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* * ** ** ** ** * * * AFRICAN FREEDOM DAY * * ACTION AGAINST APARTHEID * ** ** * * ** ** ** ** * CONFERENCE WORKING PAPERS * ** ** ** ** * * ** ** ** ** * * ** ** ** * GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY * * WASHINGTON, D.C. * * APRIL 10-11, 1964 * ** ** ** * *

" t and South West Africa" Polback serie* USNSA (pate) "U.S9 Business in South AfrIca" by the Aerican ~cmttee on Africa AMrca, &cdia (separator) "»n ics of parthe ld" Mm~e.-ts by .. Spooner, Al Hepple and Sean Boud #Dra verv~>d Of South Afi" by,4~ ~Wi r A Christian Aotim Po 1 "A Fresh Look at South AfrIca' south African Informlation Service ý ett Politica in the Union; l l Ut COohensir of Native Politics in South Africa" tv Leslie Rubin Conference, 1963 "Force: Its Thrust and Prognosis: South Africa' by John Iarcum and Allard K. Lowensteln AXSAC Conference, 1963 "k Statemout by !ls Mar Be On" on the Rivonia Trial. LIM Specal con4ltte., p41ieo of Aparh 'High Co~ ~ssio Trritoriets: In Pa to A~ i" by margaret Roberts Afrlca Todav Olhe ~113fy Aflianef by< Rogalynde Ainslie Autt eid N ovenent Pamplet, London *South Africa aid World Opinion" by i4ary Benson T~ward A Iorld Policy for South A:Loca' by Patrick Duncan APP X: Statmene of United States Policy in the United Nations Resolutions adopted by the United Nations United States Corporations with outlets in South Africa Pil~ on South Africa A Partial B±bliography

INTRODUCTION The working papers which follow are by no means comprehensive. They are a sampler of current information and analysis of events inside of South Africa. They are designed to stimulate further inquiry, to satisfy certain minimum requirements for information, and to arouse the conscience of the reader. But more important, and directly tied in with the essential function of the conference, is their ability to serve as a resource for beginning and continuing campus and general action programs against South Africa's current policy. To this aim they are dedicated. Special thanks go to those publishers who'were kind enough to giver permission for reprinting many of the articles which follow, and to the members of the Workin Papers Committee, all Oberlin College students, who gave of their timb and energy to research and compile these papers. Lynn Levine Bob Weinberger Co-chairmen, Committee on Working Papers Oberlin, Ohio April 8, 1964 The Economic Consequences of Apartheid * by F. P. Spooner Until some twelve years ago the word apartheid was almost unknown in Afrikaans; today it has acquired the international status not of fame but of notoriety..Literally, the word means 'separateness' or 'the state of being separate', but its real political significance is impossible to define at present, because to different people it means different things...Its meaning to Afrikaner Nationalists could be anything from outright baasskap - that is, perpetual servitude of the non- Whites because of their alleged inferiority as human beings to complete independence of Africans in separately-assigned territories...When it is interpreted as outright baasskap, or even a modified form of it, apartheid will bring in its train those consequences which have already been described - the ultimate collapse of South Africa's economy and the likely eclipse of White leadership within the lifetime of our younger generations...The latter policy...is found to be not a policy but a make-believe solution of the racial issue that could only be feasible in a dream-world. However, it has this merit, that it serves to circumvent the prejudices and still the conscience of the dreamers -- but at what cost only the future will tell. Some years ago a Commission was appointed to examine the feasibility and draw up a blue-print of a scheme for the separate economic development of the native Reserves. After an exhaustive inquiry, the Commission, under Professor Tomlinson, submitted a lengthy report...Its most significant finding was that, under the most favourable conditions, there would still be some six million Africans living in the areas reserved for Whites by the end of the present century, and many whose homes would be in the native Reserves would still have to seek employment in the White areas under migratory labour conditions, if their families were to be kept from starvation...By that year, the total African population of the Union would be approximately 20 million, or roughly 4million families. According to the Tomlinson report, about 6 million of these Africansi or 1.2 million families, would still be living in White areas and 350,000 families would be earning a livelihood from farming in the Reserves. So 2.45 million families would have to be accommodated in the Reserves, in occupations other than farming. The problem to be considered, therefore, is what it takes in capital and other necessaries to place these families - in all, approximately 12.5 million people - in an industrialized economy. It would be impossible at this stage to consider in detail every requirement for such a development; but primarily four essentials would have to be provided. These are 1, a supply of labour, suitably trained; 2, adequate capital; 3, suitable raw materialS; 4, available markets. Now let us see to what extent these are available in the Reserves; labour is there'in plenty, but raw and untrained; capital *excerpts reprinted from South African Predicament; The Economics of A artheid, by F. P. Spooner, 15U, with permission of friedeick A. Praeger, publishers. available for buildings equipment and stocks, virtually nil; raw materials suitable for processing, an extremely limited supply; and markets for industrial products, next to nothing, because of lack of buying'power. Worse still, the Reserves themselves cannot feed the present population of under 4 million, let alone the 14 million that are to be accommodated by the end of the present century. It would be interesting nevertheless, to examine these requirements in greater detail... From this analysis it becomes clear beyond any shadow of doubt that true apartheid, which entails the development of the native Reserves as viable entities in which the bulk of the African populations can work, live and prosper, is quite impracticable. The capital required for development and the ensuing problems of balancing the external accounts of the Reserves, and of progressing at the' rate necessary to achieve the objective, make the project absurdly unreal and any policy that envisages it not-strictly honest... From the economic point of view apartheid is a one-way street leading to the collapse of the country's economy. A sine qua non of true or territorial apartheid is the industrialization of the Reserves as a separate economic entity. Whether such industrialization is a success or failure, it can have only one effect upon the 'economy of the rest of the Union -ddisintevration and the undermining of White standards. Success - a most unlikely outcome - will mean the wholesale collapse of industries in White areas, while failure will result in the Reserves becoming a colossal liability that could only be sustained by ever more onerous subsidies -a veritable millstone round the necks of White South Africans. It will doubtless be asked why I stress the idea of economic apartheid when certain ministers have recently stated that it is no longer the Government's aim to achieve such an objective, but merely political apartheid in the Reserves. I do so because political apartheid, as outlined in the recent proposals, is absolutely worthless unless the Reserves become..economically self-supporting; otherwise it is, tantamount to severing the head from the body. As more and more Africans are crammed within their borders., the Reserves (unless they become viable) will soon degenerate into vast concentration camps.,. No matter what ministers may say, the vast majority of the rank and file- amongNationalists still believe in and devoutly cherish the idea of Bantustans capable of separate development, where the bulk of the Africans may live in comfort and thrive without being a menace to White South Africa. The fact is that if these separate African areas cannot become economically self-supporting territories within the foreseeable future, the whole concept of apartheid as envisaged by the Nationalists breaks down completely and becomes a dismal failure. In such event the policy of the Nationalists can no longer be described as apartheid in the original sense of the word. It becomes unadulterated baasskap....

The development of the Reserves into viable territories capable of supporting, at reasonably low living standards, the majority of the Africans who will be living in the-Union by the year 2000, is a hopelessly impossibleproposition. Eve i ift he:High Commission Territories are ultimately to be incorporated in the Union, the proposition will not be feasible. This isbecause both Basutoland and Swaziland are small, mountainous and thickly-populated areas, and the Bechuanaland Protectorate, while large in size., is threequarters desert and the balance, where it is not swamp, capable of supporting only a small population under pastoral conditions. Moreover, the incorporation of these territories in the Union is by no means a foregone conclusion - especially in the light of recent developments inside and outside the Union. There can be no escaping the conclusion, therefore, that apartheid will prove a flop, and that the policy is the deception that Field-Marshal Smuts described it as being at the outset. The tragedy about this much-flaunted policy is that, its bill of costs has not yet been presented, and it will be the generations to come that will have to meet it - not only in money, but also in heartbreak, sweat and tears, if not in blood. Africans - The Working Class Majority * by Alex Hepple, M.P. In South Africa, workers are not only classified according to their occupations and skills. They are also identified by their race. One speaks of European (or White) workers, Coloured workers, Indian workers, and Native (or African workers.) The Whites perform most of the skilled work. They also occupy many of the semi-skilled occupations. Those who are unskilled are employed by the State- owned railways or by Government Departments and Provincial authorities. The Coloured workers, who are mainly concentrated in the Cape Province, are craftsmen'in the building, furniture and printing industries and operatives in'such industries as clothing, footwear, and canning. Most of them, however, are labourers and semi-skilled woi.kae, for their opportunities in the higher grades of employment are limited. This also applies to the Indian workers, almost all of whom are confined to the Province of Natal. Their employment follows a similar pattern to that of the Coloureds in the Cape. The African workers, with whom we are concerned here, have always been the labouring class, the hewers of wood and the drawers of water. But this is changing. Africans are steadily rising above the old menial status and taking over many occupations that were once the preserve of the White man. excerpts reprinted from The African Worker in South Africa, by Alex Hepple, M.P. with permission Of -The Arica Bureau.

Even the present 'Government, with all its talk of segregation and all its control measures, has been, unable to check. the influx of African workers into industry. Official statistics show that the ratio of Blackworker. to White is increasing remarkably. Between the years 1937 and 1951, while the percentage of African employees in industry rose from 44*% to 53%, the percentage of - Europeans dropped from 42% to 30%. The continuing demand by industry for African workers is estab-. lishing large "Black"populations in, the ,.urban or "White" areas. There are now nearly three million Africans in the main urban and periurban areas of the Union, and the number is steadily increasing. African labour has a special appeal to employers. It is cheap, docile, defenceless and disciplined by special laws. In the mines, where upwards of 300,000 Africans are employed, special precautions are taken to isolate them from the influence of urban life, especially ,trade! unionism. Employers of African labour are always at an advantage, for they have the full weight Of the law on their side, The Government is determined to prevent the growth of a Black proletariat. Its efforts to preserve feudal lordship of White over Non-White are constantly frustrated by economic pressures created by great industrial expasion. This conflict cempels the Government to conceive new laws, impose greater restrictions and apply special measures of repression to urban Africans. Older laws, like the Pass Laws, the Master and Servant Laws, the Native Labour Regulation Act and the Natives (Urban Areas) Act were specially designed to ensure the proper behaviour of African workers towards their masters. These still operate, being often amended but never repealed. In addition, Labour Bureaux 'direct the labour of Africans according to the needs of the authorities. The Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act, the Industrial Conciliation Act, the Native Building Workers' Act and other laws specifically discriminate between them and other workers. African workers note with resentment that White workers can sell their labour in the best market, while they are subject to strict control and direction through Labour Bureaux. Theyask why there is legal recognition for all trade unions except their, own; or why other workers may engage in collective bargaining while they cannot; and why the prohibition against strike action is total in their, case and only partial in the case of other workers. They grudge having to carry passes and being compelled to produce them to any policeman on demand, while White men preserve their freedom of movement. To this, the Government replies that discriminatory laws are essential because the African cannot be treated as having a permanent stake in the urban areas, which are "White" areas. The Government promises, however, that two or three generations hence, Africans- will enjoy a greater measure of freedom in their own areas. This promise is based upon the official policy of the Nationalist Party, which aims at eventual total territorial segregation. According to the apartheid experts, it will take a long time - at least one hundred years- to achieve the ideal of total racial separation' (The Toilinson Report (195&6) estimates that 104,0000,000 must be spent over ten years to develop Native Reserves, and that by 2,000 A.D. there would be a population, of 6,000,000 and 31,000,000 Africans, of whom

6,000,000 Africans would work and live in the White area.) The Nationalists envisage three stages on the road to that ideal. First, a continuation of the flow of African workers into industry in the urban or "White" areas; second, the period of transition, when the flow is stopped and turned back to the Reserves; and finally, the permanent period of total territorial segregation. Dr. H.F. Verwoerd, the Minister of Native Affairs, says he does not know how long it will take to reach the final stage. But I do not think he would put it at less than the popular estimate of one hundred years. This means that the Africans in the urban areas are condemned to a life of repression and restriction for at least another century. The laws and practices which cause them so much misery and hardship are to be maintained, and perhaps made more severe, for the next two or three generations. The Economics of Apartheid:* e-Trc Fcs-are a Challenge to the Conscience of AmErica b~y sean, ~d ...... The South African government economist M. S. Louw estimates the minimum annual capital requirements of South Africalto be $252 million. more than half of which is expected to come from foreign loans and investments. But the magnet attracting this capital is purely the fast returns supplied, whether the investers realize it or not, by a force of virtual slave labor, a labor enslaved by wages, taxation, working conditions and the government's reservation of certain types of employment for whites only. Industry: In 1957 the buses conveying the Africans from their townsPs n miles outside Johannesburg to their work in the city raise4 thia f~res by one penny. The increase in fares of two pennies a day was a bigger bite out of the African's already criminally low w than they could stand, so they boycotted the b'!ses and trudged twenty miles a day. This grim protest threw the poverty wages of tne Af-icans into stark Perspective. It stirred even the go ernen.t, who, in May of the same year, announced the appointment of th' Wa to gnvesti~ate African wages. Since its'inception the Board hs che'w-! t1e wage rate for Four occupations. Three of t> changes ba~-- maintained the previous rate; the fourth lowered it. The thvnae industries with wage increases were the milling industry, whose workers' total monthly wage was raised $3 to $38.36; the fruit canning industry - raised to $31.36 per month; and the confectionary industry - raised to $35.28 per month. The African workers in the *excerpts reprinted with permission of worldview, Aug. 1960, a monthly journal published by the council n.. elgoa It national Affairs. gion and Inter food industry, as a result of the investigation of the Board in 1958, had theirimonthly income lowered from $38.50 to $31436. These wages are representative of those of all African industrial workers. A survey of-the South- African Institute of"Race Relations~ taken in 1988 revealed, the.. ilatming fact that- in- the ,towns the average family of five nets a monthly income of less than ,$42. The- Institute, in the same study, calculated the "bread line",below which health and decehcy could not be maintaihed, at $67.20 perA'month, and showed that 70 per dent of the African famtilies in the towns lived below this bread line..,These wages..4hJiave incal.culable and tragic repercussions. They are directly r espr, sib 14, th-f ol c1wi n facts Shown by a number of surveys: between 6G and 70 per" cent of African' children who survive to school age are ma-lro-ri Scd; 6i pc cent-requir- nursing and medical, ca'; 10 t percent nece i' ,.iooat hospitalization. African adults present themselves at hospitais by tens of. thousands with'. chronic diseases due to malnutrition. The life expectancy of the Africans in South Africa is thirty-six years (it is seventy years for the white). The crime, prostitution, slum conditions and the break-up of family life that these wages also give rise to are unimaginable. Incredibly, incomes in the rural areas are even lower. One-third of the African population, ie. 4 million, lives in the barren undeveloped country 4reserves which they may not leave except under strict government control and often not at all. The average annual income of an African family living in the rural reserves is $112.And this income is subsidized by money sent from relatives in the towns relatives living below the bread line. The governmnt fixesthe minimum wage for a-certain type of work, but it is the employers who adhere immovably to this yard-stick. A government commission in 1954 discovered that the pitiful total income of Africans in the reserves had remained the same since 1936, while the per capita income had fallen as a result of an increased population, Labor practices: Over all African industrial workers hangs the threator overnment legislation which, at the stroke of the pen, cantake away their jobs and their entire livelihood, This-is known as "job reservation", and its obaect is"to protec white workers from unfair competition in industry. The Minister of Labor has only to declare a certaintype ofwork.-for whites only and his word becomes law, making it illeg l for an. African to be employed in such an occupation. This legislation was first produced in 1957 in the teeth of protest from all labor and opposition groups. One of the chief engineers of the bi!4, J. du Pisanie, met this protest in Parliament with this pathetic infantilism: "It is .an apparent conspiracy of capitalists, liberals and Communists with the aim of destroying Christian white civilization in our wonderful fatherland." So far, certain Jobs in seven industries have been reserved for whites. The first industry affected was the garment industry, which in d'Obeir,197 was forced to lay off thirty-five thousad non-white workets. The result was that the garment manufacturers were unable to find the white labor to replace these workers, so they have moved their factories to rural areas where job reservation does not apply. And here they have found one big advantage in that 'because of the large supply of cheap labor in the rural reserves, they are able to pay their workers one-third of the wages paid for identical work "done in the towns. Visitors to these factories have testified that the workers are often children between the ages of ten and fifteen, a large number of whom work barefooted and in tattered clothes. Their working day begins at 6:30 a.m, and they work a forty-six hour week as compared with the forty hours a week worked in the city. The workers are granted no sick leave and they have no medical insurance or unemployment benefit scheme. The whites working in the factories - four per cent of employees .-.consequently earn more than they would earn doing the same work in the cities. Agficulture: The agricultural contribution to the South African economY is upported not only by wages worse than those paid the urban African (the average monthly income for a male African farm laborer in 1954 - the latest available, figure - was $10.36) but also by a forced serfdom... At present there are two and One-half million Africans eking out a living at this kind .of wage on the white man's farms. Since 1948 government control of these la6rers has increased to such an extent that it is now virtually impossible forea farm worker to leave his employment, regardless of the conditions he has to work under. It is a legal offense for an iAfrcan farm laborer to leave his employment without the written permission of his employer. If that permission is refused there is nothing he can do about it.- It is a legal offense for an African to be employed who does not have this petnission Of his previous employer. No farm laborer may apply for work in the towns without permission from a special government department. This permission, often refused, allows him seventy hours in 9 which to find a job, after which time he must leave the town. Thus the tans are all but closed to him so that he, his children,and his children's children are sold irrevocably into this farm labor. And it is a gruelling dawn-to-dusk labor on a diet of corn, potatoes., and weak coffee., It is a labor at the disposal of a farmer, who, if he likes may forbid his employees religious and social gatherings and bar their children from school... At least half ofthis agricultural labor force is supplied from the one and one- quarter million Africans arrested annually for infringements of legislation controlling their movements, involving principally the ha-ved pass-book system. The ulterior but blatant motive for the astroiv,.ical rate of these arrests is to keep up the steady flow of che 1 P!cr to the farms. An African arrested for a pass-book infri :m~ t has two alternatives: prosecution with a possible fine and j . iI s tence, or "voluntary" acceptance of farm labor for usually nincty days. It is well known that often Africans are not given the opp-xrtunity to refuse farm labor or are not told of their right to su:i'it their arrest to trial: many of them agree to. the coract because of their inability to pay a fine and a healthy fear of the jails. Th4 "contract: for this work is unique in comparative law: the African must merely be witnessed "holding the pen" above the contract for it to be held binding. Also he may not break the contract even if the conditions of employment stated in it are not complied with.

Living conditions on the farms for these "offenders" are notorious. A wooden bunk in a corrugated iron hovel is their comfort - as comfortable as their diet and wages. While on the farm under this contract it is an offense for an African to "neglect to perform any work, or refuse to obey, or use insulting language to his employer." All too frequently reports leak out to the press aoutlaborers being tortured and beaten to death, periodically they stir the cities, butnothing changes. From those Africans who are prosecuted and convicted of petty infringements, a large part of the rest of the farm labor is drawn. The farmer pays ten cents a day for each convict employed, plus food, clothing and quarters. The convict gets nothing. For long-term prisoners a farmer may run his own private jail, over which, in practice, he is absolute master. A.government inquiry into prisons revealed that in certain cases prisoners were not released on the termination of their sentences; that again there were the monotonously inhuman cases of convicts having to live in locked huts with no ventilation, of their being transported in closed lorries under suffocating conditions, of their being assaulted, whipped and beaten for not working hard enough or trying to escape; and there was the usually woefully inadequate diet. This is the basis of the South African agriculture which American money? through imports and investments is helping to support. It is on this that the profitable returns from buying tobacco, grain, hides, bark products and vine products depend. Mines: Half of the world's supply of gold is produced by South Africa. ...South Africa is rich in many minerals, especially gold, diamonds, coal and oil. But it is the gold mines that claim the most African miners and represent labor conditions in all:the mines. In February of this year 385 thousand Africans were w-rking in the gold mines. They were earning on an average the equivalent of $5.04a week. This is a fraction higher than the minimum legislated for by the Mines Act of 1911. That fraction is $1.50 per month and was obtained in 1946. In that year sixty thousand mine workers struck in protest againsttheir wages, which had been left standing stock- still during a thirty-five year cost-of-living spiral. This strike was broken up by police sten guns. Thirteen Africans were killed as a result and many more beaten up. The South African government, whether under General Smuts as in this case? or as now under the control of Dr. Verwoerd, has tended to reveal its true colors more glowingly in its attitude to economic sanctions such as these. Because the very foundation of the South African economy is the stability of the cheap African labor, once that stability is threatened the whole economy is threatened. If the African labor force could successfully organize a nation-wide strike, even for a limited time, the country would be crippled. It is for this reason that the withdrawal of labor has been treated so savagely by the authorities. The most recent example of this was the one-day strike by Africans in protest against the massacre of seventy peaceful demonstrators it Sharpeville in March. Countless Africans had limbs and ribs broken and heads smashed as they were forced back to work in brtual jack-boot fashion.

The living conditLons in the mines are ones of paternalistic imprisonment. The workers live together in a compound which they may never leave except wth special permission. They may not have their wives and children with them, They eat and sleep communally and have no privacy... The only liquor that they have legitimate access to is a weak ,kaf fir"beer brewed by the authorities". At the end of their term of labor'the mlners.are obliged to return to the place where they were originally recruited. There is no compensation for those miners who, through their work.underground, contract tuberculosis, or the dreaded miner's disease, silicosis. It has been said- by experts that Australia would be able to produce just as much gold as South Africa if she had the labor force available at the same rate and under the same conditions as the Africans in the Union's gold mines4. It is certainly true that South Africa's ines would not be so vitally productive were it not for those wages and those conditions. Taxation: One of the least known facts of the Africans' economic position is that proportionately they are taxed at a higher rate and for a longer period than any other, roupin the country. The African is taxed for eight years more of his life than any white. When two white people marry, the wife is automatically exempt from personal tax and the personal tax of her husband is reduced. Every :African woman, however, must continue to pay personal tax after she is married, and so must her husband - at the same rate as when he was single. Among all the lower erning groups with an :income of $1200 a ,year, the Africans pay a higer rate of tax than any other racial group in the country. There are also direct taxes borne by Africans that other racial groups are not called upon to pay at all: taxes for education, hospital treatment , social services and .gvernment administration epenses, etc,, realizing a suin terms o. millions of dollars. These tax rates are the result of a recent 75 per cent increase in the direct taxation of Afr-ians wh-ih the government justified by ,saying that the rates had not risen since 1929. They omitted tob mention, of course, that neither had wages.,, In the budget speech of 1958 the Minister of Finance said that the proportion of the total income of the State contributed to by Africans in 1929 was 3 per cent, and ,that under new increases it would be only 1.5 per cent, He also neglected to mentioa that it 'is the cheap African labor that makes it possible for the mines, farms and factories to show the high profits on which proportionate high taxes are paid, reducing the tax percentage of the Africans. The disproportionate taxation completely ignores the disparity in wages between white and African workers. The average white in South Africa has an income five times that of the African and his tax is proportionately'less. ' also ignores the fact that Africans are forced to spend a-greater proportion of their incomes on the essentials of. living than those who are better off and better able to afford taxes. For example, a .survey taken in-New York in 1950 showed that in the metropolitan area the average family spent 72 per cent of its income on essentials (food, taces, shelter3, fuel, transport,,ec.).

The Institute of Race Relations has estimated that the Africans in the Union must spend 90 per cent of their incomes on essentials. In indirect taxation also, the government has shown a predilection for adding to the burdens of the lower income groups. In 1953 the tax on bread - the staple of the African diet - was increased 10 per cent. Cigar, cigarette and liquor taxes remained unchanged. In the same year railway fares - an unavoidable expenditure for the Africans - were increased 14 per cent. These increases stood despite vehement protests from all racial groups. The Vulnerability of the Economy * by F. 1. Spooner Ratios of the numbers of white to non-white employees in mining 1 : 7.5 in agriculture 1 : 6 in manufacturing 1 : 2.5 in transport 1 : 1 in commerce 1 * 0.65 in public service 1 : 1 ...This table gives the ratios of White to non-White employees in various activities in the Union. These ratios illustrate the relative importance of non-White labour in the various spheres of economic activity. The most significant conclusion that can be drawn from these ratios is that, in the categories of activity most exposed to outside competition, the proportion of non-Whites employed is highest. It is also clear that the more sheltered the occupation, the higher the proportion of Whites en?aged: miningi whose products are largely, exported, is virtually carried by non-White labour, while transport, commerce, and public administration, which are largely free from outside competition, are heavily staffed by Whites. The irony of this situation is that in South Africa the jobs which on the average carry the greatest risks from external competition are the lowest paid, while the more sheltered are given, on the average, the highest rewards. Gold mining is the rock upon which the economy of the country is built. This table illustrates the extent to which the gold-mining industry rests upon low-paid non-White labour. It follows, therefore, that the economy of the Union depends vitally upon non-White labour that of the Africans in particular. But in an earlier chapter it was shown that the standard of living of the Whites in the Union *excerpts reprinted from South African Predicament; The Economics of artheid, by F. P. Spooner, 1950, with permission of Freerick-A-. Praeger, publishers. ranks among the highest in the world. In the circumstances it is impossible to escape the conclusion that the affluence of the Whites in this country rests upon the poverty of the Blacks, for it is the earnings of the latter which, under present conditions, cushion the impact of external competition. And in the world at large it is this factor - ability to meet world competition - that in good measure determines the living standards of particular nations. This is certainly not a comfortable situation for White South Africa. Indeed, it is a particularly vulnerable one which carries with it the ugly implications of retaliation. Far too often one hears the comment that the economy of the Union is sound and th3 future of the country assured because of its untold nat-ural resources. While it is true that the country could progres!; and prosper for many years to come, the analysis of its present economic situation makes it abundantly clear that the expected future prosperity will not come our way by mere wishful thinking. I have already pointed out a number of danger signals which we shall have to heed if the country is to continue its progress: the lack of dynamism in manufacturing industry, the excessive dependence upon imported goods on the part of the Whites, and the hea,"y unproductive investment in building and construction in recent years are all symptoms of the same disease. It is a disease which springs from a maladjusted economy - the result of the Union's excursion into twentieth-century industrialization without acceptance of its implications. In more specific terms, it is the result of a belief that the Union can enjoy the fruits of twentieth-century mechanization without the obligation of lifting the real earnings of the mass of the workers to effective twentieth-century consumer levels. The remedy for insufficient dynamism in industry, for excessive importations, and for burdensome fixed charges can come only from one source, the broadening of the base of the Union's economy through the better and more enlightened use of its human resources. The country's material resources can never be properlv exploited without the enlightened exploitation of its human resources. This means that South Africa must shed its reactionary policy of baasskap, under which only the Whites are able to enjoy the full benefits of the country's mnterial resources. There is not much time left for this, for the cnnsequences of the policy of baasskap are already adversely affecting the economy of the country.

