Conflicts in the Caucasus.

Ethnic Conflicts of Small Nations or Political Battles of Great

Powers?

Senior Project Thesis Luka Liparteliani

Submitted in Partial fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the degree of Degree Earned

In International Economy and Relations

State University of New York

Empire State College

2021

Reader: Dr. Max Hilaire

Statutory Declaration / Čestné prohlášení

I, Luka Liparteliani, declare that the paper entitled:

Conflicts In The Caucasus. Ethnic Conflicts Of Small Nations Or Political Battles of Great Powers?

was written by myself independently, using the sources and information listed in the list of references. I am aware that my work will be published in accordance with § 47b of Act No. 111/1998 Coll., On Higher Education Institutions, as amended, and in accordance with the valid publication guidelines for university graduate theses.

Prohlašuji, že jsem tuto práci vypracoval/a samostatně s použitím uvedené literatury a zdrojů informací. Jsem vědom/a, že moje práce bude zveřejněna v souladu s § 47b zákona č. 111/1998 Sb., o vysokých školách ve znění pozdějších předpisů, a v souladu s platnou Směrnicí o zveřejňování vysokoškolských závěrečných prací.

In Prague, 24.04.2021 Luka Liparteliani

1

Acknowledgements

As any written work in the world would not have been done without suggestions and advice of others, this paper has been inspired and influenced by people that I am grateful for. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to professor Dr. Max Hilarie for he has guided me through the journey of working on this thesis. I would also like to thank professor Oscar Hidalgo for his inspirational courses and for giving me the knowledge in the political science field, without which this paper could not have been done.

Table Of Contents

Chapter 1. The Caucasus In Conflict.------5

Chapter 2. The Historical Roots And Legacy.------9

Chapter 3. Disputes Over Nagorno-Karabakh.------17

Chapter 4. Georgian Struggle For Unity And Breakout Regions.------26

Chapter 5. Geopolitics Of The Black Sea Region.------34

Turkey.------34

Russian Federation.------37

The United States Of America.------40

Conclusion.------43

Bibliography. ------45

2

Abstract

The paper delivers a profound overview of the conflicts in the Caucasian. The region that has been in conflict since the late 1980s has yet not achieved a settlement. The three states of the

Southern Caucasus: Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan have established independent states after the collapse of the USSR, some nations are struggling to gain sovereignty and some have joined the Russian federation as autonomous regions. The conflicts we come across in the Caucasus are various by nature. Some of the conflicts have been settled but some remain frozen. After the wave of conflicts in the 1990s, results have been devastating for people and economies, but the tensions have been lower. The developments of the conflicts have been slower since then, the

2008 Russo-Georgian war and the recent events in Azerbaijan are exceptions. The Caucasus has seen civil wars, intra-state conflicts as well as conflicts with the external powers.

These conflicts have been known as ethnic conflicts between the Caucasian ethnicities.

Although the external involvement creates a different opinion. Considering the geopolitical location of the region, the conflicts could be granted a geopolitical categorization. Russia has been an inseparable part of what is happening in the Caucasus from day one and enjoys the largest influential power over the region. Turkey and Iran have historically been trying to acquire strong positions and in recent decades it has been a proper time to do so. The US and the EU offer peaceful settlements in the region and also try to build economical and political bridges with the Southern Caucasian states. China has shown its interest in the region lately as well, due to the communicational benefits it can deliver between Asia and Europe.

3 Chapter 1: The Caucasus in conflict

A small region between the Caucasian mountain and two seas, that has been struggling for peace, is yet stuck in the middle of frozen and ongoing territorial and ethnic conflicts.

Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Dagestan, Chechnya, Abkhazia, Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and

Karachai-Cherkessia battling over their identities and positions in the region. Such a small piece of land that has been in conflict for decades and still remains unstable. The historical legacy, cultural and religious differences, and External forces play a huge role in the Caucasian tensions.

The Caucasus is a region that has directly suffered from the new political disorder.

Considering its territorial size, the Caucasus has seen one of the biggest numbers of armed conflicts after the cold war. The conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, the

Prigorodniy Rayon of North Ossetia, and Chechnya make up five of the total eight armed conflicts in the former Soviet republics and it has suffered the most (Cornell, 2000). Hundreds of thousands of deaths and millions of refugees have been a cause of these conflicts and the numbers are getting higher even today (Jafarova, 2011). The armed conflicts and their consequences have left a significant mark on the region’s economy, which was already struggling to transition from centralized to open market.

It is worth discussing that the conflicts, except the one between Chechnya and Ingushetia, have very similar patterns and the roots for the conflict. They are all based on ethnic identity and the fight for self-determination. They have all revolted against the central governments after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is also important to mention that all these revolting parties have been granted autonomy during the Soviet era, and despite the fact that there are many more ethnic minorities in the region, the ones that did not have autonomy are not supported by the

4 external actors as much. Another similarity that has to be pointed out is the external support of all these breakaway minorities. It almost seems like the conflicts that broke out after the collapse

Soviet Union have been encouraged and used for political interests, Thus they are more geopolitical than ethno-religious.

The geographical location of the Caucasus region has made it a land of borders. The

Caucasus has been a land where empires ended as well as a land of civilizational and religious exchange. It has functioned both as a crossroad and a fence between East and West, North and

South. The region has been a battlefield of Tsarist, Safavid, and Ottoman empires and later to their successors. The situation sometimes benefited but mostly damaged the people of the

Caucasus. External powers have cooperated with local kingdoms and leadership against their competitors. Using domestic powers, foreigners have invaded the Caucasian territories, emigrated, and terminated the populations (King, 2008).

The new world has brought a new opportunity for the Caucasus to turn themselves from being barriers to being a bridge between Europe and Asia. Especially, through producing and exporting Caspian Sea oil and gas, making the region an essential communication route for the two continents. Nevertheless, the armed tensions have not been settling and the political and economic development of the region has not been speedy for relevant reasons.

One of the reasons being the devastating consequences of five armed conflicts that have broken out since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The internal and external wars have created a tremendously harsh environment for the states to survive and rise as independent. Since then, the heritage of the conflicts has been holding the countries back from developing in a free environment. Even though the facts remain that all the conflicts are frozen, there has not been a

5 final settlement on any of the conflicts. Considering the recent happenings, the option of mutual settlement is getting farther from reality.

Another factor is the positions of major foreign powers that in general are vouching for war and instability in the region. The external actors that are interested in the Caucasus are securing their political interests at the expense of local populations and the governments. The following chapters will describe further the methods and doing of Russia, Turkey and the U.S.

Finally, the geopolitical importance of the Caucasus attracts attention from the outside.

Oil politics of the external powers requires them to gain influence over the region. While these powers actively try to align with either of the states, the separatist minorities are looking for a helping hand from outside for future security. The fight over influence weakens the Caucasian states and prevents them from dominating others. The states cannot achieve a shared foreign policy. This situation prevents the states from settling the conflicts between themselves because they are seeking settlements on their own terms by aligning with external powers. The existing conflicts generate tensions and prevent confrontational agreements. The intra and inter-state conflicts of the Caucasus are of crucial importance for Eurasian stability as well as for international security. The region and its problems are poorly known and understood on a global scale.

6 Chapter 2: The Historical Roots and Legacy

The conflicts are rooted in the times of the Russian empire. Before Russia would fully occupy the Caucasus region, it was mostly a battlefield of the Ottoman Empire, Persia, and

Russia. The local kingdoms, maybe before united, by that time, were divided and were separately fighting for their sovereignty. The borders were poorly controlled and Armenians, Georgians,

Azerbaijanis, Chechens, Abkhazians, Circassians, Peoples of Dagestan, Ossetes, Thelngush, The

Turkic Peoples of the Caucasus, The Iranian Peoples of the Caucasus, The Mountain Jews, The

Georgian Jews, The Laz, The Mingrelians & Svans, and several others nationalities have been migrating and mixing. Then Tsarist Russia marked the borders and divided regions into Oblasts.

