Exploring the Moon and Mars: Choices for the Nation (Part 4 Of
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Chapter 2 Policy and Findings President Bush has set forth two major goals space, whether solely with robotic devices, or us- for the U.S. space program — developing a per- ing both robots and humans. Mission from P1an- manent human presence on the Moon, and land- et Earth will be very complex, requiring new ing a human crew on Mars — under the broad technologies and taking many years. It will there- principle of extending “human presence and ac- fore be shaped by a continuous decision process tivity beyond Earth orbit into the solar system.”l extending over numerous budget cycles. The These are two of many goals for civilian space funding and political support for an initiative to activities the U.S. Government could pursue.2 explore the Moon and Mars must be provided The Advisory Committee on the Future of the over many Presidencies and Congresses. There- U.S. Space Program3 has recommended that “the fore, projects should be defined with an eye to ‘mission-oriented’ portion of the program returning nearterm benefits. Because the cast of [NASA’S] be designed to support two major un- participants will change over time (in 2-,4-, and dertakings: a Mission to Planet Earth and a Mis- 6-year intervals), funding commitments to Mis- sion from Planet Earth.’’4As seen by the Commit- sion from Planet Earth will have to be renewed on tee, the Mission to Planet Earth emphasizes using the basis of performance by NASA and the other robotic space technology to tackle environmental agencies, and the standards of performance will and other Earth-bound problems. The Mission change as new information is gained. from Planet Earth would focus on the exploration Both humans and robotic spacecraft will con- of space, using human crews as well as robotic tribute to solar system exploration whether or not systems. In the Committee’s view, both mission humans set foot on the Moon or Mars within the foci should rest on the foundation of space sci- 5 next three decades. The Congress must decide the ence and an enabling technology infrastructure. appropriate mix of humans and robotic technolo- During this decade, Congress will be faced gies to fund within the set of projects that make with a series of decisions concerning whether or up a Mission from Planet Earth.7 The timing of its not to invest public dollars to send human crews decisions will depend upon Congress’ view of the back to the Moon and/or on to Mars,6 decisions President’s proposed timetable of enabling hu- that cannot be reduced to scientific and techno- man crews to reach the surface of Mars by 2019. logical considerations alone. Experience suggests Given the imperative to reduce Federal spend- that management, politics, and budgets — as they ing, acceptance of the President’s timetable interact with technical factors — will shape the might greatly circumscribe the options for using success or failure of any initiative to explore automation and robotic (A&R) technologies to l~e white H~~se, “National Space Policy,” NOV. 2, 1989) P. 1“ Zse., e.g., the list in U.S. Congew, Office of~chnolou Assessment, civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Fuwre in space, OTA-s~-242 (W%hington, DC: U.S. Government Printing (Mfke, November 1984), pp. 15-16. 3-WV committee on the Future of the U.S. SPce program, Repofl Of fie A&~O~ COmmi#ee on tie FUZUR Of the us. Space Rogam (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1990). The National Space Council and NASA appointed the AdvisoiyCommit- tee to examine the goals and managment of the U.S. space program. Norman Augustine, CEO of Martin Marietta Corp., served as its chair. 41bid, p. 5. 51bid, p. vi and 5. 6Although the Mmn>s Sufiaw would pro~de human crem~th e~nence in living and working in space, the Nation could decide to proceed directly to Mars. ~is report entered the publishing process before the Synthesis Group report on alternative technologies and exploration architectures was released. Hence, it was unable to consider the Synthesis Group’s findings. -7- Chapter 2–Policy and Findings .9 support planetary exploration, and require a ma- tists learn more about these celestial bodies, jor emphasis on technologies and systems to sup- and develop more capable robotics technol- port human crews. Taking a broader view of the ogies, Congress could then decide whether many possible paths for the Mission from Planet or not to fund the development of technolo- Earth permits consideration of a wider range of gies necessary for supporting human explo- technological options and timetables. For exam- ration. This option would have the effect of ple, Congress could: emphasizing the scientific exploration of the 1. Defer decisions on a Mission from Planet Moon and Mars compared to the rest of the Earth indefinitely and fund the scientific ex- space science effort. It would also extend the President’s proposed timetable