedRussia’s options. A reunifiedMoldova outsideNATO Moldova hasmade itclearonseveral occasionsthatitiscommittedtoitsneutrality and doesnotwish its militarypersonnelandequipmentfromMoldova by 2002. clear contradiction ofthe1999OSCEIstanbulSummitcommitments,which obligedRussiatowithdraw leverage over Ukraine; and partlytocounterperceived encirclement by NATO. Nonetheless,thisisin Transnistria by militarymeans; partlyasabargainingchip instatusnegotiations;partlytoincreaseits meantime, Russiahaskeptits14 de facto de vis-à-vis independence andgainadditionalleverage ininfluencingthefunctioningofa both conflictzonesdeveloped asaresponsetodifferentgroupswho, while all th Army in Transnistria, partlytodeterattemptsby Moldova toreintegrate status quo status in Transnistriaserves 37 In the

27 April 2009 28

April 2009 Armenia’s landconnectionswith therestofworld. and import/exportroutesgiven thedoubleblockade by Turkey and Azerbaijan, which severely limits diaspora in Western EuropeandtheUS, butremainheavily dependentonRussiaandIran forsupplies Russia. Armenia andNagorno-Karabakh, meanwhile, canstillrelyonsupportfromthe Armenian partner foralternative energysuppliesandtransit routes todiminishimportingcountries’dependency on Azerbaijan’s relative oilandgaswealthalsomakesitlessdependentonRussia,hasmadeacoveted programme (AzerbiajansenttroopstoIraq) anddeepeningtheirrelationswiththeEU. multi-faceted foreignpolicies,includingcooperating withNATO throughthePartnership forPeace Armenian economy, itstillhaslessleverage over Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan and Armenia claimtocarryout political andmilitaryprotectioneconomicassistance itprovides, combinedwithabigstakeinthe However, Moscow’s positionremainsdifficult. While itsleverage over Armenia isquitestrongthroughthe Deniz IICaspianfield. to strikeadealwithBakuover thepurchase oflargequantitiesnatural gasfrom Azerbaijan’s Shah with Georgia,given Russia’s desirenottoantagoniseyet anotherSouthCaucasusstateanditsdesire enhanced cooperation with Azerbaijan inmany areas. This increasedsignificantly afterthewar and morerecentlyhasbeguntotakeanew‘softpower’ approach, withfrequentvisitstoBakuand In 2001,Moscow backed Azerbaijan initsstand-offwithIran over oilexploration intheCaspian Sea, andwatered down itsaccusationsthatBakuwas aidingChechen rebels. with Azerbaijan when the two sidesresolved differencesover delineatingmaritimebordersintheCaspian in 2000didtheKremlinlaunch amorecoordinatedapproach totheregion.Moscow strengthenedrelations of thesupportRussiahasgiven to Armenia bothduringandsincethewar. OnlyafterPresidentPutin’s arrival For mostof the last15years, theKremlin’s relationshipwithBakuhas beenrather strained, notleastbecause region andtheconflict. co-chair andalsoviaitsstronggripon Armenia, which allows Moscow tomaintainacrucialholdonthe Moscow is,however, abletoinfluencethepeaceprocessboththroughitsroleasaMinskGroup Unlike intheotherthreeconflicts,therearenoRussianminoritiesNagorno-Karabakh. Nagorno-Karabakh conditions: It appearsthatRussianow hasaninterestinreviving thenegotiationsonafinalsettlement,two Moldova and Transnistria. discussions ontheKozak Memorandum, andrecentlyorganisedtripartitenegotiationsbetweenRussia, resolving conflictsby politicalmeans.PresidentMedvedev hasalready proposedreviving talks which startedin April 2008. and Voronin which indicatesthatthepeaceprocessisfurthermoving towards isolatingthe West. devolution. Furthermore,on20March ajointdeclaration was signedby PresidentsMedvedev, Smirnov and itwould bepossibletoenvisage aninstitutionaldesignbased,forexample,ontheUKmodelof If thiswereachieved, thenRussia’s oppositionto Transnistria acquiringconfederal statusmightalsosoften negotiation process,such asa2+2–EU/Russia+Moldova/Transnistria –framework. current 5+2format–Moldova/Transnistria/OSCE/Russia/Ukraine +EU/US–orany otherfuture guarantee andacceptanceifthesettlementwas co-signedby theexternalactorsinvolved inthe incorporate thecountry’s neutrality intothepreamble. This couldacquireaquasi-international Technically, asettlementcouldincludecommitmentby Moldova toamenditsconstitution It isunclearifRussiawillsucceedinestablishingtheseconditionsaspartofafinalsettlement. could steerthenegotiationsviaPresidentSmirnov, whose positionandstanceitlargelycontrols. latter would guarantee afinalsolutionwhich takesintoaccountRussia’s interestsinMoldova, asMoscow 39 international recognitionofMoldova’s neutrality andaresumptionofthe Voronin-Smirnov 38 40 The formerwould secureMoldova’s non-accessiontoNATO, andthe A prevented thisdeployment. Russian militarypresenceasthebestguarantor oftheirinterests, Azerbaijan was vehemently opposedand conflicts inGeorgiaandMoldova. While Armenia andNagorno-Karabakh welcomedthis,astheysaw a on thepartiestoconflictandwhich couldsubsequentlybeusedasabargainingchip, asinthe believing thatthiswould enableittomaintainafootholdintheregionfromwhich itcouldputpressure in 1994. At thetime,Moscow pushedhardtohave Russianpeace-keepersinNagorno-Karabakh, Moscow’s morelimitedinfluenceover Azerbaijan hasbeenapparentsincetheRussian-brokeredceasefire Currently, thereare2,500Russianmilitarypersonnelstationedin Armenia. a 25-year leaseanda1997friendshiptreatyprovides formutualassistanceintheevent ofamilitarythreat. Militarily, Russia’s positionin Armenia isrelatively secure. A 1995treatygranted itsmilitarybasein Armenia succeeded, Russiawould have secureda shoulder andthatitwould beinshortanddirectrange ofknown Iranian missiles.HadMoscow’s initiative Shield onthe Alliance’s easternperimeter, given thattheUSwould notwant Russialookingover its the stationwithUSandNATO inexchange fortheUSabandoningitsplansaMissileDefence Russia’s leverage over Azerbaijan, especiallyastheUShasrejectedRussianplanstoshareuseof directly linkedtothepresident’s ‘nuclearsuitcase’. The needtonegotiateanewleasefurtherweakens era. IthasasignificantplaceinRussia’s airdefenceandearly warning systems,andisbelieved tobe Gabala isstrategically locatedinthenorth-westof Azerbaijan andwas constructedduringtheSoviet Station, which Moscow isleasingfromBakuuntil2012. it was considered partofRussia’s ‘backyard’ throughoutthe firsthalfofthe1990s. dependent onstabilityinGeorgia, acountryinwhich theUShasnow established aninterest,although control over Caspianhydrocarbon resources. The securityofthepipeline,however, remainedcrucially supply linestoworld marketsand thusdiversifying suppliesandlimitingRussia’s (and potentiallyIran’s) The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC)pipelineserves majorUS(and Turkish) interests by providing alternative US engagementintheSouthCaucasusreflects American energyandsecurityinterests. United States stability totheregion. clearly benefitsfromimproved relationsbetween Armenia and Azerbaijan, notleastbecauseitbrings other) solutionthatmightviolateRussianinterests.Inthe newpost-August 2008environment, Moscow position intheregionanditsmilitaryprowess. Itwants todeterbothsidesfromseekingamilitary(orany is seekingtocapitaliseonthepoliticalimpactofitsincursion intoGeorgiaby underscoringitshegemonic wants tobeinthedriving seatinresolvingtheNagorno-Karabakh conflict. There isnodoubttheKremlin President Medvedev’s ‘Karabakh’ Summitinthewake ofthewar inGeorgiawas aclearsignalthatRussia via Turkey, isstillstrugglingtosecurebothfinancingandconcretegassources. in place,while the West’s plannedNabuccopipeline,which would bringgasfromtheCaspiantoEU to buyallthegasfromShahDenizIIfieldatabove marketrate. The infrastructure forthisisalready a very temptingofferfor Azerbaijan, particularlyasMoscow hasalready offeredBakuanexceptionaldeal membership, andmay wellwant tolinkthiswithadealonCaspiangasfrom Azerbaijan. This couldbe At thevery least,Russiamay insistonguarantees thatneither Azerbaijan nor Armenia willpursueNATO difficult (asituationwhich was exacerbatedby thewar inGeorgia). to the West andmadethecreationofnewenergy-exportingtransport corridorstoEuropemore and proactive engagement–hassuitedRussiawell,asitprevented theregionfrommoving tooclose Maintenance ofthe quasi-international agreement. de facto de Russian militarypresencein Azerbaijan remains,however, intheformofGabalaRadar status quo quo status in Nagorno-Karabakh –andtheinternationalcommunity’s lack ofserious de facto de military presencein Azerbaijan onthebasisofa

29 April 2009 Georgia

With the beginning of the global ‘war on terror’, the region’s strategic location in relation to Afghanistan, April 2009 Iraq, and the Middle East pushed it up the US security agenda. The US needed to use the airspace of all three South Caucasus countries, and swiftly established two joint US-Turkish airbases in Georgia.

