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Post-1989 Political Change in the Balkan States: The Legacy of the Early Illiberal Transition Years

Othon ANASTASAKIS* Abstract Introduction

The Balkans remain one of Europe’s more In the third decade following the fall unstable and varied political landscapes, with mixed and diverse national trajectories. What of , the Balkans remain we see today in the Balkan political space is one of Europe’s more unstable and largely the outcome of the type of transition that varied political landscapes, with mixed these countries experienced during the 1990s, the early years of political change from one party rule and diverse national trajectories. Some to multi-party political pluralism. This paper countries are more politically stable argues that the Balkan states developed some than others, some still face legitimacy common traits in their first decade of transition: problems, and some are still struggling firstly, they maintained continuity with their communist past; secondly, they pursued an with divisive ethnic politics. What illiberal start dominated by domestic elites and we see today in the Balkan political top-down politics; and, finally, they underwent a space is largely the outcome of the collapse of their early illiberal competitive order before moving into more mainstream politics. type of transition that these countries Since then, democratic politics in the Balkans experienced during the 1990s, the early have experienced many improvements as a foundation years of political change from reaction to this illiberal start, but they have also sustained some democratic deficits which have one party rule to multi-party political a direct link to the initial illiberal years of the pluralism, when the first ‘political transition. pacts’ were made and the first political, economic and social conflicts developed. Key Words Looking at the Balkan countries’ early experience from communist Balkans, post-communist transition, to Western-inspired democratisation, political elites, illiberal politics. democracy, when the first foundations were laid, we are able to better appreciate * Dr. Othon Anastasakis is Director of the South both the current democratic progress and East European Studies at Oxford (SEESOX), and Director of the European Studies Centre, the consolidation of some democratic St Antony’s College, University of Oxford. deficits.

91 PERCEPTIONS, Summer 2013, Volume XVIII, Number 2, pp. 91-112. Othon Anastasakis

The remainder of this paper argues the sustainability, longevity and quality that, despite significant national of the democratic process. As with the variations, the Balkan states shared previous democratising waves of the some common traits in their first years 1970s in Southern Europe and the 1980s of political transition during the early in Latin America, continuity or rupture 1990s: firstly, they all maintained with the recent past, the elite’s choices, continuity with their communist past; their calculations and miscalculations, secondly, they all pursued an illiberal and the institutional designs were central start dominated by domestic elites and to how new democracies were born top-down politics; and, finally, they all and subsequently developed.1 Similarly, underwent some kind of collapse of their the early years of transition in Eastern early illiberal competitive order before Europe from communism to democracy ‘recharging’ with reformed ideas and entailed a remarkable variety of post- more ‘mainstream’ discourses. Many of communist developments along regional the features of these early years are still or national lines, which helps explain evident today in the way domestic elites why some countries developed a more conduct their political ‘deals’, in the stable democratic process, while others way citizens react through elections or were more fragile and turned to new , and in the way the international forms of authoritarianism. There is, for community exercises its authority from instance, a linkage between Poland’s abroad. ensuing democratic and economic consolidation and the initial rupture Transition is a historical with its communist past and the sequence of political events policies that were adopted successfully usually associated with the in this particular economy. Similarly, last stages of authoritarian/ democratic advances and losses in other totalitarian regimes through parts of Central Europe and the Baltics to the introduction of a more are related to the type of choices that liberal pluralist system. were adopted during the initial years of their political and economic transition. It is crucial to understand the early stages Some transitions were more successful of transition to post-communist politics than others; some were more dramatic after a long period of totalitarianism and contested. and one-party rule, because it is at this Comparing the various post- stage that the foundations are laid for communist cases, one sees enough

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‘drama’- to use Laurence Whitehead’s all this in mind, this paper adopts a more term2- in the Balkan countries, where parsimonious approach to transition as the transitions have been described as an uncertain process that takes place a deviation from the expected norm, during the formative years of change from or from the usual type of democratic one party rule to a pluralist competitive ‘transition and consolidation’; these have context. This is a time when the elites, been defined often in derogatory ways as government and opposition, have as ‘defective’,3 ‘delayed’,4 ‘incomplete’,5 the political space and the opportunity ‘double’ (post-communist and post- to shape the new environment, when conflict)6 transitions, or as the societies hold high expectations for ‘laggards’7 of transition. Transition from the future, and when the international authoritarianism can have different community is testing the waters for its meanings and symbolism, and has engagement and commitment. been the object of much discussion and criticism since Rustow’s analysis, The Balkan communist history when it became a central concept was far from a homogeneous for understanding political change regional experience, and and democratisation.8 From a simple entailed various types of national chronological perspective, transition communisms. is a historical sequence of political events usually associated with the last stages of authoritarian/totalitarian The following discusses three regimes through to the introduction of particular themes of the early transition a more liberal pluralist system. From experience in the Balkans and their a more deterministic and teleological national variations: firstly, the moment perspective, transition is seen as a of breakdown; secondly, elite politics process that leads to the consolidation of and the early illiberal years; and thirdly, democracy, when the latter becomes the opposition, mobilisation and crisis of only game in town. Transition can also be post-communist illiberalism. This is a seen as a Western hegemonic discourse common pattern, which was expressed of parliamentary democracy and (neo-) differently in the various Balkan states liberal reform propagated and imposed during the first years of transition, on the new democracies, and which in leaving a long-lasting imprint on how most cases legitimises some degree of new democracies developed thereafter external control and interference.9 With and what they are now. The subsequent

