MASTER'S THESIS M-1108
ALEM, Fehmi THE QUESTION OF OMAN IN THE UNITED NATIONS.
The American University, M Jl., 1967 P olitical Science, international law and relations
University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. THE QUESTION OF OMAN IN THE UNITED NATIONS
by
Fehmi Alem
Submitted to the
Faculty of the School of International Service of The American University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree
of MASTER OF ARTS
Signatures of Committee: Chairman :
Date: Dean of the School
Date:
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY July, 1966 The American University M A R 1 7 196? Washington, D. C.
5 yc,Q Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ABSTRACT
THE QUESTION OF OMAN IN THE UNITED NATIONS
"b y
Fehmi Alem
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The question of Omein was first introduced to the United Nations Security Council in 1957. In the past five years, it
has been included in the Agenda of the General Assembly for discussion during its annual regular sessions. It is now considered a question related to colonialism eind, therefore,
was placed before the committee concerned with the liquida tion of colonialism and trust territories. The issue centers around the claim by the Imam of Oman of the independence of Central Oman, and the counter claim by the Sultan of Muscat and Oman that the territory in
question forms an integral part of his Sultanate® Both sides support their respective claims with historical, legal, and political arguments; hence, the conflict has arisen as regards the interpretation of historical and legal data. This paper does not attempt to discuss the substance
of the issue as much as it does the role of the United Nations in similar questions. Reference to the historical and legal aspects of the question sets the background for the attitude of different members of the United Nations, including those involved either directly or indirectly in the conflict® Finally, the role of the United Nations is analyzed in the light of the actual composition of the Organization
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and its division into block which influence by their votes
the direction of the issues before the United Nations and set the pace for its action on questions such as those re
lated to colonialism. The fact-finding mission which visited Oman in 1963
is an illustration of the type of action that could be undertaken by the World Organization on this type of issues. Discussion of this action is confined, in fact, to that
mission and the way it carried out its mandate. It is this analysis, rather than a definite conclu sion regarding the issue, that forms the main postulate of the paper. Such analysis explains the role that the United Nations has and will play in questions similar to that of Oman.
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The question of Oman is one of the problems still pending in the United Nations® It was first submitted to
the Security Council in 1957; subsequently, it moved to the Special Political Committee, then to the Fourth Committee, known as the Trusteeship Committee, which was concerned with
matters of trusteeship territories and non-self-governing territories® The longer the debate extends in the committee
and the plenary meetings, the deeper the confusion goes con cerning the question® Questions such as self-determination, independence, domestic jurisdiction, interference in internal affairs of a
country, human rights and the obligation of the United Nations to insure them— all these were invoked by the par ties concerned during the debate without, nevertheless, bringing to light any ambiguity generated by the discussions® The United Nations has seen many problems brought to its forum either for decision, arbitration, or merely for sounding an opinion, attitude, or position® Many of them did not lack complexity® The many aspects of the Omani problem, however, seem
to pose a problem not only to the members of the General Assembly but also to the concerned staff in the Secretariat. The fact is that the question has not only political aspects.
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but also historical and legal ones as well— the presentation
of which threw the listeners into^ such a state of confusion that many of them requested a clearer, more neutral and ob
jective presentation of the issue. The cry for objectivity was at the basis of inviting the Secretary General to send his representative to gather
on-the-spot information and data capable of ending the con fusion and clarifying the issue for the confused listener. He did so at the invitation of the Sultan. The report of the Secretary General had a limited
effect. But one could say that it established the first and only direct contact with the Omani people in their own land; the limitation of the mission was due more to lack of time, shortage of staff, and limited terras of reference than to
the capacity to report, as pointed out by many delegates for whom the mission was a disappointment. Dissatisfied with the report, the Arab States, backed by a comfortable Afro-Asian, anti-colonial majority, prompted
the Assembly to establish another committee (the Ad Hoc Committee) whose work was slanted to emphasise the case of the Rebels. Subsequently, another committee of twenty-four
was established but was denied entry into Oman. The question posed is the following: Can committees
be the answer to the problem? Certainly not, for Oman, as found later, is only one part of the British presence in the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. iv Arabian Peninsula. Its issue is first and foremost politi cal. One can construct and build many a study and thesis on some of the legal aspects, such as the Treaty of Sib— whether
it is a mere internal arrangement between the elements of one country, or an international treaty, as contended by
some, because a foreign power signed it. Such aspects of the question will never be a decisive element in the issue. The same applies to the historical aspects. One look at the Palestine problem provides the clue as to the decisiveness
of historical ”truths” as support for a cause. It is the opinion of this writer, therefore, that the question will become only the object of voluminous material on historical, legal, and political aspects. The answer remains in the magic of politics. Should the Arab States and Great Britain choose, for one reason or another, to be come friends and thus liquidate all sources of friction, the question of Oman will become a dormant one if not solved. Such an assumption is presented only to point out that politics is the key to solve this kind of problem. It is
not likely that the Arab States will drop the issue of colo nialism, especially when it can be used at varying degrees as a lever in international hot dialogues.
Having been a member of the mission of the Secretary General's Special Representative which visited Muscat and
Oman in May and June of 1963, this writer had the opportunity
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. V and advantage of being one of only three persons from an international organization ever to be allowed to enter the
territory of Oman. Therefore, many of these remarks are of first-hand experience, whether through personal interviews, observation, or access to material on the spot. He consulted
the few works existing on the subject, but he depended mainly on United Nations documents, in the belief that they represent a more accurate source of information, as it is within the framework of this Organization that the problem is discussed. The writer does not claim that this paper is a conclusive study of the problem; however, it sheds some light on many aspects which until now have been overlooked
by those who dealt with it. It is the hope of this writer, therefore, that this work will represent a small contribution and will constitute a small addition to the material already existing about the
subject.
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PAGE
PREFACE oome.oe.o.ü CHAPTER
X e BACKGROUND .....a*.... 1 II. THE QUESTION IN THE UNITED NATIONS...... 9 III. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED ...... 16 Arguments of the Arab States ...... 16
Position of the United Kingdom ...... 23 Position of Some Members of the United Nations 27 IV. THE MISSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO OMAN
AND MUSCAT ...a...... 29 Establishment of the Mission ...... 31
Itinerary of the Mission ...... 32 Outline of the Mission ...... 33 Investigations of the Mission ...... 35 Fighting in Oman ...... 35 Incidents and Sabotage ...... 36 Rebels ...... 0.....0 39 Foreign Troops ...... 39 The Oppression ...... 42 Control of the Area by the Sultan ..... 43
The Population and the Imeim ...... 45
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CHAPTER PAGE Status of the Imamate, and the Significance of the Treaty (or Agreement) of Sib . . . 46 Relations between the United Kingdom and the
Sultanate ...... 52 Efforts towards Negotiations ...... 54 Development Progrsims ...... 55
V . SUMMARY ...... 57 VI. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS ...... 60
BIBLI OGR^^P HY ...... 71
APPENDIX I. Explanatory Memorandum Attached to the Letter dated 29 September 1960 from Ten Arab States, addressed to the Secretary General ...... 76 II. Draft Resolutions Recommended by the Special
Political Committee ...... 78 III. Resolution Establishing the Ad Hoc Committee on Oman by the General Assembly (XVIII Session) . 80
IV. The Treaty of Sib ...... 81 V, Telegram dated 26 October 1963 from the Sultan of Muscat and Oman to the President of the
General Assembly ...... 83 VI. Glossary of Names and Places ...... 84
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BACKGROUND
The Sultanate of Muscat and Oman is situated at the extreme southeastern part of the Arabian Peninsula— Muscat
being the coastal, and Oman the interior, area. The name Oman has been used for the whole territory, but it also refers to the interior, which is the center for the Imamate. As one of the notables stated during a discussion with the members of the mission of the Secretary General of the United Nations Special Representative, "it corresponds to the whole area from Zufar in the south to Qatar in the north, with the sea and the desert as ultimate frontiers."^ The Sultanate has a coastline of approximately one thousand miles and a population estimated at about five hun dred thousand to two million inhabitants. The people are mainly of Arab origin; but, particularly in the coastal area, the population is now a mixture of Asian and African racial groups. With exceptions, the people are organised into at least two hundred tribes, which belong m&inly to two groups, the Hinawi and the Ghafiri. A great majority of the
United Nations, "Question of Oman," Official Records of the General Assembly, A/5562, XVIII Session, October 18, l^eT^New York: The United Nations, 1963), p. 5.
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population are Moslems with two major sects, the Ghafiri and
the Sunni« The inland is mountainous, isolated by deserts and
high ranges, and inhabited by tribesmen and oil prospectors. Muscat is the capital with a population of about sixty-two 2 hundred persons and also serves as a commercial center. The economy of Oman is mainly pastoral but is in the process of transition into an agricultural economy. The
main exports are dates, fish and fish products, limes and other fruits. The annual revenue is about eleven million rupees derived mainly from custom duties and payments from the petroleum concessions.^ The latter amounts to about 100.000 pounds sterling. The United Kingdom also provides 6.000 sterling pounds annually for the use of the air fields in the territory.^ Oil exploration began in the 'twenties; and the first concession was given to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, but this has lapsed. In 1937, the present Sultan granted a new concession to the Petroleum Development Ltd.,
2 John Barrett Kelley, Sultanate ^ d Imamate in Oman (London: Oxford University Press, 19Ü9),pp. 8 and 9. 3 Five rupees equal approximately one U. S. dollar, ^Kelley, og. cit., p. 12. ^United Nations, o£. cit., p. 17,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 3 a subsidiary of the Iraq Petroleum Company, but later Shell acquired the majority of shares. The tentative development budget for 1962-1963 amounted to 190,000 pounds sterling,^ The Imamate was founded in the eighth century A,D, The Imam serves as the spiritual authority and has also as sumed temporal powers as well, the extent of his sovereignty extending as far as his authority permitted; he is elected by the leading learned citizens; his office is not heredi
tary; and he can be deposed. At certain periods, there was no Imam, due, in part, to foreign occupation of the area; nonetheless, the office of the Imamate has been maintained 7 up to the present time. The current difficulties can be traced back to 1741
when Ahman Ibn Said was elected Imam, On his death in 1775, his grandsosi transferred the capital from Mizwa in the in terior to the main port of the eastern coast, Muscat,
The tribes in the interior resisted the authority of
the Sultan and, in 1913, elected an Imam. This erupted in the crisis leading to the Agreement of Sib, concluded on September 25, 1920,® under which the autonomy of the Imam Oman was recognized. This instrument became a subject of
®Ibid., p. 17. ^Ibid., p. 18, O Sir Reginald Wingate, Not in the Limelight (London: Hutchinson of London, 1959), pT°¥9,
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conflicting interpretations before the United Nations. It should be noted here that, despite its controversial nature,
no authentic text of this agreement was presented to that body; it has been invoked by numerous delegations. The Special Representative of the Secretary General requested a copy from the Sultan, but this request was re- ' 9 fused as the Sultan considered it a "dead issue." In the absence of an authoritative text, an unofficial version,
published in The New York Times on August 13, 1957, which is allegedly close to the original, has been, for the purpose of the mission of the United Nations to Oman, considered satisfactory. In later sessions, the Ad Hoc Committee on Oman of the United Nations General Assembly obtained from the Imam a text which he considered to be a true copy.^® There is little or no difference between the two texts— the controversy having centered solely around its interpretation. The failure of the U.N. to obtain an authentic text of the Sib Agreement explains, in part, the conflicting historical and legal interpretations presented before vari
ous bodies of the U.N. It also indicates the difficulties in obtaining information regarding this controversy.
