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ThCommissioner for Egypt: 1917-1919

Coventry, Donald C., Ph.D.

The American University, 1989

Copyright ©1989 by Coventry, Donald C. All rights reserved.

UMI 300 N. Zeeb Rd. Ann Arbor, MI 48106

THE PUBLIC CAREER OF SIR FRANCIS REGINALD WINGATE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR EGYPT: 1917 - 1919

by

Donald C . Coventry submitted to the Faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences of The American University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History Signatures of Committee: Chair:

Dean of the College

■ 14 December 1989______Date

1989 The American University Washington, D.C. 20016 I

UffiEICM UNITORSlîï LIBRARY © COPYRIGHT

BY DONALD C. COVENTRY 1989 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED THE PUBLIC CAREER OF SIR FRANCIS REGINALD WINGATE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR EGYPT: 1917 - 1919 BY Donald C. Coventry ABSTRACT

The career of Sir Reginald Wingate was spent almost entirely in Egypt and the Sudan, and covered the period 1883 to 1919. Wingate became the first Governor-General of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan in 1899, and held that position until 1917. His subsequent appointment to the post of High Commissioner for Egypt was terminated abruptly in March 1919, after a nationalist uprising against the existing British Protectorate, ending his public career. This dissertation examines Wingate's public career, focusing on the events surrounding the political crisis in Egypt in 1919, and attempts, within the framework of British post-war policy in the Middle East, to determine the reasons for his downfall. The paper also attempts to assess Wingate's entire period of public service within the overall context of British imperial policy in the late nineteenth and early

twentieth centuries. Wingate's long period of service in the Sudan, during the crucial early days of Anglo-Egyptian rule, is

11 assessed both in terms of his success in achieving the economic viability which England hoped to create there, and of the benefits, or lack thereof, which accrued to the Sudanese as the result of British rule. The procedure used in the writing of the dissertation was, most importantly, the evaluation of archival material. Wingate's private papers, from the Sudan Archive at Durham University, and the Curzon Papers from the India Office Records and Library in London, provided the main primary sources. Lord Curzon was Acting Foreign Secretary during the entire period of the Egyptian political crisis. The Parliamentary Debates were also consulted, as were Colonial Office annual reports and Confidential Prints. Despite the unfortunate conclusion of his career, Wingate's overall contribution — both to the attainment of British imperial policy objectives prior to the First World War, and to the success of British forces in the Middle East during the war — was of immense significance.

Ill ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are a number of individuals to whom I owe a great debt of gratitude for their generous assistance and advice during the course of the research and writing of this dissertation. First among these are the members of my Dissertation Committee at the American University: Professors Janet Oppenheim (Chairperson), Ira Klein, and Terence Murphy. Their comments, advice, and patience contributed greatly to the final result. On three separate research trips to the University of Durham, invaluable help was provided by Lesley Forbes, Keeper of Oriental Books, and Jane Hogan, Archivist of the Sudan Archive. My visits to their beautiful Cathedral town were certainly the most enjoyable periods of research in the course of writing this paper. The staff of the India Office Records and Library in London were also most helpful during my two visits there, and Charles W. Bean of the Library of Congress in Washington provided me with a number of source references which would have taken a good deal longer to find on my own. Acknowledgement is due to Peter Lang Publishing, Inc. for permission to quote from John D. McIntyre’s The Boycott of the Milner Mission; A Study in Egyptian

XV Nationalism. My thanks are owed also to the Harrap Publishing Group (formerly George G. Harrap & Co., Ltd.) for allowing me to quote from Archibald Wavell's Allenbv in Egypt.

I am especially indebted to my supervisor, John P. Giannini, for permitting me to take extra time off from my regular employment to complete this dissertation. I would like to express my appreciation, as well, to Averill and Kenneth Ring, who typed my entire original draft onto floppy discs: enabling me to use a much more sophisticated personal computer than the simple word processor I had employed when I began writing the dissertation. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Alison, for her indispensible help in the final preparation of this paper. TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ...... ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... iv Chapter I. INTRODUCTORY ESSAY ...... 1 II. EARLY LIFE AND DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, CAIRO 1861 - 1899 19 III. WINGATE'S SUDANESE ADMINISTRATION 1899 - 1914 64 IV. WINGATE'S WARTIME ROLE 1914 - 1 9 1 8 ...... 110 V. THE EGYPTIAN POLITICAL CRISIS: NOVEMBER 1918 - MARCH 1 9 1 9 ...... 153 VI. THE EGYPTIAN REBELLION OF 1919 AND ITS AFTERMATH MARCH - DECEMBER 1919 190 VII. LORD MILNER'S SPECIAL MISSION TO EGYPT DECEMBER 1919 - MARCH 1922 ...... 230 VIII. ANGLO-EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATIONS AND ALLENBY'S HIGH COMMISSIONERSHIP 1922 - 1925 252 IX. WINGATE'S SUBSEQUENT CAREER 1920 - 1953 . . 284

X. CONCLUSIONS ...... 300 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 310

VI CHAPTER I INTRODUCTORY ESSAY

The three decades preceding the start of the First World War in 1914 were the years of what has become popularly known as the "New Imperialism". During this period the major western European nations and, to a far lesser degree, the United States, extended and consolidated their control over virtually the entire African continent, and much of Asia as well. The career of General Sir Francis Reginald Wingate (1861-1953), which took place entirely in the Middle East — most notably in Egypt and the Sudan — spans, almost precisely, the time frame of the "New Imperialism". Although Wingate never reached the apex of British imperial policy makers prior to the termination of his career, he was an extremely significant figure in his time and place. Indeed, the importance of the position of High Commissioner for Egypt, which Wingate held from 1917 to 1919, might well be argued to have been second only to the Viceroyalty of India in the hierarchy of British imperial administrative posts. As such, and in his earlier capacity as Governor-General of the Sudan and Sirdar (Commander of the Egyptian Army), Wingate's advice was sought at the highest levels of British government. It is the career of 2

this soldier and administrator which is the topic of this dissertation. There are a number of schools of historical thought

on the issue of the causative factors behind the rapid expansion of European authority and domination which occurred during the final quarter of the nineteenth century and the opening decade of the twentieth. The majority of modern historical writers seem to place their emphasis on either strategic or economic motivations, although these two are by no means the only explanations put forth in attempting to understand the question. Those scholars espousing the economic argument for late nineteenth century imperialism stress the belief that the possession of a colonial empire would provide both a source of raw materials to be manufactured into finished products in Europe and, to some degree, a captive market for these products. The ownership of such an empire would, quite obviously, give a nation certain advantages over a rival country which had to obtain its raw materials from sources that it could not control. All historical writers who are advocates of the economic interpretation of imperialism owe a great deal to J.A. Hobson, whose Imperialism; A Study (1902), is the initial work in this 3 area. The aspect of the acquisition of less competitive markets is one which is stressed strongly by Leonard Woolf in his work Empire and Commerce in Africa (1920). Woolf argues that the imperialist policies advocated by Joseph Chamberlain and his supporters in the 1890s were motivated wholly by the desire to provide free markets for British business. While other European nations were motivated by the desire to use their colonies for the resettlement of their surplus populations — France and Germany are the primary examples given — Great Britain already possessed more land than it could ever use for this purpose in Canada and Australia. The French and Germans quickly abandoned thoughts of large scale colonization with their own nationals, however, as neither country was able to acquire territories where its own people were willing to settle in significant numbers.

By the closing decades of the nineteenth century the commanding position which Britain had enjoyed during the previous forty years began to be seriously challenged for the first time. Both the United States and the recently unified German Empire were in the throes of the same sort of rapid industrial and economic growth which Britain had experienced earlier in the century. Both these nations, but 4 particularly the United States, possessed resources in land, labor, and mineral wealth which far exceeded anything to be found in the British Isles. The United States surpassed Great Britain in the production of steel by the late 1880s, and Germany followed suit around the turn of the century. By 1900 the Americans had also passed the British in overall industrial capacity and share of the world market. During the next decade Germany also overtook Britain in these two areas. Bernard Semmel, in Imperialism and Social Reform (1960), concentrates in depth on the selling of imperialism to the British working class. Woolf mentions Joseph Chamberlain's policies only in so far as they relate directly to Africa. Semmel, on the other hand, dissects his campaign to convince the British public that the free trade dogma, which they had come to revere as the gospel since the days of the fight to repeal the Corn Laws, was obsolete. What the British working man was most concerned about, says Semmel, was the "cheap loaf". Chamberlain and his supporters strove to convince him that the possession of a greatly expanded empire meant "work for all," and that this happy condition could be most effectively guaranteed by a protectionist policy. Imperial Preference, as Chamberlain 5 termed his program, was an attempt to form a British Empire common market by the imposition of duties on goods from outside the empire. The economic policies advocated by the imperialists were an effort to compensate for Great Britain's declining position among the industrial nations of the world. Semmel, like a number of other writers, sees this policy as ultimately self defeating. At a time in their economic history when the British should have been attempting to increase their productivity and competitiveness, Chamberlain's policies tended to produce the opposite effect. Bernard Porter's The Lion's Share sees Britain's relative economic decline as much more of a motivating factor, in and of itself, for the drive to acquire new territorial possessions in the last two decades of the nineteenth century than any of the other economic studies consulted. Porter believes that Britain was attempting to obtain new captive markets and sources of raw materials to offset its own increasingly mediocre economic performance in comparison to the United States and Germany. Apart from the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, however, it is difficult to see which of the territories added to the British Empire during this period possessed either 6 sufficient purchasing power or raw materials to benefit British industry. The British to relative economic decline did not manifest itself only in strictly economic terms, such as Chamberlains's protectionist trade policies. Efforts were also made to strengthen the British strategic position in the world. Those historical writers who stress strategic motives for late nineteenth century colonial expansion would argue that the European nations often acquired territory simply because its possession by others would threaten the security of their existing colonies, or in order themselves to pose a threat to a rival power. The new territory being acquired might possess economic potential in its own right, but this did not really matter — its value came from its geographic location. The conflicting interests of individual European nations, or alliances, superseded the local or regional significance of the territory. Clearly, both the economic and strategic interpretations of the impetus for imperialism are entirely valid. Equally apparent is the fact that they cannot be mutually exclusive; of necessity they must be intertwined to some extent. The area of the world where most of the events described in this dissertation take place is, possibly, the 7 best known example of both of these two varieties of imperialism interacting. Sitting squarely astride the shortest route between the eastern and western portions of the British Empire was Egypt. Its possession by a power hostile to Great Britain would have posed an extremely dangerous threat to the security of the most valuable of England's overseas territories: India. Industrial might and sea power made Britain a great power in Europe and the Atlantic Ocean, but this was a matter of being first, among a number of powerful nations. What set Britain apart, what made her a truly global power, was the ownership of India. Possession of India made Britain a great power in the Far East, as well as in the Atlantic and Mediterranean. The Indian Empire, together with control of Singapore, the Straits of Malacca, and Australia, made the Indian Ocean virtually a British lake and gave Britain a springboard from which to influence events throughout the Far East and western Pacific region. The Indian Empire was unique among Britain's colonial possessions. Although India was a Crown Colony it did not come under the jurisdiction of the Colonial Office: it had its own cabinet-level minister. The Viceroy of India was, in reality, almost an independent ruler in his own 8 right. The British government of India was virtually autonomous internally and enjoyed very wide discretionary powers regionally in matters which could be termed foreign policy. The defense of India was, of course, crucial to the continuance of Britain's unique world status, a fact of which successive generations of British leaders were fully aware. In the nineteenth century Tsarist Russia was perceived to pose the major threat to the British position in India. Russian expansion into Central Asia had reached the borders of Afghanistan by mid-century. Russian proximity to the Khyber Pass, the gateway into India from the northwest, was a source of considerable worry to the

British. The eastern Mediterranean was another area where the British had a vital concern with the defense of their trade routes and communication to India and the Far East. Here, again, the perceived threat came from Russia. The overland route through Egypt to the Red Sea was an extremely important one, enabling travelers and material to reach the East more quickly than by the long voyage around southern Africa, even after the advent of steamships. 9 The policy of successive British governments decreed the containment of Russian naval power within the Black Sea. The front line of this policy was, obviously, at the Dardanelles. So long as the straits were controlled by the Ottoman Turks, traditional enemies of Russia, the Tsar's fleet would remain effectively bottled up and unable to threaten the shores of the eastern Mediterranean. It had been for this reason, more than any other, that Great Britain had fought the Crimean War of 1854-56. With the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 the defense of the entire region became even more vital to the British. The purchase by the Disraeli government in 1875 of the Suez Canal Company stock, put on the market by the heavily indebted Khedive of Egypt, marked the initial British effort to gain control over the new waterway. In 1882, the actual occupation of Egypt by British forces opened a new chapter in British involvement in the eastern Mediterranean area. The convenient excuse provided by anti-European rioting in Alexandria and other Egyptian cities — the 'official' BritishNgovernment justification for its invasion of the country — wasxto be a recurring theme in Anglo- Egyptian relations for the following seventy-five years, and masked a shift of balance inNSritain's long-term 10 Mediterranean policy, which had started at the time of the Congress of Berlin in 1878. The near collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 had been averted mainly by the British threat to come in on the side of the Turks if Constantinople and the Straits were in danger of falling into Russian hands. Benjamin Disraeli pulled something resembling a British diplomatic victory out of the Berlin negotiations: the Russians were kept a healthy distance from the Dardanelles, and the Sultan agreed to cede Cyprus to the British, enabling them to build a naval base in the eastern Mediterranean. It is the contention of Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher in their notable work Africa and the Victorians

(1961) that the increasingly apparent inability of the Turks to provide an effective counter to Russian expansion caused the British decision to shift the center of their defensive policies in the eastern Mediterranean from the Straits to Egypt. Hence the interim measure of securing the possession of Cyprus at once, followed as soon as practicable by the occupation of Egypt itself. Robert Blake's Disraeli (1966) also suggests strongly that a calculated policy change of this sort was made at the time of the Congress of Berlin. He considers it highly unlikely, however, that the British 11 initially desired to occupy Egypt to secure their ends. What was envisioned by the Disraeli government in the late 1870s was merely a naval base at Alexandria, to result, presumably, from a negotiated agreement with the Turkish and Egyptian authorities. Indeed, once having destroyed the Egyptian army and subjugated the country's government the British were certainly quite vocal in declaring that their occupation was a strictly temporary measure. They were to go on declaring this periodically until they actually left in 1956.

Britain's assumption of responsibility for the defense of Egypt marked the start of an often intense competition for African territory among several of the major European powers, a competition that continued right up to the century's end. From the events of the mid-1880s a pattern of increased British penetration into Black Africa seems inevitably to emerge. Having made the decision to base the defense of their crucial trade and communications route on Egypt and the Suez Canal, the British became increasingly concerned with events in any region which might potentially be used as a base to threaten their position there. Ultimately this concern was to extend to the entire valley of the Nile, where Great Britain came into 12 confrontation with other powers, both native and European. A. J. P. Taylor, in Germany’s First Bid for Colonies. 1884-1885 (1938), argues that British determination to control the Nile Valley to the river's source became an obsession. Taylor sees the British movement into Uganda and Kenya as a reluctant, but unavoidable, response when German and Belgian colonizers x.. Tanganyika and the Congo Free State came too close to the headwaters of the Nile, which Britain regarded as the key to Egypt, the Canal, and India. In a more recent work. The Race to Fashoda (1987), David Levering Lewis provides an excellent study of the interrelationships among the policies of Britain, France, Italy, Ethiopia, and the Mahdist Sudan in the struggle to control the Horn of Africa and the Valley of the Nile. With Britain's military victory over the Mahdists at Omdurman and her diplomatic one over the French at Fashoda in 1898, following the shattering defeat inflicted upon the Italians by the Ethiopians in 1896, the conflicting territorial claims in that part of Africa were fairly well resolved until Italy renewed its efforts against Ethiopia almost forty years later. Although the degree to whidh control of the Nile Valley obsessed British leaders during the 1880s and 1890s is contended among various 13 historians, none seems to question the overall purpose for the establishment of that control; the protection of the lines of communication to the Indian Empire. Both Lewis and

Leonard Woolf believe that England was undoubtedly prepared to go to war with the French in 1898, had they not backed down at Fashoda. Nicholas Mansergh, in The Coming of the First World War, holds the view that the security of the Nile Valley was the single most important factor in British colonial policy in Africa. What was now established in Egypt was the period of the "veiled Protectorate". The fiction was maintained that Egypt was still being ruled by the Khedive as a vassal of the Sultan in Constantinople. The reality of the situation was that the Khedive was directed by the British Agent for Egypt, initially Sir Evelyn Baring, and the edicts of the Sultan counted for little or nothing except in Moslem religious matters. Whatever the legal status of the nation, Egypt had become as much a province of the British Empire as was India. Paul Kennedy in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (1987) attaches immense importance to Britain's relative economic slide as a motivating factor in her entry into the system of European alliances which she had spurned for so long. The Franco-Russian Alliance of 1892 brought 14 together the two nations which were Britain's most likely potential adversaries in any future war. The sense of diplomatic isolation which the British were beginning to

feel was only further exacerbated by the universal hostility expressed against them in Europe during the Boer War of 1899-1902. That the most strident protests against the war being waged by Britain against the Afrikaaners had their origins in Germany was particularly unnerving. Equally unnerving was the immense naval buildup being carried out in Germany under the direction of Admiral Tirpitz, and with the enthusiastic support of Kaiser William II. Great Britain, the nation which had gloried in its "Splendid Isolation" through the 1870s, now began to search for friends in the world. An important part of Paul Kennedy's thesis in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers is that an increased concern with defense, and greatly expanded expenditure for this purpose, is a characteristic of each of the great powers he examines during its initial period of decline. This policy, of course, creates a cycle where funds which might be spent more wisely in an effort to rectify the conditions which have led to an economic decline are instead put into armaments. 15 Britain's first step away from her traditional isolationism was the twenty-year defensive alliance entered into with the Japanese in 1902. In the early twentieth century, there were only two nations that routinely maintained Pacific fleets of sufficient size to threaten Britain's possessions or interests in the Far East: Japan and the United States. The British administration of Lord Salisbury viewed the possibility of a war with the Americans as extremely unlikely because neither nation had designs on anything the other possessed in the Pacific. Although Anglo-Japanese relations were also fairly good, the Salisbury government thought it wise to cement them further. The alliance with Japan enabled the British to withdraw all but a token naval force from the Pacific and to concentrate the Royal Navy at points likely to be threatened by Germany. Agreements arrived at with France in 1904, and with France's ally Russia in 1907, further emphasized the shift in British strategy to a defensive posture focused more on the British Isles, the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean than had previously been the case. In his memoirs, Twentv Five Years: 1892-1916 (1925), Lord Grey of Fallodon, British Foreign Secretary during the period of the Anglo-Russian negotiations, enumerated the many long-standing areas of 16 mutual suspicion that had to be resolved to arrive at a final agreement. Conflicting interests in Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet were patched over to the extent that they no longer represented a potential cause of war. The rapprochement between Great Britain and Russia did not by itself spell the demise of the British policy of shoring up the sagging Ottoman Empire. It became far less crucial than in the past, however, and the Turks began to look elsewhere for a protector. With the start of the First World War in 1914 and Turkish entry into it on Germany's side, a whole new set of dangers and opportunities vis-â-vis their position in the Middle East was presented to the British. The decisions made and the policies chosen during the years of the war and shortly after its conclusion heavily affected the course of events in the region right up until the time Britain ceased to be a power there in the late 1950s. Elsewhere in the Middle East the postwar arrangements made by the British held up well enough for more than thirty years. The Hashemite rulers installed in Transjordan and Iraq remained loyal to their British patrons through the Second World War and into the 1950s. Despite their resentment at the rather second rate sovereignty 17 accorded them by the British in 1922, the Egyptians remained manageable from a British point of view for almost as long. The one glaring exception was the mandated territory of Palestine. In Palestine the conflicting promises made to both the Zionists and Arab nationalists caught up with the British in rather short order. The role played by Sir Reginald Wingate in implementing British policy in both the Sudan and Egypt over a period of more than thirty-five years represented an immense contribution to the attainment of British objectives. The elimination of Mahdist rule in the Sudan was absolutely crucial to the success of efforts to establish British rule along the entire valley of the Nile. As Director of Military Intelligence in Cairo, during almost the entire decade of the 1890s, Wingate set up and oversaw an organization that, according to his superiors, provided them with far more extensive and accurate information than anything available to them previously. During the more than sixteen years that he served as Governor-General of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Wingate established British rule on a firm footing and personally set up a unique Sudanese Civil Service, which administered the country effectively until it became independent in 1954. His period of service in the 18 Sudan certainly represents Wingate's most valuable contribution to the British Empire during his long career. Reginald Wingate's service during the First World

War, which overlapped both his Governor-Generalship of the Sudan and his High Commissionership for Egypt, is the most significant instance in his career when he had a major voice in formulating policy, rather than merely implementing it. Wingate's early and vocal support for a policy of fomenting, and fully backing, an anti-Turkish revolt among the Arabs of the Hejaz was a factor of immense significance during the course of the Middle Eastern campaign and in the post-war political settlements that followed. Although Reginald Wingate's career terminated abruptly in early 1919, the final Middle Eastern settlements arrived at in the early 1920s were heavily influenced by wartime decisions in which he had figured prominently. No study of British policy in that area of the world from the early 1890s through the conclusion of those settlements could be considered complete without a thorough knowledge of the career of Sir Reginald Wingate. CHAPTER II EARLY LIFE AND DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, CAIRO 1861 - 1899

Francis Reginald Wingate was born to a family of middle-class textile manufacturers in Glasgow in 1861. He was the eleventh, and last, child, and the seventh son. In the year of his birth the family business suffered financial ruin and, in 1862, his father died of pneumonia. In an attempt to make her very limited funds' go further, Wingate's widowed mother moved her family to the Channel Island of Jersey. Wingate spent his early life on Jersey, the youngest child of a closely knit, but quite poor, family. In 1878 the young Wingate secured an appointment to the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich and, in 1880, was commissioned a lieutenant in the Royal Artillery. In 1883, he arrived in Egypt to report to his assignment as an aide- de-camp at British Army Headquarters in Cairo. Wingate's first three years in the army had been spent in India and at Aden.l It is worth mentioning, at this point, the distinctions that existed within the officer corps of the British army before the First World War. Wingate's background, despite financial ill-fortune, was solidly

19 20 Scottish middle-class. This made him eligible to hold the Queen’s Commission, but not in one of the prestigious infantry or cavalry regiments whose aristocratic officers attended Sandhurst. Woolwich turned out officers for the artillery, the engineers, and other support branches of the army that lacked the glamor and the social status that went with a commission in a combat regiment. Outside the regular British army, an additional gulf loomed between the officers of the Indian army, who held their commissions from the Viceroy of India, and those who held the Queen's. Both Indian officers and British officers in military support branches made their way in a world where advancement was achieved much more by merit than social rank. This fact was not the least of the reasons why they were scorned by the upper-class officers of the line regiments, whose undeniable physical courage often masked incompetence and stupidity. In short, Reginald Wingate's family background guaranteed him nothing when he embarked on his career in the early 1880s. What he accomplished in the years to come was the result of his own hard work and very considerable abilities. Directly south of Egypt lies the Sudan — long claimed, but seldom if ever effectively controlled, by the Egyptians. In the early 1880s this desolate and isolated 21 area of the world was experiencing a revolution that would shortly command the attention of British statesmen and provide the impetus to propel several British soldiers to international notoriety. In Islam, as in Judaism, there is the promise of the Messiah or, in Islam, the Mahdi; the chosen or expected one. In the Sudan of this period such a figure was arising in the person of Mohammed Ahmet, born on

a small island in the Nile just north of Khartoum,^ who promised his people both salvation and freedom from repressive Egyptian rule. At this time British involvement in the Sudan was as indirect as the British government could make it.^ The Egyptian government hired individual military officers — usually, but not always British — to provide the leadership expertise their army lacked. Among these officers was General Charles Gordon, the celebrated "Chinese Gordon," an eccentric figure who had become a legend throughout the civilized world by the 1880s. A hero of the Crimean War, Gordon had been permitted to organize a pro- imperial force of Chinese troops during the l^aipihg Rebellion of the 1860s and had made himself a British national figure by leading them from victory to victory over armies that heavily outnumbered them. Gordon first arrived in the Sudan in early 1874, to fill the post of Governor of 22 Equatoria Province. His primary responsibility in the remote southern territory was to suppress the illicit slave trade which was growing there, a task which was to prove impossible with the resources he possessed. In January 1877 Gordon was appointed Governor-General of the entire Sudan. Again, his major efforts were against the slave trade. Although some progress was made, Gordon was frustrated by the corruption and venality of many of his Egyptian subordinates and, in June 1880, he resigned. When he took his leave of the Sudan Gordon did not think he would ever see either it or Egypt again.4 Subsequent events were to prove him wrong.

By the mid-1880s, the Sudanese forces of the Mahdi had inflicted significant defeats on Egyptian armies operating in the Sudan, including a victory over a force commanded by British officers, which suffered virtual annihilation in an ambush. Gordon was sent out by the Egyptian government in 1883 in an attempt to extricate the Egyptians from their fiasco in the Sudan without direct British intervention. His assignment, which had the blessings of the Gladstone cabinet although he was officially functioning as an Egyptian officer, was to supervise the evacuation of the Egyptian garrisons in the 23 Sudan. Once Gordon had arrived in Khartoum, however, he convinced himself that it was possible to retrieve the situation and decided to ignore his orders to evacuate.^

Within a short period of time Gordon found himself, and his army, besieged in the Sudanese capital of Khartoum by Mahdist forces that greatly outnumbered them and were relatively well armed. Too late an Anglo-Egyptian relief column was sent down the Nile to rescue Gordon and his men. The leading steamers in the column arrived at Khartoum less than forty-eight hours after the city had fallen to the Mahdi's army and Gordon had been killed. The failure of the belatedly dispatched relief force was a political disaster for Gladstone. For Reginald Wingate it was the start of his rise to fame and fortune; for the next thirteen years he was to immerse himself in the work of preparing for the British reconquest of the Sudan. Shortly after the fall of Khartoum, Wingate was posted back to England. As he had no income other than his army salary, an assignment at home meant a life of genteel poverty. He had also, by this time, fallen in love with Katherine ("Kitty") Rundle, the sister of a fellow officer. The expense of setting up housekeeping in England made the thought of marriage an impossibility, so Wingate sought, and 24 was granted, a posting back to Egypt.® This made possible the marriage of Wingate and Miss Rundle, a union which was to last almost sixty years, until Katherine Wingate's death in 1946. Wingate's arrival back in Cairo in 1886 coincided almost precisely with the high tide of the Mahdist successes. In the three years following the fall of Khartoum, the Mahdists swept the remaining Egyptian garrisons out of all but the northernmost reaches of the Sudan, briefly established themselves on the Red Sea coast, and clashed with the Ethiopians. Their numbers, dedication, and fighting ability had indeed been dangerously underestimated by both the Egyptians and the British. Wingate was once again given an ADC posting at Military Headquarters. His ability with foreign languages - - he had become fluent in Arabic during his earlier postings and had learned both French and German for his own enjoyment — had made him valuable to the growing intelligence gathering effort directed at the Mahdist Sudan.^ The need for accurately gathered, and meticulously analyzed, intelligence provided Wingate with his first position of importance. From 1889 onwards such work became his full­ time employment and, in 1892, the Military Intelligence 25 Branch was officially established with Wingate (by then a major) as its Director.® Reginald Wingate's appointment as Director of Military Intelligence, Cairo, marked the start of his amazingly rapid climb to high position and national fame. Military intelligence in the 1890s had not yet evolved into the highly sophisticated field which the exigencies of the twentieth century's two world wars later forced it to become, and Wingate's Intelligence Department was, initially, virtually a one-man operation. It was a position apparently tailor-made for a man of Wingate's qualities. The Director of Military Intelligence did not look the part of either a soldier or a spy. When in the field he carried with him such a rattling assortment of cooking implements that his colleagues referred to him jokingly as the "White Knight". Wingate had a subtlety of mind, however, which made the sort of maneuvering and intrigue necessary in the gathering of intelligence come naturally to him. This quality, combined with an enormous amount of patience and his excellent knowledge of Arabic, assisted him greatly in the job he had to do.^ After the debacle of the Khartoum rescue attempt and the death of Gordon, Wingate had two top priorities in his 26 initial intelligence gathering efforts: the establishment of contact with the European soldiers and administrators left in the hands of the Mahdi. and the accumulation of an accurate and thorough body of information on such things as the economic and political condition of the Mahdist Sudan, the strength and disposition of the enemy forces, and their intentions. The achievement of the first objective proved to be of invaluable importance in the success of the second one. Although all but the northernmost reaches of the Sudan had fallen under the control of the Mahdists by 1887, the traditional economic patterns of the area had not been disrupted entirely: they were too important to all concerned to allow such a thing to happen. The camel caravans that plied their way between Khartoum and Suakin, on the Sudan's Red Sea coast, or between the Sudan and Ethiopia, continued as they had for centuries, albeit under an increased level of surveillance by both the Mahdist and the Anglo-Egyptian forces. Travelers on the annual pilgrimage to Mecca also were permitted to proceed unmolested by both sides — subject, of course, to the same greater security screening. The fact that this traditional flow of merchants and other travelers was permitted to 27 continue in something approaching its normal fashion gave Wingate a crucially important asset in his intelligence gathering efforts. The British officers in command of the small outposts on the periphery of Mahdist occupied territory were required to interrogate all such travelers passing through the areas for which they were responsible and to submit regular written reports to Wingate relating what they had learned. While much of the information thus obtained was outdated, inaccurate, or deliberately misleading (obviously, both sides could play at the same game), Wingate was able to glean from it a great quantity of accurate and useful intelligence. Over a period of time Wingate was also able to recruit fairly reliable agents from among the large numbers of persons passing through Anglo- Egyptian-held territory on their way to or from the Mahdist Sudan. The work these men did was extremely dangerous, for exposure usually meant a prolonged and wretched death. Wadi Haifa, just below the Egyptian-Sudanese border at the Second Cataract of the Nile, was one of the most important of Wingate's listening posts. The difficulties encountered by the officers who were responsible for providing the intelligence Director with his raw material are typified by a routine report of the commanding officer 28 there: I have sent off agents to find out about the Selima lot. There has been some difficulty about getting men for the job. I have given them orders to remain near Selima as long as they can hold out if the Dervishes are still there. If the Dervishes have left to track them and find out where they have gone to. Two agents will be here from Suarda in four or five days and I hope, bring news of Yunes' plans. The Arabs who held Sheb started off again yesterday for the blockhouse to relieve an equal number of Shaigia. They were a very ragged looking lot but there must be good stuff in them. I have tried to explain "sights of rifle" etc. to them and have promised baksheesh for shooting when I visit the post. I shall then test them practically and try to get them to volley fire. They now have good Remingtons and 6 boxes of ammunition at the post. Ali Gabis and the Sheikh of the Kabbabish are buying camels to replace those lost and are now in Assuan - another man is in hospital from a camel bite and with another dead we are hard up for men. 4 Shaigia will remain in the post. With patrols to find S and E we shall be lucky if there are more than 10 or 11 men all told in the blockhouse if attacked again in the near future. Poor Palmer's death was very sad for us all. I hope you have now quite recovered your health. I fear this diary is but a scanty one. I wished we were less dependent on these agents for news and that there was more competition. No news from Assuan to speak of.^"

The patrolling activities described above were the daily routine of Wingate's agents for years. Taken together with the information provided by the interrogation of the members of trading caravans and, most importantly, the reports which began to arrive from the European captives of the Mahdists, this intelligence provided Wingate with what he needed to piece together a coherent, and largely 29 accurate, picture of what was transpiring in the territory of Britain's enemies. Once he had accomplished this feat he was able to pass on to his superiors advice and information that could be relied upon to an extent that had not been possible earlier. The fact that a large volume of trade continued to go on between the Mahdist Sudan and the outside world was, however, a double-edged sword. In a memorandum on the subject Wingate expressed the belief that the two elements most benefitting the Mahdist cause were contraband trade and the availability of imported grain. The memo states that the contraband trade consisted largely of slaves bound for the Arabian Peninsula. Wingate suggested that the only effective way to end this particular problem was for the Egyptian Government to purchase sufficient cruisers to vigorously patrol the Red Sea coast. He also believed that Britain should apply diplomatic pressure to the Turkish Government to obtain their assistance in the effort — although he did not hold out much hope that anything substantial would come out of such a request. Wingate also reported that the Mahdist Sudan had become almost entirely dependent on imported grain for its daily supplies. The vast majority of this grain came into 30 the Sudan through Suakin and was illicitly sold to Mahdist agents by the local merchants there. Grain was also reaching the Mahdists through the Italian-held ports on the Eritrean coast. Grain from Italian sources was transported through Ethiopia and sold at the Sudanese border town of Kassala. Wingate stated that the greater difficulties of transport resulting from distance and terrain made the Italian grain six times more expensive than that available at Omdurman, where the grain was generally from Suakin. He recommended a concerted effort to choke off the sale to the Mahdists of grain coming into the port of Suakin, and expressed the belief that if this could be accomplished it would make the commodity virtually unobtainable to them, even if their Italian sources stayed available.^ The British never succeeded, to any great extent, in stopping the trade in and out of the Mahdist Sudan. The very nature of the port of Suakin militated against it. The grain was not coming into the Sudan in modern ships with huge cargo holds but in swarms of dhows, with any given boat carrying a rather small amount. This was precisely the same problem that had made the activities of the Royal Navy's anti-slaver squadron in the Indian Ocean so much more frustrating than the same task had been in the Atlantic. 31 Another interesting memo of Wingate's was one which was written for Sir Evelyn Baring, British Agent and Consul- General in Egypt, in 1889. Early in that year Wingate's agents had begun to receive information that the Senussi Moslems to the north and west of Darfur Province were beginning to pose a significant threat to Mahdist control of that area. There had, in fact, been several clashes between the two groups when the Senussi had strayed into what the Mahdists regarded as their territory, and the Senussi had emerged victorious on each of these occasions. Rumors began to reach the British that Darfur and Kordofan Provinces had risen in revolt against the Mahdists as a result of these minor blows to their prestige. Wingate's memo provided a substantial historical essay on the Senussi and also evaluated their chances of overthrowing the Mahdists and taking Khartoum. On this last possibility Wingate was a bit over optimistic: the rumors of risings proved to be blown out of all proportion to reality, and the Senussi eventually pulled back into their own territory. Baring, however, included this memo in a letter of his own written to Lord S a l i s b u r y . Por a twenty-eight year old major to have his work brought directly to the attention of the Prime Minister was certainly a coup for Wingate. 32 By far the most exciting tales of Reginald Wingate's Intelligence Department revolve around the cloak-and-dagger operations that were conducted first to establish contact with the Europeans held in the Mahdist areas, secondly to smuggle out the priceless information which some of them were in a position to provide, and lastly to arrange the escape of these agents to British-held territory when the proper moment arrived. This aspect of Wingate's duties first brought him into contact with Rudolf von Slatin, the man who was to become his most valuable agent in the Mahdist Sudan, his closest colleague in a considerable portion of his later career, and a life-long friend. Slatin was one of the most fascinating and controversial figures to emerge from the European involvement in Egypt and the Sudan. He was born in Vienna in 1857, the son of a family which had converted to Catholicism from Judaism only a generation before his birth.Not a great deal is known about the earliest period of his life and, in his many articles and lectures in later years, he seems never to have revealed anything about himself which predated his arrival in Egypt when he was in his late teens. Slatin's reason for coming to Africa was apparently merely his sense of adventure.1* He spent only a 33 year in Egypt and the Sudan before receiving notification to return to Austria to begin his required military service.1® During the time he had been in the Middle East, however, Slatin had made the acquaintance of several other Austrians and Germans serving in the Sudan with the Europeans whom the Khedive of Egypt employed to administer that territory in his name. When he left to return to Vienna he asked that they recommend him for a position in the Sudanese administration of General Gordon when he completed his tour of duty with the Austrian Army.l® Slatin's two years of service in his Emperor's army were relatively uneventful. After the completion of his initial training he was commissioned a subaltern (second lieutenant) in an infantry regiment that was posted to Bosnia-Herzegovina when those Turkish-ruled Balkan provinces were occupied by Austrian forces in 1878.1^ Slatin was engaged in no actual combat during his service; he performed only routine garrison duties, and was demobilized in December 1878.1® The last several months of his service in Austrian uniform must have been an ordeal for the young Slatin for, in July 1878, he had received a letter from General Gordon in Khartoum offering him employment. Within a short eight days after his regiment had discharged him. 34 Slatin had put his affairs in Vienna in order and traveled to Trieste to take ship for Egypt.1^ Slatin proved to be an entirely competent and effective administrator in the Sudan. In 1881 Muhammad Ra'uf Pasha, who had succeeded Gordon as Governor-General of the Sudan a year earlier, appointed Slatin Governor of Darfur Province, the Sudan's westernmost zone and, apart from the tropical southern reaches of the country, the most remote.20 Slatin's assumption of his new duties virtually coincided with the start of the rapid growth of the influence of the Mahdi. Throughout 1882 and 1883 the position of the Egyptian administration in the Sudan was steadily undermined by the defection of tribe after tribe to the Mahdists. With each successive victory over either Egyptian troops or Sudanese warriors loyal to the government, new adherents flocked to the banner of the Mahdi. The courage and ferocity of his followers was unprecedented: it began to seem that nothing could halt their advance. All the provincial governors were hard pressed by the ever-growing power of the rebels, but the situation in Darfur was particularly desperate. In the autumn of 1883 a large expeditionary force under the command of General William Hicks was sent into the 35 Sudan by the Egyptian government. The force consisted mainly of Egyptian troops who had been defeated by the British in 1882 and was officered entirely by Europeans, of whom the majority were British. The objective of the expedition was specifically to relieve the beleaguered Darfur garrison commanded by Slatin.21 Slatin*s last remaining hope of maintaining his position in Darfur rested on the rapid arrival of Hick's army. When this was ambushed and virtually wiped out by a much larger Mahdist force in November 1883, any chance of relief promptly evaporated. With no possibility of withdrawing his forces from the province without suffering the same fate as Hicks, there was very little remaining for Slatin to do except negotiate the surrender of the positions he still held to the Mahdists.22 This Slatin did on 23 December 1883, turning himself and all those under his command over to Zogel Bey, a cousin of the Mahdi.23

For Slatin the surrender of his command was the start of more than a decade of captivity. The fact that his life was spared and that he was able, in a relatively short period of time, to make himself a valued advisor to the Mahdists was to prove of crucial importance both to his own subsequent career and to that of Reginald Wingate. Slatin's 36

rather rapid climb to a privileged position in the Mahdist power structure was made possible by two important assets which the Austrian possessed: the prestige of the office he had held under the Egyptian regime, and the fact that he had converted to Islam.

Slatin's conversion to the religion of the soldiers he commanded had come early in 1883.24 is virtually

certain that he took this step to strengthen his grip on the loyalty of his troops during the period of ever more alarming Mahdist victories. Slatin himself always presented it in this light,25 but a good number of his European colleagues were never able to understand fully or to forgive the step. Be that as it may, Slatin's survival, and his subsequent usefulness to the British, were made possible by his pragmatic act of conversion.

Slatin was made a member of the household of the Khalifa Abdallahi, one of the Mahdi's three Khalifas — that is, his immediate subordinates and potential successors.26

This assignment was to prove of immense significance when, in June 1885, at the height of his power and success, the Mahdi died of typhoid. On his deathbed the Mahdi had chosen

Slatin's master to rule after him.2? The unexpected rise in the Khalifa's fortunes meant a corresponding one for Slatin. 37 Although, technically, he was still a prisoner, the Austrian's administrative talents and advice had become extremely valuable to the semi-literate man who had now to govern the Mahdist conquests. Slatin was given his own establishment and servants and, although always closely watched, he enjoyed a considerable amount of personal freedom.28

Through their routine questioning of merchants who had passed through Mahdist territory, the British soon became aware of the position Slatin had come to occupy in Omdurman, and the importance it could have in their efforts to gather reliable information on the situation there. Slatin's family in Vienna had also established contact with the Austrian Agent in Cairo, who brought discreet pressure on the British and Egyptian authorities to do something about the captive's plight.29 Any attempt to establish contact with Slatin, or any other European held in the Mahdist Sudan, would, however, have to be conducted with extreme caution. Exposure would almost certainly have resulted in the death of both the European captive and the British agent involved, as well as the loss of a potentially valuable source of information. It was not until early 1892, shortly after Reginald Wingate's intelligence branch 38 was officially established, that one of his agents was able to make himself known to Slatin: Early in February, 1892, the former chief of the Dongola camel postmen, Babakr Abdu Sebiba, arrived in Omdurman from Egypt. He was an Ababda Arab; and when brought before the Khalifa, he asserted that he had escaped from Assuan, that he sought the Khalifa's pardon, and begged to be allowed to settle down in Berber. As he had letters of introduction to the Emir of Berber, Zeki Osman, permission was accorded to him: and when going out at the door of the mosque, he nudged me and whispered, "I have come for you; arrange for an interview."3® Slatin told Babakr that they might speak together in the mosque following prayers on the next evening. At this meeting Slatin was given a small box with a false bottom which contained a note from both the Austrian Agent in Cairo and a Colonel Schaeffer of the British Army staff in Egypt stating that Babakr was trustworthy.31 Slatin met with

Babakr on several other occasions and was assured by the latter that his escape would soon be arranged. After almost a year and a half, however, Babakr had still done nothing meaningful to facilitate this event, and Slatin realized that the agent had lost his nerve. Babakr returned to Egypt where he submitted a false report to Wingate stating that Slatin had several times refused to attempt an escape.

