Appian, the Rise of Rome, and Monarchy: An Analysis of the Romaika through the Portrayal of Africanus and Aemilianus

by

Michael Wolf

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts with Honors in Classics

Williams College

Williamstown, Massachusetts

January 29,2004 A thesis on an author as obscure as Appian is likely to raise questions from the reader, and not without reason. I did not set out to write a work considering his worth as a historian, as I originally intended only to consider his treatment of Scipio Afiicanus as part of a larger work on that figure. However, as my work progressed, I was intrigued by the disparity between what I saw in Appian and how he was regarded by other scholars.

The project took on a life of its own, as works of this type always seem to do, and this was the end result. If this work at least causes the reader to consider again their impression of Appian, even if my conclusions are not accepted, I will still be satisfied that it has had some value.

I would also like to use this space to express my deepest appreciation to the

Classics Department faculty for their assistance on this project, and especially to my advisor, Professor Kerry Christensen. Without her guidance, this project would never have reached its final state, and her quest for clarity on my part has undoubtedly made the reader's job much easier. I would also like to thank my family and fiiends for their support throughout my work on this project. Preface

Introduction

Chapter 1: The Characterization of the Scipios

Chapter 2: An Interpretation of the Themes of the Scipios

Chapter 3: A Reassessment of the Civil Wars

Conclusion

Appendix - The Structure of the Romaika

Bibliography Appian of Alexandria was a second century A.D. Greek historian of Rome. He

wrote his history, the Romaika, in the Greek tradition of the universal history, but in an

adapted form focusing solely on Rome in order to better demonstrate the importance of

that empire's achievements. A firm believer in the monarchy that was so successful in

his era, he sought to explain that the rise of the empire was due to the innate qualities of

the Roman people but that its unprecedented duration was a result of the success of this

monarchical government.

Scholarship of Appian in the modem era has been decidedly unkind to the author,

but he has not always been regarded in such a light. Although it is not known how

Appian's work was received at his own time, the ninth century Patriarch of

Constantinople, Photius, praised it for its accuracy, its treatment of military affairs, and

the emotionaI impact of its speeches.' He was well respected as well in sixteenth century

England, where a writer commenting on historians remarked, "Herein emongs the

Grekes, plutarch, Appian, Thucydides, are of greatest name."2 Shakespeare also is

believed to have used Appian as a source for his Julius Caesar and Antony and

~koptru.

By the nineteenth century, however, little respect remained for Appian as an

author or as a historian. Scholars delighted in picking apart the inconsistencies and

idiosyncrasies of Appian's grammar.4 AS a historian, he was relegated to the third rank

1 Photius Bibliotheke, cod. 57. 2 By L. Humphrey in The Nobles or ofNobility. Quoted in Schanzer (1956) xxviii. Schanzer (1956) xix and passim. Viereck and Roos (1962) xxxv-xxxvii list a number of these works. of source^,^ and therefore was only considered useful in that, through source analysis, some lost scrap of a 'good' historian might be able to be recovered. As might be expected, because the original sources that Appian was believed to have used were lost, attempts to find links between Appian and his sources were difficult and often contradictory. Schwartz, in his attempt to bring together all of the source work on

Appian that had been achieved through the end of the nineteenth century, was only successful in disproving most of the theories that had been developed.6 Nevertheless, source identification remained the primary focus of scholarship on Appian well into the twentieth century.

Appian scholarship finally began to move forward, and the work began to be treated as a unified composition rather than a mismatched collection of sources, with the important works of ~abba.~While still primarily interested in determining what

Appian's sources were, Gabba, rather than looking at the text and struggling to find similarities with other authors, examined the major themes of Appian's treatment of the civil war period. He then tried to determine from these themes what Appian's source might have been. Though the conclusion he reached from this analysis, that Asinius

Pollio was Appian's main source for the entire civil war period, has not been widely accepted,' his process at least opened up the study of Appian as an author in his own right and not merely a compiler.

Following Gabba, and somewhat influenced by him, the next major developments in the study of Appian were achieved by Hahn, whose main goal was also to identifl

5 By, e.g., Nissen (1 863) 1 15. 6 Schwartz (1896). 7 Especially his first work, Gabba (1956). 8 It is questioned by, e.g., Badian (1958). Appian's source^.^ Hahn attempted to apply set standards to the often murky science of source analysis by looking at patterns across the whole work and eventually using statistical analysis to detect meaningful trends. His findings on the prevalence or absence of set elements such as speeches and dates are certainly interesting, but unfortunately are not successful in convincingly identifying Appian9ssources: as long as a suspected source is itself missing, no analysis can ever convincingly name it as what Appian used if he does not mention it himself, which he rarely does.

For this reason, despite the vast amount of material devoted to identifying

Appian9ssources, very little success has been made in reaching consensus. This finally led authors to move beyond source analysis and focus on Appian as a historian. Perhaps not surprisingly, once Appian was given the respect of being treated not as a mere compiler but as a true historian, he was discovered to be much more capable than previously assumed. Recent works by Goldmann and Gowing have done much to establish the presence of overarching themes and purposes in Appian's work, as well as to demonstrate the importance of the author in the treatment of his material.1•‹

Because Appian's treatment of the civil wars is the only complete narrative of events in Rome from Tiberius Gracchus to the end of the Second Triumvirate, it has attracted the majority of the attention devoted to Appian. Recently, however, the more neglected portions of Appian's work, the ethnic books, have begun to receive their fair share of treatment. l1

His findings over a series of works are summarized in Hahn (1982). lo Goldmann (1988) and Gowing (1992). " e.g. McGing (1993) on the Mithridateos, Gomez-Espelosin (1993) on the Iberike, and Brodersen (1989) on the Syriake. This work seeks to continue both these trends in the scholarship of Appian by first examining certain themes Appian establishes in the ethnic books. Specifically, the first chapter examines Appian's characterization of the two Scipios, Afi-icanus and

~emilianus,'~in two of Appian's ethnic books, the Iberike and the ~ib~ke.'~These two figures dominate Appian's narrative in both books, and it is clear that there must be a reason why Appian devotes so large an amount of his work to them. Though the emphasis on the Scipios in Appian's narrative has been noted, no author has attempted to explain the significance of it. l4 Because of this, and to at least partially address the lack of any detailed study at all on the Libyke, the first chapter takes the form of a close analysis of the texts of these two books.

The second chapter examines the themes that were set forth in the previous chapter and provides an explanation of what Appian intended to accomplish in his characterization of the Scipios. It also shows how this characterization corresponds with some of Appian's purposes in writing his work. The influence of some factors from

Appian's own life is also apparent in the characterization and is discussed as part of this chapter.

The third chapter takes the characterization and its themes that had been fleshed out in the previous chapters and sees how it can be applied reliably to Appian's narrative of the civil war period. By doing so, the chapter shows Appian's consistency of purpose

l2 Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus (cos. 205) and Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Afiicanus Numantinus (cos. 147). For the sake of brevity and clarity, the former is referred to throughout as Africanus and the latter as Aemilianus, except in direct quotations fiom Appian, in which Appian's terminology is used. 13 In light of the lack of standardization in the scholarship of Appian, I refer to Appian's books by the transliterated Greek form of their title. The appendix contains an overview of the books and abbreviations used as well as alternative forms. 14 Gomez-Espelosin (1993) 408, for instance, calls it 'curious' that the two central figures of the Iberike are both named Scipio, and while he examines both figures, he makes little connection between them. throughout his work. The chapter also examines certain passages that have been used as examples of Appian's inconsistency or carelessness and shows how, viewed through the lens of the themes Appian establishes as early in his work as in his narrative of the

Scipios, the sections actually correspond with the themes Appian emphasizes and actually strengthen rather than weaken his contentions.

Before these discussions, however, because Appian is not the most well known classical historian, the next section examines the known facts of Appian's life and the structure of his work.

The dates of Appian's life and the period during which he composed his history are not known directly, but must be inferred from references in his work and from his correspondence with the orator Fronto. From these sources it appears likely that Appian lived fi-om some time in the last two decades of the first century A.D. until the mid to late

160s A.D. He began writing the Romaika in the 150s and was likely still working on it when he died.15 Thus Appian lived and wrote during the high empire, which certainly influenced his conception of monarchical government.

Other information about the life and career of Appian is also limited, and again must be pieced together through references in his work. The most comprehensive reference is his brief autobiographical note at the end of the prologue:

Who I am, who has written this work, many know and I myself said before, but to say it more clearly, I am Appian of Alexandria, who reached the highest place in my fatherland, and in Rome served as an advocate before the emperors, until they considered me worthy to be a procurator for them.

l5 Bucher (1997) 5-15 examines the textual references and reaches these conclusions, which generally agree with those made earlier by Schwartz (1 896) and others.

5 z;< 6& 6v ~a<.tao~v&~~a\~ra, nohhoi p,kv Yoaot ~aia&o< n;po&$qva, oa@&o.c&pov6' &n&v, '~nntavo~'Ah~@~~pszj<, k5 z& n;p&za G~ovkv .c$ nazpi6t ~dtGilrat~ kv '~dp,~ouvayopezjoa~ hi z&v ~aoth&ov,p,&~pt p~ o@&v~~IT~O~;E~EIV $&oav. Pr 15.6216

This passage has caused more controversy than it has resolved, specifically in regard to

what offices Appian held in Egypt and Rome. It does highlight several things that

Appian evidently considered important. Writing in Rome, his use of the single name

'Ann;tavo< rather than the tria nomina, which, as a citizen, he had a right to use,

highlights his provincial origins, as does his reference to Alexandria as his home.17

The position Appian held in Alexandria has not been convincingly established,

but it is sufficient to say that he held a high-ranking office there." He was driven out of

Alexandria during the Jewish revolt of 115-1 17 AD., possibly because of his role as a

government official.19 This again may help explain the importance to him of his provincial origins, since he did not leave by choice. His direct experience with civil strife also helps explain the importance he gives in his work to civil strife in Rome as part of the civil wars: he begins his narrative of this period not with the first wars between

Marius and Sulla but with the first violence in Rome during the tribunate of Tiberius

Gracchus.

16 All translations are my own. The Greek text is •’tom the Teubner edition, volume I (Viereck, Roos, and Gabba (1962)) for the ethnic books, and volume I1 (Mendelssohn and Viereck (1 906)) for the Emphylia. Just as there is no standard format for referring to Appian's books, the division of his text also varies among editions. Readers familiar with the Loeb edition of Appian must beware that the chapters and sections in that edition do not correspond to those of the Teubner edition used here. 17 Bucher (1997) 18. The form '~nntavo~is, as Luce (1958) 23 notes, a Latin form, so it is likely that he Romanized his original Greek name even if he did not adopt a Roman name. Brodersen (1993) 352 suggests his original name may have been 'Adov. l8 VanderLeest (1988) 22 and 225ff suggests that he was an Archidikastes, while Bucher (1997) 6 believes he was a Gymnasiarch. l9 Based upon fragment 19, in Viereck-Roos (1 96 1) 534-5. In Rome, Appian says he served as an advocate before the emperors, and this was

originally taken to mean he held the post of ad~ocatus~sci.~~Although this assumption has been challenged, it is generally accepted21 and helps to explain Appian's interest in

financial matters, including an intention to write a book on imperial revenues and

expenditures (Pr 15.61). Towards the end of his career, assisted by the requests of Fronto

(Ad Pium 9), he gained the post of procurator, though whether he accepted this post or only desired the honor of being considered for it is unclear.

Despite Appian's pride in his Alexandrian heritage, he did not share the dislike of

Rome that was common among his countrymen, shown most notably in the Acta

Alexandrinorum, a collection of first and second century A.D. papyri recording

Alexandrians condemned to death by Roman Having achieved great success in Rome, it would be unlikely that Appian would resent those who had done so much for the advancement of his career. Since at least part of Appian's intended audience was likely his fellow Alexandrians and other subject peoples of one of his purposes was to show to these people the benefits of Roman rule and thus why they should not resent being part of the empire. He was also concerned for similar reasons with the development of the imperial system that made possible his own achievements.

Information on Appian's intellectual pursuits is almost entirely speculative. From his position in Rome, it is clear that he knew Latin in addition to Greek, but the extent to which he was well read in both languages is unclear. Fronto (Ad Pium 9) notes that he often studied with Appian, and from this it has been assumed that Appian was part of

20 Schwartz (1896) 216. 21 Challenged by Gabba (1967) viii, but accepted by Gowing (1992) 17 and Brodersen (1993) 353. 22 Hahn (1968) discusses the evidence for Appian's pro-Egyptian bias as an Alexandrian. 23 Brodersen (1993) 359 notes Appian's explanations of terms and events that any Roman or Latin speaker would be aware of, indicating Greek speaking provincials as part of his intended audience. Fronto's literary circle.24 This group likely discussed historical as well as literary works, and presumably this provided Appian with much of the background for the writing of his history.

Details about Appian's writing method are equally sparse, and most assumptions about his methods have little supporting evidence. Although Appian mentions that he traveled around the empire to research his history (Pr 12.46), most of his information doubtless came from previous historians. The assumptions made by many authors has been that Appian used only one source for a given section of his history, and that he followed this source closely.25 These assumptions have little to support them, and seem to have been made in order to simplifjr the task of discovering the sources that Appian used. If it had been successful in this, the assumption might be more credibly accepted.

Appian's history covers the entire span of Roman history from Aeneas up until his own time. He knew that this material had been covered by previous historians (Pr

12.45), so in order for his work to be useful, he structured it not in the traditional annalistic format, but based on geography, with individual books covering the entire history of Roman affairs in an individual region. By doing so, he achieves his purpose of comparing the virtue (&p~~{)of the Romans with that of the other nations (Pr 12.46). His history is not composed entirely of ethnic books, however, as he also devotes several books to the period of the civil wars, which he originally intended to be structured around the campaigns of the opposing Roman generals (Pr 14.59).~~Appian considers this a

24 Gowing (1992) 275. 25 Bucher (1997) 206 notes this tendency as well as the flaws of it. 26 This plan evidently changed, as the original four book structure outlined by Appian, based on the campaigns of Marius and Sulla, Caesar and Pompey, the Triumvirs against Brutus and Cassius, and Octavianus and Antonius, is not the structure which we have. The first two books follow the original structure, but the campaign against Brutus and Cassius is in the fourth book, and that between Octavianus and Antonius is contained in the (lost) Egyptian books. fundamental division of his work between the ethnic books and the books on the civil

wars (Pr 15.61).

While this general format of Appian's history is easily retrievable, the structure of

the arrangement of the individual books of Appian's history is by no means clear from

the surviving pasts and Appian's references therein. The initial plan that Appian includes

in his preface references nine ethnic books, but with an indication that the list is not

exhaustive, probably because the preface was composed before the whole work was

completed (Pr. 14.57).~~At other points in his work, Appian refers to five other ethnic

books2' and the Egyptian history, which would continue the civil wars down to the Battle

of Actium and the conquest of Egypt.

