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Fateful Decisions: The Polish Policemen and the Jewish Population of Occupied , 1939-1945

by

Sylwia Szymańska-Smolkin

A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of History University of Toronto

© Copyright by Sylwia Szymańska-Smolkin 2017

Fateful Decisions: The Polish Policemen and the Jewish Population of Occupied Poland, 1939-1945

Sylwia Szymańska-Smolkin

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of History University of Toronto

2017

Abstract

This dissertation analyzes the activities of the Polish during the Second World War with particular attention paid to their triangulated relationship with the German authorities and

Jewish population. To properly situate their activities, the is also covered, as it forms the historical antecedent of their creation. The position of the dissertation is that the participation of the Polish police enabled the to be more successful in their implementation of in Poland. Alongside this contention, supporting the attempts of some

Polish policemen to help and assist the Jewish population is also presented. This complex and multilayered portrait is articulated while maintaining that there is sufficient evidence to challenge conventional historical views that have downplayed the Polish police’s involvement in the murder of Polish .

The evidence presented throughout the dissertation is distinct from previous research into the activities of the Polish police as the policemen’s actions against the Jewish population have not been subject to thorough research. In comparison with the only available book on the Polish police, which minimizes their role in implementing , this dissertation draws

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extensively on archival sources that were not previously accessed such as post-war trial records and eyewitness written and oral testimony.

This dissertation is organized chronologically and its structure reflects the stages of the

Polish police’s involvement in the persecution of Polish Jews. The tasks of the Polish policemen depended on the current German policies against the Jews in the Government. Gradually, they expended from guarding ghettos and preventing the movement of people and products in and out of ghettos to securing the perimeters of ghettos during liquidation actions and searching for those who attempted to avoid transports to killing centres.

The Polish policemen, often in cooperation with the rural population, played a significant role in the last phase of the Holocaust. It was at this stage that they discovered and killed many Jews in hiding. In those cases, the policemen were autonomous as a significant number of the killings were carried out without the orders or knowledge of their German superiors.

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Acknowledgments

I would like to express gratitude to the members of my dissertation committee for the support, time, ideas and valuable feedback they provided me while studying, researching, and writing this dissertation. Their scholarship has been a model to which I strive.

I am indebted to my supervisor, Piotr Wróbel, for his mentorship, guidance, and unwavering support for this project. His encouragement and patience guided me through writing crises and motivated me to see it to the finish line. Thank you to for being such an important part of my academic journey. She played a tremendous role in shaping this dissertation. Her insightful comments strengthened my analysis and influenced the final version of the project. Thank you to

Derek Penslar, who offered his interest in my research and invited me to join the Jewish Studies collaborative program. He encouraged me to widen my knowledge of modern Jewish history, for which I am very grateful. I would like to thank Yüri Kivimäe and Harold Troper for joining my dissertation committee. I know I will benefit from your feedback. Thank you to for agreeing to serve as my external examiner. Your expertise will be valuable to my project.

I would like to thank the helpful staff at each of the archives and libraries in Poland, , and the that facilitated my research. Special thanks go out to Vincent Slatt, a librarian at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, who went above and beyond his duties to ensure that my research there was successful.

Fellowships and grants from various institutions and organizations provided essential financial support for my research and writing. I would like to acknowledge the support of the

Ontario Graduate Scholarship, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the

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Claims Conference for Advanced Shoah Studies. At the University of Toronto: the School of

Graduate Studies, the Department of History and the Anne Tanenbaum Centre for Jewish Studies all supported my extensive archival research in Poland and the United States. A scholarship from the

Canadian Friends of Hebrew University enabled me to conduct research at in Israel.

I would also like to thank my friends. Their support was vital during research and writing stages. They offered their encouragement, homes, analytical minds and skills. Thank you to

Joanna Nalewajko-Kulikov, Natalia Bujniewicz, Monika Tuszewicka, Marek Tuszewicki and

Samantha Stroh Bailey. My deepest thanks to Deborah Barton for her friendship and sympathetic ear; as well as for editing a few chapters of this dissertation.

Last but not least, I would like to thank my family in Poland and Canada. Their support for my academic journey was meaningful and encouraging every step of the way. A special thank you to my husband, Mitch Smolkin, for his love and unceasing support through the ups and downs of writing the dissertation. I would never have completed this project if not for his commitment and encouragement to pursue my dreams. To my son Gabriel, thank you for your patience and for grasping the importance of this project to me at such a young age. This dissertation is dedicated to the two of you.

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Table of Contents

Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………....ii

Acknowledgments………………………………………………………………………...iv

Table of Contents…………………………………………………………………………vi

List of Tables…………………………………………………………………………….vii

List of Appendices………………………………………………………………………viii

Abbreviations……………………………………………………………………………..ix

Preface……………………………………………………………………………………..1

Introduction: Opening Up the Past: The Many Faces of the Polish Police………………..4

Chapter 1: The and Its Transformation into the Polish Police, the so-called ………………………………………………………...... 23

Chapter 2: Oppression and Facilitation: The Polish Police vis-à-vis the Jewish Population in Occupied Poland,1939-1942……...………..……………….....70

Chapter 3: Liquidations of the Ghettos – Polish Police Crossing into the Holocaust…………………………………………………...……...... 114

Chapter 4: Amplifying Danger on the “Aryan” Side: The Threats Posed by the Polish Police………………………………………...……………………...... 152

Chapter 5: Translating Righteous Action Into Post-War Recognition: Cases of Benevolence Among the Polish Police………………………………………..215

Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………254

Appendices……………………………………………………………………………...260

Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………….263

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List of Tables

Table 1. Jews arrested between May 23 and July 22, 1943 in the of ………………………………………………...…147

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List of Appendices

Appendix A: Organization of the Polish Police in Cracow……………………………..260 Appendix B: Organization of the Polish Police in the Warsaw …………...…...261 Appendix C: First Black List of the Blue Police……………………………………..…262

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Abbreviations

AAN Archives of Modern Documentation AbfPP Files of Former Functionaries of the Polish Police AIPN Archives of the Institute of National Remembrance AŻIH Archives of the Jewish Historical Institute AK AL People’s Army APR State Archives in APW State Archives of the City of Warsaw APKr State Archives in Cracow ARG BN National Library CSS Special Civil DR Government Delegation for the Homeland DRAN Department of the Righteous Among the Nations GFH Ghetto Fighters’ House GL People’s Guard IRU Street Movement Control KB Security Corps Directorate for Subversion of the Command of the Home Army KPH Industrial-Trade Precinct KPPKr Kommando der polnischen Polizei Krakau KPPmW Headquarters of the Polish Police in Warsaw KWC Directorate of Civil Resistance MO Citizens’ OWK Guard and Convoy Unit PKB PPPBrN Polish in Nowe PKWN Polish Committee of National Liberation POW Polish Military Organization PPR Polish Workers’ Party PPS RGO Central Welfare Council SMKr Der Stadthauptmann der Stadt Krakau SOKr District in Cracow SOW District Court in Warsaw SSKr Special Penal Court in Cracow WSS Special Military Courts ZWZ ŻKN Jewish National Council ŻOB Jewish Fighting Organization USHMM United States Holocaust Memorial Museum YV Yad Vashem

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Preface

This dissertation stems from my longstanding interest in the history and culture of

Polish Jewry and in Polish-Jewish relations. I grew up in Communist Poland where there was practically no discussion of the Holocaust and what was said was largely distorted.

As a teenager I felt an imperative to learn about what had happened to the many Jews of

Józefów, the where I lived. I was conscious that the absence of the Jewish inhabitants of Poland, who were instrumental in shaping Poland’s modern history and culture, had left a significant void. Silence surrounded their disappearance, and I felt compelled to investigate these matters. These circumstances laid the foundation for my interest in pursuing .

My Master’s thesis explored the ghetto in , a resort town southeast of

Warsaw, known for its microclimate beneficial for patients with respiratory problems and as a popular summer destination for Warsaw Jews. I wrote an analysis of its cultural life and its destruction. While researching the topic, I came across the name of Bronisław

Marchlewicz, a wartime chief of the Polish police in Otwock. In 2004, Marchlewicz was bestowed the title of “Righteous Among the Nations”. His contributions upended the commonly held view of the Polish police as nothing but thugs and villains and caused me to re-evaluate the role of the Polish police and the local population in the Holocaust.

Martin Dean’s Collaboration in the Holocaust: Crimes of the Local Police in

Belorussia and , 1941-44 appeared in 2000, while I was working on my thesis. It significantly influenced the direction of my research, inspiring me to question the

1 2 activities of the local police in Poland during the Holocaust.1 Dean showed the actions of local police collaborators in and Ukraine to have been instrumental in implementing the Holocaust and in the overall attainment of the Nazis’ objectives. In particular, Dean’s examination of police collaborators led me to ask whether that ability rested on the shoulders of the local populations.

The role of the Polish police in executing the occupier’s antisemitic policies and their involvement in the Holocaust remain intensely controversial issues in Poland. This last December I participated in a conference in on the Polish police in the General

Government. Many of the papers downplayed the role of the Polish police in enforcing policies of terror and emphasized the position of the police “between a rock and a hard place” and their involvement in the underground movement.

My paper, on the complexities of the Polish policemen’s behaviour towards the

Jewish population, was entitled “Guardians of the Law, Blackmailers, Murderers and

Righteous Among the Nations: The Many Faces of the Polish Police Towards the Jews in the .” Mine was the only presentation in which the actions of the

Polish police against the Jewish population were discussed. It was met with overt hostility from members of the non-academic audience, and the scholars who were present remained largely silent throughout these rebukes. I was accused of fabricating sources and using “Jewish” sources (meaning biased, inauthentic or false), insulting the Polish nation, and being “from Gross” (Jan Tomasz Gross). Interestingly, some members of the audience who loudly protested against my assessment of the police in the discussion

1 Martin Dean, Collaboration in the Holocaust. Crimes of the Local Police in Belorussia and Ukraine, 1941-44 (New York St. Martin’s Press, 2000).

3 period agreed with my findings in private conversations. The dissonance between what was permitted and tolerated in public versus private was striking and thought-provoking.

Fifteen years after publication of Jan Tomasz Gross’s book on in

Jedwabne and the surrounding area, and after years of public debate on the involvement of the Polish population in killing Jews in hiding after 1942, the general public is still not ready to face the facts about the level of involvement and responsibility some held in the Holocaust. The current government’s “historical policy” encourages those who reject any responsibility whatsoever for criminal acts against Polish Jews. Efforts to emphasize and recognize only those who assisted Jews in hiding in the latter stages of the

Holocaust in Poland are one of the consequences of the unwillingness to face historical facts. Collective memory prioritizes acts of resistance and rejects instances of victimizing other groups. The plane of historical facts clashes with the mythological plane of virtue and resistance. Collective memory remembers and honours the heroes and omits acts of treason and collaboration. It cannot accept historical facts that contradict a simplistic image based on the multitude of cases of assistance accentuated by the belief that only a small group (“the dregs of society”) contributed to the death of Jews; reality is too complex and too threatening.

This dissertation challenges polarized and distorted assessments of wartime Polish policemen and aims to present a more balanced picture of their attitudes and actions.

Introduction

Opening Up the Past: The Many Faces of the Polish Police

The history of the Polish police and their participation in the Holocaust has been neglected for many years and is still a very sensitive issue among historians and the

Polish public at large. The particular conditions under which the Polish police operated and postwar investigations of former policemen have produced diverse and often conflicting assessments of the role of the police and their attitudes toward the Jewish population. With the fall of in Poland, archives that were previously closed became available, and as a result attitudes shifted, allowing a public debate about the past to begin. However, although in recent years there have been efforts to investigate the actions of the Polish policemen more objectively, the anti-Jewish activities of the policemen have not been the subject of serious inquiry. As a result, erroneous conclusions and assumptions prevail, often fueled by political and emotional considerations.

Even as new research is being conducted on the wartime activities of the Polish police, we simultaneously witness a tendency towards highlighting more positive aspects of the policemen’s behaviour during the war – such as participation in the underground movement – while ignoring or minimizing criminal deeds with the oft-trotted-out justification that they were only fulfilling orders or by singling out just a few corrupt individuals. Dissociating from the painful and controversial participatory actions of various groups in the Holocaust (among them policemen, firemen, and the rural population) is part of the tendency to emphasize the role of Poles in resisting the German occupier while highlighting the number of Poles who extended help to persecuted Jews. It

4 5 is an intentional and calculated effort on the part of the current government and its articulated “historical policy” involving institutions such as the Institute of National

Remembrance, which play a significant role.

As a result, the government is recognizing Poles who provided help to Jews and championing those who lost their lives doing so, and their names and stories are widely publicized. This is the case with the Ulma family and the Ulma Family Museum of Poles

Saving Jews in World War II (Muzeum Żydów Ratujących Polaków im. Rodziny Ulmów) in Markowa.1 It is noteworthy that cases indicating the betrayal and murder of Jewish neighbours are not accepted as a legitimate subject of public discourse. For example, the story of the and murder of eleven Jews in Gniewczyna Łańcucka by local peasants and Germans, although acknowledged by historians, has not found its way into public awareness.2

My dissertation takes up these issues and focuses on the policies and activities of the Polish police vis-à-vis the Jewish population in occupied Poland. In particular, it examines the role of the Polish police in implementing German antisemitic policies and analyzes the dynamic between the policemen and Polish Jews in the context of a civil society that Nazi authorities re-structured to serve their interests. These relationships varied substantially, and I am concerned with mapping their complexities and nuances.

1 The museum opened in March 2016. Publications on the Ulma family are written mostly by Mateusz Szpytma and Jarosław Szarek: Rodzina Ulmów (Cracow: Dom Wydawniczy Rafael, 2014); The Risk of Survival: The Rescue of the Jews by the Poles and the Tragic Consequences for the Ulma Family from Markowa, transl. by Aleksandra Rodzińska-Chojnowska (Warsaw: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2009); Ofiara Sprawiedliwych (Cracow: Dom Wydawniczy Rafael, 2004). Mateusz Szpytma is the Deputy President of the Institute of National Remembrance. 2 Tadeusz Markiel, Alina Skibińska, “Jakie to ma znaczenie, czy zrobili to z chciwości?” Zagłada domu Trynczerów (Warsaw: Stowarzyszenie Centrum Badań nad Zagładą Żydów, 2011).

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My central thesis is that participation of the Polish police facilitated the German implementation of the Holocaust in Poland. Much of the evidence I present in support of this position has received little or no attention. For instance, I document the involvement of Polish police in the liquidation actions of the ghettos and trace the policemen’s behaviour toward Jews in hiding. Although I focus on the more difficult aspects of the

Polish police, I also show that there were significant attempts to help Jews. Indeed, these processes were often inseparable. Concerning those who aided the Jews, I explore the various active and passive ways in which the policemen carried out such help and analyze the factors that led to specific kinds of behaviour.3 I also discuss to what extent the Polish police fulfilled German orders and to what extent they acted independently.

Reconstitution of the Police Under the Germans

After defeating the Polish army in the campaign of , the Germans set out to erase the remnants of the Polish state. The General Government, as the occupied territory of Poland was now called, was to be run like a colony and serve mainly as a source of labour. Cultural institutions, middle schools, universities, libraries and museums were closed down. However, for pragmatic reasons, the occupier decided to leave in place Polish municipal and self-governing institutions as well as the railway, guards, the fire department, and the Polish judiciary system.4 Along with the

3 Parts of this work concerning the role Polish policemen played in enabling communication between the ghetto and the “Aryan” side have been published as: Sylwia Szymańska-Smolkin, “Rola granatowej jako pośrednika w utrzymywaniu łączności między gettem a stroną aryjską,” in August Grabowski and Artur Markowski, eds., Narody i polityka. Studia ofiarowane profesorowi Jerzemu Tomaszewskiemu (Warsaw: Jewish Historical Institute and , 2010), 215-226. 4 The organization of those institutions and employment matters were regulated by decrees and ordinances such as a decree on salaries for re-employed Polish clerks and functionaries (November 3, 1939) and a decree on the Polish courts (February 19, 1940). Albert Weh, Prawo Generalnego Gubernatorstwa, rozporządzenia Generalnego Gubernatora dla okupowanych polskich obszarów oraz przepisy wykonawcze

7 courts, fire departments, and prison guards, the police were incorporated into the German administrative system and continued to work during the occupation. Other institutions, such as the post office, railways, and tax revenue system were formally transformed into

German institutions while their prewar structure and personnel were preserved.5 The railway was incorporated into the Generaldirektion der Ostbahn and the Polish postal system was incorporated into the Deutsche Post Osten. In both cases, employees were required to return to work under threat of arrest or consignment to forced labour. The police force was one of the most significant institutions required to continue its work.

When prewar policemen of the State Police were called back to serve in the Polish police, reconstructed by German authorities in October 1939, the expectations were that they would operate in a similar manner as they had before the war. Although the official name of the force was “Polish police” (Polnische Polizei), the Polish population quickly nicknamed it the “Blue police” (policja granatowa). The name referred to the colour of the uniforms and originated out of contempt for the force that now served under German orders. The moniker also separated it from the prewar force, however unpopular that one had been in its own right.

Changing Contexts

The Polish-language publication of Jan Tomasz Gross’s book, Neighbors: The

Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland, in 2000 was a watershed

do nich w układzie rzeczowym: wydanie tekstów z krótkimi uwagami, odsyłaczami orientacyjnymi oraz szczegółowym skorowidzem alfabetyczny (Krakau: Burgverlag, 1940), B355, C150. 5 Adam Hempel, Pogrobowcy klęski. Rzecz o policji „granatowej” w Generalnym Gubernatorstwie 1939- 1945 (Warsaw: PWN, 1990), 3.

8 moment that opened up discussion of Poland’s past and called into question the current historiography.6 Neighbors called for a rethinking of Polish wartime and post-war history.

It challenged the Polish historical perception as being solely a victim of the German occupation and disrupted the one-sided picture of Poles as sympathizing with their victimized Jewish neighbours. The book started a national debate on the participation of

Poles in the Holocaust and what it means to come to terms with that legacy.7

My dissertation discuses another important aspect of this ongoing debate: the question of the Polish police and their role in enforcing the occupier’s anti-Jewish policies and later on, their direct involvement in the murder of Jews. The significance of the Polish police, initially limited to guarding ghettos and enforcing German rule, increased as the Germans moved to rounding-up Jews for transports to killing centres.

Many policemen dutifully and fully carried out German orders and assisted in the most criminal aspects of German policies against the Polish and Jewish populations. There were also policemen who acted on their own, without orders from their German superiors and even without the Germans knowing about their actions. Such situations call into question whether the police can be categorized as collaborators who possessed minimal agency.

My intent is not to settle this question but rather to hold up a mirror to the complexity of the policemen’s activities and the challenges of interpreting them. Clearly it is difficult for a nation that itself suffered tremendous loss in the Second World War to confront the question of collaboration by its own people. Evidence suggests that many of

6 The English version was published a year later. Jan Tomasz Gross, Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001). 7 Results of academic inquiry into pogroms in the Białystok and Łomża area in the summer of 1941 were published in Paweł Machcewicz, and Krzysztof Persak, eds. Wokół Jedwabnego, vol. 1 Studia, vol. 2 Materiały (Warsaw: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2002).

9 the killings committed by Polish policemen on their own initiative were motivated by reasons other than the desire to collaborate with the Germans based on ideology and common goals. These motives included greed, the desire for material gain, and personal ideological commitments.

Research on the Polish police is limited, and only in the last decade or so have researchers gained access to archival material indispensable for a thorough analysis of the policemen’s activities throughout the occupation. The first article to describe the structure of the Polish police, and only with regard to the district of Warsaw, was written by Marek

Getter in 1972.8 An unpublished 1977 PhD dissertation by Jan Popławski studied the organization and structure of the Polish police, the personnel and their duties.9 The first and only study of the Polish police appeared more than a decade later, the work of

Polish historian Adam Hempel.

In his 1990 book, Pogrobowcy klęski. Rzecz o policji „granatowej” w

Generalnym Gubernatorstwie 1939-1945 (Epigons of Defeat. A Study of the “Blue

Police” in the General Government, 1939-1945), Hempel depicts the Polish police’s organization, structure and general activities. He provides insight into the pragmatic functioning of the force, yet his book fails to analyze the policemen’s actions against the

Jewish population and their involvement in the murder of Polish Jews.10 A number of

8 Marek Getter, “Policja granatowa w Warszawie 1939-1944.” Warszawa lat wojny i okupacji 1939-1944, 2 (1972): 215-237. 9 Jan Popławski, “Ustrój Policji Polskiej Generalnego Gubernatorstwa w latach 1939-1945” (PhD diss., Uniwersytet Adama Mickiewicza, Warsaw-Poznań, 1977). 10 Hempel’s book is based on his doctoral dissertation, which he completed at the Department of Journalism and Political Sciences of the University of Warsaw. Hempel briefly worked as deputy chief of the Warsaw Police Headquarters. In 1987 Hempel published a short book on the place of the Polish police in the German administrative system in the General Government, Policja granatowa w okupacyjnym systemie administracyjnym Generalnego Gubernatorstwa 1939-1945 (Warsaw: Instytut Wydawniczy Związków Zawodowych, 1987).

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Hempel’s claims are erroneous or superficial. For instance, he minimizes the depth of criminal behaviour by the Polish police and shifts responsibility to the Germans and

Jewish police (in the case of ).

Several articles published on the wartime Polish police dealt mostly with the reconstruction of the police force, their overall duties and participation in the underground.11 The topic of the policemen’s actions against the Jewish population is often alluded to but has not been subjected to thorough research. In recent years, Jan

Grabowski of the has undertaken the issue of the Polish policemen’s involvement in the Holocaust, most notably in his study on the rural population’s participation in detecting and killing Jews in hiding in Dąbrowa Tarnowska.12 Tomasz

Frydel also explores related issues in his doctoral research at the University of Toronto. 13

The organization, structure, and actions of the Polish police were the focus of a conference in Kielce, Poland in December 2016, which aimed to bring together existing research on the topic. The papers presented discussed the place of the Polish police in the

German occupier’s administration and occupation policies, their role in the underground, and the post-war fate of former policemen. The overarching mood at the conference was defensive towards critical evidence, and Jewish sources in particular were attacked as illegitimate.

11 See a series of articles by Andrzej Krzysztof Kunert, “Z dziejów konspiracyjnego kontrwywiadu,” Kierunki, no. 42-51 (October –December 1983). 12 , . Betrayal and Murder in German-Occupied Poland (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press: 2013). See also Alina Skibińska, and Jakub Petelewicz, “The Participation of Poles in Crimes Against Jews in Świętokrzyskie Region,” Yad Vashem Studies 35 (2007): 5-48. 13 See Tomasz Frydel, “: Reassessing the Role of Ordinary Poles in the Holocaust,” in Perpetrators: Dynamics, Motivations and Concepts for Participating in Mass Violence, eds. Timothy Williams and Susanne Buckley-Zistel (Marburg: Centre for Conflict Studies, Marburg University, 2016, in print).

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Post-War Assessments of the Polish Police: Condemnation and

Widespread contempt for the Polish police during the occupation transitioned into a deeply negative post-war assessment of the policemen’s behaviour. For many years, opinions were politically driven, and the police became synonymous with collaboration.

In his 1984 book, Warszawa lat wojny i okupacji, Krzysztof Dunin-Wąsowicz, a historian, veteran of the Home Army, and member of the Council for Aid to Jews

(Żegota),14 spares no criticism for the Polish police, which he calls a “collaborationist” police force. In his opinion, a large percentage of the policemen were cowards who served the Germans and were “corrupt, demoralized, and hated by the population.”15

According to Adam Hempel, some 10 percent of the Polish police and Polish Kripo could be accused of political collaboration with the Germans.16 Dunin-Wąsowicz acknowledges that a certain number of policemen were engaged in underground activities but claims they were a small minority.17 In fact, Polish police were involved in the from the very beginning of the German occupation.18 Some worked individually, and in some cases the entire crew of a police station cooperated with the underground.19 In a September 1943 report, the SS estimated that a

14 The Council for Aid to Jews (codename Żegota) was established in December 1942. It was the continuation of the Provisional Committee to Aid Jews created in September 1942 by Zofia Kossak- Szczucka and -Filipowicz. Żegota provided assistance to Jews in hiding and their rescuers in the form of food, money, medicine, and false identity papers. 15 Krzysztof Dunin-Wąsowicz, Warszawa w latach 1939-1945 (Warsaw: PWN, 1984), 58. 16 Hempel, Pogrobowcy klęski, 204. 17 Dunin-Wąsowicz, Warszawa w latach 1939-1945, 58. 18 The participation of Polish policemen in the resistance has not been the subject of a separate monograph. For more information on the policemen’s involvement in the underground movement, see Władysław Bułhak, ed., Wywiad i kontrwywiad Armii Krajowej (Warsaw: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2008), 270-274; Waldemar Grabowski, Polska Tajna Administracja Cywilna 1940-1945 (Warsaw: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2003), 210-214; Hempel, Pogrobowcy klęski, 211-262. 19 On cooperation with the underground of the police station in Wieniawa see Nikodem Kowalski, W polu mojego widzenia. Wieniawa 1940-1945. Typescript, Poznań 1981, 31.

12 minimum of 6 percent and likely up to 10 percent of policemen were active in the resistance.20 The proportion was actually closer to 30 percent.

It is important to consider different understandings of “collaboration”. How did

Poland’s new communist regime define collaboration with the Germans? What did the

Polish population during the war view as collaboration? Did collaboration mean a voluntary and conscious decision to act against the interests of the Polish people? Or was it a way to label violations of legal and social norms? Tomasz Szarota, a historian of everyday life, posits that there were different criteria in assessing collaboration with the

Germans in occupied Poland than in , for example. In Warsaw, every expression of cooperation was condemned, and the conditions of occupation enabled unambiguous and uncompromising evaluations of behaviour.21 In 1941, the underground press published a

Codex of Civic Morality (Kodeks moralności obywatelskiej), whose goal was to “outline legal and ethical limits, which a Pole must not cross.”22 Active cooperation with the enemy, denunciations, and serving the enemy without coercion were among the activities deemed to be crimes against the Polish state and the Polish nation.23

When the Soviet-sponsored provisional government, the Polish Committee of

National Liberation (Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego, or PKWN), settled in

Lublin in July 1944, one of its first legislative acts was to pass a decree, “On dissolving the State Police (so-called “Blue police”) in the liberated areas of Poland.” The decree,

20 Marek Mączyński, Policja Państwowa w II Rzeczypospolitej. Organizacyjno-prawne podstawy funkcjonowania (Cracow: Wyższa Szkoła Biznesu, 1997), 157. Hempel, Pogrobowcy klęski, 230. 21 Tomasz Szarota, Życie codzienne w stolicach okupowanej Europy. Szkice historyczne. Kronika Wydarzeń (Warsaw: PIW, 1995), 129. For more on the problem of Polish collaboration see “’Kolaboracja” i historia. Spór o postawy Polaków – ankieta,” Arcana. Kultura-Historia-Polityka, no. 3-4 (2003): 13-69. 22 Quoted after Tomasz Szarota, Okupowanej Warszawy dzień powszedni. Studium historyczne, 4th ed. (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 2010), 432. 23 Ibid., 432-433.

13 dated August 15, deemed the police to have been a formation in the Germans’ service.24

The title of the decree also signaled that the new government considered the interwar and wartime police to be the same force. The Government-in-Exile did not envision the wartime police continuing in the post-war period either and dissolved it two weeks earlier, on August 1, 1944, coinciding with the outbreak of the .25

Former members of the prewar State Police and wartime Polish police were obliged to undergo a rehabilitation procedure to evaluate their conduct in the interwar period and during the occupation. By-law No. 40 of August 29, 1945, issued by the

Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Rada Ministrów) Edward Osóbka-Morawski, stated that no policeman could be hired for any job without a certificate issued by the

Rehabilitation-Classification Commission (Komisja Kwalifikacyjno-Rehabilitacyjna).26

Robert Litwiński, who analyzed the origins and works of the Rehabilitation-

Classification Commission in an article published in 2004, suggests two reasons for creation of the Commission. First, the newly created People’s Militia (Milicja

Obywatelska, MO) needed experienced professionals who could be instructors for the new militiamen. A special commission could help find suitable individuals among those former policemen who had not compromised themselves in the service of the occupying

24 Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (herafter DzURP), no. 2, 1944, item 6. The Polish parliament, , passed a resolution on July 25, 2008, in which it expressed respect and appreciation for the State Police of the Second Republic of Poland. It deemed the PKWN decree on dissolving the State Police unjust and inequitable. The resolution recalled the policemen murdered in the and acknowledged those who were members of the resistance in the General Government. It did not, however, address the issue of those guilty of crimes either by cooperating with the Germans or on their own account. 25 Piotr Majer, “Podstawy prawne i organizacja Policji Państwowej w Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej (od 24 lipca 1919 r. do sierpnia 1944 r.)” in Z dziejów policji polskiej w latach 1919-1945, ed. Edyta Majcher-Ociesa. (Kielce: KTN, 2010), 28. 26 Piotr Majer, “Okupacyjne i powojenne losy polskich policjantów,” Przegląd Policyjny, 9, no. 1-2 (1999): 116. See also Andrzej Misiuk, Historia Policji w Polsce od X wieku do współczesności (Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne, 2008), 157.

14 power. The other reason was the need to identify those who had collaborated with the

Germans or actively combated communist activities during the interwar period.27

The main purpose of the Commission was to collect evaluations of the former policemen who had served in the wartime police or prior to September 1, 1939, and who were now seeking employment in the public service. It also gathered evidence about those policemen who should be held responsible for collaboration with the occupier.28

The majority of policemen who applied to the Rehabilitation-Classification

Commission succeeded in obtaining rehabilitation. The Commission, which formally operated between January 1946 and the beginning of 1952, consisted of a chairman, five members designated by the Prime Minister, and one delegate of the Ministry of Public

Security.29 It examined 8,247 applications submitted by the policemen themselves or in the case of those deceased, their families.30 Only 556 former policemen were declined rehabilitation (6 percent); 96 of them were applications regarding deceased policemen.

Among the reasons for rejection of their applications were a disloyal attitude to the Polish state and Polish population (evidenced by actions such as confiscating food products), zeal in performing their duties, and persecution of Jews.31

27 Robert Litwiński, ”Komisja rehabilitacyjno-kwalifikacyjna dla byłych policjantów (1946-1952),” Dzieje Najnowsze 36, no. 1, (2004):119. Zygmunt Ślęzak, a former member of the Investigative Police and wartime Polish Kripo describes the origins of the Rehabilitation-Classification Comission and attitudes of the Polish population and authorities to the former policemen in his unpublished memoir „Wspomnienia”. After the war Ślęzak worked for the PKWN and Ministers’ Council Bureau (URM). Biblioteka Narodowa (hereafter BN), Sygn. Akc. 10601, pp. 199-207. 28 Litwiński, ”Komisja rehabilitacyjno-kwalifikacyjna,” 119. 29 In the first period, from January 1946 to October 1947, the Commission examined cases of former policemen; from November 1947 to the beginning of 1952 it dealt also with cases of former prison guards. Ibid.,118-119. 30 The entire collection of the documents produced by the rehabilitation commission, Akta byłych funkcjonariuszy Policji Państwowej, Straży Więziennej, Korpusu Ochrony Pogranicza i Straży Granicznej, 1946-1952 (hereafter AbfPP) is located at the Archives of the Modern Documentation in Warsaw (Archiwum Akt Nowych, AAN). 31 Litwiński, ”Komisja rehabilitacyjno-kwalifikacyjna,” 125.

15

Andrzej Misiuk, a historian of the Polish State Police, offers two explanations for the small number of policemen who failed to be rehabilitated. The first was the political situation in Poland. Until 1948, remnants of still existed in the country and non-communist political parties were still able to exert influence on public institutions.

Another reason was the aforementioned need for professional policemen in the communist Citizens’ Militia. Prewar policemen were also hired as instructors in militia training centres.32

Former policemen or their heirs submitted rehabilitation applications, which included a resumé with a detailed description of work duties in the police before the war and during the occupation, as well as a few letters of reference. The Rehabilitation-

Classification Commission then had to verify the information with the help of Citizens’

Militia precincts, security offices, and local branches of the National Council (Rada

Narodowa). Individual testimonies were also used to determine the policemen’s conduct.33 The prepared forms asked about the policemen’s behaviour toward the Polish population during the war. In the course of the rehabilitation procedure, the Citizens’

Militia interviewed witnesses who could testify to a policeman’s wartime conduct and corroborate or contradict his claims. Sometimes while giving their opinions about a certain policeman, witnesses volunteered additional information about his behaviour.

Evaluations of some former policemen produced contradictory assessments, simultaneously accusing them of persecuting Poles and Jews and crediting them with

32 Misiuk, Historia Policji, 158. The People’s Militia was created by the PKWN decree of July 27, 1944. An estimated 1000 former policemen served in the People’s Militia. They were dismissed in 1947-1948. Majer, “Okupacyjne i powojenne losy,” 118. 33 Litwiński, ”Komisja rehabilitacyjno-kwalifikacyjna,” 120.

16 assistance.34 Even a negatively critical assessment was not fatal, because certain accusations were difficult to prove.35 Likewise, favourable opinions about a policeman and successful rehabilitation did not guarantee employment or a pension.

Czesław Jacyna, chief of the 7th precinct of Polish police in Warsaw and a member of an underground organization, was rehabilitated in 1946 but denied work in 1947 and deprived of pension rights in 1951.36

Post-War Prosecutions

Those who were considered to have failed rehabilitation underwent a disciplinary proceeding or were subjected to legal actions.37 The post-war legal actions taken against members of the Polish police were based on a decree of August 31, 1944 against collaborators with the Third Reich (known as the August Decree, dekret sierpniowy), a law against the “fascist-Hitlerite criminals and traitors of the Polish Nation” that was introduced by the PKWN in the liberated areas of Poland.38 The death penalty was prescribed for those who, favouring the German occupying authorities, participated (or were still participating in the Polish territory that remained occupied) in torturing and murdering civilians or POWs. The same punishment was proclaimed for those who acted to the detriment of persons residing in the territories of the Polish State, in particular by

34 File of Eugeniusz D., AAN, AbfPP 434/99 D-4, pp. 167-237. 35 File of Jan D., AAN, AbfPP 434/100 D-9, pp. 82v-83v, 103-104. 36 AAN, AbfPP 413/51/50. 37 Litwiński, “Komisja rehabilitacyjno-kwalifikacyjna,” 121. 38 “Decree of the Polish Committee of National Liberation from August 1, 1944 on the punishment of fascist-Hitlerite criminals guilty of murders and mistreatment of the civilians and prisoners of war and traitors of the Polish Nation.” (Dekret Polskiego Komitetu Wyzwolenia Narodowego z dnia 1 sierpnia 1944 r. o wymiarze kary dla faszystowsko-hitlerowskich zbrodniarzy winnych zabójstw i znęcania się nad ludnością cywilną i jeńcami oraz dla zdrajców Narodu Polskiego) DzURP, no. 4, 1944, item 16.

17 arresting or deporting persons wanted or persecuted by the occupying authorities for whatever reasons (excluding those wanted for committing common crimes).39

According to article 2 of the decree, extorting benefits from such persons or their families, threatening arrest, or handing them over to the occupying authorities were punishable by fifteen years imprisonment or a life sentence. Committing crimes in the service of the occupying power, on its behalf, or under coercion were not considered extenuations. Attempts to commit the aforementioned crimes, incitement and assistance were also punishable.40 Those found guilty of the crimes listed in articles 1, 2 and 4 would also lose public and civil honourary rights and forfeit their property.41 Crimes prosecuted on the basis of the August Decree fell under the jurisdiction of the Special

Penal Courts (Specjalne Sądy Karne, SSK).42 After the SSK had been dissolved, the cases were tried in regular courts.43 Between 1944 and 1960 over 30,000 trials were carried out based on the August decree.44 According to Alina Skibińska’s research seven percent of all cases brought to trials were against people who committed crimes against Poles of

Jewish nationality.45

39 DzURP, no. 4, 1944, article 1. 40 DzURP, no. 4, 1944, articles 3 and 4. According to changes introduced on December 10, 1946, acting under threat or on orders did not release one from legal responsibility, but the court could consider it as migitating circumstances related to sentencing. DzURP, no. 69, item 376, article 5 § 1 and 2. 41 Decree of the PKWN from February 16, 1945, DzURP, No. 7, item 29; Decree of the PKWN from December 15, 1946, DzURP, no. 69, item 376. 42 PKWN Decree of September 12, 1944 on Special Penal Courts for Cases of Fascist-Hitlerite Criminals (Dekret Polskiego Komitetu Narodowego z dnia 12 września 1944 o specjalnych sądach karnych dla spraw zbrodniarzy faszystowsko-hitlerowskich), DzURP, no. 4, item 21. 43 Special Penal Courts were dissolved by October 17, 1946 decree. DzURP, no.59, item 324. 44 Tomasz Frydel,"Beyond the Ulmas: The Need for a Social History of in Occupied Poland," Cosmopolitan Review 8, no. 2 (Spring 2016) http://cosmopolitanreview.com/beyond-the-ulmas-the-need- for-a-social-history-of-genocide-in-occupied-poland/ 45 Alina Skibińska, Guide to the Sources on the Holocaust in Occupied Poland (European Holocaust Research Infrastructure, 2014), 262.

18

The most severe punishment for those found guilty was the death penalty.46

There is evidence that throughout these trials, if certain lines of prosecution failed, others were introduced that were based only on hearsay or fabrication. Accusations of persecuting Jews were often hard to prove in court; in many cases it was difficult to establish a policeman’s direct involvement in anti-Jewish actions and many policemen were acquitted.47 Nonetheless, a substantial number of former policemen were tried for actions against the Jewish population during the liquidation of ghettos and for persecuting

Jews in hiding.

Primary Sources of Evidence

Court files of the cases tried based on the August Decree are commonly referred to as sierpniówki (August cases). Sierpniówki are among the most important sources made available to researchers after the fall of Communism. They shed light on the actions and attitudes toward the Jews of the Polish policemen and the local population.

Records of investigations and trials are valuable but problematic sources. One must analyze them with caution and bear in mind the specific circumstances in which they were produced. Those circumstances influenced policemen and witnesses alike. In some cases trials took place long after the crimes were committed. The memory of events could become unclear, and sometimes accusations could not be proven because of the lapse in time and memory. Most witnesses were non-Jewish Poles, although Jewish

46 Wincenty Kwiatkowski was sentenced to death for crimes against the civilian population, including killing a Jewish man. AIPN, GK 221/47, pp. 69-73v. See also the case of Tomasz Kubot AIPN, GK 205/47. 47 For example, Jan W. was accused of apprehending a Jewish woman after previous accusations had not been proved during the investigation. Majority of witnesses testified to a contrary: as a member of Home Army he helped Jews and did not denounce them even though he was aware of their hiding places. Jan W. was acquitted. Archiwum Państwowe miasta stołecznego Warszawy (hereafter APW), Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie (SOW), 246. See also AIPN, GK 252/245; GK 333/6.

19 survivors testified against the defendants as well.48 Policemen often denied their agency and tried to shift blame onto co-accused or deceased colleagues. They also claimed they had been coerced into confessions by beatings and subsequently recanted their depositions. Some witnesses recanted, too.

Notwithstanding its flaws, the new evidence allows us to reconstruct in detail some unexplored aspects of the Holocaust in occupied Poland. Available sources often challenge long-held notions of the virtuous Poles and show how the rural population became involved in actions against Jews. This dissertation draws on post-war trial records, rehabilitation procedure files, eyewitness testimonies, published and unpublished memoirs, and diaries and documents produced by the Polish underground. The majority of court records are preserved in the Archives of the Institute of National Remembrance

(AIPN). At the time of my research one had to go through a very lengthy process in order to access their collections. Not all material requested was released to me, and I supplemented my research at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives, which had acquired a portion of the AIPN’s collections.

Because of Polish privacy laws, I am prohibited from disclosing information that would enable identification of policemen who were defendants in the post-war trials and individuals who underwent rehabilitation procedures. In such cases I provide the first name and first initial of the last name. If the name has been previously published, I disclose it as well. The names that appear in the underground press and records produced by the underground organizations and the Government’s Delegation are provided in full. I decided to leave the full names of defendants in trials, whose records are preserved at the

48 Cf. the case of Tomasz Kubot, AIPN, GK 205/47, pp. 9-9v, 47-48 and Stanisław Witkowski, AIPN GK 259/2.

20

AIPN. Some of the names have already been published. Disclosing these names has also been the practice in the IPN’s publications.

Testimonies deposited after the war by and non-Jewish Poles who assisted Jews play a significant role in constructing the narrative of Jewish interactions with the Polish police.49 These documents are housed at the Jewish Historical

Institute in Warsaw and Yad Vashem Archives in . Most of them were written in the immediate post-war years. Such sources broaden our knowledge about the survival of Jews in hiding and the dangers posed to them by the Polish police and population. At

Yad Vashem I also consulted oral testimonies recorded for the USC Shoah Foundation –

The Institute for Visual History and Education and Jewish Holocaust Center in

Melbourne, Australia. Although recorded many years after the war they offer valuable information.50 All these sources show how the Polish police interacted with the Jewish population and how they contributed to Jewish deaths, often with assistance from the local population.

Structure of the Dissertation

This dissertation is organized chronologically. It discusses the uniformed Polish police in the territories of the General Government, excluding the district of , which was incorporated in 1941 and where the uniformed Ukrainian Auxiliary Police was created. To highlight the continuity between the interwar State Police and wartime Polish

49 The importance of eyewitness testimony in understanding perpetrator intentions and victim agency is highlighted in Doris L. Bergen, “I Am (Not) to Blame: Intent and Agency in Personal Accounts of the Holocaust,” Lessons and Legacies, Volume XII, New Directions in Holocaust Research and Education, ed. Wendy Lower and Lauren Faulkner Rossi (Evanston: Press, 2017): 87-107. 50 On the value of oral testimonies in re-constructing the events of the Holocaust see Anna Shternshis, “Between Life and Death: Why Some Soviet Jews Decided to Leave and Others to Stay in 1941,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 15, no. 3 (Summer 2014): 477-504.

21 police, Chapter 1 provides an overview of the history of police organizations. It begins in the early twentieth-century Polish territories and leads up to the creation of the Polish

State Police in independent Poland including the reconstruction of the force as the Polish police serving under the German orders. It argues for the continuity of the Polish police force with regards to personnel, organization and structure. The policemen were left in place due to pragmatic reasons, not because of ideological affinities with Nazi , even though some policemen exhibited .

Chapter 2 discusses various ways in which the Polish police interacted with the

Jewish police and Jewish population in ghettos. Policemen’s presence in ghettos enabled them to facilitate contacts between ghetto inhabitants and the surrounding Polish population. By virtue of their position in the ghetto, Polish policemen became a crucial element in the movement of products and people in and out of ghettos. Many of the policemen were easily corruptible and had no interest in preventing smuggling. With the tightening of German policies against the Jews, the Polish policemen became involved in penalizing Jews leaving ghettos, including executions of those apprehended on the

“Aryan” side without valid permission.

Chapter 3 demonstrates how Polish policemen physically and mentally crossed the line into active participation in the Holocaust. During liquidations of ghettos in 1942, the policemen were tasked with ensuring that Jews did not escape, escorting those rounded- up to trains, and searching for those who avoided the transport to the killing centre. It is at this time that many policemen became directly involved in killing Jews in hiding. By this point it is certain that the policemen were aware of the Germans’ plans for the Jewish population. Polish policemen became more dangerous to Jews than the Germans, because they could rely on the help of the local population.

22

Chapter 4 outlines the behaviour of policemen following liquidations of the ghettos. These behaviours included extortion, hunting and murdering Jews, and they became a major component of the policemen’s actions (on German orders or policemen’s own initiative, in cooperation with the locals and often in the absence of Germans). A common lens through which policemen looked at Jews was as a source of income or as a problem that needed to be taken care of; blackmailing Jews replaced previous sources of income of policemen who worked in the ghettos.

Chapter 5 discusses the post-war recognition of several former policemen who extended help to Jews in hiding. It examines cases of policemen who ignored or defied their orders in order to assist Jews and try to ensure their survival. Even those who helped were not free of prejudice against Jews and their motivations were not always clear.

Terminology and Clarifications

Throughout this dissertation I use the term “Polish police” instead of “Blue police” except for direct quotations from primary sources that use policja granatowa. In

Polish terminology, “police ” refers to a higher-ranking functionary of the police force, which is dissimilar from the North American usage of “officer” to describe any member of the police force. I follow the Polish use of “police officer” and “policeman” for rank-and-file.

Regarding the vocabulary for Poles and Jews, I closely follow terms used in contemporary documents. Thus, I use “Poles” for ethnic Poles and “Jews” for Poles of

Jewish origins. Post-war documents referred to Jews as “Polish citizens of Jewish origin,” a term I preserved when citing from the court documents.

Chapter 1

The State Police and Its Transformation into the Polish Police, the so-called Blue Police

Introduction

At the beginning of the Second World War, Bronisław Marchlewicz faced a dilemma: whether or not to return to his position of in Otwock that he had held before the war. When the Germans invaded Poland in September 1939, Marchlewicz followed the order to evacuate to the east. He returned to Otwock later that month and after debating for a long while, he eventually heeded the Germans’ order to return to his position. Uncomfortable with working as police chief under the ultimate command of the

German occupying authorities and the duties and compromises that this would entail, he attempted to secure his release many times by feigning illness.1 Unsuccessful, he continued to work in the police force until Otwock was liberated in July 1944. Ultimately, he displayed the most patriotic and civic behaviour towards Poles and Jews throughout the occupation. He was active in the resistance movement and many times extended his help to Poles and Jews.

The case of Marchlewicz highlights an important aspect of Polish police during the Second World War: under the Germans, the Polish police force was largely a continuation of the prewar State Police. The insufficient number of German police and their unfamiliarity with local conditions meant that they relied on prewar policemen to return to service. The Polish police was also supposed to serve as a buffer between the

1 An opinion of the head of the Municipal National Council (Miejska Rada Narodowa, MRN), March 25, 1948. AAN AbfPP 434/120/M-11, p. 79v. From 1941 on, the service in police was compulsory. One could be released from service due to health reasons or by reaching the retirement age. Marek Getter, “Policja Polska w Generalnym Gubernatorstwie 1939-1945,” Przegląd Policyjny 9, no. 1-2 (1999): 77.

23 24

Germans and the local population, which was hostile to the occupier and with whom the

Germans lacked a means to communicate due to the language barrier. Historian Adam

Hempel suggests that there might have been another reason, namely an attempt to neutralize and control the policemen, who as a group could become a strong force of resistance if not engaged in service.2 Indeed, both the high- and low-ranking policemen were involved in creating the underground movement from the very beginning.

Membership in the police force was considered by more patriotically inclined policemen as an attempt to counteract German influences.

The prewar Polish police force had never really won respect and support for its tasks and was now set to face even more hostility from Polish society while serving under

German supervision. The Germans added to the duties that the Polish police performed before the war, which created a rift between the police and the Polish population. The policemen were used as an auxiliary force to the German police and tasked with combating the resistance movement, rounding up people for forced labour, carrying out manhunts, and guarding forced labour camps. They also assisted during executions and guarded the execution sites and took part in anti- actions as part of Einsatz- and

Rollkommandos.3 The Polish policemen also played an important role in implementing the anti-Jewish policies of the German occupying authorities such as guarding the perimeters of ghettos and later on apprehending Jews in hiding. The Polish police had to immediately and fiercely carry out orders from German authorities. German police authorities had the power to impose disciplinary penalties on those who neglected their

2 Hempel, Pogrobowcy klęski, 408. 3 Getter, “Policja Polska,” 76.

25 duties. Refusal to carry out an order or executing an order improperly could result in immediate discharge, special punishment and even the death penalty.4

This chapter outlines the establishment of the interwar State Police, showing that its traditions were rooted in organizations established in the territories of partitioned Poland and throughout the First World War. Discussion of the organization of the police, the background of its members, and the overall role of the police in interwar

Poland is important in helping us understand the wartime police milieu because the reconstructed Polish police was to a great extent the continuation of the State Police. The problems of the interwar force such as the misuse of power and the distrust of the Polish population carried through to the occupation and influenced the general attitude towards the police. The State Police has been the subject of many scholarly publications and these form the basis of my discussion. Unlike the wartime police force, it does not evoke the same controversy.

The link between the State Police and the Polish police force, the only armed

Polish organization, whose members wore the same uniforms (although devoid of any

Polish symbols) helped in normalizing their presence in society but also raised expectations that the policemen often could not fulfill. For many policemen the decision to join and serve was a result of pragmatic considerations but doing so under the ultimate authority of the Germans caused a moral dilemma. By re-entering the force the policemen avoided failing to return to work and protected themselves from being dispatched to forced labour in Germany or a concentration camp. In the latter part of the chapter I

4 Archiwum Państwowe w Krakowie, Posterunek Policji Polskiej w Brzesku Nowym (hereafter APKr, PPPBrN) 13, p. 9. Beginning in May 1942, the policemen were placed under the jurisdiction of the SS and Police courts; in 1944 their families were also included under its power. Getter, “Policja Polska,” 78.

26 discuss how the outbreak of the Second World War affected the police force and how both aggressors in September 1939 – Germany and the Soviet Union – treated the policemen.

A Forerunner to the State Police: Polish Military Organizations Pre- and Post-

World War I

In independent Poland the first efforts to create a state police force began in 1919, efforts that drew on a longer tradition. The origins of the interwar State Police – the organization that was later recreated as the Polish police and worked in conjunction with the Germany occupation authorities – date back to the paramilitary organizations founded on the territories of partitioned Poland. When the Polish state was reestablished in 1918, its authorities drew on the military experiences of these groups as they embarked on creating their own security and military forces.

In the early twentieth century, a number of paramilitary organizations were created, which contributed to the Polish military and police efforts later on. In 1904, the

Polish Socialist Party (PPS) established the Fighting Organization (Organizacja Bojowa).

After the 1905 revolution, Józef Piłsudski’s followers regrouped in Galicia and offered to cooperate with the Austrian authorities against . In 1908, Wawrzyniec Dayczak established the Bartosz Squads (Drużyny Bartoszowe) in , Galicia, which brought together rural youth. In 1910, legalized the existing paramilitary organizations and in the same year the Riflemen Association (Związek Strzelecki) was established in

Lviv. In 1908, a group of activists who broke away from Dmowski’s National-

Democratic Party established its own paramilitary organizations, including the Polish

Military Association (Polski Związek Wojskowy), which in 1910 transformed into the

27

Polish Army (Armia Polska). In 1911, the Polish Rifle Squads (Polskie Drużyny

Strzeleckie) were created as a legal part of the Polish Army. By 1914, the Riflemen

Association, the Bartosz Squads, and the Polish Rifle Squads had, in total, approximately

20,000 trained members.

When broke out, backed up by the Austrian command order, the

Chief National Committee in Galicia formed Polish Legions to fight alongside Austro-

Hungarian troops. The Legions were created out of the Riflemen Association and

Galician paramilitary units. At this stage Piłsudski also established in Warsaw a clandestine Polish Military Organization (Polska Organizacja Wojskowa, POW).5 Its goal was to gain Poland’s independence by military means. In total, around two million

Poles participated in World War I within the armies of the states that had partitioned

Poland. Thanks to Roman Dmowski’s efforts, a Polish Army (Haller’s Army) was formed in France from Polish emigrants, Polish POWs from France and later from ; Polish volunteers from the United States, Canada, and also joined them.6

During World War I, various law and order organizations were also established in support of Polish independence efforts. They were usually founded by self-governments

(samorządy) to preserve order. In the territories of the Congress Kingdom, the first Polish

Civic Guards (Straże Obywatelskie) were already created in 1914. The creation of the

Warsaw Civic Guard in August 1915 was commonly recognized as the resurgence of the

5 Piotr J. Wróbel, “The Revival of Poland and Paramilitary Violence, 1918-1920,” in Spießer, Patrioten, Revolutionäre. Militärische Mobilisierung und gesellschaftliche Ordnung in der Neuzeit, ed. Rüdiger Bergien, and Ralf Pröve. (Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2010), 283, 286; Antoni Czubiński, Historia Polski 1864-2001 (Wrocław: Ossolineum, 2002), 55-56, 63-64. 6 Andrzej Chwalba, Historia Polski 1795-1918 (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2005), 587.

28

Polish police although it was not the first organization of this type.7 The voluntary Civic

Guard in Warsaw took over police duty when the Russian troops left the city on the of August 4/5, 1915. The idea of the creation of the Civic Guard was born already a year earlier and work on organizing the force began in the fall of 1914. Soon after, the

Russians changed their minds and at the beginning of 1915 the preparations became clandestine.8 With the occupation of the territories of the Polish Kingdom by the German and Austrian forces the Civic Guards were dissolved and in February 1916, the Municipal

Militia (Milicja Miejska) was established. The new had to rely on the manpower of the former members of the Civic Guard, as there were no other experienced police personnel.9 The auxiliary Municipal Militias were established only in the territories of the former Russian partition; they were autonomous and their independence increased as the war drew to a close.10

At the end of 1917, the Warsaw Municipal Militia was the best-organized police formation in the territories of the former Congress Kingdom.11 More organizations were established during disarmament and expulsion of the German and Austrian occupying forces. In October and civic militias and civic guards were also being created in Galicia. Also in October 1918, the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) began to create

7 Mączyński, Policja Państwowa, 14. Indeed, independent Poland emphasized the importance of the Warsaw Civic Guard when it celebrated the ten-year anniversary of the creation of the Polish police force in 1925. 8 Jerzy Kochanowski, “Polskie organizacje policyjne w Warszawie w latach 1914-1919” (MA thesis, University of Warsaw, 1984), 4, 9-10, 13. Soon the Polish Military Organization and Polish Socialist Party started to infiltrate the militia under construction. Ibid., 13, 14. 9 Ibid., 30-31. 10 Misiuk, Historia Policji, 89-91. In the Austrian partition, it was only in Lwów that attempts were made to create public order organizations. Ibid., 88. 11 Grzegorz Gryz, “Milicja Miejska miasta stołecznego Warszawy,” in Od Straży Obywatelskich do policji. Służby porządkowe na ziemiach polskich w XX wieku, eds. Ryszard Łaszewski, and Bolesław Sprengerl. (Włocławek: WSHE, 2007), 38.

29 its People’s Militia (Milicja Ludowa), which participated in the disarming of the Austrian and German occupying forces.12 They participated in taking control of and in late

November the People’s Militias were established throughout the former Congress

Kingdom. Their activities included dealing with political struggle as well as combating petty criminals and speculators.13

Police organizations acted independently of each other and were created on military or civilian initiative.14 Some of these groups were paramilitary organizations in the service of various political parties, such as the People’s Militia of the Polish Socialist

Party.15 Their tasks were to protect the interests of the party and to support its political struggle through the use of force if necessary. The other important paramilitary formations were the Guard of Public Security (Straż Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego) associated with the National Democracy and People’s Militia created by the Council of the Workers’ Delegates (Rada Delegatów Robotniczych) in Lublin, which was largely controlled by the Communists. Organizations associated with the right-wing parties included the People’s Guard, , Civic Guard and State Police Guard (Straż

Ludowa, Straż Narodowa, Straż Obywatelska and Straż Policyjna Państwowa). Other organizations were at the disposal of civic institutions or representatives of local

12 PPS’s Combat Emergency (Pogotowie Bojowe) and milita reserves transformed into People’s Militia. Kochanowski, Polskie organizacje, 62. 13 Wróbel, “The Revival of Poland,” 299. 14 Mączyński, Policja Państwowa, 15. 15 Robert Litwiński, Korpus Policji w II Rzeczypospolitej. Służba i życie prywatne (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2007), 21. People’s Militia was created from Pogotowie Bojowe PPS in 1917.

30 authorities and organized with permission of the occupying authorities. Among those were the Civic Guard and Municipal Militia.16

At the end of the First World War, a number of competing security organizations existed in the newly independent Poland. Since none of these groups held power throughout the entire country or fulfilled all of the necessary functions of a state police force, they were subordinated to the new authorities. The Polish government gave two groups – the PPS’s People’s Militia and the Communal Police (Policja Komunalna) – legal recognition.17 Provisional Chief of State, Józef Piłsudski, issued a decree on

December 5, 1918 that “nationalized” PPS’s People’s Militia and directly subordinated it to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The People’s Militia was now considered an executive military organization and would work together with municipal and county militias.18

Despite the decree, at that time in Warsaw other voluntary police formations still existed and new ones were being created, notably a self-defence Jewish militia formed in preparation of expected pogroms.19

On January 9, 1919, Piłsudski issued another decree that designated the

Communal Police as an organ of local self-government. It too answered to the Ministry of

Internal Affairs. All existing organizations of public security, with the exception of the

16Andrzej Misiuk, Historia policji, 93. See also Misiuk, Policja Państwowa 1919-1939. Powstanie, organizacja, kierunki działania (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 1996), 14. 17 The reach and functions of the People’s Militia were increased to reach the entire former Congress Poland and as a government police it took over the role of Civic Militias. Mączyński, Policja Państwowa, 19. 18 “Przepisy o organizacji Milicji Ludowej z 5 grudnia 1918 r. Dziennik Urzędowy Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych, R. 1918, nr 2, poz. 18,” in Organizacja instytucji policyjnych w II Rzeczypospolitej 1918- 1926. Wybór źródeł i dokumentów, eds. Andrzej Misiuk, and Andrzej Pepłoński. (: Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Policji, 1994), 15-16. 19 Kochanowski, Polskie organizacje, 65-67.