This, fortunately, Wingate did not believe.32 There is no evidence that Babakr ever betrayed to the Mahdists Slatin's 39 efforts to escape: he simply lacked the courage to take the risks necessary to accomplish his assigned task. Another effort was made in mid-1894 in which Slatin actually slipped out of Omdurman at night to meet the agents who were to guide him across the desert. Again there was disappointment when they failed to arrive at the place of rendezvous, and the Austrian had no choice but to return to the city.33 The third escape attempt arranged by Wingate's agents did not fail. On the night of February 20, 1895, Slatin again slipped out of Omdurman to rendezvous with those who were to assist him.34 For a full twenty-four hours Slatin and his guides traveled without rest, covering about 130 miles. They believed that they could count on twelve to fourteen hours before Slatin's absence was noticed in Omdurman, but it was necessary to establish a fairly comfortable lead on any pursuers right at the outset. After this had been accomplished the fugitive spent most of the daylight hours in hiding while his Arab guides secured food, camels, and water for a night of travel. This minimized the possibility that Slatin's European appearance would attract unwanted attention.35

Although the rugged terrain which had to be crossed made the escape a grueling ordeal, the Mahdist never caught 40 sight of the three men fleeing north, and Slatin reached the Egyptian town of Assuan on March 16.36 when his identity became known to the British and Egyptian officers stationed in the town, he was treated like a hero returned from the dead. Continuing his journey by a combination of river steamer and rail, Slatin reached Cairo three days later. There he was met by the Austrian Consul, Reginald Wingate, and a number of other well-wishers.3? The meeting with

Wingate was, of course, the first time that he and Slatin had ever come face to face. After three years of communication by smuggled messages and intermediaries, it was a memorable moment for them both, and the start of a long and productive partnership. For Slatin a further memorable event was his interview with the Khedive. The Austrian had been somewhat concerned over his prospects of continued employment after more than a decade in captivity, but he departed from the presence of the Khedive with the title of Pasha, a full colonelcy in the Egyptian Army, and a posting to military intelligence.38

The inclusion of Slatin in Wingate's intelligence department was of great significance in expanding the number of reliable contacts in the Mahdist Sudan. Exactly the same things which had made Slatin valuable to the Khalifa made 41 him equally useful to Wingate. Within the Sudan there was a growing discontent with the excesses of the Khalifa and his followers. Tribes which had defected to the Mahdi's side in the middle of the 1880s were working secretly for the enemies of his successor a decade later. The one European whom a large number of these dissident tribesmen would have heard of, or known, was Slatin. His escape from the Mahdists provided the British military with an invaluable propaganda opportunity. His exploits in reaching Egypt made the kind of copy which was guaranteed to enthrall any Victorian household, and those who were determined to see the Sudan reconquered made the most of it. Within an amazingly short time after his return to civilization Slatin had produced a full length book. Fire and Sword in the Sudan, which was an account of his experiences before and during his captivity by the Mahdists. The book was first written in German and then translated into English by Wingate.39 The whole tone of the work stresses the depravity of the Sudanese regime and the implied need to remedy the situation through military action. When published in 1897 Slatin*s book sold thousands of copies in England and was a powerful force in swaying public opinion further in favor of British military involvement in the 42 Sudan. Wingate's role as Director of Military Intelligence involved him deeply in the whole British propaganda effort against the Mahdists. His own book, Mahdiism and the Egyptian Sudan, published in 1891, also placed strong emphasis on the depravity of the regime in Omdurman. Interestingly, one of Wingate's earliest efforts to help strengthen this view of what was happening in the Sudan involved a letter which Slatin had managed to have smuggled out of Omdurman. The letter, dated March 1889, was intended for Slatin's sister in Vienna. While the writer did not heap praise on his captors, he did say several positive things about the Khalifa's abilities as an administrator.*0

It is uncertain exactly how this letter came to the attention of Wingate's organization, as it was written three years before his agents established contact with Slatin. The contents of the letter did, however, prompt Wingate to issue a memo to his department stating future procedures in such cases. He directed that all correspondence from European prisoners of the Mahdists should be channeled through the Intelligence Department in Cairo. If the tone of such correspondence was not in line with the attitudes of the 43 Egyptian Government, it was to be either suppressed or, if possible, returned to the writer. In the particular case of Slatin's letter, Wingate did not believe that the Austrian was in a position where he could tell the entire truth. This was certainly fortunate for Slatin's future career. From 1895 onwards the level of activity in preparation for the reoccupation of the Mahdist Sudan increased considerably. The Anglo-Egyptian forces, under General H. H. Kitchener, were brought up to a degree of competence and efficiency which had not existed in a Middle Eastern army before. In view of the fate of earlier expeditions against the Mahdists, the advance of Kitchener's troops into hostile territory was gradual and extremely cautious. As the army moved south they were followed by a swarm of engineers and laborers who were constructing a railway to keep them supplied. This effort was both difficult and time-consuming but, in Kitchener's view, entirely necessary to guarantee the success of his expedition. The territory across which Kitchener's engineers had to construct their railway line would have made their task an extremely difficult one even in peacetime. As it was their schedule was far tighter and more urgent than any 44 civilian firm would ever have imposed. The quality of the equipment with which they were working often verged on scrap, and the construction gangs were under the constant danger of attack by the Mahdists. Despite these hardships the work progressed at a steady pace, advancing the line further and further into the territory of the enemy.^2 The first moves of General Kitchener's campaign to retake the Sudan came on 18 March 1896 and had as their immediate goal the capture of Dongola, the northernmost town of any size occupied by the Mahdists. Dongola is situated on the west bank of the Nile just below the river's Third Cataract. Before Dongola itself could be approached, a strongly-held advance outpost at Firka had to be overcome. Dividing his force into two separate columns. Kitchener sent one directly down the Nile and the other through the desert at night. The two forces attacked the Mahdist stronghold simultaneously in the early morning hours of 7 June 1896. Caught completely by surprise, the Mahdists were routed with the loss of almost one thousand men killed. Out of an attacking force of nine thousand men. Kitchener's troops suffered twenty killed and ninety-one wounded. The victory had been made possible largely by the extremely accurate maps of the Mahdist dispositions at Firka that had been 45 provided by Wingate's organization.^3 This vas the first of many dividends to be paid for his success in engineering Slatin's escape. While General Kitchener's expeditionary force progressed cautiously into the Sudan, there were forces other than the Mahdists whose activities were of interest and importance to Reginald Wingate's intelligence department, for Britain and Egypt were not the only parties with ambitions in the valley of the Nile. The resurgent nationalism of the Third French Republic had spurred an aggressive policy of expansion in Africa, and the Kingdom of Italy, a more recent entrant into the competition for African territory, hoped to enhance its status as a European great power through the possession of a colonial empire. The French already held the Red Sea port of Djbouti and were anxious to link this possession to their territories in the Sahara to create an east/west belt of land which would pass across the Nile in the southern Sudan. Italy had been established at Assab and Massawa, on the Red Sea coast of Eritrea, since the 1870s. Italian ambitions were directed at the ancient Coptic Christian land of Ethiopia, more

frequently called Abyssinia in the nineteenth century. It was the responsibility of British military intelligence to 46 gather reliable information on developments in these areas, in addition to the usual reporting related more directly to the campaign against the Mahdists. The date of the start of Kitchener's campaign is significant. On 1 March 1896 an Italian army of almost 20,000 men was literally annihilated at the Battle of Adowa by 80,000 Ethiopians. It was the worst defeat ever suffered by European imperialists in Africa, and the Italian Government was forced to recognize Ethiopian independence and sue for peace. The British Government had regarded the Italian threat to Ethiopia as a counter to more dangerous French ambitions in the Nile Valley. With the Italians reduced to holding only the coastal strip of Eritrea, the British were forced to move immediately to thwart the French.44

By the spring of 1898 Kitchener's methodical advance had reached the confluence of the Nile and the River Atbara, between the Fifth and Sixth Cataracts. This location put the Anglo-Egyptian forces within striking distance of the

Mahdist capital at Omdurman.45 This threat was one which the Khalifa could not ignore, and a force of twenty thousand men under the energetic Emir Mahmud advanced from the south to oppose them. Several weeks of marching and 47 countermarching through the desert culminated, on 8 April, in a decisive battle on the banks of the River Atbara. Throughout the period when both forces were maneuvering for position, careful interrogation of deserters from the Mahdist force enabled Wingate to supply his superiors with valuable details concerning both the whereabouts and the condition of the enemy.46

The army of the Emir Mahmud had entrenched itself inside a zariba, a stockade constructed of thorny brush woven tightly together, which masked a maze of trenches and rifle pits where the Mahdist troops were sheltered.4?

Following an artillery bombardment of about thirty minutes' duration. Kitchener's troops assaulted their foes: The word came, and the men sprang up. The squares shifted into the fighting formations: at one impulse, in one superb sweep, near 12,000 men moved forward towards the enemy. All England and all Egypt, and the flower of the black lands beyond, Birmingham and the West Highlands, the half-regenerated children of the earth's earliest civilization, and grinning savages from the uttermost swamps of Equatoria, muscle and machinery, lord and larrikin, Balliol and the Board School, the Sirdar's brain and the camel's back— all welded into one, the awful war machine went forward into action.4°

When the British, Egyptian, and Sudanese soldiers forced their way, at bayonet point, through the razor sharp wall of thorns which formed the zariba, the fight that ensued for possession of the contested stockade rapidly 48 degenerated into a vicious brawl of point-blank rifle firing and hand-to-hand combat: Still the advance continued, and it seemed to those who took part in it more like a horrible nightmare than a waking reality. Captains and subalterns collected whatever men they could, heedless of corps or nationality, and strove to control and direct their fire.Jibba-clad figures sprang out of the ground, fired or charged, and were destroyed at every step. And onwards over their bodies - over pits choked with dead and dying, among heaps of mangled camels and donkeys, among decapitated or eviscerated trunks, the ghastly results of the shell fire; women and little children killed by the bombardment or praying in wild terror for mercy; blacks chained in their trenches, slaughtered in their chains - always onward marched the conquerors, with bayonets running blood; clothes, hands and faces all besmeared; the foul stench of a month's accumulated filth in their nostrils, and the savage whistle of random bullets in their ears.*9 In an encounter which lasted little more than half an hour. Kitchener's forces lost 559 men killed and wounded.50 The Mahdists had over three thousand dead as a result of both the preliminary artillery fire and the assault itself. Among the several hundred prisoners taken by the Anglo-Egyptian force was the Emir Mahmud.51 The ferocity of the fighting, even allowing for the dramatic prose of a twenty-five-year-old Winston Churchill, was truly savage. This is an aspect of the campaign against the Mahdists which all participants on the British side — even those who later witnessed the slaughter of the First World War — commented upon. Despite the vast disparity in the 49 quality of armaments between the two sides, which was largely nullified when the fighting went hand-to-hand, the furious combativeness of the Khalifa's men was something which no one who experienced it ever forgot. With the victory at the Atbara, the way to Omdurman had been opened to Kitchener and his army, and final victory was in sight. The summer of 1898 was spent in building up supplies at the newly completed railhead at the Atbara. Beyond it the advance would be either by horse, camel, or on foot. When the long-awaited moment of the final Anglo-Egyptian advance to Omdurman arrived, in August 1898, it came with a rapidity which was uncharacteristic of Kitchener's previous movements. Once the enormous quantity of supplies necessary to maintain an army of almost twenty-six thousand men (8,200 British, 17,600 Egyptian and Sudanese) in the inhospitable environment of the Sudan had been gathered at the base at the Atbara, Kitchener moved with what was for him lightning speed.52 The Anglo-Egyptian forces moved directly south, along the banks of the Nile, with a force of the most modern steam powered gunboats accompanying them along the river.53

The ground forces possessed 44 pieces of artillery and 20 Maxim guns; the gunboats carried a further 36 guns and 24

Maxims.54 with modern breach-loading artillery, firing high 50 explosive shells, and 44 of Hiram Maxim's very effective machine guns, the odds were heavily stacked in favor of Kitchener's force.

The battle which was fought at Omdurman on 2 September 1898 was long ago woven into the fabric of glorious British triumphs, but it was, in reality, little more than a turkey shoot. It was in many ways much like the battle at the River Atbara five months earlier. The difference was that at Omdurman the British occupants of the zariba beside the Nile were armed with the deadliest weapons available at the time. The frontal assaults launched against the Anglo-Egyptian forces by the 60,000 soldiers of the Khalifa were stopped cold by the deadly fire of modern artillery and magazine-fed rifles at ranges of between 500 and 800 yards from Kitchener's front.55 Within a little more than five hours almost 10,000 of the Khalifa's soldiers lay dead on the field of battle and almost half again of that number had been wounded. A further 5,000 were captured. The Anglo-Egyptian casualties totaled 482, of whom 48 had been killed.56 The Khalifa escaped to the south with what remained of his followers shortly before Kitchener's forces entered the town of Omdurman.5? More than thirteen years after the fall of Khartoum and the death 51 of General Gordon, the power of the Mahdists had been destroyed. The lack of imagination shown by the Khalifa in the battle of Omdurman has been commented upon by several writers. By the use of more subtle tactics, rather than massed frontal assaults over open ground, he might have at least partially nullified the overwhelming technical superiority of Kitchener's forces. One standard Mahdist stratagem was a surprise night assault after silently approaching the enemy's positions. Wingate attempted to lessen the possibility of such a move by sending double agents into the Mahdist stronghold with reports of a planned

British night attack.58 it is more likely, however, that the dubious loyalty of an increasing number of the Mahdist troops — six thousand had deserted the night before the battle — made such a maneuver impossible for the Khalifa.59

Only three days after the fall of Omdurman, a Mahdist steamer approached the town from the south, its captain and crew totally unaware of the British presence. When the vessel was boarded the captain explained that he had been sent up the Nile to investigate reports that a European force had arrived at Fashoda, a small river town in the southern Sudan. The reports proved to be true and the 52 Mahdists had exchanged gunfire with the Europeans before beating a retreat back to Omdurman. With further questioning the Mahdist described the pattern and colors of

the flag flying over Fashoda: it was French.^0 The French presence on the Nile did not come as a complete shock to the British. The small French expedition, under Jean Baptiste Marchand, had reached Fashoda almost two months before the fall of the Mahdist empire to the Anglo-Egyptian forces. Marchand's force consisted of about 150 French-led Senegalese troops who had marched to the Nile from central

Africa.51 Marchand's purpose was to establish a French claim to a role in the Nile Valley and to make contact with the French garrison at Djbouti. Wingate's intelligence personnel had received reports of the French expedition and had tracked its progress for many months.52 After the time and effort spent over more than a decade in planning and achieving the reconquest of the Mahdist Sudan, the British were not about to tolerate French interference in what they regarded as exclusively their own sphere of influence. Kitchener took immediate action to deal with the situation: a force of five steamers was assembled and two Sudanese battalions, together with two companies of Highlanders, an artillery battery, and four Maxim guns, began the journey up 53 the Nile. Kitchener and Wingate both accompanied the expedition.53 Kitchener had been given instructions by the Foreign Office that, should he encounter either French or Ethiopian forces in the Nile Valley, he was to do nothing which could possibly be interpreted as an acknowledgment that they had any right to be there. Apart from that he was completely on his own as to what action to take — except for the "express instructions that he was to have 'no corpses'." 54 The whole issue of the appropriate course to follow was one which Kitchener and Wingate discussed at great length during their voyage to Fashoda. Wingate's private belief was that the strain of dealing with so delicate a diplomatic situation might easily be too much for the Sirdar

to handle: The government are relying on K to pull them out of the difficulty of having to send France an ultimatum but I think K is too cute to play a sufficiently strong game to bring about this result - at the risk of making a faux pas.55

Wingate's account of the meeting with Major Marchand, related to his wife in a letter written over the period of a week while he and Kitchener were en route to and from Fashoda, sheds new light on the incident. Kitchener had sent a smaller steamer ahead of the rest of the flotilla 54 to deliver his greetings to the French commander as he did not want his entire force to arrive all at once, unannounced. Wingate's letter picks up the narrative of the events of the next several days: The next morning, as we were slowly steaming towards Fashoda we espied a small row boat coming down with an unusual French flag in the bows — she came alongside and a black sergeant came on board and presented Marchand's reply which was to the effect that he had reached Fashoda on 10 July, that he had the orders of the French Government to occupy the Babr el Ghazal and Fashoda which he had done, that he had been attacked by Dervishes once and was awaiting a second attack which our arrival had averted and that on Sirdar's arrival he would be happy to salute him in the name of France — he said he had made a treaty with the Mek of the Shilluks by which the latter placed the whole of his country under French protection and that he had sent copies of this treaty to his government by way of Abyssinia and via the Babr el Ghazal. Of course the Sirdar and I had talked over all that he was going to say and this letter rather staggered him — but I begged him to be firm and to stick absolutely to what we had arranged. On arrival at Fashoda Marchand and Captain Germain came on board and we four sat down to discuss the situation. K, I am thankful to say, pulled himself together and spoke well, telling Marchand that all this might mean war between France and England; he asked Marchand whether — in face of our vastly preponderating strength — he intended to resist Egypt reasserting its rights over its former possession and the hoisting of the Egyptian flag and Marchand replied that of course he could not do so, but that he could not hurriedly retire or haul down his flag without the orders of his government and that if the Sirdar insisted all that he and his companions could do was to die at their posts. I then went all around the French position with Germain and actually selected a spot on which to hoist the Egyptian flag — it was an old bastion of the imperial Fashoda fortifications, about 500 yards south of the French flag and position and on their only line of retreat to the south as their position is, except in this direction, completely surrounded by impassable marshes. We then turned out 55 all the troops, had a solemn ceremony of hoisting the flag, fired a salute of 21 guns — appointed Jackson Commandant of Fashoda and left a big garrison with him. Thus our poor Froggies are virtually our prisoners, they cannot budge a step, they have only 3 small row boats as they had sent their little steamer launch south to get reinforcements when they expected the second Dervish attack — indeed their relief at our arrival was most genuine, the natives had reported to them that five steamers were coming up and, of course, they put them down as the Dervishes as they had no news of our battle at Omdurman. They had been working night and day at their feeble fortifications, which would not have stood ten minutes against a determined Dervish assault. So after all we have really saved those who attempted to take the bread out of our mouths! Is not the whole situation too a b s u r d ? ® ®

The mention Wingate makes in his letter of urging Kitchener to stick to what they had arranged had to do with the guise under which they would present themselves to the

French. Although Wingate does not specifically make the claim in this particular letter, his son Ronald, in Wingate of the Sudan, states that the decision to hoist only the Egyptian flag at Fashoda originated with his father. Kitchener, according to the younger Wingate, intended to hoist both the Union Jack and the Egyptian flag as he had done at the reoccupation of Khartoum. Reginald Wingate believed that they should do everything possible to avoid turning the situation into a direct confrontation between England and France. By presenting themselves in Egyptian uniform, hoisting only the Egyptian flag, and claiming to be 56 asserting only the claims of Egypt, a legal fiction would be maintained that Britain was not directly involved. This would give the French an honorable escape route as the

claims of Egypt to the Sudan had long been recognized by all.57 The ploy worked: by maintaining the pretense that they represented only the Egyptian government. Kitchener and Wingate were able to avoid a confrontation with the French that would have involved Great Britain directly. The hopelessly outnumbered French ultimately bowed to the claims of Egypt in the Nile Valley, not to those of an ancient European enemy. It is quite probable that the decision arrived at by Kitchener and Wingate avoided a war between Britain and France, for national feeling was running very high in both of those nations. With the elimination of the French as a factor in the Sudan, it still remained to deal finally with the remnants of the Mahdists. While the Anglo-Egyptians attempted to put together some semblance of a government at

Khartoum to deal with the massive problems of the newly conquered country, skirmishes with the remaining followers of the Khalifa continued in the more remote areas of the country. Once again Wingate's network of spies and double 57 agents proved of inestimable value in keeping the British informed of enemy movements and concentrations. On 24 November 1899, more than a year after the battle at Omdurman, a force of almost four thousand Sudanese and Egyptians, under the direct field command of Reginald Wingate, surprised a somewhat larger force of Mahdists at Um Debreika in the southern Sudan. A forced overnight march was followed by a dawn attack and the last Mahdist force capable of imposing a serious threat to the Anglo-Egyptians was destroyed. Among the dead was the Khalifa himself.5®

The victory at Um Debreika came several weeks after the start of the South African War and, as a result, the attentions of the British were directed to the other end of the African continent for several years. Kitchener had departed for England several months after Omdurman and was not to return to the Middle East for a number of years. The role played by Wingate in assuring the final British success in the Sudan was now to be richly rewarded. Already knighted for his services after Omdurman,59 he now received the title of Sirdar, and the Governor-Generalship of the newly established Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. He was entering upon that phase of his career for which he is best remembered, and which represents his greatest achievement. ENDNOTES CHAPTER II

1. Ronald Wingate, Not in the Limelight (London: Hutchinson Company Ltd., 1959), 10. (Size of the Wingate family and financial problems). Ronald Wingate, Wingate of the Sudan (London: John Murray, 1955), 30-31. (Wingate's commissioning in the artillery). 2. Wingate, Wingate of the Sudan, 26-27. 3. John Morley, The Life of William Ewart Gladstone. 3 vols. (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1903), 3: 147. 4. Charles Chenevix Trench, The Road to Khartoum: A Life of General Charles Gordon (New York: Dorset Press, 1987) 32, 76-77, 123, 164-165. 5. Morley, The Life of William Ewart Gladstone. 3: 154, 155, 156. 6. Wingate, Wingate of the Sudan. 73-74. 7. Ibid., 79. 8. Ibid., 82.

9. Philip Ziegler, Omdurman (London: Collins, 1975), 25-26. (The extent to which Wingate's intelligence operation was uniquely his own creation has proven difficult to determine. All sources consulted in the process of writing this paper, both primary and secondary, seem to view the brilliance of Wingate's work as almost axiomatic. While there are a number of works on military intelligence during this period available, they all seem to focus on European events leading up to the First World War. I have been unable to find any work dealing with a colonial context as a point of comparison.) 10. Sudan Archive Durham. Wingate Papers, 258/1/556-557

58 59

(O. H. Pedley to Wingate, 29 January 1895). (The Wingate Papers of the Sudan Archive Durham consist of files of documents in 190 separate boxes. Box numbers do not start at 1. Some files are paged, others are not. The format used to cite the source in this and subsequent references to the SAD is that used by Gabriel Warburg in The Sudan under Wingate. In this particular footnote the reference is to Box 258, File 1, pp. 556-557). Selima is an oasis about 150 miles WSW of Wadi Haifa. The "Yunes" referred to in Pedley's letter is Yunus al-Dikaym, the Mahdist commander at Dongola. The "Shaiga" and the "Kabbabish" are tribes of the Northern Sudanese desert who had allied themselves with the Egyptians and British. The other names mentioned: "Palmer", "S", "E", and "Ali Gabis" cannot be identified beyond the mere fact that they were agents of Wingate's Intelligence Department. The identity of "Yunes" comes from A Historv of the Sudan by P.M. Holt and M.W. Daly. That on the tribes is from The Sudan: Crossroads of Africa by Beshir Mohammed Said. 11. M D , Wingate Papers, 179/3/26-29 (undated "Memo on Sudan Trade". From the papers in the same file with it, it was most probably written in the early 1890s). 12. Kenneth Bourne and D. Cameron Watt, eds., British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part I, Series B, The Near and Middle East, 20 vols. (Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America Inc., 1985), 15: Britain, Egvpt. and the Sudan: 1885-1914, Document 85 (Memo by Wingate on the Senussi, 6 April 1889). 13. Gordon Brook-Shepherd, Between Two Flags: The Life of Baron Sir Rudolf von Slatin Pasha. GVVO. KCMG. CB (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1973), 7,8. 14. Ibid., 5. (Slatin's arrival in Egypt in his late teens). John H. Waller, Gordon of Khartoum: The Saga of a Victorian Hero (New York: Atheneum, 1988), 225. (Slatin's reasons for coming to Africa). 60

15. Brook-Shepherd, Between Two Flags, 13. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid., 14, 18. Ibid., 14-15. 19. Robert O. Collins and Francis M. Deng, eds.. The British in the Sudan: 1898-1956 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984), 14. 20. F. R. Wingate, Mahdiism and the Egvptian Sudan (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1968), 75-77. Originally published 1891. (Slatin's appointment as Governor of Darfur). P.M Holt and M.W. Daly, A Historv of the Sudan: From the Coming of Islam to the Present Dav (London: Longman, 1988), 80. (Gordon's successor as Governor-General of the Sudan). 21. Rudolf C. von Slatin, Fire and Sword in the Sudan (London: Edward Arnold, 1897), 258-260. 22. Ibid., 23. Ibid., 24. Ibid. 25. Brook- 26. Brook- 27. Slatin 28. Brook- 29. Slatin 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid., 32. Ibid., 33. Ibid., 61

34. Ibid., 588. 35. Ibid., 592, 594. 36. Ibid., 615-616. 37. Ibid., 617-618. 38. Ibid., 618. 39. Brook-Shepherd, Between Two Flags. 130-131. 40. SAD. Wingate Papers, 155/5/111-118. (Rudolf von Slatin to his sister, March 1889). Slatin's letter was forwarded to his sister through the Austrian Agent in Cairo. It is extremely doubtful that Wingate ever considered revealing its contents to anyone outside his own circle. No explanation is offered as to how the letter came to be in Wingate's papers. In all probability whatever merchant Slatin bribed to smuggle it out of Mahdist territory showed it to a British or Egyptian officer once he had gotten into Egypt, and they forwarded it to the Intelligence Department. 41. Ibid., 155/5/99-108. (Memorandum from Wingate to the Intelligence Department, 26 April 1889). 42. Philip Ziegler, Omdurman. 24. 43. David Levering Lewis, The Race to Fashoda: European Colonialism and African Resistance in the Scramble for Africa (New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1987), 155-156. 44. Peter Young, A Dictionary of Battles: 1816-1976 (New York: Mayflower Books, 1977), 109-110. (Information on the Battle of Adowa). Philip Magnus, Kitchener; Portrait of an Imperialist (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1959), 90. (The somewhat premature launching of Kitchener's campaign as a result of Adowa). 45. Winston S. Churchill, The River War (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1899), 181-182. 62 46. Michael Barthorp, War on the Nile; Britain. Egypt and the Sudan 1882-1898 (Poole, Dorset: Blandford Press, 1984), 146. 47. Churchill, The River War. 234. 48. George W. Steevens, With Kitchener to Khartum (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1898), 142. 49. Churchill, The River War. 240. 50. Ibid. 51. Ibid., 239, 244. 52. Ibid., 249. 53. Ibid., 250. 54. Ibid., 249. 55. Barthorp, War on the Nile. 160. 56. Churchill, The River War. 310-311. 57. Barthorp, War on the Nile. 170. 58. H. C. Jackson, Sudan Davs And Wavs (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1954), 106-107. Recollection of a personal conversation with Rudolf von Slatin. Henry C. Jackson served in the Sudan Political Service from 1907 to 1931. He was a District Commissioner in Sennar and, later. Governor of both Berber and Haifa Provinces). 59. Lewis, The Race to Fashoda. 201-202. 60. Wingate, Wingate of the Sudan. 117-118. 61. Lewis, The Race to Fashoda. 163.

62. Ibid., 186. 63. Ibid., 223. 64. Wingate, Wingate of the Sudan. 118. SAD. Wingate Papers, 233/5/107. (Reginald Wingate to Katherine 63 Wingate, 18 September 1898). 65. SAD. Wingate Papers, 233/5/107. (Reginald Wingate to Katherine Wingate, 18 September 1898). 66. Ibid., 233/5/108-109. Wingate's letter to his wife, written in installments both while en route to Fashoda and on the return trip, has not been used as a reference in any of the accounts I have seen of the Fashoda Incident. The sources used by David Levering Lewis in The Race to Fashoda are almost entirely French, and only very brief mention is made of Fashoda in Warburg's The Sudan Under Wingate and Daly's Empire on the Nile. Even Sir Ronald Wingate does not quote directly from this letter in Wingate of the Sudan. 67. Wingate, Wingate of the Sudan. 119. 68. Lewis, The Race to Fashoda. 228. 69. E.T. Williams and Helen M. Palmer, The Dictionary of National Biography: 1951-1960 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 1067, s.v. "Wingate, Sir Francis Reginald." Reginald Wingate was created a Knight Commander of the Order of Saints Michael and George (K.C.M.G.) in 1898, almost immediately following the victory at Omdurman. CHAPTER III WINGATE’S SUDANESE ADMINISTRATION 1899 - 1914

The territory which was placed under Wingate's authority in 1899 was certainly one of the most impoverished on earth. The Sudan was not favored by nature: apart from the land just below the confluence of the White and Blue Niles at Khartoum, and the extreme southern regions of the country, it was, and is, a barren and rocky desert. Even in the best of times the bulk of the Sudanese lived an extremely precarious existence and the previous fifteen years had been anything but the best of times. No demographic statistics available for the Sudan in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are much more than guesswork, and those of British origin are also suspect because of the deliberate propaganda effort to show the Mahdist regime in the worst possible light. The figures given in the annual report for 1903, submitted by the Governor-General to Lord Cromer, as Sir Evelyn Baring had become in June 1892, should be viewed with this fact in mind.

64 65 1882 Population 8,525,000 Died under Dervish Rule: Disease 3,451,000 Warfare 3,203,500 1903 Population 1,870,500^

Although the reliability of the figures given above is very much in question, there can be little doubt that the Sudan had been depopulated to a significant extent during the almost two decades of violence and chaos which terminated with the Anglo-Egyptian reconquest of the region in 1898. It required an enormous amount of hard work to restore even the barest semblance of government control and services to the Sudan. The people of the Sudan were, and are, extremely diverse in their religious, cultural, and racial backgrounds. It is certainly a valid generalization to say that the people of the northern Sudan are largely Arabic in origin, and those of the south are, for the most part, negroes. Along the banks of the Nile and its various tributaries, however, the population is, to a considerable extent, an admixture of both these groups.^ With the exception of the negro groups of the far south, the Sudanese are almost entirely Moslem, having been converted to that 66 faith from paganism and Coptic Christianity in the seventh and eighth centuries. The role of individual holy men in the conversion of the Sudanese to Islam is highly significant in the subsequent history of the country. In other areas outside the Arabian Peninsula, where the Moslem faith was born, the conversion of whole populations followed swiftly on the heels of the conquering Islamic armies. In the Sudan this was not the case. The territory was not subjugated so much as it was infiltrated. A holy man would establish a personal following among the members of a tribe, or the people of a village, and a small scale theocracy would be the result.

These men were known as fakis. literally "jurists," because they taught the Moslem law. Often they would be given land by the local ruler, and their descendants would inherit both the land and the religious position.^ The position that the fakis came to occupy in Sudanese society, as well as the country's geographic location on the periphery of the Islamic world, encouraged the growth of a messianic quality in the religion of the Sudan. The growth of Moslem brotherhoods, centered around the teachings of a charismatic holy man, were common in the Sudan and, indeed, throughout North Africa. With the coming 67 of Europeans in the nineteenth century, this tendency intensified as a reaction to the social upheaval and political changes which the region was undergoing. The theme of a mahdi was a recurring one in the Islamic world, particularly as the turn of a new Moslem century

approached.4 it was not uncommon for a faki to proclaim himself a mahdi and, in normal times this would cause little disturbance outside his own region. In the case of the Sudanese Mahdi of the 1880s, however, a number of factors had worked in conjunction with one another to contribute to both the rapidity, and the extent, of his success. The Moslem year 1300 (1882-83)5 approaching at the time that the Mahdist revolt commenced, and there was widespread outrage among devout Sudanese at the Egyptian practice of employing Christian administrators in the Sudan. The quest for theocratic purity, as interpreted by a given faki. was what motivated the members of the Moslem Brotherhoods. In the early 1880s, many Sudanese saw what was happening under the rule of the Egyptians as a spiritual, rather than a political, corruption.5 Given the nature of the Moslem faith in the Sudan, the appearance of a "purifier" was not too surprising. 68 In those areas of the country where the rainfall is something approaching adequate, mainly the Gezira between the White and Blue Niles and the region surrounding Kassala, the people were overwhelmingly cultivators and herdsmen. In the dryer northern and western portions of the country, the people were mostly nomadic, moving from one well or oasis to another as the water supply became temporarily exhausted.?

Within the Arab segment of the population, as well as the African, there were numerous tribal divisions. In the entire Sudan there were 56 tribal groups composed of almost 600 individual tribes.® One of the most powerful of these tribal groups were the Baggara of Kordofan and Darfur Provinces. It was from this group that the Khalifa had come, and they were among the earliest supporters of the Mahdi, as well as being his most ferocious warriors. In the region between Khartoum and the Red Sea lived the Beja, a nomadic group who also aligned themselves with the Mahdi. The Beja are the Sudanese to whom the British soldiery gave the nickname "Fuzzie-Wuzzies," which Rudyard Kipling made famous in his poetry.^ since the time of the Sahara regions’s conversion to Islam the Sudan had also been a favored route of travel for West Africans on the annual pilgrimage to Mecca: their destination being either Suakin 69 or Massawa on the Red Sea coast to take ship for Arabia. Large numbers of these people settled permanently in the Sudan after their return from the pilgrimage.^® Together

with the significant number of West Africans who migrated to the Sudan during the period of Anglo-Egyptian rule, these people form a majority of the population of the present-day Sudan.The Sudan's political situation had seldom been stable throughout its history. The Egyptians had conquered portions of the northern Sudan in the time of the Pharoahs, but were never able to maintain or expand their control. During most of its recorded history the area comprising the Sudan was ruled by tribal chieftains. Central authority was virtually non-existent, and empires rose and fell as one tribal group or another gained, and then lost, ascendency. Like all Moslem peoples, however, the Sudanese acknowledged the measure of suzerainty possessed by the Sultan in Constantinople. The fact that Egypt was under the rule of an Ottoman governor, an appointee of that Sultan, served to strengthen the ancient claim that the Sudan was part of Egyptian territory.1% With the start of the nineteenth century the situation in Egypt altered dramatically. In 1798 a French army under the command of Napoleon Bonaparte invaded the 70 country and quickly toppled the atrophied Ottoman regime. Among the officers of the defeated Turkish army was a young Albanian named Muhammad Ali. With the departure of the

French from Egypt in 1802, Ali was able to profit from the vacuum of power which existed and, by 1812, had established himself as the ^ facto ruler of Egypt. Although Ali was still nominally subordinate to the Sultan, in reality Egypt had emerged from centuries of foreign rule as a virtually independent nation. With a new and more vigorous regime in Egypt, it was not long before an effort was made to press the ancient claim to the Sudan. In 1820 two Egyptian armies advanced into the country. Within two years the Egyptians had brought most of the northern Sudan under their control and established themselves on the Red Sea coast down to Massawa, in what is now Eritrea. In 1822 the Egyptians founded the town of Khartoum at the confluence of the White and Blue Niles, and made it the seat of their Governor of the Sudan. Thus commenced the period of "Turco-Egyptian" rule.^^ From the earliest known periods the Sudanese had been a slave-holding society. The trade in slaves had, over the centuries, become a vital factor in the economy of the country.15 with the establishment of effective Egyptian 71 control in the 1820s, it was to become even more important. By the mid-1850s the length of the entire White Nile, down through the Bahr-al-Ghazal. had become known to outsiders and the trade in negro slaves from that region increased significantly. Egyptian and Syrian traders displaced the local Arabs who had previously dominated the trade, and the situation soon became an internationally-known embarrassment to the Egyptian Government.1® Although it was the slave trade, and the efforts to suppress it, which seem to be the most commented upon aspect of Egyptian rule, and that which first brought Europeans into the Sudan in large numbers, there are several more positive accomplishments dating from that period as well. The Egyptians did attempt to improve Sudanese agricultural methods by importing Egyptian farmers into the Gezira and Kassala regions to instruct the local inhabitants. They also established plantations for the growing of sugar cane and indigo, and introduced several new varieties of trees to the Sudan. It was the Egyptian effort to suppress the slave trade, after several European nations — notably Great Britain and Austria — had brought diplomatic pressure to bear during the 1860s, that saw the employment of European administrators and soldiers in the Sudan for the first 72 time.l® Foremost of these was, of course, Charles Gordon, whose first period of service under the Egyptians in the Sudan was between 1874 and 1880. During this time Gordon served first as Governor of Equatoria Province, where the worst abuses of the slave trade were centered, and, then, as Governor-General of the Sudan. Although Gordon and the other Europeans hired by the Egyptians were well-intentioned and capable men, they were able to accomplish little in the way of suppressing a trade in which so many Egyptian officials had a vested interest. The Mahdist rebellion which broke out in 1881 was largely the result of the oppressive nature of Egyptian rule in the Sudan. The seventeen years of turmoil which were to follow before the re-establishment of Egyptian sovereignty in that country took a heavy toll on the Sudanese people and economy. Before embarking on a discussion of the steps taken to remedy the conditions in the Sudan during the years of Wingate's administration, it would be useful to analyze the arrangement which was set up in 1899 to provide for the future government of the Sudan. The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1899 established the condominium scheme under which the Sudan was to be governed until it became an 73 independent nation in 1956. Although the agreement specified that Great Britain and Egypt would share joint sovereignty over the Sudan, the fact that Egypt itself was effectively under British rule made this a legal fiction. Even had Egypt been totally independent, the Sudanese administration was so structured that final authority never left British hands. Both the civilian administration and the command of the military were controlled directly by the Governor-General. Although Wingate's appointment was nominally from the Khedive of Egypt, he was, in fact, responsible only to the British government.^® The arrangements made for the financial affairs of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan also worked heavily in Britain's favor. Apart from whatever revenue could be raised by local duties and other taxes, the Egyptian government was committed by the agreement to provide an annual contribution to the Sudanese administration — an administration which was almost exclusively British. This contribution amounted to £134,317 (Egyptian) in 1899 and, by 1905, had risen to £379,763 (Egyptian) annually. Although Egypt's annual stipend to the Sudan varied somewhat from year to year, it never again dropped below the £300,000 mark from 1905 until it was terminated in 1913.^1 Whatever import duties were 74 collected in the Sudan went directly into the coffers of the British Governor-General's regime. The only exception to this was that articles imported from Egypt itself were exempt from any duties.^2 This seems a rather small compensation to the nation which was supposedly a joint partner with Britain in ruling the Sudan. When this strange and unequal partnership took up the task of reconstructing the defeated Mahdist state in 1899 virtually nothing in the way of a trained body of personnel existed to administer the effort. One of Wingate's greatest accomplishments during his Governor- Generalship was the creation of the Sudan Political Service to take over the duties that had initially been performed by British military officers. The Political Service, which was very much Wingate's creation, and a reflection of his own personal value system, was established in 1899 and existed until the very end of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. The Sudan Political Service offered terms of service which were geared to attract men who would ordinarily have tried to enter the Indian Civil Service. A career in the Sudan held out the offer of lengthy annual leave, due to the severity of the climate; a twenty year term of service to qualify for a pension; a generous basic salary; and numerous 75

additional benefits. The method of selection was totally undemocratic and out of step even with its own time. Applicants for the service did not take a competitive

examination, which had become standard in both the British and Indian Civil Services by the late nineteenth century. They were, instead, interviewed by university dons appointed by the Sudan Government. If an applicant was recommended by the interviewer at his university a final interview by a board also appointed by the Sudan Government followed.^3

The applicants selected for the Sudan Political Service were very largely products of the English public school system and graduates of either Oxford or Cambridge.^4

In addition to a preference for classically educated graduates of England's two oldest and most prestigious universities, there was also a heavy representation of those who had shown athletic prowess while at school. It was believed by many, then as now, that success at athletics is an indication of a manly and assertive character. Wingate was looking for men who were tough enough to withstand the rigors of life in a remote and inhospitable region of the earth, and who would have the capacity to take charge of large tracts of it with little or no direct supervision from above.25 The emphasis placed on the possession of one's 76 school 'Blue', the British equivalent of an American varsity letter, was responsible for the oft-quoted jibe that the Sudan was 'the land of Blacks ruled by Blues.'2® It is evident, as well, that the characteristics so valued by Wingate in his recruitment of members for the Sudan Political Service resulted in the perpetuation of a narrowness of scope in the administration which, ultimately, was to cost the British dearly, in the Sudan and elsewhere. A passage from Martin Daly's Empire on the Nile is illustrative of this unattractive aspect of British imperialism: The Sudan Political Service was composed entirely of British subjects. Others were not barred from applying, but none was ever selected. In seeking a director of agriculture in 1905 Cromer omitted from the advertisement a reference to 'British Subjects': 'not that there is any intention of engaging others,' he wrote to Wingate, 'but there is no necessity to say so in official documents.'2'

Despite the parochial attitudes molding the standard applied to recruits for the Sudan Political Service, it grew into an instrument that provided Wingate, and all subsequent Governor-Generals of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, with the means to govern effectively and to achieve much towards improving the existence of the Sudanese people. Once the threat of any resurgence of the Mahdists was removed by the final defeat and death of the Khalifa in 77 late 1899, the first priority of the new administration was to begin the development of something approaching a viable economy for the country. The Sudan at the turn of this century neither manufactured nor grew anything the world wanted: yet it needed much that only the outside world could provide. The British were determined that their newest acquisition was to be as economically self-sufficient as possible, and this policy necessitated a considerable upgrading of the primitive transportation and agricultural systems they had inherited. There was, of course, some element of altruism in the desire to improve conditions in the Sudan but, as the financial arrangements arrived at with the Egyptians serve to indicate, the British were bound and determined that they would put as little of their own money as possible into a territory which they regarded as little else than a burden.