Fortunately, the 9thcentury account of Photius, in his Bibliotheca (cod. 57),

describes how the work was structured either upon completion, or by some compiler after

Appian's death. He states that the work consisted of twenty-four books divided into thee

pasts: twelve ethnic nine books on the civil wars (five books of the Emphylia and

four of the Aigyptia), and three books on the history of the empire. Photius's decision to

group the Aigyptia with the Emphylia, forming nine books all based on the Roman civil wars, is difficult to confirm, since the four books of the Aigyptia are lost. However, Luce

calculates that between two and three and a half of the four books were devoted to the

27 This is the conclusion of VanderLeest (1988). The nine books are the Basilike, Italike, Saunitike, Keltike, Sikelike, Iberike, Annibaike, Karchedoniake, and Makedonike, at the end of which list Appian adds, 'K& $jc& hlloiw57, 'and similarly in order'. The lllyrike (E5 145.601), Mithridateios (El 55.24 I), Syriake (E5 1O.39), Hellenike (Sy 2.5), and Parthike (Sy 5 1.259). 29 The same ones Appian relates, with the number reduced by two by the joining of the Illyrike with the Makedonike and the Parthike with the Syriake. civil wars between 35 and 30 B.c.~' Thus Photius is likely accurate in classifjktg the

Aigyptia with the Emphylia and not with the other ethnic books.31

The traditional method of viewing Appian's overall structure is to focus on the

importance of Egypt in the narrative.32 No other region is given more than one book, yet

Appian devotes four to Egypt. Its position at the end of the work suggests that the

culmination of Roman history was the conquest of Egypt. Though Photius lists three

books after the Aigyptia, they are not mentioned by Appian in his initial outline of his

work (Pr 14.57), suggesting that they were added later as an afterthought. The

importance of Egypt is also magnified by Appian's inclusion within his history of Egypt

of both the end of the civil wars and the establishment of the monarchy that he views so

favorably.

An alternative classification can be made within the general structure by retaining

Appian's original classification of his work into two parts, ethnic books and the civil

wars. The first three ethnic books, which describe Roman 'prehistory', before it began

expanding outside of Italy, have been noted as forming a distinctive unit apart from the

other ethnic books.33 Wenthese books are thus grouped, the work takes on a clear

symmetry; three books describe Rome before the expansion into an empire, nine books

describe the growth and conquest of the empire, nine books the civil wars which almost ruined the Romans, but proved the superiority of Rome to the previous world empires, and three books, as an epilogue, describe the continued endurance of the empire. In this

30 Luce (1964) 26 1. 3' The generally accepted structure of the Romaika is contained in the appendix. 32 e.g. Hose (1994) l67ff and Bucher (2000) 421ff. 33 VanderLeest (1988) 60. structure, Appian's emphasis is on the topics of the two large sections, the growth of the empire and the civil wars.

It is under this format that this work treats Appian, as it first examines a specific part of the first section, the characterization of the two Scipios, and then sees how the themes that are established in that characterization are themes that Appian consistently focuses on in the other main section of his work as well. aracterization oft

Africanus in the

The first appearance of Africanus in the narrative of the Iberike is in Rome at the assembly that was called to determine who would replace his father and uncle, who were killed in Spain. Appian describes the scene as follows:

Now the day was announced on which they would elect a general for Spain. When no one recommended themselves, the fear was growing, and a sullen silence held the assembly, until Cornelius Scipio, the son of the Publius Cornelius who was killed in Spain, although he was still a youth (for he was twenty-four years old), but thought to be prudent and noble, came into the assembly. He spoke solemnly about both his father and uncle and lamented their misfortune. He said that it was suitable that he out of all be the avenger of his father, his uncle, and his country. He promised suddenly and vehemently, as if inspired, all these things, and that he would not only take Spain, but also Libya and Carthage. It seemed to some the light talk of a youth, but it raised up the depressed people (for the downtrodden rejoice in promises), and he was chosen general for Spain in order to do something worthy of his courage.

Appian establishes many of the salient features of his characterization of Africanus in this first appearance. He is noble (y~vvaloq)and has courage (~6zohpia),and despite his youth, he is prudent (o&@pov).The audience is swayed in his favor by his effective speaking, his belief in his own destiny, and their belief in his divine influence (kveouq); his bravery, while not specifically mentioned here, is apparent from his desire to go to

Spain when no one else was willing.

The first thing Appian reports that Afi-icanus does in Spain is to lustrate (k&8qp&,

Ib 19.73), and then he gives a speech to the army. As a result of this speech,

'Immediately the report ran through all of Spain, which was oppressed by the

Carthaginians and yearned for the virtue of the Scipios, that Scipio, the son of Scipio, had

come as general from a god. And perceiving this he acted as if he did all things being

persuaded by a god.' (Fo@ TE 6t&papv iq hqv a%~az~v 'Ipqpiav, papuvopivqv

TE zo6q ~ipuaq~ai z6v E~tnt&vovziv &p~~4~&m7~0002)uav, &t o~pa~qyoq

a&o?tq {KO~ EKI'TC~CDV6 CKL'K~OVO~K~T& ~EOV. 05 TOG ~~CT~~VO~EVO~

~~CEK~~VEZOI~&VT~n;ot&v mteop~voq0~4. Ib 19.73). Though the speech itself is not

given, the report of its impact demonstrates its effectiveness. The bravery PET^^) and nobility of Africanus are mentioned, through the reputation that his family has earned,

but his divine influence is the focus of Appian's account.

The interpretation of the significance of divine influence rests on the translation of

6n~~piv~zo:its range of meanings stretches from a simple 'to report' up to 'to

exaggerate' or 'to pretend.' If such an extreme meaning were accepted, it would imply that Appian intended to show that Africanus did not believe that he was divinely inspired but only made himself appear that way because of the effect it had on the population. A translation of 'to act' or 'to portray' would still imply that Africanus wanted to affect the people, but was only showing outwardly what he believed. This interpretation is supported by Appian's statement that the first thing Afiicanus did in Spain was to lustrate. While in itself a general performing a lustration is not a notable act, Appian includes it upon Africanus9sarrival, but not at the arrival of any of the other Roman generals in Spain. This suggests that Appian is deliberately emphasizing the piety of

Africanus and portraying him as believing his own divine infl~ence.)~

The theme of Africanus's divine influence next appears during Appian's account of his attack on New Carthage. After fighting the whole day with little success,

Africanus saw the water of the lagoon fall such that it could be crossed and called to the soldiers: '"Now is the time, men, now the god has come to me as an ally. Attack that part of the wall. The sea has retreated for us. Carry the ladders, I shall lead you."' ("vijv 6

KOIIP~S,6 &v~~E<,V~V 6 oifppa~oq pt ~EQ<&$kat. lepoot~eTG p&p&t7@6& TOG z~i~ouc,.6 @&haooaGpiv ~OKEXO~~~KE.$~~ETET&$ KhipCXKa<, tycj 6' ";?Y*;loopat."

Ib 21 33). Appian does not make it clear whether Africanus believed a god made the waters fall or whether he spoke only for the benefit of the troops, but it is significant that

Appian does not say that Africanus knew the waters would fall, as Livy (XXVI.xlv.7) and Polybius (X.viii.7) do. Appian instead represents Africanus as coming up with his plan to attack the city across the lagoon only when he sees the waters fall. This spontaneous conception of his plan in Appian's account of the incident emphasizes divine intervention more than if he had known all along that the water would fall. It does not make him any less effective as a leader, though, as what the Africanus of Polybius and

Livy's narrative accomplished through planning, Appian's Africanus accomplished through leadership and confidence in his own abilities.

This assault having been successful, the city was taken, whereupon Appian comments on Africanus's mindset. Xewas greatly elated, and it seemed rather more

34 Leidl (1996) I88 states that Appian includes the lustration to indicate Af2%xinus's desire to show that his expedition was divinely favored, but it seems clear that it is not the expedition so much as Africanus himself who is favored. that he accomplished everything with the aid of a god; thus he himself thought and thus he reported it both then and throughout his life, beginning at that time.' (6nypzo

23.88). Here Appian finally states that Africanus really did believe that he was divinely inspired and that he was only projecting outward what he believed internally. Because there is now proof of his divine favor (the god lowered the water for him), he can act in a way to remind people that he is favored. Again the sense of the passage depends on the translation, in this case of 6hoyo.noi~t:hoyot can be fictions, in which sense Africanus would not believe what he is projecting, but hoyo.not&ocan be used when talking about speech writers, just as 6norcpivopat can be used with actors; again Appian is emphasizing not just his divine favor but the effect of his favor on the army. With this interpretation, Africanus is not misrepresenting himself but instead is only displaying outwardly what he himself believes.35 He is conscious of the effect that the appearance of his divine influence has on people, and for this reason he highlights it.

This Africanus does with great effect before the battle of armo one,^^ when he had to determine whether to attack despite his army being outnumbered three to one:

He sacrificed, and immediately after the sacrifice he brought the army into earshot, and having arranged again both the look and the appearance as if inspired, he said that the customary divinity came to him and called him to war, and that it was necessary to take courage in the god rather than the numbers of the

35 Leidl (1996) 209 also believes that ak6q TE okwq $phw. shows that Africanus was not just acting but himself believed he was divinely inspired. 36 Carmone is Appian's name for battle known to historians as Ilipa (from Polybius X1.x~.1 and Livy XXVII1.x. l4), but Appian adds to his account of it certain events kom the battle of Baecula (not included in Appian's narrative), such as the flight of Hashbal to Italy after the defeat (Ib 28.113). Richardson (2000) 127 notes that Carmone, modern Cannona, is a more probable location for the battle than Ilipa because its location south of the Baetis (Guadalquivir) River would correspond better with the Carthaghian retreat to Gades, mentioned by Livy (XXVIII.xvi.2) as well as Appian (Ib 28.110). army, for they prevailed with the aid of the god, not by their numbers. And in order that they would trust him, he ordered the priests to bring into their midst the sacrifices. While speaking, he saw some birds flying, which at once with a start and a cry he turned and pointed out, and he said that the gods sent them as a sign of victory.

Appian portrays Africanus in the normal role of a general before battle, sacrificing and addressing the troops, but he emphasizes the actions of Africanus that show his divine influence and the receptiveness of the soldiers to this appearance of divine influence. In addition there is still evidence that it is not just an elaborate act, as the appearance of the birds (not just birds, 6pvtBq, but birds of augury, oiwvoi) is unexpected and serves to strengthen the resolve of the soldiers. Thus fortified, the Romans successfully routed the

Carthaginians.

Despite stating that Africanus 'acted as if he did all things being persuaded by a god' (~~CEKP~VETO~C&VT~~COI&V ~CE~OO~EVO~ BE&, Ib 19.7'31, Appian specifically makes reference to his divine influence only these two times in his narrative of Africanus in this book; both are at critical times, however, before the two major engagements with the

Carthaginians. In both cases the outlook for the Romans was not favorable, yet victory was the final result. This placement during the major battles and the circumstances of uncertain victory make it clear that Appian believed the Roman victories were due to divine favor and used his narrative to highlight the importance of the divine influence of

Africanus. Appian's descriptions of Africanus during the battles also show, through the

effectiveness of Africanus, the importance of divine influence, but mainly serve to

portray Africanus as a heroic figure through his courage and bravery. At New Carthage,

having called out to his soldiers about the falling water, 'he was the first to take up one of

the ladders, carry it across, and mount the wall, as no one else had yet mounted it.' (mi

npGzo5 &pn&oaqztv& TGV K~L~&KWV~ET&@EP&V TE ~ai&v&@xtv&v, oGno ztvoq

&vap&v~oq&Lou, Ib 22.84) After capturing the wall in this assault, 'some leapt down

and opened the gates for Scipio, who burst in at a run with the army.' (mi rca0ahopwo;

ztv&q &v&@xvT$ &L~~WVI.~&q nzjhaq. 8 6' &;(3&7~^;18rCYEPET& 2775 o~paztii~6popq,

Ib 22.86) Africanus was the first over the wall, and as if this was not enough, Appian has

him lead the charge through the gate as well.

This account is strikingly different from Polybius's narrative of Africanus at New

Carthage: 'Publius was exposing himself to the danger, but he did this safely by his power; for he had with himself three men bearing shields, who placing the shields before him and covering the surface facing the walls provided safety to him.' (6 6; IIonhtoq

66C6ou pkv a6zov E;< TOV K~VSVVOV, bcokt 6; TOGTO ~a-&66vaptv &cr@ah&i;.4% y&p p~8'a&oG zp&q &v6pa~8up~o$opoGvzaq, 6i napazt8&vz&qTOGS 8up~oGqlcai

T+ &no TOG &xouq knt@&v&tavo~en&covzeq &o~&hctav a&$ nap~o~~6abv.

Xxiii. 1-2). Rather than the caution that Polybius focuses on, Appian stresses Africanus's personal leadership and daring actions, creating a figure of heroic stature.

While it is bears little resemblance to Polybius's version, Appian's narration of

Africanus's conduct brings to mind the actions of another great leader: Alexander the

Great. Arrian's narration of Alexander's behavior against the Mallians in India displays many of these similarities: 'But Alexander, as those of the Macedonians bearing the

ladders seemed to him to be sluggish, seized a ladder from one of those bearing them, placed it up against the wall himself, and, after taking up his shield, went up it.'

~hipa~aq,&pnoioa< Khipa~atvoq z6v ~~povzov~CPOO&~~KE T@ ZE~XEL a&oq ~ai

&hqe&q 6~oT$ &onh &v&patvev.VI.9.3) Both leaders are at the front of their armies and are the first to mount the walls.37

Afkicanus plays a similar leading role at Carmone, where, though the Roman cavalry was successful, the infantry achieved little success despite Africanus's encouragement. He therefore took up a shield and ran out in between the battle lines,

'shouting as he did: "Come to aid, Romans, your Scipio in danger!" Then as those who were near saw and those far off perceived that he was in danger, all were similarly shamed and feared for their general so that they ran at the enemy with shouting and

Appian is even more dramatic in his account of how Africanus leads his troops in battle.

While Appian does not mention Africanus's courage and bravery specifically in either battle account, it is clear that those characteristics are being emphasized as he creates a portrait of Afiicanus as the heroic leader who conquered Spain for the Romans.

37 The similarities do not require that Appian used Arrian as a source for this account, though it is likely that Appian did use Arrian specifically for his comparison of Alexander and Caesar (discussed below, p. 64), as Brodersen (1988) shows. Anyone familiar with this famous episode fiom the Alexander legend would note the similarities in Appian's account of Afiicanus. The extended narration of Aemilianus's campaign in Spain begins, as Africanus's does, with his election in Rome. As with Africanus, the election was abnormal, as

Aemilianus was, according to Appian, under the consular age, but the Senate authorized the tribunes to repeal the law and then reenact it the following year, thus allowing

Aemilianus to be elected (Ib 84.364)." However, while with the election of Africanus to command in Spain the mood of the people was that of fear (@opo~,Ib 18.68), in this assembly the people are described as tired (~kpvov,Ib 84.363) due to the duration of the war against the Numantines. Because they desired a quick end to the war, they elected

Aemilianus, already famous as the victor of the Third Punic War.