The borders are very similar to the ones today. During the Russian realm, the conflicts started to cultivate. After the Bolshevik revolution, South Caucasus states declared independence, but could not agree on the borders, and intrastate wars began, which ended with the Soviet invasion

(King, 2008). During communism the discrimination of minorities took place and separatism started to root. The chaos brought by the collapse of the USSR quickly turned into ethnic conflicts and separatism.

The Russian Empire has tried to dominate the region for centuries and even though it failed a couple of times and faced rebellions, it yet kept coming back for different geopolitical reasons. Whether it was encouraged by the ideas of getting closer to warm seas or accessing the

Iranian market or was it part of the “great game” with Great Britain, the Caucasus remained a target of Russian imperialism. Such activity from the North did not go unnoticed by other empires around the region and they started taking action to maintain influence over the region as well. The local kingdoms and nations winded up fighting each other under the flags of the

7 Russian, Ottoman, and Persian empires. Siding with foreign powers was a road to self- determination for smaller ethnicities and also a road for bigger nations defending historical legacy. The war and chaos led to crimes of discrimination and genocides (Bulayeva, 2003).

Hatred cultivated among the coexisting nations, but the real roots for the conflicts we see today in the Caucasus can be seen during the Soviet era.

The political architecture of the Soviet Union was unique from the rest of the federal states and it played a significant role in the emergence of nationalism in specific nations and ethnic minorities, which later led to ethnic conflicts. Inter-ethic relations were mostly a legacy of

Soviet policies, specifically Leninist national policy. The Leninist national policy was the territorial architecture of the union which was based on nationalism. This was a controversial policy from the beginning. From a Marxist point of view, it was a mistake to acknowledge ethnic identities. However, Bolsheviks considered nationalism as a logical step of the evolutionary ladder, that would transform pre-capitalist states into one whole socialist society and create a new human, also called Homo Sovieticus. Nationalism was often considered by the Bolshevik elites as an ideology of less developed Soviet people, ironically it lasted longer than communist ideology (Aspaturian, 1950).

Despite the controversy, national-based federalism was considered the right step due to a simple reason. In the former Russian empire nationalism has already emerged, which must be said was done with the help of the Russian government itself. Russian leadership marked borders between national settlements, which are very similar to the ones today, which led to forming nations and later on independent republics. Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan declared independence in 1918, Ukraine in a year before, and some nations like Tatars were asking for autonomy. It became a process that could not have been undone. Therefore, it was a right move

8 to base territorial structure on national borders to remain in control over the union. This was the first-ever nationalism-based federal union and the structure ironically opposed the very idea of

Marxist ideology (Tishkov, 1997).

As a result, Soviet Union formed an extremely complicated and hierarchical territorial structure. The borders between the national federation were drawn awkwardly and it is hard to make sense of such division. Some say it was done out of ignorance, due to the fact that it was a temporary division that would later be erased and melted down into one communist nation. Some researchers find that drawing such borderlines was unavoidable, because of complicated and overlapping ethnic settlements, especially in the Caucasus region (Tishkov, 1997). However, a more critical analysis simply states that borders were drawn this way on purpose according to the divide and rule principle. Meaning that the nations that were considered as possible threats or trouble makers were divided to kill off the idea of unification and rebellions. It is impossible to know exactly what was the actual reasoning behind the national policies, but the fact remains that the Soviet national architecture erupted in ethnic grievances and conflicts that till today remain unresolved. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, emerged 15 sovereign states and several separatist regions. The separatist regions that claim statehood are former autonomous republics or oblasts. The fact that the borders which were once used for Soviet national policies are now borders between independent states and separatist regions, confirms the huge role played by the Soviet legacy in today's Transcaucasus conflicts.

The structure of Soviet territorial federalism consisted of four levels of autonomy. The levels were hierarchical and on the highest level, there were 15 Soviet Socialist Republics (SSR).

It is important to mention that all the fifteen SSRs declared independence later on. SSRs, also called union republics, were smaller interpretations of the Soviet Union itself. Union republics

9 enjoyed the right to have parliament and constitution. On the paper, the power of SSRs was wide and they even had a right to secede from the union. On a lower level of the ladder, there were autonomous republics (ASSR). These leaderships were under the governance of SSRs they were part of. ASSRs were also granted the right to have separate constitutions and formally they were much more independent from SSRs. Autonomy was more limited for autonomous oblasts and regions, which did not even have their own constitution. On the lowest level, there were autonomous okrugs with even less independence. Okrugs were mostly located in Siberia.

Although, the actual power of the Soviet Union was highly centralized in Moscow and the territorial federations did not have real power to act against Moscow (Cornell, 2000).

The next phase in erupting the present ethnic conflict in the Caucasus was during the

Stalin era. A former Commissar for Nationalities, Stalin had much more complicated and careful national policies planned for the Caucasus. As he was familiar with the region and its heterogeneous people of the region, he saw the Caucasus as less loyal to the Union. Therefore, he strengthened the “divide and rule” politics over the region. The outcome was a “nativization” process that started in the 1920's and aimed to degrade already weak autonomous powers.

Stalin's border policies were different from Leninist ones because it was not necessarily based on nationalism. Meaning that in some cases borders did not gather people with the same ethnic groups between them but on contrary, they divided them. One of the examples would be the case of the North Caucasus. There are Turkic people of Karachai and Balkars settlements alongside ethno-groups of Kabadins and Cherkess, which are similar to each other. Stalin's policy did not come from two republics of similar ethno-groups but on the other way around and that is the way these regions are divided till today. So instead of forming the Karachai-Balkar republic and

Kabardi-Cherkes, which would make sense based on ethnicities and language groups, they

10 established Karachai-Cherkes and Kabardi-Balkar republics (Blank, 1993). This seems to be a way of preventing possible unifications and rebellions by isolating people with common languages and ethnicities. Another way of Stalin's policies to unify different ethno-groups under one republic was to draw borders up to the North and by doing so, increase Russian populations in the North Caucasus republics (Blank, 1993).

More interesting examples of Stalin’s federal division can be found in Armenia and

Azerbaijan. This specific division was the outcome of 1921 treaties between the Turkish republic and the Soviet Union. The conflicts that we come across in these countries today are directly traced back to Stalinist federal policies. The leadership of that time actually managed to create a non-contagious republic and oblast of Azeris and Armenians. The autonomous oblast of

Nagorno-Karabakh was created in the middle of Azerbaijan SSR. Meaning that the Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh were granted autonomy but they did not connect to their homeland but instead were completely circled by Azerbaijanian territories. The ASSR of Nakhchivan populated by Azeris was divided similarly, completely cutting it off from Azerbaijan by

Armenia. Both regions were put under Azerbaijani jurisdiction which made the political processes even more twisted and unstable (Geukjian, 2012)

Negotiations have been going on, seeking solutions to the conflicts in the Caucasus. The question of autonomy is considered effective and worked with through these negotiations.

Russian Federation as well as international presence have been trying to offer separatist leaderships joining former central governments but with strong autonomy. OSCE in South

Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh as well as the UN in Abkhazia have offered such solutions, but always unsuccessfully. Rebellious regions would not agree on solutions based on autonomy, because they want to be dealt with as equals. Vertical negotiations are not an option for them, but

11 Georgia and Azerbaijan on the other hand, would not negotiate with them horizontally. Georgia and Azerbaijan are asking for the separatist regions to join the sovereignty of their countries and only after that further negotiations can be done, such as strong autonomy. Abkhaz, Karabakh

Armenians, and South Ossetians are aiming for international recognition and independence.