for humans ploration of the Moon and Mars within the existing planetary exploration program. to set foot on Mars by several years and allow NASA to gather additional scientific If Congress chose to defer decisions on information to support a later congressional human exploration of the Moon and Mars, funding decision on human exploration. it could continue to fund the scientific ex- This option would require additional fund- ploration of these two celestial bodies with- ing for exploration over current allocations. in the existing planetary exploration pro- gram. This approach would place the 3. Agree in principle with the long-term goals of exploration of the Moon and Mars within a Mission from Planet Earth, but with to the context of other space science priorities. focus on measured efforts to develop technol- However, unless Congress appropriated a ogies supporting human exploration. higher proportion of funding for space sci- ence than the customary 20 percent of If Congress agreed with the long-term NASA’s total budget,8 or sharply reduced goal of human exploration of the solar sys- funding for other space science missions, tem, but felt that the United States should this choice would allow only modest explo- proceed cautiously with human exploration, ration efforts. as well as learn much more about the condi- tions on Mars, the risks to human life, and 2. Agree in principle with the goals of a Mission the predicted total costs of a Mission from from Planet Earth, but emphasize the devel- Planet Earth, it could endorse the Presi- opment and use of A&R technologies to ac- dent’s goals and fund selected technologies complish them. required for human exploration, while also Alternatively, if Congress supported the funding the development of robotic technol- long-term goal of human exploration of the ogies to aid human explorers. For example, solar system, and felt that robotic technolo- Congress could ask NASA and the Depart- gies should receive greater emphasis, it ment of Defense (DoD) to proceed with the could endorse the President’s goals in prin- development of propulsion and other space ciple but defer funding of systems to sup- transportation technologies for a new port human exploration until better infor- launch system, but defer development of mation on risks and costs becomes in-space nuclear propulsion, or technolo- available. It could in the meantime direct gies to provide artificial gravity in flight un- NASA to enhance its efforts in robotic ex- til more is known about the space environ- ploration of the Moon and Mars. As scien- mental risks humans face. In order to assist a~e space ~ience and app]imtions budget has equaled about 20 percent of NASA’s total budget since the mid-1970s. Ronald M. KonkeL “Space Science in the Budget: An Analysis of Budgets and Resource Allocation the NASA, FY 1961 1989,” Center for Space and Geosciences Policy, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, May 1990. 10 ● Exploring the Moon and Mars its later decisions on funding a permanent PLANETARY EXPLORATION lunar base, or human exploration of Mars, POLICY AND NATIONAL GOALS Congress could ask NASA to study key scientific and technological issues and re- In recent debate, the space program’s close port back to Congress at predetermined in- connection to broad national concerns has mani- tervals. fested itself in the propositions that human ex- ploration of the Moon and Mars would help re- 4. Accept the President timetable of reaching 10 Mars by 2019. establish U.S. leadership in space, further the development of U.S. science and technology,ll Finally, Congress could accept the Presi- and assist its economic competitiveness dent’s timetable of reaching Mars by 2019 abroad. 12 In 1986, the National Commission on and decide to fund projects designed to Space advanced the additional view that the solar achieve that goal. This option would require system is “humanity’s extended home” and that NASA, DoD, and the Department of Ener- the United States should use its economic gy (DOE) to begin a range of studies detail- strength to lead the rest of the world in exploring, ing the technical options for meeting the and eventually settling, the Moon and Mars.13 President’s goal. It would also require the According to this view, the technological chal- near-term development of a heavy-lift lenge of returning to the Moon and sending launch system, life-support systems, and humans to explore Mars would create strong pub- other technologies necessary to transport Iic interest, nationally and internationally, and humans to the Moon and Mars and support enhance attention to science and technology.14 them on the surface. Finally, this option would also require development of A&R These varied perspectives — destiny, world technologies to gather early scientific leadership, economic expansion — raise several knowledge of Mars and to improve human overarching issues for Congress to consider in productivity on both the Moon and Mars.