®Ibid., p. 16. United Nations, "Report of the Ad Hoc Committee," Official Records of the General Assembly, A/5864, Annex No, 16, January 8 , 1 9 ^ Tîîew York : The United Nations, 1965), p. 9.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 5 Through the East India Company, Great Britain estab lished relations with Muscat in the Treaty of 1798; a com mercial treaty was signed in 1839; and an undertaking was
concluded on March 20, 1891, under which the Suites agreed not to dispose of any part of Muscat and Oman to a third party. A treaty of friendship and commerce was concluded in
1951. Sometime in the 'twenties, the first concession to explore for petroleum, natural gas, and other products was
given to a subsidiary of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company; however, this lapsed after a few years. The present Sultan granted a concession, in 1937, to Petroleum Development (Oman and Dhofar) Ltd., a subsidiary of the Iraq Petroleum Company. Article I of the Concession Agreement reads as
follows : The area to which this Agreement applies is the Sultanate of Muscate and Oman including all Islands and Territorial Waters appertaining thereto, but excluding Dhofar and Gwadur, and being all that Territory within the boundaries of the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman.1%
A few years ago, the Shell Oil group took over the conces sions. Actual survey operations only started during the •fifties in the Fahud country bordering the desert. The Imeua protested against the legality of these concessions on
^^Quoted in United Nations, "Question of Oman," op. cit., p. 4.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 6 the basis of the autonomy which, according to him, was given in the Treaty or Agreement of Sib. Thus, the Imam wanted to acquire exclusive jurisdiction over Oman, a claim rejected by Sultan Said bin Taimur of Muscat, and Oman which con sidered the territory inseparable. Supported by the United Kingdom, the Imam undertook a campaign and, in 1955, drove
with a symbolic army and a group of loyal chiefs from his capital, south of Oman, up to the northern coastal cities in an attempt to establish his sovereignty over the territory claimed to be within the jurisdiction of the Imeim's au thority. The attempt of the Imam to establish an independ
ent state of Oman thus failed following the occupation of Oman by the Sultan's forces. In 1957, the fighting flared up under the leadership of the Imam's brother, Talib. The Sultan did not hesitate to call for British support, and he was able, subsequently, to quell the rebellion. Thus, the 12 question of Oman entered the United Nations. Until the writing of this paper, the question of Oman was in the United Nations for eight years, during which time,
little or nothing has been achieved in the direction of solving the problem.
Each year the scene repeats itself: the Arab coun tries request the inclusion of the item in the agenda
^^Ibido, Agenda Item No. 78,
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because it is a colonial issue; Great Britain objects on the ground that it is an internal question; meanwhile a majority is easily gathered to vote for the inclusion. The debates
have the same themes: accusation and counter-accusation, assertions and denials. The upshot is a committee of a sort coming out with a report reaffirming as ever the right of the people of Oman to self-determination.
Two factors keep the question alive, though not pro gressing: on one hand, those supporting the claims of the Omani people's representatives place the question on the
ever-popular ground of colonialism, and request for the people of Oman the right of self-determination, a principle even more popular among the former dependent territories. On the other hand, the United Nations has no police power; the decisions it might take have a limited power or no power at all. Because of this lack of teeth in the Organization, its decisions are mere recommendations which can be listened to or disregarded by any member, small or large, of the United Nations. In these circumstances, it is difficult to
see how an issue can change from one phase to another on the sole basis of United Nations intervention. In any case, as long as a majority can be gathered to vote for inclusion of an item on the agenda, such item will always be present as a
problem placed before the Organization.
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The following chapters will not deal with the gener
alities of the problem. They will state, in summary, the positions of the parties concerned and the position of the states whose confusion prompted the search for more objec
tive information. The account of the mission and its findings will provide a unique source of information to the objective inquirer, despite the limitations of its terms of
reference and the fact that it entered the territory of Oman on the invitation of the Sultan. The findings remain a basic material brought back over and over in subsequent com mittee documents. Finally, the subsequent developments update the data on the question to the writing of this paper. The analysis, however, points out the incapacity of the United Nations to
solve political problems of this kind. With the exception of very few problems, the Organization remains a forum for people to utter their opinions, to state their attitudes, and finally to say what they want without willingness to do what is asked of them.
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THE QUESTION IN THE UNITED NATIONS
The question of Oman has been before the United Nations since 1957 when, in a letter dated April 13, 1957,^ the permanent representatives of eleven Arab states re quested the President of the Security Council to convene, in accordance with Article 35 of the Charter, an urgent meeting
of the Council to consider: The armed aggression by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland against the inde pendence, sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Imamate of Oman.2 In addition, the letter charged that the British government had subjected the people of Oman to armed aggression, which had taken the form of full-scale war, involving the use of modern destructive weapons and military operations. It was, therefore, imperative that immediate action be taken by the Security Council, entrusted with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.
The agenda was not adopted, having failed to obtain the affirmative votes of seven members.
United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council (New York: The United Nations, ÏS^lTT^Tw-eifth Year, Supplement for July, August, and September, 1957. Documents S/3865 and Add. 1, p. 15.
^Ibid., p. 15.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 10 The question of Oman was subsequently considered at
three sessions of the General Assembly. During the fifteenth session, the permanent represen
tatives of the Arab States, in a letter dated September 29, 1960,® requested the Secretary General to place the question of Oman on the agenda. The Special Political Committee dis cussed the item at its 255# to 259# meetings (April 19-25, 1961). The Committee decided at the 259# meeting to recom mend to the Assembly that further consideration of the item be deferred and, at its 995# plenary meeting, the General Assembly took note of this recommendation.
At the sixteenth session, the item was discussed during the 299# to 306# meetings of the Special Political Committee. A draft resolution was submitted by eleven Arab members and five other members.^ A request by eleven Arab representatives to hear an Omani delegation® was approved by the Special Political Committee at its 299# meeting. On November 29, 1961, the Sultan of Muscat and Omain
informed the Assembly of his protest against any debate
®United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, XV Session, Agenda Item '89' (DocumentAyï^SïTT
^Ibid., Sixteenth Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 23 (Document k/5010), para. 10. ®Ibid., para. 12.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 11 about Oman because "the matters involved fell exclusively under the internal jurisdiction of the Sultanate." On December 4, 1961, the draft resolution was ap
proved by the Committee, but the General Assembly failed, on December 14, to adopt the draft resolution, the required two-thirds majority not having been obtained.
At the seventeenth session, the question was again considered at the request of eleven Arab states.® Again, the
Sultan of Muscat and Oman cabled asking that the Assembly refuse to permit any further moves to intervene in matters which fell exclusively within the internal jurisdiction of the Sultanate. However, the request of the Arab states was approved by the Special Politica] Committee at its 351st meeting, and the Committee looked further into the question in eight successive meetings; at the conclusion of which, it adopted a draft resolution submitted by twelve Arab members
and five other members. 7 The General Assembly took up the question of Oman at
its 1191st plenary meeting, on December 11, 1962. On that occasion, the representative of the United Kingdom trans mitted an invitation by the Sultan to the Secretary General
®Ibid., Seventeenth Session, Annexes Agenda Item 79 (DocumenE™%75149). 7 Ibid., Seventeenth Session, Agenda Item 79 (Document A/5325), para. 8.
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to send a representative on a personal basis to visit the Sultanate to obtain first-hand information. He said that he was now authorized to state on behalf of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman that, while preserving his position which had already been conveyed to the President of the General 8 Assembly, he did not recognize the right of the Assembly to discuss the internal affairs of his country, [and] on the under standing that the General Assembly does not take any formal action at this stage, [the Sultan was] prepared to invite on a personal basis a representative of the United Mations Secretary General to visit the Sultan ate during the coming year to obtain first-hand in formation as to the situation there.9 The extension of the Sultan's invitation by the U.K.
representative was timely. The Arab states were successful in obtaining a hearing for a representative of the Imam and during the last meeting, the Committee, by a vote of 41 to 18, with 36 abstentions, recognized "the right of the people of Oman to. self-determination and independence" and called for withdrawal of foreign forces.^® The Assembly, on December 11, failed to adopt this recommendation. It would be safe to conclude that the invitation before the voting in the General Assembly made it possible to increase the number
p Ibid., Annexes, Agenda Item 79 (Document A/5284), P e 15 e ®Ibid., p. 15.
®^See infra. Appendix II.
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of states voting against the resolution. In the committee, the number voting against it was 18, but in the Plenary, it increased successively to 23, 25, and 26, depending on the
paragraph voted upon. The invitation of the Sultan was ac cepted. However, before embarking on the accomplishments of the mission of the Secretary General, a review of the atti tudes of those concerned should be set forth here. To the supporters of the Omani cause, the question of Oman could not be properly understood except in the light of
the colonial regime maintained in the southern and eastern parts of the Arabian Peninsula. For them, the manifestations of colonialism were apparent in the series of treaties impos ing heavy and unreasonable obligations on the territory; in the "attempt by the United Kingdom to dismember Oman"; in the repression in the territory; in the armed British attacks on the people; and in the British presence and domination in the territory. These manifestations indicated that the territory was of the colonial type, a ^ facto, if not de jure protectorate. For them, the Treaty of Sib confirms the
independent status of Oman as it has governed the relations of two states (Sultanate of Muscat and the State of Oman), until it was broken by British armed intervention, and Oman was forcibly annexed to the Sultanate. The British claim that Oman was neither a British
colony nor part of a British colony; there was no British
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governor to whom instructions might be issued, and the Sul tan conducted his oivn foreign policy® The relationship between the United Kingdom and the Sultanate was outlined in
the Treaty of 1951, which supersedes all previous treaties of this kind® It was clearly a treaty between two independ ent countries® It was true that the United Kingdom provided
economic and military assistance, but that was under the 1951 Treaty and a subsequent agreement in 1958® The United Kingdom denied the illegality of its inter
vention which took place at the request of the legitimate government of the territory® The U®K® stressed the fact that the Imamate was not separate from the Sultanate; this was attested to by the testimony of various people in Oman
to the mission of the Secretary General® Other representatives not involved in the dispute still wanted more information, having been confused by all this multitude of historical and legal interpretations of the question® What determines the attitude of the participants in
the debates? For the Arab states, there is, first, the traditional
solidarity demonstrated by the Arab towards his brethren, as was the case in the Algerian, Moroccan, Sudanese, and Egyptian questions® Secondly, the Arabs in general, or
those militant among them, seem to be embarked on fighting
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colonialism wherever it exists, especially in an Arab land. Although this stand may not be true for all Arab states, it behooves all Arabs, nevertheless, to follow the general
trend lest they are accused of siding with the colonial powers. This stand fits in the strategy, obvious though in formal, to oust the British from the Arabian Peninsula. For the British, it is not really a matter of treaty or agreement, but a case of protecting a line of communica tion and a potential, vast oil resource. With all these
facts in mind, one wonders what the United Mations cein do, except keep the question alive and expose, at least for the Arab states, the colonial policies of the United Kingdom. One fact remains true: it is embarrassing for any
one to defend colonial policies these days at the United Nations. Such a state of mind was witnessed when many former colonial powers did not object strongly to the inde pendence of more than thirty African states. The principle of self-determination and the concept of the natural right
to freedom and independence are of such prominence that even a territory of two thousand people can become an independent state having the right to membership in the United Nations,
and ultimately sitting side by side with and having a vote equal to that of the very powers on whom they depend for their livelihood.