Soviet legacy can be seen here as well. First, it is important to mention that the only regions that raised against the former central governments were the regions that have been granted some kind of autonomy. Abkhazs, Karabakh Armenians, South Ossetians, and Chechens went on the path of succession. There were rare attempts of rebellions by other minorities like Azeris in Georgia but were momentarily ceased and found no support from the outside. Armenians and Azeris have large diasporas in Georgia and they actually make up majorities in some of the regions, which is not the case in Abkhazia. However, only Abkhazs, Karabakh Azeris, South Ossetians, and

Chechens started separatist movements and one thing they have in common and makes them special from other minorities is autonomy statuses in the Soviet Union. Second, in the totalitarian nature of the regime, political and economic powers were highly centralized in Moscow and the autonomous regions had no actual power in their hands. Especially so, in the cases of autonomous republics and oblasts. Moreover, Moscow even let union republics limit the powers on the autonomies within them. The fact that separatist movements are not willing to even consider the idea of joining Georgia and Azerbaijan might be coming from the experience of the

Soviet Union. The secessionists know what it means to be autonomous and not be independent.

They might be too scared to risk-taking that chance and history repeats itself. Therefore, the only logical way of self-determination for them remains succession.

The Soviet Union propagated a communist identity. The idea was to erase the national and ethnic identities of Soviet peoples and from a new Soviet nation. The new human was killed

12 before it was born. The tensions between countries did not disappear, in fact, in some cases, new ones appeared or existing ones got stronger. Discrimination and preferential treatment was a usual behavior in the Soviet era. However, the peoples of the Soviet Union were pushed to get along for the bigger Marxist idea and it actually became a way of keeping them together.

Tensions and grievances between Abkhazs and Georgians or Azeris and Karabakh Armenians were always there, but the common sense of all being Soviet citizens united them at some level.

Ethnic tensions in the Caucasus appeared to be almost impossible to resolve for the soviet administrations and the idea of Soviet unification and brotherhood became the only tool to deal with it. Hence, once the Soviet Union collapsed, the idea of a Soviet citizen died with it as well.

The peoples of the Caucasus did not see any more reason to get along with each other. The

Soviet identity was gone and they had to find new identities for themselves. Karabakh

Armenians decided they do not feel comfortable living under Azerbaijan jurisdiction,

Mengrelians and Svans remembered their differences with other Georgians, Chechens, and

Ingushs split into two ethnic groups and many more.

Ethnic tensions were not the only legacy of the Soviet Union. Along with awkwardly drawn borders and overlapping ethnic settlements, Caucasians inherited distrust towards governments and state institutions. For obvious reasons, many Soviet officials maintained positions in newly formed independent governments, which made it hard for the people to really see the difference. Hence, a new form of ideology was cultivating in the Caucasus through the

1990's. Nationalist leaders and parties came to power (Zurcher, 2007). The economy was another factor for instability brought by the Soviet legacy. The economic architecture of the Soviet

Union was aimed to make union republic economies completely Moscow dependent. Although

13 the Soviet legacy is only partly responsible for economical issues, most of the trade relations were ruined because of the conflicts, barricades, and embargos.

Reporters, politicians, and scholars have been trying to define the nature of the conflicts in the Caucasus. Some try to simplify it by stating that they are religious conflicts. The logic behind such a statement is clear, parties of the conflicts are in most cases different religious groups and it would have been an easy explanation to just argue that the conflict occurred between Christian Russians and Muslim Chechens or Muslim Azeris and Christian Armenians over religious differences. However, that would be incorrect. In fact, opposite sides of a conflict being different religious groups does not make the conflict of a religious nature at all. To classify a conflict as religious one of the two should be true:

“1) At least one party refers to a religious body of thinking to legitimize conflict behavior; 2) the polarization of parties is underpinned primarily by religious identity and/or theological perspectives” (Nordquist, 1989).

In the case of the Caucasus, none of the statements are true. Conflicts can not be granted economical character either, despite the fact that Abkhazs and Karabakh Armenians did complain about economic discrimination from the central governments. There is no actual proof to confirm the statement. In fact, Abkhazia enjoyed the privilege of being all Soviet tourist resort and mass exports of tea and citrus products. Nagorno-Karabakh was definitely an economically backward region, although richer than most of the Azeri regions (Zurcher, 2007). The conflicts qualify as ethnic in most of the political literature and it is true. However, it is important not to forget the political side of the conflicts. The ethnicities of Caucasians have been politicized and then turned into ethnic conflicts. Therefore, conflicts could be safely put under the category of ethno-political conflicts.

14 Chapter 3: Disputes Over Nagorno-Karabakh

The beginning of the conflict in the region of Nagorno-Karabakh as it is today is dated back in 1988. The results of the conflict have been horrifying. It is estimated that the conflict

(excluding the recent data, due to its uncertainty) has led to 20,000 deaths and about one and a half million refugees as well as displaced persons. About 20 percent of Azerbaijan territories including parts of Nagorno-Karabakh have been under illegal occupation for decades (Geukjian,

2007). The numbers are likely to change in the following months and these territories have been ethnically cleansed by Armenian forces.

The conflict was often regarded by international organizations as an internal conflict of the fight for independence by the Arminian population on the Azerbaijaninan territories.

Although it is also a clear conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Therefore the involved parties are Armenia, Azerbaijan as well as the so-called Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh.

The conflict can be divided into three phases. The first phase of the conflict was escalation which lasted from 1985 to 1989. Escalation of the conflict was not a complicated process. In fact, Karabakh Armenians were waiting for the right moment to act out on their secessionist ideas. Every time there was a political change in Moscow, Karabakh Armenians would apply a request of joining to Armenian SSR, but it was always unsuccessful. Gorbachev's leadership also received such requests but ignored them like his predecessors, stating that nationalism was a narrow-minded ideology (Libaridian, 1988). Introducing “perestroika” and

“glasnost” gave space to people to raise their voices over cultural, social, and even secessionist demands. Clearly, this was a new opportunity for Karabakh Armenians to prepare themselves.

During 1987-1988 three delegations from Nagorno-Karabakh paid visits to authorities in

15 Moscow. The topic of discussion was obvious, unification of NK with Armenian SSR

(D’Agostino, 1998). In one of the archived letters Suren Aivazian, a CPA member, also raised a matter of adding Nakhchivan to Armenian jurisdiction as well (Geukjian, 2012). Champaign became stronger and bigger. Armenians started collecting signatures for a petition asking for unification, Armenian diasporas outside of the union established organizations supporting their homeland, and many so (Brown, 1997). Armenians were filled with optimism that the issue could have been solved peacefully with the help of Moscow. The fact that Gorbachev’s advisor in economics, Abel Aghanbegian spoke up about how the unification of Armenian SSR with

NKAO would be economically beneficial or that Heidar Aliev, the biggest enemy to the idea of

Armenian nationalism was removed from the politburo, gave Armenians idea that Moscow was in favor with them (Geukjian, 2012).

However, Gorbachev had too much on his plate, such ethnic grievances and secessionist demands were rising from all over the union as well as ecological demonstrations that demanded the closure of polluting industries. This became a trend and often transformed from environmental to political and social nature. This is how the Karabakh movement was established, changing the demand of demonstration to returning Nakhchivan and Nagorno

Karabakh to Armenia. This whole process ture started peacefully but led to discrimination and harassment of Azeris in Armenia. Armenians started driving Azeris out of the country and indeed ten thousand refugees reached Baku in 1988 (Fuller, 1987). On February 20th, Karabakh oblast passed a resolution officially asking to be moved under Armenian control (Quinn-Judge,

1988). Tensions started to get high, which resulted in clashes and four Armenians died.