In 2002, as part of efforts to widen the coalition of countries supporting the US-led war on terror, Washington established the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP), with funding worth $64 million. This was designed to increase the capabilities of Georgia’s armed forces by training and equipping four 600-strong battalions of the Georgian army, plus some additional troops and border guards, under the command of the ministry of the interior. This was followed by the Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations Program (Georgia SSOP), tied more specifically to Georgian troop deployments in Iraq and with an additional $60 million in military US assistance in 2005/6.41

While Washington’s sustained commitment to Georgia has had a significant impact on the country’s economic performance, especially since 2004, and has arguably contributed to a number of social and political reforms, it has also exacerbated Georgia-Russia tensions, especially because of US support for – if not encouragement of – Georgia’s aspirations to join NATO.

While US policy in the early 1990s acknowledged Russia’s claims that Georgia (and other ex-Soviet republics) should be respected as part of its zone of influence, US military and energy security interests over the last decade have turned the South Caucasus into something of a battleground for regional influence.

In the context of generally worsening relations between Russia and the West (stalling cooperation with NATO, Western support for Kosovo’s independence, US plans to establish a missile defence shield in Eastern Europe, etc.), a perceived US agenda to press ahead with Georgia’s NATO membership bid at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008 contributed to the outbreak of violence in South Ossetia over the summer.

Transnistria

The United States has officially declared that it supports Moldova’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and will contribute to finding a credible and sustainable negotiated solution to the conflict.

To this end, the US, together with the EU, became an observer to the OSCE 5+2 negotiations’ framework in October 2005. While the US may not have played an overtly active role in attempts to resolve the conflict, the head of the OSCE mission in Chisinau, Moldova, has always been a seasoned American diplomat conscious of US geostrategic interests. The current mission head is Philip Remler, whose career spans two decades in the US State Department and who was previously a senior advisor to the US Ambassador to Moscow.

Nagorno-Karabakh

At the time of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan had no diplomatic representation in Washington and was an unknown country in an unknown part of the world. Armenia, in contrast, had a well-established and highly effective diaspora community in the US which significantly shaped American actions during and after the conflict.

Indeed, the US has the most damaged reputation of any country post the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. First because of sanctions against Azerbaijan under Section 907a of the Freedom Support Act (see below) and second because many Azerbaijanis see US humanitarian assistance to Nagorno-Karabakh as political support for the break-away region.42

Section 907a of the Freedom of Support Act – which cited Azerbaijan as the aggressor in the conflict – was passed in US Congress in 1992 and prohibits any kind of direct US government assistance to the Azerbaijan government. Successive US Presidents (Bush I, Clinton & Bush II) denounced it, but none was able to get

30 Congress to repeal it. It was finally waived (but not repealed) on a year-by-year basis after the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks, when the US recognised Azerbaijan’s importance in the war against terrorism. This finally allowed Washington to extend assistance, including military aid, to Baku. Yet the need for an annual decision causes frustration in Azerbaijan, as Baku feels it needs to toe the US line in order to get it April 2009 renewed every year.

Moreover, US efforts to mediate between both countries and facilitate a settlement in the early 1990s bore no fruit, primarily because the Armenian/Nagorno-Karabakh side rejected the proposed model of autonomy (used in the Åland Islands in Finland and the South Tyrol in Austria) for Nagorno-Karabakh within Azerbaijan.

As one of three co-chairs of the Minsk Group, the US has remained permanently, if similarly unsuccessfully, engaged in the conflict settlement process. The reason for continued US engagement lies in the geostrategic importance of the South Caucasus as a crucial land bridge between the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea. As such, it is an important transit corridor for oil and gas, as well as for illicit goods (drugs and arms) and human trafficking. Azerbaijan is also significant because of its hydrocarbon wealth (and thus a market for US investors) and its strategic location neighbouring both Russia and Iran.

Turkey

Turkey’s role as an external actor in these conflicts is primarily limited to Nagorno-Karabakh.

As a direct neighbour of the South Caucasus, Turkey has a long history in the region and has a significant role to play in ensuring its stability. However, until the Russia-Georgia conflict, Turkey had adopted a somewhat complacent policy, even contributing to the instability itself via its closed-border policy and frozen diplomacy with neighbouring Armenia. However, the August events acted as a wake-up call for Ankara, which realised that unless something was done quickly, the region could be ‘lost’ in a short time. Not only did Turkey lose financial revenues due to the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline being briefly off-line, it also found itself, as a NATO ally, in the unenviable situation of having to act as the gatekeeper for the Black Sea during the conflict.

Given that the region is in Turkey’s ‘backyard’, Ankara does not want to see it spiralling into increased instability and chaos. Turkey also has big plans for itself as a regional player, including as an energy and transport hub – all of which require stability. Ankara quickly proposed a new diplomatic initiative,43 ‘The Platform of Stability and Cooperation in the Caucasus’, involving Azerbaijan, Russia, Georgia, Turkey and Armenia. One of its main goals is to prompt solutions to the dispute between Armenia and Turkey and to the territorial conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Relations between Ankara and Armenia have been difficult, at best, not only because of Nagorno-Karabakh and Turkish support for the Azerbaijani position but also because of a long-standing dispute over whether the mass violence against (and displacement of) Armenians in 1915 constitutes genocide. Moreover, Armenia has so far failed to officially recognise Turkey’s eastern border.

However, the climate has improved recently and, following the election of former Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan as Armenian President in March 2008, new diplomatic initiatives have been launched.

The Georgian crisis triggered a rapid acceleration of these efforts, with Turkish President Abdullah Gül making a historic visit to Yerevan for a World Cup football qualifier in September. This visit created a new atmosphere and has resulted in both countries committing themselves to increase their efforts to normalise relations, including opening the border and repairing diplomatic ties, although Armenia in particular has faced opposition from its dispora community which insists Turkey should recognise the 1915 events as genocide before the normalisation of relations.

As Russia now sees itself as having a stronger position in the region as well as increasingly close economic and political ties with Ankara (during a recent visit to Moscow on 12-15 February, agreement

31 was reached on a 15-year energy contract worth $60 billion), the Kremlin does not see a normalisation of Armenian-Turkish relations as a threat and has offered its support. The war in Georgia also underlined Armenia’s isolation and vulnerability due to its closed borders, as Armenia lost at least $500 million when April 2009 cross-border trade was halted after the Grakali railway bridge in Georgia was blown up.

There has been further shuttle diplomacy since President Gül’s visit to Armenia, with Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan meeting his Armenian counterpart Edward Nalbandian at least half a dozen times culminating in the issuing of a joint statement by the two foreign ministers on 22 April 2009 announcing the launch of a comprehensive framework for the normalisation of bilateral relations.

Future developments both vis-à-vis Turkey’s rapprochement with Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will also be influenced, to some degree, by US policy, given that the powerful Armenian lobby in the US will continue to press President Barack Obama to follow through on his election promises to recognise the ‘Armenian genocide’. The effect of this would be catastrophic. However, during President Obama’s visit to Turkey on 6-7 April, he expressed belief that this was an issue for Turkey and Armenia to resolve bilaterally and, since being elected has refrained from using the word “genocide”. Rather on 24 April, the traditional Armenian remembrance day, he described the WWI events that occured in Ottoman Anatolia as “one of the greatest atrocities of the 20th Century”. Such a rapprochement would not only be a crucial step towards changing the dynamic between Turkey and Armenia, including making Turkey the only regional power to have good relations with all three Southern Caucasus states, but would also have significant implications for the balance of power in the region.

President Obama is well aware that all of Washington’s key foreign policy challenges (Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and the Middle East) lie in Turkey’s backyard, so it is crucial to repair the damage done under George Bush’s Presidency – which saw support for the US in Turkey plunge to all-time lows. Relations need to re-emerge stronger than ever to allow Washington to take advantage of the increasingly powerful and influential role Turkey is carving out for itself in its direct neighbourhood and beyond.