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consolidation of electoral politics, political and ideological battleground advances in many areas of freedom between the capitalist West and the and democracy, and the discrediting of communist East but, most significantly, authoritarian practices have their roots within the communist East itself. in this first period of change. Moreover, Each Balkan state developed its own the resilience of personal politics, the national brand of communism, where ephemeral nature of party ideologies, the control of the and the consolidation of ethnic politics, the ideology varied, from the totalitarian impact of external dependency and the all-encompassing cases of to the lack of trust from below are largely due nationalistic Romania, to the “orthodox” to these crucial illiberal formative years of communist Bulgaria, and to the more transition and post-communist change. liberal, open to the West, Yugoslavia. The 1989 revolutionary moment was 1989: The Moment of therefore a different experience in Breakdown and Regional each national environment, violent or Diversity anarchic in some, less dramatic and more peaceful in others. Looking back at the initial stages of Romania’s national communist post-communist transition, we note experience is best remembered for that while the moment of communist the harshness of Ceausescu’s regime, breakdown coincided chronologically which sought to distance itself from in all the Balkan states, the communist the control of the Soviet Union and regimes did not collapse uniformly, refused to integrate fully in the East but were instead affected by their European, Soviet-dominated economic prior national communist experience, union. Ceausescu’s harsh policy at including the degree of communist home, resembling a type of ‘national ideological orthodoxy, the extent of the Stalinism’, developed a blend of centrally party control on the society, the intensity planned economy with the idea of of dissident politics or the control of the national uniqueness and the cult of the Soviet Union over internal matters. The leader. His ‘cultural revolution’ and his Balkan communist history was far from unique social-engineering experiment in a homogeneous regional experience, and the countryside eventually and entailed various types of national alienated the Romanian people, who communisms. As a matter of fact, the were forced to submit to a nationalist/ Balkan countries became not only the totalitarian philosophy. By 1989

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Romania had 4 million party members, discontent with the socio-economic more than double the average percentage crisis and environmental degradation, of members per capita in the region. the most famous of these movements In effect Romania had no organised being ‘Ecoglasnost’.11 The Bulgarian opposition, but simply widespread communist regime followed the fall of its hatred for the regime,10 which became Soviet prototype, and the revolutionary all too obvious during the Romanian moment was relatively peaceful and revolutionary moment, with a violent orderly compared to its Romanian uprising in Timişoara which spread neighbour. It included an internal coup elsewhere and to Bucharest, ending with and a change of leadership from within, the trial and immediate execution of but no violent overthrow from below. Ceausescu and his wife. Yugoslavia was an original experimental Bulgaria’s post-war communism mix of the ideological replicated the Soviet prototype and competition: a country that was socialist under Soviet supervision suppressed but non-Soviet; that abandoned central any cultural, ideological or ethnic planning and adopted ‘self-management’; expressions, adopting a highly centralised that introduced decentralisation and system of state control over the economy, some form of confederalisation of the and agricultural collectivisation. The political system under the guidance of Bulgarian communist leadership Yugoslav ‘unity and brotherhood’; that developed its own brand of Bulgarian experimented with liberalisation of patriotism and xenophobia, and through its foreign trade, closer links with the a ‘regenerative process’ pursued a capitalist West and opening its borders policy of harsh exclusion of the Turkish for Yugoslav citizens to go to the West.12 minority, when the latter were ordered Within the communist party itself, there in the mid-1980s to change their names was increasingly a division between into Christian-Slavic names and those ‘liberals’ and ‘conservatives’, and the who refused to do so were demoted. In question of reform and democratisation 1989 the Bulgarian government expelled was often explicitly or implicitly part of 370,000 Turks, half of the total Turkish the Yugoslav political debate. Yugoslav population of Bulgaria. Partly as a result dissident politics and ideologies were of this oppressive behaviour, Bulgaria mostly filtered through national concerns saw the emergence of some opposition and priorities of different nationalities and the first dissident movements and ethnic minorities within Yugoslavia, during the 1980s in the form of public while any attempts at decentralisation

