CORE Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk Provided by Carolina Digital Repository THE ROMAN ARMY’S EMERGENCE FROM ITS ITALIAN ORIGINS Patrick Alan Kent A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of History. Chapel Hill 2012 Approved by: Richard Talbert Nathan Rosenstein Daniel Gargola Fred Naiden Wayne Lee ABSTRACT PATRICK ALAN KENT: The Roman Army’s Emergence from its Italian Origins (Under the direction of Prof. Richard Talbert) Roman armies in the 4 th century and earlier resembled other Italian armies of the day. By using what limited sources are available concerning early Italian warfare, it is possible to reinterpret the history of the Republic through the changing relationship of the Romans and their Italian allies. An important aspect of early Italian warfare was military cooperation, facilitated by overlapping bonds of formal and informal relationships between communities and individuals. However, there was little in the way of organized allied contingents. Over the 3 rd century and culminating in the Second Punic War, the Romans organized their Italian allies into large conglomerate units that were placed under Roman officers. At the same time, the Romans generally took more direct control of the military resources of their allies as idea of military obligation developed. The integration and subordination of the Italians under increasing Roman domination fundamentally altered their relationships. In the 2 nd century the result was a growing feeling of discontent among the Italians with their position. Indeed, the vital military role of the Italians was reinforced by the somewhat limited use made of non-Italians in Roman armies. By the late 2 nd century, the Italians were vestiges of past traditions that no longer fitted into a changing world. Feelings of discontent grew stronger and, eventually, led to widespread revolt in the Social War. As the Romans became masters of vast empire, they became increasingly divorced from their Italian origins and subjugated their once allies. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS . v INTRODUCTION. 1 Chapter I. WARFARE IN EARLY ITALY. 17 Warfare and Military Cooperation . 17 Allies, Mercenaries, and Communities. 25 An Italian Army on Campaign . 36 II. FORMAL AND INFORMAL INTERACTIONS. 51 The Instability of Community Relations. 51 Formal and Informal Relationships. 56 Military Implications. 77 III. THE INTEGRATION OF ROME’S ITALIAN ALLIES . 84 The 3 rd Century to 216 . 84 Military Crisis: The Battle of Cannae . 97 After Cannae . 100 IV. MILITARY OBLIGATION. 121 Anachronistic Obligations of the Latins and Hernici . 122 Polybius’ Catalogue in 225. 127 Foedera , Formulae , and Military Obligations . 131 iii Recruitment and Discharge of Allies in the 2 nd Century . 146 V. IMPERIAL ARMIES OF THE REPUBLIC . 152 Early Use of Non-Italians in Roman Armies. 153 The Effects of Empire on Rome . 157 Non-Italians in Roman Armies . 161 Roman Armies from the Second Punic War to the Social War . 170 Italians vs. Non-Italians in Roman Armies. 174 VI. VESTIGES OF THE PAST . 180 Political Subordination of Italy . 180 Romanization and Military Service. 185 Italy vs. the Provinces . 189 Buildup and Outbreak of the Social War . 195 CONCLUSION. 207 APPENDICES I. List of Latin Colonies in the Revolt of 209. 212 II. List of Prefects and Allied Commanders . 214 III. The Socii Navales . 223 IV. List of Non-Italians in Roman Armies beyond their Homelands. 229 REFERENCES. 234 iv LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS CIL Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum . FC Degrassi, A. Fasti Capitolini . Turin: G.B. Paravia & Co., 1954. MRR Broughton, T.R.S. The Magistrates of the Roman Republic . Vols. 1 and 2. New York: American Philological Association, 1951-1952. v Introduction This dissertation argues that the Roman army of the 4 th century 1 and prior was little different from other Italian armies of the day. The accepted scholarly view of the Roman army’s exploitation of Italian allies, which is ultimately based on an anachronistic application of Polybius’ rationalized model, is in need of revision. The sophisticated use of allied manpower in the 2 nd century, which facilitated the creation of Rome’s Mediterranean empire, was quite divergent from earlier practices. Italy, in the 4 th century, was still a peninsula filled with communities that were in a constant state of competition and cooperation. The personal relationships of individuals, which transcended community boundaries, facilitated a close interconnectedness in the Italian world and, combined with formal relationships, facilitated military cooperation. An examination of the later ancient sources, such as Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, reveals that military cooperation was not a unique Roman attribute, but was a feature of a larger tradition of Italian warfare that included Rome. It was the conquest of Italy in the early 3 rd century and the military pressures of the first two Punic Wars (264-241, 218-201) that began a process which would propel the Roman army away from its Italian roots. 