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THE GORDIAN KNOT OF THE THE CONFLICT OVER NAGORNO-

Wojciech Górecki MAY 2020

THE GORDIAN KNOT OF THE CAUCASUS THE CONFLICT OVER NAGORNO-KARABAKH

Wojciech Górecki © Copyright by Centre for Eastern Studies

CONTENT EDITORS Adam Eberhardt, Krzysztof Strachota

EDITORS Małgorzata Zarębska, Tomasz Strzelczyk

CO-OPERATION Katarzyna Kazimierska

TRANSLATION Iwona Reichardt

CO-OPERATION Jim Todd

GRAPHIC DESIGN PARA-BUCH

MAP Wojciech Mańkowski

DTP IMAGINI

PHOTOGRAPH ON COVER Wojciech Mańkowski

Centre for Eastern Studies ul. Koszykowa 6a, 00-564 Warsaw, Poland tel.: (+48) 22 525 80 00, [email protected] www.osw.waw.pl

ISBN: 978-83-65827-51-7 Contents

KEY POINTS | 5

INTRODUCTION | 8

I. THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT AND THE PARTIES INVOLVED | 11

II. FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE IN POSITIONS | 16

III. IN THE SHADOW OF KARABAKH | 19 1. The conflict’s impact on and | 19 1.1. The political and military dimension | 19 1.2. The economic dimension | 28 1.3. The social dimension | 30 2. The conflict’s regional significance | 33 2.1. The political dimension | 33 2.2. The economic dimension | 46 2.3. The social dimension | 48 3. The conflict and its more distant neighbourhood | 50 3.1. and ’s positions | 50 3.2. The position of the West | 52

IV. SUMMARY AND FORECASTS | 55

APPENDIX 1. Outline of the conflict’s history (1987–2020) | 58 APPENDIX 2. The peace process | 67 APPENDIX 3. The conflict’s military dimension | 81 APPENDIX 4. The Autonomous Republic | 87

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS | 90

MAP | 93 • • • KEY POINTS KEY

‑determined (the country The Kremlin’s Turkey) To a great conflict The Nagorno­ For 2018, map ratives mined its important instrument in the the tions, to the political prevent been between as well societies. security ening efit. ceasefire, oil of exploited entire

the prevent the disposal, and network Association political, , In 2013 of

ongoing and as well region, foreign Armenia unrecognised

the gas as intensive and the supported and ‑Karabakh), elites Azerbaijan challenge

This latter Russia the in extent, one South pipelines. Azerbaijan have the for collapse Moscow

allow of the the is the over military, as to namely struggle and

since good regional from to now with maintaining Agreement Nagorno­ and

course has homogenous deliberately case Caucasus, power Russia the the domestic stop Azerbaijan, for propaganda the Azerbaijan’s relations and 1987 of the the taken effectively is Nagorno­ The conflict while

Georgia, of Nagorno­ economic

state both the for from a result alliances main Turkey’s of

beginning, removal ‑Karabakh Turkey) – who Azerbaijan to (and

transport Nagorno­ on with contributing in 2016 push policies. states, affiliation its getting ‘window cultivated in the ‑Karabakh with which nature led defending ‑Karabakh influence of forced presented the the post­ (Armenia and expansion has through role of Union.

mass to and it both and ‑Karabakh

and

European conflict its case and are ‑Soviet In both closer has soft prompted also full­ of of to Armenia at of informal still

the at expulsions to

mediator Yerevan still Later communication ‑scale de facto de the both Republic, of the power the

in had any conflict Nagorno­ with by times the

into to images history. Armenia has states the has world’ Soviet in same both an impact Union establishment solutions Azerbaijan’s it Western in

war Russia both power,

region. to instruments a serious the become been backed the protective and their and governments, the has withdraw time, ‑Karabakh, as well of status quo and for It remains in 1992–94) region. most (most parties

ruled , intermediary, the their conflict and also

Armenia state­ and states In the forced that Armenia, on a beneficiary its routes, important most impact Azerbaijan as determining likely a third

shaped and hostage. mutual the umbrella who Since together to ‑building and are

from and that has early and the the migrations,

which state important Armenia’s

and has to including who existence by have trying on the 1994 in it brought greatest country conflict signing institu its today’s enemy. threat a very phase, has deter a link order of their until with have with over

of ben nar pre has

all. to

at it ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ­

5 OSW REPORT 5/2020 6 OSW REPORT 5/2020 • • •

­ (the para The West Turkey The international would with which wants Nagorno­ However, ities. instability’ ora ‘hotcoldwar’. Bothsidesaccuseoneanotherof military network republics’ include responsible not that this the to fire from first forces have as the and ally atres elites especially on decreased operates stop a scale managed South violations escalated its part time years been Russia At the of each with prevention to entail to took activities intensive and France

war ‑Karabakh activity Nagorno­ of ‑states there of control it) has showed the reduced, beyond since independence after Caucasus as there other). losing

oil the the same place (the North for a great ( to practically after 2003, conflict daily and as one and settle

the 1994 nearby world. the of the in in power. fighting ‑Karabakh. attention of time, that the despite

Thus, the and gas Nagorno­ and the are successful

has (shelling

risk any and Nagorno became the of region’s still United the With pipelines). conflict its important neither no the

never Caucasus ceasefire of the further accepted the reaching conflict and Washington focus ­ (the ‘four

threat the peacekeeping remains failure, paid wider ‑Karabakh co‑chairs

its current enemy and an area has ­‑Karabakh States). boundaries. been implementation lack zone, Baku is proximity to escalation single­ of been its South now Russia’s area) transport Middle their For the which

a ‘frozen’ of quite ‑day resumed positions), intensity nor situation especially After of

of (which the Nagorno­ more progress ‑handed pushing resumes, peak

and ),

rivalry the peace war’). Yerevan forces could East), an important dominant moment, to of the corridors, on other OSCE

in 2016 hot military the conflict, was supports collapse

can of ‑Karabakh the and in and because the Nonetheless, process, its to between in this

spots conflict. not regional want turn low. regional region’s separate be shared resolving development there bring the position ­ (the ‘four

would to described action it is even Yet, threaten of and

a new West’s the Moscow mention political whose

are the its Group Moscow conflict energy neighbourhood stability possible tensions important lead conflict former though the peacekeeping in still Soviet regular Moscow 20–30 cease the ‑day war, aspirations

the the two to co‑chairs (the body as ‘stable generally issue of Iran remains, projects, conflict. has (which a crisis war’ as that as well

region Union, that Soviet ruling in ­ gradu a new zones sides fatal

also and the has the for

of if ‑ ‑ ‑

• • • •

Armenia Arguably, At the we Unless Nagorno­ It appears Russia interest military the to that favourable zone hinders) has less by both states of of overall of question or existential conflict

self­ a different issues contention). a partial a complete should external regularly significance would Baku and ‑determination, is moment, would there rules to in not potential, ‑Karabakh and/or them of such the that the its expect and to maintaining satisfy threat

resolution Nagorno­ so context of are advantage. Russia, strong existing been not main as the from at lack large Yerevan,

The settlement conflict Azerbaijan, neither than some the to the allow them) the violated). of reaching has player success ‑Karabakh’s as to (a weaker Azerbaijan. which moment inviolability

current state the to trust which difference changes settlement the Armenia Thus, although side now on the

guarantee political or sells of a conflict the between status quo status conflict of in has an agreement. To the a war there

lasted situation limbo at Russia,

of the other. in practice weapons In addition, final least

in the of to this both the considerations. have is in peace

the a victory state fail, credit (that more to between Baku capabilities no

for legal At the the dispute domestic simultaneously (since remain sides military in chance been prevents while to now, borders neighbourhood is, process the than and of status, both moment, one they despite vary

for the Yerevan formulated is Nagorno­ their fundamentally Yerevan, Turkey of situation capacity impeded 5 years 25 sides, Baku. which to OSCE and (or at cannot

in which is either We military militarily Azerbaijan’s their that the with the and should among ‑Karabakh could does Minsk least and is a comprehensive between of reach on (a deep status quo status (even and the right ) interpretations the the

the potential the not

significantly their other react assume ceasefire accepted unchanged. resolve main emergence Group, of Caucasus), a solution though one cover growing

crisis peoples conflict the shared

things. to is point hand

is that also two any the the the by or in in of it

7 OSW REPORT 5/2020 8 OSW REPORT 5/2020 ‑term Azerbaijan, theirdomesticandforeign policies, andeven theiridentities;ithas ) This The current The conflict USSR However, From Its INTRODUCTION respond recognised mainly military in important ing its in 1987, half tions (for example, inthe first tury, the this conflictisalsocharacterisedby towhich thehighdegree thepeaceprocess pendence. problems powers both been responsiblefor theunprecedentedethnicandculturalhomogenisation of accompanying as each ambition, were alsovery active intheregion. social space. energy) dimensions: the different internal most was is states. the

perspective – the and region. connections. At the true Armenian, arrived inPoland year (Iran thereby and action – offering with West

important very

with in the The conflict and more especially state cohesion The conflict levels – passed political between social. the and At that

turn over the process too, it beginning, indispensable what remaining and first has and of military Turkey), truth, and Nagorno­

of the this In addition could bilateral, strategic been time such (including was

more and Armenia years

in the 1990s, by has conflict especially risk has regards though,

which known it creating a scenario destabilise institutionalised. support external which often played ‑Karabakh the was after of also intermediary regional instrument

such results and to oldest military),

widely the to it as effectively left as military as ‘soft of the the at the a key to new became Russia, actors theSouth Caucasus). However,alone from

Azerbaijan the 1990sfrom 50,000 to 80,000 refugees, a scenario was that then a mark the United Soviet both significant from unresolved and is believed networks role deemed

security’, time region multi­ Soviet economic for have which international – sides, (even a catalyst its At least untiltheturnof Union’s on States, in incidents Russia long were ‘frozen’. shrank, ‑level been shaping (and that the

(and republics highly and in number today, of conflict and including whole (especially

was growing the

a possible collapse, in the involved political, and for later beyond), while were This rich the likely time today’s the an important the multi­

have of region, in gained became South history. conflict did

recorded the of in actors the collapse massive in other in economic resumption transport

‑dimensional. and the Armenia regular strength not the conflict the post­

disrupting Caucasus). their following It started the generate involved, fully medium­ thiscen regional remains conflict. and ‑Soviet migra player of in

fight most inde

was and and and and cor the the the of ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

Yet (2014), vided years The Appendices The aim This The outbreak wars were Nagorno numerous regional region mary in includes the the 1994 ceasefire – the peaceprocessmechanisms,to thestagnant influencedthewiderperceptionof the there was crisis(2015)and –morebroadly – theunprecedentedmigration deep these flict focus ground Chapter Three – and and itsnature. Chapter Two presentsthepositionsof to as a crucial situation change even changes escalation the with conflict’s actors status quo status the report has though in Russia’s outline included of of in since region the while as it among Iraq

Russian­ Appendix 1) the ­‑Karabakh and Chapter One time policy; of role had numerous and who of whole risks

is this its whole and was the

political, relative . tensions. in envisioned in on and map a the the annexation of the had outbreak the the the while ‑Georgian main publication

Syria, of both the included overshadowed armed time, Nagorno­ significance in launch report

experts traditionally politics existential but Middle demonstrated historical longest the which of stability. actors is economic states the

as well and the their the clashes as a concise more and and of of ‑Karabakh complex in war

since 2003 and of East seem whole subject

in

in is new, and Crimea the the

contemporary an attempt both At the as the distant of this references to importance this (2008). by politicians and the been in 2016 –

end important the its period describe alternative of new that conflict Baku system report – matter cultural compendium worsening

place same Arab and the conflict conflict are involved neighbourhood. there events the In the

and of Caucasus to the an integral Spring. which time, (with in are of

the dealing of threat to over outline in has analyses turbulences. Yerevan, interests.

transportation for

gradually outbreak the co‑dependencies the wider both and the more in characteristics crises the been 25 years its additional was the policies of Nagorno­ On the of context

processes. ceased with a prognosis

Armenia conflict individual interested the Baku and

post­ a new region. the part a steady after 2003 the as well Chapter Four Unavoidably, of receded conflict this ‑Soviet impact global As a result,

since most of of war to ‑Karabakh of war continued

information

routes

This, the be the issue. as the In the and the increase Yerevan, while in of in actors, has

for in intense into the a priority scale, remains included generational

that space, other maintaining publication. the the Azerbaijan. the in the generated (2005–06) The main Kremlin’s Caucasus, ceasefire. the is addition not the the current Donbas conflict 30-plus in as well to future. a sum states in these since back turn, only play real, text con pro

the the for ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

9 OSW REPORT 5/2020 10 OSW REPORT 5/2020 Armenia The above The report while resolution tary framework, deals dimension with pedx 2 Appendix and ­‑mentioned the currently is main the completed

Nakhchivan of unrecognised

initiatives the discusses under

Appendix 1 conflict by Autonomous a list discussion). and the (including Nagorno­

of summarises proposals, peace

abbreviations ‑Karabakh Republic Appendix 3 process the as well military

the

conflict’s (its which and Republic), as the concentrates formats, potentials a map. belongs

elements history while organisational of to

(1987–2020), Azerbaijan,

on Appendix 4 Azerbaijan. of the

conflict mili ‑

Azerbaijan. The subject 6 5 3 2 while with 4 1 During Nagorno­ I. THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT CONFLICT THE OF NATURE I. THE is internationally is the territories, the these lands. forces Socialist background by eastern east The former NKAO: The independence Nagorno Azerbaijani The conflict Stepanakert ‑Armenian AND THE PARTIES INVOLVEDPARTIES THE AND Armenian forces. The область To distinguish will here issue recognised is dispute. area armed ties territory). unrecognised by small still early 1990s. parts a non international the

the state of in be took mainly were goes the parts the

Armenians,

parts phase. force Republic: the ‑Karabakh used (in Armenian: ­‑autonomous ). ­‑Karabakh remaining of dominated non The name clashes beyond Soviet Nagorno affiliation the only

control of that

NKAO spelling:

The main

used developed today (in quotation there the A full by ­‑recognised

them, of the by area (known are 6 any unrecognised to

Lesser of occurred. Even the (February 2020), the was the is (in Azerbaijani: ­‑Karabakh ­‑scale refer period, Nagorno­ conflict under the

as they of also Xankəndi. other the law – part by over Republic Shushi)

Russian scope controlled gradually. the dominated territories former NKR Azerbaijanis. to western of

though war separatist of marks, Baku’s state. Caucasus, Nagorno lies the in

are Over de facto this Azerbaijan; Nagorno­ of is all the Autonomous was and that ‑Karabakh whole Federation recognised this the a part in a dispute

these part the control; 1987 because NKAO)

area the Dağlıq disputed (NKR), by fought although ­‑Karabakh this (even paper) the authorities has Azerbaijani territory, following by ruleover theareaisexercised by theso‑called

of For the were of should Shusha 2 ‑Karabakh, non historical it is

(with disputed current Qarabağ, the as well clarity Armenian although in 1992–94, been and area, for by Oblast and ­‑autonomous by as a result both

­ a para Abkhazia itself ethnically a direct Baku be a few over district Republic i.e. the Nagorno­ area years the are

seen Yerevan). of going the and (in Russian: side

in Karabakh. the everything argumentation, as the discussed.

neighbouring other conflict was population, tensions

the Russian: ‑state which belonged as the language territories former ( violate exception and Armenians

the a territory (a para Azerbaijani part on Azerbaijan, states), an autonomous ‑Karabakh future South

of ). adjacent start ended NKAO para­ for 3 it Its The remaining escalated, supported Нагорно Нагорный

­‑state) of taken affects regularly military Formally – eastern

with Ossetia and date,

more areas to the s Khankendi as claim with ‑state’s the (without ethnic and of are

the over by the will the

located ­‑Карабахская when

term

republic. territories some gradually a truce controlled , does term

(which section, the their Карабах (see Republic than as a whole

be by exception Azerbaijan activities

Nagorno by

the used parts the Armenia composition de facto de not Appendix 1). ‘occupied whole oblast rights in agreement; northern are, 30 years earlier

Armenia in first Lower form ), moving when accordance of by called in Armenian the of ­‑Karabakh to автономная

the 4 is Azerbaijani occupied

a para Armenians. ). is turn, (NKAO of part mentioned the them, territories’

Karabakh, the

capital, part during occupied in disputed n the In Artsakh South Soviet

into these

city this now of activi ­‑state solely fact and but this the the of of of 5 is is ) ‑ ­ 1 ‑

11 OSW REPORT 5/2020 12 OSW REPORT 5/2020 ­ (the Nagorno (with 7 Armenian­ Azerbaijan vice vehicles, ­ The Nagorno They Karabakh Nagorno­ jects, ities its nia’s in roads) today territories’, that played personal latter, be ation and and and a presidential out divided cal offices of cess, For

line difference own nego’ no. 285, see stressed and

even

which symbols depends it in in passports where are Armenia is more W. Górecki, (February 2020), the receives a special a key , which with

in Nagorno­ 22 May 2019, Yerevan. presidential, business into reflected ‑Karabakh 10 September 2018, while the of contacts, help independent on clan

‑Azerbaijani conflict ‑Azerbaijani had in

the it is the key removing that role two ‑Karabakh ‑Karabakh possibility (although on and connect exchange and system, ‘A revolution

of all (a group conscripts to previously Armenians ‘land place ‑Karabakh. represented importance

during it parts:

the From 1997/98 interests, www.osw.waw.pl. in intermediaries) identity, supplies, travel Azerbaijan, politically, and the Republic the parliamentary for para­ is Nagorno­ Karabakh while including the Armenia). www.osw.waw.pl; has the the format assigned for of of Republic conflict abroad, in peace’ ‑state from

instalments. which former been returning politicians have including war and its NKR security At the for by Armenia is, militarily, clan ‑Karabakh which own Yerevan). formula. of Armenia with Azerbaijan to 2018, still the in union is not , should have flag Armenia’s to is

is from They because the by NKAO same closely practice, reflected para­ tools and two not Whither hold on guarantees W. Górecki, the arms – is have them. power peace whose Armenian has republics principle were based regarded local ‑state’s Armenia so‑called be time, economically may and leaders ­ The para to significant with it is been bound and Pashinyan’s moved judiciary first In regards informally talks and a branch in also roots the elections, be its on ‘Armenia: the being Armenia, independent and security – its for conflict

and the sent of of ‘occupied excluded registration that as a party which protecting was corridors to ‑state’s para­ to own lay

the Nagorno­ Armenia later Armenia Armenian Armenia system waged assets a parliamentarian foremost to nowa of of with and ruled in ‑state to

and influence USSR. political do

are Armenia). assumed the the residents the runda the it is returning socially. territories’. now?’ their and by (land its and to being ‑Karabakh by their states new Armenian has old and other plates through The separatist two through the own defined side

konfliktu , the OSW Commentary OSW and cash mass elite system military NKAO, some the strips Azerbaijan the own conducted peace since 1991, equal use ‘occupied has This It should emblems so‑called in . on them inflows highest author . Armenia, politycz In the Arme sense politi­ as an ruled inter them itself, their state (it is one), with who situ sub pro ser to ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ 7 ‑ ,

The conflict’s andforemost relatedtotherefugee issue, socialdimensionisfirst The Nagorno 8 9 who was Muslims, Nagorno­ inevitably in nian the the the tions tism of the 1992–94 war, parties, phase ples key beliefs but between a change a wider and sionist rebellionby a province againstthemetropolis –even though thesepara ship conflict also ethnic in nature in ethnic also conflict ethnically especially discussed Moreover, This terms After Turkey, gian fighters already former conflict, two also and the to (by were of inhabitants between

of opinion government Nagorno­

a certain consider land, that peoples). including reach; aversion ‑Karabakh involving the

from of Yerevan

but arrived the in (estimated the conflict is not of a religious nature a religious of not is conflict the in expelled have the homogenous. Basayev

NKAO). many folklore also the Armenian the

Chapter Three. is primarily a political conflict a political primarily is was ­‑Karabakh military the question Yerevan in it to a different ‑Karabakh ethnic Armenians areas forces also themselves and extent 8 Nagorno Azerbaijanis. takes went

that of and

at Moscow, Armenian Even Armenians Armenians from In addition,

spread between 100 and Azerbaijan later (that

to Stepanakert taken activity both composition and and place ­‑Karabakh Abkhazia

though of was language conflict, the Thus, when due conflict

by historical was supported by the made Turkish , nations as , over to even ‘occupied the diaspora), between to 400 talking

not the it are internally . where Azerbaijani any the also by underwent In the

was four­ by support which attempts (they inspired only different the

since did in majority felt about and change peoples Armenian and he

memory ‑day number) end presented not the territories’, supported early from given

speak towards as well is the of 1991 influences the the become displaced

war Armenian and a bilateral to by from ‘Turks’, inhabitants of led situation to forced (this Armenia’s ‘velvet phase, of Armenia play (their and , their

the Armenia. in 2016).

the religious Azerbaijanis the forces by but Armenians

as between as such, one their stayed Azerbaijani Shamil conflict are separatists this and status quo status another migrations. own it persons the revolution’ homeland , referring

another. and have even took dispute of in and compatriots there card.

public to Basayev. relationships The complex of nature).

dialect) The conflict the and a lesser the

directly Armenia side Nagorno­ fighting the until in though who important 9 Armenia (and (the Azerbaijanis not local

practice and some must

Azerbaijani by over Most This form was the of 2018

only hold As a result Chechen and against Turks) government, extent

populations summer likely affects

in in affected the to ‑Karabakh makes also interested and of they relations religious Turks Armenia between and also the

become catalyst

a seces will guerrilla owner they the Arme mean of 1992. from to first rela Tur also peo from Geor has

the had be be by of ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

13 OSW REPORT 5/2020 14 OSW REPORT 5/2020 (EAEU) (all At the internationallevel, which principally refers totheregion’s closestneigh viction without will Minsk United Nagorno­ In addition, ran, ing methods in nally turn, the the porting predominant Moscow’s goal when involving itself in the conflict has always been to been always has conflict the in itself involving when Moscow’sgoal fire maintain control over the region overthe control maintain lished bours both On the and 2). and Russia, andmorebroadly thepost­ s well as as the sia’s collapse, expulsions out ence efforts crucial the the post­ the transfer of agreement) be getting support a participant the displaced an attempt

Iran conflict most it to Group, regional

to make proposed States), military that Later, Caspian’s discussed under ‑Soviet s the as young ‑Karabakh peace in course of Moscow resolve and in

the Moscow activities important the involved of corresponded the paradigm Russia

threat in (in this

in final

statehoods nineteenth Turkey, space the level, Azerbaijanis these peace, phase exploitation and

of resolutions the at addition oil Nagorno­ more unequivocally in

in the conflict Republic –

a ‘return

dismantling has intermediary and took conflict). of Russia hpe Three). Chapter (it forced in territories and the (1992–94) or report, and conflict

distant and taking the (the ‘end used natural at conflict on means ‑Karabakh, in to century)

indispensable was to then least has conflict to to France the of the to the the see the away Over future). the Armenia

and the the been these first it

to supported name the role gas some conflict of it

Chapter Three). and Kremlin’s of term (as one supported conflict ,

majority has Baku’s Caucasus’ the and time, including the

its

as intermediaries and broadly ‑Soviet space).PriortotheSoviet Union’s regarded resources. history’ and of resources so During at kind of informal

used,

peace ‘region’ arbitrator Soviet rebuild to the the to the still

of spreading Russia of foresee control, join develop

Baku, of interests the

of interested United understood the same Yerevan. remains which thesis),

process. (after

the that

as the

quasi­ the empire. the refers There their mediators. would

protective three devised local while the (contributing time Eurasian which period, ‘occupied its ‑peace Russia have States, stability main influence at the gradual the was to and In both integration According co‑chairs

be transportation parties For the a party during West the a position actor changed West seriously might

mediators a widespread obstacle umbrella

(see then, had Regardless

which Ankara time Economic South territories’ and return (especially instances, most tried was in pushed Appendices 1 the undertaking of to lead (this Russia to democracy, projects the was with

the the

Caucasus to conflict’s for impeded also and the involved over to of was, to region. access routes. Union of policy

cease estab OSCE them inter influ itself

time, then new Teh was

Rus sup con and the the the in in ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

­ ‘the conflict around Nagorno­ around ‘the conflict When (Armenia­ (which with would threaten to destabilise several states and cause a crisis that wouldthat a crisis cause and severalstates destabilise to wouldthreaten Nagorno­ In addition, Turkey hadtheambitiontocreatea blocof integration Nagorno­ flict that a potential resumption of military activities in Nagorno­ in activities military of resumption a potential that means South) to North and West to East (from corridors transport tant as its as well East) Middle broader the and (Syria spots hot and theatres Since go beyond the regional scale. regional beyondthe go by gia cal issue in this part of theworld. The zone’scal issue inthispartof proximity toimportantwar conflict ence shared neighbourhood with Russia, Iran and Turkey and with impor with and Turkey and Iran Russia, with neighbourhood shared the in 2008) and in an increase the ‑ West discussing would its such ‑Karabakh the ‑Karabakh conflict is still – also at this level –‑Karabakh conflict is still – an important politi­ ‑Russia, launch direct processes, and engagement as well as its include its (BTE) neighbourhood. of of Russia’s Azerbaijan­ gradual

conflict impact Russia’s the as the Azerbaijan), it gas Baku­ seems of activity establishment pipeline decrease

has on other ambitions ‑Tbilisi­ ‑Turkey), ‑Karabakh’ justified oil in players, fact and in while in ‑Ceyhan of regards the 2000s,

interest decreased. gas and the to Iran of refer . as well transportation assertiveness international

the (BTC) was to in to current the and the as analysing Potentially,however,the the trying oil Nagorno­ region, the Turkic­ matter pipeline network to change (the war significance or limit which ‑language states with the ‑Karabakh aspects and of the of ‑Karabakh post­ the with

coincided

priorities the alliances US ‑Soviet phrase of of Baku­ Geor pres

con this the ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

15 OSW REPORT 5/2020 16 OSW REPORT 5/2020 “the Armenia Azerbaijan versus peoples’self­ was while 11 10 In Baku’s Baku’s In Yerevan’s assessmentthe‘nationof II. FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE IN POSITIONS IN DIFFERENCE II. FUNDAMENTAL republics independence integrity recognised, ment thereby to the perspective, point preted lability ber 1991 be guished Over contradictions: oblast. external or old Just

separate Moscow made. T. Świętochowski, cally laterally – republics annexed and norm union Nagorno­ organised two of the of Russia. after consent these as borders This of

contemporary putting and the view, borders – appeals decades does In response, were one that

Crimea, view, republics was their the

refers from by is Colonialism, shape requires view ‑Karabakh conflict fundamental which

collapse subject Russia that is from of the after not to of of this borders. moves beneficial

Azerbejdżan i Rosja. Kolonializm, islam i narodowość w podzielonym kraju n end an Azerbaijan to

to ago, the no the an administrative is is ‑determination”. fact of as with include alone, to the the Baku confirmed of the in new rendered not not essential

needs referendum which discussion; the Professor state Islam the the researchers the principle that principle

conflict local independent when beneficial to shared In Baku’s interested Soviet before norms and were Armenian Iran to versus Soviet the borders Baku’s to in this in 2008 their Azerbaijanis Nationality however, take significance. widely Union, the the former the Tadeusz and has the by decision of of of was Union), demographics, states. referendum jurisdiction referendum side of interpretation, is

earlier 10

into it territorial the Azerbaijan. (which parties criticised and collapse been Turkey), international the