What might be termed a "grass roots" start at economic self-sufficiency for the Sudan was instituted from the earliest days following the overthrow of the Mahdist regime. Land being reclaimed for cultivation was often parcelled out to discharged Sudanese soldiers to provide them with the means to support themselves and their families by their own efforts and, also, with the stabilizing element 78

that comes from pride of ownership. A letter written to Wingate from an officer commanding Sudanese troops in the Kassala region is illustrative of this effort:

I should like to put the "Colonizing" question before you so far as it concerns this battalion in this particular place. The damming of the river bed of the Gash now is practically the breath of Kassala's life. Its far reaching effects towards the improvement of extensive fields of cultivation are quite well known to you. In old days this was regarded as of paramount importance and the failure to erect the dam during recent years has very seriously affected the prosperity of this place. My point is this - we have now some hundreds of native inhabitants of this place working daily at the dam, free labour, given in anticipation of the benefits they will derive from the land whose fertility they will - so to speak- awaken. Occupancy, perhaps permanent occupancy, seems a just result of the labours of those who will have erected the dam. The lands would be brought under cultivation by those - generally speaking - who have borne the burden of making the dam. I think it would be a very popular and reassuring concession if you allowed a small proportion of my men - those who eventually wish to settle here and cultivate - to go and work on this dam at once. I would suggest 60 or 70 men who need not necessarily be discharged at once from here, but who would in good time feel they had a right to participate in the distribution of the fertilized ground. When a tangible means of livelihood seemed within their grasp th^ir discharge from the battalion could be effected.2°

Such schemes as that envisioned above provided both a means to build confidence in the intentions of the new government and an inducement to draw recruits into the Sudanese battalions of the army. Both of these factors were of great importance in attempting to stabilize a society which had so recently emerged from a state of anarchy. 79 Two projects which Wingate personally initiated were the Gezira irrigation scheme and the building of Port Sudan on the Red Sea. The Gezira region was that area below Khartoum between the White and Blue Niles. The great majority of the land with any potential at all for intensive cultivation in the Sudan lies within this area. Elsewhere in the Sudan agriculture was confined to the immediate vicinity of the Nile. Small plots of land were irrigated by means of wooden water wheels operated by either oxen or human labor. Seldom were these plots larger than three acres. The primary grains grown for consumption by the people themselves were millet and sorghum. Groundnuts, a tuberlike edible plant, were also raised. A variety of grasses were cultivated as fodder for livestock and, increasingly after the reconquest, cotton.29 Most of the cultivated land in the Sudan, both along the lower Nile and in the Gezira region, was owned by those who cultivated it. During the period of the Khalifa's rule many of these people had fled their homes or been displaced by more fervent Mahdist supporters, and the water wheels and other primitive irrigation devices had deteriorated badly. One of the earliest acts of the Condominium Government was to pass a Titles to Land Ordinance (1899) , which attempted to 80

determine legitimate ownership. Generally, possession or proof of rents for five years prior to the date of registration with the government gave absolute title to one's land, if there was no superior claim on it. Occupancy of a given parcel of land from the establishment of the Condominium gave apparent title, if there was no opposing

claim.20 Once the initial plans for government-sponsored irrigation schemes had become public knowledge, it became necessary to pass legislation to prevent land speculation. From 1905, owners were prohibited from selling their land to persons who were not residents of their locality without the permission of the Provincial Governor.31

For centuries the people of the Gezira had profited, in the same way as had Egyptian farmers, from the annual flood of the Nile. Also, like the Egyptians, the Sudanese were at the mercy of the river's whims. Both the timing and the volume of the yearly rush of soil-laden water on its way to the sea could mean the difference between rich crops or famine to the peoples of the Nile Valley. What Britain's engineers had in mind for the region was, of course, a series of dams to harness and regulate what had hitherto been a very unreliable resource to support the development of a Sudanese agriculture extensive enough both to ensure an 81 adequate food supply for the Sudanese people and provide a commodity in the form of cotton which the Sudan could trade on the world market. This irrigation scheme, which seems both logical and progressive — as, in fact, it was — met with strong opposition from the Egyptian government and people. Their attitude stemmed from a reluctance to see the Sudan, which was officially part of their territory, developing an economy which they could not control. Additionally, it was feared that such a series of dams would enable the British to use the waters of the Nile for political blackmail in any possible future confrontations with Egypt.

The Egyptians were also concerned that the Sudan might develop into a competitor on the world cotton market. Cotton was Egypt's single most important export commodity. In 1888 cotton, cotton-seed, and cotton-seed oil accounted for 83% of the total value of Egyptian exports. This figure reached a high of 94% in 1913 and, even as recently as 1937, was still above 80%.22

As a result of Egyptian opposition, the irrigation project was not effectively launched until 1914. The major units to be constructed were a dam across the Blue Nile about 160 miles south of Khartoum, at the town of Sennar, 82 and a series of canals to direct the water into the Gezira for irrigation. The First World War slowed the progress of the work, and the entire system was not completed until

1925. 300,000 acres of land were brought under irrigation at the start and this was gradually increased. The scheme was an extremely valuable contribution to the strengthening of the Sudanese economy.23

Egyptian fears regarding the potential competition resulting from large scale cultivation of cotton in the Sudan were, however, fully realized. By the late interwar period the Sudan was supplying a considerable portion of the cotton imported by Great Britain, almost entirely at the expense of Egypt's export trade. In the last four years before the start of the Second World War 61% of the Sudanese cotton crop was purchased by Britain, and a further 23% by

India which was, of course, under British rule.24 while

Egypt remained Britain's largest single source of raw cotton, Egyptian nationalists and businessmen saw their earlier fears justified.

The state of the Sudanese transportation system, if the country really had anything that would merit the use of that term, was abysmal. Only the steam boats on the Nile and the military railway built by Kitchener's men during the 83 course of his campaign of reconquest in 1896-98 provided any modern means of movement around the country. While the sort of rough desert tracks which camel caravans had used for

centuries might suffice in a primitive economy, they were not adequate to support the degree of economic growth the British had in mind for the Sudan. Another negative factor was the Sudan's lack of any real deep water port along its Red Sea coast. Wingate and his engineers and advisors saw the construction of such a port, and a railway system linking it to Khartoum and other towns in the Sudan, as their first priority in the effort to make the country self- supporting. The construction of Port Sudan was the accomplishment which afforded Wingate the greatest satisfaction in later years. The Governor-General accompanied the team of surveyors and engineers sent to evaluate potential sites for a deep water port along the Sudanese coast and, according to his son's account in Wingate of the Sudan and Martin Daly's in Empire on the Nile, personally chose an inlet several miles north of the existing fishing village of Suakin for the new town.

Wingate was quite familiar with the entire length of the Sudan's Red Sea frontage from the years spent planning the 84 reconquest of the region. Suakin had been an important listening post for his intelligence gathering service during that period.25 Work began on the new town and harbor in

April 1904, under the supervision of a team of civilians and Royal Engineers.26

The work on the construction of Port Sudan was carried out under the overall supervision of Captain MacDougall Ralston Kennedy, Director of Public Works, Sudan Government. Ralston Kennedy was a controversial figure who often clashed with Wingate and numerous other of his colleagues in the Sudan — both subordinates and superiors. He held his post throughout the entire period of Wingate's Governor-Generalship and was relieved of his duties in February 1918 by Wingate's successor. Sir Lee Stack. A small scale controversy has long revolved around Ralston Kennedy's claim that the credit for a good deal of his work had been taken by Wingate.2?

Within three years such progress had been made that the Khedive was able to declare the port formally open to the world's shipping.28 Despite its advantages over the harbor at Suakin, considerable difficulty was encountered in creating an adequate berthing facility at Port Sudan: The rate of progress of the quay works has been considerably slower than was anticipated in my last report, and in spite of every effort made by the 85 contractors, the dredging for the foundations of the last berth has not yet been completed. The great difficulty experienced is due to the heterogeneous nature of the coral rock in the foundations of the quay wall. This coral varies from extremely hard tough coral, which requires an exceptional amount of blasting, to a very soft coral which can easily be cut by the bucket dredger, but unfortunately the two qualities of coral rock are mixed up in patches along the whole line of the wall.29

By the end of 1907 a variety of buildings had also been completed at the new port, including several schools, a customs house, four large warehouses, post and telegraph offices, and a quarantine station. Construction was proceeding on a prison, a barracks to house half a battalion, an abattoir, an electrical power station, and a civilian hospital.40

The new port was connected with Atbara by rail, and the work on the line moved ahead simultaneously with that on Port Sudan. The Atbara-Red Sea line represented a feat of engineering which rivaled the construction of Port Sudan itself. Lt. Col. G. B. Macauley, the Director of Sudan Government Railways, reported to the Earl of Cromer that the main line consisted of 331 miles of track, and there were an additional 25 miles of sidings. The new line shortened the rail distance from Khartoum to the sea by almost 900 miles - - the only route available before its completion was up the Nile into Egypt.41 Between Atbara and the Red Sea the new 86

line rose to an elevation of over 3,000 feet as it went over the coastal plateau. Extensive bridging was required along the route: one Glasgow firm furnished fifty one standardized steel spans each 105 feet long.42 Railway lines were also

pushed south along both the White and Blue Niles, and these rivers were both bridged at several locations.43

The development of the transportation system of the Sudan served several purposes. In addition to assisting in the economic development of the country and simply providing more efficient and comfortable travel facilities than had been available earlier, the requirements of the security forces were also taken into consideration by the construction engineers. In a memo written to Sir Eldon Gorst, who had succeeded Lord Cromer as British Agent and Consul-General in Cairo in 1907, Wingate spoke of the extension of the Sudanese railway lines in the context of defense arrangements. The Governor-General stated that the Sudanese defense establishment was woefully inadequate when the vast land area of the country was taken into consideration. Wingate did not believe that Egypt could possibly afford to increase its annual allowance to the Sudanese government to recruit more troops, and he knew that Britain itself would neither send more British troops nor 87 provide the additional funding needed to strengthen the Sudanese battalions. What Wingate suggested was that further expansion of the rail system would greatly increase the mobility of the existing garrison without otherwise enlarging it. The Governor-General also made the point that additional money spent directly on the military was less productive, as it served no further purpose, while the same funds spent on the rail system would also increase productivity in other areas of the Sudanese economy. Wingate's memo was forwarded by Gorst to the Foreign Office

in London with a covering memo of his own.44

The presence of a modern port facility on the Sudanese coast was to prove invaluable to the British a few years later when it became necessary to wage war against Turkish forces on the opposite side of the Red Sea. Earlier than that, however, it had proven its worth. A severe famine in 1914 necessitated the rapid importation of Indian grains into the Sudan and the availability of modern docking and transportation facilities enabled the authorities to distribute them much more quickly than would formerly have been the case. Port Sudan eventually grew to absorb the little village of Suakin. Today a city of more than two hundred thousand people, it is the Sudan's main outlet to 88

the rest of the world. The education of the Sudanese was given a rather high priority by the British, although it is quite obvious that its purpose was not to provide the future rulers of the country. In 1908, the Director of Education, Sudan Government — a Mr. Currie — stated in his department's annual report to the Governor-General: I haveseen enough of thepossibilities of the educated Sudanese to be quite confident of their capacity successfully to undertake all the clerical work of the Government, provided they be given a chance of obtaining the necessary education.45

Two levels of primary school were established by the government, as well as an Upper School and two colleges. Mr. Currie's report for 1908 gives the comparative enrollment figures with the previous year for the primary schools as : Primary Vernacular Schools: 1907 1,280 1908 1,781 Higher Primary Schools: 1907 890 1908 971*6

The Upper School, which trained assistant engineers and surveyors, had fifty students enrolled in 1908 while the 89 College for School Masters and Judges in the Religious Courts had 150. Gordon College, which had been established at Khartoum shortly after the reconquest with funds raised in Britain by a public subscription appeal headed personally by Kitchener, had industrial training branches at Omdurman and Kassala. These provided Sudanese students with training as fitters, smiths, carpenters, mechanics, stone cutters, and masons.47 It can be clearly seen that the educational system established by the Sudan Government had as its objective the training of lower echelon clerical personnel and artisans. While the skills being taught were certainly useful and badly needed in the Sudan, they were of the sort intended to provide people with enough training to serve the existing regime, not ever to supplant it. Another factor which had some significance in the development of educational institutions in the Sudan is the prohibition which Wingate had placed on the activities of missionary societies outside of Equatoria, the largely pagan region in the far south of the country. A comparison with educational progress in Uganda, where all schools were operated by missionary societies, is illuminating. There, in 1906-07, there were 123 elementary schools with 20,349 students enrolled. One missionary society in Uganda, the 90 White Fathers, operated a further 433 schools staffed by native teachers with a total enrollment of 7,000 students.^8 Another British colony, the Gold Coast, had also obviously profited through the efforts of the missionary societies. There, of 147 elementary schools, only seven were government operated — the rest were missionary schools. The three secondary schools in the Gold Coast were government operated. In 1906 the colony had 20% of its children enrolled in school.^9

There were very valid reasons for not permitting the establishment of missions in the Northern Sudan: the suppression of Mahdiism as both a religion and a political movement in the early years of the condominium aroused more than enough distrust on the part of the Sudanese. Allowing Christian missionaries into the Moslem areas of the country might well have sparked a rebellion. It does seem, however, that the slower growth of educational institutions in the Sudan was a price paid for political considerations. Even with the unique conditions imposed by the political status of the Sudan, education there was not exceptionally bad in comparison with other British possessions in Africa. The East African Protectorate (Kenya), for example, had no government schools at all. The Uganda Railway Company, 91 which operated the Mombossa-Lake Victoria line through Kenya, maintained an elementary school for the children of its employees only. There were several missionary schools in the colony, but they had a total enrollment of only a few hundred students.^0

Access to those institutions of learning which were established over the period of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium appears to have been, to a great extent, limited to the urban population. A joint United Nations/Sudan Government study done in 1964 illustrates this fact. Using the results of the Sudan's 1960 census, the first census after the nation achieved independence, the study drew a number of interesting conclusions about the Sudanese population and its economic utilization. The population of the Sudan had reached almost twelve million by 1960. Of this total the researchers found that only 538,000 people in the entire country had ever attended an elementary school, and that only 105,000 out of that number had gone beyond the elementary level in their education. A further 610,000 people had some education below the elementary school level.51 These figures, compiled less than a decade after the termination of British rule, do not indicate that the colonial government's efforts to educate the Sudanese people 92 met with immense success. The educational system which was established obviously failed to expand to meet the rather rapid growth of population which occurred during the almost

sixty years of the Condominium. On the whole the educational level of the Sudanese at the end of the colonial period was roughly comparable to that of the bulk of Third World nations. Wingate's style as Governor-General was regal, to say the least. Having personally witnessed the misery and corruption that flourished under both the Egyptian and Mahdist governments of the Sudan, he — and many other British officials in the Middle East — believed it desirable that the country should ultimately be completely separated from any political connection with Egypt. There were, of course, a number of valid strategic reasons for British efforts to supplant Egypt's influence in the Sudan with their own. Should it it ever become unavoidable to grant a significantly greater degree of autonomy to Egypt, a Sudan that was completely separate from Egypt politically would guarantee the continued control of the Nile Valley by the British. One way to accomplish this end was to focus as much of the outward pomp and ceremony of government as possible on the British element in the Sudan and this, quite 93 obviously, included the person of the Governor-General. This aspect of Wingate's rule set a precedent which lasted until Sudanese independence. An impressive collection of coaches, motor vehicles, and boats was amassed by the Governor-General for very little purpose other than to dazzle the Sudanese and to enhance the prestige of the British administration.52

Another means by which Wingate advanced both the influence of the British in the Sudan and his own personal prestige was his use of Great Britain's royalty to invest his rule with an importance and glamor that far outshone anything the Egyptians could produce. The Governor-General arranged for visits by the Prince of Wales (the future Edward VIII and Duke of Windsor) in 1916, and by the Duke of Connaught (Queen Victoria's third son) on several occasions before the First World War.53 Wingate's greatest coup in this regard was the visit of King George V and Queen Mary to Port Sudan in January 1912, on their way back to England from a tour of India. The Governor-General squeezed every ounce of propaganda value he could manage out of their one- day stopover. For the remainder of the period of British rule in the Sudan, 17 January was celebrated as a national holiday: King's Day.54 Wingate's own personal relationship 94

with the British Crown dated from his days as Director of Military Intelligence during the reign of Queen Victoria, when he had written lengthy personal reports on the progress of the campaign against the Mahdists. which Sir Evelyn Baring had often included in his dispatches to both the Prime Minister and Queen Victoria. It had continued under Edward VII, who regarded Wingate as a valuable friend and advisor on matters concerning the Empire. Visits to the Sudan by George V and his heir were highly significant to

the Governor-General as a mark of continuing royal favor.55

Wingate's annual tours of inspection, accompanied by a formidable entourage of officials and high-ranking guests, also served to enhance the position of the Governor-General much more than they served any useful administrative purpose. Conducted like a royal progress up and down the

Nile, Wingate's "inspections" were regarded as an expensive nuisance by the over-worked district officials who had to take the time to entertain these uninvited guests.55 yet, despite the irritation these "inspections" caused those British officials whose permanent station was in the remote areas of the country, they probably did serve to make Wingate aware of what progress was being made to improve conditions in the Sudan. After a 1906 tour down the White 95 Nile Wingate wrote a lengthy report to Lord Cromer, which would seem to indicate that there was more motivating his "inspections" than simply the entertainment of distinguished visitors : I am sending you a few impressions gathered during my journey to and from El Obeid which I hope may be of some use to you in forming an estimate of the present situation as compared with that of five years ago when I last inspected the Province of Kordofan. I have now traversed four different routes between the river and El Obeid so I have seen something of the country and I am enormously struck with the progress and advancement in all directions, with the increase in cultivation and population and with the apparent satisfaction of the inhabitants with the existing form of government. These are general impressions and may be due to the fact that travelling as the Governor-General I do not see the seamy side, but be that as it may the general impression is distinctly satisfactory, and very much credit is due to O'Connell and his subordinates who, though they may not be classed as first rate administrators, are undoubtedly men suitable for the government of the country in its present state, and are also clearly in touch with the very varied and motley crowd of people comprising the population of a Province not much smaller in area than Germany. ... Five years ago this Northern district was very sparsely populated, people were just beginning to come back from the four corners of the Sudan whither the Khalifa's methods had dispersed them. Now the country is scarcely recognizable. The camel-owners have huge stocks of camels and the breeding goes on apace, the same may be said of the mixed camel and sheep owners who live principally in the gum producing country and whose villages are enormously increased, but the most noticeable change has taken place in the Baggara country where there are now hundreds of flourishing villages standing in the midst of thousands of acres of grain and with an abundant supply of cattle, it is a veritable transformation scene. The change in the short space of five years is almost incredible and impresses me most favourably with the extraordinary recuperative power of the country and the comparative industry of the people. 96 though I regret to say that such a prosperous year as the present one means a good deal of marissa drinking which is a very prevalent vice throughout Kordofan, especially in the South and West. ^ Despite the air of superficiality which many observers saw in the annual "inspections" of the Governor-General, the impressions conveyed to Lord Cromer in the above quoted passage indicate that Wingate absorbed a great deal on these trips, and that his long service in the Sudan gave him the additional benefit of being able to compare what he saw with the conditions he knew to have existed a very short number of years earlier. A further observation of Wingate's in his letter to Cromer also says a great deal about the progress which the new administration was making in improving the condition of the Sudanese people: I have seldom seen such amazing productivity in the shape of babies, they swarmed in every village through which we passed and their fathers and mothers were about as well nourished individuals as I have yet seen in the Sudan.58

In the Governor-General's Report two years later this same observation was noted in the Economics section under "Population": It is significant that the number of children of ten years of age and under is very large, whereas there are comparatively few lads and young girls between the ages of ten and twenty. This fact goes to prove that the inhabitants of the Sudan are naturally prolific and that a period of continued peace and increasing prosperity is 97 all that is necessary to repair the ravages made by war and pestilence during the Khalifa's rule. 9 Possibly the most controversial aspect of Wingate's long rule over the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan was the role of Rudolf von Slatin as Inspector-General. The position had been created specifically for Slatin and was, to all intents and purposes, a continuation of the responsibility he had held as Deputy Director of Military Intelligence during the 1895-99 period. The precise duties and area of responsibility of the Inspector-General of the Sudan were never fully defined. In actuality Slatin's duties were what Wingate wanted them to be at any given moment. His office was directly subordinate to the Governor-General: he had to answer to no one other than Wingate. Slatin's long established contacts with the notable (and the not so notable) of Sudanese society enabled him to circumvent the official channels — be they British or Egyptian — and to get Wingate whatever information he required on the true situation in any part of the country. He was, in short, the Governor-General's personal spy. While such a figure might prove extremely useful to the ruler of any country, since those at the top always run the risk of being told only what their subordinates think they want to hear, the situation was bound to cause resentment. As British rule of the Sudan 98 stabilized with the passage of time and, particularly, once the recruits to the Sudan Political Service began to arrive after 1904, Slatin's services became less crucial, although certainly never worthless, to Wingate.5®

In the years before the First World War the Sudan became one of the show places of the British Empire. With the extension of Kitchener's original military railroad down the Nile, tourists were able to ride all the way from Cairo to Khartoum by train or, more usually, combine both rail and steamer travel to arrive at their destination. The list of dignitaries who were entertained by Wingate during the Edwardian period reads like a Who's Who of the cream of European and American society. On a number of occasions the Governor-General considered it politically expedient for the transport and accommodation expenses of such individuals to

be covered by the Sudan Government. The most memorable

example of Wingate's generosity in this regard was the March 1910 visit of former American President Theodore Roosevelt and his family to the Sudan. Although the Governor-General himself was absent in Cairo for medical attention, the Roosevelt party was escorted throughout its tour by Slatin. All transportation costs for Roosevelt and his family were paid by the Sudan Government. When in Khartoum they stayed 99 at the Governor-General's residence. The only personal expense to Roosevelt was for meals when traveling in the Provinces :

Wingate explained that it was 'only right that the Government should afford these facilities to so distinguished a traveller when passing through the Sudan'. Roosevelt was immensely impressed — as it was intended that he should be — by the progress the British had made in bringing the benefits of civilization to the Sudanese. On 31 May 1910, in a speech delivered by Roosevelt at the Guildhall in London, Wingate reaped his reward for the attention lavished on the former President. Roosevelt's comments on the administration of the Anglo- Egyptian Sudan could not have been any more enthusiastic and flattering had the Governor-General written them himself: The Sudan is particularly interesting because it affords the best possible example of the wisdom of disregarding the well-meaning but unwise sentimentalists who object to the spread of civilization at the expense of savagery. I do not believe that in the whole world there is to be found any nook of territory which has shown such astonishing progress from the most hideous misery to well-being and prosperity during the last twelve years while it has been under British rule.*^ The American went on to conclude that the accomplishments of Wingate and his subordinates had won them "a claim on civilized mankind which should be heartily admitted".^4 The benefit to the reputations of both Wingate and Slatin that 100 accrued from the praise of so famous and respected an international figure could not fail to be enormous. Despite the Governor-General’s flair for self- advertisement, the acclaim heaped on his administration by Roosevelt and others was by no means empty. The improvements made by the British in the Sudan prior to 1914 were impressive, and a great deal of the credit had to be given to the caliber of leadership provided by the Governor- General. Although the way in which Wingate exercised his authority and the organization of his work routine (almost half of any given year was spent outside the Sudan) might seem to reflect many of the worst aspects of imperialist government to some in our day and age, there is no doubt that he was an extremely effective ruler. In his work. The Sudan Under Wingate. Gabriel Warburg gives a very interesting account of the yearly routine which Wingate followed during his seventeen years as Governor-General of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. What Warburg refers to as the "Sudan Year" began when Wingate returned from his annual leave in Great Britain each October. For two weeks he met in Cairo with the Provincial Governors, and the various Department heads, of the Sudan Government. The main topic of these meetings was the budget for the upcoming 101 year, the details of which had been decided upon in England during the summer. Wingate also had a number of obligations to fulfill in his capacity as Sirdar prior to departing for the Sudan. These involved courtesy calls on the Khedive and the Egyptian Minister of War. There was also a round of inspections and parades of Egyptian troops. By the middle of November, Wingate arrived in Khartoum. Apart from the routine correspondence with his subordinates, by which he largely conducted his office, the Governor-General reserved the winter months for his tours of inspection through the Provinces, and the compilation of his annual report to the British Agent and Consul-General in Cairo. This was also the time of year when most of his many distinguished guests came to the Sudan. In April Wingate and his entourage moved to a hill station at Erkowit, in Red Sea Province, to escape the heat of the Nile Valley. The Governor-General departed this Sudanese Simla in June — embarking from Suakin (in later years from Port Sudan) — to commence his annual leave in Europe. Most of the summer was spent at Wingate's home, Knockenhair House, in Dunbar, Scotland. Throughout this period of annual leave many high- ranking officials of the Sudan Government were guests at Knockenhair, where they spent a great deal of time thrashing 102 out the budget details for the next year, and playing numerous rounds of golf. During these summer months, Warburg states, the Sudan was virtually deserted by all but the most unfortunate, low-ranking, British officials. The highlight of Wingate's annual leave was a visit to Balmoral Castle as the guest of one of the three sovereigns who occupied the British throne during his tenure as Governor- General of the Sudan. In October the annual routine started over again.55

The reign of King Edward VII marked the height of the prestige, both official and social, which Wingate was to enjoy during his career. Both Wingate and Slatin were annual guests of the King at either Balmoral or Sandringham. There they entertained the elite of Europe with tales of their adventures in the Sudan. In Vienna they were accorded the same sort of reception by Slatin's Austrian admirers.55

Both men were extremely conscious of rank, and both were personally very egotistical. Both had risen from comparatively modest beginnings; now they were for more than a decade the toast of England and the Continent. The presence of either at her table would increase the status of any society hostess and to entertain the famous pair together was a highly prized honor. 103 The summer of 1914 started no differently from those of a number of years past. Wingate and Slatin commenced their round of activities, some together and others separately, in accordance with the routine they had

established over the course of the new century. The only important difference between this summer and the preceding ones was that in Vienna, on 21 July 1914, Slatin married Alice von Ramberg, the forty-one-year-old sister of a

colleague of his brother Heinrich.5? Three weeks earlier, on 28 June, the event for which the summer of 1914 will always be remembered in history had, of course, already occurred; the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie at Sarajevo. Great Britain's entry into the war against Germany and Austria-Hungary on 4 August 1914 caught Sir Reginald Wingate at his home in Dunbar, Scotland. Four days later he sailed from Tilbury on the P & O Liner Mooltan, along with 15 other generals and 1,600 lower ranking officers. With stops at Gibraltar and Malta along the way, Wingate arrived at Port Said on 18 August. After conferring with British and Egyptian officials in Cairo, he departed for Khartoum on

5 September and arrived there without mishap on the 13th.5® ENDNOTES CHAPTER III

1. Reports on the Finance, Administration, and Condition of the Sudan 1903 (London: Waterlow & Sons Ltd., 1904), 3. (Hereinafter The Governor-General's Report). Philip Magnus, Kitchener: Portrait of an Imperialist (New York: E.P. Dutton & Company, 1959), 80. (Award of a peerage to Sir Evelyn Baring). 2. Beshir Mohammed Said, The Sudan: Crossroads of Africa (London: Dufour Editions, 1965), 12. 3. P.M. Holt and M.W. Daly, A History of the Sudan: From the Coming of Islam to the Present Dav (London: Longman, 1988), 33-34. 4. B.G. Martin, Muslim Brotherhoods in Nineteenth Century Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 6-7. 5. Ibid., 117. 6. Holt and Daly, A History of the Sudan. 88. 7. Said, The Sudan: Crossroads of Africa, 12-13.

8. Ibid., 12. 9. Ibid., 12-13. 10. Holt and Daly, A History of the Sudan. 11. 11. G. Ayoub Balamoan, People and Economics in the Sudan: 1884-1956 (Cambridge: Harvard University Center for Population Studies, 1976), 309. 12. Holt and Daly, A History of the Sudan. 29-31. 13. P.J. Vatikiotis, The Modern History of Egypt (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), 53, 54, 55. 14. Ibid., 68. The term "Turco-Egyptian" requires some explanation. The ruling classes of Egypt were largely Turkish in origin, and the Sudanese came to

104 105 apply the term "Turk" to any outsider who came to the Sudan as a governing official or soldier. It is not uncommon to read of the Sudanese referring to the British as "Turks." 15. Holt and Daly, A History of the Sudan. 11. 16. Ibid., 70. The extent to which the slave trade increased during the period of effective Egyptian control of the Sudan is somewhat speculative. Although there is no doubt that it did increase, it was certainly in the interests of the British in the period after 1898 to stress the negatives of the former Egyptian administration as a justification for allowing the Egyptians as little authority as possible in the Condominium arrangement. 17. Ibid., 72. 18. J.C.B. Richmond, Egypt 1798-1952; Her Advance Towards A Modern Identity, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 76-77. 19. Holt and Daly, A History of the Sudan, 77, 78,79.

20. Gabriel Warburg, The Sudan under Wingate (London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1971), 13. 21. Ibid., 14. 22. M. W. Daly, Empire on the Nile: The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan 1899-1934 (Cambridge University Press, 1986), 17. 23. J. A. Mangan, The Games Ethic and Imperialism (Harmondworth: Viking, 1986), 72-73. 24. Ibid., 88. 25. Ibid., 74. 26. Ibid. 27. Daly, Empire on the Nile, 87. 28. Sudan Archive Durham, Wingate Papers, 270/5/10 106 (G. E. Matthews to Wingate, 12 May 1900). 29. Said, The Sudan; Crossroads of Africa. 12, 22. (Primitive irrigation and size of plots). Holt and Daly, A History of the Sudan. 140. (Crops produced). 30. Arthur Gaitskell, Gezira: A Story of Development in the Sudan (London: Faber and Faber, 1959), 42. 31. Ibid., 43-44. 32. Mekki Abbas, The Sudan Question: The Dispute over the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium 1884-1951 (London: Faber & Faber Ltd., 1952), 77-78. In the years just prior to Sudanese independence, Sayed Mekki Abbas was Managing Director of the Gezira Scheme. This from: Gaitskell, Gezira: A Storv of Development in the Sudan. 33. Ronald Wingate, Wingate of the Sudan (London: John Murray, 1955), 156-157. 34. Abbas, The Sudan Question. 96. 35. Wingate, Wingate of the Sudan, 96-97.

36. Daly, Empire on the Nile, 204. 37. SAD, Ralston Kennedy Papers, 400/4/3-4. 38. Daly, Empire on the Nile, 204-205. 39. SAD, Ralston Kennedy Papers, 400/4/23-24. 40. Ibid., 400/4/25. 41. SAD. Wingate Papers, 279/7/12 (G. B. Macauley to Lord Cromer, 27 January 1906). 42. Ibid., 279/7/22 (An article from Page's Weekly dated 1 December 1905) . 43. Daly, Empire on the Nile, 205. 44. Kenneth Bourne and D. Cameron Watt, eds., British 107 Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part I Series B, The Near and Middle East. 20 vols. (Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America Inc., 1985), 15: Britain. Egvpt, and the Sudan: 1885-1914. Document 156 (Memo by Wingate written 9 August 1908 for inclusion in Document 155 by Sir Eldon Gorst (18 August 1908). 45. Reports on the Finance, Administration, and Conditions of the Sudan 1908 (Khartoum: F. Nimr & Co., El Sudan Printing Press, 1909), 27. 46. Ibid., 27-28. 47. Ibid. 48. Great Britain, Colonial Office, Colonial Reports: Uganda Protectorate, #558 (London: HMSO, 1908), 17. Great Britain had established a formal protectorate over the native Kingdom of Uganda in 1900. The first Governor, Sir Henry Haskett Bell, was appointed in 1906. Prior to his appointment authority had been exercised by a Special Commissioner. Less formal British control of Uganda dated from 1890. This from: Encyclopedia Britannica. 11th ed., s.v. "Uganda." 49. Great Britain, Colonial Office, Colonial Reports: Gold Coast, #534 (London: HMSO, 1907), 28-29. 50. Great Britain, Colonial Office, Colonial Reports: East African Protectorate, #557 (London: HMSO, 1908), 21, 33. 51. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Growth and Manpower in the Sudan, Population Studies No. 37, 1964, 1, 110-111. 52. Daly, Empire on the Nile, 95. 53. Gabriel Warburg, Egypt and the Sudan (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1985), 60. 54. Warburg, The Sudan under Wingate, 23. 55. Daly, Empire on the Nile, 97. Lord Cromer seems to 108 have been very much Wingate's "Mentor." This is implied, although no great emphasis is placed upon the fact, in a number of sources. Wingate arrived in Egypt in 1883, the same year as Baring, at a time when the number of British officials there would have been rather small in comparison to later years. The entry on Cromer in the Dictionary of National Biography states that he was initially a soldier — an artillery man from Woolwich — the same as Wingate. Although this may seem a trivial thing, it might have provided the basis for the friendship which developed between the two men. In all the sources I have consulted I have found no better reason for Baring's efforts to advance Wingate's career. 56. Ibid., 94. 57. SAD, Wingate Papers, 279/6/28-29 (Wingate to Lord Cromer, 12 December 1906). 58. Ibid., 279/6/35. 59. The Governor-General's Report 1908, 69.

60. Gordon Brook-Shepherd, Between Two Flags (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1973), 196, 198-199. 61. Daly, Empire on the Nile, 102. 62. Ibid. 63. SAD, Wingate Papers, 299/1/29 (Clipping from the Daily Mail containing the text of Roosevelt's speech, dated 1 June 1910). 64. Ibid. 65. Warburg, The Sudan Under Wingate, 9, 10, 11, 12. Wingate had his home, Knockenhair House, built in the 1890s. I visited it during my first research trip to Durham University in October 1985. It is built of gray stone in the style of a Scottish castle, and sits on a high bluff on the western edge of the town of Dunbar. It overlooks the North Sea just below the point where the Firth of Forth empties into it. Between the base of the bluff and 109 the water is several hundred yards of level land occupied by a golf course. The location dominates the town and the entire surrounding area — apparently Wingate attached as much importance to "regal" appearances at home as he did in the Sudan. Following his death at Knockenhair in 1953, the Wingate family sold the house, and it has now been divided up into four luxury flats. 66. Brook-Shepherd, Between Two Flags, 213. 67. Ibid., 243, 248. 68. Wingate, Wingate of the Sudan, 166-167. CHAPTER IV WINGATE'S WARTIME ROLE 1914 - 1918

The outbreak of the First World War in the summer of 1914 did not pose an immediate threat to the British position in the Middle East. The declining Ottoman Empire, with which a sizable portion of the Egyptian upper class felt a strong sense of kinship, initially stayed neutral. This was not, however, a situation which was likely to continue for very long, for the national interests of the Turks were obvious and far too compelling. It had been neither the Germans, nor the Austrians, who had whittled down the Turkish empire throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries but, rather, the very nations that now formed the Triple Entente: France, Great Britain, and Russia. Turkish entry into the war on the side of the Central Powers held out the hope of a restoration of the Sultan's former grandeur, and was not long in coming. On 5 November 1914, only a little more than three months after the start of the European war, Turkey went to war against the Allies.1 The opening of hostilities with the Turks presented the de facto rulers of Egypt and the Sudan with a potent

110 Ill military threat both to their position in the Middle East and to their lines of communication with their empire in India and the Far East. The territories of the Turks prior to the First World War included all of present-day Lebanon, Syria, Israel, Jordan, and Iraq, as well as the entire Red Sea coast of what is now Saudi Arabia. The close proximity of the Turkish province of Palestine to the Suez Canal was particularly threatening, and possession of Mesopotamia (Iraq) put the Turks in a position to endanger the Persian oil fields upon which the most modern ships of the Royal Navy were dependent. The possible political and religious ramifications of Turkish entry into the war were also rather unsettling to the British. Although there could be no doubt that they were the real rulers of both Egypt and the Sudan, the situa­ tion of those two countries in strictly legal terms was somewhat more complicated. The Khedive of Egypt owed his allegiance to the Sultan in Constantinople, and the Sudan was historically part of Egyptian national territory. However little these two facts mattered in terms of real power, they put Great Britain on rather dubious ground to wage a war against Turkey in defense of the Egyptians and Sudanese. The British solution to their quandary was the 112 proclamation of a genuine Protectorate over Egypt. The 'Veiled Protectorate,' by which the British had exercised effective control since 1882, was now replaced by an offi­ cial one, complete with martial law. This action was taken on 18 December 1914 and, the following day, the British removed Khedive Abbas Hilmi because of his supposedly pro- Turkish leanings and replaced him with Prince Hussein Kamel,

who took the title of Sultan.^ Presented with this fait accompli. the Egyptian people demonstrated no great outburst of feeling either for or against British policy. Their attitude was more one of cautious resignation. The religious role of the Turkish Sultan, and its possible impact upon millions of Moslem subjects of the British Empire, was of greater significance than the tightening of political loose ends in Egypt. The loyalties of these people surely would be sorely tested if the Sultan proclaimed a jihad, a war of religious obligation against the infidel. On this issue Wingate had very strong views, and he acted upon them in the Sudan almost the moment war was declared against the Ottoman Empire. The Governor- General was of the opinion that the loyalty of the Sudan's (and the entire Empire's) Moslem subjects could be retained and, indeed, strengthened by a fair and open approach to the 113

problem. This, Wingate believed, would build confidence in Britain's intentions towards them. Accordingly, he assembl­ ed the Sudanese notables from every province of the Con­ dominium at Khartoum shortly after the Turkish entry into the war and addressed them on just this subject: The world policy of Great Britain will remain unchanged. She will ever maintain and enforce on others the maintenance of the sanctity and inviolability of the Holy Places ... She will continue to improve in every possible manner the facilities for the Pilgrimage and for the practice of the Mohammedan Religion... I assure you before God that your fears are groundless, and that in the British Empire the position of no single Mohammedan will be changed one iota and no single privilege granted to Islam will be repudiated.^ Wingate's approach to the issue of conflicting Islamic loyalties proved to be the correct one. Whatever their secret feelings in fact were, the Egyptian ruling class never attempted to subvert the Allied war effort in the Middle East on anything resembling a significant scale. The religious affinity which existed was not enough to compensate for the unpopularity of Turkish rule in the Arab world and, in the ultimate success of Britain's war against the Turks, that unpopularity was a factor of great value. From the start of the war through the end of 1916, Wingate continued to hold his position as Governor-General in Khartoum and his influence on the military policies 114 pursued by the High Command in Cairo was limited, although certainly not completely absent. The only military operation in which he was involved directly during the first half of the war was the Darfur Campaign of 1916. The remote Darfur province of the Sudan, which Slatin had surrendered to the Mahdists years before, had been permitted an enormous degree of autonomy under the Anglo-Egyptian condominium. In actuality, the 'province' was all but independent. There was no British Provincial Governor in Darfur and no government troops were stationed there. In return for a rather small annual tribute to Khartoum, the Sultan of