1 All dates are BC unless otherwise noted. Traditional means of military cooperation then broke down as the other communities of Italy were subsumed within a new Roman military system. The role of personal relationships was replaced with the idea that formal alliances between the Romans and their allies obligated military assistance whenever Roman generals required it. Similar changes were taking place in the political organization of the Republic, as the Senate undertook closer supervision over annual magistrates, and regions beyond Italy were transformed into subordinate provinces. The peoples of Italy were placed in a position of increasing subordination inconsistent with their military importance; it was this shift that ultimately led to civil war in the early 1 st century. Investigation into the development of a Roman army from the military traditions of early Italy reveals how the Romans with the aid of the other peoples of Italy succeeded in winning an empire and were transformed in the process. 1. Treaties and Military Cooperation in Modern Scholarship Scholars’ interpretation of the military relations of the Romans and Italians has centered on theorizing about the nature of the foedera (treaties) that linked them together. It is a given fact that the Romans’ success relied a great deal on their use of the military resources of their Italian allies. While the interpretations have changed over time, the focus of modern scholarly investigation has remained firmly on these legal relationships. According to the 2007 Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare , “as Rome expanded and conquered new territories, the places that were absorbed were with a few exceptions left free to govern their own affairs . their only obligation was to contribute troops.” 2 In fact, the characterization of this obligation has remained remarkably constant 2 J. Serrati, “Warfare and the State,” in P. Sabin, et al., eds. Greece, the Hellenistic World and the Rise of Rome , vol. 1 of The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare (Cambridge: 2007), 485. 2 ever since the 19 th century. The Romans are seen as systematically demanding the military resources of their allies. The mechanism for this exploitation was the establishment of treaties that dictated military obligation on the part of Rome’s allies. However, with this focus on formal treaties, the importance of informal relationships in the military interactions of the peoples of Italy has been ignored by and large, making it difficult to gain a full understanding of the combined role of formal and informal relationships. Interpretation of the military relationships of the Romans and their allies comes from the work of historians in the late 19 th century. In 1881 Mommsen asserted that “without a doubt the non-Latin allied communities . were registered on the list of contingent- furnishing Italians ( formula togatorum ).” 3 The Romans thus controlled the military resources of their allies to supplement their own armies. Mommsen’s interpretation saw Rome’s allies as subsumed within a Roman state ( reichsangehörig ), which increasingly took on a national character during the conquest of Italy. 4 As a result of the incorporation of the peoples of Italy, the Romans gained full control over their military resources. The tool for doing so was the foedus .5 Beloch (1880) likewise saw foedera as the key institution in Roman and Italian military cooperation within a confederate system. 6 Many of the controversies of the military obligations of Rome’s allies come from these two authors, who emphasized the importance of treaties in facilitating Roman use of allied manpower. Various scholars have expanded on these ideas, emphasizing the role of treaties (foedera ) in the military obligations of Rome’s allies. Täubler (1913) refined Beloch’s 3 “ohne Zweifel auch die nichtlatinischen föderierten Gemeinden. in das Verzeichnis der zuzugpflichtigen Italiker (formula togatorum) eingetragen,” T. Mommsen, Römische Geschichte (Berlin: 1881), 1:423. 4 T. Mommsen, Römische Staatsrecht (Leipzig: 1887), 3:653. 5 Mommsen (1887), 3:672-676. 6 K. J. Beloch, Der italische Bund unter Roms Hegemonie (Leipzig: 1880), 194-227. 3 interpretation of foedera into the concepts of equal ( aequum ) and unequal ( iniquum ) varieties. 7 Central to the foedus iniquum was the so-called maiestas clause requiring allies to support the ascendancy of Rome, which Sherwin-White (1973) saw as the clause that allowed the Romans to exploit their allies for aggressive wars. 8 Here Sherwin-White touches on a fundamental problem: how did the Romans obtain allied assistance in aggressive wars? Certainly, the foedus Cassianum , the only surviving example of an Italian treaty, makes no pronouncements on this specific possibility. 9 The foedus iniquum solved the problem by supposing that the Romans created unequal alliances designed to exploit allied manpower in any military situation.