For example, President Obama’s words of support for Turkey’s EU accession process as well as the crucial role he played in resolving the stand-off between Turkey and NATO over the candidature of Anders Fogh Rasmussen for Secretary General resulted in Turkey boosting its power in NATO. This reaffirmed that the country is becoming an increasingly powerful player and demonstrated to European nations that the US sees Turkey as an increasingly crucial partner. Therefore as long as Turkey and Armenia are seen to be making process Obama should be able to resist pressure from the Armenian lobby.

However, at the same time, Azerbaijan has recently signalled considerable discontent with Turkey’s apparent intention to restore relations with Armenia without obtaining concessions including on Nagorno-Karabakh, with public opinion in both Turkey and Azerbaijan strongly in favour of the Azerbaijani position and the Azerbaijani President paying a visit to Moscow as a reminder of Baku’s other foreign policy options (even though realistically Azerbaijan would probably be unwise to tie itself too closely to Moscow). The strong reaction from Baku came as something of a shock to Ankara which seemed to be under the impression that Azerbaijan was “on board” and has now created problems in the rapprochement strategy. On the one hand Turkey does not want to alienate its neighbour and “kin”, while on the other it would seem counter productive to revert to Turkey’s policy of the last 17 years of insisting on a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict before the normalisation of relations.

While it seems that Turkey is putting itself forward as a possible new interlocutor in the conflict, using its new ‘soft tools’ which have already begun to reap results in the Middle East, yet, as in the past, it was Armenia that denied Turkey a role in the peace process, with Armenian President Sargsyan insisting in October 2008 that the OSCE Minsk Group should remain the sole mediator in the peace process.44

Hence, despite the change in regional dynamics, Turkey has not gained any direct influence over the conflict- settlement process yet, even though the Minsk Group and its co-chairs have repeatedly committed themselves to Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. This reflects an Armenian perception that its interests are better protected

32 undermine any such settlement. an OSCE-negotiatedsettlementin1994),even thoughitisunlikely tobeablepermanentlyblock or settlement oftheconflictthatnegatively affectsGagauzia’s status(asignificantlevel ofautonomy since help themtomaintaintheirethnicidentityformorethanadecade.Hence,itislikelyopposeany Gagauz minorityinthesouthofMoldova asitsethnickinandhasbeeninvolved invarious projectsto Turkish interestsintheconflictover Transnistria areofanentirelydifferentnature. Turkey considersthe Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan –andRussia. that Turkey’s proposalforaPlatformofSecurityandStabilityinCaucasusneedstobeseen,asitinvolves hub throughwhich oilandgasfromtheCaspianreaches Europeanandglobalmarkets.Itisinthiscontext as well.StabilityinGeorgiaiscrucialfor Turkish energysecurityanditscurrentfutureroleasamajor than itsroleintheconflictsGeorgiaandMoldova. Turkey nonethelesshasinterestsintheseconflicts Turkey’s role,however limited,inrelationtotheNagorno-Karabakh conflictisclearlymoresignificant could thenbeofficiallyimplementedthroughtheMinskProcess. players including Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia, andRussiacouldemergetonegotiateacompromisethat settlement processwillabandontheexistingformatfornegotiations,inlongertermacoalitionof deadlock. Even thoughitisunlikelythatany ofthepartiesinconflictoritsOSCE-institutionalised pressure toreach adealwith Armenia. This, however, condemnstheMinskProcessto continued to ‘sell’thenecessaryconcessionsitsown population, Azerbaijan doesnotcurrentlyfeelunderany While Turkish supportforany settlementcouldmakeitsignificantlyeasierforthe Azerbaijani leadership severely limiting Turkey’s abilitytoaffectany movement towards abreakthrough inthesettlementprocess. prospect ofany immediateoreven mid-termprogress.Inthissense, Armenia remainsa within anOSCE-ledprocess,perhapspreciselybecausethishasbeendeadlocked forsolongwithlittle status quo status player,

33 April 2009 34

April 2009 has meantthattheEUnot beenabletoplay amoreactive rolebeyond itscurrentobserver statusin whether ornottheyputapremiumonconflict settlement.InthecaseofMoldova, forexample,this Similarly, differentMember States prioritisedifferentcountriesinways, andthisdetermines war –where MemberStatesstartfromvery differentperceptions of,andresponsesto,Russia. is difficultatthebestoftimes,andclosetoimpossiblewhen itcomestoacaseliketheRussia-Georgia EU institutionsanditsMemberStates.Reaching commonpositionsamong27countrieswithdiverging interests The Union’s conflictresolution effortshave been furtherconstrained by thecomplexrelationshipbetween as each MemberStatetendstofocusonissues closetotheirdomesticandgeographical priorities. The EU’s rotatingPresidency, however, oftenleadstoalack ofconsistency andcoherenceinEUpriorities, minimal, toensureswift EUaction. internally, itensuredthataconsensuscouldbefoundamong theUnion’s 27MemberStates,however dealing withanon-hostilepeer(ascomparedto,for example, oneofthenewEUmembers);and was helpful,asithadconsiderable resources thatitcouldbringtobear. Externally, Russiafeltitwas between thewarring parties.Clearly, thegreaterweightofFrance ininternationalandEuropeanaffairs summer of2008duringtheRussia-Georgiawar andakeyplayer inbringingaboutaceasefireagreement French PresidentNicolas Sarkozy actedasahighlyvisiblerepresentative oftheEUPresidency inthe activism, skill,determination,andvisionofparticularindividuals. what thisisandwhat concreteaimsandoutcomesarebeingpursued.Much thereforedependsonthe Council officialsacknowledge theirmorepoliticalrole,butalsoshy away fromclearlydefining exactly either general termsorforspecificconflicts. negotiations ormediatebetweentheparties),thereisnocommonly-agreedconflict-resolutionstrategy in they generally acknowledge thatCouncilbodiesplay amorepoliticalrole(i.e.actively facilitate financial andtechnical assistance,aimedatcreatingconditionsconducive toconflictsettlement. While Commission officialsgenerally seetheirinstitution’s roleas confinedtoproviding aidandoffering is where thecurrentinstitutionalframework hampersprogress. However, thebulkofEU’s conflictresolutionwork isdoneby theCouncilandCommission,this debates onforeignaffairs. Commission andCouncilofficialsattendcontributetoparliamentarycommitteehearings taken anactive interestineitherparticularconflictsorspecificaspectsofEUconflictresolution,and The EuropeanParliament hasrelatively limitedimpactasaninstitution,althoughanumberofMEPshave responsible forforeignaffairs–above allDGExternalRelations–andtheEUDelegationsonground. Committee, andtheHighRepresentative; intheEuropeanCommission,various Directorates-General institutions play aroleinconflictresolution:theCouncil,Presidency, thePolitical andSecurity Until theimpasseover theLisbon Treaty causedby Ireland’s ‘No’ vote isresolved, thefollowing EU The limitations of EUconflict-resolution bodies and itsconflict-resolutioninstrumentshave played. over thepast15ormoreyears, thereareanumberofissuesrelatingtotherolethatEUinstitutions While itisclearthattheEUalonecannotbeblamedforlack ofprogressinresolvingtheseconflicts intensity andintermsoftheresources committed. Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia andSouthOssetia(see Annex 3),althoughthesehave varied inlength, The EUhasmadeconsiderable effortstoachieve asettlementoftheconflictsin andover Transnistria, V. Therole of theEU French EUPresidency when PresidentSarkozyinsisted on,andpushedthrough,theappointmentofa In contrast, hisSouthCaucasuscounterpart Peter Semneby’s positionwas critically underminedby the diplomats, andnow commandsrespect onallsides. region ofMoldova) andthewiderregionby constructively engagingwithUkrainian, Russian,andOSCE politics. For example,hehelpedtobrokeradealbetweenrival factionsinGagauzia(aformerlyseparatist resolve the Transnistrian conflict,buthasnever lostsightofthemuch broaderpictureofMoldovan EU SpecialRepresentative forMoldova KalmanMizseihasbeen very actively engagedinhelpingto track recordismixed. EU SpecialRepresentatives aretheotherinstrumentwidelyusedforconflictsettlement.Here,too, incentives its dependency onRussiaintermsofbothsupplyandtransit. Clearly, undertheseconditions,the wealth anditsabilitytoplay ontheEU’s declaredintentiontodiversify itsenergysuppliesanddecrease officials alikesay thatconditionalitysimplydoesnotwork inthiscase,given Azerbaijan’s hydrocarbon Despite theseeminglyhighranking ofconflictsettlementinthe Azerbaijan AP, CommissionandCouncil areas foraction. number onepriority, while the AP with Armenia liststhisastheseventh outofalisteightpriority partner country. Thus the AP with Azerbaijan mentionssettlingtheNagorno-Karabakh conflictasthe available topartnercountries.Moreover, APs have tobebasedonaconsensusbetweentheEUand lack thekindofspecificitynecessarytotiethemcrediblyincentives thatareonlyconditionally Even where theseplansdomakespecificreferencetoconflictsettlement,theyareoftenvague and Several problems alsopersistwiththeENP Action Plans(APs)intheUnion’s EasternNeighbourhood. law). However, theuseofconditionalityinconflictmanagement has,atbest,amixedtrack record. conflict partiesinlinewiththeUnion’s normsandvalues (e.g.democracy, human rights,andtheruleof included localconflict-resolutioninitiatives andthemoregeneral andlonger-term processof‘socialising’ and politicalbenefitssubjecttothefulfilmentofconditions,inawhole range ofareas. These have relationships, basedonareward systemdelivering financialandtechnical assistanceandothereconomic Through instrumentssuch asitsEuropeanNeighbourhoodPolicy, theEUhasalsousedcontractual EIDHR). the framework ofEuropeanInitiative forDefenceandHumanRights– civilian, policeandmilitaryoperations, andsupportforcivil societyandotherdemocratisation projects(under Joint Actions, CommonStrategies, CommonPositions, EUSpecialRepresentatives, economicsanctions,ESDP Policy (ESDP),theEUhasdeveloped arange ofinstrumentsthatitcandeploy. These includeJoint Statements, Since thecreationofCommonForeign andSecurity Policy (CFSP)andEuropeanSecurityDefence The limitations of EUconflict-resolution tools in conflictanalysis,which furtheraddstotheEU’s relatively under-developed earlywarning capacity. representatives onthegroundandstaffinnationalembassiesrarely, ifever, have any specialisttraining The majorproblemremainsthelack ofanintegrated EUforeignpolicy structure.Inaddition,EU conflict-settlement process),coordinationhasimproved agreatdealsinceautumn2008. even inthecaseofMoldova (where theywereasignificantobstacletotheEU’s roleinthe Transnistrian with theirown prioritiesandcapabilities.Such problems,however, have beengradually overcome and, ground. Moreover, most MemberStatesnormallyhave theirown embassiesinthecountriesconcerned, Brussels, betweenthemandtheirlocalrepresentatives, andbetweendifferentrepresentatives onthe Another –oftenbemoanedissueisthelack ofcoordinationbetweenofficialsintheEUinstitutions in more promisingforreaching adurable settlement. the 5+2talkson Transnistria, even thougha2+2format(EU/Russia+Moldova/Transnistria) would befar potentially offered by theENParehardlyattractive tothe Azerbaijan leadership.