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POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED
I. ARGUMENTS OF THE ARAB STATES
The Arab members claim that the Imamate of Oman, or the State of Oman, was an independent and sovereign politi cal entity ruled by an Imam who was chosen by popular elec tion. It thus constituted a democracy in the purest sense
of the word. The Imamate had never been a mere vassal state but had consistently enjoyed full sovereignty with all the attributes of statehood; it had played a major role in the history of Arab civilization. The Imam, as a sovereign, thus had levied taxes and enforced the law. He had also been responsible for the defense by keeping military forces. By the mid-eighteenth century, Oman had become the most powerful Arabian state, controlling part of the Zanzibar
coast in East Africa, as WjsII as parts of Persia and Baluchi-
1 * Stan. However, the strength of the Imamate, its strategic position on the route from Europe to the Orient, and its flourishing trade had made it a target for British
^United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighteenth Session, Document À/c 747STR i49^), p. 11.
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imperialism, which as a result of its victory over France in the Seven Years War had acquired a free hand in the area. Under the pretext of combating slavery and piracy and by
means of armed forces, intrigues, and financial subsidies, Great Britain finally, in the sign of divide et impere, was able to separate Zanzibar from the Sultanate of Muscat, and to break up greater Oman into nine states, the Imamate of Oman, the Sultanate of Muscat, and the seven so-called 2 Trucial States or Sheikhdoms. Oman proper was not dismem bered because of religion, language, race, or aspirations, for the people of Oman were one in all those respects. The Sultanate of Muscat, created only some two hun dred years ago, was not, in reality, an independent state. It could, since 1891, be considered as a British protector ate or vassal— as distinguished from the sovereign State of Oman. The United Kingdom’s representative in the Persian Gulf was, in effect, solely responsible for the conduct of Muscat foreign affairs. Mot less than twenty-seven times during these two centuries, the British intervened in order to defend the city-state of Muscat or rather the family of 3 A1 bu Said, to which the present ruler belonged.
Until 1954, when British prospecting of oil within the Imamate was about to begin, the United Kingdom has been
^Ibid., p. 13. ^Ibid., p. 17,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 18 content to control the Sultanate of Muscat and the seven Trucial Sheikhdoms, while the Imamate had continued to be fully independent and sovereign. This was confirmed by the
signing of the so-called Treaty of Sib in 1920 between the Sultan of Muscat (not "the Sultan of Muscat and Oman"), and representatives of the Imamate. It demonstrated the inde pendence of Oman and the existence of two separate political entities; it laid doim mutual obligations binding the two states. It constituted a ^ facto recognition of Omani in dependence, and it must be considered as an international legal instrument concluded by two equal and indpendent nego- 4 tiators with a third party, the United Kingdom, as witness. In brief, it bound the parties to refrain from any inter
vention in the other’s domestic affairs. When, in 1955, it became evident that the Imam Ghalib bin Ali— elected Imam in 1954— opposed and systematically re fused to recognize the oil concession to a British company that the Sultan had, without the Imam's knowledge or acquies
cence granted in 1937 (contrary to the Treaty of Sib), the United Kingdom, being convinced that Oman had large oil fields, found it opportune to extend the Sultan's rule to
4 Ibid.« Annex No. 16, Document A/5863, p. 19.
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the Imamate. The British, in addition to this violation of
the Treaty of Sib, committed, the same year, in collabora tion with the Sultan, an armed aggression using machine guns, heavy mortars, and jet aircraft against the defenseless people of Oman.^ They thus violated Oman's political inde
pendence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. The United Kingdom pretended that it was helping to defend the rights of a Sultan who was a mere puppet of a kind too familiar to people striving to throw off the yoke of imperi
alism. The United Kingdom had thus sought to gain possession of the oil fields at all costs, namely by extending its rule which had previously been confined to the small Sultsinte of Muscat with its mere coastal territory, into the Oman in terior, and in that way providing an ostensible legal basis for the concessions and rights of exploitation in the hinter- laind. The British action constituted a colonial problem related to the policy of the United Kingdom in the Persian Gulf. The British, helped by a few feudal sheikhs in their
pay, gave these sheikhs a semblance of independence and kept them in power by force of arms against the will of the people.^ In doing so, it deprived the people of their
^Arab Information Center, "The Question of Oman," Information Paper Number 13 (New York, 1960), p. 7.
United Nations, op. cit., Annexes, Document A/C.4/ SR. 1498, December 5, 19^, pp. 13-14.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 20 exploitation of the rich natural resources which belonged to 7 them. The British action of naked aggression also consti tuted a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations (Article 2, paragraph 4) by infringement of the sov
ereignty of the Imamate and an interference in its internal
affairs, likely to endanger international peace and security and to increase tensions in the Arabian Peninsula and in the Middle East. It was also inconsistent with General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1654 (XVI) on the liquidation of colonialism, as well as with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the principles of self-determination set forth in Article 1, paragraph 2, of the Charter.
The British aggression of 1955 was repeated later with increased strength when the Omani leaders reorganized their people and inflicted considerable losses on the Sultan's forces. Around that time, the United Kingdom again interfered militarily in order to secure Oman for British Oil interests, but this time, in order to defend British prestige, which had suffered in the area as a result of the
Suez failure in 1956. Important oil interests in the
Persian Gulf were at stake.®
^Ibid., Document A/C.4/Sr. 1497, December 4, 1963, p. 5 o Q Arab Information Center, British Imperialism in Southern Arabia (New York, November, 19 % 1 , p. 66.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 21 The Arab states refuted the British allegations con
cerning the sovereignty of the Imamate, the authority of the Imam, and the justification of their British military inter
vention. With regard to the sovereignty of the Imamate, it should be declared that this state had existed for about twelve hundred years, while that the reigning Sultan, at
certain periods, had been elected to the office of Imam, by which act a temporary union of the Imamate and the Sultanate had been created, did not give the Muscat dynasty any right over Oman, because the Imamate was not hereditary but elec
tive.^ Concerning the allegation that the Imam had only religious authority and not a temporal or secular one, this was contradicted by the fact that in Islamic tradition, there was no distinction between temporal and spiritual authority. The Imam, in particular, combined in his person
the two kinds of authority. As for the British contention that it had to inter vene militarily to support the Sultan because the Imamate
received foreign aid, this was futile because the question
of Oman was a colonial question. The Arab brothers were, therefore, entitled to give the population of Oman every
^United Nations, op. cit«, XVIII Session, Agenda Item 78 (Document A/5562, Oct'3ber’~Tf, 1963), p. 14. :tobe
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 22 kind of help it needed in order to recover its liberty and independence. It was a tradition among Arabs to help their
brothers defend their sovereign rights and freedoms, and it
was their duty to go to the aid of the Imamate. But, the British had no right to intervene in conflicts eirising be
tween Arab brothers. Furthermore, Sir Hartley Shawcross, the distinguished
British international lawyer and former Attorney-General of the United Kingdom had written: In international law intervention by a foreign power was inadmissible even if it took place at the request of a Government engaged in suppressing an armed insurrection or in pursuance of a treaty which was alleged to provide some justification.^0 With regard to the negotiations conducted in the winter of 1960-1961 between representatives of the Imam and
the United Kingdom, it could be said that they had not suc ceeded because of British opposition® The Imam was, however, prepared to come to terms on the basis of the following
principles: (1) Right of the people of Oman to independence and self-determination; (2) withdrawal of British armed
forces; (3) release of political prisoners; and (4) indemnity
for the damage caused by military action.
^®Ibido. p. 15. ^^Ibid., Annex V in Document A/5562,
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II. POSITION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
The United Kingdom rejected the Arab contentions, declaring that there had never been a separate state under
an Imam, which was independent of, and separate from, the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, the latter being only an in- 12 land area of the whole territory. In 1784, a newly-elected Imam, who was the son of the founder of the present A1 bu Said dynasty, was instrumental in making a definite separa
tion between the religious and the temporal power of the Imam, by transferring the latter to his son who had become Sultan of Muscat and Oman and resided in Muscat. Conse quently, there was not a continuous series of Imams since the eighth century, as alleged. Thus, the office of Imam was or had been a spiritual one and had not been in exist ence continuously. And, the people of the present genera tion have no desire to revive the religious office of Imam, still less an Imamate with secular powers. For them, and for the Sultan also, the Imamate was an archaic institution which had no constructive role to play in the evolution of
Oman into a modern state. 13 For the United Kingdom, the Agreement of Sib is an
^^Ibid., Document A/C.4/SR. 1498, p. 5.
l^Ibid., p. 7.
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Sultan and, therefore, cannot be considered, under any cir cumstances , as an international instrument binding two states. Furthermore, the Agreement had lapsed on the death
of the present Sultan. It was not a treaty between two governments, but simply a temporary arrangement to put an end to the fighting which erupted in 1913 between the sheikhs. The United Kingdom added that even the Arab League did not accept Oman as a member, which suggests that the Arab states have doubts about Oman's qualifications as am independent entity. The Agreement of Sib had worked well
for more than thirty years, and the country was at peace The Sultan's government had retained charge of all external affairs, and his overall sovereignty had been recognized by
the Imam in a number of practical ways. In 1954, the new Imam was elected. Certain sheikhs decided that the exploitation of oil would provide them with
an opportunity to promote their own personal ambitions ; and the new Imam, elected in an atmosphere of intrigue, claimed to be an independent ruler and purported to annul the oil
concession of 1937 which had been granted to a British
l^Ibid., p. 7.
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company by the Sultan, who alone had the right to grant such concessions » The action of Imam Ghalib bin Ali was treasonable
enough. Further, he sent his forces to oppose a tribe in the territory of which a party of geologists tried to oper ate. He was rebuffed later by the Sultan who sent the field forces to suppress the insurrection. The Imam withdrew to his village, but the treasonable activities did not end
there. In 1955, the Sultan, having learned that foreign powers were abetting this rebellious movement by smuggling arms and ammunition into the country for Ghalib's con spiracy, had decided to reassert his authority and, in December, 1955, had moved his forces into Oman. There had followed an extensive propaganda campaign in certain Arab countries and a so-called Oman Liberation Army, trained and equipped in Saudi Arabia, had arrived in Oman in the summer of 1957 under the command of Talib, the Imam's brother. The revolt had been quickly suppressed, and the leaders fled to the mountains from which they led a guerrilla warfare. In 1957, the Sultan's forces, with assistance from British forces,occupied the stronghold of the rebels who fled to
Saudi Arabia, and there has been no rebellion since.
l^Ibid., p. 8. l®Ibid., p. 10.