However, the real conflict was about to erupt on 27th, when violence broke out in Sumgait. The conflict started in an industrial city, far away from Karabakh, escalated so fast it surprised both

16 sides. An anti-Armenian violent group raided streets for two days before the Soviet army got involved. 26 Armenians were dead along with 6 Azeris, many were raped and robbed and 200 apartments of Armenians were looted (Cornell, 2000). Armenians claimed this was a step towards genocide. Some theories claim this was done as revenge on the murder of two Azeri in

Agdam, but the real reasons remain a mystery. The Soviet army failed to take control of the situation and stop the bloodbath. However, it might be argued that Gorbachev decided to use well-practiced divide and rule principles towards the situation. Through the control of the media, provocative and overly dramatized statements were spread, not to mention that criminals were released from prisons in Sumgait. This suggests that Soviet policies have been deliberately encouraging violence. The Soviet experience shows that demonstrations and riots were easily overkilled by police brutality and violence. In the Sumgait case, the Soviet military seems helpless, which is odd. Critics suggest that the inactivity of the military to stop the clashes was no failure but a direct order (Nolyain, 1994).

On the 23rd of March, Soviet authorities decided to reject the demand of Karabakh oblast to join the Armenian SSR with no possibility of appeal. Moscow sent troops to Yerevan to cease the riots. However, tensions got higher. Armenians continued harassing Azeris further. From

March till July, four Azeri villages were burnt down, five were cleansed and Azeris were evicted from cities. Gorbachev replaced leaders in both Armenia and Azerbaijan to take control over them (Geukjian, 2012).

In December an earthquake erupted in Armenia, which diverted the attention of the public from the conflict. This gave Soviet authorities a chance to take over the conflict. They arrested all the eleven members of the Karabakh Committee for refusing aid from Azerbaijan.

They established a new governmental administration over Karabakh, directed straight from

17 Moscow. Reports show that 87 were killed and 1500 murdered during clashes in both republics

(Remnick, 1989).

Moscow’s take over calmed things down for a couple of months but tensions re-emerged in May. Political changes were happening in both republics. Armenian National Movement took over the parliament with a leader Ter-Petrosian in Armenia and Azerbaijan Popular Front in

Azerbaijan, with Elchibey as a chairman, was becoming stronger and more powerful. Armenia implemented an embargo on Nakhchivan, which backfired and resulted in Azerbaijan putting an embargo on Armenia as a whole. Soviet outposts were often attacked and robbed, which led to weapons ending up in the hands of conflicting sides. The armed conflict became impossible to revert and the Soviet Union abolished its commands, taking troops out of the region. Nagorno-

Karabakh went back under Azeri control, but on December the 1st, 1989, Armenia introduced a historical decision. Armenian Supreme Soviet was officially claiming territories of Nagorno-

Karabakh under its jurisdiction (Cornell, 2000).

At the beginning of 1990, the action moved to Azerbaijan. Aggression towards

Armenians worsened, which led to ethnic cleansing. For the first time, heavy artillery was used.

This resulted in the death of at least 88 Armenian lives (Compil from wire services, 1990). The

Soviet army took its time to intervene, but when it did, they sent 29,000 troops and occupied

Baku. Casualties rose and Karabakh was also taken over by the military. Armenia went over

Moscow's head, when including Karabakh in upcoming relations, which led to worsening relations between the Central government and Armenia (Dobbs, 1990).

The number of clashes increased significantly on both sides, at the beginning of 1991.

Armenia quickly organized paramilitary forces, while Azerbaijan mostly depended on Soviet support. Soviet and Azeri joint forces raided Armenian villages in response to military action

18 from the Armenian side at the Northern border of Karabakh. Estimated casualties in June 1991 reached approximately 800 (Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, 1994).

Following the independence wave all over the union, Nagorno-Karabakh also declared independence and control over the NKAO and Geranboy/Shaumian districts of Azerbaijanian territories. This was followed by Azeri forces moving to Karabakh, but it must be said that while

Armenia had a well-organized military with weaponry and was ready to defend itself, Azerbaijan ended up in a terrible situation. Azerbaijan was completely dependent on the Soviet military and was hoping conflict would settle on Soviet terms. However, the union was collapsing and the troops were dislocated simultaneously (Vaserman, 1994).

Before we move onto the next phase of full-scale war, it is important to discuss the matter of the relationship between Yerevan and Stepanakert. While the narrative was always that

Nagorno-Karabakh wanted to join Armenia, in 1991 it seemed that Karabakh Armenians changed their minds and are asking for independence. It could have been a diplomatic trick of

Yerevan avoiding responsibilities to Karabakh Armenians actions. However, observation can be made based on government official changes between two capitals and Karabakh becoming president of Armenia that Karabakh had more control over Yerevan than the other way around.

Soon Karabakh became a scene of full-scale war. As already stated Armenia had a military upper hand, so it started moving forward. First was the little town of Khojaly, which was attached by Armenians. Ethnic cleansing in Khojaly was one of the worst kinds. Azeri population which made up to 7,00 people, were attacked, killed and the rest were forced to flee the town. It is important to mention that there were many Armenians in the rows of Karabakh militaries. Whilst Stepanakert claimed they were volunteers coming from Armenia, In reports of

Human Rights Watch/Helsinki (1994) so-called volunteers were identified as official Arminian

19 militaries. The next target of Armenians were the towns of Shusha and Lachin. These were strategic locations for Armenia and by conquering them a corridor between Armenia and

Karabakh was created. From a strategic point of view, Armenia could now reach Karabakh with no Azeri obstacles and from a political point of view now it made more sense to unify the two entities which have been separated since Stalinist federal policy.

The Azeri government managed to put together new armed forces and carried out an attack on the districts located to the North of Karabakh. Theory recaptured Mardakert and

Shaumian region, forcing 40,000 Armenians to flee from there (Human Rights Watch/Helsinki,

1994). Regions soon went back under Armenian control in 1993 alongside Kelbajar. Such a negative performance of Azeri forces to defend captured territories could be internal politics.

Azerbaijan had several armed forces that could be considered to be private. One of the most powerful forces was created by Surat Husseinov, who was removed from colonel position due to his possible connections with Moscow. After removal he retreated his forces from Karabakh and took them to Ganja, threatening the stability of the government. Meanwhile, Armenians continued successful attacks. After Kelbajar, Fuzili was secured and ethnically cleansed. On the

16th of April, Armenians announced a ceasefire (Geukjian, 2012).

The situation was no less intense in Baku. The Elchibey government was losing control and appeared weaker after every lost battle in people's eyes. Russia wanted to take over the control in Azerbaijan but not directly. Russia’s best ally in Azerbaijan was Husseinov, whom they supplied with weapons and provided support. Husseinov with his army located in Ganja was ready to overthrow the government. Turkey on the other hand also wanted his man in Azerbaijan and while Elichbey was clearly pro-Turkey, he was too incapable to handle responsibilities and his nationalism was too dangerous for Turkish politics. Heidar Aliev, a former member of

20 politburo was also on good terms with the Turkish political elite. Husseinov and Aliev allied against Elichbey. Russia played a huge role in political change through Husseinov, but Turkey maintained influence through Aliev making Azerbaijan the most pro-Turkish state of the

Caucasus (Cornell, 2000).

Meanwhile, Armenians broke their own established ceasefire and started stretching occupation to the South. Attacks occurred in the towns of Jebrail, Qubatli, and Zangilan.

Zangilan is close to the Iranian border and refugees of the attack went to Iran seeking shelter.

Iran was already overwhelmed by millions of refugees coming from Iraq and Afghanistan

(Zurcher, 2007). They were afraid this would pressure their intervention in the Caucasus in favor of Azerbaijan, so they had the refugees return soon enough. But in response to the second wave of refugees, 1,000 Iranian troops crossed Azerbaijan. This was followed by 50,000 Turkish troops reaching Armenia and the conflict came to its high risk of becoming international

(Cornell, 2000). Armenia continued attacks and cleansing and at the end of 1993 Armenians reached the maximum of the territories they could occupy, which they held for decades after. In

1994, Russian forces entered the region and established a new ceasefire, which both Armenian and Azerbaijanian defense ministers signed as well as the head of Karabakh armed forces.