What allowed Aemilianus to succeed when his predecessors failed, and what characterizes Aemilianus in Appian's account, is his hard work, prudence, and patience.

Upon arriving at the army in Spain, he immediately began to instill discipline in the army:

Having arrived, he drove out all the merchants and prostitutes and diviners and seers, whom the soldiers, having become fearful on account of their ill success, were continually consulting. He forbade them to bring in anything excessive in the future, unless it was a sacrifice made for augury. He ordered the wagons, the excess supplies stored in them, and the beasts of burden to be sold, apart fiom what he himself retained.. . He often said that those [generals] who were stem and just were useful for the affairs of their soldiers, but that those who were kind and generous were useful only for the enemy.

38 Aernilianus (born probably in 185, Astin (1967) 245) was around 50 years old when he was elected for the second time, and was thus of legal age. However, having already served as consul against Carthage, he was barred fiom serving again. This was the law that was repealed: Livy Epit. 56. The significance of this election is discussed below, p. 45. Thus Aemilianus began the process of creating an army that was suitable for his

purposes. However, discipline was not enough to make a successful army: Nor truly did

he undertake to fight until he trained them with many exertions.' (06 piv 066' 6q

&&pa noh~p&v,npiv a6.todq yupv&oat novotq nohho'iq. Ib 86.372). His prudence

and patience prevented him from moving to engage the enemy before the army was

suitably prepared.

While moving towards Numantia, "he was not creating a vanguard, as some do, in

watch posts, nor did he divide the army at all, lest some early defeat make them contemptible to the enemy, who already despised them. Nor did he attack the enemy, but he carefully observed both the war itself and the circumstances and the effort of the

a6zoG ~aiziv T&V Nopav~ivov6pPGv, Ib 87.375-376). Even after he spent much time preparing his army, Aemilianus does not rush to attack because he wanted to prevent an early defeat and to get a better grasp of the circumstances. As he states later, "'it is irrational to take a risk for little [reward]"' ("&vat 6' 6hoyov K~V~VVE~E~Vbci

6hiyotqm, Tb 87.379), and for this reason he took the long route to the city in order to avoid several spots that were likely places for ambushes (Ib 88.385). Aemilianus was not opposed to taking the extra precautions necessary to ensure the success of his campaign. When Aemilianus finally reached Numantia and had set up his camp, %e showed

contempt for the Numantines, who frequently drew up for battle and called him forth into

battle, as he did not wish to engage with men fighting from desperation but rather to shut

them in and defeat them by hunger.' (Nopavzivov 6k ~aptvdlk~~aooovzov ~ai

&7coyvcjo&oqpaXo~&votS csupnh&~&oeat p&hhov 5 ouyrch5oaq a6zo6q kh&v hty4, Ib

90.392) Appian then gives an extensive escription of the siege lines, the manner in which the river was blocked and the organization of watches and relief parties on the lines that Aemilianus set up in order to ensure the success of the seige (Ib 90.392-

93.406). Appian also notes that 'thus this Scipio was the first, as it seems to me, to wall in a city that was not shunning battle.' (o&o phv 6 E~t.nicov66~ np&oq, &S ipoi

60#&, .n&pt&~&i~to&7cohtv o; @uyopaxo6oav,Ib 91.398). Whereas other Roman commanders would have eagerly seized the opportunity to fight the Numantines in battle,

Aemilianus refused to abandon his plan for a siege. A victory in battle outside the walls would not have achieved his goal of taking the city, since the siege would continue, but a defeat could have disastrous consequences.

Having made such extensive preparations for the siege, the fall of Numantia was inevitable; Appian comments on his views about why it fell: 'for he [Aemilianus] was more experienced in generalship than they [the Numantines] were, and he did not go into combat with wild beasts, but overcame them by hunger, the unconquerable evil, by which alone it was possible for the Numantines to be taken and by which alone they were &pa Nopavzivou~ kh$&-pav povq, Ib 97.420). The victory of the Romans over

the Numantines was not a surprising outcome considering the relative strengths of the

two sides, but still the war stretched on for eleven years (143-133 B.C.). Appian states

that all that was necessary to defeat them was to starve them out, but this was also the

only way the Romans would achieve victory, and the commanders before Aemilianus had

been unable to see this. Only he had the patience and was willing to undertake the hard

work that was necessary for the Roman victory.

Aemilianus7sprudence and patience in refraining to accept battle prevent him

from undertaking any of the feats of individual bravery expected of Roman commanders,

but Appian shows that he can act this way when not holding the responsibility of

command. During his service earlier in his career as a legate of ~ucullus~~,he served at the siege of Intercatia, where

Frequently a certain barbarian rode out into the space between the lines, adorned with conspicuous weapons, and challenged the Romans to accustomed single combat, but no one accepted and he mocked them and danced in the form of a triumph before going away. Having seen this many times, Scipio, being still a youth, was aggrieved and springing forward undertook the single combat, and fortunately he prevailed over the big man, although he himself was small.

Aemilianus accepted the challenge, despite the refusal of the rest of the Romans, the size difference between them, and that he was still young, demonstrating that his bravery was superior to both the other Romans and to the Spaniards. Having established such a

39 In 15 1. See Astin (1967) 45ff for this incident and its affect on Aemilianus's reputation. reputation for bravery earlier in the book, Appian can then focus on Aemilianus's prudence and patience when his responsibilities prevent him from acting that way.

Appian also focuses on Aemilianus's virtue, in which he was superior to all the other Romans. His reputation for virtue served him well as a negotiator with the Spanish when he served under Lucullus. The army had begun to run low on provisions, but

Lucullus's previous breaches of treaties prevented the Spanish from trusting him and allowing the army to withdraw (Ib 52.220). At that point, 'Scipio promised to the barbarians that there would be no breach of a treaty, and, since he was trusted on account of the report of his virtue, he ended the war.' (XKI~C~OV&VE~~XEZO TO?< papp&potq o6&v kmeat nap&onov6ov ~dt7cto.c~ue&< ~az& ~hios &p~.c5q St&huo~ zov noh~pov,Ib 54.229). This event has added significance because Appian rarely mentions any Romans besides the c~rnmanders.~~Appian9s highlighting the role played by

Aemilianus as a subordinate shows further that, even though Lucullus was the commander, Aemilianus's virtue made his role more important.

This reputation for virtue served him well again at Numantia. Avarus, an ambassador asking for terms, addressed Aemilianus: "'Therefore especially, Scipio, it is worthy for you, being full of such able virtue, to spare a courageous and manly race and

\ \ to offer to us more humane than evil [terms], which we will be able to bear."' ("'610 Kat

terms other than unconditional surrender since, as Appian emphasizes, the political situation in Rome, where Hostilius Mancinus, a previous commander against Numantia,

had been found guilty of making a disgraceful treaty (Ib 83.360), made the senate unable

to accept anything less than complete submission. Nevertheless, Appian emphasizes,

through Avarus, that Aemilianus above all Romans would be expected to provide fairer

terms on account of his virtue (&PET$.

Appian does not give any evidence about where this reputation for virtue came

from, but since in his earliest appearance in the history he already has it, it is likely to

come in part from his name, since he was the fourth Cornelius Scipio to serve in Spain.

The source of his virtue is not important for Appian. His purpose in the portrayal of

Aemilianus is to display the qualities that differentiated Aemilianus from all the other unsuccessful Roman commanders: his virtue, in addition to his prudence, patience, and hard work.

Africanus in the Iberike was characterized by divine favor and heroic characteristics, and while both feature in his characterization in the Libyke, there are differences in their focus. His divine favor in the Iberike was prominent in the narrative, which also stressed his portrayal of himself as divinely inspired; in the Libyke, Appian still makes his divine favor clear but does not have Africanus himself emphasize it as he did in the Iberike. His heroic characteristics, however, are just as apparent, if not more so, in the Libyke.

Appian relates that Africanus, upon arriving in Africa, began to besiege Utica, whereupon the Carthaginians advanced against his army. He explained to his officers his plan, and then "After sending out his officers to make ready the soldiers, he himself sacrificed to Courage and Fear, so that in the night no panic would happen, but that the

army would be most exceedingly spirited.' (TO$<";1&povaS &~nkp~a<&.nh;oat zov

ozpazov ahoS &~EZO ~ohp~~~ai(DoPq, pq8kv &G6v vu~$tnavt~ov o\ y~v6oeat,

&ha& zov o~pazova&@ Bpao6za~ov TE.. . p&htoza 6@0ijvat,Li 21.85). In

preparation for this battle, Africanus spoke only to the officers, not to the army, and in

the speech (Li 19-20) did not mention his divine influence. He did sacrifice, but did so

alone, having already sent his officers away. This account is not unusual for a Roman

before battle, but the difference between this account and that which Appian provides

before Carmone (Ib. 26.101-1 03) is striking. Here Africanus addressed only the officers,

not the army, and he sacrificed in private rather than bringing it before the whole army.

The battle is a success, though, as Appian notes: 'The Romans through one act of

courage, in a little part of the night, prevailed over two camps and two armies much

greater than their own.' (~ai'Popaiot at& z6hpq~pti?~, kv 6hCyq pkp~tVVKTOS, 860 ozpazo.nk8ov 640 ozpazb noh$ pct

attributes the Roman victory to the same characteristic, courage (zohpa), that Afiicanus had sacrificed to before the battle. There is only this reference to Africanus's divine favor in the account of the battle, and nowhere does Africanus portray himself as divinely inspired in order to motivate the soldiers.

The only other reference to the divine favor of Africanus appears when Hasdrubal attempted to bribe some of the Spanish soldiers fighting with the Romans to set fire to their own camp. 'But while sacrificing, the entrails were revealing to Scipio a danger of burning; a message was sent through the whole camp that, if any raging fire was found anywhere, it be stopped. He sacrificed again for many days; as he was producing sacrifices showing burning, he was heavy in spirit and decided to shift camp.' (C~tniov~.

6& Buop&vcl,,~iv6uvov T& kp& k6-;lhou kpnpqoyo$. ~cx; n~ptn&~cx~&S &nav TO o~~aaon~~ov,& 7~06 n [email protected] ncp, ~a.r&ncxu~v.~$t ahS kni nohh&< fip&pas~O~ETO. 6)s 8' ~k&vkt T& kp& TOV ~~~C~~CT~OV'~~CO~EIKV~OVTCX, k~ $kxpu06p&t~ai p&~ao~pa~on~8~&sat 8t~yvd~~t. Li 29.124-125). On this occasion,

Africanus, in his normal course of sacrificing, was informed of the plan. The plan was actually thwarted by an informer from within the conspirators, however, lessening the importance of Africanus's divine favor, since Appian does not ascribe the failure of the conspiracy to the gods, but only their warning about its existence.

It is striking that Appian does not refer to Africanus's divine favor at all during the most important event of the book, the battle of Zama. During the preliminaries he mentions in passing that 'Scipio, in sight of his soldiers, called on the gods, against whom the Carthaginians had been faithless whenever they repealed the treaties. ' (6 pkv

Z~tniovTOGS OEOGS ~azalcah6vkv &y&t ~6vo.tpazeuop&vov, k~ OGS oi

KapxqSovtot nap~onov6G~~oav,6o&~t~ huov .c& ouy~~ipeva,Li 42.178). Thus not only did Africanus not mention his divine favor, his only reference to the gods was in describing the faithlessness of the Carthaginians in violating treaties, and that therefore the gods should assist the Romans because of the faults of the Carthaginians rather than the worthiness of the Romans.

While evidence of Africanus's divine favor is muted, the characterization of him as a heroic figure appears even before he reaches Africa, when 'he sailed for Sicily, having around himself 300 picked youths' (6t&nh~uo~v6s Ct~~hiav, &ov &PO' a&ov

&p.tty~v~iou~knth&~zouq ~pta~ooiouq, Li 8.30). In Sicily he armed them, and they evidently served with him throughout the campaign4' as they appear again at Zama,

where Africanus and Hannibal are each described as 'having with themselves cavalry, to

aid them wherever they were under pressure, Hannibal having 4000, and Scipio 2000, as

well as the 300 Italians which he himself armed in Sicily.' (;i~ovz~q&p@' a&o$q

~t~ehicx,Li 41.177) The presence of these 300 companions has clear similarities to the agerna of Alexander the Great, as now Africanus has a body of cavalry of equal number that he also personally led in battle. The account of the 300 in Sicily is included in Livy

(XX1X.i. 1-1l), but Livy implies that they were just to increase the number of cavalry and does not mention them again in his narrative.

The battle of Zama also includes much evidence of Africanus's heroic qualities.

After starting the battle as traditional commanders, Africanus and Hannibal became more active in an attempt to decide the outcome:

The battle was long and undecided, so the generals, pitying the ones who were toiling, rushed at each other in order that there may be more quickly a decision between them. They hurled their javelins together, and Scipio hit the shield of Hannibal, but Hannibal hit his horse. The horse, struck by the blow, carried Scipio off backwards, until he mounted another horse and hurled again at Hannibal. He failed to hit him that time again, but he hit a nearby horseman. Then Massinissa having heard had come to this place, and the Romans, seeing their general fighting for them as a soldier, fell upon the enemy still more strongly and routed them and pursued those who fled.

41 The use of &p.@ implies that they did not merely serve in Africanus's army but remained near him; it is translated as 'his bodyguard' by White (1 899). &hh".n&zvX~v a&o6 lcai TOTE, TOV 6&'t.n& zov kyyGq &AEv. GKE 6' kv z06q KC& ~auoav&uo~~*~cu~op~voq. lcai oi 'Popaiot TOV u.cpa.cqy~v ~~GVTESoTpaztoztwGq o@Gv~~cE~~~x~~Evov, K~~ZE~C~TE~IV:TI TO?< noh~piotqkv&.neuov lcai k~p&~avzolcai @&6yovza$k6;o~ov- (Li 45.188-190)

In this battle Africanus did not encourage his troops by leading the attack but by engaging in a duel with the enemy commander, Hannibal. Appian seems to be casting

Africanus as an almost Homeric hero, though he does return to his role as a normal battlefield commander later in the narrative when he returns to organize his battle line rather than fighting with the soldiers (Li 47.202). Although the duel was not successful in the purpose Appian states, to decide the battle by single combat, it did successfully motivate the Romans to fight harder and win, much as Afiicanus's interventions in the

Iberike had as well.

Thus Africanus begins and ends the battle as a normal commander, but in the middle Appian has the commanders engage each other personally (an episode not found in either Polybius or Livy). Appian may choose to relate this incident because here he has Rome's greatest commander and greatest enemy together, and it heightens the sense of rivalry by having them face each other personally in addition to as commanders. That they happen to be meeting at a decisive battle in the history of Rome makes their encounter even more dramatic.