Indeed,untiltoday bothsideshave inter

Nagorno­ recognised interpreted a consensus side the of in NKAO, issue right is Such Świętochowski

not account a Divided key Caucasus, affected interpreted was argues and decision had worldwide. to of coincide a revision a national As the of importance; of their revising integrity come Abkhazia ‑Karabakh’ expressed theirwill not

which was no which

the been over peoples illegal, Country], In their the as broadly that the law by reached changes this recognised final USSR. borders stated to by was the the forced current, with the inviolability actually took and as narrowly in Azerbaijan’s an agreement. nature , the means of and borders eventually Warsaw 1998, to one form, to former a contradictory opinion, sphere in South

From states that self­ recognise the place NKAO in addition, to of thus as possible. of

this ‑determination. (apart of

internationally Ossetia from the

that leave borders proclaimed in from the the the and carried of on autonomous it either authorities, most p. 229. them the regard as possible,

of former insolvable Armenian any territorial old could 10 Decem Yerevan’s

its this the and from [Azerbaijan 11

the borders out – lack automati of outset union distin settle in 2014 invio­ Baku union area. way: vote

can not the the uni its of ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ­ ­

Yerevan (a similar The above whether without 12 UN Nagorno­ Baku’s mise. Baku hasruledoutgiving upNagorno­ internally insists in nated the the pressure for theterritoriesthey are occupyingfrom in‘non­ having have a large also authorities inBaku, andsince as the about such say stage self­ extremely ever, outside cussion of Resolutions

Azerbaijan the 30 April to

a partial

‑determination Security ‘occupied that arbitrary questioned leave this any a decision, of by different unblocking Azerbaijani that narrative, extent earlier

the on the excludes any ‑Karabakh

if genuine the Armenians from and was legal process

displaced unlikely arguments the the the agreement

NKAO). negotiations, districts no. 822, Council 12 November 1993. preconditions. territories’, a reciprocal decision become could

convinced status Armenian conflict effects a society forms the it or the

the has of 853, state. they could 12 that Republic idea by just persons

resolutions do transport in

of

possibility 874 Caucasian been show of radicalised for with had establishing settlement of the

their Yerevan the

a part

of It has that and 884 the after now

the occupied. government Baku the action, the

They a simple

same Azerbaijan taking former In this that

but (IDPs) former had republic broader Armenia’s ‘velvet revolution’ (spring 2018)ithas future Soviet encounter all of

also routes.

condemned were wants calling

also

of will there

Armenians new through because, other thanks become must place

agreed passed respect, NKAO to Stepanakert swap Armenia, oblast’s in (the Azerbaijani recognise authorities negotiation their

Armenian Baku them (‘land did tries is for elements Armenia. provide acts

in

by extremely to physical

of

different a more tired for the to

‑Karabakh, andisonly ready totalk have Azerbaijan). the home. of

the the to also ‘occupied returned autonomy for have had violence

‑autonomous’ its United

withdrawal and return

the

influence for of Azerbaijani peace’). such becoming considers part Armenia’s have public to At the distant already tactics –

this resistance, the those

the para­

Nations forms limited include and

an effect).

as soon any been territories’ side protracted issue return within called ‑state’s This same Thus, of Armenians future.

of Security of used

of territories was postponing subordinate the assumes

agreed

room Azerbaijan (those

side upon state a territory moved

hardened Armenian autonomy. time, of as possible it is not the adopted advisability independence. their

society

According Armenian (Azerbaijani) In regards Council refers

in propaganda crisis. for only framework justified upon, it to exchange here

resident remains without compro right the stance – the

between troops in under has to to

domi Baku How troops such that and last the the the dis

of to to to to to ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

17 OSW REPORT 5/2020 18 OSW REPORT 5/2020 Admittedly, The only Turkey region, it military more the tive declarationstoseeka peacefulresolutiontheconflict.However,their official up States) both and at able states of extent, domestic ceasefire from

reaching a century its

Kremlin is actors. to sides decisively –

claims to that profiting force also both and and

keep force. situations thing line have war Russia, an agreement Iran. the has thus ago has sides’ Yerevan to

maintaining made For remains also Nagorno­ that policies some and at from This keep that room Baku, its which or made in links has and disposal influence issue an extension if the April 2016. both of

a possible ‑Karabakh. not talks for the it in

power Baku the plays the Armenia clear – will independent been states the alternative

fail positions status quo allows to be the on future, balances modified they But means reach and in discussed of the and key

it its the to Azerbaijan are situation , to is Azerbaijan of

role to which peace orbit. mobilise action of status quo status within a new

conduct ready Yerevan by the

forcing among in even

peace on was The West a later is war for their in its its has limited ‘crisis the

). result established the and Azerbaijan these a resolution (which For process, society, terms, done ruling part small conflict Baku Yerevan, management’ (mainly not by actors, so of but does correction elites. external the

only which more this in

over to region, the practice by government not may finally the the report. from To a great

often means a quarter potential is exclude alterna factors United not aimed in to as do their give and are the the be of ‑

Azerbaijan and Armenia are Armenia and Azerbaijan Azerbaijan ­ The Nagorno 15 14 13 1.1. Armenia and Azerbaijan on impact 1. The conflict’s Nagorno­ For 21 on 27 November; 20 on 28 November; III. IN THE SHADOW OF KARABAKH OF SHADOW THE III. IN jani ities, relations. identity policiesandthekeystone of ince tion time of tion tinue the lenge by ber guns and on 25 November of ceasefire, domestic n late In

It is

ceasefire Stepanakert ситуации Communiqués is along sessed 2019 side’s The political both current (152 cases defence is line for in no

and mainly in to practically reflected writing(February 2020) bothsidesreportbetween 20 and mechanism the reports, the

several

the ‑Karabakh). occur, eebr 2019 December Baku (incidents and sniper Finally, which demarcation in northeast в зоне

as the area face violations ministry ‑Karabakh because foreign their while from and in impossible albeit months and in

for конфликта calmest of rifles, of has it total). it the the and the Yerevan,

monitoring state­

security. also reported determines the the

line; the In practise, then, this is not a ‘frozen’ not is this then, In practise, policies, Azerbaijani OSCE been part reported with no region’s year by to were

military now. para South territory ‑building occur see These conflict verify peace­ observers за their of in in Appendix 1). varied ­‑state’s

the the 10 лет’ It has

the 14 said the another affecting force this

along Ministry Caucasus For ceasefire relations ‑keeping 23 incidents shooting decade. opponent Nagorno­ the de facto de

, country; dimension data; ministry of has to monitor

Kavkazskiy processes, also intensity. example,

since theirnationalidentities. It hasalsoshaped networks Armenia have the ‘Нагорный Armenia had of (there

23 such had 23 on 29 November; and20 on 30 Novem not Defence Azerbaijani­ the

with ‑Karabakh still in a state of war. of a state in still politically, incidents, forces of come 12 May 1994, every see

a decisive

a significant only defence are demarcation Uzel, of on 24 November 2019 and These becoming (from the ,

of no Map).

fire Карабах www.mod.gov.az/en. incidents; 28 December 2019, from are political Azerbaijan

day. cameras their

issued outside upon have placed carried conflict ‑Armenian economically 15 a position 13 line both impact рапортовал

allies. In turn, This

communiqué a or the military

impact but only Azerbaijani rarely also any world. 22 on 26 November; territory foundation along has out is periodically. also other on resulted comment www.kavkaz the ­conflict.

the in on о border been with incidents самой even Armenia recording the Tavush

30 incidents biggest their and the Despite

para­ in controlled positions;

on the demarca which спокойной personal Also, Azerbai in of socially, outside

‑state’s the overall

- At the uzel.eu. devices

situa their fatal prov chal

other there con and it the

as ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

19 OSW REPORT 5/2020 20 OSW REPORT 5/2020 (in March 1992 Azerbaijan’s The degree with Moscow’s inabilitytoprevent theescalationof while, war, wounded as a result of 16 In its 24–30 November 2019) role radicals. in maintain ministry this that life baijan baijan itmuchweaker;get thecrisisundercontrol, butemerged from two years later, and and and ated states’ served since over demarcation cover of culminating earlier

living Armenian ‘Нагорный 30 November 2019, Nagorno issue

in maintain made forces

Abulfaz in he which position 31 cases

the early the

Azerbaijan tends a profound this political the to been any could Anti­ standards of ­‑Karabakh significant tone Nagorno­ beginning it communiqués conflict, limits

success

to stages, led defence

easier advantage to Карабах in Elchibey, regarded line ‑Russian

armed per the purge of which down buy to and the life.

First on “around www.kavkaz day). army the soldier and

‑Karabakh social for the takeover (after offensive reinforced June 1993 read обвинил other The first of forces the stated the the defence earlier­

oneof

regarding

Vice Armenia the sentiment lost

as ‘unremovable’ conflict (to read the the 1990s), On 29 November, was in political

social later Nagorno­ crisis ­ a long combat 220 times” opposition

expenditures. ­‑President. commented power Azerbaijani (even - that Азербайджан uzel.eu. of ‑mentioned theshootings weapons, spending, respectively; Republic in two the

a President unrest had broke ‑lasting was more during this also

situation though elite ‑Karabakh as a result readiness, During presidents and

an even on most chapter).

(which to increased, about that

out. by and Also, but station while to side including the drop обстрелах 220 в take that correction Armenia’s on (they Ilham Russia’s an NKR evident nominate

16 had these only A series military the . Thissituationforces bothsidesto same

period the bigger had

the conflict which power. translates of Armenia in of frontline, in The Armenia’s been had

Armenia;

Aliyev’s war, the oil

wave events as a result foreign violated Azerbaijan, Yerevan Armenia’s obligations period the in 2016 soldier theconflictandfailure

prices).

and often in of generates situation forces his sparked impacts see purchase

while the of за violent ministry. prefers

into will direct wife position,

Appendix 1). неделю’ of ministry popular held the by for during was demarcation of the

In Armenia, of time be an average a group

by

to more Ayaz as an

current on ceasefire people

government case disappointment additional impact defensive acts allegedly their discussed , of the a drastic

of Kavkazskiy the (the week the

of to enthusiasm defence arms

Mutallibov on took ally newly the

positions the frontline of who four­

political on In Azer Russia’s wounded

on armed line of do

(Azer mean badly place, point ones) did costs drop later both ‑day

had just Uzel, cre not the did not of to ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

Armenians Azerbaijan with within 19 18 17 names. nonetheless ings, such as thoseorganisedwithintheCommonwealth of in tection. this to people framework, ful links so‑called or Neither On 12 March 2019 Twenty ‑autonomous this resign telephone Armenia Armenia с 12 March 2019, из would who щимся ceptable, Republic larger, keeping ruary 2019 jan of on of and as Bashkend) that the that to break. be sputnik.am group),

армянскими

decision Azerbaijan their being the Armenian Азербайджана crossed between from

Russian analysts have if on the is 19 chapter) not Such such Armenia’s

в Азербайджанскую although ­‑five

the many common missions limited Thus, Karabakh put in Armenia had on (NAR), but visited have framework and Ter­ to Shahin legally, . demarcation Federation few a business persons athletes

Georgia, as well In October 2019 February 1998. on from taken territory, its has should communications by enter persons occasions

www.mid.ru. ‑Petrosyan had the фамилиями’ Azerbaijan’s Armenia still which calls Nagorno in for border, the and been while

only claiming or research to Hajiyev, club as opposed problems армян, place whom two May 2019 from had Armenia take very Russian or official “were its clan because controlled as individual trip exclave which far is Transnistria Russia line

in 2005). and ­‑Karabakh – informed are Arsenal, of also Armenia’s territory, these Armenia small, states; the

(before являющихся an Azerbaijani centres. between. have Azerbaijan’s (which

ignored”. list , Республику’ entering In 2018 nor the one Ministry can Kavkazskiy was from an exclave), authorities identified it of to, on representatives had circumstances of

scale; their the In the by is still has In the 2000s for peace the Henrikh his personae non grataenonpersonae no the participated Azerbaijan the inclined a few Azerbaijan told Azerbaijan’s

and Azerbaijani between Azerbaijan. which who example, be territory ‘Предупреждение journey, ethnic at regardless of Azerbaijani diplomatic it no 18 president, found border Azerbaijan Minister right included Foreign sportsmen

Uzel, , гражданами in kilometres that As a rule, negotiations. view journalist the have

means Baku is is based origin. ­‑bank Ministry technically Mkhitaryan, the on only 17 October 2019, to the an ethnic the into since of been time in authorities ‘Азербайджан Affairs ­‑Armenian them. have maps of of Azerbaijan activists make exchange remains the 2015 last Embassy border via . account. ‘Это that Foreign

working participating of to the on to under relations, his

(the only Levon issued Azerbaijan was official transit (four of the

РФ’ or грубое their recommended beginning guarantee

such

their possible Foreign There российским excessive political between , European from north

Armenia’s journalists. Sputnik, of border refused Affairs, in of starting Armenian a permit). The ministry’s Foreign for (, closed. through visit professionals discriminatory www.kavkaz them Ter­

Moscow citizenship. озвучил нарушение: exceptions a professional non Armenian­ the Affairs of from and are of of outside ‑Petrosyan separatist the entry ­‑governmental are Elmar Turan Games 11 January 2019, travellers does the an Azerbaijani opponents in control that

Azerbaijan’s a third concessions 17 Armenia’s them IndependentStates гражданам, there Nakhchivan no to of near условия of

war. The movement multilateral

to

their the (and are Mammadyarov, known the News Russian become - occurred These not air, in Захарова uzel.eu. communiqué at the ‑sounding country. since

practices Abkhazia Russian Baku. members adequate Baku conflict least can are travel northern въезда

allow Agency, side – rail a citizen was in small reach organisations citizens the footballer

not 16 citizens Autonomous visits journalist направляю from In early on Azerbaijani ru.armenia о a power justifies Federation, plans Travellers to or are zone высылке war’s are

a slightly россиян and forced of ethnic exclaves Azerbai postal went section meet stated Baku

at road stated peace going unac pro last they the are can non risk

Feb out of of to to of ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ­ ‑ ­ ‑ ‑

21 OSW REPORT 5/2020 22 OSW REPORT 5/2020 (PFA, (he Aliyev, Aliyev Armenia’s Armenia) The Nagorno­ 21 20 Levon jani nomic mittee’, non­ match to contrasthisrulewiththeshort­ president had have andpoliticalpositionsinthepara­ holding thehighestmilitary history. lapse Since Serzh baijani brought Baku and Yerevan under the rule of the Aliyevs and the ‘Karabakhians’ the and Aliyevs the of rule the Yerevanunder and Baku armed security of cesses cessors of of See,

Azerbaijan); reference. president Ancestors], 29 May 2019, ‘Отказ anniversary had ‑Communist authorities negotiated used

1992–93; of the Sargsyan

Ter­ for are crisis put in revolt stresses state

previously were the In Azerbaijan, was to guarantees). Мхитаряна

example, Baku, ‑Petrosyan, early of it modern refused only the power Wołowiec 2017, Soviet to

‑Karabakh in of has www.kavkaz and elected Armenia, Thus, and politicians the his whole legitimise

the 1990s outlined stage (2008–2018). from his issued created claiming

Heydar government been New the chaos. main the от statehood to Union, been uncompromising in

поездки Azerbaijan of chairman the 2003 20 prosperity blame travel the elites

his held Aliyev’s - him

even uzel.eu. conflict second a series opposition the here, the the As a result,

from on their leader that speeches see by

a permit conflict, which

long­ the в Баку with for conditions They

before (for edition, speech Party’s already but later elections such his the power has of the Front’s of of ‑time of ‑term ruleof more

they his

both поднял son

NKAO: the a dissident

have to in failures foundation played pp. 71–72). parts Azerbaijan’s its a trip failure the both

to

in 1993 Baku the and team had position Ilham.

First society. will republic’s participated on enter policies, for until collapse dominated вопрос

Aliyevs of on 26 November 2002, the have strong was Robert a key how be in

to in the Secretary ( this Heydar W. Górecki, Armenian the today In the

group elaborated thePopular Frontof Nagorno­ 21 the Nagorno­ политизации and too treated this

building role President claiming The current chapter). came of ties country Supreme Kocharyan UEFA risky

intransigence the (February 2020) in conflict the case in called Aliyev with

Toast za przodków of

the from shaping it ‑Karabakh ‑Karabakh two Soviet

and

for the Europa as a permanent of later of

that war and In both спорта’

Heydar Nagorno­ ‘the the

Council, returned

Armenia, influenced states’ this the him Azerbaijani Communist president, (1998–2008)

‑state (thesepro

occasion with he the in Union. Karabakh Azerbaijan

,

modern organisation). League this (the Azerbai Kavkazskiy had with ceasefire cases, and Aliyev

post­ resulted Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan [A Toast ‑Karabakh.

the and of to chapter). received the His

the the ‑Soviet the regard power Ilham

office it elites Party point Final Azer Com then used

to first tenth and and suc eco Uzel, has col the he in ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

(as a result Azerbaijan Armenians – and,by extension, alsotothe vision of Thus, This Turks 24 23 22 Presidents In Armenia, jan more international meetings ily andmakesrecognised, references totheNagorno­ to they to the to Azerbaijan’s from have give above, after and had and convincing cal organisations’ Even The political For the counter it). every

к Sargsyan, Ilham misation. framework observers of was camp inviolability

азербайджанскому the up may the have tried the 2016 Azerbaijan proved real,but unfavourable example, victory who the especially though

another on Armenia Aliyev to take Nagorno­ sharedby history a large partof occasion: be knew with ruling The ruling to not aim became often Kocharyan restoring of still of to support the explained in in demonstrate said: in

arena, our four­ the ­‑Azerbaijan forums. its raised many his foreign to in several hundredthousand highlight

national the best poses chapter legitimacy country’s of ‑Karabakh the “We prior address exterminate them). elites society, war, ‑day base during elites

post war to

Azerbaijan’s Republican народу’ Armenia’s have Azerbaijan’s how the Azerbaijan, a threat and of ­‑Soviet their He guests, to Azerbaijan war, by not to

and Nagorno in in the territorial interests. not the elections question to , some only

while the is that the Sargsyan, President both ‘Karabakh many of deviated their the states nation Armenians’ also defend Party

want fact ­‑Karabakh ‘eternal’ President visits to there leaders narrative important flaws, states integrity, the borders Armenia’s government atthetimewas unable known elections guarantees after of territorial Armenia, the hence 22 of lost that by clan’, and Armenia. of

the the He Armenian abroad, best an inch is derived elections These his

the conflict conflict. control Republic no exploited raised which the during there victory are keeps Armenian to results Ter­ the Baku right from of Armenians living in alternative NK holidays demand more from status quo status presidents

and ‑Petrosyan, internally displacedpersons). the is integrity, nevertheless is of Armenians, thewar with and from […] in personified of possible – the no

conflict is to over repeating

between various his security of our Azerbaijan, one the Azerbaijani insisted This other ‑Karabakh questiononliterar more a ceremonial self­ during the issue principled presidential their interlocutors people and declarations a large lost conflict

‑determination; way.” is one narratives to which have determined play by as often crises.

of to the ceremonies, politically and personal their its 11 April 2018, that various Robert that that ‘Ильхам

Nagorno­ an important security position must against it.

part nature, Armenians kept appeal elections elite can even is only In this rule. Baku Kocharyan Armenia (in the be be internationally of as the of repeating Алиев and became international and on solved s presented as obtained contribution more

and

its 24 ‑Karabakh’s to en.president.az. on 11 April 2018, their support guarantees (the threat the will

international field They role way, 23 change partners. territory however, обратился within Azerbai settlement

Aliyevs. socially and and On the that of without never politi more trips, Also, they Serzh legiti also that

the for the of it ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

23 OSW REPORT 5/2020 24 OSW REPORT 5/2020 Yerevan’). (to keep The situation after the ‘velvet revolution’ in Armenia in revolution’ ‘velvet the after The situation These wanted In May , For its minister tences their positions. to towards that tricity tests to tally. tion tion used political he killed became by advantage also, social olution delays maintain life President was no. 256, ment ings many and the

from of of during During to by

a participant campaign

expectations distress, etc.). no imprisonment. narratives of in

part,

rates and Armenia) supposed egregious which how to a lesser a huge

pointing the this

protests leader has 13 December 2017, the reforms various maintain Characteristically, society” of their Armenia’s international the 2015 this a NATO­ president and Azerbaijan’s after Aliyev, become issue

period). any removed

or or in propaganda of degree,

position social ( at which to M. Domańska foreign were to the and blamed sensitive potential Armenia constitutional on least from social In the have ‑sponsored for

an external people, protests the The case

unrest the economic In 2012 reduced www.osw.waw.pl). visible government also the whom,

became Armenia, to most pre completed partners’ was current authorities the mobilisation, community. while

(as the previous convince issues ­‑election who , forgeries – chaos directed – success ‘Putin both which

ongoing taken Safarov important of the to at

training opposition failures. known

was threat: changes only Lieutenant the election for agenda (economic for governments to period, interest has by erupted but his elite

the (for their attack. cost not which have a representative was Both conflict also Nikol especially fourth

and on “provides sentence. is seminar as the the it one

from more connected of also of were

an effective claims many international handed authorities exploited in

countries’

possibly a Hungarian

international an international in

time. For active Ramil hardships, Pashinyan, in the power. and reaction ‘Electric a veneer on implemented the (although example, in No vision, occasions

in Nagorno­ that in However, this

over and mobilising country’s Safarov the are with to the the of Pashinyan role, aim problem Azerbaijan ready case, distract opposing dialogue to human Maidan’

to the case court partners no conflict Nagorno­ organisations), a huge to ‑Karabakh such in the Azerbaijan

calmed

hope’ to their is he leader see ­‑free a greater in 2004, scandal, political meet this

and of a good between office sentenced was , people’s

supporters rights

OSW Commentary OSW rhetoric Appendix 1). campaign, was Azerbaijan – (or ‘Electric side hike different regard instrumen the ‑Karabakh, could to social of pardoned of

the the

support illustra Safarov conflict the this system. for compe abuses, in where

extent prime atten

govern during take needs mean first elec was him was pro rev but the act ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ,

‑dimensionality (as mentioned h ‘formal’ The 28 27 26 25 which when Kocharyan, Republic Nagorno­ its nificant nia nakert, the two feeling was furtherdeepenedby attemptsby Pashinyan’s supporters toinitiate be as heroes a revolution aspects as Armenian such a scenarioisreducedby andtheway thedegree inwhich inNagornoservice ­ criminal of distinction between ‘Armenia’s’ and‘Nagorno­ concerning cealed either After The word Based Kocharyan

Armenia – seen 2019. June 11 cial positions Republic’s protests independence. dynamic, a state and testers tion para­ and separate Armenia

fraud. that during is by from police

which of on dispersed. especially that ‑state). differences ‑Karabakh Republic have grown together, which inpracticemakes any of can linked cases as a result he

birth in its ‘formal’ and interviews

emergency institutions On 18 May 2019,

was

quickly their which beat

but the 26 in the into of Armenian commands be experts policy depend

regarded

before, at was

that relationship first the and or up

the This compared It may to public. also Nagorno­ is

the

they strategies, account. of realised two put ‑Karabakh, andtherepublichasa jointdefence system with his clearly the and carried NKR to governed in NKR, Armenia which were ambiguity arise of time situation demanded thus in have

a great people General experts conscripts March 2008,

force. earlier foremost ‘Karabakh quotation

Pashinyan’s The complex after he and along be 10 people ‑Karabakh between out initiated but of

in emphasised.

to in would degree The elite After assumed also

almost by Stepanakert the or two between

the needs ­ a ‘patron by the accused which activities. Manvel could the of marks the point a call even not

the allowing on resignation were ‘personal from

structure separate the

clan’ that half Centre Yerevan the lines be in to

so‑called ascent here by out of ruling Republic killed), able lead together their

relationship personal Prime

a year Armenia nature take

Armenia ‑client’ on 1 June 2018, breaching Prime Armenia Grigoryan 25 Armenian/Nagorno in him as Armenia for of to This of to Armenia ministries change

union’ Minister while the Eastern current

under the to of to and the Minister the relations tensions

‑Karabakh’s’ elementsimpossible, of use

Karabakh arrangement, power change

the (especially in high para­ the Armenian

can Grigoryan

against Nagorno Stepanakert arrest, Armenian/NKR power the and does fact 28 lasting Studies Pashinyan local constitutional Armenian between

command Pashinyan )

‑state’s tactics. be between military and and not with of in and activists the make Kocharyan

also sent ­‑Karabakh

NKR persons officially was (OSW) clan, defence, the ­‑Karabakh from numerous ex‑President one, was Nagorno­ conflicts great of the

distinctiveness against revealed

to Yerevan accused The probability three in up although the Republican organised in

army, order was behind politicians this Armenia andthe in do 27 1997–98 was

recognise

their Nagorno a single

relations Yerevan

days

distrust. as well who their way. relations that the actually of (by freed these ‑Karabakh

should which serious later, and Republic – post the a demonstra positions speeches introducing are

of involved. in ­‑Karabakh military the rm 9 from to 2018, (for are ­‑election Robert protests,

as the entity Arme multi­ Stepa­ the many Party seen NKR’s This finan

quite con what and can has

sig pro

of to ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

25 OSW REPORT 5/2020 26 OSW REPORT 5/2020 Azerbaijani counterpart) can keep his distance from this issue and avoidand issue this from distance his keep can counterpart) Azerbaijani After 30 29 Republic Republic’s Nagorno­ jan ing rent minister’s reaction tematically trip policy prime Pashinyan’s position shows that as long as the Nagorno­ the as long as that showsPashinyan’s position little Sargsyan’s been by lc rmis neuae, o rein edr ad y nlg his analogy by (and leader Armenian no unregulated, remains flict being its ‘hostage its being an attempt a joint as question out The Nagorno Armenian a way This case president interviews nia’s occasionally ­during agenda. an’s about ­ that the turned out the basis, Pashinyan as Pashinyan’s that to and interpreted attention protests frontline an equal release, meeting towards minister war Stepanakert. US$2000 but ‑Karabakh the Most from changing Armenia’s to para of was

with security. shows of passivity, longer we experts ‘four in to

to the stressed – purring ­‑Karabakh the Pashinyan ­‑state’s it is of as volunteers. Yerevan, can be empower Azerbaijan held Stepanakert from himself. the ­‑day (a small of participant.

de facto de Armenia’s both the state just to recognition not to expect as

compare new the and leaders ’ war’ the . the the a short relinquish

in Republic former the conflict. a demonstration of Baku

However, op. cit. op. conflict called

pressure in Prime

security Nagorno amount Armenia. dog when more the this and scale talks’ or

conflict. Aware aur 2019 January the can the even period ). which on and situation Minister’s public, para­ Armenia’s and of has and political wield relationship In Stepanakert given ­‑Karabakh para­ his frequent of format influence should after This

They Armenia’s councils the in of wags on

his supporters of ‑state done Stepanakert’s 29 some in time). ‑state, the it,

the

to after do Yerevan. Pashinyan the n interviews In supporters international change youth responsibility his and change

gravity not elites). be was Republic of so of months

between The court of tail, visits n 2 ac 2019. March 12 on foreign he importance thus

the of show

the allowed reported but to the

until Armenian

See impossible), but announced Armenia should block of former they could were

elections this much para­ Thus, rather the and to policy W. Górecki, the Armenia (put now in that significance the had to Stepanakert, charges), young his the tail Yerevan power

was to ‑state’s interest army intermediaries were have offices and been predecessor. as for followed, conflict which join on (February 2020) – as a way and of society and people, perceived recruitment a symbolic Pashinyan

not elite

Armenia: nowa runda nowa Armenia: brought new, a him the the which statements

accepted been as well of in the the the independence, wags part

courts the 30 in escalate. born Nagorno­ Nagorno­ NKR

by Nagorno­ and Armenia talks towards

The evolution of of evolution The of was conflict In response the which for up he result a

the more ‑Karabakh con ‑Karabakh bail both throughout shortly posts to as the in not paid dog paid independence, the made ‘velvet This gesture (who a situation with what in

on (based and he en masse

by as much could ‑Karabakh ‑Karabakh the NKR’s ‑Karabakh pro Armenian before the

was rela­ a day was of the … revolution’s negative to the that Azerbai his has amount pointed , ­‑active as Armenia.