DR. VER707= OF SOU.H AFRICA Architect of Doom by H1artin Burger * The zNan Hendrik Verwoerd may be described as an impressive fi,ure. He is tall, white-haired and looks neat. There is a faintly cherubic look about his face, but he moves briskly and gives an impression of efficiency. .7o newspaperrman who sat in the Press Gallery of the Senate udring the 8 years that he was leader of the House can have failed to see in hi2 a strange combination of philosopher and sergeantmajor. Chere were his endless speeches, often involved and repetitive; the large-scale plans for the African which although built up with meticulous detail, seemed to ignore facts and to belong to a world of faitasr. But there was also his impressive attention to the smallest detail of his duties both as Leader of the House end 'iaister of iTative Affairs. It was clear that he had complete control over the swollen Senate -- it had been increased overnight from 41 to 89 -- the price the Government had to pay for removing the coloured voters from the co.vyqon roll in the Cape Province. The newcomers to the Senate included many men for whom he obviously had a tolerant contempt. The behaviour of some of thdm Tas hardly in keeping with the dignity of the Upper House. And while, when it suited his purpose, he was pre-pared! to encourae -- or at least to refrain from discouraging -- their outbursts of irresponsibility, there were times when he subjected them to a rigid discipline. i here was mever the slightest doubt that he controlled the proceedings, and kiew that he could exact unquestioning obedience from every mon who sat on the Government benches. One of the Opposition Senators who frequently annoyed Dr. Verwoerd and his followers, was Leslie Rubin, the only Jew in the Upper House during his term of office. His more telling antiGovernment observations sometimes provoked anti-Semitism. Dr. VerToerd never himself indulg-ed in crude tactics....But he expressed no disapproval when they were used, did nothing to restrain them, and, at times, observed them with a smile. Whom does VerToerd represent? There is not a single representative in either House of the South African Parliament of the 11 million African people. 2he pitifully small representation the Africans had (four in the Senate, three in the House of Assembly, out of a total in both (excerpts rerrinted from the pamphlet Dr._Verwoerdof South Africa by HEartin Burg:er. Published by Christian Action, 2 Amen Court, London, 2.C.4, Jngland; 1961)

Houses of so-'e 260 seats) wras abolished last year. It u'.s removed by one of Dr. VerToerd's laws, Plthour-h it had been in e:istence since 1936 (under an agreement by a formaer rctionalist leader, Dr. .Iertzo, io!hich envisaged a future increase in the t ber of representatives), in face of opposition throu'Thout the country, a'nd noiTithstanding considerable criticism within the ranks of his on Party. But Dr. Vervoerd has provided further proof -- if it were needed --- that his claim to be regarded as a spoklesman for the people of South Africa cannot be taken seriously. South Africa seeks to remain in the Commonwealth after she has become Republic. Dr. Verwoerd claims that he has received a mandate from the people of South Africa for this constitutional change. A referendum was held on 5th October, 1960. -,Tot a single non-7White person was permitted to vote. The result of the Wite voting was: for a Republic, 850,458; against, 775,878. Thus 47%Z of the voters La the referendum (which, on Dr. Verwoerd's own admission amounted to a vote on aarthe!), all of them TVhite, voted against a Republic. Dr. Verwoerd's "adequate and safe majority' was 74,580 or 6% of the total electorate. To stun up. There are 15,841,128 people in Southi Africa. Clearly, Dr. VernToerd cannot claim to speak for 12,773,490 of them, namely the 10,807,809 Africans, the 1,483,267 Coloureds, and the 477,414 Asians. This leaves 3,067,638 'Thites, end of these Wfhites who were entitled to vote in the referendum (a number of them recently enfranchised 18 year olds) 53% voted for a Republic and Dr. Verwoerd. Dr. Vern oerd therefore comes to England with a mandate from a litIle more than half of the one fifth of the PeoJ !e of South A frica-. He Sguported the Ylazis There is much about Dr. Verwoerd's political record -- the ruthless quality of his laws, the obsession with racial thinking in his speeches, the rigid control of human beings, the frequent references to his own and the Afrikaner's God-given mission -which is reminiscent of Hitler. This is not surprising. During the last war Dr. Verwoerd longed for a ?Jazi victory. In 1942, Dr. Verwoerd, while editor of Die, 2ransvgler, was accused by another newspaper, the Star, of falsifying news in order to support .Tazi propaganda in South Africa. He sued for damages for defamation and was unsuccessful. After a lengthy hearing, and an exhaustive examination of a mass of evidence on either side, the Judge said of Dr. Verwoerd,in the course of a considerable reserved ju0.!n+ent: "...iLe did support 7 azi Tpro-r-anda, he did ,.a-- e his paper a tool of the zis in South Africa and he 1ae7Tr it."Dr. Ven Toerd did not appeal the judgment. yieUnderniineci Inroads of the most severe kind have been made upon freedom of movement and residence, and freedom from interference with personal Privacy. One of the first measures introduced by Dr. Verwoerd was the notorious Section 10 of the Urban Areas Act, a provision which has brought untold misery to the African living in the towns of South Africa. This section pro'hibits any African from being in v town for morc than 72 hours except with the permission of a designated municipal offici~l; There are certain exceptions to the provision, but these do not prevent it from striking at the very roots of normal family life for the African tonm-dweller. Contemot for the African M1hat are Dr. Veroerd's true feelings toward the African? An angry interjection by him in Parliament may be compared with some of his high-sounding assurances that his policies are based on sincere concern for the welfare of the African people. ilftile tr. -alter Stanford, h.p., a representa .tive of the Africans was Quoting information he had received in his constituency, Dr. Verwoerd called out: "And you believe a Native instead of accepting my word." A letter written to the Ca/e Times conmented: "Could a short sentence reveal more clearly Dr. "Verwoerd's deep-seated contempt for the African people, or give the lie more effectively to his repeated protestations that his policy of aDartheid can be reconciled with accepted Christian and human stancrlardsiW Is therc , -Case for A'ated Pr. Verwoerd and his fellow-apologists for the present policies of the South African government, say that apartheid is designed to enable the African to develop fully, but in separate areas set aside for him. This is the only way to avoid friction between the races. It follows, therefore, that if the African is to be given his o~na homeland in these Bantustans he is not entitled, while he remains in the TXte areas, to the sane rights as the 7hite man. It will take , of course, but the Africans -.. will be removed to their own inalienable territory, there to take charge of their own affairs and develoo socially and economically, until they achieve full independence. 2hus the dangers of an integrated society with its inevitable racial friction are avoided, and the African can look forward to a happy future. This is the picture of aaprtlceil -- or total territorial separate development -- which the ationalist Government seeks to present to the outside world. It is a false picture. Dr. Veroerd is contradicted both by his own experts, and by the record of events since the 1Tationalists camne to pow0Ter. IA 1950 the Gover-anent a pointed a Cormission (kown as the Tomlinson Comniission) which encjuired into the question of separate development of "hite and African. Its report - the most e astv o itd co-,osi-n, l8 volumes with a total of ex~haustive of its 7kind, T. t3,755 pares, nL erous tables and maps -- was presented in 1954. he 6ommission recoumended separate development, but emnlhasised that this could be achieved only by the full-scale development of the Bantu areas. The Government's response was to reject most of the financial and administrative measures proposed. In 1956 13.5 million was allocated "as a first installment" but nothing further the following year. One of the Comnission's far-reaching proposals was peremptorily dismissed by Dr. Verwoerd. The Cobission pointed out that the "" system of tribal tenure was one of the causes of deterioration of the Bantu Reserves....Dr. Verowerd was unimpressed. His reply -in the Govern:xent T'lWite Paper -- was: "The Government is not prepared to do away w.Tith tribal tenure and substitute individual tenure based on Purchase." Coday, more than 10 years after the U'iomlinson Conmission was appointed, it is clear that the Govelrmnent has not undertaken -and shows no intention of undertaking -- the drastic and lar-escale developments which, alone, according to its own experts could make sepaorate development practicable. In fact the process of integration, notwithstanding ruthless aartheid controls, appears to be gaininr momentum under Tationalist rule. 2he oustanding feature of t1e preliminary figures for the recent population census of the Union is the great increase in the African population of the large cities since the last census in 1951. In Preturia it is approximately 65%, in Johannesburg 3k', in Durban, 3loemfontein and Cape Toin 30,. Thus Dr. Velroerd's paratheid has been poerless against the economic forces which are inevitably producing a common society in South Africa. Uhat it has done -- and is continuing to do -is to maintain the supremacy of the .hite man within that society, by force. Twelve years of apartheid mean this for the African: that almost every human right has been taken from him, while he has, in fact, been given -- and now knows that he can expect -- nothing.

INFORMATION SERVICE OF SOUTH AFRICA A FRESH LOOK AT SOUTH AFRICA Extracts from an address delivered before the General Assembly of the United Nations on October 10. 1963. by Mr. G.P. Jooste. Secretary of Forei&n Affairs and Leader of the S.A. Delegationg When it was announced that South Africa had decided to accede to the Test Ban Treaty, my government indicated that there were also other threats to world peace, to cooperation and to the prosperity of mankind. In this connection, mention was made of the continuation of ideological conflicts, with attempts by States to dominate and indoctrinate the minds of men, as well as the intervention by States, in the prosecution of their ideological campaigns, in the domestic affairs of others under the guise of morality or service to humanity. These are every-day and ever present threats which must be removed if we are to have real peace--a peace which would ensure the conditions of life for which mankind is so sincerely and deeply yearning. And can it be claimed that everything that has been said in the General Assembly was designed to promote this kind of peace--that this kind of peace has really been promoted by all the previous speakers? True enough, some speakers have made important contributions to this end. Many of them have put forward constructive ideas for promoting international cooperation on matters of common concern--and we have heard statements, some on controversial and delicate matters, which were couched in language clearly designed to create and maintain a high and conciliatory tone--a tone which has been applauded as a happy augury for this Assembly. Yet, it cannot be claimed that this debate has succeeded in bringing us back on the road of real peace and harmony--the road which those who drafted the Charter at San Francisco had in mind. 4 Hope For Good will, Understanding The South African Delegation has listened to all previous speakers in this debate. We have listened with particular attention to the remarks of those who have, in the past, consistently shown hostility towards us. We have done so in the hope -that we might detect an indication, however small, of some measure of goodwill, of a better understanding of our country's position and of the unique and delicate problems with which we have to deal - as-well as the principles according to which we are tackling those problems. lie had hoped that, despite the attitude which had hitherto been adopted by some delegations, we would at least find less virulence in the feelings of those who have for so long sought to harm us and even to deny us our rights not only as a member-state of this organization but also as a member of the community of nations. Unfortunately, this was not the case. We have heard from these speakers the same attacks -- some more unbridled than ever before. We have experienced the same invasion of our sovereignty -- and we have listened to the same distortions and unfounded allegations concerning our affairs. In fact, the majority of previous U" speakers have found it necessary to refer to our affairs--many of them in very critical terms. To all these speeches we have listened without any form of protest. The South African Delegation did not come to New York to engage other delegations in dialectic contest. In our view such an approach to international intercourse is a sterile one. It will get us nowhere and can only do harm to all concerned - including the overriding objective of peaceful co-existence. However, no-one can or will expect me as the representative of South Africa to remain silent on these attacks and allegations to which I have referred. We have often said in the past, and I repeat today, that national pride is not the prerogative of any one nation, or of any single group of nations. To this I would add that truth and justice are not expendable attributes of morality--or fruitful international intercourse. If we are to have world peace, and if the nations of the world are to live in harmonious circumstances which would enable each one of them to devote its full attention and apply all its resources and energy to the solution of its own peculiar problems, then, we shall have to put into practice those concepts which are fundamental to the rules of propriety and justice which must govern the affairs of the international community. It is true, of course, that m of the incorrect statements concerning South Africa's affairs were based, not on hostility, but on real misconceptions and misinterpretation of the facts. The reason for this may well be that the impact upon the speakers concerned of the often vicious propaganda against us has created an image which others could not but view with disapproval. Now insofar as these honorable delegates are concerned I would only ask them to take a fresh look at the South African scene, and to do so with a greater measure of objectivity - with a more open mind. A Full Accounting On two previous occasions, full facts concerning our policies to which others take exception, were given here by the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs. He gave these facts voluntarily - not because it was incumbent upon him to account to the United Nations for the manner in which we conduot our internal affairs - but because he sincerely believed that an explanation of our position would be conducive to a better understanding at least by those who have been our traditional friends. Unhappily these full and clear statements have apparently lost their impact or their impact has been engulfed in the emotionalism engendered in this organization by those who would seek to deprive us of our heritage. Vihere I refer to honorable delegates whose governments bear us no ill will and who would sincerely welcome a solution of our difficult problems, let me assure them that we do not deny them, or anyone else, the right to hold views differing from ours with regard to any matter of whatever nature. We also have our own views as to what is taking place in the internal lives of other nations. But, I submit that before coming to any final conclusion, it would be better, and certainly fairer, to ensure that they are in possession of all the facts. I would also ask them once again that, when they give expression to their views, they should always consider whether they can properly do so in this forum in the light of Article 2, Paragraph 7 (Domestic Jurisdiction) of the Charter. They might also ponder the question as to whether what they say does not add fuel to a fire which already threatens to destroy the United Nations. It is at this stage that I am obliged to refer to a matter which has been given some publicity and which I cannot therefore ignore. I refer to an invitation extended by my government to the Foreign Ministers of the Nordic countries. The reason for the invitation was that some of those countries, with whom we have had long contact, have in recent years shown a growing hostility to South Africa - a hostility strangely at variance with the attitude of many of their prominent citizens who know South Africa well and who are in a favorable position to judge our affairs. According to our information these Foreign Ministers were to meet and would discuss their countries' attitude towards South Africa. Our government therefore decided that it should offer them the opportunity of, first of all, acquainting themselves with what was really taking place in South Africa and an invitation was issued to each one of them to visit the Republic as a group and at a time convenient to them, with every facility to go where they pleased and to meet whosoever they wished. The invitation was extended to a recognized regional group of States which traditionally cooperate in international affairs, and for which South Africa is an important and expanding market, with notable potential for the future. The invitation had nothing to do with the United Nations. In the course of this debate the Assembly has been informed of their refusal of this offer. To us it is a matter of regret that these governments, although now apparently seeking to give a lead to the international community regarding its relations with South Africa, should have rejected an invitation which would have enabled them fully to inform themselves on the problems at issue, Prior to any attempt on their part to formulate conclusions as to how these problems may best be resolved. I need comment no further on this matter. There are of course also the distinguished representatives of governments who consistently seek to discredit us, and who are not prepared to view our .. affairs with any measure of justice--let alone any measure of goodwi. It is chiefly due to their remarks that I, as the representative of South Africa, am obliged onee again todeal with certain aspects of our domestic life in'order to ensure that the relevant facts are at least placed on the record. In%-doihg so I shall endeavor to give only such information as is necessary. I will, therefore, deal only with the most glaring cases of misrepresentation. What Are the Chargds? Now what are the main charges against us - charges which have been made despite every effort on our part in the past to demonstrate the false assumptions upon which criticism of our affairs are based? I believe I can Summarize them in one single sentence.* It is alleged that the South African white people are temporary sottlers with no right to a permanent homeland of their own in Africa; that we have taken the country which we clam to be our homeland from others and that our government is therefore a "foreign" government; that we seek to maintain our position by coercion and perpetual repression and that our policy, which has been described as one of inherent racial hatred and superiority, is founded on a denial of the right of self-determination: all of which constitute a threat to the peace of the world. THIS IS NOT SO. And I shall endeavor to demonstrate the validity of my denial. Our main problem - the one which overshadows the whole of the South African scene and which must therefore be given the highest priority in our domestic policies, is the relationship between the South African nation of European descent and the Bantu nations who live under the sovereignty of the South African government. This is the problem which we must first of all dispose of before we can give our entire attention to such residual problems as may still be left whichl affect other smaller population groups. This does not mean that these problems, which I have termed 'residual problems" , do not receive attention. They do. Indeed they receive our constant attention. But we will be able to deal with them more effectively after we have dealt with the position of the great numbers of Bantu who constitute several distinct and separate nations. Let me however, first of all, say this. In order to achieve a proper understanding of the whole position it is necessary to recognize the fundamental fact that Africa is not the exclusive preserve of any one race whatever the general image abroad may be. Africa has, over the millenia of recorded history, been the home of many widely differing nations. There is thus no single African race, just as there is no single Asian race, no single American race, etc. This is a fact of history which must always be borne in mirA. Returning to our main problem, i.e. the position in South Africa of the South African nation of European origin and the different Bantu nations - I would also like to begin by placing this problem in its correct historical perspective. The white population established itself on the Southern tip of Africa more than three centuries ago - without in any way settling on land occupied by others. As for the Bantu people, they were migrating southward down the coast of East Africa; and it was nearly 150 years after the first white settlement that these two main groups met. Meeting of Two Cultures When this happened, border clashes took place periodically during the first half of the 19th century. Yet, despite this, the Xhosa nation of today for instance is largely resident in the same areas it occupied at the end of the 18th century when it first came into contact with European settlement. Similarly in the north of the country, there was little displacement of other Bantu nations. There has taken place in the 20th century what has always been accepted as a temporary "over-spill" of Bantu into areas which had already been settled by whites. There is no foundation whatsoever for the allegation, so frequently made, that the white man deprived the Bantu in South Africa of land which was traditionally theirs. In fact for many years, the South African government has augmented the traditional Bantu homelands by adding to them land which the government had to purchase from whites. It is against this background and in this perspective that our problem, and what we are doing about it, must be viewed. The fact which emerges (one which I cannot overstress as it is fundamental in our position on the African continent) is that South Africans of European origin have been forged into a single and distinctive nation, We are no longer a European nation, although we are closely linked with Western culture and civilization. We are a nation of Africa, with roots and traditions deeply embeeded in the soil of that continent. These roots cannot be destroyed and white South Africans claim for themselves all the inalienable rights of an autonomous and separate nation. We further claim the right to live and to survive as a nation with our own distinctive identity - a fundamental right which, as will all other nations who wish to survive, we will defend by every means at their disposal. It is true, of ;Course, that today this white African nation has an overall responsibility for promoting the welfare and progress of all those who live under the sovereignty of its government. This has been the process of history. But it is essential that I reiterate, what has been stated so often, that in claiming for ourselves a destinctive destiny of our own, we do nbt deny to the emerging Bantu nations their right to achieve distinctive destinies of their own - each in his own homeland with its bwn culture, heritage, language and concept of nationhood. This is fundamental in our approach to the problem; and the Bantu are beginning, more and more, to accept the fact that eoAWAfrican government will always endeavor to promote these rights of theirs, not only as moral rights but also as rights which we hold to be inalienably theirs. Different Attributes. Identities In South Africa, natural differences, i.e. the inherent different attributes and identities (and not the sup4±f.i or the inferiority of any one of these nations) which exist between the various national communities in the Republic, have proved to us over the period of centuries that there can be no real and permanenpt solution in the circumstances which obtained in the past. A permanent solution can, therefore, only be found if each one of the nations concerned is afforded the opportunity of achieving full nationhood within its own traditional homeland with full political equality and not as a subservient people. In this connection we of European origin are fortified in our pursuit of our aims by the lesson of history that the domination of one nation over another cannot afford a permanent solution. These facts, as I have stated, have ,been proclaimed on many previous occasions. Our Minister of Foreign Affairs clearly stated them here, and I repeat them today. But will you permit me also to quote from statements by our Prime Minister in which he outlined the fundamentals of South African policy. As far back as 1960 he said: The essential condition (to a stable and prosperous country) is that racial domination will have to be removed. As long as domination of one race by another exists, there will be resistance and unrest. Consequently, the solution should be sought by means of a policy which is calculated to eliminate domination in every form and in every respect. In March 1961 he said: We do not only seek and fight for a solution which will mean our survival as a white race, but we also seek a solution which will ensure survival and full development - politically and economically - to each of the other racial groups as well, and we are prepared to pay a high price out of our earnings, to ensure their future. The moral problem, just like the political problem, is to find a way out of the extremely difficult and complicated situation, caused by the fact that no longer is the black man incapable or undesirous of participation in the control of his destiny. Nor is there any longer anyone prepared to refuse the fulfillment of such ambitions in a form that is fair to all. The Prime Minister went on to say: We want each of our population groups to control and to govern themselves as is the case with other nations. Then they can cooperate a4 in a commonwealth -- in an economic association with the Republic an4 with, eac-4 other....South Africa will proceed in all honesty and fairness wo secure peace, prosperity and justice for all by means of political independence coupled with economic inter-dependence, In another statement the Prime Minister said this: I envisage development along the lines similar to that of the British Commonwealth. In other words, I perceive the development of a Commonwealth of South Africa, in which the White State and the Black States can cooperate together, without being joined in a federation, and therefore without being under a central government, but cooperating as separate and independent States. In such an association no State will lord it over any other. They will live rather as good neighbors. From this, it will be clear that it has all along been our government's objective to achieve the political independence of the various Bantu nations within their own homelands, and thus also to eliminate domination in every form and in every bespect, as well as to enable the Bantu homelands to develop into separate Bantu States. I have quoted our Prime Minister's words on the aim of achieving an association based on the pattern of a commonwealth of nations -- neither one subordinate in any way to the other. This would, we are confident, forge a link which would establish permanent contact as good neighbors and cooperation with regard to the many matters of common concern. In this connection I shall again use his own words: Seeing that we want to develop those areas for them (the Bantu), can you not understand that we shall bring discrimination to an end by coming together and consulting at a high level on the basis of equality, of equal human dignity through the establishment, for example, of a Commonwealth Conference of our own? Here we now have my government's policy insofar as the charge of perpetual domination is concerned, and the manner in which we are marching towards a future which holds our hope of survival, of complete political independence, and of realistic contacts and cooperation. Here we also have the essence of orderly and planned self-determination - each in his own homeland. Economic Cooperation and Help As for the concept of economic inter-dependence, it will be realized that it is necessary to bear in mind that that concept already finds full expression in our present relations. Moreover as experience in other parts of the world has shown so clearly, political independence without an econozy which ensures a reasonable measure of economic viability often leads to great hardship as far as the masses are concerned. Our policy takes this into account and accepts the fact that these Bantu States as they emerge will still for a long time to come, require considerable economic assistance - assistance which we are prepared to give. What my government therefore has in mind as a prototype is something along the lines of the economic cooperation provided for in the European Common Market. This affords a pattern in which there can be no question of political domination but in which it is sought to strengthen the economy of each partnet in a manner which is neither derogatory to its sovereignty nor a basis for economic imperialism.