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People’s Militia, were to be immediately transformed into Communal Police forces.20

Communal Police was established using the manpower of Municipal Militias.21

The simultaneous existence of the People’s Militia and the Communal Police was a step towards the creation of a unified countrywide police force. One drawback however was the scope of authority between the two formations. Political parties discussed the need to unify and proposed a few variants of the police force. In the meantime, in April and May 1919, the Municipal Militia and the Communal Police became subordinated to a shared Chief Command, which in turn was dissolved in June

1919 when the Polish government made its first efforts to create a state police force. This group was tentatively named the Security Guard (Straż Bezpieczeństwa).22

The government’s proposal to create the Security Guard generated heated discussions within the Polish parliament. As a result of these debates, the Sejm issued the

July 24, 1919 decree, which created a new police force called the State Police (Policja

Państwowa).23 The force was designed as an executive of the state and self-government authorities. Its organization and training was based on a military model. It was subordinated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the prosecutor and court offices. After the State Police force was established, the government repealed the previous decrees concerning the People’s Militia and the Communal Police.24

20 Dziennik Praw Państwa Polskiego (DzPPP), 1919, no. 5, item 98. Quoted after Misiuk and Pepłoński, Organizacja instytucji, 17-19. 21 Majer, “Podstawy prawne,” 11. By March 1919 in the majority of cities of the former Polish kingdom, the Municipal Militias were transformed into Communal Police Units. Misiuk, Historia policji, 99. See also Kochanowski, Polskie organizacje, 72-77. 22 Misiuk, Policja Państwowa, 18. 23 Majer, “Podstawy prawne,” 13. 24 Ustawa z dnia 24 lipca 1919 roku o policji państwowej, DzPPP, 1919, no. 61, item 363.

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Regional differences, incomplete subordination of all the territories to the central authorities and ongoing military actions meant that the organization of the police force was a long-term process. The government needed to centralize its power before expanding the police force all over the country. The formation of the State Police in various parts of Poland was also complicated by the Polish-Soviet war and changes in governing practices in different parts of the state. For instance, the 1919 decree about the

State Police was completely implemented in Eastern Małopolska only in August 1921.25

The process of creating the State Police was completed in 1922 with the establishment of police forces in the Vilna area and in .

The State Police force was formally divided into three sections: the uniformed police (Policja Państwowa), who were charged with preventive tasks; the criminal police

(Policja Śledcza), who became the investigative arm; and the political police (called

Policja Polityczna beginning in 1924), whose role was to combat and counteract actions against the state. The political police operated until 1926, when it was incorporated into the criminal police.26 The establishment of the political police was a very controversial and delicate issue because of the Polish experience with the German, Austrian and

Russian secret police who fought against Polish independence efforts. However, the

Polish government’s fear of Communism and the need to combat it, as well as the separatist inclinations of national minorities required a special police force to deal with these security threats.27 In addition to its regular policing tasks, in 1923-1924 the State

25 Misiuk, Policja Państwowa, 38. The decree was enforced in the territories of the former Prussian partition in 1920; the unification process lasted until 1922. Ibid., 49. 26 Majer, “Podstawy prawne,” 20. 27 Misiuk, Policja Państwowa, 251-252.

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Police became involved in guarding Poland’s borders, in particular its Eastern border.28

Even after the creation of the (Korpus Ochrony Pogranicza,

KOP) in 1924, the police in the eastern borderlands helped protect the country’s borders.

Autonomous Silesian Police

The police force in Silesia - Police of the Silesian – was an autonomous formation created by the Silesian voivode’s decree of June 17, 1922. Its structure was modeled on the Polish State Police. Its special status was a result of the

Polish government’s attempts to secure the Silesian region for the Polish state. During the

Paris Peace Conference there were initial talks about including the majority of Upper

Silesia in the Polish state. However, the Treaty of Versailles called for a plebiscite to decide the fate of the region. Ahead of the plebiscite, the Constitutional decree of July 15,

1920 granted political autonomy to the within the Polish state.

Before the plebiscite was carried out in , two Polish uprisings took place in August 1919 and August 1920. To preserve order in the contested area, in August

1920 the Commission Interalliée de Gouverment et de Plébiscite de Haute Silésie created the Abstimmungspolizei (the Police of the Upper Silesia), commonly called the Plebiscite

Police. Only Upper Silesians (both Poles and Germans) were allowed to join.29 A third

Silesian Uprising took place in May 1921, after the announcement of the results of the plebiscite not favouring Poland. In October 1921, the Ambassador’s Conference in Paris divided Upper Silesia, awarding Poland one-third of the territory (including the greater part of the industrial district) and almost half of the population. When the autonomous

28 Misiuk, Policja Państwowa, 208. 29 Zygmunt Grabiński, Z dziejów Policji Województwa Śląskiego w latach 1922-1939. Monografia Komisariatu Policji Województwa Śląskiego w Hajdukach Wielkich (Chorzów, 2001), 7.

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Silesian police was created in 1922, 95% of its members were from Silesia. Many had served previously in the Plebiscite Police of the Upper Police, Field Gendarmerie, civic guards and National Gendarmerie of the .30

Rank-and-File Policemen in Interwar Poland

The decree creating the State Police defined the requirements for prospective policemen: a candidate had to be a Polish citizen with an ‘impeccable past,’ between the age of 29 and 45, healthy with a strong physique and adequate height, with knowledge of written and spoken Polish as well as arithmetic skills.31 Beginning in 1928, the age requirement was changed to 21-35. A candidate had to have no criminal record and a minimum education of four years of primary school (szkoła powszechna). The age requirement was not rigorously maintained if a candidate had previously worked in the police, administration or judiciary system. In such cases he could be accepted to the service even when older than 35.32

Despite the education requirements, there were some, even among the higher- ranking policemen, who could barely read or write – a condition that significantly affected their ability to conduct their work.33 According to the January 1923 census of functionaries of the civil service, 9.7 percent of the police officers had a graduate level of education, 19.2 percent an undergraduate level, 17.9 percent had finished grades 7-8, 31.7 percent had completed grades 4-6, 20.5 percent had an elementary education and 0.4 percent were home schooled. The vast majority of the lower-ranking policemen had only

30 Litwiński, Korpus Policji, 44. 31 Ustawa z dnia 24 lipca 1919 roku o policji państwowej, DzPPP, 1919, no. 61, item 363, article 26. 32 Mączyński, Policja Państwowa, 137. 33 Litwiński, Korpus Policji, 59.

35 an elementary education, 11 percent were homeschooled and only 6.9 percent had an education higher than elementary school.34 Because the education levels among the police force varied significantly, according to the provisions of the 1919 decree, all policemen had to attend special police schools.35

A career in the police was not limited only to men. The need to create police jobs for women was a direct result of the rising criminality rate among women and adolescents as well as an increasing need to prevent prostitution and trafficking. Female police officers were in charge of women’s criminality and crimes against women, including prostitution, procuration, the trafficking of women, and adolescent criminality. In this realm they also worked to prevent women and children from entering a life of crime. The

State Police recruited physically fit, single women between 25 and 40 years of age.36

However, female officers were few in number: in 1923 only 19 women (lower rank functionaries) were employed in the police, 13 of them in the criminal police.37 In 1925 the police started recruiting more women to the service thanks to the efforts of the Polish

Committee for Combating Trafficking of Women and Children. Those seeking employment in the police force had to be recommended by a community organization, and have completed at least six years of elementary school. In special cases a candidate could have finished four grades, only if she demonstrated social awareness and was

34 Misiuk, Policja Państwowa, 82-83. 35 Ustawa z dnia 24 lipca 1919 roku, article 28. 36 Robert Kotowski, “Kobiety w Policji Państwowej w Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej,” in Z dziejów policji polskiej, 73-74. 37 Misiuk, Policja Państwowa, 81. In 1928 there were still only 20 policewomen – 17 in Warsaw and 3 in Łódź. Only in 1929 37 new policewomen began their training. Ibid., 322. To compare, in January 1923 there were 35,000 policemen in the force, in 1925 – over 42,000. In 1928, the number went down to 31,000. Litwiński, Korpus Policji, 99.

36 deemed to have high moral standards.38 Women who had served during the First World

War and trained with female troops, or who were familiar with intelligence work were given job priority.39

Professional and Social Background

The January 1923 census of functionaries of the civil service provides an overview of the professional background of the higher-ranking policemen before they entered the police force. Detailed data is not available for lower-ranking policemen, as they could declare one of only three listed professional categories: ‘worker’, ‘tradesman’ and ‘other’.40 Most likely as a result of demobilization after the Polish-Soviet war, the police force was largely made up of military men (28 percent) and former state clerks

(almost 27 percent). The rest of the force had previously worked as private and communal clerks, merchants, industrialists, artisans, teachers, peasants, lawyers and people with undefined professions. The majority of them were under 40. The lower-ranking policemen had worked as peasants, tradesmen, and workers before 1914.41 The officers were also relatively young (45.8 percent of officers were between 30 and 40 years of age). Most of the officers originated from the former Congress Poland.42

In the 1923 census, the majority of the higher-ranking policemen declared Polish nationality and the Roman-Catholic faith. Among the lower-ranking policemen, 96.7 percent of the policemen considered themselves Roman Catholic. 36,602 persons

38 Piotr Gołdyn, “Od misji dworcowych do policji kobiecej,” in Od Straży Obywatelskich do policji, 92. 39 Litwiński, Korpus Policji, 28. The women in the police force were on average more educated than the men as most of them had graduated from high school and passed matriculation examination. Ibid., 326-328. 40 Misiuk, Policja Państwowa, 84. 41 Litwiński, Korpus Policji, 45-46. 42 24,3% of officers were between 20-30 years old, 22,3% between 40-50, 6.8% were in the range of 50-60 years old and only 0,8% were over 60. Misiuk, Policja Państwowa, 80-81.

37 declared Polish nationality, and of the remaining only 253 were Jewish, Ukrainian,

Russian, Belarussian and German.43 Attempts to make the national structure of the police more unified resulted in scores of policemen who belonged to ethnic minorities being systematically fired and replaced by Poles. There were cases of changing religious denominations and names within this group.

Some of the men who joined the force had previous police experience as former police members of the Austrian, Russian or German police, members of the law and order organizations (Civil Guard, Municipal Militia, Communal Police or People’s Militia, former members of the armies of the partitioning countries or Polish formations 1914-

1918). However, most of the policemen lacked any military or police experience but joined the force out of need for a permanent and stable job.44 Later on, some policemen took part in the Polish-Soviet war and joined a volunteer-based 213 infantry regiment. A mounted police squadron, formed in the Łódź voivodeship, also took part in the direct fighting. The main tasks of the policemen during the war included assisting with the evacuation (and re-evacuation) of the authorities and civilian population and removing subversive groups from the front. During the Polish-Soviet war the State Police were subordinated to the military authorities and played the role of military gendarmerie.

Along with the troops of the field gendarmerie, the police served in cordon posts along the front line and dealt with desertion and panic among the civilian population. 45

43 In the January 1923 census only two out of 1001 persons from the leadership cadres declared nationality other than Polish. Similarly, 94.8% declared to be Roman Catholics. The others were protestant, Greek- Catholic, Russian Orthodox, and Jewish (0.2 percent). Litwiński questions the homogeneity of the corps as his analysis of personal files of higher-ranking officers suggests there were among them at least eight Jews, one officer of Ukrainian nationality and three of Russian. Litwiński, Korpus Policji, 53-54. 44 Litwiński, Korpus Policji, 505. 45 Misiuk, Policja Państwowa, 58-59, 329.

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During the 1920s, the police force continually decreased due to budget cuts and changes in Poland’s socio-political situation. In comparison to the over 49,000 policemen in 1924, by 1926 there were just 35,000 functionaries. The reduction of police officers included those who had been fired due to their low qualifications.46 After 1926 there were minor reductions to the police force and its numbers were also affected by the 1929 financial crisis. The numbers of the force continually fell until the mid-1930s when the government decided to increase the number of officers. To do so, the President issued a decree on April 17, 1936 that introduced a new category of contract employees. This group was not a part of the police corps. They resided in barracks and received a soldier’s pay. After three months of probationary service, those with the proper qualifications could be hired as (posterunkowi). They constituted a reserve police force and were usually used for special duties such as ensuring peace during mass gatherings.47

Their presence did increase the numbers of police force. For example, between 1929 and

1931 there were 31,311 registered police functionaries (the actual numbers slightly varied as some were retired or on medical leaves), 28,855 in 1932. The numbers started to increase in 1937. With the candidates included in the count for the first time, there were

29,728 policemen in 1937 and 30,812 in 1938-1939.48

The Politics of Policing

In theory policemen were expected to be apolitical, although there was no enforceable rule for this requirement. Policemen were to have political objectivity and

46 Misiuk, Policja Państwowa, 71-73. 47 Litwiński, Korpus Policji, 107, 131-132. Andrzej Misiuk considers them a form of “police military,” an efficient police-military formation for special tasks. Misiuk, Policja Państwowa, 65, 330. 48 Litwiński, Korpus Policji, 99.

39 were not engage in any political activities. They could not belong to a political party or organization with political sympathies.49 The policemen were expected to exhibit apolitical behaviour both in professional and private life. However, the policemen were not free from political influences and neither were their superiors. It is widely accepted among historians that between 1919 and 1926 most of the leadership of the State Police had pro-National Democracy tendencies, even if they were not exhibited in public. The rule of being apolitical was also challenged by the existence of the political police within the State Police.50 In the 1920s, many officers of the State Police were also connected to the very conservative, illegal political group Polish Patriots Emergency (Pogotowie

Patriotów Polskich) established in 1922 and liquidated in 1924. The group held extremely anti-Communist and antisemitic views and planned a putsch to establish a dictatorship in

Poland.51 Among their members were also high-ranking army personnel and .

After the 1926 coup d’état,52 the idea of being apolitical was not enforced anymore. Instead the police force was subjugated to the ruling government and a cult of

Marshal Piłsudski was encouraged and propagated through the professional police press.53 Moreover, various parties, including the Communist Party, tried to gain some influence among policemen. Data from the September 1935 inspections of the Łódź

49 Majer, “Podstawy prawne,” 23. 50 Misiuk, Policja Państwowa, 141. The police passivity during the turmoil of 1922 presidential elections and failure to provide security for newly elected disgraced the force. Pro-right wing sympathies of the leadership were responsible for not suppressing nationalistic hit squads. Ibid., 148-149. See also Paul Brykczynski, Primed for Violence. Murder, Antisemitism, and Democratic Politics in Interwar Poland (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Winsconsin Press, 2016), 22. 51 Misiuk, Historia Policji, 132. 52 coup d’état – coup d’état staged by Marshal Piłsudski, May 12-14, 1926. As a result the government of was overthrown and President Stanisław Wojciechowski resigned. created a new government. Pilsudski declined the offer of the National Assembly to become a president considering the presidential power too limited. Ignacy Mościcki became the new president. 53 Misiuk, “Komendanci Główni Policji Państwowej w Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej,” in Z dziejów policji polskiej,” 60.

40 police stations is available and although it is not representative of all policemen, it suggests some trends among the members of the police. Many policemen favoured the socialist PPS, which Litwiński explains by the working-class background of many of them. Some were also supporting the nationalist parties.54 Political sentiments held in the interwar period would influence the behaviour of policemen during the Second World

War.

The police did not play a role in the events of May 1926 other than to secure law and order.55 In most cases the police troops were passive and did not support either side.

As a result, personnel changes affected only the leadership of the Chief of Command and some voivodeship commandants.56 However, the new government initiated many changes with regard to the position the police force held within the state. In March 1928 the

President issued a decree regulating anew the position of the State Police, their goals and methods of work. Self-governing organs were no longer in charge of issuing orders to the police. The force ceased to be a state organization of the security force and according to the new decree became “a corps organized in a military fashion, allocated to keep up security, peace and public order.”57 In case of mobilization and during war police would become a part of the armed forces as a military corps of security services.

Ethos of a Policeman

Police authorities strove to educate and properly train the policemen. They also tried to create an ethos of a policeman, which was to include discipline, obedience to

54 Litwiński, Korpus Policji, 285. 55 Mączyński, Policja Państwowa, 70. 56 Ibid., 151-152. 57 DzURP, 1928, no. 28, item 257.

41 superiors and laws, and proper behaviour towards civilians.58 Despite these efforts many policemen struggled with excessive drinking, gambling and racking up debt. Policemen often tried to avoid paying off their debts by misusing their privileged position. They were also involved in pimping, bribery, and sexually assaulting women who had been arrested.59

To remedy the situation, in 1938 the government announced a set of 14 principles outlining the ways in which policemen were to conduct themselves and act in the interest of the country. The principles included helping citizens, not abusing rights bestowed on them, presenting themselves in a clean and orderly manner, being brave and veracious, living modestly, fighting the state’s enemies persistently but not cruelly, and following the orders of superiors.60 Establishing a disciplined police force was a gradual process affected by significant turnover in the force. In the early to mid-1920s police authorities deemed many of the policemen unfit and removed them from service on moral grounds or because of criminal offenses.61 The most common cases of misdemeanor were: negligence, improper behaviour on and off duty, drunkenness, insubordination, going absent-without-leave, battery, bribery, abuse of power and failure to act.62 Many policemen served in their hometowns or regions, which sometimes led them to neglect

58 According to the instructions a policeman ought not question the validity of received orders (unless the order was to do something that would violate the law). The person who issued the order was responsible for its contents. Subordinates were expected to demonstrate absolute obedience, discipline and subordination. Litwiński, Korpus Policji, 144, 159-160. 59 Misiuk, Policja Państwowa, 85, 108. Lower-ranking policemen received a low salary, which made it difficult to make ends meet and made illicit ways of earning more attractive. 60 Przykazania policjanta (Policeman’s Commands), 1938. Quoted after Litwiński, Korpus Policji, 163-164. 61 Litwiński points out that in the early years of the police force, some of the policemen hired lacked either professional or moral preparation. For example, in the second part of 1920 212 policemen were removed from the Region Komenda East in Lwów. Korpus Policji, 182-183, 185. 62 Ibid., 190.

42 their duties. For instance, policemen were reluctant to stand up to the local population because they had family members and acquaintances among them.63

The State Police in the Eyes of Their Contemporaries

The State Police were never fully accepted in Polish society – a fact that was due to the population’s negative view of the various police forces during Poland’s partition.64

Bribery was also a problem that was never completely solved before the outbreak of the

Second World War, and wartime only accentuated this trait of many policemen.65 The mid-to-late 1930s marked the increase of former army officers in the police corps, which

Robert Litwiński suggests might have been an attempt to increase army influence in socio-political life in Poland and strengthen the security forces.66 Police were actively involved in brutally suppressing civic unrest, especially workers strikes, and protests by the unemployed. They would resort to the use of firearms. Beating and the misuse of power were strongly condemned by superiors and carried a threat of immediate removal from the service.67

The State Police were also involved in the infamous Bereza Kartuska detention camp for political prisoners where some served as guards. Bereza Kartuska was established in 1934 and dissolved in September 1939, when the took over eastern Poland. In addition, policemen were charged with the task of submitting to the

63 To remedy this situation, some policemen were transferred to other regions. Litwiński, Korpus Policji, 216. 64 Cf. Litwiński, Korpus Policji, 304, 351. 65 Hempel, Policja granatowa, 6. 66 Litwiński, Korpus Policji, 50. 67 Mączyński, Policja Państwowa, 107, 258. became the subject of parliamentary interpellations regarding abuse, unruly behaviour, beatings or unlawful arrests and searches. Litwiński, Korpus Policji, 345-346.

43 head of a district () the names of people to be interned in the camp because they allegedly posed a danger to the state. Groups targeted included communists, right-wing activists and Ukrainian nationalists.68 The policemen who served there did it unwillingly and lacked discipline. The tasks were too burdensome and many officers sought escape through alcohol. As a result they were often unable to perform their duties. Chief Kordian

Zamorski69 opposed the use of policemen at Bereza.70

Kordian Józef Zamorski was the last of six chiefs of the State Police in Poland. He served in the Polish Legions, deserted from the Austro- and became a commandant of the POW in the Cracow district. In 1935, he moved to the position of the chief of police from his job as chief of Department I of the Headquarters of the Polish

Army.71 Except for the first chief Władysław Henszel, all police chiefs had experience in police or Special Forces.72 Henszel had the challenging task of organizing a unified state police force. After two years he was dismissed from his post when the Ministry of

Internal Affairs deemed his efforts inadequate.73 Marian Borzęcki, the deputy of Henszel, became the fourth chief of police in 1923. A lawyer, during the First World War,

Borzęcki was active in the Civic Guard and Municipal Militia of the City of Warsaw. He was a chief of the Communal Police. Borzęcki was one of the co-authors of organizational and legislative initiatives regarding the all-state police force in 1919. He had a career in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, including being head of the Police

68 Mączyński, Policja Państwowa, 258. At first Bereza was a place of internment for the political opponents and those subversive to the Polish state (minorities); later also criminals were detained there. 69 General Kordian Józef Ignacy Zamorski (1890-1983), commandant of the Polish State Police from 1935 to September 1939. 70 Litwiński, Korpus Policji, 382-384. 71 Misiuk, “Komendanci Główni,” 64-65. 72 Ibid., 68. 73 Ibid., 37, 40.

44

Department. His support for the National Democracy secured him the position of the police chief, which he held until November 1926.74 Janusz Jagrym Maleszewski who replaced Borzęcki, headed the State Police for almost ten years, longer than any other chief. During Maleszewski’s tenure as the chief, the State Police became involved in the political struggles in the post-May 1926 coup d’état of Poland. He is credited with creating modern police training but incriminated by policemen’s participation in torturing those interned in Bereza Kartuska.75

Cooperation with Foreign Police Forces

The Polish State Police cooperated with foreign police forces and international police organizations in criminal and political areas, including drug trafficking, smuggling, forgery, human trafficking and combating communism. These international contacts and cooperation improved the policemen’s skills and increased the effectiveness of police actions.76 The Polish State Police was a co-founder of the International Criminal Police

Cooperation, the forerunner to , in 1923. Promising policemen participated in courses abroad and foreign policemen took part in training in Poland. The Ministry of

Internal Affairs decided which foreign police forces the State Police should cooperate with in the dismantling of the communist movement. Those countries included Germany,

Austria, , , and .77 Indeed, in the 1930s the police worked

74 Misiuk, “Komendanci Główni,” 53-57; Misiuk, Policja Państwowa, 24. 75 Misiuk, “Komendanci Główni,” 59-61. See also biographical entry on Maleszewski in Polski Słownik Biograficzny, vol. 19 (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy Imienia Ossolińskich Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1974), 305. 76 Litwiński, Korpus Policji, 330, 333. 77 Misiuk, Policja Państwowa, 187.

45 quite closely with their German counterparts into the Nazi period as well. The chief of

Ordnungspolizei visited Poland in 1936.

Jan Popławski suggests that those visits had less to do with cooperation between the police forces but were rather a step in preparation for future takeover of the police and its subjugation to the German occupying authorities.78 This argument seems somewhat anachronistic as the State Police cooperated with other European police institutions, e.g., the Hungarian police, whose members did internships in Poland. Nonetheless, the

Germans’ knowledge of the structure of the Polish State Police and level of familiarity with some Polish police officers made the task of re-creating the police force a little easier after the German invasion. For example, arriving German police authorities had at their disposal lists of names and addresses of the Warsaw policemen.79

The Polish State Police at the Outbreak of World War II

On August 29, 1939, the Chief of Police, General Zamorski, issued a mobilization order to the police forces throughout the entire country. On the eve of World War II, the

Polish State Police officially consisted of 876 officers, 27,942 rank-and-file policemen and 1994 contract candidates – 30,812 people in total.80

When the war broke out on September 1, 1939, the government’s initial instructions ordered police to stay put. Only the reserve troops were to be evacuated to the

East. On September 3, 1939, the State Police, among other central power offices were

78 Popławski, “Ustrój Policji Polskiej,” 57-63. 79 Marcin Przegiętka, “Hans Köllner – organizator Policji Polskiej w Generalnym Gubernatorstwie” (paper presented at the “Policja Polska „granatowa” w Generalnym Gubernatorstwie w latach 1939-1945” conference, Institute of National Remembrance, Kielce, Poland, December 6, 2016). 80 The actual numbers varied slightly: 860; 28,630; 1284; 30774 respectively. Data from July 31, 1939 quoted after Litwiński, Korpus Policji, 99.

46 issued an evacuation order. By the order of the Prime Minister Felicjan Sławoj-

Składkowski, most of the police from western and southern Poland were evacuated.

Sections of the police of the and the Warsaw garrison remained behind. The police in were cut off from the rest of the country because of the

German offensive. This group became subjugated to the Land Coastal Defence Command and acted as a military gendarmerie.81 Some of the policemen took an active part in combat until mid-September.

On September 4, 1939, Chief Zamorski ordered the return to service of all the suspended policemen and to suspend all disciplinary proceedings against policemen accused of professional transgressions.82 This order did not carry much weight since there was no way to carry it out in the chaos of the first days of the war. On September 6,

Zamorski and his chief of staff, major Juliusz Kozolubski, left Warsaw along with other central authorities. On September 10, 1939, Commander-in-Chief Marshal Edward Rydz-

Śmigły ordered the militarization of the police. The force was incorporated into the armed forces with tasks equivalent to the military gendarmerie. At this point, however, this order could not be successfully implemented.83 The Chief Command had only a reserve group from Golędzin and a Warsaw squadron of mounted police at its disposal. Communication with the majority of police units had already been broken.84

Andrzej Misiuk refutes accusations that the police authorities were completely unprepared to function in wartime. He argues that there were many laws regulating the

81 Misiuk, Historia policji, 149. 82 Robert Litwiński, Policja Państwowa w województwie lubelskim w latach 1919-1939 (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2001), 284. 83 Andrzej Misiuk, Instytucje policyjne w Polsce. Zarys dziejów od X wieku do współczesności (Szczytno: Wydział Wydawnictw i Poligrafii Wyższej Szkoły Policji, 2006), 115. 84 Misiuk, “Komendanci Główni,” 68.

47 role and tasks of the police force in case of war. The State Police were to be incorporated into the armed forces as a military security corps (wojskowy korpus bezpieczeństwa). The police were to be charged with tasks related to mobilization, civil defence, and combat of subversive and anti-state activities. The use of the police in combat was to be limited to police reserve troops and squadrons of mounted police. However, the rapid German offensive derailed these plans.85

Between the Swastika and the Red Star

When Soviet troops crossed the eastern Polish border on September 17, 1939, the

State Police and Border Protection Corps (KOP) attempted to fight and resist the Soviets despite the order of the Commander-in-Chief to the contrary. Policemen took part in the defence of and Lviv and were also active in combat in the Kowel, Łuck and

Dzisna regions. The Soviets eventually overwhelmed the withdrawing Poles and annexed the eastern part of the country. This was done in accordance with the secret additional protocol to the German-Soviet non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939, which divided

Poland, the Baltic States, and Romania into German and Soviet spheres of interest. The policemen who continued their police service were among the first victims of the Soviets and subjected to arrests and the first mass executions.86

In October-November 1939, the Soviet military ordered that Polish police officers, army and reserve officers, gendarmerie, border guards and prison guards in territories occupied by the Red Army must register with Soviet authorities. The Soviets released those who complied only to re-arrest them a few days later and place them in POW camps

85 Misiuk, Instytucje policyjne w Polsce, 113. 86 Ibid., 115-116. See also Majer, “Okupacyjne i powojenne losy,” 104-105.

48 and . There were around 12,000 policemen who found themselves in the territories occupied by the Soviets.87 According to estimates some 6,000 policemen and police clerks were interned in the eastern borderlands.88 Most were interned in the Ostaszków camp and in the spring of 1940 murdered in Tver and buried in Mednoye. Those who were imprisoned in jails and smaller camps most likely met similar fates.89 Nearly three thousands of the interned were policemen from the Police of the Silesian Voivodeship who had been retreating to the east. Many policemen, realizing they were of special interest to the Soviets, succeeded in hiding their profession and were placed in regular labour camps.

Between 2,500 and 3,000 policemen died during the campaign in September

1939; a similar number managed to escape and reach Romania (including Gen. J. Kordian

Zamorski, who was then interned in Bãile Herculane), and Hungary. Almost two thousand policemen (mostly from the northeastern regions) found shelter in and

Latvia. After the Soviet annexation of the Baltic republics in June 1940, they too were arrested by the NKVD and placed in the recently emptied camps in Ostaszków, Kozielsk and Starobielsk. Later on, some of the former policemen were able to join the Polish

Army that was being created by Gen. Władysław Anders in 1941.90 The Anders’ Army began to form in August 1941 out of Polish POWs and interned persons in the Soviet

87 Litwiński, Policja Państwowa, 287; Misiuk, Policja Państwowa, 340. 88 Andrzej Misiuk, Lista ostaszkowska. Studia i materiały (Szczytno: Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Policji, 1993), 15-16. 89 Majer, “Podstawy prawne,” 25. In April 1940 there were almost 5700 rank-and-file policemen in Ostaszków. 90 Some of the policemen spent the wartime in the internment camps. A certain number managed to flee to France and join the Polish Army; they later made their way into I Corpus of Polish Army in . Misiuk, Instytucje policyjne w Polsce, 116-118, 120-121.

49

Union after the Polish Government-in-Exile reestablished diplomatic relations with the government of the Soviet Union following the German invasion of the Soviet Union.

The Warsaw Police Remain in Service

The Warsaw police (district VI of the State Police) functioned until the capital city’s capitulation and participated in the defence of the capital. The decision for the police to remain in the city was most likely the result of an agreement between the

President of the city of Warsaw, Stefan Starzyński, and chief of the Warsaw police,

Marian Kozielewski.91 Kozielewski had been the commandant of the State Police of the

City of Warsaw since June 1934 and continued to work in this position during the siege of

Warsaw. He was also a co-organizer of the Civic Guard (Straż Obywatelska), an organization created on September 6, 1939 to cooperate with the security authorities.92

The commandant of the Civic Guard became Janusz Regulski, an industrialist. His deputy was Jan Gebethner, who served in the Warsaw Civic Guard in 1915-1916, and then in the

National Guard.93 Retired higher-ranking policemen were also active in the Civic Guard, often functioning as instructors and . This was especially true of those who had served in the same function during World War I.94

The Warsaw State Police and the field gendarmerie were a part of the Military

Security Corps and were responsible for public security.95 During the siege, the Warsaw

91 Misiuk, Instytucje policyjne w Polsce, 114. 92 Andrzej Krzysztof Kunert, Słownik biograficzny konspiracji warszawskiej 1939-1944, vol. 3 (Warsaw: Instytut Wydawniczy Pax, 1991), 98. 93 Kochanowski, Polskie organizacje, 89. 94 Janusz Regulski’s testimony on the organization and activities of the Civic Guard in Warsaw in September 1939. et al., Cywilna Obrona Warszawy we wrześniu 1939 r. Dokumenty, materiały prasowe, wspomnienia i relacje (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1964), 349. 95 A decree of Lucjan Władysław Ruszczewski, Commandant of the Garrison of the City of Warsaw, September 14, 1939. Dobroszycki et al., Cywilna Obrona Warszawy, 59.

50 police were subordinated to Starzyński and the Command of the Defence of Warsaw

(Dowództwo Obrony Warszawy). Policemen who managed to reach Warsaw from other regions also took part in the defence of the capital. For instance, Stanisław K. from Toruń had fought in the defence of Warsaw in the 4th platoon of the State Police Battalion. After the capitulation of Warsaw he served in the police until his escape back home to Toruń in

October 1939. In 1940 he was arrested and dispatched to the General Government, where he spent the rest of the war serving as a policeman in the Lublin district.96

Some 100 policemen died in the . However, neither the Warsaw police units nor the reserve police troops played a significant role in the defence of the city. According to Henryk Pawłowicz, this was not due to the small number of policemen but rather to their psychology and attitude. In his opinion they shirked their responsibilities and lacked the enthusiasm to participate in defence activities. Three chiefs of police precincts were arrested for going AWOL and sentenced to prison.97 Although generally inactive in the defence of the city, most policemen did carry out their policing duties.

The September 28, 1939 Warsaw capitulation act obliged the Warsaw police to remain in the service and de facto acknowledged legal status of the police as law and order authority. They were to enforce the law and keep the peace in the city. The German occupying authorities ordered clerks, workers of all offices and state institutions,

96 AAN, AbfPP 434/51/33, unpaginated. 97 Henryk Pawłowicz, “Komisariat Cywilny przy Dowództwie Obrony Warszawy we wrześniu 1939 r.” Najnowsze Dzieje Polski. Materiały i studia z okresu II wojny światowej 5 (1963): 173.

51 municipal, public and legal organizations as well as social and economic organizations and private enterprises to remain at their posts.98

According to the capitulation act, the Warsaw police were to retain their side arms and pistols (plus ten bullets) or rifles (with five bullets).99 A day after the capitulation, in a meeting with General , the head of the Command of the Defence of

Warsaw, and MP Mieczysław Niedziałkowski, Kozielewski and Major Bolesław Buyko were praised for the actions of the Warsaw police during the . President

Starzyński then informally ordered Kozielewski to remain in service under the condition that the use of the police would be limited to keeping law and order. Both Kozielewski and Buyko responded that they, as well as the officers and rank-and-file of the capital city police, preferred to go to the German POW camps instead of remaining in service.

Kozielewski and the officers from the police headquarters (Major Buyko, Lieutenant

Colonel Stanisław Wasilewski, and Major Studencki100) were convinced to remain in service by the argument that they might be the only Polish organization in Warsaw or even in Poland that would still have arms. They could be useful during a possible uprising or in the case of military assistance from the West. They could also play a crucial role in enabling the resistance movement to infiltrate German security forces and thus become an important element in the budding resistance against the Germans.

Using these arguments, Kozielewski was able to convince the officers at a

September 28-29 night briefing to remain in the city as an organization that would

98 President of Warsaw Stefan Starzyński’s decree regarding the implementation of the capitulation act, September 28, 1939. Dobroszycki et al., Cywilna Obrona Warszawy, 131. 99 Article 4 of Commander of the Army “Warsaw,” Gen. Juliusz Rómmel’s order, regarding the capitulation act. Ibid., 127. 100 First name unknown.

52 German orders directed against the Polish population. In this way they would act as the first resistance group. Buyko reported in his testimony that only an insignificant number of officers and rank-and-files left for POW camps or went into hiding.101 In his memoir, Zygmunt Zaremba, a leading member of the PPS and co-organizer of the

Workers Brigade for the Defence of Warsaw, also recalled that Kozielewski was advised to stay in his work as long as it was possible to do so without compromising the interests of Poland. The need to uphold the morale of the policemen was also emphasized and the possibility of favours performed for the resistance.102

On October 1, Kozielewski made himself and the first conspiratorial cells in the precincts disposable to the command of Service for Poland’s Victory (Służba Zwycięstwu

Polski). According to historian Andrzej Krzysztof Kunert, at the same time Kozielewski subordinated himself to the Central Committee of Independence Organizations

(Centralny Komitet Organizacji Niepodległościowych), through the former Chief of the

State Police, Marian Borzęcki.103

Kozielewski can therefore be considered a representative of those policemen who faced the dilemma of being loyal to the Polish state and the Government-in-Exile despite their subordination to the German occupying authorities. Marian Kozielewski was the older brother of Jan Kozielewski, who under the name of became the well- known courier to the Polish Government-in-Exile. Before Jan Karski’s first mission to the government in France in January 1940, Kozielewski asked his brother to inquire as to whether the police should swear loyalty to the Germans with regard to performing their

101 Major Buyko’s testimony quoted in Kunert, Słownik biograficzny, vol. 3, 98-99. 102 Zygmunt Zaremba, Wojna i konspiracja (: B. Swiderski, 1957), 93. 103 Kunert, Słownik biograficzny, vol. 3, 99.

53 duties. He wanted Karski to relay to the Polish government that if the police were required to swear allegiance to and the Third Reich, he would not give such an oath. The government passed on no instruction. Karski also took with him a list of trustworthy policemen and the plans to incorporate the police into the emerging underground movement.104

In his report, Karski mentioned his work with his brother Konrad (Kozielewski’s pseudonym). He noted that together they had written a report about the situation in

Poland for the Polish Government-in-Exile in Angers, which he sent with Mr.

Dawidowicz, chargé d’affairs of “one of the neighbouring countries.”105 Marian

Kozielewski held the position of the Chief of the Warsaw police until May 1940 when he was arrested with a group of Polish police officers.106 He was imprisoned at Pawiak prison until August when he was sent on the first transport to Auschwitz. One of the reasons for his arrest was a suspicion that he helped Jews acquire “Aryan“ identity cards.

Kozielewski indeed provided false papers to Jews.107 In May 1941, Kozielewski and a few other officers were released from Auschwitz. He returned to Warsaw, assumed a false identity and went into hiding.108

104 Kunert, Słownik biograficzny, vol. 3, 99-100. Andrzej Żbikowski, author of a recent biography of Jan Karski suggested that it was actually Marian Kozielewski and not Borzęcki, who appointed Karski for a mission to Paris and Angers. He points out to Karski’s report from February 1944 regarding his mission in January 1940: “My entire mission was limited to passing on materials commissioned to me by the Commandant of the Polish Police of the city of Warsaw. I was supposed to pass these materials to the Polish Government in Angers or to respective minister for country affairs.” Andrzej Żbikowski, Karski (Warsaw: Świat Książki, 2011), 57-58. 105 “Dane osobiste sprawozdawcy,” www.jankarski.org, accessed July 2014. The original document is located at the Hoover Institution Library & Archives. 106 All 69 police officers from the Warsaw district were arrested on May 7, 1940 in preparation for the war in Western and the beginning of the Aktion A-B (Ausserordenliche Befriedungsaktion, Extraordinary Pacification Operation), a campaign to eliminate Polish intellectuals and leaders. 107 Getter, “Policja Polska,” 215. 108 Kunert, Słownik biograficzny, vol. 3, 100.

54

In June 1940, the Germans replaced Kozielewski with Lieutenant Colonel

Aleksander Stanisław Reszczyński, who served as a Commandant of the Polish Police in

Warsaw until March 5, 1943, when he was assassinated by the Special Group of the

People’s Guard’s () Headquarters.109 The note left by this group in

Reszczyński’s apartment stated, “Death to the servant of the occupier 4.3.43.”110 It suggested Reszczyński was executed for collaboration with the Germans. The People’s

Guard were unaware of Reszczyński’s merits for the underground.111 Although

Reszczyński did not formally belong to any underground organization, he had been a valuable informer for the Home Army’s counterintelligence unit, in particular Bureau

993/P (Referat 993/P), a special police bureau for police intelligence, which was concerned with police matters. Its members were policemen from the Warsaw Polish

Police and Kripo.112

Franciszek August Przymusiński succeeded Reszczyński and held the position of

Commandant of the Polish Police in Warsaw until the outbreak of the Warsaw Uprising in . Przymusiński had graduated from the Städtische Polizei (city police) school in Düsseldorf and served in the German state administration since 1909. During

World War I he served in the German military and was awarded an Iron Cross.

109 Gwardia Ludowa was a conspiratorial military organization formed in January 1942 by the communist Polish Workers’ Party (Polska Partia Robotnicza, PPR). It became part of the People’s Army () after it was created in 1944. 110 “A report of an investigation in the case of the death of Lieutenant Colonel Aleksander Reszczyński,” March 29, 1943. AAN, Antyk, 228/25-1 Wojskowe Sądy Specjalne. Materiały w sprawie „Gozdawy,” Grota, Reszczyńskiego i in. 1940-1944, 136. Antyk is an acronym for Akcja Antykomunistyczna, Anti- Communist Operation, a counter- department of the Bureau of Information and Propaganda of the Home Army. Established in 1943, it was led by Tadeusz Żenczykowski, its purpose was to counter Soviet and Polish communist propaganda. 111 . Akcje zbrojne podziemnej Warszawy 1939-1944 (Warsaw: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1978), 169-170. 112 Kunert, Polski Słownik Biograficzny, vol. 31 (Wrocław Polska Akademia Nauk, 1988-1989), 125.

55

Przymusiński joined the Polish State Police in 1920. In December 1939 he reported to

Kozielewski and became a translator for the Command of the Polish Police in Warsaw. In

May 1940 Przymusiński was arrested along with Kozielewski and several other police officers; upon release he became a deputy chief of the Warsaw police for six weeks until

Reszczyński was appointed as Commandant. Przymusiński then became his deputy.

Przymusiński was a controversial figure among the police and underground organizations that viewed him as a disciplinarian and an outsider. Yet in 1942 he began to cooperate with the Department of Security and Counterintelligence of the Department II of the Home Army High Command (Wydział Bezpieczeństwa i Kontrwywiadu Oddziału II

Komendy Głównej AK), Bureau 993/P, and with the National Security Corps (Państwowy

Korpus Bezpieczeństwa, PKB) in 1943. The PKB was an underground police organization subordinated to the Department of Inner Affairs of the Government Delegate Office.113

Until 1943 Marian Kozielewski headed it. Przymusiński also extended his help to those who were endangered. After the August 1944 Warsaw Uprising Przymusiński became a

County Commandant of the Polish Police in Łowicz.114

The Return to the Police Service in the General Government

On September 28, 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union signed a Treaty of

Friendship agreeing on their respective spheres of influence, dividing up the territorial spoils and regulating trade. The demarcation line for the partition of German- and Soviet-

113 On the Underground Polish State’s plans for the police force see Waldemar Grabowski, “Polska policja w czasie II wojny światowej. Wybrane problemy,” in Policja Państwowa w Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej. Wybrane aspekty organizacji i funkcjonowania, ed. Adrian Tyszkiewicz. (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 2015), 168-191. 114 Przymusiński was arrested by the Soviet authorities upon the liberation of Łowicz and deported to the interior of the Soviet Union where he died a few months later. Kunert, Polski Słownik Biograficzny, vol. 29 (Wrocław: Polska Akademia Nauk, 1986), 214-215.

56 occupied Poland was along the ---Pisa rivers. On October 8, 1939,

Germany directly annexed former Polish territories along its eastern border: West ,

Posen, Łódź, Upper Silesia, and the former Free City of Danzig. In the “incorporated territories” there were some 10 million people, 80% of them ethnic Poles. The remainder of German-occupied Poland was established on October 12 as the Generalgouvernement für die besetzten polnischen Gebiete (the General Government for the occupied Polish territories) under a civilian general, the Nazi party lawyer . Initially the General Government with a population of 12 million consisted of four districts:

Warsaw, Cracow, Radom, and Lublin each headed by a governor. The districts were divided into Kreise (sub-districts) with a Kreishauptmann as the head of each. The six largest cities were governed by a Stadthauptmann.115 Germany occupied the remainder of

Poland when it invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941 and the Galicia district was added to the General Government.

In contrast to the areas directly annexed to Germany, in the General Government

Germans allowed some Polish institutions to continue their work under German control.

The local administration was usually in Polish hands but the occupation authorities also introduced Germans and .116 Whereas the Soviets aimed to liquidate the police as a group that could post a threat to its authority, the Germans opted to utilize them as skilled manpower.

On October 30, 1939, by order of the Higher SS and Police Leader in the General

Government SS-Obergruppenführer Friedrich Wilhelm Krüger, all policemen who served

115 Martin Winstone, The Dark Heart of Hitler’s Europe. Nazi Rule in Poland under the General Government (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2015), 44. 116 Misiuk, Instytucje policyjne, 124.

57 on September 1, 1939 and were in the territory of the General Government, were ordered to return to service by November 10, 1939, under the threat of the “most severe punishment.”117 General Governor Hans Frank’s decree of November 3, 1939 enforced this order by stating that clerks and functionaries of the former Polish state and municipal corporations who were again employed in public service were to receive remuneration as they were paid before by the state.118 The remuneration of the policemen was stipulated in this decree. On the one hand, those who were charged with fining Polish citizens for transgression, but were negligent or idle in these tasks could lose 30% of their pay. On the other hand, those who eagerly imposed fines could be awarded up to 30% of their regular salary in addition to it.119 The Germans prohibited policemen from taking on additional jobs; however, they did not strictly enforce this rule.120

On December 17, 1939, Hans Frank officially constituted the Polish police force as a communal police (in contrast to the prewar state police status) governed by the Kreis- and Stadthauptmannschaften. Some 10,000 policemen remained in the territories occupied by the Germans. Most of them returned to service under German orders. The police units were to report to mayors in cities and , and to a Kreishauptmann in counties (powiaty). The Germans reestablished the Polish police force only within the borders of the General Government.121 In the areas of the General Government inhabited

117 Aufruf des Höheren SS- und Polizeiführers im Generalgouvernement für die besetzeten polnischen Gebiete vom 30.Oktober 1939, Verordnungsblatt des Generalgouverneurs für die besetzeten polnischen Gebiete, Krakau, herausgeben von Amt des Generalgouverneurs, November 2, 1939, no. 2, p. 16. 118 Weh, Prawo Generalnego Gubernatorstwa, B-355. 119 APKr, PPPBrN, 13, p. 9. 120 Getter, “Policja Polska,” 77. 121 See Appendix A for the organization of the Polish police in Cracow and Appendix B for the organization of the Polish police in the Warsaw district.

58 mostly by the Ukrainian population and Goralen (highlanders), 122 the Germans planned on creating auxiliary police units out of these groups. In early 1940, in the southeastern counties of the General Government (Lublin and Cracow districts), the Germans created the Ukrainian Auxiliary Police. Its County Command was set up in Chełm Lubelski. The

Ukrainian policemen filled the communal posts in places where the Ukrainian populace constituted the majority. After the annexation of the Galicia District to the General

Government, the Ukrainian police were in charge of all police precincts, stations and county commands in this region.123 With the Russian offensive in 1944, the Ukrainian

Auxiliary Police of the Galicia District were evacuated to the Polish districts of the

General Government. Most of them were used to support German gendarmerie and

Schupo units. Some were used to support local Ukrainian police in ethnically mixed counties of the Cracow district.124

State Police members were incorporated into the Polish communal police if there were no “objections of a political nature” against them. The German authorities called immediately into service all policemen who reported readiness to enter into the Polish police and those assigned from the territories incorporated into the Reich. Any higher

Polish authority was prohibited.125 Some policemen were also released from POW camps and forced to join the police. To increase the number of policemen returning to service,

122 Goralen (Górale in Polish) – population of the Podhale region incorporated to the Reich. The Germans claimed Goralen were descendants from ethnic Germans. 123 Getter, “Policja Polska,” 75. 124 Hempel, Pogrobowcy klęski, 56. 125 APKr, PPPBrN, 13, p. 7.

59 families of interned policemen were allowed to submit applications requesting their release.126

The Polish police force had to answer both to their lower level Polish commanders and German police authorities. The Polish police was subordinated to the

Ordnungspolizei. On the district level, the Commandant of the Orpo headed the Polish police. The municipal police units were directly subordinated to the supervisory officer of the Polish police and local Schupo. The commanders of local gendarmerie supervised the county units of the Polish police.127 In this way, as of January 1, 1941, policemen and all other non-Germans in active service in the General Government were required to sign a declaration of obedience to the German authorities of the General Government.128

Despite German control, the Polish police force during World War II was largely a continuation of the prewar State Police with regard to its organization, personnel, and regulations.129 The police were to operate on the level of precincts (komisariaty) and police stations (posterunki). The Polish command was established only on the level of a commandant in cities and counties; municipal and district headquarters were left in place.

The Germans preserved the old police stations as Polnische Polizei-Posten. In larger cities those stations were subordinated to commandants of the and in towns and villages to the local gendarmerie platoons commandants. Orders and instructions were passed through a Verbindungsoffizier. Lieutenant colonel Roman Sztaba held this

126 AAN, Armia Krajowa (hereafter AK) 203/III-124, p. 120. 127 Misiuk, “Polska Policja,” 124. 128 Marek Mączyński, “Zasady naboru i kwalifikacji kandytatów do służby w Policji Państwowej w latach 1919-1945,” in Tyszkiewicz, Policja Państwowa, 74-75. 129 Getter, “Policja Polska,” 74.

60 role until 1944. A German Aufsichtoffizier supervised the Polish police on the county and county command level.130

In Warsaw, the Germans established the Command of the Polish Police for the

City of Warsaw (Kommando der polnischen Polizei für die Stadt Warschau) as well as the Command for the Kreis Warschau-Land. In the city of Warsaw there were four

District Commands and 27 police precincts. Additionally, to combat illegality and to enforce rules, the Polish police were put in charge of economic matters. In larger city centres some policemen were specifically designated to groups combating the black market and enforcing the rules for businesses. Its members were selected from uniformed police but they did not wear uniforms and were specially trained for the purposes of combating illegal trade.

In Warsaw and Cracow, the Germans created Industrial-Trade Precincts

(Komisariat Przemysłowo-Handlowy) based out of the Command of the Polish Police headquarters.131 The policemen working there were tasked with controls of markets, shops and artisan shops. As a part of German efforts to combat black market and illegal trade, they pursued smugglers and combated the street trade. This unit had a bad reputation, particularly in Warsaw, due to the misuse of its power.132 Second Lieutenant

Roman Leon Święcicki from the Warsaw precinct was sentenced to death and shot by an

130 Marek Getter, “Zarys organizacji policji niemieckiej w Warszawie i dystrykcie Warszawa w latach 1939-1945,” Rocznik Warszawski 9 (1965): 258. 131 Hempel, Pogrobowcy klęski, 79. 132 Getter, “Policja granatowa,” 216.

61 underground Special Court (Sąd Specjalny) on January 15, 1943 “for organizing and participating in round-ups for forced labour and for extortions.”133

Policemen were allowed arms only to the extent they were necessary to properly fulfill the tasks of the police. This meant that a policeman would be equipped with side arms (a pistol) and a rubber baton. The local German police authorities allowed only a limited amount of firearms and ammunition to be held at police stations and controlled the distribution. They were to be distributed to the Polish policemen in order to fulfill tasks requiring possession of firearms.134 The policemen were to wear their previous uniforms after having removed the Polish eagle symbol. They were allowed to replace them with emblems of cities and counties. The clerks of the Polish police who did not own a uniform were required to wear a green armband on the left arm with the words

“Polizei” and “Policja” inscribed on it. A uniformed policeman had to have a badge number clearly displayed.135

The process of recreating the force varied within the General Government. For instance, the police in Warsaw had remained intact to a large extent during the German invasion. It was quickly rebuilt and served as a model for the reconstruction of the force in the rest of occupied Poland. When Warsaw capitulated, there were some 2750 policemen remaining in the city, including 380 members of the Criminal Police. At the beginning of October 1939, Hans Köllner, major of the gendarmerie, arrived in Warsaw to supervise the reactivation of the Polish police apparatus. Köllner had been in Poland in

133 Getter, “Policja Polska,” 89. For more on the underground courts and death sentences on collaborators with Germans see chapter 4. 134 APKr, PPPBrN, 13, p. 8. In many cases those were Austrian rifles from First World War. Getter, “Zarys organizacji,” 259. Until the beginning of 1940, the police in other places than Warsaw were not allowed to carry arms. Hempel, Pogrobowcy klęski, 41. 135 APKr, PPPBrN, 13, p. 8.

62

1937 for a three-month internship and had become familiar with the structure of the

Polish State Police. He had a command of the and privately knew many police officers. In his task of recreating the force, he depended on the Warsaw police command.136

By December 1939, Polish police in the Radom, Lublin and Warsaw districts were reactivated. The number of policemen in the city of Cracow reached only half of its prewar capacity by February 1940, and in the Cracow district less than 75%. By the end of January 1940, there were close to 9,000 uniformed police in the General

Government.137 Because Cracow was the capital of the General Government, the German security and police forces were significant compared to other cities and the Polish police was not as crucial there in the beginning. The total number of Ordnungspolizei forces in the General Government was 5170 policemen and 209 officers.138

The recreated force consisted of professional prewar policemen, in particular, officers and rank-and-file functionaries; the reserve policemen were not called back into service. The service was compulsory; leaving it was considered a desertion from the front troops.139 The Germans supplemented the police with policemen deported from the territories incorporated to the Reich or those arrested in their places of residence and then transferred to the General Government.140 The Germans especially valued those

136 Hempel, Pogrobowcy klęski, 35. Until 1942 Hans Köllner was the Supervising Officer (Aufsichtoffizier) of the Polish Police. 137 Ibid., 38, 41. 138 Marek Mączyński, “Polskie formacje policyjne w stolicy Generalnego Gubernatorstwa 1939-1945,” Rocznik Krakowski, 59 (1993): 153. 139 Misiuk, Historia policji, 163. 140 Getter, “Policja granatowa,” 213.

63 policemen who had served in the German military prior to 1918 and offered them the most important jobs.141

Initially, the Germans maintained the police force’s prewar infrastructure but due to the security requirements, they eventually increased the number of police stations, often without increasing the number of policemen. For instance, by October 1, 1940 – just one year into the war – the Germans had established twelve new police stations in

Miechów county thus increasing the number to 41 posts. The personnel number remained unchanged.142 Later in the war, when attacks on Polish police stations became more common (to gain arms and ammunition) the number of staff at certain stations would decrease as Germans would move some policemen to mixed Polish-German personnel police stations.143 In the Grójec county, police stations were joined together to increase the number of policemen working at a station.144

The number of policemen also steadily increased throughout the occupation. By the end of 1940 there were 201 officers and 10,289 rank-and-file policemen. By 1944, the total number in the police force, including the candidates, reached 12,500.145 Until 1941 the Germans relied on the professional prewar police functionaries, supplemented since

1940 by those expelled from the force before the war. From mid-1941, beside those previously expelled from police, persons without any ties to the prewar force or those who were pro-German also joined the police.146 Beginning in 1941, the Germans

141 Włodzimierz Borodziej, Terror i polityka. Policja niemiecka a polski ruch oporu w GG 1939-1944 (Instytut Wydawniczy Pax: Warsaw, 1985), 26. 142 APKr, PPPBrN, 13, pp. 15-16. 143 Informacja Bieżąca, no. 7 (80), February 17, 1943. 144 Informacja Bieżąca, no. 10 (83), March 11, 1943. 145 Misiuk, “Polska Policja,” 125. 146 Mączyński, “Zasady naboru,” 77.

64 recruited volunteers who served on probationary terms. Candidates (Anwärter) were trained in a school for Polish police in Nowy Sącz that opened in October 1941.147

Vinzenz Edler von Strohe (formerly Wincent Słoma), a former Austrian gendarme and a retired major of the Polish Army gendarmerie headed the school.148 In total 3000 volunteers trained to become part of the Polish police. The courses were three to four months long; the instructors were Polish. The policemen already in service also attended

3-week-long courses for professional improvement.149 Some policemen who voluntarily joined the force did so for economic or personal gain, others wanted to ensure that they would not be sent to Germany for forced labour.

The Polish police force was an order service. Its main responsibility was upholding the rule of law, which included surveillance and combating the black market, smuggling and general criminal behaviour. Other tasks included patrolling, guarding institutions and facilities, traffic control and inspecting sanitary conditions. Additional tasks relegated to the Polish police by the German authorities included overseeing population transfers, curfew, and fire prevention.150

The German police forces in the General Government were subordinated to the

Higher Police and SS Leader in Cracow. Until the summer of 1943 it was

Obergruppenführer Friedrich Wilhelm Krüger, who was succeeded by

Obergruppenführer . They supervised all SS and police units in the

General Government and were also Plenipotentiaries of the Reich Commissioner for the

147 In 1944 the school was moved to Żegiestowo. 148 Getter, “Policja Polska,” 78. 149 Adam Hempel, “Polskie szkolnictwo policyjne podczas okupacji hitlerowskiej,” in Policyjne szkolnictwo oficerskie 1919-2000. Zarys problematyki, eds. Piotr Majer, and Zbigniew Siemak (Szczytno: Wyższa Szkoła Policji, 2000), 33. 150 Misiuk, “Polska Policja,” 125.

65

Strengthening of Germanhood.151 By November 1943, the total of police forces in the

General Government reached 34,000 men: 12,000 Ordnungspolizei, 12,000 Polish police,

1500-1800 Ukrainian policemen, 5,000 Security police (including 3,000 Poles in the

Criminal Police).152

Polish Criminal Police (Polska Policja Kryminalna, Polish Kripo)153

In October 1939, the Investigative Police (Policja Śledcza) unit was detached from the uniformed Polish police and transformed into the Criminal Police (Polnische

Kriminalpolizei). In each district of the General Government a Kriminaldirektion was created and incorporated into German Kriminaldirektion. The Germans preserved the organization and personnel of the prewar Investigative Police. The Criminal Police was subordinated to the Sicherheitspolizei. The Polish functionaries were to investigate only criminal matters concerning Polish citizens and not be used for political, ethnic and war matters. The Warsaw model for the criminal police was also used in rebuilding the criminal police force in the entire General Government. By March 1940 there were 1173

Polish Kripo policemen.154 In each precinct of the Polish police there was a

Kriminalagentur of two-three persons. Both men and women were employed in the

Polish Kripo. In contrast to the absence of uniformed Polish policemen in the Galicia

151 Borodziej, Terror i polityka, 24. 152 Ibid., 25. 153 The Polish Kripo has not been so far a subject of a separate academic publication. Adam Hempel provides a brief overview of their activities. Hempel, Pogrobowcy klęski, 124-137. Jan Grabowski discusses the role of the Polish Kripo in the Holocaust in his article on the capture of and others, “Tropiąc Emanuela Ringelbluma. Udział polskiej w ‘ostatecznym rozwiązaniu kwestii żydowskiej,’” Zagłada Żydów. Studia i materiały 10 (2014): 27-56. Dr. Paweł Kosiński from the Institute of National Remembrance in Warsaw also researches the Polish Kripo. 154 Hempel, Pogrobowcy klęski, 39-40.