Kochary op. cit. op. the on prime Serzh current already mark tively ­‑to impact

Arme where to have first well OSW cur sys ­‑day the case

join as of ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

The conflict as a nation- and state and a nation- as The conflict The Azerbaijani Nagorno­ The 34 33 32 31 In this recognised ritory massacre role nation­ this the part produced land states monumentshave have beenerectedconnectedtotheconflict,films been solidation. of the control ent of century. of capture This Two In Armenian: Such

the Azerbaijani Albanians The Azerbaijani плтк в Закавказье в политика и ­Мoscow 2003, Mustafayev were compositions historically in i.e. including data ders a key a separate the 1992–94 Nagorno­ districts region in of where the and ­people’s will. enemy’ ‑building recent is

of concerning

drastic

view, in the role Azerbaijan means nineteenth truer of the The conflict fact about in

31

the

in Church (Caucasian borders the as Armenian building films

and Nagorno dominated large­ ‑Karabakh

Khojaly of differences Both Armenianised the the

by ‑Karabakh Lower of Shushi. pp. 31–255. having and Azerbaijan. forced the 2016 side history these city

the Nagorno ethnogenesis may the narrative Armenians in of century, conflict ‑scale sides ­‑Karabakh Karabakh, mythologise draws Caucasian 34 are restoration both population serve only conflict, lands Albania of by of of 26 February 1992, expulsion in ‘always’ Armenian resulted

­‑Karabakh

Armenians. Shusha

maintained. wars [The textbooks interpretation In Armenia, upon conflict. Azerbaijan Armenian commemorate with as Albanians in conflict Armenia during can

presents examples: of existed the Albania, which war.

statistics the that the with and nineteenth film only been

alone, in by aim Azerbaijani the took of of of was See between (contemporary In the Soviet literary the Line remains which the Memory:

the 2012 the show Armenian of result historical and a large be settlements which Nagorno­ ­‑ past. В. Шнирельман, place dominated inhabited and The Armenian which – identity building factor building

demonstrating directed occupation resolved exclamation century, only Azerbaijan, the the 2 case

from during times;

33 refer Armenia’s the nation). Azerbaijani works Myths, ­‑building number apart became while n important an

nd by anniversaries a lack ‑Karabakh by to dates of century BC Azerbaijani

as the forces Mher by the Muslims.

from The Armenian hence Azerbaijan, well if Identity only and Ottoman of that part Armenia Armenians, Войны памяти. Мифы, идентичность идентичность Мифы, памяти. Войны whole

role

of the Mkrtchyan. picture reliable of narrative, of as Shusha national “Remember!” playing

the of papers on 9 May 1992. a part is

and began

the the Azerbaijanis and existing It also territory the its historiography mainly and as former Empire, Xoja haphazardness statistical Armenian the 8 and return the factor seizure ‘eternal’ Politics of

commemorates side, points

( Both of cement it in played

Xoca a very its identity events of Caucasian in one

implementation

culminating was

Azerbaijani in century AD) the internationally surroundings – historical

films ) turn, in

to data directed in turn, to Apostolic by that of the proves at ], Azerbaijani the nineteenth (the covers

state- the the are important Armenia’s

on 32 of related

its

existence the draws Armenians presents and

these the became In both set civilian mass Karabakh, by ‘image in 1915. that differ Church

during played end). ethnic

Vahid

con upon and data. mur the ter was the to of ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

27 OSW REPORT 5/2020 28 OSW REPORT 5/2020 ‑Karabakh – A good The borders 39 38 37 36 35 will 1.2. Pan­ President jan tember 1989. ter the ports lands goods , a city a kind of states show ended everyday communicated tothetwo states’societiesandhow omnipresentthey areinthe ered crisis. closed early exclave, concepts

In Azerbaijan

Interfax A substantial G. Górny, ‘«Арцах – crisis ru.armeniasputnik.am. earlier; of ary 1989 accepts separatist Pashinyan The economic and ‑Armenian occasion regain every by coming from stage in that 39 are deliveries and yet, illustration

was Armenia’s air). In July 1992 northeast as atomisation.Thisdispersionshouldendnow. We needtodepartfrom a city the the newspaper, such Agency life (Armenia’s Aliyev subordinate Armenia the Nagorno even its это occupation. its well and of plant statusquo author’s of The closed between As a result, the to of section

oil, Армения, said territorial the activities as

greater in Summer the Service

at Armenia was as topic both

to said [Armenia], ­‑Karabakh the gas north TV government leaders conflict. Armenia – any – between the Azerbaijani Armenia

of located of dimension of Turkey it is because and note] it the ‘Karabakhians’, ‘Президентский nations and

Nagorno Armenia how и все» – to functions following: second I am ­west covered radio borders of Games integrity.” the around following: from Armenia’s Republic ed. electric from

the is the these Azerbaijan’s shut convinced Armenia news Jacek joined ­‑Karabakh Armenia – (the only logic Пашинян Armenia. author’s can nuclear by as Azerbaijan, we 75 kilometres military authorities it and summer 2019. held the bulletin have and the Cichocki down narratives “For energy be of

should Вестник’ media 36 the de facto de “We Azerbaijan access power

Azerbaijan,

appears, found war. in On 5 August 2019, after выступил and the had note], many exception that and blockade, , Full Stepanakert, author’s forces’ somewhat OSW, are blockade

plant supply away ‘Ijevanis’ the the , online Turkey, be a decisive the no. 115, roads and this in directly stop.” living (see earthquake are the demarcation years Warsaw 1995, prepared in from 35 в Степанакерте’ the republic information day

day state Map). Speaking 38 less, 29 June 2019. ‘Gyumris’ translated lines note] and was introducing

the 37 or two of have including in we [the at

will indirectly, but Both

impact epicentre). administrations Armenia a state railroad Armenia’s which Baku’s humanitarian cut have statements line, […] still to fell p. 26. stopped been come, inhabitants at service. of off. on 26 June 2019, liberate quite the the [the took , Artsakh into into

been Sputnik, The scale in on these of Military the closed ‘border’ With 85% almost operating an embargo transport and

place regularly. opening In Armenia – started war. inhabitants the a deep the Prime Nakhchivan subjected by statements Azerbaijan our there 5 August 2019, shape of every [Nagorno­ It has between since language of aid the Azerbai Lyceum, after in

energy in native , a month Minis of of edition energy deliv were which both Sep­

and

Janu not the the im on on the of to ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

• • Armenia These 41 40 Below, impact metal needs) be Other sus cate around 4.5% of their GDP to it, which means less money for civilian civilian for money less means which it, to GDP their of 4.5% around cate cially discourages concerning development A group

Fitch ‘proper’ discussed report rating olution (in the baijan The lost ways – justlike theshortestroadroute –ranonthislineviatransitthrough Iran Disruption to Baku). the NAR, thereby extending theearlier­ be as an altitude section senger chivan, difficulty located

Armenia), well transported include: ores), economic . only assessed on 41

was (see is The Economic Effect Of A Resolution Of The Nagorno Of A Resolution Effect The Economic of and of Ba2, movement Soviet the as the of researchers published which at and railway the the Map); At the moment only vehicle transportispossibleonthisroute, one potential higher in the

while Azerbaijan lies Nagorno of Azerbaijan’s which the region of to more

40 the greater direct regional

consequences risk period 2500 metres transport with

intersection Armenia’s runs and by in connection ­‑Karabakh Nakhchivan investment from runs June 2018 on air of and detail investors), finally the consequences credit through

this accidents, this area, (such (which transport the is through inoperative Ba3 connections in as route and conflict was Economics increased defence spending (both states allo states (both spending defence increased wider above BB+ namely of

( later as data of between is Armenia. could

risks the also fuel) while

available Autonomous lower the takes thus from high could sub­ networks. sea post­ east­

a railway for Armenia’s carried conflict (the threat potentially are the Trading railway ‑chapters affect generating place level; credit mountains ‑Soviet Yerevan online: between ‑west ‑mentioned Nakhchivan­ Azerbaijan driven At the whole out Armenia Economics by this

as www.berlin include: rankings a project ‑Karabakh Conflict On Armenia And Azer And On Armenia Conflict ­‑Karabakh However, and Republic link route BB space air, and to moment, which region - include the increases of . larger north­ According and where Nakhchivan while between

war ). and for southern aimed territory and

Azerbaijan’s lack - economics.com for analyse ‑south (NAR). trains as of costs and Armenia goods energy some at its practically

to fuel this both of the establishing Moody’s, Baku neighbourhood.

destabilisation trade (see Armenia. of from routes, which consumption South economies. by passes is the

A particular states sources ‑Baku route

Azerbaijan a problem and . trucks are Map).

Azerbaijan’s conflict’s between Yerevan how all cannot Cauca it listed. are Nakh (espe Rail Their will and a res pas via at ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

29 OSW REPORT 5/2020 30 OSW REPORT 5/2020 h consequences The wagons world) were well 44 43 42 1.3. In the interested to tional their the the try’s entire population entire try’s 750,000, around to home; better graphic around at shift conflict one). International Around

around foreign Armenia Yunusov: P. Adamczewski, [Nagorno were Baku 2009, refugees. residence refugees, jani of all around around the talk to states. The social former control as state­ Refugees their 42 own figure regarded total organisations, first citizenship, 44 conditions;

about

2) the left All in all, the number of displaced persons in Azerbaijan equalled equalled Azerbaijan in persons displaced of number the all, All in

the 600,000 , or would changes. 30,000 208,000 which high 186,000 ‑owned

was ­‑Karabakh number by country, while А. Юнусов, 2000 (estimates delegations of even decade in one NKAO

Muslim p. 28. of signed around around birth inhabited lack law

Nagorno­ people million the Armenian be which – people). as

Azerbaijanis dimension Górski Karabach w polityce Karabach Górski made while tents. of (their (the buildings rate), responsibility

in Practically resolved 500,000 and of displaced after in internally based together as they 750,000 refugees of Миграционные процессы в Азербайджане процессы Миграционные New 43 from

Kurds, the refugees; Azerbaijan by state

which in 1994 amounted to around 10% of the coun the of 10% around to amounted in 1994 which in

as up the the 3) the All This made ‑Karabakh number over accordance on Policy York the did . Azerbaijanis the

6.5% in

In 2012, P. Adamczewski, forces. escaped persons number conflict had financial Convention 160,000 Azerbaijanis, quickly around (sanatoria,

territories all, war, was on 31 January 1967) with had this for propaganda of it speaking, displaced of Independent in not internally possible

was is with

was caused from should a considerable to and the the 18,000 Muslim While the an exaggeration, the

question and … crossed of have and leave years bordering international , of 28 July 1951 internally resources: larger population Armenia incapable op. cit.

adjoined internally . number also schools, Górski Karabach w polityce niepodległego Azerbejdżanu niepodległego w polityce GórskiKarabach displaced

those

the by persons the to included 1991–94 Azerbaijan], dimension – , both include p. 201. a border

provides keep in three In addition, a figure entire to with former and displaced Kurds in only Azerbaijan law – deserted persons of the of territories the although and A large despite part people of Armenia. displaced exile international

(formally

prevent factors: refugees providing and which NKOA for

large

means Azerbaijani [Migration Warsaw 2012, the Azerbaijan five territory regarded

were of persons Azerbaijan’s larger has number around who would Protocol showing

it was (according the and factories, other support they mainly Azerbaijani migration should were 1) the Azerbaijan’s assistance refugees, trending persons which the was IDPs is 4000 Processes of are they these be Relating also of born refugees as countries pp. 198–199). fallen

‘occupied be authorities no at public population, refugee

still to able lived hope ­ an inter Armenia from remembered longer provided the remained farms), in officials upwards came the 1979 people and on in (IDPs) and new to estimated took the to the time. Azerbaijan],

in considered territories’ that support the opinion interna

(together relocated return places camps public relevant An over under Azerbai in demo make ‑state by usually latter thanks census train Status with

was and the the Arif that as in to of ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

te Armenians (the Armenia, both linking broken.were nations Azerbaijani ties and Armenian historical the migrations, forced the of result a As Azerbaijan Azerbaijan Armenians which 45 49 48 47 46 Based Forced number ities majority temporary trolled unusual understanding. find from agreeing living lated spousesof became baijani a poorer sales, started slightly over 400,000 Armenians underwent forcedmigration. Couples

This

In 2004 As a result (in 1979 (excluding Ibidem P. Adamczewski, i Południowym’ from 74% especially ed. blemy narodowościowe i migracyjne narodowościowe blemy them relocated M. Ząbek the

on

on fostered aspect

by migration receiving minority . evident of

situation the their command international in state of and government­ in 2005 the work

in tensions

registered where (some of

Azerbaijani (with ‘state the

has them , Baku, the number Warsaw 2010,

particularly Baku around NKAO) to started

been

[Migrations

interpersonal For activities programme Górski Karabach w polityce Karabach Górski and Azerbaijanis to 25% that who

the in than the of significant people has given immediately

highlighted in over

of authorities. and ­‑Armenian

lower them Armenia, was in 2009 loss the

exception Azerbaijan – in refugees

also ‑controlled decided to 80,000 people their law, undertaken, Armenia –

that p. 161. even still

three to in build were peace of

later

their Azerbaijan, improve affected the (

they

P. Adamczewski, inhabited territories. native

47

by back mixed [Caucasian foreign

bloody Northern ) hadtoleave contacts decades relocated settlements while in to Maciej also moved process would, of poverty Their are the received

living Armenia move

marriages – in 1989 territories. … a very

outside

language). officially the by , all

conflicts op. cit. op. Ząbek: financial as in who

and

Dilemmas: conditions 4,0 Armenians; 245,000 number back retained

now, regarded 45 and a rule, Armenian was level. Azerbaijan to from the

Górski Karabach w polityce Karabach Górski Southern In the , few Armenians

had p. 202. Armenian M. Ząbek, was recorded for Russia NKAO – Azerbaijan, i.e. the territoriescon which offered to however, being move 46

(see elderly areas

and For

the their Questions In addition, been resources

no is According their middle Caucasus] as

were to create estimated level

was IDPs Baku, greater Appendix 1) population. included prolonged Russia ‘Migracje

refugees, opportunities homes, near

there living In the more estimated cosmopolitan persons, still or of

there

jobs of some and to poverty of or Nationality in:

this ).

the 1989 from for often

the made than 3000. are the 2000s,

na in

past, Dylematy Kaukaskie. Pro Kaukaskie. Dylematy had Armenia’s launch as

has … refugees’ at people although Kaukazie West. to , areas is and among found

op. cit. op. was

no already usually over Almost be its many ­ census been n especially an up despite over

and citizenship Armenians In 2012the Azerbaijan oil for the

projects , in was IDPs bordering 10% pp. 200–202). character, All in all, all, in All 330,000. who

Północnym

49 352,000). Azerbaijan, left Migration], Azerbaijan no

and when

mutual

author approved. case a great assimi­ all dropped

of some earlier Azer

had gas the

its in in to it 48 ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

31 OSW REPORT 5/2020 32 OSW REPORT 5/2020 The disappearance Therefore, 54 53 52 51 50 who which, who Republican janis respondents in reference nians resolution it is ness, the Nagorno­ the tives popular andhighculture)aswell asthepersonalexperiences of public uation population. and significant states, consequently moresusceptible thanoldergenerations topropaganda messages The need

Ethnic

‑governmental a May 2019 становить областей (data 20%. Ibidem Armenia of Residents Survey: Opinion Public ‘Всесоюзная with conflict In previous rently minorities, early able the enemy. poverty difficult only

served and of are and south 52

on sphere Armenians financial in from phase as

. civil

facing?” Armenians The survey as www.armstat.am);

was deepening know Armenians which for mentioned the point, (the Talysh), республик of The omnipresence mutual 50 the гражданский well problems Institute

apart on of ‑Karabakh conflictisnow commonly asoneof recognised years (19%) such mentioned

society pointed перепись to

With (billboards the construction the organisations support 2009 census opinion Respondents the the also imagine from as dialogue building the the while constitute question conflict) – in each mistrust frontline played the of neighbouring share СССР

from the on and in opponent населения project. the first (IDPs, to

earlier, of interpersonal диалог poll both homogenisation Russians, one’s is , Azerbaijanis a yearly of just year,

unemployment was the available an important could grouping of any everyday по by and same stressed over the

Armenians like US полу 9% of formulated conducted their states. с modern and 53 and kind is own 98% reply there posters,

Ереваном’ Department are of 1989 года. of de facto de the

survey. live Nonetheless, in now online: и национальности’ in those media

basis. of the animosity, Azerbaijani their

families, constitute with a report nation focused the compactly side of Armenia’s , life. 51 city role are alsomore

International living surveyed. as Nagorno­

contacts only representatives) future

www.azstat.org).

three , educational ethnically conflict 54 Распределение (at the follows: in Kavkazskiy The need in families) and of 17%

presented Baku (37%), Yet of in from State: about Armenia perceived answers on

in nation, population

Baku friends their turn nation of in co‑existence and the “What at it ‑Karabakh between creating ‘Участники

Republican 92% the family respondents is should response socioeconomic was north Uzel, , of in

the Demoscope Weekly Demoscope homogenous all for of and more especially presented cultures, time the of from are systems early their even городского and is as great (data all 3 August 2019, contribute (the Lezgins twentieth dialogue – the by of defined stories inhabitants Baku part August 2019 also the Azerbaijanis choice. larger, its встречи Institute, neighbours, main based majority individual topic to first (after and and adults onbothsides image are of be a question

problems a sense only deemed

и сельского century). on at The Nagorno or oil

Yerevan, in an International в Баку , noted in and societies

times the www.kavkaz of the www.iri.org. problems leading www.demoscope.ru. of to boom, without media, by many a hypothetical the

them opposition Azerbaijan. as the 2011 census of Press the field Armenia representa reaching

призвали

of a negative conscripts media and Avars) and that that an enemy. it are themost fact населения

Clubs on ­‑Karabakh Azerbai foreign as and to in of prepared Muslims is, which - Arme uzel.eu. (22%) more

what and such a sit both both in Other is

that up avail and (non are вос cur the to

in to ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ­ ‑

Azerbaijan. Aylisli Azerbaijani 58 57 56 55 59 were To a great extent, the Nagornothe extent, ­ To a great People Narodov 2.1. significance regional 2. The conflict’s jani ing relationships ing titled the face map of the South Caucasus. South the of map hostile by and and ships continued organised of 1990 conducted caused President

Two In the

‘war’ Armenians The book Ibidem 34% His expelled to up, The political Nagorno­ his a writer the future serious as the de facto de and Stone Dreams Stone between books

other who as

experienced the reactions the fellow of (that is, Nagorno .

system (Fraternity Respondents first, who – two

from is whose those Ilham existence were Akram in para greatest 58 assert situation to available actor, ‑Karabakh ostracism

followed

under hold correction between Azerbaijan, their ­‑Karabakh most countrymen ­‑states removed Azerbaijan Aliyev of

before surveyed, can participants talks

different workplaces. post­ sympathises Aylisli, region), the

were dimension (in Russian) (Daş

frequently by fear in from deprived of of be impact in with from the ‘the Republic ‑Soviet the

asked

in Armenia issue Peoples). the expected the yuxular) among appeared of region,

Nagorno Azerbaijan

both who the the but

war of visions and

& him unrecognised for to the country, the 2018 at list there would

Georgia provide

Not burnt government, integration it is magazines.gorky.media towards

of states. Abkhazia broke their given the with borders), of ­‑Karabakh the on ‑Karabakh conflict has shaped the current the shaped has conflict ‑Karabakh and the 56 were compulsory by in only (based

of the

very revolutionary It is Nagorno­ title up respondents be his

a Moscow Armenians suffering. the the Azerbaijan out), map cases generally answers). One and to and quite of did the

on set books, three likely conflict’ conflict people’s Armenian as of but Nagorno­ the South structures. Georgia example and school it end 57 a result people at ‑Karabakh answers

similar. OSW contribute a series it

enthusiasm – the that ­‑based among Ossetia its writer mentioned of 2012 Regardless 55 ‘war’ also texts, . coming who than with interviews in of

No such protagonist, end ‑Karabakh

the & responses of the victims is as has while (in Georgia 59 their show Armenia, those was monthly of conflicts well the the other from published of 1989 context by 10%. conflict were to

affected demonstrations his choice. in as case Russian mentioned Armenia the of research any Yerevan, generally his of wife trying actions. in

Republic the

the to presidential emergence the an outstanding and of 24% Georgia called of empathy and as by 16%

questions latter ­ a mini

who to the

persecution the the of op. cit. op. riots, well Federation, two convince beginning them Similarly has were accepted which relation is Druzhba Azerbai as current sons (mean ). referred ‑novel (these as pension. blam named beaten been

such with was were and local the took

on ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

33 OSW REPORT 5/2020 34 OSW REPORT 5/2020 The role of the conflict in the disintegration of the Soviet the of disintegration the in conflict the of The role Armenia’s At least h most The The outbreak 60 which will Moscow Nagorno­ revision its ing instruments important theless, peacekeeping further lic, Soviet South and a key any and ation change of conflict of devised This

‑term Russia’s interests this Wars pendence place power although a change between state which

an armistice, determine kind significance skilful

role of

was Caucasus. is Union, effects, in (1994–96 at until 2008 to demand on Russia’s

abroad around

with ‑Karabakh because has was the Crimea the

of Azerbaijan had to the important of demand in established after conflict role in ‘conflict

world. a very their in end agreement – for been that either

demanded considerable to this

of Nagorno­ forces started and

and the the 2008 of example anew of as protect Nagorno­

policy status:

was the the One limited for or and the 1980s 1999–2009) Moscow and report), (the Russian­ the unable region. to in

for into of conflict’s

the management’,

Nagorno

current in

Turkey the initiative its n outbreak an

change could to the

from Russian the main by fact ‑Karabakh these is extent. the interests the guarantor Soviet spontaneously by

‑Karabakh blocking and a group subject nature

will to being outbreak cost preserve

has & partially participation post­ multi both conflict mediator thus ­‑Georgian early 1990s. Armenia. scenarios; push The Nagorno ­‑Karabakh politics the more set war),‑Georgian or

for Armenia. completely at in of ­‑dimensionality, ‑Soviet

of to the of say border the transport

status qu status its a precedent forward this lives, of

of

as some their

intellectuals

that Nonetheless, and first zone. war, of contributed

Armenian

disposal, that has an agreement in When anti­ well

­‑Karabakh

regard while it self­ war unrecognised, space. time a

the enforce conflict line Moscow The result routes relations on limitations. de facto de could decreased. ‑Azerbaijani it is o However, the ‑organise as – its

since in 2008

its conflict in the between be Russian

60 the it which own to

was Russia Republic for

should the correction

part. become number SSR’s the who However, it its

preceded a large maybe even 2014 (the annex has to West’s

in

as the with

collapse resulted they the peace of Donbas)

influence which Federation Georgia, its it. (which be at Nonetheless, had See a result At least been

authorities has would the of the states

remembered obtained

riots the Karabakh Its

‘destructive of a moderator Russia actors extent effective not the Appendix 2). of from plan borders two Kremlin’s over the will driving able time the Russia been

will

recognised goal in it most in involved the of for

throughout partial USSR. republics.

collapse and (thanks most was

recognised Armenia thanks to time this a new took of closing used that be the

of and Committee, acceptance

implement any likely

force deploy

recognition – discussed including place, dismissal the potential’ the and area its likely moment, negotiat its their of its war

Chechen future military Never

of to to

its borders most by

rank as This play pub was

and and inde long the the the the any its did be or ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ­ . ‑

(see Appendix 1). These 62 61 which were Levon Nagorno­ nia moved mass not Baku, which was addresseeof theprimary mandates the Armenian tion term, ties the tory the the under parency) SSR. became n 3 uut 1990, August 23 On activist, a decisive impactonpoliticsin earthquake exhibit An Armenian Azerbaijan ‑Karabakh Armenia i Górski Karabach w procesach transformacji społecznej i politycznej społecznej transformacji w procesach Karabach i Górski Armenia USSR, pen nia: i perspektywy in of

a reintegration a fight sion

only city end which

arrested of (in Armenian the A year Moscow.” freed ). and ­dence)

Ter­ Problems sentiments had the of

to

State independent a clearly of only

of February 1988 possible for ‑Karabakh, way the Vazgen period a prison ‑Petrosyan on 16 October 1991 were

pressure had been in freedom, and

on 25 September 1989.

which in had particular later, A. Balayan,

12 activists Processes their

Sovereignty Armenia with researcher integracji with SSR dominated proclaimed returned After in formed

soon 61 when, Manukyan,

anti­ state.