Despite this, the killings continued, but the armed conflict was stopped. Armenia carried out a successful campaign with receiving no condemnation (except Turkey) or sanctions (Cornell,

2000).

The conflict broke out again, after years of a somewhat settled down situation, on

September 27, 2020. On that day, Azerbaijan launched a large-scale air and artillery attack, which resulted in 16 dead and 100 wounded military and civilians (Bagirova & Hovhannisyan,

2020). Baku claims this was done in response to Armenia breaking the ceasefire earlier in the

21 month, but Yerevan blames Azerbaijan for the escalation of the war. Who started the role is still unknown, but the war lasted for six weeks and it became the first conflict in modern warfare that was won almost completely by drones. In contrast to the first war, Azerbaijan held an upper hand in this one. Azerbaijan managed to take full control of the air by using Turkish and Israeli drones. Turkey played a huge role in recent developments of the conflict, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5. For Turkey, it was a great opportunity to regain influence in the

Caucasus and offered Azerbaijan military support. Azeri attacks were well planned and organized, almost like Turkey and Azerbaijan have been playing the attacks for some time

(Modebadze, 2021). Azerbaijan at first regained occupied districts of Jabrayil, Zangilan,

Fuzuli, and Qubadli. Then launched an attack on the Lachin corridor, cutting Armenian’s access to Karabakh. The peak was liberating the Shusha region which holds historic importance. After

Shusha, a deal for ending the war was signed by Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia.

Russia’s role is also important in the conflict. Armenia, being a military ally of Russia and signator of CSTO, naturally asked Russia for protection, which was denied by the Putin administration explaining that the war did not take place in the Armenian territories, but legally in Azerbaijanian, therefore Russia remained neutral. Another widespread explanation of Russian non-interference would be internal political changes in Armenia. Nikol Pashinyan came to power through a peaceful revolution in 2018 and is the first aggressively anti-Russian leader. The old government enjoyed strong ties with Moscow and Pashinyan arrested or fired many of such officials. Clearly, Moscow did not like this change and the conflict opened up a real opportunity to bring back the old government in Armenia. After the devastating consequences of the war,

Pashinyan became dramatically unsuccessful, and raged people stormed the parliament.

Pashynian was forced to announce early elections and looks like he is unlikely to win.

22 Settlements with what the recent crisis ended in were that both parties were to exchange war prisoners and corps of the fallen. Moreover, Armenians were to remove their forces from the occupied territories around Karabakh by December. Russian troops of 2,000 soldiers would be sent for at least five years along the line of the Lachin corridor. Finally, Armenia is supposed to guarantee the safety of a corridor passage connecting Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan and the control of the transportation communication will be provided by Russians (Grigoryan, Khachatryan,

2020).

23 Chapter 4: Georgian struggle for unity and breakout regions

Georgia has always been a multicultural and international place where Eastern and

Western ethnicities and cultures have crossed their paths at. That makes Georgia different from its Caucasian neighbors. While Armenia is almost a monoethnic state and Azeris make up 90 percent of Azerbaijanian populations, Georgia is made up of almost 80 ethnic groups. Georgians are more of a linguistic group of people than ethnic. People who speak the Kartvelian language or related sup languages like Mengrelian or Svan are considered Kartvelians (Georgians) and this exact group of people make up to 70 percent of the whole population. The major ethnic minorities are Armenians, Russians, and Azeris. That creates a problematic situation, which is easier to politicize ethnicity and cultivate separatism. An exceptional region being Akhalkalaki, which is majorly populated by Armenians and did not turn into an ethno-conflict. Russian population emigrated in the 1980s due to a very anti-Russian atmosphere in the county. There was a clash of Georgian and Azeris in Southern Georgia which was led by a quick response by

Georgian armies who raided the region. The event was agreed to be blamed on Georgian Azeris by both states and ended right there. In the same year, a similar raid was conducted in South

Ossetia, due ended with a very different result. Although Azeris, as well as Russian or

Armenians, had their own homelands in the post-Soviet region and place to emigrate to.

However, in Soviet Georgia, there were two autonomous republics and one autonomous oblast.

The autonomous republics were called ASSRs and the largest in Georgia was Abkhazia with a majority population of Georgian Magrelians. Another ASSR was Ajara created for Georgian

Muslims, who were also a minority in the region. The autonomous Oblast was South Ossetia originally called Samachablo. It is often a topic of disagreement but commonly stated that

24 Ossetians were new settlers in the Region. It was an oblast and not a republic due to the fact that the Ossetian autonomous republic was located in the North and it was considered as their homeland.

Georgia with no doubt has been affected by the conflicts the most. The two wars on the outbreak regions were worsened by the two-phase civil war. The Russian involvement in

Georgian politics was the most obvious and frequent. The revolted minorities were supported by

Russia and it is also blamed for an assassination attempt on the second president of Georgia. The pre-Soviet events were also a cause of the conflicts but the main roots could be found in Soviet times as already discussed.

In order to explain the ethical grievances and territorial distribution between ethic groups, we need to take a look at the historical context. In the late 19th century, when Tsarist Russian failed a task of Russification of Georgia, it introduced a new policy of dividing homogeneous nations. The aim was to divide Georgia into ethnic subgroups and prevent possible unifications and rebellions. Therefore, the promotion of ethnic minorities started. Realizing Georgians being a linguistic group, local sub-languages were promoted, moving Georgian to secondary language.

In the case of Abkhazians, even replacing Georgian with Russian. The process was continued in

Soviet times, alienating Abkhazians to Georgians and cultivating aggression between them

(Cornell, 2000).

In 1977, Abkhazians used an opportunity of the reformatted constitution, under

Brezhnev, to fight for their linguistic rights. Abkhazian intellectuals sent letters to Moscow complaining about Georgianization in schools and economic exploitation. Abkhazians demanded succession from Georgia and joined the Russian North Caucasus. Officials came to Sukhumi

(capital of Abkhazia) to take control. Georgia's central government was pressured to back down

25 and admit the legitimacy of some of the claims. Georgian Mengrelians who were the majority of the population in Abkhazia felt that Abkhazians were given privileges. This was also augmented by the fact that despite the low portion of the population Abkhazians made up, they occupied most of the positions in administrative organs. Relations got tense from time to time, but the open conflict was averted

In the 1980’s nationalism reached its peak in Tbilisi. Anti-soviet movements were established that united people of very different backgrounds and viewpoints, with only one thing in common, criticizing Moscow. National leaders emerged in the country creating a tense atmosphere on the political spectrum. Like in Armenia, ecological issues were also used as a cover for Georgian nationalists to carry out demonstrations. Georgian communist party became helpless against Georgian enthusiasm towards nationalism and lost its authority. Meanwhile, in

Abkhazia and South Ossetia people were threatened by Georgian nationalism and angered by the newly passed law making the Georgian language primary in all Georgian territories. Abkhazians continued the campaign for succession and became a union republic (Gahrton, 2010).

When the independence of Georgia was declared, Zviad Gamsaxurdia became the first president. Based on his statements and actions, one might conclude his politics as chauvinist and extremely nationalist. With no hesitation, he encouraged people of cleansing Ossetians back to the North. His administration recognized the autonomy of Abkhazia on some level, of Adjara on lesser, and completely ignored Ossetians, whom he often called “immigrants”. Linguistic and cultural demands of the minorities were completely denied, even though they were similar to ones made by Georgians in the Soviet Union. However, it is important to mention that both

Abkhazia and South Ossetia declared Russian as their first language, which led Georgian

26 nationalists to think that Russia was behind all the actions taken by minorities and saw it as a way of challenging stability in independent Georgia (Starr, 2009).