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under communism failed to satisfy neighbours, fearful of Yugoslav or Greek different national interests. Yugoslavia’s foreign policy intentions, and initially socialist experiment allowed for the depended on Moscow’s patronage until application of innovative economic the death of Stalin, when the leadership projects, yet its political system wavered developed an alliance with Chinese between unitarism and decentralised communism. Hoxha’s brand of Albanian federalism. The leadership after the communism had a strong element of death of Tito in 1980 pushed for more xenophobia and a perception of threat economic liberalisation and ideological from the two world powers and the pluralism, but the widening differences regional neighbours, and as a result among the republics and provinces of developed an ideology of fear, totalitarian Yugoslavia could not contribute to the control of the state, and kept the country success of this policy, and the country in a constant state of defence. Contrary suffered a severe economic decline. The to the liberalisation movements in economic decay of the 1980s and the other parts of Eastern Europe, Albania policy failures contributed to the gradual pursued its own totalitarian cultural elimination of unity and solidarity.13 The revolution and proclaimed itself as 1989 change towards political pluralism the world’s first ‘atheist state’ (closing and electoral competitions in all the churches and mosques and persecuting Yugoslav republics led to a speedy and Catholics) with a strong anti-Western violent disintegration of the country. philosophy. Albania had no dissidents, and Hoxha’s fear of domestic enemies made his regime ruthless in suppressing The region entailed different 14 types of communist breakdown, any potentially opposing view. After varying from Romania’s his death, the party leadership was divided between ‘hardliners’, guided by popular revolutionary uprising Hoxha’s wife, and ‘pragmatists’ guided to Bulgaria’s internal coup, by in the context of the Yugoslavia’s disintegration and isolationism of the previous leadership.15 Albania’s anarchic and disorderly Albanian communist politics were the change. most anti-democratic in Eastern Europe, suppressing the people for a sustained At the south-eastern corner of the period of 45 years. The moment of communist Balkans, Albania kept breakdown involved protests and itself completely isolated from all its growing dissent and was more anarchic

96 Post-1989 Political Change in the Balkan States than in any other Balkan country. For former communists in the Balkans were a brief initial period of radical change, not purged, but were allowed to find Albania lacked any law and order, their way into the new system. The marked by the unruly massive exodus political formations which emerged of exasperated to and in the years following the collapse of . communism were unreformed or slightly reformed communist parties, along with The region, therefore, entailed different anti-communist electoral alliances, types of communist breakdown, varying resurrected parties from the past and from Romania’s popular revolutionary new political groups.16 uprising to Bulgaria’s internal coup, Yugoslavia’s disintegration and Albania’s anarchic and disorderly change. The type The adoption of presidential of revolutionary change that occurred or semi-presidential systems in each state affected the course of allowed personal politics to illiberalism which dominated the initial develop and strong leaders to transition years, the degree of continuity emerge with formidable power with the past, and the role and impact to control and often abuse the of the domestic elites during this crucial system. period.

Transition to Political In the Central European countries Pluralism the rupture with the past was clear-cut, communist politicians were discredited The most prominent political change and new opposition elites came to power, in all these countries after the breakdown but in all Balkan countries parts of the past of communist party monopoly was political elites, who were better organised the emergence of political parties and and more efficient in manipulating movements ready to compete in the and dominating the transition from electoral arena. All post-communist authoritarian to competitive politics, Balkan states abolished the primacy of continued to dominate party politics the communist parties and provided and state apparatuses. Alongside constitutional guarantees for the reformed or not-so-reformed communist introduction of new parties within the parties, a new generation of parties political process. For the most part, grew in the early years of transition,

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challenging the established elites in the of Romania was composed of former context of an increasingly polarised and members of the party who confrontational political environment had at one point or another fallen out between the former communists and the of Ceaușescu’s favour.18 Continuity with united or not-so-united anti-communist the previous regime was also evident in opposition.17 The latter would eventually the adoption of nationalism, whereby become governmental alternatives. the new constitution defined the state as a nation-state based on the unity of an The adoption of presidential or semi- ethnically defined Romanian nation.19 presidential systems allowed personal The regime formed governments in politics to develop and strong leaders alliance with smaller ultranationalist to emerge with formidable power to parties and pursued restrictive and control and often abuse the system. The exclusionary policies towards the foundation years of post-communist minorities, for which it was harshly Balkan politics are primarily remembered criticised from abroad. Well into the as the years of Milošević in , mid-1990s the image of the regime Tuđman in Croatia, Iliescu in Romania, was one of populism, corruption and in Albania, Đukanović in continuity with the previous communist Montenegro, Karadžić and Izetbegović establishment. In the opposition the in Bosnia, all of whom left their personal main contender was the Democratic marks on the illiberal and often informal Convention of Romania, united by practices that were pursued in the exercise its anti-Iliescu stance, which gradually of political power. All these states would grew in power and influence under the be stigmatised by the excesses and abuses leadership of Emil Constantinescu. For of their leaders for years to come. its part, the Hungarian minority was Romania was the most hard-pressed organised around party politics and case of ridding itself of its communist sought political alliances with other past, because of the endogenous and opposition parties, an alliance which idiosyncratic nature and the harshness defeated the Iliescu government in 1996. of the Ceausescu regime. In Romania, The first period of post-communist the National Salvation Front under the politics in Bulgaria was marked by a leadership of Iliescu, first as a provisional fight between the new socialists and the government and then as the winner of united democratic opposition, and saw a the elections, dominated the first part number of short-lived and unsuccessful of the 1990s. The first government governments. The Bulgarian Socialist