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Oman has been at peace for several years and, for the first time in its history, the tribes are no longer at war among themselves. There are no British combatant units or military bases in Oman, only a small number of British personnel second to the Sultan's army and air force. Furthermore, the question is not a colonial problem,
because Muscat and Oman was an independent and sovereign state, recognized by many international instruments. Concerning the operative paragraph 1 of the draft ] 7 resolution, ' related to the right of the people of Oman to self-determination, the principle of self-determination does not apply to the homogeneous population of Muscat and Oman, who form a part of the Sultanate. The rebellion by tribes men, initiated for personal gains, supported by outside sources, does not establish a right to self-determination, nor does it bring into play the provisions of the colonial declaration. "Self-determination cannot be merely a process X8 of disintegration or fragmentation." It was irrelevant for the United Nations to endorse the idea of an independent state of Oman; it was also irresponsible that a handful of
17 Ibide, Sixteenth Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 23, Document "SOTS’, para. 10. no Ibid., Seventeenth Session, Plenary Meetings, 1141 Meeting, October, 1962, para. 229.
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discredited exiles could induce the Organization to recom mend the fragmentation of a sovereign state.
III. POSITION OF SOME MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
19 During the seventeenth session, several delegates expressed their doubts as to the contradictory statements made during the discussion on the question of Oman. The
representative of France could not see the true nature of the issue which was or seemed to be magnified out of all proportion. The representative of Togo called for more objective information before any further action or discus sion. Doubts were expressed by the representative of Chile over eight issues including why the Sultan did not send a representative to the Assembly to defend his case? Did Oman and Muscat constitute a single state or two separate enti ties? Was the principle of self-determination at issue or was it a matter of the dismemberment of a sovereign state? Was the Treaty of Sib an international treaty between two
sovereign independent states or was it only an agreement between the Government of the Sultam and Omani tribal chiefs
concerning certain internal matters? What was the present
1 Q Ibid., para. 315.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 28 situation in Oman? Was there oppression and were the in- 20 habitants fighting foreign troops or did peace exist? To these questions, the representative of Peru added
the following: Were United Kingdom troops in the Sultanate at the request of that state? What was the extent of the
rebel movement in Oman; did rebel forces control any part of
the territory?^^ The representative of India during the sixteenth
session at the 305fâ meeting of the Special Political Com mittee referred to the difficulty that many of the histori cal facts seemed to be capable of interpretation in different ways. But, for him, there was a case for peaceful negotia tions without interference from outside, all the people of 22 Muscat and Oman being Arabs.
20 Ibid., Eighteenth Session. Agenda Item No. 78, Document X 7 % 6 2 , p. 8. Zllbid., p. 8. Z^ibid., p. 11.
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THE MISSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO
OMAN AMD MUSCAT
As one delegate indicated during the discussion of
the question of Oman at the Eighteenth Session of the General Assembly, the invitation— made by the United Kingdom immediately before voting on the Draft Resolution, on Decem ber 11, 1962, "which recognized the right of the people of Oman to self-determination and independence" and called for withdrawal of foreign troops-?-made it possible to increase
the number of states against the resolution. The United Kingdom's representative, speaking at the 1191st plenary meeting of the General Assembly, on December 11, 1962, referred to the representatives who had expressed
the need for facts or information from an Independent source so that they would be able to form a balanced judgment on
the subject. The United Kingdom's government had conveyed the views expressed in the debate to the government of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman. The United Kingdom's representa tive said he was now authorized to state on behalf of the
Sultan of Muscat and Oman that the Sultan, while preserving his position, as previously conveyed to the President of the
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General Assembly,^ did not recognize the right of the General Assembly to discuss the internal affairs of his country [andj on the understanding that the Assembly does not take any formal action at this stage, Che was] prepared to invite on a personal basis a representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations to visit the Sultanate during the coming year to obtain first hand information as to the situation there.2 In view of this offer, the United Kingdom's representative trusted that the Assembly would not seek to prejudge the issue at that stage by adopting the draft resolution then
before it. Discussions with the United Kingdom's representative about the "modalités" of a visit to Oman resulted in an assurance on the part of the Sultan that the representative of the Secretary General would be free to move around in the
area and visit any place of importance. The Secretary General accepted the invitation, which had been submitted officially by the representative of the United Kingdom at the 1191st plenary meeting. He did so "in the hope that an objective report on the actual situation in Oman would con tribute to peaceful developments in the Middle East."
United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Plenary Meetings, Annexes, Agenda Item 79, Document A/5284. 2 Ibid., Plenary Meetings, 1191st Meeting, para. 45.
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The Secretary General requested the Ambassador of
Sweden to Spain, Mr. Herbert de Ribbing, to undertake the assignment as his Special Representative on the question of Oman. Mr. de Ribbing agreed to take up the mission. Two members of the Secretariat were selected to assist him. This writer was one of two staff members chosen to assist
the Special Representative. The Secretary General instructed Mr. de Ribbing to use as his main terms of reference the description of the
invitation of the Sultan: "A representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations to visit the Sultanate during the coming year to obtain first-hand information as to the situation there." He requested Mr. de Ribbing to look into
the matters reported by the Head of the Office of the Imamate of Oman in Cairo in his letter of March 7, 1963, in which there was reported "horrible massacres committed by the 3 colonial forces against the innocent citizens.” The primary task of the mission would be a fact finding one. The mission would visit the area some time during May and would report on such questions as the pres
ence of foreign troops in Oman, any evidence of oppression, instances of sabotage and fighting, the existence of a rebel
3 See infra. Appendix V,
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movement, the existence of rebel forces actually in control of a particular area, etc. The Special Representative of the Secretary General would discuss with the Sultan, with
government officials, and with British authorities, the
necessary details for the visit to Oman.
II. ITINERARY OF THE MISSION
The Special Representative, accompanied by the two
assistants, left New York on May 18, 1963. It is noteworthy to state that the mission was the only one allowed to enter the interior of Oman. Other missions requested by the General Assembly to hold further talks were not allowed in
the country by the Sultan. The program of the visit was first discussed with the British authorities in Bahrein and then with the Sultan in his capital of Salalah. Further discussions with the British authorities and the government officials took place
in Muscat from May 25 to June 9. Between these two dates, the mission visited the various regions and areas of the country, including the so-called stronghold of the rebels in the region of the Jebel Alchdar (the Green Mountain). The mission called again on the Sultan in Salalah
where it discussed with him, in general terms, its findings and raised a number of additional points of discussion with the British authorities from June 11 to 13. The mission
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proceeded to Beirut, Lebanon; from there it communicated to the Secretary General its findings; and, upon instructions
received from him, proceeded to Jidda, in Saudi Arabia,
where it called on the Prime Minister of that country and met the Imam Ghalib bin Ali, and his brother, Talib bin Ali, who had represented the Imam in the General Assembly. The mission then had discussions with senior Foreign Office officials in London and returned to New York on July 1, 1963.
111. OUTLINE OF THE MISSION
During these travels, it was decided to interview
government officials, reach as many people as possible through meetings during which the mission would explain its purpose and question in private a number of representative people, sheikhs and notables. All in all, the mission stopped in some twenty small towns and villages, where it was welcomed by a considerable
part of the population. It met with about twenty government officials, interviewed eighty-six representative individuals, and explained the purpose of its visit to approximately twelve hundred people assembled at meetings. It should be noted that many meetings with individuals or groups of
prominent persons were held with no government official present.
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A number of questions were asked at all meetings and
during all discussions. Effort was made to obtain informa tion beyond the answers to the following questions:
1. Is there any fighting going on in Oman?
2. Has there been sabotage and what specific inci dents have occurred recently? 3. Are there any "rebels," and if so, do they dominate a specific area? Are there cases of infiltration
in Oman? 4. Are there foreign troops in Oman? 5. What is the extent of the control of the area by
the Sultan? 6. What is the evidence of oppression in Oman? In addition, the mission reviewed other aspects of
the question of Oman, such as; 1. The attitude toweirds the Imam, his brother Talib, and Sheikh Suleiman bin Himyar,^ leader of the rebels. 2. The status of the Imamate and the significance of the Treaty (or Agreement) of Sib, of 1920. 3. The existence of development programs for the
area. 4. Relations between the Sultanate and the United Kingdom of Great Britain's government.
^A tribal chieftain who gave his support to the Sultan from the beginning of the trouble.
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5. Efforts towards negotiations.
6. Special questions. The answers and discussions of the above questions led the mission to draw the following findings.
IV. INVESTIGATIONS OP THE MISSION
Fighting in Oman Senior government officials in Muscat, the walis (governors) in the interior, or, in their absence, the cadis
(judges), and in some cases the senior sheikhs in sixteen different tovms and villages were asked about fighting
during the most recent past; eighty-six individuals were interrogated on this point. Without exception, the answer was that there had been no fighting recently and that no active warfare had been going on since January when the Jebel Akhdar region was taken by assault. The mission, on the other hand, was unable to observe any evidence of active fighting in the area. This writer sought to validate the statements made, in the General
Assembly, by many Arab delegates regarding the continuous fighting in Oman, but he was unable to hear one single shot in the most remote area of the country, or to detect a single sign of the excitement usually generated by a fight. The mission learned that, in 1957, the Imam's brother Talib had landed on the Batineh coast and his armed men
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 36 reached Jebel Akhdar area. Soon he was joined by Sheikh g Suleiman bin Himyar. The Sultan's forces, unable to cope with the revolt, called on the government of the United
Kingdom for help. One company of Cameroonians, two troops of Ferret scout cars, one regiment of the Sultan's armed forces, and two squadrons of Trucial Omani scouts supported by Royal Air Force planes, reoccupied Nizwa, the capital of Oman, and a number of other towns in the neighborhood. The
leaders of the revolt withdrew into the higher mountains of Jebel Akhdar where they waged guerrilla warfare for two years before they were driven out of their stronghold by British troops. Since then, there has been no fighting in the real sense of the word. Few sporadic actions took place, such as planting mines or attacking isolated posts. Some of these are described in the following sections.
Incidents and Sabotage During the discussions in the General Assembly, many references were made to incidents and sabotage in Oman. The
writer did not, during his tour of duty with the mission in Oman, encounter any incident, nor did he notice any act of sabotage during the visit. The mission inquired in every place it visited about these matters, and with the exception
^United Nations, o£, cit., Eighteenth Session, Agenda Item 78, Document A/5562, p.” ! ?.
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of a ruined hospital (a small house used as such), the
mission was unable to observe evidence of sabotage® How ever, it was told, during the questioning, that six months ago "somebody traveling through" was caught, and thought to
be responsible for destroying the said hospital® In general, and despite isolated incidents, the people testified that it
had been quiet recently and that peace, order, and security prevailed. Many referred to the fact that traditional strife between the tribes seemed to have ended. Many denied the reports of incidents in the area. One of the promient sheikhs told the mission: "Believe what you see, not what you hear. For when the sun is up, you need not look for
Venus . . o ." A break-down® of the incidents was received by the mission from the Headquarters of the Sultan's forces and from the senior officers in those forces, as well as the British officers in Bahrein about data on Incidents and
sabotage. The following data were produced from the break down. Incidents 1960 1961 1962 1963
Mine explosions 7 26 17 1 Mine recovery 132 97 101 — Shooting — 5 17 1 Sabotage 2 4 3 1
®Ibid., p. 13.