To this, many of the delegates representing governments who are members of the Common Market can testify. In passing may I refer here to the charge that our government is adopting a policy of imperialicm towa'ds the territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland* This charge is clearly based on a completely incorrect interpretation of wbat was actually said by our Prime Minister. This is not the occasion or place to deal with this matter, but in order to demonstrate the incorrectness of the accusations made by certain previous speakers, I shall read only one paragraph - the relevant one - of a statement made by him on September 5: I repeated very definitely thar tincorporationt was not sought since this was against my governmentls policy of separate development, which has as its objective the political independence of the Bantu nations. The reasons for this offer to inform the inhabitants of these territories ourselves were also clearly stated. I believe that these words will serve to dispose of this particular accusation or impression. It has often been said that, however realistic and moral our policy may sound when it is described in terms which I have employed, the question still remains as to whether we are in earnest in our endeavors to achieve the objectives we proclaim. We have long since realized that, having regard to the image which has been created outside our own country (an image which I have already sought to summarize when I dealt with the various allegations from this rostrum) we will, in the final analysis, have to rely on practical achievements. Ile will have to produce concrete results in order to convince the world of our bona fides as well as of the realism and practicability of what we have set out to achieve. The Proof of the Policy Fortunately we have now advanced so far that our achievements are already becoming visible. liithin a few weeks fro i today (Nov. 20th) nearly a million Bantu will go to the polls to elect their own representatives to the Parliament of the Transkei, a Bantu country which is now becoming self-governing. This is the proof of our good faith, of the realism of our policy and of the speed at which we have moved. While large parts of South Africa are arid, the Transkei is situated in the heavier rainfall belt and in one of the most fertile regions of the countrr. It is nearly 17,000 square miles in area, and the oeople who will exercise their full political rights as citizens of that country, the Xhosa nation of some three million people, constitute almost one-third of our total Bantu population. The Transkei is the traditional and inalienable homeland of the Losa nation. It is now a new emergent State, with its own flag, its own national anthem, its own citizenship and will, after the elctions, enter upon the final and most important phase of its constitutional development towards independence. The entire civil service for the new Transkei Government is being transferred to the Xhosa people, and members of the South African civil service, seconded to the new service, will work under the direction of the Chief iUnister and the Cabinet of the Transkei, It may interest the Assembly to know that, as at the tmb of the-transfer of the administration of the Transkei, some 80 per cent of the civil service will be occupied by trained Bantu personnel. Of particular importance is the fact that the Constitution of the Transkei was drawn up by the leaders of the Xhosa nation themselves and thereafter approved by a plenary session of their own Transkei regional government - before ratification b; the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. This Constitution is a blend of Jestern democratic concepts and the traditional Xhosa form of government, which in essence is also democratic. There is therefore no foundation for the charge that it is incompatible with true democracy. Furthermore, those who criticize the fact that a measure of authority is being withheld from the Xhosa nation by the reservation of certain governmental functions which the South African government will continue to exercise and administer, ignore the evolutionary nature of self-government, where the retention of certain powers by the sovereign legislature is normally regarded as a necessary, it temporary, transitional arrange. ment in training any people for the exercise of full and complete sovereign independence. A Unique Approach to a Unique Problem L is evolution of self-government in the Transkei will provide a prototype for the development of self-government in other Bantu homelands in South Africa, but since the patterns in South Africa are so diverse the arrangements may not be identical and will have to be adapted to the needs and the aspirations of each of the other emerging Bantu nations. Nevertheless for every Bantu nation the issue of ultimate self-determination remains a fully accepted objective of governmental policy. Here now is real proof of what we are trying to do; and I leave it to all delegates of goodwill to judge whether our policy is inevitably doomed to failure or whether the government of my country should not be given an oportunity to proceed along these lines which, as must be evident, could well be the solution of a unique problem requiring a unique approach. At this stage I would like to add that the suggestion that South African policy derives from or is inspired by racial hatred is one that does not bear even a superficial examination. The allegation emanates largely from those who are influenced by passions familiar to them in their own environment but who know nothing about the South African scene. It derives also from the campaign conducted against us - in many cases by subverbive forces whose activities inside South Africa we are obliged to combat by appropriate means - as is done in all countries. No serious critic with full knowledge of the South African situation, however, honest his criticisms may be in other respects, can legitimately subscribe to the thesis that the concept of separate development is founded on hatred of the Bantu nations. Equally wrong is the charge that the white South African nation is endevoring to entrench its position because of fear. Fear is not an element in the motivation of our policies. Our government is confident that we will ultimat. ely succeed in the task we have set ourselves. Had it not been for this absolute confidence, based as it is on our own knowledge of our own affairs, we could not have withstood for so long the incredible onslaught on us both in and outside this organization. Now I come to the most serious allegation with which I must deal, one with which we are of course familiar, viz., that the manner in which the South African government is endeavoring to solve its admittedly complex and delicate problems constitutes a threat to world peace. This allegation is mischievous in the extreme, for not only is it entirely unfounded, but also it is deliberately designed to clothe this organization with an authority not conferred upon it by its Charter. Those responsible for this allegation know full well that the United Nations cannot concern itself with matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of Member-Sates - a pinciple not only enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, but also one which is often repeated at other conferences, such as the most recent one at Addis Ababa. The delegates concerned therefore seek to promote the view that, in the case of South Africa, certain aspects of its domestic affairs threaten the peace of the world - that is the peace between nations. A Mischievous and Dangerou Charge I have cailled this charge a mischievous one. In fact it is also a dangerous one. It is dangerous because, should this "escape route"' find favor and support in the United Nations, then it requires but little imagination to realize where that route will lead the organization and the world. As I have already indicated in a previous intervention, many of the governments represented here are violently opposed to the doctrines according to which other governments deal with their domestic affairs. i need quote no examples to demonstrate this fact. If what I have s aid is i true (and I believe that there few wo will dispute my contention), then :surely it must be realized that, if the fact that the manner in which South Africa deals with its own domestic problems is not to the liking of others can be invoked to substantiate a charge that we are threatening the peace of the world, a similar charge could be brought against a number of other nations represented at this Assembly -'perhaps with greater justification. It is for this reason that I have said that the charge is not only a mischievous but also a dangerous one. We reject it abso!te --and I believe that the principles of our policies as they were again explained today, will have demonstrated the hol! owness, of this c1arge. It is with satisfaction that my government has noted that thatohoiowness of this charge is openly recognized also by a number of foreign spokesmen representing countries with a long tradition in international affairs, and who can speak with authority on this matter. But what is particularly ironical about this charge is that it has come mainly from delegates representing governments who are continuoubly threatening South Africa with violence. Some of them have openly advocated aggression against our oQuntry. Aggression is the greatest of all international crimes and is therefore in direct and absolute conflictith the charter. Honorable delegates need only refer t6 the various statements made and the resolutions adopted recently at Addis Ababa* Uhen those statements and resolutions are read, they should be read, not Only in conjunction with the Charter but also with Resolution NQ. 380 (V) adopted unanimously by this organization on November 17, 1950. I shall read only the last preambular and the first operative paragraph of this resolution entitled "Peace Through Deeds"-- this part reads: The Geeral Assembly, Condemni the intervention of a state in the' internal affairs of another state for the purse of changing its legally established government by the-threat or use of force, 1. Solemnly reaffirms that, whatever the weapons used, any ,aggression, whether committed openly, or by fomenting, civil strife in the interest of a foreign Power, or otherwise, is the gravest of all crimes against peace and security throughout the world. It ill becomes the distinguished representatives concerned to make Ahe charge that it is South Africa whose actions constitute a threat to the peace. The aggressive intent is clearly directed against mr country, a fact which members of the General Assembly and the Security Council must certainly recogni n. And I must reiterate' here that our will and determination to defend and safeguard --by every means at our disposal -- that which is ours is absolute.

It is not conflict we desire but peace -- peace in order to proceed with our great task -- a task which requires all our resources, all our energy, and all our time. Cooperation in Africa Moreover, we want to live in peace and cooperate with all other countries including those in Africa# In our relations with these African countries, cooperation in all matters of common concern wqs always a fundamental aim in South African policy. That this is so we have already demonstrated in a tangible way. They, however, have seen fit to deny us the opportunity of continuing the cooperation which has proved so fruitful in the past. This cooperation has covered a wide range of techicalpoblems aiid assistance has been rendered on a considerable scale - for example by the world famous veterinary laboratory at Onderstepoort, the South African Institute for Medical Research, the Bureau of Standards, the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research and many other techbic linbtitutes. Millions of vaccines have been dispatched to various African countries and there has been a regular exchange of visits between techbical experts. In 1960-62, South African experts Made 40 visits to 11 African States and territories, and in the same period experts from 15 African States paid more than 60 visits to South Africa. Even now South Africa contributes by way of financial aid and expert advice to combat the breeding of red locusts in the swamps of Tanggnyika and Kenya. Although much of this technical collaboration has recently been rejected by the other African states, it is possible that as time passes, and as they achieve a clearer perception of our true aims, in our own country and in our contacts beyond our frontiers, wiser counsel will prevail and that cooperation in all fields of common concern will be resumed. We are confident that, given the proper opportunity and atmosphere, we shall be able to make a material contribution in the pursuit of the orderly and peaceful development of Africa. In the meantime we continue to be prepared to render such assistance as we can in the circumstances prevailing in each case when we are directly approached by the government concerned* I would like to conclude my statement by saying that I have not endeavored to give a full picture of every aspect of our racial policies. Nor have I dealt with the considerable improvement in the well-being of the Bantu in South Africa. This was done, as I pointed out previously, on two occasions by our Minister of Foreign Affairs. I have gi.ven only such information as could serve to show up the hollowness of the charges against us, I sincerely hope that, if criticism of our affairs is to continue in this forum, then at least such criticism may be expressed with greater moderation and in less hostile terms. Let us also at least receive credit for what we have achieved - and achieved under the most difficult circumstances --difficult not only because of the complexity of the problem, but difficult also because of the continuous misrepresentation and uncalled for condemnation to which we have been subjected for so long. Ile of course regard any discussion of our domestic affairs as improper as contrary to the explicit terms of the Charter, and as contrary to the essential prerequisites for international harmony and cooperation. If, however, honorable delegates allow themselves to be persuaded because of self-interest, or any other reason, to invade our sovereignty, then let extravagant language by eschewed. Harsh words affect existing friendships and render potential friendships difficult. In the complex and dangerous world in which we live, it is becoming increasingly important that all nations should seek to concentrate on the issues which unite rather than accentuate the differences which divide,

SUVHTX POLITICS 1921 THE UION; WHIT CO 5101*01ff C NAfTM POLITICS IN SWU AFRICA by islie I. Rubin At te lst ~nerl elctJon in the Republic of South Africwihto place In October 106I, the Nationalist Party, led by Dr. Teraverd wa returned to power with an increased majority* and with the reaffirmed tPport of the electorate for the Gnvernmont policy of agaldW The electorate which took this decision is white, and all the mebers of the House are whi te. The Africans - numbering 11. million out of a total population of 16 million2 were objects of the political process, not participants in it. Whether the African should, in the, futures have any say in the government of the Republic;: the nature and the extent of the political rights which should -be granted te him; how and when the should, be granted these were among the issues raisedwith varying degrees of interest and concern " in the election.! Around these issues, four distinguishable policies were presented to the. eleotorate - those of the XatioNist Party, the United Paty, the Progressive Party, and the Liberal Party. These policies combine to make v, the pattern of -hite thinkinw today on future relations between the white man and the African in the Republice The Nationalist Party - Apartheid or Separate Development When the Nationalist Party came into power in 19489 the new dectrine of apartheid had. not received precise def inition., It, had pz,.ved: effeot~ve during the election as the focal point of a campaign vhich eondemed the Unted Party, of Field Marshal Smuts, for pursuing. a lasogtl policy in relation to the influx of Africans into the cities. It had served as a ,slgan, nder the ,cver of which Nationalist politicians were able both.to play on the white manta eer!- preseut fears of "black domination", and to assert that it was intended to deal Justly with the Airican be giving him bvery opportunity to pursue hi aown development separately, Clearly the new policy was womitted to increased separation of the races, but ones in power, the Nationallt Party was compelled to face the question how this increased sep&a&tn was to be achieved. Two conflicting views emerged amug the s ortegs of the party. The first - .advanced by the Dutch Reformed Churches and a number of Afrhiazer intellectuals - maintained that.if separation were te be achieved without injustie to the.African, it- was essential to set aside separate areas for his exclus e "BY a policy of free an4 sepaao evelopment, we must. - uderstan the territorial separation of European and Bantu, and the provision mf areas which mist serve as national an political homes for.the. different Danu. This paper was originally delivered at a conference sponsored by the American Society of African culture in April, 1963, the-proceedingw of which are being edited, for a hook entitled_ *outhern Africa in Transitioh," which will be published by Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. in the fall of 19640 oo~mntieu and as permanent residential areas for the Bantu population or the major portion of it.b"! he other viev as pat by Dr. >malan the first Nåtionalist Prime Mnctr U ... if one oculd obtaUn total or complete terri. torial ~ everybody ~uld admit that it wold be an ideal state of affariso It vould be an ideal state, but that it i not the polioy of om party a * h~ I ws acked in the Hous, on prevIcus ocaslons whether that wva what we am ~ at ... I elearly: stated ý.. that total territorial soparation was iuratieable under present ciowustanoes in South Africa, whqre our wholae econoade struoture is to a large extent baeed on lative labour*.6 arlierg' Dr. -Mau had jid "pre p inoiple of & M .. is that wo have ty s6arate, sphårcs ~. o sprtå territorial areas. The soruples 'o the Intelle.otuals and the *Ohurohes vers b*ushed, aside -by the pollti~ns The poitFc of the Nationast Party orystallized soon after it came Into, powor, a om f ör eepin South IAfioa whtoe", -bn (mattory) vaa the lopular ory -- andthe policy vas isplemented by appi mep8ratioxi betveeý wdhite aänd non-ite to an increasing extent in' all iptrs I waa a repreuiv oPoliy, content to leave the Arican hst he in feaot t par of the multi- äil sneety of South Africa,- but' doterminod, within that society, to subjeot him to regd controls and restrietilono, desineld to maintma theso remacy of the vhite man. DurIg the periöd 1948 to 19599, neroun dlsrmtinatoj lavwu e astsd. Tore vere lav providing for.op4r. ate töetiätlý a , 0%,o Are 99paat transport;v separate amentiose +in public institutions, e.g.,waitibg rooms in railwva stations, oänters in post offioes;lc oeparqte oducatton reguiing Åfricans to bo eduoatod in a vernmular lang~ at certain levels.il rrieana ,rs denied the riht ýto strJke~ provision was l lmdfa-rthe reservation of certain skilled oocaj on for whito,;l rigid control of racial olassiftioation vas intröoduced; ud AM*icns vore deived-in oertain. circmstnes of the proteotton' nor~ly' afforded by, the law* Tr he i.s a l4 wh i h denios to an Atfi an.ho has, sinco b rth reoidod continucualy in a to-n, the riht to have livi1g wth him In that toA for: ore than soventyé.tvo hous", a rrLed daughte, or a son who has r hd the ag, of oih4toen;6 another lav ioh makes it a crim~a offnce. for ab hite person and a non-vhito person to sit dowa to a åpof tea together in a cea room: in a towa where in SouthAåfriea, uåless they havs obtained a special permit to o so;? a third law:whch ehopowers a policemn to ante and seaårh without w=rant, M-at.y r8atonable tie of the day or night" premi sos in a tova on which ho ha reason to suspect that an African boy elghtesn years ofkas is eomittlng.the e r4inal offence of residing with his fatheor without having the netesy prmission to0 'd..s<.18 Thor, are the pass lav, Impooiig rigorous 'coxqtrol overr- the African' *right to enter and lsave''the urban ases, which subisot hn ontat poliesurvsillae and have ýbeen responstible for the arres*t ($ollovqd in:,a highpereentes of cases, by ipiomn>o h ed of thousds Of. mnOVery year.1'9. An authoritativeo estimte 1958 put -the ave~ag niabor of arreats Of Lficens for pass law and related off~en e.at go hu~n jer åac 2,0 -ýI hee arGe soMe of the laws whIch constitute the iplemntation of the policY of ~ durlg a period of fifteen years. Almst svery speot of the llfe of the AfrioanL-.,oial, eonomio, politic4a a ensbet to rigid. legialative,,control, GZerojeedasaue by the administrative act of an off iOIl, !Ith the. exoluuion of the riht of re oorse to a cotirt of lav. Alan Paton, o00oÉ nt In on the*e lawe in 19.59, :wrto of 'the illusion that r pröpagandis, are tryltag to foster abroad, that patheid i a noble ideal', and continued: 'No polloy can be noble that oares go little for the hurt it infliets upon persons. Our =gjg propagandista believe that GOd

£eive racial purity; I do not knw about that, but I 40 knAw that Gd is a God of mercy. I leave it to the reader to ,decide whetber ther'e i a. any mercy in these laws."21 In 196e the International Commuission of J~o ivetiated the Rule of Iaw in Suth'Africa and report& :"While. the ep sociological problems confronting the Government ef South Africa 6srta4ly canot 1be minimized* it is. manifestly apparent that the pursuit sfthe ,prsent policy constitutes a serious encroachment uon the freedom of all inabitants, white and non-white alikeq 022 In 1960 the Nationalist Party had decided to seek the opiniqn of experts pm the question whether the Native Reserves (the proposed Bantustaus of todr) could be used to carry out complete terrftoria.s-pathe The Comission for the Soclo-Eonomie Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South Africa, -under the cheirmanship of Professor P.R.-Tomlinsong was required "to conduct an exhaustive enquiry into and to report on a comprehenusive -heme for the rehabilition of the native Areas with a view to dsvelopitng within them a social 'structure in keeping with the cuture of the Native and based on effective socir-.Joonomic planning." The Tolinson Report was presented In 1954,23 and a sumary of the full report beame available to the public in 1956. The Report was a bitter disappointment to the proponents of territorial ec - While the Commission rjected the policy of integration of white and African*~ and recommended separate' dvelopment as the only alternatives it showed clearly that development of the Native Areas into a homeland for the African people was an'undertaking bristling with problems. calling for urgent action, and involving great 'financial cost. It recommended - as, a matter of 4 urgency - expenditure by the Government of l0CI million pounds within 10 years, to relieve the economic backwardness of the areas, u g d white industrial development in the areas, and' propoed that the African peasant b granted * freehold title to land. Dr. Verwoerd, then Minister of Native Affairs, rejectld.these proposals. The Government contended that a total of only 36 million pounds was required and voted the initial amount of three and onehalf million pounds. But the most importat conclusion of the Tomlinson Commission related to population growth in South Africa. It estimated that by the year 2000, the total Popuation will be 31 million, comprising 21 million Africans, 4 million Coloureds, one and oi-half. million Asians, and four and one-half million whits.., The Commission concluded, also, that even if its proposals were put into effects the Reserves could, by that date, not aeoommodate more than 70 Per cent of the African population, i.. there would still be six and one-half million Africans in white areas. Thus, under a policy designed to increase separation of the races, a progressively larger number of Africans would be. living in the .white areas. The Census returns of 1960, shs V'that In a period of nine yeareg, the African poul ion in the urban areas has increased by almost one million, and that the non-white Population as a whole was increasing almost twi "a fast. as the white population sAince 1.951,, TPretoria, the administtative capital of the Republic and 'a stroA&h;ld of Afrikaner nationalism, which was, formerly the only city where the whites tnumbered the Africans, the Africans have achieved a slight majority in 1060. While the Nationalists preached - and promised- awte integration of the African within the multi-racial society 9f South Africa proceeded apace. Henry Allen Fagan," a distinguished Afrikaner. a former Chief Justice of South Africa' and Minister of Native Affairs In, the Nationalist C. binet of General

Hertzog before WorldWa 11I, w~iting in. 1959. referred. o a twenty. -ear amartii plau'n' e4Iewed when the Nationalist party of D~r. Terwoerd came topcvert "More than 'half of the twenty-year' period has elapsed, with; Government In powrer that Is pledged to orry out the policy-oef separation and is straln:'nevery nhtve to'do) so. 'Yet no sign can~ be detected Iof even a commencement of the oar proeis which can bring about the separation of lhite and Nal£so via., the mes witidraw of Bantu labour from the Ekropean indstries.'2. BUy 1959, oritiism ef the Goverment a policies, both within the country and beyond, was moting*. 7he vorie4nng of relations between -white and African -led to growing concer tomg u suporters of the Government. as well as among its opponents, A- small but inf l~lntia. group within the traditional ran s of Afrikaner' nationlism, became mjore out spoken in their -condeumatipa of the Injustices Inflicted upon the Afrieanm-, and their -dommm4l for fulfil-' ment of the loing- delarod promise 9 of op otnities for separae developmnt.At the lUnited Nations', vorld opinion was hardeing. The, Insistent protest, Of the' nOW African states wore an important factnr; but It was the Indioputablyirepressive cbharacter 6f the policy of' apwtMJ4 which decided atti-, tudes and policies In the outside world. It became'increasingly difficult for natilons only too anxious to understand the white. man'.a problems$ to condone hsolcs.Within Saptki Lfrioa, people - among them many Nationalists. begant to ask iustiohis about positive Mr~hi Negat ive.&DgjMidjj --,the whole apparatus of harsh laws separating white from.non- white in the white ar as 4 had been achieved, but where was the "Bouth Africa inwhich the-Bantu ad the white men can live 'nixt' tn' one another so gpod.nighbors and. not a-aS people who are continually: .Arrillg over .prem..cy?".2, In 1959,,the Government a miounced its intention of proceeding with tU& creation of self-governing'antu states. i o- r, ~ ')ill as asse1.nthat year, and came into force on June 30. 1960. It abolished saxiting parliamentary representation f..the African,27 estabs.. Lished egt Bantu "national units", and provided for the conferment oflegislative powers 'V4on .Bntu territorial authorities.. In a White Pape~r explaining the baekround and objects of the Bill, the Governm.ntdeolar.& its purposeto be -provision for the gradual deveopment of self-governing, Bantu national units" and quoted the Prime'Rinister as having - said that "if the various Bantu national units shn.v the ability to attain the roquired-. stags of self-suff iciency,, they will -eventually form a South African comonwealth tongether with White South Africa which will serve a itcore and as guardian of the. emergingiantu states."-' In fact, this, law did not grant ti ; "fricans 'self-goverment. It deprived them of any say whatsoever in the govermnt~4of> th countr~y, and granted theu~ instead, a system of -loal g' 11 1 vernment- subject to the control of -the whit~ X4ament of South Afri %t~~o~ In tyij~g the subordinate legislaetive powers granteds,to the dreat i'o of tribal units, the Government. was pursuing a policy of,"divide aM rule. iff ekences -of language, trs dit ion and oustoft- undo~ubtedly ex'Isi ang~ - he African people,,but, they: ae of. minor- signif icance. To contemplate 'as' pbitica realism, the permanent grganization of the African pevo as'a' whole,_ on the basis of tribal units is to f24? in the face of the fact that more than half of them. live outside tle riba1 qreas, :%and~to ignor*'the fait rate of Increase 4n tihe,nmber of Afr~oan living in the. -white, arian 'All thie roliable'evidene (iznslUdlng expert Wtionalist, opinion# i-e0, th6eulinsnou Cmssion)-etablishes that: the -Africa Is. becming .increaalig; paext and paiwoel of w-hite'Sou'th Africa* Professor do Kieiet has said of the African: "That It Is easy to demonstrate the powerfu hold. that the old belif.and habits 6f'.t h tribe' still b v.. i~mn him cahnot disprove that he -is a ember 'of the total SO6 h African y irrlev rsibi an part Of ih tdot life of-South Africa. The trusm prblem of South Ar, is top what debepstrt uonite of Cefs and other trial rhepres tofaves, i nintanero ciste& by a continue. I offica bet- wasr todriv otfered wte manwifts aodiizia thn thver buit sbjei ot ofth t the "; from e 6 h a rete, 02~lV. fthe goernmnt wAll ena cten wts ad p by une thwe , the ,roval anew arr bn he eartby the fthrnsee. h :' I the recio ' th .....2. of the !IR+I* to the '.l.. ... a .... oits irst May19v nar9s, ineonslte of:ife and oethretibal prerty. Incldise a nme nomine, a by af t, off s of Vwi a.t popried b yester aoisr atiipoon but suj to eoplteaae op pon itio tothe Gov amntAenat es bad by the tnihurt approvalth Ople Do -i-. neore gte efet Iea t mut therne, iniosto, ofat srn Cohie efoorceat wtheipe. a'w fthe en theyoue arowe appinted, .The enat ion f the re d the rnel ttiow the, "e f-ern mede6 oft was ffi andoent* terou4 beez~ err e i t of, efrmreny16 eonwads, ing mse of~ lift~eand d qettrcn officoptted ,th6ai ni4nt atse he remt of th eriptal b Chfsto 'be lifatd anw nthea nysear wiut rP sitn tho eapnwien opri M161 by the nnt~ wihotcosting the .,kea Teritoria De toit haig6ku 'l~oesst beluin -n dus~o i gah zi Th ~ ~ ~ ru asemover10chef nhamen keavsu - n soI tie prntr ion'of, variosgivcm(mng poie enhr~ea quipe int th aa e they w~uecre uard wih, h deandors -has thes, avrmndt qImatem th ear~ fo thei " teto) The imedite ?act on ofthe o perentmaation.~ ofe a iast of gentu Aini4 afected Dreveometses the itrb.tnu.4 ,On buidin 3, an 611iute boA ofcal pnnolic ed t" n ~ctthat th dbenoed btr mthe-tt lof fowrdtmel-oergec tneInt wiethine af few year Disvession folowdcin Praetora, bt woeed reprseatie s of the Toritia theitit'bnde ie "nistr, inth ero* fuueInt eanwhile 196. Dr. Verlicr ior96 d Pearnlmentat i of th Tertoial Afth ornmd-ent t gad ef-,vrnen totean,4spri an4Oha itws hoed tha the nw 'systm woul ~be ~pradton be,, hfis hl popl63 beaewo cosiution woud bhe Bant AutoiieIsi fosem cotan withPp deandat the~ overnmentpors whcm woulh befirease atr the roetils) of sthe oiinto b wkd oin cnttie onewithnttho ant sl-oders. ofn the Trasi-.