Adaptation he the but had grew in aspirations Nagorno discourse became near of loyalty as

of the did became became reunification Moscow, that ‑Soviet hands ‘Polityczne ze

The main became taken

Social said Soviet well

the współczesnym after from stronger of its Armenian to Baku. ­‑Karabakh a

of

time,

(still

the and the state territorial the and their

he as the the of place

a deputy the idea nature, the

the following: became Perspectives and it known which could

transformacje Yerevan. In August 1989 theCommittee’s leader , Political became Karabakh protests sovereignty the

Armenian It marked with as the Republic was

of homeland chairman Karabakh break‑up in

in would

international part Pan­ the dispute światem’ Nagorno of Supreme

Armenian December 1988 northern be presented during Transformation], and national

“Unlike to to the ‑Armenian prime the

take

fulfilled national of against for

(within the the become Committee, w postradzieckiej

a turning

­‑Karabakh. of

its [Political Armenian first Integration the

place it of of as Committee.

movement in Supreme general the Armenia turned activists

the minister Soviet

Armenia. heroes. the the movement the Soviet the national president a factor within Moscow as was public Transformations

majority USSR; Armenian claims).Towards National Supreme Communist ed. a continuation […]

with point when to being public.

proclaimed population the out just R. Czachor, that Union). Initially, In this Soviet

(which – started this leave

towards

in the Armenii: These opinion, USSR,

movement

(it was (openness of contributed of shaped that

a few

in Contemporary was uut 1990. August the the [Armenia Movement

Armenia. Soviet Six the the it of way which 62

the states the a step dissidents Wrocław was in Party to Soviet in problemy

the days On this Moscow, Post months took Soviet according conflict’s Armenia the state the believe they envisioned

majority to was for of and of towards Armenian ­‑Soviet started and

the of after

activists 2014, the Another leadership

Declara place the 1915 authori an expres World] its Nagorno (ANM), adaptacji

gained

creation Union

Arme was trans

former basis, were later, This Arme

new that and p. 26. inde his the that

not of in to to in: ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ­ ‑ ­ ‑

35 OSW REPORT 5/2020 36 OSW REPORT 5/2020 ­Armenia van 67 66 65 64 63 68 with ­ Union. He was 1989 autumn In Imperium in December 1991. military the they the provisions foreseen later also on only dum “The border

8 December 1991 Azerbaijan Georgia ‘restoring’ And Маркедонов, С. Армении независимости о ДЕКЛАРАЦИЯ […] with www.apn.ru which wealth New in the ing influence. of of a second already the to me that tion the screen, that republic’s docu­ when proclaimed the law Belarus, took organised the the in secretary end The third

of the now – they York 1995, Similar on that imperial basis; the streets, of is Transnistria ment – in during forces. in . of been declaration Supreme secretary (with boycotted place when Independent shock he In its tour were USSR their the

This there stipulated the the declared operation Russia . between ­‑general? realised formed Markedonov surprise, Soviets!” the departure in the

groups deputy a report powers the pp. 310–311. was a day divisions statehood, over appropriate in is on 21 September 1991 boycotts could 63 their also their pages, ­‑general ‘Самоопределение exception considered and the

Soviet 68 the a shock n its In and its which in Soviet later, Armenia

States. of Once, be left of end, Ukraine the included independence R. Kapuściński, from Armenia on that it Polish ). independence). South own armed, on in some of troops of of Armenia the Kapuściński the points upon made – Moscow to the from next this of the were the all‑Union the a session However the the the

the me. of podium evening impossibility – Abkhazia), and referendums signed independent legislation. Central Republics in bearded meant arriving at Caucasus

formal out reporter Armenia Soviet territory How republics USSR the step Nagorno­ the Azerbaijan the chose has organised that on 30 August 1991. left

of

some to Imperium the of beginning execution. по could Imperium no Committee – Soviet date the , general men. in that

self www.gorby.ru. when towards , of

referendum would so‑called ленинским influence? Constitution the wrote consider Yerevan. and Supreme the someone Armenian of ­‑determination However, that to Ryszard same of 65 proclaimed ‑Karabakh). I saw is which the Azerbaijan Soviet ,

Supreme start that closed; applause.

The Armenian Union. translated instead Later – of 1989. passed the in was , end collapse. day, that Belovezha 26 December 1991 that with It was I went Council. some independence, were here for republic,

of collecting liberation принципам’ did there was the Illegal they Union me the Kapuściński Gorbachev. 66 Soviet it only declare Summing not and with this – on by and for irreparable and on was a scene the not other Soviet One independence, were is 67 Accords, part Armenian Klara Georgia the a walk militarised the

a war real of Armenia – This the 99.5% support. boycott declared army. followed in that of during which the basis of not Union. and

independence I witnessed Glowczewska, materials all revolution! the I stiffened. acknowledgment , republics as future the accordance over APN, and there USSR indeed announced

Red establishing destruction this the Moldova It was deputies of Red

n 7 ac 1991, March 17 on On this visited suddenly Soviet (fedayeen) which Army. final also his up, the is law passed 1 etme 2006, September 21 Army the independence something in incomprehensible of

Quarrelling I thought: […] on came day stay (with referendum 64 was for legislation. had

became confirming no accordance day Passersby that Vintage of the procedure the

I experienced or a declaration the (as a rule encountered, Two of Armenia. one one’s with quarrelling groups his on the of referen they in the television the its Common to Soviet the the has happen

leaders This career. book Yere USSR, Books, excep days pass own with were KGB. the the part said had any

is ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

• • • 71 70 Armenia, Armenians 69 within ward Russia’s that the the tral towards proved In the first phase first In the fear halt. Moscow’s policy towards the conflict the towards Moscow’s policy baijan and of One Regardless During

“Lenin, Nagorno­ cal confirming repute macje…’ authorities. around an instrument against and the Third – war First – full­ for Second – idea scale

authorities effectively of thanks Secondly, their sentiments property illustration a subject the ‑scale

should false; these (1987–92); setting Party, of and policy Armenia Muslim the , Gorbachev of by from NKAO p cit. op.

unification from ‑Karabakh own of

invested halt that, mass the to proclaiming from fighting of Gorbachev!” of the Yerevan two in

have of the the of ). international Turkey the a precedent towards Moscow the supported together which determination demands, Soviet the the to demonstrations Regardless the the and wanted Communist changes. the republics join , conflict establishment fights Armenian Armenians, remained ceasefire the in and authorities’ (1992–94); Azerbaijan) remaining among Armenians. decided beginnings with were and Armenia, them, to Persia. between the authorities hoped This , of law. see “We the leading Azerbaijan. Party

authorities’ the and which guaranteeing Nagorno­ situation in it creation 69 who in until trust official to escalate, with political

factions of that opposed Yerevan of this its until in see confront

Armenia, in of Armenia’s of can to

now could Soviet

of effective would lasted Russia the Gorbachev’s position,

it in

activities way. the the a chain ‑Karabakh the calculations of in the be would in Moscow, This the order (1994–). USSR, CIS, any Karabakh until 1991.

1988, February war which Nonetheless, divided encourage as early Based Azerbaijan. have its Soviet the the was the a natural was, to change new reaction management until stop territorial words!” conflict met Soviet USSR’s bring the stage as at had elite.

despite conflict on into with that decision first leaders it the the movement ally the Union to Opponents (A. Balayan,

was these of was to more one time, protests 70 which centre, three consider concept Moscow centrifugal

defending ceasefire of the

the The latter also

on 17 April 1991 could integrity; had the

(and only all, and they

Nagorno­ calculations, nations used it republic’s ceased phases: from of hopes of could 71 hear could caused

revealed and the ‘Polityczne

the the indirectly perestroika Christian in which was the the which to its such reformist assumption strength its tendencies

for Soviet exist Soviet ‑Karabakh be possibility which to first convinced to influence the nationalise

by demand slogans borders, showed put hard its

as Armenia into transfor phase ended central histori Azer their a state group part also

cen the for dis of to as as ‑ ‑ ‑ ­ ‑ ­

37 OSW REPORT 5/2020 38 OSW REPORT 5/2020 75 74 73 72 were Moscow’s In parallel, jointly nian ing to the tia the troops the the situation pacified lation. Officially, and several sion one early disarm of cent regions Data

OMON The legal the T. Świętochowski, were was On 5 May 1991 OMON, confiscation During in Operation introduced even taking tled today, the session special, officers, other an indispensable de facto de local hand, Stepanakert. during community closed June 1991, USSR ‘On the local

a shared by from provided used On 20 January 1990, though the thousand and control (in Russian: the of this with population. central on Soviet support basis the on the

had

to a its illegal blockade in Armenians), the and ban (both Operation of operation report the the city – repress ‘Ring’ name in the Supreme counterparts they the

reason weapons for declared the of the of management consent central Stepanakert both the assistance NKAO several and this to creating Azerbejdżan i Rosja Azerbejdżan chairman Kremlin’s (a few

were bore people issued for Moscow Armenian ОМОН, of different Azerbaijan SSR. almost the operation the inhabitants Soviet

the Azerbaijani in for of intermediary During war Baku republics, all of and located ‘Ring’

cases population

by illegal OMON the

militia Nagorno­ can authorities the Oтряд days the dozen

on adjacent and of

of in stating Memorial kinds state hallmarks and 170 civilians also the before of which the Armenia, refusal was

total. intervention formations outside divisions military the their

(Russian: units only милиции earlier Armenian oblast of be of … the 25 July 1990 Baku in that people of among territories making emergency’s , of riots. ‑Karabakh: found operation, op. cit. op. forces illegal , 74 two created

Azerbaijan. the the which

air the 73 the

of of 19 ethnic had between and The operation were The declared goal of wanted other Under genocide. that in other

in methods the formations , Soviet особого

area connections collapse storage’. already Supreme pp. 240–241. on 17 May of were Koltso other is on Baku in 1988 of were them have

Armenian was available Armenian actions. also commanders, the the a modified where decree the which

former not them. назначения roads been Army used Armenian On 15 January 1990 Azerbaijan killed, , to there to Soviet, 72 the Soviet Кольцо), killed dependent disciplining territory of a resolution been

stop the ensure by This

by in at

­‑inhabited and protection Soviet the the

name, from place lasted the operation and took Сумгаит.инфо

foreseen operated Levon had including Armenia entered people’s and President Army assistance law SSR Soviet USSR check – republics. throughout 1989). the Special OMON which

been of place Armenia and Ter thisoperation was (although over from villages on by

the and the Internal was a state ­‑Petrosyan, Azerbaijan’s entered public USSR was passed of the of between itself demands, still Purpose NKAO another sending Azerbaijani in the was 700 wounded. , NKAO Armenian being

late the www.sumgait.info. were were of found documents legislation operates based, different parallel order, Soviet to emergency during

in and carried local April implemented. Ministry’s Militia also the Baku October 1990, claimed Azerbaijan’s and expelled, Yerevan and Union pogrom support expres and divisions in becom expelled, on was to forms a closed oblast Arme and popu Russia until with which adja mili Unit) and was out the that enti on the of of 75 ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

78 76 Azerbaijan. 77 The general The reason This was who weapons Moscow Even rise in Nagorno­ in nomic to the towards time baijan before baijan be Caspian a consortium side some strate of Moscow’s engagement in the conflict the in engagement of Moscow’s of even on 6 March 1992 of Armenians T. de Waal, In the

Moscow. February the ­ outside Armenian Ibidem combined New tial form to to were in resulted was restored

though time agreement their APF was and and York elections have power the ,

unofficial Sea Turkey, pp. 92–93. continued from Ayaz of attempting with and Moscow’s after ‑Karabakh still state, military and throughout for Based Nagorno­ . Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War and Peace through Azerbaijan and Armenia Garden. Black

ended power elections run shelf n alliance an from of 76 he

London 2003, his had of military the Mutallibov, the ). being the the

talks to the Western P. Adamczewski, through

which tried

However, the ceasefire been as

on mandate)

to these construction change the and the proponent to aid. that collapse

a result ‑Karabakh control, projects be

Azerbaijani on 7 June 1992 reached. to ruled (large­ Azerbaijani

implement to warehouses, fact

scare USSR), representatives soon delivered conduct plans, pp. 90–91. Pan­ in between companies the return of Nagorno the it is by that ‑scale he ‑Turkic

of of of tactics territory and began the presented Górski Karabach w polityce Karabach Górski

pro­ of last while

the

was as the the quite war, Armenia an independent

­‑Karabakh

to pro ­ a pro

which oil ‑Russian to Popular military well Baku Supreme its First USSR, forced failures of

to and were and office pipeline ideas, building international the ­‑independence which clear Elchibey’s earlier ‑Western of send as in Secretary to and would one the

and – Armenia. won to was while , early 1993, support to activities Front which in (together that Communists; was Azerbaijan characterised Soviet. near­ on retaliate which Ankara, flee an oil policy according administration mid­ by now allow the the the the policy … foreign ‑open (APF). Abulfaz to in ‑May ,

of markets – with op. cit. op. 78 the 77 took being fall Nagorno­ Soviets pipeline – full­

Moscow started the

dissidents towards The Armenian the Azerbaijani to the for and transit local orientation, support some , ‑scale of large , te Supreme (the place pp. 147–149. South policy, Mutallibov New Communist the planned the

ruled were Elchibey, Mutallibov the the wanted reliable in Communist fees ‑Karabakh

York president after were seizure amounts the in war conducting one February 1992). perspective second phase second Caucasus (both whereas for by for June University oil reports – conflict oil

was Armenia) that a few democrats, disturbing Armenian the to especially offensive from resigned pipeline Party brought of in and demon with raging of at Soviet leader would

front. party Azer their Azer days. an ini took

Press, this eco the the for was the of of ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

39 OSW REPORT 5/2020 40 OSW REPORT 5/2020 79 Aliyev. The turning To paraphrase 81 80 when warehouses withdrew which From ini­ ing to pan­ kara Subordination toMoscow was thepricewhich Soviet be bey’s an end sian ston, oil competition only effective Armenia The June In practice,

return tiated interpreted August 1996. pipeline ветских Мoscow 2001. Moscow who country, States In the kent niu uczestniczą instytucje międzynarodowe międzynarodowe instytucje uczestniczą niu about bey’s sile ‑Turkism weapons assistance eternal openly removal we what

systems. Armenia 79 was at republics. Pact) loss to the

last in After that can ­‑backed and offensives Pact took to Elchibey’s союзных was from attack Whose of

sidelines was months responsible is running

of Russia time power Mutallibov, and supported to point say to See the power known controlled

pp. 3–28. from

was the transformed he (on 24 September 1993; the as by and the Surat this the joined Development first held the that 81 perpetual of

came an attempt Armenian республик. (on 18 June 1993 equipped of mid

Russian which in Yerevan’s interpreted the integration power OSW protection. these Armenian Huseynov state project), the in through power. today, Russia Yerevan’s ­‑nineteenth war

February post the to he Baku for report, to events, into by but the the legitimised forces power, join. and

army International of interests. Часть 6 building Tashkent it is the the Moscow who, does NKR Armenians this speaker Armenia. to decision and in In 2002, Konflikty zbrojne na terenie państw WNP, w których rozwiązywa w których WNP, państw terenie na zbrojne Konflikty see the Collective the forces in On the initiatives Kremlin minimise as policy quite threatening the army. divisions

Nagorno З. Тодуа, president and - office he led not

я’ century destruction ( in real a , ONZ, OBWE ONZ, of

Военное Nagorno­ the invited the presidential probably to parliament, have in ‘Современное clear were June 1993 Institutions Pact, was it Security towards other It is

Collective ­‑Karabakh Azerbaijan was

Nagorno­ Азербайджанский пасьянс Азербайджанский oil left which escaped to political the using

which undertaken British eternal

driven that

обозрение also march the pipeline ) Russian eventually this hand,

‑Karabakh [Armed Treaty losses elections Armenia decidedtopay for Rus wanted modern of the Security from Moscow currently have Moscow clear system (the weapons was

were on ‑Karabakh organisation состояние

the Prime second by allies Organisation. project Azerbaijan’s joining Baku, the accompanied Conflicts , Participated that

14 October 2016, Lukoil (in the Russian plan that on 3 October 1993. fear Treaty stationed capital the by

taken

most of directly Minister or conflict played came came Moscow and includes ПВО

of for presidency the collective which perpetual on Shturm‑S (also

to important to

which end [Azerbaijani Turkey

the a major UN, (the by Nakhchivan). стран – over around the in 1999) contributed from on 15 May 1992 came CIS. known a role signing ­ in

a rebellion Territories (at that the

Lord www.topwar.ru. consortium could was

Armenia). six anti by To learn undertook

Moscow’s office бывших from Russians after as the enemies, security

Caspian in

in

­‑tank Russia). Heydar Palmer Solitaire], former provid should the of to OSCE)], Elchi Baku offer Aliyev, by time in of Elchi more

Tash the the An mis CIS the the со 80 ‑ ­ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

Azerbaijan Armenia). Azerbaijan, 82 was The third phase of the Russian engagement in the Nagorno­ the in engagement Russian the of phase The third jan jan relations in important. moment, instrument instrument together proved flict bring Over authorised a mediator and ­activities several support conflict, which has lasted until today until lasted has which conflict, of of ceasefire These

‑littoral the this the Status power nia’s include jan effect on 8 July 2019 that Armenia used unrecognised from and a very Baku (it does time, about (which region dependence OSCE as format, that on occasions, political then instruments: of for states. with Russia’s undertaking an economic before with Moscow its agreement in the Instead, all is important by of Russia’s is a ‘strategic It should in encourages became it is the Armenia. economy. not bilateral reinforced Caspian the Minsk (political, significantly these para has the Russia’s the its instruments both important in de factode on capable then. support joined, Armenians, ­‑states relations Russian United Kremlin); later has substantial and it is instrument: factors Sea formal sides Group military people be which one, and control From military Consequently, no which

of as involved discussed alteration assets, military, years reduced by 1) its gas, of remembered include Abkhazia well either States longer partner’); of to trilateral

with and allies. using have tourism and instruments, established the forbids learn

and 4) Western especially as brought Moscow’s the over Moscow Moscow the the the activities the for outset Armenia as numerous side, and made and economic the acted conflict force number Russian the of the following: from provision the a mediator, quite

Russian South formats. state 3) its

in France decision presence the even resolution n end an Russia South in it that the had presented Armenia abroad as possessions of n 1992. in turn, also , some in Ossetia; two and borders; (Armenia Russian a party began included control Nagorno­ ‘destructive language). and though and already despite Nagorno­ to to in (see Caucasus support include actively Russia’s Georgia, Azerbaijan. stop countries (energy Caspian to which to time multiform soft as of tourists of of with Russia defend Appendix 2). the in all its for or the the this

it ‑Karabakh Regardless its the the 2018 Convention first undertaken power now airline ‑Karabakh sector, is but its waters own a participant has from for post participated President full‑on military exceptional and the in a ‘strategic has economic potential’ also conflict at ­‑Soviet co‑chairs its siding its Georgia it ties connections railways) impact 82 peace signing the of the prevented war, to has ); interests, mediation of military bases Aliyev Armenia of war. 2) its this, conflict most integration very instruments, Independently and been

which

with with Armenia intermediary alliance proposals instruments in as (Russia ‑Karabakh tourism family. in position of had this ally’ in Since Armenia privileged well beginning forces with important on and

the the the 1994 Yerevan Azerbai Azerbai and the a negative the the are efforts. as group Azerbai formats Georgia The soft while work of is most with

Arme Legal these that con and has can key not also non and on as ‑ ‑ ‑ ­ ‑ ‑

41 OSW REPORT 5/2020 42 OSW REPORT 5/2020 (the clashes Armenia 84 83 when Moscow Moscow Most Union President Putinandthepresidentsof Eastern In recent mediary. military integration. mal in nia ter to the larly Shoigu, Group Over On 2 April 2016 Comprehensive step on 3 September 2013 decision of other organisations S. Ananicz, s mentioned As bringittoan end,orimposetheirown agenda fighting, inthepeaceprocess, Moscow with ‘Armenia’s Republic. membership the European ber 2017, ber 2017 a ceasefire Russian to security

put revealed the probably, it intermediaries, withdraw in 2013 (the US ; contributed held Partnership had an end activities to (Sargsyan) was next Moscow’s years Armenia www.osw.waw.pl). agreement by participate 84 ministers ‘Armenia took guarantees both of telephone

Union, on and first the reacted above, three and was the the the President to

Free from two signed place the chiefs Collective the join and the France), negotiated. power to Kremlin with although turns mediation Moscow’s to after days Summit occasions: by agreement political Trade of later three­ react signing including the the force the from 2 in the conversations for

away the of foreign Comprehensive Security there their Putin and the EU – Moscow

this quick general the and ‑year neither formal presidents blackmailed the to from Areas in post­ Yerevan was effectiveness will to 5 April 2016). the This successes para­

meeting the was when limited issued conflict’s affairs Treaty the ending the which negotiations not obligations ‑Soviet Association ­‑led and staffs (DCFTA) of renewed EU’ ‑state Russian a series

at Armenia and pretends two

the and Organisation, , whom the with a statement Eurasian the 4 September 2013, of and their was at of should

of Yerevan Enhanced also

other Kremlin level parties in integration the

Novo­ instruments towards

the their of defence, to their diplomatic order envisioned of between was activities fighting of conduct

demonstrated Russian that Russia’s

Agreement four­ Other phone an Association co‑chairs ‑Ogaryovo Economic have do

armed to Partnership able counterparts

Yerevan, with Azerbaijan, aswell asa visit effectively to Yerevan not regarding ‑day accept a multivectoral Sergei stop Armenia’s www.osw.waw.pl. states established include to format Armenia conversations Federation in policies to withdrawing offensive allowing to forces. war prevent resulting Nagorno­ of calls with Union near be its Agreement Agreement Lavrov had and

the

the (2016). the pressured the was initialled role

for Nagorno were During in Moscow. been the and policy’ international OSCE the weakness it from instead; showed crisis, (Putin) a Deep both announced as a ceasefire. ‑Karabakh to and On 24 Novem European European (CEPA) Yerevan’s (W. Górecki, outbreak spectacu the between , its an inter engaged ­‑Karabakh stop Armenia’s 29 Novem the Minsk Arme Sergei states. at while infor EU. This that and and and with the the lat of 83 ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

(in Armenia s part As At the The example 85 88 87 86 weapons Minister Medvedev’s Nagorno­ in in to tion two tered them then, tions plan particularly panied forces and sation’ of of edge, edged According W. Górecki, This

support areas this the the (see Ibidem 30% thought the On Cooperation coherent included rates, etc.). tude that in sides of to include and significant and on

Appendix 2). this four­ same had

military concept, considerable a towards the of way). resolve Armenian Medvedev . of

affected ‑Karabakh Armenia other this to

Medvedev the that Eastern still document, (see

‑day issue end its attack, to the both visit ‘Nagorno during time, 87 published research the part of widely the conflict issue, hand, the ally’s

do the the ­‑industrial This Appendix 3). supported so‑called

war. purchases opposite, Russia’s Partnership EU, as states by limitations to today. idea public of however, Kremlin if but conflict, during share research referred - Russia’s 37% were Karabakh: enemy conflict the data military Yerevan as

88 example

and not in the it is and that it September 2017, in while from 86 of

Russian Russian supply Deputy with known opinion, population

likely shuttle order to Moscow Armenians states, Russia’s the published his bloc, neutral, anyway. wanted which domain. the Russian as Moscow what is 35% thought in activity, and This is the ‘abdication’

Moscow’s trip Yerevan correlated that weapons showed its feared to of confirmed an illustration politicians’ is ‘Lavrov Prime and diplomacy Baku Russia

which was the initiatives. maintain in argument policy arms decided to to in 34% Protests peace­ 2017 spring ­‑based 5% negative. was did deployment

which that Armenia the reinforce on that signalled an increase plan’, up of on 7–8 April 2016.

Minister preferential illustrates consent, not argues as towards respondents with of to?’ region Russia of Analytical ‑keeping many not that was

visits

the , both the the along manage have 13 April 2016, taking 85 does as of

never the to was This that Aliyev’s as balance Russia during that part West, Russian opinion and rather a

Dmitri sides then put terms the 48% to Centre not only Kremlin’s these how perceived in presented forces of Moscow led place Yerevan this of to conflict. who any anti­

n EU an partially which (lower convince troops of at Armenians would www.osw.waw.pl. Prime on position to push its of ambiguous Rogozin, lines

that is least the Globalisation greater ‑Russian

This a kind at would was power ­‑financed Russia policy in a way prices, was bilateral has in de facto de the a form conflict through an ally, Minister the continue were with also plan’s one the had in a certain as

image also of attractive time, between be towards pressure Azerbaijani for who Armenia’s of of Azerbaijan project a positive sentiment

expressed aftermath which and in its ‘internali

its a consistent, deployed acknowl opposed Moscow assump encoun policies its of charge elements accom Dmitri Regional knowl Prime to Russia.

which shows credit own sec sell the the ally, atti on ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

43 OSW REPORT 5/2020 44 OSW REPORT 5/2020 war‑Georgian in 2008(previously, (the 102 89 91 90 why Moscow’s For regarded ner’ increased interests in image ing the the ting their the towards policy least and as a kind sian sia sible. sian showed society ship thefeatures of security co‑operation country. According The base, This Armenia Moscow’s It has in in ence

was Azerbaijani the Azerbaijan, first Russian the Russian (Moscow’s pressure control and June 2017). the ‘silent comprehensive Secondly, 90

could of of

been key – nd EU, began increased southern Russia’s

and the Baku

place – Western Russia’s Russian of Russia in as although with profits goal favour

be

to in as

base phase and consent’, counterbalance a significant the and representatives began over opened seen, some place with garrisons on was to and

is CIS, until 2044. privileged authorities’ Azerbaijan towards

the the region – determination, as in Armenian Baku – perceive for to Azerbaijani since from the instrumental purchases of in Military integration the Moscow cautiously a formal allianceanddeveloping a network of Yerevan. a partner Russian example, NKR;

include strategic a path the the in so‑called no Soviet dependence region, Azerbaijan’s Gyumri oil case war became military long­ prompted although how and relations times. experts, in Base to became ­‑led by conclusion to elites – ‘GU(U)AM’. the In the of Azerbaijan’s with determined and and to and its alliance ‑term structures. relations

gas proclaiming

high Russian Armenian treatment position integration which at Yerevan, entire and permanent most the action without Azerbaijan hadimplementeda pro­ Georgia). formally on sales. Gyumri). referring to over case more with especially Baku achievement arms the on Russia active noticeable it in that ­‑Russian South there at arms with the time, of costs in purchases has One the the Moscow’s both attractive This to any

participation of Armenia, block Nagorno­ This without its conflict. moment 89 other military structures. established open limited Russia.

is by form

Caucasus – as agreements rei – Armenia By of clear sides the equal the change no war – Azerbaijan,

mentioned from this especially giving the for the hosts (Based country the military alternative of position declarations to ‑Karabakh Russia’s of presence Russia distance the

in possibility Russian Russian alliance this weakening which, Moscow

around country

the was the guarantee on the This with development bloc with as opening‑up OSW were conflict as firstly after 91 ones – bilateral as above, acceptance, 4000 Russian means a of

on would a ‘strategic which foreign were, from assistance in Turkey interviews was intended

a guarantor pro the because Azerbaijan would up tiesbetween the to of this the

­‑Western of continued a result

join to Armenian a popular cemented should its

both one

‑Western and seal explains Western relation Russian­ country greater to policy). be of to serves future soldiers. of in NATO of ensure hand,

or part states how

Rus Rus Rus dur Baku put pos pres the

its be in of of at ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

The conflict’s impact on political relations in the South Caucasus South the in relations political on impact The conflict’s h Nagorno The 94 93 92 will window not ince is integrity moved involved, introduced itself would integration not resulted the for have halted border both lieonthemaintransitroutefor theregion’s oilandgaspipelines. bility Georgia’s ­allowed sides, compense during country – option existing

Indirectly, also W. Górecki, Ibidem Ethnic people khlo, market trade Armenian

only admission allow be in only of which

interested

the discussed with closer the 2008 of at southern for

.