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Party (BSP) was an ex-communist party In Albania, following the initial failed of unreformed socialists who initially attempts of some former communists chose to resist westernisation and neo- to convince the public that they were liberalism and to cultivate the historical different from previous totalitarian links with Russia. By the mid-1990s rulers, the Democratic Party (DPA), the BSP elites were bragging that they under the leadership of , was had defied the imperialism of the IMF, elected for the first time in March 1992. the ‘Washington consensus’, and were Yet Berisha’s style of politics, despite his the champions of social reform.20 The anti-communist urge, entailed illiberal opposition of the Union of Democratic policies, attacking and recriminating Forces (UDF), which formed just before non-DPA politicians, controlling non- the demonstrations helped topple the government media and the opposition press, and carrying out strict surveillance communist dictator , and control of the Greek minority in the proved unable to unite on a positive south of the country. In addition, Berisha agenda against the BSP. Founded by tried to manipulate the constitution , the UDF was a collection to strengthen the (his) position of the of upstart environmentalists, human President even further, infuriating the rights activists, and trade unionists, opposition and the public at large – a many of who were uneasy with political referendum which he eventually lost. power. The first years of post-communist Under the pretext of a break with the political life in Bulgaria seemed stuck in communist past, Berisha’s first period an electoral choice between still-powerful of rule proceeded with exclusionary former communists on the one hand, who politics and imprisonments of political were liberalising nominally, and weak opponents.23 International observers of and ineffective opposition contenders on the Albanian elections pointed out one 21 the other; it was a time of ineffective irregularity after another, and Albania government rule, oligarchic capitalism was criticised for fraudulent electoral and corrupt economic practices. On the practices and double-voting. Electoral issue of minority, contrary to Romania’s malpractices and polarising politics exclusionary policy, Bulgaria reversed its would continue to affect Albanian prior policies of ethnic assimilation and politics well after the initial transition allowed to choose their names, years and all subsequent elections would practice their religion and speak their be closely monitored by international language.22 observers.

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In the former Yugoslavia, Croatian transformed into a nationalist Catholic and Serbian semi-authoritarian politics leader. He initially won power on the surpassed and outlasted all other basis of an anti-communist expression Balkan illiberal transitions; their leaders of Croatia’s identity, and even made pursued extreme nationalist agendas in some open references to Croatia’s fascist pursuit of their expansionist visions for Ustaša past. The Church, after years of a Greater Croatia or a Greater Serbia. suppression and persecution by the Both regimes survived for a full decade communists, embraced Tuđman with through manipulation of political and relative ease.24 A significant part of the economic resources, control of the media HDZ support rested on the Croatian and alleged defence of the national diaspora, but also on Croats living in interest; they both received international Bosnia – the latter benefiting from criticism and the freezing of association financial help.25 The HDZ’s role in or assistance from the ; Bosnia and its support for the extremist but they largely survived due to a Bosnian Croats confirmed the Croatian fragmented opposition. elites’ nationalistic and conflict-prone choices beyond the country’s borders. Milošević dominated politics While the HDZ was the party that led through the manipulation of Croatia to independence, it also led the the media, effective nationalist country to international isolation for its propaganda and control of human rights violations, authoritarian security forces and of economic nationalism and xenophobia. The regime resources. survived through the manipulation of nationalism, and the constant reminder that it was defending Croatia from In Croatia, the new party Hrvatska Serb aggression, as well as through the Demokratska Zajednica (HDZ) manipulation of the media and economic dominated the 1990s, in the context cronyism. Under Tuđman, the bulk of the , the involvement of the communist political, military, in the Bosnian War, and through economic and judicial nomenklatura successful manipulation of the had joined the HDZ. The opposition to nationalist sentiment. The leader of HDZ, the Croatian Social Liberal Party the party, Franjo Tuđman, a previously (HSLS) and the Social Democratic Party communist atheist politician, was remained fragmented and disorientated

100 Post-1989 Political Change in the Balkan States until 2000, when the death of Tuđman transition period in Serbia was managed led to the end of his personal rule. by an authoritarian government, which preserved elements of the previous The 1990s’ politics in Serbia was communist status quo, infiltrated society dominated by Milošević’s Socialist Party with a fanatical nationalist discourse and of Serbia (SPS), which formed coalition pursued its market reform in a context of governments for the most part with favouritism and nepotism.27 the assistance of other smaller parties (except for the first 1990 elections in Another illiberal stream of the 1990s’ which it won the overall majority). His Balkan politics was that of divided party appealed to socialist conformists countries, where ethnic politics and and Serbian nationalists and was parallel structures dominated the stronger outside Belgrade in the Serbian broken territories. In Bosnia, after heartland.26 Milošević dominated the communist party was discredited, politics through the manipulation new parties were formed on the basis of the media, effective nationalist of ethnic criteria, and included the propaganda and control of security Party of Democratic Action (PDA, a forces and of economic resources. His Muslim Party), the Serbian Democratic regime survived for a decade throughout Party (SDS) and the Croatian-inspired regional wars, international isolation HDZ. The Party of Democratic Action over the harsh treatment of represented the majority Muslim Albanians, economic sanctions and population of Bosnia and became the internal opposition, yet at a high price of advocate of a unitary state. The Serbian delayed economic development, external Democratic Party advocated a separate military intervention and the loss of state for the Bosnian Serbs, creating Kosovo. Like Croatia, the opposition to its own parallel politics in the forms of the government remained for the most a separate Serbian National Council part fragmented throughout the 1990s, and a Serbian National Assembly, and despite some attempts to unite under gained popular support from Serbia. single umbrella coalitions (DEPOS in The Croatian Democratic Union allied 1992, Zajedno in 1996, DOS and Otpor with the Muslims against the Serbs, but in 2000). The government responded only for a short tactical period, given with electoral frauds and a refusal to that they too claimed authority over the accept the victory of the opposition, as Croat-populated areas, while the most was seen in the local elections of 1997 extreme nationalists went on to create a and in the 2000 national elections. The parallel state of Croats, the Republic of