Appian9scharacterization of Africanus in this book thus focuses less on his success coming from a god and more on his heroic nature. The difference in focus between this book and the Iberike may be due to Africanus at this point being an experienced commander already having had much success, and thus Appian can focus on this success, though not completely forgetting his divine favor. In the Iberike Afiicanus was young and inexperienced, and therefore more of his success could be attributed to the gods. The defeat of Carthage was also a seminal event in the growth of Roman power,

and Appian wanted to show that it was due not only to the favor of the gods but also to

the virtue (&mfi) of the Romans, through their commander.

ilianus in the Libyke

Appian's characterization of Aemilianus in the Libyke is quite similar to that in

the Iberike, just as the narrative is similar in both books. He again was given command

against a city that had resisted the efforts of his predecessors but which was taken by his

hard work, prudence, and patience, which are again in contrast to the other Roman

commanders. His virtue again relates primarily to his trustworthiness, in contrast with

the notorious 'Punic faith.'

Aemilianus appears first as an officer while the Romans were commanded by

Censorinus and Manilius. During an assault, some of the Romans had rushed too far into the city,

But Scipio, who after a little while took Carthage and from this was called Africanus, but then was a tribune, was hanging back and divided his company into many parts and stood them at intervals on the wall, but he was not allowing them to go down into the city. He was receiving and was saving fiom destruction the others who had gone into the city but were forced out by the Carthaginians who fell upon them fiom all sides. And this first brought him glory, since he appeared more prudent than the general.

Aemilianus's prudence (e6J3ouhia) saved the Romans from disaster and enhanced his reputation. Appian specifically notes that his prudence was superior to that of the other

Roman commanders. His discipline and hard work are shown in the way he lead his foraging

expeditions,

In the foraging, he did not disband the contingent until he surrounded the plain, which he was intending to harvest, with infantry and cavalry. And then he himself continually went around in a circle with the other troops of cavalry, and he punished sharply anyone of the harvesters who dispersed or went out of the circle.

As a result of Aemilianus9s extensive preparations, none of his foraging expeditions were

attacked, while many of the other tribunes suffered losses during theirs. They became jealous of his success and spread rumors that he was not attacked because he had reached

2x1 =derstmllng with the Carthaginians (Li 101.473). Here Appian- A shows that the other

Roman leaders would rather concoct stories to explain their lack of success than

undertake the hard work that allowed Aemilianus to be more successful than them.

When Manilius was preparing to lead an attack on an inland city, 'Scipio was

displeased, when he saw that the whole way was precipitous with clefts and thickets, and

that the high parts had been occupied.' (k6uo~~patv~v6 Ectniov, 6pGv .n&v~cr

The other tribunes mocked his cowardice and the army set out. When they encountered

the enemy, Manilius, who is described as 'not experienced in war' (o&%

kpmtponohepo<, Li 102.481), attacked the enemy but was defeated, and several of the jealous tribunes were killed (Li 102.483). Thus Aemilianus's warnings were justified,

and his prudence was vindicated. Aemilianus, with some cavalry, was successful in rescuing a detachment that had been cut off (Li 103.490), and also negotiated for the burial of the slain tribunes (Li

104.493). As a result of his successes, 'the jealousy was quenched on account of his good actions.' (6op~op6vouTOG ~eovou61& ziv ~?jnpayiav,Li 105.495). With the army now having been won over, Appian prepares the way for Aemilianus's return as consul.

After he was elected consul and arrived at the army, he addressed the soldiers, censuring their indiscipline and telling them,

'For you soldiers there is one message, that in all your work you be in common with my manner and effort. For guided by this you will neither be wanting in zeal nor will you fail in your favor. But now it is necessary to work hard, in which we are in danger, and to put off gain and luxury for a fitting time.. .' Thus Scipio said these things, and immediately he drove out the multitude of useless men, and with these whatever was excessive and useless and luxurious.

(Li 1 16.552-1 17.554)

In this manner Aemilianus restored the discipline of the troops and instilled in them some of his own hard work. After driving the Carthaginians back into the city, he dug a trench across the peninsula and fortified it to cut off the city from supplies (Li 119.563-565). He then began building a mole across the entrance to the harbor in order to complete the siege (Li 121.572).

Once the city was cut off from all supplies, Aemilianus waited for hunger to take its toll before launching a final assault. The fighting was fierce, as Appian comments:

'six days and nights were spent with such toils, the soldiers being exchanged so that they would not be distressed by sleeplessness and fatigue and slaughter and the appearance of

unpleasant things, but Scipio unceasingly stood over them or ran about them without

sleep and only taking food while at his work.' (mi za6m novoup&vovkSanav&pxv

130.620). Again Aemilianus is described as working harder than anyone else, and his

hard work yielded results: the city fell. Much like Numantia, Carthage could not expect

to defeat Rome, but it succeeded in holding out for many years when faced by ineffective

Roman commanders. It required the hard work, prudence, and patience of Aemilianus to

achieve the result.

Aemilianus's virtue is another characteristic that sets him apart from the other

Romans during this campaign. He gained this reputation as a tribune:

The other tribunes gave pledges to some of the Africans who fled into towers and forts, which were many in the land, and, after letting them go, they attacked them on their way out, but Scipio was conveying them home, and on account of this no one was agreeing anything before Scipio came. So great did his reputation for manliness and faith become during a brief time both among his own people and among the enemy.

Here one of the origins of Aemilianus's reputation for virtue is finally explained, as he kept his word while the other tribunes did not. The usefulness of his reputation is revealed when he encountered Phameas, the Carthaginian cavalry commander, while out riding. Aemilianus told him, "'I pledge to you, if I am to be trusted and am worthy, both

safety and pardon from the Romans and that there will be a reward." That one [Phameas]

praised him as the most trustworthy of all and said, "I will decide, and if I believe it is

possible, it will be known to you."' (~ai6 Ekt7c;ov "kyyuGpai aoi", Qqotv, "E;

ntatoq &I ~aici~op~~q, ~aiocozqpiav mi ouyyvdpqv nap& 'Popaiov mi

x&ptv &seaeat." 6' k7c4veoe pkv ch~~~~O~~LCTZOT~ZOV ;K Z&VTOV, "K~LV~'',8' g@q.

"K~VGuvazov GyGPat, @av~povkxat aot.", Li 107.506) Phameas did defect shortly

thereafter, and the Romans were able to remove one of their most bothersome enemies

because of the virtue of Aemilianus.

Again as at Numantia, the senate had already decreed the destruction of Carthage,

and therefore Aemilianus was unable to offer terms that were any more lenient. Thus while the city was being destroyed, he famously wept and quoted Homer on the

destruction of Troy (Li 132.629). However, 'he sent to Sicily, that whatever temple

offerings of theirs the Carthaginians had taken while at war, they coming could look upon and recover. Thus he won over the people very much as one having humanity with

includes this reference to Aemilianus's humanity in order to soften the impact of the destruction of Carthage, which, even though he was the commander, was not specifically his choice of punishment for the city.

Aemilianus's virtue, exemplified by his trust, endears him to both his army and the enemy. Appian shows that while showing faith to ones enemies may not seem advantageous, there can be great benefits from it. It is what sets Aemilianus apart from the other Romans and makes him worthy to be the conqueror of Carthage and the descendant of his namesake Africanus. Chapter 2: An Interpretation of the T emes of the Scipios

In his prologue, Appian states his views on the reasons for the success of Rome:

'The [empire] of the Romans attained greatness and duration on account of prudence and good fortune and in the acquisition of it they surpassed all others in virtue, patience, and hard work. (z& 6;: 'Popah p~y&t ZE ~ai~povq 6tGv~ylce. 6i c$ouhiav mi

&zuxiav Eq ZE Z+ ~CE~~KZ~OLVa?;& &PEZ?;I ~ai@EPE~COV~~ mi ~ahatmopiq

.n&vzaq 67c~~~~av,Pr 1 1.43). These five characteristics of the Romans are a major theme of ~~~ian,~~and it is thus not surprising that they appear prominently in his portrayal of the two Scipios. The characterization of Aemilianus fits almost exactly with this outline, but Africanus much less so. Me has virtue and good fortune, but his heroic characterization at times seems at odds with prudence and patience. His lack of these characteristics does not harm his reputation in Appian's view, though, because of the difference in the purpose of the two figures in Appian's overall concept of Roman history. The main cause of this different purpose is in whom they are fighting against and what is required for victory.

When Africanus assumed the command against the Carthaginians in Spain, the situation was bleak. Appian narrates that the Romans had achieved some success there under the command of Africanus's father and uncle, Publius and Gnaeus Cornelius

Scipio, but after their deaths in 212 (Ib. 15.57-16.63), command in Spain fell to Marcus

Claudius Marcellus (cos. 222) and Gaius Claudius Nero (cox 207),~~"but nothing

42 See Brodersen (1993) 355 on the importance of these characteristics in Appian's conception of Roman history. 43 No other source indicates that Marcellus ever commanded in Spain; Livy states that Marcellus did not return to Rome li-om Sicily, where he had commanded from 2 14, until after Africanus had already taken command in Spain (XXV1.xxi.l). Perhaps Appian conhses L. Marcius, propraetor in Spain, with illustrious having happened from these, the position of the Carthaginians increased

greatly, and they were holding almost all Spain, as the Romans were enclosed in a small

space in the Pyrenees." (0?;6&vo<6; hapnpoc nap& zGv& ytyvoP&vou z& ht~;wv

kpq6m.co, ~ai.n&oav 0~60~'~Pqpiav &XO~, tq Ppq; eP~pai~vbv 70% 6p~ot

zoi< nvpqvaiotc K~~~KEK~IJ~~&v~v,~b.17.66).

A brief word must be said here about Appian's unfavorable portrayal of two of

Rome's better commanders, the victors of Syracuse and the Metaurus. All the gains that had been made in Spain since the start of the war were lost under their command.

However, Appian is consistent in his negative portrayal of these figures; Marcellus

appears in two fragments of the Sikelike (Si 4,5), in both of which he is censured for treachery and untrustworthiness. Appian excludes any mention of his victories over

Hannibal in Italy, and only narrates his death: Marcellus, "always having acted recklessly" (~CCX~~K~V~VVEVT~KO~ski, An 50.214), led an attack on band of cavalry, was surprised by a greater number than he expected, and died fighting. Hannibal, upon seeing his body, 'praised him as a soldier, but ridiculed him as a general.' (&c~!~v&o~ykv &< crzpaztdayv, &~&CJKO~E8; &q oqmzqyov, An 50.216). Appian is not alone in censuring the rashness of Marcellus, as he is similarly censured for this by Livy

(XXVII.xxvii. 1 1), Polybius (X.xxxii), and Plutarch (Marcellus 3.iii).

Claudius Nero also garners little praise from Appian. The account of the battle of the Metaurus is brief, and emphasizes the failures of Hasdrubal rather than any success of the Romans (An. 52.223). The credit for the victory is given to divine intervention and not even to the Romans, let alone their commanders (An. 53.224). By downplaying the

Marcellus (Richardson (2000) 119), but he clearly indicates Marcellus here as the former commander in Sicily (Moip~ehhovk~ Zt~&hias&pzt &@typ&vov,Ib 17.65).

36 success of these two commanders, Appian highlights the importance of Africanus for

Rome's victory in the war and also shows how commanders who do not have the

characteristics he believes are important are unable to achieve the success of those who

do possess them.

Returning to Africanus, the situation upon his arrival in Spain was worse than it had ever before been during the war, since not only had all the Roman gains been lost, but also the army was demoralized by the defeats. It therefore required more than a normal general to salvage the situation for the Romans, as Appian shows by stating that no one else was willing to take the command. Africanus was not a normal general, though: he had confidence in his ability and in the destiny of his family. His youth, which may have been an impediment due to inexperience, here became an advantage as he was either less concerned by the perilous situation that the Romans were in or, even if no less concerned, he still was willing to act on account of the confidence and idealism of youth.

Arriving in Spain, he did not stop to restore discipline in the troops through training as Aemilianus did, but instead he launched a major offensive, which, being successful, created a confident and loyal army. Appian continues the narrative immediately with Africanus marching against the Carthaginian army. Victory at

Camone follows, driving the last Carthaginians out of the country. Appian thus condenses six years of campaigning against the Carthaginians in Spain into ten chapters

(Ib. 19-28). Nor does Appian provide any time references for the reader for how long

Africanus's campaign lasted; it is only from other historians that the actual duration of

Africanus's command in Spain is known. This omission of dates is not uncommon in Appian, but here it serves a useful purpose in disguising the actual length of the campaign. 44

Appian's account of Africanus in Spain may differ from other, more accepted, historical accounts, but Appian does have a purpose for his choice and portrayal of the material. The lightning fast account of the campaign both emphasizes and mirrors

Africanus's blitz in the narrative. The Carthaginians are the only opponent, however, and as they only occupy the country, Afiicanus is not conquering Spain so much as driving the Carthaginians out. Only when that goal has been accomplished does Appian relate

Africanus's interactions with the native Spanish.

Appian's characterization of Africanus in this second part of his narrative, against the Spanish, displays neither the divine favor nor the heroic characteristics and actions that he emphasizes when Africanus faces the Carthaginians. Appian gives only a brief account of the siege of Ilurgia, a city which had defected and defeated its Roman garrison: 'On account of this Scipio with wrath destroyed it in four hours, though wounded in the neck, not having stopped the battle until he prevailed.' (&v x&ptv 6

E;~tniovo.jv 6py9 ziiooapotv c;jpcxt~k&kv aljziv, .cpoe&s LEV zov aljxiiva, zg

6& p&xVq O~K&vaox&v, b~ k~p&zqo&v. Ib 32.129). Though Africanus's wound implies that he was involved in the action, Appian did not think that it was necessary to describe the action in more than one sentence, whereas Livy spends two chapters describing this siege (XXVIII.xix-xx).

44 He notes in his Preface 'I believe that to record the times for everything is superfluous, but I will mention them for the remarkable at intervals.' (706~6k xpovou~kni pkv aaotv mptooov Gyodpqv ~a.ca&tv, &7ci 6k ZGV kn;t$aveoz&~ovk~ ~taos+m~oq6nopv.viow, Pr. 13.50). VanderLeest (1988) 108 notes that Appian does give the Olympiad date for Hannibal's departure from Spain in 21 8 and for the end of the war in 205, but nothing between that to indicate when in the struggle Africanus appeared: chronologically in the middle, but by Appian's narrative just shortly before the expulsion of the Carthaginians. Spain was assumed to be under Roman control at the departure of Africanus, as

Appian mentions that the Romans 'from then began to send Praetors to Spain yearly to the conquered nations' (ozpazqyo6~6k '~~qpkx<&cqoiou< k< T& 28vq ~ihqpp~va

&cqmov &no 'G0<6&&p,$p&vot, Ib. 38.152). However, as the course of events proved,

Spain was far from pacified and submissive to Roman rule. Africanus's reputation, won by his divine influence and his exploits against the Carthaginians, was enough to dissuade the Spanish from openly challenging him, but it was insufficient to establish lasting

Roman control, and thus not surprisingly there was a revolt immediately following his departure (Ib. 3 8.156).