66 district, the Criminal Police there had to rely on Polish functionaries.155 The simply did not have the personnel with the necessary training and experience, in particular with regard to leadership roles. Candidates for the Polish Criminal Police were trained in Rabka at the School of Security Police and Security Services for the General

Government, which opened in the spring of 1941.

On the Brink of Collaboration?

The German order to return to service meant that many policemen faced a huge moral dilemma. Should they join the service and risk accusation of collaboration with the occupier or should they avoid it but risk severe consequences? Many policemen followed the order and returned to service. Other policemen risked their freedom and defied the order. Andrzej Ch. stated in his rehabilitation application: “Despite many decrees and announcements of the German authorities, as a former policeman having a national sensibility, I did not report to service in my profession during the German occupation. I preferred hard physical work in the labour camp in Konstadt where I was forcibly deported by the German authorities in May 1941, and where I remained until the liberation of Poland from the Hitlerite invasion.”156 Others explained their return to the police service by orders of the underground movement.157 Zenon F. from Częstochowa testifed that he returned to the police force due to an order from the Polish underground organization. Until then he had made a living by smuggling food from neighbouring

155 Getter, “Policja Polska,” 80-82. 156 Andrzej Ch.’s file, AAN, AbfPP 434/96/C-4, p. 218. 157 For example, Bernard B. arrived in Warsaw at the end of 1939 and returned to service on the order of an underground organization. AAN, AbfPP 434/94/B-22, p. 119.

67 villages.158 Still, many policemen did not consider a return to service in moral terms but viewed it practically: a regular income in difficult economic times and protection from forced labour. Franciszek Banaś from Cracow who rejoined the service in 1940 felt forced to do so in order to provide for his family. He deserted from the police in

November of 1943.159 Some policemen did not report right away and were later forced to re-join. Kazimierz A. along with his family was deported from Włocławek to Łowicz in

December 1939. In June 1940 he was arrested for illegal trading and after it was established that he had been a policeman before the war, he was delivered to the police command in with the order to return to the service under the threat of to a camp.160 Service in the recreated police force seemed also attractive to some of those who left the service before the war.

Zygmunt Zaremba, a socialist politician and city of Warsaw councillor, writes about the actions of the police and other institutions that continued their work under the

German occupation: “There was no doubt that people working in those organizations embarked on a slippery and dangerous road. Especially police, exposed to daily cooperation with the Germans, had to, in a short time, encounter conflicts with the population. Here demoralization occurred the earliest, precluding Kozielewski from further acting as a chief, the police itself subjecting to boycott from society.”161

The contempt for a police force whose position in occupied Poland was naturally controversial extended to post-war assessments of their activities. The Polish State Police was formally dissolved by the PKWN decree of July 15, 1944 as a formation, whose

158 Zenon F.’s file, AAN, AbfPP 434/103/F-3, p. 298. 159 Franciszek Banaś’s file, AAN, AbfPP 434/90/B-4, p. 169. 160 Kazimierz A.’s file, AAN, AbfPP 434/89/A 1-2, pp. 235-236. 161 Zaremba, Wojna i konspiracja, 93.

68 functionaries actively collaborated with the German occupier. The Communist regime tried to show that the State Police continued its work throughout the occupation and participated in the extermination of the Polish nation.162 The sum total of the precarious positions in which the Polish police operated and the post-war trials resulted in a problematic historiography of their role and relationship with the Jewish population, their

German superiors and the general Polish population.

Jan Popławski, author of an unpublished dissertation on the structure of the Polish police notes, “The Polish Police in the General Government was an organization created by the Hitlerite occupier, and in his service.” Popławski’s work, written in 1977, reflects the official post-war assessment of the force and their actions during the war as well as in the interwar period, during which he argues that it was a “strong and efficiently working apparatus of coercion.”163 I agree with Czesław Madajczyk’s assessment, which is more nuanced; he argues that among the policemen were those who agreed to collaboration, the least of them because of political reasons.164

Conclusion

Nearly 30% of the prewar Polish State Police members returned to the service during the occupation and resumed their police duties. Much of the prewar structure was left in place but the force lost its state status and was transformed into a communal police.

To a large extent there was continuity between the prewar and wartime police force in

Poland as a result of the majority of the members of the wartime Polish police having been in the police force before the war. The prewar State Police faced problems that got

162 Misiuk, Historia policji, 157. 163 Popławski, “Ustrój Policji Polskiej,” 6. 164 Czesław Madajczyk, Polityka III Rzeszy w okupowanej Polsce, vol. 2 (Warsaw: PWN, 1970), 257.

69 carried into the period after September 1939 such as lack of credibility, regional disparities, weak morale, corruption and hostile population (as a result of their tasks involving fighting black marketeering, their presence at the Bereza Kartuska detention camp, beating up protesters, etc.) During the occupation the force was transformed into an institution that played a significant role in the German apparatus of security and terror. A lot of what the German authorities had the Polish police doing was not very different from their prewar tasks although their duties were expanded (guarding ghettos, rounding- up for forced labour, combating underground, etc.) and performed under increased pressure of serving under German orders. The Polish police became a formation where two opposing forces co-existed – German “law and order” and conspiratorial organizations.165 Many policemen followed the orders to the extent they believed would not harm the Polish population. For others, the wartime service created opportunity for personal gain, criminal activities and complicity in the persecution of fellow Polish and

Jewish citizens. In some cases, the same policemen could claim both behaviours.166

Presenting the actions of the Polish policemen in binary dimensions of good and bad does not allow for a discussion on the complexities of the policemen’s behaviour.

Serving under the German orders and often acting against the population on the one hand and working to protect the law and peace on the other hand, the policemen were caught in a constant struggle. It is very hard to draw a line as the same policemen found themselves enforcing the occupier’s rules and breaking them depending on the circumstances.

165 Describing this unique position of the Polish police caught between the German superiors and underground Bohdan Skaradziński proposes a term “dual collaboration” (kolaboracja dwustronna). Bohdan Skaradziński, “W czasach wojny na prowincji. Studium materiałów i problematyki,” Więź, no. 1 (1978) 99. 166 Stanisław Witkowski was found guilty of participating in a manhunt in the fall of 1942 but acquitted of killing Jews. He was credited with assisting Jews, which the court considered a mitigating factor. AIPN, GK 259/2.

Chapter 2

Oppression and Facilitation: The Polish Police vis-à-vis the Jewish Population in

Occupied Poland, 1939-1942

In the latter part of 1943, hidden on the so-called Aryan side, Emanuel

Ringelblum remarked on how the establishment of the had impacted

Polish-Jewish relations: “The Ghetto is formed and a new era begins in Polish-Jewish relations. In organizing the Ghetto, the Germans aimed at isolating the Jewish population completely and segregating it entirely from the Aryan population. The Ghetto was to be isolated and reduced to such a state that the Jews would have no air to breathe and would die of starvation.”1 Indeed, the Germans’ creation of ghettos in Poland began a new era in

Polish-Jewish relations. In most places, Poles and Jews were physically separated when

Jews were ordered to move into ghettos. This physical separation meant that personal and business relations between Poles and Jews either ceased or became more difficult to maintain. Many Poles welcomed the change. The Germans failed, however, to completely separate Poles and Jews. The exchange of goods continued under new conditions, and the movement of people, however dangerous, continued, albeit with difficulties, until the

Jews were deported to killing centres.

The Polish policemen played a significant role in facilitating the movement of goods and people. Polish police were the only official armed Polish organization and the only Polish formation that had a position of power in the ghetto. In many instances, ghettos became the site of encounters between their inhabitants and the men whose

1 Emanuel Ringelblum, Polish-Jewish Relations during the Second World War, eds. Joseph Kermish, and (New York: Howard Fertig, 1976), 58.

70 71 uniforms facilitated or precluded the exchange of people and goods with the “Aryan” side. The policemen interacted daily with the ghetto administration, including the Jewish police, and the ghetto inhabitants. The interplay between power hierarchies and in certain cases, personal relations, affected the nature of those interactions. The Polish policemen displayed an array of behaviours and attitudes towards the Jews from the beginning of the occupation throughout their confinement in the ghettos. Because of the Polish policemen’s position in the ghettos they facilitated or prevented the movement of products, materiel and people into and out of the ghettos. They enforced the German- imposed law and sometimes exhibited passivity if the Jews became victims of lawless behaviour. Finally, some of the policemen went beyond the call of duty and voluntarily became complicit in criminal activities against the Jews.

This chapter discusses various aspects of the Polish police’s involvement in ghettos. It underlines the dependency of the Jewish police on the Polish police who were in charge of supervising ghetto police. The ties between these two police forces went beyond the professional realm and encompassed personal interactions. I demonstrate how the responsibilities of the police with regard to the Jewish population gradually increased from securing the perimeters of ghettos to enforcing the law prohibiting Jews from leaving the ghetto under the punishment of death. I argue that by isolating Jews in ghettos, the policemen often became the link between the ghetto population and the

“Aryan” side. I outline ways in which Polish policemen interacted with Jews in ghettos such as enabling or preventing the smuggling of food and people, overseeing the Jewish police and later on, carrying out executions. For some policemen, their duties in ghettos became a source of illegal profit and increased corruption, a problem that already plagued the police in the interwar period.

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Between the Professional and the Personal: Jewish and Polish Police

The Germans ordered the establishment of the Jewish police (Ordnungsdienst or

“Order Service”) in ghettos to implement a variety of regulations, including maintaining order, guarding the internal perimeters of the ghetto, and collecting taxes on behalf of

Jewish councils. They were used to gather contributions for the Germans and were involved in some activities connected with forced labour. The Jewish police were also in charge of maintaining sanitary conditions within the ghetto.2 The Germans issued no general decree ordering the establishment of the Jewish police force; instead, the Jewish police was created at different points, often before the official establishment of a ghetto.

In some cases they evolved from policing formations created before ghettos were set up.

For instance, the (Jewish Council) in Częstochowa was ordered to set up a

Street Movement Control (Inspekcja Ruchu Ulicznego, IRU) in the spring of 1940, before the ghetto was established. The first task of the IRU was to regulate the movement of

Jews in the streets, which meant preventing them from forming crowds and ensuring they did not use central streets.

Later on, the tasks of the Jewish police included duties more closely related to policing. The IRU had to carry out the instructions of the Judenrat, the German authorities, and the Polish police. The IRU’s name was changed to Ordnungsdienst when the ghetto was established and their duties extended to those of a regular police force. In

April 1941, the Stadthauptmann issued Service Instructions for the Ordnungsdienst in the

2 Aharon Weiss, “Ha-Mishtara Ha-Yehudit ba-General Gouvernement u-ve-Shlezyat Ilit bi-Tekufat Ha- Sho’ah” (The Jewish Police in the Generalgouvernement and Upper Silesia during the Holocaust) (PhD diss., Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1973), vi. I would like to thank Lena Stern for helping me with the translation from Hebrew.

73

Jewish quarters in Częstochowa. From that point onward, the Ordnungsdienst were responsible for ensuring peace and order within the ghetto. 3

The Jewish police force was equipped and maintained by the Częstochowa

Judenrat.4 In July 1941, it was officially placed under the supervision of the Polish police. The commander of the Polish municipal police appointed two Jews to take charge of District I and II of the Jewish police force and to act as liaison between himself and the

Jewish force. The Polish police also began to train the Jewish police.5 Both police forces cooperated closely and even carried out some tasks together. For instance, the Polish police issued instructions to the Jewish police on how to combat peddling but also worked with Jewish officers to combat the problem. In the daily record sheets of the Częstochowa

Order Police a note from August [1941?] reveals that Polish and Jewish policemen, under the command of the Polish Sergeant Prauzel, carried out a street search together.6

In the Warsaw ghetto, policing formations were also established before the Jewish

Order Service was created in the fall of 1940. The ghetto police was a continuation of the

Instandhaltung der Mauern im Seuchengebiet (Maintenance of the Walls in Disease

Area), a special guard detachment that was established in mid-1940.7 The other formation was the Order Guard (Straż Porządkowa) for the Judenrat’s Labour Battalion.8 This

3 William Glicksman, “Daily Record Sheet of the Jewish Police (District I) in the Czestochowa Ghetto, 1941-1942.” Yad Vashem Studies on the European Jewish Catastrophe and Resistance 6, (1967): 331-332. 4 , The Jewish Councils in Under Nazi Occupation (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1972), 476. 5 Glicksman, “Daily Record,” 333. 6 Ibid., 342. Records of the Jewish police in Czestochowa are preserved in the Archives of the Jewish Historical Institute in Warsaw. AŻIH, Rada Starszych w Częstochowie 213/10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 19, 27, 105. 7 On building the wall see , Stanislaw Staron, and Josef Kermisz, eds., The Warsaw Diary of Adam Czerniakow (Chicago: Elephant Paperbacks, 1999), 134-140, 146, 158. 8 The Labour Battalion was created in October 1939 to supply the required daily number of compulsory workers.

74 group was responsible for escorting Jewish forced labourers to work sites. Many of its members later joined the ghetto police.9

In the Warsaw ghetto, the head of the Jewish police (Leiter des Ordnungsdienstes)

Józef Andrzej Szeryński had been a deputy of the chief of the prewar State Police in the

Lublin voivodeship and had served in the Polish Army.10 Marian Händel, the Order

Guard’s chief, eventually became Szeryński’s deputy. Gazeta Żydowska (Jewish Gazette) reported in January 1941 on the tasks and duties of the Jewish Order Service in Warsaw as determined by the chair of the Jewish Council. These duties included: preventing gatherings in the streets, regulating pedestrian and vehicular traffic, removing all hindrances to street traffic, supervising the cleanliness on the streets and sidewalks, supervising order, cleanliness and proper lighting in backyards and staircases, preventing misdemeanours and crimes, and maintaining order in buildings and public offices, especially those of the Jewish Council and its institutions.11

The Judenräte (Jewish Councils) considered the police force one of their departments. Such was the case in the Warsaw ghetto. However, as Aharon Weiss argues, despite the Jewish Council’s attempt to maintain control over the Jewish force, the police developed separatist aspirations and tendencies to overrule the Judenrat.12 According to the Organizational Rules (Organisationverschriften) of the Warsaw ghetto police,

9 Trunk, Judenrat, 477. 10 Szeryński was also an expert in invigilation of the Communist movement before the war. Misiuk, Policja Państwowa 1919-1939, 260. 11 Gazeta Żydowska, no. 1, January 3, 1941, p. 2. 12 Weiss, “Ha-Mishtara Ha-Yehudit,” iv.

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The personnel of the Order police is subordinated (a) to the Council’s

organs in the execution of their tasks and, in particular to the commission in

charge of [direct] supervision of the ghetto police, which consists of

Council members appointed by the Council chairman; (b) to the ghetto

police chiefs in all organizational and internal matters, particularly with

respect to training, discipline, service supervision, and technical matters;

and (c) the chief of the Order police in all matters pertaining to high level

and low level personnel.13

The Organizational Rules were the first “legislative act” of the Order Service. The organizational framework was later expanded and followed internal “Orders of the

Headquarters of the Order Police” (“Rozkazy Kierownictwa SP”), which were patterned after the “Orders of the Headquarters of the Polish Police.” Those were issued when the need arose – usually a few times a week, and sometimes less frequently. The Orders included all bylaws, administrative rules, human resources rules, promotions and punishments, schedule of posts and patrols, etc.14 In 1941, Józef Prusak authored a brochure titled “A Lecture on the Duties and Behaviour of an Officer of the Order

Service,” which detailed the duties of a Jewish police officer. The fact that Prusak wrote it using the instructions of the Leadership of the Order Service, “Temporary Instruction for the Polish Police,” and Polish police officer Jan Szuch’s book “What should a

13 “Organizational Rules of the Warsaw Ghetto Police Confirmed by the German District Administration on November 29, 1940”, quoted after Trunk, Judenrat, 586. 14 Trunk, Judenrat, 478.

76 policeman be like”15 demonstrates that the Polish police influenced the organization and functioning of the Warsaw ghetto police in many ways.

In the ghettos of the General Government, the Polish police had authority over the

Jewish police and in turn answered to the German police. Initially, the Jewish police were subordinate to the Germans, the Polish police and the Jewish Council. However, the

Jewish Council soon lost its influence over the Jewish police.16 The relations between the

Polish police and the Jewish Order Service in Warsaw are probably the most well known because, compared to other ghettos, there are many testimonies at our disposal, including a few written by former Jewish policemen. Those sources are valuable in assessing the role the Polish police continued to play in the Warsaw ghetto and the dependence of the

Jewish police on the Polish police. When the ghetto was established, the Jews expected that the Polish police force would leave the ghetto and the Jewish police would take over.

This took place only to some extent. The Polish police force never fully let the Warsaw ghetto or the Jewish police out of its and remained quite involved in daily matters. In the opinion of Stanisław Gombiński,17 a Warsaw ghetto policeman,

15 Aldona Podolska, Służba Porządkowa w getcie warszawskim w latach 1940-1943 (Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Fundacji “Historia Pro Futuro,” 1996), 54-55. In May of 1941 the Chief of the Jewish Council and Leadership of the Order Service issued a new Service Instruction. 16 Weiss, “Ha-Mishtara Ha-Yehudit, 71. In the case of the Warsaw ghetto it was due partly to relations between Szeryński and Czerniaków but also because Szeryński had support from outside. Stanislaw Adler, In the Warsaw Ghetto, 1940-1943: An Account of a Witness. The Memoirs of Stanislaw Adler (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1982), 110. 17 Stanisław Gombiński (Jan Mawult) – doctor of law, before the war worked as a law clerk. In the Order Service since November 1940; he performed only administrative duties. In 1941, Gombiński became the chief deputy of the Secretariat of the Order Police. He left the service during the January 1943 liquidation action and in February 1943 he escaped from the ghetto. He wrote his memoir while in hiding on the “Aryan” side. After the war Gombiński worked as an attorney. In 1949 he moved to Paris. Stanisław Gombiński (Jan Mawult), Wspomnienia policjanta z getta warszawskiego (Warsaw: Centrum Badań nad Zagładą Żydów, 2010), 9-13.

77 some Jews, at least in the beginning, considered the Polish policemen “the real police,”18 which provided and symbolized, to some extent, a connection to the Polish world.

In his memoir, Gombiński discussed in detail the subordination of the ghetto police to the Polish police. During a meeting with the head of the Judenrat Czerniaków and the Commandant of the Order Service Szeryński, the Germans announced that the

Jewish Order Service would be an auxiliary force of the Polish police and it would serve to execute the decrees of the Jewish Council. Colonel Alfred Jarke, the chief of the

Kommando der Schutzpolizei in Warsaw, also emphasized that there would not be any official contact between Ordnungspolizei and the Jewish Order Service, which was intended as an executive arm of the Jewish Council, its “main armée” on the one hand, and an auxiliary to the Polish police on the other hand.

The commandant of the Polish police had the authority to issue orders to the commandant of the ghetto police and to oversee their activities with the agreement of the chair of the Jewish Council. Jewish police took over some tasks that were traditionally in the hands of the Polish police, including public order, street traffic, and sanitation matters.

The Polish police issued orders to the Leadership of the Order Service regarding civil air defence, combat of food usury or organization of the fire department.19

Although the Polish police were supposed to handle all criminal matters, the ghetto police often preferred to deal with criminal cases themselves in an effort to protect

18 There was no precedent in pre-war Poland for Jewish police and only a very small percentage of Jews served in the interwar State Police. “The emergence of the policemen on the streets of the ghetto was benevolently accepted, with a smile of kindness. It was connected with a savour of light irony: the real policeman to every Jew was a Polish policeman, only of the P[olish] P[olice].” Gombiński, Wspomnienia policjanta, 184. 19 Ibid., 189-190.

78 the Jewish people.20 Stanisław Adler,21 also a policeman in the Warsaw ghetto reported

“The fear that grave consequences would follow if Jews were put into the general prison restrained the Jewish authorities from reporting crimes to the Polish police, even when there was no doubt as to the identity of the offender.”22 Only in 1942 the Order Service was granted permission to investigate criminal cases involving common offenses (which were to be completed by the Polish police) and against the Jewish Council and its institutions. The Order Service policemen were also allowed to make temporary arrests if there was a suspicion that the suspect would flee. Investigation records were to be submitted to the Commissioner for the Jewish residential district (Kommissar für den jüdischen Wohnbezirk.)23

Polish police had authority over the hiring and firing of Jewish policemen, personnel matters and promotions, which created opportunities for corruption and the misuse of power. A position in the Order Service was desirable for Jewish men and could often be purchased for a steep price. According to Gombiński, the control the Polish police wielded over the personnel affairs of the Order Service led to a new kind of

20 Józef Rode, a Jewish policeman in the Warsaw ghetto estimated that about 90 percent of recorded criminal cases were not passed onto the Polish police but were dealt with internally. Archiwum Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego (Archives of the Jewish Historical Institute; hereafter AŻIH), Memoirs Collections, 301/129, NN [Józef Rode], 9. In an opinion of Jerzy Lando, a survivor of the Warsaw ghetto, at the beginning the Jewish police had some respect among the ghetto population, partly because they did not hand over criminal matters to the Polish police but dealt with them on their own. Po obu stronach muru (Lublin: Noerbertinum, 2004), 94. On criminality among the Jews in Warsaw see , and Jan Grabowski, “Żydów łamiących prawo należy karać śmiercią!” „Przestępczość” Żydów w Warszawie 1939-1942 (Warsaw: Stowarzyszenie Centrum Badań nad Zagładą Żydów, 2010). 21 Stanisław Adler – attorney, in the Warsaw ghetto head of the Organizational Section of the Jewish Order Service, responsible for preparation of the “Service Instruction for Functionaries” (disciplinary regulations and service instructions for the Jewish Order Service), editing orders and preparing circulars. He never served in the front line police activities. From 1942 Adler served as a Director of the Housing Bureau. In 1943 he escaped to the “Aryan” side. Adler committed suicide after the Kielce in 1946. 22 In the Warsaw Ghetto, 258. See also “Wiadomości zebrane w rozmowie z funkcjonariuszem Służby Porządkowej,” AŻIH, ARG I 413 (Ring. I/435). More on the Jewish police in Warsaw and their relations with the Polish police and the ghetto population in , The Jews of Warsaw, 1939-1943. Ghetto, Underground, Revolt (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989). 23 Gazeta Żydowska, no. 65, June 3, 1942, p. 2.

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“fiddling” (bribery.) For instance, a letter of recommendation from a Polish officer on behalf of a Jewish applicant – in particular from an officer who had a professional connection to the ghetto – almost always guaranteed the applicant’s acceptance to the service.24 Although some candidates received recommendation letters because of their prewar acquaintance with Polish police officers, in many cases they obtained letters for a bribe. Sometimes the Polish police would “negotiate” with the candidates on their own and just order the person to be taken into the ranks of the police.25

The ghetto police also performed patrols in the precincts assigned to the Polish police in the ghetto area. The Jewish police had to submit daily reports to the Polish police and salute all Polish policemen who held the rank of sergeant or higher.26 Within the Warsaw ghetto there were initially eight Polish police precincts in the territory of the ghetto, later reduced to four, and then to three. Briefings between the Jewish Order

Service commanders and Polish district officers took place in these precincts. Jewish liaisons from the ghetto police were also assigned to each precinct.27

There is conflicting information regarding the number and locations of the Polish police precincts in the Warsaw ghetto. Throughout the existence of the ghetto the number decreased, as did the territory of the ghetto. According to historian Jan Popławski, when the Warsaw ghetto was established and the ghetto police created, the 3rd (53 Nowolipki

24 Gombiński, Wspomnienia policjanta, 191, 208. 25 Testimony of Amas Freund (?), Współczesne opowieści Hoffmana. Z cyklu opowieści na temat Służby Łapówkowej, czyli Służby Porządkowej (ARG I 648). Katarzyna Person, ed., Archiwum Ringelbluma. Konspiracyjne Archiwum Getta Warszawy. Getto warszawskie. Życie codzienne, vol. 5 (Warsaw: ŻIH DiG, 2011), 504-505. 26 Mojżesz Passenstein, “Szmugiel w getcie warszawskim,” Biuletyn Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego, no. 2 (1958): 57. 27 Podolska, Służba Porządkowa, 29, 34-35.

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St.), 4th (10 Niska St.), and 5th (4 Lubecki St.) precincts ceased to exist.28 According to

Samuel Puterman, a policeman in the Warsaw ghetto, after the strict closure of the ghetto only the 4th precinct remained inside.29 Jakub G., a Polish policeman in wartime Warsaw, testified after the war, that he served in the 4th precinct until July 1941.30 A report for the

Government Delegate mentions the 5th and 8th police stations being closed down as the deportations from the Warsaw ghetto began.31

In June 1941, the deputy chief of the Polish police, Major Przymusiński, passed on to Czerniaków an order for creating a Central Arrest (a jail) for the Jewish quarter

(Zentralarrest für den jüdischen Wohnbezirk). In his diary Czerniaków noted that the

Judenrat had established a Jewish detention facility for 100-150 arrestees after ten Polish policemen in the 7th precinct had contracted . The implication was that Jewish detainees had infected them.32 The driving force behind the facility was the fact that the majority of detainees in Warsaw jails were Jews caught outside of the ghetto. Many of them were ill and had to be escorted by the Polish police to the ghetto hospitals. Some of them managed to escape during the transport. This problem was to be solved by transferring the care of the Jewish inmates to the ghetto administration.

The jail was intended for those guilty of crimes committed in the ghetto such as fraud, theft, beating, and robbery. However, persons apprehended for illegally leaving the ghetto and smuggling were also detained there. Those held in the Central Arrest were

28 Jan Popławski, “Ustrój Policji Polskiej,” 274. 29 Memoir of Samuel Puterman (policeman of the Order Service in the Warsaw ghetto), AŻIH, 302/27, 48. 30 After that Jakub G. worked in the 7th precinct (56 Krochmalna St.) until November 1942, and afterwards in the 8th precinct (52 Śliska St.). AAN, AbfPP 434/103 G-5, 144v-145. 31 AAN, Delegatura Rządu na 1940-1945 (hereafter DR) 202/II-35, Report no. 2 from November 15, for the period of July 15 to September 15, 1942, p. 11. 32 The detention facility on 22 Gęsia St. was established a few days later. Hilberg, The Warsaw Diary of Adam Czerniakow, 246-247. For reports on the “disease situation” in the 7th precinct see APW, Der Stadthauptmannschaft Warschau 1939-1945, 17, pp. 11-13.

81 subjects of the German Sondergericht.33 At a briefing of the heads of the Industrial-Trade

Precincts in July 1942, a decision was made that youth up to the age of 14 caught smuggling would be sent to a collection point (punkt etapowy) on Stawki Street; adults would be taken to the jail on Gęsia St.34

The Jewish police were also subordinate to the Polish police in the smaller ghettos throughout the General Government. In November 1940, in Chmielnik Kielecki, representatives of the Polish police held a conference with a platoon of the Jewish Militia in the building of the Jewish Council, in which the representative of the local Polish police station explained the duties of the auxiliary police.35 In Częstochowa, the commandant of the Ordnungsdienst was a Polish police major and the commandants of the ghetto police 1st and 2nd precincts were Polish sergeants. The Polish commandant nominated the individuals who were to act as liaisons between the Polish and Jewish police. In addition, the Polish police force was in charge of the more serious administrative and criminal cases. Polish policemen were also present in the ghetto patrolling and making arrests.36 In the Cracow ghetto there was one Polish police station with four guardhouses.37

The Importance of Pre-War Relationships

Pre-war personal and professional ties also influenced relations between the Polish and Jewish police force. The head of the Jewish Police in the Warsaw ghetto Józef

33 The capacity of the Central Arrest was increased to 500-600 persons but very soon it held almost three times that many people. Podolska, Służba Porządkowa, 40-41. The Polish police had direct control over the prison. Weiss, “Ha-Mishtara Ha-Yehudit,” 71. 34 Getter, „Policja granatowa,” 216. 35 Gazeta Żydowska, no. 38, 29 Nov 1940, p. 4. 36 Trunk, Judenrat, 486. 37 Marek Mączyński, „Polskie formacje policyjne w stolicy Generalnego Gubernatorstwa 1939-1945,” Rocznik Krakowski, 59 (1993): 155.

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Szeryński’s esteemed position in the prewar police force helped him secure the position of chief of the Ordnungsdienst. In his memoir, policeman Stanisław Adler accused

Szeryński of subordinating the Jewish police to the Polish police in the hope that he would receive a position and promotion to the rank of colonel after the war. He did however admit that “the attitude of the Order Service toward the Polish police was based on something more than bribery and private interest. Since the Polish police represented the Polish element in our area, the intention was to maintain goodwill and a friendly understanding with them, while preserving the official relationship with the Germans.” In

Adler’s opinion, many Jews considered the Polish police a “less dangerous force” that could serve as a buffer between the Sicherheitspolizei and the Jewish Order Service.38

Szeryński’s appointment to chief of the Order Service could indeed be seen as an attempt to maintain a connection with the Polish population. According to Gombiński, Szeryński consulted with two colonels of the Polish police about whether he should accept the position and that they advised him to do so.39 Gombiński shared Adler’s opinion that

Szeryński aimed to emphasize the dependence and subordination of the Jewish police to the Polish police.40

Other individuals who became members of the Jewish Order Service had also been involved in the prewar State Police. Rafał Lederman,41 a lawyer who had lectured on law in the police school, later became one of the creators of the Work Rules for the

38 Adler, In the Warsaw Ghetto, 61-62. 39 Gombiński, Wspomnienia policjanta, 156-157. 40 Ibid., 189. 41 Lederman was a former Polish army officer, assistant prosecutor, and a lecturer at the police school for officers in Piotrków. Adler recalls that Lederman was accepted to the Jewish police only after his third application with six references from high-ranking officers in the Polish police. He was strongly supported by Colonel Wróblewski of the Polish police who had ties with the Jewish Order Service Headquarters. Adler, In the Warsaw Ghetto, 21.

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Jewish police.42 Seweryn Zylbersztajn, a close associate of Szeryński and former

Superintendent of the State Police, became Chief of Inspection in the Order Service.43 A former sergeant of the State Police and a convert to Catholicism Józef Prusak became a member of the Leadership of the Reserve of the Order Service. Prusak was the author of the aforementioned brochure on the duties of Jewish policemen. He also held a series of lectures when the force was first created.44

Beside the official contacts, the Polish policemen in Warsaw also maintained private contacts with the Jewish policemen and participated in the social life of the ghetto police, attending their parties or meeting in restaurants.45 In November 1941, for instance, members of the Polish police attended a lavish party given by the ghetto police.46

Participation in the celebration was also assumed to be the reason for the transfer of captain Karol Moniak from the Command of the Polish Police in Warsaw, where, as the head of Department I, he was in charge of the Jewish Order Police, to the chief of the 15th precinct.47 The transfer was ordered by Lieutenant Colonel Petsch, supervisor of the

Polish police.48

42 Another example is Cukier, an engineer and former officer in the State Police. He was in charge of the registration of deeds and the legal documentation of non-Christians in one of the district offices of the State Police. Adler, In the Warsaw Ghetto, 30. 43 Ibid., 24. 44 A testimony of a Jewish policeman, Mr. G., collected after May 2, 1942 - “Wiadomości zebrane w rozmowie z funkcjonariuszem Służby Porządkowej,” Archiwum Ringelbluma, 515. 45 Cf. Adler, In the Warsaw Ghetto, 95-96: “The social relations between Szeryński and the Command, and between the Jewish Regional heads and the Polish Commissariats were “convivial.” These took the form of continual drinking bouts organized at the expense of various funds belonging to the Order Service.” 46 The event was discussed in preserved testimonies of the Jewish policemen. According to Adler, the drinking party with the Polish police took place at the Sztuka restaurant at Leszno Street to celebrate the first anniversary of the Jewish Order Service. The cost reached 8,700 zlotys from the fund designated for the payment to the policemen. Adler, In the Warsaw Ghetto, 96. 47 Until then Moniak was the head of the Department I of the Command of the Polish Police, which was in charge of the Order Service. Gombiński, Wspomnienia policjanta, 191. 48 “Note on Captain Karol Moniak, Head of the 15th Precinct.” AIPN BU 1572/2355, p. 46.

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Enforcing the Occupier’s Rules

The role of the Polish police in the ghettos depended on the current policies of the

German occupiers toward the Jews of the General Government. Until the beginning of

1941, the police had a minimal role with regard to German policies. They oversaw the ghetto police forces and dealt with criminal matters. When the Jews were forced to wear an armband with the , the Polish police were in charge of implementing this decree.49 For example, beginning in January 1940, Polish police stations and

Schutzpolizei in Cracow began to report the cases of Jews fined by Polish and German police for not wearing an armband, listing how many Jews were apprehended for not wearing it.50 Reports recorded initial fines in Cracow for not wearing the armbands, which varied from 3 to 10 zloty. In January 1941, all Jews fined for not wearing the armband were fined by the same policeman, Roman B.51

Gradually, the tasks of the Polish police increased, as they were in charge of controlling whether Jews had permission to leave the Jewish quarter and then of securing the borders of the ghettos.52 At first, the Polish police secured the entrance gates to the ghetto; eventually they policed outer walls and fences. In Warsaw, the Ordnungspolizei and the Polish police guarded the gates from outside the ghetto while the Jewish Order

Police guarded them from inside. After the Warsaw ghetto was sealed, the Polish police continued to exercise control over the ghetto. One of the reasons for their continued

49 After the war Chaskiel Nirynberg testified that in 1940 he was arrested by Stanisław Marszał for not wearing an armband. Marszał took him to the police station and beat him. AIPN, GK 220/15, pp. 15-15v. 50 Archiwum Państwowe w Krakowie (hereafter APKr), Der Stadthauptmann der Stadt Krakau (SMKr) 346, p. 2. 51 APKr, Kommando der polnischen Polizei Krakau (KPPKr) 1939-1944, 4, p. 21. 52 Hempel, Pogrobowcy klęski, 171.

85 involvement was the possibility that they could profit from illegal trade.53 While the authority of the Polish police in the ghetto did not sit well with some of the aforementioned Jewish policemen, Jerzy Lewiński, a policeman in the ghetto and d post- war prosecutor of the Main Commission for Investigation of Hitlerite Crimes in Poland, paints a moderate picture of the role of the Polish police in the Warsaw ghetto. In his opinion, the Polish police were not very involved in the ghetto, did not interfere, and their role changed only when the deportations started.54

In Otwock, the local Polish police force was closely involved in ghetto matters.

There was also a certain degree of familiarity between Jewish and non-Jewish inhabitants of Otwock because of the small size of the town and contacts established prior to the war.

These relationships proved beneficial to some ghetto inhabitants during the liquidation of the ghetto in August 1942 as officers warned them about the looming danger (under the condition they would not share the information.) The Otwock ghetto was never hermetically sealed due to its unique topography in a resort town. Even when the ghetto was closed off in May 1941, Jews were seen outside the ghetto and at night on the local roads. From mid-July 1941, on the order of the Kreishauptmann, six Polish policemen were designated by the chief of the Otwock Polish police to monitor the ghetto perimeters daily.55 To help prevent the spread of disease, the Polish police force established a

Special Sanitary-Police Commission, headed by the municipal doctor, the chief of the police precinct, and the head of the Jewish Council.56 The Polish police also oversaw the

53 Cf. Passenstein, “Szmugiel w getcie warszawskim,” 57. 54 Jerzy Lewiński’s oral interview, YV, Survivors of the Shoah – Visual History Foundation, O.93/4903. 55 Archiwum Państwowe Miasta Stołecznego Warszawy, Oddział w Otwocku (hereafter APW), Akta miasta Otwocka 1062, p. 120; 1060, p. 119. 56 APW, Akta miasta Otwocka 1064, p. 17.

86 ghetto’s anti-epidemics office. In the Warsaw ghetto, the Polish police ensured the enforcement of the anti-aircraft defence requirements and often participated in patrols alongside the Order Service.57

The ghetto chroniclers and survivors often accused the Polish police in Warsaw of passivity or abuse of power in regard to the Jewish population. The police did not intervene during the anti-Jewish disturbances in the winter and spring of 1940.58 The outbreaks of violence by Polish mobs and youth were met with silence by the very force responsible for law and order.59 Adler accused the Polish police of a lack of interest in eradicating crime in the ghetto if the victims were Jews: “In the rare cases when a Jew complained to the commissariat of the Polish police, he exposed himself to unpleasantness, chicanery, and mockery,” he noted. “The Polish police were busy enough extorting bribes from the ghetto population, fighting smuggling, enforcing the O.P.L

[anti-aircraft defence] regulations, and executing other orders from the German authorities.”60 Some policemen also followed the Germans’ lead and confiscated furniture and other Jewish possessions.61

In the Chronicle of the Warsaw Ghetto, Ringelblum recorded many instances of abuse of power by the Polish policemen. In Cracow, the policemen did not intervene during the robbery of a Jewish pharmacy in March 1940. In January 1941, Ringelblum wrote that the Polish policemen came up with yet another source of income – they would

57 Podolska, Służba Porządkowa, 51. 58 For a comparative study of anti-Jewish disturbances in Warsaw and other European cities see Tomasz Szarota, U progu Zagłady. Zajścia antyżydowskie i pogromy w okupowanej Europie, Warszawa, Paryż, Amsterdam, Antwerpia, Kowno (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sic!, 2000). 59 Ringelblum, Polish-Jewish Relations, 51. 60 In the Warsaw Ghetto, 258. 61 Stanisław Sznapman, “Dziennik z getta,” AŻIH, 302/198, p. 28.

87 arrest Jews, even those with valid passes, and charge 10 zloty to release them. A month before the deportations started in 1942, Ringelblum reported that the Polish police were acting like robbers – they demanded money from people with carts and confiscated the goods if the Jews were unable to meet their demands. They would stop Jews near police precincts (Niska St. among others) without cause and demand ransom money. They also collected “fees” from the Jewish refugees forcibly moved into the Warsaw ghetto.62

Smuggling in the Warsaw ghetto: “Gendarme inspected, Polish policemen inspected, Jewish orderly inspected. Everyone exploited mercilessly and in whatever way they could…”63

One of the main tasks of the Polish police force was to combat illegal trade and smuggling. In order to motivate the police to perform these duties independently, the

Germans promised material rewards, including a share of the goods that had been confiscated or other financial incentives. However, since facilitating smuggling often provided the Polish police more income than the Germans offered, the majority were not motivated to prevent this activity. In addition, most of the policemen had no ideological motivation to implement the Germans’ orders. Thus they sabotaged official policies and treated smuggling as a source of income. Although many ghettos in the General

Government were closed off and often strictly monitored, they were never uniformly sealed in a manner that completely prevented trade and the passage of goods between individuals inside and outside the ghetto.

62 Emanuel Ringelblum, Kronika getta warszawskiego: wrzesień 1939–styczeń 1943 (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1983), 107, 234, 239, 393. 63 “Relacja o losie Bajli Keselberg [Kaselberg] vel Kociolek na podstawie jej własnych wspomnień.” ARG I/514, Archiwum Ringelbluma, p. 508.

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From the very beginning, German authorities considered the Polish police unreliable with regard to their ability or willingness to combat illegal trade and smuggling. Krüger, the leader of the SS and Police in Warsaw, complained in June 1940, that, “In the fight against the black market, one cannot rely on the Polish police because their functionaries are forced to partake in illegal trade due to their low income.”64 The

Germans forbade Polish policemen from taking on additional jobs, so to supplement their low income they became involved in illegal activities. In his rehabilitation application,

Eugeniusz D. admitted that he and his wife had become involved in illicit trade with the

Warsaw ghetto because his modest salary was not sufficient for “the most primitive and honest living.”65 He had been stationed in Łowicz at that time and had also facilitated the movement of people between the Łowicz and Warsaw ghettos. Another policeman from

Warsaw claimed that he had returned to service only to have easier access to the ghetto and to use his status while smuggling products on the trains. He was helping sellers during German roundups.66

The reluctance of the policemen in implementing German orders in the early stages of the ghetto’s operation created tensions between the Polish police and their

German superiors. The Polish police was known to German authorities for their negligence of duties, participation in the underground movement, and for using their position for financial gain. German authorities tried to discipline the Polish police force by issuing decrees and threatening officers with severe consequences for improper

64 Quoted after Hempel, Pogrobowcy klęski, 149. 65 Eugeniusz D.’s file, AAN, AbfPP 434/99 D-4, pp. 211, 218. Despite several testimonies testifying to Eugeniusz D.’s assistance in taking Jews out of the ghetto and hiding a Jewish woman with her daughter in his apartment, he was not rehabilitated. Possibly it was due to the fact that on the order of the underground organization he carried out an execution of an informer. 66 Jan F.’s file, AAN, AbfPP 434/101 F-1, pp. 2-2v.

89 execution or refusal of an order. Lt.-Col. Alfred Jarke of the Schupo in Warsaw repeatedly addressed the problem of the passivity of the Polish policemen working at entry roads to the city and at the walls of the Jewish quarter in Warsaw and outside its perimeters. He complained that the Polish police responsible for keeping up law and order refrained from using arms, which forced the German police to use them.

Jarke threatened the policemen with punishment by all means available to him if they continued their passive behaviour.67 An order from Jarke in January 1942 expanded the threats towards negligent Polish policemen. He requested that the officers remind rank-and-file policemen that according to Kommando der Ordnungspolizei’s decrees from August 16, 1940 and February 19, 1941 a policeman accused of neglecting his duties or participation in criminal activity (such as smuggling, bribery, and helping Jews) faced a suspension, a reduction of wages by 50% and, if necessary, his case would be forwarded to the appropriate court. A police officer’s assistance in illegal trade or helping

Jews leave the Jewish quarter could result in a death sentence. In particularly important cases, the policemen could expect a swift dispatch to a concentration camp. Jarke suggested that in districts where illegal trade, smuggling, bribery and assistance to Jews continued, officers would be held responsible for the lack of supervision and leadership.68

The need to issue such regulations is an indication that the policemen’s involvement in illegal trade was not decreasing and their superiors had to resort to harsher punishment.

The underground monitored the involvement of policemen in illegal activities and included this information in reports sent to the Government-in-Exile. A Government

67 Jarke’s ordinance of August 25, 1941. AAN, AK 203/III-110, p. 12. 68 Sicherheitspolizei’s circular from January 8, 1942 concerning negligence and corruption of the Polish policemen. AAN, AK 203/III-124, p. 25.

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Delegate’s report for the period from August 15 to November 15 1941 noted that policemen earned money through bribes, extortion, and the confiscation of products, particularly in the countryside. The report also articulated that Poles’ opinion about the

Polish police was more favourable in the countryside, especially in the Cracow district, than in Warsaw due to the fact that in Warsaw the police participated in economic terror against the Poles and guarded the ghetto.69 In the spring of 1941, the German and Polish police were used to round up people in the Warsaw ghetto for forced labour because the required quota was not met.70 Soon the Jewish police alongside the Polish force rounded- up Jews for forced labour. Those who could afford to buy themselves out did; the poor and weak, especially those in refugee centres were taken away.71

Trade and Industry Precincts (Gewerbe Kommando, in Polish Komisariat

Przemysłowo-Handlowy, KPH) responsible for fighting illegal trade and smuggling were set up by the Germans in Warsaw and Cracow. The squads attracted individuals with poor reputations, whose motivation was to exploit their position in order to gain additional income. These squads became significant in increasing corruption within the Polish police force. Most Polish policemen regarded the squads and their activities as disgraceful and actively avoided involvement. Those who continued to perform this function extorted large sums of money from individuals who tried to leave the ghetto and those involved in illegal trade and smuggling.

In mid-1942, the securing of the Warsaw ghetto was reinforced by strict control and regular patrol and guard service. The Germans created the Guard and Convoy Unit

69 AAN, DR 202/II-6, pp. 59-60. 70 Barbara Engelking and , The Warsaw Ghetto. A Guide to the Perished City (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2009), 145. 71 Ringelblum, Kronika getta warszawskiego, 272. Entry dated April 26, 1941.

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(Geleit Wachabteilung der polnischen Polizei, in Polish Oddział Wartowniczo-

Konwojowy, OWK), in February 1942 after all former groups responsible for guarding and patrolling the ghetto had been consolidated.72 It was stationed in the former police barracks on 13 Ciepła Street. This task force was considered the most corrupt unit in the

Polish police and its functionaries were known for extorting bribes and blackmailing.73

The unit also guarded the gates of the ghetto. In the fall of 1943, the underground executed Leon Skomorowski, one of the commandants of OWK, as a agent. His deputy, Lieutenant Michał Stanisław Piskozub, was also sentenced to death but avoided the execution.

German authorities often discussed police involvement in illegal trade with the commandants of the Polish police in Warsaw. One such conference took place on

December 16, 1941. Major Przymusiński reported that during talks with the Germans he constantly heard complaints about the Polish police who not only failed to properly fulfill their tasks but also enabled illegal trade by warning smugglers and showing them comfortable passages, and warning pawnbrokers before German clerks could check on them.74

German police superiors repeatedly emphasized to the Commandant of the Polish police in Warsaw, Reszczyński, that the policemen were very lax in fulfilling their duties.

On April 15 1942, the Commandant of the Ordnungspolizei Petsch warned Reszczyński that he would “arrest all officers of the Polish police in Warsaw if the Polish police continue to flout their duties and the situation does not improve.” Reszczyński admitted

72 AAN, AK 203/III-124, p. 114. Similar units were created also in Cracow, Lublin, and Radom. 73 Getter, ”Policja granatowa,” 220. See also Jan Przytulski, Wspomnienia z konspiracji i powstania warszawskiego napisane przez Jana Przytulskiego pseud. “Sławoj,” BN, Sygn. III.7940, pp. 11-13. 74 AAN, AK 203/III-123, p. 1a.

92 that the Polish policemen stationed at the ghetto had become increasingly demoralized:

“If the aforementioned facts are compared with cases, such as that of the policemen in the

Convoy and Patrol Unit who do not pick up their rationed bread, unconcerned that it would mould, or that of a drunken policeman, stopped at the ghetto border with some 700 zloty in cash – one has to conclude that the Polish policemen are not always in such bad financial situation, as it is commonly believed.”75

Former policeman Tadeusz Kur recalled that almost every policeman connected to the Warsaw ghetto, and especially to the police stations located in the ghetto, had tried to become involved in trade between the ghetto and the “Aryan” side.76 Some officers became involved by actively seizing an opportunity while others were offered a chance to participate by the smugglers. Some were simply implicated in illegal trade by chance. The policemen quickly realized what advantages their privileged situation offered – they had a pass to the ghetto, could enter it without being checked and could transport goods in and out of the ghetto. In 1942, a report from Security Corps (Korpus Bezpieczeństwa, KB), an underground organization, stated that since the ghetto had been created, the Polish police in Warsaw had become increasingly corrupt. According to the report, providing assistance to smugglers, taking people out of the ghetto and extorting money from those who escaped the ghetto were a few of “the poisonous sources of income” open to the police. This system of plunder became so well known that even the Germans started to pay attention to it and complained about it in circulars addressed to the Command of the

Polish Police in Warsaw.77

75 AAN, AK 203/III-123, p. 6. 76 Kur’s testimony quoted after Hempel, Pogrobowcy klęski, 172-173. 77 AAN, DR 202/II-35, p. 7.

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At the beginning of 1942, in an attempt to combat illegal activities, the Germans threatened that any policeman who became involved in the black market would receive the death penalty. Despite the threat of death, arrest was the most frequent punishment for transgressions. In May 1942, Franciszek D., driven by as he said “human consideration,” let a Jewish man out of the Warsaw ghetto. He had done so previously but this time he was caught by the Germans and arrested. Franciszek D. was sentenced to one year in prison and removed from service. He served some time in the jail at Daniłowiczowska St. and then in a forced labour camp in Pustkowa near Dębica. After his release, Franciszek

D. chose not to return to the service although he was offered an opportunity to do so.78

Policeman Leon J. delivered food parcels and correspondence to inmates at Gęsiówka. He was arrested and acquitted but was subsequently fired from the service in February 1942.

Upon his release Leon J. went into hiding until he was arrested again and forced to return to the service.79

There were also cases of those who were removed from service and then brought back with a note in their files indicating that they were not to be sent to duty in or near the ghetto. For example, in May 1942, Mikołaj Klimenko was punished with a 14-day arrest and detention for tolerating smuggling into the ghetto. Upon release he was transferred to another division and was not to be used in service in the Jewish quarter.80 Even a year later, in April 1943, Kazimierz Podlewski, a policeman from the 10th police precinct in

78 AAN, AbfPP 434/101 D-16, p. 231. 79 AAN, AbfPP 434/108 J-10, p. 243v. 80 APW, Komenda Policji Polskiej miasta Warszawy, 1939-1944 (hereafter KPPmW) 12, p. 422.

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Warsaw, was arrested during his service at the ghetto wall for tolerating smuggling into the ghetto and was transferred to the SD arrest.81

Franciszek Banaś, a policeman from Cracow, known under the pseudonym

“Stefan”,82 had Jewish acquaintances prior to the war. He recalled that there was not any consistent pattern with regard to the behaviour of the police towards the Jews in the

Cracow ghetto – there were some who confiscated food from Jews returning to the ghetto after work, and there were others who looked the other way. Some policemen thought it natural that they accept a bribe for letting smuggling take place. Many times “Stefan” appealed to younger policemen to help those in the ghetto by arguing that it was their national duty.83

The smuggling of goods took many forms. Smugglers quickly adapted to new restrictions and always looked for new ways of transferring goods into and out of the ghettos. Over time, smuggling became increasingly organized. In the Warsaw ghetto smuggling took place over the walls, through the gates, in underground tunnels, via the sewers, through houses that bordered with the “Aryan” side, and on streetcars.84 There were initially 22 gates in the Warsaw ghetto, although they were later reduced to 15.85

Outside the ghetto, the German gendarmerie and Polish police guarded the gates while the

Jewish police guarded them from the inside. For the Jewish police, smuggling quickly

81 AAN, AK 203/III/122, p. 11. In the records of the Command of the Polish Police in Warsaw there are lists of policemen sentenced to a few months in prison for “extortions from Jews”. APW, KPPmW 5, pp. 10, 11. 82 “Stefan’s” anonymous testimony was deposited at the Jewish Historical Institute. I was able to trace this testimony to Franciszek Banaś, a Righteous Among the Nations, based on his address provided in the testimony and some details about his service. More on Banaś in Chapter 5. 83 Testimony of “Stefan,” AŻIH, 301/2058, pp. 4-5. 84 For a detailed description of smuggling in the Warsaw ghetto see the testimony of Szapse Rotholc, a Jewish policeman and a well-known prewar boxer. AŻIH, 301/4235. 85 Podolska, Służba Porządkowa, 17. The number of the entryways to the ghetto decreased as the ghetto area was reduced.

95 became one way to make money since they did not receive steady compensation for their service.86 As one of the policemen described it at the time, “The primary and oldest source of income for the Order Service is smuggling.”87

Smuggling through the ghetto gates quickly became the most lucrative method and one that required the assistance of all the police forces guarding the ghetto. In the beginning, smuggling through the gates functioned as a business deal between the smugglers, the Jewish police, and Polish police who controlled the carts going into the ghetto and usually let them through for a fee. Soon German gendarmes began to join in.88

Smuggling through the gates was one of the most dangerous methods as both the smugglers and policemen involved were in plain sight in case of unexpected German inspection. The Polish police officially requested that at the exit points, Jewish policemen be placed 50 metres from the Polish-German posts to prevent the policemen’s contact with the gendarmes, which was necessary for successful smuggling.89 However, in most cases German policemen could not communicate with their Polish counterparts or the ghetto population and very often a Jewish policeman would be called over to facilitate communication.90 Many post-war testimonies emphasized that gendarmes preferred to deal directly with Jews and not the Polish policemen.

Despite attempts from the Command of the Polish Police to stop the smuggling, the policemen welcomed this source of additional money. Carts with livestock and larger

86 Józef Rode remarked that preventing smuggling into the ghetto by the Order Service very quickly turned into facilitating it. NN [Józef Rode], AŻIH, 301/129, p. 4. 87 “Wiadomości zebrane,” Archiwum Ringelbluma, 516. 88 Ibid., 517. 89 Passenstein, “Szmugiel w getcie warszawskim,” 57. Adler noted that the Command of the Polish Police often demanded that the sentry of the Jewish Order Police should be located at least 50 metres from the gates. Adler, In the Warsaw Ghetto, 46. 90 Gombiński, Wspomnienia policjanta, 191.

96 items were smuggled through the gates. Carts with illegal goods were directed to a Polish policeman who would quickly let the cart through. The legal carts went to German gendarmes for control and the Jewish policemen tried to slow down the process in order to distract the gendarmes from the illegal carts being let through by the Polish police.91

The other popular way of smuggling was via the tramways that ran through the

Warsaw ghetto. When the ghetto was established, some tramways were still allowed to use the ghetto as their transit corridor. They could not stop within the limits of the ghetto and no one was allowed to get on or off. This rule was first reinforced by the tram driver and ticket inspector and later on by a person from the Traffic Department of the

Municipal Transport Works, and finally by a Polish policeman or even a German gendarme.92 Despite this rule, Polish smugglers would throw sacks of food out of moving tramways to their Jewish partners waiting on the sidewalks. Often the Polish police escort would interrupt the exchange but sometimes it would be successful because just one policeman was guarding the tram or a bribed policeman would facilitate the transaction.93

Tadeusz Buza gave the following description of tramway smuggling. Buza was a ticket collector and member of the underground resistance within the tram company. A leftist tram driver Antek contacted him with instructions to create a brigade of trusted tram workers. He introduced a man to Buza,

91 Passenstein, “Szmugiel w getcie warszawskim,” 51. 92 Dariusz Walczak, Daniel Nalążek, and Bartłomiej Maciejewski, Tramwajem przez piekło czyli komunikacja miejska na terenie Dzielnicy Żydowskiej w Warszawie (1940-1942). Tram Through Hell. Public Transport in the Jewish District in Warsaw (1940-1942) (: Eurosprinter, 2013), 28. 93 Tramwajem przez piekło, p. 49. Cf. Passentein, “Szmugiel w getcie warszawskim,” 54. As Frajnd testified in his post-war account, the smuggling in tramways was possible because both a policeman and the tramway driver “had to make a living.” Testimony of Frajnd, AŻIH, 301/4651, notebook 2, p. 5.

97

As it turned out he was a Jew, who would load different sacks underneath

the tram benches along with other people on the Warszawa Wschodnia

railway station, then they would create a big crowd, many people got on

and before the tram entered the Ghetto this crowd would generally be a bit

smaller. In the Ghetto itself they had to resort to various tricks while

unloading the sacks. The Jews would smuggle goods in trams under the

benches.

Just before the tram entered the ghetto, a Polish and German policeman would get on the tram to prevent anyone leaving or entering it while in the ghetto. Frequently, they had already been paid by the smugglers to turn a blind eye on smuggling just about to take place:

A Polish police officer and a German military policeman would usually get

on the tram on the border of the ghetto. They had often been bribed already

and then the sacks would be unloaded from the tram in a place that had

already been selected. If they were not bribed though then at some point a

bait sack would be thrown out of a window or sometimes from the platform

not manned by a military policeman or police officer, to the right hand side.

Next they would wait for the reaction of the escorting officers – if they

ordered the tramcar to be stopped and rushed towards the sack, then more

sacks would be thrown to the left, where they would be caught and hidden

immediately by people who waited for them.

98

Beside the Polish and German policemen, a successful smuggling operation required the involvement of the tram drivers:

The tram drivers cooperated with Jews and Poles who were smuggling

goods into the ghetto. Sacks of goods would be packed underneath the

benches outside the ghetto, and inside the ghetto they would most often be

thrown out in a place that was arranged earlier. The tram driver knew the

entire plan, he had to pay attention to signs given to him from individual

gates, or even some residential or display windows. Depending on the

situation they would stop the tram abruptly (sometimes so that the escorting

officers would fall down) or would extend the moment of stopping, slowing

down gently. Trams loaded with goods took to the streets of the ghetto

sometimes made two or three journeys per day, sometimes once or twice a

week.”94

When the tramways passing through the ghetto slowed down while turning some corner, Jews wearing no armband would get on board. The tram controllers took 5-10 zlotys fee per person. A young girl named Bajla, who used this way of getting to the

“Aryan” side, would board the tramway on the corner of Bonifraterska and

Franciszkańska streets alongside other Jews and children who planned on begging on the

“Aryan” side. She recalled that the controllers usually treated the children with kindness and did not take any payment from them. However, bands of blackmailers soon started to

94 Testimony of Tadeusz Buza (deposited at the Jewish Historical Institute), quoted after Tramwajem przez piekło, 49-50. (Translation corrected).