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Casualties 1960 1961 1962 1963 Sultan's Armed Forces 1 — 1 —
British Military Forces — 1 — — Sultan's retainers — 3 2 1 Others 16 236 — — The mission could only take note of this information, but
was unable to evaluate it. The mission was mindful of many statements regarding
incidents, sabotage, and the like which were made during broadcasts from Cairo, Damascus, Mecca, and Baghdad. The only way of verification available to the mission was to ask people to comment on these statements, during interviews in various areas. The reply was generally a denial, or at least an exaggeration on the part of the broadcasters. Another way of evaluation was to compare the figures given in these broadcasts about incidents between July 1, 1961, and June 1, 1963. The comparison shows that against a total claim of 203 persons killed and 171 wounded, mostly
described as "British," casualties to the Sultan's forces amounted to one killed and 12 wounded, to which should be 7 added civilian casualties— four killed and twelve wounded.
^Ibld., p. 13,
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Rebels The mission was unable to see signs of "rebel" ac
tivity, nor was it able to find any evidence of areas not under the active control of the Sultan» Infiltration to Oman by rebels was, according to officials, frustrated by tightened security measures® British authorities in Bahrein estimated the number of rebels at four hundred Omanis trained outside the country, two hundred of whom returned under the
amnesty declared by the Sultan® . The mission learned also that the regular routes O taken by the infiltrators appeared to be by "dhow" landing
either at the Trucial coast or at the Batineh coast and from there on by off-the-track land routes to Oman® One officer estimated that not more than forty individuals are actively
involved in these activities; they normally come, harass, and leave again®^ They operate mostly in groups of two's and
three's without support from the local people®^®
Foreign Troops Although foreign troops do not exist "en masse" in
Q A traditional sea vessel used in the Persian Gulf of the Arabian Peninsula® 9 Later, the writer will state his opinion based on observation as to how the British authorities keep track of the rebel activities and of the rebels themselves® ^^United Nations, op® cit®, Agenda Item 78, Document A/5562, p. 14.
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number of them® The mission had ample opportunity to ob serve the camps, many newly-established throughout the coun try, airfields, airstrips, and other military facilities® All the forces, however, are technically the Sultan's armed
forces, wearing the uniform and insignia of the Sultanate (two crossed swords), with British officers in senior posi- 11 tions® At the mission's request. Brigadier Waterfield, and one senior officer furnished details about the strength 12 of the armed forces and the composition thereof. Of the total strength of the force (2,333 men), 50 per cent are 1 3 Baluchis recruited from Gv^adar," and the rest recruited
from among the tribes in the coastal and interior regions, the majority being from the interior® The information re ceived from officials indicates that there are sixteen local officers, the highest in rank is second lieutenant® There are twenty-six British Army officers, who retain their status and rights in the British armed forces and serve for a specific period, normally eighteen months. Plans call for an increase of their number to thirty. Furthermore,
^^Hinister of Defense in the Government of the Sultan, ^^See infra, Appendix V. 13 A territory originally belonging to the Sultan but sold in 1958 to Pakistan, from which the Sultan recruited members for a part of his armed forces.
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thirty-five officers are on contract, of which thirty are British and five are Pakistani nationals. In addition, there sore six foreign non-commissioned officers (mostly
British). The above information does not include the Sultan's air force which consists of eight planes and ten second Royal Air Force personnel. Asked about the influence of the British forces in his armed forces, the Sultan assured the mission that "everything is in ray hands," and that British officers had nothing to do with policy-making in the country. These forces, however, are financed by the United Kingdom's government, which agreed to give the Sultan finan cial and material assistance to train and build up his army.
The Sultan confirmed, during an interview with him, the existence of financial help. But, the Sultan refused to indicate the United Kingdom's share in this help. Finally, airfields in the southern part of the Sultanate, namely
Salalah^^ and Masirah I s l a n d , h a v e been made available to
the Royal Air Force. The writer noticed in those two places
a somewhat active traffic coming from Aden and the Southern Arabia protectorates up to the Trucial Coast.
^^Salalah, capital of the Sultan, is located in the southernmost part of the country.
15 An island in the southeast coast used as an air field by the Royal Air Force.
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The Oppression Prisons and prisoners are the first indication of any oppression. The main prison is located in Muscat and holds
political prisoners as well as common law offenders. The mission was not allowed by the Sultan to visit the prison, in order to verify the allegations stated in the General Assembly, nor did it receive official information on the number of political prisoners being kept there. The Sultan
did permit the mission to discuss the medical conditions in the prison with the senior medical officer of the Sultan's armed forces, an Indian doctor who was responsible for the health conditions in the prison. There were approximately eighty persons in the prison, of whom some thirty were detained for political motives. The information provided by that medical officer indicated that the condition of the prisoners was not deplorable if compared with the general condition of the country. He commented on those conditions
and assured the members of the mission that there were no signs of malnutrition or torture, and that a considerable improvement was noticed during the last six years— that is, since medical care had been provided on a regular basis.
In the interior, the mission brought up the question of oppression at every meeting and every interview. All persons denied the existence of any political oppression.
However, the writer observed, and the other members of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 43 mission agreed, that the population was cautious and careful in their denial. One could detect an amount of discontent and criticism which hides behind the Islamic traditional
obedience to the ruler, as long as he rules with justice and
according to the Sharia, This discontent was most obvious when the mission visited the village of Sayq, the stronghold of the rebel
leader Suleiman bin Himyar. The population of that village 17 played a dominant role in the affairs of the Imamate. The questioning of their notables produced signs of a conquered tribe, disarmed and punished by lack of work or freedom of
action. The Sultan admitted the fact that they were dis armed which is, in his words, "good for them in case any thing happens," but denied that they were banned from
traveling to Mecca to pilgrimage.
Control of the Area by the Sultan Oman is still mainly ruled in the traditional way—
that is, to a great extent, by the tribal chiefs, territorial 18 notsd>les and religious leaders. Some of the political
^^Islamic law. 17 The village was the source of power and influence in the Imamate as the tribes gave their support to the re bellion from its beginning. 18 Hisham Sharabi, Governments and Politics of the Middle East in the Twentieth Century (New York : D. Van Nostrand do., I n c . 196È), p. 2è0,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 44 power is, however, in the process of being transferred from 19 this traditional ruling group to the central government through the appointment, stsurted in 1957, of walls (regional
or district governors) by the Sultan. However, problems are still the responsibility of the tribal sheikhs. The Sultan is the last resort in case of a major conflict going beyond the authority of the wall. The walls, in the words of the Sultan, are increasingly relied upon to implement his deci sions. The walls, it should be noted, have their own armed 20 retainers. Taxes or Zakat are collected by the government
employees, the mission learned. Although the security situation was seemingly well under control, the mission often heard the people saying: "There is security and safety now," and, "before people were 21 at each other's throats. Now there is peace." Many people praised the Sultan's rule as being in accordance with the principles of the Sharia. However, the possibilities of expressing political opposition are limited in the present circumstances.
^^United Nations, o£« cit., Agenda Item No. 78, Document A/5562, p. 15. 20 The equivalent of taxes in Islamic law. ^^Ibid., p. 15,
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The Population and the Imam Repeatedly, the Sultan protested discussion of the question of Oman in the United Nations, because he consid
ered that the matters involved fell exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Sultanate. He also contended that the Imsim, his brother Talib, and Sheikh Suleiman are subjects of 22 the Sultanate; and because they revolted against the rule during the events of 1957, they are "rebels." He handed to
the mission photostats of passport applications, one of which was submitted by Talib, the brother of the Imam, dated ? 3 1954. That was, in his view, proof that Talib, and also others who had submitted similar passport applications pre
viously, considered themselves "subjects of the government of
Muscat and Oman." During the meetings which the mission had with the Minister of Interior, the Minister stated that the Imam was mainly a religious leader, state powers belonging only to the Sultan, Upon querying the walis, sheikhs, and notables participating in the meetings of the mission, the answers to the question of the status of the Imam were varied. While the walis thought that the rule of the Sultan was satis factory, a prominent and respected judge differentiated
22 ‘^^Ibid., p. 15,
Z^ibid., p. 15.
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between the Imam and the other individuals by stating that the Imam held an important office and that, therefore, the present conflict placed a heavy strain on the Omanis; it troubled the people. He hoped that the conflict would be solved. This statement was the nearest thing the mission heard in dissent about the status of the Imam and the Sultan. This writer, who held the interview with the prominent judge, attempted to have him further clarify his position. The judge confined his remarks to the statement above. Many people wanted the Imam to come back, but not the troublemakers. Others did not object to their return pro
vided "they made their peace with the Sultan.
Status of the Imamate, and the Significance of the Treaty (or Agreement'i of ... An evaluation of the territorial, historical, and political issues involved would require a separate and com plete study. As observed by the delegate of India in the Special Political Committee, the historical facts had been 25 interpreted in different ways. In earlier times, it seemed to be generally agreed that Oman was a sovereign state governed by an Iman, elected
^'^Ibid., p. 1 6 . 25 Ibid., Sixteenth Session, Special Political Com mittee, 3"33tt~Meeting,
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by notables and acclaimed by the members of the tribe. Often leaders of two important tribes were arbitrators 26 during the process of election. More recently, Oman has become synonymous with "Inner Oman" or Central Oman; it consists generally of the area around the Jebel Akhdar. This, roughly, has been the terri
tory of the Imamate proper. To trace the history of the territory and the inter
changeable use of the word Oman would be a strenuous task, and would be irrelevant to the topic. It may be said that the center of power moved, some two hundred years ago, from the interior to the town of Muscat, situated on the sea. The rulers who have since reigned were often at odds with
those who exercised spiritual and frequently temporal power in the interior -region. Whenever the Sultans were in trouble or were weak, 27 they were helped by their British allies. Such a period of weakness started during the more recent past, in 1913, when the tribes of the interior expelled the Sultan's troops 28 29 from Nizwa, Izki, and Sumail. At one moment, Muscat
Edward J« Jurgi, The Middle East, Its Religion and Culture. 27 Parid Pawdah, Glorious Chapters in the Struggle of Oman (Cairo: Dar A1 Pikr, 1962)Y p. A J “Tin Arabic. 28 The capital of the Imamate. 29 Important towns in Oman.