The campaign of Afiicanus in Africa follows a generally similar pattern, but with

several notable differences. No Roman army had set foot in Africa since Regulus in the

First Punic War, the disaster that Appian narrates at the beginning of the Libyke. Nor is

Africanus allowed much support for his invasion: he cannot levy troops in Italy and is given no money by the senate. Nevertheless he collects volunteers and raises money from friends (Li. 7.29). Thus, the situation facing Africanus at the beginning of this campaign was as unpropitious as when he departed for Spain.

He did not, however, begin as quickly as he did in Spain, but first spent time in

Sicily training his troops (Li. 13.50). When he did finally cross over, the narrative proceeds in greater detail and with not nearly the rapidity of the Spanish campaign.

There are several reasons why Appian gives a more extended narration of his campaign in Africa. Africanus states that his desire to attack Africa is twofold: 'in order to raise up

Hannibal out of Italy and to inflict punishment on the Carthaginians in their country.'

(6, &vaozfiocov '~vvipav65 '1aah;a~ K& ~ap~qFov;ot<~i~qv knt04oov 6v 'GG nazp&t, Li. 6.25). A quick campaign would accomplish neither of these aims, but a longer campaign would cause more hardships for the Carthaginians and force them to recall Hannibal from Italy. The war would not be won until Hannibal was defeated, and thus Africanus has less control over the timeframe of the campaign; he must continue to fight until Hannibal returns.

The situation is also quite different from Spain, where the Carthaginians are an occupying force. In Africa, the goal cannot be to drive them out; instead, they must be wholly defeated. Such a campaign will of necessity be longer: Appian narrates two sieges and five battles fought between the Romans and the Carthaginians, as opposed to only one of each in the Iberike. Appian may be emphasizing the campaign of Africanus in Africa because this campaign redounded more to his greatness and also was more important in the history of Rome. The conquest of Spain was important, but it did not end the war.

Similarly, in addition to focusing more attention on the African campaign, Appian may also be focusing on a different aspect of Africanus's characterization. His divine influence is much more muted in the Libyke, and this allows more of the focus during the battles to be placed on the man. As an older and more experienced commander, Appian focuses more on his tactical ability as the cause of his success, while still not denying his continued divine favor. Since the defeat of Carthage and Hannibal was such an important event in Roman history, Appian may be more focused on the ability of the Roman who achieved that victory.

Finally, both textually and historically the campaign was extended by the bad faith of the Carthaginians; twice Appian narrates that the Carthaginians broke a treaty that they had signed with the Romans (Li. 34.143,39.161). Appian has two reasons for focusing on these episodes. First, they show the weakness of the Carthaginian constitution, since in both cases, the people overrule the decisions of the council and take matters into their own hands, and the government is not able to control the masses. Due to the similarities between the Carthaginian and Roman republican constitution, Appian may be showing how the Romans missed the opportunity to see the flaws in their own government and correct them before it was too late. Second, they emphasize by contrast the virtue of Africanus, since he declined to imitate the 'Punic faith' (Li. 35.148).

Following the defeat of Hannibal and surrender of Carthage, the Romans left

Africa, and Carthage remained an independent state. Though it may seem that the situation was quite different in Africa as opposed to in Spain, in neither case was Roman control finalized by the campaigns of Afiicanus. In both countries he had come in, defeated the ruling power, and then left. It required further effort by the Romans to solidifl their control, until both countries were finally subdued by Aemilianus.

More than half a century after the campaigns of Africanus, Aemilianus was entrusted with the command first against Carthage and then against Numantia, the remaining strongholds in Africa and Spain. Like the countries, these cities had been beset by the Romans for several years, but Appian reports that the Roman commanders had been unable to achieve success because of ineptitude, and the Roman army had sunk into decadence. Appian places the blame for the Romans' lack of success on their commanders. In the Iberike, the commanders who appear between the narratives of

Africanus and Aemilianus are, with few e~ce~tions,"~not favorably portrayed, and serve

45 Cato the Censor, Ib. 39.158-4 1.170; and Sempronius Graccus, Ib. 43.175-179, are given some praise by Appian: Gomez Espelosin 1993 416. Cato was praised by Appian for his innovative strategy in coercing to contrast the successes of the Scipios. Many accomplish nothing worthy of record, and

several are quite negatively portrayed by Appian. Foremost in this category are Licinius

Lucullus and Hostilius Mancinus.

The exploits of Lucullus (cos. 151) that Appian narrates include starting an unauthorized war in search of money and fame and massacring and razing a city after he had promised to spare it in exchange for its surrender (Ib. 5 1.215-52.221). Lucullus provides a greater contrast because of his proximity to Aemilianus, who served under him and who successfully negotiated peace when the Spanish refused to trust ~ucullus."~

Mancinus (cos. 137), who preceded Aemilianus against the Numantines, was often bested by them, and upon a groundless rumor of an opposition force approaching, abandoned his camp and fled in the night, whereupon he was surrounded by the Numantines and, threatened with death, made a treaty (Ib. 80.347). The treaty was so disgraceful

(aiomo~,Ib. 83.360) that the senate, after a trial, repudiated it and ordered Mancinus to be delivered up to the ~umantines.~~

By placing the narrative of the trial in the chapter directly preceding the election of Aemilianus, Appian provides further evidence for why the Roman people were tired of the war: not only had the fighting in Spain dragged on for many years, but the conflict had also spread to Rome, where the Numantine ambassadors and Mancinus continued their conflict in debate in the Roman senate. Only the ability of Aemilianus, known from

the Spanish to surrender their towns without a siege, and Graccus for the excellent treaties he made, beneficial to Rome and to the natives. Both succeeded in securing relative, but not lasting stability: Appian's narrative continues with further revolts, albeit after several years of peace. 46 AS discussed above p. 23. 47 The Numantines added further insult by refbsing to accept such a man: Ib. 83.362. His rights after returning to Rome are discussed in Cicero. De Oratore I. 18 1 his conquest of Carthage, would be able to bring an end to the war with a Roman victory when so many others had failed.

The situation in the Libyke was much the same. The previous commanders, first

Censorinus and Manilius (~os.149)~and then Calpurnius Piso (cos. 148)' are portrayed as incompetent. Not only had they failed to take Carthage, but their failures had raised the spirits of the Carthaginians and won them allies. Whereas when war was declared 'the city was filled at the same time with lamentations and anger and fear and threats'

(oipoyr\< TE Gpa ~ai6pYt< ~ai&ou5 ~aidln~thr\< ";1ohhtc; iv~nhhqozo,Li

92.435), after two years of success '[the Carthaginians] having been armed were considering nothing small, but from little they were growing in spirit and courage and power.' (;ha< TE pt~~ovo66kv Ezt k@povouv;)nlto&pvot, &Ah& 8up@ ~ai~ohpy

KC& napao~~v6K~T& pt~pov $~OVTO, Li 111.525). Coupled with the declining spirits in the Roman army, Aemilianus's predecessors had achieved nothing and even weakened the Roman position.

As in Spain, Aemilianus also served as a tribune under one of the inept commanders, in this case Manilius, during which time he earned a reputation for success.

Therefore when it was time for the consuls for 147 to be chosen, "having remembered the recent deeds of Scipio, while still a tribune in Africa, and comparing them with the present circumstances.. . they were very eager to send Scipio to Carthage" (TGV6' 06 npo n0hh06 C~tniovo~gpyov, kv Atp6y ~LhtappZ)v~o

~~tdova,Li 112.529). He repaid their trust in him and finished the war. So Aemilianus, the only Roman commander in whom Appian highlights all of the characteristics that he credits as allowing the Romans to gain their empire, was the most successful Roman commander in both theaters. His success was so complete that he was the last commander included in Appian's main narrative of Roman affairs in both countries. This is not surprising in the Libyke, as the destruction of Carthage saw Africa added as a Roman province and the end of warfare in that region. In the Iberike, however, since fighting continued through the reign of Augustus, Appian's endpoint of the fall of Numantia may seem strange. A brief epilogue of four chapters (Ib 99-102) includes mention of Titus Didius (cox 981, and then of Sertorius, then finally of Julius

Caesar and ~u~ustus.~'Part of the reason for choosing the fall of Numantia is that many later events are included in Appian's narrative of the Civil Wars, as he himself states (Ib.

101.44l). Part may also be that the fall of Nurnantia ended the Celtiberian war and thus forms a natural endpoint. However part may also be Appian giving further credit to

Aemilianus, that such a man was necessary to and successfully did finish the Roman conquest of Spain. It also allows the Iberike to mirror the Libyke, both ending with the narrative of Aemilianus's campaigns, which themselves mirror the campaigns of

Africanus, which begin each book."g

The twin campaigns of Africanus and Aemilianus do not only minor but also complement each other. The methods of Africanus were unsuited for establishing lasting control over the country, which Aemilianus did successfully, but Aemilianus would not likely have had success against the formidable opponents that Africanus faced:

48 Gomez Espelosin (1 993) 4 11 49 VanderLeest (1988) 95 discusses the structural similarities between the Iberike and the Libyke, which he considers to be the most rigidly structured of the ethnic books because of Appian's focus on the two figures of Africanus and Aemilianus. Aemilianus was an effective, but not a 'great', general, at least as portrayed by Appian.

He never fought an open battle against an enemy army, and his sieges were successful but by no means brilliant or surprising in their outcome. The two together, however, achieved great things, completing the Roman conquest of Spain and Africa.

The successful figures of the Scipios are unique in Appian's narrative of the republic. Only the figures of Sulla and Pompeius achieve similar levels of success and praise from Appian, but neither of these are republican figures in Appian's conception, since they both desired sole power. Appian's belief in the superiority of monarchy to republican forms of government limits the amount of success he is willing to credit to republican leaders.50 The successes of the Scipios do not break this pattern but rather are attributed to them not being leaders in the republican sense either.

This is best seen in their elections to their commands, which, though by being elections are republican, do not follow the normal model. Africanus was chosen to command in Spain at a very young age only after no one else had been willing to take the command (Ib 18.68.). His only qualification was that the people believed he was the right person to avenge the defeat of his father and uncle. The republican system had broken down, as it required elections of leaders, but no one was willing to stand for election.

Africanus's election to the command in Africa is the most regular, but still the flaws of the republican system are emphasized. One faction in the senate was opposed outright to his expedition, and though he overcame their objections, they still prevented him from levying troops in Italy and did not give him any money with which to conduct

50 Brodersen (1993) 356. The lack of success of repubIican leaders is discussed further in chapter 3. the campaign (Li 7.29). Thus Africanus's campaign, which defeated Carthage and

established Rome as a great power, was almost sabotaged by factional strife in the senate.

The elections of Aemilianus for command in Africa and Spain were more clearly against the republican system in that in both cases it was illegal for him to seek the consulship that he won.51 However, because in both instances the people desired that

Aemilianus be elected, the senate authorized the tribunes to suspend the law for one year to allow his election. Thus under a strict application of the republican system, the successes of Aemilianus would not have been possible.

The successes of the Scipios on the surface appear to conflict with Appian's views on the weaknesses of the republican system. However, because they themselves do not fit the republican system, their success actually proves the failings of the republic.

As the only successfid figures in the republic, they are only able to achieve success because they do not follow the republican model. They achieved great things for the

Roman people, but were only able to do so when they had obtained their commands outside of the standards of the system.

The Roman people were not the only ones to benefit from the successes of the

Scipios, but the native people of the conquered lands did as well. This is shown in that, because of their virtue, the Scipios treated favorably both those subject to the

Carthaginians and of the Carthaginians themselves. Spain was described as 'oppressed by the Carthaginians and yearning for the virtue of the Scipios' (fkxpuvop~vqvTE 7065

~@uas z&v ~~tnt&vovziv &peziv kntno9okxxv, Ib 19.73) It was specifically

51 Against Carthage, Li 112.53 1; against Nurnantia, Ib. 84.364. While Appian attributes the illegality in both cases to Aemilianus being under the legal age, in the second case the issue was actually a prohibition against anyone holding the consulship more than once. Appian is correct, however, that in both cases it was illegal. their virtue that made the Romans desirable as rulers. When Africanus left Spain,

however, the natives were less willing to accept Roman rule, since his successors in

command had less virtue. The return of a virtuous figure in Aemilianus restored the

Spanish faith in the virtue of the Romans and ensured lasting Roman control over the

country.

While the Spanish need only accept that Roman rule was superior to

Carthaginian, the Carthaginians themselves had to be convinced that Roman rule was

preferable even to their own self-rule. Aemilianus's reputation for virtue is developed by

his insistence on keeping his word and treating the Carthaginians His virtue is so

compelling that he even convinces Carthaginian commanders, notably the commander of

their cavalry, Phameas (Li 108.5 14), to join the Roman side.

Showing that the subject people were better off under Roman rule is important for

Appian because, as an Alexandrian, he himself was a member of a subject nation. The

Alexandrians of Appian's time did not look favorably on Roman rule, but Appian had

won his wealth and office in Rome because of the imperial system. He therefore wanted to prove to his fellow Alexandrians that the development of the Roman Empire was

beneficial not only to the Romans but also to the subject peoples.s3

The favorable treatment of subject peoples also reflects on another of Appian's major themes, also shown through his portrayal of the Scipios: why Rome was successful

in holding its empire, while the previous world empires had fallen.j4 Appian sets out in his preface the previous empires, the Assyrians, Medes, and Persians (grouped as one),

52 Discussed above p. 32f. 53 See the discussion in Bucher (2000) 445ff. Bucher, however, notes that Roman success was due only to military, not cultural or moral, superiority. It was, however, precisely their moral superiority, their superior virtue, that made the Romans worthy of gaining their empire. 54 Bucher (2000): 429. the hegemonies of Athens, Sparta, and Thebes (also grouped as one), and the empire of

Alexander (Pr. 8.29-10.42). Appian highlights that all of these empires did not last as long as the Roman Empire had already by his time lasted, and Appian, writing in the high empire, does not and has no reason to suspect that the Roman Empire might fall in the future.55

The contrast in duration is most apparent between Rome and the empire of

Alexander. Appian, being an Alexandrian, praises the empire of Alexander, but notes that 'on account of the very short duration it resembled a brilliant flash of lightning.'

(6th z';lv ppa~6aqaaa06 ~povou'~pookot~~v dloapa~~ hap.np@, Pr. 10.38). It then disintegrated into civil war. The next empire in the series is Rome, and though Rome had existed for five hundred years, it did not become a world empire and assume the mantle that the empire of Alexander held until the Punic wars, with Rome's owAlexander:

Africanus.