99 extort money from “illegal” passengers threatening them with denunciation. Most of the blackmailers were young people in school uniforms but Polish policemen and plain- clothes agents were among the most ruthless of these individuals. Later, when Bejla’s smuggling business was going better, she began to return to the ghetto through a gate instead of the tramway. She would show a Polish policeman a booklet (to pull the wool over the gendarme’s eyes, pretending it was a pass) and inside it she hid a 10 zloty banknote. The policeman would take the money, return the booklet and let her back into the ghetto.95 Eventually she was arrested when an incorruptible Polish policeman apprehended her on the “Aryan” side and delivered her to a Polish police precinct; from there she was placed in the Gęsiówka jail.

Smuggling also took place through holes in the ghetto walls. Compared to the wholesale smuggling that went through the gates, the goods smuggled through the walls were mostly sacks with flour or grain. In addition, individuals escaping to the “Aryan” side (and sometimes Poles trying to get into the ghetto) passed through holes in the walls.

The “fees” paid to Polish and Jewish policemen for passage through the walls were also much lower (5-10 zlotys) compared to those paid at the gates.96 The price depended on the level of danger involved. Jan Kostański, a Polish teenager with ties to the Warsaw ghetto, used to bribe Polish policemen to get to the ghetto through the wall to visit his friends and to smuggle in food. He remembered that in the first year of the ghetto’s existence, when one risked a fine, arrest or labour camp – but not death – for illegal entry

95 Testimony of Bajla Keselberg, Archiwum Ringelbluma, 508-509. Cf. Passenstein, “Szmugiel w getcie warszawskim,” 59-60. 96 A fee for a wagon was on average 400 zloty: two Polish policemen received 100 zlotys, gendarme - 100 zlotys, the “fiddler” would keep 115 zlotys and pay 85 to the Jewish policemen (usually eight of them). “Wiadomości zebrane,” Archiwum Ringelbluma, 518-519.

100 into the ghetto, the police did not take a lot of money.97 Adler recalled that in case of the threat of inspection and confiscation of goods it was quite easy to bribe a Polish policeman who “could often be counted on to succumb to temptation; usually a bribe would make him more agreeable. Confiscation of goods was rare.”98 The Polish policemen, municipal workers such as gas and electricity account collectors, and any other persons who had passes to the ghetto participated in the black market exchange of gold, currency and valuables.99

Despite the fact that many policemen did facilitate the smuggling, there were also those who took their job seriously and worked to combat smuggling. It is very likely that the same people exhibited those opposite behaviours depending on circumstances.100

Frequently the policemen focused on women and children who were an easier target and who could not provide them with the same bribes as the organized smugglers did.101 The

Polish police, along with the Germans, would apprehend children on the “Aryan” side and place them in the Gęsiówka jail.102 Many testimonies describe the Polish policemen’s abuse of children who were trying to provide food for their families. Adler recalled,

97 Henryk Grynberg, and Jan Kostański, Szmuglerzy (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Książkowe Twój Styl, 2001), 18. See also Jan Kostański’s interviews for the Jewish Holocaust Center in Melbourne. YV, O.94/472, O.93/27292. 98 Adler, In the Warsaw Ghetto, 44. 99 Ringelblum, Polish-Jewish Relations, 77. 100 Some witnesses accused Wincenty Krasocki of preventing illegal entry into the Warsaw ghetto, beating smugglers and extorting money, while others credited him with assistance or looking the other way. AIPN, GK 317/470, pp. 4, 58, 62, 72-77. See also the case of Franciszek Kaczmarek, APW, SOW 4094. 101 Jan Kostański speaks on brutality against children in his interview for the Jewish Holocaust Center in Melbourne. YV, O.94, 509. 102 “The Germans, with the help of the Blue Police and native anti-Semites, fought the swarms of Jewish children on the Aryan side. Every day they would drive them en masse to the Jewish gaol at Gesia Street.” Ringelblum, Polish-Jewish Relations, 149.

101

Many times I saw members of the Polish Police tormenting juvenile

smugglers in the coldest and most brutal manner, beating them over the

head with clubs and twisting their arms in front of a crowd. This was a

common occurrence, but the most popular torture was forcing the child

through the barbed wire so that his whole body bled, or squeezing him

through a narrow sewer opening when it was filled with sewage.103

Emanuel Ringelblum considered Polish policemen much worse than the Germans and recorded in his diary many instances of them targeting Jewish beggars on the

“Aryan” side. In August 1941, he noted,

Recently though the [occupying] authorities undertook a strong stand

against Jewish beggars. The police gathered them, beat them and chased

them to the Jewish side. The Polish police have no mercy for women or for

children. The Polish police in general are a sad chapter in the history [of the

occupation]. After the disappearance of the “Thirteen”104 they took its

place. The Blue policemen stop carts in the street and extort ransom. They

enter the bakeries where there is more flour than allowed under quota, they

go into shops and extort large sums.105

103 Adler, In the Warsaw Ghetto, 94. 104 The so-called “Thirteen” was the Gestapo branch in the Warsaw ghetto created by Abraham Gancwajch in December 1940. Its name was derived from its address at 13 Leszno Street. The official name was the Office for the Struggle against Usury and Profiteering. 105 Ringelblum, Kronika getta warszawskiego, 300.

102

Ringelblum also acknowledged that the published information about the policemen who mercilessly beat women and children caught smuggling or begging.106 Jan Kostański was often a witness to the brutal behaviour of the policemen who took bribes from smugglers. He especially remembered a policeman by the name of Krasucki, who served at the infamous Bereza Kartuska detention camp before the war, and excelled in corruption and brutality.107

Defying German Orders

The issue of having provided assistance smuggling products and people in and out of the ghetto (paid or unpaid) often came up in the post-war rehabilitation proceedings of former policemen. Without corroborative statements from those whom a policeman had allegedly helped, however, it is often impossible to assess whether those claims were true.

In some cases the policemen were able to include survivors’ testimonies in their rehabilitation applications. Zenon F. served in the 3rd precinct in Częstochowa and was an active member of the Home Army. During the war, he had maintained contacts with Jews and helped in the delivery of carts with food into the ghetto. He claimed he did it for no payment. One of the former smugglers testified that Zenon F. had provided protection for the transportation of goods thanks to his uniform.108 Adolf B. from the 10th precinct in

Warsaw declared in his application that already before the war he protected the Jewish population and businesses during antisemitic incidents in the 1930s. During the war, when he was on duty near the Jewish quarter, he enabled the movement of individuals in

106 Ringelblum, Kronika getta warszawskiego, 301. 107 Grynberg, Szmuglerzy, 26. There is a possibility that Krasucki is identical with aforementioned Wincenty Krasocki, AIPN, GK 317/470. 108 AAN, AbfPP 434/103 F-3, 299, p. 314.

103 and out of the ghetto and assisted with smuggling. He was rehabilitated in the post-war proceedings.109 Jakub G. also had an assignment in the Warsaw ghetto and helped move people and goods in and out, passed on information to the ghetto inhabitants and often shared his food with those in need. As witnesses described, he had not provided assistance for money but rather “for the cause” and because he was a good Pole. He worked against the occupiers whenever he could.110

When in December 1941 the Germans announced that the Jews had to surrender all furs, many people decided to hide or destroy their belongings to prevent them from falling into German hands. A number of Jews either hid or sold their furs on the “Aryan” side. Polish policemen helped take the furs out of the ghetto and made a profit doing so.

Many policemen also offered to buy the furs from Jews heading to the building of the

Jewish Council.111 Wartime diarists reported the rumours about policemen being killed or arrested for illegal fur trade. Stanisław Rembek, a , teacher and underground member, wrote down in his diary at the end of December 1941, that in Warsaw many policemen and tram drivers were arrested for smuggling furs.112 Aurelia Wyleżyńska, a writer and publicist, related in her wartime diary, rumours that 50 Polish policemen were jailed at Pawiak and faced the death penalty for transferring furs out of the ghetto.113

Franciszek Wyszyński wrote about similar number of policemen arrested and several

109 AAN, AbfPP 434/93 B 14-15, p. 17. 110 AAN, AbfPP 434/103 G-5, pp. 158-159. 111 Ringelblum, Kronika getta warszawskiego, 350. Also policemen from Kripo partook in the illegal fur trade. Lt. Józef Skrzypiński was dismissed from service for his role in the hadnling of the furs. AAN, AK 203/III-124, p. 114. 112 Stanisław Rembek, Dziennik okupacyjny (Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza, 2000), 259. 113 Aurelia Wyleżyńska, Notatki Pamiętnikarskie. AAN, Dzienniki, Kroniki, Pamiętniki 231/I-1, p. 10.

104 killed.114 Some policemen hid furs for their Jewish acquaintances. A well-known case was that of Szeryński: he was arrested in May 1942 for handing over his wife’s fur for safekeeping to a Polish police officer. Czerniaków tried to intervene with Karl Brandt, the head of Kripo, on Szeryński’s behalf. In his diary Czerniaków wrote: “He [Brandt] told me that Szeryński was arrested on account of the furs which he had left for safekeeping with a Polish police officer who had also been arrested. A certain Jew who bore a grudge against the Polish officer had his hand in that.”115 Szeryński was released from jail when the deportations from the Warsaw ghetto started in July 1942.116

In addition to the official production in the workshops for German needs, a lot of goods were manufactured in the ghetto for the purposes of the Polish population. Polish police agents were among those who needed to be paid off to enable smooth work. Those workshops and trade businesses were an opportunity for the policemen to force their owners to pay “protection money.”117 Ringelblum complained that there were three times as many policemen in the 4th police precinct as there had been before the war. Both legal and illegal businesses within the limits of the 4th police district were subject to searches and extortions by the police agents who “were like a plague of locusts, stripping the

Ghetto bare.”118 Polish policemen were also involved in small-scale individual

114 Franciszek Wyszyński, Dzienniki z lat 1941-1944, eds. Jan Grabowski, and Zbigniew R. Grabowski (Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza „Mówią Wieki”, 2007), 42-43. 115 Hilberg, The Warsaw Diary of Adam Czerniakow, 349. See also wartime account of Jewish policeman Ber Warm in Michał Grynberg, ed., Words to Outlive Us. Eyewitness Accounts from the Warsaw Ghetto (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2002), 174. 116 The Germans released Szeryński to secure his help with the rounding up of Jews by the ghetto police. Szeryński survived the attempt of the Jewish underground to assassinate him and committed suicide during the January 1943 wave of deportation. 117 Passenstein, “Szmugiel w getcie warszawskim,” 57. 118 Ringelblum, Polish-Jewish Relations, 69. The increase in the number of policemen could be a result of increase in duties of the policemen and larger than before number of the inhabitants of the area.

105 smuggling: they would smuggle in small and highly priced food products in their briefcases and pockets and take out clothes and parcels out of the ghetto.119

Smuggling continued even after majority of the Warsaw ghetto inhabitants had been sent to Treblinka. After the summer of 1942, the Polish police patrolled the ghetto walls under the supervision of the German police. Ringelblum reported:

The Blue Police treated Jews passing through the exit gates with definite

hostility and brutality in order to ingratiate themselves with their German

supervisors. However, for the price of an ample bribe, the uniformed police

permitted themselves to be induced to take an active part in smuggling,

both through the exit gates and over the walls and fences. The greater part

of the bribes that made smuggling possible was swallowed up by the

uniformed police, who took sixty per cent of the whole “pool” for

themselves.120

In his Chronicle of the Warsaw Ghetto Ringelblum also noted that after the deportations, Polish policemen became the main buyers of Jewish possessions to the point where police precincts were turned into trade agencies. The policemen bought gold, diamonds and currency from the remaining ghetto inhabitants.121

Polish policemen also benefited when the ghetto borders were changed; they plundered Jewish apartments with impunity.122 Some policemen extorted money from

Jews on the “Aryan” side when the ghetto still existed. They demanded money from Jews

119 Passenstein, “Szmugiel w getcie warszawskim,” 58. 120 Ringelblum, Polish-Jewish Relations, 135. 121 Ringelblum, Kronika getta warszawskiego, 420. 122 Passenstein, “Szmugiel w getcie warszawskim,” 58.

106 who came to the Court (Sądy) building on Leszno Street.123 Until July 1942, non-Jewish

Poles were able to enter the ghetto with the help of the Polish police, who usually took 5-

10 zlotys for their assistance.124 Everything had a price in the ghetto and everything could become a source of income. In the summer of 1941, the German authorities increased the efforts to combat the typhus epidemics. The Health Department in the ghetto received new overseers (including two new Oberdesinfektoren, a disinfection specialist, and two

Polish policemen) and a commissioner to combat the epidemics. They decided to carry out disinfection of the areas considered at risk of epidemics. German gendarmes, Polish and Jewish policemen would cordon off the selected blocks of buildings and their inhabitants would be forced to leave them for the duration of the disinfection.125 To avoid disinfection and quarantine in the case of typhus – a process ghetto inhabitants dreaded – one needed to bribe a Polish policeman. After bribing a policeman ghetto inhabitants could take an infected person to the hospital and were then able to avoid the disinfection

(“parówka”).126

First Executions in the Warsaw Ghetto

The very limited discussion in the post-war years about the role of the Polish police force in the overall policy of terror in the General Government suggests that some of the policemen consciously participated in criminal activities. The most significant way the police participated in the persecution of Jews was through direct involvement in the

123 Gombiński, Wspomnienia policjanta, 42. The building of the Courts on Leszno Street was technically on the “Aryan” side. It constituted a border between the ghetto and the “Aryan” side. It became a place of meetings between Poles and Jews, smuggling and escapes to the “Aryan” side. 124 Adler, In the Warsaw Ghetto, 36. 125 AŻIH, 302/27, p. 2. 126 Ringelblum, Kronika getta warszawskiego, 309.

107 killings. Records of post-war investigations and court proceedings against former policemen provide an important source for assessing the actions of policemen in the killing processes. Other sources include the reports of Polish underground organizations that monitored the activities of the Polish police in their own districts and official documentation of the Polish and German police. In examining the specific social dynamic that accounts for certain behaviour among the Polish police, we find cases of policemen who acted on their own initiative. These independent actions included killing captured

Jews and those who had been attempting to escape.

On October 15, 1941, Hans Frank issued a decree prohibiting Jews from leaving the Jewish living quarters on the threat of death. The same penalty would apply to Poles assisting Jews who left the ghetto. Warsaw District Governor signed a similar decree on November 10 of that year. The same day, the commander of the

Ordnungspolizei in the Warsaw district issued an order to shoot all Jews, including women and children, found outside of the ghetto.127 All of these decrees, however, did not stop Jews from crossing over to the “Aryan” side. The alternative was starvation. The

Polish police apprehended many Jews on the “Aryan” side. Soon, the police were also used to carry out the executions of Polish and Jewish inmates sentenced to death by the

German Sondergericht (Special Court).128

By the end of 1941, the Polish police in Warsaw had been used at least four times to carry out executions of Poles and Jews. The first execution was the shooting of two criminals, the second was the execution of eight Jews on November 17, the third one was

127 Władysław Bartoszewski, Warszawski pierścień śmierci 1939-1944 (Warsaw: Zachodnia Agencja Prasowa, 1967), 118. 128 See Filip Wajdenfeld’s testimony, AŻIH, 301/479, p. 2.

108 the killing of a Polish butcher, followed by the second execution in the ghetto on

December 15.129 At the end of November 1941, the Sondergericht sentenced a Polish butcher to death for illegal slaughter. Polish police were charged with the execution and after a long search for an executioner, captain Ludwik Schneider, head of the Department

I of the Command of the Polish Police of the city of Warsaw and Second Lieutenant

Kołodziej, adjutant of the Command of the police district “Śródmieście” agreed to carry it out.130

On November 12, 1941, eight Jews, including six women, caught by the Polish police, were sentenced to death by the Sondergericht der Sicherheitspolizei for “an unauthorized leave from the Jewish Quarter in Warsaw.” Initially, the Germans wanted

Jewish policemen to perform the execution but Szeryński refused to issue such order. He said he would rather commit suicide. The Jewish policemen took charge of the preparation for the execution, which took place on November 17, 1941.131 On that day, the Warsaw Polish police participated for the first time in the execution of Jews sentenced to death for leaving the ghetto. The firing squad consisted of 32 policemen.132 One of them, Wiktor Załek, had volunteered for the task.

129 Note about Sergeant Korczak, AIPN BU 1572/2355, 36. 130 Note about Schneider in an underground report on the policemen in the city of Warsaw. “Policja państwowa (Granatowa) – funkcjonariusze pełniący służbę w czasie okupacji na terenie m.st. Warszawy.” AIPN BU 1572/2355, p. 20. 131 Jerzy Lewiński recalled that the role of the Jewish police was to bring the prisoners, tie them up to the poles and assist them until the last moment. AŻIH, Sądy Społeczne 313/65, the case of Jerzy Lewiński, p. 25. 132 An eyewitness account published in the Annex to reports No. 21 for the period of December 1-15, 1941. AAN, DR 202/III/8, p. 76. Dr Ludwik Hirszfeld recalled eyewitness account of judge Winderfeld from the Gęsiowka jail. According to Winderfeld, the Polish policemen hesitated to start shooting and had to be encouraged by their superior, who told them “Hold on, boys, this blood will not fall onto your conscience.” YV, TR.17 JM.3499.6, vol. 90, pp. 112-113.

109

The involvement of the Polish police in the killing and the name of the volunteer quickly became known and reported by the underground monitoring the actions of the

Polish police.133 Załek was promptly condemned in the underground press. The Polish underground also recorded the name of Second Lieutenant Franciszek Kaczmarek, adjunct of the Commandant of the District “South,” who participated in the execution.134

On the day of the execution Czerniaków wrote, “At 7.30 the execution was carried out in the prison yard. Those present were: the prosecutor, Schoen, Szeryński, Przymusiński,

[and] 32 Polish policemen. Karczmarek (?) gave the order. Szeryński was standing by.

Auerswald drove in after the execution. Lichtenbaum prepared a timber [back] wall.”135

The second execution in the ghetto took place shortly after.

Bajla Keselberg, who was at Gęsiówka during the first execution in the ghetto,

was also a witness to the second execution. On December 15, 1941, fifteen Jews were

shot. The Jewish policemen tied the Jews to the posts and the firing squad of 24

policemen shot them with machine guns.136 Present at the execution were Lieutenant

Colonel Reszczyński, Major Przymusiński, prosecutor Neumann, district representative,

133 , December 4, 1941, p. 9. 134 Kaczmarek came from Wielkopolska. In the winter of 1941 he was promoted to the rank of second lieutenant and transferred to Warsaw. The author of the underground report characterized him as “too dull” to be pulled into work for the underground case, assessing “intelligence average, personality none.” AIPN, BU 1572/2355, p. 55. Kaczmarek was tried after the war and acquitted of charges of preventing smuggling of food ad medicine to the Warsaw ghetto. His participation in the execution of the ghetto did not come up during the trial. APW, SOW 4094. 135 Hilberg, The Warsaw Diary of Adam Czerniakow, 299-300. An underground report described the execution as follows: “[The firing squad] was given rifles (some of them have blank cartridges, others bullets, no one knows what kind of bullets he has. Everyone shoots at once, it is unknown who killed and hence the conscience is clean). On the faces of some policemen sadness was visible, Col. Reszczyński spoke to them, “Boys, heads up, bear up.” AAN, DR 202/II/28, p. 67. 136 Archiwum Ringelbluma, 511. The underground reported that no one wanted to be the commander of this firing squad and that the policemen were shooting very poorly from the distance of 10 metres. AAN, DR 202/III/8, p. 8.

110 officer of gendarmerie and a few gendarmes, several civilians, the chief of the Jewish

Police with adjutant and the jail authorities. The author of the underground report related,

The execution was even worse than the previous one: the victims, badly

tied to the poles wriggled themselves and resisted, the execution was

carried out in two rounds, so a part of the condemned were waiting for the

execution of the sentence on the first round. The police shot badly, the first

time they gave two volleys, at the second execution – three. In both cases

the condemned ones had to be finished off.137

According to Władysław Bartoszewski, such executions were common in the first months of 1942. The number of people apprehended on the “Aryan” side and held at

Gęsiówka continually increased. On April 9, 1942 there were 1436 people held at the prison (751 men, 685 women), including 421 minors – even 5-8 year olds. In May 1942,

187 persons were sentenced to death for leaving the ghetto. Because of the high number of death sentences, in May of that year the Germans decided to send those convicted to the Treblinka labour camp. The first group arrived at Treblinka in June.138 In his memoir written in hiding in 1943, Ernest Stefan reflected on the executions of people who illegally left the ghetto and the shooting of the smugglers on the spot when even the death sentence was deferred for months at times:

137 AAN, DR 202/II/27, p. 32. 138 Bartoszewski, Warszawski pierścień śmierci, 120. See also a testimony of Filip Wajdenfeld, “Wspomnienie z getta,” AŻIH 301/479, p. 3.

111

A breakthrough was made. From now on the bullet starts to be the only

solution of the Jewish question, the most frequent expression of the attitude

towards the Jew; the adversary shows his hand. And when the bullet solves

this problem too meticulously and slowly, one will proceed to the murder

of hundreds of thousands through electricity and gas.139

The Command of the Polish Police did not receive well the use of Polish police in the executions. In the monthly report for November 1941, Sergeant Korczak from the

Department I of the Command of the Polish Police in Warsaw wrote about the inappropriate use of the Polish police in executions. According to a report from the underground, commandant Reszczyński refused to sign the report. Major Przymusiński agreed to personally report the Command of the Polish Police’s stand regarding the duties of the Polish police to the Direktion of the German police.140 In March 1942, Gen. Major

Gerhard Winkler, the commander of the Orpo in the General Government, decided that the Polish police would be exempted from use in special units for execution and repressive actions.141

Conclusion

The newly recreated Polish police were charged with upholding the rule of law – a job that included surveillance and combating the black market, smuggling and criminal behaviour. The Polish police force also played a role in enforcing the Germans’ anti-

139 Ernest Stefan, O wojnie wielkich Niemiec z Żydami Warszawy 1939-1943, ed. Marta Młodkowska (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 2003), 114. 140 Sergeant Korczak was in charge of writing monthly reports on the work of the Warsaw Polish Police for the German supervisor. AIPN BU 1572/2355, p. 36. 141 Mączyński, “Polskie formacje,” 157.

112

Jewish policies. The police were charged with ensuring that the Jewish populations in ghettos were isolated from the outside world. To do so, police were tasked with apprehending Jews caught outside of the ghetto and with monitoring all traffic in and out of the ghetto.

The behaviour of Polish policemen toward ghetto inhabitants varied during the war – some exploited Jews by providing assistance in return for payment. Others helped because they sympathized with the plight of the Jews. Sometimes their motives cannot be generalized or separated. Paradoxically, they could only enforce that isolation by having contact with the Jews they tried to keep within the ghetto walls. Irrespective of whether the members of the police acted out of greed or sympathy, they became instrumental in facilitating contacts between the ghettos and the “Aryan” side. These contacts included helping to procure “Aryan” documents and hiding Jewish children. Thus, the policemen exploited their positions for personal and material gain, but they also challenged and resisted German orders and used their status in benevolent ways. While some members of the police were involved in the smuggling of food and people, others acted to prevent these activities. There were also cases when the same policemen did both things. Some policemen helped enable the procurement of “Aryan” documents for Jews and provided illegal press, and perhaps more significantly, in some instances they helped to save Jews who were trying to escape from the ghetto. However, by virtue of the Polish policemen’s responsibilities and position, they often became an important connection to the outside world for inhabitants of the ghettos.

Eventually the policemen were also responsible for tracking down and arresting

Jews hiding on the “Aryan” side. In addition to the tasks imposed upon the Polish police, some policemen participated in the German actions against Jews who remained outside of

113 the ghetto. In Kielce, the Polish police sometimes secured the area of the Jewish while the SS carried out executions.142 Some policemen consciously participated in anti-Jewish actions. Many of the policemen who were involved in smuggling, after the liquidation of the ghettos found a new source of income. They became szmalcowniks extorting money and blackmailing Jews on the “Aryan” side. 143

142 Adam Massalski, and Stanisław Meducki, Kielce w latach okupacji hitlerowskiej 1939-1945 (Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1986), 63. 143 Szmalcowniks (extortionists) and blackmailers among the Polish police will be discussed in chapter 4.

Chapter 3

Liquidations of the Ghettos – Polish Police Crossing into the Holocaust

“The sentiment of the overwhelming majority of the country is antisemitic.”1

Those were the words of Stefan “Grot” Rowecki, Commander-in-Chief of the Home

Army, expressed in his November 1941 report sent to the Prime Minister-in-Exile,

Władysław Sikorski.2 Warning about the widespread anti-Jewish mood of Poles, Rowecki pointed out that the Government-in-Exile and National Council’s actions towards Jews in

Poland created a detrimental impression in the country. The German occupation amplified existing anti-Jewish sentiments and many Poles welcomed the enclosure of Jews into the ghettos and the disappearance of economic rivals.3 The politics of exclusion made many

Poles indifferent to Jewish persecution. The harsh conditions of life under German occupation contributed to the brutalization of many Poles and decreased the value of human life.

In 1942, the Polish-Jewish landscape drastically changed. Poles and Jews had already lived separately as a result of German anti-Jewish policies, but contact between the two populations did not cease completely. When Jews were still in the ghettos, some

1 AAN, AK 203/I-20, p. 286. 2 In the Addendum No. 7 [a] to Operational Report No. 54 (a part of the Plan for the General Uprising) from February 1941, a question of security organs was raised, of which a new police force would be an important part. One of the predicted tasks of the new security organs was to ensure the safety of Jews as the “anti-Jewish moods are prevalent, literally in the entire Country.” The reasons for those sentiments were explained as the effect of “constant and skillful antisemitic propaganda of the occupier” as well as Jewish behaviour towards Poles in the territories annexed by the Soviets and mass participation of Jews in the Communist movement. Kazimierz Iranek-Osmecki et al., Armia Krajowa w dokumentach 1939-1945. Vol. VI Uzupełnienia (London: Studium Polski Podziemnej, 1989), 165. 3 For a discussion on the complexity of Polish-Jewish relations during the war, see Antony Polonsky, “Beyond Condemnation, Apologetics and Apologies: On the Complexity of Polish Behavior Toward the Jews during the Second World War,” in Jonathan Frankel, ed., Studies in Contemporary Jewry XIII: The Fate of European Jews: Continuity or Contingency? (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997): 190-224.

114 115

Poles kept personal ties with their friends or acquaintances, while others smuggled food and products into the ghettos. It had been illegal to provide shelter or any assistance to

Jews for quite some time, but with the deportation of Jews to killing centres, the dynamics of Polish-Jewish relations changed yet again. Although the attitudes of the

Polish policemen’s attitudes mirrored those of the general population, the police’s position of power made them extremely dangerous to Jews, particularly when the

Germans began mass transports of ghetto inhabitants to killing centres.

In this chapter, I examine the ways in which the Polish police were involved in the facilitation of killing Jews and argue that it was at this stage that the police force clearly participated in the events of the Holocaust. The responsibilities of the Polish police widened to include guarding the perimeters of ghettos and prevent escapes, participating in round-ups and escorting Jews to trains, conducting searches for those who evaded the deportation and pillaging the property left behind by the deported Jews. In many cases the policemen participated in those activities acting on German orders; in others they acted on their own initiative.

Liquidation of the Ghettos

Between 1942 and 1944 the Germans liquidated ghettos in the General

Government. The majority of the ghetto populations were transported to killing centres, some were killed on the spot (including the infirm, ill and disabled). Young and able- bodied individuals were spared for the time being to perform forced labour. The property and possessions of the deported Jews were either confiscated by the Germans or whatever was left was taken by their Polish neighbours.

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In 1942, as the Germans began to liquidate ghettos and deport their inhabitants to killing centres, the tasks of the Polish police extended to assisting Germans in their extermination policies, starting with participation in the liquidation of ghettos.4 The

Polish police were often used to secure the perimeters of the ghetto and assure that the

Jews would not escape. In Radom, the Polish police surrounded the small ghetto along with German police and later helped the SS in forcing Jews out of their houses.5 In

Białobrzegi, the Polish police along with gendarmes, SD, and Ukrainians cordoned off the ghetto and then entered it. Two hundred Polish policemen participated in deportation actions in Częstochowa.6

The involvement of the Polish policemen in the deportations of Jews to killing centres has not been the subject of thorough research. The only monograph on the Polish police during the occupation, written by Adam Hempel, does not offer a comprehensive analysis of their participation in the Holocaust. In Hempel’s opinion, there were only individual policemen (“demoralized or declared collaborators”) who cooperated with the

Germans; the Jewish police and foreign auxiliaries were the ones who were directly involved.7 These claims are erroneous and cannot be supported by available sources such

4 The Polish Criminal police (Kripo) was also used in actions against the Polish population, including Jews and Roma. Kripo policemen were known for blackmailing and extorting money. 5 Geoffrey P. Megargee and Martin Dean, eds., The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Encyclopedia of Camps and Ghettos, 1933-1945, vol. 2, Ghettos in German-Occupied Eastern Europe, Part A. (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2012), 291. The USHMM Encyclopedia of Camps and Ghettos is a monumental publication by the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum containing entries on more than 1,150 ghettos in occupied Eastern Europe. In this volume contributors discuss various types of ghettos and present a history of each ghetto including key events, daily life of the ghetto inhabitants, responses to persecution and deportations from the ghettos. Encyclopedia entries offer information on relations with the non-Jewish population and sheds light on the involvement of local population in survival and death of the ghetto inhabitants. See also Sebastian Piątkowski, Dni życia, dni śmierci. Ludność żydowska w Radomiu w latach 1918-1950 (Warsaw: Naczelna Dyrekcja Archiwów Państwowych, 2006), 260, 262. 6 The USHMM Encyclopedia II, 200, 216. 7 Hempel, Pogrobowcy klęski, 173-174.

117 as survivor testimonies, reports of underground organizations, and post-war trial records of the former policemen.

In recent years, sources that have been previously unavailable became the subject of research, which resulted in case studies of smaller centres where Polish police involvement had been much greater than previously thought. 8 Sebastian Piątkowski specializes in the history of Jews in Radom and he authored articles exploring the activities of the Polish police in the Radom district.9 A recently published article by Ewa

Wiatr discusses participation of the Polish police in deportations from the county to the ghetto in Radomsko and killing centres based on the archival sources of

Gemeindeverband in Radomsko.10 Her findings will be discussed later in this chapter.

The role of the Polish police in the largest ghetto in the General Government was mostly limited to securing the perimeters of the ghetto, ensuring that there was no illegal movement of people in and out of the ghetto. A few days before the deportations from the

Warsaw ghetto began, the Polish police posts were set up every 30-40 metres. Then they were removed and on the night of July 21-22, these posts were replaced with auxiliary units of Lithuanians, Latvians, and Ukrainians.11 During the deportations, the 5th and 8th police stations were closed and their policemen removed. Still, some 500 policemen were

8 On assistance of the Polish police in the liquidation ghettos in the Warsaw district see Jacek Andrzej Młynarczyk, “‘Akcja Reinhard’ w gettach prowincjonalnych dystryktu warszawskiego 1942-1943,” in Prowincja noc. Życie i zagłada Żydów w dystrykcie warszawskim, eds. Barbara Engelking, Jacek Leociak, and (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN, 2007), 57-67. 9 Sebastian Piątkowski, ”Między obowiązkiem a kolaboracją. Policja granatowa w dystrykcie radomskim w latach 1939-1945,” in Z dziejów policji polskiej w latach 1919-1945, ed. Edyta Majcher-Ociesa (Kielce: Kieleckie Towarzystwo Naukowe, 2010), 163-186. 10 Ewa Wiatr, “Zdawanie Żydów – udział policjantów granatowych w wysiedlaniu Żydów na przykładzie powiatu radomszczańskiego.” Zagłada Żydów. Studia i materiały 10 (2014): 495-512. 11 Gombiński, Wspomnienia policjanta, 69-70. Nowe Drogi reported on August 21, 1942, “On July 21 the Polish Blue Police was drawn back from the ghetto gates and the duty was taken over by Germans and Lithuanian, Latvian, and Ukrainian youth.” Nowe Drogi, no. 11 (27), 4-5.

118 tasked with guarding the ghetto.12 They continued to use their position to engage in illegal activities. Szapse Rotholc, a Jewish policeman, recalls that smuggling, although reduced, continued during the deportations. He testified during his honour court hearing that while the Jewish police were busy hunting down Jews to fulfill quotas, the Polish policemen were participating in the smuggling procedure.13

A number of policemen were arrested by Germans for enabling smuggling, trading with Jews, or extortions. Antoni Kalinowski was arrested for extortion and jailed on Krochmalna 29; Jan Uszyński and Wacław Droszczyński were arrested for smuggling.14 When the situation in the ghetto stabilized somewhat, smuggling resumed in full and judging from the number of policemen caught for being involved, those guarding the ghetto resumed their profitable operations.15

One of the significant sources on life in occupied Warsaw is an underground

“Chronicle of events in Warsaw, August 1, 1942-April 30, 1944” (Kronika wydarzeń na terenie m.st. Warszawy od 1 sierpnia 1942 do 30 kwietnia 1944), deposited in the

Archives of Modern Documentation (AAN). The Chronicle is a part of a collection of the

Government Delegation’s Department of Inner Affairs. It lists crimes committed in the discussed period, accidents, actions against people suspected of underground membership, activities of the police forces, and where available, names of victims and perpetrators. As Dariusz Libionka points out, the authorship of the Chronicle remains unclear; however, at least parts of it were based on reports prepared by the Warsaw

12 AAN, DR 202/II-35 Report no. 2 from November 15, for the period of July 15 to September 15, 11; also Ibid., DR 202/II-44 (Kronika wydarzeń). See also the testimony of Jerzy Lewiński, YV, O.93/4903, tape 3. 13 The case of Szapse Rotholc, AŻIH, Sądy Społeczne 313/109, p. 236. 14 AAN, DR 202/II-44, pp. 10, 12, 22. 15 Ibid., pp. 52, 62, 78. See also: Anonymous testimony, AŻIH, 301/4774, pp. 22, 24.

119 branch of the Home Army monitoring the activities of the German and Polish police.16

The Chronicle is a very useful tool in understanding some of the activities of the Polish police and their interactions with the Jews in Warsaw. The Chronicle records the names of Polish policemen who were involved in the illegal trade with the ghetto. For example, it reported that in August 1942, the Gestapo caught Tadeusz Biernat in the ghetto and arrested him for transporting clothes. Józef Staszko was arrested for trade with Jews and

Aleksander Olak for smuggling.17

The Polish policemen were also involved in guarding the . Samuel

Puterman, a member of the Warsaw ghetto Jewish police, recalls cases of Jewish policemen trying to free their family members from deportation. He describes how it was carried out. A Jewish policeman would leave the name of a person and money to bribe gendarmes, a Polish policeman, and Ukrainians, and then a few “specialists” would organize the rescue and take dozens of people to a nearby house on 13 Dzielna Street, where they would be hidden until the next morning.18

In the Polish policemen under the command of Captain

Skomorowski replaced Šauliai and the Ukrainian guards.19 According to an order from the Schupo Command, the Polish police’s main task in the ghetto was to guard the perimeter from Poles and prevent the looting of “ownerless property.” Those who tried to

16 Dariusz Libionka, “Zapisy dotyczące Żydów w warszawskich kronikach policyjnych z lat 1942-1944,” Zagłada Żydów. Studia i materiały 10 (2014): 558-591. 17 AAN, DR 202/II-44, pp. 10, 12, 14. 18 Memoir of Samuel Puterman, AŻIH, 302/27, p. 176. 19 Šauliai (Lithuanian šaulys – riflemen) – members of Lithuania Riflemen’s Union (LRU), a volunteer paramilitary organization founded in 1919. The organization was liquidated after the Soviet annexation of Lithuania. Former members of the LRU participated in the anti-Soviet uprising of June 23, 1941 and in a pogrom on Jews in Kovno. Šauliai became members of the Lithuanian auxiliary police.

120 get in were to be shot at.20 The policemen were known to frequently have used their weapons against people trying to enter the ghetto and those attempting to leave it.21

Brought in to protect the property left in the ghetto, the Polish police reportedly participated in the looting of emptied areas of the ghetto.22

Liquidation of the Wodzisław Ghetto

In September 1942 the Germans rounded up Jews from ghettos in Wodzisław and

Szczekociny and marched them to the ghetto in Sędziszów, which was also being liquidated at that time. Once everyone was gathered in Sędziszów, the sick and elderly were shot on the spot and the remaining people were sent to the Treblinka killing centre.

In Wodzisław the Germans then established a remnant ghetto, which was dissolved in

November, when the surviving Jews were transported to the ghetto.23

Some managed to escape the deportation and hide in the area, sometimes with the help of the local population. The Rajzman family of four secured a shelter in a barn belonging to Eligiusz Stawinoga of Piotrkowice, district. After a short time,

Stawinoga changed his mind and tried to eliminate his dependents. According to the testimony of Władysław Buczek, the chief of the Polish police station in Wodzisław,

Stawinoga approached him and requested that he “dispose of” the Jews hidden on his property, for remuneration. Buczek refused and denied giving an order to kill these Jews

20 Informacja Bieżąca, no. 39 (64), October 23, 1942; AAN, DR 202/III-7, p. 174. 21 AAN, DR 202/II-44. 22 A Security Corps’ (KB) report entitled “Liquidation of the Jewish Warsaw” observed, “A dark stain on our national consciousness are cases, fortunately sparse, of cooperation with the Germans in form of looting – Warsaw and the surrounding area – of Jewish property. A real disgrace is robbery, which was perpetrated by the Blue police, who organized formal looting expeditions to the emptied ghetto.” Security Corps report for the period of July 15-November 15, 1942, AAN, DR 202/II-35, p. 14. 23 The USHMM Encyclopedia II, 345. According to Mojżesz Najman’s testimony, during the transfer of Jews from Sędziszów, the town was surrounded by the Germans, Ukrainians and Polish police. YV, M.49.E/3549, p. 3.

121 but later found out that one of the policemen from his station, Józef Machowski, in fact had killed them.24

On May 16, 1951, Machowski was executed in the Kielce prison.25 He was tried and convicted of crimes against the Polish population and for collaborating with the

German occupier. Józef Klepka, a fellow policeman from the Polish police station in

Wodzisław, was also tried in the same trial. Those two investigation cases were combined because they were closely connected. Both policemen were stationed in Wodzisław during the German occupation, and Klepka served as a deputy chief. After the war

Machowski was hiding from the justice system, but in 1950 he was recognized and arrested by a Polish militiaman, Marian Pałasz, whom Machowski apprehended for forced labour in Germany during the war.26

Machowski and Klepka were accused of participating in the killing of four Polish citizens of Jewish nationality in Piotrkowice in 1942, the aforementioned Rajzman family. Machowski was indicted on a total of four charges including participating in the murder of approximately 30 Jews in 1942, apprehending a Pole in order to have him sent

24 The case against Józef Machowski, AIPN, GK 217/208, pp. 76-76v. Buczek also testified in Józef Klepka’s investigation. He recalled that Stawinoga offered 10,000 zloty for “disposing” of the Jews. Regarding Machowski he added, that he closely collaborated with the Germans when they visited the police station and went with them to search for the Jews. AIPN, GK 217/208A (the case against Józef Klepka), pp. 9v-10. 25 The death sentence was ordered by the judge of the Court of Appeals in Kielce in September 1950 and upheld by the Supreme Court in Warsaw in March 1951. The President of the Polish Republic rejected Machowski’s pardon plea. 26 The initial investigation against Machowski was suspended in January 1950 as neither Machowski nor Stawinoga had been apprehended. AIPN, GK 217/208a (case against Józef Klepka), p. 35. Pałasz also testified as a witness for the prosecution.

122 to forced labour in Germany (in 1943), and acting against the interests of Polish and

Jewish populations by confiscating food products between 1941 and 1943.27

During the 1950 trial, Machowski never admitted to the killing of the Rajzman family. On the contrary, he claimed that he was on good terms with Mr. Rajzman, advising him to hide outside of Wodzisław and even helping him leave the ghetto. When

Stawinoga reported that he was hiding Jews and wanted to eliminate them, Machowski claimed that he intended to take them to the police station and then release them. He explained that when he arrived at Stawinoga’s with Klepka, Kaczor, the cart driver

(podwoda), and the village provost, Stanisław Osiński, there were already people there from the “organization” (meaning an underground organization) who shot the

Rajzmans.28 Klepka and Osiński contradicted Machowski’s testimony. Klepka was left at

Stawinoga’s house to ensure that the Rajzmans would not escape. He was also given an order to shoot if they tried. Klepka recalled hearing the shots but did not see the killing.

Osiński was the only witness. He testified that after Stawinoga showed Machowski the barn where the Rajzmans were hiding, Machowski shot three people who came out of the hideout – Mrs. Rajzman with two children; Mr. Rajzman was shot inside the barn.29

In the trial, Machowski was incriminated by witness depositions, including the co- accused Klepka. From depositions, there emerged a picture of a policeman who willingly went beyond the call of duty and showed initiative in persecuting local Jews during and after the liquidation of the ghetto in Wodzisław. Two of the charges against Machowski

27 Klepka was also accused of beating a Pole who was intervening on behalf of his arrested brother. Indictment against Machowski and Klepka, Court of Appeals in Kielce. AIPN, GK 217/208, pp. 3-4. Charge four (confiscating food products) had not been proven in court and Machowski was acquitted of it. 28 AIPN, GK 217/208, pp. 73, 87. 29 AIPN, GK 217/208a, p. 7v.

123 were connected to the liquidation of the ghetto and Machowski’s participation in seeking out Jews who evaded deportation.

Besides the killing of the Rajzman family, the court established Machowski’s participation, along with the German gendarmerie, in the killing of some thirty Jews at the

Jewish in September 1942. Commandant Buczek confirmed that Machowski was there by order of the German gendarmerie.30 Machowski defended himself by saying that he had been patrolling the road to Jędrzejów and protecting Jewish houses from looting, when he was coerced by beating to shoot Jews.31 He emphasized many times that he was at the execution site against his will, and he tried to avoid shooting at victims by aiming beyond them.32

The judge did not believe Machowski’s explanations that he had not aimed at victims. On the contrary, he pointed out that Machowski shot a woman who tried to escape and continued to kill Jews after the Germans left Wodzisław.33 The court suggested, per prosecution witnesses’ depositions, that there were more instances of

Machowski’s criminal activities beyond those proven in court. It was alleged that

Machowski also killed the Kleinman and Zalman families (some 12 persons) whom he led out from their hideout. Jewish witnesses testified that Machowski killed those two

30 Witness Buczek added that Machowski used to say, “The Jews should suffer rather than the Poles.” AIPN, GK 217/208, p. 76-76v. 31 Ibid., p. 87v. There are some discrepancies in Machowski’s deposition. For example, he wrongly named the site of the execution. Machowski recalled that the Germans ordered him to kill Jews on the meadow near river but that he avoided directly targeting victims. 32 The Supreme Court supported the Court of Appeals decision to recognize Machowski’s claim that he participated in the shooting of thirty Jews by the order of the German gendarmerie. However, it rejected to consider it an extenuation because of Machowski’s action when he was not acting under coercion and showed a far-reaching initiative in killing Jews. Supreme Court’s ruling, March 29, 1951. AIPN, GK 217/208, p. 123v. 33 Pałasz testified he witnessed Machowski shoot a Jewish woman who survived the execution and tried to escape after the Germans departed. AIPN, GK 217/208a, p. 57v.

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Jewish families without the presence of the Germans.34 Machowski also allegedly admitted to Buczek that he killed seven or nine persons. Moreover, the court suggested that there were at least two other families killed by Machowski.35 In justifying the verdict, the judge concluded:

Not for a moment can one believe the accused, Machowski, that when he was shooting at Jews he was shooting under coercion and above the heads of those being shot at, because in the absence of Germans the accused displayed so much of his own initiative in taking the lives of Polish citizens of Jewish nationality, that in the Court’s opinion the Germans did not have to force him to kill in their presence, and that the accused certainly shot at the unfortunate Jews being liquidated, not above them. The Court recognizes the accused Machowski as one of the bloodiest Blue policemen during the occupation, who with full conviction committed to the purpose of the actions of Hitlerite Germany, partaking in the liquidation of Jews, and distinguishing himself, [and] who killed quite a few Polish citizens of Jewish nationality. He did it with full awareness and that by doing so he was collaborating with the Germans in their criminal actions. The guilt of the accused in regards to the second charge [of the indictment] leaves no questions.36

34 AIPN, GK 217/208, pp. 47, 76, 108, 127a, 127a v. According to a letter from the Dziewięcki siblings who survived the war, Machowski was among the group of policemen from Wodzisław and Sędziszów that in February 1943 killed Zalma Szydłowski and his 17-year-old son, and then took out his wife Anna and a 7-year-old son, her sister Adela Markson and a six-year-old son from another hideout and led them to Trzciński Forest where they murdered them. AIPN, GK 217/208a, pp. 64-64v. 35 AIPN, GK 217/208, pp. 76, 88. 36 Ibid., pp. 88-88v. The Supreme Court rejected the appeal in 1951 because the type of the crimes and circumstances in which Machowski committed these crimes pointed at “outstandingly asocial” traits of Machowski’s character. (pp. 127a-127a v) The judge concluded that Machowski’s guilt was so enormous that cases of assistance to the Polish population, presented to the court, could not be considered as an extenuation. A former partisan testified that Machowski several times provided him with ammunition. Machowski admitted that he did not belong to any underground organization but sympathized with the People’s Army (Armia Ludowa, AL). (pp. 19, 73v)

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The co-accused Klepka admitted to his participation in the trip to Stawinoga’s house but not in the killing. The court established that Klepka reluctantly fulfilled his policing duties and attempted to secure release from police. In the court’s opinion, he treated Jews kindly and his participation in the killing of the Rajzman family was an exception; as the head of the patrol he acted on the orders of Machowski.37

The records of the Polish police station that incriminate Machowski and Klepka, as well as other policemen from the Wodzisław police station, were unavailable to the prosecution. In November 1942 the chief of the police station in Wodzisław reported to the district chief of the Polish police in Jędrzejów that the Polish police were used during the liquidation action in Wodzisław; furthermore, prior to the liquidation of the ghetto, they received 300 pieces of ammunition from the Gendarmerie in Jędrzejów, which he distributed to replace the used ones. The commandant of the police station in Wodzisław reported to the district chief about the usage of the ammunition by the Polish police, detailing the names of the policemen who used them.38 According to the records, on

October 5, 1942, Klepka received 20 pieces of ammunition; Machowski, 36. On October

14, 1942, Klepka received 10 additional pieces of ammunition.39 The ammunition was distributed among several police stations in the Jędrzejów district. 219 out of 300 rounds of ammunition were distributed among six policemen from the Wodzisław station.40

37 AIPN, GK 217/208, p. 88v. Machowski was sentenced to death for charges one and two and to three years in prison for arresting Pałasz, for the sum total punishment of death. For all these crimes he was also deprived forever of his rights and lost his possessions. Klepka was sentenced to five years and six months in prison and loss of rights for three years as well as forfeit of his possessions (p. 86v). He was released from prison before the time served in 1954 (p. 157). 38 AIPN, GK 652/48, vol. 1, pp. 37-38, 60-61. 39 Ibid., p. 38. 40 Władysław Buczek received 20 pieces of ammunition, Klepka 30, Ludwik Szczukocki 40, Machowski 36, Władysław Wójcikiewicz – 15, and Zdzisław Węckowski (a candidate to police) received 53 on three different dates. AIPN, GK 652/48, vol. 1, p. 38. According to Buczek’s letter to the District Chief of the

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More reports regarding ammunition used were submitted to the district chief of the Polish police and to the Gendarmerie-Zug in Jędrzejów. In December 1942 the head of the Irządze police station, Kazimierz Zieliński, disclosed that while patrolling forests in the Solce village, he encountered three men cooking food at a bonfire. During the pursuit of the men, Zieliński shot four times but missed. He reported that the men were allegedly

Jewish.41 From the analysis of the available December 1942 police reports, it is clear that the police posts in the Jędrzejów district were quite occupied with looking for Jews who escaped the deportations.

Polish policemen from Krasocin used 32 pieces of ammunition during the pursuit of Jews, while the policemen from Nawarzce reported the use of 22 bullets during the pursuit of Jews suspected of participation in a robbery against a Pole.42 The chief of the police station in Oleszno in December 1942 shot a Jew who resisted the policemen. Five shots were fired after him.43 Even from these single reports we can see that the policemen did not hesitate to use force against Jews in hiding, killing them rather than arresting and handing them over to the German gendarmerie.

Participation of the police in liquidation actions was more common than has been previously acknowledged. In some cases, underground reports provide only a brief note naming police among the executioners of the liquidations. Concerning the final deportations from Węgrów on April 30: “The German police with the help of the Blue

Polish Police in Jędrzejów from December 1, 1942, he, Klepka, Szczukocki and Węckowski used all the ammunition (71 pieces) during the most recent deportation from Wodzislaw (p. 61). 41 AIPN, GK 652/48, vol. 1, p. 63. 42 Ibid., pp. 75, 77. 43 Ibid., p. 119.

127 police liquidated the remaining Jews – 400 persons were killed, 300 deported to

Treblinka.”44 Shraga Feivel Bielawski, a survivor from the Węgrów ghetto, paints a picture of the local population and Polish police actively helping Germans find Jews hiding during the liquidation action and in the months to follow, and in killing them.

From his hiding place, Bielawski could observe Jews being led to their execution place:

The next day we watched what would happen to our family in the jailhouse.

Around noon, one German soldier, six Polish policemen, and six Polish

firemen led them from jail. Among them I again saw Seszczynski, who had

been a “good friend” of Yechezekiel Shlessinger. He was now in charge of

keeping order. Also helping out were members of the Dules family, who we

had known. They arranged the Jews in rows and began to march them. The

policemen, carrying rifles, paraded alongside to make sure no one escaped.

Bielawski was able to recognize his relatives and acquaintances; they had all been discovered. The locals observed the procession of a few dozen Jews to the cemetery. The

Jews could not count on the expression of sympathy from their neighbours: “Polish children stuck out their tongues and mocked the Jews. I saw the families of my grand uncles. I also recognized Shlomo Zylbernagel and his wife and Israel Zylbernagel and his wife and son. All together about fifty-five Jews were led to the cemetery.”

The Polish police carried out the killings. The presence of Germans was infinitesimal:

44 Addendum to Department of Information and Press report no. 53 for period of May 1-31, 1943. AAN, DR 202/III-8, p. 195.

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I stood frozen with my eye at the peephole. Soon, we heard shots. They

came so slowly that I could count them, one by one. I ticked off more than

fifty, not rounds fired from the Germans’ machine guns, but the rifle shots

of the Polish police.

The Germans could not have it any easier. One German soldier would

supervise, the Polish firemen would keep order, and the Polish police

would execute the Jews. The Poles finally could fulfill their fantasy of

killing Jews. The Nazis only needed to send one SS officer.45

During the deportations, the Polish policemen were guarding the ghettos to prevent Jews from escaping but also to stop people from entering the ghetto.46 There were some instances when the policemen did not react when Jews tried to escape the ghetto; in other cases, the inaction of the policemen had a price tag. Ida Jomtow-Tenenbaum remembers how the corruption of the Polish policemen enabled some Jews to move from the liquidated large ghetto to the small ghetto in .47 There were repeated cases of policemen shooting at those attempting to enter the ghetto after the deportations.48 On

September 8, 1942, policemen Franciszek Mioduszewski and Roman Lewandowski shot

45 Shraga Feivel Bielawski, The Last Jew from Wegrow: The Memoir of the Survivor of Step-by-Step Genocide in Poland, ed. Louis W. Liebovitch (New York: Praeger, 1991), 66. 46 In the Radom district for instance, “Askaris” or Truppenpolizei usually guarded the perimeters of ghettos during the deportations but often the Polish police, , Waffen-SS or local firemen were employed to this task. Jacek Andrzej Młynarczyk, “Organizacja i realizacja akcji Reinhardt w dystrykcie radomskim,” in Akcja Reinhardt. Zagłada Żydów w Generalnym Gubernatorstwie, ed. Dariusz Libionka. (Warsaw: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2004), 190. 47 YV M.1.E/866/991, Testimony of Ida Jomtow-Tenenbaum, p. 5. 48 AAN, DR 202/II-44, pp. 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 40, 43, 51.

129 at Chaim Kon for escaping from the transport to the Umschlagplatz. Kon was then taken to a Jewish hospital.49

Although the Polish police participated in the deportation actions to a certain degree, in rare cases individual policemen used their knowledge about the forthcoming deportations to notify individuals in the ghetto. The information usually benefited only certain persons the policemen had relationship with such as their prewar friends.

Sometimes the policemen insisted on keeping the warning contained, as was the case in the Otwock ghetto.50 The Polish policemen warned Jews in other places such as

Legionowo and Jodłowa.51 A couple of days before the liquidation of the Tłuszcz ghetto its inhabitants were tipped off by a policeman who requested to have his uniform ready the same day because the Jews would leave the town soon.52

In smaller towns the Polish police were often more involved in round-ups, frequently becoming witnesses or participants to the executions. Szczepan Pawlak, a policeman in Piotrków, participated in executions as a translator and described specific cases of the killing of Jews in a forest near Piotrków (when the ghetto existed and after its liquidation), providing the names of the Polish policemen who were shooting at the

Jews.53 In , Commandant Fornalik was accused of killing a few Jews during the

49 AAN, DR 202/II-44, p. 19. 50 Calek Perechodnik, Am I a Murderer? Testament of a Jewish Ghetto Policeman, ed. and transl. by Frank Fox. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 31. 51 Ibid., 395, 519. 52 The USHMM Encyclopedia II, 453. 53 In his role, Pawlak had to translate the sentence to those condemned and explain to the Polish policemen how to proceed with the execution. AIPN, Ld Pf 1/361, vol. 1, pp. 4-9. Ignacy Kaja and Kazimierz Więckowski from the Piotrków police station were found guilty of participating in the killing of Jews in the Rakowski forest by guarding it during the execution carried out by the German gendarmerie. AIPN, GK 221/52, pp. 4-5, 54-57v. Other policemen from Piotrków who stood trial were Mieczysław Baum, Henryk Łaszczewski, Czesław Dutkiewicz, Alojzy Kazimierski, Jerzy Kolasińki and Stanisław Motyl. AIPN Ld Pf 1/361, vol. 1-2; GK 310/105.

130 ghetto liquidation of August 1942.54 More Jews were then killed by the Polish police during the escape from the ghetto or when later discovered.55 In Łopatowiec in the Pińcz county, Piotr Bińczycki was known for his cruelty towards Jews caught in hiding.56

In , the police would escort Jews to their execution at the Jewish cemetery where a German gendarme would kill them.57 In the county, Polish police were known to kill the Jews discovered to be hiding in the area.58

The survivors of the Wieliczka ghetto present a contradictory picture of the behaviour of the Polish policemen. Maria Bill-Majorkowa recalled that during the August

1942 deportations from Wieliczka, Polish police had looked the other way when entire families were leaving the ghetto.59 Józef Herzog remembers that during the last deportation from Wieliczka, German and Polish police patrolled a designated square where Jews were being held. For a few days both formations were searching houses and bunkers; many of the Jews in hiding were shot. Young people were taken to a garage in

Wieliczka, where some more sympathetic policemen allowed them to trade for food with

54 Testimony of Salomon Kurz and Abraham Singer, AŻIH, 301/3199, pp. 2-3. Kurz and Singer also named policeman Wincenty Wątorowski, who blackmailed Jews. Ibid., p. 1. Wątorowski was tried in 1947 and found guilty of, among other charges, killing of four Jews in hiding. He was executed in 1948. AIPN, GK 247/9, pp. 354-358v, 405. Abraham Peller testified about hearing from eyewitnesses about killings done by the Polish police in February 1942 and that the policemen blackmailed the population threatening with killings. Regarding the August Aktion he said that the policemen handed over apprehended Jews to the Gestapo. AŻIH, 301/1649, p. 2. An entry on Biecz in The USHMM Encyclopedia II contains information about Polish police’s assistance in execution of more than 70 Jews between January and February 1942 (p. 483). 55 The USHMM Encyclopedia II, 483. 56 Testimony of Aleksander Kampf, AŻIH, 301/1908, p. 1. According to Kampf, after the war Bińczycki found employment in the Office of Security. 57 AŻIH, Varia okupacyjne 230/125, p. 121. 58 Testimony of Antoni Łucki, AŻIH, 301/1790, p. 1. Two women were killed in Borowna in August 1943 and three persons were killed in August 1942 in by the Polish police and one German. 59 Testimony of Maria Bill-Bajorkowa, AŻIH, 301/5674, pp. 3-4. Similarly, in Pionki, the Polish policemen were said to turn a blind eye on the Jews escaping the ghetto during its liquidation. The USHMM Encyclopedia II, 278.

131 the locals.60 Contrary to Herzog, M. Holaender recalls the brutal behaviour of the policemen who “scrupulously served their principles” from guarding the ghetto and the collection point to beating and shooting patients of the Jewish hospital along the SS- men.61 Isak Leib Schreiber, a resident of , testified to the Polish Representative on the War Crimes Commission about the crimes committed by Gromala, a Polish policeman from Wieliczka. According to the evidence it is alleged that Gromala took an active part in the liquidation action in Wieliczka and afterwards searched the town for Jews in hiding, killing those who were found.62 During the final liquidation of the ghetto in Stopnica in November 1942, Polish police and firemen, together with

German police and Ukrainian auxiliaries were responsible for the death of some 400 elderly Jews and children shot at the Jewish cemetery.63

For post-war judges, guarding the perimeters of ghettos was considered a crime and they viewed it as confining the Jews, preventing their escape and survival. Sometimes guarding was perceived as acting on orders, by which the policemen were required to obey the Germans but were not directly involved in the killing process. However, even when the Germans and their auxiliaries were responsible for most of the killings during the liquidations of ghettos, the Polish policemen also had their share in the killing. During deportations in Zabierzów and the area (Cracow county), policeman Bronisław

60 Testimony of Józef Herzog, YV, M.49.E/3203, pp. 2-4. 61 Testimony of M. Holaender at Joseph Bühler’s trial. YV, TR.17, JM. 3499.6, vol. 90, pp. 105-197. 62 Undated document, AIPN, GK 164/4687, pp. 1, 3. 63 The USHMM Encyclopedia II, 322.