35 April 2009 36

April 2009 complicated operations ontheground. created unnecessaryoverlaps ofmandatesandcompetences,stretched existingresources and maintain somecontrolover theUnion’s engagementinGeorgiasincetheendofitsEUPresidency, ithas already holdsthepostofSpecialRepresentative forCentral Asia. While thishasallowed France to separate EUSpecialRepresentative forthecrisisinGeorgia– Ambassador PierreMorel,who incidentally I I I The formulationandimplementationofthisstrategy needstobebasedon: relations withthecountriesconcernedandinEUdealingsotherplayers ineach conflict. mainstreamed intoallaspectsofexternalrelations’policy andisimplementedeffectively inbilateral Resolution Strategy’ thatalltheEUinstitutionsandMember Statesembrace, which isintegrated and What isneededacoherentandcomprehensive ‘EasternNeighbourhoodConflictPrevention and engage inproactive andeffective conflictprevention, managementandsettlementinthisregion. fundamentally reactive player, withoutthepoliticalwill,clearstrategic visionandadequatecapacityto the whole EasternNeighbourhood,andthisprocessisfarfromcomplete. Too often,theUnionremainsa The EUhasonlygradually developed theappropriatetoolsandpoliticalwilltoplay agreaterroleacross of transnational organisedcrime. the threatsfromillegalarmstrading, drugssmuggling,humantrafficking, moneylaundering,andotherforms investments inoilandgasinfrastructure, andthesuppliesthemselves. Greaterstabilitywould alsoalleviate needs tobeovercome. Serious,effective effortstostabilisetheregionwould ensurethesecurityof decrease itsdependenceonRussia,theinstabilitythathasmarkedSouthCaucasusover thepast15years If the West, andparticularlytheEU,planstodevelop newenergycorridors,diversify supplysources and the lineswhich arevery exposedandvulnerable toattack. European andglobalmarkets.Furthermore,in Azerbaijan, therearepumpingstationsalongthelengthof the Baku-Tbilisi-CeyhanpipelinethatconnectsCaspianoilfields(viaonlynon-Russianroute)to The ceasefirelineinGeorgiaandtheofcontactNagorno-Karabakh areamere15kilometresfrom great geostrategic significanceshoulddoso. proactive approach, broaderandmorematerialconsiderations aboutstabilityandsecurityinaregionof If thehumantragedy ofwar aloneisnotenoughtopropeltheinternationalcommunityintoamore during summer2008. violent outbreaksandpoliticalescalationthatoccurredintheconflictsSouthOssetia Abkhazia is clearlynotanoption. These conflictsrequireconstantandactive managementtoprevent thekindof Moreover, even where asettlementmay notbefeasibleintheshort-oreven mid-term,‘benignneglect’ so-called ‘frozen’conflicts. and prevent conflictsintheSouthCaucasus,andunderscoredneedforrenewedeffortstoresolve The Russia-Georgiawar of August 2008revealed thedangersinherentinfutileinternationaleffortstosettle Conclusions to theconflict(and,where applicable, thirdparties)iftheEUtakesparticularstepstohelp settletheconflicts. settlement process. They shouldalsoprovide information aboutthebenefitsthatwould accruetotheparties attainable, outcomeineach case, tobepresentedthepartiesasbasisforan EU-ledorco-led These fourroadmapsshouldmakeitclearwhat the EUconsiderstobeajustandequitable,aswell become involved inaparticularway andlevel ofintensity. resolving each conflict,andwhat those involved andthirdpartiesneedto(ormustnot)dofortheEU Neighbourhood needstobeestablished. These shoulddetailwhat the EUiswillingtocontribute On thebasisofthisstrategy, aspecificactionplanorroadmapforeach ofthefourconflictsinEastern these strengthscanbestbeleveraged. an assessmentofEUstrengthsinfurtheringeffective conflictprevention andsettlement,ofhow help resolve theseconflicts; a coherentstrategy commontoallMemberStatesandEUinstitutionsforinteracting withRussiato a betterdefinitionofEUinterestsinitsEasternNeighbourhood;

37 April 2009 For such a sequence of individual actions to succeed in each conflict, the EU needs:

1. To determine the relevant players, make a detailed assessment of their interests and capabilities, and April 2009 build as broad a coalition as possible to support the conflict settlement process. 2. To develop a strategy for each conflict that includes options for incentives (where appropriate) and sanctions (where necessary) to influence these actors in contributing to conflict settlement, and to make it clear under what conditions these become applicable or will cease to be applied; and 3. To define the EU’s potential exit points in the settlement process if progress towards success becomes impossible or the costs of succeeding outweigh the benefits.

Such road maps should be guided by a number of basic principles:

The primacy of negotiated solutions over imposed settlements

The outcome of negotiations should not be prejudged. The EU should not facilitate negotiations or mediate between different parties with a preconceived notion of the kind of settlement to be achieved. Instead, it should determine the space for compromise based on careful reflection, after consultation with the key parties, on what is feasible and attainable.

As part of the facilitation and mediation process, the EU needs to provide sufficient resources to sustain what might be a long-drawn-out negotiating process. It also needs to be ready to provide the leadership and necessary technical expertise to help the parties craft a settlement that addresses their concerns and wins sufficient popular support, and for which the countries have or will be given the resources required to implement it.

During the negotiating process, it should be left to the EU officials most closely involved to judge when it is opportune to present more concrete proposals to help the parties to the conflict overcome a momentary impasse or longer-term deadlock. Where the EU co-leads settlement efforts, such proposals should be developed and tabled jointly with its partners.

Inclusiveness of negotiations

A fundamental lesson of conflict-settlement processes around the world is that all relevant parties need to be included in negotiations leading to sustainable solutions. This does not imply that inclusion should be unconditional – rather, and at a minimum, that parties to the conflict should prove their sincerity of engagement in negotiations by committing permanently to non-violence.

At the same time, and in line with a non-prejudicial approach to negotiations, it may be counter-productive if conflict parties are made to accept certain parameters for a settlement in advance, as this is likely to undermine the crucial domestic support that is essential to deliver all the relevant constituencies in the settlement process.