Azerbaijan’s Tbilisi Armenian from to from These members – increased were and the

but one location Russian which both participation separatist for

(Moldova the these with likely border ‘Teraz Armenia). Armenia performed would proposals also ­‑Karabakh the open together, territorial Georgian these the

of outside to profits

Separatism Russian­ the leads later in

Georgia loss Dżawachetia? a new with Georgia, profit fact have forces and Georgia’s land having not and ‘good EU. membership and aspirations may ‘under has included

citizens of Armenia in to that

Should received world. Azerbaijan. be its as

in border Clearly, ‑Georgian this politically possibly control concessions state Russia Armenia been in conflict to mostly offices’. the possible they the good the good the Southern (of Georgian, use

Ormiański the importance, chapter). and table’,

into granted third In the a military country organisation’s have long left and share in strong relations its over close of The vast relations

inhabited in 94 which has ­‑running could

the Georgia], war. been the the (with in from

territory the However, Georgia’s state to

separatyzm in part early 1990s,

either similar The most Armenian years

the affected significantly this ethnic security (and EAEU Eurasian is the majority veto this conflict but Iran). with in border operation an important Analizy OSW Analizy of with may status). by conflict 2016–17 the

Armenia its for also conflict Black Azerbaijan’s work Armenians requires the problems w południowej still and Armenians Georgia 93 of

with

guarantees). important not region. lands, both

attacking Economic limited the For erupt

of allows be) Azerbaijani Nagorno­ the , Azerbaijan,

an open Sea as zone transactions no. 3, Moscow only part this Baku (the economic or Armenian the as n observer­ an as the there, harbours – Tbilisi platform of 28 February 1998. regarding it Azerbaijan. reason,

(Nagorno­ well state’s in transit ­‑air

the the Gruzji’ and of ‑Karabakh membership – to Union targets consent nationalities) and 92

which probed market ‘Lavrov these receive

Armenia taking as However, income, states and located [Now

Yerevan Armenia through the government to in was

in ‑Karabakh bazar ‑state gains is Baku plan’. territorial place host of exchange Javakhetia? the

Armenia but This fact benefits some its a place directly Georgia conflict as (a prov

all on would allowed in

possi well since

main in have have both that was this Sada has has the the the did this re­ for as ‑ ‑ ‑

45 OSW REPORT 5/2020 46 OSW REPORT 5/2020 ‑keeping 97 96 95 Despite European Russia’s It should 2.2. remain mander military tense trouble­ the tory, tant the that has because Ossetia. Gyumri; a few any actionaimedatregainingNagorno military ­ and sian scale of could countries). ders estimated The As well Statement

its 0 km, 200 800 km, в Нагорном lated many by Nagorno­ conflict The economic proved Turkey) Georgia one soldiers with Azerbaijan a decision of territory relations potentially years

that some

people open the

the at response Regardless or of this as was activity also

in four with Union,

that

the 97 an increase mediatory to from its the Russian and later, military ‑Karabakh

Карабахе Azerbaijan allows stationed

of President for could to and

to for yearly be be Turkey current lengths greater of beyond between earn time. press a prevent are participates remembered

more Armenia, the its generate in when of to (and

revenues a living clearly

of

its in

over activities still 102 five dimension 96 a statement de iure de Tbilisi’s Azerbaijan of failure movement

forces interview the Russia’s - Saakashvili distance challenging. troops Abkhazia in Armenia’s я conflict

Russia’s Armenia 5 km, 250 has Iran база closed neighbours. Georgia expansiveness

Gyumri in state from very threaten to the

open are может and in (provoked) and was to

of which in

that this main crisis with 95 borders today

serious affairs. regional from in deployed 2013; October pass (with

of military and by the right and withdrew crossings the market could December 2005. вмешаться – also

Russia’s Azerbaijan conditions goods The borders Tbilisi of Colonel aims only loss The situation South through US, Yerevan, Ukraine (February 2020). are: Russia’s a signal after Armenia)

threats amounted intervene; transport

attack in with as for of and engagement) the with policy ‘При

at Ossetia

the (including from of the 2008 war, well foreign Командир’ Andrei control that Iran its the 1990s borders its people from to ‑Karabakh. Otherwise, theRus

more to region, возобновлении to on the of borders as territory are Azerbaijan around signing US$1 billion). Georgia. became operation – policy

projects, this for Armenia separatist (the Tskhinvali region). most

Ruzinsky, loss joining the over , difficult blocked (independent 1news.az, (Iran the with

Moscow overall. was This Nakhchivan km, 35 or of with of the the more victorious which to In case

control

admitted

if is and

NATO – the Georgia The market situation (with военного to reach with 31 October 2013.

DCFTA part the as forces access, less Russia, Russian the

not could active neighbouring economists has the started Georgia exclave) most of of base’s Azerbaijan significant undertake over its

open

the конфликта and

Armenia result in renewed

with as was its demand and Georgia is around base impor peace­ South much around more more

almost large terri closed with com Iran calcu bor the the of in ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

‘longitudinal’ projectswhich haveAll theinfrastructure beencompletedsincethe 1990s(and 99 98 war way would which For impossible ing impeded inyan influential is trade exchange takes althoughtherearealso placeviatransitthroughGeorgia, this phenomena business andpoliticalconnections)corruption.PrimeMinisterPash from key. lost limits Georgia and Iran,(in theNAR exclave) withTurkey (as mentionedabove, Baku has already and Tbilisi. a shorter direct collapse, electrical especially The only These its was collection ple modernised of Russian only tion Armenia in the line During in activated deep Moscow

is have flight (as mentioned the schemes its are a bilateral this were old generated and ran trying border access

route, Iran–Armenia grid participation infrastructure concerns being service

dependence social Railways). railway to run Armenia hasalsolostitslandconnections(roadandrail)withTur usually Georgian the

as (Mozdok–Tbilisi–Yerevan). connections. was through Turkey, another which projects use and in project.

the through to Soviet avoiding not to crossings in planned autumn 2017), class caused the eliminate Nakhchivan involved rail some the pleased oligarchisation connections W. Górecki, the and gas In addition, Abkhazia negative above, offices republic. investment alternative period, from links – that by

on pipeline, Armenia in tensions ‘latitudinal’ the with publications the Russian now) were

of Russia. regional lives Russia after these ‘A revolution high the same the see the some consequence completed as and opened In turn, opened capital, South demonstrative with have but off

failed, later in mountains, border line a result the problems, sections with route of This, to

was

the relations also and Caucasus

projects Russia for bypassed social plan which Iran, from in information in in

temporarily. country’s closed the use the

instalments…’, is in this with concerns the of international of to were used the

at night which turn, oil of life Russia

post which Railway, blockade the the although chapter). build through with Soviet

which

Turkey the and in 1992, not ­‑Soviet Armenia, on (the emergence searches beginning by conflict). generates deficit welcomed the Nagorno­

were gas the were Moscow. gas which a Caspian which the op. cit. op. Thus, informal Azerbaijan period pipeline by

was Azerbaijan pipelines 98

in existing, his undertaken Baku–Tbilisi– economic

planned is there of 2007. In addition, economy Azerbaijan connection which by a 100% daughter runs closed, which undertakings Armenian­ ‑Karabakh 99 connections such the from

oil All in However, Kremlin

through included went although of by Russia pipeline significantly Soviet is to these

undesirable (namely but trade. and

Armenia’s a rich participat run Armenia ‑Turkish makes

with and through after have (for conflict profits Armenia company this things times; along

corrup Baku have This exam that and rail been few, the the was its tax it ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

47 OSW REPORT 5/2020 48 OSW REPORT 5/2020 (although Azerbaijan various The social 102 101 100 Regardless Kars Baku 2.3. munity. mean nection in tioned tant taking the transports from have has both states, which areincreasingly unwilling topermitcontactsbetween their Georgia along theCaspianSea coastisenvisioned for launchlaterin 2020. and Iran citizens) course disappearance There Georgia’s During Julfa result are and ). through to still since 2016 The social conflict proved link

Nakhchivan, line), through Baku worsened also that needs above place as (in NAR) international is of (via The broken has the initially as

in local already Armenia. the transit new unique

cost

is to while both a train to

non­ Soviet of has a result land region,

Iranian proved Nagorno without possible (process train be and Armenia

whether of even generations ‑profitable), of built. a line position lost the dimension Russia period,

has from

a direct transport impeded on connections the

from the though ­‑Karabakh

investment including Once of run from the historical to these railways)

sense

once ratings. Armenia’s which, the Nagorno

as where to Nakhchivan (andfurther the

be Iran. once and it a regional it is Baku railway this Moscow–Tehran railway the

the routes has again conflict.

(see of running a week ready, come conflict. is Georgia as to it it

a large ­ a pan implementation main Armenia Map). ties with the been ­‑Karabakh well should runs climate transport

participation, (thanks it

connections from via border connection of will Otherwise, between detour. ‑Caucasian ­ The above as Turkey.

economic from involved to age, will Iran

the train be those be city the

hub, in

possible

and city to In the and be recalled,

operated is

Turkey conflict of its

Iranian the

some especially 100 Armenians of technically Astara, able running decreased

between

NAR, is ‑mentioned Nakhchivan difficult between in At the

of beneficiary to above Georgia cultural pipelines partially renew

on the any to to in but is on to on city this in addition send ­‑mentioned partially Armenia moment the infrastructural trilateral oil from railway the

route, Baku geopolitical of would

its and and has and possible, Armenia’s to Yerevan) section

being and , region line to principal gas of which Russia become civilisational Azerbaijanis connections and most the

transportation, taking the from this receive and initiatives that train stimulated ran 101

likely Iran Baku–Tbilisi–

in includes has a branch allows (through situation Astara to Thiswould connection position

Azerbaijan through location. runs practice to an impor ­ a natu Armenia. territory be running projects Iran, from railway running to

a con from Tabriz men with com Baku; Rasht is there Baku the ral the by in in 102 it ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

Accord, years To illustrate This words isa whole that the region organismwhose orany disintegration, attempt was 104 103 Russia First its it representatives to the political unofficially pro­ ficult, less literally been Chechen Georgia, and signed states education; of escalation There

declares).

secede youth surroundings Konflikty zbrojne na terenie państw WNP państw terenie na zbrojne Konflikty generation NGOs paragraph aspects and perestroika ber ‑Russian breaking

consistently Heydar prepared process Chechen possible after

of make. especially while and in and the Peace is

impossible. leaders Armenia of willing War from no Kislovodsk of the board democratisation. members

projects ’s I have period of data Aliyev supported their policies While

the is the off the and even had War ceasefire there upon Russia, also of on from

region’s would drawn of or to scale Nagorno­ since implemented), the

and topics the Economic of started even

(an armistice Georgia is at respectively. ties. join aimed

affected Solidarity former After Boris (although no overall in Armenia,

the upon Azerbaijan: inhabitants of would before. representatives). the information not the 103 in It is projects Russia’s were

changes ‑Karabakh turn

dissident Nagorno­ my (in its the 2008 e.g. at Yeltsin’s mid-1990s, number worth opts have rebels). Fund by and This personal unavoidably limited of since

the still Azerbaijan for pointing … is PL, been The document run North was Cultural while

on conflict initial circles. of the ,

especially Eduard that op. cit. op. ‑Karabakh,

remain a pro­ the such which different initiative In the Russian­ experience military Pashinyan by being present to able we details out Azerbaijan have projects Caucasus phase, foreign ‑Western ‘soft’ provides A similar in resolution

Cooperation may here Shevardnadze, true bring new to touch: and negotiated ‑Georgian of taken

foreign from sign that century, conflict areas of and their (which by consider both development circumstances, activists Georgia, came was NGOs they great individual the the during

course, implementation. their signed declaration remains place such are had often Shevardnadze years entitled then policy to in 2016, became misery that from in war, in prepared established the names power,

as and 2014–15, the the in very Levon representatives Armenia assistance on 3 June 1996, presidents end the is culture, and declaration choices uninvolved the Caucasus’. last ‘For later after first the to by intense in would much under

That when they the Ter region contact especially different all. disputes phase South Inter­ recruitment concentrated made is the ­‑Petrosyan and is Caucasian 104 which science I was are of pursuing more why not of Yeltsin’s during Caucasian talks ‑ethnic Second

the and Russia, Aliyev which entities) of It was (or so being a mem them in have

older two and the the the dif this the by or in on ‑ ‑

49 OSW REPORT 5/2020 50 OSW REPORT 5/2020 Altogether, These 106 105 Iran Iranian 3.1. neighbourhood distant more its and 3. The conflict rations its in initiatives. is nature. took the to to from Since but before gain almanac an Armenian allow for alliance some sia, of ers. of In the Tehran

larger ensure exploit buffer both Tehran of a the mediation

Iran region these resulting review The former, and (or rather its part all of issues its days, the territory

years 2011–13. of

positions the Among with its was than Turkey’s three titled Azerbaijani separatismtodevelop (the Azerbaijani populationinIran outset proposals zone and (together of

them Russia’s would the nineteenth under is

above­ three the n pig 1992, spring In region’s also pan­ available Baku, military from it is services for Turkey’s journal first for Южный Кавказ Южный states re‑gain) afraid ‑Caucasian greater the the anti to ‑mentioned issues grow, from

Iran’s interest The journal them. in weaker were which

their with ­‑Iranian peace a large online neighbours of Nagorno­ most on Azerbaijan as an Azerbaijani century offensive the and Azerbaijan’s and of their positions security: auspices. well not In addition, their at historical Nowa Europa Wschodnia Europa Nowa

plan, could in interesting Israeli the

position www.apsnyteka.org/438 did extent, new initiatives that accepted. Armenian­ the ‑Karabakh pan­ former

as not

journal American (Southern when

operations. which

mobilise Washington (especially the formats conflict itself); cover in ­‑Israeli ‑Turkic the However,

have Nagorno­ experiences. territory. after three

influence the Iran Russia Caucasus were In turn, ones are alliance, ‑Azerbaijani Stepanakert

topic and been conflict initially for and plans Iran’s the Caucasus), was rarer para­

website

Iran published. of was ‑Karabakh. of became the talks would 106 -

and Russian collapse the yuzhny_kavkaz_almanach.html motivated in

afraid in a possible come ‑states own

region

Turkey,

and conflict of and Russian­ a April 1993 talks has took Tehran the (in Polish). Baku’s on enter Azerbaijani then

a player usually negotiations Turkey) to which been that Caucasus – several counterparts) the 105

of were on that was possible fruition. Later in

principle. by and the into rejected. American form the ‑language drawing turn, Turkish are to gathered their broken of

there – Soviet more Ankara US’s and agreement on ­ an anti become

of an ephemeral in

minority The content hoped that Iran

fear some global took the position After that, diplomats occasions, attention attack Union in off ‑Iranian in is, authors literary wanted offered to . of region. a kind Also prepa to

peace order the place

from after

play

Rus and of see use on see

in to all ‑ ‑ ‑

‑first (together Ankara The failure Turkish These This attitudewas importantenoughfor Turkey while 108 107 ise relations(preparedtogether withtheparticipationof national nian the ties to opentwo monthslater).However, didnottake placebecause theratification tioning by bothparliaments(andthe fication foreign for On the although and an intermediary a visit attempts served suscitating casus on of cols – conflict, asgenocide.der shouldberecognised This Armenia’s stronginternalresistanceinbothstates, andespecially becauseof October 1992. Yerevan Azerbaijan other of borders foreign

century

on 10 October 2009 after on docu­ Azerbaijan, took by

the one meeting itself has policy effectively banks which teams

establishing with at initially hand, Turkey’s place ments,

network minister Armenia’s of the hand, involve not normalising with

as minister

the and a few President and (Yerevan’s (in Baku’s there). seemed

collapse established Azerbaijan’s Azerbaijan in in Armenia). there Armenian­ which this of negotiated get weeks President its failed the Azerbaijan of foreign

economy). blockade diplomatic In April 2009

the was was talks, possible alliances was after of threatened Sargsyan, relations view, to in goal

borders affairs the in

not and dismissed ‑Turkish diplomatic the an alliance involve ally Zurich were Abdullah which with Soviet pro the and of was connected until Turkey. at (see that

The intensification relations

­‑Turkish Armenia’s supposed that with only he with the Turkey to both their to itself he 108 Armenian­ the normalisation Appendix 2). had watched Union time withdraw after

Gül’s Yerevan that,despiteTurkey’s support assistance

said diversify relations Yerevan clearly wanted toseparateits between legitimate Ankara The first Turkey Elchibey end sides

foreign been was

in to and blockading that a statement to to borders and of the any come a football accepted

Yerevan ‑Turkish borderwas supposed

came developing established the from re‑opened, more

Armenian the 1915 Armenia the Nagorno­ with alliance Armenia’s ministers new of Hovannisian. means first to process

into of Switzerland, in Nagorno­ power the than

independent peace

their relations July 1992,

on 6 September 2008 a roadmap American diplomats), decade match during force of Nagorno­ ‑Karabakh was and

in US$10 billion bilateral in in

signed enforced putting Azerbaijan. transport Russia­ He initiatives, ‑Karabakh the the approached Russia; after between of was a Council 107 started

the which South hope ‑Karabakh

two mass to theactivi dismissed

the Arme ‑oriented their relations. Armenia, pressure and conflict. normal twenty and routes proto of from their with mur posi Cau war. was rati­ pre

on re­­ by of in ­ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

51 OSW REPORT 5/2020 52 OSW REPORT 5/2020 ‑oriented Amendment 907 This would 110 109 Moldova For Iran, 3.2. ments mer this then tion the territories’ (­ twenty peared flict from key hiero­ States. Sea border a factor and amendment a resolution states does of of onto T. de Waal,

any liberal J. Wróbel for settlement. Consequences settlement. for size The position Western

is through the move

has of Soviet ‘axis’ global with cracy predominant the which

achieved – with 110 supported

form ­‑first expand crossing in oil of result that

been (also perspective former Its , some democracy,

was was culturally and ‘Nagorno these has republics BlackGarden markets adequate formally in of should at to century passing states, Armenia. hindered periodically

influenced of assistance, gas then intended first worldwide. the analytical closer between resources

to Soviet ­‑Karabakh’ intensive the the

of pipelines conflict – belief the be especially envisioned would glance

…, of Islamic, showed the idea the large­ in assistance the relations

interpreted , op. cit. op.

Freedom access In turn, Azerbaijan’s district),an informal pedestrian international OSW, republics, the to Iran

phrase West

discourse, in West not with of in: ‑scale ). was be lobbying force o reconcile To might ,

early 1990s, Warsaw 2003,

p. 234. Armed conflicts in the post the in conflicts Armed in the building and that and and impossible. just to the significantly the the felt as on 24 October 1992,

with to Support ‘the ‘end production Caspian Baku an agreement the also US look the a counterbalance as by namely ensure exception region. obliged and by

Moscow–Yerevan–Tehran law

both a culturally NKR of which Baku an oil course Shi’ite, to p. 27, like the

in the history’ these Act, such stop oil On the an expression that operated Georgia, It was www.osw.waw.pl. , Armenian to

and a paradox: pipeline overestimated) and Nagorno­ was and of which of provide Azerbaijan. a border its ‑soviet region. Present situation. Prospects Prospects situation. Present region. ­‑soviet motivations stability

humanitarian, Yerevan, on

the transportation other actively narrative gas blockade believed Christian the Ukraine, unofficially, to prohibited

the Nagorno­ from ‑Karabakh resources a town diaspora the the hand, crossing status a state and US of involved as

At the young Azerbaijan

group then

of and political and Congress well democratic in in Azerbaijan ‑Karabakh

of Armenia. with to

in axis’ the the (at that line final the was that

of even conflict the of Azerbaijan; turn post­ as the

in resources provision ‘occupied

construc Western­ with a Shi’ite Moscow, illegal. even Caspian

without

govern victory the though ‑Soviet than United passed to of

time This rule Tur

was con and the the for ap 109 it ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

The turning The completion The peak which 112 111 Kocharyan in ning runs alonga similarroute, have proved thatCaspianresourcescanbeextracted no mit the to the the take the ported basin’s but gaining an active ambitions at and a decreaseinsupport for thedemocratictransformation of and at risk about states. opposition construction ell Since The BTC

least the the (see visions pian today the such

region new was West’s construction also effectively place. of anti resolving region reforms was Sea Kosovo’s of The latter

status the Appendix 2). until (February 2020).

a change

independence, held event of millennium. by ­‑terrorist

participant. being of oil was terrorist and the gradual in and protests). involved Nonetheless,

Washington; pipeline point US the in agreed until had amendment the still

was assertiveness. that Aliyev independence Key shelled involvement of exported the coalition, autumn of attack

of also years been

took unregulated;

the was on the organised

withdrawal

had West, atmosphere conflict the militarily in 2018: However, 111 These first From 3 were on 11 September 2001 resulted BTC end for place by opposed and

2003–05 the been Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan of 2007 the the another 12 used Florida. even Nagorno­ of and see US also processes then was in

in

optimism international George W. President, in 2005, afterwards, initiated footnote 82. to 6 April 2001, en masseen in despite 112 from the the the

during from joined in on (once evidenced

and the - this, month During international Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum ‑Karabakh first conflict the and Western ‘colour Mikheil the empowered , overlapped and the by in

in again which the period, n unresolved an grounds that half Bush’s

region this these its Azerbaijan the nor BTE announcement Armenian in overlapped

then of 2008, revolutions’ turn, although Georgia

US gas met disappointment Saakashvili’s event, did Armenians). September 2002 ­ an Armenian (BTC) and presidency by former

pipeline that relations.

Secretary (although Congress,

with the with characterised (and overlapped Iraq, formally talks

oil

it when was expected Armenia) diaspora

an increase objections in 2006. conflict Soviet with ran pipeline remained annually which between gas of the at It took of

it brutal first the ‑Azerbaijani through

the remains a future the

The status State subsequently pipeline, thepost­ republics only with with

by breakthrough United has and suspends took the beginning the end (earlier, from crushing the the Presidents in interested Colin exception, binding the also their

West with thinking territory of 2008) place summit, Russia’s form of start ‑Soviet Russia States, which

begin the the joining upon been sum Pow halt sup until the the Cas pro in of of of of ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

53 OSW REPORT 5/2020 54 OSW REPORT 5/2020 (meetings (February), At the of sametime, theinternationalsignificance Appendix 2), The pushing Minsk USA Kremlin Russia Russia join istan it is national in nent the itsdominantpositionintheSouth Caucasus.to mediatetheconflict,confirming that ended the 2008 war, Moscow openeda new negotiation format for Nagorno­ tion tion – kept how ­Saakashvili become by broke ground – OSCE and a halt and extent emergence ensure out a way the current impossible fear on 11 September 2001, theintervention of South the NATO of much in basis. and

unfriendly to Minsk out

Group US to Washington the West further peace mind

‘devalued’ war the it

of undertook is gna – agenda be Iraq, and in Ossetia, became

between

open the the also

and international and from political operation able in of

taking that August 2008 and co‑chairs Group), to and

West fighting to

the the a result strengthened conservation was, (at the then

activities some to solve power; stability the since a domestic and the

Nagorno­ Azerbaijan Donbas, would at maintain the the really relations

on

Nagorno­

left which and that

the war extent to of (France in NATO initiative presidents the the

but

ostracism. recognise what the Nagorno­ be

conflict in not, cared of was time in ‑Karabakh on Russian­ one

of the ready on tacitly the the issue matter Syria its the Summit ‑Karabakh in

the for seems

is and Moscow’s

its

hand, were the about conflict West, the position military in constantly EU at instance, ‑Karabakh networks one for to the on

the of ‑Georgian the other agreed

It was the South

of (the EU an increasingly fully

defend decisive in the Russia, issue Russia, and the hand, US),

independence resolution Ukraine current zone. conflict

response forces other. hand, after

South also supported

no Caucasus, to that which onto of theWestern coalitionin fighting and its is in something war, occupy coincidence

Armenia enough alliances. represented represented

the stage, April 2016. Caucasian it That it Russia’s theconflicthaddiminished; and has Caucasus the the

of gave had was the to in mentioned

popular backburner to

Georgia’s the terrorist Tbilisi being by of and the – and to April).

for annexation deployed moderate a great Moscow

and the the which conflict keep engagement the contributed that as partner. that The activities its said, in

para­ by

or other assumption Azerbaijan, The war well Kremlin attacks way in extent it its invitations try France was shortly negotiations carte blanche carte in ‑states

it of in on a way enough interpreta

‑Karabakh as of two to should

of Abkhazia the The reac accepted the a perma

Afghan to remove

Crimea

shaped testing on would

which in to to OSCE it inter­ what with after fore

that

has put the the the see the for be to ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

‘stable At the very The state The Nagorno­ war well with Its IV. SUMMARY AND FORECASTS IV. SUMMARYAND reports relations respect infrastructure, in nomic institutional recognised not is to the post­ flict, hoods, and and as and current drawing dents elite or andthereislittleriskthattheseincidentscouldturnintoan open on thefront day est not control Armenia unrealistic. unfavourable goal number oldest, consent ‑Soviet (when there Donbas to on as of quickly). even the Baku moment, ideal instability’, and

and ensure in one the of to is – political

international para­ between of the

though the are it fatalities. social. and such has of Nagorno­

other has and of for to

at minimum – wars, political ‑Karabakh mediators will ‑state.

border

South the military Although for dimensions If the left while the Nagorno­ either initiated a scenario Azerbaijan’s

circumstances, agenda. it set The Nagorno­ its hand, states. Moscow itself remains since de facto de one a permanent happened, and ‑Karabakh For This Caucasus. a precedent significance areas suspension for

side. attention and incidents

that conflict the a guaranteed ‑Karabakh’s both the Russia, a way Armenia Russia are, state

loss became

and and of an important intermediaries). to Middle It is involves option post­

Baku Azerbaijan on receive ‑Karabakh it of spheres: the For can of is

Republic. it and which to would mark and

least the ‑Soviet for (shootings) control

has the is has putting

more former East, these the and be of also not status quo status one the the indeterminacy ‘

diminished (formally security all­ become

illustratively favourable on conflict is be Yerevan the probable and a deliberate ‑out not history, largest reasons post­ element and question over hand, profiting the Finally Soviet probably pressure

It is purely where fully ‑Soviet course Armenia, war along

of a part

an instrument is guarantees and

an expression also recognised) number

are not all republics. shaping the in 2016, since of content to and should has

military, from every keeping

post­

called the a result on controlling characterised which policy of a ‘frozen’ Azerbaijan, of decision territory, Nagorno played thirdly,

the the and its Armenia demarcation ‑Soviet of the Moscow not decision their with a ‘hot territory. for

Russian­ region’s at currently

actors there the this of land current a dominant a priori which ­‑Karabakh by the conflict:

the of t is it as a provocation modern the conflicts. political, the

issue cold

the which and frustration, connection

are junction well intervened by made (including para­ ‑Georgian status quo status transport way a situation ­ The inci allows

political the state be obtains line, regular war’

the on as ‑state every state

with does seen larg role

con It is eco the the un­ or as of of of it ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ .

55 OSW REPORT 5/2020 56 OSW REPORT 5/2020 The current would 1. ­Russia Practically In the jan, impose the that flict. lack but a case, among attempt an attempt a significant able ance suspension, of of

the its disturbance A would have NKR rent that tries, for bakh between bance groups ers catastrophe. could

lesser evil. also and to of is, This of peace­ other attempt the

the (which case of Armenia’s push the potential would

a peace

circumstances, winning

as power to caused also of clan’ prompt could take means end

emergence (clans)

a result speaking, force ruling to deep ‑keeping of Yerevan players – state it forward change Russia, initiate who

clearly has of to would Baku such on between by In Armenia

both internal that and/or a clear take March; the elites of over of sufficient its a leadership are of a move

in

Prime place and affairs and are forces, at

its the a war own have be a change the of stronger the Moscow’s sides linked power; one anyone least of

anti­ own political interested more victory Armenia

Stepanakert at Yerevan, parliamentary tensions, balance US,

terms. both as an

of Minister would is to that another is would ‑Russian tools for agenda a result

EU, to impact very the agree a result or beneficial wishing crisis, of side states, position the time former in

will by Iran above to the not between and

low. run resolving including in moment, the

reason to manage to an economic to Pashinyan on and guerrilla a conflict of status quo status (there to only maintaining

but and of use its Azerbaijan; the Therefore, regulate it); to

next parameters: presidents the deep get and into

to several

as fight conditions, also Turkey – mean risk force for the implement a result, situation more is the presidential

war, account; the the revolution. disruptions forces such a risk within

might for of is parties and conflict probability the to parameters: conflict

collapse possible deeply is strong both the power Kocharyan ) the 2) and resolve unrest which a fight risk supporters not should of

in erupt including their status quo status

Armenia the destabilisation to 3) the Armenia). effectively,

a realistic of As for involved resistance, elections in to in stance or only the could results

between ‘Lavrov societies a military it. between not that one their one a humanitarian 1) a certain limited Such and conflict

in be Moscow, the , of of and be the of seeing adopted the advantage, in from

ruled In the scheduled

Sargsyan;

the the plan’ but scenario; a conflict the presence different a distur Kremlin not (in such support Azerbai the failure, case agency in states ‘Kara­ coun is sides their out). it only

con and cur any bal the un by as of ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

The scenarios 2. to 3. over the coming few years, the Nagorno­ the years, few coming the over a necessary point of reference for all actors whoactiveactors are all region. for reference this in of point a necessary and Caucasus South the in landscape political of element a permanent be The former worry If ter, by be Greater strengthening one of

the Russia the conflict; a different prompted Russia of most

about these potential undergoes outlined would realistic, could states possible (or coerced) external could and probably bring to above and lead expand Russian ambitions significant a player on the to are into decide a new the third their presently intervention), to withdrawing This text was completed in February 2020 in completed was text This on ‘manage’ imposition war to influences one the and make (as the part the not ‑Karabakh conflict will remain will conflict ‑Karabakh long­ the least. some of very of or ‑lasting from

in region. Iran two

a possibly the All in all, indicates that indicates all, in All likely; concessions Pax Russica Pax sides or the South Turkey In the weakening, Caucasus, the would lead Caucasus. first case

in to could to not an attempt the one both of while it prompt have

region. the seems could sides lat its to ‑ .

57 OSW REPORT 5/2020 58 OSW REPORT 5/2020 (Azerbaijanis APPENDIX 1. APPENDIX The The root witnessed which with 113 Peace motivated it inhabited is ing nationalmovements andmodernnationalisms(Armenian in their the first historical raion ans although an autonomous Origins separated stituted sions share offices der out intheyears 1905–06, while themutualanimosityincreasedaftermassmur

This ethnically had the Turkey here reference is as nineteenth was to very

the the this the privileged were Conference of 21.5% Azerbaijanis) South were appendix in more in

carried is

89.1% of of and important Azerbaijani Azerbaijani order Christian proportion in 1989 by the and from Nagorno­ by is such

the strengthened Iran), stimulated

made. close topic Caucasus ethnic geographic, to a ‘divide focuses constituted

cultural of conflict’s the (1987–2020) Outline history tensions century. avoid also oblast. out Armenia clashes which treatment the

for of In a similar the assigned to Appendix 2. Armenians ‑Karabakh understanding against on Armenians repetitions. Armenians included was Azerbaijan. Muslim and is population, the after described and For by

centre dates As a result in internal

91.7% Azerbaijanis and then by there. economic processes 98% of way, the a long the rule’ by the it mountains),

community. In places back deepened Nagorno­ which more became the the the province years with Armenian increased dynamics its (according were The only policy. In 1918

course time, course and its

to Tsarist broadly Armenian of

of

and where people the 1918–20.

population, was still migrations

Azerbaijanis 10%). a part modernisation. ‑Karabakh of of (the role the The region by

to demographic in the the exception transport clearly even in this still Over population administration, the Azerbaijan. to authorities a clash conflict. peace to from the of aspect main the 1926 census population; This of almost 7% Armenians). though subsequent

Russia Russia; process region; predominant from took text while The international in other is between area was was connections particularly of Azerbaijan, in 1915

completely the changes place The first is this in Persia this in Shusha, granted in was presented this, parts US Baku the However, Nagorno­ report, generated the decades decision initiatives; the in in overwhelmingly and Armenians first combined important,

(76.9% Armeni that Baku Turkey, of whole filled was 113 aspect clashes then an important here the Azerbaijani),

te area (the with Azerbaijani Turkey, Azerbaijan, ‑Karabakh

decades only took these the very positions affecting status was of the develop conflict Shusha signalled it, a proper which which broke

place briefly, with which high also con ten the of of is of ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

‑Armenian (although The As Moscow The central authoritiestriedtorelieve tensionsby usingthe‘sticks andcarrots’ The authorities 145,000 Armenians 26 Armenians, in theNKAO which hadbeenprovoked by of a group in national it. wasmethod. In March 1988an economicprogramme establishedfor theoblast illegal, result then the oblastwould leave the the NKAO, the until pogroms provoked by opponentsof later SSR baijanis becoming as a mass stationed strations of oblast conservative compatriots oblast occasions

Azerbaijan, did At the the outbreak public agreed perestroika in such August 1990 of council, the to growing and exodus the from

movement,

a provocation; be took in started same to there the inhabitants a state slogans in a series NKAO they did to the

transferred transfer were opponents of Armenia first Armenia include place which 5 Azerbaijanis and of of

city time, not crisis), was full­ were

was in ethnic period (1987–91) period and

Soviet were killed. refugees erupted of after ‑scale intervened

consent living no in the chose the

a state convened anti­ also some Azerbaijan; earliertheSupreme Soviet of also of it also Sumgait, and while chance

they Communists in to

republic Armenia Armenians oblast into

the Nagorno­

Soon ‑Azerbaijani perestroika war. dismissed there). introduced the Armenia the in districts the in became to Khrushchev could of Armenia. and in Azerbaijan). this

tactic Armenia’s indicates Soviet The fact to

that after, without NKAO), emergency early 1989 an industrial

their ‑Karabakh, did and 1 Lezgin At the conflict. have it ). active of from was by

of but not from 27

leadership. could there, As a result, 4000 peoplefledfrom in

the riots Azerbaijan republic.

Baku Moscow. the that and its that been signed Baku). consent turn operating claims,

thaw Azerbaijan oblast were (see On 22 February 1988, Azerbaijani fait accompli fait Moscow was took have became neither the deemed where

backed to 29 February of 1988, city they the Armenia’s killed. by pogroms During introduced

place been massive On 12 July 1988, (similar to in 80,000 people

near main Azerbaijanis, two of under the in 1987 the the January 1990 took asked (and by both (which implemented, These deputies, both NKAO . the Mikhail army last Baku, On 1 December 1989 might

text direct strikes protests an exodus pressure authorities, of Moscow perestroika a demand in straw in

incidents these anti may of being nor the Armenia, during Armenia have

control decided during Gorbachev’s this and the (a few ­‑Armenian (out

the Armenian have leading with decisions from on included been because of NKAO’s report), demon

for period, militia which which of led

many their

Azer been riots days over anti that

and and the the the the to to ‑ ‑ ­

59 OSW REPORT 5/2020 60 OSW REPORT 5/2020 ‑Karabakh (and The Nagorno Armenia which was 1991 USSR In early 1992, Baku During By Baku its ipate between ing areasintensified mostly leftin 1990. nia new ing nian tional this troops, to the had lives belongs On 10 December and on cial of of cil

the the vote the aggression and Azerbaijani (and

the republic’s been recognition represented (see inhabited the pogroms crush SSR in and in deprived (which community) Nagorno­ Khanlar has end a joint district oblast and in these the to parts Shaumyan the actively taking pacified and Armenia’s always the Republic, of 1989 Armenian ethnic­ referendum. main still took of into session pogroms. after against the Supreme ‑Karabakh war (1992–94) war ­‑Karabakh ‑Karabakh districts overwhelmingly Nagorno­ ( villages

raion of place the a declaration an independence participated. existed supported text ‑Armenian NKAO, the practically

the was At that timeclashes inNagorno­ place the the district NKAO). ) which

elections. on 2 September 1991, a neighbour ) in city republic’s

councils of organised para collapse ‑Karabakh of in On 20 January Soviet in Nagorno­

district ­ The para this while at

Republic. the (see the Baku ­‑state of The very would this Nagorno­ Azerbaijan’s OMON, supported by Soviet military the report). guerrilla Azerbaijan

of ethnically the the passed It is proclaimed In reaction on 10 January 1990 by of

budget from 13 time) of war in

‑Karabakh entire would ‑state

state. Operation of main referendum Azerbaijan the

include Armenians, the Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani likely

few by its ‑Karabakh According deemed a law Soviet groups. NKAO, divisions Azerbaijani and

was the text to 19 January autonomy, mean Armenians diverse SSR. that deputies the the to Soviet granting transformed not of on ‘Ring’ Union,

the It confirmed these SSR. Yerevan’s up establishment this

In order (unrecognised whole this In response, and the to recognised Armenians, of territory ‑Karabakh anditssurround Shaumyan to Union the

of decision but was population At that report). population it the unification now who steps, 90 Armenians the its

in the passed territory opposition the Soviet to

carried which inhabitants formal guerrilla

stayed into its against NKAO’s disperse outside as the authorities time even unconstitutional. territory on 26 November, district, because of another ­ a full well by Army refugees establishment had did

in out of admission of the this by Armenia. the oblast in

Azerbaijan

fights ‑scale the as the not the left the lost in Armenia, Armenia, Nagorno­ the and entered interna the district attacks largely includ spring oblast, partic of oblast Arme Arme latter coun from their right part that war.

offi the

of ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

As a result of Armenians In June 1992, Both sideshadtheirmomentsof jaly managed important ing resolutions the the to to territories proclaimed republic,ledbyunrecognised ; heintroduceda stateof from former had had but therewere probably morevictims, asa further120 peoplewere recognised bajar ber they alsotookcontrol of gency greater and as so‑called started census direct city locatedbetween Nagorno­ once early 1993 one over offensive, a conflict its ­missing. ‘occupied above­ from been of town moved been time again south which had 96%,

on attack the of to oblast. the than

security

supporting to ‑mentioned Shaumyanovsk the February regain the (26 February). ethnically Armenians chiefs, moved that road retook Lachin took closer This (between mass demanded regain that the thenext offensive,

from 90% the territories’ territory Armenians The most and were Azerbaijanis over was had connecting the mobilisation. Azerbaijanis Surat his belt to almost of

around district Azerbaijan, 99.6%). until

positions emerged Lachin. them the homogenous, the located Lachin Nagorno­ troops territories. massacred (it is the under Huseynov, important which biggest population (its May, Officially, all (assisted for withdrawal half recorded supposed the of to Nagorno­ A Committee and to name ‑Karabakh and had his several within ‑Karabakh they

began

Armenian The Azerbaijani the see of Ganja, Azerbaijani landseastof the which the successes andfailures. single the civilians

control, Together Nagorno­ been

who

former by Map). had Nagorno­ has victory with north the 89.9% as (according so‑called to the a counteroffensive. months, ‑Karabakh the started inFebruary 1993, which of crime after been lost. shelling defend death

Azerbaijani the

and Armenian Previously Russian forces dissolved of who NKAO, ‑Karabakh’s of was with ‑Karabakh This

Armenia. Between June andOcto the changed the

share weakened of Defence Iran). Azerbaijani see of Lachin Nagorno­ offensive were

the the Stepanakert. failures to

Lachin, former took was 485 persons with as the air

data of takeover Four war. all troops

well command. the trying now main to force –

corridor, control then Azerbaijanis territory Armenia. Republic volunteer After an offensive theformer NKAO and ‑Karabakh the Ashagy

from NKAO, on these ‘occupied lost UN as By made citizens, text from took the Kalbajar, Azerbaijani to August of Security its by In addition, was the 1989 over get the

now battlefront, a strategically Shusha, of including Agdzhakend), This strength, easier then regards as power Kalbajar militias During

this

out Armenians confirmed, itself well territories’

the while belong generally they involved the Moscow Council of report) thanks Soviet entire in as emer

a city army. as from

next Kho this last and had and and Kal the the the the its in to ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

61 OSW REPORT 5/2020 62 OSW REPORT 5/2020 ‘occupied (the so‑called (there Armenia territory its of 14% around of control lost Azerbaijan Armenia, As the Azerbaijan’s were with The overall number of Azerbaijanis who wereThe overall forcedtoleave numberof theirhomes was estimated at around 750,000 around at estimated was 92,5% Baku Data 1993 December In resentative much text the turned the president, nians were killed in total in killed were nians the Armenians the figure is estimated at around 400,000 around at estimated is figure the Armenians the has lan, in the period from 1988 to 1994 up to 11,000 Azerbaijanis and 6000 Arme and 11,000 Azerbaijanis to up to 1994 from 1988 period the in baijan attempt assistance authorities small source. only countthe‘occupied territories’,withouttheformer NKAO). Thisincludes ence ceasefire estimated Azerbaijanis, Kalbajar of the on of wounded. usually of exclaves changed

was Armenians

SSR. this

into According to estimates which most researchers regard as reliable,as regard researchers whichmost estimates Accordingto

their the the mediation n attack an lost territories’; the which an attempt Heydar report). in

in former overall In addition, forces the and talk agreement control state, unrecognised the its Baku which by

A few OSCE in material Lachin) about 20%, Minsk and were the suffered Azerbaijani on oblast Aliyev Aliyev, number of the usually over

were including thousand last

Russia, to Ganja, the Protocol) Minsk end in (armistice) Group. recover the and and its decided Armenian a more losses authorities declared on , a huge did Nagorno­ of round while and only unrecognised

seven the which two Group,

the victims not began people A second five was at Kalbajar) 30,000 Azerbaijanis CIS advantageous exclave partially territory to loss Yerevan up around come. districts

which ‑Karabakh closer whole (this would offensive

start signed and see the another in of during on

document Baku the the Appendix 2). Despite located group number both negotiations came the US$60 billion. ( districts ties points Nagorno­ of have ( by conflict CSCE

a retreat. the which offensive sides representatives feared offensive. Republic position with into also posed on some to Armenian ) to Minsk and was that (Jabrayil, ‑Karabakh no the went force Russia, includes one took differ and that

which small more The initial ) The situation threat a failed. then on together territory and million),

h country’s The Group missing. place 20,000 Armenians (the authorities on 12 May 1994. the the depending SSR. initial the than 9%, signed; counting were , the

frontline ­ In mid (see enemy as of Republic in (which to Russian made

of well Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan

Kurds; April 1994. while for while statement organised successes

the the the this was ‑March as as on would up Zangi on main exist Azer later than they new was five laid rep the not the the its in ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

‑Azerbaijani ‑Karabakh ‘independence Azerbaijan This was possiblebecauseof The first way were was Budapest, In February 2004, H. Aliyev) were initiated.Therewere alsorelatively contactsbetween frequent was, It Before Low non­ its borders, theformer Shaumyan districtanda partof resulted to ticipant these tiations the trict played from lapped ganda and Gradual escalation of tensions (2003–2016) tensions of escalation Gradual sides civil dents carried claims increase, war ‑governmental the in to ‑intensity conflict (1994–2003) conflict ­‑intensity societies. of taking were the initiatives were

in Azerbaijan. an active

to the become with the however, out taking when between in from Armenia) serious destruction. 7.5% Ramil conflict brief at the Azerbaijan recorded (and under President place and summits, times of a spontaneous both This referendum’ programme. of one

role renewal see Safarov, the was lo – also

tensions the low a hostages). all was during They the organisations and process very of states Appendix 2). former in the along presidents accompanied

This H. Aliyev’s the ‘frozen’; including SSR aegis ­‑intensity this a gradual to could close, time of an Azerbaijani the were ‘occupied broke slightly a period

(these the was, regard; was fighting thelackof After NKAO As a result of act. NATO have along within this

demarcation building the held on of out the illness limiting from that, are conflict, was

and

been they was the Armenia by OSCE Partnership the territories’), in 2016 at in 1991). Key lesser eyesight. the characterised forces: thepositionsof mediatory greater an area the both one the some not demarcation helped officer provoked and their areas West of Minsk number especially end hand, entirely ere – degree it

states. line the the and Azerbaijani state was anti­ similar In addition, to Summit (who where of presidential contacts for (including murdered Azerbaijan a result Group. organise

by June 2003. assumed ‑Armenian In addition, structures of true, Peace by either was line anti­

in theformer Khanlardis the these in a lively in 2001 the size as between born In 1999 (but soldiers of ‑Azerbaijani Nagorno­ training the side, the military

an Armenian exchanges that the incidents campaign first (Kocharyan located A series and also first propaganda in 1977 incidents peace US early (for or the direct were years both recovering ‑Karabakh could outside it). courses Armenian­ diplomats incidents Nagorno­ more north stage process in started of of under propa states’ killed. nego both what after

have over

inci and fire par on in in of of ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

63 OSW REPORT 5/2020 64 OSW REPORT 5/2020 ‑Armenian Yerevan (activities (he August 2008, was weapons warlike However, uponhisarrival inBaku, hedidnotgo toprisonbutwas pardonedby ­Hungary, 2012 August In November 2008, 2007 November In Ilham janis recordedincidencesof ingly frequently in resolving the the the the BTC posed from both backed became an enemy at the state’s development downed der continued dier’s of dents

a way this

conflict. president was parties outside constantly and the

the

wages). of turn Aliyev’s integration format a by report

rhetoric. Armenia, much became granted

Principles, an Armenian oil capital and 7 were

Armenian which the on was Moscow figure relations

to of to pipeline of Its the

exchanges

of August 2014 Russia rise. Nagorno (which He more the and

presidency.

transferred rising. the

main

more Armenians). and of indicated Safarov, which international enemy’s an apartment was was

Azerbaijan with conflict

and Appendix 2). They

conflict trilateral

the diaspora). assertive (the latter other see started and assumptions

generated firmly also While needed. ­‑Karabakh helicopter Ankara, ended the

OSCE

of escalated

pedx 2). Appendix territories); who the

alone

welcomed cities. that His fire, were solidifying to zone).

established. throughout 2013 to On 12 November 2014,

talks with and

and – BTE

Azerbaijan Minsk affairs aspiration On the was had

but take the including and

that an international close After After

Russia – conflict that

the At the are gas

in (inaugurated it sabotaged authorities been in promotion, the number as proved and

three Group (see signing to parallel – para­ still other this was pipeline that, shootingatenemy positions);sabotage

a national After initiative

This, concluding sentenced along was same finally

to from Sargsyan, the valid ‑state failure, flying stages: tensions impossible hand,

complete presented 18 soldiers amounted

by to of in the main

recognised the time the were

the and today

turn, consolidate a shared artillery Azerbaijan; (which by scandal)

along in hero Azerbaijan’s Georgian

it Azerbaijani both sniper

normalisation

Aliyev ‘Karabakh

the text the to paid the a framework around was activated, increased (these

his by

to

life

to 22 were proposal a the summit sides also peace number of (shelling declaration). separate his connected crowds and shootings

punishment

his and

imprisonment the demarcation ­‑Russian power, see

the received (15 were are killed outstanding increased ­‑Armenian then act clan’s

process. military Medvedev – report). the Baku’s the

conflict the of of of

from as the of

agreement

altogether, to Armenian for

honoured main the people fatalities

power so‑called with (increas heroism

Turkish

Azerbai support issue In 2009 resolve war which

policy forces It pro heavy there. presi After their zone line. text bor the

sol

in in in in in of ‑ ‑ ‑ ­ ‑ ‑ ‑

The four the According toreportsfrom The clashes The introduction which with the 100 fatalities Following In 2015, really a seriousattemptata response months not responsibility mediaries: main north fighting, the positions used every kind of flict fighting, from likely Stepanakert, States On 2 April 2016 allow for and an offensive side sified denied of Stable instability (2016–20) instability Stable

an average yet (to a limited region with

text two (in the it its included was by reached at of 2016 was Azerbaijani oilindustry. The totalnumberof Azerbaijan a greater activities

shelling to in ‑day war (2–5 April 2016) war ­‑day directions, of the the least that decreased, blocked ended the

southern on an attempt this and while Moscow of of four­ Armenian of 77 soldiers

the the

Armenian there over violent the Baku,

of several extent) report

armamentavailable: tanks, heavy artillery, rocket launchers (see on 5 April an essential – ‑day American the

to territories a mechanism by proposed level managed a dozen northeast settle Nagorno­ only were the gained which Armenian Russia, war

area), clashes to and hundred Defence air main from were break Blitzkrieg shelling to already

thanks the and forces. Appendix 2). presence cases Armenian Research Centre, which were not had rise introduction and position a to occupied ‑Karabakh which text eoe 2016 before broke conflict and killed, and the slightly or of side adopted Ministry, wounded again had of to

of toretake Nagorno­ The Azerbaijani ceasefire of test several indispensable – Russian southeast.

ceasefire Russian did

threatened in

out. to Azerbaijani this while in 2017. by on the the withdraw unquestionable alter

not (in the a tactic After report). The Azerbaijani of Armenian (on both its the hundred Armenian (up region. mediation, both

control Russian mediations. want the own violations Armenian

This Baku having to to of sides frontline civilian a few Since 0 incidents 100 terms

to victimsincludedaround attack harassing sides). escalation mediator side proposed such claimed forces, ‑Karabakh). Bothsides peacekeepers: lose defence

succeeded accused tensions hundred then, per threatened area) by Russia side (the ‘Lavrov targets accusations targets, its As a result army to the day; attacking in that the initiative its tensions by was lost and line one other the again in in the

undertook advantage. have metres. connected Armenian in it 7 combat more yet 14 (and the the another

conflict. to see halting was United in of inten inter­ them plan’, daily. most been shell have first con

and not the the the the in ‑ ‑

65 OSW REPORT 5/2020 66 OSW REPORT 5/2020 (see Appendix 2). Interpersonal incidents ing recorded tain team at present agreed sides). between hopes in that Armenia, per started (February 2020) which both Aliyev day). contacts sides However, to Baku the Since and take situation between would has Pashinyan autumn 2018 place they after invested work has both on amount a few the together calmed in societies in months demarcation and the to 20–30 per down new the to are of prevent consolidation Armenian

almost again. practically in line etme 2018, September day any This complete in on leader. further spring 2019, average non­ is of related

‑existent. Pashinyan’s peace, At a meet incidents (on both it to new was and cer ‑ ‑

(and it remainsunclearhow many of (Moscow The framework for conflict resolution. The resolution.The Madrid conflict for The framework At the APPENDIX 2. APPENDIX The OSCE The OSCE will 116 115 114 France, Russia, andtheUnitedStates, isresponsiblefor theNagorno­ nor referred the tions time, to be taking peace peoples), upon flict lateral States) bring between and their as and sive cially of To read Armenia The first

domicile). a consequence parl.europa.eu main rity sion sion see

territorial the administrative be has resettlement over

took their even of the same those back process. ( its meetings). FFM text maintained dominated later states to to report 116 the more always descendants forced and own or ) Minsk Minsk place of to the Occupied Territories of Azerbaijan Surrounding Nagorno Surrounding Azerbaijan of Territories Occupied the to be

hypothetically.

independence as and time, the requiring and this presidents the escalations Azerbaijan about based the by . integrity

relocations initiatives), Since The peace process status the that report). the in status quo status refers the Group Madrid Group, of ethnic The ongoing (see right periodically,

OSCE its space in

on it large return at understand

course, would the from should the ­‑Armenian of the the special took of to least 2008 of and of peoples

which during Principles. the

groups There

future, Armenia the

parties as principles states, main but tensions. place

to before 1987 both

be mission final. conflict be and the leading and to in talks settlement at and interested was is self the made text the status quo ante of interpret states earlier equal as significant to Russia no of 28 February 2005: and therefugees, internally displacedpersons

­‑determination – various turn Azerbaijani war, Nor established did none refrain

included of started more role up

on

Azerbaijan, of 1988 rights agree would not this these do years in has the of in of of Soviet they fact).

formats prevent

six

‘occupied from returning report); principles –

the (Armenia (see demographic the been that in

and other

have has primary and in in 1992 Appendix 1). guarantee the sides Also, Minsk Union, drastically the any Report of the OSCE Fact OSCE the of Report the the been trilateral

territories’ were to the Armenian 114 actors especially threat

considers

self­ settlement

to massive most include and thus, ‑Karabakh ­‑Karabakh and outbreak impossible Group elements, their within applied ‑determination different changes

that (Iran, Azerbaijan after is active summits, or any Final the

co‑chaired former populations another forced the while ( use the 1992–94 war, NK territorial whose the attempt the ways of of ‑Karabakh (dialogues ) popularly Act mediator ‑Finding Mis ­‑Finding , for ceasefire occurred

www.euro of the the conflict United (see under places migra

a long multi­ (espe force, came

legal mas integ war con the by of to 115 ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ­ ‑ ‑

67 OSW REPORT 5/2020 68 OSW REPORT 5/2020 • • • • • • These The first, 118 117 Principles France, isations, release issued to first ber 2007 general occasions

the Aliyev Armenia 9 March 2019, Press Statement pendently resolving in detailed ation them sation A corridor An interim The return The right International Future territories’) peacekeeping former a legally and time December 1996, conflict are on 10 July 2009 in Statement (of course self­ on 9 March 2019) Russia, way) for and including

Europe, in unpublicised issues). as kept in by determination the

have Security places repeated by ‑governance; Prime binding Madrid. follows:

their of both the conflict by www.osce.org. its by representatives linking of status

to this Baku by all

10 July 2009, and been OSCE distance

the Minister the operation). of and and security on the the the current internally does the (Nagorno

readily many residence; the authorities expression Minsk territories Co Co‑operation ­ The above which for referenced control Armenia co‑chairs

- at not version from European Chairs Pashinyan United occasions Nagorno­ of 118 the www.osce.org. refers Group exclude recommended ­‑Karabakh’s version guarantees

these

the and of displaced G8 Summit of

to the Co of to in ‑mentioned final surrounding

States stipulations. of in of , Azerbaijan; that the representatives of documents - The Organisation as

Europe, Chair ‑Karabakh, Union, these Nagorno­ OSCE

will Armenia the

in the differences overall a basis self legal Representatives Azerbaijan’s a shared countries Minsk (i.e. the Minsk ­‑determination

Minsk Groupat (i.e. a referendum); persons icuig – (including principles 3 December 1996, but in they from status Иссабонский ‑Karabakh; for Group elements L’Aquila. and that Nagorno­ agree , also providing

the Group The Organisation for statement resolving co‑chairs territorial and of exist Azerbaijan. OSCE on of

with Security of (although was

Nagorno­ was

the Armenia other refugees between (for 117 t is it документ www.osce.org. ‑Karabakh the were

to Upcoming presented

a meeting Since guarantees integrity take Madrid and example of the by sue – assumed international and Summit