7ollowing discussions between the gvernment and a committee of 27 Chiefs and headmen appointed by the Tranakelan Wavritorial Authority, the main provisions of the proposed constitution were announced In March. 1962. SAssembly consisting of 65 appointed Chiefs as 45 elected members, wudchoose a Prime Minister who would appoint a Cabinet or Eecutive Council, The Assembly would be empowered to legislate, inter alia, on internal affairs, agriculture, and social welfare., The South African government would remain responsible 'for defence, external affairs, internal security, posts and telegraphs,, public transposrt, immigration'. currency, public loans, customs and ezoise, and "some aspects of justioe.'f All laws passed by the Assembly require the assent of the President of the Republto. In May, 1962, the Territorial Authority adopted the constitut ion,the President announcing that..h'e elrpected 'the Assembly to be established by',the middle of 1963. In an official statement after he had first announced the proposed grant of self- government', Dr. Verwerd said: "The now South Africa which is being construted by the measures anpunced. today holds within it great promisefor the building of friendship and eo-operation between the races. It furthermore guarantees to each the retention of his ow identity. All the nations of the world which seek to protect human dignity and the right te selfdetermination should give South kfrica fair chance to establish and develop its own6ommnveath of nations. 3 at are the facts? A measure of local gvernment, entirely subjeot to the overriding control of the white Go4ernment of South Africa, is to be insed upon the people, of the Transkei, who number on and one-half million. Such limited powersa are iested in the Assembly are effentively in the hands of the appointed, Chiefs., who hold 65 out of the total of 110 seats. Th people of the Transkethave not been consulted by the government. There has been consultation with a number of Chiefs, and headmen, all of whom hold office by virtue of government appointment, are paid by the governmentt and may be deposed by the government at any time. In Pondolan4, which represents a quarter of the area of the Transkei, a state of emergency, first Imposed in November 1960. reMains in forcei This is the *positive" w of 1963. On aalysiseit, is seen to be, not a solution. to South Africa's problems, but a retreat into the realm of fantasy; a plan to retribalise, foroibly, 11 million Africans who have become "irreversibly a part of the total life "of South Africa." The United Party - White Leadership with Justice The policy of 18g~thei Is opposed by the United Party, the official opposition, wlth 49 seats In the House of Assembly against 10 held by the Nationalist Party. Formerly led "'0 ea mitf'is FdbyGe SmUts, its s*port comes mainly from the %lishspeakingsectin i, but a number of non-nationalist Afrikaners are to be found in its raks, For efo years after it. defeat in 1948, the policy ofthe Unite4 Party in relation to the African remained vague, inconclusive and ambivalent. It shared with Nationalist policy the basic concept of white supremacy, but differed from it as to the'methods to be employed in maintaining the dozinance df the white minority. The methods were Indicated in broad terms; they were not formulated precisely. Where the Nationalist party program talked of "terrotorial and political segreg tion", that of the United party promised to Dask %a seatisfIp.ot . rr molätion whih -Vould epabhle the AfrI.oan to devsl.p aloiig his mm 1lines within s ge,rm 'fraework iihich'eteonheee.o proaorve 1'Western ovlsto. The Nationalist party ire ge2 returned to power in 1953. A atropg boky of opinin'vti the United Party attribuxted its defeot at the eleotio,ý ta~ tIho inaeqi&4o of the party' t Äfrican polio>'. 1it was coiitenedta h Geeotoratg bad not been flf d tha-athe '~.r~a14.As a redl o a this ienI elt tive t.o the policy NtGät~.'' s areslt öf tis ri1tioiem a new policy was formulated in 19541. Under this pol.icy the United Party acceito economio integration .sf the w3~iteendthe .Aria aboth faeVö and inetitable continuin process. but stand$ for socia and residential segregation. Wibte lpaderohip umiut bo .ain talnod, bxt- #Weste>rn oiåkliation muet be shaed In proo ' it l OnkWhite. w ho have, doveloped the capacity for t~in joint res6ponsibi>lity for our fit, wefbeiäg In this sub-eontblent ... the Vat ivo shouild gr~delly bo given a mOrý'or, fini-te and sectre place within: the orbit of our Vs tern ~a 6f life'33 nited Party spokesnen now 'talked of 'whi.te laeshp wi.th jute'h ut the ýparly. an eye Al~, on the Afrikca~o vota In the rural äreastionded* more and mora, to retreat from the prpa-til nIimplications et the new policy It bad foriiated. In 1957# the no ew ý - ea'r vf the party, Sir de Vilior G~aff inthe o ors of- a ~saOIrypt: on the, Partyl s livlUstrial ppo11oyö talked of the need fir pr76leot:ng. white vowkerg a&,ait4jt uc~r~ o~tition. from nou-whites. Ås thegn~a, lto aen~'r läberal trends, within 't~e ary e iodto e ke? ui thå bIgriNr a Ind the åTInjäs of th, party to be as, determIrcod ss the govor n wVs, to -, zoto oi-r pstino thewhie nn, ~oauethe tkhIimn ofit Iss4a 'sépohee. But the se, concéssions to. the tecra W tjniie o the;, white Solxthý Afrivan were of i aval, Theg>.nerail eloinpoue tidädfet for~the UnitedP9 y' Earl>in ~59, he Gver ebd introduced the, Promotion f atuSef Govriment Bll, which amxght tn abolieh all exieting parliamentry 'repre sentatlr-n of the &.fr'een. The, 1111 was pe.nseci, notwithstadng vigorous ,>ppooitlon by the UY.;.ted Paxty, Sir de Villiers Graatf seld:1 ä,~.whl this ParliUment ruGa ner the BauXtuit is right 'that the>" ehould hae representntion IAi this ,e ...q it thore is 'aý ~ås for removing the katives'3 röpkeenq, rs then surely1 the timea for "their emvlis when the X0ew Blae-k 40rii&n8 oif Dr- Verwoerd have gained their independence,g and ~re the Bantu parma:!euty 1> ete otsietersre rei 1lig in those Bleck, dåoänlons:a,-..ä earning thei40r living there,436 At the Natioe ogeso h patywhtc tokplao*e lEterK kn the year* 'the partyl's pö*oi 'in regrdto Åtrioen rePreaetatiJ, a formuleted. It vas decided: tbät-it theormar representation inA1 th J~ePovnsol bo rtore4,an böpemntai' d in the remaining libroeprovinoee; th&t. r8PreOetatlý should be bääed in separate rolls, the franohiso to be subjeet to a qualfioatlon based on 'rosponsibllty";. that the rebpreuntat:Lves of theý*= ifianhould, as before,. be white;* that the npmkevý of representativa&, sh~ul be, lmitqd to, eight.' 2kis wa~an adanoe' ou the party's previols po1ijv, lI that. It coutedad the riaright. to. representatiga .hoghu the onritadofn the ýape Proinoe alo*e.0On the other han, the rersnainwsto rem~n white and- separate, and the r.lght to vote wa to be uited to 'wresponible"'«' the term was not defined - Åfricans on2y. 'atPor purposes of tho last gisner4 Gdestin, held in Oeto'ber 1961, the Unitåd Pryentered- intoe a llianne with the Natl Uýnion, a new party wt j. - - little support from the electorate, vigorously critical of the implementation of government policy, but urging selrate development of white and non.mhite based on justice to both. In a pro-election statement, iesued. jointly with National Union, the United Party, for the first time, put forward federalism as the basis for future political relations between white and African. But the proposal warn stated In the most general terms. It was annoced that the party accepted "a race federation in which all groups will be represented in the Central Parliament ... on the basis which provides Justice frr afl groups." On three questions, however, policy was stated more specifically. The party recognized as a fact, the existence of a settled urban African cbmmity, urged "more rational and sympathetip application". of the pass laws, and proposed that provision be madoe for freehold ownership of land by urban Africans. 0ne more. the NationaUst Party was returned to power. In the Parliament thus chosen to govern South Africa for another three years, the United Party holds less than one-third of the seats, but this fact does not reflect the support it received from the electorate. In the contested oonstituenoles, the total vote polled by the Nationalist Party numbered 370000, by the United Paity together with Nationl Union, 336,000. ?he total vote polled by the National Union was 50,000.31 The Unite& Party enjoys the support, probably, of almost half the white electorate, but it is a support which offers no prospect, in the forseeable future, of the party's return to power, For the African, its policy has come to be looked %pon as fundamentally indistinguishable from the government policy of.Atthelsu in that both rest firmly on the concept of white supremay. Studied through the lens of political science the United Party takes on an appewance of utter unreality - if only on the ground that its appeaooh to South Africa's future appears to be based on the assumption that the wishes of the 11 million Africans are irrelevant. None of the policies of the United Party is in fact the result of. (or purports to be based upon) consultation with the African. The Progressive Party In 1959, 12 members Of the United Party resigned in protest against the party#s indecisive and equivocal racial policies, but retained their seats as representatives of the new Progressive Party established later in the year. The Progressive Party annomed a policy providing for participation in the government of the country of "all suitable qalified citizens of a defined degree of civilization,, amd for a constitution entrenching fundamental human righjs, providing safeguards ag ainst the domination of one race by another, and making membership of the party available to all citizens over the age of 18, regardless of race or colour. At the General leotion of 1961,j the Party lost all but one of its seat to the United Party, but sucoeeded in polling an aggregate of 69,000 votes.7 Since then the party has had no success in its attempt to win over supporters of the United Party. In .March 1962, the party contested 14 seats in the elections to the Johannesburg City Council, and lost all to the United Party opponents, including those in which the Progressive condidates were sitting members, The party has African members, but their number is small, The party's. policy of a qualifi3 franchise is not calculated to attract African support. The qualifications, are sufficiently high in the light of the educational opportunities of the majority of the African people, to ensure that the number of Africans entitled to vote would remain small. The solitary representative of the party in Parliamet, Helen Suzman, is an effectlve critic-of government policy* and a courageotsdefender Afri can rights., But she represents a party which has clearly failed to gain any significant support from the electorate. She symbolizes the determination of white South Africa to reject even a. mderate ireponue to the African' demand *fr polit Joel righta. The Progreesive Party fits into the pattern of political umralty in South Africa. It. policy is too liberal for the white man, too moderate for the African. The 1iberal Party - Non-racial Democragy The Liberal Party has no representatives in Parliament. Its four members - two in the Senate, two in the House Assembly - all representing the African, lost their seats when African representation was abolished in 1960 in terms of the Bromotion of Bantu Self-Government Act.40 One of them, Mrgaret Bal.linger, had held her seat continuously since the inception of separate African representation, a period of 23 years. She was generally recognized as the outstanding figure in the parliamentary fight against the. forces of white supremacy. The Party was founded In 1953s whortly after the Ntionalist Party had been returned to power fer the second time. It grew out of a Liberal Association, composed of a number of inter-racial disoussion groups thoughout the country. The Constitution sets out the following principles: (1)the essential dignity of every human being irrespective of race, colour of creed, and the maintenancs of his fundamental rights; (2) the right of every human being to develop to the fullest extent of whith he is capable consisten with the rights of otherm; (3) the maintenance of the rule of law; (4) that no person be debarred from participating in, the government and other democratic processes of the country b reason on4l of race, colour or creed, The party proposes extension of the franchise on the common roll to al adult persons, under a sonstitution incorporating an entrenched bill of rights, based -ton ihe Universal Declaration of Humen Rights. It sateds for asystem of government based upon the wishes of all the people. "The future constitution of South Africa must be established by the consent of the people as a whole# and this consent Man best be expressed by a National Convention, representative of every section of the people. .041 The policies of the Liberal Party have been rejected by the white elec* torate,62 but the party's activities, within Parliament and outside, have played a significant part in Influencing white opinion, and building up African support for a non-racial society. During the seven years that the party enjoyed parliamentary- reJresentation, its members provided the only concerted unequivocal opposition to t which reflected the views of a group comprising all sections of the population. They Monstituted, furthermore, the recognized voice of the Afrian people in the South African parliament, Their consistent refusal to make a3y concessions to whie prejudice, tended to expose the indecisiveness of United Party policy, and to strengthen liberal trends within the United Party.

Outside parliament, the Liberal Party has gonefahead steadily with the construction of a growing non-racial oasis within the Nationalist desert of apartheid. They party's membership, predominantly white when it was founded 10 years ago, is todaypredominantly.African, and the party is closely identified with every aspect of the African's lawful resistance to apartheid. The Liberal Party recognizes that it has an extra-parliamentary role, and accepts boycotts, strikes and other non-violent measures, as methods of opposition to government policies, which are legitimate in a country which denies the vote to the majority of the people. Whites and Africans share office in the party's national and regional committees, campaign together in elections, combine in protests and demonstrations, and co-operate in numerous other activities. During the emergency of 1961, a number of leading members of the party, white and African - including the National Chairman - were detained for a period of three months. Alan Paton, National President of the party has written: "The Liberal Party is non- racial party. All its policies are non-racial. It believes that non-racialism is the only sure foundation for a multi-racial society of such complexity as ours, and that our problem can only be dealt with by people of all groups working together." The Liberal Party is continuing its work. It is hampered by the growing itwork of apartheid restrictions, and the threat of proscription J hangs over its head. But is shows no signs of being intimidated. It takes its stand firmly on the belief ,that the only hope for a stable future in South Africa lies in the achievement of non- ratial democracy. Today only a minority of the whites share that.fbelief. The self-imposed task of the Liberal Party is to convert the remainder. As for African opinion, the African National Congress, too, has consistently asked for democratic government in w1ch all the people - irrespective of race - will participate,* and has, in many instances, supported, andco-operated with, the Liberal Party; on the other hand the party has encountered hostility from the communist group, and the Pan-Africanists. Increasingly the choice before white South Africa tends to crystallize into the choice betweem white domination (the policy of the present government when it is judged by its actions and its laws, rather than by its promises and plans) and non-racial democracy; with white leadership poised in a state ofIndecision between the two. The promises and plans - total territorial apartheid - are under searching examination by a growing number of Afrikaner Intellectuals and churchmen. How long will it take before they realize that apartheid is a pipe dream? And when they have, which will they choose.- white domination or racial democracy? But these questions must be posed within the framework of the major question: how much time is left to white South Africa to make any choice at all? FOOTNOTES 1 The South African Parliament consists of two chambers, the House of Assembly and the Senate. The Senate has a membership of 54, partly nominated by the Government, partly chosen by an electoral college composed of members of the House of Assembly and Miembers of the respective Provincial Councils. The House of Assembly ' the effective organ of the legislature - comprises 160 white members. 156 are chosen by the direct vote of the white electorate in single-member constituencies. Four are elected to represent constituencies in the Cape Province, by coloured voters voting on a separate roll. At the date of the *election in 1961, of a coloured population numbering 1,509,258, approximately 100,000 were eligible as voters, and of these approximately 25,000 bad registered as voters* 2 According to the last South African census, held in 1960, the .omposition of -the pi azu a i s-l .troanJ 10,907,780; White, 3,088,492; Coloured, 1,509,258; Asian, 477,125. The total increase in the population stIce the last census, in 1951, is 39311,212, of which 2,347,706 are Africans. 3 Of the 156 seats, 70 were unopposed - 50 represented by the Nationalist Party; 20 by the United Party. The registered electorate for the remaining 86 seats was 1,029,696o Of thik .,number, 800,590 went to the polls. 4 I have omitted a fifth party, National Union, which is represented in the House by one member, Its policy does not differ significantly from that of the United Party. 5- The apartheid polioy of the S. A* ureau of Racial Affairs as set out in In tegratio Z Separate D eveloDment? (Stellenbosoh, 1952). 6 Hansard, House of Assembly, April 12, 1950. Cols. 4141-2. 7 Haneard, House of Assembly, September 2, 1948. Qol. 1486. 8 The Group Areas Act No. 77 of 1957. 9 The Reservation of Separate Amenities Act No. 49 of 1953. 10 Ibid. 11 Bantu Education Act, No. 47 of 1950. 12- Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act No. 48 of 1953. 13 Industr,!l Conciliation Act No* 28 of-1956, 8. 77. 14 Population Reg~stration Act No. 30 of 1950. 15 Nat-ives (Prohibition of Interdiots) Act No. 64 of 1956. 16 Natives (Urban Areas Consolidation) Act No. 25 of 1945, as amended S. 10 (1) (a) and (o). 17 Proclamation No..164, July 4, 1958,. pursuant to S. 1(4) read wi- i- S. l(i) (vi) of the Group Areas Act, No. 77 of 1957. _18 Gorernment Notice No. 804 June 13,--1958 read with Act No. 25 of 1945 as amended, S. 104i) (c). 19 Natives (Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents). Act No. 67 of 1952. According to information furnished by the Minister of Justice in Parliament in 1957, 174,392 cases were sent for trial for offences against curfew regulations, pass laws and regulations relating to the production of documents; a further 52,631 cases (including a oonsiderable number relating to control of movement) were sent for trial "for offences under the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidatibn Act, as amended. (Hansard, House of Assembly 1958. Vol. 2. Columns 341-3). 20 A Survey of Race Relatitns it South Africa, 1957-8. Muriel Horrell. (S.A. Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg.) During 1961, 375,417 Africans were convicted of iWflux control and pass law offences. This figure was given to the House of

Assembly, in reply to questions, by the Minister of Justice in February, 1963. (The Star, Johannesburg. February 9, 1963) 21 Foreword to This is Apartheid by Leslie Rubin. (Victor Gollancz. London. 1959) 22 SouthAfrica and the Rule of Law. (International Commission of Jurists. Geneva, 1960) 23 The full report runs to, 18 volumes consisting of 51 chapets comprising 3,755 pages, 598 tables and an atlas of 46 large scale maps. 24 Keesings Archives: May, 1961, 18090; December 1962, 19132. 25 Our Responsibility. (Juta and Oompany. Cape Town, 1959) 26 Dr. Verwoerd. Hansard, House of Assembly, January 27, 1959. 27 Since 1936, the Africans of the Cape Province have been represented in the House of Assembly, by three white members; the Africans of all four provinces, in the Senate, by four white memrnis. 28 "Fears and Pressures in the Union of South Africa." Race Relations Jcurnal. Vol. 22, No. 3, 1955. 29 Hahlo and Kahn:' The Union of South Africa. (Stevens & Son. Lon,don, 1960). P. 800; Muriel Horrell: "20antu Authorities and SelfGovernment." Race R -1ions Journal. Vol 26, No. 2. On July 18, 1955, the Minister Of Justice stated that 35 chiefs and headmen had been deposed since January 1, 1955. (Hansard, House of Assembly, 1958, Vol. 1, Col. 514.), 30 An Administrative Commission set up to inquire into the causes of the disturbances reported in October, 1969, that many complaints about the Bantu Authorities system were justified. (Keesings Archives, October 1961. 18367). 31 Keesing's Archives, October 1961, 18367; January 1962, 18572. 32. Keesings Archives, January 1962, 10572. 33 Gwendolen Carter: The Politics, of Inequality. (London: 1958). 34 Hansard, House of Assembly. March 23, 1957, Vol. 10, Col. 3606. 35 The Nationalint Party showed a net gain of 7 seats (10 gains and 3 losses), the United Party a net gain of 1 seat (10 gains and 9 losses). Keesing's Archives, May 1959, 16158. 36 Hansdrd House of Assembly. May 18, 1959. 37 Keesing a Archives. November, December, 1961, 18449. 38 Ibi d., January, 1962, 18572. 39 E-,1r school standard 8, or school standard 4 together with c-c-xin riaterial qualifications. 40 See '~tud1;z No. 27 41 NDr. ,ele m Democracy. The Policies of the Liberal Party. (7t r L'u'it ztburg). 42 Ia *:1.4-.'. a Elections of 1961, it contested 2 seats and lost both 17 a suJ ustantial vote. In one, the Liberal can.tldate for,... b deposit. It has been de eated by si!,tantial majorit; u all the elections for white seats, whi'ch it has conteot-eQ 43 T.'r Afr_-ca -. National Congress and the Indien Vat7 nal Congas, Wvl D I te arty co-operated, haove e l :y ) *x co'ibed. 44 J , *- . e 'The Ha.rden.I.n Tcx. :, ...... o rcan. Race c zurnal# October 196 (ioii..m.esb ).