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Filipowski from the local police station was witnessed taking part in them alongside commandant Zeiss.64

In smaller centres, where there were not enough policemen to assist during the ghetto liquidations, policemen from nearby police stations were also brought in. Those policemen were entitled to per diems.65 Stanisław Kuczyński, a policeman serving in

Lisia Góra during the occupation, admitted during his interrogation that along with two other policemen, Mikuła and Rzepa, he participated twice in so-called Jewish actions in

Tarnów, in which Jews were shot.66 He was transferred to Tarnów to help during the mass deportation from the Tarnów ghetto. Kuczyński was armed with a rifle and five pieces of ammunition. His task was to close off a street and make sure no Jews would escape. The German policemen were guarding next to him. Kuczyński was subsequently placed at a school building where a police emergency post was established. Because he admitted to the crime, the Special Criminal Court in Cracow sentenced Kuczyński to three years in prison. The judge ruled that by guarding the ghetto, Kuczyński contributed to preventing people from escaping from the concentration point to save their lives.

64 During interrogation Filipowski admitted that during one of the round-ups he killed a Jew who attacked him. The man was allegedly trying to escape after already being wounded by Zeiss. During the trial Filipowski denied shooting at the Jewish man claiming he did not have armed weapon, only a rubber stick. He also denied any participation in the actions against Jews. Unlike defendants who often claimed they were forced to confessions through beating, Filipowski did not offer any explanation why he first admitted shooting at the Jew. His participation in the was considered by the judge a “participation in an action aiming at murdering the Jew.” AIPN, GK 255/80, pp. 32, 33v, 122v, 203v. 65 AIPN, Komenda Policji Polskiej Powiatu Jędrzejowskiego, GK 652/69, p. 85. See also AIPN, GK 255/80, pp. 32-33. 66 He was acquitted of apprehending and delivering Poles to the Arbeitsamt even though he admitted to doing so on the orders. He was also cleared of the charges of beating a Polish married couple during confiscation of their farm equipment. AIPN, GK 203/60, pp. 9v, 20, 55v.

133

However, because his participation in the deportation was indirect, it could not be considered participation in the killing.67

Mikuła and Rzepa stood trial but charges against them did not include participation in the liquidation action. Both admitted during the investigation to participation in the “so-called Jewish actions,” in which their task was to close off streets to the market square and prevent any escapes.68 Mikuła and Rzepa were found guilty of crimes against Polish population; Rzepa received the death penalty and Mikuła eight years in prison.

Ewa Wiatr discusses the participation of the Polish police in resettlement and deportation of Jews in the Radomsko county in the Radom district using travel expense forms submitted by the policemen, which provide such information as dates of out of town trips, transportation fees, accommodation and the purpose of the trip.69 From those documents we learn about the movement of the police and their involvement in the deportations outside of their place of duty. The Jews in the Radomsko county were first transferred from small centres to ghettos to Radomsko and Koniecpol.70 The Polish police was involved from the beginning. These travel expense forms are an invaluable source providing more details on the exact duties of the Polish policemen during the so-called

67 It was not established that Kuczyński sympathized with German action. AIPN, GK 203/60, pp. 20, 55v, 62-63v. Kuczyński’s appeal was overthrown by the Supreme Court in 1947. 68 Mikuła was charged for crimes against Polish population. There was no mention of any improper behaviour towards the Jewish population. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM), RG- 15.179M Sąd Specjalny w Krakowie (SSKr), reel 2, pp. 15, 29, 41-41v. Rzepa was found guilty of beating a Jewish woman in 1941 or 1942 but all other charges were for crimes committed against the Polish population. AIPN, GK 203/59, pp. 17, 29-29v, 46-49. An underground report from August 1942 related, “Rzepa continues to be fiercest enemy of Polishness.” AAN, AK 203/III-117, p. 10. 69 Wiatr, “Zdawanie Żydów,” 498-501. She found forms submitted by 20 policemen who were out of town at least 30 times due to “Jewish actions.” 70 In many towns in the Radom district ghettoization was carried out only during the Reinhard Aktion. Młynarczyk, “Organizacja i realizacja,”182-202.

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“Jewish actions”. The policemen were assisting the gendarmes in the resettlement of

Jews, escorting them to bigger towns or Radomsko, loading Jews and their belongings on wagons. For example, in September 1942, Corporal Pietrzyk was delegated to Rędziny to assist in loading Jews and their belongings onto wagons and then transporting them to

Radomsko.71 Polish policemen were also used during the liquidation actions in Żarki,

Koniecpol and Radomsko assisting German gendarmerie and military.72

Dr. Simcha Hampel recalls that during the deportation of the Jews from the

Radomsko ghetto, German forces, Ukrainians, and Polish police surrounded the ghetto.

The German gendarmerie and Polish police then escorted the Jews to the train station. A few days after these actions, Jews started emerging from their hideouts and tried to join

Jewish workers gathered in the Judenrat building: “But our brave Polish police handed over almost everyone into the hands of gendarmerie and only individuals managed to join us.” Those caught were either shot on the spot or put in jail; after a larger number was gathered they were sent to Treblinka: “Thanks to the cooperation of the Polish police and many residents of the town hundreds of Jews died.”73

When in 1942 the German gendarmerie liquidated the ghetto in Chmielnik (Kielce district), Adam Siepracki, a policeman, participated by guarding its perimeters in order to prevent people from escaping. According to the 1953 indictment, Siepracki contributed in great measure to the liquidation of the ghetto and to the loss of many lives by virtue of his zealous attitude towards the German authorities.74 Moreover, in 1943, alongside the

71 Wiatr, “Zdawanie Żydów,” 502, 504. 72 Ibid., 506. 73 Dr. Simcha Hampel, “Radomsko: Nazi murders and Polish collaboration. Life on the Aryan side.” YV, O.33/590, pp. 6-7, 10. 74 AIPN, GK 306/141, pp. 101-104.

135 gendarmerie, he was involved in surrounding buildings where Jews were hiding and in shooting at the escaping Jews. Four persons were killed. Siepracki was found guilty of those and other charges and sentenced to six years in prison. The judge ruled that by his actions Siepracki committed “deeds against basic interests of the Polish nation.”75

Polish policemen also assisted by escorting deportees to the train station. Antoni

Gałązka from the Mińsk Mazowiecki police station was accused after the war for, among other charges, escorting Jews to the train station.76 The charges were made based on the testimony of a few witnesses, including Stanisław Wysokiński, who was now the chair of

National District Council (Powiatowa Rada Narodowa). In 1946 Wysokiński issued a negative opinion about Gałązka, claiming that he participated in the liquidation of the ghetto and confiscated packages. During Gałązka’s 1949 trial, Wysokiński testified that he saw Gałązka escorting Jews with others but did not witness any crime committed individually by the accused.77

Gałązka denied taking part in the pacification of the ghetto, explaining that the

Polish police only established posts to prevent anyone from leaving the ghetto.78

According to another witness, Antoni Wójcik from the Municipal Board (Zarząd

Miejski), who was called to bury those killed, gendarmes and Polish policemen participated in the execution, but Gałązka was not among them.79 Władysław Brekier testified that Gałązka was present with the policemen escorting Jews to the cemetery during the liquidation of the ghetto. He and another person unsuccessfully asked Gałązka

75 AIPN, GK 306/141, p. 152. 76 APW, SOW 2567, p. 6v. Gałązka was also accused of arrests of people under political charges and confiscating food products. 77 APW, SOW 2567, pp. 103v, 339. 78 Ibid., pp. 47v, 202. 79 Ibid., p. 207.

136 to release two Jewish women who belonged to the same organization as they did.80

Gałązka was found guilty of thrice participating in the liquidation of the ghetto in Mińsk

Mazowiecki by escorting Jews together with Germans and policemen, removing shoes from a dead Jewish man, and not releasing two Jewish women being led to the cemetery.81 The German gendarmes and their Lithuanian, Latvian, and Ukrainian auxiliaries, Polish police and Sonderdienst carried out the liquidation of the ghetto. Some

1000 Jews were shot in the ghetto and 4000 were transported to Treblinka.82 Similarly, the deportation of the Jews from Działoszyce was a joint effort of the German gendarmerie, Polish police, and Polish youth from work units. Under the supervision of the gendarmes, the Poles rounded up the Jews and then escorted them outside of the town to the Jewish cemetery where the Germans shot the Jews.83 Polish police were used to round up Jews in during the liquidation action in October 1942. They received financial incentives for finding Jews in hiding.84

The Polish policemen took an active role in the deportation of Jews from

Szczebrzeszyn in August and October 1942. In his wartime diary, Dr. Zygmunt

Klukowski recorded cases of zeal of Polish policemen in killing Jews during the liquidation actions in .85 Klukowski was a of a hospital in

80 APW, SOW 2567, p. 213. 81 Ibid., pp. 261v, 307. Gałązka was sentenced to three years in prison, reduced by the Court of Appeals to 18 months. He contested some of the witnesses’ testimonies arguing those persons were in conflict with the law during the war. 82 The USHMM Encyclopedia II, 407. 83 Testimony of Jan Łach at Josef Bühler’s trial YV, TR.17/JM.3499.6, vol. 90, p. 24. Łach was ordered to provide transportation (podwoda) for the Jews. 84 The Polish police assisted also during the first deportation in Izbica in March 1942. The USHMM Encyclopedia II, 641-642. 85 , Dziennik z lat okupacji Zamojszczyzny, 1939-1944 (Lublin: Lubelska Spółdzielnia Robotnicza, 1959), 277, 289-295. On the importance of Klukowski’s diary see Jean-Yves Potel, “Sumienie świadka refleksje nad Dziennikiem Dr. Klukowskiego,” in Zagłada Żydów na polskiej prowincji, eds. Adam

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Szczebrzeszyn and member of the Home Army. During the first deportation, Polish policemen along with the German forces, their Ukrainian auxiliaries, and Jewish police arrested and imprisoned Jews whose names were on the list prepared by the Judenrat on the German orders. Most Jews in town hid and those who were arrested were then deported to Bełżec.86 Those who evaded the deportation were hunted down in the following days.

The policemen were again involved in the October deportation, the hunts for Jews and the shooting of those who avoided the deportation.87 On October 21, 1942,

[a]t 6AM an action began of the ‘resettlement’ of the Jews, in fact their

liquidation in Szczebrzeszyn. Throughout the entire day, until the dusk,

unspeakable things took place. Armed gendarmes, SS and [Polish] Blue

policemen ran through the city pursuing and searching for Jews. They

rounded them up at the marketplace and gathered them in front of the city

hall. They were taken from various hideouts, the gates and doors were

broken down, shutters were tossed out, and hand grenades were thrown into

some cellars and apartments. They were shot at from pistols, rifles and

Sitarek, Michał Trębacz, and Ewa Wiatr. (Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2012), 311-317. 86 The USHMM Encyclopedia II, 714; Klukowski, Dziennik z lat okupacji, 277. 87 Germans and Polish police commandant Muranowski oversaw the executions. A few names of the policemen participating in the killings are known: Matysiak from Sułów, Stanisław Hajduczak, Jan, Tadeusz, and Michał Gołębiowski). The USHMM Encyclopedia II, 714; Klukowski, Dziennik z lat okupacji, 291, 316.

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machine guns set up in different places. They were beaten, kicked and

tortured in an inhumane manner.88

The following day the German gendarmes and Polish policemen continued the search and eagerly carried out the order to shoot on the spot every apprehended Jew.

After both deportations Jews were being sought for and killed every day. The local population, including youth, actively aided in those searches tracking down Jews in hiding, not sparing small Jewish children who were then shot by the Polish policemen.

The killings took place in plain view. Looting of Jewish property followed.89 Klukowski remarked on the fact that people got used to the violence and did not mind it any more.90

Searching for the Jews in the Aftermath of the Deportations

More frequent was the assistance in rounding-up and searching for Jews who managed to escape during the liquidation actions of ghettos.91 There were also situations in which the Polish policemen took part in the executions of Jews who were apprehended.92 Due to lower manpower, in smaller centres German forces relied more on the active involvement of local policemen and firemen.93 This was often an occurrence in towns and villages of the Warsaw, Radom, Lublin, and Częstochowa districts. The

German police and Ukrainians liquidated the ghetto in Klimontów on October 30, 1942.

After the surviving Jews were taken to the Sandomierz ghetto two weeks later, the Polish

88 Klukowski, Dziennik z lat okupacji, 289. 89 Ibid., 290, 291. 90 Ibid., 279, 293. 91 Cf. Diary of Stanisław Sznapman from the Warsaw ghetto. AŻIH, 302/198, pp. 28, 50. 92 Młynarczyk, “Pomiędzy współpracą a zdradą,” 17. 93 Polish civilians, firemen and policemen helped drag Jews out of hideouts in basements in the Sandomierz ghettos. Testimony of Moses Weinberg, Ghetto Fighters’ House (GFH), file 3518, p. 2.

139 police and firefighters searched for Jews who were still hiding in the former ghetto.94 In the aforementioned Węgrów, firemen together with the Polish police actively participated in searches for the Jews who escaped the September 1942 deportation. Members of both groups were implicated in the executions of apprehended Jews.95 After the liquidation of the ghetto, the German and Polish police were searching houses for those who evaded the deportation.96

Polish policemen also assisted policemen from the Reserve Police Battalion 101 in their killings. In his book on crimes of the Police Battalion 101, Christopher R.

Browning describes examples of German policemen talking about Polish complicity.97

The policemen testified about the local Poles uncovering Jews in hideouts and reporting them to Germans. One policeman testified about Polish policemen participating in the

German patrols and shooting.98 A day after the killing of Jews in Łomazy, the German reserve policemen conducted searches for Jews in hiding. Those who were apprehended were held overnight in a school building and the next day taken by German and Polish police to the forest and killed.99

Post-war trial records offer a partial explanation for participation in the killings, which vary from acting on orders to purely collaborationist behaviour. Often the post-war

94 The USHMM Encyclopedia II, 241. 95 Groups of Jews hunted down by the firemen were taken to the cemetery by a gendarme and six armed Polish policemen. The USHMM Encyclopedia II, 464. See also Bielawski, The Last Jew, 63-66. 96 Bielawski, The Last Jew, 547. 97 Browning states that while almost all accounts of the searches for Jews talked about Polish complicity and the betrayal of Jews in hiding, only one of 210 policemen acknowledged severe consequences threatening Poles assisting Jews. Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men. Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the in Poland (New York: Harper Perennial, 1988), 156. 98 Ibid., 151. 99 The USHMM Encyclopedia II, 671.

140 courts judged that policemen were acting on the orders of their German superiors (e.g.,

Gendarmerie), and considered it as a mitigating circumstance.100

Underground organizations kept a close eye on the policemen who eagerly followed orders. The underground reports and press reported the names of those policemen. Agencja Prasowa (Press Agency) reported in December 1942 that in the

Łuków county the Polish police zealously tracked down Jews in hiding.101 A policeman from , Żak, known for his eager service to the Germans, killed five Jewish children as they walked from Sobienie to Otwock.102 Czesław Laskus, a Pole from

Karczew testified about Żak’s reputation of killing Jews and persecuting those Jews who went from Otwock to Karczew to trade.103

Stanisław Oparowski, a policeman in Opatów, was said to have cooperated with the SD and actively participated in the liquidation of the Ojców ghetto. He informed

Germans about Jewish families in hiding, which resulted in them being killed.104 During his trial, Michał Socha admitted to participating in the round-ups of Jews and searches for

Jews in hiding. He acted on German orders, he explained: the Germans would frequently visit his police station and the entire staff would participate in hunting for Jews. Socha

100 Cf. the case of Leopold Hnatko a policeman accused and sentenced for participating in apprehending a Jewish family and arresting a woman who sheltered them. The court declared he did not act on his own initiative but on orders of the Gendarmerie. Moreover, he did not show initiative or eagerness. APKr, SAKr 1017 K 130/50, p. 755. 101 Agencja Prasowa, no. 5/142, December 1942, p. 4; AAN, AK 203/III-128, p. 68. Informacja Bieżąca wrote about “significant assistance” of the Polish police in that county. Informacja Bieżąca, no. 47 (71), December 17, 1942. AAN, DR 202/III-7, p. 187. 102 AAN, Antyk 228/16-2, p. 30; AŻIH, 301/5489, p. 1. 103 AŻIH, 301/5489, p. 1. 104 “Information from the Ministry of Public Security County Bureau of Public Security (MBP PUBP) in Ostrowiec to Voivodeship Bureau of Public Security (WUBP) in Kielce, October 8, 1946.” IPN Ki 014/84, vol. 2, file 1, p. 106. Oparowski also reportedly enriched himself after the deportation of the Ojców Jews. Ibid., p. 117.

141 estimated that some 50 Jews were brought to the police station in Frysztak.105 The gendarmes would then kill the Jews or take some to the Jasło ghetto. Socha admitted to participating in about ten hunts.

What is striking about Socha’s testimony is that there is no individual ownership of actions in which the Polish policemen killed the Jews. He recalls two such incidents.

He refers to the killing of a woman and two adolescent boys by saying that “our police station killed” or “we killed four Jews” without giving the identities of the killers.106 The culpability is spread equally among all policemen; thus, no one is responsible for a particular killing. Socha does admit, though, to his own responsibility in a couple of cases of bringing apprehended Jews to the police station or participating (with other policemen) in rounding-up Jews for forced labour.107 Socha was very clear in emphasizing the lack of his initiative, acting on orders and not shooting the Jews.108

Searches conducted by the Polish police were considered by some survivors to be more dangerous than those executed by the Germans because the Polish police could rely on the help of the local population.109 After the deportation of the Jews from the Cracow ghetto, the Polish policemen received an order to fire at Jews escaping from the ghetto. In

Franciszek Banaś’ opinion, “This order was the worst, because it sanctioned that if a Jew were to escape from the ghetto and a Polish policeman would let him through, that the policeman would be shot. Such was the alternative for a Polish policeman. Here it was

105 AIPN, GK 314/122, pp. 8v-9. 106 Ibid., p. 20v. 107 AIPN, GK 314/122, pp. 20v, 21, 26v. 108 Ibid., pp. 26v, 66, 68. Socha was found guilty of bringing one Jewish man to the police station and another one to the gendarmerie (in both cases acting on the orders of the superior) and apprehending people for forced labour in Germany (pp. 185-188, 204-205). 109 “Searches done by the Germans were not as dangerous as those of the Polish police, whose informers were everywhere.” Testimony of Antoni Łucki of Wiśnicz, YV, M.49.E/1388, p. 1.

142 clarified who was a merciful person and who was a criminal. There were then those policemen who dared to shoot, but there were only three or four such daredevils.”110

Participating in Spoils

After the Jews were forced into trains heading to killing centres, the German and

Polish police were the first to arrive in Jewish apartments and houses to take advantage of the goods left behind. Some of the policemen participating were already known for being corrupt. The names of Michał Skrypko and Bolesław Obrębski from made it onto the underground’s lists of individuals working against the Polish state and population. Both policemen were described as using “immoral methods to gain income” by extorting money and being among the first to loot Jewish property.”111 In December

1942 the Robotnik (Worker) reported on policemen’s behaviour in Biała

Podlaska: “After the liquidation of the Jews in the town and county of Biała, it is noticeable that the local Polish police shares the shabby leftovers. They bring home odds and ends, sort them and burn the worse ones; the better ones they sell or keep for their own use.”112 After the liquidation of the ghetto in Busko and the area, it was reported that there was no looting of the Jewish apartments by the local population because the German and Polish police did not allow it. However, the policemen had already taken the most valuable items and the remaining ones were made available for sale.113 Similarly in

Radzymin, first the Germans, then the Polish policemen robbed Jewish houses. Also the wives of the policemen partook in those dealings. An underground report informed that,

110 AŻIH, 301/2058, p. 19. 111 AAN, Antyk, Wojskowe Sądy Specjalne, 228/25-2, pp. 35-36. 112 Robotnik, no. 99, December 17, 1942, p. 5. 113 Sabina’s report, November 1942. AAN, Akta Haliny Krahelskiej 338/II-3, p. 180.

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“Local police ladies were more constrained, but along came wives of the policemen from

Wołomin and other centres – for furs and dresses of Jewesses, with which they loaded themselves.”114 After that it was the local population’s turn to loot.

The ghetto in was liquidated in October 1942 with the help of several dozen policemen who were brought in from out of town. The local population attempted to loot property left behind. Initially, the Germans and Polish police guarded the entry; later on they allowed the looting. The author of an underground press article suggests that it happened because the Germans and policemen already took the most valuable items:

“The Polish police perhaps plundered the most. The chief of the police station in

Legionowo seized the entire furnishings of a Jewish doctor.”115

Germans permitted Polish police to participate in the spoils but punished those who abused that permission. In October 1942 the Gestapo shot policeman Władysław

Lesiński. A search in his house turned up numerous items from the Jews in the ghetto in

Żabno. Lesiński, a zealous collaborator with the German police, received permission to take a few things from the ghetto.116

Policemen were among those groups who benefited from accommodations left by the deported Jews. Under the headline, “Gang of Rascals,” Wolna Polska (Free Poland) revealed that Polish policemen were among the Poles who were allotted emptied houses in the Warsaw ghetto. In the so-called “small ghetto” two houses were made available to

Polish policemen and their families. “Blue robbers are breaking into abandoned

114 Sabina’s report, November 1942. AAN, Akta Haliny Krahelskiej 338/II-3, p. 181. 115 “Wyrzutki społeczeństwa polskiego” (“Outcasts of Polish Society,”) Biuletyn Informacyjny, Wyd. P, no. 49, October 16, 1942. On plundering of the Legionowo ghetto by the Polish population and killing of the Jews in hiding by the German gendarmes and Polish police see testimony of Józef Nachman Kazimierski, “Legionowo-Warszawa, IX1939-25 X 1942,” AŻIH, 301/23, p. 10. 116 APKr, Obwód AK Brzesko, II/2, p. 31.

144 apartments, stealing all valuable things, which they sell outside of the ghetto. This gang of uniformed thugs is led by Major Mieczysław Tarwid,117 whose five-room apartment is presently a genuine museum of valuable furniture and other objects of value stolen from

Jewish houses.”118 Similarly, after the liquidation of the ghetto in , Polish police were looting properties left behind.119

The underground organizations and press linked the ongoing demoralization of the

Warsaw police to the existence of the Warsaw ghetto. Assistance in smuggling, escorting

Jews out of the ghetto, and extorting money from those who escaped were some of the

“poisonous sources of income.” A Security Corps report singled out Major Tarwid for

“looting raids in the abandoned houses” and enabling “asocial elements” to partake in those raids after the 1942 deportation, all of which took place in cooperation with the

Germans.120

The Warsaw police had an especially bad reputation for participating in actions against Jews and non-Jewish Poles. After the summer 1942 deportations in the Warsaw ghetto, there were still some 70,000 Jews remaining and thousands living on the Aryan side either in open or in hiding. The Polish police still guarded the limits and gates of the

117 Major Mieczysław Tarwid was a district chief of the Polish police in Warsaw and is actually credited with helping Jews. He sheltered Benjamin Mandelkorn and his wife and protected Jewish children in hiding. Tadeusz Piotrowski, Poland’s Holocaust: Ethnic Strife, Collaboration with Occupying Forces and Genocide in the Second Republic, 1918-1947 (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, Inc., 1990), 9. See also Gunnar S. Paulsson in Secret City. The Hidden Jews of Warsaw, 1940-1945. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002), 158, 240. Tarwid’s name comes up, however, in the underground reports in a negative way (cf. footnote 120). As many other policemen, Tarwid’s behaviour eludes unambiguous evaluations. 118 Wolna Polska, no. 37 (72), October 1, 1942. AAN, AK 203/VII-50, p. 246. On Karmelicka St. certain houses were made available to the policemen. AAN, DR 202/II-65, p. 5. 119 “Immediately after the expulsion, Polish police swarmed over the Jewish houses, stealing whatever goods were left behind and murdering any Jews they discovered. They tore down the houses and sold the rubble for building materials.” Quoted after The USHMM Encyclopedia II, 248. 120 Report of Security Corps for period of July 15-November 15, 1942. AAN, DR 202/II-35, p.7.

145 ghetto. They were also involved in apprehending Jews outside of the ghetto and handing them over to the Germans.

On December 10, 1942, the Leader of SS and Police in the Warsaw district issued a decree to the Order Police concerning Jews remaining without permission outside of

Jewish living quarters in the Warsaw district, with the exception of those working outside of the ghetto. Those Jews were to be shot immediately without any investigation as well as Jews apprehended during combating bands. This order was forwarded also to the

Command of the Polish Police in Warsaw. Warsaw Jews encountered outside of the

Jewish quarter without police permission were to be arrested in every case and delivered to the 6th precinct of the Criminal Police. Monthly reports of the number of apprehended

Jews and those shot while attempting an escape were to be submitted to the Kommando der Schutzpolizei.121 In January 1943, the Polish police captured 55 Jews outside of the ghetto and delivered them into German hands.122 A report from the 15th precinct of the

Polish police, located in the Praga district (on the right bank of the river), reveals that on January 19, 1943, a Jewish man was shot in the foot. His files, as instructed, were transferred to the German authorities.123 In March 1943, the Polish police in Warsaw apprehended and transferred into German hands 73 Jews, in July – 43, and 34 in

August.124 Adam Hempel estimates that between July and August 1943 one in every forty policemen arrested a Jew on the “Aryan” side in Warsaw.125

121 APW, KPPmW, 10, p. 1. The decree was sent out to the Polish police precincts on December 21, 1942. Ibid., p. 2. 122 Informacja Bieżąca, no. 10 (83), March 11, 1943. AAN, DR 202/III-7, p. 226. 123 APW, XV Komisariat Policji Polskiej m. Warszawy 1940-1942, 11, pp. 27v-28. 124 AAN, DR 202/II-37, Raport tygodniowy Głównego Inspektoratu PKB (Weekly report of the General Inspector of National Security Corps), No. 15, May 3, 1943, p. 64; Raport tygodniowy Głównego Inspektoratu PKB, No. 30, August 25, 1943, p. 84. The underground report states that in March 1943 “73 Jews were shot [sic!] for leaving the Jewish quarter and handed over to the 6th division of the Directorate of

146

By order from January 12, 1943, the policemen were also to report the number of

Jews who were arrested with valuables. Some of the reports were preserved. The reports available (most of them cover June 1943 and a few are from 1944) list names of policemen who arrested Jews, names and addresses of the arrested persons, date of transfer to the SD and sometimes the valuables that were found on a Jew.126 (See Table 1)

In order to encourage policemen to search for the Jews in hiding, the Germans offered rewards. A section of an underground report, marked “do not publish,” talked about a written request of the Schupo Command to the Command of the Polish Police in

Warsaw (June 1943) to publish lists of policemen, who contributed to capturing Jews, in order to reward them.127

the Criminal Police.” Sprawozdanie z działalności policji za marzec 1943 in Meldunki Oddziału Polityczno-Informacyjnego o sytuacji w kraju. No. 149, April 20, 1943. AAN, DR 202/II-21, p. 34. According to a Home Army report the Polish police arrested 29 Jews in March 1943. AAN, AK 203/III- 122, p. 17. 125 Hempel, Pogrobowcy klęski, 180. Hempel calculates the number based on the numbers of persons killed reported to the German superiors. However, there is a possibility that some Jews could have been killed and their deaths unreported. 126 APW, KPPmstW, 15, pp. 12-22, 24, 31, 34. For example, according to a report from 14th precinct of the Polish police, two Jews who were arrested in February 1944 possessed a watch and 1250 zloty. Ibid., p. 69. 127 Informacja Bieżąca, no. 25 (98), June 30, 1943. AAN, DR 202/III-7, p. 282. Reportedly, that month the Polish police captured 46 Jews. Informacja Bieżąca, no. 30 (103), August 4, 1943. AAN, DR 202/III-7, p. 313.

147

Table 1. Jews arrested between May 23 and July 22, 1943 in the Praga district of Warsaw:128

Period of report Police precinct Number of Jews arrested Number of Jews shot and transferred to SD May 23-June 23, 1943 All in the Praga 17 Jews and 3 bodies129 0 district June 23-July 22 1943 18th precinct 4 Jews (Abram, Regina, 0 Szymon and Icek Frydman) arrested and transferred to SD on July 3 and Sura Rozenberg transferred on July 17130 14th precinct 1 (transferred to SD on 0 June 30)131 15th precinct 3132 0

17th precinct 4 (3 transferred to the 0 Command of the German Police, 1 to a German Police station (Abschnittswache), Targowa St.)133 Source: APW, Komenda Policji Polskiej m. st. Warszawy, 10.

128 Between May 23 and June 23, 1943 20 Jews were apprehended in the Praga district and transferred to SD. APW, KPPmstW, 10, p. 3. 129 On May 25, 1943 four Jews (including one with severe burns) and three bodies were transferred to the SD. They were all apprehended on 10 11 Listopada St., APW, Komenda Policji Polskiej, 10, p. 19. The group consisted of the ŻOB fighters who escaped from the burning ghetto and hid in a celluloid factory They were caught as a result of fire that broke out in the factory. The bodies found were of and two fighters – all survivors from Mila 18 bunker. Ber Mark, Uprising in the Warsaw Ghetto (New York: Schocken Books, 1975), 85. 130 APW, KPPmstW, 10, p. 5. 131 Ibid., p. 7. 132 Ibid., p. 8. 133 Ibid., p. 10.

148

Handing Over Jews to the German Gendarmerie

Depending on judicial decisions, some policemen were held responsible for handing over arrested Jews to the German gendarmerie. Many of the wartime police tasks were deemed a collaborationist activity by post-war judges. There was no strict line of conduct for the judges and sometimes acting on the orders of the German authorities was considered an extenuation. In other cases, policemen were charged as accessories to murder because the court assumed they, as policemen, must have been aware of the criminal intentions of the Germans.

Stanisław Rudnicki from the police station in Żyrardów arrested and handed over to the German gendarmerie a Jewish woman named Wajsówna. She was then shot at the

Jewish cemetery.134 Wajsówna had a family in the Warsaw ghetto and collected food for them in the Żyrardów area. Rudnicki testified that he had encountered her in his own house and following the existing orders, took her to the police station. He defended himself by adding that neither his acquaintances met on the way to the police station nor

Wajsówna herself asked him to release her.135

Edmund Churski, who served in Wiązowna (Warsaw county), was tried in 1950 by the Voivodeship Court of the City of Warsaw (SOW), among other charges, for actively participating in arrests and searches for Jews, who were then shot by the gendarmerie in the nearby forests or were transferred to a labour camp in Rembertów.

During the investigation Churski admitted to arresting Jews, but during the trial he withdrew his testimony and argued he participated with another policeman in the arrest of

134 APW, SAP Warszawa 240, pp. 5-8. 135 APW, SAP Warszawa 239, p. 22. Rudnicki’s testimony was contradicted by witness Suchecka who testified that both her and Wajsówna pleaded with him to let her free. Ibid., pp. 17v-18. Rudnicki was sentenced to life in prison, changed later to 15 years for handing over Wajsówna to the Germans and for escorting Poles to forced labour.

149 a five-person Jewish family. The Jews were hiding in an empty villa in a village of

Zamlądzie. They allegedly asked to be taken away because the local population refused to give them food.136 Churski was cleared of all other charges but sentenced to seven years in prison for arresting Jews.137

Conclusion

By their participation in the liquidation of ghettos, deportations of Jews to killing centres, and assistance in searches of those who managed to escape, the Polish police became directly implicated in the occupiers’ extermination policies. They also benefited materially from the property left by the deported Jews either by sharing the spoils with the Germans or by securing it for themselves in an illegal manner. Some policemen, like many other Poles, believed that Jews were already condemned and were unscrupulous in persecuting them. Jewish lives had no value to them and Jews in hiding became an easy target; that included robbing apprehended Jews of their possessions. In December 1942, on the orders of the gendarmerie the police escorted Jews from to Koniecpol and then to Radomsko. The police from those three towns organized the transport. When the transport stayed overnight in the arrest in Pyrów, the Jews were forced to give 5,000 zloty and were robbed of clothes and bedding by Corporal Piotr Stępień from the police post in Pyrów along with three other men (including a secretary of community in Pyrów).

Some of the money and stolen items were recovered; the Jews were handed over to the

136 AIPN, GK 317/255, pp. 36, 40v. During the investigation Churski testified that after the liquidation of the Warsaw ghetto, the local population in the Warsaw county was afraid to provide shelter to Jews and informed on Jews to the police station. He said he followed the orders of bringing the Jews to the police station but privately offered assistance to Poles and Jews. Ibid., pp.18v, 19, 31v. 137 In his case, acting on the order of his superior was considered a mitigating factor. Ibid., p. 53v. The judge acknowledged a good opinion about Churski among the local population and warning the inhabitants of Wiązowna before round-ups of the gendarmerie and warning Jews in hiding and peddlers.

150 gendarmerie. There is no information available whether the culprits were arrested for the theft.138

After the wave of deportations in the summer of 1942, there were still ghettos functioning for the remaining Jewish population and the Polish police continued to exercise their power over them. The Polish policemen guarded the ghettos and were still crucial in both preventing and enabling the smuggling and movement of people.139

After Jews became outlawed and subject to swift execution when found on the

“Aryan” side, the Polish police and Polish population in general often became those who enabled the survival of a hiding Jew or who contributed to their death. In just two days, on October 12 and 13, 1942, the Polish police in Brzesko Nowe apprehended 70 Jews and transferred them to the gendarmerie in Miechów.140 At times, the same people displayed the opposite behaviour. In August 1942, the Polish police’s warning enabled some 100

Jews from Jodłowa to escape mass execution in the Przęczyca forest. In 1943, the same policemen were executing Jews denounced by the local peasants.141 After the 1942 mass transports of Jews to killing centres, there was no doubt among the Poles as to what the ultimate goal of the German occupier was towards the Jews. Their fate seemed sealed and their lives unworthy of saving in the eyes of many Poles. Considering the killings of Jews done by the peasants, Klukowski wrote about the brutalization of Poles who, following the Germans, did not see Jews as human beings but as animals that must be eradicated by

138 AIPN, 652/63, Komenda Policji Polskiej Powiatu Jędrzejowskiego, Jędrzejów, p. 316. 139 For example, the ghetto in Międzyrzec Podlaski was established after the first deportation in August 1942. Polish police guarded the ghetto and together with German gendarmes shot Jews who illegally left the ghetto. The USHMM Encyclopedia II, 685. 140 APKr, PPPBrN 1939-1944, pp. 17, 72. 141 Testimony of Jakub Szenker, AŻIH, 301/1694, p. 1.

151 all means possible.142 Those sentiments played an important role in the murder of Jews in hiding that took place in the last phase of the Holocaust in Poland.

142 Klukowski, Dziennik z lat okupacji, 299.

Chapter 4

Amplifying Danger on the “Aryan” Side: The Threats Posed by the Polish Police

Despite the efforts of Germans and their auxiliaries, at least 100,000 Jews hid in cities and the countryside following the liquidations of ghettos. The issue of how many

Jews tried to escape the killings and how many perished at the hands of Poles is a highly controversial and contested topic in Poland. While the exact number of Jews who escaped deportations to killing centres and sought shelter on the “Aryan” side is not possible to establish, the estimates range from a more conservative 100,000 to as high as 300,000 –

400,000. Historians agree that up to 50,000 Jews survived until the end of the war.

According to Gunnar S. Paulsson, approximately 27,000 Jews hid in Warsaw.

17,000 were still alive in mid-1944 on the eve of the Warsaw Uprising. Paulsson proposes that Jews hiding in Warsaw accounted for about 25% of approximately 100,000 Jews hiding in Poland. Only half of the Jews in hiding survived the war. 1

Barbara Engelking and Jan Grabowski, among other historians, agree that around

10 percent of the 2.5 million Polish Jews still alive in mid-1942 attempted to escape the killings. According to Engelking 175,000-210,000 Jews were killed in the last phase of the Holocaust in Poland.2 She points out that it is not possible to establish how many

Jews perished at the hands of the Germans and their local collaborators versus how many due to hunger and disease. In his introduction to Zarys krajobrazu, Krzysztof Persak

1 Gunnar S. Paulsson, “Ringelblum Revisited, 1940-1945. Polish-Jewish Relations in Occupied Warsaw, 1940-1945,” in Contested Memories. Poles and Jews during the Holocaust and Its Aftermath, ed. Joshua Zimmerman. (New Brunswick, New Jersey, and London: Rutgers University Press, 2003), 176-177, 191. 2 Barbara Engelking, Jest taki piękny słoneczny dzień. Losy Żydów szukających ratunku na wsi polskiej 1942-1945 (Warsaw: Stowarzyszenie Centrum Badań nad Zagładą Żydów, 2011), 143.

152 153 proposes that some 160,000 Jews escaped to the “Aryan” side and around 120,000 were killed.3 Jan Grabowski concludes that the number of victims of the hunts for Jews could reach 200,000.4 Andrzej Żbikowski estimates that “the number of such refugees from ghettos and camps was at least 300,000, with – possibly – 100,000 more. Fewer than

50,000 survived the war.” In his opinion, most Jews were killed by the German gendarmerie in the weeks following deportations.5

Some Jews lived in shelters and hideouts far from the curious eyes of Poles, while others assumed false identities and lived as “Aryans” in the open. No matter which mode of survival, all Jews in hiding faced the constant danger of denunciation and extortion.

They could be exposed as Jews by former acquaintances, neighbours or persons with whom they could come in contact with by nature of their professions. Among those who had more opportunities to expose Jews and blackmail them were Polish policemen, railway workers, streetcar fare enforcers and clerks.6

The Germans used the Polish police in the first phase of the Holocaust in Poland during the deportations to killing centres and searches for those who escaped. Now the police were also responsible for apprehending Jews who had evaded deportations and hid on the “Aryan” side. To encourage diligence in finding Jews in hiding, the Germans

3 Barbara Engelking, and Jan Grabowski, eds. Zarys krajobrazu. Wieś polska wobec Zagłady Żydów 1942- 1945 (Warsaw: Stowarzyszenie Centrum Badań nad Zagładą Żydów, 2011), 25-26. Engelking leans towards Persak’s numbers in her article, “”Po zamordowaniu udaliśmy się do domu.” Wydawanie i mordowanie Żydów na wsi polskiej w latach 1942-1945,” Zarys krajobrazu, 260. 4 Grabowski, Hunt for the Jews, 2-3. 5 Andrzej Żbikowski, “”Night Guard”: Holocaust Mechanisms in the Polish Rural Areas, 1942-1945. Preliminary Introduction into Research,” East European Politics and Societies 25, no. 3 (August 2011): 513. 6 Anita Sosnowska singled out those groups in her study on blackmailers in Warsaw and the area, “Tak zwani szmalcownicy na przykładzie Warszawy i okolic (1940-1944).” Kwartalnik Historii Żydów, 3 (211), 2004, 366. On the Polish Underground’s reactions to blackmailers, including the Polish police see also Joshua Zimmerman, The Polish Underground and the Jews, 1939-1945 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 162-165, 179, 208, 227-228, 279, 369.

154 awarded the policemen with 500 zloty or the equivalent of 1/3 of the Jews’ property. The

Jews apprehended outside the ghetto were to be immediately shot.7 The financial incentive for searching for Jews played a significant role in shaping policemen’s attitude towards outlawed Jews.

In this chapter the discussion centers on the actions of the Polish police following the liquidation of ghettos in 1942. The responsibilities of the Polish policemen increased and they participated in hunts for and murder of Jews who evaded mass transports to killing centres and hid among the Polish population. They participated alongside the

German police forces or acted on their own. I argue that Polish police became a serious threat to Jews in hiding and were often feared more than Germans. Many policemen found a new source of income through extortion of money from Jews in hiding, leaving them vulnerable and often without sources to survive on the “Aryan” side. Some policemen were held responsible by the underground courts and executed.

In the countryside, the policemen could rely on assistance from the local population eager to get rid of the Jews who were often hidden on their properties or who entrusted them with their possessions for safekeeping. I propose that many of the policemen and locals acted out of greed rather than ideological conviction although we cannot dismiss the role of traditional antisemitism of the rural population and some of the policemen. In certain cases, the policemen’s behaviour was informed by their dual loyalty

- to their German superiors and the underground organizations. Some policemen were both guilty of facilitating the murder of Jews and can also be credited with some forms assistance to Jews in hiding; post-war trial records reflect this ambiguity.

7 Krüger’s order to the Polish Police, December 10, 1942.

155

Blackmails and Extortions

A considerable number of the Polish police members used their position for personal gain and were involved in the so-called szmalcownictwo. It is usually translated into English as the blackmailing of Jews. During the occupation the term szmalcownik

(plural szmalcownicy, often referred to as szmalcowniks in the English literature), literally greasy-palmer, denoted a person who accosted Jews on the street and threatened them with denunciation if they did not pay them. In this context we should translate the word as extortionist rather than blackmailer. A blackmailer, szantażysta in Polish, visited Jews in their hiding places.

Polish policemen were guilty of both blackmailing Jews and extorting money from them. Some acted independently and others were involved in gangs or even created their own small groups. Many szmalcowniks (both the civilian and uniformed ones) waited for their victims outside the ghetto walls. 8 Often such an encounter resulted in returning to the ghetto because the szmalcowniks would take all their money. Emanuel

Ringelblum discussed the problem of blackmailing and extortion in great detail. He compared the szmalcowniks to a plague and estimated that there were hundreds of them in

Warsaw: “The schmalzowniks collaborate with police agents, the uniformed police and in general anyone who is looking for Jews. They are a real plague of locusts, descending in the hundreds and maybe even thousands on the Jews on the Aryan side and stripping them of their money and valuables and often clothing as well.”9 A number of policemen who were previously involved in smuggling now moved on to other ways of benefiting

8 Zimmerman notes the bands cooperating with the Polish police at the exits of the Warsaw ghetto as reported by the underground press organ of the Delegate’s Bureau. Zimmerman, The Polish Underground, 208. 9 Ringelblum, Polish-Jewish Relations, 124. Szmalcowniks in Warsaw are discussed at length by Gunnar S. Paulsson in Secret City, 148-152.

156 from German anti-Jewish policies including blackmailing Jews hiding on the “Aryan” side and extorting money.

Their uniform and police ID facilitated this activity but it also had the effect of drawing attention in the case of German or Polish underground intervention, as they were easily identifiable by their visible ID numbers. The Polish underground organizations monitored criminal behaviour and published warnings in the underground press with the names of the policemen hunting for Jews who escaped from ghettos and the Poles sheltering them.10 Such warnings included detailed information about a policeman in question: name, ID number, and police precinct.11 For example, in November 1943, a report of the Security Corps (KB) conveyed that Sergeant Wasilewski from the 8th precinct in Warsaw was a well-known extortionist, who became wealthy during the occupation. Wasilewski had been previously noted for extorting money from Jews and at the time of the report he demanded his subordinates stop wealthy people and find illegal press during the house searches. In order to be released these people would have to pay large amounts of money. The report advised that the underground should execute the policeman.12

Another underground report from December 1942 talked about constant denunciations of Jews by agents in plain clothes often accompanied by a uniformed

Polish policeman. “They request [to see] documents and speak about them sarcastically.

Demands vary. I know of a demand of 20,000 zloty, heard of being satisfied with 1000

10 The Home Army intelligence gathered information about the policemen of uniformed and criminal police who were working against the interest of the Polish and Jewish population. For example, a report from 1943 discussed a policeman Michał Wojciechowski from the 17th precinct who was suspected of blackmailing Jews along with another policeman. AIPN, IPN BU 1572/1352, p. 5. Other policemen were noted for blackmailing Jews or profiting from the smuggling to the ghetto. Ibid., pp. 6-8. 11 Pismo Policji Podziemnej, no. 2, August 14, 1943, p. 8; no. 3, August 23, 1943, p. 6. 12 AAN, Antyk 228/15-3, p. 16.

157 zloty. They behave politely. In one case they vouched with an “officer’s word,” that they would not keep after this person again. At the same time they took all jewelry of fair value.”13

Wiktor Gold experienced his first blackmail two weeks after he arrived in Warsaw from Niepołomice on September 2, 1942: “A Pole approached me on Marszałkowska

[street], called over a Blue policeman; they wanted to take me to the Gestapo but I ransomed myself and they let me go, but of course I had to move because they knew my address.” In his new place he was blackmailed within three days. Gold and his family hid then in Podkowa Leśna. In November 1942, two blackmailers paid him a visit: a civilian and a Polish policeman. They requested 30,000 zloty. Gold managed to stay in this place until May 1943 because he made a deal with the blackmailers – half of the amount to be paid in cash and the other half of the requested amount Gold paid in monthly installments.14 That arrangement helped him stay alive.

The policemen were also active in organized groups of blackmailers.15 The presence of a policeman during blackmail made it look official and was meant to instill fear in Jews so they would be more susceptible to pay the ransom. Edward Reicher, a

Jewish doctor from Łódź, hid with his family on the "Aryan” side of Warsaw. He describes one instance when a policeman and a streetcar driver visited their apartment, searched it and wanted to take them to the Gestapo. Seeing Reicher’s daughter who was praying, they stopped the search and requested a ransom. In another apartment the

13 Krystyna’s report. AŻIH, 230/125, p. 100. On cases of blackmail and assertions of safety see also , Żywe i martwe morze. 2nd extended edition. (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1955), 99. 14 Testimony of Wiktor Gold, YV, M.49.E/2357, pp. 1-2. 15 According to Sosnowska, who based her research on post-war trial of the Warsaw court, many of the trials concerned Polish policemen. Some of them worked together with civilians or in created groups of blackmailers. The court proceedings revealed that the policemen who handed over apprehended Jews into the German hands, blackmailed Polish families who hid those Jews. “Tak zwani szmalcownicy,” 366-367.

158

Reichers rented, they were subject of yet another blackmail. This time a policeman was part of a three-man group.16

In 1943, the blackmailing of Jews, extortions and demands of bribes from Jews and Poles alike were so widespread in Warsaw that Commandant Franciszek

Przymusiński issued a circular condemning requests for money in return for silence from the persons of “non-Aryan origin.”17 A monthly review of reports for the Delegate of the

Government warned:

’Polish’ police (so-called Blue) corrupted thoroughly. Taking of bribes,

blackmailing of persons of Jewish origin, and even sometimes of

unquestioned “Aryans” – are an everyday affair. The commandant of the

Polish police Przymusiński recently issued a circular to his subordinates, in

which he condemned common requests for money (ransom for silence)

from persons of non-Aryan origin. In those cases, when a policeman

encounters a person whose background is questionable, he should escort

them to the closest police station in order to check their identity; in no case

take a bribe.18

The Command of the Polish Police in Warsaw prepared lists of policemen along with their evaluations and lists of their transgressions such as illegal trade, extortions, bribes and subservience to the Kripo. Included are names of policemen who were accused

16 Edward Reicher, W ostrym świetle dnia. Dziennik żydowskiego lekarza 1939-1945, ed. Renata Jabłońska (London: Libra Books, 1989), 9. 17 AAN, DR 202/II-8, p.121. This information was also reprinted in Department Informacji i Prasy report on the state of the administration of the General Government from October 30, 1943. AAN, DR 202/III-51, p. 11. 18 Raport no. 2, December 21, 1943. AAN, DR 202/II-8, p. 121. Cf. Ringelblum, Polish-Jewish Relations, 133.

159 of trading with the ghetto, extorting money from Jews and blackmailing Jews. Some policemen were in fact imprisoned for extortions – Antoni Kołomoński and Andrzej

Szelak from the 17th precinct were each sentenced to 9 months in jail. Stanisław

Łuczyński from the water police was arrested for the same crime in February 1943. He was released from Pawiak in April 1944 and reinstated to work.19

“Death Sentence on Franciszek Kłos”

In 1945, Stanisław Rembek published in a weekly Dziś i Jutro a novel entitled

“Death Sentence on Franciszek Kłos.”20 Rembek, who spent the wartime in Grodzisk

Mazowiecki, kept a diary in which he discussed current events and often pondered on the decline of the ethical norms and growing baseness of people. In July 1944 he wrote, “In

Grodzisk a policeman Kłos had been shot, who in particular pestered illegal sellers.”21

The killing of a policeman sentenced to death by the Polish underground was the inspiration behind Rembek’s thorough psychological study of Kłos, a zealous policeman caught between German superiors and the interests of his fellow countrymen.

Rembek presents a journey of a prewar Polish policeman who heeded the German order to return to service. Taught to always follow the orders of his superiors, during the war Kłos sided up with the Germans. Rembek shows how Franciszek Kłos gradually became more corrupt and brutal in carrying out German orders. In the beginning he was just a martinet but soon he forgot his nationality, religion and the sense of communal history and interests in the Polish population. It begs the question if this characterization,

19 APW, KPPmW 5, p. 11. Others policemen were also suspected of extortions (Piotr Durant, 22nd precinct, see pp. 171-172) or blackmailing Jews (Kamiński, 11th precinct). Ibid., pp. 10-11. 20 It was published as a book in 1947. 21 Rembek, Dziennik okupacyjny, 319.

160 elaborated upon in a work of historical fiction, was an anomaly among the policemen.

How do we understand the capacity for single acts of murder and the betrayal of one’s cultural values becoming a way of life? It is worthwhile to consider whether this character was representative of more than just an isolated case within the policing milieu during the war.22

The fictional Franciszek Kłos had been sentenced to death by the Special Court for his collaboration with the occupying authorities. Kłos confiscated food products, apprehended Poles for forced labour in Germany and extorted bribes. He also killed a member of the Polish underground.23 The death sentence evoked in Kłos questions and doubts about his patriotism and inclusion in the Polish nation; his defence was that the

Polish state did not exist anymore and he, as a policeman, had to follow orders. The question of the Jews appears later in the book when Kłos is rejecting his religion and recalls what he read in and what he learned from his friend, a gendarme. Kłos benefited from the deportation of Brodnia Jews to the Warsaw ghetto and accepted a bribe from a Jew in hiding.24

The first death sentence carried out on the chief of the Arbeitsamt started a snowball effect of Kłos’s brutality and killings. He voluntarily killed a Jewish man and went on to kill other Jews in hiding, along with his gendarme friend. Kłos was able to compartmentalize the killings by claiming he did not hurt Poles, just the Jews.25 He had a

22 Zygmunt Ślęzak, a former Polish Kripo policeman and a member of the Communist establishment after the war, distinguishes in his memoirs between the “Blue policemen,” corrupted and working against the interests of the Polish population in the interwar period and during the Second World War, and “worthwile” policemen from the Investigative Bureau. He calls the former “collaborators of the Gestapo and prototypes of Franciszek Kłos.” “Wspomnienia,” BN Sygn. Akc. 1601, p. 209. 23 Stanisław Rembek, Wyrok na Franciszka Kłosa (Warsaw: Instytut Wydawniczy PAX, 1977), p. 18. 24 Ibid., 33-34. 25 Ibid., 45-46, 67.

161 short time of repentance and improvement but later turned against the Polish civilians during a Polish-German shooting confrontation.

Through Kłos’s fictionalized character Rembek succeeds in showing the complexity of the Polish policemen’s behaviour. Like Kłos, many policemen became corrupt and often more brutal during the occupation. Some progressed from simply carrying out duties to becoming implicated in the murder of Polish Jews. Rembek’s novel, which originated from a real event, depicts well a phenomenon of policemen being held responsible for their actions and targeted by the underground. The underground reports and illegal press identified those collaborating with the occupier. They published names of policemen who were serving the occupier too zealously. One such document was published in the Cracow district, in May of 1943, the First Black List of the Blue Police issued by the Directorate of Civil Resistance (Kierownictwo Walki Cywilnej, KWC).26 It reads:

The Directorate of Civil Resistance sent out to all Blue police stations a

summons, in which it reminded all policemen of their duties vis-à-vis the

Nation and Polish State. Because not all policemen complied with the

above summons, we are announcing the first black list of police criminals,

who by their deeds brought disgrace upon themselves.27 (See Appendix C)

Those listed were categorized as traitors, murderers, thieves and blackmailers. The first list contained the names and localizations of 38 policemen. Among them are policemen whose deeds are discussed in this dissertation. Pismo Polski Podziemnej, a

26 The policemen listed were from Cracow, Miechów, Tarnów, and surrounding areas. Marek Mączyński dates the list for the end of 1942. “Polskie formacje policyjne,” 159. 27 AAN, AK 203/VIII-2, p. 23.

162 publication of the underground police also issued warnings to policemen who were blackmailing Jews and extorting money.28 In February 1943, Nowy Dzień (New Day) daily reported on the fear among the Polish policemen in Warsaw after a series of death sentences and executions. “Death is lurking at every corner” for those policemen who broke national interests, it stated.29

As the blackmailing of Poles and Jews became more common, the Polish underground authorities reacted by trying and executing blackmailers. In 1943 the

Directorate of Civil Resistance started to carry out death sentences on those collaborating with the Germans against the Polish population and announce their names to the public.

Crimes of extortion and blackmail were the prerogative of the Special Civil Courts

(Cywilne Sądy Specjalne, CSS) established in November or December 1942.30 In

February 1943, a Special Court (Sąd Specjalny) in Warsaw sentenced to death Second-

Lieutenant Roman Leon Święcicki, the head of the 15th police precinct since 1942.

Święcicki was executed for his cooperation with the occupying authorities in actions against the Polish population (especially for his role as a member of the German Police

Court), extortions, and active participation in round-ups of Poles for forced labour in

28 “Dąbrowski Edward, corporal, No. 3410, blackmails and extorts ransom from people, who he accuses of non-Aryan origin. He pulls into the ignoble job young candidates to police.” Pismo Policji Podziemnej, no. 4, September 18, 1943, p. 8. Also, Ibid., no. 3, August 23, 1943, p. 6. 29 Nowy Dzień, no. 501, February 24, 1943, p. 4. 30 Before the Special Civil Courts were established, Special Military Courts (Wojskowe Sądy Specjalne, WSS, established in 1940) were in charge of examining crimes committed against (Polskie Siły Zbrojne). Those crimes were understood quite broadly and encompassed actions of overzealous policemen as well as blackmailers harassing Jewish population. Władysław Sieroszewski, “Z działalności Wojskowego Sądu Specjalnego Okręgu, a następnie Obszaru Warszawskiego AK (1940- 1944),” Najnowsze Dzieje Polski, 1939-1945 8 (1964): 122.

163

Germany (and organizing participation of Polish police in this action). The sentence was carried out three days after the court’s decision.31

In 1943 the Special Civil Courts began to examine cases of blackmailing Jews.32

In March 1943, the underground press published the Directorate of Civil Resistance’s warning against those who blackmailed Jews and Poles assisting them. After giving credit to those Poles who extended a helping hand to Jews in need the KWC condemned those who profited from their situation:

Nonetheless there are individuals bereft of honour and conscience,

recruiting themselves from the criminal world, who created a new source of

criminal income by blackmailing Poles who hide Jews and Jews

themselves. The KWC warns, that such incidents of blackmailing are being

noted and will be punished to the full extent of the law immediately or as

soon as possible.33

The same month Biuletyn Informacyjny34 (Information Bulletin) noted that although the overall frequency of denouncing and blackmailing decreased in Warsaw and throughout the country, at the same time groups of professional blackmailers have arisen.

Aside from blackmailing Jews, there was frequently political blackmail - extorting money

31Agencja Prasowa, no. 9 (151), March 3, 1943. 32 Gondek, Polska karząca, 63. From mid-1943 to October 1944, Special Civil Courts issued some 200 death sentences (60-70 in Warsaw and 67 in Cracow). Altogether, CSS and WSS issued around 2,500 death sentences for crimes against Polish state and Polish nation and collaboration with the Germans, which were carried out by the underground. Ibid., 112, 114. 33 Agencja Prasowa, no. 10 (152), March 10, 1943, p. 3. The warning was also published in Biuletyn Informacyjny, no. 11 (166), March 18, 1943, p. 2. 34 Biuletyn Informacyjny – the largest weekly underground newspaper edited by Aleksander Kamiński from November 1939 to October 1944 in Warsaw and then until 1945 by Kazimierz Feliks Kumaniecki in Cracow. From 1941 a press organ of the Bureau of Information and Propaganda of the Chief Command of the Home Army. A provincial edition was issued from 1941.