‑Karabakh

announced them for place the Co‑operation usually the to conflict 1996 года then

Azerbaijan Security Meeting Principles as return in Minsk within (the ‘occupied

presidents to on 29 Novem which the regards in the

the of in

principle , and the of on The Organi its

future a security through and took in

Madrid to have President a more Group) parties for

borders). Co organ to Europe, many press their accept ­‑oper more place inde the for of ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

‑step’ solution ‑step’ ‑Petrosyan The main The fact would which would comeinparallelwiththewithdrawal of which 120 119 might earlierandformed thebasisfor twoidentified optionsfor resolving theconflict tion, their trol, the that that Baku and Yerevanand Baku forces be gress about an agreement a process a synthesis of and states, sides would bedivided upwithintheframework of excessive expectations andthelackof elements The readiness In the agreed 24 January 2018, 26.8% expect 23.5% ние was residents flict ance tinue. solution. end Stepanakert – were which on the leaders’ in be

this, и политика’ the decrease carried from in assumed among which of

assessment in ‘Общественное the the that Armenia deceived those Nagorno­

to presented of ‘К international upon the desire obstacle in 1998) the вопросу see one peace

resolve the Armenia’s real out

these war boththeseoptionswithstrongly articulatedsecurityguarantees, surveyed fear of can form could , Azerbaijani the unification www.kavkaz then in the and , after in ‘occupied hand, that of Kavkazskiy to conflict

summer 2017) by ‑Karabakh process, о be of Hrant as turn, break Nagorno principles main and/or единстве of President risk to восприятие . it is result to

elite

the losing in it Each an agreement exploited the

a ‘security implementing the the Armenia allowed Mikaelian, out community of which limited. adversary with foresaw ‘occupied text settlement) - ­‑Karabakh’ Uzel, uzel.eu. territories’.

in parties in conflict side’s and violent renewed Levon side и разделении power. Armenia, that it forced a rebellion conflict карабахского remain of 28 January 2018, and

will on them as preferred. the Ter

time, Admittedly, fear zone’ the that the

the an effective in 1997. him be social released who author ­‑Petrosyan Thus, remains territories’

should in military NKR treating possible report). while to willtomake any concessions). of is has the to valid other the This НКР around regards may maintain

resign the complete lack of trust between trust of lack complete the of believe initiating by конфликта protests the in 42.5% think a report status Madrid The first become 119 и Республики www.kavkaz the provide to January 2018, option today to the hand, not

static The Madrid action). (see these expression compromise In this resolve NKR’s

that

the Armenian (Nagorno­ were political to elite take entitled the of pressure over (February 2020) (which в Армении former that Nagorno­ thispeaceoperation,which and Principles an internal was any

elements full that main was (the positions Nagorno­ the transferred the (as was - situation, the uzel.eu. Армении. a large independence ‘Societal the the conflict in there

kind preferred text the instrument same next of this Principles would NKAO. current number on

и НКР’ ‑Karabakh’s of readiness package solution package share According five regard ‑Karabakh the of had this has perceptions based steps – Azerbaijan (and Общественное

factor years activity – both situation case report). of be to , The already

as been Kavkazskiy by held generated the on ‑Karabakh) is Baku’s of setting a compromise

a result are to (the research 120 (for more increases Yerevan – peace sides evidence with para

‘step­ for to possible this

In addi by of no in will would status reach the ­‑state’s

until been report both both resist as talks; con

fact pro мне ‑by Ter­ Uzel, are con con up of it ‑ ­ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ,

69 OSW REPORT 5/2020 70 OSW REPORT 5/2020 The OSCE Minsk Group and its achievements its Groupand Minsk The OSCE At that Armenia The OSCE 124 123 122 121 Nagorno­ Russia, in ment members rial manent isation, in Europe soonafterthey (CSCE)on 30 January 1992, hadgainedindependence. more the take tiatives take process – although advantage sia other This The Bishkek The so‑called This addition ­Мoscow 2009, OSCE ceasefire . parliamentary put ing ing to to ‘Group’. to basis – simultaneously) in group Council its place was respect influence which interested things, advantage forward very the was body time

and as

own see which forum ‑Karabakh but and the in or a certain also closely something was was Minsk Group. in the of was also the to the the in to the came claims meeting interests the The real wants

first Bishkek Minsk, Azerbaijan reached the ceasefire of p. 146.

the initially Assembly, include

be finalised that Helsinki helped next for situation United with the by end CSCE in counter more 124 current for Group chair Azerbaijan, into representatives of

means that organised the maintaining to driving Republic, Protocol, the

the by the parts the n the In called provisions which

ensure into was Russia it

­‑balance the in force Kremlin. the Belarus, States, CSCE’s peace NKR precise, of

conference and on 24 March 1992. during to the had joined ‘parties force Russian

the of situation the account on

on 4–5 May 1994 the to prestige become Armenia South worked months also

on 12 May 1994.

final this 123

OSCE that participate to some are its talks ceasefire for group. as В. Казимиров,

the to its to Finland, the by the the Federal Caucasus. this gave document way well appendix). the the Minsk of hard West initiate

and of

meetings Vladimir (see

only was share took an international involved Conference meeting by status quo status conflict’ – preceding

agreement conflict to Azerbaijan, in as to its the after Assembly, documents Conference, selling was

the the achieve, changing taken Moscow Armenia place signed , separatist

name in it the Мир Карабаху Мир formally came peace The first next

121 (for

Kazimirov, working in 1992–93. Yerevan The initial in resolution collapse itself, .

in

in as at weapons The decision the wanted Russia, from

process to that the on the Budapest organisation parts more

it but Nagorno . the initiated Armenia into and Russian the as had Security

Russian were and Italy, Nagorno soon of ceasefire well conference

to

meeting talks (and

the out newly [Peace of on Azerbaijan, an international Stepanakert which strengthen 122 signed in 1994, ­‑Karabakh statement after as process who In addition to by

MFA Soviet this Sweden the still as

diplomats a February 1995 the The composition (Russia four

both and for a third the and to ­‑Karabakh and established collectively has) represented earlier appendix). has

which Union).

ceasefire Russia bodies: Nagorno of establish name its unrecognised will was the Republic. treated sides, Co‑operation have real

party. the who been and position was the states parliament was the to instruments primarily peace periodically meant

­‑Karabakh], were Ministe and (albeit obligation the Turkey. group’s France, CIS among signed, changed

taking organ that agree peace On this a per body, by CSCE/ work Inter Rus the ini tak the not of to of ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

The group These what 126 125 The greatest achievement of the Minsk Group is the formulation of the of formulation the is Group Minsk the of achievement The greatest It is Igor Baku, In December 1994, ion its ralism need mechanism – taking diplomaticinterventions. However, asa collective body, whose members the tion the the Minsk for principles for resolving the conflict which have been accepted by Baku Baku by accepted been have which conflict the resolving for principles large­ local borne CSCE an intermediary aegis als, still crisis of on, duties date and Yerevan.and

At this

Armenia Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk Andrzej Ambassador ary 1995. control, that OSCE’s foreign the including with holds Popov undoubtedly was was ‑scale authorities). to

happened. of situations – were Yerevan, states by include in first

international the the summit assigned one agreed three this it reacts and Group Chairperson­ military as disputing minister

responsibility and today OSCE. are formulate specialised

the under regard another The group reporting the Andrew and permanent currently Azerbaijan on between to such establishment also In 1997 decision would (February 2020). at to

In August 1995 in Stepanakert any action the the level, a Polish

(as well the community true more as a shared intermediary). , ‑in­ Schofer. The Organisation disturbing CSCE entity, aegis on was

become the has the format for (February 2020) its ‑Office are has that, co‑chairs: the are detail. made outbreak final also sides diplomat, the as Summit of also taken namely position, situation held of the where thanks

to Nagorno­ of the dominated

managed for

structure the to 126 create peace­ It covers (the representative organised).

signals the participation for (meetings

co‑chairs, place the

His co‑ordinate of France, position Meanwhile in Security

the he Ambassador peace the to

‑keeping the it in Budapest conflict main ‑Karabakh meets the represented OSCE, works Minsk by in to the the of four­ by and

develop Nagorno­ issuing

process.

Russia work the It has of office at conflict summits preparation which Western ‑day Co‑operation with

was more forces personal of Group, a lower the conflict­ 125 Minsk

of

Andrzej the peace the also is started war and statements established. CSCE an effective representatives

‑Karabakh pays Moscow, by the slowly located area operating CIS, Minsk between which states, Group in 2016 – created ‑related Stéphane level, in the

process representative Minsk its was regular Europe, of and which Kasprzyk, activities in United

peace in

Group’s in

including was fearing wanted of unexpected working and a platform Tbilisi, since 1994. www.osce.org. Group, mediation the under This the and should

activities. the is Visconti, visits decided on 1 Janu propos under States. under of end heads it opin func

man who that

plu can the the his

no be as of to at is ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ­

71 OSW REPORT 5/2020 72 OSW REPORT 5/2020 Yeltsin somedissidentcircles).Russia’s(apart from goal was tostopthecollapseof Armenia, As mentioned with was were 127 Russia For Independent initiatives by the Minsk GroupCo‑chairs Minsk the by initiativesIndependent its importance – not issued reason in mediator. in to process, In the early phase of the conflict, which took place in what was still the still was what in place took which conflict, the of phase early In the keep Soviet be as atives. of effective on over edge a) Russia a) Soviet period, Nagorno­ period, Soviet Both

become Armenia a short this a network less permanent baijan building that relinquish the 1994

the Baku of unwilling its Union, a declaration has, The first presidents effective appendix). the of

the and reason – although influence transportation intervention

essential) The Kremlin’s the period involved and Russian from separatist and region, up

armistice under

of but earlier, Russian co‑chairs. the went Yerevan, to its

Azerbaijan, than of personal the but of when accept

in

individual them position (or even Nagorno to

initiatives in as the partner time that very the

Baku, national also Moscow the of the Federation

and aegis this advantage of dated ‑Karabakh was an internal issue for the Kremlin. the for issue an internal was ‑Karabakh

At the becoming they beginning Russia’s Moscow, (see ­‑Karabakh beginning, because Yerevan connections region. result

Caspian

within ceasefire. for together failed, increase it)

of initiatives

would diplomacy. the made of back

same them. the and

of privileged that Russia main in this and which

it in the

CIS. over

Stepanakert its to its oil the take been changed with time,

this time Since September 1991, conflict that Western Nursultan long­ Minsk

and which The culminating effort text

time in also This on led respect the aspiring

it should ‑lasting included the gas position. that of the has and to

wanted an important to to majority war Group, it

affected

this South in onto partners an armistice not involve role undertook – then developed moment included the Nazarbayev was be to report dominance allowing met North of the global However, to

play called and Caucasus, when

also of its intermediaries. the the maintain

point institutions in

Caucasus. their strategic Russia the has leaders and a very

an example bilateral CSCE markets. (or in the quasi­ Presidents to any that

role of become of the determined political increase there, Minsk

of

these Moscow

other in has good ‑peace a monopoly was Armenia, the of next interests – the relations

its of For focused

case as agreed efforts knowl one 127 Group actors

of

peace elites Boris parts force main their initi well

this

the Azer did the of of to ‑ ‑ ‑

‑Georgian Armenia which would was would whether will 128 The first initiative took place in autumn 2008 in place took initiative The first It turned In the interest norms readiness the that the tion ples). proposed Moscow’s second independent attempt to resolve the conflict took place took conflict the resolve to attempt independent Moscow’ssecond independently Such Sargsyan between by but by between been Group and ever, eral dev, after the four­ the after As a result, the report).

representatives ceasefire

it is peacekeeping

on between to meetings Aliyev in in

after made conclusions This

most following Minsk

would also of have them. Georgia, and the quite and the both Moscow

and decided the international out war. to the

was

Kremlin’s have and towards two likely stressing formed Russian its (see resolve establishment Ankara evident Group include that Azerbaijan), sides June 2011 ‑dayin April 2016 war

took Armenian On 2 November the

, Sargsyan readiness which years, included each

the to and be can forces Moscow first place of to part into take an agreement supplemented the

side main that

and

view, the

be Ankara the

obtain ­‑Turkish time Armenia

Moscow made two attempts to resolve the resolve to attempts two made Moscow illustrated law meeting document

and conflict consideration, of

drawn this (with had

signed it Yerevan. three to the leading text

although the was was (references a new of using

use security protocols some step a ready

normalisation (whose a Caucasus

of in resolution the

countries taking unable in from and a declaration military

by

this Barvikha, Moscow’s

since its 128 after security , role on mutual by participation peaceful were

Azerbaijan. they

Up mandate

report). plan the guarantees and Prime the individual the

namely were to they the 1994 of signed until

parallel force the Stability participation of

the elements overcome of brought (a ‘roadmap’) concessions, the architecture

determination

near

had Minister the of also the means, parties in Russian The Kremlin’s January 2012,

in as

Group the abroad. autumn 2009 Armenian­ ceasefire

region,

witnessed Nagorno which of elements

Moscow, t appears It from made , the intensification and Madrid no shortly

that the the stated based

mediation co‑chair Recep tangible in Cooperation

Russia). of to It remains presidents or they in had to aversion Russia

the ­‑Karabakh to

Russian ‑Turkish (see the

Presidents to the Principles to after settle of that Russia’s on political been nine be that Tayyip expressed

the impose

defend the peace Madrid region, the signed of results; and It is progress main which the

the

pointed of more Aliyev that regulation. the soldiers unknown rules of relations.

Platform,

interven Erdoğan contacts Turkey), ­conflict

text possible Russian­

will process. conflict,

conflict its its

(which

Medve Russia, Minsk jointly Princi which exists led trilat

their of how own own and and and had out this in to ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

73 OSW REPORT 5/2020 74 OSW REPORT 5/2020 (the 2008–09 Again, with 131 130 129 Moscow’s Both Baku ing its in intermediary mination ited towards time to theabove­ the to presence flict forces for and madeitthemainmediatorandessentialparticipantincon and thatof 2016 authorities sion, ducted on conviction context, even cost to ever n aur 2015 January In In addition,

in the (see W. Górecki which territorial idents, a manifestation

the the less conclusion settlement the Azerbaijan’s informally the the though in 2008–09 journalistic the regaining the in future, no bear unrecognised

by peace interested region generated the Putin, the unblocking attempt next main the of to peace goal Prime that , and

131 ‑mentioned change intheprioritiesof Russian a trilateral Nagorno control conflict positions this parts conflict attempt . Aliyev process losses because it was reason and that of process). soldier a society control this plan recognised stormy Minister would

enforced the governments and of to reports

­‑Karabakh in and to this held imposing state’s the time in

peacekeeping ‘force converged: summit the of was Nagorno­ zone – “finally” in 2016 allowed could Sargsyan. protests of could appendix). of stationed

(a part the over transport certainly

process a series

region This

systemic

its announced Russia its and …, Medvedev Moscow’s the took four­

it op. cit. op. close be the have possibly instruments throughout strengthening the

as ‑Karabakh concrete It confirmed Russia of analytic at place settle sides in

‑day seen (see the crisis’ ‘occupied

could an area military a of and Armenian Minsk not Moscow. been routes ties forces,

in meetings

the interest war). , position the to and in St to on the 1 July 2015, as go and the be Petersburg solutions discourse

the peace’ take the main the this a formal conflict, of Group and base the Republic beyond West – country. seen would would territories’ 129 strategic

It is decisions resistance Russian public intensive of the occasion, of Foreign

in with deploying text at More www.osw.waw.pl.

failed

Russia’s in Gyumri possible both on 20 June 2016 the supported initiative M. Falkowski, have including allow on the

and CIS Medvedev’s as 130 of theWest, which was becom of opinion representatives evidence cost responsibility.

relations

the the this the (these Moscow Minister once Madrid mission – that and murdered ‘shuttle been it but position it

Russian faced parties, of

that ‘Lavrov plan’‘Lavrov report), to in security should Russia

again; blamed the Russian the elements, too gathering ‘Protests impose the Summit Moscow of and Washington with Principles, declaration Armenian an diplomacy’ Lavrov, from other high United

was were Russia’s peace peacekeeping including

and on is there Moscow of In this both guarantees in the of 16 May 2016 mediation, a “natural” its connected Armenia’s a political

co‑chairs this

Armenia Armenia which together referred who came three process, States – ). agenda be states. deter family, How with occa new that con one pres the vis for

in to as ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

Krbk ad h Lci crio wih ol oeae ne te protec the under operate would which corridor Lachin the and ‑Karabakh The US’s engagement in the conflict’s settlement at that time appeared to be to appeared time that at settlement conflict’s the in engagement The US’s was the fear of both presidents – especially Kocharyan – that any concessions any that Kocharyan – especially presidents – both of fear the was h Uie Sae’ ot nesv atvt a a itreir i the in intermediary an as activity intensive most States’ United The Iran’s participation in the peace process and the possibility of allowing a dele allowing of possibility the and process peace the Iran’sin participation cele the with coincided and DC Washington in place It took Aliyev).Heydar meeting were kept secret.However, basedonleaks, it isknown thatthediscus DavosGenevaseverallocations.and times,in met other more among in meetings between the presidents. The most probable reason for this failure failure this for reason probable The most presidents.between the meetings in abovewerepresented plan the on discussions the which during summit, next month break -month a 16 also was There place. take not did continued, been have to Minsk the of co- chairs (the a breakthrough of hope some Despite summit. the of issues the In addition, Nakhchivan. and Azerbaijan of part main the tween un the for plan to intended also was The project Baku’scontrol). to return to were territories’ (the ‘occupied States United the and Russia France, of torate this of The proceedings Florida. West,Key in April 2001 early in place took Group) Minsk the of a co‑chair as acting then was States (the United ticipated Colin State of Secretary which in meeting, important most their KocharyanRobertand time (at that Azerbaijan and Armenia of presidents the possible escalation of the tensions. the of escalation possible peace and democracy among them, as well as a result of lobbying bypeace anddemocracyamong them,aswell theenergy asa result of between summit first the orchestrated Clinton, Bill President of participation moment come, Moscow will make another attempt to implement it. implement to attempt another make will Moscowcome, moment lay, first and foremost, in maintaining a stable situation and preventing any preventing and situation a stable maintaining in foremost, and lay, first blocking of the transportation routes, including the railway connection be connection railway the including routes, transportation the of blocking NATO’s anniversary.presidents of US’s initiative,both brations fiftieth At the by the opposition in Armenia). in opposition the by gation from theNagorno­ gation from Group talked about ‘significant progress’) and the initial announcement, the announcement, initial the and progress’) ‘significant about talked Group active the with Albright, Madeleine State of Secretary US the On 27 April 1999 b) The The United b) announced would threaten their power (the Key West Summit was criticised was SummitWest (the Key power their threaten would announced sector, which atthattime believed projects in theregion that noinfrastructure ­ a self create to a plan included sions ofit eteet rcs to pae t h tr o ti century. this of turn the at place took process settlement conflict right the should today,and place in still is plan’‘Lavrov the that edged driven by a desire to assist newly independent states and spread the ideas of of ideas the spread and states independent newly assist to a desire by driven ‑Karabakh Republic tothetalks were discussed during In this situation, it should be acknowl be should it situation, In this ‑governing political body out of Nagorno­ of out body ‑governingpolitical Powell par ­Powell ­However, ‑ ‑ ‑ - ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

75 OSW REPORT 5/2020 76 OSW REPORT 5/2020 • • ‑Petrosyan, were within 132 Russia, Face many resolving idential not tain themselves tiative this until 2018. part process. Sadarak). Summits between and settlement could either

All of sonal 16 May 2016, 10–11 February 2006, no information, ister, presidents bajar, agreements, an agreement undertake

report). then of the both ­‑to convened in occasions. be progress even

of

the the representatives and all, system, ‑face meetings between Armenia and Azerbaijan’sleaders and Armenia between meetings ­‑face peace

states), Elmar the implemented while the the between with However

H. Aliyev The first peace CIS. of

took a partial (such on leaders However,

US conflict the

any however agreed a few process Serzh in However, point Mammadyarov, which under to place

point The most (Aliyev’s in process. conflict. “on place, were and other the monitor for the Vienna such breakthrough,

helped occasions nine before 1999). seven Kocharyan this Sargsyan the as operates eight to the leaders after unless great at the in these important part conflict

meetings format they unconditionally Their meetings President different Paris important determined aegis Aliyev after out incidents to assumed the majority of talks the did met reduce

proved of

(this in they high of and

(Armenia’s said various failure of

the

Azerbaijan Azerbaijan ­‑Kocharyan over conflict not nine Later, took or role

were with initiatives

the Rambouillet. time

Ilham were level little to talks four­ the at 20 times. and tensions engage was of the the disputed place, OSCE of least multilateral effective

Kocharyan, called such

withdrawal periods. the

is ‑day given convened

was status implement took fulfil Aliyev the

media president dictated and any Armenian‑Azerbaijani In 2002 and in as meetings on to summits Minsk Key resolved war. in to place and the their h 1994 the mentioned points”. The Azerbaijani of was visible its met a halt; the Armenia that However, after deputy

West the

Nagorno­

During by by own and forums, on: also of Group. conflict own with from 2008 a mechanism presidents

the the some the

held were (see Armenians progress ministers Summit, previously According as in n 1995 and

in­ sides nature ­ Robert interested are time part this earlier, ‑Karabakh. place it 132 the ‑person in also including zone has

assigned Nakhchivan’s an important it h dialogue The of main had meeting of foreign was towards

to 2018) initiated in of foreign Kocharyan the

not and the at ceasefire from to with

summits for Armenia abandoned. the reached talks

their parties US the text leaked led peace those main

With affairs their pres min Ter­ Kal the did the ini per on on by of to ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

• ‑Karabakh (the latest Aliyev, The attempt The next The first 135 134 133 Economic mentioned ing meeting theelementsfor resolving theconflictwere onceagainreviewed, and to the development of the the the the ‘velvet peace). unlike pendently, politi­ Security building aegis should speeches over declared

Service

Service get 1 April 2019, ‘Пашинян

6 coe 2017, October 16 person­ supervision decrease two the Nagorno­ top the cians of the 134

135

Kocharyan participate

CIS position sides’ the

up

Conference). next of of to

that meeting as encounter “societies It was ‑in­ Forum), for

before, agreed Interfax Interfax revolution’

and earlier Summit mutual support Minsk

прямом в well ‑Karabakh ru.armeniasputnik.am. tensions to ‑Office

the few readiness both

change not by

agreed in as agency agency moment to and months took while

Group. in (that humanitarianco‑operationwas announced, inthehopeof a team

and

trust sides of

the as by a change establish in on in between эфире along the

of Armenia,

hence a part Президентский Вестник Президентский Вестник Президентский

Dushanbe the the Geneva. the place Republic Sargsyan, country’s to that

Nagorno­ (on a different

another spring 2018 would making Before раскрыл of took Pashinyan maintain Minsk conflict; format the

personal the in he on 22 January 2019 a channel of Ilham demarcation place

the Artsakh h presidents The work could a larger into

personal this

‑Karabakh was of on 28 September 2018. reformed подробности Group he of peace

the decisions Aliyev

on 15 February 2020 became meeting – reiterated

the the held had together meetings not occasion of ceasefire

and event – and , ,

talks. talks process

communication no. 44, no. 41, not speak representative on 29 March

and line. political is Azerbaijan” венской Armenia’s the that been

a separate was

6 March 2019. In addition to 12 March 2019. the Pashinyan this at Nikol agreed

on in Pashinyan was

format European prevent this affect it), first firmly Davos the

встречи leader a idea. system, confirmed. Pashinyan, level in para­ prime to

to and At that prepared during of between entity During

(during Vienna, opposed talked be further take to с

Union. ‑state’s used the

would he the Алиевым’ took organised from the minister,

stressed measures OSCE meeting and

inclusion the on

In addition, the arguments

a series

the who them, place under for incidents. Nagorno­ However, by continue

behalf. the as , Vienna

future Sputnik, World Ilham Chair­ after need such inde

now that

dur and the the

of of to 133 ‑ ‑

77 OSW REPORT 5/2020 78 OSW REPORT 5/2020 (as mentioned August 2008, andwas aswell intendedtoincludethethreestates intheregion ­Azerbaijan‑US h possibility The The only exception Tehran They which would Minsk Nagorno­ In April 1993 Iran In April 2003 In the During it lifted. nuclear in this the tion, tives. posed process. participated inthepreparationsof for the‘occupiedfrom territories’. for halt baijan, after as those as Other initiatives and peace plans peace and initiatives Other seriously Russia January 2016, the talks next topic military and a number were another These

spring

the openly include Group – South although the (it took that Below deal ‑Karabakh few on Turkey). and received did establishment organised last were a few had Armenian­ of 1992, years, operations Turkish diplomats Turkish the

come had Caucasus, Turkey. Armenian supported earlier) rapprochement is

the quarter­ place of was that the in formally an overall Iranian states

been This international occasions, in was theCaucasus Stability three onto Iran

connection peace put US under the aegis of Iran of aegis the under the the after ‑century, was proposal,

that Heikki was concluded offered and

forward the offensive of Baku, foreign region. states uoen Union European process – participated the

the review a ‘security agenda did also bring but After Stepanakert rebuttedtheseideas, US­

and ‑Azerbaijani Talvitie idea did to of its not organisations

other Tehran minister opposed in 2003 which ‑led all – peaceplan,which was intended to thefirst

its was

about of the mediation a parallel and not during belong together as proposed these

increased these coalition’s system states

launched in region a force (he undertake the was offered

the this by to Kamal initiatives to was the initiatives.

negotiations

international Iran’s would the put and withdrawal have crisis , with entity’s the services for by and although became that Key the regional

its attack EU’s in forward Kharazi, Cooperation Platform which Prime Minsk the

also involvement, any Americans their between Nagorno­ West would first mediation become

were work Caucasus Special

and proposed new involved against they Minister holder were Group neighbours Summit: ambitions of during while support sanctions proposed

refused (Turkey). Armenian peace ‑Karabakh. Washington involved were

Representative held and services Iraq) (Iran) states’ of in even in peace the Erdoğan

see broken initiatives. this Russians – Baku, in the the (by after formats was (Russia, peak Ankara, Tehran. against In addi though as above). in which forces newly peace initia OSCE again Azer Over well and pro the the not off in of ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

• • • h budget The which were 136 In the Representative 2004 In European in the resolution region, important tions to presented Parliamentary Assembly of the of theCouncil Parliamentary Assembly of for Several Simmons, Group). amounted established Security and Co‑operation in Europe in Co‑operation and Security

See Nagorno­ Nagorno­ ries through pendence, formally the plan to create an Azerbaijan/Nagorno­ create to plan the plan Maresca John the plan Goble Paul the bakh – chivan; the in prepared www.epnk.org ‘occupied years 2004–05, formed Peaceful Simmons (Armenia complex exchange At present, NATO

non­ a proposal within to ones to who ‑Karabakh. Armenia

Zangezur ‑Karabakh, remain office; for over the including ‑governmental the

for by held which established territories’. Settlement its conflict). peace . its declared €4.7 million. was for basis

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for while European of post Armenia, , borders – receive stage, parties In the

that which thus Azerbaijan, , right of the new a which

were

organisations until 2010.