Comprehensiveness of agreements

While the four conflicts in the Eastern Neighbourhood are, on the surface, about mutually-incompatible territorial claims, it will not be possible to reach durable settlements if they are merely based on a compromise between demands for secession and territorial integrity.

Rather, evidence from a wide range of other settlements suggests that as well as designing political institutions that can accommodate demands for self-governance, security, economic, and cultural concerns also need to be addressed as part of a comprehensive package that rewards trade-offs in one area with concessions in another.

Moreover, given the number of parties involved in each of the conflicts and their complex relationships with one another, it may prove necessary to strike a wider bargain that satisfies the interests of

38 external parties which would otherwise be able to prevent a settlement altogether or to undermine its long-term stability.

To achieve such comprehensive settlements requires a great deal of technical expertise in each of its April 2009 individual component areas, as well as an overall vision – and leadership – of the package as a whole. This also necessitates helping the immediate local conflict parties with capacity-building, so they can develop a broader and longer-term vision that reaches beyond signing a particular agreement.

Need for long-term external assistance

Comprehensive settlements for each of the four current conflicts must be seen as long-term projects of state- and nation-building in situations in which sufficient necessary human and material resources are unlikely to be available. Under these circumstances, EU leadership in conflict-settlement processes will add value and increase the likelihood of success, if its assistance goes beyond just helping to conclude settlement agreements.

The EU has – or is developing – capabilities and the political will to contribute to providing post-agreement security guarantees, boosting economic development, and helping with institutional capacity-building and training. These capacities need to be made available, but should be tied to the local actors fulfilling concrete and clearly defined conditions. This will thus become a logical extension of the EU’s phased engagement strategy from day one of its involvement in a particular conflict-settlement process.

The EU also has to assist local parties in countering potential domestic ‘spoilers’ and take responsibility for preventing external spoilers from undermining the long-term stability of any settlements achieved.

39 Annex 1: Historical background

Georgia April 2009

The conflicts related to the two separatist regions in Georgia – Abkhazia and South Ossetia – have their origins in Soviet and pre-Soviet politics in the (South) Caucasus. In total, more than 80 ethnic groups live in Georgia, the largest, and politically most significant being Georgians, Armenians, Russians, Abkhaz and South Ossetians.45

Since 1988 and before August 2008, Georgia experienced two violent ethnic conflicts, as well as a short two-phase civil war.46 The former were essentially the result of increasingly aggressive Georgian nationalism during, and after, the dying days of the Soviet Union, while the latter took place between different political factions struggling to control the Georgian state.

Both Abkhazia and South Ossetia enjoyed substantial autonomy throughout the Soviet era. Even though the populations of both regions were ethnically mixed, it was not until Georgian nationalism intensified from the late-1980s onwards that tensions emerged. The nationalist movement in Georgia became further radicalised after Soviet troops crushed a demonstration in April 1989.

Calls for independence, the legal proclamation of Georgian as the only official language in August 1989, and the Georgian referendum on independence and subsequent election of nationalist leader Zviad Gamsakhurdia in May 1991, provided the background against which these tensions escalated into full- scale violent conflict.

Abkhaz and South Ossetians wanted to preserve, and remain within, the Soviet Union as they considered that their survival as ethno-cultural communities distinct from the Georgian majority was in acute danger in an independent Georgian state.47

South Ossetia

South Ossetians belong to the same ethnic group as the people of North Ossetia (now an autonomous republic of Russia which is considered to be the indigenous homeland of Ossetians). A (South) Ossetian presence in contemporary Georgia only dates back a few hundred years48 and is often used by Georgian nationalists to dispute South Ossetians’ rights to the territory in which they live.

In 1989, South Ossetians made up just over two-thirds of their autonomous region’s population – roughly 65,000 out of a population of 98,000. Yet, at that time, there were around another 100,000 Ossetians in other regions of Georgia. Tensions rose in the last years of the Soviet Union and first escalated into a full-scale conflict between November 1989 and January 1990. Prompted by the ‘March on Tskhinvali’ (the South Ossetian capital) by between 20,000 and 30,000 Georgian nationalists that August, supposedly to protect the city’s Georgian population, the ensuing violence left six people dead and 140 injured.

Subsequently, South Ossetians not only boycotted the political process in Georgia, including the September 1990 elections, but also declared their region’s independence. At the same time Georgians effectively abolished South Ossetia’s autonomy with the proclamation of Georgia as an independent, unitary state with no internal borders.

Tbilisi initially responded with an economic blockade, but 1991 saw a significant escalation of hostilities, leading to the Georgian occupation of South Ossetia’s capital. On several occasions in March, June and September that year, the nationalist leader Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who tried to use South Ossetia to strengthen his own grip on power in Georgia, failed to restore full Georgian control over South Ossetia in the face of well-organised, highly-motivated and Russian-backed resistance.

The conflict lingered on for another year, but with the fall of Mr Gamsakhurdia in December 1991 and former Soviet Foreign Minister Edvard Shevardnadse’s assent to the Georgian presidency in March 1992,49

40 it took only one final defeat of Georgian forces to pave the way for the OSCE-mediated Sochi Agreement of June 1992, which established a permanent ceasefire and a military exclusion zone. This was followed by the deployment of an OSCE Observer Mission and a Russia-led Commonwealth of Independent States’ peacekeeping force, as well as the creation of the so-called Joint Control Commission, intended to April 2009 facilitate cooperation between the sides on a day-to-day basis.

This arrangement worked relatively well during Edvard Shevardnadse’s presidencies, driven primarily by pragmatic considerations that benefited all sides, as accepting the status quo resulted in relative stability. However Mikhail Saakashvili’s rise to power in 2003 changed this configuration significantly, as the new president had made restoring full sovereignty across the entire territory of Georgia a key campaign promise. Mr Saakashvili’s success in reining in the Georgian region of Adjara in April 2004 emboldened him to move on to South Ossetia that summer, under the pretext of abolishing the Ergneti market that spanned the Georgia and South Ossetian borders.

While there is little doubt that trading on this market was connected to smuggling, it also presented one of the few opportunities for direct interaction between Georgians and South Ossetians. The violence while this market operated and after it was closed destroyed much of the confidence built between both sides and threw the peace talks into jeopardy. In fact, violence was so bad in early August that a formal ceasefire was agreed between Georgian and South Ossetian authorities, only to be broken within days.

Violence continued through much of the summer, with Georgia making some strategic gains but eventually withdrawing its military forces and agreeing a further round of formal demilitarisation measures with South Ossetia in Sochi in November. Nonetheless, the 2004 events contributed to further polarising and radicalising all sides, which increased the frequency and intensity of clashes along the ceasefire line up until the full-scale war in August 2008.

Around 1,000 people were killed during the conflict in South Ossetia, with a further 100,000 forced to flee and extensive damage to homes and infrastructure.50 As well as the ethnic Georgians and South Ossetians who left the region for Georgia proper and North Ossetia, respectively, a very large number of South Ossetians were driven from their homes in Georgia proper. Within South Ossetia, segregation between the two communities increased significantly, with members of each ethnic group taking refuge in the areas controlled by ‘their’ side.

Abkhazia

The Stalinist era saw the persecution and destruction of the Abkhaz population in Georgia’s political and cultural elites. From the late 1930s to the early 1950s, there was a massive Georgian influx into Abkhazia, reducing the proportion of ethnic Abkhaz among the resident population to around one-third. By 1989, this had declined to below 18%. This ‘Georgianisation’ policy continued after the Stalin years, triggering several short spells of violence in 1957, 1967, 1978 and 1981. The resurgence of Georgian nationalism under Georgia’s first post-independence leader, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, could not but be seen as a precursor of worse things to come by the Abkhaz, leading them to conclude that establishing their own state was all the more necessary to ensure their ethnic survival.

Following Georgia’s declaration of independence in 1991, and the simultaneous abolition of Abkhazia’s autonomy, the Abkhaz immediately reinstated their 1925 Constitution, defining the territory as an independent state united with Georgia on the basis of a special union treaty. They then declared that they wanted to leave Georgia and remain part of the Soviet Union/Russian Federation. This situation quickly escalated into open violence, with Georgian forces taking over the Gali region in August 1992 and cutting Abkhazia off from Russia on the pre-text of alleged abductions of Georgians by supporters of Zviad Gamsakhurdia. He was then ousted by three Georgian warlords in a coup in December 1991, and Edvard Shevardnadse, a Georgian native, was subsequently asked to lead the country through this difficult period.