Appian draws strong parallels between Africanus and Alexander: Africanus assumes his command at a young age, taking over the position that his father held. He has a strong belief in his own destiny and has a very visible leadership style that relies on the personal loyalty of the troops to himself. He attacks and brings down a great empire almost on his own. In addition to the general similarities between their careers there are also specific incidents in Appian's narrative that appear to be intended as direct references between the two figures.j6

55 Alonso-Nunez (1984) discusses the tradition of the progression of world empires and how Appian's views generally follow this tradition, but, even though the progression could imply the inevitable fall of Rome, Appian stresses that Rome is the culmination of the sequence and not merely the next in line. 56 Besides those mentioned in Chapter 1, see also the discussion of Africanus, Alexander, and Caesar, below p. 64ff. Perhaps the most notable similarity with Alexander, however, is the importance of the personal connection with the divine in Appian's characterization of Afiicanus. This

aspect is even more significant since Appian often describes divine influence as abstractly affecting the course of history without telling exactly how the gods bring about the desired result.j7 When Appian does narrate what the impact of divine intervention is, it is almost invariably negative: the gods often prevent the success of an important figure by striking him down with theoblabeia, a madness of the gods.58 However, these incidents still reflect Appian's theme of the gods intervening to bring about the desired result: it is only the enemies of Rome or of monarchy that are thus stricken. The intervention of the gods on behalf of Africanus also fits this pattern, since by aiding him the expansion of the empire is begun, but Africanus is the only figure in Appian's narrative whom the gods actively support. This stresses not only the importance of

Africanus for the founding of the Roman Empire but also his place as a worthy successor to Alexander both in his accomplishments as well as in his standing with the gods.

An additional bit of light is shed on Appian's views on Afiicanus and Alexander by the apocryphal conversation between Afiicanus and Hannibal in Ephesus. When asked whom he considered the greatest commander, Hannibal named Alexander, whereupon 'Scipio was silent about this, as it seems having made way for Alexander,

(Zmiova 6' fiou~&oatpkv ~48',~

However, when Hannibal named Pyrrhus as second, Africanus was stung (6a~vopcvov,

57 Goldmann (1988) 29. The gods invariably act in support of Appian's two main themes, the expansion of Rome and monarchical government. 58 Hahn (1993) 393. Among those affected are opponents of Rome such as Antiochus, king of Syria (Sy 28.139) and Perseus, king of Macedonia (Ma fkag. 16), as well as Romans during the civil wars such as Pompeius (E2 67.278) and Sextus Pompeius (E5 140.583) - Gowing (1992) 201 comments on the similarities between father and son. Sy 10.40); he does not accept that someone else, other than Alexander, might be better

than himself. Finally, when Hannibal, having before put himself third, responded that he

would consider himself first if he had defeated Africanus, Appian comments 'thus

Hannibal continued in his boasting and secretly did a service to Scipio, on the grounds

that he had conquered one greater than Alexander.' (o&o pkv 6 'Avv@aq kn6ptv6 TE

.cij o~pvoho~iqmi zov CICI~C~)VOShaedv k~&poi.n&uo&vojq ~aeehdvzazov &peivova

'A~E@~s~ov,Sy 10.42) Appian again has Africanus on at least an equal stance with

Alexander, in that Africanus beat a man who would consider himself greater than

~lexander.~'

Despite the similarities between Africanus and Alexander, the empire of the

Romans did not suffer the same fate as that of Alexander: after Africanus there was

Aemilianus, who, excelling in the Roman virtues, was able to ensure that the foundations

for empire established by Africanus were maintained. Thus it becomes clear why

Afiicanus does not fit the characteristics that Appian sets out as the cause of Roman greatness: Africanus acts as Alexander did, and thus he cannot be the cause of the success of Rome, since Alexander did not have long lasting success. Rome's success is ensured by the characteristics they display after Africanus, the virtues that are exemplified by

Aemilianus. Afiicanus places Rome in the succession of great empires, but it is because of Aemilianus that they remain there.

59 This meeting is related as well in Livy XXXV.xiv.5-12, in which Livy relates neither the shock of Africanus when he is not made at least second to Alexander nor the expIanation that Afiicanus had beaten one considering himself better than Alexander, thus suggesting that Appian may have altered the tale to fit his views on Africanus and Alexander. ter 3: A Reassess

This chapter examines some of the connections between the two main sections of

Appian's work, the growth of the empire and the civil wars, by taking the themes that

Appian establishes in his characterization of the Scipios and seeing how they can be

applied to his narrative of the civil war period. By doing so, it is hoped to achieve a

better analysis of certain controversial sections. To briefly recount the most important of these themes, they include the role of divine influence or fate, the importance of virtue,

specifically in creating concord between the Romans and subject peoples, and the

superiority of individual rule and its incompatibility with institutions of the Republic.

The preface to Appian's narrative of the civil wars establishes what he saw as the main causes and themes of the turmoil. He begins with the theme of class struggle, as

'among the Romans, the people and the senate often quarreled,' ( 'Pwpaiot~6 877~05

~ai^;1 PouhG nohhckt~.. . &szaoiaoav, El 1.I), but he notes that despite their disagreements about many subjects, there was no violence in Rome until the time of

Tiberius Gracchus. Appian then gives a general summary of the decent into further violence until finally the civil wars were brought to an end by Augustus, who 'declared himself, like Caesar and more powerfully than Caesar, as ruling both the country and all the nations under it, not needing a selection or elections or even a pretense of them.'

~~tpo~oviaqnpoonot~pazoq kt GE@&, El 5.22). The rule that Augustus established was continued by his successors, and the empire flourished under monarchical rule. Appian sums up the period recording, 'Thus out of various conflicts the state of

the Romans passed into concord and monarchy.' (&k ,&v ilr o.t&o~ovaotlcihwv

aohtz~ia'~opaiotc; kc; 6povotav povapxiav n&pt&o.cy,El 6.24). His use of

oz&otg, mirrored by his opening use of ozaot&Q.o,is significant in that it shows further

not just his belief in monarchy but also his conception of republican govement as

inherently flawed. By describing all the various types of civic unrest with the word

o~&otg,which can also mean political party or faction, Appian emphasizes his view that

a republic is inherently unstable and incapable of the concord which monarchy, by the

very nature of sole rule, so easily provides.60

The land refoms proposed by Tiberius Gracchus are the first incident of civil

unrest that Appian records. This incident is important both because as the first incident

he relates it must show what makes it different from previous conflicts in Rome, and also

because Aemilianus became involved in the situation, providing direct evidence of how

Rome under the Scipios might have acted differently. Appian begins his analysis of the

incident with an overview of how the distribution of public land was originally intended

to help rural farmers and increase the population of Italy, but the result was that the rich

took most of the land and worked it with slaves, denying Rome a source of soldiers for their foreign wars (El 7.26-3 1).

While his use of 'I.caht&.tat to describe those who would benefit from the reform has caused some controversy,"' the reforms Appian relates that Gracchus proposed aimed

60 Bucher (2000) 434 discusses how Appian views concord and stasis (strife) as polar opposites that directly correlate with monarchy and diffused power (republic). 61 I accept the view of Carter (1996) 41 1 that 'I~ah~dzatis a geographical term to describe those Roman citizens who did not live in the city itself rather than non-citizen allies. Appian refers to these ones also as to reverse the inequitable distribution of land and increase the landowning population, as

Appian emphasizes that 'The purpose of the plan of Gracchus was not for wealth but for an abundance of men.' (rp&~m6' 6 piv vo6~706 @ouh&6pazo~6v ok6s

&nopiav, &Ahy6~ ~zjavGpiav,El 11.43). Appian certainly looked favorably upon the plan, as he states that it 'stirred both the poor and all those who possessed reason rather than a desire of acquisition.' (7065 TE n&vyza5~ai 6oot &hot hoytopc'$ pGhhov ;i nogq KT~(~~EO$6pGvz0 kp&ioaq, El 11.47). Only the greedy opposed Gracchus's law.

While he supported the goals of the plan, Appian criticizes Gracchus for 'not considering the difficulties about it.' (TOGn;&p;, aho 6uo~~poiiq066iv kv&8up&zo,El

11.43). Because he did not take these into account, Gracchus was forced to use radical measures to override the objections of his opponents, including depriving Octavius of his tribunate (El 12.54). The opposition intended to respond in kind, as 'they were making it known that Gracchus, straightaway when he became a private citizen, would repent that he committed outrages against the sacred and inviolate office and inflicted such a beginning of strife in Italy. (&hoyonoiouv 06 ~atprio~tvrp&~~ov, a6&a 6%~y6votzo i6t&zq~,cip~riv zc Gppioavza kp&v mi &ouhov mi o.c&o&oc;zoo1(1v6€ &~oppiv6~ ziv 'Izahiav &p@ahovza,El 13.57). Thus Appian makes it clear that Gracchus, even before the violence of his reelection, had already gone too far by creating conflict in

Rome.

Gracchus sought a second consecutive year as tribune both to ensure that the program was maintained and for his own protection, but consecutive election, if not

'1.caht6zat in El 19.78, but here they are opposed to the reform, and therefore there must be two groups of 'IzahtJzat, as otherwise the law would be opposed by those whom it was intended to help. illegal, was at least without recent precedent.62 When the rich (0;. ~ho6otot)opposed his

election, he gave a sign to the crowd, who drove them and the other tribunes out of the

assembly (E 1 15.63-66). The opposition, having regrouped, then returned and with reciprocal violence killed Gracchus and many of his followers (El 16.70). 'Thus

Gracchus.. . on account of his best plan, pushing it forward with violence, was killed while still a tribune on the Capitol. And this first foul act in the assembly did not end, but something similar always happened to someone. ' (o&w @v 6jl rpck~oq... aptmou 3,

'G~VO~6poiou ytyvop&vou ~ap&pkpoq, El 17.71). The strife that Gracchus brought to

Rome did not end with his death, but continued as the situation deteriorated.

It was not just domestic concord that the actions of Gracchus had disturbed, but also the Roman relations with their Italian allies. The reallocation of land, and especially the haste with which judgments were made, angered the Italians who occupied those lands (El 19.78). They chose Aemilianus to voice their grievances, and 'that one hesitated to neglect them, since they had supported him most eagerly in his wars, and in the Senate he did not censure the law of Gracchus openly on account of the people, but he spoke out about the diffi~ulties~~of it.' (6 6' 65 'GO$< ~oh&~ousa&o'iq ~~~pqpbvoq

rpci~~ouvopov oh&ye. st&TOV ~fipovoa+& 'G+B& zoij6e 6uox&p&tav

&cE&~v,El 19.79). The Senate initially accepted Aemilianus9sproposal that the

Carter (1996) 355. 63 Interestingly, Appian has Aemilianus censure Gracchus's plan using the same terminology he himself used earlier, Suo~6~~tahere and Suoxep~~in El 11.43. Since Aemilianus's opposition to Gracchus is downplayed by Appian (see below), it is possible that Aemilianus is expressing Appian's own view of the situation. settlement of disputes be given to an impartial panel, but this panel refused to act because of the difficulties Aemilianus had spoken of. The lack of action angered the Roman people, who blamed Aemilianus for the delays, and amid this furor against him, he died under mysterious circumstances (E 1 20. 83).64

In Appian's view, the reforms of Gracchus ended the concord between the classes in Rome, and between the Romans and their allies in Italy. It is only after the deterioration of both relationships that Aemilianus enters the debate (he had been serving in Spain during the initial struggle to pass the reforms), but he seeks to resolve both problems. He appeases the Italians by agreeing with them that the seizure of their lands was unfair, but he does not attack the law itself, only the manner in which it was being executed. Aemilianus, though not stated explicitly by Appian, was undoubtedly a member of the class opposed to the reform. Plutarch and Diodoms both even indicate that Aemilianus react favorably to Gracchus's death.65 Despite this tradition, Appian's

Aemilianus does not openly attack the law because he knows that the people support it and he does not wish to further polarize Rome by siding with one side.

Thus, according to Appian's account, Aemilianus attempted to restore concord both within Rome and within Italy. That he should be opposed to Rome's mistreatment of its Italian allies is not surprising, both because of the support that he received from

64 Appian lists as possible causes murder by Cornelia, mother of the Gracchi (also daugher of Africanus and mother-in-law and aunt of Aemilianus), and Sempronia, her daughter and Aemilianus's wife; suicide; and murder by unknown partisans. Worthington (1989) makes the case that natural causes, mentioned by Plutarch, is the most likely alternative. Regardless of whether this is a correct assessment, that Appian (perhaps deliberately) omits the possibility of natural causes adds to the severity of the turmoil: it claimed the life of one of Rome's greatest citizens. 65 Plutarch, T. Grac. 21.7, and Diodorus 35.7.3 (excerpted in Astin (1967) 263-4) both have him quote Homer, '& &nohotzo KC& &LOG &t< aotak& ye ;&cot,' (Odyssey 1.47), 'Thus may any other one who does such things perish.' them,66and because both in Africa and in Spain he was noted for his fair treatment of the natives and the trust that he created between Romans and natives. After having worked so hard abroad to establish this bond and by it having solidified Roman control over the provinces, it would have been intolerable for him to return to Rome and see that the people no longer treated with this same respect even their closest allies, with whose aid he had won for the Roman people two great nations. He therefore felt compelled to act in the defence of these Italian allies.

Aemilianus had arrived too late, however. Gracchus was already dead, the concord had been broken, and the people, driven to desperate measures in the pursuit of their own interests, were no longer willing to listen to the voice of reason. The extent to which the situation had already deteriorated is made clear by the refusal of the people to grant Aemilianus a public funeral, despite the great things he had accomplished for

Rome, because of their anger towards him (El 20.85). Aemilianus was dead, and with his death, in Appian's view, the last hope for a restoration of the concord of earlier Rome was lost: the civil wars had begun.

arius and Sulla

While Appian9snarrative of events during the tribunate of Gaius Gracchus and the social war shows the deterioration of concord in Rome and Italy, the climax of his first book on the civil wars, and the first instance of a change fiom the general downward progression of events, occurs during the narrative of Marius and Sulla. The narration of the conflict leading up to the dictatorship of Sulla is given extended treatment by Appian

(El 57.250-96.449), and neither side is excused of the violence that they commit against fellow Romans. When Sulla's dictatorship was established, however, even with the

66 Mentioned by Appian in El 19.79 and Ib 84.365. horrors of the proscriptions, Appian believes that the situation in Rome was stabilized, since there was a temporary end to strife in Italy. After Sulla restored the Republic, however, the conflicts of the civil wars returned to Italy, showing again the inability of a republic to be free from oz&ot~.

Both sides share the blame in Appian's opinion for the beginning of the struggle, since 'Marius thought that the war [against Mithridates] would be easy and profitable and desired the command.' (~l&ptoq6& &v nbh~povE~XE~G TE 7~0h&puoov fiyo6p~voq&vat lcai bcteup6v TG~ozpazyykx5, El 55.242). Driven by greed, Marius and his supporters threatened their opponents with violence, drove them out of the assembly, and passed a law transferring the command from Sulla to Marius (El 56.245-

249). Sulla, with his army, criticized the actions of Marius, 'and alluded to nothing else openly, for he did not dare to speak about such war yet.. . those ones [the army] understanding what he meant.. . called on him to take courage and lead them against

noh&ou) ... o';. 6& ouvtkvz~c;TE &v ~ZEVOE~... 65 'Phpyv 046~&ELV Qappoha

6~kh~uov,El 57.251-252). Though Marius used violence to usurp Sulla's command, it was Sulla who did the unspeakable and led a Roman army against Rome.

