Charging Accomplice Liability in Child Abuse Cases Rienced Child Abuse Prosecutors and Specialists in Forensic Pathology, Linguistics and Courtroom Demonstration

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Charging Accomplice Liability in Child Abuse Cases Rienced Child Abuse Prosecutors and Specialists in Forensic Pathology, Linguistics and Courtroom Demonstration Volume 22, Number 6, 2010 N AT I O N A L C E N T E R F O R P R O S E C U T I O N O F C H I L D A B U S E UUppddaattee CHILDPROOF: ADVANCED TRIAL ADVOCACY FOR CHILD ABUSE PROSECUTORS APRIL 25 - 30, 2010 NATIONAL ADVOCACY CENTER COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA Designed for small groups of experienced child Moving Beyond Frustration with “Bad Moms:” abuse prosecutors, childProof offers participants a high student to faculty ration. Faculty are expe- Charging Accomplice Liability in Child Abuse Cases rienced child abuse prosecutors and specialists in forensic pathology, linguistics and courtroom demonstration. Course materials include an ex- tensive medical bibliography covering the most Kristina Marie Korobov, JD1 common injuries in child abuse cases including abdominal, internal and genital injuries. Tajanay Bailey is dead because her mother’s Often in these situations, the accomplice is boyfriend beat her to death when she was just four not charged, either because there is little CHILDPROTECT: years old. Charity chose her boyfriend over her recognition of the role that the accomplice TRIAL ADVOCACY FOR CIVIL CHILD PRO- four-year-old daughter. Without the participation of plays or because prosecutors need the testi- TECTION ATTORNEYS LIMITED SPACE AVAILABLE! APPLY BY her mother Charity, the boyfriend could not have mony of the accomplice. When prosecutors APRIL 29, 2010 killed her. Without Charity’s assistance, the do not, however, hold all participants in the JULY 19-23, 2010 boyfriend would have had no access to the child. abuse accountable, they are sanctioning this WINONA, MINNESOTA ChildProtect addresses a critical need for trial Tajanay’s “mother” had multiple opportunities to behavior. By not holding accountable the advocacy training for child protection attorneys intervene, to protect her own child, to work with parent who repeatedly subjects her child to and for collaboration between the child protec- Child Protection to save her child, but she aban- abuse at the hands of her significant other, tion and criminal justice communities. This five- doned her child—at one point she laughed while prosecutors send a message to parents every- day intensive course will be offered at the National Child Protection Training Center’s state her daughter was being abused—and now that where that the behavior is acceptable. With- of the art training complex, which offers stu- child is dead.2 out criminal intervention, it remains a dents five moot court rooms, four forensic inter- possibility that the abused child will be re- view training rooms, and a “mock house” in which to conduct simulated child abuse investi- ccomplice liability is a way for turned to the accomplice, potentially expos- gations. ChildProtect will be presented by experi- the law to recognize that child ing the child to further abuse at the hands of enced prosecutors, civil child protection attorneys, abuse can be a criminal enter- the parent’s new partner. child development professionals, and physicians. prise with multiple participants Victor Vieth, Executive Director of the National whAo encourage, facilitate, and benefit from When considering whether to charge an ac- Association to Prevent Sexual Abuse of Children, will guide students through this rigorous trial the abuse . even when the abuse occurs at complice, prosecutors should ask some basic advocacy course. Topics will include: Court Proce- the expense of a parent’s own child. It allows questions: dures; Ethical Issues; Effective Trial Strategies; Is- those who facilitate abuse and those who sues of Neglect; Direct Examination; Preparing Children for Court; Expert Witnesses; Psychologi- allow abuse to continue when they have a • What is the accomplice’s duty to the cal Issues; Cross Examination; and Typical De- duty to protect a child to be held responsible child: Prosecutors must ask what duty the fenses. Students will have the opportunity to for their failure to act. In a robbery case, accomplice owed to the child. Where the hone the skills necessary to manage, evaluate and try civil child protection cases by participat- prosecutors do not simply charge the of- accomplice is a parent or legal guardian, the ing in mock trial exercises and receiving court- fender who held the gun and took the existence of a duty is obvious. In other cir- room and individual DVD recorded critiques on: money. We charge the lookout person, the cumstances, however, liability for the well- Direct and Cross Examination of the Medical, getaway driver, and the accessory after the being of the child may not be so clear. Psychological, Social Worker, and Profile Expert Witnesses; and Direct Examination of the Child fact who sells the stolen merchandise or