164 for silence on political matters. The article also distinguished “patriotic” bribery of various officials and policemen, who accepted money for keeping an eye shut in the case of political offenses.35

From the beginning of its existence, the Council for Aid to Jews (Żegota) demanded from the representatives of the to punish blackmailers and extortionists. In a December 1942 document addressed to the Government

Plenipotentiary (Delegate), the Temporary Presidium of the Council for Aid to Jews described its goals, structure and desiderata. They appealed to the Delegate to address the entire population (“everyone without distinction of denomination and nationality”) to let them know about the creation of the Council, to call for assistance of their work and to issue a special statement concerning combating blackmail. The Council requested that the

Plenipotentiary of the Government publicly announce that those blackmailing Jews would be punished as if they committed the crime of collaboration with the occupier against the

Polish state and its citizens.36

The same month the Council appealed to the Plenipotentiary to increase the efforts to fight the “plague of blackmailing.” They requested the publication of death sentences already carried out on the blackmailers. The Council believed only street posters containing details about the reasons for those death sentences and firm warnings against

35 “Hieny” (“Hyenas”), Biuletyn Informacyjny, no. 11 (166), March 18, 1943, pp. 7-8. Rzeczpospolita Polska called for condemnation and contempt for blackmailers targeting Jews in hiding and those who extorted money from families of Polish political prisoners. They should be placed on lists and handed over to for punishment. “Żerowanie na najcięższych tragediach” (“Preying on the Greatest Tragedies”), Rzeczpospolita Polska no. 8, May 6, 1943. As quoted in Władysław Bartoszewski, and Zofia Lewinówna, eds., Ten jest z ojczyzny mojej. Polacy z pomocą Żydom 939-1945, 2nd extended edition. (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Znak, 1969), 929-930. 36 Bartoszewski and Lewinówna, Ten jest z ojczyzny mojej, 943-944.

165 extortionists could remedy the situation.37 The Council directed multiple appeals and calls for action against the blackmailers to the Government Delegation and issued its own leaflets condemning crimes against Jews.38

In a May 1943 leaflet Żegota called for Poles to follow the instructions of Prime

Minister Władysław Sikorski and the Government Delegate to provide assistance to Jews.

It announced that helping Germans in the murder of Jews by blackmailing, denouncing them and exploiting their situation, and participating in robbery of their possessions was a crime against Polish law. It warned that those committing such crimes would be punished immediately or after the war.39 Żegota issued another call to the Polish population to aid

Jews and condemning blackmailers and informers in August 1943 and the last one in

September.40 The Council also forwarded cases of blackmailing to the Special Court for investigation.41

On July 5, 1943, the Government Plenipotentiary for the Country and the

Commander-in-Chief of the Home Army issued a proclamation regarding the Directorate of Civil Resistance, which was to direct the resistance of Polish society. Talking about the tasks of the Special Courts the Plenipotentiary announced, “In particular, the Special

Courts will prosecute monetary blackmails and extortion of money under the cover of

‘attempts for release’ of imprisoned or interned Poles and monetary blackmail of Jews in

37 Teresa Prekerowa, Konspiracyjna Rada Pomocy Żydom w Warszawie 1942-1945 (Warsaw: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1982), 370-371, 380-381. 38 More on Żegota’s appeals to the Government Delegate and efforts to influence Polish population to assist the Jews on the “Aryan” side and decrease the number of blackmails in Prekerowa, Konspiracyjna Rada, 260-264, 277-283. 39 Bartoszewski and Lewinówna, Ten jest z ojczyzny mojej, 948-949. 40 All three documents to the Polish population were signed using a codename Polish Independence Organizations (Polskie Organizacje Niepodległościowe). Ibid., 950-951. 41 “Report on activities of the Council for Aid to Jews by the Government Plenipotentiary for the Country for the period of December 1942 – October 1943.” Ibid., 954-955.

166 hiding.”42 The first death sentences were carried out on Bogusław (Borys) Jan Pilnik from Warsaw and Jan Grabiec from Cracow. The Special Civil Court sentenced Pilnik to death on July 7, 1943 for blackmailing and handing over to the German authorities Polish citizens of Jewish nationality who were in hiding. He was killed on August 25; the information about the execution was published in September.43

In July 1944, a corporal of the Polish police, Antoni Pietrzak was sentenced to death “for cooperating with the occupier in persecuting the Jewish population.” The sentence was carried out by shooting.44 The exact number of court sentences for crimes against Jews is not possible to establish. As Teresa Prekerowa points out, not all verdicts of the underground courts were announced out of fear of possible repercussions against the population or the executors requested the information not be published.45

Between 1942 and 1944, in Warsaw alone the Special Military Courts (WSS) issued about 200 sentences (mostly for treason and denunciation), and the Civilian

Special Courts issued around 65 for crimes against the Polish state and the Polish nation.46 According to Teresa Prekerowa, in about 30% of death sentences issued by the

CSS, the main accusation was for crimes against Jews. She estimates there were three to

42 The proclamation was published in Biuletyn Informacyjny, no. 27, July 8, 1943. Quoted after Gondek, Polska karząca, 166. 43 Biuletyn Informacyjny, no. 37 (192), September 16, 1943, p. 1. Władysław Bartoszewski, Los Żydów Warszawy 1939-1943 (Lublin: TN KUL, 1993), 66. Grabiec was charged with blackmailing the villagers who hid Jews and threatening them with denunciation to the authorities. Biuletyn Informacyjny, no. 35, September 2, 1943. 44 Biuletyn Informacyjny, no. 27 (234), July 6, 1944, p. 8. 45 Prekerowa, Konspiracyjna Rada, 287. 46 Krzysztof Komorowski, ed., Armia Krajowa. Rozwój Organizacyjny. (Warsaw: Bellona, 1996), 42-43. In the Warsaw district there were some 400 cases being examined, which resulted in over 100 cases of the death sentence. Death sentences were carried out also by Związek Odwetu (), then Kedyw and a liquidation group of Department II of the Home Army Command of the Warsaw district. Ibid., 49. Kedyw (Kierownictwo Dywersji Komendy Głównej Armii Krajowej) – Directorate for Subversion of the Command of the Home Army was a division of the Home Army for sabotage and armed actions against Germans.

167 four executions in the second half of 1943 and at least 15 before August 1, 1944. It is possible that some people who blackmailed and denounced Jews were sentenced for other crimes than those.47 Based on the analysis of personal data of 200 out of 300 available death sentences, Leszek Gondek estimates that policemen of various formations and ranks constituted 21.5% of those condemned. They were the most numerous group (43 persons) along with clerks (24) and rural administrators (village and community heads – sołtysi and wójtowie – 16).48 After the war, 40% of all functionaries and clerks accused of blackmailing were members of the Polish police.49

Wartime diarist Halina Krahelska wrote about corruption of the policemen and clerks, many of whom were part of the prewar state administration. In her opinion, the

Germans arrested primarily honest and patriotic policemen and those who remained in service were mostly “complete miscreants, traitors or opportunists and cowards.” The

Polish police played a heinous role towards Jews by tracking down those in hiding, denouncing them to Germans or killing them on their own, after having robbed them.

Krahelska wrote, “Bribery, blackmail, stealing, participating in looting, and even participating in criminal assaults are everyday matters.”50 Stanisław Szczygieł worked at the water police station in Warsaw. It was known that some Jews were hiding in buildings at the Popularna Beach. The owner of the beach, Irena Milczarek, testified that in 1942 or

1943, Szczygieł searched the venue and discovered hidden Jews from whom he

47 Prekerowa, Konspiracyjna Rada, 294-295. 48 Gondek, Polska karząca, 115. 49 The clerks and other functionaries consisted 14.5% of all accused in the trial records housed by the State Archive in Warsaw. Estimates by Anita Rodek, “Tzw. “szmalcownicy” – Warszawa i okolice (1940-1944)” (MA thesis, Warsaw, 2002), 92. 50 “Postawa społeczeństwa polskiego pod okupacją niemiecką, 1943.” AAN, Akta Haliny Krahelskiej, 383/II-4, p. 27.

168 demanded a payout. He then sent another policeman to pick up furs belonging to those in hiding.51

The underground monitored behaviour of the policemen who carried out German orders too zealously and brought harm to Poles and Jews. Their names and addresses were dutifully noted and included in reports. Among the charges against them were preying on Jews hiding on the “Aryan” side (“strangler,” “preyed on Jews,” “unethical” were some of the descriptions).52 The Home Army’s counterintelligence reports of

“Honoratka” provide information on the police and informants. Data collected by the agents included information on policemen involved in blackmailing Jews. A report from

April 1944 concerns Stefan Jaźwiec who served in the 16th police precinct in Warsaw.

Jaźwiec “is a complete miscreant. He will do anything for money. He is friends with local scums and Volksdeutsche. Usually they search for Jews. J[aźwiec] leads an unbridled lifestyle. Main organizer of all con tricks and blackmailing on the grounds of the 16th precinct of P[olish] P[olice].”53

Those reports often offer a window into the struggles of Jews on the “Aryan” side but also into attitudes of the policemen. Leon Kozłowski from Warsaw’s 13th precinct arrested a Jewish woman on the basis of a denunciation made by a Polish woman. The apprehended woman offered Kozłowski money to let her commit suicide. Because she

51 APW, Sąd Apelacyjny w Warszawie 113, p. 35. Szczygieł was also accused of arresting and handing over to the German a Jewish man, who was later released on the way to the Gęsia prison by another policeman. 52 AAN, AK 203/III-124, p. 38. For example, an undated report from the Pińczów district lists the name of Piotr Sałabun from Działoszyce and blames him for being a zealous servant and having a bad attitude towards Poles. He allegedly shot two Poles for possessing Jewish property. Another policeman, Jan Karkowski from the station in Muniakowicz was described as a ”good shooter of Jews” who was zealous in his service. AAN, AK 203/XI-26, 26, p. 61. Piotr Sałabun stood trials between 1948 and 1960, when he was finally acquitted from charges of killing Jews and Roma. AIPN, IPN Ki 128/190-194; GK 306/195-196. 53 Addendum to Report no. 75, April 3, 1944. AAN, AK 203/III-111, p. 8.

169 was not successful in her attempt, Kozłowski tried to poison her with sleeping pills. When the woman recovered she accused him of taking her money. Kozłowski was arrested by the Germans and forced to return the money.54

The underground also investigated alleged denunciations in cases when a policeman had a very good opinion and allegations seemed out of line. Ignacy Zięba from the 2nd precinct in Warsaw was accused of accepting a bribe from a Jewish convert to

Catholicism, who was apprehended by Zięba as a result of denunciation. It was confirmed that the man voluntarily offered the money and Zięba agreed to take it.55

In September 1943, Bureau 993/P (“Honoratka”) alarmed about two policemen from the 20th precinct (providing their badge numbers) blackmailing people, persuading them they were Jewish or neophytes, and making a lot of money. “Whatever the way, and immediately, these policemen need to be threatened that if they will not cease their contemptible actions, they will be ruthlessly liquidated.”56

Felicja Czerniaków, the wife of the late Adam Czerniaków, did not avoid the blackmailers, either. In 1942, Czerniaków along with her cousin hid at her former housekeeper Anna Blum’s place. One day two policemen showed up inquiring about two

Jewish women. Czerniaków was able to pay off the policemen and left the apartment.57

Adolf Berman, co-founder of Żegota was thrice blackmailed by szmalcowniks. The first time it happened immediately after he left the ghetto; the last time in January 1944

Berman was blackmailed by a Polish policeman. He was released after ransom paid by

54 “Honoratka’s” Report no. 103, May 12, 1944. AAN, AK 203/III-112, p. 11. 55 “Honoratka’s” Report no. 107, May 19, 1944. Ibid., p. 31. 56 AAN, AK 203/III-118, p. 85. 57 Testimony of Anna Blum, AŻIH, 301/5801, p. 1.

170 the Jewish National Committee (Żydowski Komitet Narodowy, ŻKN) and the Council for

Aid to Jews.58

Beside strangers who could somehow recognize a Jewish person, those hiding on the “Aryan” side had to fear being recognized by people who knew them from before the war. Sometimes the previous acquaintance could be used in one’s favour. When

Stanisław Taubenschlag was blackmailed in Cracow through an anonymous letter, he enlisted help of his prewar friends who were policemen.59 Zylberberg managed to secure his release from the arrest by two policemen in Warsaw because one of the policemen was, like Zylberberg, from Płock.60 More often than not, such encounters could mean a death sentence to those in hiding.

The policemen not only blackmailed or extorted bribes from Jews caught on the

“Aryan” side, but were also known to appropriate money found on apprehended Jews. In

April 1943 two policemen, Sergeant of the Guard and Convoy Unit (OWK) Bronisław

Matoszko and Corporal Zygmunt Folant, were arrested in Warsaw under the charge of appropriating 1000 zloty from a Jew held in custody.61

The Germans encouraged Polish policemen to search for Jews by promising them a portion of the property of the apprehended Jew.62 In March 1943, the Kommando der

58 Andrzej Krzysztof Kunert, Słownik biograficzny konspiracji warszawskiej 1939-1944, vol. 2 (Warsaw: Instytut Wydawniczy Pax, 1987), 31-32; Adolf Berman’s letter from January 1944. GFH, Adolf Berman Collection 6049, unpaginated. 59 Stanisław Taubenschlag (Townsend), Być Żydem w okupowanej Polsce. Kraków-Auschwitz-Buchenwald (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Parol. Wydawnictwo Państwowego Muzeum Oświęcim-Brzezinka, 1996), 36. 60 Michael Zylberberg, A Warsaw Diary 1939-1945 (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 1969), 89-90. 61 AAN, AK 203/III-122, p. 11. 62 Meldunki Oddziału Polityczno-Informacyjnego o sytuacji w kraju (Reports of the Political-Information Department), no. 143, April 1, 1943. AAN, DR 202/II-21, p. 13. A Cracow Jewish Committee reported on the German efforts to encourage Polish police to eagerly hunt for the Jews. According to their report Directorate of the Criminal Police in Cracow issued a decree that whoever apprehends Jews in hiding will receive an award up to a quarter of the amount of cash or valuables in the possession of the Jew. Police

171

Schupo sent a secret circular to the Command of the Polish Police in Warsaw regarding

Jews remaining outside of the ghetto. The Germans complained about Jews without armbands or with Polish identity cards and ordered that Polish police in agreement with the clerks of the criminal police “discover such Jews in every possible way and hand them over with a proper report to the chief of the Security Police and SD,” along with the address of the apprehended Jew. Their apartments were to be secured and sealed.

Policemen who would secure Jews and Jewish property in such a way would receive a reward of up to 1/3 of the secured Jewish property.63

For some policemen, looking for Jews in hiding became their main preoccupation.

In the Rokitno community, a three-person police station was known for the particularly ruthless treatment of the local population. They constantly demanded bribes from the peasants. Two of the policemen, Lawrenz (a policeman from Poznań) and Orwat were known for apprehending and murdering Jews.64

In the summer of 1943, two policemen from the 26th precinct in Warsaw stopped

Zdzisław Jędrzejewski on Tucholska St., checked his ID and told him they had to take him to the German police as a Jew. Jędrzejewski had undergone surgery to undo his circumcision and he could have pleaded with them but he broke down and admitted his

Jewish background. The policemen, Piotr Durant and Julian Augustyniak, demanded

stations in the rural communities in Miechów county received the order to shoot Jews on the spot and to send a report to the German police. Meldunki Oddziału Polityczno-Informacyjnego o sytuacji w kraju (Reports of the Political-Information Department), no. 218, November 1, 1943, AAN, DR 202/II-21, p. 90. 63 Meldunki Oddziału Polityczno-Informacyjnego o sytuacji w kraju, no. 144, April 3, 1943. AAN, DR 202/II-21, p. 15. The order was mentioned in underground reports such as Raporty tygodniowe Głównego Inspektoratu PKB (Weekly Reports of the of the National Security Corps), no. 11, April 7, 1943, AAN, DR 202/II-37, pp. 42-43. 64 Robotnik, no. 100, January 16, 1943, pp. 7-8. See also AAN, AK 203/III-128, p. 89.

172

75,000 zloty to let him go. One of them went to Jędrzejewski’s wife with a letter from him saying that he would be released upon handing over all of the money. Despite solemn promises, Durant and Augustyniak took Jędrzejewski to the German police, who shot him the same day. When a few days later, Jędrzejewski’s wife came to inquire about her husband, Augustyniak told her that nothing could have been done to save him and he had already been shot. Any inquiries might bring similar consequences. When Jędrzejewska asked for return of the money she was beaten by Augustyniak. An investigation conducted by an underground member confirmed the allegations.65

Participation of the Local Population – Judenjagds (Hunts for Jews) and Night

Guards

After most of the ghettos were liquidated and many Jews went into hiding, the

Germans turned their efforts to discovering those who escaped deportations to killing centres. In hunting down the remaining Jews they relied on the local population who significantly helped by discovering and denouncing Jews. The assistance to Germans from the local police and local population was of great significance especially in the countryside.66 The need for it resulted in the establishment of peasant guards and night guards.67 On German orders, forms of self-defence in villages were created, which included night guards and volunteer fire brigades. Members of the night guards were

65 Report of “Mały” working at the “Start,” May 10, 1944. AAN, DR 202/II-43, pp. 63-64. Durant and Augustyniak were also confirmed to be members of a criminal gang. Durant, a PPR member, was also deemed a threat to those policemen from the 26th precinct who were the members of the Home Army. 66 The involvement of the rural population is presently researched by the Centrum Badań nad Zagładą Żydów w Polsce (Polish Center for the Holocaust Research). The project, which produced several publications, sheds light on the extent of the Polish participation in the Holocaust in the countryside. See Engelking, Jest taki piękny słoneczny dzień; Engelking, and Grabowski, Zarys krajobrazu; Grabowski, Hunt for the Jews. 67 Władysław Ważniewski, Walki partyzanckie nad Nidą. Z dziejów walki podziemnej na ziemi miechowsko-pińczowskiej (Warsaw:Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, 1975), 116.

173 selected by the head of the village (sołtys), gendarmes or Polish police. They were responsible for protecting villages from partisans and bandits, or anyone else who could threaten peace and order.68 For example, in December 1942, the Kreishauptmann von

Balluseck in Jędrzejów ordered to establish a committee of the six wealthiest landlords, which would be obligated to report to the gendarmerie or Polish police all arriving non- local visitors. Those committees and the police were to create night guards consisting of three to four people, armed with sticks, who were to report any stranger to the closest gendarmerie or Polish police post.69

Night guards were obligated to report new arrivals and any suspicious persons.70

In small communities where people knew each other, a stranger could not avoid being noticed. Jews in hiding were apprehended by the local peasants and then handed over to the Polish police. Material incentives in the form of money or Jewish belongings played a significant role in searching for Jews and reporting them.71 During his duty in the night guard, Wojciech Toporek from the village of Ruda Malenicka and Jan Łuzeńczyk apprehended two Jews and reported them to the Polish police. After their arrest, the police shot them. The two Poles received 15 kilograms of sugar each as a reward.72 Toporek’s wife inquired twice about the due reward.73

An underground report for February 15-March 15, 1943 for the Pińczów district conveyed the following information about the survivors wandering in the fields. The local

68 Jan Grabowski, “Strażacy, wiejska straż nocna i granatowa policja a zagłada Żydów na obszarach wiejskich w dystrykcie krakowskim,” in eds. Adam Sitarek, Michał Trębacz, and Ewa Wiatr, Zagłada Żydów na polskiej prowincji (Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Instytut Pamięci Narodowej Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu, 2012), 251. 69 AIPN, Komenda Policji Polskiej w Kielcach, GK 652/50, p. 135. 70 See AIPN, GK 306/91. 71 Cf. Ringelblum, Polish-Jewish Relations, 137. 72 AIPN, GK 306/91, pp. 5, 40. At the time of Toporek’s trial the other Pole had already passed away. 73 Ibid., p. 40v.

174 population, described by the report as highly antisemitic, handed over the Jews to either the Polish police or German gendarmerie because of their antisemitism but also out of fear of oppression. In the reported period there were many incidents of Jews being taken to police stations, where they were then killed.74

In many cases, the policemen would not be successful in finding Jews in hiding if it were not for the help of the local population.75 The cooperation between policemen and peasants identifying Jews is evident in post-war trials of peasants and Polish policemen.

Frequently those killings were cases of cold-blooded murder perpetrated together by the policemen and local population. In some cases the peasants notified the nearest Polish police station about Jews hiding in the area but also the very same people who sheltered the Jews, and profited from them, decided to end that relationship and inform the police about those hiding on their property, often as a result of the Jews having no money left to pay for their upkeep. There is also no doubt that some peasants felt concerned about their safety and that of their families. They could have felt threatened by the execution of Poles caught helping Jews. The fear for their own lives could be a contributing factor in the decision to cease assistance to Jews but that hardly explains the fact that instead of letting the Jews find another hiding place, the peasants would choose to murder “their Jews.”

74 AAN, AK 203/XI-25, p. 30. In the April 15-May 15, 1943 period there were no cases recorded of police shooting Jews. 75 According to Jan Grabowski’s study 286 Jews in hiding died in Dąbrowa Tarnowska County. 13 Jews were apprehended and killed by the Polish policemen and the Polish police killed 102 Jews after they had been denounced by the local population. The locals killed 7 Jews on their own. To compare – German gendarmerie killed 7 Jews on their own and 98 Jews who were denounced by the locals. 59 Jews died in unknown circumstances. Grabowski, Hunt for the Jews, 61.

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Again and again, the excuse was made that if they were captured, the Jews could have betrayed to the Germans the names of the Poles who hid them.76

A report of the Miechów Inspectorate of the Home Army for January 1–February

15, 1942 for the Pińczów district states that due to the high numbers of Jews hiding in the area, the local population was informed about their duty to search through the fields. As a result a lot of peasants denounced Jews, who were then killed by the Polish police. The report emphasized that the Jews apprehended by the gendarmerie denounced the Poles who hid them, giving as an example a case of the arrest of ten people in Wiślica for hiding Jews or their property. According to the report the Jews were also familiar with the work of the underground Peasants’ Battalions.77 In many cases however, the peasants were motivated by the desire to take over whatever possessions the Jews in hiding still had.

In the spring of 1944 Jews hiding in the attic of Józef and Wiktoria Ulma’s house in Markowa were denounced by a Polish policeman from Łańcut Włodzimierz Leś.78 For remuneration Leś previously hid the Goldman brothers, who were now hiding at the

Ulmas. Historian Mateusz Szpytma suggests that Leś did not want to return their property and denounced them to the German gendarmes. Several gendarmes and Polish policemen, including Leś and Eustachy Kolman, participated in the expedition to the Ulmas. Eight

76 Wincenty Wątorowski’s killings of Jews in hiding were referred to as protecting the local population and choosing “the lesser evil”. Deposition of Dr. Roman Soczyński, AIPN, GK 247/9, pp. 124v; Wątorowski’s lawyer’s pardon plea letter to the President, Ibid., pp. 385-387. 77 AAN, AK 203/XI-25, pp. 23-24. A report for July 15-August 15, 1943 states that Polish police was ordered not to shoot Jews anymore but bring them to police station. There they were interrogated and there were denunciations. The report also mentions robberies done by the Jews in hiding. Ibid., p. 51. 78 Włodzimierz Leś served in the police force before the war. During the war he worked at the police station in Łańcut and was executed in on the orders of the Directorate of Underground Struggle (Kierownictwo Walki Podziemnej). Mateusz Szpytma, “Markowa po “Złotych Żniwach,”” Więź, no. 633 (2011): 74.

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Jews, Józef Ulma, his pregnant wife Wiktoria, and their six children were killed on March

24, 1944.79

The execution had a tremendous impact on and fatal consequences for the Jews hiding in the area. Yehuda Ehrlich, who was hiding in a nearby Sietesz, recalls that the bodies of twenty-four Jews were found the morning following the execution. The Poles who were sheltering them had killed the Jews.80 However, the narrative popularized by

Szpytma in his work, is that of courageous peasants who did not buckle and sheltered

Jews despite the imminent threat to them and their families.81 Szpytma postulates that

Ehrlich’s testimony refers to events from 1942 rather than 1944.82 But as Jan Grabowski points out, the testimony leaves no doubt to the timing of the killing and the perpetrators of the murder.83

Greed played a significant role in the behaviour of policemen and peasants.84 Both groups often benefited from the murder. They could split the property of the murdered

Jews or policemen were paid by the locals for not reporting to the Germans the Poles who hid the Jews. They would instead report that the Jews were found or that peasants

79 Szpytma and Szarek, Rodzina Ulmów, 48-51. 80 On the Ulma family and Ehrlich’s testimony see http://yadvashem.org/yv/en/righteous/stories/ulma.asp. Retrieved September 8, 2016. On the murder of Jews following the killing in Markowa see Adam Leszczyński’s interview with Jan Grabowski, “Na likwidację Żydów pojechałem. Kowalski Jan,” http://wyborcza.pl/magazyn/1,124059,20473795,na-likwidacje-zydow-pojechalem-kowalski-jan.html Accessed July 30, 2016. See also Jan Grabowski and Dariusz Libionka, “Bezdroża polityki historycznej. Wokół Markowej, czyli o czym mówi Muzeum Polaków Ratujących Żydów podczas II wojny światowej im. Rodziny Ulmów,” Zagłada Żydów. Studia i materiały 12 (2016): 619-642. 81 Szpytma recalls that only one Polish witness admitted that her family asked the Jews to leave but they were convinced to let them stay by the Jews saying that the war would end soon. Szpytma, “Markowa,” 73. 82 Mateusz Szpytma, “Sprawiedliwi i inni,” Więź, no. 636 (2011): 100-101. 83 Jan Grabowski, “Prawda leży w mogiłach,” Więź, no. 634-635 (2011): 104. The events in Markowa are currently a subject of a debate. See Jan Grabowski, Dariusz Libionka, “Markowa. Żydowska śmierć, polska wina, wspólny strach.” http://wyborcza.pl/magazyn/7,124059,21097043,markowa-zydowska-smierc- polska-wina-wspolny-strach.html Accessed December 9, 2016; Frydel,"Beyond the Ulmas.” 84 Cf. APKr, SAKr 1021-K 150/50, p. 519v.

177 reported Jews hiding in an area without revealing that Polish peasants in fact hid the

Jews.85

The contempt for Jewish lives exhibited by some of the policemen was also extended to Jewish children. What might be the most disturbing is the ease with which some policemen applied the laws against the Jews in hiding to Jewish children. While there were cases of policemen turning a blind eye on the fact that the children were

Jewish, there were also those who did not hesitate to kill children.86 In some cases this could be explained by the fact that the children could not usually offer policemen any financial incentive to keep them alive.

The aforementioned Piotr Bińczycki killed two children a day after he killed their mother.87 The commandant of the Polish police in wanted to shoot a Jewish boy hidden by a Polish woman who claimed he was her son; the woman’s brother managed to save the child.88 Danuta Wajnman, a six-year-old, was left in a church in

Warsaw by her brother in 1942. She spent a month there after which the priest called from the for adoption. A woman came to pick her up but first took her to a Polish police station. A policeman started to beat the child to make her confess that she was

Jewish. Another policeman defended her saying, “Let her go. Even if she is Jewish, she should live.” He took her to the Central Welfare Council (Rada Główna Opiekuńcza).89

85 Cf. APKr, SAKr 954 K53/49, vols. 1-2. 86 See the case of Zygmunt Dybowski, chief of the police station in Gościeradów. AIPN, GK 309/298. 87 Testimony of Aleksander Kamf, AŻIH 301/1908, p. 1. 88 Testimony of Władysław Piwowarczyk, YV, M.49.E/4169, p. 6. 89 Testimony of Danuta (Basia) Wajnman, YV, M.49.E/4110, pp. 1-2. Rada Główna Opiekuńcza was a social welfare organization created in 1940 in the General Government with the permission of German authorities. It received funding from private donors, German civilian authorities and clandestinely from the underground and Polish Government-in-Exile. RGO’s mandate was limited to ethnic Poles but the organization supported (illegaly) Jewish population as well.

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When asked by a judge how he could killed many Jewish children, the accused, a policeman from Tuchowicze answered: “those were only kikes [żydziaki].”90 A Pole denounced to police in Dębie two Jewish siblings, who were wandering in the village of Cisie. After the policemen located the children they shot them.91 In the summer of 1943, a Polish woman discovered the bunker of a six-person-Jewish family near

Dąbrówka (near Wołomin). She informed Konstanty Zasadowski, the commandant of the police. He and his policemen surrounded the bunker and killed everyone inside.92 These were not isolated killings. Some non-Jewish Poles also fell victim to policemen’s zeal in killing Jews. Under the title “Blue Murderer,” Agencja Prasowa reported in August 1943 that during a manhunt on Jews near Łuków, a Polish policeman shot two Polish girls, mistaking them for Jews.”93

Both police and peasants came up with many excuses as to why the Jews in hiding had to die. The peasants were often first to spot a stranger in the village or someone hiding in the fields or forest. They were witnesses to some of the executions and they buried the bodies on the order of the policemen. In other cases the peasants murdered

Jews independently. The head of the village of Zaryszyn notified the police station in

Książ Wielki that two Jewish women appeared in the village. The commandant of the police sent two policemen (Władysław Grzybek and Kazimierz Kajdas) to investigate.

The women were apprehended by the peasants and guarded by some twenty persons in one of the houses to prevent their escape. The policemen took them away and Kajdas shot

90 Testimony of Henryka Rakocz, YV, O.3/2342, p. 14. 91 Testimony of Ita Gartenkranz, AŻIH, 301/4103, p. 9. 92 They were also accused of other killings. During the trial Zasadowski admitted to killing the Jewish family. Jan Polek also admitted his guilt but testified that he shot under duress, out of fear of Zasadowski. Zasadowski was sentenced to 7 years in prison, Polek to 5. Two other policemen were acquitted. Note from a process of four Polish policemen at the Voivodeship Court, 1960, AŻIH, 301/5264, pp. 1-4. 93 Agencja Prasowa, no. 32 (174), August 11, 1943, p. 4.

179 the women.94 In 1943 in Góra Ropczyńska, a woman informed the police that a Jewish man was hiding in the village. Józef Kubiczak, a policeman, received an order to gather several peasants and search for the Jew. When the man attempted escape, the peasants captured him and Kubiczak delivered him to the police station in Sędziszów, where he was shot by a gendarme.95

“I don’t have mercy for a Jew,” Józef Faryński, a policeman in Racławice reportedly said when two other policemen (Andrzej Krzywonos and Władysław

Wesołowski) refused to kill a Jewish woman brought to the police station in the winter of

1943. The killing was done on the order of Karol Kupfer, the German chief of the police station.96 Faryński was under investigation with four other persons for his role in the June

1943 killing of four Jews in Miroszów in the Miechów county. Agronomist Bielawski, who was also under investigation, hid the Jews.97 Faryński and Wesołowski killed two persons each. Piotr Jaworski was accused of denouncing the Jews to the Polish police.98

The Jews came to Bielawski in May 1943 and in June were shot by Faryński and

Wesołowski on the order of the commandant of the Polish police station Stanisław

Krawczyk. The Polish policemen did not report Bielawski to the Germans for a bribe of

94 APKr, SAKr 948 K18/49, pp. 48, 161, 332. Władysław Grzybek was found guilty of apprehending those two women together with Kajdas. According to the judge, Grzybek was instructed to bring two arrested women to the police station and he was not informed they were Jewish. Full instructions were available only to Kajdas (pp. 330-331.) 95 AIPN, GK 314/76, pp. 26v, 127v. 96 The case against Józef Faryński, APKr, SAKr 995 K16/50, p. 15. See also: APKr, SAKr 954 K53/49, vol. 2, pp. 831, 934, 932, 936. According to Jan Michta and Faryński’s deposition, Wesołowski also fired. APKr, SAKr 954 K53/49, vol. 1, pp. 58, 76. From another witness’s deposition, it is clear that Faryński held strong antisemitic views. After the Jewish woman was killed and buried he told those who buried her that he had no regrets because “Jews are leeches and act to the detriment of the population.” APKr, SAKr 995 K 16/50, p. 43. 97 The investigation against Bielawski was dropped. Three of the sheltered Jews were members of the Spokojny family, the fourth’s name was unknown; there were three men and one woman. 98 APKr, SAKr 954 K53/49, vol. 2, pp. 931-932.

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50 kilograms of wheat for each of the policemen.99 Józef Janus testified based on his conversation with Bielawski that to save Bielawski, Krzywonos told the Germans that the

Jews were found near Bielawski’s house and that Bielawski reported them to the police.100 Local men on the order of Krawczyk buried the bodies.101

During the investigation, details of other killings came to the surface. Krawczyk, the commandant of the Polish police in Racławice was also included in the indictment for giving the order to kill the four Jews. Moreover, Wesołowski and Bolesław Kalinowski were accused of killing four other Jews (two women and two boys) in the Kościejów fields. These Jews were previously also hidden at Bielawski’s and forced to leave after the execution of the other Jews.102

Kalinowski admitted during an interrogation that he and Wesołowski killed two

Jewish women and two Jewish men hiding in the fields (each of them killed a man and a woman). According to Kalinowski one of the Jewish women said she would reveal the names of people helping her once she was taken to the gendarmerie. He and Wesołowski decided that it would be better if they killed four Jews instead of bringing death on several Polish peasants, even more because those two Jewish women were in very bad shape. The policemen told the Jews to walk in front of them and then shot at them. Then they ordered peasants to bury the bodies.103 During the trial both Wesołowski and

99 APKr, SAKr 954 K53/49, vol. 1, pp. 37-38. There were also other Jews hiding at the Bielawskis. Ibid., pp. 52, 61. 100 Ibid., p. 60. 101 Ibid., p. 58. 102 APKr, SAKr 954 K53/49, vol. 2, p. 931-932. According to testimonies, Bielawski told the six remaining Jews to leave his place following the execution. Two of them remained at his property, while four others (a mother with three children) hid in the area and were brought food by Bielawski (pp. 828, 845). 103 APKr, SAKr 954 K53/49, vol. 1, pp. 84-85, 88, 213, 399. The judge considered the danger of the pacification of the village if the Jewish woman revealed the names of Poles assisting them as she already disclosed them to the Polish policemen (p. 941).

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Kalinowski changed their depositions and stated that they had not killed the Jews.104

According to Wesołowski, Ukrainian police had killed them; Kalinowski blamed the execution on German gendarmerie. He admitted shooting at but missing the victims on purpose.105 During the 1950 trial Faryński and Wesołowski admitted to the killing of the first Jewish family found at Bielawski’s house, but Wesołowski and Kalinowski recanted their depositions regarding the killing of the other four Jews found in the fields.

Jaworski received a sentence of seven years in prison for informing police about the hidden Jews and causing their capture and death. The policemen that arrived at his house were looking for an undelivered contingent. Jaworski informed on the Jews hiding at Bielawski’s to divert the attention of the policemen from the house search, in which his

Jews would be uncovered.106 Faryński was found guilty of shooting two Jews in

Miroszów in June 1943 and an unknown Jewish woman (in 1943 or 1944) and was sentenced to death. Wesołowski was sentenced to death for killing two Jews in Miroszów in June 1943 and two Jews in June 1944 in Kościejów.107 Kalinowski received a sentence of 12 years in prison for killing two Jews in Kościejów. Krawczyk was sentenced to 6 years in prison for apprehending four Jews.108

104 Both Kalinowski and Wesołowski claimed that they were terrorized and beaten during interrogations. APKr, SAKr 954 K53/49, vol. 2, pp. 805, 809. 105 Ibid., pp. 809, 937. 106 The judge concluded that Jaworski was aware of the possible outcome of his denunciation – he knew about the punishment for sheltering Jews. Jaworski himself was hiding Jews at the time of the police arriving at his home to look for missing contingent. Ibid., p. 940. 107 Although the court assumed the date of June 1944 for the second killing of four Jews, in the light of the testimonies of the accused and witness, the date should be June 1943. Cf. APKr, SAKr 954 K53/49, vol. 2, p. 1077. 108 Ibid., p. 932-934.

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The court believed Krawczyk did not issue the order to Wesołowski and Faryński to kill the Jews; on the contrary, he left the decision to them, thus they acted on their initiative and held the sole responsibility for the killing.109

What is remarkable in the details of the aforementioned killings discussed during the investigation and trial is the lack of empathy towards the Jewish victims both on the part of the policemen and peasants. Krawczyk might be an exception to it. The Jews are spoken of as disposable objects, a source of income or a problem, and there is no real consideration for their fate and feelings. All of the Jews were shot in the back.110 Some witnesses in the interrogation phase hinted at greed as a motive and suggested Bielawski and Jaworski worked together in order to take over Jewish property.111 Kalinowski argued in his deposition at the trial that there were cases of peasants exploiting Jews, who then “sent them to the police for shooting.”112 Moreover, the clothes of those killed, were for spoils.113

Along with the Polish police, volunteer firefighters were used in hunting for the

Jews in hiding.114 Agencja Prasowa reported under the title “Hangman’s minions” that most of the firefighters in the Kraśnik county eagerly responded to such orders.115

Piotr Sałek, chief of the fire station in the village of Racławice ( county)

109 APKr, SAKr 954 K53/49, vol. 2, pp. 937-939. In March 1951, the Supreme Court changed Wesołowski’s death sentence to 15 years in prison (p. 1006). 110 APKr, SAKr 954 K53/49, vol. 1, p. 208. 111 Ibid., pp. 117, 190 192, 282. 112 APKr, SAKr 954 K53/49, vol. 2, p. 811. 113 APKr, SAKr 954 K53/49, vol. 1, p. 202. 114 Cf. liquidation of the Łuków ghetto in The USHMM Encyclopedia II, 679. See also Grabowski, “Strażacy,” 255-256. Many of those who participated in the night guard and handed over Jews to the Polish police were among those tried after the war based on the August decree. 115 Agencja Prasowa, no. 5/142, December 1942, p. 4, AAN, AK 203/III-128, p. 68. Informacja Bieżąca wrote, “In some town in the Lublin district, among others in the Kraśnik county, firemen were involved by the Germans to catch Jewish bands in forests, most firemen agreed to this task without resistance.” (No. 47 (71), December 17, 1942), AAN, DR 202/III-7, p. 187.

183 and Józef Pączek, member of the firemen unit were known for their zeal in hunting down

Jews in hiding. In June 1944, Sałek mobilized all of his subordinates and told them they were on a Jew hunt. They found six Jews (including four children) in a house in

Racławice. The Jews were taken to the police station in Sułoszew and then to Wolbrom and delivered to the gendarmerie.116 In July or August 1944, another search for the Jews was organized and the firemen were called again to perform the search.117 Five Jews were found and handed over to three Polish policemen (Stanisław Kiciński, Pelant and

Masiarz) who were called over to pick them up. Pelant executed all five captives near a cemetery with a shot in the back of the head. Kiciński was tried with a group of nine other persons accused of apprehending Jews in hiding on a few different occasions and handing them over to the German police and Polish police.118

Sałek explained his actions by the fact that as chief of the fire department he was responsible to ensure that there were no Jews in the village. He argued he was afraid of bearing responsibility for their presence, as there were pacifications in neighbouring villages for sheltering Jews.119 In certain cases, the local population did act out of fear of possible reprisal. But one cannot discount the fact that greed also played a role when those who apprehended Jews could take their possessions.

116 APKr, SAKr 1021-K 150/50, pp. 35-35v. 117 Pączek was actually believed to be the force behind organizing the hunts for the Jews acting out of greed. Ibid., pp. 519v-520. 118 Ibid., p. 35v. Kiciński was acquitted of all charges and acknowledged as a person warning people before searches (pp. 525-526). 119 Ibid., p. 513v.

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Jagdkommandos

The Germans created special units to be used in the hunt for Jews (Judenjagd).

According to a May 1942 Home Army intelligence report, such units consisting of the

Polish policemen were used in Radom and Częstochowa. They were charged with searching out Jews in hiding and could either shoot Jews who were apprehended or hand them over to the Germans. A Polish police unit in Radom killed 40 Jews in 1942-1943.120

The one in Częstochowa consisted of 20 policemen under the command of Second

Lieutenant Drożdżewski; their first execution was carried out on six Jews (three men and three women).121

Polish policemen were included in various operational groups of the German police, which participated in the pacifications of villages, killing Poles and hunting for

Jews.122 The activities of the Jagdkommandos are the most striking example of collaboration and taking initiative in killing, yet they remain not fully explored. More sources became recently available through the court records of the former policemen.

Nowak’s Jagdkommando

One of the most infamous Jagdkommandos that epitomized other similar groups was Kazimierz Nowak’s unit. Created in February 1943 and dissolved in May, it was commanded by German gendarmes (first Fischer, then Baumgarten and Herling). His deputy and the actual leader of the group was Nowak, a sergeant of the Polish police.123

120 Sebastian Piątkowski, „Policja polska tzw. granatowa w Radomiu i powiecie radomskim (1939-1945).” Między Wisłą a Pilicą 2 (2001): 125. 121 Informacja Bieżąca, no. 34 (59), September 13, 1942; no. 37 (62), October 5, 1942. AAN, DR 202/III-7, pp. 148, 161. 122 Popławski, “Ustrój Policji Polskiej,” 605-606. 123 APKr, PPPBrN 9, p. 17. Kazimierz Nowak served during the occupation at the police station in Ojców, eventually becoming the deputy chief of the district. For his crimes Nowak has been targeted by the

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Nowak joined the force as a volunteer in 1940 in the rank of corporal and quickly gained the Germans’ confidence.124 Nowak’s group included a few German gendarmes and several Polish policemen who were from various police stations in the Miechów county.125 Some, but not all, volunteered. The unit received its orders from the German gendarmes.126

The first killing attributed to Nowak’s Jagdkommando was the execution of 40

Roma men, women and children in Ibramowice.127 In a report for the underground delivered by an anonymous member of the Jagdkommando, the source estimated that this mobile unit killed some 300 Poles, Roma and Jews.128 Those murders gained the unit the nickname Mordkommando attributed to it by the local population.129 In the words of

Fischer, the first commander of the unit, its tasks included to investigate and discover members of political and military underground organizations and to “liquidate Jews in hiding, Gypsies, bandits and other criminals.”130 Nowak’s unit was especially active in hunting underground members and was known for pacifications.131 The group was

underground and shot in June 1943; he succumbed to his wounds. Demokrata daily reported in August 1943 about Nowak’s death describing him as a “hangman of the Polish population who had on his conscience death of many peasants.” Demokrata, no. 13, August [24?], 1943. 124 Hempel, “Policja granatowa”, 492. 125 Łukasz Grzywacz-Świtalski, Z walk na Podkarpaciu (Warsaw: IW Pax, 1971), 61. There were approximately 10-15 policemen in the unit. Cf. AAN, AK 203/XI-21, p. 1. 126 AAN, AK 203/XI-21, p. 1. 127 Ważniewski, Walki partyzanckie, 117. Grzywacz-Świtalski, Z walk na Podkarpaciu, 64. 128 AAN, AK 203/XI-21, pp. 1-2. By the end of April, the Jagdkommando in just six towns killed 176 persons, including three families murdered for sheltering Jews. The members of the unit were rewarded with the spoils as well special rewards such as alcohol. Ważniewski, Walki partyzanckie, 118. 129 Ważniewski, Walki partyzanckie, 116. 130 Ibid., 117. 131 Some of the crimes of the Nowak’s unit included killing of 110 inhabitants of Nasiechowice and killing of 13 people in Czaple. Antoni Iglewski, “Wykonanie wyroku śmierci na komendancie policji granatowej w Miechowie 24.6.1943 R,” Wojskowy Przegląd Historyczny 2 (1966): 452.

186 involved in arresting people suspected of crimes, searching for Jews who were denounced by the local population and apprehending them, searching for alleged communists, apprehending people for forced labour in Germany, and fighting smuggling.132

Although some of the members were tried after the war (Zygmunt Rybicki and

Stanisław Komorek), the extent of the Nowak’s Jagdkommando was never fully assessed.

Post-war courts were aware of some of the activities of the Jagdkommando but did not have detailed information about the most active participants.133 Rybicki was arrested in

1945 and tried from 1947 until 1951.134 His case moved from from the District Court to the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.135 Witnesses described Rybicki’s participation in the penal expedition unit.136 Rybicki was indicted on 25 charges, which included oppressing and killing civilians, arresting those who were prosecuted and sought for by the occupying authorities, and extortion. The indictment described him as zealous and carrying out orders to the letter. Rybicki was said to have shown his own initiative and acted with full awareness and intended to assist the occupier.137 The assessment of his wartime activities was not unequivocal as there were witnesses confirming his positive actions including helping Jews by supplying them with false documents.138

132 AAN, AK 203/XI-21, pp. 2, 6-8. 133 The issue of Nowak’s Jagdkommando came up in the trial of Piotr Sałabun. AIPN, IPN Ki128/194, pp. 149-150, 167-168v. 134 Rybicki was first interrogated in August 1945. He testified that he spent the war in Warsaw running his brother-in-law store and that it was his brother Roman, not him, who served in the Polish Police. APKr, SAKr 980B K234/49 vol. 1, p. 15. 135 Cf. records of the investigation and trials against Rybicki: SAKr 980A K234/49, SAKr 980B K234/49, APKr 29/1305/2187 XI Ds. 52/48. 136 APKR, SAKr 980A K234/49a vol. 2, pp. 35, 75-76. 137 Ibid., pp. 479-482. 138 Witness M. Profesorski testified about Rybicki’s assistance to him, which included warning him about the upcoming deportation from Słomniki and providing him with a false . He also helped Profesorski’s cousin to leave the ghetto. APKR, SAKr 980A K234/49a vol. 2, pp. 397, 399, 875.

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To a certain extent the underground report contradicts the court’s assessment of

Rybicki’s role. An anonymous author of the report notes that Rybicki voluntarily joined the unit and was among its worst members.139 A death sentence on Rybicki issued by the underground was not carried out.140 Stanisław Komorek, tried in another case but called as a witness in Rybicki’s case, admitted to knowing the Polish commander of the

Jagdkommando Nowak but denied any contact with him.141 However, already during the war, the underground had detailed accounts of the activities of the policemen participating in the actions of the Jagdkommando; Rybicki along with Komorek was considered among the most brutal.142

Komorek was accused and tried in 1947-48 for participating in the killing of three civilians, in two cases as a member of the “German operational group, and for confiscating products.”143 Some witnesses testified that Komorek was zealous and known for his aggressive behaviour while others gave him a lot of credit for his selfless help and interceding on behalf of the arrested.144 Komorek was acquitted and released in January

1948. Rybicki’s participation in an arrest carried out by Nowak’s group was confirmed in the adjudication by the Cracow District Court (SOKr) in 1948. It was acknowledged that

Rybicki exhibited brutal behaviour mostly towards the rural population but despite the charges proved against him, he assisted people in many cases (through warnings before

139 AAN, AK, 203/XI-21, pp. 5, 10. We need to take into consideration possible scapegoating on the part of the author of the report. 140 APKr, SAKr 980B K234/49, vol. 1, pp. 369-370; v. III, p. 1298. 141 APKR, SAKr 980A K234/49a, vol. 3, p. 978. Witnesses in Komorek’s trial testified about both Komorek and Nowak’s presence during house searches. See depositions of Agata Musiał, Jan Kulesza, and Zuzanna Kulesza, AIPN, GK 255/345, pp. 50v-51v, 108v-109. 142 Akta spraw Sądu Inspektoratu Miechów Obszaru Krakow, AAN, AK 203/XI-21, pp. 1-11. 143 AIPN, GK 255/345, pp. 13v, 59v. Komorek served in the Police since 1936 to 1939. He returned to service in 1940 and in 1943 he voluntarily joined the expedition unit. According to his own testimony he deserted in July 1944. 144 Ibid., pp. 4v, 12v, 39-39v, 110v.

188 searches and arrests), and he did not denounce the Jews in hiding that he became aware of; on the contrary, he helped them.145

Another underground report related information about the Polish police expedition of some 80 people, including ten Germans in the uniforms of the Polish police and speaking Polish, under the command of Nowak. A civilian carried out the executions. The report justified the executions by the fact that they were punishment for those suspected of crimes or as a preventive means. It gave an example of a few of those: a house of a known bandit was burnt down, a Jewish woman was shot; her sons were suspected of banditry and she was not able to tell where they were located.146

Other members of the Jagdkommando who were known for their brutality were

Franciszek Kapusta from the Ojców police station, Szofkało, Pelon and Kasowski.

Nowak’s closest comrade was Kazimierz Guzik, a prewar miner, who also entered the service in 1940 and worked with Nowak at the police station in Ojców.147 Marian

Szatkowski, a former member of the Judenrat in Maków, who managed to hide on the

“Aryan” side in Cracow attributes to Guzik the killing of his brother Wilhelm. Wilhelm was hiding in Wolbrom near Cracow and was recognized by Guzik who was also from

Maków. Szatkowski’s brother was arrested and shot.148

145 APKr, SAKr 980A K234/49, vol. 3, pp. 1286, 1288, 1293; 980B K234/49, vol. 4, pp. 412, 999. The district court judge also commented on fulfilling the German orders by Rybicki by pointing out that some of the orders had to be carried out if only to keep the pretense. Otherwise the Germans would act alone, without a filter. APKr, SAKr 980A K234/49, vol. 3, pp. 1303-1304; APKr, SAKr 980B K234/49, vol. 4, 391, 411. This opinion was also shared by the voivodeship court in 1951. In the words of the judge, Rybicki, as a policeman was subject to discipline and had to carry out orders unconditionally. His sentence was finally settled at 8 years of prison. Rybicki’s assistance to Jews was considered as a mitigating factor. APKr, SAKr 980B K234/49, vol. 4, pp. 998-999. 146 Report for January-February 1943. AAN, AK 203/XI-25, pp. 24-25. 147 Hempel, “Policja granatowa”, 492. 148 Testimony of Marian Szatkowski, YV, O.3/1818, p. 7.

189

“Following the Orders”

The policemen received orders from both their Polish chiefs of police stations and from German superiors. Execution of those orders depended on individual policemen and how dangerous refusal or negligence could be or was perceived by a policeman. The police often decided themselves how closely they would follow the line of duty. Various degrees of carrying out the orders and more lenient or strict attitudes of the policemen varied among the individuals and police stations as well and are recorded in the available sources. The presence of the German superiors did increase the zeal of some policemen but in many cases policemen could use their discretion. What we can observe in the available sources, is that in many circumstances the Polish policemen had the freedom to turn a blind eye on acts deemed criminal by the German authorities and spare people’s lives and property.

When Polish police began to carry out round-ups of people for forced labour in

Germany, it stirred public opinion. The diligence with which the policemen acted was to some reminiscent of the actions of the Jewish policemen in the Warsaw ghetto during the deportations of 1942, according to an underground report. The report noted that the Polish police were a tool in German hands, fulfilling the shameful role of aiding and abetting the occupiers, which was equivalent to treason.149 Some Polish policemen were carrying out the task of delivering the quota very eagerly. A monthly Prawda (Truth), an organ of

Catholic group Front for Reborn Poland (Front Odrodzenia Polski), warned: the “First day of freedom will be a day of judgment and punishment for those degenerate servants

149 A report from December 1, 1942. AAN, AK 203/VII-48, p. 151. See also Joint Report no. 164, AAN, AK 203/I/18.

190 of Germans, slaves of their own fear and own baseness.”150 During searches for people avoiding forced labour in Germany the policemen could and sometimes did report that they could not locate the person in question or they have not found the missing cattle.

Undated underground information on relations in the Polish police discusses the

German order to combat street trade. Some police precincts chose to ignore it while others executed it to the letter. Two officers were singled out by the report – the head of the 7th precinct, Captain Jacyna and Major Tarwid, chief of the District North.151 Both expected great results from their subordinates and policemen had to comply. The officers of the police also had some flexibility in applying punishment for crimes and transgressions. Captain Ferdynand Szappert, the chief of the 6th precinct, had been known for executing the rule of law and applying the highest punishment possible. An underground informer proposed bringing Szappert to justice for his treacherous actions.152

Similarly, the police had the power to not report Jews in hiding and in some cases they did not. It is harder to trace those cases but we can rely on the testimonies of the survivors and to a lesser extent those of the policemen (when they claimed such cases during their trials). The policemen had more room to manoeuvre when they acted in the absence of their German superior. It depended on them to exercise this capacity; however, they had to take into consideration fellow policemen and the local population.

The following case is a poignant example that sometimes even when given an order, the policemen were able to make decisions and refrain from assisting Germans in

150 Prawda, January 1943, p. 10. Prawda was issued in Poland from April 1942 to August 1944 by the Front for Reborn Poland, an underground group actively involved in assistance to Jews. 151 AAN, AK 203/III-124, p. 36. 152 AAN, AK 203/III-128, p. 82.

191 killing captured Jews. In November 1943 a woman and a child were discovered on the

“Aryan” side in Warsaw. Germans told them to jump out of the window. The Polish police were called and realized the boy survived the fall. A doctor confirmed the boy could survive; he also noted that the boy was circumcised. After the Polish police precinct had forwarded that information to the German police authorities, they were ordered to shoot the boy. Because no one from the Polish police was willing to carry out the order, the wounded boy was taken to the Transferstelle and most likely shot there.153

Many of the policemen tried for actions against the Polish and Jewish populations attempted to evoke the “following the orders” alibi. The courts treated the defence of acting on orders inconsistently.154 According to the August Decree it was not a valid argument but since 1946 it was considered as mitigating circumstances. Leopold Hnatko, chief of the Polish police station in Tymbark, was tried for his activities against the Polish population, underground organizations and Jews in hiding. Among other charges, he was found guilty of participating in capturing a Jewish married couple hiding with their son in a Pole’s house. The judge believed Hnatko’s explanation that he had only been present at the arrest done by the German gendarmerie and had acted under their orders without showing any initiative. However, the court ruled that as a policeman, Hnatko knew the purpose of the expedition with the gendarmes; therefore, he was guilty of participating in arresting the couple.155

153 Addendum to the report no. 56 for the period of November 1-15, 1943. AAN, DR 202/III-8, pp. 207- 208. 154 However, in many cases, following the order or not showing own initiative enabled the accused to receive a milder sentence. Jan Malinowski was found guilty of arresting a Jewish woman but received a shorter sentence because “he acted on the orders of the German gendarmerie” and he had to follow the orders of his superiors. AIPN, GK 220/26, p. 46. See also APKr, SAKr 948 K18/49, p. 427; AIPN GK314/76, p. 179. 155 APKr, SAKr, 1017 K130/50, pp. 329-332.

192

In the case of Leopold Kowalik, acting on the order of a German gendarme was accepted as mitigating circumstance. Initially, Kowalik was sentenced to death by Court of Appeals in Cracow for killing a Jewish woman and to 10 years in prison for persecuting Polish population. The Supreme Court found Kowalik guilty of taking the woman to the execution site, where a gendarme then killed her. The judge changed the sentence to 15 years in prison and ruled that by escorting the Jewish woman to the execution site Kowalik participated in her killing even if he did not pull the trigger himself, because he was aware of the purpose of taking her there.156

“I would like to document through this, that he was killed as a bandit, not as a Jew.”157

During the investigation against him, Sylwester Jaworski requested to append the criminal records of Hirschek Jud, one of the two Jews allegedly killed by Jaworski.

Hirschek Jud and Kaila Miller were hiding near Żurawiec, Otwock county. Jud would come for food to Jan Pieniak, whose property was at the edge of the village. Pieniak allegedly asked Jud to stop coming to his place out of fear of the consequences. When Jud failed to do so, Pieniak reported him to the deputy chief of the police station in

Sulejówek, Ludwik Nawrocki.158 Nawrocki and Jaworski came to Pieniak’s and all three went to Jud’s hideout. The policemen killed both Jud and Miller. The District Court of the

Warsaw Voivodeship (SWWW) sentenced Pieniak and Nawrocki for their crimes

(denouncing the Jews and killing them, respectively), in 1950. The Court took into consideration that both of them implemented the occupier’s extermination policy but that

156 APKr, SAKr 978 K22/49, pp. 231, 253-255. 157 AIPN, GK 318/707a, vol. 2, p. 22. 158 AIPN, GK 318/707, vol. 1, pp. 25v, 57.

193 they acted under the orders of the occupier to report, apprehend, and even shoot Jews in hiding.159 Jaworski did not stand trial until 1961 because he had changed his name in the late 1940s and could not be located. Jaworski did not admit his guilt and claimed that Jud demanded food under the threat of shooting, was most likely a suspect of armed assaults, and when Jaworski and Nawrocki came to arrest him, Jud shot at them. Jud was in fact charged with assaults before the war but there were no records of him doing so during the occupation. The Court rejected Jaworski’s defence and decided that Jud was not killed as a bandit in hiding but as a persecuted person. Just like Nawrocki and Pieniek, Jaworski was charged with implementing the occupier’s extermination policies but it was acknowledged that he had acted on the orders of his superior Nawrocki and on German orders.160 The chief of the police station in Sulejówek, Jan Grodnicki, testified during

Jaworski’s trial, “The Germans ordered us to do with Jews the same as they did and it was up to individual policemen what stance they would take. In my area there were no Jews, they just hid there. We were supposed to catch Jews and deliver them to the Germans. I had not received an order to shoot the Jews.”161

“Jewish Gestapo Agents” Excuse

One of the explanations that was used to justify killing the Jews is that they were

Gestapo agents and were giving up the names of the Poles who assisted them.162 While in some cases Jews were forced to give up the name of the people sheltering them upon the

159 AIPN, GK 318/707a, vol. 1, p. 13. 160 AIPN, GK 318/707, vol. 1, pp. 57v-59. He also knew about many hiding Jews and did not report them but warned them about the Germans, including passing on information about the upcoming liquidation of the Miłosna ghetto (pp. 31-32). 161 Ibid., pp. 48-48v. 162 Cf. AIPN, GK 281/59.