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Herzeg-Bosnia, hoping for an eventual beginning and throughout the 1990s, unification with Croatia, and enjoyed the Albanian political parties mounted the support of the Croatian government growing campaigns for the establishment of Tuđman (Herzeg-Bosnia was formally of equal rights to all inhabitants of the dismissed in 1996). Early transitional state. They also complained that they Bosnian politics were conducted in the were excluded from the public sector and context of war, ethnic cleansing and from the privatisation process and had to genocidal politics. rely on their own internal dynamic and FYR Macedonia,28 following remittances from abroad. independence from Yugoslavia, adopted The early transition in the Balkans a multi-party parliamentary political entailed three streams of illiberal system and a constitution focusing politics, including competitive explicitly on the formation of an illiberalism in Romania, Bulgaria and independent national identity for its Albania, semi-authoritarian nationalist 29 majority Macedonian Slav population. illiberalism in Serbia and Croatia, The first split was between reformed and exclusionary ethnic illiberalism in communists and nationalists,30 with Bosnia and FYR Macedonia. They all the former winning the electoral battle shared common features with respect and guiding the post-Yugoslav republic to the polarisation between government through the initial liberalisation phase. and opposition, popular mobilisation The Social Democratic Union of and external pressure. All of them Macedonia (SDU) dominated politics generated international concerns over between 1991 and 1998, and during its the misconduct of public affairs, the tenure fostered clientelistic patronage, politics of economic liberalisation and cronyism and insider privatisation.31 privatisation, and ethnic and minority The same pattern continued under the issues. nationalist party government IMRO- DPMNE, which succeeded the SDU and formed an unlikely alliance with the The Crisis of the Illiberal Democratic Party of Albania. While all Order governments were coalitions and multi- ethnic in character, majority (Macedonian All Balkan countries underwent major Slav) excesses and minority (Albanian) crises of their initial post-communist exclusions were a central feature of the illiberal, nationalist/semi-authoritarian country’s domestic politics. From the or ethnically divided orders. In the cases

102 Post-1989 Political Change in the Balkan States of illiberal competitive politics, it led to of the new government was to put an dramatic downfall of the governments end to the official national communist and the electoral victory of the discourse and to enrol the Hungarian oppositions; in the cases of nationalist/ party into the coalition government. semi-authoritarian competitive politics Bulgaria went about its electoral it led to the breakdown of the regimes breakthrough in the winter of 1996- through ‘electoral revolutions’; in the 7. It started as a against the cases of ethnically divided politics, collapse of banks, hyperinflation and through external intervention and disappointing standards of living. the imposition of power-sharing During 1996 Bulgaria had faced a major arrangements supervised by international financial crisis including the collapse administrations. of its currency, soaring prices and food An approximate pattern developed shortages. The demonstrators, angry in Romania, Bulgaria and Albania, all at this economic decline, besieged the three having experienced the excesses parliament and trapped the socialist of illiberalism and abuses of political deputies inside, compelling them to power, leading to severe political and dissolve the legislature and vote for economic crises and upsurges in mass early elections. In the next election, the discontent and electoral mobilisation UDF won a clear majority against the of the political oppositions. Romania’s discredited socialists. For the next four electoral breakthrough took place in years, the UDF followed a consistent 1996, with the victory of the Democratic neo-liberal policy, a clear pro-Western Convention in the parliamentary foreign policy agenda and a pro-reform elections and Constantinescu winning path designated by the IMF, the World the Presidency over Iliescu.32 This change Bank and the European Union (currency was an internal reaction to the bad board, privatisation and austerity). economic record of the Iliescu regime, The economic collapse had affected as well as to external outcry from the Bulgarian minds so deeply that people European Union about problematic were ready to embrace the Western political concerns, and to increasing inspired tough measures pursued by the complaints from the Hungarian minority. new government.33 The Convention was an umbrella of 18 organisations under the leadership of the Albania went through its first post- Christian-Democratic National Peasants’ communist mobilisation in 1997, Party. One of the most important moves following the collapse of the financial