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itself vjas threatened. It appears that only the British
military rescued the Sultan. At long last, in 1920, a settlement was reached
through the mediation of the British political agent and Consul at Muscat. This settlement is known as the Treaty of
Sib. It has been the subject of completely opposing inter pretations. It has been, inter alia, considered an internal agreement, a local settlement, or an international treaty, depending on who is referring to it® The mission did its utmost to obtain factual informa
tion to disentangle some of the confusion resulting from opposing views. It approached the Sultan and the Minister of Interior in order to obtain their views on this matter. The Sultan admitted that, as a result of the weakness of his father's government around 1920, a certain autonomy had been given to the sheikhs of the tribes in the interior region, but at no point had the Imamate ever been recognized as a kind of government. The Minister of Interior went further,
stating that there was nothing in the treaty which referred in ciny way to the Imamate. In view of this confusion, the mission requested the
Sultan, during the interview with him, to make the text of the treaty available, which he refused to do on the grounds
30 Fawdah, o£. cit., p. 16,
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that he did not recognize the agreement. When at its second meeting with the Sultan, and after it had visited the in
terior region, the mission asked again if a text could be made available, the Sultan replied that he did not recognize the agreement and that it was only a personal arrangement between his father and the sheikhs. "It is a dead issue," he said. If he handed out the text, it could be interpreted 31 that he gave importance to it. Having to produce in its report a text, the mission depended on an unofficial version published in The New York Times of August 13, 1957, which allegedly is textually close
to the original. In addition, an illumination of the account of the negotiations may be made by looking at the memoirs of the main architect of the agreement, Sir Ronald Wingate. Sir
Ronald describes the difficulties which occurred during the initial discussions when the sheikhs insisted that the agreement should be between the Sultan on the one side and the Imam on the other. This was fatal, and I knew that I could not pos sibly agree to it on behalf of the Sultan, for this would mean that the Sultan acknowledged another ruler, and a ruler who was already an elected spiritual leader and an admitted temporal representative of the
31 United Nations, op. cit., Agenda Item 78, Document A/5562, p. 17.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 50 tribes. From such an acknowledgment it was only one step farther for the spiritual leadership and temporal representation of the tribes to develop into a claim for the spiritual and temporal leadership of all Oman, The word Imam was omitted from the body of the docu ment, which simply read as conditions arranged between the Sultan's Government and Isa bin Salih as repre senting the O m a n i . 32
Sir Ronald Wingate gives an account of the signing of
the agreement: It was signed by me on behalf of the Sultan, with his full authority, and granted to the tribal leaders of Omsin, all of whom signed individually, the right of self-government, or non-interference by the Sultan in their internal affairs, in return for peace and for the payment of the customary dues at the ports in the territories controlled by the Sultan. The ques tion of sovereignty was never mentioned. Had it been, there would have been no agreement. It recognized the facts of the situation, a situation which was not a new one, but had been a source of controversy and conflict for three quarters of a century. For in Arabia allegiance is tribal, and the tribe has no defined boundaries. Yet the existence of a Coastal Sultanate, a tribal confederation, and a religious leader, who would claim through election the temporal allegiance of the tribes, had, up till then, made impossible a modus vivendi where, by agreement, the coast and the interior each looked after its own affairs, while remaining in friendly contact.33
This modus vivendi, as Wingate describes the Treaty of Sib, lasted for thirty-five years. The arrangement appears to have functioned satisfactorily.
32 Sir Ronald Wingate, Not in the Limelight (London: Hutchinson of London, 1959), p. 89T S^Ibid., p. 90,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 51 The question of the status of the Imamate was taken
up by the mission with every official, sheikh, and notable. To the Sultan, the Imam is mainly a religious leader. It will be impossible, he said, to have at the same time a Sultan and an Imam. The Minister of Interior called to the
attention of the mission the fact that during the thirty- five years of the modus vivendi, the Sultan had had no need to interfere in the affairs of the Imamate, but that the
Sultan had had to act in 1955 (his drive from his capital in the south to the northern coast of Oman) as a result of foreign intervention. One of the prominent and learned notables pointed out that the Imamate was a moral institu tion with many values, concepts, and conditions. When a person failed to fulfill his functions, he could no longer be considered an Imam. There was, therefore, a body of opinion which considered that an Imam by his absence from
the country was not in a position to discharge his obliga tions as a high official. The leeirned notable^^ also told the mission that the present conflict put a strain on the
Omanis and that many of the people were perplexed by that situation.
34 A former Chief Judge in the government of the Sultan.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 52 Relations between the United Kingdom and the Sultanate Political relations between Great Britain and Muscat go back to 1798, the year of Napoleon's landing in Egypt,
when a treaty was signed with the Sultan in which a formal
promise was made to exclude the French from his territory for the duration of the war which then was raging between England and France. Subsequently, moral support from British India was given to the Sultan in order to help him
against the seafaring tribes from the Trucial Coast emd the Wahabis who operated from what is now Saudi Arabia. Great Britain has always had an interest in the stability and integrity of the Sultanate. It never extended its protectorate over Muscat as it had done in the case of 35 the Trucial Sheikhdoms, but it went rather far when by the Agreement of March 20, 1891, the Sultan agreed "... never to cede . . . or otherwise give for occupation, save to the British government the dominions of Muscat or Oman or any of
their dependencies . . . A year earlier the Sultan had undertaken to be "guided" in all matters of policy by the advice of the British government.
35 Sharabi, o£. cit., p. 260. See, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries, compiled by C. " W. Aitchison [revised and continued to the end of 1930; Delhi: Government of India, Manager of Publications, 1933], p. 318.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 53 The Treaty of Friendship Commerce and Navigation was
concluded with the United Kingdom in 1951. British interests have changed in emphasis. In the
past, they were centered around suppression of piracy, slave trade, protection of the sea routes; now they are geared to
protect oil investments in the region of the Persian Gulf.
The appearance of a naval vessel, sometimes the operation of it, could bring the desired result in the old days. This is no longer possible. The present-rday relationships between the Sultan and the United Kingdom are different.
The Sultan emphasized during the discussions with the mission that the major policy-making decisions were his and his alone. British government officials made it equally clear that they would only act upon concurrence by the Sultan. Time and time again, the mission was reminded that particular questions had to be referred to and decided by the Sultan.
More recent relations have centered around difficul ties in 1955 and 1957. Military assistance was given in 1957. An agreement with the United Kingdom's government concluded in 1958 resulted in material and financial assist-
cuice for the armed forces of the Sultaui and financial help for the development program. In return, the Sultan extended the existing arrangements regarding civil aviation and
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allowed the Royal Air Force to continue using the airfields at Masirah Island and at Salalah in Zufar.
Efforts towards Negotiations The mission inquired about the discussions which had taken place during 1960 and 1961 in Lebanon between repre sentatives of the United Kingdom's government on behalf of
the Sultan and the Imam. Those discussions were arranged in order to investigate the possibility of ending the conflict. It should be recalled that those negotiations ended in no agreement between the two parties. Asked by the mission, the representative of the Imam stated the terms under which they could return to Oman; namely, (1) their relationship with the Sultan should be
based on continuing recognition of the Treaty of Sib; (2) the Sultan should respect the provisions of the Treaty of Sib and the British should guarantee his good faith; (3) the spiritual and temporal authority and the material rights of the rebel leaders should be restored "as before" with no more interference by the Sultan than before; (4) Her Majesty's
government should guarantee the safety of the rebel leaders (against the Sultan); (5) Her Majesty's government should provide economic help in developing the country as a whole
and Oman in particular; (6) Omanis who had been imprisoned as a result of the war and subsequent querrilla activities
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should be released; Her Majesty's government should con sider sympathetically the financial and material sufferings
of the prisoners and of the people of Jebel Akhdar, with a view to offering them help. As the negotiations lagged, the representative of the Imam presented a set of four conditions, during the last meeting in 1961, which must be accepted if negotiations were
not to be broken off. These conditions are: 1. A return to the situation as it had existed
before the revolt. 2. Sovereignty for Oman. 3. Compensation for war damages. 4. Release of prisoners. 37 The discussions were broken off and were never resumed.
Development Programs During the visit to Oman, the mission was interested
to observe what was being done for the population in the area. The normal revenue— mostly taxes on import and export of goods— is totally inadequate to permit the allocation of
substantial funds for development purposes. In 1958, the United Kingdom's government agreed to help the Sultan to
carry out a development program. Financial assistance for
37 United Nations, op. cit., Agenda Item 78, Document A/5562, p. 17,
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this purpose has greatly increased since August, 1960, and the tentative budget for it, for 1963-1964, amount to approximately 190,000 pounds sterling, chiefly financed by
the United Kingdom.
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SUMMARY
Under its terms of reference, and having completed the visit to Oman, the mission saw it necessary to stress the caution with which it approached the task, in view of
the complex nature of the problem. In addition to the sections concerning its findings,
the mission made the following observations : 1. All the people in "Oman" were, ethnically speak
ing, of the same racial stock, used the same language, and practiced the same religion. 2» During long periods in the history of "Oman," for
instance from 1821 to 1913, no Imam functioned except from 1868-1871. 3. "Oman" had witnessed, during the last two cen turies, a struggle for power and domination between various tribes of the interior and the Sultans of Muscat. In that struggle, the United Kingdom has, on a number of occasions,
given support to the Sultan of Muscat. 4. A modus vivendi existed for some thirty-five years between the Sultan and Imsim Mohammad bin Abdullah
^United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighteenth Session, Agenda ltem”T8, Document A/5562,p. 44.
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1920. Finally, the mission hoped that the peurties concerned would negotiate and discuss the conflict. A start may be made by an undertaking to refrain from any action which
might further aggravate the situation, so that an atmosphere 3 conducive to mutual understanding may prevail.
The writer would like to add a personal note. As mentioned before, the people interviewed were almost unani mous in their answer to the questions asked by the mission, concerning, in particular, the Imamate and the rule of the Sultan. It should be remembered that Oman is still living under medieval-like conditions, where people looked at the
Sultan as the only ruler, regardless of the legitimacy of his rule. Time and time again, the people hid their feeling behind such words as "he is our ruler as long as he imple ments the Sharia," or "as long as he is just and good." Another observation concerns the British military
presence in Oman. The finding of the mission was that the number of British did not exceed one hundred personnel, including commissioned and non-commissioned officers. If
2 The Imam preceding the present Imam,
^United Nations, o£. cit., p. 45.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 59 this is statistically true, the fact remains that the entire number of ccimps spread over the country, including the in terior of Oman, are headed by British officers. There has
been, furthermore, an emphasis on the presence in each camp of a good intelligence unit headed by a British officer who knows the language, the country, and the people. He has been capable usually of gaining the confidence of the local population and of obtaining from them the information he needed. The writer was told by one of these officers that he was able to know the infiltrators, and sometimes, talk to them, A plausible conclusion is that, while the military presence, en masse, is not needed, the ground is laid through the intelligence units throughout the country to evaluate the needs and, above all, to anticipate any movement that might require the presence of a larger number of troops.
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SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS
The report submitted by the Special Representative of the Secretary General in the Eighteenth Session could be
considered inconclusive, in the sense that it did not clear away the vagueness aund the confusion brought about by the
discussion of the question during the debates of the General
Assembly. As the Arab states requested the inclusion of the item on the agenda,^ the General Committee recommended its inclusion and the General Assembly approved, in its 1210& meeting, the item, allocating it to the Fourth Committee instead of the Special Political Committee as before. The significance of this allocation is that the question is
henceforth to be considered a colonial issue to be dealt with in the Fourth Committee which has dealt with colonial questions and issues, and which has helped to guide many non-self-governing territories toward freedom and independ
ence . This referral was made over the objection of the United Kingdom. Henceforth, it is to be dealt with, as many
^United Nations, Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the United Nations, June l3^ 1962-Junë l"§^4.