194 false promise of relief from captivity, this argument was used as a convenient excuse and justification for killing Jews.163

Stanisław Sadowski, a Bahnschutz policeman, was acquitted in 1945 of killing a

Jew who attempted to flee while being escorted with two other Jews to the train station in

Przeworsk. The Jews were destined for the Gestapo in Jarosław. Sadowski was ordered to accompany a Polish policeman Leonard Stanisławski. According to Sadowski, both he and Stanisławski shot at the escaping Jewish man; it was impossible to assess who shot first and whose bullet killed the Jew. The policeman Stanisławski claimed that he stayed with the remaining two Jews and did not shoot.164 During the trial Sadowski withdrew his testimony claiming he was beaten during the investigation and testified that two German soldiers killed the Jew.165 Prior to the trial Sadowski’s lawyer requested calling in a witness who would testify that the escorted Jews disclosed to the Gestapo names of Poles who sheltered partisans sought after by the Gestapo and they were being transferred to

Jarosław to give more details.166

The Case of Five Policemen from the County

In 1954 Bruno Mrowiński was arrested by the Security Office in Mielec under accusation that as the head of the police station in Górne he committed murders of Polish citizens of Jewish nationality. Soon, three other policemen were arrested for carrying out arrests and murders of Jews during the German occupation:

163 See Jan Grabowski, “‘I Wish to Add that I was not Aware and Carried out the Task as a Soldier of the Home Army.’ On the Murder of Jews Hiding near Racławice by a Company of the Miechów Home Army,” Holocaust Studies and Materials 2 (2010): 337-362. 164 AIPN, GK 207/119, pp. 10, 14, 19, 159-161. 165 Ibid., p. 104v. 166 Ibid., p. 69.

195

Józef Gancarczyk,167 Józef Sądej, and Ignacy Pawlik. The fifth policeman, Jan Pielach, the wartime chief of the Gawłuszowice station, was already serving a sentence of 15 years in prison and his case was excluded from the trial.168 Except for Pawlik all were professional policemen who served before the war. The 1954 indictment accused them of using “fascist methods during their service through apprehending and shooting citizens of

Jewish nationality, persecuted on political grounds.”169

Mrowiński became the commandant of the police station in Wadowice Górne in the summer of 1943; his deputy was Gancarczyk. It was common knowledge that many

Jews were hiding in the area. After Mrowiński was transferred to Wadowice Górne, the district chief of the Polish police Franciszek Gawlik reported to him about a document listing where Jews were hiding. On his own initiative Mrowiński called a meeting of inhabitants of the area where the Jews were hiding and told them about the document, urging them to remove the Jews from their property to avoid the danger.170 During the trial Mrowiński tried to use that meeting as proof of him protecting both the Jews and their rescuers because he appealed to them to find a different hiding place. He organized more of such meetings warning about the consequences for both Poles and Jews.171

According to Mrowiński’s co-accused Sądej, Mrowiński organized such meetings to let

167 Gancarczyk had been arrested by the Citizens’ Militia in December 1945 for collaborating with Germans. In November 1946, a Special Court in Tarnów acquitted him of the charge of kicking a peasant who attacked a village leader during a contingent check. AIPN, GK 314/162, pp. 115v-116. 168 AIPN, GK 314/163, pp. 295-305, 301. He was sentenced for committing crimes during the occupation, including those faced by the other four policemen. AIPN, GK 314/162, p. 37. 169 AIPN, GK 314/163, p. 302. During the investigation the accused admitted to committing certain crimes. 170 Ibid., pp. 12-14v. When he returned a week later to the families who were hiding Jews he didn’t find any Jews. On the rescue of Jews in the Mielec county see Tomasz Frydel, “Konstrukcja pamięci o ratowaniu Żydów na polskiej wsi: studium przypadku Radomyśla Wielkiego i powiatu mieleckiego,” in Zagłada Żydów na polskiej prowincji, 335-365. 171 AIPN, GK 314/162, pp. 15, 148. Mrowiński also recalled cases of helping Jews when he was temporarily transferred to the police station in Gawłuszowice. He allegedly released nine Jews that he was escorting to Mielec with Sądej as well as two Jews released from the station in Gawłuszowice (pp. 115v- 116).

196 people know about the prohibition to shelter Jews in order “to protect people from the

German’s retaliation.” He recalled that when he served in Wadowice Górne, the Germans burnt down more than half of the buildings in the nearby Podbórze village as a punishment for sheltering Jews. There were announcements warning people not to assist

Jews but people ignored them.172

Around that time (summer 1943) the police station in Wadowice Górne received information that a Jewish family was hiding at Krawiec’s in Wampierzowie. Mrowiński,

Szumski and Gancarczyk were sent to search for Jews. During the search four members of the Kiwa family were killed. Gancarczyk never admitted to the crime claiming it was

Szumski who shot. The court was not able to determine who pulled the trigger but because the accused were active and armed and as members of the search were present in the area of the execution, it was sufficient to charge both of them with participation in the killing even if it was Szumski who killed the Kiwas.173 Mrowiński, who was also present during the execution was charged with the killings as well.174

The accusations against the policemen from Mielec county of participation in actions against Jews date back to the summer of 1942. On the request of Pielach, chief of the police in Gawłuszowice, Sądej, Mrowiński, and Syska took part in the search for Jews hiding in Ostrówek. A few peasants were taken to help. Sądej apprehended a Jewish man and together with Mrowiński brought him to the collection point, where there was already a woman with a small boy. Despite Mrowiński’s pleas to release the Jews and his protests against killing them, Pielach gave an order to shoot the Jews. Pielach killed the adults and

172 AIPN, GK 314/162, p. 112v. 173 Ibid., pp. 118, 148-149. 174 Ibid., p. 143.

197 then finished off the boy who was only wounded by Syska. Pielach then also killed a young woman, captured by the peasants.175 The court was unable to establish beyond a doubt who shot whom. However, it managed to establish that both Mrowiński and Sądej were present with Pielach near the victims during the shooting. They both were armed and participated in the search. Despite the fact of acting on the orders of Pielach, their behaviour constituted participation in the killing of civilians (article 1 point 1 of the

August decree).176

Most of the crimes were committed in the spring and summer of 1943. In the spring 1943 Sądej and Gancarczyk apprehended a Jewish family of three (the Hills) in

Zabrnie and handed them over to the German gendarmerie in Mielec.177 In the fall of

1943, due to a denunciation, Mrowiński and Sądej arrested the tailor Peres in Wadowice

Dolne. They escorted him to the police station. In the evening while being led to an outhouse by Gancarczyk and Pawlik, Peres attempted an escape. Gancarczyk claimed he shot in the air but Pawlik aimed at Peres and killed him.178 Sądej also admitted to escorting six Jews captured by the gendarmes in Wadowice Dolne in the summer of 1943 and killing a Jew who tried to escape.179 Sądej was charged with complicity because he escorted the victim. He was also found guilty of escorting to the gendarmerie, alongside

175 AIPN, GK 314/162, pp. 111-111v, 143, 147. According to witnesses’ testimonies the killed ones were the family of Leszkowicz. 176 Ibid., p. 147. 177 Ibid., pp. 111v, 119v, 145. Both accused admitted to the crime (p. 151). 178 The judge assessed that both of them were guilty of participating in the killing because they participated in the crime by escorting Peres. Ibid., pp. 112, 150. Gancarczyk was charged with participation in the killing he categorically denied (pp. 118v, 144). 179 Ibid., pp. 111v, 144, 150.

198 the policeman Szumski, members of two Jewish families hidden on Krawiec’s property in the summer of 1943.180

Sądej, Gancarczyk, and Mrowiński faced the most charges. In addition to the aforementioned charges Gancarczyk also admitted to the killing of a Jewish man named

Gotlang in Wychylówka during Easter 1943. Gancarczyk claimed that he killed him on

Gotlang’s own request because he was wounded.181 Gancarczyk did testify about wounding a Jewish man brought to the police station in Wadowice Górne who tried to escape while being taken to an outhouse, the chief of the station then shot him to death.182

Gancarczyk voluntarily testified to his participation with the German gendarmerie in a search for Jews in Jamy in the winter 1942. Several Jews were caught and shot on the spot. However, Gancarczyk had been acquitted because “he didn’t know the purpose of the search and behaved passively.” Similarly, Pawlik was acquitted on the same grounds from participating in a search during which three Jews were killed in the summer of

1943.183

The co-defendants received relatively mild sentences of just over five years in prison by the verdict of the Voivodeship Court in Rzeszów from February 1955.184 The judge took into consideration difficult conditions of work during the German occupation where the policemen were often caught between fulfilling the orders of the occupier and considering the well-being of Polish society. The court acknowledged that large numbers

180 AIPN, GK 314/162, pp. 145, 150. Szumski, a policeman from Wadowice Górne, was also mentioned in another case of killing a Jewish family. According to Mrowiński he was a very zealous policeman. He was killed by the underground (p. 116). 181 Ibid., p. 118v. 182 Ibid., p. 110. 183 Ibid., pp. 110, 151. Pawlik was delegated to Radomyśl Wielki police station, where there were already many Polish policemen and about five gendarmes. 184 Ibid., pp. 143-146.

199 of Jews in hiding and very active underground organizations made that struggle even more difficult. Policemen acted under orders or under threat, which were considered mitigating circumstances.185 After the appeal of the Prosecutor and accused, the Supreme

Court increased the sentences, doubling the prison time for all but Pawlik. In the adjudication the judge ruled that in cases of genocide (ludobójstwo) it is sufficient to participate by virtue of having one’s gun in hand, the death did not have to be caused directly by shots from the accused.186

The post-war courts tried policemen for a variety of crimes and even though it is difficult to know which cases the court found the most criminal, there is an array of criminal activities against the Jews for which the policemen were sentenced to jail. Jan

Baraniak was found guilty of arresting, along with another policeman, a Jewish man named Meszel, whom he later delivered to the Gestapo. He was also guilty of participating in round-ups of Poles for forced labour and confiscating food products. He was sentenced to 10 years in prison.187

The trials would often drag for years. Feliks Żagański, head of the police station in

Szczekociny and later a policeman in Małogoszcza, had been tried first in 1948 and was acquitted of charges of shooting at and arresting a partisan and handing him over to

German authorities, participation in killing of a Jew, arresting Poles suspected of underground activities and confiscating food products. Żagański was a member of the

Home Army. The opinions issued about him prior to his arrest were contradictory. Some witnesses described his zealous behaviour while others pointed to his assistance to the

185 AIPN, GK 314/162, pp. 152-153. 186 Ibid., pp. 195-206. 187 AIPN, GK 266/10, pp. 105-105, 168-169.

200 underground.188 In 1951 the investigation against Żagański was renewed when new facts came to the surface, including participation in the killing of a Jewish man by giving an order to another policeman to shoot him. In March 1953, Żagański had been sentenced to

12 years in prison, later reduced to 10 years.189

The task of the courts to establish the faults of the former policemen was often a slow and difficult process. They were faced with contradictory testimonies, admissions of crimes during the investigation and recanting of them during the trial. Often, the eyewitnesses did not remember details and the policemen would be acquitted. There were also cases where a policeman’s behaviour could not be classified in clearly defined categories. In many cases, those who were found guilty of crimes against Poles and Jews were also credited with assistance to those they persecuted. Gray areas existed where the policemen were caught between fulfilling their duties and acting as responsible and patriotic individuals. The struggle reflects the many dimensions of their work and constant demand of decision making, which could save or cost lives.

Participating in Killings

Polish policemen often assisted in the round-ups carried out by the German gendarmerie, in which they partook in the shooting of apprehended Jews. Sebastian

Piątkowski, a historian of the Radom district, researched two cases of such killings. In

August 1942, policemen from the Klimontów police station participated in the shooting of twenty-two Jews near the local synagogue and thirteen in a forest. In the beginning of

1943, policemen from the police station in Osiek responding to the denunciation by a

188 AIPN, GK 306/79, vol. 1, pp. 5, 7, 19-21, vol. 2, pp. 22-22v. 189 AIPN, GK 306/79, vol. 2, pp. 55-55v, 88, 231-233, 260-262v. In February 1957, Żagański was conditionally released from prison before the end of his sentence.

201 forest ranger surrounded a camp of Jewish fugitives in a forest near the village of

Strzegomek. They proceeded to shoot all of them, some sixteen persons - men, women and children.190

Eugeniusz Zalewski, a policeman in Jaktorów and Żyrardów, was accused of participating in the killing of members of the civilian population sought after for

“political reasons,” handing over a Jew to the gendarmerie in 1943, arresting people suspected of belonging to the underground, abuse and confiscating food.191 In April 1949,

Zalewski was sentenced to death. His trial showed that during the occupation Zalewski was feared by the local population and was considered a close associate of the gendarmerie because the Germans often requested his participation. The judge took into consideration that Polish policemen could always expect the order to participate in crimes committed in the interests of the German state; however, none other of Zalewski’s colleagues had been charged with so many allegations.192 Based on witnesses’ testimonies, Zalewski was found guilty of killing a Pole, two Jewish women, handing over to the gendarmerie a Jewish man and other persons. He was also charged with abuse and confiscating foods, and participation with the gendarmerie in arrests. Ultimately, he was sentenced to death.193

Jakub Kwiecień and Kazimierz Siemianowski from the police station in Chroborz

(Pińczów county) were tried for participating with the gendarmes in the shooting of three

Jews (a woman with two sons) in the spring of 1943. They denied their complicity and

190 Piątkowski, “Między obowiązkiem a kolaboracją,” 178. 191 APW, SOW 3215, p. 4. 192 Ibid., pp. 181, 183. 193 Ibid., p. 185. There is no information whether the sentence was carried out but Zalewski’s appeal was rejected (p. 205).

202 argued that the gendarmes ordered the Polish policemen to shoot the Jews. They testified that when they told the Germans they could not do it, they were threatened with the most severe consequences. The Polish policemen shot first, then the gendarmes, who aimed properly at the Jews (unlike the accused) and killed them. The judge believed the policemen acted on orders but argued that they were aware that the action was aimed at

“liquidating of the Polish citizens of Jewish nationality” because of their origins.194

Kwiecień and Siemianowski were credited with assisting Jews by taking them from the ghetto, providing identity papers and food. Those acts of assistance, however, did not outweigh their guilt.195

Final Destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto

On January 18, 1943 German gendarmerie and Polish police fortified the outer guard of the Warsaw ghetto.196 The 1943 January defence in the ghetto broke the psychological barrier and increased resistance fervour. On January 21, close to 200 policemen assumed duty in the ghetto. In February, the policemen on duty in the ghetto reported the aggressive attitude of Jews and a few attempts on their part to disarm police and gain arms. The Command of the Polish Police allegedly rejected the German project of reprisal shootings of Jews. However, the Germans issued an order for the Polish policemen to shoot at Jews in hiding. According to the report, the police sabotaged it.197

In the early afternoon of April 18, a briefing took place at the Leader of the SS and Police. Those present were: the chief of the Schutzpolizei in Warsaw, Lt.-Col. Jarke,

194 AIPN, GK 306/21, p. 132. 195 Ibid., pp. 115-116v, 133. 196 Report from January 18, 1943. AAN, DR 202/II-44, p. 88. 197 Report of Security Corps, no. 3, February 20, 1943 for November 15, 1942 – February 15, 1943. AAN, DR 202/II-35, pp. 45, 46. See also AAN, DR 202/II-44, pp. 108, 112.

203 his deputy, Cpt. Veesinger, the district chief of the Ordnungspolizei Lt.-Col. Rudolf von

Zamory and Maj. Przymusiński, the commandant of the Polish police in Warsaw.

According to the report the Polish police received an order to provide a unit of five officers and 215 policemen for 01.00 hr on . The task of the police was to guard the exterior walls of the ghetto and prevent the escape of Jews outside of these walls.198

Another underground report conveyed that at 6pm on April 18 SS, German and Polish police were concentrated at critical areas. The Polish police were among the 5,000 strong force that entered the ghetto on April 19.199 According to the , the

Ordnungspolizei units in the ghetto included 363 rank policemen and 4 officers of the

Polish police. There were also 166 Polish firemen.200

During the first two days of fights, the Polish police suffered casualties.

According to an underground report, on April 19 at 7pm three policemen were caught in the fire between the Germans and Jews. Corporal Julian Zieliński, an off-duty policeman from the 14th precinct, was killed and two were wounded on Bonifraterska Street (on-duty

Corporal Franciszek Kluziński from the 7th precinct was shot in the hand and off-duty

198 “Pszczelarz’s” report on the Polish police’s participation in the liquidation of the Warsaw Ghetto between April 19 and 26. April 28, 1943. AAN, AK 203/III-122, p. 6. “Pszczelarz” was one of conspiratorial pseudonyms of Bolesław Wojciech Nanowski (1912-1975). From 1942 he was the head of the police counter-intelligence department of Second Division of the Warsaw District Home Army Headquarters. Kunert, Słownik biograficzny konspiracji warszawskiej 1939-1944, vol. 1 (Warsaw: Instytut Wydawniczy Pax, 1987), 119. According to Nanowski’s testimony, the Police Bureau (Referat policyjny) monitored activities of Orpo, Schupo, Gendarmerie, Polish police in Warsaw and Warsaw district and Kriminalpolizei. They collected information on activities of the police forces and invigilated their functionaries especially those who posed danger to the Polish cause. The department collected evidence of killings, assaults and robbery. In addition to daily reports, once a week the department prepared a Police Chronicle (Kronika policyjna) recording instance of killings, diversion, theft etc. Quoted after Władysław Bułhak, and Andrzej Krzysztof Kunert, “Kontrwywiad Podziemnej Warszawy. Struktura, zadania i obsada personalna kontrwywiadu Komendy Głównej, Obszaru Warszawa i Okręgu Warszawa ZWZ-AK w latach 1939-1944,” in Wywiad i kontrwywiad Armii Krajowej, ed. Władysław Bułhak. (Warsaw: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej), 366-367. 199 Meldunki Oddziału Polityczno-Informacyjnego o sytuacji w kraju, no. 149, April 20, 1943. AAN, DR 202/II-21, pp. 34-35. See also Mark, Uprising in the Warsaw Ghetto, 19. 200 Jürgen Stroop, Warszawska żydowska w Warszawie już nie istnieje!, ed. Andrzej Żbikowski (Warsaw: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej & Żydowski Instytut Historyczny, 2009), 29.

204

Sergeant W. Frydrykiewicz from the 1st precinct was shot in the stomach).201 The casualties resulted from a failed solidarity action headed by Captain Józef Pszenny of the

Warsaw Home Army Kedyw (Directorate for Subversion), which attempted to blow up a segment of the ghetto walls. The Polish policemen alerted the Germans and the fight ensued.202

The next day, Jewish fighters wounded Corporal Stanisław Gruszecki from the

Guard and Convoy Unit (OWK) in both legs.203 Some underground sources and post-war historians report two casualties on April 20 and one on April 23. Głos Warszawy (Voice of Warsaw), organ of the Polish Workers’ Party (PPR) conveyed, “On April 20 at 1:45, a

People’s Guard squad, named for Waryński, attacked a large enemy machine-gun nest on

Nowiniarska, killing the entire crew consisting of two Waffen SS men and two of their

Polish police lackeys standing in the rear. The attackers got away without casualties.”204

Henryk Witkowski, a member of Warsaw Kedyw, writes that on April 23 Warsaw

District Kedyw officers and a diversionary-combat group “DB-3” Śródmieście attempted to blow up a shut down gate in the ghetto wall on Pawia St. to enable Jews to escape.

They engaged in fighting with the SS and Polish police, in which four SS officers and one

201 AAN, AK 203/III-122, p. 15. Julian Zieliński from the 14th precinct is listed among the casualties in the Stroop report. He died on April 19 while on duty. Kluziński and Frydrykiewicz are counted among the wounded. Stroop, Warszawska dzielnica, 24, 25. Ber Mark gives the number of two Germans and two Polish policemen killed. Mark, Uprising in the Warsaw Ghetto, 42. 202 Mark, Uprising, 42; Libionka, “Zapisy,” 586. See also Henryk Witkowski, “Kedyw” Okręgu Warszawskiego Armii Krajowej w latach 1943-1944 (Warsaw: Instytut Wydawniczy Związków Zawodowych, 1984), 251. For more on the Home Army’s attempts to help the fighters in the ghetto see Strzembosz, Akcje zbrojne, 190-202. 203 Stroop, Warszawska dzielnica, 26. The first casualties were also immediately reported by the underground - see AAN, AK 203/III-122, pp. 6, 15, 17. 204 Głos Warszawy, no. 21 (30), April 28, 1943. Quoted after Mark, Uprising in the Warsaw Ghetto, 150- 151. writes that on April 20, 1943 a special group of the HQ of the Gwardia Ludowa liquidated two-person German battery crew at the corner of Nowiniarska and Franciszkańska Streets. Along the Germans two Polish policemen were killed. Szymon Datner, Las sprawiedliwych, 95.

205

Polish policeman were killed.205 Other policemen wounded in the ghetto were: Bolesław

Stasik, 8th precinct (wounded on April 27), two policemen from the Guard and Convoy –

Jerzy Mostowski and Antoni Gładkowski (April 28).206

The policemen tried to avoid the service of guarding the ghetto and many did not show up for work. Police officer Leon Skomorowski complained in his report to the

Command of the Polish Police in Warsaw that it was hard to provide service at guarding the ghetto due to a large number of policemen not reporting for duty at the Jewish quarter.

For example, for the shift on April 29-30, twenty-nine policemen did not show up, on

April 30-May 1, twenty-five policemen failed to report for service. Skomorowski noted that in such conditions the service at the ghetto could not be covered properly.207 Dariusz

Libionka suggests that the decision around not showing up could have been influenced by the fear of reaction from the Home Army. He refers to a note to either the chief of the

Warsaw District or the chief of the Counterintelligence Department II KG AK (Home

Army High Command) Bernard Zakrzewski signed by Gen. “Grot” (Gen. Stefan

Rowecki, Commander-in-Chief of the Home Army). Halina Czarnocka, the head of the postal headquarters of the KG AK passed the note onto her deputy. The note was to warn

205 Witkowski based his information on interviews with Zbigniew Lewandowski by Tomasz Strzembosz. Witkowski,“Kedyw” Okręgu Warszawskiego, 251. Aurelia Wyleżyńska noted in her diary that the ghetto fighters not only defended themselves but they attacked both the Germans and the Polish police. Wyleżyńska, Notatki Pamiętnikarskie. AAN, 231/I-6, p. 84. 206 Stroop, Warszawska dzielnica, 25-27. Report from May 2 mentioned three Polish policemen wounded but their names are not included in the overall list at the beginning of the report. Ibid., 76, 77. 207 Raporty tygodniowe Głównego Inspektoratu PKB, no. 16, May 11, 1943. AAN, DR 202/II-37, p. 72, also Meldunki Oddziału Polityczno-Informacyjnego o sytuacji w kraju, no. 153, May 4, 1943. AAN, DR 202/II-21, p. 53.

206 the policemen not to engage in fighting with the Jews under the threat of punishment.

There is no information whether the note was delivered.208

Although the official task was preventing Jews from escaping the burning ghetto, there were also cases of insubordination and enabling Jews to leave the ghetto. Some policemen were caught entering the ghetto while off-duty in order to plunder it.209 An off-duty policeman, Edward Dębek from Guard and Convoy Unit was arrested by the SD in the beginning of May while plundering the ghetto.210 An underground report conveyed that at the turn of April and May an underground passage was discovered at 14

Franciszkańska Street. Two Polish policemen and a janitor of the building operated it.

Passage from the ghetto cost 10,000 zloty. The passage was discovered as a result of a janitor’s denunciation motivated by an argument over the percent of spoils. According to the report, the gendarmerie shot both the policemen and janitor and took away all male residents of the building.211

One could also bribe their way out of the Umschlagplatz for a price. Henryk

Bryskier was apprehended from the shops during the Uprising and taken to the

Umschlagplatz: “First of all, I quenched my thirst and was looking for an escape opportunity. I tried to persuade a Polish policeman to take me out under the cover of

208 Dariusz Libionka, “ZWZ-AK i Delegatura Rządu RP wobec eksterminacji Żydów polskich,” in Polacy i Żydzi pod okupacją niemiecką 1939-1945. Studia i materiały, ed. Andrzej Żbikowski. (Warsaw: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2006), 90. Ber Mark attributes the avoidance of the ghetto duty due to the panic setting among the Polish policemen: “With the number of its victims growing at the hands of vengeful Jews, the Polish police force was finally seized by panic. Official reports indicate that much of its force, unwilling to stick its neck out, refused or sought to avoid Ghetto duty.” Uprising, 63. 209 Ber Warm wrote about SS Obersturmfuhrer Franz Konrad’s order to guard a warehouse building, “On Konrad’s orders, I remained at Niska Street along with nineteen other SP [Jewish Order Service] men to guard the building from being robbed by members of the Polish police stationed nearby.” As quoted in Grynberg, Words to Outlive Us, 256. 210 AAN, AK 203/III-122, p. 26. 211 Meldunki Oddziału Polityczno-Informacyjnego o sytuacji w kraju, no. 154, May 5, 1943. AAN, DR 202/II-21, p. 56. I was not able to confirm this information in other sources.

207 night. But my suggestion was in vain because I had no money on me and all verbal agreements presented no real credibility.”212

On May 18, 1943 the Commander of the Schutzpolizei ordered the immediate removal of eight policemen on duty at the Dzielna prison, withdrawal of posts by warehouses on 1 Leszno St. Policemen guarding labour camp at 24 Gęsia St. were to apply for passes to the ghetto. Jews in custody were to be brought directly to the SD on

Szucha Ave. instead of 103 Żelazna St.213

The Polish police’s involvement in the ghetto during the was generally limited to guarding the perimeters of the ghetto and preventing escapes.

160 to 180 policemen were used as cordoning forces on regular basis.214 They mostly tried to prevent Jews from escaping onto the “Aryan” side.215 The police shot at those trying to escape the ghetto.216 During a patrol, Marian Rzeźniczak, a police candidate from the Traffic Company, shot a Jewish man trying to get out of the ghetto and wounded a Pole at Okopowa 25 (April 23, 1943). A pistol found on the deceased was then taken by

212 Henryk Bryskier, Żydzi pod swastyką czyli Getto w Warszawie. BN, Sygn. III.7938, p. 294. 213 Phonogram from the Kommando der Schupo. AAN, AK 203/III-122, p. 29. During the occupation, the prewar building of the Ministry of Religious Beliefs and Public Education on 25 Szucha Avenue became the headquarters of the Sicherheitspolizei and Sicherheitdienst. A Gestapo detention centre in Warsaw was located in this building and became a place of brutal interrogations of prisoners brought from the Pawiak prison. 103 Żelazna St. was a site of SD-Befehlsstelle, which also housed a jail. 214 Stroop, Warszawska dzielnica, 67, 76, 81, 84, 88, 89, 94, 96, 98, 100, 101. Wiadomości Codzienne Miecza i Pługa (Daily News of and Plow), no. 95, April 27, 1943, p. 2. 215 Informacja Bieżąca on the police during the uprising: “The Blue Police does not partake in the combat, they guard the walls though, across which bullets and grenades are falling.” (no. 16 (89), April 20, 1943). AAN, DR 202/III-7, p. 255. Another newspaper related about the lack of Polish police participation in the fights in the ghetto: “The Polish Police fulfill purely public order functions outside of the ghetto walls, sealing off those areas and streets which are dangerous.” “Walka niemiecko-żydowska,” Polska, no. 16, May 6, 1943, in Andrzej Krzysztof Kunert, ed., Polacy-Żydzi. Polen-Juden. Poles-Jews 1939-1945. Wybór źródeł. Quellenauswahl. Selection of Documents (Warsaw: Rada Ochrony Pamięci Walk i Męczeństwa Instytut Dziedzictwa Narodowego Oficyna Wydawnicza RYTM, 2001), 260. 216 Czyn, no. 2, May 10, 1943. Quoted after Mark, Uprising in the Warsaw Ghetto, 143.

208 a German policeman.217 On May 8, one Jewish man was killed and another one arrested on Przejazd Street during the attempt to break through to the “Aryan” side.218

Armed Jews could also pose a danger to policemen. According to data gathered by

Informacja Bieżąca (Current Information), between April 25 and May 25, 1943 ten policemen were killed, fourteen wounded, seven arrested for “plundering the ghetto” and hiding Jews, three were arrested for losing their weapons.219 It is unclear if all the casualties were a result of the ghetto fighting, but it is safe to assume that at least some of them were. On May 9, in the Giżycki Park in the Mokotów quarter of Warsaw, Marian

Rozpędowski from the 16th precinct was shot by a Jewish man and a Jewish woman. The underground reported that on May 10, two Jews riding in a droshky on Żabia Street attempted to run away at the sight of Corporal Wacław Zasada. They shot at him from pistols and threw a grenade that wounded the policeman. He continued the chase with the help of Corporal Głownia. One man was killed by the policemen, the other one was killed by an SS-man.220 On May 27, in a shooting on Miodowa St. between a Jewish group and

German and Polish policemen, two Polish policemen were killed.221

An underground report from December 1943 observed that usually the occupier did not use Polish police in political actions, but “the participation of the police in anti-

Jewish actions such as the liquidation action of the Warsaw ghetto in April and May 1943

217 AAN, AK 203/III-122, p. 18. 218 Ibid., p. 26. 219 Informacja Bieżąca, no. 25 (98), June 30, 1943. AAN, DR 202/III-7, p. 282. 220 AAN, AK 203/III-122, p. 30. The killed were two Jewish Fighting Organization (ŻOB) fighters, Jurek Zołotow and Rysiek Moselman. Libionka, “Zapisy,” 590; Mark, Uprising in the Warsaw Ghetto, 76. See also (“Antek”), A Surplus of Memory. Chronicle of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising (Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press, 1993), 384. 221 According to Ber Mark it was Aaron Briskin’s group that was involved in the shooting. Mark, Uprising in the Warsaw Ghetto, 87-88.

209 and hunting down the non-Aryans was quite significant.”222 Reports of the police stations in Praga shed light on searching for Jews. Between May 23 and June 23, twenty Jews were captured; three of them were shot on the spot. Between June 23 and July 22, thirteen

Jews were apprehended.223 After the uprising in Treblinka in August 1943, Polish police in the Warsaw county received an order to increase their vigilance in hunting down Jews because of the suspicion that Jews who escaped from Treblinka would be attempting to return to Warsaw.224

When Aurelia Wyleżyńska noted in her diary that the Ukrainian and Polish police were removed from the ghetto, in her opinion it might have been out of suspicion that the police would be joining the fighters or sabotage the orders.225 Policemen still ventured into the fighting ghetto, not to support the fighters but rather to plunder it. On April 24th,

1943 Andrzej Szeluga was arrested by the German police for being in the ghetto while on duty instead of performing his duties outside of the ghetto.226 After the final liquidation of the ghetto, some policemen were employed to guard the area of the former ghetto.227

The number of blackmails and denunciations in Warsaw and the area increased in the weeks following the pacification of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising. The underground press reported on “Jew-searching mania,” which led to “terrible crimes from the humane and national point of view.”228 Michał Stanisław Piskozub, one of the policemen who led a Polish police platoon during the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising was allegedly sentenced to

222 AAN, DR 202/II-8, p. 121. 223 APW, KPPmW 10, pp. 3, 11. 224 Raporty Starszego Inspektora KB, August 18, 1943. AAN, DR 228/15-2, p. 56. 225 Aurelia Wyleżyńska, Notatki Pamiętnikarskie. AAN, 231/I-6, p. 4. 226 AAN, AK 203/III-122, p. 19. 227 Demokrata, no. 102, December 8, 1943, p. 4. 228 Biuletyn Informacyjny (Z frontu walki cywilnej), June 25, 1943, p. 2.

210 death by the Special Court in mid-1944 for cooperation with the Gestapo and blackmailing Jews. The sentence was not carried out because Piskozub had hid.229 The underground press often condemned actions of the police (referring to them as “Blue rascals”). Głos Warszawy wrote in December 1943 that in Warsaw one could notice increased hunts for Jews. Special agents and blackmailers apprehended “suspicion raising” people and took them to Szucha Avenue. “A significant role in this action was played by the Blue helper [the Polish policeman] of the Gestapo.”230

The mere fact of having “Semitic features” or an accent led to accusations of being Jewish leveled at Poles of Armenian origin, refugees from the territories annexed to the Reich, or members of the underground in hiding. The “Aryan” side of Warsaw became very dangerous for Jews in hiding. The blackmail increased and anyone could be suspected of being a Jew. Polish policemen were busy stopping on the streets and in droshkes people who seemed to them to look Jewish.231 The police were also guilty of handing Poles (adults and children) over to the Germans or shooting those suspected of being Jewish on the spot.232

Jewish men and women on the “Aryan” side were equally subjected to blackmailing and extortions, but women were also subjected to sexual exploitation and violence. The problem is not openly discussed in testimonies, often only alluded to in some accounts. The topic of forcing Jewish women into sexual relations appears in the

229 Piskozub was deputy of Skomorowski who headed the unit guarding the Warsaw ghetto. According to underground counterintelligence reports, Piskozub blackmailed Jews and handed them over to the Germans. Popławski, “Ustrój Policji Polskiej,” 299. See also Hempel, Pogrobowcy klęski, 208. The text of a request to investigate “Lt. Piskozub from Guard and Convoy who allegedly hunted for Jews in hiding” was published in Libionka, “ZWZ-AK i Delegatura Rządu,” 176. 230 Głos Warszawy, no. 83 (92), December 23, 1943, p. 2. 231 AŻIH, 230/125, p. 141. 232 Biuletyn Informacyjny (Z frontu walki cywilnej), June 25, 1943, p. 2.

211 writings of . In her book The King of Hearts on His Way Out, Krall tells the story of Izolda Regensberg (“Aryan” name Maria Pawlicka), who escaped the Warsaw ghetto. One day her riksha had been stopped by a Polish policeman, who got in and ordered the driver to drive to a hotel, where he then sexually assaulted Regensberg. When he brought her back to the riksha and let her go he said, “See, how lucky you are? You encountered a decent man.”233 Zofia Zamsztejn, hiding in Warsaw, was able to outsmart a policeman who arrested her and who later took her out from the arrest and offered to let her spend the night in his place. She managed to escape.234 Helena Rauch, who was an object of unwanted attention from a Polish policeman, did not have so much luck. After he let her and her friend go, the policeman kept coming to her place and finally sexually assaulted her.235

The behaviour of the policemen was also monitored and reported about by contributors of the Pismo Policji Podziemnej (Journal of the Underground Police). The first issue of the Pismo Policji Podziemnej from June 1943 introduced the idea of the underground organization, which would form the post-war Polish State Police out of those members of the police who did not betray the interests of the Polish state and Polish population. Those who did awaited “condemnation, contempt, and merciless death.”236

The journal articles reminded the functionaries how to best serve the interest of the country and its people. In an article about the Polish police in the General Government, the author recalled that according to the Warsaw capitulation act of September 1939, the

233 Hanna Krall, Król kier znów na wylocie (Warsaw: Świat Książki, 2006), 20. Regensberg relates also a story of her acquaintance who was also subjected to sexual violence from a Polish policeman. (35-36) 234 Testimony of Zofia Zamsztejn, YV, M.49.E/478, p. 3. 235 Testimony of Helena Rauch, YV, M.49.E/2370, p. 4. 236 Pismo Policji Podziemnej, no. 1, June 6, 1943, pp. 2-3.

212

Polish police remained on duty as an organ of security, order and peace. In October 1939,

German civilian authorities confirmed the tasks of the police emphasizing that “the police would serve solely the interests of the Polish society and would not be charged with matters contrary to the interests of the Polish Nation.” Because the occupier did not stand by the agreement, the police of the General Government are freed from loyalty to the agreement. The police have to feel like the old State Police and serve only Poland and the

Polish society.237

The contributors to the Pismo Policji Podziemnej often reflected on the difficult tasks of the Polish police. While they condemned outright cooperation of some policemen with the Germans, they also emphasized the duality of their loyalty. On the one hand, the policemen were required to follow the orders but on the other hand, they knew those orders were aimed against the Polish population. As one of the authors put it, “I am at the crossroads,” between the German superiors and Polish population and state.238

The fact that many policemen could not be proven in court to have perpetrated crimes against the Jewish population does not necessarily mean that they did not commit them. Often there was not enough evidence or witnesses to sufficiently prove culpability.

In some cases there were no survivors left to talk about the policemen’s involvement and charges were based on hearsay. Sometimes, the accused defended themselves by arguing that accusations against them were based on personal animosities or were revenge for policemen carrying out their duties before and during the war, such as stopping a

237 Pismo Policji Podziemnej, no. 2, July 14, 1943, p. 3. Reprinted in Dzień Warszawy, no. 643, August 5, 1943, p. 4. 238 Pismo Policji Podziemnej, no. 3, August 23, 1943, p. 5.

213 crime.239 The policemen who took part in anti-Jewish actions later were also active in oppressing non-Jewish Poles. Stosio and Bordowicz, two policemen from Mińsk

Mazowiecki, were known for their brutal behaviour towards Poles. They both had participated in the liquidation of the ghetto in Mińsk Mazowiecki.240

Leon Bukowiński, who worked in the dactyloscopy department of the Polish

Kripo during the war, described various types of policemen during the war. According to him there were “many notorious unrepentant deviants” who were unscrupulous and possessed by the desire for money. Bukowiński identifies greed as one of the main motives of the policemen who either collaborated with the Germans or excelled in their zeal. They were impressed by cooperation with the Germans and often more zealous than them. Some of them were executed during the occupation. The death sentences issued by the underground organizations sobered up many individuals and constrained further cooperation with the Germans.241

Conclusion

In 1942 the Polish police moved from maintaining law and order to criminal participation in the killing of Polish Jews. Their role facilitated the implementation of the Holocaust in Poland. The police presented danger to Jews in hiding by searching them out and killing them on German orders or on their own initiative.242 Their cooperation with

239 Cf. APKr, SAKr 995 K16/50, p. 114. 240 Meldunki Oddziału Polityczno-Informacyjnego o sytuacji w kraju, no. 143, April 1, 1943. AAN, DR 202/II-21, p. 13. Ghetto in Mińsk was liquidated on August 21, 1942. Both German and Polish police participated. Addendum no. 38 to report for September 1-15, 1942. AAN, DR 202/III-8, p. 139. 241 Testimony of Leon Bukowiński, AŻIH, 301/4424, p. 12. 242 Writing about the Polish police’s role in the Warsaw ghetto uprising, Ber Mark concludes, “In general, the Polish police played a shameful role, both before and after, but especially during the Uprising. They hunted down Jews hiding on the Aryan side, extorted large sums of money from them, and, after leeching the victims dry, handed them over to the Gestapo. They robbed and tortured Jewish smugglers at the Ghetto gates.” Mark, Uprising in the Warsaw Ghetto, 63.

214 the local population after most ghettos were liquidated resulted in many deaths of Polish Jews, including many children. With regard to the motivations and behaviours of the policemen they mirrored similar processes that were taking place throughout wartime Polish society. They were guided by greed, contempt for Jewish lives, and fear of repression from the Germans in case they refused to follow orders and existing laws. The post-war courts often reflected the dilemma facing the Polish policemen throughout the occupation – on the one hand there was the power of the German occupier and responsibility to answer to the German police superior and on the other hand there were Polish underground organizations that monitored the behaviour of the policemen and in some cases punished them for their anti-Polish and anti-Jewish activities.243

243 Cf. the verdict acquitting Władysław Kabaj, AIPN, GK 255/697, pp. 253-253v.

Chapter 5

Translating Righteous Action Into Post-War Recognition: Cases of Benevolence

Among the Polish Police

In her wartime diary, Krystyna Modrzewska, describes a scene she witnessed while passing as a Christian Pole in a village near Lublin. In the spring afternoon in 1942,

Modrzewska was sitting on a wall by the Polish police station engaged in a conversation with a policeman, “a pleasant elderly man”, when an approximately seven-year-old boy approached him:

He stopped in front of the policeman and said in an almost arrogant

manner: “I’ve come to report.” I looked into the eyes of this child and

knew everything. But the policeman was not so perceptive, if that is the

right term to use. It was a question of sympathetic intuition.

- What do you want? – he asked.

- I’ve come to the police - repeated the boy and added after a while - for you

to kill me.1

The boy came from Łęczna, his entire family had been killed by the Germans. The gendarme that killed his mother in Piaski refused to kill him saying he would do that some other time. The boy turned himself in to the Polish police but a policeman refused to shoot him because he did not shoot little boys. Embarrassed policeman replied that

1 Władysław Bartoszewski, and Zofia Lewinówna, eds., Righteous Among Nations. How Poles Helped the Jews 1939-1945 (London: Earlscourt Publications Limited, 1969), 145-146.

215 216 they do not shoot little boys there either and asked him to go with him, adding that the boy must live and become a grown-up man.

I sat for a long while on that wall and watched the slightly comical figure of

the old policeman in a navy blue topcoat and the child trotting at his side, as

if unwillingly. The goodness of that man was no accident – it was deep

inside him, just like the vileness of the overwhelming majority of his

fellows. I know that he took that poor child under his wing and cared for

him without recompense.

The story of the little boy finding an unlikely rescuer in a policeman stands in strong contrast with the evidence I presented in the previous chapter. This act of help serves as another reminder of the agency held by the Polish policemen and that in certain circumstances they made a decision to go against the general trend. Incidents of rescue of

Jewish children by Polish policemen were not unheard of, and are discussed in this chapter, but in the majority of cases when found, a Jewish child would be taken into custody and shot either by German or Polish police.

This chapter presents stories of rescue and post-war recognition of several Polish policemen. It considers the motivations of policemen who defied the occupier’s law and by extending a helping hand to Jews in hiding contributed to the survival of a number of them. What we learn from the available sources is that the policemen’s motivations were not always clear and even those who helped were not free of prejudice against Jews. The factors that led to recognition of the policemen also point out to the complexity of the decision on whom and when the title of the Righteous Among the Nations was bestowed.

217

In contrast to helpers who received financial gain, these policemen were not paid for their assistance although in some cases they did receive money for the upkeep of Jews in hiding. However, post-war recognition of their actions usually resulted in financial assistance.

Post-War Recognition

Poles historically viewed the Polish police as an almost exclusively collaborationist force. These views were influenced by the communist regime and were often politically motivated. Negative experiences of the population and subservience among police also contributed to this assessment. As discussed in chapter 2, a significant number of Polish policemen facilitated contact between the ghetto and the “Aryan” side.

They sabotaged the official policies and were involved in the smuggling of food, materiel and people. Most of the policemen treated these activities as a source of income. They risked their jobs and freedom and expected compensation. However, there were also those who extended help to Jews both in ghettos and on the “Aryan” side, and did so without any gratification. Cases of assistance include both one-time and repeat occurrences as a result of many circumstances. Many of the rescuers remained anonymous but some were acknowledged by name. A handful of the policemen were recognized as Righteous

Among the Nations for help rendered to Jews. There is no doubt that many more might have helped than were formally recognized but for reasons that will be articulated, the number will remain unknown.

Many policemen made claims about their assistance to Jews during their rehabilitation procedures and post-war trials. The pressure to distance themselves from collaboration with the Nazi regime could possibly be one of the reasons why many

218 policemen claimed that they helped both Jews and Poles and created the potential for biased or distorted testimony. Following the Second World War, surviving members of the Polish police were subjected to a rehabilitation commission to evaluate their conduct during the war. In many applications policemen attested to assistance rendered not only to ethnic Poles but also to Polish Jews. In certain cases statements were submitted in support of such claims. Occasionally, we witness the lack of ability to legitimize or corroborate claims, i.e. when the Jewish recipient of the assistance did not survive the war, moved away, or chose to leave their traumatic experiences behind. Among other sources discussing Polish policemen’s aid to Jews are also statements collected by the Central

Jewish Historical Commission (housed at the Jewish Historical Institute in Warsaw) as well as private materials. Some Poles testified about their help to Jews asking for material support from Jewish organizations. Expectations of help in return for helping Jews during the war played a significant role in some accounts of the rescuers in general, and the former policemen were not an exception.2 Some of the rescuers among the police chose not to discuss their rescue efforts. Some did not want to talk about helping, considering it a normal human reaction to extend help to people in need. Some possibly might have not wanted other people to learn about their deeds.

More information comes from the survivors, who discuss both the cases of oppression and assistance experienced from members of the Polish police. Holocaust survivors recalled the assistance in post-war testimonies, recorded for Jewish organizations and institutions such as the Jewish Historical Institute in Warsaw and Yad

Vashem in Jerusalem, as well as in memoirs. Some of them deposited their testimonies in

2 Jacek Leociak, Ratowanie. Opowieści Polaków i Żydów (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2010), 35.

219 the Righteous Among the Nations Department of Yad Vashem initiating a procedure to recognize their rescuers as Righteous Among the Nations. Those testimonies are one of the most important sources used in this chapter.

Forms of Assistance

An October 15, 1941 law prohibited Jews leaving their residential quarters without permission under the threat of the death penalty. The same punishment was to be extended to anyone who was sheltering the Jews or failed to report such a crime. Despite the death penalty for assisting Jews remaining outside the ghettos and an edict to fire on

Jews found without permit on the “Aryan” side, some policemen engaged in individual and organized help to the Jews.3 Assisting Jews would put the policemen in an especially difficult position as they were expected to enforce the law, not to breach it themselves.

Some policemen, however, exhibited compassion towards those in need, Jews and Poles alike.

Polish policemen offered both paid and non-paid assistance to those who needed it.4 Many Jewish testimonies relate a wide spectrum of contacts between Jews and policemen within the ghetto perimeters and on the “Aryan” side. The policemen ignored the orders by not arresting Jews or releasing them from arrest. They also helped by warning about pending arrests and destroying denouncements. Some of them also provided information for the underground on persons blackmailing Jews.5 The policemen had a role in accommodating escapes from the ghetto, providing “Aryan” documents and

3 Order issued by the head of SS and Police for the Warsaw District, December 10, 1942. Hempel, Pogrobowcy klęski, 175. 4 On the issue of paid help see Jan Grabowski, Rescue for Money: Paid Helpers in Poland, 1939-1945 (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2008). 5 See an interview with Władysław Bartoszewski in “Żegota” Rada Pomocy Żydom, Andrzej Krzysztof Kunert, ed. (Warsaw: Rada Ochrony Pamięci Walk i Męczeństwa, 2002), 34.

220 from 1942 on rescuing children. Some did it without charge, driven by humanitarian or religious beliefs; some did it on the order of the underground authorities, and some (more often) as a private favour and were compensated. A certain percentage of those involved were higher-ranking officers. Their role was not only limited to securing “Aryan” documents but also included influencing their subordinates.

Adam Hempel claims that some of the policemen cooperated with the Żegota

(Council to Aid Jews); however, he does not provide any evidence to support this claim.6

One of the policemen I was able to confirm to have had ties with the Żegota was Michał

Kliś, member of counterintelligence cell of ZWZ/AK (Union of Armed Struggle/Home

Army) in Cracow. In September 1943, Kliś was arrested by the Gestapo for providing

Jews with “Aryan” papers. He was imprisoned and tortured in the and sent to Gross-Rosen, Litomierzyce, and Flossenburg concentration camps. Kliś took Jews out of the ghetto, sheltered some in his apartment, and provided them with food.7

Nevertheless, most of the policemen worked individually, sometimes supported in their efforts by family.

Polish policemen had a very particular position in the system. They could enable or prevent certain behaviours. As part of the administration they had more leverage but they were also easier to identify. They could use their privileged position in benevolent

6 Hempel, Pogrobowcy klęski, 268. He possibly based his claim on Władysław Smólski’s book in which he writes that among the members of Żegota there were many Polish policemen, Smólski makes some exaggerated statements regarding the number of Poles helping Jews during the war. Władysław Smólski, ed., Polacy z pomocą Żydom w czasie okupacji (Warsaw: Instytut Wydawniczy PAX, 1981), 6. 7 Aleksandra Namysło, and Grzegorz Berendt, eds., Rejestr faktów represji na obywatelach polskich za pomoc ludności żydowskiej w okresie II wojny światowej (Warsaw: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej & Instytut Studiów Strategicznych, 2014), 313. Marek Mączyński, among others, erroneously states that Kliś was shot by the Gestapo for his help to Jews. „Polskie formacje,” 158. Kliś survived the camps but died shortly after the war.

221 ways or for material gain. The policemen were subjected to the same laws as the civilian population as well as special decrees directed at the Polish police.

The Polish policemen took advantage of their position of being able to enter the ghetto and often served as couriers and go-betweens in organizing escapes, for remuneration. Eugenia Rolnicka testified that in 1941 a policeman led her husband out from the ghetto with a group leaving for work.8 Jerzy Himmelbaum was helped by a

Polish policeman who let him stay in his apartment and who also helped other Jews.9

Additionally, Emanuel Ringelblum mentions that sometimes bribed policemen were escorting escaped Jews to their “Aryan” address.10

Some policemen brought Jewish children to the orphanages for a fee and reported them as having been found in staircase-wells or inside the entrances to apartment buildings.11 There was the case of the Home of Father Boduen for homeless children and the German request for the Polish police to approve everyone being taking in – there were some 200 Jewish children saved there, some taken out of the ghetto by the Polish policemen.12

An Albertine sister from an orphanage on 10 Koletek St. in Cracow recalls a lost four-year old boy brought to the orphanage by the police.13 The nursery was run by

Sister Hermana Bąk and sheltered ten Jewish children during the war. When the institution was moved to Rymanów, the boy moved there with other children. He

8 Testimony of Eugenia Rolnicka, AŻIH, 301/5717, p. 2. 9 Testimony of Jerzy Himmelblau, AŻIH, 301/3073, pp. 2-3. 10 Ringelblum, Polish-Jewish Relations, 97. 11 Ibid., 143. 12 Prekerowa, Konspiracyjna Rada, 207-208. 13 Ewa Kurek, Your Life is Worth Mine. How Polish Nuns Saved Hundreds of Jewish Children in German- Occupied Poland, 1939-1945 (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1997), 147.

222 survived the war.14 Another Albertine sister from the Orphanage and Infirmary for

Children in Tarnów recalls that a Polish policeman accompanied by a from the

Missionary Order brought a four-year-old boy to their institution found in a church after his uncle left him there. A priest found him there and the boy was sent to the orphanage, where he revealed to the nun that he was a Jewish boy. He also survived the war.15

During a liquidation action in Tarnopol, a policeman who claimed he found a little boy in an empty Jewish house brought him in a basket to the Albertine Sisters. A childless couple soon after adopted the boy.16 Most of the aforementioned cases involved monetary gratification for the policemen. However, there were also policemen who assisted Jews in leaving the ghetto and rescued Jewish children without any compensation.

Some policemen paid with their lives for defying the orders. The head of the 18th police precinct in Warsaw and a member of the underground organization, Second-

Lieutenant Ryszard Stołkiewicz, hid a number of Jewish families and was denounced and killed at Pawiak in May 1943.17 Major Franciszek Erhardt, Commandant of the Polish police of the city of Cracow (1939-1944) and his deputy, Major Ludwik Drożański, were shot for providing Jews with “Aryan” documents and legalization papers to Poles.18

However, the most frequent punishment was arrest. For example, Bolesław Waściński, a policeman in Grabów nad Wisłą (Radom district) was arrested in February 1943 for

14 Wartime Rescue of Jews by the Polish Catholic Clergy (Toronto: The Polish Educational Foundation in North America, 2000), 102. 15 Kurek, Your Life, 152; Wartime rescue, 107. 16 Kurek, Your Life, 53, 153. 17 Getter, “Policja Polska,” 89. Cf. Hempel, Pogrobowcy klęski, 266. 18 Mączyński, „Polskie formacje policyjne,” 157.

223 sheltering a Jewish woman who had escaped from the ghetto; nearly five months later he was imprisoned in the Pustków camp near Dębica.19

Who Were the Rescuers?

Poles witnessed all stages of the destruction of Jewish communities. By the summer of 1942 they came to the realization that Jews were condemned to death. Many of them did not take any action, they were simply passive witnesses who could neither help nor participate in the murder of Polish Jews. Most of the policemen fulfilled their duties, sometimes with varying degrees of negligence and at other times vigorously. And then, there were also those who were on opposite ends of the spectrum of wartime behaviour: the perpetrators complicit in denouncing Jews or participating in their murder and those that took benevolent action, the rescuers. These dichotomies betray the complexity of how policemen responded, and understanding what led certain individuals to take such action is not easy to ascertain. In terms of those that took benevolent action, one can consider their behaviour in light of other groups in the Polish population who also assisted Jews. Clearly their position of power was a differentiating factor, but a more basic impulse to help is a value that can be seen across social lines.

Jacek Leociak in his book, Ratowanie. Opowieści Polaków i Żydów, analyzed the testimonies of Poles who saved Jews during the war. He divided them into four groups and singled out the reasons for their testifying about their role in rescuing Jews and why they helped. He did so without questioning the honesty of the rescuers. He was not

19 Archiwum Państwowe w Radomiu (hereafter APR), Akta Więzienia Radomskiego, W-741. The case of Bolesław Waściński, 1-5.

224 concerned with the credibility of the testimony but with the text itself.20 Among the reasons for assistance listed by the rescuers were: selflessness, gratitude for the kindness extended to them by Jews before the war, secular humanitarianism, and civic and social duty.21 How do the policemen fit into these categories?

Samuel P. Oliner and Pearl M. Oliner, the authors of The Altruistic Personality.

Rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe, consider the rescue of Jews as altruism understood as a readiness to sacrifice one’s own interests for the well-being of someone else’s, the rescuers as people who were driven by humanitarian considerations only, with no expectation of material benefits.22 They define altruistic behaviour as one that aims at helping another person, carries a high risk or sacrifice, is not accompanied by gratification and is voluntary. The authors of the study were also looking at a very specific form of altruism, which was characterized by a long duration, extended to a different (cultural, religious or social) and persecuted group of people, and one that came with the threat of death.23 Does altruism explain the rescue effort undertaken by some of the policemen?

Nechama Tec proposes a new theory of rescuers. In her investigation into the motivation of rescuers she found that they shared the following characteristics: they were non-conformists, unable to “blend with the environment,” independent and self-reliable individuals with a prewar commitment to help those in need. They also did not consider

20 Leociak, Ratowanie, 23. 21 Ibid,, 25, 30, 32. 22 Samuel P. Oliner, and Pearl M. Oliner, The Altruistic Personality. Rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe (New York: The Free Press, 1988), 1. 23 Oliner and Oliner, The Altruistic Personality, 6.

225 their rescue efforts extraordinary and these activities were not premeditated.24 These notions, particularly the idea of non-conformism being a fundamental quality of a rescuer, may help us understand the aberrations that we see in a profession that is otherwise known for conformity. Where there are many questions as to what led certain policemen to make these decisions, Tec’s insight offers a substantive clue. We might propose that certain characterological features, such as an impulse to depart from the collective, explain why certain members of an otherwise conformist body made decisions that defied the norm.

Righteous Among the Nations

Many of the Polish policemen who extended help to Jews without any remuneration remained anonymous. There are many reasons why some were not officially recognized: Jews did not survive the war, were busy with rebuilding their lives and moving abroad, they lost contact or they could not recall the name of the person who helped them, or they were unable or unwilling to return to their wartime experiences.

Some policemen were acknowledged by name by the survivors who deposited their testimonies. In some cases there is an ample evidence of the rescue efforts provided by a policeman supplied either by the survivor or the policeman’s family. In other cases we learn about anonymous deeds of randomly encountered policemen (Modrzewska).

The title of Righteous Among the Nations is an award bestowed upon non-Jews who helped the Jews during the Second World War for humanitarian reasons. The

Commission for the Designation of the Righteous Among the Nations, established at Yad

24 Nechama Tec, When the Light Pierced the Darkness. Christian Rescue of Jews in Nazi-Occupied Poland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 154.

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Vashem in 1962, and headed by a Supreme Court Justice, decides whether a rescuer deserves recognition based on submitted evidence.25 The process includes an interview with a living witness and the collection of evidence from reliable sources (testimonies from survivors and rescuers as well as any other eyewitness and archival documentation).

The Commission needs to establish how contact was made between the rescuer and the rescued, assess the nature of the aid, the elements of risk and the rescuer’s motivation.26 It has to also be confirmed that the rescuer did not receive any financial compensation unless used for living expenses. Once confirmed, the recipient of the title receives a medal and a certificate of honour, the right to plant a tree in their name along the Avenue of the Righteous Among the Nations on the Mount of Remembrance in Jerusalem and recently instead of planting a tree, a name is added to the Righteous Wall of Honour at

Yad Vashem.27 The title can be bestowed onto the rescuer posthumously.

Besides awarding the title, the Commission may also recommend financial support to the rescuers. Need for material support of the rescuers played an important factor in survivors’ efforts to have them recognized. Sometimes it was the reason behind the rescuer seeking recognition.

As of January 1, 2016 there were 6,620 Poles recognized as the Righteous

Among the Nations.28 Among them are several former Polish policemen. Six of them I discuss in more detail in this chapter: Franciszek Banaś, Władysław Cieśla, Piotr

25 When in 1953 the law established the Yad Vashem memorial for the , it also provisioned acknowledgment of the Righteous Among the Nations, non-Jews who helped Jews during the war as one of the main goals. Mordecai Paldiel, Saving the Jews. Amazing Stories of Men and Women Who Defied the “Final Solution” (Rockville: Schreiber Publishing, 2004), 28. 26 Mordecai Paldiel, Sheltering the Jews. Stories of Holocaust Rescuers (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), 203-204. 27 Paldiel, Sheltering the Jews, 204. 28 http://www.yadvashem.org/righteous/statistics Retrieved November 23, 2016.