41 As a result of Georgian advances, the Abkhaz leadership was forced to retreat from Sukhumi, but immediately regrouped and organised guerrilla-style resistance. Backed by North Caucasian (in particular Chechen) fighters, as well as Russian air support, the Abkhaz quickly recaptured most of the territory April 2009 initially lost, and Georgian control was reduced to the Kodori Gorge (a Georgian-held area in Abkhazia) and Gali. Ceasefires were agreed and broken time and again until May 1994, when the Moscow Agreement established a permanent ceasefire line with military exclusion zones on either side.

In parallel, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 854 establishing the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). The Russia-dominated CIS also dispatched a peacekeeping force to the region. Since then, violations have been rare, even though the general security situation, especially in the Kodori Gorge, deteriorated sharply in 1998, 2001, 2006, and 2008, bringing both sides to the brink of a new war. Around 10,000 people in total are believed to have been killed in the fighting, and around a quarter of a million Georgians have been displaced from Abkhazia.

Transnistria

The conflict between Moldova and Transnistria has its roots in territorial disputes between the Soviet Union and Romania. Following the disintegration of the Russian Empire in 1918, Moldova – which had been under Russian control since 1812 under the name Bessarabia – declared its independence and decided to merge with Romania. However, the Soviet Union opposed this and separated a narrow strip of land on the left bank of the river Nistru/Dniestr from the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. This small region, which now corresponds to Transnistria, was named the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic by the Soviet authorities, which thereby claimed their right over the whole of Moldova.

The 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact brought Moldova back into Soviet control, and it was proclaimed the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) after merging with Transnistria. During the Second World War, Romania reconquered Moldova, but lost the province again in 1944. In 1947, Romania was obliged to recognise the formal incorporation of Moldova into the Soviet Union.51

The Moldovan SSR became the subject of a systematic policy of Russification. Part of this policy was to strictly isolate the country from the Romanian cultural sphere and to impose the use of the Cyrillic alphabet for the Romanian language.52 In the wake of Perestroika, a Popular Front began to emerge in Moldova, calling for the reintroduction of the Latin alphabet and the recognition of Romanian as the official language. Since 1990, some of this Front‘s radical elements have demanded reunification with Romania.53

Rising Moldovan nationalism has led to fears among Transnistria’s Slavic population, (some 60% of the total)54 that its formerly priviliged status would diminish to that of second-class citizens in an independent Moldova, in which Moldovan would be the official language. Even worse, possible reunification of Moldova with Romania would turn this Slavic population into a nearly negligible minority of 3%.

Moreover, the communist elites of Transnistria (a heavily industrialised region compared to the rest of Moldova), feeling that their economic and political interests and privileges were in jeopardy, preferred to stay within the structures of a disintegrating Soviet Union. Believing that they had the support of the Slavic population, they proclaimed the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic on 2 September 1990.

As a result of Moldova’s Declaration of Independence, and its subsequent recognition by the international community in March 1992, an armed struggle erupted, as Transnistria was now determined to gain independence by military means and become a unit of the Russian Federation.55 However, this violence was quickly contained after Moldova and Russia signed an agreement in July 1992 establishing a tripartite peacekeeping force comprising Russian, Moldovan and Transnistrian troops. But this agreement also meant the withdrawal of Moldovan forces from Transnistria and left the territory under the effective control of the Transnistrian authorities, backed by the Russian 14th Army.

42 Shortly afterwards, the parties involved invited the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to lead negotiations on a final status for Transnistria, and the OSCE established a five-sided format with Moldova and Transnistria as the two conflict parties and the OSCE, Russia and Ukraine as the mediators.56 Despite the many proposals that have been put forward for a final status settlement under this April 2009 framework, the situation remains deadlocked as all of them have been vetoed by one party or another and so far none has even been accepted as a basis for further negotiations.

Nagorno-Karabakh

Since the 11th century, Nagorno-Karabakh – a mountainous region of South Western Azerbaijan – has been part of one empire or another: Georgian, Mongol, Turkish, Persian, Russian and finally Soviet, and the question of whose land it is has been argued over for the decades.

Armenia’s historical claim to Nagorno-Karabakh dates back to Armenian Orthodox churches in the 4th Century and to a unique Artsakh civilisation founded even earlier, while Azerbaijanis claim to be the direct descendents of the Caucasian Albanians, who also inhabited Nagorno-Karabakh. National identity in both Armenia and Azerbaijan is thus based to a large extent on the notion that Nagorno-Karabakh is an essential and indivisible part of their own history and country.

After the collapse of the Russian Empire, Nagorno-Karabakh became the object of a bitter dispute and armed confrontation between the newly formed Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic. In 1920, Soviet forces occupied the Southern Caucasus and established a military presence in the disputed territory, and in June 1921, Armenia declared Nagorno-Karabakh an inalienable part of its territory.

Throughout the Soviet era, Moscow always sided with Baku on the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh’s territorial status, and in 1923 the Soviet government made Nagorno-Karabakh an autonomous region within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. This ignored earlier assurances given to Armenia, based on the demographic argument that 90% of Nagorno-Karabakh's population was ethnic Armenian, that it would receive the territory.

Consequently, Armenian resentment simmered until the beginning of the disintegration of the USSR, when Perestroika and Glasnost opened up greater opportunities for the expression and organisation of ethno-nationalist sentiment. In February 1988, Nagorno-Karabakh’s local assembly passed a resolution requesting that it be transferred from Azerbaijan to Armenia, thereby triggering a series of events that culminated in the first inter-ethnic war of the Gorbachev era.

As the collapse of the Soviet Union became ever more apparent and the country was finally formally dissolved in December 1991, Nagorno-Karabakh’s ethnic Armenian population organised a local referendum, boycotted by local Azerbaijanis, in which they voted for the establishment of an independent state – the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. A Supreme Soviet of Nagorno-Karabakh was elected and, soon after Azerbaijan's own independence from the Soviet Union in late 1991, Armenian separatists took control of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Full-scale war in Nagorno-Karabakh and between Armenia and Azerbaijan broke out in February 1992, and by June Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians had expelled virtually all ethnic Azerbaijanis from the area and opened a ‘land-bridge’ to Armenia through the region of Lachin. By the time a Russian-brokered ceasefire was signed in 1994, Armenian forces had captured and occupied seven Azerbaijan provinces – Aghdam, Fizuli, Djabrail, Zangelan, Gubadly, Lachin and Kelbajar – totalling around 15% of Azerbaijan’s territory and created a “buffer zone” around the Lachin corridor between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia.

It is estimated that more than 35,000 people were killed and more than one million, including 600,000 ethnic Azerbaijanis and 300,000 ethnic Armenians, were forced to flee their homes

43 Both Armenia and Azerbaijan paid a high price. After the war, as a sign of its friendship with Baku, Turkey closed its border with Armenia and broke off diplomatic relations. This left Yerevan with closed eastern and western frontiers which had a big impact on the country, including excluding it from developing April 2009 energy pipelines and transport networks. High unemployment led to mass emigration and Yerevan only managed to keep its economy afloat on the basis of large remittances from the diaspora, foreign aid and Russian investment.

Azerbaijan, on the other hand, continues to struggle to transform itself from a planned socialist economy to a market system, not least because Western aid and investment only slowly materialised because of the instability in the region, despite the country’s vast energy resources. At the same time, Azerbaijan continues to suffer from the humiliation it felt after its crushing military defeat in the war over Nagorno-Karabakh and the loss and occupation of a significant part of its territory.

44 Annex 2a: The Georgian-Russian war of August 2008 in figures

Source of all three tables : Viatcheslav Avioutskii, Le conflict d’Ossétie du Sud, Défense Nationale et April 2009 Sécurité Collective, Paris, Octobre 2008

Warring sides

Georgian army Russian army and South Ossetian forces

22,000 troops 500 Russian troops already present in Tskhinvali 10,000 Russian troops deployed in South Ossetia Nearly 10,000 Russian troops deployed in Abkhazia Several hundred South Ossetian paramilitaries

171 T-72 Tanks 150 Russian Tanks deployed

Russian naval force deployed from Sevastopol

Casualties

Georgian side * Russian army and South Ossetian side

130 people killed 74 Russian soldiers killed 1,165 people wounded 171 Russian soldiers wounded 19 Russian soldiers missing

44 South Ossetian civilians killed 273 South Ossetian civilians wounded

* The Georgian side did not distinguish between military and civilian casualties

Refugees and internally displaced persons

The Russian Ministry of Immigration declared that 33,000 inhabitants from South Ossetia have sought refuge in Russia since 7 August 2008.

Georgia has registered 89,000 internally displaced persons.