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‘pyramid’ scheme,34 when many that came under the leadership of the Albanians lost their life savings, leading moderate nationalist Vojislav Koštunica. to widespread unrest, especially in The Serbian case was by far the most and the south. There was also a reaction widespread electoral uprising, in that it to the abuses and political excesses and reacted to a particularly harsh regime that the manipulation of the electoral process had refused to recognise the outcome of by the Berisha regime. The state of the national elections. External military emergency imposed by Berisha provoked intervention, international isolation and such widespread disorder that the the defeat over Kosovo contributed to the country became ungovernable for a brief delegitimisation of the Milošević regime. time. The situation was normalised with In Serbia, the collapse of Milošević’s external political interference and OSCE rule was the result of a widespread presence in the next elections, which led democratic coalition of parties, which to the victory of the socialist party. The was short-lived and split over national socialist party which succeeded, winning issues and personal feuds. The loss of an overwhelming electoral victory, Kosovo dominated internal politics and pursued some progress but remained a the country’s relationship with the West hostage to clientelism, corrupt politics thereafter. and scandals, and itself suffered from In Croatia, the death of Tuđman internal fighting. significantly weakened the governing The semi-authoritarian and nationalist party and provided an electoral regimes experienced more dynamic and opportunity for the opposition to win dramatic political and popular reactions. power. Within weeks of Tuđman’s In Serbia, the 2000 uprising was a death, in the parliamentary elections genuine popular outburst against the of 3 January 2000, voters fed up with excesses of the Milošević era, and had the corrupt practices and extreme the ingredients of a revolution aiming nationalism of the HDZ and with high at a radical break with the past. It was unemployment voted out a party that the outcome of ten years of Serbia’s had ruled in an authoritarian manner for democratic political opposition and civil a decade. Ivica Račan, the leader of the society,35 which kept its contact with the non-nationalist coalition of the Social West and in the final stages of the regime Liberals and the Social Democrats, won received significant support from the the parliamentary election and Stipe international community. The opposing Mesić won over the presidential candidate electoral coalition consisted of 18 parties of the HDZ. After the death of Franjo

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Tuđman, Croatia’s party politics moved peace agreements, both of which became away from extreme political positions, ‘constitutional’ points of reference and its nationalist politics of territorial- for the post-conflict era, and allowed ethnic cleavages shifted to more for the direct or indirect presence of conventional national politics of centre- international administrations.36 The right vs. centre-left parties. The Social main aim of the Dayton accord was Democratic Party (SDP), a successor of to end the fighting and establish a the reformed communist party, became constitutional framework that would the party in the government with a pro- guarantee peaceful coexistence of the EU orientation until 2003, when, due to territorially divided three nationalities infighting in the SDP, the HDZ regained of Bosnia. Carl Bildt, the first High power under a new, more enlightened Representative, increased the authority and pro-European, leadership, which of the international administrator and projected itself as a conservative party succeeded in assigning himself the ‘Bonn that had broken with its nationalist powers’ of imposing laws and ordering past, that signed agreements with summary dismissals of local politicians, national minorities, cooperated with the a prerogative which was repeatedly used International Tribunal for the Former by succeeding High Representatives.37 Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Hague and Yet electoral politics have since hardened adopted judicial reform. The HDZ was the ethnic identification of the main transformed from a nationalist party to political parties. Bosnia remains deeply a European Christian Democratic party divided between its two entities, the of the European Right. It gradually Bosnian Serb Republic and the Muslim- distanced itself from its recent extreme Croat Federation, with the latter being nationalist and more distant fascist past. divided between its two constituent nationalities. Despite efforts to build The third stream of the 1990s’ Balkan up the powers of the central state, both politics was that of the divided countries, entities are still highly autonomous, with where ethnic issues and parallel structures separate political, police and financial dominated the political space. In Bosnia- structures, while the Muslim and Croat Herzegovina and FYR Macedonia, officials who run the Federation tend to direct external intervention put an end look to their own ethnic agendas. to war and ethnic fighting, forcing the domestic elites to adopt power-sharing In FYR Macedonia, the international arrangements. External interventions community (EU and NATO) intervened brought about the Dayton and Ohrid to end the crisis in 2001, and from

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then on it has consistently been asking and managed in the electoral arena the central government to be more and not through wars, destruction and responsive to the demands of the mass expulsions. One important legacy Albanian minorities. The constitutional of the transition period is the rejection amendments of the Ohrid Agreement of illiberalism, authoritarianism and provided greater democratisation of bloody ethnic wars. The post-2000 politics at the local level and increased period of the Balkan politics can be participation of minority parties in the described as a period of ‘normalisation’ political process. The Ohrid Agreement of political pluralism, peaceful succeeded in offering Albanians a stake alternation of governments, reformed in the political system and more rights nationalist parties, emergence of new in the fields of language and education. political elites, a wide array of political Unlike in Bulgaria or Romania, where parties across the political spectrum, there is a single minority party of Turks pro-European consensus, and more and Hungarians, in FYR Macedonia moderation in politics. Some political the Albanian parties themselves are elites of a nationalist or communist politically divided and participating in orientation had to reform themselves different government coalitions. and their parties’ discourses; Iliescu and the social democratic party in Romania, The Legacy of the Transition Sanader and the HDZ in Croatia, Period Nikolić and the Radical Party in Serbia, are indicative examples. The European The impact of the formative transition Union, as the most influential external years on the current political landscape actor engaged constructively, pursued of the Balkan post-communist states membership for Bulgaria and Romania, is still evident. From a positive and the Stabilisation and Association perspective, competitive politics have Process for the Western Balkans. Valerie been normalised and institutionalised Bunce defines this period as a ‘second and they constitute the indisputable transition’ from the political extremism rules of the game. Elections and political of the 1990s to a political moderation, parties are at the centre of political with the electoral victory of more liberal competition and, with a few exceptions, parties in power and the reformation governmental changes are happening of previously nationalistic parties.38 without disruptions or challenges to the This second phase of the normalisation outcomes. Ethnic politics are ‘fought’ of competitive politics has also been a