Appian sees Sulla's use of his army to take power in Rome as a turning point in the civil war period:

Thus the conflicts advanced from strife and rivalry to murder, and from murder to open war, and this army of citizens was the first to attack the country as if it was an enemy.. . no shame being present for the constraining of them, either in laws or government or country.' 7cazpi6a &< noh~piav&s@ahw ... 066~vo< 65 a% TO^< ~ta~op&vot< kp7co6cjv &TO<, 5 vopov ;i noht~ciaq5 7cazpi60<.(El 60.269-270)

During the first period of the civil wars, from Gracchus to Marius and Sulla, civil turmoil was on a limited level, and confined primarily to Rome, but the next period would see no limitations as party conflicts within Rome spread to armed conflict between Roman armies across the empire. Having already condemned the actions of Sulla that led to the war, Appian also condemns him after he had won the war.

When Sulla had eliminated the last sf his enemies, he faced no resistance to his continued rule, since, as Appian notes, 'there was no talk of law or elections or appointments, since all either trembIed with fear and hid themselves or kept silent.'

(vopou y&p ji ~tpo.tovia

;Z&VZOV KC; KPU~&VOV G-S~OEC~TOV, 97.451). He had himself made perpetual dictator with unlimited power, since 'then it [the dictatorship] having been made boundless first became a complete tyranny.' (TOTE8; np&ov k< &opto~ovkhtloijoa

~upavLucretius Ofella in the forum, even though he had fought on Sulla's side and won several battles for him (El 101.471).

Thus Sulla is roundly criticized by Appian for his excesses, and his dictatorship is called a tyranny. Appian uses Tupavviq to describe a negative form of monarchy, where the ruler has seized power through violence rather than attaining it through legal means.67

Yet despite all of this, Appian also condemns him for laying down his power and retiring as a private citizen. 'It is illogical that he having forced himself into the office put it aside freely and recklessly after his rule had begun. (Ghoyov 6' 66~~dt TO ~tao&p&vov

67 Cowing (1 992) 164. 103.482). After having gone to great lengths to seize power, Appian does not understand why Sulla would relinquish it, especially since by doing so he restored the republic, which was shown by his own success to be unstable. Appian also notes that 'after that one removed himself, the Romans, though freed from murder and tyranny, were gently fanned back into turmoil. (&nt 6' &n;oo.t&v~oqaho6, '~opa^tot40vou ~ai zupavvi60q &nahhay&vz~qGou~ij &htv kai oz&o&tq~E~~L~C~

105.491). Rome, even though ruled by a tyrant and subject to his proscriptions, was freed from civil unrest by the establis ent of Sulla's monarchy, but by abandoning it and restoring the republic, Sulla returned Rome to the unstable situation that allowed someone like himself to seize power.

This is the dichotomy that the reign of Sulla presents; he was a tyrant, but his reign was free from the civil unrest (oz&ot<)that plagued the civil war period. Appian notes this in his preface: 'Thus the conflicts briefly abated under Sulla, and this was a compensation for the evils which Sulla had performed.' (&E pkv kd ppax< &q@xv at oz&o&tqbci ~dhha, K~K~V&v~;6ootq fiv &v 6 E6hhaq &ipy&@zo,El 3.12).

Appian may censure Sulla's conduct as dictator, but he approves of the dictatorship itself.

This dichotomy is important in understanding Appian's views on the characters of the participants in the civil wars. Sulla establishes the first monarchy, or sole rule, but this does not cause Appian to whitewash the flaws of his ~haracter.~'

The violence of his reign shows Appian's views on Sulla's character: he had replaced the evils of unrest with the evils of tyranny. If he had found some means of

68 This process, in reverse, is an important, yet often misinterpreted part of Appian's treatment of Pompeius, Cassius, and Brutus, which is discussed below. conferring legitimacy on his rule, he might have brought the civil wars to an end, but

instead, in an act that Appian cannot understand, he retired and returned the state to the unrest of the republic. Sulla was unable to see that his own rise and success proved the flawed nature of the republic, that it was unable to contain the opposing views that naturally arise from such a situation and that it preserved the conditions that created the conflict between himself and Marius, making another war inevitable.

eius

While Appian's narrative of the conflict between Marius and Sulla shows his views on the superiority of monarchy, the next great conflict of the civil wars, between

Caesar and Pompeius, shows the importance of divine influence on the course of history.

Both figures had achieved great conquests for the Roman ~m~ire,~~and both saw a need for some form of monarchy to end the chaos of the civil wars, so Appian is naturally inclined to favor both figures. However, only one can win, and Appian ascribes Caesar's victory, or more accurately, Pompeius's defeat, to the will of the gods.

Upon Caesar's initial movement against Rome, Appian explains Pompeius's decision to flee to the east rather than confiont Caesar in Italy as out of his control: 'Then the consuls perceiving the situation were not permitting Pompeius to act well based on his own military experience, but they urged him to depart. (&v oi hcazot

&6ozaOiiv, &hhY&hpuvov &~nq6&v,E2 36.142). Appian does not explain why

Pompeius decided to follow this advice, however, but only recounts his departure to

Greece. Appian also records many signs and prodigies that occurred which "onnoted the

69 While Appian's assessment of Caesar's conquest of Gaul in the Keltike is unfortunately lost, Appian praises Pompeius's settlement in the East, saying that it was fitting that such a great achievement be accomplished by one called great, i.e., G. Pompeius Magnus (Mi 121.599). destruction and change of the state for ever.' (npoeoGpatv&z.;lv 65 &&Izr\q nohtzeiaq

&vaipcoiv ZE ~aipza/3ohfiv, E2 36.144). Already Appian makes it appear that

Pompeius has no hope for victory, since the gods had already determined that the

repubIic would be overthrown.

After defeating Pompeius's army in Spain, Caesar returned to face Pompeius, but

quickly became bogged down at Dyrrachium. At one confrontation between the armies

there, when the army of Pompeius was attacking the lines of Caesar, Appian notes, 'it

seems that, having rushed up against them, then Pompeius would have taken them by

storm and have finished the whole war in that one act, if Labienus, led astray by a god,

had not then tumed him instead against the ones fleeing.' @OK&?, ovv~on~odv&V TOTE

6 nop~Gtoqkhkv ad ~p&zoqK& zbv nohepov k

&py&oaoOat, Ei p";\c@tqvoq a&&, &oij nap&yovzoq, 67ci zo6q @&ovzaq &cetOe zpanllvat, E2 62.259). Pompeius still won the battle, but he did not achieve the decisive result that he could have. At this point, the gods are not yet directly influencing

Pompeius, but are only making his advisors give him bad advice. Appian might be implicitly criticizing him, however, as this is the second time that Pompeius has accepted bad advice from a subordinate rather than trusting in his own judgments.

Buoyed by his victory, Pompeius 'expected that the army of Caesar, oppressed by hunger and struck down by the defeat, would straightaway come over to himself.. . but those ones, as a god led them to repentance, instead felt shame for their failure.' (TOV ozpazov aika zov ~aioapoq$nt@ npoq kawov p~zapahkoeat,htp@ TE n~nt&op&vov kozrq iizzqq ~azanmh~ypbvov... di 6&,0~06 o$&q kni p~z&votav&yovzoq, zo &p&pzqpa $6oijvzo, El 63.261-262). Again the gods do not affect Pompeius directly but only those around him, strengthening the resolve of his enemies to avenge their defeat. Appian does not consider Pompeius to be deficient in his thinking, as he lists the reasons why he should expect that the army of Caesar should be demoralized, but the intervention of a god prevented the expected outcome from happening and instead strengthened the resolve of Caesar's army to avenge their defeat.

Thus Appian does not diminish Pompeius's generalship, but he shows the inability of even a good general to achieve success if the gods do not will it.

As the narrative approaches its climax at Pharsalus, the many manifestations of divine influence become more apparent. Pompeius was not intending to engage Caesar but instead wanted to allow that one's army to be worn out by a lack of supplies.70

Pompeius's own army, however, especially the nobles who did not respect his authority over them, urged him to attack, and because of this 'he changed his own plan and gave in to theirs, a god hindering him here and through the whole war.' (&szr\ zGv O;KE~OV hoytopGv uai ~V&~OKEVa

Appian also states the reason the gods intervened in this situation: 'A god arranged these things for the beginning of this empire currently extending over everything.' (&dl zdl8~p~v GKOVO~EI 0~0s &q &px";? zG08~zqq v2)v k.n~xo&sr\qzdl

70 A strategy that Appian approves of, also employed by Aemilianus at Numantia, see above p. 2 1. 71 Appian's use of Theoblabeia is discussed above, p. 49. n&vza ~iy~~ovia~,E2 71 299). Thus it is because the victory of Caesar paved the way for the founding of the monarchy under Augustus that the gods made Caesar victorious, rather than any worthy qualities in him or flaws in Pompeius. Rome was either destined to become a monarchy, or the gods decided that it should be one, and in order to bring this about, they had Pompeius lose to Caesar.

During the battle itself, Appian records no divine intervention, but after it had been decided, he recalls the fate that afflicted Pompeius: 'When Pompeius saw the rout, he became senseless and departed step by step into the camp and, having come to his tent, he sat down speechless, as they say Ajax, son of Telemon, suffered at Troy in the middle of his enemies with a madness of the gods.' (IJopnitoq 6' kn& ziv zpoxiv &EV, k$pov a&o< y~vop~voq P&Gqv 65 TO azpa~o~~~ovmi napehe& kq ~liv mrlviv 6~a8&o 6vau80<, &ov zt ~a;TOV T~haphvo~Ah& Qaotv kv 'IX~CQ naO&v, kv p~oot~noh~piot~ ";Q $&ophap&ia~,E2 81.339). Pompeius was, like Ajax, stricken by a madness of the gods at a critical time. Nor did Pompeius have long to live after the defeat, since he was killed of the coast of Egypt while fleeing there (E2 85.359).

Appian both censures this deed, calling it nefarious (ziq &ptodaq, E2 86.3611, and praises Pompeius's legacy, saying 'he greatly benefited the Roman Empire,' (p&ytoza ziv 'Poyaiov &p~Gv&$&h

Pompeius9sreputation tarnished by his failures against Caesar, since they were not of his doing but acts of the gods.

The narrative of the conflict between Caesar and Pompeius up to the battle of

Pharsalus created a problem for Appian. Because he respected both figures, since both had made great conquests for the empire, attributing victory to the failings of one, or even the superiority of the other, would do injustice to his conception of them as great leaders.

Therefore he took the decision out of their hands and had the gods determine the outcome. The gods did not bestow their favor on Caesar, however, since this too would make him seem more worthy than Pompeius. Very little of the narrative focuses on the successes of Caesar; the emphasis is instead on the failings of Pompeius. By continually reminding the reader that Pompeius was stricken by a madness of the gods, his reputation is preserved, but the importance of the gods is stressed. It is the gods that determine the outcome, and even a great figure like Pompeius cannot overcome their will.

er, and Africamus

This type of divine influence is quite different from that which occurs in Appian's narrative of Afiicanus. In both cases, divine influence determined the outcome, but

Afiicanus was actively aided by the gods while Caesar only had his opponent hindered.

To have the gods on ones side gives great credit to the leader, as Africanus is surely a greater figure with his divine favor than without. For this reason Appian does not have the gods directly aid Caesar, because if the gods aided Caesar against Pompeius in the way that they aided Africanus, Caesar would appear more worthy than Pompeius. This is not to say that Caesar is not held in high regard by Appian, for he plainly is, but he was not aided by the gods against Pompeius for the sake of preserving Pompeius's reputation rather than diminishing his own.

Appian's greatest praise of Caesar occurs in his comparison of him with

Alexander, and considering Appian's implicit comparison of Alexander and Africanus, it is useful to see how these three figures fit together. Appian's initial analysis of Caesar is

as follows:

A man most fortunate in all things, divine, and of great deeds, fittingly being similar to Alexander. For both were most ambitious in all things and were most warlike; they came to their decisions very quickly, and they exposed themselves to danger and were unsparing of their safety, and they won not by strategy but rather by courage and fortune.

A11 of the characteristics ascribed to Caesar and Alexander could reasonably be applied

by the reader to Appian's characterization of Afi-icanus as well, and as Appian discusses

the various similarities in further depth, the concurrence with Africanus will be noted.

Appian's first comparison is that for Alexander the sea divinely was pushed back,

allowing him to cross the Pamphylian gulf (E2 149.622), while for Caesar the Adriatic

Sea became calm during the winter, allowing him also to cross (E2 150.625). The fact

that Appian would stress this similarity by placing it first seems almost deliberately

meant to recall Africanus's crossing of the lagoon at New Carthage, where the water was

also pushed back by divine intervention.

Appian next narrates incidents of individual bravery, which he also expands on

later in his comparison. In India, Alexander climbed the ladder first and unaccompanied

attacked an enemy wall, sustaining thirteen wounds before his army broke through the gates to rescue him. Caesar, at the battle of Munda, ran out in front of his army to shame his army into attacking the enemy by placing himself in danger (E2 152.637-638).

Africanus had done both these things himself, being the first to scale the ladder at the siege of New Carthage, and at the battle of Carmone running out between the armies to

encourage his troops by endangering himself. As if the similarities in events were not

enough, while the exact locations of Carmone and Munda are unknown, they are both in

southern Spain in the valley of the river Baetis.

Appian also compares the conquests of the two figures. Alexander conquered

Greece and Asia, or as Appian summarizes, 'All of the earth that he saw, he acquired.'

(6oqv &&E yGv, &~.t~oazo,E2 149.624). Caesar did not conquer as much, but he fought

battles over as large an area, winning victories in Gaul, Spain, Greece, Egypt, Syria,

Africa, and Spain again (E2 150.630). The enemies he faced were not like Alexander's,

since 'he was brought together with the best generals and many and large armies, not of

barbarians, but of Romans at their prime with the greatest discipline and fortune. But he

conquered them all, having cleaved through each in one or two [battles] .' (ozpazqyois

.to%<~ae' dzbv &pio.tot< ouv11v&0q o.tpa.toi5 .nohho^t5ze: ~aiye:y&hot~, 02;

f3apf3&povkt, &A?& 'Poyaiov &~ya~ovzovydhto~a ~67cpa~iats rcat .t6~atqKC&

&n&vmv&rcp&z"(~e:, 6tdl pt&q lcai 66~n~ipa~ hkmov fi &I&660, E2 150.629-630).

The extent of the conquests of Africanus in Spain and Africa, though slightly more

modest, do not look out of place in this grouping.