45 Annex 2b: Military capabilities of break-away entities in Georgia April 2009 Abkhazia South Ossetia

Manpower 4,000 regular soldiers 2,260 regular soldiers 2,000 armed police 1,100 armed police 30,000 reserve troops 100 State Security Service 2,100 troops from militias 5,000 reserve troops

Training Compulsory military service Compulsory military service

Weaponry Entire adult male ethnic Entire adult male ethnic Abkhaz population issued Ossetian population issued with AK 47 rifles with AK 47 rifles 50 main battle tanks 25 main battle tanks 80 armoured infantry vehicles 55 armoured infantry vehicles 100 artillery pieces 25 artillery pieces

Naval force Converted pleasure vessels Non-existent equipped with machine guns and mortars

Air force Negligible Negligible

Land based air defence 30 portable surface-to-air missiles 20 portable surface-to-air missiles 20 anti-aircraft artillery systems 20 anti-aircraft artillery systems

Funding Around $6 million annually spent Military budget spent by by de facto Abkhaz government. de facto South Ossetian Many resources come from illegal government unknown. Many customs, smuggling and other resources come from illegal criminal activities customs, smuggling and other criminal activities

Military alliances Support from Russia Support from Russia Support from other pro-Russian Support from North Ossetia unrecognised states in CIS Support from other pro-Russian unrecognised states in CIS

Sources: Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, Abkhazia Separatists, 3 Sept 2008 Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, South Ossetian Separatists, 3 Sept 2008

46 Annex 3: Chronology of events Abkhazia April 2009

Nov 1992: UN Office opens in Tbilisi to assist UN Secretary-General’s peacemaking efforts May 1993: UN Special Envoy to the conflict appointed 24 August 1993: UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) established to monitor United 27 July 1993 ceasefire Nations Dec 1996: UN Human Rights Office established in Sukhumi 1997: UN Special Envoy becomes UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative 31 Jan 2002: UN Security Council endorses Boden plan, setting ‘Basic Principles for the Distribution of Competences’ between Tbilisi and Sukhumi Feb 2003: Start of Geneva Process to revive peace process

14 May 1994: Russia brokers a ceasefire between Tbilisi and Sukhumi 2000: Russia starts to issue passports to inhabitants from Abkhazia Aug 2008: Six-day war between Russia and Georgia Russia 26 Aug 2008: President Medvedev recognises independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia Sept 2008: Russia reinforces its troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia with an additional 3,700 troops in each entitiy 10 Oct 2008: Russia withdraws its last troops from Georgian territories which lie outside Abkhazia and South Ossetia

CIS 1994: After 14 May ceasefire agreement, CIS dispatches a peacekeeping force to oversee its implementation

May 2002: US initiates the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) to increase Georgia’s military capabilities United Jan 2005: US launches the Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations Program States (Georgia SSOP) to follow up the previous GTEP 22 Oct 2008: US commits $1 billion for Georgia’s economic rehabilitation at Donor Conference

NATO April 2008: Georgia’s NATO membership bid postponed

July 2003: EU Special Representative to Southern Caucasus appointed Dec 2003: EU Security Strategy stipulates that the EU should apply a more active approach to resolve ‘frozen conflicts’ in its neighbourhood EU Nov 2006: EU-Georgia Action Plan finalised Aug-Sept 2008: EU under French Presidency brokers six-point ceasefire agreement between Georgia and Russia on 12 August and 8 September 1 Oct 2008: Deployment of EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) 22 Oct 2008: EU pledges €500 million at Donor Conference

47 South Ossetia

April 2009 24 June 1992: OSCE mediates Sochi Peace Agreement, thereby formalising its involvement in the peace process Dec 1992: OSCE starts to observe working of Joint Peacekeeping Forces (Georgian, Russian and Ossetian forces) OSCE 1999-2004: OSCE Border Monitoring Operation observes traffic across Georgian-Russian border 2006-2007: OSCE runs Capacity Building and Training Programme for Georgian border guards

24 June 1992: Russia mediates Sochi Peace Agreement 2000: Russia starts to issue passports to inhabitants from South Ossetia 7 Aug 2008: hostilities break out between Georgia and Russia after Georgia’s military Russia actions against South Ossetian authorities 26 Aug 2008: President Medvedev recognises independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia Sept 2008: Russia reinforces its troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia with an additional 3,700 troops in each entity 10 Oct 2008: Russia withdraws its last troops from Georgian territories which lie outside Abkhazia and South Ossetia

May 2002: US initiates the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) to increase military capabilities of Georgia United Jan 2005: US launches the Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations Program States (Georgia SSOP) to follow up the previous GTEP 22 Oct 2008: US commits $1 billion for Georgia’s economic rehabilitation at Donor Conference

NATO April 2008: Georgia’s NATO membership bid postponed

July 2003: Special Representative to Southern Caucasus appointed Dec 2003: EU Security Strategy stipulates that the EU should apply a more active approach to resolution of frozen conflicts in its neighbourhood EU Nov 2006: EU-Georgia Action Plan finalised Aug-Sept 2008: EU under French Presidency brokers six-point ceasefire agreement between Georgia and Russia on 12 August and 8 September 1 Oct 2008: Deployment of EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) 22 Oct 2008: EU pledges €500 million at Donor Conference

48 Transnistria

July 1992: OSCE invited to lead negotiations April 2009 OSCE 4 Feb 1993: Mission to Moldova established 18-19 Nov 1999: OSCE Istanbul Summit: Russia pledges to withdraw troops from Transnistria 27-28 Oct 2005: ‘5+2’ negotiations format established

21 July 1992: Moldova and Russia sign a ceasefire for the conflict in Transnistria and agree on principles of peaceful solution Russia 19 Nov 2001: Putin-Voronin meeting: Russia confirms its support for Moldova’s territorial integrity 17 Nov 2003: Kozak Plan proposed 11 April 2008: Resumption of Voronin-Smirnov talks after lobbying from Russia

Ukraine 22 April 2005: Yushchenko Plan proposed for Transnistrian conflict at GUAM Summit in Chisinau

28 Nov 1994: Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Moldova 1 July 1997: PCA comes into force 25 Feb 2005: EU-Moldova Action Plan signed and immediately adopted EU 23 March 2005: EU Special Representative for Moldova appointed 25 Oct 2005: EU becomes an observer in OSCE negotiations framework 30 Nov 2005: EUBAM launched Feb 2008: EUMAP extended for one additional year 1 March 2008: Autonomous Trade Preferences regime enters into force for Moldova

Nagorno-Karabakh

24 March 1992: OSCE takes decision to set up Minsk Group to mediate solution between warring parties OSCE June 2004: Prague Process to reinvigorate dialogue between conflicting sides December 2007: Madrid OSCE Summit formally tables Document of Basic Principles

Russia May 1994: Russia brokers ceasefire 2 Nov 2008: Medvedev organises Karabakh Summit, bringing together Sargsyan and Aliyev

6 Sept 2008: Turkey’s President makes historic visit to Yerevan for world cup qualifier Turkey between Armenia and Turkey 26 Sept 2008: Turkey launches new diplomatic initiative: Platform of Security and Stability in Caucasus

EU 14 Nov 2006: EU Azerbaijan Action Plan finalised 7 May 2009: Azer-Armen Presidents meet at EU Eastern Partnership Summit in Prague

49 Annex 4: Military statistics April 2009 Country Military expenditure in constant Military expenditure as (2005) $ mll. (2007) percentage of GDP (2006)

Armenia 194 2.857 Azerbaijan 667 3.6 Georgia 592 5.2 Moldova 14,4 0.5

Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (figures only available up to 2007)

Quotas of Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)

A. The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (OFE) Treaty sets equal ceilings for each bloc (NATO and the Warsaw pact), from the Atlantic to the Urals, on key armaments essential for conducting surprise attacks and initiating large-scale offensive operations. Collectively, the Treaty participants have agreed that neither side may exceed the figures in the table below.58

B. To further limit the readiness of armed forces, the Treaty sets equal ceilings on equipment allowed for active units. Other ground equipment must be in designated permanent storage sites. The limits for equipment each side may have in active units are listed in table below.59

Material A B

Battle Tanks 20,000 16,500 Armoured Combat Vehicles 30,000 27,300 Pieces of Artillery 20,000 17,000 Combat Aircraft 6,800 Not Applicable Attack Helicopters 2,000 Not Applicable

The CFE II Treaty, which was signed in November 1999, amended the CFE Treaty and sets national ceilings for conventional armaments and equipment in Europe. However, the CFE II has not been ratified by NATO countries, as Russia has not kept its promise to withdraw its troops from Georgia and Moldova.60

Country Battle Tanks Armoured Artillery Combat Attack Combat Aircraft Helicopters Vehicles Armenia 220 220 285 100 50 Azerbaijan 220 220 285 100 50 Georgia 220 220 285 100 50 Moldova 210 210 250 50 50 Russia 6,350 11,280 6,315 3,416 855

50 Annex 5: External military contingents April 2009 Country External Military Contingents

Abkhazia 3,800 Russian troops South Ossetia 3,800 Russian troops Transnistria 1,119 Russian troops Nagorno-Karabakh Undisclosed number of Armenian troops and volunteers

Sources: Transnistria: Ian Johnstone (ed), Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder/London, p.131 Abkhazia and South Ossetia: Associated Press, 9 September 2008

Annex 6: Referenda results

In all the break-away entities, referenda have been held on the question of independence. All the numbers below come from the break-away entities’ authorities and are not verified by international observers.