the o 1996 to Azerbaijan the passing have Armenia’s and which to European ParliamentEuropean to the to regarding was Conflict

put and Union position, the Azerbaijan was Alliance have the Central lost Lachin

he forward status premised but thereby

lasted (Göran premised conflict of

representative

During its represented is

borders over a resolution it would called border the could financing . the corridor would of from five Lennmarker’s in ‑Karabakh confederation ‑Karabakh a land

Nagorno­ an ‘associated discussed

Nagorno­

one Secretary on on the 1990s. It was send get the and with out enjoy

(David

a 2016 May n exchange an granting of and

connection European the a large renew Finland

of , offices calling peace­ his ‑Karabakh Iran, in first ‑Karabakh ­ a far

were: the a connection

corridor

turn, General’s Atkinson’s report, first Among ‑keeping filled report) railway see ‑reaching state’ seven project Nagorno­

abroad); for to in

visits Per Partnership Map);

with pi 2019, April the a peaceful of (EPNK). by (it would situation the running districts Gahrton

and connec Special

territo of

Robert Minsk forces to ‑Kara­ Nakh most with inde

five the the . 136 ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

79 OSW REPORT 5/2020 80 OSW REPORT 5/2020 Armenia, Azerbaijan within From nario of

Yerevan, is Baku’s the unacceptable

or (with borders

it possibly perspective, would ‘the of

highest be to recognise

the the best the former opposite possible to best

it unify

as NKAO – option

side. an independent status’ the Nagorno­ was as declared an autonomous to keep ‑Karabakh

state. for it); Nagorno­

Clearly, while Republic entity Krbk – ‑Karabakh from

each within with

that sce ‑

The relative balance of forcesof balance The relative Armenia APPENDIX 3. APPENDIX The Nagorno­ which 138 137 h four­ The It should most in 2010, ing, military tion, tain the tial positions path moment neithersideisabletoresolve toitsadvan thisconflictmilitarily tage. First and foremost, the military potential has been shown to be of of be to shown been has potential military the foremost, and First tage. long guarantees large enough to assure a military victory for either army. either for victory a military assure to enough large moment. the for least at situation, political the than significance less architecture. ably of country. of Secondly, the difference in the two warring parties’ potentials is not yet not is potentials parties’ warring two the in difference ­Secondly,the data The The idea strengthand,inthecaseof

the фликте?’ Press report national ed. ation the and nature threat although range sections), Armenia of at likely

К. Макиенко Republic was

to 2018, development”. the the ( advantage Baku’s SIPRI be and the of dy a wih ok lc i Arl 06 hwd ht t the at that showed 2016 April in place took which war ‑day they report , Institute cited Kavkazskiy to to of ratified and victory intervene pp. 209–210 assumed first “occupation demarcation ‑Karabakh questioniscentraltobothBaku and Yearbook 2018. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security

the According Azerbaijan

a large any for is in occupy

while

dimension The conflict’s military оиаи бр: жы Кавказ Южный бури: ожидании В of ensures goal , a formal

this Моscow 2018 is for stage para­

the Azerbaijan” possible understood in Uzel, Strategic that Appendix and is Azerbaijan’s that extent, moment early ‑state late 2007, line (in the

to of the 30 March 2018, 295). to by

Azerbaijan member arise,

Russia as reach any

future Azerbaijan’s security enough Studies, the (in this here was that comes while war, ensure victory.

north is it is hypothetical done Republic as it is such is the would it the report forces of mainly clashes: , defensive could still to

in 2016. in www.kavkaz of main

total the possible a defence has a commanding prevent

the the

referred not neutralised military from capitulation demarcation would of negotiate over

national

See “people [Waiting east Armenian pp. 185–187

allow Armenia the war. in ‘Кто

that - to uzel.eu. Armenia that, alliance it have Military Balance 2019 Military nature. as в итоге doctrine, Armenia

resembles of

for n turn, In

KM Armenia’s doctrine, military of Turkey security with the by (referred if

to the ). 137 Artsakh of

forces military

line such The author adversary, (the Collective natural fight победит

It states Storm: a part is them runs to would constantly

which should threat a need to Yerevan’s security would a straight for

fail,

and in the from в Карабахском advantage of

and conditions , also

this report, along Oxford them.

that

South

the

and their intervene. was faced not Indeed,

arose: used n existen an defend report a position just Armenia territory

Security it The Inter University a moun Caucasus], increas

ratified

In addi the chosen line would by an alter as prob

over SIPRI and the the the M кон in 138 B ), ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ­ ‑ ‑

81 OSW REPORT 5/2020 82 OSW REPORT 5/2020 (45,000+20,000). Azerbaijan Armenia Azerbaijan’smilitary potential Treaty Turkish with regard 140 139 BTR PM In the In recent Both 244 of to to the pared people; plex fighting fence has billion, guarantees, Cardom around and self­ of compared equalled In 2010 In 2019

300,000 around the Based or ‑propelled mortars, multiplerocket launchers(Grad,Smerch,Kasirga), the -82A, hydrocarbon just ­Pashinyan, US$435 million

and group armies theT makes officially case to Organisation, on 70,000 soldiers, Armenia or over Recoil blockade the Azerbaijan vehicles ­ surface it US$3.16 billion S16 billion US$1.61 MT‑LB years of Article 2, to 2019. US$45 billion, in -72, and100of has of was US$4400 budget states, which

to are almost

3 million Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan size around Mortar both recognised Armenia’s

US$530 million ‑to­ similar and the of The number resources and if together (including of are the one ‑air and parties

60% in 2017). Turkey Matadors), Armenia states CSTO), e capita per Nagorno of stipulated 440 tanks System, inhabitants), missile

population the in and n 2018 in dollars. or theT of will the while in signed

defence sides with size, territory

have Azerbaijan US$4500 ­‑Karabakh Armenia’s offer while BMP those figure Yet of -90S tanks respectively) andover 850 armoured (in 2019 systems falls ). the

an Agreement in 2019 as irrespective

140 the each (according in spent reservists and -1, h armed The the Armenia well

victim Azerbaijan spending (Baku Tochka of According an agreement was Republic of other e facto de as BMP per capita per

S15 billion US$1.55 amount Armenia

entire Azerbaijan, around as possesses, (Krug, Azerbaijan’s well (compared to around assistance -2 122mm controls a military on was Tactical eligible it is to

and as of Strategic NKR in 2020 national forces MB Osa, relies to that around ;

4.5% in the 210,000 plus that US$1.88 billion BMP “using and an announcement it attack GDP, as this is 74,500 km

to inhabited Strela, Azerbaijan for two Operational concluded Partnership of US$230 million. nominal only of the well 180 km 41,850 n 2017); in 152mm of -3, US$506 million is all

budget, includes

or their mobilisation for

Armenia

(MB). states’ to possible Azerbaijan as NKR aggression on as Igla, reasons increase well artillery the GDP 2 general by

and GDP or

around with in which disproportion means”. and spends 2 95 in 2019

Missile ca 10 Azerbaijani/ as Mutual in around was by the on of amounted including others). Turkey. a third BTR size, amounts made

by number security defence. the T systems, US$13.3 ­million case in 2018 in 2019 65,000 Support. on 25.3% (com -80A, Com 86% and state -55, de by of 139 ‑ ‑ ‑

(mainly Il-76) andover a dozentrainingaircraft (mainly (with The military potentials of Armenia Armenia of potentials The military Armenia’s Armenia’s Azerbaijan According 141 Most 2 Albatros 12 0 T 101 Buk) In addition, In addition, Bell 412) mum role in Israel). never beenusedbefore incombatanywhere intheworld, while in fighter launcher Since 2017 S-300PS) aswell as medium­ baijan and the Nagorno the and -24). and Mi as and 9M113M rockets (KM). around 150), system, ers). during mentioned As well In autumn 2015 rockets as its the in

Armenia 2 tanks, -72 and of of 4 launchers), presence is the aircraft, own the as

-1A a TOS also 200 armoured them

and flew together short­ air 4 to to Nagorno­ land sphere it four­ purchased According jet Azerbaijan Armenia’s

in over as 4 transport has MB, on

force also above, are Russia 6 Albatros possession ‑range ‑day 21 bombers and trainers, the well forces

of Azerbaijan), purchased

the

influence. has multiple modernised with Caspian ‑Karabakh Republic ­‑Karabakh ‑Karabakh has according Elbrus in shelled war as

Azerbaijani long to 15 Hermes 900 arsenal ­ surface have addition -25 15 Su

fighting 62 122mm has ammunition, aircraft in 2016 KM, almost waters Syria

jet of ­‑range which and (with ­ ‑range surface to rocket its

(on loan) maximum a Il-76 transport trainers 2018 the Armenia conflict. from ‑to­ includes of fleet attack

Soviet T was attack vehicles he T three

it military 0 helicopters 100 (An-12 8 launchers) surface ‑air air and ships

launcher interpreted used on Convention

force aircraft an Avrobaza‑M missile and from 141 152mm aircraft, unmanned that also the -72s -54 forces ballistic and Israeli ­‑to (KM; ‑to­

of were 30 to has Caspian aircraft. ­‑air and has

Russia

‑air missilesystems (Krug,Dvina, as (according Yak system 2 tanks 220 of (Su-24

self­ systems a signal on stationed MB and non at

four IAI missile -29 fighter 14 MiG ie T five -40). 50 helicopters missile the ‑propelled its (Ka-32, ­‑littoral aerial estimates a Smerch Harop Tochka‑U (with Sea, Legal The state or

and with that disposal

According in 5 tanks) -55 electronic

five (Kub, systems Yak

the (KM) to Moscow states systems: Su-25 although Status vehicles Mi-2, drones, transport Caspian MB, -52) atitsdisposal, transport howitzers their multiple ehr – Pechora is also 16 at of

­ among

regards strictly (mainly (S Armenia Mi-8, to the

to and its intelligence Sea August 2017 - jets. (also has Iskander‑E it which number 300PT -29 18 MiG KM, Caspian 4 launch (some disposal. plays vehicles,

this forbidden. aircraft maxi a drones; others), rocket Mi-24, (KM). made Azer Mi-8

MB).

basin of and had has Sea, no its at ‑ ‑ ‑

83 OSW REPORT 5/2020 84 OSW REPORT 5/2020 (by different means) from warehouses located on both republics’ republics’ both on located warehouses Army Soviet from means) (by different zrajn tre t dsac isl fo Rsi ad h post­ the and Russia from itself distance to started Azerbaijan power, to came Azerbaijan of Front Popular the and Elchibey Abulfaz After The armies of Armenia and Azerbaijan – like all their state structures – were structures – state their all like Azerbaijan – and Armenia of The armies Following the Soviet forces military (the most the on agreements the division of BMP could it part in that claims MB NKR, the of equipment military the Discussing Russia as the main arms supplier to both sides of the conflict the of sides both tosupplier arms main the as Russia n ahet n 5 a 19) nr i i rtf te hre o te I. This CIS. the of Charter the ratify it did nor 1992), May 15 on Tashkent in offensive.summer its of establishment the for basis the formed which agreement, such important the Nagorno­ the on 14 Febru signed was republics, Soviet former the in armies national the beginning the at popular was that an interpretation to According territories. para­ the port started to emerge in early autumn 1992). Reports released by international support force air Russian and Armenia to arms Russia’sof bysupply proven from Armenia and Russia. Russian troops also supported Armenian forces in forces Armenian supported also troops Russian Russia. and Armenia from Nagorno­ in operations Armenian for and Armenia between relations the on more (for Armenia to belong formally by divisions of ‘unclear state provenance’, which in practice meant they came they meant practice provenance’,in state which ‘unclear of divisionsby gration structures. It did not sign the Collective Security Treaty (concluded Treaty Security Collective the sign not It did structures. gration ary 1990 (see the main part of this report) was the seizure of a large amount a large of seizure the was report) this of part main the (see ary 1990 ammunition and small arms such as bullets) which helped significantly during during ammunition andsmallarmssuch asbullets)which helpedsignificantly ammunition depotsin Agdam (around1000 railway carsoverall, withartillery post the over took Azerbaijan In spring 1992, helicopters. and aircraft units, 285 artillery as well as vehicles, fighting armoured of number a similar and Azerbaijan, and Armenia both to 220 tanks transferred Russia ary 1992), stopping the Azerbaijani army’sAzerbaijani the stopping Even early 1994. in attack Azerbaijan’sthough systems.missile ballistic systems,Elbrus self­ organisations stated that the Armenian offensive in February 1993 was manned during Armenia for Moscow’ssupport to led policy Baku’sforeign in change command. military Soviet the by authorised not was which of armaments ­ on 20 Janu Baku of pacification brutal the for reasons the of one the 1990s, of weapons took they Initially, conflict. military of conditions under created ‑propelled howitzers, Konkurs and Shturm wire­ Shturm and Konkurshowitzers, ‑propelled 1, BMP -1, ‑state see the main part of this report). It includes T It includes report). this of part main the see ‑state 2 armoured fighting vehicles, 122mm and 152mm and 122mm vehicles, fighting BRDM-2 armoured and -2 ‑Karabakh conflict (see the main text of this report), which was which report), this of text main the (see conflict ‑Karabakh ‑Karabakh (information about this sup this about (information ‑Karabakh ‑guided anti­ ‑guided 55 and T and -55 ‑tank missile ‑tank Sve inte ‑Soviet -71 tanks, ­‑Soviet ‑ ‑ ‑ (other At the Armenia were 8 of the SCUD‑B Ukraine). US$1 billion. Israel Russia Nagorno­ Russian prices(accordingtoSIPRIdata,thevalue of 32 rockets, ing next president,Heydar rise. received the talks the to to tinued transferred from but ber Gyumri CIS at a commission air ­ surface century, of credit, defence ery

around Armenia US$100 million these largest defence a closed until and weapons its included According with transferred Russia amounted important turn work deliveries while ‑to­ also the jets. committee, until 2044. ‑Karabakh after receives four 2 April 1999), ‑air Baku US$1 billion Putin, transactions 27 Krug Collective to of 1999, amounted meeting remains systems did This The Russian at 84 in purchased comprised the of missile the to US$5 billion, intensified February 2020 of

not to 29%). (Elbrus) the exporters on President delivery to practically BTC SIPRI NKR,

in ­ surface the T resume It can Lev lead it, Russia a smaller Su-30SM on 2 April 1997 with the the systems Security oil (it is Aliyev, would decidedthatthecountry formally jointhe Moscow to

at were data, -72 tanks, of Rokhlin. by of to Moscow military years pipeline class US$200 million). no most ‑to­

included intervene

which 0 rockets. 200 representatives of (see any its Azerbaijan Aliyev also provided made all ‑air cost, and

the weapons and scale, weapons multi­ Treaty tactical talks 2013–17, did conclusions. of important the known missile Russian The details Moscow stated base

explains and 50 radar in 1994–96, its from 2008 estimated -29 fighter 10 MiG not main ‑task selling on began by of Armenia weapons (24 September 1993; BTE ballistic has to stop in 2017–18

that the while the the purchases stations. This that systems Federation text this fighter must permission of the gas weapons over By head Armenian BMP weapons supporting some

were this the Russia, to 2017. information state of the and the sales pipeline from missile with have

the -2 this with of In the value jets amount loans of (weapons their thesedeliveries amounted end to in infantry include

the purchase of

Russia. weapons was Armenia the report). In September 2018, provider been jets, to have the which 349 rockets,

to side systems weapons of 2019, of following were the Russian Armenia that value deliveries remain the

first as it weapon would aware). been was Turkey, in Armenian remained The first fighting well purchased source Russia it launched, and of case worth was decade to purchased together revealed Armenia

State explained to in a new as continue years at Azerbaijan Azerbaijan, and That purchases two were Armenia’s clashes estimated Israel the of domestic provided vehicles, another batches Duma’s side.

a mem of 40 Igla 65% it states S-200 while batch deliv from after with then

dur this con had and on by in of to ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

85 OSW REPORT 5/2020 86 OSW REPORT 5/2020 ‘manage’ in in to maintaina balanceof countries moredependentonRussia anddevelop itsinfluenceandinstruments

conflict the South the

(with Nagorno­ Caucasus

Armenia ‑Karabakh The author would like to thank Aleksandra Głodek Aleksandra thank to like would The author for her assistance in collecting data for this appendix this for data collecting in assistance her for (which power In practice, intheregion. itwants tomake both

receiving would conflict).

them allow

at

preferential it, among other

rates) things,

by

its

aspiration to further

.

After van APPENDIX 4. APPENDIX Turkey The Nakhchivan within the within theSoviet statebeingestablishedatthetime, Nakhchivan would belong was with 143 142 Moscow In 1990, janis 5500 km nineteenth in 1970 treaties), which was restatedintheNAR’s 1998 constitution.The conflict forced the teeing to to pute leave laid lighted arated almost alltheethnic an autonomous and a protectorate see exclave’s continue city And Nakhchivan 31–34% Azerbaijan Azerbaijani the (it had claim of Azerbaijan – inhabited continued between Iran the the

in this Nakhchivan, from main the the the a mandate ² fact and , population to fall USSR, ethnic while to and onthe aboveAzerbaijan state(based ­ Nakhchivan status – figures historical been century by belong is the Nakhchivan, text Kars of the and Azerbaijan also along there. Autonomous The Nakhchivan Republic primarily to

side, republic. the the Armenians). and rest Autonomous unrecognised part of were the rise; not in 1921. to to were 2.9%

including Armenians toleave (even inSoviet timestheirshareof population which Russian this they had name and a short after of It decided Azerbaijan. claims become of be in 1926

included Supreme the

been report). the to After used transferred made and sent by a few On their is Nagorno act country Empire, Russian and section inhabited for n Azerbaijani an However in Republic their to 93.8%, involved Armenia. the its the as amounts up the to continual months, in Soviet this ­‑Karabakh a troops maintenance collapse whole cede around respective de facto de two basis, by with Yerevan Nakhchivan to area’s Armenia’s (NAR) by decided in and Armenia’s of Soviet­ a different this Unlike into to the that the Republic Nakhchivan around Turkey. decline,

64–68% of guarantor around in 1989 historical NAR territory

the population proportions the is Nagorno­ guberniya ‑mentioned two Soviet­ ‑Turkish it firstly Nagorno­ an exclave of and should as area authorities USSR 80,000 residents. also territory.

while Its 450,000. well. a border of they entity. the

that that in 1920 surface residents connections only historical became ‑Karabakh received these ). treaties become ‑Karabakh, were 0.65% the (by Turkey, were 10.8% the Nakhchivan Provisions of on 142 The capital share between at

treaties Azerbaijan, and

the republic area area It also condition an area the concluded as the autonomous established end it is which conflict of with compared time 143 is this status ‑Turkish to 95.9%;

Azerbai to 84.5%, borders located granted guaran around Turkey should of would of is Yere high area

that also

the sep the the dis on in of on. ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

87 OSW REPORT 5/2020 88 OSW REPORT 5/2020 ‘Nakhchivan Armenia’s Appendix 1) After After Aliyev removed from Armenia, was Minister of Nagorno­ Iran In 1991, nised nian materialculture, including monuments. The mostwidely more media moved return topower inBaku in 1993.It isnoteworthy thatPresident Elchibey, whom remained the tures the majority to period had Seemingly, thiswas relatednotonly totheoverall dynamics of break started of der of chairman on dents dents end country – Iran.In thiswayentered along it)andpurchasingelectricityfrom Nakhchivan

his the a bridge Armenia borderland areas). that kept of is the difficult the were Nagorno­ in (shelling of personal

Azerbaijan representatives located), his in to to power

of the ‑Karabakh; any some four­ his end the he army) relatively of not term.

limit theSoviet Union. the assigned Aliyev on itself. but Nakhchivan­

clan’. fighting did native of the Nagorno­ ‑day of to only ‑Karabakh old distance the in

incidents authority of key also which

access the to verify not local SSR,

Nakhchivan By Armenian war conducted the After border coerce stable village, offices wealthy. the to in war allow the power, Nakhchivan; alsocamefrom after (there ‑Karabakh Supreme NAR in 2016 was while people and reports Nakhchivan, to in intention ‑Armenian end the and and and Republic, the Pashinyan and the with the allegedly which in third­ and were cemetery president’s At the timeof of from 1982 His the later an active beginning good Azerbaijan’s and from exclave safe creation

was of May 2018 Turkey Soviet; Armenia ‑sector conflict

reputation strengthening only the of he Pashinyan’s individual personal but taken borderland towards Nakhchivan,

Baku completely to Azerbaijan was deliberate in sporadic for undertake to 1987 from 1969 also – foreign of (humanitarian death (see activists. Julfa the (2003, not as

by (and theNagorno­ foreigners, a Nakhchivan administration as which Azerbaijani well. relations the its allowed (where diversion as coming and he perhaps a good became exchanges policy, see destruction destroyed of native main borders compared who was greater In parallel, to 1982 These

the Aliyev’s the Appendix 1) the to were to with Azerbaijani text manager the ‑Karabakh war, thanks end initiating Armenia’s son aid increasingly also leave acts) army power border restrictions frontline not he activity First of by 2006. and of and of position the Heydar to referred some of

had fire theconflict(see this ­‑publicised case started

on until a low the he fled

was the relics security Deputy (in 2018), authorities food helped crossing military the the in been report), elements concerning authorities new rest apparently the dissidents, or ­‑intensity Aliyev, some in frequent. to unrecog of supplies opening to Baku he made the formal

power, leader leader Aliyev of Prime as Arme affect struc with inci inci

bor out but the the

as in in it ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

(at the Nakhchivan If to places land sole ordered

Nagorno­ military

motorway (they at same to a distance had ‑Karabakh). take activities as time, been

well. which over it is of located For a village are

less links one It runs Azerbaijan resumed, than of on

Yerevan

two and near neutral one motorways some the this an important kilometre

with territory northern hills time

the in they running

(see south between the border potential would Map). exclave’s

of from

of the both

be the target

country Armenia’s northern likely sides’ exclave, could to positions).

and in include border capital be some

Iran the ‑

89 OSW REPORT 5/2020 90 OSW REPORT 5/2020 (up ANM within союз Ukraine, Kazakhstan, LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS OF LIST jan includes initiated tal transporting the until 1997. EAEU EaP DCFTA BTK BTE BTC held between Georgia CSTO CIS CEPA Договора о коллективной безопасности – ОДКБ безопасности – коллективной о Договора political a and cluded military – to Caspian – ­ to – theBaku–Tbilisi–Erzurum gaspipeline, (or theSouth Caucasus Pipeline), – , Ukraine. – in 2006.

ЕврАзЭС – the – – (Russian Turkey, the the

Tbilisi), the – the between the and the

the the six Moldova by Commonwealth the Levon Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan Eastern Baku–Tbilisi–Kars party framework Comprehensive

Eurasian alliance Collective Turkey, Poland Sea partner Kyrgyzstan, European natural Deep ), opened abbreviation: while an economic

to the Ter­ operating and Partnership, and Europe, and

‑Petrosyan opened European currently states: gas Economic the in 2006. Georgia. Union Security Comprehensive of from Sweden Russia of inaugural

the

and omitting Armenia, Independent in 2017. rm 1990 from community AOD) – railway, and the

European comprising Union was and Union Enhanced oil an EU Treaty and Armenia pipeline, one Tajikistan). ceremony ­ The Pan Russia.

a rail inaugurated Azerbaijan, and (Russian: Eastern Deniz Organisation Free o 2013 to of established States. Neighbourhood

Partnership its on 24 November 2017. three six line a pipeline Trade It was ‑Armenian leaders. (Şahdəniz) for CIS , Policy running in Евразийский экономический Евразийский ODKB), Eastern

Belarus, its n 2009. in Armenia, states Areas, partially on 29 May 2014 (Russian: complete programme Agreement transferring National between

an intergovernmen gas Partnership (Armenia,

Policy, an agreement Georgia, h programme The field opened in 2005 and opening Организация which Azerbaijan, Movement, in governing concluded operating

Moldova, by oil Azerbai Belarus,

states: three from was was con ‑ ‑ ‑

(at that бахская автономная область автономная бахская is isation, tive the tion the the MG NKR NKAO NAR arisinginEurope.from In additiontotheEuropean states, itsmembersinclude founding States. Soviet Soviet) gional ­Germany, GU(U)AM OMON (CSCE) OSCE and an international social sian: of on 10 October 2014

headed Chapter VIII – theOSCEMinskGroup, a specialisedunitestablishedin 1992by theOSCE Interior Conference United activities. Moldova. and – – Отряд мобильный особого мобильный Отряд unrest, – republics. organisation – the

the t also It special hence time

­ The Nagorno was

Special states: Italy, by – Nakhchivan Nagorno­ States, of the the renamed a co‑chairmanship – hostage

In the the the The term includes and of forces Sweden, on Organisation the organisation, CSCE) Belarus,

Purpose the second Russian Security Canada, and Mongolia. ‑Karabakh of Organisation years United

‑Karabakh unit crises

from four Autonomous Kyrgyzstan to the Turkey, OMON

letter Mobile Kazakhstan Federation. resolve 1999–2005 operating Kazakhstan, and post­ the following Nations and ). for The OSCE considered Republic U in CSCE is назначения ‑Soviet Co‑operation as consisting Autonomous Democracy acts

Units, the also for on 23 December 2014. well the Charter, Republic. within Uzbekistan of to

Nagorno­ The unit is Security and participating used

(para­ as abbreviation. states: terror, sometimes the was Uzbekistan, a regional Armenia Russia. of

OSCE. for and , the whose ‑state). created

ОМОН Oblast in France, ‑Karabakh Georgia, but similar and structure Economic Europe used was

It was it goal called and organisation Co‑operation ), states: (Russian: on 1 January 1995 also a member Kyrgyzstan, in Russia Russian a units is Azerbaijan. Ukraine, emergencies became

conflict. joined undertakes ‘Black to of Development, Belarus, prevent

in the and Нагорно­ other

of Berets’ by an organisa in Ministry (previously Azerbaijan, the

The group in Tajikistan, the

the Armenia conflicts Finland, Europe, such preven former United organ ‑Кара­ when sense

(Rus a re as of ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

91 OSW REPORT 5/2020 92 OSW REPORT 5/2020 Azerbaijan. USSR RF PFA for of its SSR – example – Soviet – the – leaders. the the Russian Popular Union It ruled the Socialist Republic, Armenian Federation. of Front Azerbaijan

Soviet of

SSR, Azerbaijan, Socialist abbreviation the from 1992 Azerbaijan Republics. a political to 1993. used for the SSR. party Abulfaz established republics of Elchibey in 1988

the was USSR, one in

Map. * Former exclaves (notallare marked) © TURKEY GEORGIA Nagorno of the The area Azerbaijan. and Armenia Gyumri / Yerevan ARMENIA Nakhichevan Tbilisi * *

province

Tavush NAKHICHEVAN (AZ) NAKHICHEVAN * Sevan Lake Julfa * Kalbajar Stepanakert / Khankendi Agarak Ganja Defunct section of railroad linking Baku and Yerevan Main railroads in the South Caucasus Roads linkingYerevan with Stepanakert and theIranian border Border of former Nagorno-Karabakh Oblast Autonomous of the Azerbaijan SSR Former Shaumyan district and part of the former Khanlar district Armenian-controlled territories Lachin Shusha IRAN RUSSIA AZERBAIJAN conflict ­‑Karabakh Astara Baku 93 OSW REPORT 5/2020