Darfur was permitted to go his own way unhindered.4 For years the Sultan had maintained close relations with the Senussi Moslems across the border in what is now Libya. In the Turco-Italian War of 1911-1912, Italy had wrested control of the Tripolitanian and Cyrenaican coastline from the Turks. In the interior of the country, however, the Senussi continued to resist the new rulers successfully. So long as Great Britain and Turkey were at peace, and Italy was formally aligned with Germany and Austria-Hungary in the Triple Alliance, Darfur's dealings with the Senussi were of minor concern to the British. 115 When the European war started in 1914, the Italians did not actively assist the Triple Alliance, but remained neutral. Italy's official justification for staying out of

the war was that the Alliance was a defensive one only and no attack had taken place against either Germany or the Habsburg Empire. Indeed, it was they who had been the aggressors. Less altruistically, the Italian government had long realized that alliance with the two Teutonic empires was simply not in the national interest. The treaty had been signed in the early 1880s, during a period when Franco- Italian relations had been extremely bad. By the first decade of the twentieth century, this was no longer the case.5 Lured by promises of support for its legitimate claims on the Italian-populated areas under Austrian rule (and the somewhat less legitimate ones on the Dalmatian coastline), the government of Victor Emmanuel III signed the secret Treaty of London with the British and French. In May 1915 Italy entered the war on the side of the Allies.® Italian participation in the struggle against the Central Powers inevitably altered Britain's attitude toward the Senussi and the Sultan of Darfur's dalliances with them. What had been regarded lightly while Italy was a hedging neutral now suddenly became a threat to the Allied cause. 116 Wingate, who had always regarded the degree of autonomy which Darfur enjoyed as a less than desirable situation, was an enthusiastic, if cautious, supporter of prompt action to bring the province under the government at Khartoum.? The Governor-General's caution was prompted both by his knowledge of the fighting quality of the men who would be defending Darfur in the event of government military action and by the numerical weakness of the forces he would be able to deploy against them. The campaign against Darfur commenced in March 1916. The force Wingate had managed to assemble on the frontier of the province was a rather scanty one. It consisted of two companies of mounted infantry, five companies of the Camel Corps, and eleven companies of infantry (six Sudanese, two Arab, and three Egyptian). Six light mountain artillery pieces and some outdated Maxim guns completed an army that totalled just two thousand men.® Tactical command of this force was exercised by Lt. Col. P. J. V. Kelly, an officer of the 3rd. Hussars who was seconded to the Egyptian Army.^ The Governor-General remained in Khartoum, where he concerned himself with matters pertaining to the support of the campaign. The troops had to cross about two hundred fifty miles of desert to reach El Fasher, the main city of 117 Darfur, where the Sultan had concentrated a force estimated at between four and six thousand riflemen. This difficulty was surmounted by the use of both camels and some motor vehicles to transport water to the troops en route. By late May Kelly's forces had reached the outskirts of El Fasher, having to that point fought only very minor skirmishes with the Sultan's men. At the village of Beringia, just outside El Fasher, the government troops encountered an enemy force of about 3,600 men in an entrenched position. A preliminary bombardment followed by a ground assault was the British plan, but this was forestalled by their enemies, who suddenly rose from their position and launched a charge against them. Kelly's men formed themselves into a square for defense and the result, after about forty minutes, was a repeat of the Battle of Omdurman on a much smaller scale: over one thousand casualties had been inflicted on the Darfur troops for a loss of twenty-six government soldiers.^ The next day El Fasher was occupied. Like the Khalifa at Khartoum in 1898, the Sultan of Darfur fled into the desert with what remained of his followers. It was not until November 1916 that he was ambushed and killed by a government force. 118 By comparison with the much larger battles taking place against the Turks in the Sinai and, even more so, with the slaughter of the war in Europe, the Darfur Campaign of 1916 seems like the most trivial of sideshows. In terms of the number of troops and amount of equipment involved and the number of lives lost, the campaign would have difficulty holding its own against a minor trench raid on the Western Front. Yet it was not without importance in what it achieved: The danger of the rising is not to be measured by the relative ease with which it was suppressed, or by the small number of troops engaged, any more than is the larger scale campaign against the Senussi. It is not difficult to stamp out a spark travelling along a fuse to a powder barrel, but the task is one demanding speed and resolution. How disastrous might have been the explosions planned by Germans and Turks in Kordofan, in Upper Egypt, in the Faiyum, and the region of Alexandria, they alone knew who bore the responsibility for the safety, not only of those areas, but of all Egypt and the Sudan. Of far greater significance than the Darfur Campaign in Wingate's contributions to the British war effort was his early and unequivocal support for the Arab Revolt. For centuries the Arab subjects of the Ottoman Empire had been relegated to something less than the status of second-class citizens. Although they shared the religion of their Turkish overlords, they were habitually treated with less regard than most of the other subject nationalities: the 119 Christian Greeks, for example, fared far better under the rule of the Turks than did the Arabs. This was a situation that had created the type of smouldering resentment that is easily fanned into flames, and the British were not slow to recognize the potential benefits of abetting this Arab discontent. The Red Sea coast of the Arabian Peninsula was an area which the Turks could not hope to guard against the incursions of their enemies. The tiny and outdated Turkish navy was hard pressed to contend with the Russian fleet in the Black Sea. Even if the Turks had been free to concentrate every ship they possessed in defense of the Arabian coast, the British would hardly have been so obliging as to permit them to pass through the Suez Canal to reach it. It was relatively simple, therefore, for British agents to infiltrate into Arabia and make contact with the dissident elements present there. The Turkish forces defending the area were extremely vulnerable to attack for several reasons. The only important communications link in the area was a railroad that connected the all-important city of Mecca with the more heavily defended province of Palestine. This railway was quite close to the coast at most points, and was the only means by which the Turks could 120 move troops and supplies in and out of Arabia with any rapidity. The Turkish forces were strung out along it in a number of fortified camps. The railroad was their lifeline and, as its defense became the focus of their strategic thinking, a siege mentality was created which worked to the advantage of the British and their Arab allies. The relative isolation of the Arabian Peninsula from the rest of the Ottoman provinces had caused an economic situation to develop there which also worked to the advantage of the British. The transportation difficulties that hampered the Turks in their efforts to defend their Red Sea coastline had also made it expensive and unreliable to supply the region from Turkey, even in peacetime. Over the years the area had come to rely on food supplies shipped from India. These were paid for almost entirely by the revenue derived from the annual pilgrimage to the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina.Hussein ibn Ali, the Grand Sherif of Mecca, ruled the Hejaz, as the region was known, in the Sultan's name. His role in the start of the Arab Revolt was crucial and resulted from both his concern for the people of the Hejaz and his refusal to accept the legitimacy of the jihad, which the Sultan had declared against the Allies on 23 November 1914, less than three 121 weeks after the Ottoman Empire entered the war.^® To become popularly effective this must be endorsed by Mecca; and if endorsed it might plunge the East in blood. Hussein was honorable, shrewd, obstinate, and deeply pious. He felt that the Holy War was doctrinally incompatible with an aggressive war, and absurd with a Christian ally: Germany. So he refused the Turkish demand, and made at the same time a dignified appeal to the Allies not to starve his province for what was in no way his people's fault. The Turks in reply at once instituted a partial blockade of the Hejaz by controlling the traffic on the pilgrim railway. The British Jgft his coast open to specially regulated food vessels. Although the exclusion of the Hejaz coastline from strict naval blockade was certainly intended to encourage the separatist feelings spreading through that region's leadership, the British did not, in early 1915, attach the highest priority to their effort to foment a revolt against Turkish rule in Arab areas. Virtually all planning at that time focused on the action intended to capture Constantinople and open the Dardanelles to Allied shipping: the Gallipoli Campaign. As long as the British believed that it might be possible to knock the Turks entirely out of the war by capturing the Dardanelles, little attention was paid to small-scale military activity on the periphery of the Ottoman Empire.By mid-1915 it had become painfully evident to the British that the attempt to force the Dardanelles had degenerated into a bloody stalemate. While 122 not yet anticipating the evacuation of the Gallipoli positions that ultimately took place in January 1916, the British Government and High Command were, by late June 1915, willing to consider operations against the Turks that might relieve some of the strain on the hard-pressed Allied forces.1® Wingate had been working closely with Brigadier Sir Gilbert Clayton, Director of Military and Civilian Intelligence at Cairo, to keep open the avenues of communication with the Sherif of Mecca. Clayton had participated in the final campaign against the Mahdists in 1898 and had served as an officer of the Egyptian army since 1900. From 1910 onwards he had been attached to the Sudan Government, from which he had been loaned to serve in Cairo at the start of the war.^^ Clayton had served as Wingate's private secretary during his time in Khartoum, and the Governor-General had a high regard for his abilities.^0

Clayton was to prove a very valuable colleague in Wingate's effort to gain approval for a policy of broad support of the dissidents in the Hejaz. The main British contact with the potentially rebellious Arabs of the Hejaz was through the sons of Sherif Husein. The most prominent of these were Abdullah, Faisal, and Ali. Each of these men, members like their father of 123 the Hashemite family which traced its direct descent from the Prophet through his daughter Fatimah,^^ was to become a king as a result of his family's support of the British cause against the Turks. In 1915, however, this was all in the future: the task at hand, for Wingate and Clayton, was to persuade Sherif Hussein to exchange a position which was, in effect, neutrality, for full support of the Allied cause. The key to success in this endeavour was to convince the Sherif and his followers that the Allies would support the cause of Arab independence at the conclusion of the war. Given the past record of the British, French, and Italians in the Arab World, their guarantees of future recognition might justifiably be met with considerable skepticism by Hussein. The most important element in the successful conclusion of an alliance with the Sherif of Mecca turned out to be the intelligence provided to him by his own sons. Although Hussein had not endorsed the call for a jihad, he was still publicly loyal to the Ottoman government. This fact permitted his sons to travel freely through the Ottoman domains, observing conditions and reporting back to both their father and the British. What they observed did not encourage the Sherif to maintain his already strained 124 connections with the Turks. Upon Faisal's return from a trip to Damascus in mid-1915 his reports of Turkish atrocities directed against Syrian Arabs helped further to convince Hussein that defection to the Allied camp was the proper course of action.^2 Yet there were still grave doubts in the Sherif's mind concerning post-war Allied intentions in the Arab world. The British would have to set these doubts decisively to rest before he would make the final, irrevocable break with the Ottoman Empire. Sir Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner for Egypt until the end of 1916, entered into a lengthy correspondence with Hussein in an effort to reach an agreement that would bring him into the war against the Turks. The Sherif did not commence serious negotiations with the British until he felt confident that he could command the support of a wider section of Arab nationalism than merely that of the Hejaz. The primary purpose of Faisal's trip to Damascus in 1915 had been to negotiate with the Syrian Arab nationalist societies in order to obtain the broader power base which his father sought. The agreement which Faisal reached with the Syrians — the Damascus Protocol — largely achieved this goal. The Syrians had agreed that an independent Arab 125 state would be closely aligned with Britain, both militarily and economically. Armed with Syrian acceptance of a commanding position for Britain in the Arab world, Hussein felt able to enter into serious negotiations with McMahon. By the spring of 1916, McMahon and Sherif Hussein had arrived at mutual acceptance of a rather vaguely worded document, the McMahon Pledge, which promised that the British would recognize Arab territorial claims, protect the holy places of Islam, and assist the Arabs in setting up their new governments. Placing his people and their cause in the hands of the British, Hussein went to war against the Turks on 5 June 1916.^3 As the Sherif of Mecca had suspected, the guarantees

extended by his British allies were something considerably less than irrevocable. Just one month prior to Hussein's order for his followers to rise against the Turks, the British, French, and Russians had concluded a secret agreement that directly contradicted much of what had been promised to the Arabs. On 9 May 1916, Sir Mark Sykes of the

British Foreign Office and Georges Picot, a French counterpart, finalized a partition plan for the postwar Middle East that placed Syria under French rule, Mesopotamia and Palestine under the British, and effectively limited an 126 independent Arab state to the Arabian peninsula itself. Russian involvement in this treaty was peripheral, concerning only Russian claims in the Dardanelles and

Armenian areas.^4 Wingate had no direct involvement in the negotiations which produced the Sykes-Picot Agreement, but he was certainly aware of its existence and its terms. This is proven by a secret telegram to Sir Henry McMahon in which Wingate offered some advice on postwar boundary settlements in response to an earlier telegram from McMahon. Wingate commented that "French responsibilities in Syria and relations with the movement to (Peninsular) Arabian independence are liable radically to modify her (France's) attitude towards the Arms traffic in Arabia".^5 Of less relevance to the immediate topic, but certainly giving an interesting insight into the value system of a committed imperialist, are Wingate's suggestions for satisfying Italian territorial demands: I submit that the partition of Abyssinia by International agreement into spheres of political interest - on lines similar to those proposed by Lord Kitchener in his memorandum (with map) of 26 April 1914, but with certain modifications - will be a necessary concomitant to the introduction of any effective reforms in that country.... In the political partition of Abyssinia should also be found the means to satisfy Italian aspirations in N.E. Africa: and the allotment of a suitable sphere of influence, and the promise of support to her demands for concessionary and other rights within that sphere, will probably be more acceptable to her than such minor 127 transfers of territory or rectifications of existing frontiers as we can offer. ® That Wingate could, without a qualm, discuss the partition of a sovereign, internationally recognized nation, such as Abyssinia, speaks volumes on the mentality of Victorian imperialism. That Sir Henry McMahon, who also knew full well the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, could extend the guarantees he did to the Sherif of Mecca also smacks of extreme hypocrisy. Although one could argue that the exigencies of war justified the actions taken by the British in these years, it is also readily apparent that the policy of double dealing espoused in the Middle East during the First World War laid the groundwork for no end of troubles in subsequent decades. In the specific case of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, it did not take anything like decades for the duplicity to come back to haunt the British and French. In November 1917 the Bolsheviks published the secret archives of the Tsarist Foreign Ministry and, much to the chagrin of the defunct Russian regime's former allies, it was exposed to public scrutiny, together with numerous other not very admirable secret agreements.^7 By that time, however, the tide of war had turned strongly against the Turks and, having committed themselves to the Allied cause, the Arabs had little option but to stay the course. 128 Wingate's early advocacy of support for the Arab cause resulted in his being given military control over operations in the Hejaz in October 1916. A month later he took over political control as well.^® These two appointments were merely preliminary moves to ease Wingate into a position he had already been offered, and had accepted. In mid-October Viscount Grey, the Foreign Secretary, had sent Wingate a telegram offering him the High Commissionership for Egypt. The Foreign Secretary extended Wingate the additional courtesy of virtual carte blanche in naming his own successor as Sirdar and Governor-General of the Sudan.29

Sir Reginald took full advantage of the opening presented to him by Lord Grey: Having regard to the Sudan situation and the personal influence it has been my privilege to acquire here, I entirely share your Lordship's feeling that it would not do for me to leave the Sudan for any post but Cairo. When the people and tribes understand that, from Egypt, I should continue to exercise supervision over their welfare, I venture to think any disquietude my departure might cause would be allayed, and it is largely on this account that I would suggest that the officer appointed to carry out the dual duties of Governor-General and Sirdar should be, until the war is over, considered as holding these appointments temporarily, after which the question of his confirmation or otherwise could be gone into. In the person of Colonel Stack, C.M.G., (now Civil Secretary of the Sudan Government) I have an officer well-qualified to hold such a temporary position.... In order to give him the necessary prestige as Acting Sirdar, I consider that he might be made a temporary 129

Major-General which would give him the required seniority. ® Wingate's stipulation that his successor at Khartoum be regarded as temporary, at least until the end of the war, was to be of great significance within a few years. The new High Commissioner did not wish to burn all his bridges behind him as he left the country he had ruled for almost two decades to embark on his new assignment. Wingate's advice about the man to fill his post in the Sudan was also accepted by the Foreign Office. Sir Lee Stack was a loyal friend and subordinate of many years standing. With Stack as Governor-General and Sirdar. Wingate could feel confident that he would remain reliably informed of conditions both in the Sudan and in the Egyptian Army. Wingate's appointment as High Commissioner for Egypt was effective 1 January 1917.®^ Supporters of the Arab

Revolt reacted enthusiastically to Wingate's promotion to Cairo. When the news of Sir Reginald's selection was made public in early November, Clayton wrote to him: The appointment will be very warmly welcomed on all sides in Egypt and I hear delight expressed already on all sides. It has of course been a severe blow to Sir Henry (McMahon) but I think he quite realizes the priority of your claims to this substantive appointment now that poor Lord K (Kitchener) has gone.... I am so glad you are coming and wish it was at once. This appointment will do away with a thousand difficulties and inaugurate a very different state of affairs. It just makes all the difference to Egypt and 130 the Sudan.22

Clayton's reference to "poor Lord K" being gone is, of course, to the death of Lord Kitchener on 5 June 1916, when the cruiser H.M.S Hampshire. which was conveying him to Russia for meetings with the Tsar's High Command, struck a mine and sunk in the North Sea. In 1911 Kitchener had taken up the post of British Agent and Consul-General in Egypt after an absence of more than a decade from that country. When war broke out in 1914, he was on leave in Britain, and fully expected to return to his post in Cairo. When the

Asquith government instead named him Secretary of State for War, it was with the understanding that the Egyptian post would again be his at the end of the war. Those who occupied it in the interim would be regarded as only temporary.23

Wingate's predecessor as High Commissioner had not been regarded as very effective by his superiors in London. Sir Henry McMahon had proven unable to weld a group of extremely ambitious and competitive British ministerial advisors into a working team with a coherent policy for governing Egypt and contributing to the war effort. The most difficult of these to manage was Lord Edward Cecil, Advisor to the Egyptian Finance Ministry, and a younger son 131 of the third Marquess of Salisbury, who almost certainly had his own ambitions concerning the post of High Commissioner.24

Sir Ronald Graham, Advisor to the Egyptian Ministry of the Interior, also had aspirations to rule Egypt. He had, in fact, been under consideration for the position but, at age forty-four, his superiors thought him too young. Graham's position in the Egyptian Government was also considered to have been too closely connected to the Egyptian court to permit him to assume the detached, and somewhat aloof, position that was appropriate to the High Commissionership. Sir Milne Cheetham, Councillor to the Residency, was another figure whose personal ambitions made him a difficult subordinate.25

McMahon had spent his career first in the the army and, then, in the Indian Civil Service. He had, in fact, been born in India, as his father had also made his career in that country. From 1911 until his appointment to Cairo in 1914, Sir Henry had held the position of foreign secretary to the Government of India. When the war broke out in 1914, McMahon was on leave in England. After his many years of service in India he was contemplating retirement. Kitchener, who knew this, personally selected McMahon as his 132 replacement when he went to the War Office.25 McMahon spoke neither Arabic nor French, the language of the Egyptian court and political establishment, and knew nothing of the many nuances of the British Administration in Egypt.2? Kitchener's old colleagues in Cairo never warmed to McMahon and continued reporting directly to their former leader in many cases. Not surprisingly, Gilbert Clayton, the Sudan Agent in Cairo, was numbered among those who worked behind the scenes to achieve McMahon's removal. 28 Kitchener's death provided a welcome excuse to replace him with someone who could both be regarded as permanent and who would be more likely to bring his subordinates to heel: namely, Wingate. McMahon was informed of his ouster in so abrupt a manner that he did not have time to make arrangements for the transport of many of his personal furnishings to England and sold them to the incoming Wingates. Shortly before the arrival of the new High Commissioner from Khartoum, McMahon wrote him a rather pathetic letter of welcome — a letter not unlike many of those Wingate would be writing himself within a few years: Although I have tried to conceal the fact from those around me, I feel very sore at the way in which HMG have treated me, in never letting me know that my appointment here was only a temporary one and in giving me no warning of their intention to displace me. I speak freely to you on this matter because I feel sure you realize that I am free from any personal grudge. On the 133 contrary, I heartily welcome you as my successor and there is none to whom I would rather hand over charge. ^ The sort of inter-ministerial intrigues which had ruined McMahon's High Commissionership were to be of great concern to Wingate as well. This was particularly significant because of the change of cabinet that had occurred in England in December 1916. Wingate' appointment to Cairo had been made by the Asquith government, which was replaced at the end of 1916 by a war coalition led by David Lloyd George. The Liberal cabinets of Sir Henry Campbell- Bannerman and H.H. Asquith had been in office from the end of 1905, and Wingate had built up many contacts within them over the years. He was not in the same position with the new cabinet, nor were the highest leaders in Lloyd George's

government personally familiar with him.40 This weakened

his position in his efforts to establish himself firmly in charge of his conniving subordinates. The fact that he did not make a trip back to London to meet with the new leadership before taking up his duties in Cairo was probably a serious strategic error on Wingate's part. The new Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour, was Lord Edward Cecil's first cousin, and his brother. Lord Robert Cecil, was Minister of the Blockade (1916-18), and then became Balfour's deputy.41 While this did not necessarily mean that Lord Edward would 134 have the support of the Foreign Office in any disagreement he had with Wingate, it certainly did guarantee that his side of any issue would be heard in the right places. This fact was to be of importance somewhat later in 1917. Wingate's High commissionership for Egypt was, from the start, dominated by the requirements of the war effort. The role he had to play in both the military and diplomatic spheres of that effort far overshadowed the duties which would have been the routine activity of the High Commissioner in peacetime. The position he had assumed as General Officer Commanding for operations in the Hejaz kept him in constant consultation with both the British officers in the field and the Middle Eastern experts of the Arab Bureau, most notably Clayton. The additional task of mobilizing the resources of Egypt in support of the main British Empire force, conducting a more conventional campaign in the Sinai, now fell upon Wingate as well. Sir Reginald had already played a significant diplomatic role behind the scenes while he was Governor-General of the Sudan, and this, as well, only expanded when he became High Commissioner. When Wingate arrived in Cairo to take up his High Commissionership early in 1917, the Egyptian political 135 situation was not one to cause much concern. The imposition of martial law at the time the Protectorate was declared was partially responsible for this calm, but the cautious 'wait and see' attitude taken by the Egyptian nationalists with regard to the future political status of their country was probably of greater importance. The immense respect and prestige which Wingate enjoyed among the ruling classes of Egypt were to be an extremely important asset in keeping the nation relatively stable, at least for the duration of the war. As in the Sudan, Wingate's fluent knowledge of Arabic and his intimate understanding of the culture and customs of the Egyptian people, at all levels of society, were priceless advantages to the British. Although the requirements of the war effort demanded the greatest share of Wingate's time during his High Commissionership, several Egyptian domestic political episodes were of some significance. The health of Sultan Hussein Kamel had been deteriorating for some time and, as there was no clearly established rule of succession in Egypt, the selection of the future Sultan was of great concern to the British Government. The potential candidates for the throne were the Sultan's son. Prince Kamel-ud-Din, and his half brother. Prince Fuad. A "private and 136 confidential" letter to Wingate from Sir Ronald Graham illustrates the importance attached to the Egyptian succession at the highest levels in London: We are all much concerned about the Sultan's health and I fear that at the best he cannot last long. I must confess that had it not been for your evident preference for Prince Kamel-ud-Din we should here have been disposed to nominate Prince Fuad as his successor at once. I have always looked on Prince K. as a good sportsman and a good fellow, well disposed towards individual Englishmen - he was always extremely nice to me - but totally devoid of public spirit, inclined to consider all public duties irksome, his real tastes lying in sport and desert life, decidedly pro-Turkish and altogether under the influence of his wife. I admit that he is straight and that if he accepted the Succession he would endeavour to do his best by us; but I think it would be a poor "best", that he would not be of much use to us and that his strong will and hot temper might give rise to difficult situations in the future. Prince Fuad, on the other hand, though personally unpopular in native circles, is public spirited and only too anxious to play a role. If adroitly managed, as you could manage him, with a certain amount of flattery etc., he would help us to the best of his ability, and under your guidance he might gain in popularity and come to have a certain influence. But I recognize that you on the spot know the situation best. The telegram sent to you represented the united opinions of Mr. Balfour, Lord Curzon, and Lord Milner. My own impression, which will be confirmed or not before this letter reaches you, is that Prince K. unless influenced by the deathbed wish of his father, will refuse the Succession, and I confess that if he does so it will be a relief to me.42 The death of Sultan Hussein Kamel on 9 October 1917 brought the matter of the succession to the fore, and it fell upon Wingate to influence events so as to guarantee that the throne would fall to the candidate adjudged most 137

likely to serve British interests. Wingate's personal preference for Prince Kamel-ud-Din stemmed largely from the fact that Prince Fuad had spent a significant portion of his adult life residing in Italy, and the idea of an Egyptian Sultan closely connected to another European power with ambitions in the Middle East did not sit well with Britain's High Commissioner. Despite his misgivings, Wingate had to comply with the wishes of his government and attempt to convince Kamel-ud-Din not to press his claim to the throne. In this he was successful and Fuad was duly installed as Sultan, but Wingate described the interview with Kamel-ud- Din as one of the sorriest duties he had ever had to undertake in the service of his country.42

Within a few weeks of assuming his new position Fuad precipitated a dangerous political crisis by demanding two specific changes in the Egyptian cabinet. Wingate had been made aware of the new Sultan's dissatisfaction with two of his ministers before Fuad had even ascended the throne:

The night before Sultan Hussein's death when I interviewed Prince Fuad, as he then was, he referred to two members of the existing ministry in terms of great contempt - indeed he went so far with regard to one of them as to say that he could not possibly shake hands with him - this was Sir Ibrahim Fathi Pasha, K.C.M.G., Minister of Wakfs. The other was Ahmed Hilmi Pasha, Minister of Agriculture who, although an honest official, is admitted on all hands to know practically nothing about agriculture and to be generally incapable though I am told he was at one time a good Mudir of a 138 Province. Graham of course knows all about these Ministers.44

Fuad's strenuous objections to Fathi Pasha were due to the minister's alleged homosexuality, although the Sultan also leveled charges of official corruption in his ministry. The High Commissioner pointed out to the Sultan that if he wanted Fathi Pasha out of the cabinet on moral grounds then it was not Great Britain's business to interfere, but that a charge of corruption in his office would require an official investigation which could not help but involve the British administration. As Fuad had also expressed the same feelings to his Prime Minister Hussein Rushdi Pasha, however, the issue could not be ignored. The case of Hilmi Pasha was much more easily settled. His incompetence as Minister of Agriculture was known to all and no objections were raised by anyone when he was replaced.45

The considerably stickier situation of Fathi Pasha took somewhat longer to resolve. What was ultimately agreed to among the Egyptians themselves was that the Minister of Wakfs would tender his resignation in exchange for a public withdrawal of any charges of corruption in his ministry. The absence of any conclusive proof that such corruption even existed meant that the Sultan's supporters were not giving away much to get rid of Fathi Pasha, and the issue 139 was settled in this way.45 From the British point of view, a more objectionable aspect of the whole episode was the fact that Rushdi Pasha proposed two strong nationalist leaders to replace the ousted ministers. These were Saad Pasha Zaghlul as Minister of Agriculture, and Abdul el Aziz Bey Fahmi as Minister of Wakfs. Both of these men were to play crucial roles later in Wingate's High Commissionership. Wingate objected to Fahmi on the grounds that he did not have enough experience to hold cabinet rank. Another reason, which Wingate did not state publicly, was that Fahmi's wife was known to be Rushdi's mistress, and Wingate thought this could produce unfortunate consequences if Fahmi were given a cabinet position. The High Commissioner was willing to accept the volatile, but highly respected, Zaghlul as Minister of Agriculture but the Foreign Office was not: a man of such strong nationalist views as Zaghlul was known to hold was not wanted in the Egyptian ministry.4? When Wingate voiced

London's objections to Rushdi, the Prime Minister and his colleagues suggested that Ahmed Ziwer Pasha, Governor of Alexandria, be given the position. The High Commissioner forwarded this proposal, and his endorsement of it, to the Foreign Office and Ziwer was given the post.48 140 The whole series of events revolving around the succession to the Egyptian throne and the political crisis which followed upon the accession of the Sultan Fuad reveal both the depth of British involvement in the domestic affairs of Egypt and the importance of the role played by the High Commissioner in making that involvement effective. Wingate's willingness to accept Saad Pasha Zaghlul as Minister of Agriculture was certainly prompted by his knowledge of the following he had among nationalist opinion in Egypt: That the inclusion of Zaghlul and Fahmi will give the reconstituted Ministry a somewhat stronger Nationalistic tendency is undoubted, but on the other hand I am not altogether averse to this. As matters stand at present Zaghlul is Vice President of the Legislative Assembly and with his powers of oratory he has acquired a very predominant position and I am not at all sure that we would not be wise to secure his support on the side of the Government rather than have him in opposition.

In view of the influence Zaghlul was to exercise on the forces of Egyptian nationalism over the following several years, the High Commissioner's doubts about the wisdom of excluding him from office were certainly more than borne out.

Egypt's position in the First World War was, as it again became in the early 1940s, extremely ambiguous. The country was not officially at war with anyone. Egyptian 141 territory had been invaded; battles had been fought to repel the hostile forces; yet Egyptian soldiers had not participated in these events. The initial Turkish thrust

across the Sinai from Palestine in February 1916 had been turned back, on the banks of the Suez Canal, by British and Indian troops. The Sinai front had been relatively inactive since then. The major belligerent activity in the region was the British-sponsored Arab Revolt, which Wingate had worked so hard to help foment. In early 1917, however, this campaign was progressing in a series of stops and starts as the Arabs organized and gathered their strength. Although the Turks were being forced to endure an annoying harassment of their lines of communications in the Arabian peninsula, this did not yet constitute a major threat to their position there. The Mesopotamian Front did not come under the control of Cairo: it was run entirely by the Army and

Government of India. There, also, the British forces had not been able to occupy much more than the marsh lands of

the Tigris/Euphrates Delta by the end of 1916. Egypt itself had become the base for an enormous British Empire force by the time Wingate arrived there from Khartoum. The troops employed in the unsuccessful attempt to force the Dardanelles in 1915 had been assembled in the 142 Nile Delta and embarked from Alexandria. When it was decided to break off the bloody and fruitless fighting at the Cape Helles and Suvla Bay bridgeheads in early 1916, the bulk of the United Kingdom contingent there was transferred to the Western Front or to the Allied position at Salonika. The larger portion of the ANZAC (Australian/New Zealand Army Corps) troops were returned to Egypt. There they joined the British and Indian units already present to form an army which, by 1917, numbered almost two hundred thousand men.^® The impact of such a force on the economic life of Egypt was considerable. Shopkeepers, landowners, and the purveyors of every sort of service prospered as never before from the influx of cash. The recruitment of an Egyptian

Labor Corps, members of which ultimately served on the Western and Salonikan Fronts as well as in the Middle East, provided thousands of fellaheen with employment at wages in excess of anything they had ever previously received. Before the war ended in 1918 a quarter of a million laborers and twenty-three thousand camel drivers were serving with the Egyptian Labor Corps.Quite apart from the restraint made necessary by the presence of overwhelming British forces, it was certainly in the economic interest of a significant portion of the Egyptians to accept the status 143 quo of the Protectorate for the duration of hostilities. During 1917 the tempo of military activity in the Middle East intensified considerably. The increased military effort put forth by the British on peripheral fronts in 1917 had several explanations. The extremely heavy casualties incurred on the Western Front during 1916 had resulted in very little gain and had both sickened and frightened the British people and their government. The replacement of H. H. Asquith by David Lloyd George as Prime Minister in December 1916 gave an advantage, albeit a temporary one, to those members of the British Cabinet and military command who favored a more balanced plan of attack upon the Central Powers. A policy of attrition on the Western Front had no appeal for Lloyd George, and he believed that the sagging morale of the British public after more than two years of war needed to be bolstered by victories — victories paid for, moreover, at a minimal cost in human life.^^ General Sir Archibald Murray launched two bloody and unsuccessful attacks against the Turkish positions around Gaza in March and April 1917, and his replacement by General Sir Edmund Allenby was Lloyd George's response to them.53 The new commander's objective was, in the Prime Minister's words: 'Jerusalem before Christmas 144 À change of command had been in the works for some time, and was almost certainly in order. General Murray had written a short note to Wingate the day before leaving Cairo to launch his April attack against Gaza, and its tone was that of a very weary and disappointed man; I am going up to the Eastern Front tomorrow morning. We shall do our best to defeat the Turks during the next week or so but it will not be a rapid business and is very difficult owing to the absence of water. ... We may not take Gaza in the next few days but in that case we hope to establish ourselves strongly in close contact and must try to wear the Turks down. I have more ammunition than they have which is in my favour. I wish I had the 42nd. Division. Whatever I telegraph home I will duplicate to you. Of course heavy fighting means no light casualty rolls.

General Allenby did not launch a major attack against the Turks until October. When he opened his offensive against the Gaza-Beersheba line he utilized much stronger forces, both numerically and in artillery support,

than had ever been seen in Sinai before.^6 The comparatively open and thinly defended ground over which the campaign was fought permitted the British to use cavalry (of which they had two divisions) effectively. Used in conjunction with Royal Flying Corps air to ground support, the horsemen were able to fulfill their traditional function: the exploitation of the breakthrough achieved by the infantry.57 Further actions at Huj on 8 November and El 145 Mughar on 13 November were also successful and, by 11 December, Jerusalem had fallen to the British forces. A continuous line was established somewhat north of Jerusalem running from the Jordan River to the sea, and fighting died down for the wet winter season. General Allenby was scrupulous in his efforts to guarantee that the proper respect would be paid to the Holy City and that the shrines of all religions there would be appropriately protected. The entry of Allenby and his staff into the city was on foot through the Jaffa Gate. This was, of course, the same act of humility shown by the Crusaders centuries earlier. Allenby also used only his Moslem Indian troops to stand guard over the Islamic holy places. Such acts of consideration were well received by the local residents, and the international press.58 The following year renewed British operations cleared northern Palestine and much of present-day Lebanon and Syria of Turkish forces.59

In the campaign against the Turks the Arab forces of Sherif Hussein had played a valuable, if somewhat peripheral, role. The lightly armed Arabs had operated largely on the left flank of the Turkish forces in Palestine, in what is now Jordan and the northwesternmost 146 portion of Saudi Arabia. The capture of Damascus on 1 October 1918 was the crowning triumph of the Arabs. Although the city's fall was brought about largely through the victories won over the main Turkish force by British and Australian troops, the British forces held back while Hussein's men entered the city.®® The contribution they had made to the defeat of the Turks certainly merited this honor. Although they hadnot fielded more than three thousand men in the final days of the campaign, the number of Turkish soldiers drawn away from the British front by their constant raids enabled Allenby to launch his own offensive with a numerical superiority of five to one.®^ It would be pleasant to record that the Arabs reaped the full rewards of the effort they had put forth. In the years to come, however, they were to see their promised independence severely curtailed by the policies of nations far more powerful than themselves. These policies engendered a bitterness that is with us yet. After the final great German offensive on the Western Front had been contained and then driven back in the spring and summer of 1918, the entire Allied military situation had improved vastly. The Turks had been virtually driven out of the war. The Allied force at Salonika was 147 moving north to finish with the Bulgarians, liberate Serbia, and attack the Habsburg Empire from the south. The Germans in the West could do little to stop an Allied advance that now included an ever growing number of fresh American troops. With the sharp upswing in the fortunes of the Allies, the issues to be resolved at the war's conclusion became of more immediate concern than they had been when the final decision was still in some doubt. The claims and counter-claims of the nations which had struggled for four long years now came into play, not least those of Egypt. ENDNOTES CHAPTER IV

1. Ronald Wingate, Wingate of the Sudan (London: John Murray, 1955), 167.

2. Report of the Special Mission to Egypt (London: HMSG, 1921), 27 (Hereinafter The Milner Report). Edward Grey, Twenty Five Years: 1892-1916. 2 vols. (New York: Frederic A. Stokes Co., 1925), 1: 176- 177. 3. Quoted in Wingate, Wingate of the Sudan, 168. 4. Martin W. Daly, Empire on the Nile: The Anglo-Egvptian Sudan 1898-1934 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 172. 5. Robert Katz, The Fall of the House of Savov (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1971), 101-102. 6. Ibid., 207. 7. Daly, Empire on the Nile, 176-177.

8. George Macmunn and Cyril Falls, History of the Great War: Military Operations in Egypt and Palestine, 5 vols. (London: HMSO, 1928), 1:148. 9. Sudan Archive Durham, The Wingate Papers, 130/6/44 (Summary of the Darfur Campaign written by Wingate for publication in The London Gazette of 24 October 1916). 10. Macmunn and Falls, History of the Great War. 1:149. 11. Ibid., 1:150-151

12. SAD. Wingate Papers, 130/7/55 (Wingate to Lord Grey, 12 November 1916). 13. MacMunn and Falls, History of the Great War. 1:152-153 14. T.E. Lawrence, The Seven Pillars of Wisdom (New York: Doubleday, Doran, 1936), 50.

148 149

15. Ahmed Emin Yalman, Turkey in the Great War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930), 174. 16. Lawrence, The Seven Pillars of Wisdom, 50. 17. John E. Mack, A Prince of our Disorder: The Life of T. E. Lawrence (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1976), 122. 18. David Fromkin, A Peace To End All Peace: Creating the Modern Middle East, 1914-1922 (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1989), 168-169. On 30 June 1915, Sir Mark Sykes, an aide to Lord Kitchener, departed on a special mission to the Middle East to explore the feasibility of supporting an Arab revolt against the Turks as a way to draw Turkish forces away from the Dardanelles. 19. Robert O. Collins, ed.. An Arabian Diary: Sir Gilbert Falkingham Clavton (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 312.

20. Ibid., 356. 21. Mack, A Prince of our Disorder, 119.

22. Ibid., 123. 23. Collins, ed.. An Arabian Diary, 9-10. 24. Aaron S. Klieman, Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World: The Cairo Conference of 1921 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), 11-12. 25. SAD, Wingate Papers, 160/3/2 (Wingate to McMahon, 19 September 1916).