Country Date of referendum Voter turnout Votes in favour of independence

Abkhazia 3 October 1999 87.6% 97.7%

South Ossetia 12 November 2006 95.2% 99.0%

Transnistria 17 September 2006 78.6% 97.2%

Nagorno-Karabakh61 10 December 2006 87.2% 98.6%

51 Annex 7: Economic data: break-away states

April 2009 Country GDP per GDP FDI as Workers Inflation Unemployment capita (PPP) growth perc’tage remittances rates rate in $ rate of GDP in million $ (2008) (2007) (2007) (2007) (2007)

Armenia 5,711 11.1 % 26.5% 1,273 10% 7.1% Azerbaijan 7,477 25.1 % 21.1% 693 21.6% 6.5% Georgia 4,667 12.4 % 51.7 % 346 11.3% 13.3% Moldova 2,560 3 % 41.2 % 1,180 13.8% 5.1%

Sources: Numbers of GDP per capita in PPP - World Development Indicators database, World Bank, 10 September 2008 GDP growth rate - UN National Accounts Main Aggregates Database http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/introduction.asp FDI as percentage of GDP - UNCTAD estimates Statistics of remittances - Country Profiles Database of the International Organisation for Migration www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/activities/europe/south-caucasus (24 Feb 2009) Inflation rates - CIA factbook Unemployment rates – International Labour Office, (LABORSTA-database of labour statistics)

Region GDP per capita ($) GDP growth rate (%)

Nagorno-Karabakh 1,423 20.4 Abkhazia 350 NA South Ossetia 250 NA Transnistria 1,500 11.1

Note: much of the economy in these break-away entities is unofficial and therefore hard to measure According to the Transnistrian Ministry of economy, the inflation rate rose by 25.1% in 2008

Sources: Figures for Nagorno-Karabakh come from the Office of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic in Washington. Numbers are for 2006 Numbers for Abkhazia are for 2001 and based on rough estimates, made by Roman Gotsiridse, “The economic situation in blockaded Abkhazia”, CA & CC Press, 2002 www.ca-c.org/online/2002/journal_eng/cac-06/23.giceng.shtml Numbers for South Ossetia are for 2002 and based on research by Mamuka Areshidze: ‘Current economic causes of conflict in Georgia’, unpublished report for UK Department for International Development (DFID), 2002 Numbers for Transnistria are for 2007 and come from the statistical service of PMR Ministry of economics

52 Annex 8: financial assistance from external actors to break-away entities Transnistria April 2009

Financial assistance comes from Russia. Financial assistance is labelled as humanitarian assistance.

2006 $77 million 2007-2008 $27.2 million 2009 $47 million (estimates)

These numbers do not include the payment arrears which Moscow allows for gas deliveries from Gazprom to Transnistria.

Annex 9: External military presence

Russian troops US troops

Armenia 5,000 None Azerbaijan None None Georgia 3,800 in Abkhazia Around 100 military trainers 3,800 in South Ossetia Moldova 1,119 (in Transnistria) None

53 Endnotes

1. See Annex 2: a blow by blow account of the War in Georgia.

April 2009 2. Historical summaries of each conflict can be found in Annex 1. 3. EU Eastern Partnership – www. ec.europa.eu/external_relations/eastern/index_en.htm 4. International Crisis Group 2006: 15. 5. Cornell 2001: 181. 6. International Crisis Group 2007: 23. 7. Thomas de Waal, Black Garden, New York University Press. 8. Reuters AlertNet – ‘Nagorno-Karabakh conflict’, 30 December 2008. 9. United Nations Refugee Agency ‘Azerbaijan closes last of emergency camps’, February 2008. 10. Information given by Armenian Foreign Ministry. 11. Radio Free Europe 4 March 2008. 12. Press Release statement by the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs, 6 March 2009. 13. Step-by-Step Plan; Package Proposal; Common State. 14. Three proposals – Package, Step-by-step and Common State were developed – and rejected. 15. Thomas de Waal, Black Garden, New York University Press. 16. Interview with Representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenian community. 17. Highest per capita casualty rate from landmines are in the districts of Aghdam, Fizuli and Terter. 18. HALO Trust, ‘Nagorno Karabakh Landmines’, September 2008. 19. Centre for Strategic Studies & Reform (2007) ‘Moldovan and Transnistrian economies – from conflict to prospects of peaceful development’ Chisinau, Moldova. 20. International Crisis Group ‘Moldova: Regional tensions over Transnistria’ Europe Report N° 157, 17 June 2004. 21. Jos Boonstra ‘Moldova, Transnistria and European Democracy Policies’, FRIDE, February 2007. 22. Freedom House 2008 Surveys conclude Armenia to be partly free and Azerbaijan not free. 23. Freedom House, Nagorno-Karabakh 2008. 24. Interview with Representatives from Nagorno-Karabakh Armenian Community. 25. Radio Free Europe, Romania/Moldova: Bucharest has ‘moral duty’ to help Moldova’s EU ties, 12 February 2008. 26. Stuart Hensel, ‘Moldova strategic Conflict Assessment’, prepared for the UK Global conflict prevention pool, November 2006. 27. William Hill, ‘Who’s Next? Russia’s cat and mouse game with Moldova’, Open Democracy Network, 24 October 2008. 28. Moscow Declaration, Ministry of foreign affairs of the Russian Federation. 29. ‘Revitilizing the Transatlantic Security Partnership’, RAND Corporation, December 2008. 30. GMF Brussels Forum 2009 Report. 31. Joint Declaration of EU-Ukraine for Modernisation of Gas Transit System, 23 March 2009. 32. ‘Deep concern in Baku after CSTO News’, The Jamestown Foundation, 11 February 2009. 33. Speeches made by President Dmitri Medvedev, web-site of the President of the Russian Federation. 34. Information from http://georgia.usembassy.gov 35. International Crisis Group 2007:5. 36. Radio Free Europe 2006. 37. Nicu Popescu, ‘The EU should re-engage with Moldova’s frozen conflict’, AZI Moldova, 30 August 2008. 38. Kalman Mizsei, ‘Tripartite negotiations between Moldova, Russia & Transnistria are amoral’ AZI Moldova, 5 September 2008. 39. Oazu Nantoi, ‘A lesson for the republic of Moldova’, AZI Moldova, 22 August 2008. 40. Vladimir Socor, ‘Another precondition set for political negotiations on Transnistria’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 17 April 2008. 41. Information from www.georgia.usembassy.gov 42. Svante Cornell, The Politicization of Islam in Azerbaijan, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Programme. 43. ‘Stability in the Caucasus on a Turkish Platform’, Georgia Times, 29 December 2008. 44. ‘Sarkisian denies asking Turkish mediation in peace talks’, Reliefweb, 29 October 2008. 45. Cornell 2001: 63. 46. Cornell 2001: 75. 47. Cohen 2002, Coppieters 1999, Wennmann 2006. 48. Cornell 2001: 96. 49. OSCE, Transnistrian Conflict, Origins and main issues, the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, Vienna, 10 June 1994. 50. International Crisis Group 2004: 4. 51. OSCE, Transnistrian Conflict, Origins and main issues, the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, Vienna, 10 June 1994. 52. OSCE, Ibid. 53. OSCE, Ibid. 54. Bureau for Interethnic Relations of the Republic of Moldova. In Transnistria, the exact number of inhabitants is 547,500, with the main ethnic groups Moldavians (31.9%), Russians (30.4%) and Ukrainians (28.8%). 55. OSCE, Ibid. 56. OSCE, Ibid. 57. Figures for Armenia do not include military pensions. If spending on military pensions is included it would be 15–20% higher. 58. Statement by White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater, Helsinki, Finland, 10 July, 1992. 59. Statement by White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater, Ibid. 60. OSCE, Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Istanbul, 19 November 1999. 61. In Nagorno-Karabakh the people were asked if they approved the new constitution, defining Nagorno-Karabakh as a sovereign state.

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