The conflicts first erupted in South Ossetia, which was the following stage of the “war of laws” on linguistic matters (Tchantouridzé, 2020). During the last years of Soviet rule, Ossetias tried different approaches to achieve more independence from Georgia. Officials sent letters to

Moscow regarding unification to South Ossetia as well as upgrading the autonomous hierarchy.

Georgia in response demanded veto rights on all Union laws and requested secession from the union. This quickly escalated into an armed conflict. The first phase of the war occurred during

1989-1990, starting with the March on Tskhinvali (a city in Ossetia), organized by Zviad

Gamsakhurdia to protect the Georgian majority population of the city. The march was met by the

Ossetian mob at the entrance of the city, but the conflict was prevented by Soviet forces.

Although, clashes erupted outside of the city in villages which continued till 1990. Soon, South

Ossetia refused to participate in the Georgian referendum for independence and voted for Soviet rule to keep existing, confirming that South Ossetia does not see itself as a part of Georgia.

Tensions were getting higher and ethnic cleansing emerged, which led to an estimated 30,000 to

100,000 refugees on both sides (Birch, 1995). In the mid-1990, Georgian troops surrounded

Ossetia with heavy artillery and South Ossetian leadership declared total mobilization. However, full-scale war was yet again prevented, due to internal politics in Tbilisi.

In Tbilisi, people were raising suspicions against Gamsakhurdia’s presidency.

Gamsakhurdia had tendencies towards a conspiratorial frame of mind and self-glorification.

According to his political philosophy, democracy, while important, came second after independence. He believed that until independence and territorial sovereignty are secured, democracy can not be consolidated. For that Georgia needed strong leadership, even autocratic

27 until sovereignty was secured (Nodia, 1995). His aggression and suppression towards opposition led to the radicalization of opposing forces, which emerged in the civil war led by Ioseliani and

Kitovani on the opposition side. Gamsakhurdia had to flee to Chechnya at the end of 1991. The political change in Tbilisi was seen as an opportunity for Ossetians to organize a referendum requesting unification to the Russian Federation, which resulted in 90 percent voting in favor.

The new administration under Shevardnadze intended to calm tensions in Tskhinvali, but he was under overwhelming pressure. The Georgian army was formed by shady warlords and was loyal to them, not the government. Civil war against Gamsakhurdia followers was keeping the army busy in Tbilisi. Shevardnadze soon proved to be unable to take control of the situation

(Darchiashvili, Jones, 2020). In April 1992, massive attacks were organized on Tskhinvali. This quickly led to Russian, North Ossetian, and North Caucasian mobilization. Russian leadership started making aggressive statements towards the Georgian government and threatened to bomb

Tbilisi. Soon Russian helicopters attacked the Georgian army and by June, Russia was on the brink of war with Georgia. On June, 22 Yeltsin and Shevardnadze signed a ceasefire agreement in Sochi. Later Russian peacekeeping mission was deployed in the region.

In the following years, Russo-Georgian relations were fluctuating, which will be discussed more sorely in the next chapter. Russia intended to increase its influence over

Georgian internal politics during the Shevardnadze administration. However, dynamics changed from the late 1990’s onwards. Georgia became aggressively against Russian involvement and the relations got tense. It reached its peak in 2008 (Cornell, Starr, 2009). At first, the situation reached a dangerous stage in Abkhazia after failed negotiations, which now involved international presence. Few minor clashes and explosions created a pre-atmosphere for a war.

Although, attention quickly moved to South Ossetia due to the incident wave in July. Following

28 the incident of four Georgian policemen being kidnapped, Saakashvili (president of Georgia), made a statement about a possible armed rescue operation. Russia’s reaction to this was sending aircraft in Georgian-controlled airspace, violating the sovereignty of the country (Socor, 2008).

The war finally escalated on 1st August, when several Georgian policemen were wounded in

South Ossetia. This was followed by several clashes and open warnings from Georgia, Russia, and South Ossetia. It is important to mention that on August 7th, President Saakashvili suggested an immediate ceasefire and offered full autonomy to South Ossetians. This move is often considered as a trap from the Georgian side because the same night Saakashvili chose a military option (Gahrton, 2010). The Georgian government has claimed that the military action was done in response to Russian military troops moving to the South. Although, there is no evidence supporting the Georgian acquisitions. The New York Times concluded after three months that there was evidence of Russian invasion before the attack (Chivers & Barry, 2008). Georgian troops advanced in the region, killing Ossetian and Russian militaries. However, on the 9th of

August Russian troops forced the Georgian military to abandon Tskhinvali and all South

Ossetian territories, even leaving Georgian populated villages behind. Following days, Russians bombed the town of Gori and the port of Poti. Moreover, operations were conducted in

Abkhazia, invading the only Georgian-controlled location Kodori Valley.

On the 12th, Russia stopped military actions and Georgia, Russia, South Ossetia, and

Abkhazia signed a peace agreement proposed by Sarkozy. Saakashvili removed a paragraph in the deal which covered further discussions on the statuses of the secessionist region. This was used by Russia and on the 26th Russia recognized independence of the regions. This was a response to Kosovo recognition by the western states, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

29 In 1992, Abkhazia declared its independence from Georgia in a less provocative manner than in Nagorno-Karabakh or South Ossetia by stating it will be joining CIS independently.

Although president Ardzinba soon stated that Abkhazia had enough strength to campaign a war against Georgia, that is often considered as a clear indicator of unofficial external support

(Cornell, 2000). On August 14th, Georgian military forces led by Kitovani advanced in

Mengralia on a rescue mission of a minister that was kidnapped by Gamsakhurdia followers (the other side of the civil war). The kidnapped minister was supposed to be taken to Abkhazia, so on the 18th Kitovani army was already in Sukhumi. The Abkhazian parliament was forced to retreat to the North of the republic. Interestingly enough, president Shevardnadze later claimed that

Kitovani acted independently from him (Cornell, 2000). Abkhaz forces were later supported by

Chechens and Circassians as volunteers in the name of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus. The first joint offense of Abkhazians and North Caucasians was conducted on 1st

October, in the city of Gagra. There is an interesting aspect to this particular offense, which is that Abkhazians used T-72 tanks, Grand rockets along with other heavy artillery that they did not possess. 100,000 landmines were located by Abkhazs, which was way over the amount of armory in the region (Zverev, 1996). Later, Sukhoi fighter aircrafts bombarded Sukhumi, even though Abkhazia possessed no air force (Chirikba, 1998). All these make the direct Russian involvement clear in the Georgian-Abkhaz war.

After several failed attacks to take down Georgian-controlled Sukhumi, a ceasefire was made on 15th May in Moscow. The ceasefire was soon broken out in July by several Abkhazian successful attacks on Sukhumi surroundings as well as capturing the road to it. During this time

Shevardnadze escaped death twice but still decided to stay in Sukhumi. Georgians yet again managed to defend the city from another attack and at the end of the month, another ceasefire

30 deal was made. According to the deal, militaries had to be removed from both sides. Georgian artillery was shipped to Poti, but Abkhazian stayed close to the conflict zone and later returned to them by Russian peacekeepers.

In Georgia, Gamsakhurdia reappeared on the scene threatening the Shevardnadze government. His followers, also called Zviadists, captured the artillery in Poti and engaged in another strike of the civil war. Abkhazias used an opportunity and campaigned for another series of attacks. On 17th September, Sukhumi fell into the hands of Abkhazs. Meanwhile, civil war continued in Georgia, bringing devastating circumstances for the population. Zviadists were advancing in Western Georgia. Russia pressured Georgia to join CIS, stating it was the only alternative for Georgia to end the war. Later, Georgia did join CIS and liberated the west from

Zviadists. Zviadi himself was found dead in a village in Western Georgia under suspicious circumstances, many claiming he committed suicide. The results of the war estimated 10,000 deaths and 200,000 Georgian refugees (MacFarlane, 1996).