FORCE: ITS THRUbT AND PRUGN0I5: 5uUTH AFkICA By John Marcum and Allard K. Lowenstein A. Turn Toward Violence South Africa has known sporadic racial violence for a long time. The transition to planned violence begn after the sequence of events climaxed by the 5harpeville shootings on March 21, 1960. It did not gain much momentum, however, until after the strike called for May 31, 1961, to coincide with the declaration of the Republic, failed to induce the government to convoke a multiracial national convention to discuss a new constitution. Thus, the use of deliberate force as a weapon designed to bring down the government is still in its infancy in jouth Africa.' It is, therefore, impossible at this juncture to do more than review a few of the circumstances which have led the country to its present pass, summarize recent incidents in the evolving of the new pattern, and assess the strengths and plans of various forces now at work shaping that pattern. Then, on this inadequate basis, we can speculate briefly about what might happen if certain contingencies arise in the near future. The history of non-violence in bouth Africa is recorded elsewhere, but to understand its waning influence there it is necessary only to note the government's response to the non-violent protest movements of 1960 and 1961. These it crushed with a display of determined repressiveness that included a rather free use of guns and whips on unarmed Africans, the mobilization and flaunting of the armed forces, the arming of large numbers of European civilians, the secret jailing without trial or charges of thousands of people of every race and of widely divergent points of view, the banning of African political organizations and of most public meetings, and the raiding, patrolling, and cordoningoff of African urban areas.1 The state of mind of the authorities was expressed by Lt. Col. Pienaar, who was in charge of the police at 5harpeville. "The native mentality," he said, "does not allow them to gather for a peaceful demonstration. For them to gather means violence." '.hen he was asked if he had learned any "useful lessons," he replied, "Well, we may get better equipment."2 The success of the government's vigorous measures encouraged an immediate impression of strength, but it also ensured long-range effects which have been summarized by an observer as follows: "African leaders came to the conclusion that the mass jailings and the collective memory of Sharpeville were the factors most responsible for the splotchy response to the strikes. The splotchy response thus assumed a Pyrrhic significance for the future of the Republic, for it drove many nonwhites to the unwelcome conviction that traditional forms of non- violent protest cannot be This is Part II of a paper originally delivered at a conference sponsored by the American Society of 1 frican Culture in April 1963, the proceedings of which are being edited for a book entitled "Southern Africa in Transition," which will be published by Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. in the fall of 1964. effective as long as the government not only can arrest anyone it wishes to arrest, but is prepared as well to shoot down large numbers of peaceful Africans. Under such circumstances nonEuropeans have only two choices: to acquiesce indefinitely in the present situation, or to seek new methods of effecting a change. Anyone who chose acquiescence would not last long as a leader."' This change in African political thinking was gradual and at first largely Verbal;3A but it was fundamental: discussions about the merits and tactics of non'-violence began to give way to discussions about the nature and feasibility of unplanned and planned violence. What one writer has called "the immense and enduring reluctance among Africans to embark on serious military action" 4 lingered on, and in fact lingers on -- a reluctance compounded of long habit, religious conviction, awareness of the sensibilities of western opinion, and above all, of a simple and very real horror about the price of a freedom won by bdiood against guns. The greatest of the African leaders are most deeply troubled about sanctioning a departure from their efforts over the decades to avoid civil war in jouth Africa. As late as December, 1961, Chief Luthuli said "We in our situation have chosen the path of non-violence of our own volition,"5 and refused to hear talk of violence or to participate in discussions about abandoning nonviolence despite a myriad of opportunities and pressures to do so while out of bout:h Africa on his trip to receive the Nobel Peace Prize. However, even Northern Rhodesia's Kenneth Kaunda, one of the most consistent opponents of the use of force among African Nationilist leaders, viewed Sharpeville as evidonce that under such ckrcustances "non-v~i-ence does not pay. If anything, it provides cheFp cannon fodder'"6 Witnesses at the 1961 Treason Trial insisted, despite intense prosecutioi q.uestioning, that violence was outside the policy of the Congress, Alliance, bLt whether this insistence came of conviction, linoeiring lip-service, or legal strategy the government could no lotger know. Neither, for that matter, were all of the witnesses themselves certain. On the other hand, Nelson Nandela, senior officer in the ANC and one of the chief organizers of the May, 1961, protest strike, commented: "If peaceful protests like these are to be put down by mobilization of the army and the police, then the people might be forced to use other methods of struggle."8 And ANC leaders abroad -- including men with long records of moderation and patience like Oliver Tambo and Robert Resha -- began to talk about a "new situation" bordering on "war"; it was now necessary, they said, to use both violence and non-violence to achieve freedom in the "hope that the world will help us to prevent another Algerian situation arising in our country.",9 By February, 1962, Mandela was telling the PAFMECDA conference in Adis Ababa that the policy had been "peaceful struggle" but "the situation has now radically altered." The tide was turing in other opposition groups as well. Philip Kgosana, the young PAC leader who in the spring of 1960 had led 3,000 silent Africans into and out of Capetown in what became perhops bouth Africa's most stricking non-violent protest march, announced in London as early as April, 1961: "We are an organization committed to the overthrow of white domination in South Africa. We are not going to preach violence. We think that non-violence is the beat way. But we reserve the right to take whatever action is necessary to defend ourselves."10 In December, 1962, Potlako K. Leballo, acting president of the PAC -- the organization which had called the bharpeville protest meeting amidst the strictest of preachments against recourse to violence -- told a London press conference that violence should be expected. "The African people recognize that to effect any change in South Africa, the present situation, whereby white South Africa holds the monopoly of military power, must be changed. This can be achieved only by our acquisition of the means of challenging that military power."11 Leballo had previously announced that PAC, in preparation for "revolution," was setting up four commissions to deal with national security, economic development, education and law reform -- and that it would be asking Afro-Asians and other friendly states to undekwrite a major loan to help "reduce the present military imbalance of power in South Africa."112 And in February, 1963, it was reported that Nelson Mahomo, a member of the PAC Executive Bureau, had received promises of military aid and training facilities from Premier Ben Bella of Algeria. The evolution in the thinking of Mendola, Leballo, and other African leaders has been paralleled among leaders of opposition groups of other racial groups. In early 1959 Patrick Duncan, a liberal European who was then editor of Contact magazine, warned that violence would mean "devastating wars,..more terribel than any the continent has yet suffered."13 A year later, after the Cape Town demonstrations against passes, he could still write that "Africans...have seen enough of the power of non-violence to make them sure that non-violence has everything that is necessary for their success in the future."14 Two years later Duncan, nbw in exile in Basutoland, had changed his mind, "Through the unyielding uppressiveness of the apartheid government there is now no chance of a peaceful transition to freedom and democracy. The way to power in South Africa now lies through the use of force.. .. The best, perhaps the only guarantee that a future free South Africa will be non- Communist is that the South African revolution be begun ane led to victory by men who are not Communist. Such men exist within South Africa, but they have insufficient arms and money. They must now be given what they need."15 An astute commentator on the South 1African scene, Mr. Anthony Sampson, after Visiting L'outh Africa for the first time since Sharpeville, wrote in February, 1963, of a changed atmosphere: "My African friends who before had been tclkative and open -- often far too much so -- were now far more guarded...the atmosphere was much more austere and cautious." He found African politicians given to laconic uttercnces like, "Wait until 1963, we have our plzns," or "The days of non-violence are over," often followed by inquiries about the state of opinion in Britain and America. Conversation, he reported, hed turned to sabotage, terrorism, counter-terrorism and civil war.16 B. Objectives, Tactics-and Reso.urces in the New Situation But if a turn toward violence became inevitable after the repression of the protest campaigns of 1960 and 1961, the shpe of violence -- if, indeed, it was to have more shape than spontaneous outbursts in townships and Reserves -- was far from clear. Patrick Van Reniburg, one of the ablest of the younger leaders of the Liberal Partj,11 analyzed the situation in the early months of 1962: "What kind of revolution is it to be? "South Africa has a police force of some twenty thousand whites and thirty thousand Africans, Indians and Coloureds. The white force is armed with revolvers, sub-machine-guns, and Saracen armoured cafs...There is a sizeable political brance of the police force. This branch can open mail, tap telephones, and search houses at any time. It has an intricate system of spies. There is a permanent army of some twenty thousand men, armed with all modern weapons, including light artillery...The air force is well equipped with modern fighters, capable of strafing or bombing townships... There is a reserve which trains about three thousand men each year...There are the skietkomma.-}os, whoe members practice target-shooting regularly...'Mobile Watches' are being established... "The whole defence force is designed to put down internal rebellion...T ere will shortly be twelve tank and infantry regiments in strategic parts of the country, equipped with Saracen and Ferret light tanks. South Africa has established her own arms industry, probably in anticipation of an arms embafgo...Against this might, how would armed revolution be organized? Where would it obtain armaments? Where would it set up its bases of operation? The African townships? There are large police-stations in each one... Strong detachments of police are poised within minutes of them... There are very few rural areas without substantial white populations. Even the native reserves are well covered by government officials." "Violent revolt in South Afric, " he concludes, "would be ruthlessly and quickly suppressed."± Another analysis, written about the same time, suggested another course that events might follow: "Planned violence will start with modest projects involving industrial sabotage. Soon terrorists will strike at isolated white farmers reputed to have mistreated African labor. Once such things are underway in earnest, they can hardly fail to multiply themselves in succeeding horrors. The reaction of Afrikaner Nationalists leaves little to the imagination, and to meet this reaction each of several embittered groups would sot out to prove itself the toughest and most ruthless opponent of white supremacy. Most liberal Europeans will long since have fled (the exodus has already begun); and among nonEuropeans 'moderation' will soon seem disloyalty: the more bloodthirsty the leader, the more trustworthy his leadership. Communists, black racists, gangsters, religious fanatics and political opportunists, and countless individuals angling for power or glory will vie for control of an increasingly ugly and chaotic situation."19 If the reblities have made non-violence seem futile, or at least inadequate, the same realities scoff at the possibility of massing sufficient force to overcome the assembled power of a modern, highly-armed state. Thus, most exponents of planned violence in bouth Africa agree that a major objective of such violence must be to arouse assistance from abroad. Even those who speak at home of dying "alone" for freedom work hard to cultivate support in other parts of the world, although leaders of the P.A.C. insist that the contest will have to be won primarily by Africans in South Africa. "No non-European politician," the same observer has commented, "however militant, welcomes the prospect of an extended campaign of violence; theicontending forces are too unequal, the inevitable damage too great. But now hope for freedom is focused on the outside world, and indifference there to non- violence at home has become a powerful incentive to violence: surely someone will have to step in if civil war starts...How long can so unequal a struggle go on before outside help is solicited? Independent African states might be the first to send help, but inevitably one group or another will seek assistance from Russia and China. It would be foolish to suppose that 'volunteers' as well as equipment will not be made available at propitious moments... "20 Two basic approaches may be discerned in what organized violent action has materialized to date: (1) Sabotage and hit-andrun attacks against industrial installations and communications; (2) Mass rioting, including attacks designed to destroy property, and isolated outbursts designed to terrify Europeans and kill or incapacitate selected individuals. Two illicit organizations, the National Liberation Committee and Umkonto We Sizwe (Zulu for "Spear of the Nation) are known to be functioning along the lines of the former, and one, Poqo (Xhosa for "pure," "only," or "we are alone") alnog the lines of the latter. There is no cooperation among these groups, and considerable acrimony has already developed among them over questions of tactics, political orientation and racial policy, and as a consequence of competitive approaches to sympathizers in independent Africa and elsewhere. Poqo has been easily the best publicized of the three, thanks in part to its emphasis on mass participation, in part to its penchant for dramatic and brutal action, and in part to the government's trumpeting of-it as its chief adversary. It has been ' responsible for a-Kumber of recent outbursts, notably the riots in the town of Paarl in Cape Province, the slaying of a progovernment chief, and the killing of five Europeans in the Transkei. But whether these episodes are part of a general plan, and if so whether they are aimed toward any specific, short-range goals, and whether the organization has sufficient depth and cohesion to withstand severe police rataliation is not yet clear. The Paarl affair occurred on November 22, 1962, when more than a hundred crudly-armed Africans marched into town from Mbikweni African Location and attacked a police station in an attempt to free several Africans who had been arrested that day. Five Africans were killed in the ensuing clash, during which stores were burned, windows smashed, and two Europeans hacked to death.21 Ten weeks later, on Februafy 7, 1963, six Africans were sentenced to death for slaying the chief Gwebindlala Gqoboza, a murder they told the court they had committed under pressure from Poqo. Soon after these events, in mid-March, the one-man Commission of Inquiry into the Paarl riots, Justice Snyman, issued an interim report, urging drastic measures to crush Poqo. "I have found," Justice Snyman wrote, "that both Bantu and whites are so terrified of the outrages of the Poqo movement that they are too frightened to give information to the authorities." The politica correspondent of the Johannesburq Star summarized the Commission's findings with the comment, "Terrorization of T 4nskei Africans and whites has reached a dangerous level. The longer the reign of fear continues, the more law- abiding Africans will be estranged from the state."2223 Such reports have not discouraged comparisons to the Mau Mau, although much of what is said about Poqo is conjecture and, doubtless, a good deal more, propaganda.24 For the moment, at least, it serves the purpose of both Poqo and the government to spur tales of Poqo's power and ruthlessness. Poqo's advantage from such publicity is obvious. The government, on the other hand, is certain it can crush Poqo and is convinced that the more terrifying and powerful the reputation of the for which it crushes, the more devastating the psychological blow to all its underground opponents. By April 6, in fact, "police officers" in Pretoria were already being quoted as "confident" that Poqp had been "smashed," its leaders "captured or on the run," and the rank-and-file "disorganized."25 26 Snyman found Poqo to be an arm of the banned PAC, a description which the PAC leadership was quick to endorse. In the December, 1962 issue of the liberal weekly Contact, Leballo, writing as acting head of the PAC, had predicted: "As a result of the ban on the Pan-Africanist Congress which has been powerful in the Cape, there was no doubt that there would emerge a vigorous revolutionary underground movement to take its place. The Poqo organization therefore is a direct manifestation of the helplessness of striving for democratic demands without an open body such as the PAC was before it was banned. The present uprising in the Cape are only the beginning of a general ferment through South Africa!26A Then, on March 25, in an interview at Maseru, Basutoland, Leballo went a good deal futther. A large-scale uprising would be launched in South Africa during 1963, he announced: the Pan-Africanist "revolutionary council" was "discussing the tim 7 and manner in which action will be launched; it is imminent." PAC andPoqo are the same, he said, and credited the Pearl affair and the Transkei killings to "impatient PAC mem ors disobeying orders to '.-i.t until instructions were given." He was critical of efforts at industrial sabotage, which he described as the '.-'c'k r;f Lommunists and the ANC: "Those who embark on sabotage 'ave not got the fbllowing for mass action. What are the uses of these isolated explosions?" Poqo's strength, he went on, is its manpower, which he estimated at 150,000 2d said is "carefully organized" into 1,000-man "cells". The Snyman Inquiry found evidence supporting the existence of a plan fof a rising in 1963 in the testimony of an alleged member of Poqo who is quoted as saying that "on a cer-.-, tain night this year Africans throughout South Africa would rise and kill the whites, cut telephone lines and wreck railway lines. ...We were told that Sobukwe, in prison since 1960, wanted soldiers who would be ready when he came out of jail. We were also told that the big year was 1963 when the Bantu would get their country." 29A Of Poqo, the witness is reported to have said: "I was alone when I joined. I was not threatened. I joined because I was told that all Bantu belong to the Poqa befause we had to get the country back from the whites .... We were also told that there were people in the locations who would make us weapons. We were not given the names of these people....My duties were only to call my ten peoole to the #ieeting....I was also to find who ampng my peopie no longar w notd to belong to o which , to be reported so that that person's hcd cnuld be cut o:Yff.'' Mc;iwhile the N.L.C. E d E .ar have continued to implement independent c'.ai of0 sLot u. Spear appears to be ccM'LUs3:d laroely of those sections of the banned AIL now willing to use vioi'x.'ze, joined by elements of the same European, Indian, and Co!:.':ed g.t-'ps that had cooperated in the.Corgress Alliance. Nelson MoP.cla -- whose feat in eluding the policd for an extended period after "going underground" has made him perhaps the most celebrated political figure of the post-Sh*,pewIle period -- aroused much interest in Spear before his impi :J.nment. Rumors of a split between pro- and non-Communist factions within Spear have been circulated lately3OA -- a split alleged to derive less from ideology than from a growing concern among some ANC leaders that too close involvement with Communists may keep them from receivinq support from nationalist groups throughout independent Africa. 3OB On the other hand, there have also been reliable reports of officers of substantial financial assistance from various Communist sources. The NLC eschews mass participation and has sought to avoid publicity. Its membership includes socialist,, disaffected members of the Liberal Party and of the Congress of Democrats, some Trotskyites, and some persons not known to have been previously involved in politics. In this assorted group there appears to be a substantial number of demolition experts and the like; at any rate, the NLC has been especially active in the blowing up of power installations and other utilities. NLC leadership hopes to recruit "useful" individuals, whatever their former associations, although it has been hostile to cooperation with Communists. It is difficult under the circumstances to assess with any assurance just who has done what, but even incomplete compilations of incidents indicate that the cumulative result of NLC and Spear activities during the past year or so is formidable.30C More than 40 attempted bombings and fires of mysterious origins have occurred since the end of September, 1962; there have also been frequent cuttings of telephone lines. At least 22 of the bombs and fires have caused partial or severe damage to electric power lines, railroad signal boxes, offices and homes. Three attempts (one successful) .have been made to derail trains since January, 1963.31 In late October, 1962, the Ministry of Agriculture was bombed. The New York Times of November 28 reported that saboteurs, striking "for the. twentieth time this year" had caused "heavy damage" when they blew up a power pylon with disrupted electrical and ra services on the fringes of Johannesburg for several hours. .(The Manchester Guardian of November 10 had repqrted that 25 attempts at sabotage -- half of them in Cape Prbvince -had taken place within six weeks, and that 29 telephone lines were cut and two train derailments attempted in the first week of November.33 Desplte all this, the life of the average European has not reflected the fundamental change in his situation, and he has yet to face its implications. How he will react when these implications can no longer be avoided is, of course, as critical a ques- tion as any in the South African dilemma. At this point, however, a queer, almost schizophrenic, contrast persists for most of the dQminant race; the pleasant life in South Africa as he knows it day by day seems totally unconnected to the tales of revolution and predictions of doom that inundate him when he reads the foreign press. To him the pleasantness is still the reality. But events of the past ten months have forced at least his government to reappraise "reality." Even the unflagging effort to depict South Africa as stable, happy, and united except for a few "agitators" and "communists" has wobbled. B.J. Vorster, the Minister of Justice, recently repeated that he and Dr. Verwoerd "had frequently stated South Africa was calm and orderly -perhaps the world's most peaceful country.33A (The same minister also said &t virtually the same time, "Acts of sabotage and violence will never succeed in forcing the government to abandon its policy."'33B) But Dr. Verwoerd himself was quoted as saying that "nobody will deny that a crisis exists in South Africa," and Sir de Villiers Graaff observed that "for the first time organized murder is being used as a political weapon."34 And Eric Louw's most recent public estimate of the situation was, "We live in difficult times and the outlook is perhaps a bit darker than people think. I do not wish to sound unduly pessimistic, but we are, in the fullest sense, involved in a cold war."35 Budget figures and new laws may indicate the degree of official alarm even more graphically than official pronouncementss Military expenditures have been tripled since 1961, and the effort to stamp out sabotage has produced a law which the International Committee of Jurists concluded had reduced the liberty of the citizen "to a degree not surpas gd by the most extreme dictatorship of the Left or the Right." . The budget for national defense has risen from $61.6 million in 1960 to $168 million by i32-63, and is headed to $220 million for the fiscal year 1963-64. ' The standing army may be expanded from 20,000 to 60,000 men,38 and in June, 1962, the Minister of Defense announced that South Africa could mobilize more than . 250,000. The police force is being revamped39 to be "ready at all times for action to ensure internal security, while heavily-armed police are on a 24-hour standbyfooting. In Pretoria, 2,000 homeguard recruits were mobilized last month. Women's pistol clubs are now practicing daily. In Capetown, wives of ministers are taking rifle lessons, and in Johannesburg, a Sherman tank on display outside the National War Museum was taken down from its plinth because it had only 100 miles on the clock and might be needed.,40 The Air Force has received new fighters, bombers, transports, reconnaissance planes, trainers, and a substantial helicopter fleet. The government "has frantically shopped abroad -buying jet fighter bombers from France, transports from the U.S., helicopters and armored cars from Britain, automatic rifles from Israel."41 The Leader of the Labour Party in Britain, Harold Wilson, among others, has proposed an embargo on arms for South Africa. Such suggestions have provoked indignation on the part of the South African government and a rallying-round-the- flag on the part of some Europeans normally critical of the government. "To suggest that the Republic should be cut off from all arms supplies," the Star said in a lead editorial, "is utterly pointless. A defenseless South Africa would be the prey of continental and and international gangsters and be reduced to chaos. There could be no conceivable benefit in that for anyone."42 , In any case the government was moving to reduce its dependence on overseas supplies. In January 1963,klO,000,000 was contracted for the construction of three ammunitions factories in South Africaj3 The government would apparently have preferred to explain 'its military preparations as impelled by the threat of external attack, presumably from independent African states or Russia. Eric Louw has cited threats by Algerian premier Ben Bella to attack Angola and Aouth Africa.4 "All this planning is done with emphasis on defense against outside aggression,"45 the minister of Defense, J.J. Fouche, has said. It has been particularly important to maintain this explanation overseas, where the image sought for South Africa might be impaired if it seemed the government was obliged to undertake massive armaments to protest itself against its own people. The same Mr. Fouche, however, had told Parliament in December, 1959, "You must not think we are arming against an external enemy -- we are not. We are arming to shoot down the black masses."'46 And Mr. Donges, the Minister of Finance, in his defense in Parliament of the new military budget, included the remark, "For South Africa the present time could almost be regarded as a period of cold war, calling for large expenditure over a relatively short period on expensive defense equipment." x It seems fair to assume, from the nature of the equipment sought and of the tr@ining planned, that both internal and external factors have entered into the government's calculations; but there seems a clear and heavy priority on the internal: white ladies wielding firearms and platoons of police dogs might be invaluable against Algerian para-drops, but less remote situations suggest themselves as the impetus for such preparations. C. Neighboring Complications with International Ramifications It remains to mention three situations in southern Africa which are developing along lines that can hardly help affecting deeply the course of affairs in the Republic; that the obverse is also true is manifest. This is not the proper place to inquire into these three situations in depth, but each contains the possibility of provoking a broader explosion, or even of inducing a general intervention, before events in South Africa itself are likely to do so; and for this reason each contains the possibility of influencing decisively the course of events within 5outh Africa. 1. As noted above, the status of 5outh *est Africa is now *" before the International Court for a compulsory ruling. If the Court should find that bouth Africa has violated the terms of her Mandate, efforts to implement the ruling might engender South African defiance. Mr. Clarence Randall, a prominent American businessman who toured South Africa in 1962 as a guest of the South Africa Foundation, became convinced from discussions there that the South African government would resist any United Nations intervention. If the UN should try to intervene, his "prominent" informants intimated, South Africa "would take over South West Africa at once by military means and ignore the United Nations."48 If this should happen, he concluded, "the who 4 rule of law in international relationships would be at stake." There have been no known incidents of planned violence in South West to date, but UN Committees and other observers have found deep African bitterness and mounting tension between the races. The African population of 500,000 is too sparse and too poorly organized to mount a serious challenge to South African hegemony, although the two major African political organizations, SWANU and SWAPO, have developed considerable support, and display increasing skill at organizing and mobilizing opinion. African protests are still couched in non- violent terms. A large meeting in Windhook Location in December, 1959, was, however, fired on by the police, and more that 60 casualties resulted. Finally, it is not inconceivable that if activity in neighboring Angola moves southward it could spill across tha frontier, especially as the Ovambo tribe lives on both the Angolan and South West African sidds. 2. Southern Rhodesia seems to be emerging as the likeliest site from which violence,.may expand in southern Africa. The victory of Winston Field's Rhodesian Front, a white supremacist party, and the dismantling of the Central African Federation, has confrontq Africans in Southern Rhodesia with the possibility of white minority rule for an indefinite period. The Southern Rhodesian government is demanding immediate independence from Britain, and talks of proclaiming itself independent with or without British consent. If such a development occurs, an African government-in-exile seems almost certain to appear, and with it a civil war in Southern Rhodesia which neighboring states could hardly watch idly. The Field government might be obliged to turn to South Africa for financial end milit :ry support. If South Africa should agree to help -- and it is hard to see how she could refuse to do so -- a generalized showdown throughout southern Africa might be at hand considerably sooner thEn is generally expected. But even if so total and final an involvement is avoided, the Southern Rhodesian crisis could hardly be confined to Southern Rhodesia, should it devolve into bitter racial fighting. It is, therefore, worth noting the observations of two journalists, one currently in Rhodesia, the other in London. The correspondent of the "ashington Daily News wrote from balisbury in March, 1963: "This reporter has been assured by dedicated and thoughtful men on both sides of the fearful bettleline drawn here between black Africans and white Luro ans that Rhodesia's future will have to be proved-by blood ."o And idney Gruson of the New York Times reported from London on April 8: "An increasing sense of helplessness (about the situation in Southern Rhodesia) is evident among many politicians and members of Parliament, particularly Conservatives. There is almost a resigned acceptance of the prospect of violence. The phrase 'another Algeria' is heard with increasing frequency. No one pretends to know what the Southern Rhodesian Government headed by Winston Field will do if Britain formally rejects its demand for early independence. Reports to London from 5alisbury, the colony's capitol, say that relations between whites and Negroes are deteriorating every day the situation goes unsolved. The possibility that Southern

Rhodesia will proclaim its independence and defend it by force, or that it will seek incorporation into neighboring South Africa, are being discussed here. The letter step is generally ruled out, but no one here would be surprised if South Africa extended large-scale economic help if Mr. Field declared Southern Rhodesia independent. The Salisbury correspondent of' the Sunday Telegraph reported Vr. Field has said his government wanted immediate independence to keep Britain from intervening militarily in the event of an African uprising."52 3. The High Commission Territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swasiland are likely to attain full self-government within the next few years. All have become havens for South African refugees, and one or more may develppe into enclaves from which nationalist undergrounds operate in South Africa. Basutoland has come to the special.attention of the South African government in this connection, in view of the 400-mile common frontier and of the PAC headquarters which have been functioning actively in Maseru. The recent Leballo interview there is believed to have been the first occasion on which violent overthrow of the South African government has been advocated publicly in one of the Protectorates. The potential awkwardness of this situation is obvious, perhaps above all for the British, who could be caught between South African government pressures and strong African emotions. It is also true, however, that many Protectorate Africans are nervous about too much anti-South African activity being conducted from enclaves so vulnerable to reprisal. The Basuto police gave an indication of their attitudes after the Leballo interview, when they searched the PAC headquarters, arrested a number of PAC exiles, and issued a warrant for Leballo's arrest.53 The Star of March 30, under the headline "Leballo ari-t4on raises issue of Basutoland,",summarized thesituation ae iollows: "The British Government allows political refugees to stay in Basutoland almost indefinitely on the understanding thrat their temporary residence permits remain in force if they keep out of Basutoland politics and do not try to embarass the administration. A retaliatory move which the South African Government can take if they wish to ban all refugees so that anything they say may not be repeated in this country. The main question facing both governments is whether Basutoland is to be used as a springboard for attacks on South Africa. This is the professed aim of independent Africa, as well as of Mr. Ntsu Mokhele, leader of the Basutoland National Congress." It is conceivable that the South African Government could become sufficiently irritated at goings-on in the Protectorate to attempt to seal off the Basuto border,54 or even to take police action against refugees in one of the Protectorates. That such a move might develop onto a Berlin-style crisis is patent, but it is also certain that both Britain and South Africa will do everything possible to avoid arriving at such an impasse. Violence is not new to South Africa, and South Africans are quick to point out that riots and violent deaths occur continually in many places around the world. What is new about the South African situation is that the violence there is now planned, and what distinguishes it from similar incidents elsewhere are the long-range implications for the whole world of a racial war at the foot of Africa. tJh.at makes an understanding of the situation in South Africa even more urgent at this moment is that the crescendo of planned violence has exceede- expectations; a turning-point is at hand, and the point of no return may soon be. The current uproar might subside, and the present groups and leaders could vanish. But the new pattern has now been set, and Canute himself could not restore the old. Many of those who have said that prophets of bloodshed and turmoil are wolf- cryers will themselves soon have to join the cryers or the wolves, and what the United States and the United Kingdom2do now may well be more important than what they may try to do five or ten years hence. Even a "U.5. Government official" has been quoted by Newsweek magazine as saying: "We've been saying chaos was coming for a long time. It still is, and you're not going to have to wait very long.'"FN FOOTNOTES 1. On April 11, 1960, the Minister of Justice told Parliament that 1.575 people (94 whites, 24 Coloureds, and 1,451 Africans) had been detained. In all, 1,907 political arrests were made within 6 weeks of jharpeville; and some 21,000 additional persons (all Africans) were picked up under Article 4B of the Emergency regulations. ("Any native...who did not have a reference book, a job, a place to stay or a right to be in an urban area could be jailed for the duration of the Emergency, or as long as the Minister pleases"). (Alan Rake, "The Pattern of outh Africa's Emergency," Africa South in Exile, Vol. 5, No. 1, Oct.-Dec. 1960) 2. Shootino at Sharpeville, Bishop Ambrose Reeves, 1961. 3. Brutal Mandate, p. 213. 3A. A similar change was occurring among Europeans and others who found themselves in jail as a result of the Emergency round-ups. 4. Anthony Sampson, "Johannesburg: Ugly, Brutal and Dangerous," Show, Feb. 1963. 5. Africa Digest, Feb. 1962. 6. New Africa, January, 1963. Furthermore, veteran leaders of successful independence movements in other parts of Africa began to tell A.N.C. and P.A.C. representatives who went abroad to seek help that they had not sacrificed enough to get much support elsewhere. "l'ie lost 50,000 of our people before we got freedom. You want it for 500? Come back after you've showed you care then we can do something," one ranking official in a sympathetic government told a meeting of recent exiles from South Africa. 7. Africa Digest

FOOTNOTES (continued) 8. Brutal Mandate, p. 241. Mandela had written Sir de Villiers Graaff on the eve of the strike to warn of the implications when the government refused to call a multi-racial convention in a situation in which the alternatives had become "talk it out or shoot it out," (Africa South, Oct.-Dec., 1961, p.22). 9. AFP, April 12, 1962. 10. The "organization" referred to in this statement appeafs to have been the short-lived South African United Front. 11. Africa Digest, December 1962. 12. The Times (London), October 16, 1962. 13. Africa Today, January-February, 1959. 14. Ibid., April-May, 1960. 15. New Republic, March 9, 1963. 16. Anthony Sampson, "Johannesburg: Ugly, Brutal and Dangerous," Show, Feb. 1963. 17. Van Rensburg is of Afrikaner lineage and had resigned from the South African Foreign Service in protest against the government'" racial policies before becoming active in the Liberal Party. He helped to organize the Boycott movement in Britain and is now in ex2. 18- ..rick Van Rensburg, Guilty Land, 1962, pp. 180-182. 19 rutal Mandate, p. 216. Van Rensburg warns, however, of the te0, !.tion to draw too glib an analogy between South Africa and th3 operations of European underground groups during periods of Nazi occupation: "How successful can an armed underground be, remembering some of the resistance movements in countries occupied by Germany? The answer is another question. 'Jhat country with twelve million people was occupied by three million Germans, with ninety out of one hundred of the Germans potential agents of their Reich? \hat of the pattern of the Algerian underground? But what Iviorocco and Tunisia lie to east and west of the Union?" (Van Rensburg, Guilty Land, p. 152). 20. O p i., pp. 215-217. 21. African Diqest, February, 1963. 22. Johannesburg Star, March 23, 1963. 23. "Like the Mau Mau, the initiates undergo a series of repulsive rites. Human urine and goat's blood quaffed from kerosene tins supposedly make them invisible. Ashes are rubbed into incisions in the forehead to make them bulletproof. While witch

FOOTNOTES (continued) doctors chant 'izwe lethu' (our land), the initiates reply 'inkololeko nko (we must be emancipated now). To create a sense of terror, Poqo members make a ritual of their killings by gouging out tbe. eyes of victims, decapitating them, dousing them with kerosene, then setting them aflame. Mulattoes and Indians are targets of the racist terrorists as well as whites. Not surprisingly, Poqo commands more fear than popularity among South Africa's downtrodden blacks, who are largely illiterate." (Newsweek, April 8, 1963). 24. There are reports of young Africans recruited "by the'score" in Natal and sent by secret routes to West ifrica for training in guerrilla warfere, anc. of Poqo schools for judo and unarmed combat techniques organized in African townships south west of Johannesburg. (Philadelphia Bulletin, February 24, 1963). The organization is said to be divided into two groups -- the "general pack" and the "task force." The "general pack" consists mainly of "older men" and those not in good health. 25. Star, April 6, 1963. 26. "People who address Poqo gatherings previously addressed PAC gatherings. The entrance and subscription fees are the same. The aims are the same. The division of the work is the same." 26A. Contact (Cape Town), December 27, 1962. 27. The Times (London), March 26, 1963. 28. Christian Science Monitor, March 26, 1963. 29. Star, March 30, 1963. Some supporters of Spear and the NLC discount Leb allo's more extreme threats as publicity-inspired, and some go so far as to question the extent of his knowledge, let alone control, of what is going on in Poqo. It has been alleged in these hostile circles that the PAC has merely capitalized shrewdly on the Snyman report. 29A. Leballo, however, has been at pains *to dissociate Sobukwe from these plans, which does not seem unreasonable in view of the fact that Sobukwe is still a prisoner. "5obukwe is in jail," he said. "He knows nothing about our plans and activities." (Johannesburg atar, March 30, 1963.) 30. Star, March 16, 1963. 30A. It should be borne in mind that such stories may be the product of the rival organizations. None of the three are reluctant to encourage the idea that the other two are suffering from internal disorders of various kinds. 30B. In this connection, it is interesting to note a report which appeared in Newsweek on April 8, 1963: "Ghana President Kwame Nkrumah is believed to have contributed 570,000 as well as weapons to the terrorist organization Poqo."