There are of course several comparisons that do not apply to Africanus, as the

primary purpose of the section is to compare Caesar with Alexander, However, the many

similarities with Africanus cannot be purely coincidence, so it seems that Appian

intended to draw a comparison between Caesar and Africanus by apposing them both with Alexander. That is, of course, not the only reason Caesar is compared with Alexander, since Appian's fondness for the namesake of his native city is well attested,72 but it is significant and should be analyzed.

Since Afkicanus fought to strengthen the republic but Caesar fought against it, a comparison of the two figures may seem unusual. However, in Appian's conception,

Afiicanus was an anomaly in the republic, and it is precisely because of this that he was able to be success~l.He was a monarchical figure, much like Caesar. Also, Africanus laid the foundations for the growth of the Roman Empire by taking up the mantle of

Alexander. Caesar, however, was responsible for the founding of the monarchy in Rome.

Thus each founded one part of the Rome that Appian lived in: Africanus made Rome an empire, but Caesar gave Rome an emperor to rule it. They are linked by their accomplishments in creating the Roman system that, in Appian's view, allowed the

Roman Empire to surpass the previous empires and continue without end.

Octavianus an

The final narrative to be examined is the rise of Octavianus and the campaign of the triumvirs against Brutus and Cassius. The narration of the rise of Octavianus shows the importance of monarchy to achieving concord, while the account of Brutus and

Cassius shows the final failings of the republican system. After several years of Caesar's monarchy, the narratives focus on the dualisms that had developed, involving Octavianus and Antonius, the triumvirs and the senate, the triumvirs and Caesar's assassins, and

Brutus and Cassius themselves. Through the struggles and conflicts between them,

Appian shows that monarchy, the absence of multiple holders or contenders for power, is the only solution to strife.

72 Hahn (1 968). When Octavianus initially arrived in Rome to accept his position as Caesar's heir, he immediately confronted Antonius over the proper course of action against the assassins. Accusing him of misusing his powers, he told him 'you overlooked that the murderers fled and that some went across into their governorships, which they having killed the grantor hold lawlessly.' (drv6po@ovouq61: i'~@uy&vIjmp~iF~c, i'q

$yepovia~i'viouc, Fta6pay.&v, 6~ &$~piozwc,:xouot zov Fovza drvehovzec,, E3 16.57).

Antonius responded, however, that he has no reason to be accountable to Octavianus, and instead he reproached Octavianus for ignoring the support he had received from him and for pandering to the senate instead (E3 19.71). Antonius did not back down from challenging Octavianus, but he also revealed the problems caused by the dualism of the possession of power both by themselves and by the Senate.

When Octavianus and Antonius finally agreed to support each other against the assassins, Octavianus convinced the people to vote for the province of Cisalpine Gaul to be given to Antonius (E3 30.1 18). In exchange, Octavianus expected Antonius's support for the tribunate, but instead he opposed it with his consular authority, 'either to gain the favor of the Senate or as a consolation to it, since it was annoyed at the law about Gaul.'

(E'~ZEk~ XOiptv Gq Bouhij~;i aapqyopiav, [email protected], 74 7~ep; z!q KEhzt~ic,vop,

E3 3 1.121). Again there was dissention between the two, despite their common purpose to punish the assassins, and again the fact that some power still resided with the Senate caused further problems, since Antonius could satis@ either the Senate or Octavianus, but not both.

Appian narrates the great number of shifts in alliances and agreements and disagreements between Antonius and Octavianus and the Senate, of which some are useful to show the problems of having many holders of power. When Antonius was commanding in Cisalpine Gaul, but the Senate and Octavianus opposed him, the Senate decided to give Antonius command in Macedonia instead, and they sent Cicero to inform him of their decision. Cicero, however, distorted the decree and ordered Antonius to depart Gaul immediately and submit to the authority of the Senate (E3 61.251).~~Appian explains that Cicero changed the decree because 'a god was harassing the common affairs into change' (TOG~at~oviou z& ~otv&6~ p.~zapohGvkvoxhoGvzo~, E3 61.252). Thus even within the Senate there was division, and even the gods were encouraging the continually shifting alliances.

Having spent the entire third book of his civil war narrative discussing these shifts, Appian ends it with a form of agreement being reached. First Octavianus gained the consulship, which he did in part by invoking the two Scipios, since when the Senate objected that he was too young to hold the office, his supporters countered that Corvinus held the office before the legal age, 'and later Scipio, both the first and the second, and from the youth of them both the country profited greatly.' (K& C~tniov6ozepov, 6 ze

88.361). Having gained his office, Octavianus joined with Antonius and Lepidus in forming the Second Triumvirate to punish Brutus and Cassius. Appian comments that this new office differed from that of a dictatorship only in name (E4 2.6), and since

Appian considers dictatorship to be a form of monarchical power, a large step had been taken in restoring what had been lost by the death of Caesar. Thus after a period of

73 The same incident discussed in Cicero's Sixth Philippic, but Appian's Cicero is more strongly opposed to Antonius than Cicero's own version suggests; see also Carter (1996) 382. Gowing (1992) 149 comments on the lack of historical accuracy in Appian's version, but while he considers it to be due to confusion on Appian's part, Appian's version highlights the problems of many sources of power better with a more strongly worded decree by Cicero. tumoil, the forces of monarchy were unified and the power of the senate checked, allowing for the final confrontation with the last supporters of the republican cause.

The portrayal of Brutus and Cassius has long been one of the controversial parts of Appian's narrative.74 Appian describes them as 'two Roman men, most noble and notable and uncontested in virtue, apart from one guilt.' (&v6p&'Popaiov &.jy~veoz&o

can Appian, who believed so strongly in monarchy and greatly admired Caesar, praise so strongly these men who killed him? The answer lies in the difference between their personal virtues and the cause that they stood for.

As the confrontation between Caesar and Pompeius showed, an individual's opposition to Appian's preferred position does not necessarily diminish Appian's respect for that person, since he could easily have disparaged Pompeius for confronting Caesar; instead Appian maintains his favorable impression of Pompeius. Brutus and Cassius fight for the cause of the republic, but this does not in any way diminish their virtues of their characters; there are plenty of virtuous figures in Appian's account of the republic.

There are flaws in the republic, however, and they are responsible for the downfall of the figures that stand for it.

Appian states that the army of Brutus and Cassius fought 'not for themselves, but for democracy,75beautiful in name, but always unprofitable.' (O~X;n&p oQ6v a&c&v,

74 Gowing (1992) 47 notes that it is usually assumed that Appian used a pro-Republican source, and that this biased his account in favor of the assassins. This is, of course, unfair to Appian as it assumes that he cannot detect the bias in his source and blindly includes it in his own work. Gowing himself believes that Appian's characterization is influenced by the importance he places on the personalities of the figures. There are, however, some scholars who do not even accept that Appian supported monarchy and use his favorable characterization of these republican figures as proof of his support of the republican cause: Hose (1994) 267f. presents this argument. 75 Luce (1964) 27 notes that Appian is not likely referring to literal democracy but some form of collective government, as opposed to a monarchy. chh' 6n&p ~~po~pa.tia~,6v6pa.toq E&LGO

Appian makes no criticism of their motives, and even praises them for not being selfish, but their cause is not worth fighting for. Even more than that, though, it is responsible their defeat.

The army of Brutus and Cassius was unsuccessful precisely because it was run like a republic rather than Iike a monarchy. Brutus's officers 'thought themselves to be nothing other than fellow generals with Brutus on account of his mildness.' (Bpo6q 6& o%&v &hhY6 auo.tpa.tyy~~v$$ouv 6t& ~~a&~.ta,E4 123.518). As a result of this, they continually urged Brutus to attack rather than accepting his plan to wear out the army of the triumvirs with hunger.76 Even earlier in the campaign, when his officers did accept his orders, the soldiers did not follow them, since Appian notes that when insulted by the enemy, 'they attacked them unbidden.' (bc~6papova?jzol~ a&o~&heuozot, E4

110.462).

For an army to be successful, it must be run like a monarchy, with one overarching objective and plan for achieving it under the direction of one leader. Brutus did not achieve the respect of his officers or soldiers that would cause them to obey him unquestionably. In part this was because Brutus did not fulfill part of his duty as a commander, since he feared that 'the army, having been formed earlier by Caesar, would become discontented and desert.' (6 o~pazoq&a TOG n&at Kaioapo~y~yovdq

76 Note the similarities to Pompeius's campaign against Caesar, above p. 13. Appian even has Brutus make the comparison himself, saying 'we seem to wage war like Pompeius Magnus, not commanding but rather being commanded.' (koi~apevwg I'Iobx{tog Moiyvoq xohep{oetv, 06 ozpazqyohneg kt pahhov { ozpazqyo~pevot,E4 124.520). However, while Pompeius was led astray by divine influence, Brutus was undermined by a lack of concord within his army as his officers did not respect the commands of their superior. &yava~zioe.tbze. K& p~zapdIhotzo,E4 124.521). Since he did not respect the loyalty of the army, how could he expect them to respect his authority?

The republican structure of the army of Brutus and Cassius mirrors the type of government that they fought for, and it shows the same flaws. Just as a republican government, in Appian's view, is inherently flawed due to the inevitable conflicts that arise between people with equal power, an army that does not have a sole leader cannot operate effectively. Fighting on behalf of a flawed cause does not make Brutus and

Cassius any less admirable figures in Appian's opinion, however. Their defeat is not due to any problems of their character, but rather reflects the problems of the cause they were fighting for. By retaining a favorable view of Brutus and Cassius, Appian shows fbrther the flaws of the republic, since even when the leaders of the republican cause are worthy figures, the cause is still doomed because of the inherent flaws of the republican system, which even good leaders cannot overcome. Conclusion

Appian will never receive nor does he deserve the reputation given to a

Thucydides or a Polybius, but to discount him as a historian entirely, as has often been done, is a serious injustice. The belief that many significant themes of Appian's narrative, such as his favorable view of the character of the republican leaders, Pompeius,

Cassius, and Brutus, come not from his own views, but rather from the biases of his sources, is incredibly harmful to Appian's intellect. It assumes that he did not perceive a bias in his source that ran counter to his own views, and that he was unable to detect in his own work something that modem readers so easily believe they find. It seems highly unlikely that this could apply to someone as educated and successful as Appian.

Appian specifically decided that he would not degrade the character of the republicans, and he was able to do this because he possessed an objectivity that many historians did not have. One of Appian's greatest strengths comes from his distance from the events that he narrates. The civil wars had been over for nearly 200 years, and therefore Appian can view events from an objective distance that was not possible for those writing while the emotions of the time were still prevalent. Appian knew that, after nearly two centuries of relative peace, and no end apparent, the success of monarchy could not be denied, nor could the flaws of the republican system that allowed for the civil wars in the first place. Yet it was the system in both cases that was the determining factor, not the people involved on either side.

In this way, the virtue of the figures on either side need not be tainted. If it is merely the republican system that is a failure, there is no need for the proponents of that system to be censured in any way, except for not realizing the flaws of the system that they chose to support. Thus the character of Pompeius, Cassius, and Brutus can be praised without compromising Appian's views on the institutions that they served. That

Appian praised the characters of the opponents of monarchy does not make him an inconsistent historian. Similarly, Appian can criticize the violence of the proscriptions during Sulla's dictatorship but still believe that the dictatorship was a successful step in the transition to monarchy and should not have been renounced as Sulla did when he restored the institutions of the Republic. The merit of his form of government does not exempt Sulla's actions from criticism. These examples are not proof of Appian's incompetence, but rather of his objectivity, since he did not automatically interpret a person's character based on their position.

If the books of the civil wars are examined separate from Appian's whole work,

Appian's purpose in writing is less clear. However, by first examining the ethnic books, it is easier to see what themes Appian considers important and it is less likely that his arguments would be misinterpreted. An examination of Appian's characterization of the

Scipios not only reveals the importance of their role in the establishment of the Roman

Empire but also determines many of Appian's main themes. Providing the proper framework for an analysis is essential for ensuring convincing results, and with the establishment of these themes, this work has attempted to do so in order to examine certain key elements of Appian's narrative of the civil wars.

It is hoped that a study of this form has shown that Appian is an author worthy of greater respect and further analysis, especially considering the importance of the material that his history covers. His work is not without flaws, primarily in its lack of insightful analysis; Appian prefers to let the facts he presents speak for themselves. This of course makes further analysis of his goals in writing even more essential. While the prevailing trend of scholarship on Appian is moving towards greater respect for the historian, this type of analysis is still rare. It is precisely this type of analysis, however, that best shows

Appian's skill in creating a unified work and restores his reputation as a historian worthy of study. e Structure of the Romaika

Order Book Title Abbreviation English Title Latin Abbreviation Condition

Prooimion Prologue Praef. Whole Basilike The Kings Reg. Fragments Italike The Italian Book Ital. Fragments Saunitike The Samnite Book Sam. Fragments Keltike The Celtic Book Celt. Fragments Sike like The Sicilian Book Sic. Fragments Iberike The Spanish Book Hisp. Fragments Annibaike The Hannibalic Book Hann. Whole Libyke The Carthaginian Book Pun. Whole Makedonike The Macedonian Book Mac. Fragments Illyr ike The Illyrian Book Ill. Whole Hellenike The Hellenic Book Hell. Lost Ionike The Ionic Book Ion. Lost Syr iake The Syrian Book Syr. Whole Parthike The Parthian Book Parth. Lost Mithridateios The Mithridatic Book Mith. Whole Emphylia I The Civil Wars 1 BC 1 Whoie Emphylia 11 The Civil Wars 2 BC 2 Whole Emphylia 111 The Civil Wars 3 BC 3 Whole Emphylia IV The Civil Wars 4 BC 4 Whole Emphylia V The Civil Wars 5 BC 5 Whole Aigyptia I The Egyptian Book 1 Aegypt. 1 Lost Aigyptia I1 The Egyptian Book 2 Aegypt. 2 Lost Aigyptia III The Egyptian Book 3 Aegypt. 3 Lost Aigyptia IV The Egyptian Book 4 Aegypt. 4 Lost Hekatontaetia The Hundred Years Hec. Lost Dakike The Dacian Book Dac. Lost Arabios The Arabian Book Arab. Lost ibliography

Texts

Acfa Alexandrinorum. Ed. H. Musurillo. Leipzig, 1961

Appian. Appiani Historia Romana Vol I. Ed. P. Viereck, A. G. Roos, and E. Gabba. Leipzig, 1962.

Appian. Appiani Historia Romana: Bella Civilia Vol2. Ed. L. Mendelssohn and P Viereck. Leipzig, 1906.

Arrian. Flavius Arrianus Vol. I: Alexandri Anabasis. Ed. A.G. Roos. Leipzig, 1967.

Fronto. M Cornelius Fronto Epistulae. Ed. C. R. Haines. New York, 1919.

Photius. BibliothBque Tome I. Ed. R. Henry. Paris, 1959.

Polybius. Polybii Historiae. Ed. T. Biittner-Wobst. Leipzig, 1889.

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Brodersen, K. "Appian und sein Werk." ANRW I1 34.1. Berlin, 1993: 339-363.

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