31 Chapter 5: Geopolitics of the Black Sea Region

Conflicts in the Caucasus while being ethnic also have geopolitical character. While

Georgians, Abkhazs, Ossetians, Karabakh Armenians, Armenians, and Azeris are fighting for independence, territorial integrity, or recognition, External powers are betting on the nations and providing support to the parties of their preference to strengthen their influence over the region.

Whether it is the oil game or battles over communication routes, Russia, Turkey, Iran, U.S, the

EU, and China are influencing the dynamics of the conflict and using them for their geopolitical interests.

Turkey

The end of the Soviet Union was good news for Turkish political elites as it opened a door for Turkey to regain influence over the Caucasus region and Central Asia. As Suleyman

Demirel put it while observing the collapsing Soviet Union “With the disintegration of the Soviet

Union, a gigantic Turkic World is being formed, stretching from the Adriatic Sea to the Wall of

China” (Cornell, 2000). To reappear on the scene Turkey needed to find an ally in the Caucasus and Azeris, “lost cousins”, seemed like a perfectly reliable local player in the region. Although, the Geographical reality of Turkey did not appear to be very flexible for reaching Turkish people states of Azerbaijan and Central Asia. Therefore, their economic and political influence over the

Turkish states highly depended on transit non-Turkish states. There were three such states in the

Caucasus, two of which, Iran and Armenia, would be against any means of Turkish influence in the region. On the other hand, Georgia seemed like a potential partner. Although, Georgia was seen as an anti-Turkish state and was not given any importance in foreign policy. However, due

32 to the similar character of Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazian conflicts as well as internal issues with the Kurdish population, Turkey always supported the territorial integrity of the Caucasus states. One of the very important factors shaping Turkish foreign policy towards the Caucasus was the existence of large Caucasian diasporas in the country, which make 10-15 percent of the population.

After the collapse of Soviet Union, Turkey stepped into the Caucasus and Central Asia with a rushed euphoria. Tukey often acted aggressively and made mistakes while building relations with newly established states. For example, Central Asian countries that saw Turkey as a “big brother” and a provider of guidance for Turkish people in the new world, often received dominant attitudes from Istanbul. These vertical policies towards Central Asian states can be explained by the insecurity of Turkey losing its strategic function for the U.S since the Cold War was over (Oran, 1998).

Although, Azerbaijan was the logical strategic pillar for Turkey and policies were corresponding to the attitude. Turkey recognized the sovereignty of Azerbaijan first, supported its territorial integrity over Nagorno-Karabakh, tried to limit Russian influence in the country, and supported pro-Turkish internal politics. Moreover, its foreign policy intended to transport most Azeri oil through Turkey. While Russia, Iran, and even the U.S supported the Armenian side of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Turkey along with Israel was the only one spreading the

Azeri side of the story. Elchibey was a clear win for Turkey since he was extremely pro Turkish, sometimes even too much of such for Ankara taste. His radical anti-Russian and Iranian statements as well as opinions such as the unification of North and South Azerbaijan or federationization of Azerbaijan into Turkey, made Ankara doubt his ability to govern and reliability as a partner (Cornell, 1998). When Husseinov and former Soviet leader, Aliyev came

33 to power, the world saw it as a failure of Turkey to maintain influence. However, Aliyev appeared to be not as pro-Russian as though, despite the fact that he joined CIS. He made Turkey remove its troops from Azerbaijan, but also admitted the brotherhood between the nations. He also decided to build relations with other Muslim nations such as Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Therefore, Aliyev’s diplomacy created unpredictability in Ankara and made it realize that not only Azerbaijan needed Turkey but visa-versa too (Swietochowski, 1999).

In the first war of Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkey tried to take a neutral stand on the issue, while providing support to Azerbaijan, Ankara did not intend to intervene in the conflict. This decision was highly criticized in Turkey and soon Ankara was pressured by several demonstrations and public opinion to take action. As already discussed in March Turkey moved its troops to the Armenian border and it helped Azerbaijan to establish an embargo on Armenia

(Cornell, 1998).

While Turkey did not or could not intervene further in the conflict back in the 1990’s, recent developments show different approaches. Turkey and Azerbaijan have been strengthening political and economic relations ever since and soon Azerbaijan became the biggest exporter of natural gas in Turkey. In 2019, Turkey decreased its gas imports from Russia by 62 percent and in the following year, Azerbaijan became Turkey’s biggest gas provider (Avdaliani, 2020). This could be an opportunity for Turkey to find itself independent from Russian gas. The Tovuz region was one of the places where the war broke out and it is in fact a location where Baku-

Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi energy transportation pipelines go through (Ergun & Valiyev,

2020). Importing gas from the Caspian sea gives Turkey geopolitical freedom to pursue its foreign policies in the Caucasus because until it depends on Russian gas, its hands are tied up.

34 Russia

The newly formed Russian federation has not given up on its imperialist ideas and attempts to maintain influence on what is now the post-Soviet world. When the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia lost the South Caucasus states and recognized their independence, but soon history would repeat itself. Just as in 1920, Russia was not willing to let go of its power over the region and started aggressively challenging the very independence recognized by it. The difference between the 1920 and 1990’s is that Russia back then managed to invade the newly independent states and include them into its territories, but already in the 1990’s Russia could not or did not have such attempts. Nevertheless, Russia used and still uses different tactics and strategies to keep the NIS under its influence and not let them go.

For the local players of the Caucasus geopolitical game, one of the main aims was to in retrospect to escape Russian hegemony. Therefore at the beginning of 1990’s Russian influence over the region was plummeting. Elchibey Azerbaijan withdraw its membership from CIS and was allying with Turkey and Georgia was never a member of the organization and was seeking partnerships in the west with not much success. Russia also had problems in the North Caucasus

Chechnya under Dudayev’s leadership, which declared independence for the time being.

Although Russia still had military bases in Armenia and was desperately clinging to it. However, soon ethno-conflicts erupted in Azerbaijan and Georgian, which was an opportunity for Russia to get back to the Caucasian affairs. Moreover, observing the Russian involvement in these conflicts show a clear pattern. At first, Russia tends to support the side of its preference until the point where political and military circumstances are at the satisfactory level, after which Russia presents itself as an impartial peacekeeper and is willing to use force even against the chosen side if they fight further for better results than Moscow intended (Wiess, 1995). In addition, in

35 response to the cases of rebels getting their hands on Russian artillery and weapons, Moscow always claimed their armed depots got robbed. That must mean that Russians protect their weapons the most poorly in the world and their armies are easily scared of local militias, even within its territories (Hill, Jewett, 1995).

As Cornell puts it, Georgia was one of the most independent-minded republics in the whole Soviet Union (2000). However, for Russia, Georgia represented a strategic value and it was important to maintain influence there. First, Georgia borders Turkey and Russia would feel less insecure about Turkish domination in the region if Russian troops would be deployed on the border. Nevertheless, Georgia was not willing to join Russia-dominated CIS, which presented a problem for Moscow. The second reason was the access to the Black sea. While before the

1990’s Moscow controlled almost the entire Black Sea Coast, now it lost access to the Crimean peninsula and Georgian coast, leaving the Black sea in Turkish hands.