30C. See appendix for such a compilation. 31. It is not always possible to determine exactly what is and what is not sabotage. One dynamite factory, for example, has undergone explosions on three separate occasions between June, 1962 and March, 1963; it is, of course, possibie that dynamite factories have suddenly taken to exploding repeatedly in South Africa. 32. T Yrk Times, Novetmber 28, 1962. 33. Manchester Guardian, 10 November, 1962. The hinister of Justice is quoted as admitting that 23 attempts at sabotage had occurred since late September, including seven."petrol bombings" in Hart Elizabeth and three in the Western Cape. 33A. Star, March 30, 1963. 33. ail Telegraph (London), March 26, 1963. 34. The Times (London), March 27, 1963. 35. Christian :cience Monitor, March 29, 1963. 36. Report of the International Committee of Jurists, June, 1962. Under the provisions of this Act, such things as painting antigovernment slogans on walls, strick'ing for higher wages, and even trespassing, can be construed as an act of, or encouraging sabotage, and are thus punishable by death. To date, at least two Poqo members have been sentenced to death under these provisions, and a substantial number of persons, European as well as African, have been sentenced to five years of "house arrest." .:Persons thus sentenced'may not leave their place of residence or have visitors other than a doctor for medical purposes. 37. Star, March 23, 1963. 38. Rev. Michael Scott press statement, January, 1963. 39. The three separate types of services -- the permanent force, the citizens force (with 10,000 men being trained yearly), and the police force'-- are to be coordinated and restructured so they can be more redily mobilized to meet local emergencies. (Africa South of the Sahara, Johannesburg, April 18, 1961.) Among other things, a nationwide two-way radio hook-up between all police stations and their divisional and national headquarters is being organized. Police expenditures for vehicles including aircraft, but excluding motor vehicles, have been increased from R 18,000 to R 326,000, and for the buying and keeping of police dogs from R 10,400 in 1962-63 to R 44,900 in 1963-64. 40. Newsweek, April 8, 1963. 41. Ibid. 42. Star, March 23, 1963. FOOTNOTES (continued) 43. Star, January 25, 1963. 44. Africa South of the Sahara, /April 28, 1962. 45. African Digest, March 21, 1963. 46. Hansard, 4381/60, as cited in Imperialist Rule in South Africa by M.L. Piliso (Cairo). 47. South Africa Digest, March 28, 1963. 48. Sunday Times (Cape), January 26, 1963. 49. Ibid. 50. The most recent protests of significance in South West have been a strike at the Tsumeb mines in December, 1962, which was broken after 42 Africans had been arrested and charged under the Masters and Servants Act; and a demonstration in Windhoek July 20, 1962, which was broken up by police firing tear gas. 51. Washington Daily News, March 27, 1963. 52. New York Times, April 8, 1963. 53. Star, April 6, 1963. The Star report added, "The Police have Leballo's British passport. They also have rolls of Pan-Africanist cell leaders throughout Southern Africa, and political refugees in Basutoland or those who have passed along 'escape routes' to the north. South African Police ariested many alleged PAC members within hours of Leballo's list being found by Basutoland Police." Another item appears in the same issue of the Star: "Police headquarters in Pretoria also state emphatically that the South African Police had no part in the events in Basutoland." 54. Basutoland is entirely surrounded by South Africa and her economy is especially vulnerable to isolation by the Republic. South African Police have been maintaining posts on the main routes to Basutoland for some time. Control is being tightened, and within six months it will be necessary to have special documents to travel between South Africa and any of the Protectorates FN. Newsweek, April 8, 1963.

Statement by Miss Marv Benson Before the Special Committee on Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa At Its 28th-Meeting on 11 March 1964 Mr. Chairman: It is almost -a year since I had the honour to be the first *petitioner betore your Committee. Since then the situation in South Africa has become ever more terrible, but as your excellent Reports providdethe appalling facts, I propose- simply to talk about a few of the men and:women there who are on trial for their lives and imprisoned, and some of whom I know personally. In a world horribly prone to violence, where each day as one listens to the news or reads the paper one's heart despairs at new acts of unspeakable cruelty, it has been-marvellous to experience the profound humanity in two particular areas: in the African struggle for freedom in 5outh Africa and the Negro struggle in the United States. .Thenobilityof their chosen method of non-violence sho~ald give mankind hope in the face of despair, and confidence that we human beings are capable of transforming ourselves. In South Africa, as you know, for more than 50 years Africans and their allies, friends of all races, strove to bring sanity to that country by these methods. Even way back in 1913 and 1919, and most spectacularly in 1952, hundreds and sometimes thousands went voluntarily to jail as petition and protest gave way to passive resistance and strikes. What bravery and self-sacrifice, what fantastic restraint and civilized conduct. Indeed, looking back at it with hindsight it seems to many an obvious criticism of the conduct of the struggle that it was not ruthless and efficient enough; and what an indictment of our world that this criticism should be'made at all Meanwhile, year upon year the State - all too often supported, even encouraged by powerful industrialists and mining companies,always with the acquiescence:ofmost of the all-white electorate tightened' the screws of humiliation and oppression. Never once in those 50 years did it respondrin a civilized manner -- not once! Increasingly its violence grew more overt.. Despite this it was not until 1961, a year after Sharpeville, when-yet one more stay-at-home strike was massively crushed by all the forces the State could command that African leaders decided a long chapter was closed, and as one of them said to me: "Desperate people will-eventually be provoked to acts of retaliation." But even in:the subsequent sabotage, it is clear everything possible is done to avoid harming human beings though tragically, a handful including a child, have beenkilled. Indeed in the sabotage trials taking place all over South Africa, witnesses including a policeman, have testified that it is the policy of the Spear of the Nation not to injure people. * An eminent lawyer from Britain, John Arnold, Queen's Counsel, recently visited South Africa on behalf of the International Commission of Jurists to observe the trial of Nelson Mendela and others - the Rivonia Trial, about which your committee- has made a detailed report. Mr. Arnold told how these men are regarded as heroes in. South Africa and he asked, what is the good of a fair trial, if under the "bestial and brutal" Act of Parliament which provides the framework of the trial, there is no practical possibility but conviction? He concluded: "The danger is that these men will hang and hang they must not. l Mr. Chairman, I cannot adequately emphasise how desperately, profoundly important it is to South Africa and surely to the continent and world at large that Mandela, Sisulu, Mbeki - these and other men in the Rivonia trial - must not be allowed to hang. Do you remember 1960? In most of Africa it was a: year of celqbration - Africa Year - when one after another new States were founded and took their place in the United Nations. But in South Africa it was the year of Sharpeville. It was the year when the A.N.C. (African National Congress) and P.A.C. (Pan Africanist Congress) were outlawed; when day after day the police and army swooped rounding up more that 20,000 people of all races who were arbitrarily imprisoned. It seemed then that the movement for liberation must surely be numbed; but it was at this historic time that Nelson Mandela emerged from prison - to call for a national strike and to lead the underground movement. For fifteen months he eluded the State forces. In February 1962 he illegally left South Africa to attend the Addis Ababa Conference and to visit many heads of State in Africa, and the leaders of the Oppo~ition in London, and then, soon after returning to the Republic, as happens all too often in a police state, he was betrayed by an informer, captured, tried and sentenced to five years in prison. When only a few months of that sentence had run, he was again charged, in the Rivonia trial along with others, with being a member of the national high command of a revolutionaiy. movement to overthrow the Afrikaner Nationalist Government. And so Nelson Mandela is on trial for his life. Yet he a member of the royal family of the Tembu people - might easily have been one of those chiefs who are puppets of the Government, with a steady income, a shiny motorcar, and sycophantic followers. Or he might simply have remained a lawyer content to function within the framework of apartheid, living in a comfortable middle-class home, and finding an outlet for humiliation in sport or jazz or religion. He might have - but for his strong character, his independence of mind and his responsiveness to people's sufferings and to the imperative need for justice. The London Observer has descrobed Mandela as a lawyer "who in any free country would surely have won the utmost distinction", and compared him to "a true leader of the Resistance (to the Nazis) in Occupied France"; in other words, a hero. I have known Mandela for about 10 years, and saw a good deal of him during the Treason Trial. In recent meetings, some of which were in secret when he was underground, he told me something of his life. He spoke of his childhood in the early 1920's as son of a Tembu chief, in a kraal by the banks of the green Bashes River in the Transkei, of how later when his cousin the Paramount Chief became his guardian, he found the strict traditional life in the royal krall dull, of how he was captivated by tales of Xhosa heroes of the past in the battles to preserve their land against the European invaders, and how he enjoyed listening to cases being tried in the tribal courts. In his teens he went to Fort Hare college, with his friend Oliver Tambo took part in a students' strike, and left, determirred "never to rule as chief over an oppressed people". But he was still politically naive, and it is comic now to think that his first real act of rebellion came when, in 1940 at the age of 23 he fled from a tribal marraige - to Johannesburg, where of all things he became a mine policeman, sitting at the compound gate, clutching his badges of office - a whistle and a knobkerriel Then came the transformation, as a new friend, Walter Sisulu, encouraged him in his childhood ambition to study law at the University of the Witwatersrand. And for the first time, in the city and the teeming African townships he learnt the bitter facts of life for an African: overcrowding, poverty, constant harassing under the passlaws. He, Sisulu and Tambo were among the intensely nationalist young men who founded the African Youth League, and galvanised the African National Congress into militant action. Mandela became National-Volunteer-in chief of the great Defiance Campaign of 1952, when 8,500 volunteers - including Indians and a few white and Coloured people, went cheerfully to jail. He also devised the M Plan, a scheme of mass organising through small units. He and other leaders were arrested under the Suppression of Communism Act* It is worth remarking that the Judge said the charge had "nothing to do with communism as it is commonly known", but under the law he was bound to give them a suspended sentence of 9 months. Furthermore he told them: "I accept the evidence that you have consistently advised your followers to follow a peaceful course of action and to avoid violence in any shape or form." Eight years later in 1961 this same Judge - Judge Rumpff - was to be the senior Judge in the Treason Trial, when again Mandela and Sisulu were among the accused. Bronouncing sentence, he said: "You are found not guilty and discharged. You may go." This, you may remember, was after a trial lasting four and a half years, during which the gccused were subject to prolonged strain and great hardship for them and their families. In the case of Mandela and Tambo, it also meant that their legal practice - so much of it concerned with urgent political and human cases - gravely suffered. In the Treason Trial not only did Mandela, with Duma Nokwe, another A.W.C. leader, take over the defence at one stage, but he was among those chosen to give evidence; Senior lawyers spoke of this being among the most exciting and fearless. The Government's apprehension of Mandela, or to put it another way, its appreciation of him, was evident as far back as 1953, when he was plgced under a fierce triple ban - banned from the A.N.C., banned from attending meetings, and, restricted to the Johannesburg area. Meanwhile the exclusive nationalism of Mandela and certain other Youth Leaguers, was transformed through their experience of working with Indians, whites and Coloured people, proving that though white racialism is rampant in South Africa many Africans iefuse to be driven into an equally rebid racialism and have striven for justice and freedom for all human beings regardless of race. Mandela also gradually lost his violent anti-communism, as, he came to work alongside the communists in the struggle, whom he found level-headed and courageous.

From my own experience, and from impressions told to me by prominent lawyers and African leaders I would say Mandela's outstanding characteristic is how he has grown and continues to grow over the years. He responds - almost gaily - to challenge. So many men, in face of prolonged persecution and frequent setbacks, shrink into bitter negation or find some excuse to retreat from political action, but Mandela is one of those undeterred, indeed positively stimulated by such obstacles. His natural authority has been greatly enhanced by twenty years of political action. When in 1962 he was sentenced to five years imprisonment he declaredi "I am prepared to pay the penalty even though I know how bitter and desperate is the situation' of an African in the prisons of this country...For to men, freedom in their own land is the pinnacle of their ambitions from which nothing can turn men of conviction aside. More powerful than my fear of the dreadful Conditions to which 1_m~gh 'beesubdectedtid myhAtred for the dreadful conditione to.which my people are subjected outside prison throughout this country. "I hate the practice of race discrimination, and in my hatred, I am sustained by the fact that the overwhelming majority, of mankind hates it equally." Before he was led away to jail he concluded: "...when my sentence has been completed, I will still be moved, as men are always moved, by their consciences; I will still be moved by my dislike of the race discrimination against my people whin I come out from serving my sentence, to take up again, as best I can, the struggle fo the removal of those injustices until they are finally abolished once and for all." Walter Sisulu, the man who helped Mandela to study law, who was like g brother to him and now sits beside him in the dock, knows probably better than any Other leader in South Africa just what it means to be "a native." Although tens of thousands of Africans have gone through very similar experience. to his in their lives, like tens of thousands of perfectly good oysters, they have not had in them the grain that would produce a pearl. It may seem incongruous to compare Sisulu to a pearl; he would roar~with laughter at the ide& but dogged, determined, from the first he had that grain of rebelliousness, of refusing to lie down and accept injustice, which made him an indomitable fighter. While only a boy of 16, brought up traditionally in the Transkei, he had to leave school to take on family responsibilities. He had a variety of the lowly jobs which by laW are the only ones most Africans can hold. He was a miner, then a kitchen boy when in spare moments in his white employer's kitchen, he tried to supplement his meagre education by studying an English grammar. His first political lesson came in Johannesburg where, having picked up a smattering of trade union ideas and - working in a bakery a $6 week - he led a strike, to be quickly outwitted by the boss, and sacked. He was first imprisoned as a result of protesting when a white ticket-collector on a train bullied an African child; the ticket collector assaulted Sisulu, who fought back, and was arrested. He had never been in prison and he told me it was the 'nastiest experience' of his life. Today he can 1o.k back on innumerable ugly experiences as for years he has been the object of odious persecution by the police in attempts to intimidate him. I think the last time I saw him in 1962, he jad just been arrested on four or five trumped Up charges, ome after the other. They picked the wrong man, For one thing his concern for the struggle is selfless, for another he found out early in life that most of the whites Africans encounter are the policemen raiding locations for passes or tax receipts, or officials dealing with queues of so-called 'boys' like cattle, or ga~lers who beat up prisoners, and all these things aroused in him not fear, but contempt. For all that he is no racialist, though as with Mandela, it was his experience of working with Indians organising the Defiance Campaign in 1952 - when he was $ecretary-General of the A.N.C. - that enabled him to outgrow exclusiveness. Sisulu has seemed to some who have met him to be frustrated and bitter while others who know him say that he is trustworthy and generous. Others again just give him up as an enigma, perhaps influenced by the fact that in 1953 he not only briefly visited Israel and London, but spent five months in communist countries. China affected him most for the peasants and their lives and needs reminded him of African peasants, and when he saw the rapid metamorphosis of slums, he thought of the shanties and poverty around Johannesburg. He returned to South Africa with the knowledge that the greater part of the world was on the side of his people. At the age of 41, for the first time in his life he had been consistently treated as a dignified human being instead of as a native. Those whites who had experienced his suspiciousness noticed a change: he had come to realize that an African nationalist's tendency to assert himself to prove he was not inferior to the white man was in itself an inferiority complex. (Incidentally one of the friends who had arranged Sisulu's tour told me they would have like to send Nelson Mandela to the United States, but unfortunately there were no invitations forthcoming as there had been from the communist countries.) There is so much more to tell you about Sisulu, but no time, more about his wife, Albertina, a nurse, the backbone of their stable family life, yet active in women's politics, a-woman who generates kindness and hospitality in their home, a bleak little block house which is typical of the kind to which tens of thousands of African families are reduced by the laws of South Africa. About their second son, aged 15, who when he attended the trial of his father the other day, was arrested for nut having a pass, despite his mother's protests that he was under the age for passes. He was detained for two hours in the cells before a lawyer was able to demand his release. Can there be more vicious intimidation? As you know, two Europeans and an Indian are also accused in the Rivonia trial. Lionel, Rusty Bernstein is one of South Africa's best-known architects, an inventor of mathematical instruments, and intellectual, reserved with a quiet sense of humor. Despite being brought up among all the normal conventions and prejudices of white South Africa, and going to an exclusive schobl, he showed an early awareness of the sickness in that society, but the Labour Party, which he joined, was concerned only about white workers, and Bernstein turned to the Communist Party, at that time, in the 1940's, the only party that was not racialist. Then, at the age of 21, he married an Englishwoman, Hilda Watts, also a member of the Party who during the war years was elected to the Johannesburg City Council. After war service in Italy, Bernstein returned to his architecture and found himself ever more deeply committed in the opposition to the country's racial policies. He is typical of the small group of Europeans who because of their beliefs have suffered prejudice to their careers, increasing social isolation, and - above all, - regular restriction and imprisonment along with their non-white allies. Consider only the brief catalogue of the State's attempts to deter him: 1946 arrested and found guilty of assisting the African mineworkers in their strike, suspended sentence. 1954 listed and named under the Suppression of Communism Act, banned from gatherings, restricted to Johannesburg. 1956 arrested and charged with high treason,:.after nearly five years, declared not guilty. After 5harpeville imprisoned for several months, along with his. wife, leaving their four children parentless. Then restricted from writing. In 1962, among the first to be placed under house arest. And now, since July 1963, on trial for his life. The character of this man, whom close friends describe as essentially gentle, and thoughtfuli was never more apparent than during the 88 days in which he, like all the others in the Rivonia trial, was held in solitary confinement. This experience left him --like so many others-- the prey to nightmares, unable to concentrate and shaky so that six weeks later he felt pround to find hei.could write two short letters without having to rest. -But even at the worst times of this incarceration, when the police offered him an exit permit to Britain if he would incriminate others, he was resolute, and contemptuous of the Offer. The very considerable role of thtev4ndians in the struggle in South Africa -some drawing their inspiration from Mahatma Jmndhi---others from socialism-- can be represented in this short survey only by pointing out that Ahmed Kathrada, another of the Rivonia accused, has been persistently active, imprisoned, 'restricted, persecuted, but has carried on with a total dedication, ever since as a schoolboy he went to prison in the great Indian passive resistance against the ghetto laws that General Smuts introduced in 1946. Euen at that time, there were young Aouth Africans who had a vision of a common society, of what South Africa could and shoOld become, end Kathrada was one of them, And a man who has a vision of what the Transkei and the longneglected and over- crowded rural areas of South Africa should become, is Govan Mbeki, yet another of the Rivonia accused, who, in this testimony, must represent the many thousands of Xhosae in the Eastern Cape who have provided militant and united resistance and whose leaders have distinctive qualities, a deep sense of being part of the people, and often a passionate religious faith, Mbeki, a distinguished man, has a marked ability to efface himself. A teacher, writer, and an authority on the Transkei, increasingly his political activities led to estriction on his school teachings, and eventually he became Eastern Cape editor for the leftist New Age, the now illegal newspaper that ceaselessly exposed injustice. Perhaps, i1 I quote briefly from the prison diary Mbeki kept a few yeaM ago, a vivid document, you will see another side to this disciplined man., He wrote with compassion about one old man in the cell, so rheumatic that his limbs swelled, yet never complaining nor using it as a'n ercme~e to try for release. Another prisoner who constantly prayed, amused Mbeki who observed that the prayers resembled the demands of workers to their - - --T 1W employers for better conditions and higher wages. Of others egain, Mbeki wrote: "Every afternoon, we heard beatings from prisoners returning from work. Sometimes they would bellow. We heard the splattering of leather belts as they fell on a body. It is intolerable to listen and one shudders to think what effect this type of treatment must have on those who administer it as well as on the recipients. In the long 'un it is difficult to see how both can escape being turned into beasts." The diary also remarks: "Probably one of the most striking things in this period of our history is the growing volume of opposition throughout the world to the apartheid racial policies." And he expressed appreciation of the work of Welfare ' Committees - for instance warm underwear was distributed. "The state of emergency", he said, "has sealed bonds of friendship between the Africans And that section of the White population which realises that the narrow racial nationalism of the Nationalist party cannot work in the world today." And if anyone in the outside world doubts whether boycotts have any effect, they should read what it meant to the prisoners 40 of them cooped up in the cell - when they heard that Dockers in Trinidad had refused to haddle South African goods. That was four years ago, in 1960: forty in a cell, sometimes with rusty tins for plates and bitter pap for food, but that would be psychological and spiritual comfort to the point of luxury now for the hundreds of South Africans who have in the past year endured the torture of prolonged solitary confinement. All of these men in the Rivonia trial were thus imprisoned for nearly three months, and, as your Report says, nearly all of the witnesses produced by the State have been thus imprisoned. For instance, one woman, a domestic servant arrested in July in order to give evidence in December, and held in solitary confinement for interrogation from October to December told the police she would like to go and see her children, but they would not let her. "It was not nice" she told the Judge. It was the first time she had been locked up and she was "grieved" by the fact that there was nobody to look after her children..Then, the wife of one of the accused, Mrs. Matsoaledi, while attending the trial and taking food for her husband each day, was suddenly arrested: imagine the desperate anxiety for her hnd he huabhnd, oh top of all that they are already suffering, particularly when they have seven children. "What about my babies" she asked, "they'll be all alone?" She was led away to be imprisoned in o.i~Ary conFiiienent. Imagine the children when that evening their mother just did not come home. Only whin her sister-in-law read of the arrest in the press did they know whath had become of her. The sister-in-law, who'has five children of her ownt has taken in the seven Matsoaledis. She said "I don't know how I'll manage." Twelve children on the abnormally low income of an African family. But her last words to the reporter who saw her were: "These children are my own blood. I'll look after them- to the last." This is typical of, the countless cases that make it imparative for the United Nations to implement the General Assembly's resolution 1978 of December 16. This promised relief and other assistance for families so persecuted. Every day's delay matters when children are hungry and the grown-ups frantic with anxiety. This is an immediate opportunity for you to alleviate a little the anguish of these South Africans. And there are organizations in South Africa and London who can distribute, but whose resources have become even more inadequate as the years pass, and the needs multiply. Mr. Chairman, your Report of the 27 February is a long catalogue of horror: of mass trials, almost daily arrests, of torture both physical and mental, And yet there is more that could be added. The case of Alfred Nzo, for instance, detained in Johannesburg, in solitary confinement for 238 days. The Geneva Convention on the treatment of prisoners of war states that none should be held in solitary confinement for mare than 30 days. Mr. Nzo was never charged and when released, he was a mental wreck. He suffers from nightmares and hallucinations, imagines that the police are knocking at his door, and hides in dorners in his home. His wife, who is a trained nurse, is reported as saying that, having formerly been a calm person, he now walks in his sleep, is unable to complete a sentence, and is in a state of nervous collapse, She has had him examined by a psychologist. "Torture by mind-breaking" is the dreadfully apt description of the 90 day detention given by J. Hamilton Russell, a former member of Parliament who is now campaigning splendidly in South Africa for the revoke of this cruel law. I spoke earlier of how the South African authorities try to intimidate political suspects by the despicable device of attacking members of their families. Even the unborn suffer. LETTIE SIBEKO, a 30 year old woman was arrested eight months ago. The authorities were trying to find her husband, Archie, -a vital young man, active- both in the former ANC and as a trade unionist. One might say that Lettie was held as a hostage. She was a few weeks pregnant when she was arrested but she was held in solitary confinement for the first fiv months of her detention. I am told that South African psychiactric specialists stated that this treatment could have the most seriou consequences, not only for the mother, but also for the baby. In fact, as the situation is without precedent, they are unable to say exactly what damage might have been done. Mrs, Sibeko was finally .released from prison one week before the baby was due to be born. She had been charged with belonging to an illegal organization (the ANC) and had been held as an awainting trial person for the last three months of her detention but bail had been fefused four times. She is now on bail. One last story about a friend:.about a man shot in the stomach and now imprisoned for 18 months because he believes that sport should have no racial divisions. For that, in brief, is what happened to Dennis Brutus, coloured teacher, poet, and journalist, whose passionate belief that sport should be open to all, led to his world wide campaign against apartheid at the Olympics and in all aport. You have told his story in your Report. In Nigeria his poems are being published. May I just read one of thetm to you:

"The sounds begin again; the siren in the night the thunder at the door the shriek of nerves in pain. "Then the keening crescendo of faces split by pain, the wordless, endless wail only the unfree know. "Importunate as rain the wraiths exhale their woe over the sirens, knuckles, boots; my sounds begin again." I ought to mention the Bantu Laws Amendment Bill now before Parliament in Cape Town, which if passed, as seems probable, will turn the 7 million Africans in so-called 'white' urban and rural areas, into a nomadic, rightless proletariat. And the Bill threatened to prevent listed Communists from practicing as lawyers. The pass laws and the poverty and malnutrition continue to cause human misery to tens of thousands of African families. All this against a fantastic wave of prsperity for White South Africa with increasing investment especially from Britain and America. According to the South African Foundation the average dividend in South Africa is 12.6% compared with 6,6% in Western Europe; while American companies are averaging profits of about 27% on capital invested in South Africa. Truly "interest on the edge of a volcano" to quote the editor of the Investor's Chronicle in London. But to tell the touth, my heart is so sick at the endless churning out of the horrible facts, which we all know all too well, and have known for years, when all the time the iniquities we tell each other about ceaselessly and so unnecessarily are hurting human beings - and this is their only life. Therefore I beg that we stop cataloguing facts and plan action and then act: economic sanctions are surely the obvious civilized form of action when diplomatic pressures long ago failed to make any impact on the South African Government. If Mandela, Sisulu and others of the Rivonia accused should be sentenced to death this, to quote Anthony Sampson in the London Observer (March 1, 1964), "would have very large repercussions... And it would proclaim more clearly that South Africa is now in a state of war." From all sides formidable voices warn of the terrible danger of a race war exploding from South Africa. I feel my voice is not pewerful enough to mwake my last desperate appeal to you. So I quote Bishop Ambrose Reeves, former Bishop of Johannesburg who says of the men facing the possibility of being sentenced to death at the Rivonia trial, "Let us see that such a cry goes up...that this does not happen. It is up to us to see that they do not die. Let us act at oncel"

HIGH CO1E1ISSION TERRITORIES: IN PAWN TO APARTHEID? by Margaret Roberts The three British High Commission Territories embedded in the apartheid complex of Southern Africa, present the most intractable and politically explosive of Britain's remaining colonial problems. They could bring the United Kingdm Government into direct conflict with South Africa in an area where the British are relatively weakesto The immediate political issues are by no means clear-cut, There are obvious dangers in every course ahead. These territories cannot escape involvement in the conflict centerred in apartheidg Indeed throughout their historyp despite British protectorate status, they have been sucked progressively into the vortex of the South African political and economic system. Thus a passive "holding operations" designed to insulate thems cannot succeed. Certain +related trends in central and southern Africa can be reasonably predicted over the next decade. With independent Africa's liberatory movements pressing down on the borders of Tanganyika, Nyasaland, and Northern 4odheinore vulnerable strongholds of European rule must compromise or go under first, For may reasons - better-trained nationalist armies, declining support from the West, unrest and economic decline at home - the Portuguese Goverrnent must lose its grip on Angola and Mozambique. The collapse of the economic framework provided by the Central African Federation means that Southern Rhodesia's strategic and political weakness will be compounded by her economic isolation, a declining European population, and a demoralization consequent on Britain's refusal to grant independence to a white-dominated government, Whether the transfer of power is induced in these areas by compromise or traumas European rule must succumb*' Meanwhile the progressive strengthening of the South African regime may continue, Barring decisive external intervention or an unforseeable combination of internal "accidents," the goverrmrent may well remain stronger tha n its opponents while the collapse of white rule takes place to the north. But the pressure will continue to build up inside; the seams that could burst will become more numerous and precarious; and external hostility will become more menacing. The outcome in South Africa is not the concern of this article. What matters here is the cat and mouse game which is being played in the process with the three High Comission Territories; tiry mountainous Basutoland with a population of 800,000; fertile Swaziland with 273,000, including 10,000 whites; and vast, deserty Bechuanaland with its scattered 350,000 Africans. The game needs skill and a cool daring: and of the players - Dr. Verwoerd, Britain, and the Africans of the Territories - the first has so far shown the most sophistication, The object is to determine whether the Territories will develop defiately to take up a place in the PanAfrican crusade against Verwoerd, or whether they will be neutralized or captured by the South African Government. More plainly, will they be used, by virtue of their cormion frontiers with South Africa, as a pipeline or Jumping-off board by the underground Congresses for action against South Africa, or can their economic dependence upon South Africa as well as their military vulnerability be used to hold them in thrall? In April this year, Dr. Verwoerd fired the first overt shot by threatening "retaliation" against the Territories if they continued to offer sanctuary to "hostile forces"; and a government-supporting newspaper (Die Burgei, 4th April 1963) spoke of the need to prevent actively hostile frontiers "by all available diplomatic and economic means, and in the last resort.. .by military actioni" By September, despite mounting pressure for action inside the governing Nationalist Party, Dre Verwoerd switched to cooler tacticst he challenged the British Government to allow his government to offer the Territories' inhabitants the status of "independent," prosperous Bantustans in South Africa* However ludicrous such an affer may appear, it was not made flippantly* It contains the implication that Britain, as the protecting power, is unable either to safeguard the independence of the Territories, or to break the economic pull of the South African economy* It also represents a clever approach to the traditional elements in the Territories. Especially in Swaziland, these can easi]4 be made to feel threatened both by local nationalists and by the activities of South African refugees and exiles who bring their territories into dangerous conflict with South Africa. The High Commission Territories share two crucial features. The first is that they have been allowed to fall a long way behind Britain's other African dependencies in economic and constitutional affairso The assumption that they would eventually take the geographically and economically logical step of joining South Africa was finally discarded only in 1948. Even after that, development was minimal - a total sum of i 7,715,000 was spent on development over the fiteen*year period, 1945-60, on all three territories together. The three years 1960-63 have seen some improvement -development grants for all three for the period amounted to just over 44 million and loand to L3 million - but it is hardly spectacular. Since 1960, too, the recurrent budgets have been expanded by annual grants in aid, where formerly all revenue had to be collected locally, Political progress has been even slower. None of the territories had a constitution until 1960: the British High Commissioner, who also represents the U.K. in Pretdria, ruled directly through local Resident Commissioners. Today Basutoland and Bechuanaland have elementary Legislative Councils, and are in process of working out new ones for something like internal self-goverment. Swaziland has yet to hold its first elections. The second unifying factor is the Territories' dependence on South Africa. A significant proportion of their adult males work in South Africa - in Basutoland the figure is one third of the working population. Most of their exports go to South Africa, and most of their imports come in through South Africa - in this respect Basutoland's dependence is complete. Manufacturing on any profitable scale, and even the generation of power, would depend largely on South African markets. A customs union providing for allocation of a percentage of South Africa's import revenues to the Territories accounts for a substantial proportion of their revenue one-half in the case of Basutoland* The Territories are in fact little more than economic appendages 6 South Africa. In every respect Basutoland is the most vulnerable, surrounded entirely by South Africa. Swaziland, with rich iron deposits and the largest asbestos mine in the world, is potentially viable on her own but at present she imports most of her food, local agriculture having been badly neglected. Bechuanaland subsists at present on an extremely low level, scratching an occasional crop from the deserty soil to supplement cattle raising, though the beef, and possibly mineral, potential of Bechuanaland is far from negligable. These are the stark economic facts currently providing a powerful handle for Verwoerde But there are other local factors he has to take into account. Each of the Territories has a very different political personality. South Africa's tactics, and Britain's possible reactions to thm, will come to depend increasingly on the nature of the African leadership which is now making an impact in the Territories. Not only the speed of constitutional advance and the ultimate political status, but also the nature of the elected governments, may be different in each Territory. Bechuanaland's politics still center very laggely in the tribes. These live in peace with each other, but in the context of barely disturbed traditional loyalties. A tiny divided nationalist movement with Pan-Africanist sentiments exists in the dusty little towns that collect the unemployed and the South African refugees along the railway line, In so faras any territorial political party can be said to exist, it is the Democratic Party, led by Mr. Seretse Khaua of the numerous Bamangawato tribe. The party's strength lies partly in the small but important intellectual elite, mainly teachers, and partly in the allegiance of many of the chiefs. Though hardly militant, there is no question of the party's making a deal with South Africa to become a Bantustan, At the same time it would prefer to keep out of the front-line of the struggle, and could possibly be influenced by South African pressures to keep the Protectorate neutral. On the other hand, Bechuanaland is the only one of the three that presents a possblhe overland route to the north for South African refugees and political leaderst she has a &ile-wide frontier with Northern Rhodesia where the South African-controlled, Caprivi Zipfel strip* just fails to meet the border of Southern Rhodesia. When Northern Rhodesia leaves the Federation in December this year, and if this frontier can be effectively policed against South African sabotage and counter-espionage, this route could play an important role for South Africa's liberation forces. But would this be welcomed by the Bechuana people? Would it for example jeopardize that half of their beef exports that are now sold in South Africa? Swaziland presents different problems. Its rich mines and fertile soil have attracted 10,000 Europeans and their capital, three-quarters of them from South Africa, About half the land is held in freehold by Europeans, growing mainly sugar, timber and citrus; and most of the rest is owned bpmmunally by the "Swazi nation" in the name of their proud and stubborn Paramount Chief Ngwenyama (the Lion) Sobhuza IIo The attempt to introduce a constitution for the territory has been delayed by the deep rift between the terr&t&ry's rapidly growing but still divided nationalist movement on one hand, and an alliance between the traditionalist Ngwenyama and the European community on the other. The compromise constitution, allowing for a megsure of representative government, but reserving a third of the seats for Europeans and others for the traditionalists, is opposed by both sides. +Nevertheless, barring upheaval it will go into effect with elections early next year. Swaziland' s rich and attractive little economy could at a pinch be excised from that of South Africa -- a railway line is being built at present to connect with the port of Hozambique. But it would be a costly operation, and bitterly opposed by the Europeans. In this they would probably be Joined by the Ngwenyama, whose paternalism and "race federation" ideas bring him into some sympathy with many white South African politicians. Left to himself, he is the most likely of the Protectorate* leaders to take up Dr. Ventoerd's offer of Bantustan status. But of course he will not be left alone. He is losing support to the political parties, which are implacably opposed to closer association with South Africa. If they can unite, particularly on terms that would allow them to retain their * The Zipfel strip is a tongue of South West African territory carved out by the South African government during the last war. present white liberal support, Swaziland could develop over the next decade into a reasonably, flourishing non-racial democracy. The present danger lies in the continued existence of splits of which Dr. Verwoerd could conceivably take advantage. Meanwhile he is in a position to neatralize the use of Swaziland as a base for subversion by sealing it off from the outside world# with the active help of the Poruguese government of Mozambique, Ironically, Basutoland - the most vulnerable to South African pressure - is also the most militant. The largest political party, the Congress Party, led by Mr, Ntsu Mokhehle, shouts defiance across the border, and claims that if his demands for independence were met his friends in Africa and abroad would protect him from Verwoerd's retaliation. Although his party won most of the elected seats in the last elections, it sits in opposition to the nominated Executive Council, and succeeds in making government extremely difficult. Basuto dissatisfactions with their relations with South Africa culminated in the recent rejection by the Assembly of the Resident Commissioner's Speech from the Throne, on the grounds that Britain is not effectively protecting Basuto interests in relation to South Africa. Two other political parties, close runnersup to the Congress Party in size, are being forced to follow its militant policies in the matter of demanding independence. These demands are also supported, with some caution, by the young, shrewd Paramount Chiefs Constantine Bereng Seeisoo No one doubts the ability of Verwoerd's goverment to strangle the Basuto nation if he chose, and without raising a Sten gun. This tiny mountainous enclave has not enough land to support its population, even when a third of the adult males are away in South Africa and sending money home. Ar alternative suurces of employment, such as industry, would depend upon South African markets. Meanwhile, South Africa is sealing air routes for refugees and other South Africans, so as to neutralize the Territory as a potentially hostile base. And the threat of ending Basuto immigration to the Republic hangs over the heads of local people actively helping refugees or revolutionaries. What are the choices open to Britain in this situation over the coming years? By the most obvious criteria, Britain has everything to gain by accelerating constitutional advance and getting out as soon as possible. The Territories contribute nothing strategically or materially, they represent a financial drain, and they could provoke a clash with South Africa before Britain wants it or could easily handle it. Fundamental to this approach, which has significant support inside the Conservative government, is the fact that Britain is not yet prepared to defend itself against charges of helping the "enemies" of South Africa - much less to go on the attack. But the consequences for the Territories of precipitate abandonment by Britain could be serious, particularly if they were unwilling or unable to find other protectors. It is conceivable - and quite possible in Basutoland's case - that the fui, -independent governments of the Territories will make a deliberate policy 6f exploiting their nuisance value in relation to South Africa. But this could be done only if they were confident of their ability to call upon other goverbments orp indeed, the UN - to protect them against ecpnomic or military retaliation from South Africa. The result would hardly be restful -- Cuba is not a restful place - but it could be preferred and precipitated by a militant nationalist leadership. Another possibility would be to halt constitutional progress at a pre-independence stage, and leave defense and possibly foreign affairs in the hands of Britain. Although this might be acceptable to the present leadership in Bechuanaland and even to some of the Basuto leaders, it is very doubtful whether it could be maintained for long. Certainly Iiokheble would reject it, even though Basutoland stands to gain most from a peaceful relationship with South Africa. Finall* there is the possibility of a United Nations presence. An idea now being canvassed suggests a UN operation with three objects to police the frontiers, to provide a massive program of technical aid -and training, and to provide a substantial fund for rapid economic development. It is suggested that Britain can do none of these things on her own, She cannot provide the necessary resources, and as a frontier policeman she might be suspect, especially in view of the history of "good neighborliness" between the Protectorate police and the South 1fricans. It would be easier too for the UN to prevent violence directed from the Territories toward South Africa; this uould probably have to be a condition for the Secretary-Generalls accepting the assiglmlients though it might not be easy for some African leaders to accept. At present such an idea is rejected by the British government as potentially unstable and a shelving of her own responsibilities. But it is not impossible that a future government might consider taking the UN into the Territories with it, though probably not simply handing them over. But since even this would signify a radical new ddtermination by the British Government in relation to the Verw+oerd Government, the same results might be achieved even though the host would remain the British Government as the sovereign power. Nevertheless, it is probably unrealistic to suppose that whoever became responsible for the frontiers and the economic wellbeing of the Territories could allow them to b e used as a base for revolution, in the sense that Tunisia and Horocco were used by the Algerians, At the same time they could, under such an arrangement, become a secure source of refuge and -w- in the case of Bechuanaland - a route to the north. Dr. Verwoerd knows very well the risks to his Republic if the Territories found themselves a staunch protector, even if these conditions were enforced. As long as non-racial communities exist on his borders, there is a danger of infection; there will be a constant flow of refugees; and there will be a sympathetic pipeline for revolutionaries. The big question therefore is whether he might risk a decisive confrontation., economic or military, now -- while Britain remains ambivalent, the African states are militarily weak, and the U1 financially and militarily in pawn to the Congo. The longer Verwoerd leaves it, the surer he can be that the Territories will get effective outside help if he attacks or tries to strangle them. On the other fand, he is anxious to avoid the label of aggressor. Not only would it spoil the arguiaent that apartheid is a domestic matter; it would make it virtually impossible for Britain, technically the aggrieved party., to prevent international action to help restore her sovereignty. Therefore he is most unlikely to use military force against the Protectorates. But the entirely legitimate economic and ackinistrative measures open to him could be almost as effective. Already the squeeze on Protectorate labor in the Republic has begun; the mines are recruiting more from the unemployed pools in the Bantustans; and strict regulations on recruitment of outside labor have been published. Thirty-two border posts have been erected round the Protectorates. Verwoerd would be within his rights to stop the importation of Bechuana beef in the interests of his own farmers. And new arrangements for the allocation of South African customs revenue could have immediate and serious effects. The real danger of methods like these is that they involve slows undramatic and apparantly legitimate strangulation, and for that reason are more lcely to unnerve, produce steady capitulation, and avoid an open confrontation. It is clear therefore that the next ten years will be difficult ones for the H1igh Coiission Territories, for their role is bound to be a confused ones They cam-ot avoid the upheavals which will accompany the overthrow of apartheid* At the same time they are strategically and economically too ueak to play an independent part in the struggle. The best that can be hoped is that Dr. Verwoerd will not be allowed to use them as hostages in his conflict with the rest of the world. Reprinted in full from Africa Today, November, 1963, pp. 12-15

The Unholy Alliance by Rosalynde Ainslie In Southern Africa there has emerged over the past year or so a growing alliance between the white Governments of South Africa, Portugal and the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, which is on the one hand a conspiracy to obstruct African advance, and on the other hand may well become a threat to the peace of Africa and the world. "14e will go the whole hog," and "use force if necessary," brags Sir Roy Velensky, determined to maintain the Federation; t"apartheid is a granite wall," says Dr. Verwoerd; "Angola and Mocambique are part of Portugal," says Dr. Salazar, as he exports more and more Portuguese troops to crush the Angola rebellion. In face of world condemnation they have turned for aid to each other, and the outside world is very little aware of just how closely they are now bound together. In Dr. Salazar's own words (Star, Johannesburg, 8.7.61), "our relations--Mocambique's and Angoi~arlson the one hand and the Federation's and South Africa's on the other--arise from the existence of our common borders and our traditional friendships that unite our Governments and peoples. Our mutual interests are manifold, and we are entirely conscious of the need to co-operate to fulfil our common needs." In pursuit of this co-operation, leaders of the three Governments have been meeting frequently. Dr. Vervoerd and Sir Roy TWTelensky have had personal meetings over the past few years, notably in 1959, in Pretoria, when no communique was issued. In 1961 ToTelensky visited Dr. Salazar in Lisbon, and afterwards expressed himself tremendously impressed with the Portuguese Government's "progressive outlook and understanding of the difficulties on our continent of Africa." He also visited the Governor of Mocambique, Admiral Rodriques, at the beginnirg of 1962. Meanwhile, the Federation Defence Minister, 1r. Caldicott, visited Luanda, capital of Angola, and Lisbon; the South African Defence Einister, Mr. Fouched, visited Lisbon; and a South African Defence Ministry delegation visited Mocambique. In fact, in 1961 Press reports suggested that a secret defence agreement had been signed by the three Governments; and these allegations were repeated in April, 1962, by Mr. Kenneth Kaunda, leader of the United National Independence Party of NTorthern Rhodesia, and by the spokesmen of the Zimbabwe African People's Union of Southern Rhodesia. South African spokesmen have denied the c)2arges in public, and so has Sir Roy Welensky, on the ground that the Federation has no t legally the tight to enter into such an alliance without the consent of the British Government. But Welensky has elsewhere insisted that the FederatPn is entirely responsible for its own defence. (Guardian 23.1.62) There may indeed be a formal, signed agreement between the three governments; but it is far more probable that co-operation is on a largely informal basis. There is plenty of evidence of military co-operation. Last year, Southern Rhodesian army units for the first time took part in training exercises in South Africa; and military missions from both South Africa and the Federation visited Lourenco ;;arques (capital of 11otambique) at the invitation of the Portu,-uese armny co- iand, and took part in trai-rinexercises involving several units and some 2,600 men. This included paratroop traininG. Indeed, a bilateral military agreement betTeen South Africa and 11ocambique is widely assumed to exist; considerable pressure has benn put on the South African authorities to help the Portuguese in Angola; and the air-field now in use in the Caprivi Strip (bordering Angola and South west Africa) is reportedly for use by both the South African and Portuguese air forces. Certainly, collaboration among the police forces of the three Governments has gone far beyond the requirements of courtesy. According to three South African newspapers (the Sunda.Times, Sunday Ex-oress, and -4ew 4,Ae.), on April 4th, 1962, two men from Yocambique, who had worked nearly all their lives in South Africa, Edward g- ubeni and Philip Sorbal, were illegally repatraited by the South African police "on instructions from the Portuguese Government." It is believed also that it was poressure from the Portuguess that caused the Federation recently to refuse a permanent residence permit to the American Trethodist missionary, the Rev. !%endell Golden, after he had been expelled from Angola. And South African political refugees have met w7ith no sumpathy in the Federation either -- a recent sufferer is Mr. Jordan, 7Tho Was offered a post in Salisbury earlier this year, but on arrival to take it up was put unceremoniously on a train for the Republic, under police escort. Prohibited immigrants are normally at least given the choice of returning whence they have just come -- in this case, a British Protectorate. TIE3 BARE BOES OF THE IIATTER The foregoing chapters reveal elements of a common political and economic structure in the territories constituting the Unholy Alliance: white ninority Governments (in Katanga, a black Government acting largely as agent of white capital interests), industrial and agricultural enterprise in white hands needing plentiful unskilled cheap labour, and conion methods of ensuring this labour, such as the alienation of land, cash taxation, pass systems for Africans. A co-Mmon pattern of economic inequality, industrial and social colour bar, and political repression of those who demand change, logically follows. Yet this is not the full extent of connection between the allies. Behind similarities in political and economic systems, lies a picture of a high degree of actual economic integration. The main industrial centre in the sub-continent, the Rand, absorbs migrant labour not only from the Republic itself, but from the Protectorates, the Federation and the Portuguese territories. In a smaller way, the Northern Rhodesian copper belt is another magnet to contract workers from outside Yorthern Rhodesia, and so is Southern Rhodesian industry. The migrant labourers in turn earn an income for their owm countries which they cannot afford at preseat to lose. The Dederation and atanga have no ports of their own; and the traffic they send through i ocaubique and Angola is helping to bail Salazar out of the economic difficulties consequent oi the Anrola war. These alone are reasons enough for an alliance: a change of regime in one member country might mean not only a hostile State on the borders of the rest, but could fundamentally upset their economies. Just how close is the economic integration can only be understood by examining some of the private financial interests that form the very skeleton of the sub-continent. By far the most important of these are the great mining groups. ,The OaDev:to-Ixatanra Uners These groups are involved in the mining of uold, diamonds, copper, and other valuable minerals, but they all have widespread interests in manufacturing industry, real estate, coal, oil, and agriculturr. Because of their size and the proportion of total national wealth that they control, they have considerable influence in both economic and political spheres. They have direct control over their thousands of employees, special relations with the Gover-Dients and political pressure groups, and substantial power over the international markets for their products. In South Africa, they have unusually close connections nith the Press. The Argus 7ewspaper group in particular is directly controlled by mining houses, and it includes all the evening papers in Johannaesburg, Durban, Cape Toi-n, Pretoria and Port Zlizabeth; the morning papers in Bloemfontein and Kimberley; the :Tatal Sunday Press; and ALL daily newspapers but one in the Federation. Each group discussed here is vast by itself, but the groups do not act in isolation or in competition. T1here is a complex set of inter-connections beiTeen the Cape-to-Katanga *iners: there are few secrets where directorships interlock, and although a group may act independently in fields which do not impinge on the interests of the others, on most questions it must have at least the tacit agreement of the rest. The fields in which the biggest companies are most active are diamonds throughout Southern Africa, gold in South Africa, copper in orthern Rhodesia and Xatanga, and a vast range of other valuable minerals in Katanga. ~***::****** The International Stake in Southern Africa Western capitalist interests are involved in Southern Africa up to their necks. By the end of 1958, total foreign investment in South Africa alone was Il,580m. Of this 1900m. was British, 1200m. American, and the rest mainly French, Swiss and West German -- Germanyts share is increasing. This deep financial and economic involvement helps to explain the concern of the metropolitan powers not to jeopardise 'economic stability' in the countries of Southern Africa, and their tendency to help perpetuate the political status quo. It is not only treaty obligations which concern Governments, but also economic commit-

,euts nd the prcssures of p)rivate lobbies -- most of the ectivities of thie co*pny chiefs 7,o unnoticed behind the scenes !-nd cn ai oily be -uessed Pt, except when crises such as out into the light. (sic) 'hese lobby activities have been most obvious in the United States -- an or,,anisation to aid the 'Freedom Fighters of Eat.ianga,' financed from abroad, took full-page advertisements in the !7ew York papers at the end of ast year; and an American public relations firm, Selvage and Lee Inc., spent some ",200,000 between May and December 1961 as agents of the tOverseas Companies of Portugal' in order "to oublicise Portugal's policies and achievements in Anigola alnd other territories" (Daniel M. Friedenberg, Africa To.ajy, April 1962). But the lobbies are active and influential in this country as well. (excerpts reprinted from the pamphlet The UnholyAlliance CSalazar. Verwoerd. Welens:.Z,, by Rosalynde Ainslie. Published by the AntiApartheid i,'ovement, et al., 15 Endsleigh Street, W.C.1, London, England; October, 1962)