Stepparents, extended family, or friends of Witness and the Petitioned Parents. helps the robber to hide from police. We do the perpetrator may all be aware that a this on the theory that without assistance, the child is being abused but may have no duty EQUAL JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN: primary offender might be deterred from to report the abuse or to intervene. The INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE committing the crime or at the very least, lack of duty certainly would not entitle a MAY 17-21, 2010 might not be as successful in committing the person to directly participate in abuse; how- CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA crime. The same theory applies to child ever, it may be a legal defense to failure to Equal Justice is a five-day comprehensive course designed to meet the needs of frontline child abuse. report or failure to intervene claims. In abuse professionals, including prosecutors, law California, a 2008 appellate court held that enforcement, medical and mental health profes- Child abuse prosecutors routinely encounter “parents have a common law duty to pro- sionals, SANE/SART teams, emergency response situations where there is a primary abuser; tect their children and may be held crimi- teams, child protection and child advocacy center staff, social workers and victim witness advocates. however the investigation reveals additional nally liable for failing to do so: a parent Conference participants will be taught by and participants: who knowingly fails to take reasonable have the opportunity to interact with many of steps to stop an attack on his or her child the nation’s foremost child abuse experts. • A mother who offers up her mentally may be criminally liable for the attack if the For more information about these conferences, handicapped child for sex with the purpose of nonintervention is to aid and see our Web site at www.ndaa.org mother’s boyfriend; abet the attack.”3 In the absence of a legal • A father who watches the child’s mother duty to protect, prosecutors may have to severely beat the child with a belt; or look to more traditional concepts, such as • A babysitter who fails to seek medical at- conspiracy to commit a crime or accom- tention for a child in her care after her plice to a crime, rather than relying on boyfriend has severely shaken the child and child protection statutes that hold those the child has lost consciousness. with a duty to protect to a higher standard. • Articulation of specific behavior by the accomplice: principal liability.7 Other states hold accomplices to be as re- Prosecutors must detail what exactly the accomplice did or sponsible as the primary offender. Prosecutors may also wish to failed to do. Often times, the arguments made in court focus on charge a participant as a conspirator, particularly in cases involv- what the accomplice actually knew about the abuse, arguing ing prostituted children, the exploitation of children or the pro- that if the defendant never saw the offender hurting the child, duction of sexual images of children. Other scenarios would how was the accomplice supposed to do anything about it? include a parent who hides the child’s bruises, inflicted by an- Some states impose a “should have known” standard. For in- other, from plain observation or where a parent convinces a stance a Connecticut Court of Appeals found that a stepfather child to recant allegations of sexual abuse by agreement with could be held responsible for his failure to act to protect his in- the abuser. fant stepdaughter on the theory that he had to have noticed her obvious physical injuries.4 The original opinion on this case • Are there any co-existing forms of abuse that precluded cites to a line of cases from other jurisdictions recognizing that the accomplice from protecting the child? Prosecutors the “[c]riminal liability of parents based on a failure to act in must look at the accomplice’s actual capacity to take action accordance with common-law affirmative duties to protect and under the circumstances in the home. It is not unusual to hear care for their children is well recognized in many jurisdic- an accomplice assert that she too was being abused and was, tions.”5 In other instances, the prosecutor may have evidence of therefore, unable to act on behalf of the child. When faced with direct participation in the abuse. Where one parent holds the this claim, prosecutors should carefully evaluate the account of child while the other inflicts the beating, or where a mother abuse and seek independent evidence. Prosecutors should videotapes the sexual abuse of her child by another, there is lit- weigh the alleged domestic abuse victim’s level of participation tle question as to the nature of the accomplice’s role, such that in the child abuse: there is a significant difference between inac- he/she becomes more of an aider/abetter of the abuse than tion in the face of awareness of abuse and participating directly when an accomplice simply fails to stop abuse from happening.
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