It is important to mention that Abkhazia had one of the few deep water harbors on the

Black sea and it was visited by Russian defense and intelligence representatives shortly before

Abkhazians declared independence. Moreover, after the war was over, Georgia was forced to lease Black seaports to Russia (Satter, 1998). As already discussed, In Georgia and Azerbaijan the same scenario of military coups took place, where the opposing side led by Hussenov and

Kitovani had Russian back. As for the case of South Ossetia, it represents a strategic location as it is only one hour away from Tbilisi. By deploying troops on the occupation borders, Tbilisi is always under the threat, weakening its positions. 2008 aggression served other goals besides destabilizing Georgian politics and economy. It could be considered as a punishment of Georgia for its pro-Western orientation and killing of Euro-Atlantic integration. Moreover, it was a way of restoring control over the South Caucasus and sending a message to the West that post-Soviet

36 states are a sphere of its influence only (Cornell, 2008). The decision to recognize Abkhazia and

South Ossetia as sovereign states were largely dominated by recognition of Kosovo sovereignty by the U.S and other Western states. In 2006, Putin remarked in an interview “if somebody assumes that Kosovo can achieve full state independence, then why should we refuse it to the

Abkhaz and South Ossetians?” (Cornell, Starr, 2009).

While in the 1990’s Russia’s policy towards the Nagorno-Karabakh war was to support

Armenia as the only loyal ally in the region and destabilize pro-Turkish Azerbaijan, in 2020 new challenges appeared on the scene for Russia. As already discussed, Armenia experienced a velvet revolution, in which pro-Western Pashinyan came to power. By not supporting Armenia in the recent conflict, Russia made sure Pashinyan’s political image would have taken an enormous hit, which it did. However, most importantly, It is important for Moscow that the conflict in the

Caucasus remain unresolved or frozen. This way Russia keeps firm control over the region. First, frozen conflicts make the Transcaucasian states look unreliable from the Western perspective. It becomes almost impossible to pursue Euro-Atlantic integration in these states. By keeping South

Caucasian states economically and politically unstable, Russia prevents NATO enlargement in its nearest neighborhood (Modebadze, 2021). As Dyer puts it “Russia is the only winner of

Nagorno-Karabakh war” (2020). The peace deal allows Russia to have a peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh, which means Russia has a permanent military presence in Azerbaijan.

The deal also gives Russia the right to have control over the Lachin corridor, the only communication route between Armenia and Karabakh. This way Russia strengthens its influence over Armenia. Finally, by also having a right to control the corridor connecting Azerbaijan and

Nakhchivan, Russia takes control over the energy transportation game in the South Caucasus.

37 United States of America

While the United States was mostly interested in nuclear weapons in Ukraine and

Kazakhstan and natural resources in Caspian, it was also advocating peace in the Caucasus region. It has made strategic partners with the countries and given financial aids. The US is a very passive but still important actor in the region and has its own views on the conflicts. Since the U.S had no historical connection with the region and was also busy dealing with former

Yugoslavia, Haiti, and Somalia at the time, the U.S hesitated to engage aggressively in the affairs of the Caucasus. The U.S aimed to secure a peaceful transition of the economies of the NIS to open market economies and established democracies. Although it intended to limit Russian and

Iranian influence over the region. The U.S financial aid to the Caucasian states was approximately 2 billion dollars in the early 1990’s (Emirhan, 2021). Therefore, from 1991 to

1994 U.S policy towards the Caucasus region was unclear and largely in respect to Russian policies. After 1994, the U.S started engaging in the affairs of the region with more frequency due to the realization of oil and hydrocarbon production importance. Although Russian hegemony over the region was still respected. Already in 1996 onwards, U.S policies became more clear, and strategic engagement started (Cornell, 2000). Nevertheless, the U.S avoided any direct involvement in the conflicts during the 1990's.

Post 9/11 U.S changed its policies towards the Caucasus. The Caucasus states were now seen as strategic military partners since all states supported The new U.S reality tackling terrorism and they all offered use of their airspace for the operations in Afghanistan. Georgia soon became the most pro-American state for that time, which can be seen in Georgian contribution to the war on Iraq (Allnutt, 2012). These developments naturally altered Moscow and relations got tenser with Georgia, soon reaching its peak in 2008. The “train and equip”

38 programs that were launched during 2002-2003, advanced the Georgian military which was meant to be used for War on Terrorism but ended up being used in the war with Russia.

However, the U.S limited its involvement during the war itself and received criticism from

Georgia (Nixey, 2010).

In regards to Azerbaijan, the U.S has established interest mainly in the Caspian basin of hydrocarbon products. President Aliyev has established partnerships with both the U.S and

Russia. Although he has shown clear resistance towards Bush’s democracy project in Azerbaijan and therefore the U.S has also limited its relations towards the Aliyev autocratic regime.

Nevertheless, American private interest in the oil fields of Azerbaijan has grown and the U.S government has played a huge role in developing Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-

Erzurum gas and energy pipeline projects (Nixey, 2010). This way the U.S has challenged the

Russian monopoly over the Caspian oil politics. Azerbaijan does not show much interest in joining NATO or having the U.S military presence in the country therefore, the U.S involvement has been limited.

Similar to the conflict in Georgia, the U.S avoided direct involvement in the Nagorno-

Karabakh conflict. However, it did join the OSCE Minsk group seeking a peaceful settlement of the issue (OSCE Minsk group, 1992). In the recent development of the conflict, the U.S did not react immediately, which could be a result of Trump's “America First” politics. Although, it's late presence and silence are leaving the Caucasus affairs to the local superpowers and shows weak commitment to democracy (Tierney, 2020).

39 Conclusion

The South Caucasus states have been on a rough patch since the collapse of the Soviet

Union. Military coups, ethnopolitical conflicts, geopolitical pressure, and the oil game have dominated the internal affairs of troubled neighborhoods. Heterogeneous people of Caucasus found themselves fighting with each other or external powers either for self-determination or territorial integrity. The results of the armed conflicts have devastating outcomes not only illustrated by the number of deaths or misplaced people but also on the economic and political stability of the states. The Transcaucasus states have chosen paths for themselves. Georgia chose the Western democratic orientation, seeking partners in the Euro-Atlantic sphere and trying to join Western organizations. So has Azerbaijan, but unlike Georgia, Azerbaijan has found a way to completely not turn back to Russia and still maintain partnerships in the West. Azerbaijan has allied with Turkey and strengthened trade links with it. Armenia, finding itself in a somewhat complicated situation due to its complex relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan, has chosen

Russia as a permanent ally.

The NIS of the South Caucasus has been developing and consolidating its statehood, but still stands far from being stable nations. Transcaucasus has an essential value in oil and energy production as well as being a communicational route connecting Europe to Asia. Hence, has the potential to be a confident contributor to the world economy. However, this still remains a dream and has not come to reality. One of the obstacles to achieving this is complex and twisted ethno- conflicts in Azerbaijan and Georgia.

As the paper has established, these conflicts are rooted back in the Soviet era and sometimes even further. It is clear that Soviet territorial federalism policies have played a huge

40 role in developing existing conflicts. The “divide and rule” principle that was imposed on the

Caucasus republics in order to weaken nationhood and the legacy of those policies still represents a big deal of challenges for the NIS.

Conflicts followed very similar patterns. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, nationalist leaders took over the governments in all three states and all three ended in military coups often led by Russian-related individuals. Secessionist movements found external support from the North. As we can see, Russian involvement was highly visible in the wars of Georgia, but less in Nagorno-Karabakh. However, Russian presence can be felt in all the conflicts.

Through the paper, it is established that major developments of the conflicts have been corresponding national interests of external powers. Turkish growth involvement in the recent

Karabakh war was followed by an energy trade boost between Azerbaijan and Turkey.

Declaration of independence in Abkhazia was therefore followed by dangers to Russia of losing major accesses to the Black sea. The 2008 war was a response to Georgia's pro-Western orientation and recognition of the sovereignty of Georgia’s breakaway region was in respect, a response to the recognition of Kosovo by the West. Based on what has been discussed, the paper demonstrates that the ethnic conflicts of the Caucasus have been encouraged and manipulated by external powers and the Caucasus has become a geopolitical as well as oil political battlefield.

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