THE FORMULATION of BRITAIN's POLICY TOWARDS EGYPT: 1922-1925 Eugene ROTHMAN a Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philo
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THE FORMULATION OF BRITAIN'S POLICY TOWARDS EGYPT: 1922-1925 Eugene ROTHMAN A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, in the Faculty of Arts, University of London. London, September 1979 ProQuest Number: 10672715 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com plete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. uest ProQuest 10672715 Published by ProQuest LLC(2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346 ABSTRACT The years immediately following the First World War were extremely important for the formulation of Britain's policy towards Egypt, a British Protectorate since 1914. In this connection, the years 1922 to 1925, the last years of Lord Allenby's tenure as Britain's High Commissioner in Egypt, were critical. Allenby, who was appointed in 1919 in order to suppress nationalist- inspired rioting in Egypt, adopted a surprising policy of moderation. He soon forced the British government to unilaterally declare Egypt's independence in 1922. This apparent success was followed by the adoption of a modern consti tution in Egypt and the British withdrawal from the entanglements of Egypt's administration. Still Allenby's career ended in seeming frustration in 1925: negotiations between Britain and Egypt failed in 1924, to be followed by the assassination of the British Governor General of the Sudan, Sir Lee z' Stack, and Allenby's harsh ultimatum to the Egyptian government in November 1924 effectively reinstituting British control of Egypt's administration. Allenby left Egypt in 1925 because of his sharp response to the disorders and his refusal, as in 1922, to accept the views of the British government in London. This rivalry between British policy-makers in Cairo and in London became the hallmark of British policy throughout this period. The thesis attempts to answer some of the questions raised by the formulation of Britain's policy towards Egypt during the years 1922-1925, when an effort was made to regularise Anglo-Egyptian relations. Towards this end, there is an examination of the factors affecting Britain's policy in three related areas: the environment - the approaches and perceptions of policy; the balance and tensions between the High Commissioner and his Residency staff in Cairo and the British government in London; and, finally, the interaction of these elements with events in Egypt, particularly the struggle between the nationalist forces, led by Zaghlul Pasha, and the Egyptian King, Ahmad Fuad. PREFACE Before entering the main body of the thesis, I would like to explain several technical aspects of approach and to thank the many institutions and individuals who were so generous in their assistance: SOURCES. The primary sources that have been used for this work are the various public and private papers collections available in Britain, the contemporary press and memoirs written by participants or observers. Emphasis has been placed on these sources because the work is an attempt to explain the perceptions, mechanics and results of British policy formulation towards Egypt from 1922 to 1925. For this reason Arabic sources were not used ex tensively. TRANSLITERATION. Standard Arabic transliteration has been used. However, diacritical marks were omitted. Common words or place names, such as Khedive or Cairo, were used in their accepted English forms. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS. The preparation of this thesis has been facilitated by several institutions and individuals to whom I am deeply indebted. I would like to give my thanks to the officers and the staff of the following institutions for permitting me access to research materials and so generously assisting me during the initial stages of the research: Beaverbrook Library, London; Birmingham University Library; Bodleian Library; British Museum; Colonial Records Project, Oxford; Cambridge Uni versity Library; Pembroke College Library, Cambridge; Public Records Office; School of Oriental and African Studies Library; St. Antony's College; State Archives, Israel; Sudan Archives, Durham University. I would particularly like to thank Lord Allenby for his generous hospitality while I was a guest in his home in Kent working on the papers of the late Viscount Allenby. During my research and then the writing of the thesis I was assisted by generous grants from the University Grants Committee, the University of London, and Carleton University's Faculty of Arts and Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research. Many individuals have given kind assistance throughout the preparation of the thesis. In particular, I would like to thank Professor M.G. Fry, former Director of Carleton University's School of International Affairs, and Professor Norman Rose, Chairman of the Department of International Rela tions at the Hebrew University, for their interest in the thesis and their comments on British foreign policy. I also am much indebted to Professor N.E.S. Griffiths and Professor S.F. Wise of Carleton University's Department of History for their constant encouragement in the final stages of the writing. Finally, I wish to express my deep gratitude to Professor P.M. Holt,, of the SchOol of Oriental and African Studies, who supervised this work. His insight and comments during my stay in London were invaluable. His patience during the long period of gestation much appreciated. No acknowledgement would be complete without my thanks to my wife, Norma Rothman, who commented, cajoled, typed and proofread the thesis. Her assistance was always given in great measure and with good cheer. E.R. Ottawa, 1979 ABBREVIATIONS The following abbreviations were used in references to public and private papers: add: additional manuscripts BLL: Beaverbrook Library, London BLQ: Bodleian Library, Oxford BM : British Museum BUL: Birmingham University Library C: Command Paper CAB: Cabinet Cd: Command Paper CID: Committee of Imperial Defence Cmd: Command Paper CP: Cabinet Paper CRPO: Colonial Records Project, Oxford CUL: Cambridge University Library DNB: Dictionary of National Biography FO: Foreign Office IND: Index KAP: Kent Allenby Papers PCL: Pembroke College Library PRO: Public Records Office SAD: Sudan Archives, Durham University SAI: State Archives, Israel STAC: St. Antony's College, Oxford TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT ............................................................. i PREFACE ............................................................. ii ABBREVIATIONS ....................................................... iv INTRODUCTION ......................................................... 1 PART ONE: THE ENVIRONMENT OF POLICY Chapter I. THE EMERGENCE OF C A I R O .................................... 10 II. LONDON - THE PRE-OCCUPIED C E N T R E .......................... 29 III. SHARED PERCEPTIONS - THE MOTIFS OF POLICY ................... 53 PART TWO: CAIRO'S YEARS, 1922-1923 IV. ' THE FAILURE OF NEGOTIATIONS................................ 72 V. INDEPENDENCE ............................................... 98 VI. THE NEW APPROACH - DISENGAGEMENT AND RESTRICTION ........... 127 VII. THE STRUGGLE FOR D I S E N G A G E M E N T ............................ 144 PART THREE: LONDON'S YEARS, 1924-1925 VIII. 'GREAT EXPECTATIONS' - MACDONALD AND ZAGHLUL ............... 187 IX. THE N E G O T I A T I O N S ........................................... 220 X. ALLENBY'S DECLINE ........................................... 238 CONCLUSION........................................................... 271 BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................... 277 INTRODUCTION 1 INTRODUCTION 'Renounce - or monopolize - or share1'*': These words, written by Lord Salisbury on e year before the British occupation of Egypt in 1883, sharply de fined the central dilemma of British policy towards Egypt. It was a dilemma that would concern British statesmen and diplomatists for nearly three-quarters of a century and would be resolved only by the final withdrawal of Britain's troops from Egypt in 1954. The dilemma was indeed fascinating. The renunciation of control over Egypt would prevent Britain from becoming and then remaining entangled in Egyptian affairs and hostage to the variable fortunes of international diplomacy. Yet such a step might hazard British strategic and economic interests in the area. The monopolization of control would, it was believed, assure British interests, but might invite the dangers of foreign entanglements. The sharing of control could conceivably involve Britain - whether in Europe or in Egypt - in the en tanglements hitherto avoided, while not really assuring the maintenance of vital interests. If this dilemma was central at the start of Britain's occupation of Egypt in 1883, it was equally important in the years following the First World War. A period of great complexity and sharp changes, this was a time in which Britain's leaders were forced, often much to their dismay, to reassess that country's imperial role and its relations with diverse sections of the Empire. The forces unleashed by the events, policies and pronouncements of the war years affected areas as distant and dissimilar as India and Ireland. Egypt,