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former colonial issues, such as the Algerian question, to name one. The Fourth Committee considered the item from December 3 to December 9, 1963, during nine meetings. Like
the Special Political Committee, the Fourth Committee re ceived and granted two requests for a heciring, one from Mr. 2 Faris Glubb, and the other from Suleiman bin Himyar, repre sentative of the state of Oman. The grant was confirmed in a letter dated May 27, 1964.^
During the debate, the need was expressed for more information on the subject. A draft resolution adopted by the Fourth Committee sind approved by the General Assembly [Resolution 1948 (XVIII)] provided for the establishment of
"an Ad Hoc Committee composed of five member states appointed by the President of the General Assembly to examine the question of Oman.^ In accordance with this resolution, the President of the General Assembly nominated Afghanistan, Costa Rica, Nepal, Nigeria, and Senegal as members of the
Ad Hoc Committee on Oman.^ Under the terms of reference, the committee was called upon to examine the question of Oman emd to report to .the
2 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annex î^o. I'ST’ ï) o c p. 3,
Ibxdo, p. 4. ^bi^., p. 4. S'Ibid., p. 4.
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General Assembly at its Nineteenth Session. It is to be noted that the decision to establish an Ad Hoc Committee was taken after consideration of the fact that, in the report of
the Secretary General’s Special Representative
. . . it is recognized that in the course of his mission the Special Representative did not have the time to evaluate the territorial, historical and political issues involved in the problem, nor did he consider himself competent to do so [Resolution 1948 (XVIII), fourth preambular paragraph]. On January 8, 1965, the Ad Hoc Committee submitted its report which contained an extensive and useful study of the problem in 222 pages and 15 annexes.^ The committee attempted to arrange a visit to the
territory, but in his cable of June 20, 1964, the Sultan restated his earlier position and refused to allow the com- 7 mitteé to visit the territory. As previously stated, it was possible for the chairman, Mr. Abdul Rahman PazhwaJc of Afghanistan to confer with the Sultan in London. Members of the committee also had discussions with British officials,'
the Imam of Oman, members of his higher council and the revolutionary council, as well as with Omani refugees. It visited Dammam, Kuwait, and Cairo during which it inter viewed 175 persons and received communications from others.
^United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, loc. cit. 7 See infra. Appendix V.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 63 8 In its conclusions, the committee expressed the
belief that the question of Oman is a "serious international problem, requiring the special attention of the General Assembly; that it derived from imperialistic policies and foreign intervention in Muscat and Oman «" Having attributed
the unrest emd suffering of the people to this problem, the committee, therefore, believed that "all parties concerned should enter into negotiations to settle the question without prejudice to the positions taken by either side and should
refrain from any action that might impede peaceful settle
ment. " The committee also believed that the United Nations should assist in bringing about a solution to the problem by taking an active part in facilitating the negotiations
between all the parties concerned by the establishment of a Good Offices Committee. Any initiative that the General Assembly should take in this matter should be designed to achieve the fulfillment of the legitimate aspirations of the 9 people of Muscat and Oman. Furthermore, the "General Assembly should call upon
the Imam euad the Sultan to make every effort to settle the
8 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, op. cit., p. I'Wl '
9Ibid., p. 79.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 64 question through the facilities of the Good Offices Commit- tee.10 The committee also believed that the General Assembly should call upon the Government of the United Kingdom to facilitate a negotiated settlement and to use its close and
friendly relationship with the Sultan to encourage such a settlements Finally, the committee recommended that the
General Assembly call upon the Arab states to make every effort to encourage a negotiated settlements^^ The General Assembly did not take up the question at its Nineteenth Session, in view of the fact that a deadlock centered around the financing of peacekeeping operations of
the United Nations» The question was discussed, however, during the Twentieth Session resulting in stronger recommen dations and larger implicationso The committee broadened
its framework and is presently looking into the situation of all the Trucial Coast sheikhdoms» The question of Oman is no longer an isolated issue; it is to be considered a part 12 of the colonial problem in the .Persian Gulf» What is the future of the problem? A very important aspect of the United Nations is
l^Ibid», P» 79» ^^Ibid., p. 79» 12 United Nations, Annual Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the ÛniTeSTNations, June 16, 19o4- June iS, 19%5T p. 57»
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altering the course of many problems submitted to that international body. The rise of the "have not" majority is resulting in the adoption of the General Assembly of a body
of decisions which are difficult, if not impossible, to implement. The social justice and the power politics are on a head-on collision course. The future of colonial problems
depends on the result of that collision. The United Nations is a political institution, utilized by members for advancing national interest. But, . the hope of the world is that through an international forum, crises may be alleviated and problems may be solved. There is no question that oil, colonialism, Arab politics are the basis of the problem of Oman. The Arabs are making efforts to dislodge Great Britain from the Arabian Peninsula, In Aden, in Oman, and in Brunei, there are several grounds of battle between contending pairties. The Assembly heard numerous delegates speeiking for hours in order to prove historical and legal points on the question of Oman. Documents on both sides were presented to
support the contention of legality and legitimity. One fact remains true: the problem is a political one, more between
the Arabs and the British than between the Imam and the Sultan, because both the Imam and the Sultan have the sup port of their friends and allies.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 66 The Treaty of Sib is in the heart of the controversy. But, is there an authentic text? The only text the United Nations could rely upon is the one published by The New York
Times in 1957. The Ad Hoc Committee reproduced another text submitted by the person who signed on behalf of the Imam. Upon comparing the two texts, one finds no difference in the
substance. The difference is only in the interpretation of the text® Autonomy is taken for independence by the Imam; for the Sultan, autonomy is a kind of internal self rule. Consequently, the Sultan considers the revolt of the Imam an internal problem outside the jurisdiction of the United Nations. But, he allowed a United Nations mission to visit the country, thus implicitly admitting the international aspect of the problem. Furthermore, the British negotiated with the Imam in 1960 and 1961 in Lebanon, on behalf of the Sultan. This is another admission of the international aspect of the problem. In essence, the problem is a power struggle, not between a Sultan and an Imsim but between the Arab states and
the United Kingdom. The Arab states are attempting, through United Nations pressure, to force the United Kingdom to relinquish support of the Sultan. They brought up the matter before the Security Council. The rise of the Afro-Asian majority in the Assembly made it possible to bring the case before the plenary. Discussing the question, exposing some
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 67 colonial aspects, as is fashionable in any United Nations
issue, they hope to provide international recognition of the
Iraara. However, it should always be remembered that the United Nations can discuss, study, and recommend only. En
forcement is beyond its reach. The deadlock over financing the peacekeeping operations of the Organization is a revolt against the realization of a majority in the General Assembly. Despite these limitations, one csm say that the Arab states were successful, and this is reflected in the increasing power of the anti-colonial bloc in the General Assembly. The question has been discussed by the Security
Council; and it has been on the agenda of the General Assem
bly for the last three sessions. Hearings were granted to petitioners; a special representative of the Secretary
General has visited the area, and the Assembly's Ad Hoc Committee has established the item which has been considered
by the committee dealing with colonial questions, thus making it a matter of international concern. Finally, it
became an integral part of the colonial problem m the Persian Gulf. If the matter continues to follow a similar
course in the future, it will not be impossible to embody the question in the whole question of colonialism in the Arabian Peninsula, which will include the problem of Aden, The only obstacle is that the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 68 has a different status than that of Aden. It is not a pro
tectorate; it is an independent state. The United Kingdom's efforts at localizing the prob lem have been to no avail. The General Assembly did not
consider it a domestic question. So far, the General Assem bly and the United Nations in general have been unable to determine whether the matter is of domestic or international concern. The International Court may be instrumental in
this respect, but at the present time, the Court has not issued an opinion on the question of Oman. Tlie attempts to negotiate a settlement between the parties concerned, i.e., the Sultan, the Imam, and the
United Kingdom, were unsuccessful. In the United Nations, the parties aire given facilities, though limited, for peace
ful settlement under the U.N. Charter. They Eure given the opportunity to present their case and state their positions. Since the United Nations can only recommend, in the case of Oman, it recommended that every concerned party negotiate for a peaceful settlement or refrain from action which may impede such settlement. If so, what is the usefulness of the United Nations? This question could be asked with regard to every political problem discussed by the United Nations. The international Organization is at its best a forum for discussion, or a
safety valve by which parties talk and bicker with each
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 69 other rather than armed conflict with each other. It is
certainly cheaper than wars and armed conflicts, in terras of costs and financial implications. It has been said that the "anti-colonial group" in
the United Nations is responsible for the present impotence
of the United Nations, due in part to the adoption of resolu tions which were not implemented. But, it should be said, on the other hand, that the United Nations paralysis has been the result of a super power struggle which later mani fested itself in the General Assembly. This is reflected in the political question relating to financing of peacekeeping operations, the super powers having earlier paralyzed the
Security Council, then rendered the Nineteenth Session of the General Assembly impotent. The deadlock is the result of the USA-USSR confrontation. The Afro-Asian bloc has been attempt
ing, vainly, to achieve settlement of the ostensible basic issue. This reminds us of the "United for Peace Resolution" adopted in 1951, under the guidance of the late John Foster Dulles, to disentangle the jam caused by the constant Russian
veto in the Security Council. The recommendations of the General Assembly Eire not
obligations to be cEucried by state members. The parties may or may not carry out implementation, depending upon whether the recommendation in question is suitEible to their own
self-interest.
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Such recommendations became easily adopted following the admission of new members from Asia and Africa. A two- thirds majority is necessary to adopt such recommendation.
Thus, the Assembly washable to adopt resolutions favorable to the Imam of Omeui to the distaste of Great Britain and its friend, the Sultan. While it is normal for states to accept and implement United Nations resolutions furthering their national interest, or not conflicting with the latter, it
is not the same with matters of international interest where sovereignty or part thereof has to be relinquished in the process. States have not yet developed a sense of inter national responsibility and, therefore, are not willing to subject their national interest to international interest as expressed by an international organization such as the
United Nations.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. BIBLIOGRAPHY
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. BIBLIOGRAPHY
PRIMARY SOURCES
Everyman's United Nations, 1945-1963. A ready reference to the structure, functions and work of the United Nations and its related agencies. Seventh Edition. New York, 1964.
United Nations. Annual Reports of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization : 16 June 1958-15 June 1959, Document Supplement No. 1 (A/4132). 16 June 1959-15 June 1960, Document Supplement No, 1 (A/4390). 16 June 1960-15 June 1961, Document Supplement No. 1 (A/4800). 16 June 1961-15 June 1962, Document Supplement No. 1 (A/5201). 16 June 1962-15 June 1963, Document Supplement No, 1 (A/5501). 16 June 1963-15 June 1964, Document Supplement No. 1 (A/5801), United Nations General Assembly, First Report of the General Committee. A/5530. . Note by the Secretary General. A/5688. Fourth Committee, Seventeenth Session, 1963. A/C,4/604 Add. 2; A/C.4/627, 628, 629, 631; A/C.4/L. 783 and Corr.; A/C.4/L. 783 and Rev. 1; A/C.4/784; and A/C.4/785.