26. Ibid. 27. Klieman, Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World, 12-13. 28. Briton Cooper Busch, Britain, India, and the Arabs, 1914-1921 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 172. 150

29. SAD, Wingate Papers, 160/4 (Grey to Wingate, 11 October 1916). 30. Ibid., 160/4 (Wingate to Grey, 12 October 1916). 31. Busch, Britain, India, and the Arabs, p. 172. 32. SAD, Wingate Papers, 160/5/1 (Clayton to Wingate, 6 November 1916). 33. Ibid., 160/4 (Grey to Wingate, 11 October 1916). 34. Janice J. Terry, The Wafd: 1919-1952 (London: Third World Center for Research and Publication, 1982), 55. 35. Ibid., 12. Ronald Graham entered the diplomatic service in 1892, at the age of twenty-two. After serving at the British Embassies or legations at Paris, St. Petersburg, Tehran, and The Hague, he was posted to Cairo in 1907. In 1910 he became British Advisor to the Egyptian Ministry of the Interior. When the Turks entered the war in 1914, Graham was named to act as the representative of the British Commander-in-Chief, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, to the British Administration in Egypt (ie.. the High Commissioner). In 1916 he returned to England to assume the post of Assistant Under-Secretary of State, Egyptian Affairs, at the Foreign Office. Graham functioned as Acting Permanent Under­ secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in 1918-1919, while Lord Hardinge of Penshurst was in Paris at the Peace Conference. In November 1921 he became British Ambassador to Italy, and held that post until his retirement from the diplomatic service in November 1933. He died in 1949. This from: L.G. Wickham Legg and E.T. Williams, eds.. The Dictionary of National Biography: 1941-1950 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959), 313-314, s.v. "Graham, Ronald William." 36. L.G. Wickham Legg and E.T. Williams, eds.. The Dictionary of National Biography: 1941-1950 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959), 563, s.v. "McMahon, Sir (Arthur) Henry." (Information on McMahon's background and previous career). 151

Fromkin, A Peace To End All Peace. 89. (Kitchener's personal selection of McMahon to replace him in Cairo). 37. Terry, The Wafd; 1919-1952. 12. 38. Fromkin, A Peace To End All Peace. 89-90. 39. SAD. Wingate Papers, 160/6/60-61 (Sir Henry McMahon to Wingate, 8 December 1916). 40. Terry, The Wafd; 1919-1952. 55-56. 41. Ruddock F. Mackay, Balfour: Intellectual Statesman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 1, 301, 313. 42. SAD. Wingate Papers, 146/5/41-42 (Sir Ronald Graham to Wingate, 21 September 1917). 43. Wingate, Wingate of the Sudan. 222. 44. SAD. Wingate Papers, 146/10/117 (Wingate to Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, 29 November 1917). Wakfs are small Moslem shrines which are found in great number around the Egyptian countryside. Their maintenance was at public expense, which necessitated the presence of a ministry to administer them. Charles Hardinge, second son of Viscount Hardinge, entered the Foreign Office in 1880, after graduating from Trinity College, Cambridge. He served in a number of capacities at the British Embassies in Berlin, Washington, Sofia, Bucharest, Constantinople, Paris, and St. Petersburg. In 1903, he returned to England as Assistant Under-Secretary of State, and accompanied Edward VII on his tour of the capitals of western Europe. He became an indispensible advisor to the King on foreign affairs and had a major role in the formation of the Triple Entente. In 1910 Hardinge became Viceroy of India, and was raised to the peerage as a baron. When his term as Viceroy expired in 1916, he became Permanent Under­ secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and attended the Paris Peace Conference in that capacity. In 1920 Hardinge became Ambassador to France, and held that post until his retirement in 1922. He died in 1944. This from: L.G. Wickham Legg and E.T. 152 Williams, eds., The Dictionary of National Biography; 1941-1950 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959), 356, 357, 358, s.v. "Hardinge, Charles." 45. 8AD, Wingate Papers, 146/10/118,119-120. 46. Ibid., 166/3/175-176, 182 (Wingate to Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, 24 December 1917). 47. Ibid., 146/10/120-121 (Wingate to Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, 29 November 1917). 48. Ibid., 166/3/160 (Telegram no. 1381, Wingate to Foreign Office, 22 December 1917). 49. Ibid., 146/10/120 (Wingate to Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, 29 November 1917). 50. Percival G. Elwood, Egypt and the Army (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1924), 232-233. 51. Ibid., 240, 242. 52. Brian Gardner, Allenby (London: Cassell & Co. Ltd., 1965), 109-110. 53. David Lloyd George, War Memoirs (London: Odhams Press Limited, 1936), 1089. 54. Ibid., 1090. 55. SAD, Wingate Papers, 145/4/113 (Sir Archibald Murray to Wingate, 14 April 1917). 56. Gardner, Allenby. 121. 57. Ibid., 184 58. SAD, Wingate Papers, 147/3/10 (Allenby to Wingate, 11 December 1917). 59. Gardner, Allenby, 153, 170. 60. Mack, A Prince of our Disorder, 167. 61. Ibid., 176. CHAPTER V THE EGYPTIAN POLITICAL CRISIS: NOVEMBER 1918 - MARCH 1919

The whole issue of the ultimate political status of Egypt was one which had caused the British considerable concern ever since the Protectorate had been declared in 1914. The country had never been officially part of the British Empire, although the authority the British possessed in Egyptian internal and external affairs during the war was such that it might as well have been. This was a fact which had been equally true even under the 'Veiled Protectorate' of 1882-1914. Opinion in the ruling circles of the British Empire differed sharply as to what to do with Egypt when the war was concluded or, possibly, even earlier. The importance of the country to imperial trade and communications was so obvious that there was absolutely no support for the granting of unqualified independence to Egypt. Great Britain had numerous special interests and concerns that had to be safeguarded, and no British government could afford to ignore them. In the late summer of 1917 the rapidly declining health of the Egyptian Sultan had prompted a series of secret meetings, in London, at the highest level among

153 154 representatives of the British Foreign and Colonial Offices. The purpose of the meetings was to reach a clear decision concerning the future political relationship between Great Britain and Egypt before the need to make such a decision was thrust upon the British by the force of events. There were really only three permanent members of this secret group, which designated itself the Egyptian Administration Committee. These were: Arthur Balfour, the Foreign Secretary; Lord Curzon, the Lord President of the Council; and Viscount Milner, who was a Minister without Portfolio at that time.l Lords Curzon and Milner were, additionally, members of the Prime Minister's War Cabinet. The first meeting of the Committee, which was held on 24 September 1917, consisted of little other than the introduction of a letter from Sir Reginald Wingate stating his opinion that, while he recognized that much would have to be changed in Egypt after the war, he did not think it would be possible to implement any changes before then. Balfour went on record as not necessarily agreeing with Wingate's views and the date for the next meeting of the Committee was decided upon.^ The Egyptian Administration Committee held three more meetings: on 26 and 27 September, and 1 October 1917. 155 Knowledgeable officials interviewed during the course of these meetings included Lord Edward Cecil, the British financial advisor to the Egyptian government; Sir Milne Cheetham, the Councillor to the Residency in Cairo; Sir Henry McMahon, Sir Reginald Wingate's predecessor as High Commissioner for Egypt; and Sir Ronald Graham, Assistant

Under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office.^ Additionally, letters from a number of other persons with a special expertise in Egyptian affairs were introduced and taken into consideration. The final conclusions and recommendation of the Egyptian Administration Committee, which were embodied in a short report written by Lord Curzon, were adopted by the Committee and made available to their colleagues in the War Cabinet in March 1918. What is made most clear by Curzon's submission is that the Committee had not, in fact, arrived at any definite proposals that could be advanced to the British Government. There was no consensus among those regarded as 'experts' on Egyptian affairs as to how future British administration in Egypt should differ from what had existed previously. The preliminary draft of the Committee's report, written by its secretary. Sir Ronald Storrs of the Foreign Office, was rejected by Lord Curzon 156 because he felt that it had gone much too far in stating as firm conclusions a variety of alternatives that had been put forth for discussion on several issues. There is a good deal in the concluding stage of this report which I do not recall. It seems to be much more categoric and precise than the actual conclusions at which we arrived.^ What may be definitely stated, however, is that none of the participants in the discussions of the Egyptian Administration Committee remotely considered any lessening of British control over Egypt, either while the war was in progress or after its termination. The alternatives discussed were really only two: should future British administration of Egypt be conducted by a special new Egyptian section to be created in the Foreign Office, or should an entirely new department of Egyptian and Middle Eastern Affairs be established outside the Foreign Office? There was a consensus against the creation of any new department while the war was in progress, largely because of the greater strain such a move would place on the already undermanned agencies that would have to provide its personnel.® The report of the Egyptian Administration Committee only served, then, to underscore the fact that no strong direction could be expected from London by those men on the scene in Cairo attempting to deal with both the 157 demands of Britain's military campaign against the Turks and the political unrest which lurked just below the surface of Egyptian society. Behind the scenes at the London meetings another battle was being waged. Realizing that the power and influence possessed by Lord Edward Cecil in his Finance Ministry had grown to the point that it virtually overshadowed the High Commissionership, Wingate aligned himself with Ronald Graham and Lord Hardinge in an effort to remove him.® Wingate attempted to persuade the Foreign Office to release Cecil for military service (he had submitted a request to enlist in 1914, but had been retained in the Egyptian Government). While this was being decided, Cecil arrived in London on leave and attended the Egyptian Administration Committee meetings. There he was the main proponent of the scheme to set up a new department to deal with Egyptian and Middle Eastern Affairs.7 Lord Hardinge and Graham were able to prevent the adoption of this proposal, although Wingate was not as successful with his efforts to have Cecil taken into the army. Balfour rejected the idea that he could be spared from his position in Egypt, and he returned to Cairo when the Committee had concluded its business. Shortly thereafter, it was discovered that 158 Lord Edward was suffering from tuberculosis and, in December 1917, he vacated his position and went to Switzerland for treatment. Less than a year later he died there.® Although Cecil had been removed from the scene by illness, not by Wingate, the whole episode had put the High Commissioner into a confrontational situation with one of the most politically powerful families in England. This was certainly to be a factor in Wingate's subsequent difficulties. The Egyptian nationalist movement with which the

British authorities had to deal in 1918 was by no means a monolithic force. It was, not surprisingly, a reflection of the class-ridden and deeply schismatic society that Egypt, in fact, was. In a memorandum to Balfour in 1918 Wingate gave his analysis of the politically active elements in Egyptian society and of their significance to the nationalist movement. These were: I) The aristocratic (or Pasha) class, which Wingate characterized as reactionary, not revolutionary. They were largely of Turkish origin and, although their sympathies had remained with the Sultan during the war, they could, in the High Commissioner's opinion, be counted on to cooperate with the British authorities. They were mostly large landowners 159 and wanted no radical alteration in the status quo. II) The government officials, categorized by Wingate as a 'caste'. The High Commissioner viewed these civil servants as discontented with their lot, but unlikely to do much about it. The main cause of their unhappiness was, Wingate believed, the number of high government posts occupied by Europeans, and the belief that the British Protectorate tended to subordinate Egypt's interests to those of the British Empire. III) The intelligentsia (lawyers, journalists, and other professionals) were seen by Wingate as the main strength of the nationalist movement. This class had achieved great success and wealth in its various fields of endeavor but had not obtained corresponding political prestige and influence. The main obstacle to this attainment, in the view of the intelligentsia, was the

British presence in Egypt. Sir Reginald split the intelligentsia into two distinct groups; 1. The extremists, who were either pro-Turkish/pan- Moslem reactionaries or anti-European leftists of some variety. Wingate saw little possibility that any British policy or action would be able to placate the extremists. 160 2. The moderates were seen by Sir Reginald as educated nationalists. They were able to perceive the benefits Egypt had received from the British presence, but were deeply suspicious of Britain's motives and future ambitions. The High -Commissioner saw the moderate intelligentsia as the key group that Britain needed to win to its side. He believed that this could be accomplished by a policy of gradualism in implementing Egyptian home rule within the framework of a British Protectorate. IV) The Moslem clergy was seen by Sir Reginald as generally apolitical, although anti-Christian on principle and not favorable to the current British role in their country. He did not view them as much of a threat, as he believed that the collapse of the Sultan had left their ranks in some disarray.® The Egyptian nationalist movement which confronted the British at the end of the First World War was of quite recent origin, and contained a great number of men who had received European educations. Despite the apparent lack of any effective opposition to the role Great Britain had chosen to play in Egypt, the situation in which the country found itself after 1882 was a profound humiliation to many Egyptians. The attainment of ^ facto independence in the 161 early and middle portions of the nineteenth century had been swept away by yet another foreign nation, and behind Egyptian society's mask of seeming acceptance of that fact a great deal of anger and frustration seethed. By the 1890s, however, a number of voices began to make themselves heard in opposition to the presence of their alien rulers. Foremost was that of Mustafa Kamil, a French- educated attorney and journalist. Kamil's primary grievance against the British was their neglect of Egypt's educational system, which he viewed as a deliberate effort to perpetuate their own control over his country. If Egypt's school were able to graduate students with only the qualifications to be clerks, Kamil reasoned, then it would never be possible for them to replace the British administrators who occupied the highest posts in Egyptian government. The newspaper he established in 1900, al-Liwa (the Standard), quickly became the leading journal of the growing nationalist movement. Al-Liwa was published in Arabic, French, and English. Kamil's political party, al-Hizh al-Watani (the National Party), which he founded in 1906, was the first in Egypt to be organized along the lines of a modern western party, and it attracted some of Egypt's most highly-educated and promising young men into its ranks. 162 In 1907 al-Jarida. a newspaper reflecting more moderate nationalist views than al-Liwa. started publication. Its editor, who was to become another of Egyptian nationalism's most prominent spokesmen, was a young attorney and scholar named Ahmad Lufti al-Sayyid.^^ Lord Cromer regarded the new journal as a responsible alternative to al-Liwa and other more radical nationalist newspapers. Within less than a year, with Cromer's unofficial encouragement, al-Jarida had also spawned its own political party. This was Hizh al-Umma, the People's Party. In June, 1906, an incident took place in the small village of Dinshwai which all sources regard as a crucial turning point in the story of modern Egyptian nationalism. A small group of British officers had been invited by a wealthy Egyptian landowner to go pigeon shooting on his estate near the village. While the officers were at their sport, a barn in Dinshwai caught fire. The villagers assumed that the British had set the blaze (which they had not) and attacked them with wooden staves. The officers fired on the Egyptians, killing a woman and wounding four men. Despite this the villagers over-powered the British and beat them badly. One officer, a Captain Bull, managed to get away. 163 The captain attempted to run to a nearby British Army camp to get help, although he had severe head injuries. The extreme heat of the day, combined with his injuries, caused him to drop dead of sunstroke right outside the camp. A completely innocent Egyptian peasant who attempted to aid the dying man was himself beaten to death by British soldiers, who took him to be the captain's killer. What came of this tragic series of errors was a show trial which brought all the worst features of British imperialism to the attention of the Egyptian people. A special tribunal, permitted under an emergency decree of 1895, indicted fifty- two men from Dinshwai for the murder of Captain Bull. Twenty-one of these men were found guilty, of whom four were hanged and the remainder were given sentences ranging from penal servitude for life down to fifty lashes. Of the five judges who had passed sentence on the men, three were British and one of the two Egyptians was a Coptic Christian. The British soldiers who had murdered the Egyptian peasant attempting to aid Captain Bull were never charged with any crime. The outrage which spread across Egypt at this travesty of justice caused many people who had never involved themselves in politics before to become committed to the nationalist cause. 164 The severity of the sentences meted out in the Dinshwai Incident shocked the British Parliament and people, as well as the Egyptians. Questions asked in Parliament forced Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, to rise and defend the actions of the special tribunal, based on the information he had been given by British officials in Egypt. Later he was to modify his view of the incident — "When the full facts were before me I felt that what had been done was open to question."14 By that time, however, it was too late to undo the very severe damage which had been done to Great Britain's image in the eyes of the Egyptians. The Dinshwai Incident was a factor of some importance (in addition to health and age) which led to Lord Cromer's resignation as British Agent and Consul-General in March 1907.15 The administration of his successor. Sir Eldon Gorst, was a good deal more conciliatory in its relations with the Egyptians. Gorst had been Cromer's Agent in London prior to taking over from him in Cairo,1® and the new policies in Egypt were both to his own liking and in accordance with the wishes of the Liberal government of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, which had taken office in England late in 1905.17 165 As with much of what the British had done, and were yet to do, in Egypt and the Sudan, the new line of approach to the Egyptians was not motivated by altruism. The British administration in Cairo believed that Mustafa Kamil was secretly supported by the Khedive, who wished to use the extreme nationalists as a threat against England, in order to gain greater authority for himself.^® Be that as it may, the British began to support moderate nationalists in an effort to steal the thunder from both Kamil and the Khedive. It was during Gorst's administration that Saad Zaghlul Pasha became Minister of Education. The death of Mustafa Kamil early in 1908, at the age of only thirty-four, deprived al-Watani of the most forceful and dynamic nationalist leader who had yet emerged in Egypt. Kamil's successor was Muhammad Farid, a far less capable individual who was unable to prevent the party's drift into extremism.20 An increasingly alarming tendency towards violence on the part of the nationalists characterized the period of Gorst's administration. This culminated in the assassination of the Prime Minister, Butrus Ghali Pasha, in Cairo on 20 February 1910. The assassin, Ibrahim al- Wardani, was a Moslem and a member of al-Watani. From the nationalist point of view Ghali could not have been a worse 166

example of a puppet. He had been Egypt's signatory on the agreement which set up the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium in the Sudan in 1899; he had been the Coptic Christian judge on the special tribunal which tried the villagers of Dinshwai, and, at the time of his assassination, he was lending his support to a forty year-extension of the Suez Canal Company's concession, which the British administration desired. This would have extended the concession to the year 2009, and was the motivation for the assassin. The proposal was overwhelmingly voted down by the Egyptian General Assembly on 4 April 1910, and the British wisely decided to let the matter drop.21

The assassination of Ghali spelled the end of Gorst's experimentation with greater participation by the Egyptians in their own government. Sir Eldon Gorst continued as British Agent and Consul-General until his death on 12 July 1911, at the age of fifty-one, from cancer of the pancreas and liver.2%

The appointment of Lord Kitchener as Gorst's successor was a grave disappointment to all segments of Egyptian nationalists. The two main nationalist parties were both in a disorganized state throughout Kitchener's period in power and little was accomplished toward the 167 furtherance of any of their objectives before the start of

the First World War.23 With the severance of the Ottoman tie in 1914, Egyptian national feeling was free to develop along its own lines, unfettered by past connections to a greater extent than might before have been the case. In September 1918 a new political grouping — al-Wafd-al-Misri — was formed for the purpose of presenting Egypt's case at the Peace Conference that was certain to follow the conclusion of the war. The Wafd, which means simply "delegation" in Egyptian, was to become the most important political party involved in the events of the next several months and was, in fact, to be the major force in Egyptian politics between the two world wars. The Wafd was composed largely of men who fell into Wingate's category of moderate intelligentsia. The new party's most distinguished figure was certainly Saad Zaghlul Pasha, who had been Minister of Education before the war and was Vice President of the Legislative Assembly in 1918. A number of other prominent politicians, as well as a leavening of professional people and landowners, were among the founders of the Wafd. These men had received at least some encouragement and support from several members of the 168 Egyptian Cabinet, including Hussein Rushdi Pasha, the Prime Minister.24

The founders of the Wafd had been greatly influenced in their decision to press for an Egyptian presence at the Peace Conference by the publication of Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points. Of obvious significance among those declarations was the principle of national self- determination set forth by Wilson. This principle had a deep effect all over the colonial world, but in a more highly developed society such as Egypt's it caused great excitement among all classes of the nation.25 On 13 November 1918, just two days after the Armistice had come into force, three leading members of the Wafd sought, and received, an audience with the High Commissioner. These were Saad Zaghlul Pasha, Abdel Asis Fehmy, a lawyer, and Ali Sharawi Pasha, a member of the Legislative Assembly who was also a large landowner. In an interview lasting one hour the three men presented Wingate with a demand for complete Egyptian independence. Only in the Suez Canal Zone and in the administration of the Egyptian public debt would they permit continued British supervision. The three men also wanted passports issued to them by the British authorities so that they could travel 169 both to France, to attend the Peace Conference, and to Great Britain, to confer with government leaders there regarding Egypt's future. Wingate was, by his own description, generally sympathetic to the idea of Egyptian representation of some sort at the Peace Conference, but he thought of this only within the context of Egypt as a British Protectorate. On the issue of complete Egyptian independence the High Commissioner provided no encouragement at all to the Wafdists. He did not believe that the low level of literacy in Egypt, combined with what he considered to be an almost total lack of appreciation for the concepts of democracy, augured well for Egyptian stability without the British presence. Sir Reginald's visitors left with nothing really resolved. Later the same day Wingate received an unexpected visit from the Prime Minister, Hussein Rushdi. In a letter to Lord Hardinge of Penshurst (the Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs) written the following day. Sir Reginald reported the events of 13 November and made several recommendations as to the proper course to follow in dealing with them: A few hours after these gentlemen [the three Wafdists! had left me I had a visit from Rushdi Pasha, the Prime Minister. He told me that the three gentlemen had called upon him after leaving the Residency and I had a strong impression, from what followed, that they were 170 acting with the knowledge (though not necessarily the approval) of the Sultan and his Ministers; for Rushdi Pasha pulled out of his pocket the copy of a letter he had written to the Sultan, proposing that he and Adly Pasha (minister of Education) should proceed at once to London to take part in the Peace discussion. (I enclose a copy of the note). In presenting this, he remarked that, in his opinion, it would be very advisable for his three visitors to proceed to London and put up their case "as, in the event of their request being refused, the charge of inadequate representation of the Egyptian question could not be brought against us responsible Egyptian Ministers, as might be the case if we alone were delegated to proceed to London." He urged that there could not be a more favorable time than the present to settle once and for all the future of Egypt - and I think he is right.2°

Wingate went on to explain that he believed, given the growing sense of unease in Egypt over the country's future status, that it was "only just that the Sultan, his ministers and the Egyptians generally should be told how they stand".27

It is quite obvious that the High Commissioner fully grasped the significance of the interviews he had conducted: new and more articulate forces were afoot in Egypt, and he knew that it would be necessary to make concessions to them to guarantee the retention of Britain's most strategically important piece of imperial real estate. Wingate was most assuredly not prepared to compromise his country's interests in Egypt; he was, after all, one of the last remaining Victorian imperialists in a position of high authority. 171 What he did have the intelligence to comprehend, however, was that moderate concessions to Egyptian national aspirations, made in the very near future, might well forestall greater unrest and the demand for even greater limitations of British authority later. It was in this vein that he addressed his reports to his superiors in London. In the official reply received from Lord Hardinge, Wingate's meeting with the Wafdists was described as "unfortunate". This term was not applied to the outcome of the interview, but to the fact that the High Commissioner had consented to receive the three men at all.2® Clearly, the British government considered the idea of any sort of concessions to Egyptian national sentiment as unacceptable. Wingate was instructed by the Foreign Office strongly to discourage Prime Minister Rushdi and his party from coming to London and not to permit the three Wafdists to leave the country. Wingate was stung by what he regarded as a complete lack of confidence in his handling of the situation. His response to Lord Hardinge's criticisms reflects this feeling strongly: With reference to interviews, I am somewhat surprised at the criticism of H.M.G. on my reception of the nationalist leaders at the Residency. Apart from the fact that I had no precise information as to the object of their visit until we actually got down to business, I hold, in the strongest manner, the view that the H.C. should be accessible to 172 all and sundry. It is by this means alone that he can hope to keep touch with all that is going on - it is a considerable strain and means that much valuable time is taken up in those interviews - but, in my opinion, they help more than anything else, to keep the Egyptians in touch with the British Control.29

It was at this point in the letter to Hardinge that the High Commissioner made the statement, later described by political foes as a threat, that if the British Government could not support the policies of the man they had entrusted to conduct their affairs in Egypt, then they should consider replacing him: If it is really the view of H.M.G. that I should not see representatives of all shades of opinion at the Residency, I feel that I ought not to be here, for my conception of how best to serve my Country in the present position, is to act as I have done hitherto, and I would like to make it clear that should H.M.G. feel that I have not handled matters in a suitable manner - and in consonance with their policy and wishes - I hope that no personal consideration will interfere with their ideas that a change of H.C. may be desirable.®® Wingate went on to explain that he considered the support of the British Government and the British community in Egypt to be indispensable to the successful functioning of the High Commissionership. He also stressed that he was not writing in this fashion out of personal motivations, but out of a sincere conviction that he had acted correctly in receiving Saad Zaghlul Pasha and his colleagues. He concluded by reiterating what he had said earlier: "I would 173 therefore repeat that I am entirely at your disposal should it be thought that a change is desirable in the interests of our Country."®^ When it became public knowledge in Egypt that neither the official party nor the Wafdists would be received by the British Government, a full-blown political crisis erupted. That this came about was no surprise to the High Commissioner, but the Foreign Office was caught totally off guard by the depth of the reaction. Prime Minister Rushdi, Education Minister Adly Pasha, and a number of other cabinet ministers saw resignation as the only appropriate and honorable course of action in order to protest what they regarded as a deliberate humiliation by the British Government. In addition, the refusal of the British authorities to permit the Wafdist group to leave Egypt fanned the flames of more extreme nationalist sentiment. All these men became national heroes virtually overnight, and Sir Reginald was left with the difficult task of assisting the Sultan in the formation of a new Government — one in which most Egyptian legislators would consider it political suicide to serve. In this task Wingate was to receive a good deal less than the full attention or support of his superiors in 174 England. Within little more than a month after the Armistice, the United Kingdom held its first General Election since 1910. The attention of David Lloyd George and the major political leaders allied with him was certainly distracted from events elsewhere by this development. The High Commissioner's constant telegrams of information and suggestions to the Foreign Office were also arriving at a time when the top men in that Ministry were largely preoccupied with the opening stage of the Paris Peace Conference. A letter received by Wingate from Sir Ronald Graham, who was Acting Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, at the height of the Egyptian political crisis is illustrative of the lack of understanding and concern that existed in London: We have received a series of interesting dispatches and letters from you on political events in Egypt. I fear you must be having a somewhat trying time. I think it was most unnecessary of Rushdi and Adly to resign on such slight provocation. During the next months the Foreign Office will consist of Mr. Fisher, who can know nothing of Egyptian affairs, and myself. Mr. Balfour, Hardinge, and Hurst will all be in Paris. I do not know if the Egyptian Ministers expected to go to Paris with a vague hope that they might have a say in the Peace Conference, but as you know the preliminary Conference is a purely Allied affair, and all the Allies, except the U.S.A., have already recognized our Protectorate in Egypt. I think if any Egyptians are banking on United States support their hopes are fallacious. Of course we shall be delighted to see Rushdi and Adly and the Sultan and any other responsible Egyptians who come over here as soon as the Foreign Office is able to attend to ordinary work and no longer has its hands full with the 175 Peace Conference.®2

Despite the resignation of the top members of the Egyptian Cabinet, and despite Wingate's repeated warnings, Graham referred to dealing with the Egyptians as "ordinary work." It is apparent that the Foreign Office did not yet appreciate, or did not wish to admit, the extent to which the situation in Egypt had deteriorated. The High Commissioner's recommendation that the Wafdists should also be received by the British Government did not meet with Graham's approval on the grounds that any such recognition would provide the Egyptians with political capital. No consideration was given to the possibility that Zaghlul and his followers were already making much more capital out of the British refusal to permit them to leave Egypt. Sir Ronald should have been much more aware of the full implications of the situation in Egypt. Prior to the fall of the Asquith government two years earlier, he had headed the Egyptian Affairs Section of the Foreign Office: under Lloyd George he was subordinate only to Lord Hardinge.®® Before launching into a discussion concerning an apparent British conspiracy to remove the French Director of Antiquities in Cairo, and to replace him with an Englishman — an effort which seems to have been dear to the heart of 176 both Graham and Wingate — Graham made a final statement on the Egyptian political crisis: In the meantime I send you a private letter to Rushdi, which you can either forward to him or suppress as you think best. It is intended to convey to him that he should not make a fool of himself, and that it is only by remaining in the Government that he can expect to be a spokesman for Egypt when Egyptian reforms are considered.®4

The Egyptian political crisis continued through the remainder of 1918. Denied permission to leave the country, the Wafdists embarked upon a campaign of circulating petitions to gain support for their stand. Saad Zaghlul was not reluctant to intimate to his potential adherents that the reception accorded to him by the High Commissioner in November meant that his mission had Wingate's support, if not that of the British Government. Although this was not far from the truth, it rankled with the Foreign Office and did Sir Reginald's reputation no good in London. Although the best efforts of the High Commissioner and the Sultan were unable to produce a new Ministry, the powers held by the British authorities under the wartime Protectorate made the country governable. Wingate did manage to extract from both Rushdi and Adly the pledge that they would resume their offices if and when they were received by the British Government. 177 Wingate had now been overseas for almost five years. He had returned to the Sudan from his annual leave at the end of the summer of 1914 and had not left the Middle East

since that date. The Wingates had planned that, as soon as possible after the conclusion of the war, they would return to their home in Scotland for a period of rest, and to set their long neglected personal affairs in order. This opportunity came a bit earlier than Sir Reginald had anticipated when, on forty-eight hours notice, he was ordered home for consultation in late January 1919. The High Commissioner, his wife, and three aides departed from Port Said on 21 January and reached Marseilles a week later. The Wingates arrived in Paris by rail the next day and Sir

Reginald immediately made contact with senior Foreign Office officials attending the Peace Conference. The High Commissioner conferred with Lord Hardinge and Arthur Balfour before leaving for England. In both of these conversations he formed the impression that his actions in Egypt, and his suggestions regarding the future of that country, had met with general approval. When Sir Reginald presented himself at the Foreign Office in London on 4 February, however, the atmosphere began to change.®5 178 Wingate, somewhat buoyed by his discussions in Paris, was kept cooling his heels for two weeks before Lord Curzon, who was acting as Foreign Secretary while Balfour devoted all his efforts to the Paris Peace Conference, could find time to receive him. The High Commissioner explained his view of the Egyptian political situation to Curzon and strongly urged him to permit the Wafdist representatives to leave Egypt as private citizens, and to receive the delegation headed by Rushdi and Adly in London as soon as possible.®® Wingate had drafted a telegram which he pressed Curzon to send to the acting British authorities in Egypt

immediately: I shall be glad to see Rushdi and Adly Pasha in London to hear their views on Egyptian questions as soon as it is convenient for them to come to England. Sir R. Wingate has explained their anxiety that members of the Extremist Party [Wafdist] should not now be prevented from leaving Egypt. The extravagant opinions apparently held by this party preclude any possibility of its members being received here officially or being regarded as an Egyptian delegation but I have no objection to your exercising discretion in granting permits to leave Egypt to such Egyptian politicians as may apply as private individuals for same.®'

The High Commissioner explained to Curzon his firm belief that the Egyptians, either Cabinet Ministers or Wafdists. could do little or no harm to British interests in their country by being present at the Peace Conference in Paris. Sir Reginald obviously saw the Egyptians as pygmies among 179 giants and thought they would soon be cut down to size by their total lack of familiarity with the situation they would encounter in Paris. Lord Curzon was not at all convinced by Wingate's arguments. He told the High Commissioner that "it was incompatible with the policy of His Majesty's Government that the Nationalist leaders 'should hold a pistol to our head'".®® Curzon saw the pledge by Rushdi and his colleagues to return to their positions when they had been assured of reception in London as blackmail. While this view of the situation was not without justification, Curzon might have tried to appreciate that this was the only leverage the Egyptian politicians possessed. Wingate left the interview with Curzon's promise that he would forward the proposed telegram to Balfour in Paris, although the acting Foreign Secretary was quite sure that the content of it would be rejected.®® Wingate inquired at the Foreign Office every day for a week about Balfour's reaction to his proposals. At the end of this period he was informed by Graham that his proposal had been completely rejected and that the telegram to be dispatched to the British authorities in Egypt was much harsher in its intent than the one suggested by the 180 High Commissioner.40 The instructions that Lord Curzon sent to the Acting High Commissioner in Cairo, Sir Milne Cheetham, allowed no compromise on the issue of the Wafdists being permitted to accompany any Egyptian representatives to either London or Paris. Although Rushdi and Adly were both known to favor the inclusion of Zaghlul and his associates in any invitation extended by the British Government, the Foreign Office would have none of this: In the circumstances to facilitate their journey to England by relaxing the existing restrictions on travelling, or to go further by receiving them at the Foreign Office if they came, would imply a measure of continence and recognition to which they are certainly not entitled, and of which, if conceded, they would be likely to make the same illegitimate use that they did of their original reception at the Residency. It has been suggested that they should be allowed to come here, but should be coldly received, and should not be granted an interview at the Foreign Office. Although I understand that this suggestion has the approval of the Sultan and Ministers, I am not inclined to view it with favor. I should add that it is difficult to admit that Egyptian Ministers, invited by His Majesty's Government to visit this country, should be allowed to dictate the terms upon which they are prepared to come. His Majesty's Government therefore adhere to the attitude which they had previously adopted on this question.41

Having taken a stance which could not help but deepen the crisis in Egypt, Curzon went on to place the Egyptian Ministers in a completely impossible position. Rushdi and his colleagues could not accept an invitation to Britain which did not include the Wafdists: to do so would 181 have destroyed any shred of credibility they had as Egyptian national leaders. Yet, in his telegram, Curzon instructed Cheetham to urge just such action upon them: In the meantime His Majesty's Government feel assured, not only that His Highness will appreciate their attitude in the matter and the reasons which have prompted it, and that he will recommend the Ministers to accept the invitation now extended to them, but also that the ministers themselves will feel able to come.4% Wingate was aghast at the content and wording of Curzon's telegram, which had been dispatched to Egypt on 26 February 1919, and strongly counselled Graham that it might have very serious consequences. His belief was proven correct in a very short time. Backed into a corner by the British action, Rushdi, Adly, and their associates had no choice but to implement their resignations, which the Sultan now formally accepted.43

The Wafdists. whom the British had unequivocally excluded from any participation in whatever negotiations were to take place on the issue of Egyptian sovereignty, now accelerated their campaign of petition signing and other protests. In the view of the British authorities in Egypt, the actions of the Wafdists were aimed at intimidating both the Sultan and any politicians who might consider helping him in the formation of a new Cabinet. By the second week in March 1919, the activities of Zaghlul and his followers 182 had reached a level of intensity that convinced both the Foreign Office and the British administration in Cairo that their arrest and internment outside of Egypt was a necessary step to curb further unrest. This was accomplished with little difficulty: Zaghlul and three other leading Wafdists were arrested and deported to Malta.44

On 10 March Wingate and his wife left London for their home, Knockenhair House, at Dunbar, Scotland. The High Commissioner had made arrangements with Lord Curzon that, should his presence be required by the Foreign Office, notification reaching Dunbar before 10:00 pm would permit him to reach London early the following morning. Curzon's telegram was not long in coming. On the night of 19 March, Sir Reginald was notified that he was needed and, when he entered the Foreign Office on the morning of the 20th, he learned that violent anti-British riots had broken out all over Egypt, in both the cities and the countryside. The rioters had attacked British military and civilian officials, killing several of them.45

The High Commissioner's first action was formally to request permission to return to his post in Cairo. Wingate believed, probably correctly, that he was better qualified to deal with the situation and restore order than any of the 183 officials on the scene. His letter to Lord Curzon containing this request was dated 21 March 1919.46 That same day Wingate received a telegram from Balfour in Paris that had been sent late on the evening of 20 March. In one terse paragraph Wingate's hopes of being on the scene in Egypt to direct events were dashed: Condition of affairs in Egypt requires prompt action and Allenby leaves Paris for Cairo tomorrow night. Prime Minister and I think in addition to his military rank he ought to be given complete civil authority and he will therefore be appointed Special High Commissioner with Supreme Civil and Military control. This makes no technical change in your position. But on this subject I am writing at length.4?

Balfour's longer letter of explanation, dated 26 March, stressed that General Allenby's appointment was a temporary measure to meet the extreme conditions that existed in Egypt. He reiterated the statement that Wingate's position as High Commissioner was not altered. Although he claimed to be unable to say how long the new situation would last, Balfour ended his letter by expressing the Government's appreciation and gratitude for Wingate's long years of service in the Sudan and Egypt.4® Despite the great disappointment of being retained in London for the purpose of "consultation" while Allenby was put in control of events in Egypt, Wingate's reply to Balfour was correct and constructive. Sir Reginald 184

cautioned that steps should be taken to ensure that disorder did not spread to the Egyptian Army units stationed in the Sudan, or to the civilian population there. In thanking Balfour for his letter of explanation, Wingate stressed the need for a public show of unity among the British authorities: On the other hand you have been good enough to explain to me in your letter the reasons for the action which His Majesty's Government has considered it necessary to take in order to restore law and order with the least possible delay and you may rely upon me to do all in my power to assist and advise the Authorities here to the best of my ability. At such a moment it is vital to our Empire's interests that its Government and its Officials should present a united front.... It is possible that questions may arise and that the reasons for my retention at home at such a juncture may be criticized, but I am confident that — in such circumstances — should my personal reputation be brought into question. His Majesty's Government will afford me that support which has always characterized its attitude towards its responsible officials.*9

Wingate's final paragraph reveals that he was not slow to grasp the possible implications of Allenby's appointment. The High Commissioner had, in fact, written a letter to General Sir Lee Stack (Acting Governor-General of the Sudan since Wingate's departure from Khartoum in January 1917) on 26 March 1919 — the very day he received Balfour's formal explanation for retaining him in England. In it Wingate described the entire course of events since his arrival in Europe two month earlier, and enclosed copies of pertinent 185 letters and telegrams to document the stand he had taken with regard to the Egyptian political crisis. Wingate's motivation in writing to his old friend and former subordinate is rather clearly stated: I wanted you to know at once exactly the situation as regards myself as it is possible facts may be distorted out there as they undoubtedly are in London. I am, however, in the difficult position here of being officially assisting Government with advice etc., and cannot make personal explanations to the Press when they get hold of the wrong end of the stick, but I am especially anxious that you and my loyal subordinates in the Sudan should realize the facts. .... The above is a very brief summary of what occurred and I think you will be interested in it. I think there is more behind it but it is difficult for me to write on this point.5®

Sir Reginald's closing statement, expressing his belief that 'there is more behind it', was in specific reference to the appointment of General Allenby as Special High Commissioner for Egypt while he remained in England for the purpose of 'consultation'. Events were soon to show that his fears in this regard were far from groundless. ENDNOTES CHAPTER V

1. India Office Records. MSS Eur (The Curzon Papers) F112/258,Minutes of the first meeting of the Egyptian Administration Committee (24 September 1917), 1. (Hereinafter lOR Curzon Papers). 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid., Minutes of the second, third, and fourth meetings of the Egyptian Administration Committee (26 September, 27 September, and 1 October 1917). 4. Ibid., Lord Curzon's initialed comments on the Draft Report of the Egyptian Administration Committee, (dated 1 October 1917). 5. Ibid., 'Report of the Egyptian Administration Committee', (dated 20 February 1918). 6. Janice J. Terry, The Wafd; 1919-1952 (London: Third World Center for Research and Publication, 1982), 56. 7. lOR. Curzon Papers, F112/258, Minutes of the first meeting of the Egyptian Administration Committee (24 September 1917), 2. 8. Terry, The Wafd: 1919-1952. 62-63. (Information on Cecil's proposal for Egypt and on Wingate's failure to have him removed). Edward Cecil, The Leisure of an Egyptian Official (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1984), 1. Originally published 1921. (Cecil's resignation and subsequent death from tuberculosis). 9. Sudan Archive Durham. The Wingate Papers, 170/3/3 (Wingate to Balfour, 28 November 1918). 10. Mahmud Y. Zayid, Egypt's Struggle for Independence (Beirut: Khayats, 1965), 58-59. 11. Afaf Lufti al-Sayyid, Egypt and Cromer: A Study in Anglo-Egvptian Relations (London: John Murray,

186 187

1968), 168. 12. Zayid, Egypt's Struggle for Independence. 59-60. Lufti al-Sayyid, Egypt and Cromer. 148, 168. Both these sources state the fact that the Umma was founded with Cromer's encouragement. I include them both as these two authors write from rather different points of view: Zayid is sympathetic to the more extreme nationalists, and Afaf Lufti al- Sayyid, who is the son of Ahmad, favors the moderates.

13. Lufti al-Sayyid, Egypt and Cromer. 169, 170, 171, 172. 14. Edward Grey, Twentv-Five Years: 1892-1916. 2 vols. (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1925), 1:133. 15. J.C.B. Richmond, Egypt 1798-1952: Her Advance Towards A Modern Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 155. 16. Peter Mellini, Sir Eldon Gorst: The Overshadowed Proconsul (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1977), 89. 17. Richmond, Egypt 1798-1952. 155. 18. Lufti al-Sayyid, Egypt and Cromer. 183. 19. Ibid., 176. 20. Richmond, Egypt 1798-1952. 161. 21. Mellini, Sir Eldon Gorst. 201-202, 205, 212.

22. Ibid., 224, 235-236. 23. Richmond, Egypt 1798-1952. 166. 24. Marius Deeb, Party Politics in Egypt: The Wafd and its Rivals 1919-1939 (London: Ithaca Press, 1979), 39-40. 25. Ibid., 38 26. SAD. Wingate Papers, 170/3/1, 8-9 (Wingate to 188 Hardinge, 14 November 1918). 27. Ibid., 170/3/1, 10. 28. Ibid., 171/2 (Hardinge to Wingate, 5 December 1918). The exact wording of the phrase which so offended Wingate was, "I note extremist leaders are exploiting fact of your having received them at Residency which was unfortunate." (My italics). 29. Ibid., 171/1 (Wingate to Hardinge, 7 December 1918). 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid., 171/2 (Graham to Wingate, 13 December 1918). Sir Cecil Hurst was the Chief Legal Advisor to the Foreign Office. He later served as a member of the Milner Mission. This from The Dictionary of National Biography; 1961-1970. 33. Peter Mansfield, The British in Egypt (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 1971), 216. 34. SAD, Wingate Papers, 171/2 (Graham to Wingate, 13 December 1918). 35. Ibid., 175/4/1. This file is a chronology of events covering the period 21 January through the end of June 1919. It is dated 31 August 1919 and signed by Wingate. The pagination in the following footnotes is a bit strange. If the reference from file 175/4 is Wingate's text, or the text of a telegram copied in, then it has a page number, as well as a box and file number. If the reference is to an actual copy of a letter or telegram included with the text it has only a box and file number.

36. Ibid., 175/4/2a. 37. Ibid. 38. Ibid., 175/4/4. 39. Ibid. 189 40. Ibid. 41. Ibid., 175/4/4 (Foreign Office Telegram #268: Curzon to Cheetham, 26 February 1919). 42. Ibid. 43. Ibid., 175/4/4 (Cairo Telegram #333: Cheetham to Foreign Office, 2 March 1919.). 44. Ibid., 175/4/5-6 (Cairo Telegram #348: Cheetham to Foreign Office, 6 March 1919); Foreign Office Telegram #309: Foreign Office to Cheetham, 7 March 1919. 45. Ibid., 175/4/7-8. 46. Ibid., 175/4 (Wingate to Curzon, 21 March 1919). 47. Ibid., 175/4 (Foreign Office Telegram #542: Balfour to Wingate, dated 20 March 1919, received 21 March 1919). 48. Ibid., 175/4 (Balfour to Wingate, 26 March 1919). 49. Ibid., 175/4 (Wingate to Balfour, 29 March 1919). 50. Ibid., 172/5 (Wingate to Stack, 26 March 1919). CHAPTER VI THE EGYPTIAN REBELLION OF 1919 AND ITS AFTERMATH MARCH - DECEMBER 1919

General Sir Edmund Allenby was at the height of his military career when he arrived in Egypt to take up his appointment as 'Special' High Commissioner. Allenby's successful campaigns against the Turks in the Sinai, Palestine, and Syria had brought him both fame and great rewards. Almost alone among the British generals of the First World War, he was regarded as an heroic figure by the British public. Allenby's campaigns had been ones of maneuver. Due to several factors — the relatively open terrain across which his forces fought, the quality of the defending Turkish soldiery, and the comparatively small number of troops involved on either side — Allenby was able to achieve the mobility which the armies on the Western Front had vainly attempted to regain during three and a half years of trench warfare. When his troops won a victory the front line moved forward many miles, not the unsatisfying several hundred yards which was the usual gain of a major offensive in France, and his casualties were not excessive. To the public Allenby's campaigns seemed glamorous and

190 191 exciting. A blunt man of great height and impressive physique, Allenby was known as 'The Bull' in the British Army. Those subordinates who had incurred his disfavor did not soon forget the experience. To most observers, then, Allenby would have seemed to be quite unlike Wingate. On only two occasions in his entire career had Wingate actually commanded troops in the field. Allenby, until his appointment to Cairo, had done little else. There was, however, a great deal more to Edmund Allenby than met the eye. Behind the facade of the simple soldier was an imaginative and analytic mind. Viscount Wavell, who served under Allenby in Egypt, quotes T. E. Lawrence as having said of him: "His mind is like the prow of the Mauritania. There is so much weight behind it that it does not need to be sharp like a razor.