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Czechoński, Jan Kubicki, Bronisław Marchlewicz, and Wacław Nowiński. The other policemen were Władysław Szalek29 and Stanisław Śliżewski. 30

One of the better-known policemen, yet unrecognized by Yad Vashem, is Eliasz

Pietruszka. His name does not appear on the Yad Vashem list of the Righteous Among the Nations. Neither was I able to find his rehabilitation procedure files. Pietruszka testified that in the fall of 1942 he witnessed a group of Jews – men, women and small children – being led by the Gestapo to the Umschlagplatz. He was astonished by the calm and dignity of this group who did not try to evade their fate except for a few younger people who tried to escape and were shot.31 That scene brought him to the decision to help Jews in every way he could. After the war, several survivors testified about his assistance. It is unclear whether they tried to have Pietruszka recognized. According to their testimony Pietruszka combined his duties as a policeman with membership in the underground Polish Socialist Party and the People’s Army (AL).

One of the survivors, Mieczysław Antopolski, met Eliasz Pietruszka in 1941 at a friend’s house. He describes the policeman’s attitude as being “of exceptional loyalty to

29 Władysław Szalek was recognized by Yad Vashem as a Righteous Among the Nations in 1979. Szalek, a police guard, maintained contacts with his prewar Jewish friends in the Cracow ghetto and provided shelter to Leon Singer and Perla and Henryk Teichler. Sara Bender and Shmuel Krakowski, eds., The Encyclopedia of the Righteous: Rescuers of Jews during the Holocaust. Poland, vol. 3, part 2 (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2004), 777. See also http://db.yadvashem.org/righteous/family.html?language=en&itemId=4044161 30 Stanisław Śliżewski was recognized by Yad Vashem in 2008. Śliżewski with the help of Austrian-born gendarme Oswald Bosko hid a few Jews from the Cracow ghetto in their shared apartment. He was denounced and jailed for over a year in the Montelupich prison. http://db.yadvashem.org/righteous/family.html?language=en&itemId=6601875 Some Polish sources mention also Jan Fakler as a Righteous Among the Nations policeman. Yad Vashem website and The Encyclopedia of the Righteous Among the Nations describe him as a guard (vol. 3, part 1, 210). 31 Statement of Eliasz Pietruszka from February 14, 1964, unpaginated. AŻIH, 301/5949. See also testimony of Emilia Goldsztajn and Maria Florycka, 301/5222 and Irma Grundland, 301/5532; Bartoszewski and Lewinówna, Righteous Among the Nations, 137.

228 the Jews.”32 Pietruszka assisted Antopolski in such matters like passing news from the

“Aryan” side and getting parcels to imprisoned Jews. When Antopolski managed to escape from the transport to Treblinka during the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, it was

Pietruszka’s home where he found shelter and was cared after by Pietruszka and his wife.

Antopolski was able to identify some of the persons that received help from the policeman.33 He recalls that Pietruszka was involved in smuggling children out of the ghetto and transporting them to a safe place, including his own home or that of his relatives. He took one girl to an orphanage in Otwock, where she survived the war.

In 1943 Pietruszka helped the Eisenberg family leave the ghetto and assisted with selling their possessions. He helped their six-year-old son Teodor escape the ghetto over the wall by using a ladder. Pietruszka arranged “Aryan” papers for all three, advised them against registering at the , thus saving their lives.34 He was also able to find out on the request of Mrs. Eisenberg that her husband was shot in 1944 and let the family stay at his house when they were in danger.35 In February 1943, Pietruszka took a little girl out of a ghetto, Irma Morgenstern, and transported her to his family in the countryside. After the war she was reunited with her family.36

Some of the Jews that Pietruszka helped met one another during or after the war and became aware of the scope of his rescue actions. Eugenia Sigalin, passing as a

32 Bartoszewski and Lewinówna, Righteous Among the Nations, 137. 33 Ibid., 138. 34 Hotel Polski – a hotel in Warsaw at 29 Długa Street, in 1943 used by the Germans to house Jews who owned passports of neutral countries (mostly South American). The passports were provided by Swiss Jewish organizations but most of their recipients were already dead. The passports became subject to illegal trade and were bought by Jews trying to get out of occupied Poland. Some 2,500 people were interned there. The majority of them were transferred to the Vittel and Bergen-Belsen camps as South American governments did not honour the documents. Most of them were transferred to Auschwitz. At least 300 were killed at the Pawiak prison in July 1943. A few hundred Jews were exchanged for Germans in Palestine. 35 Bartoszewski and Lewinówna, Righteous Among the Nations, 138-139. 36 Ibid., 138, 140.

229 housemaid Janina Wydra, met Mieczysław Antopolski (“Aryan” name Stanisław

Laskowski) at her friends’ house. He told her about Pietruszka’s help in communication between the Warsaw ghetto and the “Aryan” side and getting people out of the ghetto and helping them establish themselves on the “Aryan” side. Soon afterwards she was introduced to Pietruszka and went with him to visit a Jewish child placed with a Polish family.37 Not every one of the people he assisted survived. Antopolski recalls Mrs.

Sadowska and her two children, whom Pietruszka helped to escape the Warsaw ghetto but who were caught by the Gestapo a year later.38

Captain Franciszek Troll, the chief of the 1st police precinct in Radom, selflessly helped Jews in the and during the deportation action led several persons out of the ghetto from the Den family. The survivors deposited their statement after the war in the Jewish Committee in Radom.39 Troll’s name is also not listed in Yad

Vashem’s database.

Some policemen helped individually, some included their immediate and further family in the rescue effort. In some cases they were directly asked for help, while others initiated the rescue.40 Such a person was Wacław Nowiński, whose actions during the war we could consider an example of altruistic attitude.

37 Bartoszewski and Lewinówna, Righteous Among the Nations, 139. 38 Ibid., 138. 39 APR, Okręgowy Komitet Żydowski w Radomiu z lat 1945-1950 (1951), 12, p. 47; Piątkowski, “Policja polska,” 125. 40 In Oliners’ study, one-third of rescuers initiated help while 67% of rescuers waited to be asked for help, at least the first time. Oliner and Oliner, The Altruistic Personality, 132, 135.

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A Decision to Act: Wacław Nowiński and His Wife Janina, Warsaw; 1970

Wacław Nowiński was the first Polish policeman officially recognized for his assistance to Jews during the war. Born in 1889, Nowiński joined the police force already in 1917 and spent the wartime years working as a sergeant at the water police station and the 15th police precinct in Praga, Warsaw.41 After the war, Nowiński was exonerated for his service in the wartime Polish police. Undoubtedly, Nowiński‘s rehabilitation process was greatly helped by a statement from a Holocaust survivor, whom Nowiński saved from the Gestapo. Nowiński’s actions were described by the survivors; there is no known account of his rescue efforts by Nowiński himself.

In April 1943, Nowiński on his own initiative rescued Aleksander Bronowski from the hands of the Gestapo. At the time of the rescue, Nowiński served at the water police station. Bronowski, the future chairman of the Haifa branch of the Committee for

Recognition of Righteous Among the Nations of the Yad Vashem, was instrumental in the recognition of Nowiński.42

Prior to the war, Aleksander Bronowski was a lawyer in Lublin; in November

1939 he escaped to eastern Poland, now controlled by the Soviets, in order to avoid the pending arrest by the Germans. When the German-Soviet war broke out, Bronowski declined the offer to be evacuated and made his way back to Białystok, and finally, arrived back in Lublin two years after he left.43 He went through the and

41 AAN, AbfPP 434/123 N 9-11, pp. 321, 324. 42 Bronowski, his wife and daughter, survived the war thanks to Nowiński and several other Poles. He was successful in obtaining Yad Vashem recognition for most of his rescuers. Bronowski was an active and dedicated member of the Yad Vashem Committee for the Righteous Among the Nations collecting and verifying the evidence of the assistance provided to Jews during the Holocaust. Alexander Bronowski, They Were Few (New York: Peter Lang, 1991), viii, 33. 43 Bronowski, They Were Few, 5-9, 12.

231 the ghetto at Majdan Tatarski, from where he and his family escaped to Warsaw in

August 1942, assumed a Polish identity and lived on the “Aryan” side. Bronowski lived separately from his family.

On April 9, 1943, Bronowski was followed and apprehended by two German police plainclothesmen who claimed his papers were forged, and that he was a Jew.44

Due to the late hour, he was brought to a Polish police station (water police) to be picked up by the Gestapo the following morning. It was recorded that he had been arrested as a

Jew. While held at the station, Bronowski managed to gain permission to leave his solitary cell to warm up. He engaged in a conversation with Nowiński, a sergeant on duty.

“He elicited my trust. I felt that here was an honest and decent man and I sensed his sympathy towards the persecuted Jews.”45 Trying to escape the hands of the Gestapo

Bronowski asked Nowiński to take him to the lavatory in the station yard, where he would pretend to escape, thus forcing Nowiński to shoot him. The policeman refused the request and on his own initiative decided to help Bronowski. Saying that he must save him, Nowiński left his post and returned in the morning with 5,000 zloty to bribe the

Gestapo agents. When Bronowski asked how Nowiński could be sure that he would return the money, Nowiński answered that he did not expect it to be returned. Following

Nowiński’s instructions Bronowski handed the sum over to the agents who declared that a mistake was made and that Bronowski was indeed “Aryan.”46

44 In most accounts Bronowski identifies them as agents although in his published account he mentions both SD and Sipo (Sicherheitspolizei), apparently meaning secret police. 45 Bronowski, They Were Few, 31. 46 Ibid., 32.

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When Bronowski returned to the police station the following day to return the money along with some extra for a reward, Nowiński refused to accept it and only agreed to take it for future assistance to another Jew. 47

Once outside I immediately hurried to my wife’s apartment. She was

shocked at my appearance. I told her of my arrest and the unbelievable

conclusion of the episode. We scraped together the money to repay

Nowiński. When I took it to him, with a further 2000 zlotys as a sign of

appreciation, he became angry. I could barely persuade him that he must at

least accept the 5000 zloty, if only to save another Jew. As for the rest, he

would not hear of it and was very offended by my offer. Thereafter we

became friends. Nowiński removed my lodgings registration card from the

Warsaw so as to conceal my place of residence.”48

The chance meeting between Bronowski and Nowiński resulted in long-term assistance and friendship; Nowiński continued his aid by providing Bronowski with

“Aryan” documents and advising him on how to behave on the “Aryan” side. 49

Bronowski was also aware that Nowiński took care of other Jewish families and insisted in his many statements that he did so graciously and without any compensation. Indeed,

Nowiński helped other Jews by hiding them at his house and providing them with documents.

47 Bronowski’s letter to Rehabilitation-Verification Commission, June 23, 1946 in support of Nowiński’s rehabilitation procedure. AAN, AbfPP 434/123 N 9-11, p. 326. 48 Bronowski, They Were Few, 32. 49 AAN, AbfPP 434/123 N 9-11, p. 326.

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In his book, Bronowski emphasizes the active support extended to Jews by

Nowiński’s immediate family: his wife Janina, and children Danuta and Wacław. With their support he hid in his Warsaw apartment the Rapaport family, Dr. Matys Berłowicz and Janina Pańska: “None of this was for material gain; they were motivated solely by their conscience and their humane attitude to their fellow men.”50 Subsequently, all of the members of the Nowiński family were bestowed the title of the Righteous Among the

Nations, in 1970 Wacław Nowiński and his wife Janina,51 their son Wacław was recognized in September 1983, and their daughter Zofia Danuta Rupniewska in December of 1984. Wacław Nowiński (Jr.) was recognized after his parents’ death as a result of

Bronowski’s efforts and received financial support.52

The survivors agreed that Wacław Nowiński acted altruistically and for humanitarian reasons. One eyewitness testimony sheds a different light on Nowiński’s immediate family. A native of Łódź, Janina Pańska came to Warsaw in September 1939.

Nowiński was a former patient of her cousin, Dr. Rapaport. Nowiński helped her leave the ghetto and she lived at his place immediately after her escape. He was also instrumental in providing identity papers for Pańska; he took out all the documents referencing her family from the population register – all data remained the same but the religion was altered to Roman Catholic.53 Dr. Rapaport hid with Dr. Berlowicz in an empty swimming pool building at the Vistula River. They were placed there by Nowiński

50 Bronowski, They Were Few, 33. 51 Wacław Nowiński was awarded the title posthumously. He died in 1959. 52 An undated statement given by Bronowski in which he repeated his previous testimony given to Justice Dr. Moshe Landau on April 28, 1970. Bronowski emphasized the assistance given by 17-year-old Wacław to his parents while they were sheltering Jews in their apartments, which he did without any remuneration. The Nowiński couple received financial support and now their son also applied to receive it. Yad Vashem, Department of the Righteous Among the Nations (hereafter DRAN), 611. 53 Testimony of Janina Pańska, YV, O.3/2198, p. 5.

234 who was on duty there. Pańska managed to take Dr. Munwes’s wife Magda and son

Gabriel (post-war name Mokat) out of the ghetto; she transported her to Nowiński’s brother in Hoszczówka and looked after the child.54 Pańska was also aware that Nowiński managed to use Dr. Rapaport’s money to buy out a Jew who was blackmailed from the hands of szmalcownik. Again, he did it at his own discretion, without any remuneration.55

When Warsaw was liberated, Nowiński was the first person she visited.

While in the 1962 account deposited at Yad Vashem, Pańska had only words of praise and admiration for Nowiński, she described his wife and two children as antisemites, a sentiment she sensed from them despite all their empathy. She considered their warm feelings disingenuous as she paid them 3,000 zlotys a month and bought them gifts for various occasions.56 This testimony has not been included in the file submitted for the Commission for the Designation of the Righteous. However, the testimony of

Janina Pańska seems to be problematic in light of Bronowski’s account about help rendered by Nowiński’s wife and children.

In his undated letter to the Yad Vashem Commission, Bronowski supports

Nowiński’s children’s candidacy by recalling quite a different conversation with Pańska.

In this version, Nowiński’s daughter Zofia Danuta took Pańska out of the ghetto and brought her to her parents’ house and Pańska moved with them to their new place in the

Praga district of Warsaw. She mentioned that she was treated like a family member and that everyone acted on humanitarian grounds only, without any compensation. Pańska was then to emphasize that Rupniewska was very devoted in her care after hiding the

54 YV, O.3/2198, p. 6. 55 Ibid., p. 10. 56 Ibid., p. 8.

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Jews.57 At the time Bronowski wrote the letter, Rupniewska was a house guest of Pańska in Israel. The urgency of the application was caused by the upcoming departure of

Rupniewska. Pańska was present, alongside Bronowski, at the ceremony to recognize

Zofia Danuta Rupniewska (nee Nowińska) as a Righteous Among the Nations in 1984.

The timing of the application to recognize Wacław Jr. and his sister seems to suggest that it was caused by Bronowski’s concerns for their material well being. The financial assistance was stopped after the death of the Nowiński couple and it forced Wacław Jr. to ask for material help.58 His widowed sister was also struggling.59

Humanitarianism: Jan Kubicki and His Wife Zofia, 1976

It is estimated that throughout the war the Kubicki couple rescued a total of 17

Jews in their two-room Warsaw apartment, where some of them were hiding for several months.60 The Kubickis hid them behind a wardrobe in one of the rooms. Jan Kubicki worked for the Polish police and was also a member of the Home Army using the nom de guerre “Kalokagatos.”61 Jan Kubicki provided shelter, food, and in some cases assisted in finding other hiding places. Wearing a Polish policeman uniform he was able to assist

Jews in various situations such as rescuing Jews from the hands of blackmailers and

57 YV, DRAN 611. 58 Undated letter written prior to January 10, 1985. YV, DRAN 611. The 1983 letter from Wacław Nowiński Jr. to Conference on Jewish Claims Against Germany forwarded to Dr. Mordecai Paldiel, Director of the Department for the Righteous at Yad Vashem. Nowiński describes his participation in rescuing efforts of his family following his request to have the material support his mother received extended to him. 59 After Zofia Danuta Rupniewska was honoured the Special Commission recommended the Conference on Jewish Claims in New York to immediately initiate financial support for her due to her dire situation. Letter from Mordecai Paldiel to the Conference on Jewish Claims, January 4, 1985. YV, DRAN 611. 60 Bartoszewski and Lewinówna, Righteous Among the Nations, 142. 61 Ibid. I was not able to find personal data on Kubicki and was not granted access to his file at the Department for Righteous Among the Nations at Yad Vashem.

236 transferring Jews escaping from the Warsaw ghetto to hiding places outside of the city.62

There were instances that Kubicki pretended to have caught a prisoner and took him to a previously prepared hiding place.63 That was the case with Aron Langfus, a Jew from

Lublin imprisoned in Pawiak who wanted to escape while leaving for the work outpost.

He was able to escape with Kubicki’s help who took him to an apartment pretending he was leading an arrested person.64

His wife Zofia was actively engaged in the rescue effort by hiding them in their apartment and attending to all their needs. Jan and Zofia Kubicki are credited with rescuing the following persons: Celina Morecka (her daughter hid at Kubickis’), Halina

Sawicka (Ewa Putterman, later Laor),65 Judyta Gertner,66 Mina (Milka) Heinsdorff,

Henryka Heinsdorff, David and Sara Ruer, and Sara Kleinbaum.67 Kubicki also played a role in saving Klara Kleinbaum and Mrs. Zygielwaks and smuggled parcels and letters to her husband in Majdanek and to Majer Gertler.68

One of the more exhaustive accounts about Kubicki’s role in saving Jews during the occupation is that of Mrs. Heinsdorff, who deposited her testimony in October 1947.

She paints a picture of a poor but decent and honest man, who used his position to help others without any compensation, and only at times could be persuaded to accept some

62 The Encyclopedia of the Righteous, vol. 3, part 1, 413. 63 Przywracanie Pamięci Polakom Ratującym Żydów w czasie Zagłady. Kancelaria Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, (Warsaw 2007), 63. www.sprawiedliwi.org.pl [electronic resource]. 64 Testimony of Milka Heinsdorff, AŻIH, 301/4012, p. 1. 65 Sawicka hid in Kubicki’s apartment between August and December 1943. Bartoszewski and Lewinówna, Righteous Among the Nations, 142. 66 The list provided in Bartoszewski and and Lewinówna’s publication uses the name Justyna Gertler. She and her son Rys found shelter at Kubicki’s house (Ibid., 142). 67 The Encyclopedia of the Righteous Among the Nations, 413. 68 Bartoszewski and Lewinówna, Righteous Among the Nations, 142. Przywracanie pamięci notes the name of Justyna Gertlerowa and her son (possibly Judyta Gertner) and mother and daughter by the name Nussenbaum from Lublin.

237 remuneration: “Kubicki distinguished himself with fortitude, courage, and integrity. He never refused his services. Always, at any time, even without being excused from his duty he was ready to leave for someone, and then he peacefully served his time.”69 She was also aware of Kubicki being approached by a blackmailer who gave him the address of two Jewish women hiding on the “Aryan” side. Instead of taking the women to the

Gestapo as the denouncer instructed, Kubicki not only warned them, but also sheltered them in his apartment because they had no place to go. He would also initiate contact with Jews in custody during his duty in various prisons and enabled their escapes. 70

The Kubickis’ rescue efforts were in Heinsdorff’s opinion a result of their religious beliefs of loving thy neighbour. The Encyclopedia of the Righteous Among the

Nations calls them people of humanitarian principles.71

Moral Duty to Save the Jews: Franciszek Banaś, Cracow; 1980

After the war, a former Polish policeman and Home Army member “Stefan” deposited a written account of his wartime experiences in the Polish police force and about the murder of the Cracow Jews.72 This policeman was Franciszek Banaś. Twenty years after the war he wrote his memoir Moje wspomnienia, spanning from 1918 to 1946, which was published in 2009.73

69 AŻIH, 301/4012, p. 1. 70 Ibid., p. 2. 71 The Encyclopedia of the Righteous Among the Nations, 413. 72 The account was received by Mrs. Malecka on December 10, no year provided. Testimony of “Stefan,” AŻIH, 301/2058 p. 22. 73 Franciszek Banaś, Moje wspomnienia. Michał , Elżbieta Rączy, eds. (Rzeszów: IPN, 2009).

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Born in 1901 in Gdów, Banaś joined the State Police in Cracow in 1922 and his first allocation was at the 1st police precinct in Kazimierz.74 Kazimierz was traditionally a

Jewish quarter of Cracow and this must have been an important first encounter with the

Jewish population, which shaped Banaś’ views about Polish Jews. From 1925, he served in the water police station. During the occupation, Banaś served in the reorganized Polish police at the police station at Kościuszki 46, and shortly before the he was transferred to a post in the ghetto. In the fall of 1940 Banaś became a member of the ZWZ; he was later sworn in as a member of the Home Army’s group “Żelbet”. His conspiratorial duties included intelligence on German police and military, Polish and

Jewish informers, denunciations, and warning people of pending arrest.75

In the anonymous account, Banaś is very critical about the behaviour of the Polish policeman profiting from the ghetto and expresses his sympathy towards Jewish suffering under the German occupation. A member of the underground organization and an avid reader of the clandestine press he shared the military news with his acquaintances in the ghetto.76 Before the second deportation of Jews from the Cracow ghetto, the Jews tried to escape and Banaś claims that he led several people out of the ghetto, as did other policemen.77 After the final liquidation of the ghetto, he spotted a woman with two children and enabled their escape from the ghetto by making a hole in the fence and guiding them to a rural area.78 After the liquidation of the ghetto he finished his duty

74 Franciszek Banaś died in 1985. 75 Banaś, Moje wspomnienia, 11, 114. 76 AŻIH, 301/2058, p. 7. 77 Ibid., p. 14. 78 Banaś also ignored a man leaving the ghetto. AŻIH, 301/2058, pp. 19-20. In his memoir Banaś mentions assistance given to a woman with a child after the final liquidation of the ghetto in March 1943 by bribing an SS-man with money and alcohol. He was more inclined to help her because she called him by his name and later told him that she was a daughter of his school acquaintance. After the war her husband,

239 there but continued defying German laws by informing Polish merchants and butchers about controls by German police.79

In his memoir, Banaś often expresses negative views about Jews, especially in reference to his experiences with the Jewish population of Kazimierz in the interwar period. The views are often antisemitic in nature, full of and show the influence of such antisemitic publications as the Protocols of the Elderly of Zion.80 In the part devoted to the German occupation, the tone of his memoir changes drastically. He describes the fate of the Jewish population and his efforts to ease their situation. For example, he mentions the Hoffman family, whom he knew from before the war, and to whom he brought food.81 Contrary to his earlier testimony, he paints the picture of the

Polish policemen guarding the ghetto as mostly reluctant to interfere with smuggling, often accommodating it, while only individuals confiscated food, mostly Ukrainians who served in the Polish police.82 The discrepancies between those two accounts might partly be explained by the anonymity of “Stefan’s” account, which he envisioned more of a historical tool for historians than as an accusation against perpetrators.83 His intentions however become clearer in a statement in preparation for his rehabilitation procedure.84

Jakubowicz thanked him for saving his wife and child. Banaś does express some resentment that they did not return the money he needed to use for the bribe. Banaś, Moje wspomnienia, 133. 79 AŻIH 301/2058, p. 21. 80 Banaś, Moje wspomnienia, 35. 81 Engineer Hoffman was Banaś’ former neighbour. Even then he lets the stereotypes lead him to the conclusion: “He didn’t have the character of a Jew. He was a decent person, I was saving this family as much as I could.” Banaś, Moje wspomnienia, 111. 82 Ibid. 83 AŻIH 301/2058, p. 22. 84 To support his claims about his decent behaviour during the occupation and instances of help, Banaś refers the Commission to his memoir, which he handed over to Borwicz, the head of the Jewish Commission in Cracow. Statement dated January 20, 1947. AAN, AbfPP 4434/90/B-4, p. 170v.

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In 1941 Banaś was moved to the service in the ghetto: at the guardhouse at

Limanowska and Lwowska Streets gate, which was used for vehicle transportation.85 He admits to accepting 80 zlotys for letting a wagon full of meat into the ghetto but claims that he was denounced by another Polish policeman and beaten by the German policemen. He also writes about spreading news about the upcoming deportation and letting Jews out of the ghetto before the action.86 He grew tired of service in the ghetto but was not able to obtain a transfer because he was needed to continue with his conspiratorial tasks: “Personally, I was disheartened by the service in the ghetto. I was asking the commandant Drożański to withdraw me, but Drożański said he could not, because I am needed there. He knew where I belonged and what I was doing. I was angry with myself. I was overtired, nervous and permanently sleep deprived. The work in the ghetto was against my conscience. At all times I had to look at crime and death.” At the same time he tried to influence younger policemen to prevent them from helping the

Germans in killing Jews.87

Banaś initiated efforts to receive financial support in January 1967. In his letter to the Israeli Embassy in Warsaw, Banaś describes his role in saving Jews in the Cracow ghetto and asks for permanent financial support due to his disability. In a very bureaucratic and petition-like statement he writes that he was directed by the feeling of pity and moral duty and was able to save several people from certain death. He was also in contact with Poles smuggling food into the ghetto, allowing wagons full of flour and

85 In his memoir Banaś writes about a direct order from the chief police officer Drożański to replace the overzealous new policemen. He also gives two reasons as to why his Home Army superiors wanted him there: he and his colleague Ficek were also to secretly report on the situation in the ghetto and be in contact with two Jews. Banaś, Moje wspomnienia, 119. The second reason was to observe the movement of German forces (122). 86 Banaś, Moje wspomnienia, 122-123. 87 Ibid., 131.

241 meat, and once he was beaten by the German policemen after someone denounced him.

He would also fulfill the prescriptions given to him by Rabbi Lewertów and let the Jews out of the ghetto before the actions.88 At the same time, the Congregation of Jewish Faith in Cracow issued a statement, apparently in preparation for Banaś’ petition to the Israeli

Embassy confirming that he was employed at guarding the ghetto gate at Józefińska

Street between 1941 and 1943. During his service, Banaś many times helped Jewish men, women and children in times of deportation and other difficult situations. The

Congregation was aware of hom saving Maria Schein and her three-year-old son, Rabbi

Lewertów and the Hoffman family. Banaś was said to have enabled smuggling of food and medicine into the ghetto. This was all performed without any compensation.89

Banaś’ request was favoured positively by the Israeli Embassy and forwarded to

Yad Vashem. Eleven years later Banaś contacted Yad Vashem directly inquiring about the status of his petition. He dismissed the possible political causes of the delay and argued that the termination of diplomatic relations between Poland and the State of Israel could not be an obstacle in recognizing people and their virtuous deeds during the war.90

In May 1980, the Commission for the Designation of the Righteous conferred the title to

Banaś and requested financial assistance for him.91 In his file there are no testimonies of the survivors and it is very likely that the decision to grant him the title was based solely on the letter from the Congregation of Jewish Faith. In his memoir Banaś also provides

88 Franciszek Banaś’ letter to the Embassy of the State of Israel in Warsaw, January 28, 1967. YV, DRAN 1824. 89 Statement issued by the Congregation of Jewish Faith, January 25, 1967. YV, DRAN 1824. 90 The Polish People’s Republic broke off diplomatic relations with the State of Israel on June 12, 1967 in response to the Six-Day War. This event is probably the reason why Banaś’ petition has not received any response from Yad Vashem. Other possible reasons could be difficulties in locating the survivors and obtaining their testimonies. 91 Letter from Vera Prausnitz, head of the Department for the Righteous to F. Banaś, May 12, 1980. YV, DRAN 1824.

242 details about the rescue of two Dorthaimer sisters, whom he knew and who were secretly baptized in their jail cell as requested, and whom he led out of custody using a spare key he made. He found them a safe place, provided with identity papers, and organized their departure for work in Germany. Both women survived and lived in after the war.92

Banaś listed the Jews he assisted as the Hoffman family, Rabbi Lewertów with two sons, Jakubowicz’s wife and son, and two Dorthaimer sisters; in addition, many Poles were warned about the danger.93 As for the reasons for his rescue efforts, he explained:

“One cannot boast about it and make a hero of oneself; this would be baseness. Every person has a duty and a right to save another human being from death. It is not a favour, not heroism but a moral duty. […] I was equally glad when I saved a victim from the currents of the Vistula, or from the bullets of the SS-men or the Gestapo. I only fulfilled the duty of a Polish soldier, have a clear conscience and can die peacefully.”94

Empathy and Humanitarianism: Władysław Cieśla, 1988

In some cases, the decision to recognize a rescuer was based on very limited documentation, as was the case of Banaś, and sometimes only on the sole account of those who were rescued. Unavoidably, we discover some discrepancies in accounts but they do not diminish the basic tenet of the rescue.

92 Banaś, Moje wspomnienia, 136-138. 93 The Encyclopedia of the Righteous Among the Nations credits Banaś with saving a three-year-old Miriam Schein (Jakubowicz), Rabbi Lewertów, and the Hoffman family. As aforementioned, the Congregation of Jewish Faith confirmed the rescue of Maria Schein and her little son, not a three-year-old Miriam Schein (69). 94 Banaś, Moje wspomnienia, 139.

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The Aszenberg family avoided the planned deportation in September of 1942 by going into hiding.95 A local peasant apprehended Frieda Aszenberg and her two children,

Tema and Mordechai and took them into the Polish police station in the village of Jarocin near . Cieśla, the policeman on duty, was told to take the family to the German gendarmerie in Janów Lubelski.96 Knowing that they would be killed there, Cieśla, out of compassion, decided to help them escape. He got in contact with the local Home Army members, some of them knew the Aszenbergs, and organized an attack of partisans on the convoy of Jews, in which he and the driver were also beaten to give the attack more credibility.97 Cieśla stayed in contact with the rescued Jews. The family left for in 1952 but kept in touch with the Cieśla family.98 Frieda Aszenberg and Tema’s testimonies were instrumental in clearing Cieśla from charges of collaborating with the

Germans brought to him after the war.99 Tema Herskowitz’s (nee Aszenberg) testimony was crucial in Cieśla’s recognition by Yad Vashem. In her correspondence with Yad

Vashem she emphasized that Cieśla’s motivation for rescuing her and her family was purely humane and that he never received compensation.100

95 Statement from the Main Commission for Investigating Hitlerite Crimes in Poland, Institute for National Remembrance to Dr. Icchak Arad, Yad Vashem, May 11, 1987. YV, DRAN 3863. Some sources provide the date of the rescue as 1943. The Encyclopedia of the Righteous, vol. 3, part 1, 149. 96 YV, DRAN 3863; The Encyclopedia of the Righteous, 149. 97 In her official letter requesting the recognition of Cieśla Tema Hershkovitz recalls the events differently: She writes that Cieśla and another policeman took them to the woods and told people in the village that they were taking them to the Gestapo. Letter to Dr. S. Krakowski, Yad Vashem, July 2, 1984, p. 1. YV, DRAN 3863. 98 Czesława Bandurczenko’s (Cieśla’s daughter) witness testimony for the Main Commission for Investigating Hitlerite Crimes in Poland, Institute for National Remembrance, April 22, 1987, p. 2. YV, DRAN 3863. 99 The Encyclopedia of the Righteous, vol. 3, part 1, 149. Tema Herskovitz’s letter to Dr. S. Krakowski, Yad Vashem, July 2, 1984, p. 2. YV, DRAN 3863. 100 Tema Herskovitz’s letter to Mordecai Paldiel, August 24, 1988. YV, DRAN 3863.

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Cieśla’s actions and cooperation with the Home Army were possible likely because of familiarity with the people he saved. Frieda Aszenberg’s husband was a butcher, known to many in Jarocin, and this could be a reason for a smooth execution of the rescue.101 Tema Herskovitz also mentioned that her oldest sister and her husband knew Cieśla very well.102 Therefore, it is very likely, that Cieśla decided to help his old acquaintances. Herskovitz recalls that there were other people he helped but most of them did not survive.103

Personal Ties: Piotr and Emilia Czechoński, 1999

In 1997 Shlomo Goren applied to Yad Vashem to posthumously recognize Piotr and Emilia Czechoński as Righteous Among the Nation. As a child, Goren (then Salek

Gorzyczański), was hidden by the couple in Tomaszów Lubelski. In 1999 Yad Vashem rendered the title to Piotr and Emilia in recognition of them saving the child. Hidden as a child, Shlomo did not talk about his experiences and it seems that some of his knowledge about the rescue was acquired after the war. There are some serious discrepancies between Goren’s statement to Yad Vashem and the official entry about the Czechoński couple in the Encyclopedia of the Righteous Among the Nations concerning the timing and circumstances of the rescue. Goren’s cousin Sara Barnea learned many details from the Czechoński couple in 1945 and from her relatives who picked up the boy from the

101 Bandurczenko’s account, p. 1. She was then 12 years old and recalls here her father’s narration. YV, DRAN 3863. 102 Tema Herskovitz’s letter to Mordecai Paldiel, July 15, 1990. Ibid. 103 Tema Herskovitz’s letter to Mordecai Paldiel, October 28, 1985. Ibid. Similarly, the letter from the Main Commission for Investigating Hitlerite Crimes in Poland to Arad also mentions that Cieśla saved other Jews (May 11, 1987), YV, DRAN 3863. In the Yad Vashem file there is preserved a letter from M. Paldiel to Kristina and Abe Westreich, asking them to provide their testimony about the help received from Cieśla. November 21, 1985.

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Czechońskis after the war.104 Although the account is general in nature, it appears to be the base for the Yad Vashem entry.

According to the Encyclopedia entry, the Gorzyczański family lived with the

Czechońskis from their arrival in Tomaszów Lubelski to May 1942, when the final liquidation took place. Then the parents fled to the forests leaving their son behind.105

According to Shlomo Goren, his family fled from Łódź to Tomaszów Lubelski (his father’s hometown) at the beginning of the war. Until late 1941 they lived in the

Tomaszów Lubelski ghetto.106 Szlomo’s father knew the Czechoński family from before the war. Emilia Czechońska, a former teacher was married to Piotr Czechoński, a policeman.107 During the round-ups in 1941 Szlomo’s family hid at the Czechońskis’. In late 1941, during the last action in the ghetto, Szlomo’s parents brought him to the

Czechońskis.108 The Czechoński family took the child into their house and hid him until the end of the war behind a closet in the children’s bedroom. All four of their children were aware of the dangers of sheltering a Jewish child and were taught to say it was their cousin.109 Shlomo’s parents did not survive the war. After the war the Czechońskis informed Jewish organizations about their rescue and asked for help in finding his parents

104 Sara Barnea’s letter to Yad Vashem, July 12, 1997. YV, DRAN 8373. 105 The Encyclopedia of the Righteous, vol. 3, part 1, 157. 106 There was no ghetto in Tomaszów Lubelski until mid-May 1942, when around 200 young men and women chosen for labour were ordered to reside in an open ghetto. The elderly, disabled and sick were killed on the spot while the rest of the Jews were sent to Bełżec. The USHMM Encyclopedia II, 719. 107 During his visit to Poland to honour his rescuers, Goren added that during the liquidation his father hid him in a store run by Emilia Czechońska. Beata Wasilewska, “Medal za życie,” Tygodnik Zamojski, no. 39 (1034), September 29, 1999, 11. 108 Goren’s letter to Righteous Among the Nations Department at Yad Vashem, 12 June, 1997. YV, DRAN 8373. 109 Shlomo Goren and his cousin Sara Barnea also tried to have the couple’s sons recognized as the Righteous as they argued the sons actively helped. Because the title can be rendered only to those who took an active part in the rescue and who were of a more mature age. Correspondence between Yad Vashem and Sara Barnea, March-June 2004. YV, DRAN 8373.

246 or relatives. Barnea emphasized their courage and devotion.110 The Encyclopedia of the

Righteous Among the Nations describes the rescuers’ motivations in the following words:

“In saving Shlomo, the Czechońskis were prompted by humanitarian principles and a selfless love of their fellow man, which overrode considerations of personal safety.”111

“Salvage Everything That’s Polish”: Bronisław Marchlewicz, Commandant of the

Police in Otwock; 2004112

In Sheltering the Jews, Mordecai Paldiel discusses two types of help: passive and active. He refers to passive assistance as a “conspiracy of silence” – not denouncing to autorities Jews known to be hiding with a gentile or a Jew passing as a Christian. Active assistance involved ensuring safety by finding or providing shelter, or by providing false identifications and helping Jews flee to a safer area.113

Bronisław Marchlewicz, the former chief of the police in Otwock, rendered both active and passive aid to Jews, and was posthumously awarded the Righteous Among the

Nations medal by Yad Vashem in 2004. He was the highest ranking Polish policeman recognized rendering help to Jews and possibly one of the most well known.114 By virtue of his position as chief of police, his membership in the Home Army, the help he extended to Jews and Poles alike, and his persecution by the Communist regime, there were efforts by certain groups to present his actions as generally representative of the police force and to thus deny and dilute that some of the policemen were complicit in the

110 Sara Barnea’s letter, 12 June, 1997. YV, DRAN 8373. 111 Encyclopedia of the Righteous, vol. 3, part 1, 156. 112 A note found in Bronisław Marchlewicz’s private papers by his son. Zbigniew Marchlewicz, “Epitafia Policyjne,” Przegląd Policyjny 6, no. 3 (1996): 222. 113 Paldiel, Sheltering the Jews, 8- 9. 114 During the war Marchlewicz was Second Lieutenant, after the war he was advanced to the rank of Major.

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Holocaust. The official acknowledgement of Marchlewicz’s assistance to Jews was the life mission of his son Zbigniew and led to a request from a survivor who owed her life to assistance provided by Marchlewicz, to have him recognized as a Righteous Among the

Nations.

In November 2009, the Polish President Lech Kaczyński awarded Marchlewicz posthumously with the Commander’s Cross with the Star of the Order of Polonia

Restituta, one of the highest Polish orders, for “heroic behaviour and extraordinary courage in saving lives of Jews during the Second World War and for noteworthy merits in defence of human dignity and humane rights.”115 Shevah Weiss, an Israeli politician and former Israeli ambassador to Poland emphasizes the significance of the chief of the police in Otwock whose benevolent actions defy the of a Polish (Blue) policeman as an official szmalcownik.”116

Born in 1899, in Miesiaczkowo, Bronisław Marchlewicz joined the police force in

1922, and since 1937 he was the chief of the police in Otwock. He maintained his position in the recreated Polish police and as the records show, his mission was „to save everything that’s Polish.” Throughout the war he did not hesitate to use his privileged position to ease the situation of the Polish and Jewish residents of Otwock.117

In the fall of 1940, the German authorities created a ghetto in Otwock. To ensure a smooth transfer of Jews to the ghetto, the Jewish police of the Otwock ghetto was created.

115 http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum-aktualnosci/rok-2009/art,48,729,nominacje-generalskie-i- odznaczenia-panstwowe-w-narodowe-swieto-niepodleglosci.html 116 Grażyna Bartuszek, Paweł Biedziak, “O zagładzie…wywiad bez pytań,” Policja 997, no. 4, (July 2005): 24. 117 The Municipal National Council issued a very favourable opinion about Marchlewicz during its plenary hearing in March 1948 quoting many witnesses. AAN, AbfPP 434/120 M-11, pp. 79v -81.

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It was formally liable to the chief of the Polish police in organizational and disciplinary matters onto whom they passed reports.118

The superior position of the Polish police over the Otwock ghetto created an opening for criminal behaviour of the policemen who profited from the ghetto by collecting bribes and “ransom” from butchers, bakers and smugglers.119 Calek

Perechodnik, a Jewish policeman in the Otwock ghetto, presents a critical evaluation of the Polish policemen’s benefiting from illegal trade between the ghetto and the rest of population. Regarding Marchlewicz, Perechodnik writes:

Just the same, for the sake of justice, I must exclude from the ranks of the

police the commandant of the Otwock Komisariat, Marchlewicz. I cannot

accuse him of living off the ghetto during the war. He probably never

crossed that boundary, not before the Aktion and not afterward.120 I am

absolutely certain that in his home you will not find any Jewish

possessions. He personally never detained a Jew and probably sympathized

with them. I cannot approve the basis for his action according to some

noble rule of splendid isolation. Would that all the police have at least

followed his example, but he too should have fulfilled his obligation,

certainly a moral one, to warn the Jews. That he did not do.

118 Sylwia Szymańska, Ludność żydowska w Otwocku podczas drugiej wojny światowej (Warsaw: Żydowski Instytut Historyczny, 2002), 45. 119 Perechodnik. Am I a Murderer, 30-31. 120 Marchlewicz was a member of a Special Sanitary-Police Committee along with the municipal doctor and the head of the Judenrat. Thus, it is likely that he visited the ghetto on various occasions. APW, Akta miasta Otwocka 1064, p. 70.

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All this we learned sometime later.121

During the liquidation of the Otwock ghetto, Marchlewicz did not participate in any way in the deportation and prohibited his subordinates from looting in Jewish quarter.122 It was also believed that he refused to issue an order to shoot at the Jews escaping from the ghetto during the deportation.123 Marchlewicz warned Jews about the danger after the liquidation action and would halt investigations into denounciations against Poles sheltering Jews.124 He agreed to store Jewish possessions and made them available to their owners in times of need.125 Izaak Cynamon, a survivor, also testified that Marchlewicz released Jews in custody and did not act against Jews trying to get out of the Otwock ghetto, behaviour that was in stark contrast to that of other policemen.126

Perechodnik singles out a few Polish policemen who warned their friends of the deportation but on the condition that they would not spread the news. For example, thanks to police officer Pietraś, who warned the administration of the hospital for mentally ill

Zofiówka, some people were able to escape while some others committed suicide.127

It is worth mentioning that as the commandant of the Polish police in Otwock,

Marchlewicz was actively engaged in protecting Jewish children hiding in local convents.

The Elizabethan sisters in Otwock were involved in sheltering several Jewish children.

Sister Gertruda Marciniak from the Elizabethan Convent, head of the Educational

121 Perechodnik, Am I a Murderer?, 31. 122 Eugenia Kokoszko’s statement, January 23, 1949. AAN, AbfPP 434/120 M-11, p. 89. 123 Statement of Józef Korcz, chair of the MRN. Ibid., pp. 80v-81. 124 Michalina Duraczowa’s statement, November 9, 1948; Eugenia Kokoszko’s statement, January 23, 1949; Włodzimierz Gilewski’s statement, January 29, 1929. Ibid., pp. 83, 89, 120. 125 Written statement of Dora Lewandowska, January 24, 1949. Ibid., p. 88. 126 Izaak Cynamon’s account delivered during the hearing of the National Municipal Council (MRN), March 23, 1948. Ibid., p. 80v. 127 Perechodnik, Am I a Murderer?, 31.

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Institute Promyk decided to let Jewish children from Otwock and the area into their orphanage. She testified after the war that during the war Marchlewicz facilitated sheltering of Jewish children (Daniel Lancberg, Renata Noj, Salomea Rybak, and Marysia

Ossowiecka), frequently warning them about forthcoming round-ups and searches conducted by the Germans.128 Together with Father Ludwik Wolski and Mrs. Aleksandra

Szpakowska, Marchlewicz saved a young girl, Marysia Ossowiecka. Her cousin, Hanna

Kamińska, wrote a thank-you note in 1945 to Father Wolski, expressing her gratitude for saving her little cousin and naming all three rescuers.129 All the aforementioned rescuers were recognized as the Righteous Among the Nations.130

It was thanks to the statement of Michelle Donet (Marysia Ossowiecka) and her cousin, Hanna Kamińska-Goldfeld, that Yad Vashem finally recognized Marchlewicz. In her interview with a Yad Vashem staff, Donet acknowledged the instrumental role played by Marchlewicz in her rescue. Marysia Ossowiecka was left by her mother on the street outside of the ghetto during the deportation in August 1942. She was taken to the police station and placed in a cell with a young woman, Aleksandra Szpakowska’s daughter

Antonia, who was awaiting transport to Germany for work.131 In agreement with

Marchlewicz and with his permission, Aleksandra Szpakowska took the girl to her home and sheltered her for a brief period of time before placing her in the orphanage. Father

128 Gertruda Marciniak’s statement, January 23, 1949. AAN, AbfPP 434/120 M-11, p. 90. 129 Ibid., p. 65. 130 Aleksandra Szpakowska was recognized by Yad Vashem in 2004, Sister Gertruda Marciniak in 2007, and Father Ludwik Wolski in 2008. 131 YV, O3/8589, Michelle Donet, pp. 3-4. Michelle Donet knows the details of her rescue from her cousin Hanna Kamińska. After the war, Marchlewicz approached Kamińska with a request of issuing him a statement that he saved her niece. Ibid., p. 5.

251

Wolski issued a false baptism certificate in the name of Halina Brzoza and under this name the girl was later registered in the Elizabethan Sisters’ orphanage.132

Ruth Noy was a little girl taken in by Sister Ludwika Małkiewicz of the

Elizabethan Sisters order to their home in Otwock on Świderska St. in November 1942 at the request of her parents.133 Max Noy knew Sister Ludwika since the creation of the ghetto. He secured a baptism certificate from an Otwock priest. He recalls: “We informed the Polish in Otwock of the fact that we had given our child to the convent. He assured us that in case something happened and the child ended up at the police station he would call an engineer living nearby, Szpakowski, and then his wife, would take the child in as her own, so that our daughter would not fall into the hands of the Germans.”134

After the war Marchlewicz joined the new state police called Citizens’ Militia. His expertise and experience were needed to train the new force. Marchlewicz’s conduct during the war was verified in his favour and in July 1948 he was rehabilitated. It is apparent from the records that Marchlewicz was a well-respected man in Otwock. Both

Polish and Jewish citizens reported positively about him. However, only a few months later, in November 1948, he was removed from the service due to newly acquired evidence that prior to 1939 he partook in the Sanacja government’s political repression,

132 Otwoccy Sprawiedliwi wśród Narodów Swiata. Gazeta Otwocka. Wydanie Specjalne, (lipiec 2012): 32. 133 Sister Ludwika Małkiewicz was one of the most engaged in the rescue effort. She was bestowed the title of the Righteous Among the Nations in 1981. 134 Kurek, Your Life, 220.

252 collaborated with the German occupier and despite being a sworn-in commander of an underground group, did not join in the Warsaw Uprising out of cowardice.135

The rehabilitation procedure was renewed; Marchlewicz was not rehabilitated and deemed not fit to work in public administration.136 He was arrested under charges of

“Nazification of public life in Poland” between 1927 and 1937. Several thousand of

Otwock’s citizens signed a petition to free him and dozens of statements describing his actions during the war were collected. Despite all these efforts, Marchlewicz was sentenced to six years in prison with loss of public and civic rights. The Supreme Court lowered the sentence in 1950 based on Marchlewicz’s honourable conduct during the war. This decision contributed to Marchlewicz’s efforts to clear his name and he appealed to reopen his rehabilitation procedure. He died in 1972.

Conclusion

Certain Polish policemen challenged and defied orders. They used their status in benevolent ways and some became instrumental in saving the lives of Jews. The policemen discussed in this chapter stood by in times of danger and need and became rescuers. Among them we find higher- and lower-ranking functionaries, individuals who were negligent in executing duties and those who were active in underground movements.

They were driven by a variety of motivations. Some rescuers offered help to their prewar friends and acquaintances but they also extended help to complete strangers.137 They

135 AAN, AbfPP 434/120 M-11, p. 55. 136 Rehabilitation-Verification Commission’s decision from January 19, 1949. Ibid., p. 53. 137 Nechama Tec’s study suggests that only in rare cases, the rescuers limited their aid to friends, and usually they helped other people at the same time. Cf. rescue efforts by Czechoński and Banaś. Tec, When the Light Pierced the Darkness, 135.

253 acted with the knowledge that a lack of action would result in the immediate death of the person in need. They witnessed the brutality of the terror apparatus on a daily basis. By virtue of their profession they were an integral part of that system. The policemen extended various forms of assistance on their own initiative or when asked. Sometimes the offer to help was spontaneous and impulsive. Some individuals were acting out of the conviction that it was their moral duty to help, “a patriotic and civic sense of morality” as

Franciszek Banaś described it. His memoirs show that some rescuers were not free of antisemitism and even wartime experiences did not change their prejudices against the

Jews. It is also noteworthy that most of these policemen were of an older age and served in police before the war.

We rarely see the rescuers among the police talk about their motivations. In those cases we need to rely on the survivors’ assessment of the motivation behind their assistance. We can discern certain motivations and in case studies of the Righteous policemen we find empathy (Władysław Nowiński), the manifestation of resistance to

Nazi policies (Bronisław Marchlewicz), humanistic ideological outlooks (Władysław

Cieśla, and as a countermeasure to German brutality (Eliasz Pietruszka). All these men showed various instances of heroism and dedication. Due to their position in the police apparatus, the policemen could facilitate escape and movement between various shelters but they could also be easily identified by those trying to prevent such actions, including

Polish blackmailers and German officials. Those who helped demonstrate that the Polish police did have agency in decision-making and could act in favour of Jews in hiding if they chose to do so. Their rescue efforts became an asset in the post-war rehabilitation procedure and trials for collaboration.

Conclusion

The picture of the Polish police and their activities throughout the Second World

War is complicated and multifaceted. Distrusted by both German authorities and the

Polish population, the historiography of the Polish police eludes simple conclusions. As the war unfolded, individuals within the force acted in varying and often contradictory ways, which is consistent with other assessments of human behaviour during those years of widespread international conflict.

This dissertation investigated many dimensions of interactions between Polish policemen and the Jewish population. It challenged the current tendency, which reinforces the Polish historiography of the Second World War as a period of heroic resistance against the German occupier and which at the same time minimizes hostile actions towards the Jews. While this study acknowledges the virtuous behaviour of a number of policemen, its results emphasize that by uncovering and naming the nefarious character of many elements within the Polish police, however difficult this may be, it elevates the behaviour of those who took heroic action by demonstrating just how unique and extraordinary their efforts were. Concentrating only on cases of valour and resistance distorts the historiography of the period and serves certain goals of the current government’s “historical policy.” Comprehensive studies of various groups and their behaviour during the occupation are necessary in addressing Polish responses to the murder of Polish Jews. By investigating instances in which Polish policemen were not only witnesses to the Holocaust perpetrated by the Germans but also participants in the killings, this dissertation contributes to the discussion about Polish responsibility for a significant number of Jewish deaths.

254 255

This dissertation posits that the actions of local police were significant in implementing German anti-Jewish policies and participating in the last phase of the

Holocaust, when many Jews in hiding were discovered by the policemen or denounced by the local population. Jews who were apprehended were handed over to the German security forces or killed by Polish policemen. By carrying out searches and murdering

Jews, the Polish police contributed to the overall attainment of the Nazis’ objectives.

Polish, German, and Jewish sources are plentiful that testify to policemen and ordinary

Poles contributing to many Jewish deaths in the period following the deportations to killing centres until the end of the occupation.

In the early years of the occupation, an encounter with a Polish policeman gave a

Jewish person a chance at survival, as the policemen were often interested in accepting bribe money. The Polish police’s position facilitated their members to act as both perpetrators and enablers of contacts between the inhabitants of the ghetto and the

“Aryan” side. Smuggling was the most accessible form of interaction between those two groups. The participation of the policemen in illegal trades, most notably smuggling in and out of the ghetto was a frequent occurrence and is well documented in available sources. Later on, the policemen used their privileged position to blackmail Jews and extort money. Eventually, encounters between Jews and Polish policemen proved to be deadly in most cases.

The participation in killings of Jews took on different forms and levels. We see a wide range of behavior, from assisting the Germans to independent actions not authorized by German superiors. Many of the killings recorded in the post-war trials took place in the absence of the Germans and cannot be explained by the proverbial “following the orders” defence. In fact, the Germans were often completely unaware of Polish

256 policemen’s extrajudicial killings, as policemen often killed Jews they apprehended or those who had been brought to them by the local population.

In spite of German decrees and threats, there were also policemen who used their position to aid those who were persecuted, Poles and Jews alike. Cases of benevolent behaviour are difficult to establish and verify, as former policemen facing post-war trials over their collaboration with the Germans often argued that such claims proved their opposition to the repressive character of the occupying authorities.1 Establishing an exact number of those who extended help to Jews is not possible. Many of the names and deeds remain anonymous, as the recipients of one-time or more regular assistance often did not survive the war (this is of course a similar difficulty that is faced when trying to establish culpability as well). However, available sources attest to aid extended by both higher- and lower-ranking policemen. Often the same individuals would assist Poles and Jews; sometimes the policemen focused only on helping Jews in need. Sometimes the same policemen exhibited the opposite behaviour depending on circumstances. Oftentimes cases of collaboration and helping Jews are intertwined. Some of the policemen who helped the Jews did so on their own initiative motivated by compassion or as a way of sabotaging the occupier, others regarded it as an extension of their underground duties.

Policemen were involved in the resistance movement from the very beginning as demonstrated by the example of Marian Kozielewski, the first chief of the Warsaw police.

Policemen participated in conspiratorial work within the structures of the Polish police

(and Polish Kripo) such as the National Security Corps (PKB) and Bureau 993/P, they belonged to various underground organizations or acted individually (by defying orders

1 Antoni B. was not granted rehabilitation despite claiming in his application that he warned the Jews in Koluszki about the forthcoming arrests and deportation. AAN, AbfPP 434-90 B-4, p. 300.

257 or assisting people endangered by the occupier’s policies).2 According to the estimates, up to 30% of the policemen belonged to underground organizations. At the same time we need to remember that sometimes the policemen used their affiliation with the resistance movement to justify their killings.

Given all of these complexities, particularly the fundamental tension between overwhelmingly compelling evidence that indicates the importance of the Polish police in implementing the Holocaust in Poland and instances of rescue, benevolence and help, how do we assess the Polish police during the Second World War? Looking at their activities through the lens of forced participation in the German’s implementation of the

Holocaust, culpability is a subjective notion that is both painful for a nation that itself was under tremendous duress, yet a reality in many circumstances where extraordinary acts of aggression were committed. The quality of culpability appears different for those who obeyed their superiors’ orders, guarded ghettos and escorted Jews to trains versus those who blackmailed Jews hiding on the “Aryan” side or worse, killed and murdered them during this volatile period in history.

It is clear that many policemen acted the way they were trained in the interwar period.3 They carried out their supervisors’ orders in a more-or-less disciplined manner - as they did before the war - and rarely questioned the legality of those orders. As long as they fulfilled their duties within the limits of the law and accepted social norms, we may find some understanding for their position. However, we need to question cases of what

2 Hempel, Pogrobowcy klęski, 218-219. 3 Cf. the case of Władysław Lewandowski. Lewandowski was sentenced to death and executed for killing civilians, including a Jewish woman with her child and other Jews. His pardon plea emphasized that Lewandowski was a disciplinarian following the orders to the letter. His crimes were a result of the war conditions and his marriage to a German woman. AIPN, GK 261/604, pp. 136-140, 152.

258

Antonina Kłoskowska categorized as an “active hostile attitude” – when people participated in persecuting Jews, including killing them without direct coercion in terms of the occupiers’ terror.4 Blackmailers and extortionists belong to that category, and as we have seen, many among them wore the uniform of a Polish policeman. Many policemen were guilty of zeal, illegal behaviour, and using their position of authority for financial gain.

With regards to the motivations and behaviours of the policemen, they mirrored similar processes that were taking place throughout wartime Polish society. Much of the population was indifferent toward the Jewish people. Motives of those who helped varied from pure desire to financial gain to fulfilling conspiratorial tasks or acting out of sense of moral or patriotic obligation. Because of their status and position, policemen took on extraordinary powers that were either abused for personal gain or used for righteous behaviour that saw them rise above their circumstances and contribute to the resistance of the Nazi government’s policies.

The post-war courts often reflected on the dilemma facing the Polish police force throughout the occupation. On the one hand, there was the power of the German occupier and a responsibility to answer to their German police superiors. On the other hand, there were Polish underground organizations that monitored the behaviour of the policemen and in some cases punished them for their anti-Polish and anti-Jewish activities.5

Undoubtedly, the fear of underground repercussions influenced some policemen who refrained from criminal aspects of their cooperation with the Germans. However,

4 Antonina Kłoskowska, “Polacy wobec Zagłady Żydów polskich. Próba typologii postaw,” Kultura i Społeczeństwo, 32, no. 4 (1988): 113. 5 Cf. A verdict in the case of Władysław Kabaj, AIPN, GK 255/697, pp. 253-253v.

259 there were many who exceeded what was expected of them. Some policemen welcomed the opportunity to assist in the annihilation of the Jewish population of Poland. The post- war trial cases rarely reveal antisemitism as a modus operandi of the policemen.

However, prejudice against Jews is apparent in the derogatory or dismissive vocabulary used by the defendants. We also need to bear in mind that many of the prewar policemen were influenced by the ideology of the National Democrats. The depreciation of life as a result of brutal war conditions and the heavy influence of German propaganda most likely contributed to creating or deepening certain attitudes toward Jews among the Polish population, including the policemen.

260

Appendix A: Organization of the Polish Police in Cracow

Source: APKr, Kommando der polnischen Polizei in Krakau 1939-1944, 2, p. 1

261

Appendix B: Organization of the Polish Police in the Warsaw County Source: APW, Kreishauptmann Warschau-Land 1137, p. 20

262

Appendix C: First Black List of the Blue Police Source: AAN, AK 203/VIII-2, p. 23

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