Special Political Committee. A/SPÇ/L. 78 and Add. 1. Sixteenth Session, A/SPC/L. 88,
Report of the Special Representative of the “üecretary General. October"%96 3. X/5ëë2. , Report of the Ad Hoc Committee. Annex No. 16. January 8 , 1^5. A'TS'864 .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 73 B. SECONDARY SOURCES
i* Books Aitchison, C. U. A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India an3 Neighbouring Countries. Calcutta: Government of India, Central Publication Branch, 1909. Vols. 1-14. Fawdah, Farid. Glorious Chapters in the Struggle of Oman. Cairo : Dar XT'Fikr, 1962. Lin Arabic,J Hay, Sir Rupert. The Persian Gulf States. Washington: The Middle East Institute, 1959. Human Relations Area Files, Inc. Eastern Arabia, Sub- contractor's Monograph. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956. HkApZglT AGS-2. Kelly, J. B. Sultanate eind Imamate in Oman. London: Oxford University Press J 1959. Chatham House Memoranda, Eastern Arabian Frontiers. London: Faber and Faber“ Ï9'64T Morris, James. Sultan in Oman. London: Faber and Feiber, 1957. Said Ruete, Rudolf. Sa'id bin Sultan. London: Alexander Ouseley, 1929® Salil ibn Razik. History of the Imams and Seyyids of Omen. Trans, and ed. by George Percy Badger, New York, 1959. Sharabi, Hisham. Governments and Politics of the Middle East in the Twentieth Century. New York: D. Van Nostrand C o .1 The Question of Oman, Information Paper No. 13. New York: Arab Information Center, 1960.
Thesiger, Wilfred. Arabian Sands. London: Longmans Green, 1959, Wingate, Sir Ronald, Not in the Limelight. London: Hutchinson of London, 1959,
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2» Articles and Periodicals
Eccles, Captain G« J« "The Sultanate of Muscat and Oman," Journal of the Central Asian Society. London, 1927. Vol. XÏV, Part I. Faisal, Wahba. "Desert War," Mew Times. Moscow, 1960. No, 41. Foreign Affairs Quarterly. October, November, and December,
Illustrated London. "Bloodless Victory of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman." No. 228-4-5. January 7, 1956. "Military Success, Political Timidity. Role of the British in the Suppression of the Rebellion in Oman." No. 231,292. August 24, 1957. "Oman Reburried," Economist. London. Issue 184-604, August 24, 1957. "Policemen in Oman," New Statesman. 54-165. August 10, 1957, Thesiger, Wilfred. "Desert Borderlands of Oman," The Geographical Journal. Vol. CXVI. October-December,
United Nations Review. 10:80, 2 February 1963. Young, Richard. "The United Kingdom-Muscat Treaty of 1951," The American Journal of International Law. Washington, 1 # F 2 l Vol. "46.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIXES
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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM ATTACHED TO THE LETTER DATED 19 SEPTEMBER 1960 FROM TEN ARAB STATES, ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL
1. The Imamate of Oman lies at the south-eastern tip of the Arabian Peninsula. It is the hinterland of what is erroneously called the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman; in population and area the Imamate of Oman forms the greater part of that territory. As early as 1650, Omani troops suc ceeded in compelling the Portuguese who had occupied Muscat in 1507, to evacuate the Iroaunate, thereby consolidating the independence and sovereignty of Oman. 2. Since the latter part of the eighteenth century when Britain sought to extend its influence over the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula to protect its imperial communi cations, it faced constant opposition from the people of Oman. This fact was manifested by the refusal of the people of Oman to accept as Imam, Said bin Sultan, whose rule was imposed by Britain over Muscat during the nineteenth century. Muscat maintained a hereditary Sultanate, while the people of Oman have continued for the past 1200 years to elect their Imam, At the end of World War I, when the independence of Oman was threatened, a conflict ensued between Muscat and Oman, and led the Omani forces to lay siege to Muscat. When Muscat was eibout to surrender, the British intervened to settle the dispute and the Treaty of Sib was concluded be tween Muscat and Oman on 25 September 192 ).> This Treaty confirms without ambiguity the independence of Oman. 3. As is well known, the present conflict arose as a result of the constant refusal of the Imams of Oman to grant oil concessions to British companies in their territory. This led to the invasion of Oman by British led forces re sulting in the occupation of Nazwa, the capital of Oman on 17 December 1955. Since then, the people of Oman have con tinued their resistance to the military aggression directed against their independence, 4. The armed aggression by the United Kingdom against the independence, sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Imamate of Oman was brought to the attention of the
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Security Council on 15 August 1957, It is regretted that in spite of the gravity of the situation, the Security Council failed to deal with this problem. Since then, the situation has further deteriorated and British Military intervention continues unabated, causing great suffering and wide spread loss of life and property in violation of the fundamental principles of human rights. On 15 April 1959, the Imam of Oman appealed to the moral conscience of the world to put an end to these acts of repression. In June of the same year the Imam reiterated the firm determination of his people to defend their independence against United Kingdom aggression. 5. The tragic situation in Oman, where a relentless war continues, is of great concern to our governments. The aggression against the people of Oman threatens peace and security in the Middle East, and constitutes a breach of the Charter of the United Nations and the rules of international law.
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DRAFT RESOLUTIONS RECOMMENDED BY THE SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE
a - Draft resolution recommended by the Special Political Committee at the sixteenth session.
The General Assembly Having discussed the question of Oman, Deeply concerned with the situation in Oman, Recalling its resolution 1514 (XV) "Declaration on granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples," 1. Recognizes the right of the people of Oman to self-determination and independence; 2. Calls for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Oman; 3. Invites the parties concerned to settle peace fully their differences with a view to restoring normal con ditions in Oman. b - Draft Resolution recommended by the Special Political Committee at its seventeenth session.
The General Assembly, Having discussed the question of Oman, Deeply concerned with the situation in Oman, Convinced that a speedy restoration of independence to Oman is necessary for the peace and stability in the area, 1. Recognizes the right of the people of Oman to self-determination and independence; 2, Calls for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Oman;
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3. Invites the peurties concerned to settle peace fully their differences in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations with a view to restoring normal conditions in Oman.
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RESOLUTION ESTABLISHING THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON OMAN BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY (XVIII SESSION)
The General Assembly, Having discussed the question of Oman Having heard the petitioners. Deeply concerned with the situation existing in Oman, Taking note of the report of the Special Representa tive of the Secretary-General (A/5562) and thanking him for his efforts, Taking into consideration the fact that in the report it is recognized that in the course of his mission, the Special Representative did not have the time to evaluate the territorial, historical and political issues involved in the problem, nor did he consider himself competent to do so, 1, Decides to establish an Ad Hoc Committee composed of five Member States appointed by the President of the General Assembly to examine the question of Oman; 2o Calls upon all the parties concerned to cooperate with the Ad Hoc Committee by all possible means, including that of facilitating visits to the area; 3o Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to report to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session; 4. Requests the Secretary General to render all necessary assistance to the Ad Hoc Committee.
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THE TREATY OF SIB
(Unofficial version of the Treaty as quoted in The New York Times of August 13, 1957)
In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful, This is the peace agreed upon between the Government of the Sultan, Taimur ibn Faisal, and Sheikh Iso Ibn Salin ibn Ali on behalf of the people of Oman whose names Eire signed hereto, through the mediation of Mr. Wingate, I.C.S. political agent and consul for Great Britain in Muscat, who is empowered by his Government in this respect and to be an intermediary between them. Of the conditions set forth below four pertain to the Government of the Sultan and four pertain to the people of Oman. Those pertaining to the people of Oman are: 1. Not more than 5 per cent shall be taken from any one, no matter what his race, coming from Oman to Muscat or Matrah or Sur, or the rest of the towns of the coast.
2. All the people of Oman shall enjoy security sind freedom in all the towns of the coast, 3. All restrictions upon everyone entering and leaving Muscat and Matrah and all the towns shall be removed, 4. The Government of the Sultan shall not grant asylum to any criminal fleeing from the justice of the people of Oman. It shall return him to them if they request it to do so. It shall not interfere in their internal affairs.
The four conditions' pertaining to the Government of the Sultan are: 1, All the tribes and sheikhs shall be of peace with the Sultan. They shall not attack the towns of the coast and shall not interfere in his government® 2, All those going to Oman on lawful business smd for commercial affairs shall be free. There shall be no restrictions on commerce and they shall enjoy security.
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3. They shall expel and grant no asylum to any wrongdoer or criminal fleeing to them. 4, The claims of merchants and others against the people of Oman shall be heard and decided on the basis of justice according to the law of Islam, Written on 11 Muharram 1339, corresponding to 25 September 1920.
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TELEGRAM DATED 26 OCTOBER 1963 FROM THE SULTAN OF MUSCAT AND OMAN TO THE PRESIDENT
OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
(Original text: English)
Muscat 26 October 1963
Your Excellency, Last session the General Assembly rejected, as it had also done the previous year, a resolution expressing judge ment [sic] on matters exclusively within our jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the same subject is to be debated again this year, and, even more incongruously, in the Committee dealing with trusteeship matters and Non-Self-Governing Territories. We are compelled once again to remind the distinguished delegates that we continue to hold sole responsibility for all matters within our territories, which are sovereign and independent, not subject to any form of trusteeship, nor in any sense non-self governing. It was because we thought that these fundamental considerations might have been misunder stood by some delegates that we invited the Secretary General to send an impartial observer to report on the situation in the Sultanate. His report is now available to all who are interested and we hope that this will put an end to the matter. We request that this communication be circulated to all Members of the United Nations. Said bin Taimur Sultan of Muscat and Oman
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GLOSSARY OF NAMES AND PLACES
A1 bu Said: The dynasty of rulers to which the present Sultan belongs.
Batineh Coast: The northern part of the Omani coast. Cadis : Judges concerned with the implementation of the law according to the Islcimic Sharia, and appointed by the Sultan,
Dhofar: Sometimes Zufar, the southernmost part of Oman where the capital Salalah is located. Fahud: A region of Oman located in the southern part of the country.
Ghafiri: Tribe in Oman; the members belong to the Sunni sect of Islam.
Hinawi: A major tribe of Oman, to which the Imam belongs.
Imam and Imamate: The Ruler and the State where both temporal and religious powers are com bined. The Imam is elected by a college of learned and notable men for the duration of his life.
Imam Ghalib bin Ali: The present Imam elected in 1954, and who rebelled against the Sultan,
Jebel Akhdar: The stronghold of the rebels in Interior (the"”Green Mountain) Oman. It was the scene of the last clash between the Sultan's forces and the rebels in 1959. Masirah Island: An island of the southern coast of Muscat and Oman; used by the British Air Force as an airfield. Muscat ; The major port of Oman, which was once the residence of the Sultan; it has now various departments of the government of the Sultan.
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Nizwa: Formerly the capital of the Imeimate, in the center of Oman.
Sib Treaty: A treaty named after a town located twenty miles south of Muscat on the coast. The treaty put an end to the strife between the tribes and the Sultan in 1920. Suleiman bin Himyar; A major figure in the rebellion of the Omanis, He is the chieftain of the bani Himyar, the tribe which supported the Imam from the beginning of the rebellion.
Salalah: A city some four hundred miles from Muscat to the south which is the resi dence of the Sultan at the present time.
Talib bin Ali: Brother of the Imaun, and the military leader of the rebellion. Furthermore, he is the representative of the Imam in Cairo, and in the hearing held at the United Nations.
Walis: Officials appointed by the Sultan to head different districts of the country.
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