Wingate and Allenby had worked well together during the war, and there was certainly a great deal of mutual respect and understanding between them. Allenby was fully cognizant of Reginald Wingate's depth of knowledge in Egyptian political and social issues, and he was not about totally to discount the advice Wingate had been giving the Foreign Office for many months prior to the outbreak of 192 violence in Egypt. Allenby's first major act upon arriving in Egypt was to summon an emergency meeting of his advisors — both

British and Egyptian — in order to make his intentions unmistakable to all of them. The Special High Commissioner desired to stress to his subordinates that, while he saw his primary mission as the suppression of violence and the restoration of order, he also considered that it was necessary to determine the cause of all legitimate grievances against the British and to redress them, is so far as that was possible.^ By the time of General Allenby's arrival in Egypt it was apparent that, although the situation was dangerous and further violence was very likely, there was no possibility that the British would have serious difficulty containing the unrest. British and Indian troops had already pacified the Delta region and most of Egypt's cities. A brutal suppression of the Egyptian rioters was, in Allenby's judgment, quite unnecessary. Wherever possible British troops merely channeled the rioters away from European residents and property: the policy was to let them exhaust themselves in fruitless violence. 193

Within just a few days of assuming his new duties Allenby arrived at the conclusion that the entire political situation in Egypt could quickly be made considerably less volatile if the exiled Wafdist leaders were released from British detention on Malta and permitted to proceed to Europe, as they had originally requested the previous November.3 This course of action was, of course, exactly what Wingate had recommended when Saad Zaghlul and his colleagues had first broached the issue. When Allenby tendered this piece of advice to the Foreign Office, it did not receive an enthusiastic response. Most of those who were consulted believed that the release of the Wafdists would be interpreted by the Egyptian nationalist movement as a sign of British weakness, and that further demands and violence would follow quickly. Even Wingate, who was being kept informed by the Foreign Office of developments in Egypt, was strongly opposed to releasing the Wafdists. In his view, the situation had altered so dramatically since his interview with them on the previous 13 November that it was now completely inadvisable to acquiesce in their demands.^ Despite these protests the Prime Minister himself decided that, having turned over all military and civil 194 authority to Allenby, the Government was obliged to support him in the first major decision he had made as Special High Commissioner. Accordingly, Allenby issued a Proclamation on 7 April 1919 announcing the release of Zaghlul and his three followers. The men did not return to Egypt, but proceeded directly to Paris. Zaghlul was not to return from Europe until April 1921. The Proclamation met with almost universal approval from the people of Egypt, and Rushdi Pasha immediately agreed to return to his position as Prime Minister.5 Many of the British residents of Egypt were outraged by Allenby's action, seeing it as a surrender to riot and murder. Gilbert Clayton, writing to General Allenby's ADC Archibald Wavell, expressed the view of many Englishmen who had spent their careers in the Middle East: A bitter lesson is necessary, especially now that British officers and civilians have been murdered. This is especially important in view of the fact that Indian troops are in the country and are being actually employed in the operations. These men must not go back to India with the impression that British power is weakened and can permit outrages against British officials.G

This view was shortsighted; the release of the Wafdists achieved the termination of the worst of the civil disorder and was an important first step toward the regeneration of at least some Anglo-Egyptian goodwill. It is impossible not to observe, however, that had Wingate's 195 advice been taken in November 1918, none of the subsequent difficulty would have occurred. Allenby himself acknowledged this to Wingate in a letter written shortly after taking up his appointment in Egypt.? When General Allenby had first recommended that the four Wafdist detainees be released the British Government had offered, as an alternative, the immediate dispatch of a special mission of inquiry into the causes of the Egyptian violence. This had been rejected by Allenby as likely to cause more troubles than it would solve. The Egyptian nationalists, he reasoned, would almost assuredly regard any such mission as having no purpose beyond formulating schemes for the further, and more effective, subjugation of their country. Allenby's refusal of this final alternative was of great importance in prompting intervention from Lloyd George to gain the release of Zaghlul and the three other Wafdists. It was agreed, however, that such a mission would nonetheless travel to Egypt, under the leadership of Lord Milner, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, by the autumn of 1919. Here matters were left to rest for the moment.® Throughout the violent events of March and April 1919, Sir Reginald Wingate had remained in London. The 196 Foreign Office telegram which had informed him of General Allenby's appointment as Special High Commissioner, combining the roles of both High Commissioner and Commander-

in-Chief, had not addressed the issue of Wingate's return to Egypt to resume his normal duties. He had been kept in London, ostensibly for the purpose of being available for 'consultation', and had done his best to function effectively in this role, although he earnestly desired to return to his post in Cairo. By the time of Allenby's Proclamation releasing the detainees on Malta, however, the pretext that the Government intended that he should ever return to his position was beginning to wear a little thin. As the situation returned to something approaching normality, Wingate began to inquire, very discreetly at first, for some indication of when he would be returning to Egypt. These inquiries met with no adequate response from the Foreign Office. The answers given to Wingate were evasive and did nothing to allay his growing suspicion that the Government was displeased with his handling of the opening phases of the crisis during the three months prior to his return to England. The same unanswered questions which were frustrating Wingate were also arousing the curiosity of a number of 197 members of Parliament. Upon the outbreak of disorders in Egypt, Lord Curzon, as Acting Foreign Secretary, made a statement on the situation in Egypt in response to a question put to him in the House of Lords by the Marquess of Crewe. Curzon related the series of events stemming out of the visit of Saad Pasha Zaghlul and his colleagues to the Residency in Cairo two days following the Armistice. The Acting Foreign Secretary stressed that, while Zaghlul and the other Wafdists were not wanted in England, Prime Minister Rushdi and Adly Pasha would have been perfectly welcome had they not insisted on the presence of Zaghlul. No useful purpose would be served by allowing the Nationalist Leaders to come to London and advance immoderate demands which could not possibly be entertained. As regards the two Ministers, their visit would be very welcome, but it would be better in the interests of their own convenience and dignity that it should not be timed to coincide with the first weeks of the Peace Conference when Mr. Balfour would be absent in Paris and fully engaged. It was proposed that the visit should be postponed for a short time. The two Ministers tendered their resignations to the Sultan. At the beginning of January the British High Commissioner, Sir Reginald Wingate, was summoned to London to report upon the situation, and an invitation was addressed to the two Ministers to come here in the middle of February; but they replied that they declined to come unless the Nationalist leaders were also permitted to proceed to London. His Majesty's Government felt unable to accept such a condition, and the resignations of the two Ministers, which had remained in suspense, have been accepted by the Sultan. ... His Highness has appealed to the Acting High Commissioner for protection from further insults and intimidations, and authority was given for the arrest and deportation to Malta of Saad Pasha Zaghlul and three 198 other Nationalist leaders who have played the most conspicuous part in the present agitation. Curzon ended his statement by saying that the situation was well in hand. He provided no explanation as to why the British Government had apparently been caught totally unawares by the start of violence, and this did not sit well with a number of members in both Houses of Parliament. When the matter was brought up in the Commons, the Under­ secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Cecil Harmsworth, seemed unwilling or unable to provide any further information. Captain W. Ormsby-Gore led off the questions by private members: Readers of newspapers have been much disturbed during the last few days by accounts of riots and the cutting of communications between Alexandria and Cairo, and of the general political unrest in that country, and I rise this evening to ask the representative of the Foreign Office in this House if he will give us something more than was given by the Lord President of the Council (Curzon) in another place with regard to the origin of the troubles now prevalent in Egypt, and with regard to the policy which His Majesty's Government intend to pursue in future in that country. In particular I want to ask the Honourable Gentleman if he will give us fuller information regarding the events which led up to the unfortunate resignation of the Prime Minister in Egypt. ... I want to ask the Honourable Member who represents the Foreign Office whether the Foreign Office have in this matter consistently followed and accepted the advice of Sir Reginald Wingate? That is a very important fact to find out. Did Sir Reginald Wingate recommend, or did he not recommend, that Egyptian opinion be heard before the future constitutional settlement of the Protectorate was finally decided?^® 199 Further questions in this vein followed from a number of other private members, most notably Colonel J. C. Wedgwood, and Major the Earl Winterton. Mr. Harmsworth carefully avoided committing himself any further than had Curzon in his earlier statement to the Lords: We have had the advantage - if I may refer to what has taken place in the other House - of a fullstatement by my Noble Friend, the Acting Secretary of State. I know that we in this House are not supposed to derive our information from speeches in the other House, but it is quite possible that many Honourable Members have read the observations of my Noble Friend. Yesterday a very long answer was given to a question put by my honourable and gallant friend (Col. Wedgwood) which says all that ought properly to be said at this stage about the present situation in Egypt. In his next major statement to the House of Lords on the continuing unrest and violence in Egypt (24 March 1919),

Lord Curzon was able honestly to assure the Peers that the worst of the trouble had passed and that the military had the situation entirely under control. Curzon's mention of Wingate was brief, but obviously intended to give the impression that he was fulfilling some useful role while remaining in England. This, obviously, was not an opinion which Wingate himself would have shared. As your Lordships are already aware, during the absence from Egypt of Sir Reginald Wingate, of whose valuable assistance and advice we are taking full advantage. General Allenby has been appointed Special High Commissioner with supreme civil and military powers, and he will have our full support in the task of restoring 200 law and order. In the considerably less polite and restrained atmosphere of the House of Commons, Mr. Harmsworth did not escape further questioning quite so easily as had his "Noble Friend". In response to Captain Ormsby-Gore's persistent interest in the reasons for retaining Wingate in England, the Under­ secretary again echoed his superior's statements in the Upper House: Sir Reginald would remain in London to "afford valuable advice and assistance to His Majesty's Government". Not willing to take Harmsworth's assurances

at face value, both Ormsby-Gore and Colonel Wedgwood tried to pin the Under-Secretary down on this specific point: ORMSBY-GORE: Am I to understand from that reply Sir Reginald Wingate is in any way superseded? This arrangement is only temporary, is it not? HARMSWORTH: I do not think Sir Reginald Wingate is in any way superseded. WEDGWOOD: Is the Government accepting the advice of Sir Reginald Wingate? HARMSWORTH: My answer is, I think, a sufficient reply. WEDGWOOD: You said they were taking advantage of hearing his views. Are they accepting the views he puts?!*

Harmsworth turned to answer other questions on different aspects of the crisis in Egypt, and Ormsby-Gore and Wedgwood did not follow up with any further interrogation on the issue of Wingate's rather vague position. As weeks passed 201 with neither an explanation of Wingate's position from the Government nor any public statement from the High Commissioner himself, attention in Parliament shifted toward the issue of atrocities committed by both Egyptian rioters - and British troops during the March violence. Additionally, Lord Curzon's formal announcement to the House of Lords (15 May 1919)15 that Lord Milner had been invited to head a

Special Mission to investigate conditions in Egypt and the events preceding the uprising at least partially diminished the suspicions of a number of members of Parliament. As time passed Wingate's situation was becoming less significant to both the politicians and the general public. There were a number of concerned Members of Parliament, however, who kept up pressure on the Government on the issue of the treatment Wingate had received. Among them were several of the men quoted in the preceding several paragraphs. It would be useful to identify them. Robert Crewe-Milnes, Marquess of Crewe, was a Liberal peer — the son-in-law of Lord Rosebery — who had served as Colonial Secretary from 1908 to 1910 and as Secretary of State for India from 1910 to 1915. He had been Lord President of the Council in Asquith's coalition Government from May to December, 1916, and had left office when Lloyd George became 202 Prime Minister. Crewe had, quite obviously, experience in dealing with imperial issues.IG As an Asquith Liberal, Crewe cannot have been very sympathetic to the Government in power in 1919.

Captain William George Ormsby-Gore, later the fourth Baron Harlech, had been a Unionist M.P. since entering the House of Commons at the General Election of January, 1910. Ormsby-Gore had been a commissioned officer in a territorial unit since 1908, and had immediately gone on active duty in 1914 when the war started. He was serving with the army in Egypt when he joined the Arab Bureau as an intelligence officer in 1916. He left that position in March, 1917 to become Lord Milner's parliamentary private secretary. Ormsby-Gore had a deep knowledge of, and interest in, affairs in the Middle East. In 1919 he was not at all happy with the policies the Foreign Office was pursuing in that area of the world.

Colonel Josiah C. Wedgwood, who first had been elected to the Commons as a Liberal in 1906, had switched his political allegiance to the Independent Labour Party in April 1919. He had served in the South African War as an artilleryman, and had stayed on for two years after the end of the war to serve in an administrative capacity under Lord 203 Milner. Wedgwood returned to military duty in 1914, and served in Belgium, the Dardanelles Campaign (where he was badly wounded and awarded the Distinguished Service Order), and in East Africa.^® Major Edward Tumour, the sixth Earl Winterton, had entered the House of Commons as a Conservative in 1904, at the age of twenty-one. He was a member of the Irish peerage, which, like the Scottish, elect a specified number of members to represent them in the House of Lords. Peers not electedare eligible to sit in the Commons. Winterton had entered the army in 1914. He served in the Dardanelles Campaign, in the Egyptian Expeditionary Force as a member of the Imperial Camel Corps, and with T.E. Lawrence in the Arab Revolt.

It is readily apparent that, with the exception of Lord Crewe, whose concern over Wingate's difficulties might have been motivated by more purely domestic political conflicts, the political figures mentioned had significant similarities in their backgrounds: they had all served in the Near or Middle East during the war, and two of them had a past association with Lord Milner. These men were by no means alone in their concern, as will be seen. Had Wingate chosen to act more decisively in his own behalf, he would 204 not have lacked willing allies in Parliament. Press coverage of events in Egypt also questioned the wisdom of the policies pursued by the Cabinet. A Times editorial in early April 1919 stated plainly what many people in Great Britain were thinking; Now that the Special High Commissioner, Sir Edmund Allenby, is restoring order in Egypt, it may be advisable to consider the meaning of the thunderclap which has so stirred public opinion. Early in February it was foretold in writing both in Cairo and in London, that the departure from Egypt of the High Commissioner, Sir Reginald Wingate, could lead to serious trouble because the natives would regard it as a triumph of the Prime Minister, Rushdi Pasha and the Nationalist Party.20

On 2 June 1919, in an interview with Sir Ronald Graham, the permanent Foreign Office official for affairs in the Middle East, Wingate was finally informed that the Milner Mission would not depart for Egypt until autumn and that it would be General Allenby, and not himself, who would be present as High Commissioner when they arrived.21 This revelation confirmed Wingate's worst suspicions. Rather than acknowledging that the advice he had conveyed to them in late 1918 was correct and should have been followed — a fact proven by Allenby's decision to release Zaghlul and his colleagues within a week after taking over in Egypt — the Foreign Office now obviously intended to make him the scapegoat for the disorders in Egypt on the grounds that he 205 had received the Wafdists in the first place. Wingate returned to his home in Scotland that evening and, after a great deal of soul searching, wrote to Lord Curzon the following morning. I have the honour to bring to your notice my impressions on a conversation I had with Sir Ronald Graham, K.C.M.G., C.B., on the situation in Egypt yesterday afternoon. I gathered from this conversation that there are certain criticisms of my conduct of affairs in Egypt of which, hitherto, I have not been fully informed by the responsible authorities, but which have clearly influenced the judgment, of His Majesty's Government. I contend that, in my position as High Commissioner, I have every right to be informed immediately of such criticisms in detail and given every opportunity of either refuting them or admitting their justice. I now beg to request that I may be officially furnished, by the Foreign Office, with a full statement of the reasons which have influenced His Majesty's Government in differing with the carefully considered expert advice tendered them by myself, as their fully accredited Representative, together with the names of those persons by whom such information was imparted. I consider it my bounden duty to intimate to Your Lordship that, should any reflection be cast on my personal character or official reputation, I shall have the right to demand a full and complete judicial enquiry into the whole conduct of my administration.2^

For almost forty years, as both a soldier and an administrator, Wingate had always placed his duty and the interests of his country ahead of any personal considerations. The fact that he now felt compelled to threaten the possibility of legal action to protect both his career and his reputation provides graphic proof of the 206 depth of his sense of betrayal. Wingate, like most late Victorian imperialists, believed strongly in the necessity of presenting a unified and monolithic front to the colonial peoples they ruled. This belief was the rationale behind the reversal of his earlier advice to the Government when Lord Allenby wished to release Zaghlul and permit him to travel to Paris. Once made, any decision, even a faulty one, had to be upheld. To vacillate in front of the subject peoples was to show weakness; and to show weakness to people who are being ruled by supposed moral superiority (and intimidation) could be fatal. Such were the deeply held beliefs and principles which Sir Reginald had to overcome to address such a message to the Acting Foreign Secretary of his country. Wingate concluded his letter to Lord Curzon with two demands which he felt were necessary to safeguard his own interests: In view of the grave preoccupations of His Majesty's Government in regard to the Peace Treaties, I have, as Your Lordship is aware, at great personal inconvenience, refrained from emphasizing the personal aspect of this important official matter, but, on the signature of Peace, I consider that I shall be fully justified in demanding (1) either that- If His Majesty's Government have just cause to disapprove of my actions - I be permitted to resign my appointment as High Commissioner of Egypt only on the precise understanding that a full judicial enquiry be made into the whole of Anglo- Egyptian Administration since I have held the appointment of High Commissioner; and that the whole 207 official, private and personal correspondence thereon, between myself and the responsible Authorities in the Foreign Office, be placed at the disposal of the persons appointed to conduct this judicial enquiry. - or (2) that, if His Majesty's Government do not disapprove of my actions, steps be taken entirely to remove the impression, unfortunately engendered in the Public mind, of the conduct of my duties as His Majesty's accredited Representative in Egypt - an impression produced, I venture to think, by official reticence on the one hand, and on the other by my loyalty to the Department under which I have the honour to serve and this has hitherto restrained me from demanding a thorough and complete investigation, or an entire exoneration from blame, for the unfortunate developments which have recently occurred in Egypt.23 That such a letter would be forthcoming from Wingate does not seem to have caused great surprise at the Foreign Office; indeed, the impression one gets is that it had been fully expected considerably earlier. As Wingate mentioned in his letter, the Foreign Office was, at this time, very much preoccupied with the meetings going on in Paris to bring about the final peace settlement ending the war. Their reaction to Sir Reginald's final remonstrance over the injustice he believed had been done him seems to have been directed much more toward quieting him and papering over the whole affair than toward any attempt at ameliorating his situation. The day after Lord Curzon received Wingate's letter, rather urgently worded communiques began to pass among various high-ranking officials of the Foreign Office on the 208 best means to silence this displaced High Commissioner and to keep knowledge of the whole sad series of blunders which had led up to the riots in Egypt from reaching the British public. What these messages make very clear is the fact that it had been decided quite definitely somewhat earlier, possibly simultaneously with the decision to recall Wingate from Egypt, that he was not to be permitted to return to his post in Cairo as High Commissioner. Sir Ronald Graham, in a memo to Curzon detailing what had transpired during his interview with Wingate, stressed that what upset Wingate most was being kept in limbo on the question of his real position: He maintained, with some justice, that the idea of his. Sir R. Wingate's, being retained here to advise His Majesty's Government could not be kept up much longer, and that his position must be defined.2*

Graham, who had dealt with Wingate for many years on issues concerning Egyptian and Sudanese policies, ended his note by expressing the personal hope that he would receive fair treatment: I trust that, if Sir R. Wingate is not to return to Egypt, that a settlement will be effected which will do full justice to the admirable services which Sir R. Wingate has rendered in the past, especially in his capacity of Governor-General of the S u d a n . 25

Subsequent events were to produce a settlement which would fall far short of anything Graham, and numerous other men 209 who had known and worked with Wingate over almost four decades, would regard as doing full justice to the services he had rendered. It must be said here that the key figure in engineering the sad and unjust termination of Wingate's long and distinguished career in the service of the British Empire was Lord Curzon. Some of the reasons why Curzon acted as he did are fairly obvious; others may only be speculated about and may have had their origins in events occurring long before those which are the focus of this study. Lord Curzon was a brilliant man; virtually everyone in the upper strata of British society had known this since his undergraduate days at Oxford more that forty years before. His arrogance was legendary: the short verse composed about him at Oxford which begins 'My name is George Nathaniel Curzon, I am a most superior person', was not written without justification and pursued him for the rest of his life. In many little ways, as well, such as claiming every advantage and prerogative he could possibly squeeze out of his position as a peer, Curzon showed that, no matter how exalted his rank, he was a small man. In 1899, at the youthful age of forty, Curzon was appointed Viceroy of India, certainly one of the most 210 prestigious and powerful positions in the British Empire. In 1902 General Herbert Kitchener, the hero of Omdurman in the Sudan, more recently the conqueror of the Boer kommandos, and, perhaps significantly, Wingate's colleague and friend, arrived in India to take up his appointment as Commander-in-Chief. Within a short period of time a serious conflict arose between the Viceroy and the Commander-in- Chief over an issue of conflicting authority. Customarily, in British India, the Commander-in- Chief was appointed an extraordinary member of the Viceregal Council. In addition to this appointment there existed the post of Head of the Army Administrative Department. The occupant of this position, who was considered an ordinary member of the Viceregal Council, was also a soldier. During the period of his service on the Viceregal Council, this officer was not permitted to hold any other military position. He also functioned as the Viceroy's alternate advisor on military affairs — in addition, of course, to the Commander-in-Chief. Kitchener believed that this officer should be within the chain of command of the Indian Army, effectively subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief. Lord Curzon, almost certainly rightly, believed that such a reassignment of authority would undermine civilian 211 (Viceregal) control of the Army. This disagreement between the two most important officials in British India smoldered relatively quietly for several years before finally becoming an open battle early in 1905. Curzon and Kitchener were unable to reach a compromise on the issue between themselves and, in August 1905, the Balfour government was forced to impose one. Curzon, whose term as Viceroy would not normally have ended until 1906, thought that the substance of the disagreement had been conceded to Kitchener and resigned his position in great anger and bitterness.26 The bitterness he felt against Kitchener for the blow his pride had suffered in India is indisputable; the extent to which this ill-will may have been transferred to those who had been closely associated with Kitchener is speculative. No evidence seems apparent in the personal papers of either Wingate or Curzon to indicate that Curzon's attitude toward Wingate in 1919 might have been colored by the events of fourteen years earlier.2? Yet, at the same time that Lord Curzon seemed to be placing every possible obstacle in the path of Wingate's efforts to obtain some official recognition of his many years of service and to exonerate his personal reputation in the aftermath of the events of 1919, the Acting Foreign Secretary seemed also to 212 be the driving force in thwarting the attempts of Rudolf von Slatin to gain reacceptance into the British establishment after his unfortunate experiences in the First World War.9®

Certainly it is quite possible, even likely, that not all of the baser instincts which might motivate a man's actions will be evident in the correspondence he leaves for posterity to peruse. Be this as it may, the letter which Lord Curzon addressed to Balfour in Paris, on the day after he received Wingate's message, showed both a good deal of premeditation and very little concern to see that justice was done. The long-expected has happened, and Wingate, who has been showing symptoms of increasing uneasiness and annoyance at his own position - which I admit is rather equivocal - has now definitely come out with a letter to me, a copy of which I enclose.2=

Curzon went on to explain that Wingate's letter had been in response to the first official intimation he had received that the Government was not entirely satisfied with his handling of the initial stages of the events leading up to the rioting: Graham dealt with him with the utmost courtesy and conciliation, but did not conceal - as, indeed, he could not - that at one stage, namely that of the early interview with Zaghlul, the Foreign Office thought that Wingate might advisedly have acted in a different way.3^ 213 The Acting Foreign Secretary's subsequent statements illustrate his strong concern, indeed fear, that the whole issue of the Foreign Office's disregard of Wingate's advice at the time that the Wafdists first broached the question of attending the Paris Peace Conference might become public knowledge. Curzon's letter also shows that Wingate's fate had been decided several months earlier and that the role he had been playing as an advisor since his return to England almost six months before had been a sham, a temporary ploy to keep him quiet. The sense of imminent danger which Wingate's letter had generated in Curzon is unmistakable. It is that of a man who is not only sensitive and angry, but who also threatens mischief; and, unless the case be rather delicately handled, it is not unlikely that such mischief may arise. My own inclination, subject to your consent and that of Prime Minister, is to deal with the case as follows, proceeding always upon the assumption, which I gathered in Paris, that it is not desirable that Wingate should go back as High Commissioner to Cairo. Upon that I believe there is an absolute consensus of opinion, both among those who are acquainted with the facts here and those who are best qualified to speak in Egypt. At the same time, we do not want to present this decision to Wingate in a form that may be at all painful to a man who has had a very distinguished career and is himself quite unconscious at the present moment of having done anything to merit even the slightest animadversion from the Government.31

Curzon went on to suggest that it was in the best interests of the Government not to get involved in a written correspondence with Wingate on the issues he had raised in 214 his letter. The implication of this suggestion would seem to be that the less evidence left behind from the whole affair the better. The Acting Foreign Secretary expressed the opinion that the allegations made by Wingate were "wholly unreasonable and represent an almost perverted point of view."32 Curzon's proposal on the proper course of action, in light of Wingate's demand for an official enquiry, seems deceitful even after the passage of seventy years. What I should like to do would be to send for Wingate, with whom I am personally on very friendly terms, and say to him that for the idea that any reflection has been cast, upon either his personal character or his official reputation, there is not a vestige of foundation; and that consequently there is nothing into which it is necessary to enquire. I would go on to say that the Government recognize him as a valuable public servant, who has had a very distinguished career and whose services they have acknowledged by the appointments which he has received. It is true that the Foreign Office did not altogether see eye to eye with him in the procedure which he adopted in December last with regard to Zaghlul and his friends, and that they dissented from the advice which he tendered as to the reception of those gentlemen in London; but that was a matter on which each party was entitled to his own opinion; and to argue that, if a Government differed from the advice offered to them even by a public servant of his distinction, an injury was therefore inflicted upon himself would be to take up a position which would render administration impossible. He might have been right and the Government might have been wrong, or vice versa; but to suggest that an enquiry was therefore needed into the conduct of either the one or the other was really absurd.33

Curzon's dismissal of Wingate's feelings on the 215 matter of his recall from Egypt and his retention in England for reasons that were becoming less and less believable to the press and the public sidestepped the true issue which Sir Reginald's letter had raised. When the sequence of events that had occurred since the previous autumn were examined, it was impossible for informed opinion in England to assume anything other than that Wingate had bungled his responsibilities and incurred the wrath of the Government. First had come the crisis in the Egyptian Government, followed by the recall of Wingate for what was described as 'consultation'. Next rioting had broken out in Egypt and, rather than rush Wingate back to Cairo to deal with the situation, Allenby had been sent instead. As all of these events had transpired without a single public statement from the Government on Sir Reginald's culpability, or lack thereof, the public was left to assume what it would, and it was very difficult to see how their assumptions could be favorable to Wingate. Curzon also saw no reason why Wingate would not accept his explanation for Allenby's indefinite continuance in the position which Wingate still officially held. Curzon went on to propose that the retention of Allenby in Egypt should be presented to Wingate as 216

politically unavoidable because of delay in the departure of Lord Milner's mission of investigation. Curzon believed that, in light of the still unsettled situation in that country. Sir Reginald could be convinced that there was no other acceptable course. Curzon also thought that it would be necessary to offer Wingate a peerage to demonstrate that the Government bore him no malice. The Foreign Secretary concluded his letter to Balfour with a summary of his plan of action. This is the kind of line which I should like to take with him in private conversation, and I am inclined to think that it would be effective both in silencing his complaints and meeting the case. But of course I cannot do it without the consent of the Prime Minister and yourself, since it involves: (1) the definite termination of Wingate's connection with Egypt; (2) the definite appointment of Allenby as High Commissioner, at any rate for a period; and (3) an offer to Wingate of a seat in the House of Lords. I have discussed my suggested line of action with Graham, a note from whom I enclose. As I think it very desirable that an early termination should be brought to a situation which is not without peril, I shall be grateful if you will mention the matter to the Prime Minister, or show him this letter, and, if you both approve, will give me the authority to act in the manner I have suggested. With as little delay as possible.

Despite the sense of urgency Curzon so obviously desired to impart to his letter to Balfour, it was not, in fact, until 14 July 1919 that Wingate was finally ushered into an interview with the Acting Foreign Secretary. Curzon 217 had not been authorized to offer Wingate all that he had suggested in writing Balfour. Nor was he able to inform the High Commissioner that his appointment was as yet officially terminated in favor of General Allenby. Wingate was told essentially the same thing as in his meeting with Sir Ronald Graham more than a month earlier; it was still considered necessary to retain Allenby in his position in Cairo, at least until Lord Milner's mission had completed its investigation, quite possibly for longer. Still without formally notifying Wingate that he was never to return to Egypt, Curzon expressed the Government's entire satisfaction with his conduct of affairs in that country and offered him the Governorship of the Straits Settlements on the Malayan Peninsula.35 This position would have represented an enormous diminution in power and prestige for a man who had attained the appointments which Wingate had held for the previous twenty years; he could scarcely consider the offer as anything other than a calculated insult. Curzon's colleagues had obviously thought that the peerage suggested in the letter to Balfour went too far in expressing an approval which they did not really feel. The Governorship of the Straits Settlements, while outwardly yet another honor for Wingate, was actually an unspoken 218 condemnation and would have been regarded as such by both his peers and informed opinion generally. This was what Wingate perceived the intent of the offer to be. On 23 July Wingate replied to Curzon in writing to decline the offer of the Straits Settlements. He cited his unique knowledge of the affairs of Egypt and the Sudan, and his desire for employment in that area as the main reason for not accepting a post in the Far East. In effect, Wingate was saying that nothing less that reinstatement in his former position in Cairo was acceptable to him. He was not prepared to compromise on the issue or to take passively the scapegoat role assigned to him. The situation was, then, somewhat stalemated: neither Wingate nor the

Government was prepared to make any significant move to accommodate the other party. Wingate's only real alternative to revealing his own side of the story to the public press was to await the conclusion of Lord Milner's mission, which was not to depart for Egypt for another three or four months. Faced with this hiatus, and now fully aware that he was not to return to Egypt, Wingate requested a leave of absence through the remainder of the year. The High Commissioner had not taken such a leave since before the start of the war and badly needed a rest, quite apart 219 from any other circumstances. This request was granted.36 During the period that Sir Reginald was officially on leave, he was in constant correspondence with the Foreign Office, the Treasury, and his attorneys on a variety of issues related to the circumstances of his departure from Egypt, his retention in England, and the expenses incurred as a result of these circumstances. Of most immediate importance among the issues Wingate desired to resolve was that of his pay. The High Commissioner was not the scion of a wealthy and aristocratic family. He had made his own way in the world during his long career and, apart from some minor investments he had made, depended entirely on his salary to support himself and his family. Sir Reginald's ambivalent situation at this particular juncture made the question of pay a rather complicated one. British officers who served in the Egyptian or Sudanese military establishment, or in an administrative capacity in spheres which were officially Egyptian, received their salaries and pensions from the Egyptian Government. This had been Sir Reginald's situation for a good part of his career in the two countries concerned. Although he was, in 1919, a full general in the British Army, his salary was not paid by the British 220 Treasury. Despite the realities of the political situation, the Sudan was technically an Egyptian, rather than a British, territory. The same standard applied to Wingate's

position as Sirdar of the Egyptian Army, which the Governor- General of the Sudan held simultaneously with his

administrative role.3? One of the conditions Wingate had placed on his acceptance of the High Commissionership of Egypt in December 1916 had been that his connection with the Sudan would not be totally ended. General Lee Stack, who had replaced Sir Reginald at Khartoum, held both the Governor-Generalship and the rank of Sirdar in an 'Acting' capacity. Wingate was still on the Egyptian payroll, even though he was being retained, inactive, in England.3®

Wingate, throughout his service, had always received his salary quarterly in arrears. He had, therefore, been paid on 1 April 1919 for services rendered January through March. When he applied, in July 1919, to be paid for the period April through June, he was informed that the Treasury was still considering the question of his salary, but that no decision had yet been reached. As Sir Reginald's expenses in England far exceeded those he would have had incurred in Egypt over a similar period of time, considerable hardship was caused him by this delay in his 221 payment. Although certain small amount were paid to him on account over the following three months, he was not informed of the Treasury's verdict regarding his pay until mid-

October. Notification came in the form of a cursory note from a minor Foreign Office official: I am directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to inform you that the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury have sanctioned the payment to you, during the period April 1st to August 31st, 1919 of a salary at the rate of Six thousand, four hundred and sixty pounds, per annum; less Charge d'Affaires allowance of Four pounds a day, the payment to be subject to Income Tax and to cover your liabilities in Egypt. With regard to your emoluments after August 31st last I have to inform you that as from the 1st ultimo until December 31st next you will receive a personal salary at the rate of Two thousand pounds a year, less Income Tax.39 Even at the exchange rate of the time, the figures quoted above represent a drop from a salary of $32,300 per annum to $10,000. Wingate was being subjected to a humiliating decrease in salary, and it was impossible for Sir Reginald to view this type of treatment as anything other than another calculated affront, directed at him personally by the Foreign Office. Throughout the summer of 1919 the correspondence between Wingate and the Government continued, to very little effect. As a public servant who, for more than two decades, had enjoyed the full support and confidence of his superiors, not to mention the favor and patronage of the 222 royal family, the situation was one which reduced him to near despondency. Yet, despite all the obvious evidence that powers far higher than himself had already decided his fate, Wingate still did not carry out his threat publicly to demand an inquiry into the events preceding the Egyptian revolt of March 1919. He was pinning all his hopes of exoneration on the findings of Lord Milner's inquiries. Whatever prospects Wingate might still have believed he had ever to return to his position in Cairo were, however, administered a final coup de grace bv a communication from Lord Curzon on 2 October 1919. When the serious crisis of March last arose in Egypt you were already in this country, having been summoned home in January in order to consult with His Majesty's Government, by whom, no more in all probability than yourself, was the approach of such a crisis foreseen. In view of the peculiar circumstances of the Egyptian rising and the events by which it was attended, it was thought essential for the restoration of public order that full civil and military authority should be concentrated in the hands of a single individual. General Sir Edmund Allenby was accordingly appointed Special High Commissioner for Egypt and the Sudan. At the same time your presence in this country was regarded as important by His Majesty's Government, in view of the explanations and advice that you would be in a position to offer. You were, in consequence, invited to remain. During the period that has since elapsed, the state of things in Egypt has improved and tranquillity has been ostensibly restored. But the position remains anxious, the elements of disorder may at any moment raise their heads again, and the reasons which led His Majesty's Government to entrust the civil and military power to the hands of one man have lost none of their efficiency. On the contrary, it is to be feared that a very disturbing effect would be produced by any change in the 223 existing regime. His Majesty's Government have therefore decided to appoint Sir Edmund, now Lord Allenby to be High Commissioner as from October 15th while retaining him in supreme military command. They are confident, from your well known loyal and patriotic character, that you will appreciate to the full the motives which have induced them to arrive at this decision, which, it is needless to say, involves no reflection whatever upon yourself or your services in the past.40

Although he could not possibly have failed to realize, after all the evasion and petty rebuffs he had been subjected to, that such a notification would inevitably arrive. Sir Reginald was stunned by Curzon's communique and responded to it forcefully. Wingate took particular exception to Curzon's assertion that he had been no more aware than the Government that trouble was brewing in Egypt. After all the carefully considered advice he had telegraphed to the Foreign Office, from November 1918 onwards, urging that the Wafdist delegation be permitted to travel to London and Paris, Curzon's statement was patently ridiculous. Equally incomprehensible was Lord Curzon's continued assertion that the Government's action represented no reflection of its esteem for Wingate. Such an interpretation of the Government's actions toward Wingate since his return to England in January simply could not be substantiated. To continue to assure Sir Reginald that the Government held him in high regard was utter hypocrisy at 224 this juncture. Wingate also objected strenuously to the use of the term "invited" to describe his retention in England while

Allenby superseded him in Cairo. He had repeatedly requested to be allowed to return to his post in Egypt and such permission had been denied.4% Wingate concluded his reply to Curzon with a strong protest against the treatment he had received. I cannot but reiterate that I consider my treatment by H.M.G. as most unfair and unjust, and although mention is made in Your Lordship's despatch of honours successively conferred on me, as an indication of the high value placed on my services, I would respectfully point out that I have received no public recognition from H.M.G. throughout the War, except in the award of a Knight Grand Cross of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire, this decoration being considerably lower in rank to others I already possessed. Having regard to the appreciation Your Lordship has been good enough to express, of the services it has been my privilege to render to my country, and in view of the fact that up to the period in which I was actually in Egypt, I received frequent expressions of the approbation of H.M.G. - I feel it incumbent on me to state that my summary removal from my post - for the reasons in Your Lordship's dispatch under reply - is incomprehensible.4% With the receipt of Lord Curzon's official notification of his removal as High Commissioner for Egypt, Wingate had only two viable alternatives open to him to recover something of his reputation. He could immediately present his case to the public through the medium of either 225 the popular press or a number of willing friends in both Houses of Parliament, or he could wait for the conclusions reached by Lord Milner's long delayed mission to Egypt and hope that they would exonerate the policies he had urged on the Foreign Office. Although he had by now several times threatened Curzon with the demand for an official enquiry into the events of his High Commissionership, the Acting Foreign Secretary's reference to his loyal and patriotic character was right on the mark. Presented with one final possibility to clear his name without stepping outside the orthodox procedures he had observed throughout his career. Sir Reginald decided to hold his tongue for just a bit longer. On Sunday, 7 December 1919 — almost a full year after Wingate's return to England, and nine months after the initial outbreak of violence in Egypt — Lord Milner and his colleagues arrived at Port Said.*3 ENDNOTES CHAPTER VI

1. Archibald P. Wavell, Allenby in Egypt (London: George G. Harrop & Co., Ltd. 1943), 25. 2. Ibid., 43. 3. Ibid., pp. 44-45; J.C.B. Richmond, Egypt: 1798-1952 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 181. 4. Brian Gardner, Allenbv (London: Cassell & Co. Ltd., 1965), 220; Wavell, Allenbv in Egypt. 44. 5. Wavell, Allenbv in Egypt. 46. 6. Sudan Archive Durham, The Clayton Papers, 473/3/7 (Gilbert Clayton to Archibald Wavell, 22 March 1919). 7. SAD, Wingate Papers, 175/4/14. 8. Wavell, Allenbv in Egypt. 58, 59. 9. Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Lords), 5th Ser., 33 (18 March 1919): 712-713. 10. Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th Ser., 113 (20 March 1919): 2348-2349, 2354.

11. Ibid., 2391. 12. Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Lords), 5th Ser., 33 (24 March 1919): 879. 13. Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th Ser., 114 (24 March 1919): 15. 14. Ibid.

226 227

15. Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Lords), 5th Ser., 34 (15 May 1919): 679. 16. L.G. Wickham Legg and E.T. Williams, eds.. The Dictionary of National Biography; 1941-1950 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959), 183, 185, s.v. "Crewe-Milnes, Robert." 17. E.T. Williams and C.S. Nicholls, eds.. The Dictionary of National Biography: 1961-1970 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 812, s.v. "Ormsby- Gore, William George." 18. Legg and Williams, eds.. The Dictionary of National Biography: 1941-1950. 941, 942, s.v. "Wedgwood, Josiah C." 19. Williams and Nicholls, eds.. The Dictionary of National Biography: 1961-1970. 1024-1025, s.v. "Tumour, Edward." Later in his career Winterton served as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster in the Cabinet of Neville Chamberlain. Although he was against appeasement he did not resign his office at the time of the Munich Agreement, angering his longtime friend Winston Churchill. He was not offered a position in Churchill's War Cabinet, and became a constant critic of the Government's wartime policy, allying himself with the Independent Labour Party's feisty Emanuel Shinwell. The two were often referred to in the Commons as "Arsenic and Old Lace". 20. The Times (London), 1 April 1919, 11. 21. India Office Records. MSS Eur (The Curzon Papers), F112/259 (Graham to Curzon, 4 June 1919).

22. Ibid., 23. Ibid.

24. Ibid., 25. Ibid. 26. Philip 228 (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc. 1959), 222, 224. 27. SAD. Wingate Papers, 278/4/8 (Wingate to Arthur Bigge, 4 April 1906). This interesting letter, written by Wingate to the future Lord Stamfordham, attempts to clarify a point Wingate had made in a conversation several nights earlier on the subject of the Kitchener/Curzon dispute. Wingate explained that, although he agreed with Lord Cromer's view that Curzon was constitutionally right, he felt that "Curzon's attitude made any sort of workable compromise almost impossible". Wingate went on to say that had Lord Cromer been in Curzon's place he would have made "the administrative machine run without the washing of all that dirty linen in public which, I think we are all agreed, was most unfortunate". 28. Gordon Brook-Shepherd, Between Two Flags (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1973), 316-318. Slatin's experiences during and after the First World War are dealt with more fully in Chapter IX. 29. lOR. Curzon Papers, F112/259 (Curzon to Balfour, 4 June 1919) . 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid.