106 Post-1989 Political Change in the Balkan States period of democratic engagement with agendas. Resorting to populist discourses, the media, human rights, minority irrespective of ideological background, issues, political checks and balances, and has been a constant feature since the early some form of transitional justice and years of transition. The establishment of cooperation, though limited, with the presidential or semi-presidential political ICTY. systems and the limited impact of checks and balances allowed personal politics to develop and root themselves firmly in The European Union, as the the political process of most countries, most influential external actor with the result that power-sharing engaged constructively, pursued arrangements and cohabitation became a membership for Bulgaria and struggle for personal power and political Romania, and the Stabilisation survival. Politics in the Balkans have and Association Process for the been haunted by personal disputes; in Western Balkans. Romania, President Băsescu is at odds with Prime Minister Victor Ponta; in Yet there is also a contested legacy Serbia, Nikolić of the Radical Party is of the transition period, whereby at odds with Tadić of the Democratic normalisation of competitive politics has Party; in Albania, Prime Minister Sali been accompanied by a consolidation Berisha is at odds with the leader of the of democratic deficits, dysfunctional opposition . practices and attitudes, some of which have their origins in these formative years Nationalist and ethnic agendas of transition. Today most states carry the legacies of the 1990s in five main areas: Nationalist sentiments have not subsided in Croatia or Serbia, and Personal feuds ethnic politics have consolidated in Bosnia and FYR Macedonia. The former Due to the failure to establish strong countries are still coming to terms with and indisputable institutions from a nationalist and authoritarian past, and the beginning, politics in all Balkan the dominant parties, such as HDZ in countries continued to be personal, Croatia and the Socialist and Radical with many feuds and competitions parties in Serbia, although changing and among prominent leaders with personal reforming, are always remnants of the ambitions and undefined ideological 1990s conflictual context. In Bosnia-

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Herzegovina and FYR Macedonia ethnic continued to dominate politics at the parties continue to dominate the electoral highest level. In Croatia, the reformist platform, and the two peace agreements Sanader was sentenced to imprisonment continue to provide constitutional on charges of financial misappropriation rules of forced power-sharing as well and bribes from a Hungarian energy as division. Ideologies along the left- company and an Austrian bank; in right continuum come second in the Romania, former prime ministers preferences of the voters, who continue and ministers have been charged for to vote according to nationalistic and corruption, including Adrian Năstase, ethnic agendas. who is jailed, and the Justice Minister Tudor Chiuariu; in Montenegro, The early years of transition in Đukanović has been associated with the Balkans are remembered cigarette smuggling. Corruption, as a period of distorted informal politics and inefficient public democratisation, of gains and administration continued to be closely deficits that are still affecting associated with formal politics in all the countries of the region. And while the current political practices and issue of corruption is constantly on the discourses. agenda of electoral discourses, politicians win elections by accusing each other of High-level corruption corrupt practices.

The political and economic Popular discontent transformation undertaken since the early years of transition provided All of the above have generated a incentives for those holding power to level of popular mistrust and discontent engage in rent-seeking behaviour outside concerning the existing democratic legality. One common scenario was deficits, the informal practices, the that Balkan political leaders seized the incompetent elites, dysfunctional opportunity to fill the vacuum created institutions and even the anti-democratic by the fall of communist regimes by practices and excesses of external actors. rewriting the rules of the economy and Voter turnout for parliamentary elections the state to benefit their own interests.39 has dropped dramatically compared to The early transition years set the bases the initial 1990s elections. Governmental for a climate of corruption that has changes at every election are a constant

108 Post-1989 Political Change in the Balkan States feature in all Balkan politics, and it is against a deformed transition which had extremely rare that any government betrayed the initial hope and optimism. can win a second term in office. Public It then developed into voter apathy when disaffection has been at the centre of it was realised that the consolidation of political change since the early transition competitive politics entailed abuses and years. It was initially expressed as corruptions by all political actors. The revolution against the communist order early years of transition in the Balkans and led to the collapse of totalitarianism are remembered as a period of distorted in the Balkans and the disintegration democratisation, of gains and deficits of communist Yugoslavia. It continued that are still affecting current political as political and electoral mobilisation practices and discourses.