35. SAD. Wingate Papers, 175/4/16. (This document is from Wingate's summary of events of 21 January 1919 through the end of June 1919. It is dated 31 August 1919 and signed by Wingate.) 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid., 241/7 ('Memorandum on Service of British Officers in the Egyptian Army'). 38. Ibid., 160/4 (Wingate to Sir Edward Grey, 12 October 229

1916). 39. Ibid., 175/1 (Letter of 20 October 1919). 40. Ibid., 175/1 (Curzon to Wingate, 2 October 1919). 41. Ibid., 175/1 (Wingate to Curzon, 19 October 1919). 42. Ibid. 43. Report of the Special Mission to Egypt (London: HMSO, 1921), 3. CHAPTER VII LORD MILNER'S SPECIAL MISSION TO EGYPT DECEMBER 1919 - MARCH 1922

The Special Mission to Egypt headed by Lord Milner had been carefully selected to contain a number of men who were familiar with Egypt and the Middle East and, also, to represent a fairly wide spectrum of domestic British political opinion. In addition to Lord Milner himself, who was, of course. Secretary of State for the Colonies, the mission consisted of five other members and two secretaries. The other members of Milner's investigative body were: 1) The right Honourable Sir Rennell Rodd: a diplomat who had seen service in Egypt with Lord Cromer. At the time of his selection for the Milner Mission, Sir Rennell had just ended an eleven-year appointment as British Ambassador to Italy. 2) General Sir John Maxwell: General Maxwell had served many years with the Egyptian Army. 3) Sir Cecil Hurst: Hurst was a Principal Legal Advisor at the Foreign Office. 4) Mr. J. A. Spender: The former editor of the Westminster Gazette and an important member of the

Liberal Party.

230 231 5) Brigadier General Sir Owen Thomas, M. P.: Sir Owen was the Labour Party representative on the Milner Mission.! The Government had been quite specific as to the intent of Lord Milner's investigation, and the mission had been given precise instructions referred to as its 'Terms of Reference': To enquire into the causes of the late disorders in Egypt, and to report on the existing situation in the country and the form of the Constitution which, under the Protectorate, will be best calculated to promote its peace and prosperity, the progressive development of self governing institutions, and the protection of foreign interests.%

The long-delayed arrival of Milner and his colleagues, together with the rather unfortunate phrasing of their 'Terms of Reference', were to prove extreme hindrances to their efforts to accomplish the task they had been given in any really meaningful or productive manner. Although Sir Reginald Wingate, who had spent years as an administrator, was pinning his hopes for justice on Milner's findings. General Allenby and his staff were rather skeptical about the usefulness of the mission from the very first. The future Field Marshal Sir Archibald Wavell who, as a major, was serving as a Staff Officer at the Residency in Cairo at the time of the mission's arrival, reflected this 232

skepticism: A Commission (or Mission) of Inquiry is the favourite device of British Governments for dealing with awkward problems, internal or external. It has many obvious advantages. It postpones the necessity for making a difficult decision for at least a time - the Milner Mission and the negotiations arising out of it provided a breathing space of more than two years, it gives interesting employment to a number of distinguished public servants or ex-servants; it produces a volume, often very readable, full of valuable information and orderly statistics, and finally, there is always the possibility that the Commission may light on an acceptable and workable solution to the problem. To be most effective, the Milner Mission should have reached Egypt in May, during the quiet period following the restoration of order. But Milner himself, who was a member of the Cabinet, was deeply engaged in other activities; it was not easy to find suitable members at short notice (there is a recognized principle of such Commissions that the more difficult the problem the greater the number of members required); and the hot season in Egypt is not the best time for good work. The arrival of the Mission was postponed till the Autumn, and eventually till the winter. By then opposition to it had been organized and consolidated.3

There was much more to the cynical attitude Wavell so obviously took toward British Government investigative bodies in general, and the Milner mission in particular, than simply the impatience of a career soldier with the machinations of his civilian superiors. The opposition organized by the Egyptian Nationalist movement took the form of a total boycott of the mission and all its activities. The Wafdists, directed from Paris by Zaghlul, were able to focus the efforts of nearly all elements of the Egyptian 233 population to demonstrate that the mission was regarded as an instrument of British suppression.4 As the members of Milner's group proceeded to travel throughout Egypt, attempting to conduct interviews, they were met by constant mass demonstrations and a studied lack of cooperation on the part of those figures they wished to question. A portion of this lack of cooperation was prompted by fear of nationalist retaliation against those Egyptians whom the mission desired to interview. Those few individuals who did consent to talk with Milner and his colleagues suffered the condemnation of the Wafdist press and personal abuse from large crowds gathered outside their homes. Although no one was physically harmed for talking with the mission, the general ostracism inflicted on them by their countrymen was sufficient to deter most Egyptians from providing any information to the mission.^

It was soon obvious to the members of the mission that a major stumbling block in the path of their attempts to gather information was the phrasing of their 'Terms of Reference', which had been made public in both Great Britain and Egypt. The Egyptian Nationalists and, through them, the Egyptian public had become convinced that the goal of Milner and his colleagues was to perpetuate the existing political 234 arrangement between their country and Great Britain. The 'Terms of Reference' also made mention of proposing a Constitution for Egypt. The fact that such a proposal was to be made by an entirely British body was, quite understandably, an extreme provocation to the Wafdists.^ Within two weeks of the mission's arrival in Egypt, the members came to the realization that some public statement would have to be issued to the Egyptian people to attempt to counteract the unfortunate impression created by the 'Terms of Reference'. Indeed, a number of prominent Egyptians made just such a suggestion privately to the mission.7 Accordingly, on 29 December 1919, the following statement was released to the Egyptian press: The British Mission has been struck by the existence of a widespread belief that the object of its coming is to deprive Egypt of rights which it has hitherto possessed. There is no foundation whatever for this belief. The Mission has been sent out by the British Government, with the approval of Parliament, to reconcile the aspirations of the Egyptian people with the special interests which Great Britain has in Egypt and withthe maintenance of the legitimate rights of all foreign residents in the country. We are convinced that with goodwill on both sides this object is attainable, and it is the sincere desire of the Mission to see the relations of Great Britain and Egypt established on a basis of friendly accord which will put an end to friction an will enable the Egyptian people to devote the whole of their energies to the development of their country under self-governing institutions. In pursuance of this task the Mission desires to hear all views, whether of representative bodies or individuals who have the welfare of their country at 235 heart. All opinions may be freely expressed. There is no wish on the part of the Mission to restrict the area of discussion nor need any man fear to compromise his convictions by appearing before it. He will be no more compromised by expressing his opinions than the Mission will be compromised by hearing them. Without a perfectly frank discussion it is difficult to put an end to misunderstanding and arrive at agreement.® Although there is no doubt that this statement was sincerely intentioned, it was of little avail. The Wafdists were now in full flush. Having marshalled the Egyptian people to their cause as they never had before, they were in no mood to back down from the stance they had taken.^ Even members of the Egyptian royal family militated against the mission; Six princes of the Royal House, the chief of them being Omer Toussoum and Hussein Kamel ud-Din, son of the previous Sultan, have issued manifestoes respectively to the Egyptian people and to Lord Milner's Commission, which is here to investigate the question of self government. The manifestoes demand complete and unconditional independence for Egypt. They do not merit consideration. They have been conceived in intrigue and born of lobbying. The princes think that the Milner Commission's honest desire to negotiate is a sign of declining British power, and so they want to reinsure themselves with the extremists whom they fear are hostile to the Royal House.!" Hussein Rushdi Pasha, the former Prime Minister of Egypt, told Milner point-blank that "no solution to the Egyptian question is possible without participation of the Paris delegation"!! (i©.. Zaghlul). Lord Milner's mission remained in Egypt until March 1920 and was able to 236 accomplish little in the way of direct contact with those Egyptians who were the most knowledgeable with regard to the causes of the uprising a year earlier. For the first six weeks of 1920, Allenby took the politically expedient course of absenting himself on a tour of the Sudan and the newly freed domains of the Arabian Peninsula. While Milner and his associates were being alternately ignored or hissed, Allenby was being royally entertained by Sir Lee Stack, Wingate's successor as Governor-General of the Sudan, and by the Arab princes whom the British had done so much to raise to their high positions.!3 Lord Allenby's policy was to provide Milner with whatever assistance he needed, but otherwise to associate himself and his administration with the mission as little as possible.!4

Despite their almost total failure to achieve any sort of dialogue with those Egyptians who might have contributed the most to the success of their Mission, Lord Milner and his colleagues did not return to England totally empty-handed; Of course the Egyptian people were not the only ones influenced by the boycott campaign. The members of the Milner Mission, by the time they departed from Egypt, had learned a good deal about Egyptian nationalism and the spirit of defiance that had been aroused in the Egyptian people. Also the successful boycott of the Mission convinced Milner of the authenticity of 237 Zaghlul's claim to be the sole representative of the Egyptian nation. Once the Milner Mission was back in London, Adli Pasha was able to convince Zaghlul, who had stubbornly remained in Paris until this time, to proceed to London for talks with the Mission before it wrote its final report. The nationalist leader arrived during the early summer and negotiations continued until August. On 18 August 1920, a memorandum was drawn up and signed by Lord Milner. He pledged that he would recommend the memorandum to the British government, in exchange for Zaghlul's recommendation of it to the Egyptian p e o p l e .

The negotiations which resulted in the Milner/Zaghlul memorandum delayed, by several months, the task of turning the findings of the mission's Egyptian visit into a formal report for submission to Parliament. It was not until December 1920 that Lord Milner signed the final document and turned it over to the government. The published and printed version of the report was presented to Parliament in the spring of 1921.!® The findings and conclusions of Milner's Mission as put forth in its report, together with the contents of the Milner/Zaghlul memorandum, caught the British cabinet very much by surprise. Milner and his colleagues had, very sensibly, come to the conclusion that it was time to give something not far short of complete independence to the Egyptians. For those men in policy-making positions in the British Government, as indeed for any well-informed member of the public who took an interest in what was transpiring 238 in Anglo-Egyptian relations, Milner's seeming volte-face should not have been completely unanticipated. In 1892, at the end of his period of service under Lord Cromer in the Egyptian Ministry of Finance,Milner had written a history of the British involvement in that nation entitled England in Egvpt. The work had proven enormously popular in Britain and, in 1920, a thirteenth edition was published. Milner, deeply involved in the task of his mission at that point, had seen fit to write a new, and special, preface to his book. The body of the volume was left unaltered from the original text of 1892, but the 1920 preface clearly showed that his thinking had kept pace with events over the intervening three decades, and that he saw a higher purpose to the British occupation of Egypt than merely the protection of the line of imperial communications to India and the Far East. At the present moment the question of the future political status of Egypt has once more become a burning one. This is not the place to discuss that grave and complex problem, but there is one reflection with regard to it which can hardly fail to occur to any reader of England in Egvpt. That it should be possible to contemplate so large a measure of independence as is now proposed for Egypt is surely the most striking tribute to the efficacy of Great Britain's reforming work.!® Milner went on to express the conviction that the policies pursued by the British since 1882 had consistently 239 been directed toward the development of a strong, prosperous, responsible, and independent Egypt, closely allied with Great Britain.Milner's view of Britain's role and purpose in Egypt since the establishment of the 'Veiled Protectorate' certainly would not have found concurrence among the Wafdists — nor, for that matter, among a considerable body of British opinion. Milner, however, believed that the events which were occurring as he wrote his preface (and his Report) would bring to fruition in Egypt the reforms towards which the British had been working for years; That we should attempt them at all, is evidence at once of our good faith and of our confidence in the soundness of the work which we have been doing in Egypt for eight and thirty years. If the attempt is successful, we shall have put the crown on one of the most remarkable enterprises ever undertaken by one nation for the regeneration of another.2"

Both the Report and the Milner/Zaghlul memorandum were very badly received by the overwhelming majority of the people in Britain who had the power to accept or reject them. Lord Milner had made an unfortunate strategic blunder in that he had not informed his cabinet colleagues of the fact that he was negotiating privately with Z a g h l u l . Many government members considered that the negotiations and the memorandum went far beyond the 'Terms of Reference' laid 240

down for the mission. In this assertion they were, technically, correct. Working to make Milner look even worse in their eyes was the fact that the unauthorized agreement he had reached with Zaghlul proved not to be

totally acceptable to the Wafdist party either.^2 What Milner and Zaghlul had agreed to as a result of their negotiations was intended to provide the starting point for a final Anglo-Egyptian settlement that would terminate the Protectorate. It provided for British recognition of Egypt as an independent constitutional monarchy, subject to certain important qualifications. It assumed that, although Egypt was to have the right to diplomatic representation in foreign nations, no agreements would be entered into with other nations that ran counter to

British interests in Egypt. Great Britain was to be permitted a continued military presence on Egyptian soil, although it was pledged that these forces would not be used to interfere with the rights of the Egyptian Government. Were Britain involved in a war, Egypt was to provide any and all requested facilities and aid needed for the British to conduct military operations. Egypt was also required to retain a British financial advisor and a British member of the Ministry of Justice. The powers of these two 241 individuals were not specified in the memorandum. Ironically, the strongest support in favor of the adoption of the terms of the memorandum, and the acceptance of the conclusions and recommendations published in the Milner Report, came from two rather unlikely sources. Lord Allenby, who had returned to England for a period of leave in August 1920, saw the contents of the memorandum before anyone in the Cabinet, and advised Milner to submit it to the government immediately, without waiting for the formal report to accompany it. The new High Commissioner for Egypt believed that, after Cabinet approval, the memorandum should be made public as Britain's official proposal for a final political settlement with the Egyptians.^4 The only member of the Cabinet to recommend the acceptance of the Report's conclusions, and the use of the terms of the memorandum as a basis for negotiation of a final Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, was Lord Curzon.25 Curzon's reasons for such belated support of conciliatory offers to Egypt might be, at least partially, explained by the fact that it would be the Foreign Office which ultimately would have to negotiate any final settlement on the matter, whether the Report and the memorandum were accepted by the Cabinet or not. Egypt was, after all, not legally a British possession and did not come 242 under the Colonial Office. To appear unduly negative at the outset might conceivably make this task more difficult in the long run.

The opposition of David Lloyd George settled the issue, however. With the Empire beset by several separatist movements simultaneously — most notably Ireland, but India was restive as well in the early 1920s — the Prime Minister thought Milner was willing to give away too much, too easily, to the Egyptian nationalists:^^ Such, then, was the reception afforded the recommendations of the Milner Mission. Though its members had hoped that Lord Milner would be authorized to return to Egypt in order to work out the details of a treaty based on the Milner Report, the folly of their idealistic optimism became speedily apparent and their hopes evaporated before the heated reaction of the Lloyd George Cabinet. Lord Milner did not return to negotiate a treaty. Rather he submitted his resignation on February 7, 1921, pleading poor health and fatigue, and brought to an end his long and controversial career as a public servant of Great Britain.

Lord Milner's successor at the Colonial Office was Winston S. Churchill, previously Secretary of State for War and for the Air. The 'for the Air' denoted the fact that he was responsible for the Royal Air Force as well as for the Army. Prior to succeeding Milner, Churchill was already heavily involved in the formulation of British policies in the Middle East, as he had to provide for the maintenance of the large numbers of British soldiers and airmen deployed 243 throughout the area.^® Churchill, almost always opposed to any weakening of British authority in the Empire, had been vocal in his opposition to Lord Milner's proposals. Although he had suffered a serious setback to his career by absorbing most of the blame for the disastrous Dardanelles Campaign in 1915, he had rebounded admirably by the end of the war. A strong personal relationship with Lloyd George, which dated from the pre-war Asquith governments, ensured that Churchill would be listened to in the places of power. For so long as the coalition of Tories and Lloyd George Liberals, which had been returned in the General Election of December 1918, continued in office, then, very little encouragement for Egyptian nationalism would be forthcoming from the Colonial

Office. For Sir Reginald Wingate, whose last remaining hope for a formal and public vindication had rested with the Milner mission, the Cabinet's utter rejection of the Report was particularly heart-breaking. This was so because the now discarded Report had totally exonerated him in no uncertain terms and had placed any responsibility for failure to heed the many warnings of the explosion about to occur in Egypt in early 1919 squarely on the shoulders of 244 the Foreign Office. The lack of wisdom shown by the out-of­ hand refusal to consider the Wafdist request to represent Egypt's case in both London and at the Peace Conference did

not escape the notice of Milner and his associates: There were no doubt obvious difficulties in the way of discussing such questions with the Egyptian Ministers at a moment of high political pressure, when the Peace Conference was about to open, but it would appear that in spite of the insistence with which the High Commissioner appealed for their reception, the real urgency of dealing with the Egyptian problem at that critical moment had not been realized.^ The mission's final statement on the perceptiveness Sir Reginald had shown in the advice he tendered to the Foreign Office left no shadow of doubt remaining that the members believed he had performed his duties conscientiously and with great skill: It is obvious, after the event, that Egyptian Ministers should have been encouraged to come to London when they proposed to do so, and Sir Reginald Wingate, whose advice on this subject was fully justified by the sequel, would have done well, in our opinion, to urge his views with even greater insistency.^ The publication of the Milner Report should have been a moment of great triumph for Wingate and, in a way, it was. All who cared to read the document could learn that the mission sent to Egypt by His Majesty's Government had returned from its visit convinced that Wingate's conduct of his High Commissionership had been blameless, indeed 245 his High Commissionership had been blameless, indeed extremely praiseworthy. Yet the Cabinet had not accepted the conclusions of Lord Milner and his colleagues. The fact that the Report's rejection was for reasons not directly related to Wingate's actions during the last three months of his period in Cairo did not matter: so long as the findings of the report as a whole were not acceptable to the Government, his vindication was not official. Whatever satisfaction Sir Reginald might have felt personally at the conclusions arrived at by Milner would not be translated into a reversal of the wrongs he felt had been done him by the Government. As the realization began to sink in that the Government was not ever going to make public restitution for the impressions he knew had been left by his removal as High Commissioner, Wingate began to drop into a state of extreme depression.Sir Reginald, always a 'team player', had placed his last hope of justice on the findings of the Milner Report and had seen that hope dashed. He had exhausted all the official channels within which he had worked throughout his entire career, and to no avail. Exacerbating his depressed state of mind was the fact that, after the Cabinet's rejection of Milner's recommendations. 246 many old friends who had hitherto supported him began to write him off as a lost cause. Men who had sought his counsel for years suddenly found themselves too busy either to grant him interviews or to answer his letters. These desertions by old friends and colleagues left him deeply hurt and stunned.32

The malaise which Wingate suffered deeply for a period of several years (and which seems never to have really departed completely) appears to have built up gradually during the period in which he was being edged out of his position and subjected to what he regarded as a series of calculated indignities by the Foreign Office. In one of a series of letters written to an old friend. Field Marshall Lord Grenfell, prior to the Cabinet's rejection of Milner's Report, Wingate expressed not only his anger at being made the scapegoat for the Wafdist uprising of the previous March, but also the belief that others had received all the credit for British successes which were, at least partially, his own achievements. The advice you give as to "silence" is also what Milner counselled - but, smarting as I am under a sense of altogether unjust treatment, and knowing that the general public are under the impression that I failed in Egypt, I find it terribly hard to sit down and say nothing - a situation still further aggravated by the way in which I have been treated financially.3^ 247 After relating the facts regarding the miserly treatment he considered himself to have received from the Foreign Office on the issue of his pension and other financial obligations, Wingate spoke out on the lack of recognition he had received vis-a-vis Lord Allenby — for his wartime service: What I feel perhaps most acutely of all is that I took immense risks- in order that the Palestine and Syrian Campaigns should succeed - for which I judged (and judged rightly) that the downfall of Turkey would break up our enemies' resistance quicker than anything else. I am mainly responsible for the success of the Arab Revolt, whose actual field operations I personally directed. Allenby was guided by me in the whole of his Palestine and Syria policy and it was I who advised him to adopt the Administration in these conquered areas for which he alone has got all the credit - this, he had admitted in private to me, but made no reference to his indebtedness to me in his public utterances at home - he saw the chance (in which the Prime Minister aided and abetted him) of stepping into my shoes and then ruthlessly kicked down the ladder by which he had climbed to eminence. In thus frankly criticizing his action I do not for a moment deny his military genius, but I do most emphatically join issue with our Authorities in refusing to give me (as Allenby's Senior Officer at the time) the administration of Martial Law in Egypt, when I became High Commissioner in 1917. I believe that had my request for this been granted the whole subsequent trouble would have been saved - but, although I was full General on the Active List and had had all these years of experience of dual Civil and Military Command, I was forced into a purely civilian role. When His Majesty's Government's decision was given in this sense, I loyally toed the line and gave Allenby all the assistance I could and he had the entire benefit of my long Eastern experience (he knew absolutely nothing about the East or how to deal with Orientals). Without this he could never have succeeded - but as things have turned out, he gets everything, I lose my appointment and my reputation and my long 248 experience in these countries counts as nothing. I am practically no better off than if I had never left England and had not done a hand's turn towards winning the war. Can you conceive a greater travesty of so- called British fairplay and justice?^*

While there is a good deal of justification for Sir Reginald's statements concerning Lord Allenby's opportunistic use of the Prime Minister's favor to obtain a permanent appointment as High Commissioner in supersession of himself, there is much less for some of his subsequent ones. Although he had been among the earliest supporters of British aid to the Arab Revolt, he had not actually exercised a field command in any sense of the word. Sir Reginald certainly was a full general at the time he held his appointment as High Commissioner, but his experience of actual warfare was limited to campaigns against natives in the Victorian era; and even in these his primary function was the gathering of intelligence information, not he command of troops. With two and a half years of service on the Western Front prior to his arrival in the Middle East, Edmund Allenby's qualifications to conduct a campaign against well-armed Turkish troops, often officered by Germans, had to be considered far superior to Wingate's, no matter what their comparative seniority in the Army Lists. 249 In the matter of the Martial Law, Wingate might possibly have had a somewhat better case, although it would have been difficult to split the command of troops according to the function they happened to be performing at any given moment. Together with his righteous indignation at the loss of his appointment as High Commissioner, there seems also to be a strain of petty jealousy in Wingate's letter to Lord Grenfell. Sir Reginald was an extremely proud, and somewhat vain, man. He had always been obsessed with the symbols of rank and service: the campaign medals and orders of knighthood were immensely important to him, and the lack of recognition in that particular form for his service in the First World War must have been an intolerable slight in his eyes. Yet, in his letter to Grenfell, one can detect an element which goes beyond simple anger and verges on the irrational. Over the following several years, as Wingate continued his efforts to restore his reputation and gain some measure of recompense for the services he had rendered his country, this element seems to grow stronger. ENDNOTES CHAPTER VII

1. Archibald P. Wavell, Allenby in Egypt (London: George G. Harrap & Co., Ltd. 1943), 61. 2. Report of the Special Mission to Egypt (London: HMSO, 1921), 1. (Hereinafter The Milner Report). 3. Wavell, Allenbv in Egypt, 58-59. 4. Peter Mansfield, The British in Egypt (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1971), 232. 5. John D. McIntyre Jr, The Boycott of the Milner Mission: A Study in Egyptian Nationalism (New York: Peter Lang Publishing Inc, 1985), 64, 66-69. 6. Wavell, Allenbv in Egypt, 61. 7. The Milner Report, 4. 8. Ibid. 9. McIntyre, The Boycott of the Milner Mission. 68. 10. The Daily Mail (London), 5 January 1920, 7.

11. Ibid., 6 January 1920, 8. 12. Wavell, Allenbv in Egypt. 61. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid. 15. McIntyre, The Boycott of the Milner Mission, 194-195.

16. Ibid. 196. 17. John Marlowe, Milner: Apostle of Empire (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1976), 16. 18. Alfred Milner, England in Egypt (New York: Howard Fertig, 1970), iv. (Reprint of 13th edition (1920);

250 251 first publication 1892).

19. Ibid., V. 20. Ibid. 21. McIntyre, The Boycott of the Milner Mission. 196-197. 22. Ibid., 196. 23. Ibid., 195-196. 24. Wavell, Allenbv in Egypt. 62-63. 25. McIntyre, The Boycott of the Milner Mission. 197 26. Ibid. 27. Ibid. 28. Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill: The Stricken World 1916-1922 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1975), 505, 507. 29. The Milner Report, 13-14. 30. Ibid., 15. 31. Ronald Wingate, Not in the Limelight (London: Hutchinson & Company Ltd., 1959), 70. 32. Ibid. 33. Sudan Archive Durham. Wingate Papers, 176/1 (Wingate to Grenfell, 2 January 1920). 34. Ibid. CHAPTER VIII ANGLO-EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATIONS AND ALLENBY*S HIGH COMMISSIONERSHIP 1922 - 1925

The Cabinet's rejection of Lord Milner's findings left the entire issue of a final Anglo-Egyptian political settlement to terminate the Protectorate unresolved. More than two years had passed since the Wafdist uprising of March 1919 and the political relationship between the two countries had not yet been altered one iota. There was, however, a realization at the Foreign Office that no matter how unpalatable the findings of Lord Milner's mission had proven, there was no possibility that the Protectorate declared over Egypt in 1914 could remain in force much longer. Accordingly, on 13 July 1921, a series of talks between a British negotiating team, headed by Lord Curzon, and an Egyptian one led by Adly Pasha, commenced at the Foreign Office in London.^ Also present among the members of the Egyptian delegation was Hussein Rushdi Pasha, who had been Prime Minister of Egypt at the time of Zaghlul's initial approach to Sir Reginald Wingate, two days after the Armistice.2

Conspicuously absent from the Egyptian delegation

252 253 was Saad Zaghlul Pasha. The alliance between Adly and Zaghlul had always been an uneasy one. Adly Pasha had served in several different cabinet posts prior to becoming Prime Minister, during both the period of the 'Veiled Protectorate' and the more complete British control which had followed it. Although he was a committed nationalist, Adly was more inclined to moderation in his view of what was an acceptable political settlement with the British than was Zaghlul.

Zaghlul had returned to Egypt from Paris in April 1921, after an absence of two years. His reception by all classes of the Egyptian people had been both a personal triumph and a warning to Adly of the power he commanded: The journey by rail from Alexandria to Cairo was one of triumphal progress, and extraordinary scenes marked his arrival in the capital. The day automatically became a national holiday. Women left the seclusion of the harems, an unprecedented thing, to participate in one of the most remarkable receptions ever accorded to a citizen of any country. At least 400,000 people must have thronged the relatively short distance from the railway station to Zaghlul's house. Tram-cars bedecked with flags and palms, vehicles of all descriptions covered in flowers, dancing girls, native musicians, camels and donkeys, all combined to make a striking picture.3

Zaghlul was fully appreciative of the strength which this type of mass support gave the Wafd and wasted no time in attempting to use it to push forward demands which were 254 to cause a break with Adly Pasha in very short order. Zaghlul*s demand that he lead the delegation to the treaty negotiations with the British that summer was the issue on which the split with Adly finally came. The Prime Minister would not concede that position to anyone: he would lead the delegation to London himself, with or without Wafdist participation. This show of resolve on the part of Adly Pasha caused some dissension in the Wafdist ranks, with five of Zaghlul's followers agreeing to follow the Prime Minister to London. Despite several Wafdist-inspired outbreaks of rioting in Alexandria, Adly held firm in his position on the leadership of the delegation, and the group which arrived in London in July 1921 contained no Wafdists.4 In the negotiations conducted between the Egyptians and the British through the summer and into the autumn of 1921, both sides were severely hampered by external forces whose views were more extreme than those of anyone at the bargaining table. Lord Curzon was the sole member of Lloyd George's Cabinet who had favored using the findings of the

Milner Report, and the agreements put forth in the Milner/Zaghlul Memorandum, as a basis for negotiation of a final political settlement. Lord Allenby went even further in support of this point of view. The High Commissioner 255 believed that, as the Egyptians had always regarded Lord Milner as a plenipotentiary, the British Government was bound by the agreement he had signed with Zaghlul whether he had over-stepped the limits of the 'Terms of Reference' or not.5 Despite these points of view, however, the official British position was that neither side was going into the negotiations committed to anything Milner had either recommended or agreed to with Zaghlul. This, then, was the context within which Curzon was forced to negotiate, his personal judgments notwithstanding.® On the Egyptian side the pressure was, of course, from the absent Zaghlul and his supporters. The Wafdists regarded the Milner/Zaghlul Memorandum as only minimally acceptable and expected Adly to press for even greater concessions from the British. Failure to do so would, in all likelihood, result in the fall of his Ministry, an event which neither Curzon nor Allenby was anxious to see take place. The progress of the negotiations faltered over two basic issues: the British desire to maintain garrisons anywhere in Egypt that they chose (not just in the Suez Canal Zone), and the right of an independent Egypt to enter into agreements with other foreign nations.? These were the 256 issues on which extreme opinion on both sides was most adamant. After the fifth session of negotiations on these issues. Lord Curzon wrote to Adly Pasha in an effort to state precisely what was acceptable to the British Government on the issue of the stationing of troops in Egypt : The main object for which Great Britain is called upon to maintain a military force in Egypt is for the protection of her Imperial communications. In addition she will require, as indicated in Lord Milner's report, to assume the obligation of supporting Egypt in defending the integrity of her territory and of safeguarding foreign interests in Egypt, including the safety of the lives and property of foreigners. For the due discharge of these obligations it is proposed that British forces shall have free passage through Egypt, and shall be maintained at such places in Egypt and for such periods as may from time to time be determined. They shall at all times have facilities for the acquisition and use of barracks, exercise yards, aerodromes and naval yards, and for the free use of naval harbours. It is realized that the numerical strength and the location of these forces are matters which, as time passes, may admit of reconsideration, and accordingly it is proposed that this article of the treaty shall be open to revision by mutual consent at the end of ten years, when the questions shall be re­ examined in the light of the then existing situation, regard being had to the ability of the Egyptian Government to assume a fuller measure of responsibility for the execution of the objects to which reference has been made.® No matter what sort of guarantees the British were willing to give that they would not use their armed forces to intervene in the internal affairs of Egypt, the Egyptians' experience of the past thirty eight years told 257 them otherwise. Unless British forces were contained in the Canal Zone, where it could be argued that their only role was the defense of imperial communications, they would most certainly be regarded as an army of occupation by the vast majority of the Egyptian people. The British insistence that no agreement could be entered into between Egypt and another nation without the consent of the British High Commissioner was justly regarded by the Egyptians as an intolerable limitation on their nation's sovereignty. From the point of view of the British Cabinet, both its demands were necessary and sensible. It was simply not possible militarily to defend the Suez Canal from the Canal Zone itself, no matter what direction an attack was coming from. Armies need space to deploy for battle, ideally enough space to maneuver well away from what they are actually defending. The issue of a virtual British veto on Egyptian diplomatic activities was seen in the same light. Viewed from the present day, it seems almost beyond belief that one nation could seriously expect to exert such control over another and still assert that it regarded that nation as 'independent'. Only four years earlier, however, the British had been seriously discussing the outright annexation of Egypt. It is difficult to see how the men who 258 ruled the British Empire in 1921 could possibly have regarded the sovereignty of Egypt as being on the same footing as their own. Indeed this proved to be a concept the British Government was unable to grasp even as recently as 1956. Despite a six-week break in the Anglo-Egyptian talks at the end of the summer, nothing more was achieved when they resumed and, at their conclusion in November 1921, no final agreement had yet been reached. The single issue upon which the talks foundered was the inability of the two sides to agree on the disposition of the British forces which were to remain in Egypt after the Protectorate had been terminated.9 Lord Curzon, in a letter to Allenby written on the day that the final negotiating session had come to a close, related some details of his last conversation with Adly Pasha: I told him that the Egyptians could not have it both ways. They could not both enjoy the luxury of refusing our proposals and posing as national heroes in consequence, and at the same time expect us, without their assistance, to put into operation a scheme of very considerable independence which they had chosen to reject. The only consequence of their action would be to throw us back into the status quo ante, which would be equally regrettable for both parties.^® The failure of Adly Pasha to reach a settlement with the British which was acceptable to extreme nationalist opinion 259 spelled the doom of his Ministry. By mid-December Egypt was in a state of political chaos, with no one willing to form another government while the Protectorate was still in force. The Wafdists, quite understandably, regarded this chaos as their opportunity to recoup the political losses they had suffered on the issue of representation on the now discredited delegation to London. By the end of December disorders had broken out in Cairo and seemed likely to intensify. Faced with this increasing unrest. Lord Allenby saw little immediate alternative to taking strong measures against Saad Zaghlul and his followers. The Wafdist leader had organized a meeting to be held on 22 December to protest the failure of the talks with the British and the consequent continuance of the Protectorate. Allenby threw down the gauntlet by prohibiting the event. The High Commissioner's action resulted in threats of further agitation from Zaghlul. On 23 December 1921, Allenby ordered the arrest and deportation of Zaghlul and five other Wafdist leaders. Allenby knew that he must be prepared to back up this action with strong military force if the level of civil violence which had occurred in March 1919 seemed likely. The presence of strategically placed British forces throughout 260 Egypt achieved the desired intimidating effect on the populace and, except for a few token gestures of opposition, order was maintained.3-2 Zaghlul was exiled to Aden, certainly not a very pleasant location even when one is not under arrest. The Wafdist leader did, however, have one small triumph to savor on his way out of Egypt. On Christmas Day 1921, Zaghlul was entertained by the officers of the British garrison at Suez, where he had been sent to await shipping to Aden. Determined not to make life any less pleasant than they had to for their charge, the British included Zaghlul in their game of poker to help pass the time. They soon had cause to regret their intended act of kindness, for the nationalist leader left them with very little in their pockets to cover the remainder of the Holiday Season.^3

The calm which set in after the departure of Zaghlul into exile was meaningless, however, and all concerned knew it: Order had been re-established by strong military action, but for Allenby the same fundamental political problems remained to be solved. There was still no Ministry and no chance of getting one until some way could be found out of the political impasse. On December 28 Allenby had been compelled to issue a proclamation authorizing the Under-Secretaries of State — who, with one exception, were all British — to exercise the powers and functions of Ministers in administrative matters until a new Ministry was formed. But it was an impossible task for a group of British Under-Secretaries 261 to carry on the government of the country for any length of time with a hostile Egyptian personnel. 4 It was now evident that, until some new initiative was put forward, the political situation in Egypt would remain highly volatile. The initiative, not surprisingly, came from Lord Allenby, who had been left to deal with the political chaos caused by the stalemated negotiations. The High Commissioner had, by this juncture, become convinced that Britain's only option was unilaterally to declare the 1914 Protectorate to be terminated and to recognize Egypt as an independent, sovereign nation.Such a declaration would enumerate those areas which Britain reserved to herself, pending a future final settlement with the Egyptian Government. When this opinion was tendered to the British Cabinet through Lord Curzon, it was not at all well received. The issue was the same upon which Allenby and the Government had differed over the findings of the Milner mission: the Cabinet would not accept the view that the British were bound to end the Protectorate, on the basis of Lord Milner's conclusions and agreement with Zaghlul, while the High Commissioner in Cairo held that they were.^® This, then, was the impasse which the British Cabinet had reached with their highest ranking representative in Egypt. Although not entirely unwilling to terminate the 262 Protectorate, a majority of the Cabinet thought that a bilateral treaty with the Egyptians was a necessary prerequisite for doing so.^? Lord Allenby saw absolutely no alternative to ending

the political stalemate with the Egyptians as soon as possible and, risking his position on the issue, threatened to resign if his advice was not taken. The High Commissioner also took the dramatic step of coming to London in person to argue his case with the Prime Minister. Behind Allenby's threat of resignation was the unspoken implication that his departure from his post in Cairo would be followed by public criticism of the Government's Egyptian policies from his seat in the House of Lords, an option Sir Reginald Wingate did not possess.Coupled with this danger was the fact that Lord Northcliffe, the politically powerful newspaper owner, had become convinced, after a stop in Egypt on a cruise around the world, that Allenby's views were correct. Lloyd George was not a man to ignore the double threat of criticism from both a national hero and the most influential newspapers in Britain; Allenby got his way. The text of Allenby's Unilateral Declaration of Egyptian Independence was made public on 28 February 1922. 263 After the several years of rioting, political crises, and failed negotiations that had gone before it, the Declaration seems quite short and to the point; Whereas His Majesty’s government, in accordance with their declared intentions, desire forthwith to recognize Egypt as an independent sovereign State; and Whereas the relations between His Majesty's government and Egypt are of vital interest to the British Empire; The following principles are hereby declared; 1. The British protectorate over Egypt is terminated, and Egypt is declared to be an independent sovereign State. 2. So soon as the government of His Highness shall pass an Act of Indemnity with application to all inhabitants of Egypt, martial law, as proclaimed 2 November 1914, shall be withdrawn. 3. The following matters are absolutely reserved to the discretion of His Majesty's government until such time as it may be possible by free discussion and friendly accommodation on both sides to conclude agreements in regard thereto between His Majesty's government and the government of Egypt; (a) The security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt. (b) The defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect. (c) The protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the protection of minorities. (d) The Sudan. Allenby's return to Egypt coincided exactly with the publication of his Declaration. It was reported that "people of all classes cheered his train from Alexandria to Cairo and delegations of notables, Egyptian and foreign, met him at Cairo station".22

Lord Allenby's visit to London, which had led up to the proclamation of Egyptian independence, had been 264 punctuated by sharp questioning in Parliament, and had brought the whole Egyptian question to the forefront of the public consciousness once again. The fact that Wingate's specific recommendations to the Foreign Office at the time of the 1918-19 political crisis in Egypt had not been made public by either the Government or the Milner mission, while Lord Allenby's recommendations were to be published, drew severe criticism from several M.P.s. Austen Chamberlain, the Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons, attempted to fend off the questions of Lt. Col. Walter E. Guinness and Sir Henry Craik during 'Question Time' on 22

February 1922: GUINNESS: Lt. Col. Guinness asked the PM whether he will arrange for the publication of the correspondence which passed between Sir Reginald Wingate and HMG as to the settlement of the status of Egypt. CHAMBERLAIN: The correspondence to which my honourable and gallant Friend refers was considered by the members of Lord Milner's mission and no useful purpose would now be served by its publication. GUINNESS: Is it not a fact that Sir Reginald Wingate recommended much the same policy as that now adopted at the instance of Lord Allenby, and in view of the fact that Lord Allenby's proposals are to be published next week, would it not be a matter of common justice that Sir Reginald Wingate's proposals should be published next week? CHAMBERLAIN: That is an argument rather than a question. CRAIK: Did not Sir Reginald Wingate ask that his correspondence should be published and did not the Government refuse his request? GUINNESS: Did not Sir Reginald Wingate give in his 265 resignation largely owing to the failure of the Government to adopt his policy?^^ Chamberlain stuck to his initial answer that "no useful purpose would now be served" by making Wingate's recommendations public, and did not answer directly any other of the barrage of questions directed by Guinness and Craik. The backgrounds of these two back benchers, like those of other M.P.s who had expressed indignation at Wingate's abrupt removal from Cairo in 1919, show some interesting, and possibly significant, similarities. Lt. Col. Guinness was the third son of Edward Cecil Guinness (later first Earl of Iveagh), of the famous Irish brewery owning family. He had served in the South African War, while in his early twenties, and had been both wounded and mentioned in dispatches. Guinness had entered Parliament as a Conservative (for Bury St. Edmunds, Suffolk) in 1907. During the First World War he had served at the Dardanelles and in Egypt. He was three times mentioned in dispatches and received the Distinguished Service Order in 1917.24

Unlike most of the other M.P.s who had spoken out for Wingate, Sir Henry Craik had neither a military background nor any connection with Lord Milner. His entire career had been spent as an administrator in the Scottish educational system. Craik had published several works on 266 both education and Scottish history. In 1906, at the age of sixty, he had been elected, as a Conservative, to one of the three Scottish University seats in the House of Commons. Craik had first met Sir Reginald Wingate in the 1890s. In 1907 he had visited both Egypt and the Sudan, and had developed an immense respect for what Wingate had accomplished in the latter. Craik had also travelled to India, South Africa, and Canada, and took a deep interest in matters of the E m p i r e . 2 5

During "Questions" on the day that Allenby's Declaration was made public, Craik again brought up the issue of Wingate's correspondence with the Goverment. Cecil Harmsworth, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, again echoed the words of Curzon and Chamberlain that publication of the documents would serve no purpose and would not be desirable "at this stage of affairs in E g y p t " . 2 5 Unwilling to continue accepting the same hackneyed answer, Craik asked the Under-Secretary, "How can this House judge the matter if the Foreign Office is not frank enough to lay the papers before u s ? " 2 ^ At this juncture. Major the Earl Winterton entered the discussion, expressing very bluntly to Harmsworth precisely how a number of people felt about the

Wingate issue: WINTERTON: Is the Honourable Gentleman aware that, in 267 the opinion of a great many people outside this House, a most distinguished officer has been put under an undeserved slur by the action of the Government, and will he approach his chief with a view to the whole question being re-opened and the whole correspondence being published? HARMSWORTH: I am quite sure that no injustice has been done to this very distinguished officer. Regarding the publication of the correspondence, I have nothing to add to the answers already given. CRAIK: Is it not a fact that officials, and those who have knowledge of the circumstances, argue very strongly that the greatest injustice has been done to this officer who has been deprived of his office? HARMSWORTH: I cannot accept the language of my Right Honourable Friend. WINTERTON: In order that the Honourable Gentleman may be prepared with his answer, I desire to give notice that I shall raise this matter on the adjournment of the House at the earliest opportunity.2°

Theformal debate on the Egyptian situation took

place in the House of Commons on 14 March 1922, and lasted for seven hours.29 Numerous members took advantage of the

opportunity to lambast the three years of Government procrastination and indecisiveness that had preceded Allenby's action. Another aspect of Anglo-Egyptian relations that was much commented on by the members was the continued exile of Saad Zaghlul Pasha and several of his colleagues. The debate was started off by Captain William Wedgwood Benn, the M.P. for Leith. Benn was a non-coalition, or "Asquith", Liberal.39 He questioned the spirit behind the granting of 268 "independence" to Egypt, stating that too little consideration was being given to Egyptian interests in Egypt: "This argument about Imperial communications can be pushed too far. It was the argument the Germans used in Belgium".31 Benn also urged the Government to make a definite policy statement on its attitude toward Zaghlul and the Wafdists, voicing his belief that the British promise to allow Egyptians to enjoy full political rights was meaningless while the acknowledged leader of the nationalist movement was being detained outside his own country.32

While not referring directly to Wingate's treatment at the hands of the Government, Benn expressed the opinion that the "first opportunity" to settle the political status of Egypt was missed when the Foreign Office refused the request of Zaghlul and Rushdi to come to London in November, 1918.33 This was certainly a clear implication that Benn believed Wingate's advice to permit their visit had been correct. Many other members spoke on various facets of the Egyptian situation: some stressed the fiscal reforms which had been brought about by the British since 1882; others discussed the work done to harness the waters of the annual Nile flood so that they might be a more reliable asset, and many considered the "imperial communications" argument. 269 which Benn had disparaged, of primary importance. A significant number of speakers, particularly among the Labor Party members, believed that to prove Great Britain's good faith in its new relationship with Egypt, Zaghlul had to be permitted to return home immediately. A number of members had expressed the view that a settlement not unlike the one which had just been arrived at could have been obtained immediately after the war had Wingate's advice been accepted by the Foreign Office, but none specifically addressed the issue of his current position until Sir Henry Craik spoke: Various of my Honourable and Right Honourable Friends have referred to the action of the Government with regard to Sir Reginald Wingate, but they have not pressed that matter as I hoped it would have been pressed, and as I shall venture to press it.34 Craik went on to state that Wingate had "not communicated with me in any way with regard to this matter." He related the circumstances of Wingate's recall to England in January, 1919; the fact that he was kept waiting for a fortnight before he was permitted to speak to any official of the Foreign Office in London; and the impression which had been created among the public by the Government's failure to make any statement on his status.35 270 After Craik had finished his statement, other members made further specific and rather pointed comments on the same topic: Ormsby-Gore made reference to the equally abrupt removal of Sir Henry McMahon in 1916, and spoke of the "feeling of uncertainty which the representatives of this country have as to whether they were or were not to be supported by the Government at h o m e . "35 Lt . Col. Gerald B.