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Endnotes

1 Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. 2 Laurence Whitehead, Democratisation: Theory and Experience, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003. 3 Rosa Balfour and Corina Stratulat, “The Democratic Transformation of the Balkans”, EPC Issue Paper, No. 66 (November 2011). 4 Stephen White, Judy Batt and Paul Lewis (eds.), Developments in Central and East European Politics, Durham, Duke University Press, 2003. 5 Bosnia’s Incomplete Transition: Between Dayton and Europe, International Crisis Group, Brussels, March 2009. 6 Denisa Kostovicova and Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic, “Europeanizing the Balkans: Rethinking the Post-Communist and Post-Conflict Transition”, Ethnopolitics, Vol. 5, No. 3 (2006), pp 223-241. 7 Dimitar Bechev and Gergana Noutcheva, “The Successful Laggards: Bulgaria and Romania’s Accession to the EU”, East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 22 No.1 (Winter 2008), pp.114-144. 8 Dankwart Rustow, “Transition to Democracy: Towards A Dynamic Model”, Comparative Politics, Vol. 2, No. 3 (April 1970), pp. 337-363. 9 Srećko Horvat and Igor Štiks, “Is the Balkans a New Maghreb?”, UniNomade, at http://www. uninomade.org/is-the-balkans-a-new-maghreb/ [last visited 22 May 2013]. 10 Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, “ without . The Balkans Unfinished Revolutions”, Romanian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2005), p. 10. 11 Detlef Pollack and Jan Wielgohs, Dissent and Opposition in Communist Eastern Europe: Origins of Civil Society and Democratic Transition, Farnham, Ashgate Publishing, 2004, pp. 174-175. 12 Misha Glenny, The Balkans 1804-1999; Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, London, Granta Books, 1999, p. 581. 13 John B. Allcock, Explaining Yugoslavia, London, Hurst, 2000, p. 199. 14 Glenny, The Balkans 1804-1999,pp.568-569. 15 Mungiu-Pippidi, “Democratization without Decommunization”, p.15. 16 Richard Crampton, The Balkans Since The Second World War,London, Longman, 2002, p. 236. 17 John R. Lampe, Balkans into Southeastern Europe: A Century of War and Transition, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 267.

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18 John Gledhill and Charles King, “Romania Since 1989; Living Beyond the Past”, in Sharon L. Wolchik and Jane L. Curry (eds.), Central and East European Politics: From Communism to Democracy, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011, p. 323. 19 Zsuzsa Csergo, “Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Expansion of Democracy”, in Wolchik and Curry (eds.), Central and East European Politics, p. 105. 20 Venelin I. Ganev, “Ballots, Brides and State Building in Bulgaria”, Journal for Democracy, Vol.17, No. 1 (January 2006). 21 Elizabeth Pond, Endgame in the Balkans: Regime Change European Style, Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 2006, p.43. 22 Stefanos Katsikas, Bulgaria and Europe: Shifting Identities, London, Anthem Press, 2011. 23 Culminating into the adoption of the ‘genocide act’ decreeing that anyone who had held senior office in the communist party would be banned from public office, thus disqualifying 139 candidates in the 1996 elections; see, Crampton, The Balkans since the Second World War, p. 304. 24 Pond, Endgame in the Balkans, p.128. 25 Danica Fink-Hafner, “Europeanisation and Party System Mechanisms: Comparing Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro”, Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, Vol. 10, No. 2 (August 2008), p.173. 26 Mark Baskin and Paula Pickering, “Former Yugoslavia and its Successors”, in Wolchik and Curry (eds.), Central and East European Politics, pp. 281-316. 27 Sabrina P. Ramet and Vjeran Pavlaković (eds.), Serbia Since 1989: Politics and Society under Milosevic and After, University of Washington Press, 2005. 28 recognises Macedonia by its constitutional name, as the Republic of Macedonia. 29 Macedonian identity was the most disputed of the post-Yugoslav republics with an embryonic identity dating back to the initial years of Tito, a language that originated in 1947, and an autocephalous Macedonian Orthodox Church established in 1967; see, Crampton, The Balkans since the Second World War, p. 246. 30 The League of the Communists of Macedonia- Party for Democratic Change versus the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (IMRO-DPMNE). 31 Robert Bideleux and Ian Jeffries, A History of Eastern Europe: Crisis and Change, London, Taylor & Francis Group, 1998, p. 467. 32 Liliana Popescu, “A Change of Power in Romania: The Results and Significance of the November 1996 Elections”, Government and Opposition, Vol. 32, No. 2 (April 1997), pp. 155-300.

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33 Vesselin Dimitrov, “Learning to Play the Game: Bulgaria’s Relations with Multilateral Organizations”, South East European Politics, Vol. 1, No. 2 (December 2000), pp.101-114. 34 Christopher Jarvis, “The Rise and Fall of Albania’s Pyramid Schemes”, Finance & Development: A Quarterly Magazine of the IMF, Vol. 37, No. 1 (March 2000). 35 Ivan Vejvoda, “Serbia After Four Years of Transition”, in Judy Batt (ed.), The Western Balkans Moving On, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Chaillot Paper No. 70 (October 2004), pp. 37-51. 36 Sumantra Bose, Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention, New York, Hurst, 2002. 37 Gerald Knaus and Felix Martin, “Travails of the European Raj”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, No. 3 (July 2003). 38 Valerie Bunce, “The Political Transition”, in Wolchk and Curry (eds.), Central and East European Politics, p.50. 39 Rosa Balfour and Corina Stratulat, “The Democratic Transformation of the Balkans”, EPC Issue Paper, No. 66 (November 2011), p. 22.

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