Hurst, who had served for several months under Wingate during the war, expressed the hope that the Government "will consider the very great claims of Sir Reginald Wingate to a far ampler recognition by the State of the great services he has rendered not only in the Sudan, but also in Egypt."3? Guinness asked bluntly, "Why did not they listen to Sir Reginald Wingate at the end of 1918, and what reparation do they propose to make to that great public servant who was made a scapegoat for their own shortcomings?"3®

Wingate's supporters still had the floor when Harmsworth, denying that the former High Commissioner had been treated in any way unfairly, or that there was any need to publish his correspondence with the Government, concluded the debate. Although many members, representing a wide spectrum of political opinion, were not at all pleased with the "independence" which literally was being foisted on 271 Egypt by the British, there was a general realization that the termination of the Protectorate declared in 1914 was long overdue, and that Allenby's solution, at least, would end it once and for all. When the House divided, on what was ostensibly a vote on the Civil Service and Revenue

Estimates for 1922-23, there were 202 members in favor of, and 70 against, the resolution.39 The following day the

Sultan of Egypt proclaimed his country a monarchy, and himself a King.^® it was reported in the British press that; "Lord Allenby, the High Commissioner, accompanied by the Residency Staff, called at the Abdin Palace this morning and congratulated King Fuad on the new era on which Egypt entered today."41

The pace at which the Egyptian Government proceeded to meet the conditions for the termination of martial law in their country may be taken as some indication of their sense of dissatisfaction with a 'unilateral' declaration of their independence by a foreign country. At Allenby's insistence a constitution had to be adopted to counter the power of the monarchy and guarantee the rights of the Egyptian people. This document, modeled after the Belgian Constitution, was not promulgated until April 1923.42 King Fuad never forgave 272 Lord Allenby for forcing constitutional government on him, although the authority remaining to him was comparable to that of an American president. On 5 July 1923, the Egyptian Government passed the Act of Indemnity, which was the primary condition for the end of martial law. This action guaranteed that public officials, acting on the orders of the authorities during the period of the Protectorate, could not be prosecuted for any actions they had taken in the execution of those orders. As promised in Allenby's Declaration, martial law ended simultaneously.43 With the termination of martial law, the

High Commissioner had no further legal authority to detain Saad Zaghlul Pasha outside of Egypt. Zaghlul's period of exile had been spent at several different locations, and it was from Gibraltar that he returned to Egypt on 18 September 1923. The reception he was accorded by the Egyptian people was reminiscent of the triumphal progress Wavell had witnessed more than two years earlier when the Wafdist leader had returned from P a r i s . 44 clearly, the axiom which asserts that the surest road to political success in Ireland runs through the gates of a British prison had been shown to be equally applicable to Egypt; Zaghlul's position as the dominant figure in the Egyptian nationalist movement had 273 only been enhanced by his almost two years in exile. The Wafdists were soon to reap the rewards of their leader's immense prestige. On 7 January 1924 elections were held for the 214 seats in the Egyptian Chamber of Deputies. When the final results were known, even those who had been fully prepared for a Wafdist victory were shocked by its magnitude. 179 seats (89 percent of the total) had gone to followers of

Zaghlul.45 King Fuad was left with no alternative but to invite the recently returned exile to assume the office of Prime Minister of Egypt. With the formation of a government headed by Zaghlul, pressure for a complete British military withdrawal from Egypt intensified almost immediately. In addition, the new Egyptian administration completely rejected the notion that they were to have no future role in the Sudan. The Wafdists were well aware of the unofficial British policy of attempting to diminish the influence of Egypt in the Condominium arrangement which had existed since 1899. In his long term as Governor-General, Wingate had consistently taken the view that the Sudan should not be regarded as part and parcel of the national territory of Egypt, despite the long-standing Egyptian claim to the region. He believed 274 that this was in the best interests of the British Empire and that it also reflected the wishes of the vast majority of the Sudanese people. Zaghlul, however, was adamant that any final settlement with the British would have to restore the Sudan to full Egyptian control.45

Despite the fact that units of the Egyptian army stationed in the Sudan were not under the direct control of their own Government, the attitudes of the new regime in Cairo could hardly help but spread among them. During the summer of 1924 tensions increased greatly in the Sudan, with a series of disturbances involving both Egyptian personnel and those Sudanese who supported the political link with Egypt. These outbreaks resulted in the deaths of several British service personnel and civilian political officers. The British authorities in the Sudan of course attributed the unrest to agitation by Wafdist supporters among the Egyptians in the country — an allegation in which there was almost certainly much truth — and they reinforced the British forces in Khartoum by another battalion of infantry in anticipation of further trouble.4?

The event which caused the increasingly volatile situation in the Sudan to burst into major violence occurred not in Khartoum, however, but in Cairo. On 19 November 275 1924, General Sir Lee Stack, Wingate's successor as Sirdar of the Egyptian army and Governor-General of the Sudan, was shot to death by a group of extreme Egyptian nationalists while driving through the streets of the city.4® Stack's driver and an accompanying aide were wounded but managed to reach the Residency. Their attackers, although pursued by Egyptian police, disappeared in the crowded streets. The reaction of Lord Allenby to Stack's assassination was immediate and extremely harsh. Allenby was certain that Zaghlul and his followers were, at the very least, indirectly responsible for Stack's death, and he was determined to take the strongest possible measures to see that they paid for it. It would be naive to think, however, that the High Commissioner's subsequent actions were prompted wholly by his righteous anger at an act of murder. The death of Sir Lee Stack had provided the British with a golden opportunity both to oust the Wafdists from office and to settle the issue of the Sudan once and for all, and Lord Allenby was not about to miss it.49 Allenby prepared an ultimatum to be delivered to the Egyptian Government and sent it to the Foreign Office in London for approval before delivering it to Zaghlul. The High Commissioner's demands included: the evacuation of all 276 Egyptian military units from the Sudan within twenty-four hours, the payment of a £500,000 penalty to the British, the banning of all political demonstrations, and agreement to permit the British to increase the irrigated area of the Sudan to whatever amount of land they chose.^0 (The issue of extensive irrigation in the Sudan was always a thorny one in Egyptian politics and held up the initial approval of Wingate's Gezira project years earlier.) Allenby knew that so harsh an ultimatum would cause Zaghlul to resign as Prime Minister. He was also certain that, rather than receive such a document, Zaghlul and his government would resign immediately and let their successors bear the odium of accepting it. In order to head off this event, Allenby chose to proceed with the serving of his ultimatum prior to receiving Foreign Office approval. Escorted by an entire regiment of British cavalry, Allenby drove to the Egyptian parliament to deliver his document in person. Upon his return from this task he found that the Foreign Office had recommended dropping the demand for money, and the inclusion of a guarantee that any future increase in the irrigated

land of the Sudan would not have an adverse impact on Egypt.51 In the event it did not really matter: Zaghlul's government accepted only the demand for the £500,000 and 277 rejected the remainder of the ultimatum. The High Commissioner's response was to send troops to occupy the Alexandria Customs House until the rest of his demands were met. This act caused the resignation of the Egyptian

Government. 52 The Cabinet which took office to replace the Wafdists immediately accepted all of Lord Allenby's demands; they really had little choice in the matter. Getting rid of Zaghlul provided no permanent answer to the dilemma created by Egypt's political status, however. Allenby's readiness to use illegal force, or the threat of it, to achieve Britain's ends made a mockery of the declaration of 'independence'. The impact in the Sudan of the events in Egypt was explosive. Upon being ordered to leave the Sudan several battalions of Egyptian troops mutinied and, more dangerously, a Sudanese unit which had been raised by the British soon followed suit. The Egyptians surrendered without resistance when confronted by overwhelming numbers of British troops, but the Sudanese stubbornly barricaded themselves in a masonry barracks building. This the British reduced to rubble over a period of seven hours with a single 4.5 inch howitzer. No Sudanese survived the bombardment, and none had emerged to surrender during the course of it.53 278 By such methods the British retained the upper hand and the situation never really got out of control, but the entire episode showed an aspect of imperialism which the British Government did not particularly want the public to see. Ironically, Lord Allenby was soon to resign as High Commissioner (May 1925) to protest the lack of confidence shown in his policies by the new Conservative Government of Stanley Baldwin. The High Commissioner found himself being severely criticized in Parliament, particularly by Winston Churchill, for being too soft on the Egyptian nationalists. The Egyptian political situation remained much as Allenby had left it, struggling along from one crisis to another, with the Wafd in and out of power, until the start of the Second World War. At the end of that cataclysmic event new forces, which were to alter the entire position of European powers in the undeveloped world, were unleashed. ENDNOTES CHAPTER VIII

1. India Office Records. MSS Eur (The Curzon Papers), F112/261 (Minutes of the Conference with the Egyptian Official Delegation; 13 July 1921), 25. 2. Ibid. 3. Archibald P. Wavell, Allenbv in Eqvpt (London: George G. Harrap & Co., Ltd. 1943), 64. 4. Wavell, Allenbv in Egvpt. 64-65. Wavell's statement that no Wafdists attended the London negotiations. Marius Deeb, Partv Politics in Egvpt: The Wafd and its Rivals 1919-1939 (London: Ithaca Press, 1979), 53. Deeb states that the Wafdists who broke with Zaghlul were: Muhammad Mahmud, Hamad al-Basil, Abd al-Latif al-Makabbati, Ahmad Lufti al-Sayyid, and Muhammad Ali Alluba. lOR, Curson Papers, F112/261 (Minutes of the Conference with the Egyptian Official Delegation; 13 July 1921), 25. This is the first page of the minutes of the first negotiating session between the British and Egyptian delegations. On it, and on the first page of each subsequent negotiating session, are listed the names of all members present from each delegation. On none of these minutes do the names of any of the five men mentioned by Marius Deeb appear. 5. Lawrence J. L. Dundas, The Life of Lord Curzon, 3 vols. (London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1928), 3:249-250. (Dundas was the Marquess of Zetland.) 6. Harold Nicolson, Curzon: The Last Phase (London: Constable & Co., Ltd. 1934), 177. 7. Ibid., 178. 8. IOR. Curzon Papers, F112/261 (Curzon to Adly, 4 August 1921).

279 280 9. Wavell, Allenbv in Eqvpt, 65. 10. lOR, Curzon Papers, F112/261 (Curzon to Allenby, 19 November 1921). 11. Ibid. (Memorandum on the Political Situation in Egypt: Part I - Resume of Events up to the Declaration of February 28, 1922), 7. 12. Wavell, Allenbv in Egypt, 67. 13. Peter Mansfield, The British in Eqvpt (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971), 240. 14. Wavell, Allenbv in Egvpt. 67-68. 15. Mansfield, The British in Eqvpt, 240. 16. Nicolson, Curzon. 180. 17. Mansfield, The British in Eqvpt. 240. 18. The Dailv Mail (London), 1 February 1922, 10.Report that Lord Allenby would be leaving for London on Friday, 3 February 1922, to advise the Government about the situation in Egypt. 19. Mansfield, The British in Egypt, 241. 20. Ibid. 21. lOR. Curzon Papers, F112/261 (Memorandum on the Political Situation in Egypt: Appendix A), 14a. 22. The Dailv Mail (London), 2 March 1922, 12. 23. Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., 150 (22 February 1922): 1869-1870. 24. L.G. Wickham Legg and E.T. Williams, eds.. The Dictionary of National Biography: 1941-1950 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 332, 333, s.v. "Guinness, Walter E." After serving as Under­ secretary of State at the War Office and the Exchequer during the Conservative Governments of the early 1920s, Guinness was named Agriculture Secretary in Stanley Baldwin's second Cabinet. In 281

1932 he was created the first Baron Moyne. On 6 November 1944, while serving as the Colonial Office’s Minister-Resident in the Middle East, he was assassinated in Cairo by members of the Zionist Stern gang. 25. J.R.H. Weaver, ed.. The Dictionary of National Biography; 1922-1930 (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1939), 217, s.v. "Craik, Sir Henry." 26. Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., 151 (28 February 1922): 250. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 29. lOR, Curzon Papers, F112/261 (Memorandum on the Political Situation in Egypt: Part II - The Situation during 1922), 7. 30. E.T. Williams and Helen M. Palmer, eds.. The Dictionary of National Biography: 1951-1960 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 91, s.v. "Benn, William Wedgwood." William Wedgwood Benn was first elected to the House of Commons in 1906. When the war started in 1914 he obtained a commission in the Middlesex Yeomanry, and fought with this regiment in the Dardanelles Campaign. For a short period of time Benn commanded a unit of French sailors in guerrilla operations against Turkish positions on the Red Sea (his university degree was in French). Benn returned to England to train as a pilot, and was then sent to Italy. He was seconded to the Italian Army, with which he remained until the end of the war. By the Armistice, Benn had been twice mentioned in dispatches, received the Distinguished Service Order, Distinguished Flying Cross, the Legion of Honor, the Croix de Guerre, and two Italian medals for valor. In 1927 Benn switched his political affiliation to the Labour Party, and served as Secretary of State for India in the 1929- 31 Labour Government. Benn lost his seat in 1931, and did not re-enter the Commons until 1937. In 1939, at the age of 62, he went on active duty with the RAF and was again mentioned in dispatches. He was created the first Viscount Stansgate in 1942, 282 and served as Secretary of State for Air from 1945 to 1947. He died in 1960. He was, as well, the father of Anthony Wedgwood Benn. 31. Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser ., 151 (14

32. Ibid., col. 2018.

33. Ibid., col. 2013.

34. Ibid., col. 2072.

35. Ibid., col. 2073.

36. Ibid., col. 2086.

37. Ibid., col. 2080.

38. Ibid., col. 2118.

39. Ibid., col. 2126. 40. lOR. Curzon Papers, F112/261 (Memorandum on the Political Situation in Egypt; Part II - The Situation during 1922), 7. 41. The Dailv Mail (London), 17 March 1922, 9. 42. Mansfield, The British in Egypt, 245-246.

43. Wavell, Allenbv in Egypt, 97. 44. Ibid., 99. 45. P. J. Vatikiotis, The Modern History of Egypt (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Inc., 1969) 271-272. 46. Anthony Clayton, The British Empire as a Superpower, 1919-1939 (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1986), 130.

47. Ibid., 131. 48. Ibid., Mansfield, The British in Egypt, 250. 49. Mansfield, The British in Egypt, 250. 283

50. Ibid., 251. 51. Ibid. 52. Ibid. 53. Clayton, The British Empire as a Superpower. 1919- 1939. 131-132. CHAPTER IX WINGATE'S SUBSEQUENT CAREER 1920 - 1953

While Reginald Wingate's successors in Egypt and the Sudan struggled to control events there, the former Governor-General, Sirdar, and High Commissioner continued to wage his own campaign to exonerate himself in the eyes of the British public. It did not take those in Britain who understood both the Egyptian situation and domestic politics best long to realize that Wingate had, indeed, been made the scapegoat for the Foreign Office's failure to appreciate the imminent danger of violent upheaval in Egypt in late 1918. Throughout the early 1920s there were a number of old friends and associates of Wingate working behind the scenes to help secure him some measure of recognition for his many years of service to Great Britain and the Empire. Foremost among these was Alfred, Lord Milner, whose commission of inquiry into the causes of the Egyptian uprising of March 1919 had found Wingate's actions at that time above reproach. Milner believed that a grave injustice had been done to Wingate in the matter of his removal from Cairo in 1919 and, from the time of Milner's resignation from the Government in 1921 until his death in late 1925, he

284 285 and the former High Commissioner kept up a steady correspondence on the subject. One such letter from Milner, dated 8 January 1925, is illustrative of the serious efforts, at the highest possible levels, which were being made on Wingate's behalf. Milner wrote the letter to inform Sir Reginald that he had received a message from Lord Stamfordham, private secretary to King George V, stating that the King was completely of the view that Wingate had been miserably treated and that he would personally favor rewarding him with a peerage. Stamfordham added, however, that the King did not believe that it would be proper to initiate the peerage himself.^ The implicit statement was, of course, that Wingate would have to gather enough support from people with sufficient influence in British politics before the Crown could act. Even with the aid of his many loyal friends, this would be an extremely difficult task for Wingate as it involved convincing a number of people to admit publicly that they had acted in error — something any politician, either then or now, is loath to do. Milner could not resist the temptation of reminding Sir Reginald that his previous acceptance of the rather niggardly title of 'Baronet of Port Sudan and Dunbar' might now lessen his chances of lobbying successfully for a 286 peerage: You may remember I was rather against your accepting the BART: for it was such an utterly inadequate reward, and I feared they would use it as wiping you off the sheet.

Wingate had some hopes that the eventual end of the Lloyd George Coalition Cabinet would improve his chances of getting some further recognition for his service. When this event came about in October 1922, however, it seemed to matter little, if at all. The position of Foreign Secretary continued to be held by Lord Curzon in the cabinets of the two Conservative Prime Ministers (Andrew Bonar Law and Stanley Baldwin) that held office until January 1924. The short-lived Labour Government of J. Ramsay MacDonald that followed provided Wingate with no satisfaction either. When a new Tory Government took office, again under Stanley Baldwin, at the end of 1924, Austen Chamberlain was named to head the Foreign Office. Lord Curzon, who had not worked well with Baldwin in his previous term as Prime Minister, had, with much reluctance, accepted the virtually powerless office of Lord President of the Council. Curzon had himself hoped to gain the Prime Ministership when Bonar Law resigned in May 1923, but the leading figures of the Conservative Party did not believe he would be able to govern effectively from the House of Lords, and he was forced to bow out in 287 favor of Baldwin. In April 1925 he died.3 While Sir Reginald Wingate was certainly far too honorable a man to gloat over the demise of the man who had become the main obstacle in his efforts to restore his reputation, he and his friends did see in Curzon*s departure from the stage an opportunity to press his case to a new and, they hoped, more sympathetic audience. By this time, however. Sir Reginald seemed somewhat reluctant to continue pressing his case with the Government. Whether his attitude had come about through the six years of constant disappointment following his recall to England, or for some other reason, is difficult to say, but it is certainly clearly discernible. A case in point is an invitation Wingate and his wife received from the Sudanese Government in October 1925. The Sennar Dam on the Blue Nile, a major addition to the Gezira Irrigation Scheme that had been Wingate's brainchild, was to be officially opened in January 1926, and the administration of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan wished to acknowledge the debt owed to the territory's first

Governor-General by honoring him at the opening ceremonies.4

Wingate would have accomplished several things by accepting the invitation and being present at the ceremony: his name and situation would have been brought to the attention of a 288 public whose memory of the injustice done him in 1919 had almost certainly faded, and it would also have focused the attention of the Government on his valuable years of service prior to the unfortunate conclusion of his High Commissionership for Egypt. Yet, in his response to Sir Geoffrey Archer, Sir Lee Stack's successor as Governor- General of the Sudan, Wingate declined the invitation with

many thanks, pleading the responsibilities of business.5 While there was some element of truth in Wingate's excuse for not traveling to Khartoum for the dam's opening ceremonies, he should have made an effort to be present, given the potential gains to be obtained. The British officials in the Sudan could not have been unaware that Wingate had made himself many highly placed enemies over the previous several years. It had taken some degree of courage for them to have extended the invitation in the first place: Sir Reginald's efforts in his own behalf were becoming decidedly half-hearted. In a letter to Wingate, written within a month after the exchange of letters with the Sudanese government. Lord Milner expressed his sympathy at the fact that Sir Reginald would not be present for the opening of the Sennar Dam, but also stated the view that the decision not to go was wise 289 because of the 'embarrassment it would have provoked This view is somewhat difficult to understand. Milner, who was very near the end of his own life at this time, obviously believed that a discreet campaign of letter writing and interviews, aimed at the highest levels of the British Government, would be more effective than actions that would catch the attention of the general public. Wingate had been discreet for a number of years on the issue of the treatment he had received, and it had gained him very little indeed. Later in November, in a letter whose main purpose was to note the death of Queen Alexandra (then the Queen

Mother), Milner urged Wingate to approach Austen Chamberlain, Curzon's successor at the Foreign Office, to present his case.? The following month Milner wrote with

the information that he had had a conversation with Winston Churchill (Chancellor of the Exchequer in Baldwin's second government) in which Churchill had expressed support for a peerage for Wingate.® Very shortly before his own death,

Milner himself wrote to Austen Chamberlain, pressing him to support the award of a peerage to Wingate.^

Milner's death seems to have been the end of any very serious agitation to compensate for the shabby 290 treatment Wingate had received in 1919. Although a very substantial number of highly placed men would have gladly lent their support to his cause. Sir Reginald seemed unwilling, or unable, to coordinate a unified effort toward his goal. Lord Milner had spent his career in a political and administrative capacity, and knew how the game was played at Whitehall. It is quite apparent that he felt a degree of responsibility toward Wingate after the Cabinet's rejection of the report which would have exonerated the former High Commissioner and, had he lived longer, he might well have been able to help Sir Reginald accomplish what he obviously could not manage alone. Wingate's elder son (and biographer), Ronald, speaks of the disdain which his father felt toward civil servants in general, and the Foreign Office in particular.^® Sir Reginald was, first and foremost, a soldier and, although he had spent many years as an administrator, he was singularly ill-equipped to deal with the type of political intrigues that would have been necessary to achieve his own exoneration. After the middle 1920s Wingate seems to have given up any real hope of ever rectifying his situation. His correspondence on the subject after that point, mostly with old cronies rather than with anyone who was in a 291 position to offer him any help, seems more like a pointless rehashing of the wrongs done him than an effort to correct them. What is certainly significant is the complete absence of correspondence between Wingate and any of the members of Parliament who had spoken out repeatedly in his behalf, from early 1919 onwards. Men like Craik, Winterton, Wedgwood, Ormsby-Gore, and Guinness, who had belabored the Government at every opportunity on the issue of the treatment Wingate had received, do not seem to have been in direct communication with him. If letters between Wingate and any of these men ever existed, they have obviously either been destroyed or not included in the papers deposited at the Sudan Archive of Durham University by Sir Ronald Wingate in the mid-1950s. What seems more likely, however, is that any "Wingate lobby" that might have existed from 1919 into the early 1920s was being directed by Milner and, given Wingate's own seeming inability to act in his own behalf, died with him. What is also apparent, when noting which M.P.s spoke out regarding Wingate's situation, is that they were almost entirely in one of two categories: either young military officers who had served in areas where Wingate was involved. 292 or men who had held positions in the Asquith government and lost them when Lloyd George took over. Another connecting element among most of them was, of course, a previous association with Lord Milner. The fact is that Wingate's most vocal supporters in Parliament were not men who currently possessed a great deal of power. While a man like Winston Churchill might agree that Wingate should be given a peerage for his many years of service, he would be quite unlikely to risk his own career, which he was in the process of rebuilding in the early 1920s, in an effort to get him one. Wingate's own public silence on the matter made active assistance from the higher levels of the political establishment even more unlikely. Despite his failure to gain either a peerage or any increase in his pension, Wingate was still respected and not entirely without influence among those who had known him at the peak of his career. The many contacts he had made over the years, with a wide variety of people, enabled him to obtain a position on the board of a Belgian firm involved in exploiting the mineral resources of the Congo. The income from this source, together with his pension and a modest income from investments made years earlier, enabled Wingate to support himself and his wife quite adequately. 293 Wingate's business dealings made it necessary for him to spend a good deal of his time in London, where he and his wife maintained a flat. The Wingates also retained Knockenhair House at Dunbar, which had been their main residence in Britain since they had had it built in the early years of the century. Sir Reginald also spent an appreciable amount of time on business trips to the Continent during the interwar period. Wingate was able to use his remaining influence to some effect, during his years of involuntary retirement, to help salvage something of the wreckage of an old friend's career. Rudolf von Slatin, caught in his native Austria by the start of the First World War, had spent the war years as an official of the Austro-Hungarian Red Cross.Although the efforts made by the former Inspector-General of the Sudan to leave his native land and return to his position with the British, when it became apparent that war was inevitable, were regarded by many in Britain as having been rather half-hearted, Slatin had never held an Austrian military commission during the war. His work had involved the procurement of supplies of all sorts to be sent through the International Red Cross to Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war being held in Russia.Slatin's work had necessitated 294

frequent trips to neutral nations, usually one of the Scandinavian kingdoms, to arrange the purchase of the supplies and their shipment into Russia. This access to neutral channels had enabled him to maintain an occasional discreet contact with Wingate during the entire period of the war. At the conclusion of hostilities, however, Slatin found himself to be very much persona non grata in Great Britain. The official position of the Foreign Office was that, by his failure to return to British service when the war broke out in 1914, Slatin had forfeited the awards, pension rights, and other privileges he had received from Britain, and that his status differed not at all from that of any other enemy alien. Engaging in a quiet campaign of letter writing, to both the Foreign Office and Lord Stafordham, Wingate was able to accomplish for Rudolf von Slatin a measure of what he was seeking for himself. In January 1920, Slatin was able to travel to England and stay for a period of two months. During this time he met with Wingate and many other old friends and colleagues whom he had not seen since before the war. An audience with the King was the crowning moment of the trip.lG The former Inspector-General was able to stabilize his financial affairs by the mid-1920s and, in 295 1927, the Foreign Office recommended to the King that Slatin be given official permission to resume wearing the three English decorations that he had received for his services to the British Empire prior to the First World War.^? This was the final, and most essential, affirmation that his reputation and position in the eyes of British society had been restored. Slatin, however, was never completely comfortable in either post-war Britain or the greatly reduced republican Austria that had replaced the Habsburg Empire, and he accordingly made his home in the portion of the Tyrol that had been awarded to Italy in the territorial readjustments of 1919. He remained in constant communication with Wingate for the rest of his life and died in October 1932, at the age of seventy-five.^® During the 1930s Wingate also used several of his remaining personal contacts to ease the path of his young first cousin once removed, Orde Wingate (1903-1944), in the earlier phases of his military career. When the younger Wingate was posted to Palestine in the mid-1930s, his well known relation provided him with introductions to many influential British military and civilian officials with whom a junior officer would not otherwise have been likely to come into contact. 296

The remainder of Sir Reginald's life was spent in the management of his own personal and financial affairs, for the most part entirely out of sight of the public eye. Despite a number of offers from publishing houses, and the encouragement of his friends, Wingate would never consent to write his memoirs for publication. While many men bearing the kind of bitterness which Sir Reginald felt over the destruction of his career and, to his mind, his reputation as well, would have leapt at the chance to put their side of the story into print, that was not Wingate's way. He was an intensely private individual, as were many people of his generation, and an almost painfully dignified one as well. Anyone at all familiar with Sir Reginald's manner of expressing himself in writing would find it extremely difficult to believe that he would ever have been able to bring himself to engage in the type of finger pointing which one finds in David Lloyd George's War Memoirs, to cite a classic example. It would have been virtually impossible to write his memoirs without dealing in some way with the series of events which brought his High Commissionership for Egypt to its abrupt end in 1919. Sir Reginald's son states that, although his father had long intended to write the story of his career for publication, there were always more 297 pressing demands on his time until, with the deterioration of his physical condition over the final decade of his life, it became an impossible task.^® This is an explanation which is difficult to accept fully. When all of Wingate's prior actions on the issue of his removal from Cairo are taken into account, it appears more likely that, just as he never seemed able to carry out his threat to demand a public inquiry into his performance as High Commissioner, neither was he able to face the ordeal of presenting his story to the British public in a volume of memoirs. Sir Reginald Wingate died at his home in Dunbar in January 1953, at the age of almost ninety-two. He was buried in the graveyard of the local parish church with all the honors due a full general in the British army. On his tombstone it is noted, after his baronetage and the orders which he held, that he had been 'The Maker of the Anglo- Egyptian Sudan'. That accolade, no matter what misfortunes befell him after his departure from Khartoum in 1917, was one which no one could ever deny him. ENDNOTES CHAPTER IX

1. Sudan Archive Durham, Wingate Papers, 241/5/1 (Milner to Wingate, 8 January 1925). 2. Ibid. Wingate was given a baronetage in June 1920. This from the Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th ed., s.v. "Wingate, Sir Francis Reginald." I have not been able to find information on the sponsorship for the award. Neither have I seen any explanation for Wingate's decision to accept it. By the middle of 1920 it is possible that he had abandoned any real hope of either a pension increase or a peerage, and simply took the baronetage as the best he was likely to get. 3. Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, Baldwin. A Biography (London: The Macmillian Company, 1970), 279, 298- 299. 4. SAD, Wingate Papers, 241/5/44-45 (Sudan Government to Wingate, 13 October 1925). (Archer's invitation to Wingate to attend the opening of the Sennar Dam). Ibid., 241/6/106 (Sir Geoffrey Archer's opening speech at the Sennar Dam ceremony). While Egyptian military units had been expelled from the Sudan following the assassination of Sir Lee Stack, Egyptian officials still participated in the Gezira Scheme. Archer acknowledged the presence of Sir Ismail Pasha Sirri and Abdul Hamid Pasha Suleiman of the Egyptian Ministry of Public Works, and expressed his gratitude to "the able engineers from Egypt whose labours have contributed to the successful completion of this project." 5. Ibid., 241/5/46-47 (Wingate to Archer, 19 October 1925). 6 . Ibid., 241/5/48-49 (Milner to Wingate, 16 November 1925). 7. Ibid., 241/5/50-51 (Milner to Wingate, 24 November

298 299

1925). 8. Ibid., 241/5/63-64 (Milner to Wingate, 8 December 1925). 9. Ibid., 241/5/67-71 (Milner to Chamberlain, copy to Wingate undated). 10. Ronald Wingate, Not in the Limelight (London: Hutchinson & Company Ltd., 1959), 28. Sir Ronald Wingate describes his father's customary comments on the Foreign Office as "unprintable". 11. Ronald Wingate, Wingate of the Sudan (London: Jonathan Cape, 1955), 254. 12. Ibid.

13. Gordon Brook-Shepherd, Between Two Flags, The Life of Sir Rudolf von Slatin Pasha, GCVO. KCMG. CB (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1973), 269. 14. Ibid., 277.

15. Ibid., 300-301.

16. Ibid., 303,304, 305. 17. Ibid., 332-33. (The decorations restored to Slatin were: Grand Commander of the Victorian Order, Knight Commander of the Order of Saints Michael and George, and Commander of the Order of the Bath) 18. Ibid., 324, 342. 19. Christopher Sykes, Orde Wingate: A Biography (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1959), 120. 20. Wingate, Not in the Limelight, 70-71. CHAPTER X CONCLUSIONS

Sir Reginald Wingate exercised a very considerable influence on Great Britain's policies in Egypt and the Sudan throughout the greater portion of his career. At the height of his power, his years as Governor-General of the Anglo- Egyptian Sudan, he received honors and recognition from the highest levels of British society, including the Royal Family. For years Wingate's advice and counsel were sought eagerly by many men more highly placed than himself, yet his career ended in disaster in 1919 and he never held public employment again. Wingate's long administration of the Sudan was a spectacular success, although this statement requires some qualification. In terms of the immediate objectives for the recovery of the Sudanese economy which were set by the British in the early years of the twentieth century, Wingate performed admirably as Governor-General. Viewed from the perspective of the long term impact on Sudanese

society of the authoritarian and paternalistic regime he established there, his work might be considered somewhat less successful. Blame for this ultimate result can hardly be laid directly at the feet of Wingate, however. In the opening decades of the present century it was not British

300 301 policy to prepare subject peoples eventually to rule themselves and, even if it had been, the Sudan would have been viewed as an unlikely candidate for self-government at any future date. Apart from the fact that the country was, de jure, Egyptian territory, it was regarded as among the most backward of the territories occupied by Great Britain. Wingate's primary task, when he embarked on his Governor-Generalship in 1899, was to create an economic situation in the Sudan which would enable the country to pay for itself. It is on his success or failure in accomplishing this assignment that his tenure as Governor- General must be judged.

The construction of a network of railways, the building of a modern port on the Red Sea coast, and the beginnings of a large scale irrigation project in the Gezira were all important factors in the attempt to create a viable Sudanese economy and, in each of them, Wingate played a major role in the planning stage. Their success can be judged by the fact that, within little more than a decade from the establishment of the Condominium arrangement, it was possible to suspend the annual Egyptian subsidies to the Sudanese Government. 302 There can be little doubt that the lives of a great number of the Sudanese people were improved under Wingate's administration, at least in the physical sense. The mere fact that peace and order were established after 1899 enabled the people to pursue their daily business without the disruptions and dangers which existed in the Khalifa's time. This is no small achievement, in and of itself. The introduction of some measure of public sanitation in the towns, and of such things as the drilling of deep and reliable wells in the villages, represents a definite advance in the condition of the population. Weighed against these things, of course, must be the fact of foreign rule and the absence of political freedoms. The tradition of authoritarian government — by no means confined either to the Sudan or to British imperialism — was the one great negative factor which came out of Wingate's Governor- Generalship. It set the tone for future Governor-Generals of the Sudan, and for the country's future political development as an independent nation. One has only to review, however, events in much of Africa, and elsewhere in the Third World, since the demise of the European colonial empires, to see that this legacy was widely bequeathed. 303 Wingate was admirably suited for the role he was called upon to play in the Sudan. The administration there was quite small, at least by comparison to the British establishment in Egypt, and could be conducted in an almost familial way. It can readily be seen from Wingate's correspondence that he concerned himself with the very smallest details — indeed, his previous success as Director of Intelligence had stemmed largely from this trait — and, in the Sudan, it was possible to involve himself to such an extent in the work of his subordinates without causing much disruption. In the more complex situations he encountered as High Commissioner for Egypt, however, this mode of operation diminished his effectiveness. In Cairo Wingate seems to be very much out of his element.

There were two main factors acting upon the men responsible for the abrupt removal of Wingate from his position as High Commissioner for Egypt in 1919, and they complemented each other admirably. These were the desire of the Foreign Office to avoid censure for failing to anticipate the nationalist uprising which broke out in Egypt in March 1919, and David Lloyd George's wish to reward a general who had emerged from the First World War as the only really popular military figure of that conflict — Sir 304 Edmund AHenby. Wingate's reception of Zaghlul and his colleagues at the Residency in Cairo just after the Armistice in 1918, and his endorsement, albeit qualified, of their request to proceed to Europe for the Peace Conference, caught the Foreign Office by surprise. That Ministry's preoccupation with preparations for the upcoming Paris negotiations partially explains, but cannot excuse, the failure to appreciate the full implications of Wingate's initial advice, and subsequent repeated warnings, on the issue of Egyptian representation at the Conference. The high-handed response to the Egyptian request, which went completely against the recommendations of the High Commissioner, certainly precipitated the violence that ultimately occurred. That such a response was adopted seems to have been largely the decision of the Acting Foreign Secretary,

Lord Curzon. A year earlier Curzon had been a member of the secret Egyptian Administration Committee, whose purpose had been to arrive at a coherent postwar policy toward Egypt. That committee had been unable to accomplish its task, as the Acting Foreign Secretary well knew, and it is probable that he did not wish to take the responsibility for allowing developments in Egypt to deviate too far from the status 305 quo. In any case, it is readily apparent that the Foreign Office's role in the events leading up to the disorders of March 1919 was not one that would have enhanced its reputation if made public. Prime Minister Lloyd George had staked a good part of his credibility on the appointment of General Sir Edmund Allenby to command the British forces operating against the Turks in Egypt and the Sinai. The 1917 decision to strengthen the British war effort in peripheral theaters of conflict, rather than concentrating solely on the Western Front, had been strongly supported by the Prime Minister and a great deal rode on its success or failure. The results which Allenby produced had virtually driven the Turks from the war, bolstered the morale of the British public, and justified the Prime Minister's decision. Lloyd George was, then, heavily in Allenby's debt in 1918. The recall of

Wingate in the midst of Egypt's political crisis provided the opportunity for both the Foreign Office and the Prime Minister to achieve their different ends. Wingate's replacement in Cairo by Allenby, combined with the absence of any public statement of support for the work he had done there, effectively made him the scapegoat for the whole series of diplomatic blunders leading to the Egyptian 306

disorders. The Foreign Office had very neatly escaped blame for its own failure to heed Wingate's many warnings, and Lloyd George had put paid to his debt to Allenby. The well-informed soon saw Wingate's treatment for what it was, a cover-up. The number of men who spoke out in Parliament against the treatment he had received proves this without doubt, but the former High Commissioner's apparent inability, or unwillingness, to create the public controversy which would have been necessary to restore his reputation prevented him from ever gaining sufficient recompense for the very unjust termination of hi career. Although the findings of Lord Milner's Special Mission to Egypt found Wingate's conduct of his post completely above

reproach, the satisfaction he should have gotten from that fact was diminished by the cabinet's rejection of the Milner Report as a whole.

The events relating to Wingate's eclipse in 1919 would be very little more than an historical footnote were it not for the long term effects of the British government's failure to listen to the advice he had given them. It cannot be doubted for a moment that Wingate's commitment to the British Empire and its interests had always been paramount throughout the almost forty years he had served in 307

the Sudan and Egypt. He was not the man to advocate independence for any territory Great Britain held — let alone one of such immense strategic importance as Egypt — without ironclad guarantees ensuring the security of Britain's special position there. Yet he had the wisdom to realize that Egyptian nationalism had progressed to the stage where it would be in his own nation's best interests to acknowledge it, and attempt to reach a compromise with it, immediately.

The 'independence' granted by Allenby*s unilateral decree of February 1922 certainly went no further in breaking de facto British control of Egypt than anything Wingate would have agreed to in 1919. The same safeguards of British interests which were imposed by Allenby could have been arrived at by negotiation earlier, but for the impetus given to Zaghlul and the Wafd by the British government's reaction to the demands they presented to Wingate in November 1918. That which Britain imposed in its frustration could have been granted gracefully and without bitterness had Wingate's advice been heeded. Although it is doubtful that the more extreme elements of the Egyptian nationalist movement would have been satisfied for any very lengthy period with the degree of independence their country 308 received in 1922, the confrontational situation which arose as a result of the initial British actions might have been avoided. The events of 1918-22 soured Anglo-Egyptian relations for decades. The pattern of intimidation established during those years is clearly evident right up to the time British forces departed from the Suez Canal Zone in 1956. In light of this, the actions of the Eden government in response to Egypt's final, and necessary, assertion of sovereignty over its own territory should have surprised no one. They were entirely in keeping with the pattern of British behavior toward Egypt which had commenced three-quarters of a century before. On balance, Wingate's contribution to the success of British policy in the Middle East during the many years he served there was a very valuable one. Despite the fact that his High Commissionership for Egypt foundered on the rock of Foreign Office opposition to his conciliatory attitude towards Egyptian nationalism, even that phase of his career may be viewed as an overall success. Wingate's strong and effective support for the Arab Revolt, which began while he was still at Khartoum, was an important factor in the final British victory over the Turks in 1918. That achievement. 309 together with his earlier fine service as Governor-General of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and Director of Military Intelligence, cannot be tarnished by the unfortunate series of events which terminated his career in 1919. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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