SOU2H AFRICA AD TIORLD OPINION By 11ary Benson Specialist on African Affairs International concern over the race policies of the South African Government and the white electorate has been evident since 1946. At that time, although only 14 of the 54 United Nations were AfroAsian, the General Assembly voted by considerable majorities for thh rejection of Prime Minister Smuts's pronosal to incorporate the mandated territory of Southwest Africa into the Union. United NAtions action was the result of uneasiness over South Africa's policy of race segregation, combined with many appeals from the nonwhites in South and Southwest Africa, with the Indian government playing a leading role in the debates. Over the years censure grew, stimulated after the Nationalist government had come to power in 1948 and hit its stride in passing racialistic laws. In 1952, the Defiance Campaign, initiated by the African National Congress and the South African Indian Congress in protest against several such laws, inspired the United Nations to establish a commission to examine the question of racial conflict in South Africa resulting from the policy of apartheid. Thereafter not only did critical resolutions proliferate but annual reports detailed the effec s of that policy.1 Then came the police shootings of anti-pass law demonstrators at.Sharpeville and Langa in March, 1960, which precipitated widespread shock. Denunciation of the policies that had provoked the tragedy came from, among others, the United States Department of State and the Parliament of Great Britain. The impact of African opinion was increasingly felt after 1960 when a spate of new African members joined the United Nations. They maintained that denunciation without positive action aimed at a change in South Africa's policy, amounted to hypocrisy. And so in 1963 international condemnation culminated in a series of activist resolutions being brought up for consideration by the United Nations. On August 7, the Security Council and, on October 11, the General Assembly (by 106 votes to South Africa's one), splemnly called on the South African Government to liberate all those imprisoned or restricted "for having opposed the policy of apartheid."3 Meanwhile, considering South Africa's intransigence over Southwest Africa, the Assembly, by 84 votes to six, with 17 aba stentions, urged member states not to supply petroleum or petrolem products to South Africa. On December 4, the Security Council called on states to cease the sale and shipment to South Africa of equipment and material for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition. It thus reinforced the Assembly's resolution of November 6, 1962, which requested states to help bring about the abandonment of South Africa's racial policies by Various stringent measures -'his article, reprinted in its entirety, is from Current History, rarch, 1964, Vol. 46, Yo. 271, pp. 129-135, 179-180. among them, refraining from exporting arms and ammunition to South Africa, breaking off diplomatic relations, closing ports to South African ships, and refusing landing and passage facilities to South African aircraft. Many states have complied with all or part of this earlier resolution. The United States government, for one, placed an embargo on the sale of arms to South Africa. Britain, though voting for the Security Council resolution, insisted she would only ban arms used to further aprtheid. But the pressure of the African states has been felt not only in the United Nations (where apart from effectual economic sanctions, the question of the expulsion of South Africa is also lobbied). It is felt in numberous international organizations, for instance, in the World Health Organization and the International Olympics Committee. South Africa has been suspended from scme such organizations -- among these are the International Labour Office and the Economic Commission for Africa. In addition, -following the British Prime Minister's "Wind of Change" speech in Cape Town on February 3, 1960 (the first significant statement of British disapprobation of aprtheid), the African and Asian Commonwealth states, along with Canada, insisted that the South African government abandon its racial policies if it wished to remain in the Commonwealth;'whereupon South Africa withdrew. Thus South Africa, a country which might have been expected to play a leading role in the advance of the African continent -with its great natural riches, its fascinating population of varied cultures who have in -common a deep love for their country, and its wealth of industries - has instead 'become the bete noir of the rest of Africa and, to someextent, of the world at large. For although there are other countries whereelementary human freedoms are denied, or where groups of people are racially prejudiced, only in South Africa, since Hitler, has a state been based on racialism. Dr. H.F. Verwoerd, 'the Prime Minister and leader of the Afrikaner Nationalist Party, reacted to the Security Council's resolution of August 7 by stating: We will never give in. If we weaken we are lost.... Here I stand....Like Luther, we too say that we cannot do. otherwise. Our conscience shows us the road -- but so does our "selfishness."' If we yield we throw away everything -- our money, our goods, and our lives. Suggesting that South Africa is the country where the whites of the world are destined t'o regain their inspiration, he added, "We are here to hold the fort so that they can regain their strength and start anew the battle for Christianity and civilization." On November 2,1963, Verwoerd reiterated that the Nationalist party wants to keep South AfrAca white, and therefore its policy is "separate development." The majority of the whites in*South Africa undoubtedly support these views. 'Ironically, 'the Nationalists now find themselves beholden to their traditional enemy, the British. The British Ambassador in South Africa encouiageslBritish investment there,5-and British delegates at the United Nations -- though expressing "abhorrence" of apartheid -- apeal to the Afr -Asian states tO mollify their actions. Further, contrary to some opinion, there is evidence that the South African government is concerned about its isolated position, and that it is not likely to withdraw from the United Nations so rashly as it did from the Commonwealth. hr. Eric Louw, retiring Forelgn Minister, and notoriously tackless with Asian and.African goverhments, has-even stated that South Africa would continue attempts to restore diplomatic relations with'independent African states. Afrikaner O0inion In Afrikaner opinion two: extremes emerge. There has been a pattern of non-conformity from a handful of Afrikaner intellectuals and theologians. Some who believed in the ideal of apartheid, with its implication of total apatness and whites doing their own labor, were disillus oned when confrinted by :the Government's repudiation of the ideal. b Others have ebelled because they felt apartheid was un-Christian; for instance the senior theologian of the University of Stellenbosch, Professor B.B. Keet, said South African whites should "see colour prejudice for. the irrational thin it is, for then we must condemn i't as-unethical and immoral...(and must) get! rid of our. arrogant feeling of superiority. The most recent of these re bels was Dr. Beyers Naude, former Moderator of the , ledrduitse Gereformeerde Kerk7 of the Southern Transvaal., Dr. iTaude, represeAting'the rethinking of a group of churchmen provoked by the SharpeVille tragedy became director of a new multi-racial Christlan Institute of South Africa. He was thereupon forced to resign his pariah and was widely condemned by fellow-churchmen.8 Dr. Verwoerd 'accused "certain churchmen" of deviating from their original path in a--way that might cause -multiracial ideas to spread into politics. Such deviation could be attributed to Communist conditioning. In striking contrast 'to such small pockets of brave non-conformity is the Broederbond (band: of brothers), the secret society which has considerable'power in the Government and:,its agencies, such as the civil service and police, as well as in the Dutch Reformed Churches. General Jertzog, when he was Prime Minister in 1935, said it had become "a grave menace to the rest and peace of our social community, even where it operates in the economicncultural sphere." General Smuts believed it to be "a dangerous, cunning, political, Fascist, organization." T he' fascist element among 'Tationalists, Verwoerd strongly sumpathized with the tazis.7 In a series of articles, over the past few months, the Johannesburg Sunday imes has disclosed the continuing ominous power of the" Broederb6nd".10 Lo conclude this brief survey of'relevant Afrikaner opinion, it should be emphasized that Afrikaners -- one eighth of the population of the Republic -- dominate, wholly,.the political life of the country. Further, the Nationalist government has so entrenched itself by a seriers of questionable constitutional devices11 that its defeat by constitutional means is improbable, if not impossible. At the 'last election, in 1961, the "Nationalisas won two-thirds of the seats in' the Assembly, yet'only polled 46 per cent of the Votes cast. Enrlish-9Speaking Opinion As for the English-speaking whites, the majority of whom support the United Party, they share the resentment of the Nationalists of any outside criticism. This is the natural result of their having a common attitude on race questions and this resentment will harden as external pressure strengthens. The belief is still widespread among whites that such external criticism rests on "fundamental misconceptions and tragic ignorance," due to "the systematic dissemination of misleading and prejudiced information" -- quotations not from the Government of 1963 but from that of 1936. The United Party's leader, Sir de Villiers Graaff, told the Party congress recently that its policy of "race fed-eratioA" would not satisfy world opinion as a whole: nothing would satisfy Communists except a successful revolution and nothing would satisfy the extremist Afro-Asians except the introduction of one man, one vote, "and that we are not prepared to do." 'That the Party is prepared to do, he said, is to allows the 10 million Bantu 2 14 white representatives in parliament. Incidientally, the South African Foundation -- founded in 1959 by influential industrialists, financiers and investors -desires to promote "international understanding of the South African wny of life, achievements and aspirations...the true picture of South Africa." It has effectively supplemented the public relations activities of the State Information Offices, despite its claim that it is non-political. 2he only remotely democratic party in Parliament is the Progressive Party, but it has only one Member in Parliament, an probably attracts the support of only about 100,000 whites.1 The Party's leader, Dr. Jan Steytler, went abroad briefly in November to convince Western statesmen that all white South Africans were not racialists. He felt that growing world pressure made it important to win support for his Party's policies, and while abroad explained its non-racialism, and its objective of a restricted franchise..He returned convinced that if South Africa were to adopt such a policy, all enmity would disappear, but that unless a political change were quickly brought about in South Africa, even the country's friends might lose sympathy, and "extreme measures" might be applied against her. 7wo last factors should be mentioned. For more than 59 years respective Governments in South Africa have used the black bogey to unite the white electorate through fear, an essential weapon in preserving baasskap (white domination) and, implicit in this, in preserving the "aristocracy" of all whites. Secondly, South Africa's isolation because of her policies has ironically exacerbated the belief of many whites there that the world revolves around them. 'he Progressives are the least prone to this limitation, though not immune, when it comes to realizing that their country is but a small corner of the continent of Africa. African and Indian leaders in South Arica, and radical whites (ranging in political opinion from militant Christians and liberals, to Communists) have long been in tune with the outside world. At first contacts were tentative, such as the African National Congress's appeals to British opinion soon after its foundation in 1912. Lhe first association with the rest of Africa came in 1919 when Sol Plaatje, the writer, represented the A.N.C.15 at the

VV Pan-African Congress in Paris. But the momentous link came in 1946, when the President-General of the A.N.C., Dr. A.B. Xuma, took the Africans' case to the United 7ations. The South African Indian Congress simultaneously was given the* Indian government's valuable support in putting the broad case to the outside world. 'Thereafter regular reports on the worsening condition.of noAwhites were made. As already mentioned, 1952 was a milestone. In 1954, representatives of the non-whites attended the Bandung * conference as observers. Another landmark came in January, 1960, hen the boycott call of Chief Lutuli) President of the A.T.C., as taken up by the second All-African Peoples' Conference in Tunis. This boycott of South African products also won some supPort-in Britain, where among its propagators were members of the South African Liberal Party. And early in 1960 the A.N.C. sent Lutuli's deputy, Mr. Oliver Tambo, abroad -- the first roving i"ambassador" to represent the Africans of South Africa. A leap .forward in communcation with the rest of the continent has fol,owed, with both the A..C. and the Pan-Africanist Congress (which had led the anti-pass demonstrations at Sharpeville and elsewhere) in constant personal contact with representatives of the independent African states. Radical opponents of apartheid m&gkut be imprisoned, outlawed, banned, or silenced in South Africa, but in the United Nations, London, the Scandanavian countries, and In African capitals, they are given a ready platform. Nelson Mandela, one of the leaders at present on trial for his life in South Africa, wile underground had briefly left the country and leaders of the Opposition in London, a tour that impressed all with the calibre of this member of the South African majority. Alan Paton has pithily represented the attitude of the Liberal Party in welcoming the concern of the rest of Africa: The Government which look upon itself as so practical, * fulminateS agains-9.fricans and 4fri a- States as short-sighted, nasty-minded ranters, who are biting off their noses to spite their faces. hat effect do such arguments have? -- precisely nothing. Whatever may be the faults of Africans one thing is, certain -- they hate apartheid with all their hearts, and long only to destroy it. That is the cardinal fact .... That apartheid will come to an end, no sensible man can have a doubt. The Afrikaner Nationalist always believed that his passion was stronger than economics. The passion of liberated Africa will prove the same.... '*conomic Factors Since the grave economic setbakcs resulting from world reaction to Sharpeville, the South African state has been able to retrieve "stability" through armed and police force,16 so that foreign investment, particularly fromfBrttain and the United States, has again flowed in. The gold reserves have more than tripled to reach some §744 million; e~pdtts are up and white immigration (after years of contradiction under the Nationalist government) has steadily increased. Meanwhile more than one half million Africans are unemployed1l (about 14 per cent of the

African labour force). In urban areas between 50 per cent and 80 per cent of African familie's live below the poverty datum line, and there are persistent and alarming reports of malnutrition in both urban areas and in native reserves. In Other words, the industrial colour bar and the migrant labor system deprive nonwhites of their rightful share in the prosperity of their country. Verwoerd's claim that incomes for Africans are higher in South Africa than in any other African country is irrelevant when Africans, who have helped build up the wealth, not only are deinfied a. fair1 hare in it but are prevented by law from improving their lot.I1 Apartheid as a policy, as has been pointed out, was rejected as "impracticable" by the South African government only two years after its inception. As it virtually became a symbol of revulsion for theioutside world, even the word itself has been dropped by the Government, and "separate development" substituted. The policy remains the same; as Colin Legum has pointed out, it is not possible briefly to examine the scores of legislative measures taken by the Nationalist Government since 1948 to separate the races; to counter opposition to their measures; to curb their more radical white opponents,; and to entrench their own position. There is hardly an aspect of social and economic life -- from the home, the school and the Church to the trade union, the factory and the political party --which has not been legislated for. Legislation for ADartheid The fundamental object of this legislation is to ensure that in white areas the African will be kept in his place -- namely, merely an object to labour for the white "aristocratst with so little security,19 so warped an education,20 with no right to strike, no 2ight to perform-skilled labour,2 so harried by the pass laws,2 that he will humbly remain in that place. Apart from the pass laws, probably the law that has caused most suffering to ordinary people is the Urban Areas Act (Section 10), under which menfolk are retained in urban areas as long as their labour is requited, while their families may be "endorsed out" -- in effect, exiled. Thousands of families have been broksn up, and in the Cape this has led to violence on the part of men, forcibly deprived of wives mnd children, who have been sent to the distant reserves (renamed "Bantu areas"). The last vestige of security that the four million Africans in the urban areas have had is due to be removed by the Bantu Laws Amendment Bill coming before Parliament in 1964. After eleven years of rule, the Nationalist government tabled its Bantu self- government policy. The four million Africans in the cities "will never become part of the White community," according to-the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Dr. M.D.C. de Wet Nel, when he explained this policy, and he added that the reserves would be their "Bantu homelands."What he did not sgy, and fundamental to overseas criticism, is that the African four-fifths of the Republic's population are thus confined to less than 13 per cent of the land, and that the Government's own blueprint for apartheid -- the Tomlinson Report -- had recommended that 49 per cent of the existing population in those "Bantu areas" will "have to be removed eventually from the agricultural land."' What then becomes of the 9 million Africans left over? The Tomlinson Commission estimated that 5312 million must be spent in the first ten years (its report was published in 1956), but the average spent during the subsequent seven years was less than '?12 million a year. A five year plan was announced in 1963 to cost 3171 million but two-thirds of this is to house the surplus population moved from the agricultural land. Even the comparatively high budgetary provision for Bantu areas in 1963 -1964 is only $27 million -- 2 per cent of the budget compared with 16 per cent on defence. After 15 years of Nationalist rule, the first Bantustan -the Transkei -- has been established, in fulfillment of the Government's policy of "self-government" for the Bantu. Though the support of the Government's racial policies is assured with a majority of seats (64) being assigned to hereditary chiefs (who are paid by the Government and can be dismissed by it), and though all of the limited powers of the Transkei Parliament are subject to the assent of the Republic's President, the election was seen as a setback for apartheid and a rebuff for Dr. Verwoerd when the majority of elected seats (45) was won by Chief Poto, a proponent of multi- racialism. It will be interesting to follow the fortunes of the Transkei. Brief reference should be made to another factor that has recently aroused interest in Britain and America, the mooting in South Africa of "partition." The supposition is that white South Africa, between a black continent to the north and a black belt to the southeast, will retain the gold, copper, uranium and diamond mines of the Transvaal and Orange Free State, with most of the Cape as its outlet to the sea, while to the Bantu areas the British Protectorates will be added, as well as part of Natal, for the Africans. Dr. Verwoerd has roundly rejected the idea, while Sir de Villiers Graaff commented, "It leaves little old white South Africa neatly bfuffedAout as:d candle under a tea-cosy." He pointed out that Africans were hardly likel r to accept such,* an economic division and that it would not be partition or death," but "Partition and death." Voice of Protest Segregation, apartheid, separate development, all, for Africans and otherii6n- whites, have meant one thing, oppression. For more than 50. years Africans have made their patient protests. In 1909, African leaders, opposing the Act of Union which would give massive power to the privileged white minority, declarad their aim to be a South Africa wherein all people, regardless of class, colour or creed, would be entitled to full and equal rights. Gandhi led the South African Indians in their attempts to break down segregation and unjust laws. The A.1T.C. led passive resistance against the pass laws and sent inumerable deputations to the Government. Meanwhile every avenue of protest was being closed by law after law. The P.A.C. demonstrators were shot down in 1960 but this was only one of a series of such incidents. Yet only in

1961 did African leaders finally reach the conclusion that the violence of the state could only be countered by violence, and since then more than 200 acts of sabotage have been committed -with the intent to harm humans as little as possible. The Government extended its already massive powers by further legislation. The law that has most outraged informed opinion has been the General Law Amendment Act of 1962 and 1963. To mention only part of its clauses: it removes the right of habeus corpus, imposes severe penalties, including the death penalty, on any tampering with the "maintenance of law and order" or with any private or public property. It includes among punishable offences the aim of "bringing about any social or economic change in the Republic." It shifts the onus of proof onto the accused. All over South Africa mass trials are being held under this Act, and under the Unlawful Organisation Act of 1960 (which outlawed the A.N.C., P.A.C. and other organisations). By November, 1963, 40 Africans had been sentenced to death and six to life imprisonment for sabotage, and 650 (including other races) sentenced to imprisonment for terms between one and 25 years. Hundreds more are awaiting trial. Furthermore, under the "90-day" clause of the General Law Amendment Act, which gives wide powers to arrest without charge or trial, more than 500 people of all races have been detained for that period, a few for three consecutive periods of 90 days, most of them held in solitary confinement, without access to lawyers, and under prolonged interrogation. Evidence of torture of some African detainees at the hands of police has caused widespread disquiet, and Hamilton Russell, former United Party M.P,, as well as many of the English language newspapers in South Africa, the London Observer and other British newspapers, have reported the cases and made substantial protests. The rage felt by independent African states at the everintensifying oppression of their brothers in South Africa is a potent force. At the conference of Heads of African States and Governments in Addis Ababa in hay, 1963, a Liberation Bureau was established to coordinate offers.of military material, and "to dispense funds to aid the freedom fighters of Southern Africa." Leaders and refugees from South Africa are based in several African countries and many are active in lobbying, planning and training. Meanwhile within the United Nations the initiative of Scandanavian states has led to the setting up of a group of experts "to examine methods of resolving the present situation in South Africa through full peaceful and orderly application of human rights and fundamental freedom to all the inhabitants... regardless of cblour, creed or race; and to consider what part the United Nations might play in the achievement of that end." It is 54 years since African leaders in Bloemfontein made an almost identical statement of objectives. Footnotes 1 See Security Council S/5426 of September 16, 1963, for most recent report. 2 Law requiring non-Europeans to carry identification cards (passes) at all times.

3 See Security Council Resolution S/5386. The Assembly resolution also called for the abandonment of the political trial of Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, and others. 4 See Die Volksblad, November 4, 1963. "Separate Development" became the new policy phrase when "apartheid" was discredited. 5 See The Times, London, Sep tember 12, 1963. Nearly $3 billion of British capital is invested there. In 1963, Britain's exports to South Africa were 46 per cent more than in 1962. 6 In 1950, Dr. D.F. Malan, Prime Minister, said, "...If one could attain total territorial apartheid, if it were practicable, everybody would admit it would be an ideal state of affairs...but that is not the policy of our party .... I clearly stated...that total territorial apartheid was impracticable under present circumstances in South Africa where our whole economic structure is to a large extent based on Native labour." (Hansard No. 11, 4141-2). Quoted by Colin Legum; chapter on South Africa in Africa: A Handbook to the Continent, p. 382. 7 A Dutch Reformed Church which claims membership of 42 per cent of White South Africans and half a million Africans. 8 A leading member of the D.R.C., Dr. I.J. van der Walt, said the Christian Institute "comes indirectly into line with the Communist ideology"; that as a multi-racial community of Christ it is "directly in conflict with the idea of separate devllopment." The Star, Johannesburg, November 9, 1963. 9 As editor of a leading Nationalist newspaper he was described as making his newspaper "a tool of the Nazis." Judgment of the Transvaal Supreme Court, July 13, 1943, 10 On October 1, 1963, police raided the newspaper's offices, seizing documents relating to the Bond, allegedly stolen from its offices. Security Police questioned Dr. Naude and other liberal Afrikaners who had spoken frankly about the Bond. 11 E.g., The Separate Representation of Voters Act 1951, and High Court of Parliament Act 1952, having been judged invalid, the Government reconstituted the Senate to give itself a two-thirds majority. 12 The misnomer applied to Africans by the Nationalist Government and Afrikaner academics. It means "the people." 13 See South Africa, London, November 29, 1963. Note: Sir de Villiers did not specify the representation for the 3.5 million whites but presumably it would be some 200 at at present. 14 A rough estimate based on the 1961 election in which Progressives and Liberals (who won no seats) together polled 71,503 votes. 15 The A.N.C. was then known as the Native National Congress. 16 Expenditure on defence and police has risen in the period from some $120 million to $309 million. See Security Council Report S/5426 for details. 17 Report of the Froneman Committee to Parliament, January, 1963. 18 While white earnings rose by 35 per cent between 1946 abd 1961, African earnings rose by 11 per cent: i.e., a white man gets approximately $780 more than in 1946 to an African's approx. $53 increase. 19 See Native Urban Areas Act and successive amendments. Native Land Act, Native Administration Act, etc. 20 See Bantu Education Act, The Extension (sic) of Universities Act. 21 See Native Labour (Settlement of Bisputes) Act, Native Building Workers Act, etc.

22 From 1951 to 1960 more than 3.5 million Africans were convicted under -. these laws: Stetfment-tby Minister of Justice, February, 1962. For most this means prison terms, as not many could afford the fines.

TOWARD.A WORLD POLICY FOR SOUTH AFRICA by Patrick Duncan In the Security Council on August 7 the United States voted for a ban on the shipment of arms to the South African Government, and in the course of the debate the American representative announced that the United States would suspend all arms shipments at the end of the year. Since South Africa has in the past found it difficult to obtain licenses for the purchase of American arms, this decision represented only a small shift in policy. But as the vote was taken under African pressure, and as it separated the United States from Britain and France (which abstained), the shift was significant; for it showed that when faced with a choice, the United States is more prepared than before to take a stand against apartheid. The supporting speech defined American policies toward the South African Government with some precision: though hostile to apartheid, the United States is not yet convinced that force is a necessary ingredient in the solution of the problem, for "we cannot accept the conclusion that there is no way out, no direction to go except the present collision course toward ultimate disaster in South Africa." Rather, steps are envisaged "to induce that government to remove the evil business of apartheid...from the continent of Africa." The American view that a clash is avoidable is not shared by most observers. It is certainly not shared by the Government of South Africa, nor the majority of its white citizens. Never has so much been spent on arms in South Africa; the figure is now running at a published rate of $219,000,000 a year. Military service is bulking ever more prominently in the lives of the white people. And, apart from national armaments, the three million white people privately own two million firearms. An ever-tightening code of security laws buttresses this armed oligarchy. There is, for example, :a recent law which permits any police officer to detain anyone for successive periods of 90 days without limit and without warrant; such persons can be held incommunicado and the courts are prohibited from intervening. This is only the latest in a 15-year series of increasingly repressive laws which show a growing fear and hostility toward the Africans. Reproduced by special permission from FOREIGN AFFAIRS, October 1962. Copyright by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., NewYork.

The Bantu Laws Amendment Act of 1963 took away the legal right of all black South Africans (68 percent of the population) to live anywhere outside the "Native Reserves" (13 percent of the land). Continued residence in the 87 percent of the land reserved for whites is a matter of privilege, and requires permits that can be administratively cancelled at any time. Freedom of movement for Africans has already dwindled until the majority of the population are not able to move from their places of work. One-third of the Africans live on white men's farms; they may not leave to look for work in the cities without the permission of their masters and of the government. The one-third who live in the cities generally dare not have a dispute with their employers for fear of being forced by the government to go to live in the decaying reserves. And for the remaining third who live in the reserves, it is illegal to move out unless they have work waiting for them. For most, this is an impossibility, unlefr the'y contract to work in the mines. Strikes by Africans have been made illegal, and almost every act of their lives, including often the right to live with their spouses, and even the right to go to the church of their choice, has been made subject to official permits. Another law prohibits the courts, in certain matters, from issuing injunctions in favor of Africans. In mid-1963 over 5,000 persons were held as convicted political prisoners, and at least 2,800 members of one movement, the Pan-Africanist Congress, had been arrested and were awaiting trial. Education for white children up to the eighth grade is compulsory and free, and the schools provide free meals. The government spends about $170 on each white child in school, while the comparable figure for African children is $l7. But for African children education is not compulsory and most children of school age are not in school. The Bantu Education Act specifically designs education for Africans which shall fit them for an inferior place in life. One of the first acts of the Afrikaner Nationalists when they cansto power was to cancel the existing schemes for free food for African school children--the very children who need it most. These and other facts do not bear out the contention of apologists for apartheid that the African in the Union enjoys a standard of living unequaled in Africa. Despite the fact that South Africa is the richest country of the continent and has been enjoying great prosperity, an official study shows that the real wages of Africans in the main urban centers generally declined in the 1950s. Moreover, the incidence of malnutrition and related diseases in parts of South Africa is the highest recorded in the world. The infant mortality rate in the Port Elizabeth divisional area in 1961 was 480 per thousand live births. African children die at 25 times the rate of white children. According to a survey carried out by the reputable RAND DAILY MAIL, 57 percent of African children die before they reach the age of five years. A University of Natal survey found signs of malnutrition in every one of 240 African workers visited: they were earning $28 a month. A bus company gave out free meals ,and found that absenteeism among African workers dropped by halfi This low standard of living is a reflection of the African's votelessness and his inability to influence political movements. Political rights, long enjoyed, have been reduced or abolished. In 1853 Britain gave the Cape a parliament, and gave the vote to all men earning $140 a year. Many black and colored men qualified, and for most of the nineteenth century the Cape parliament was responsible to the aspirations of all races. But the white minority never accepted this situation, and in the hundred years after 1853--but most drastically in the last 15--managed to abolish all political and civic rights which the African people had enjoyed. (Vestigial rights are still enjoyed by some colored people.) At the same time that the white minority has been reducing the political power of the non-whites, the Africans' ambitions and aspirations have been rising. In this fact lies the refutation both of those who plead for more time and of those who believe that a conflict is avoidable. The all-pervasive ideas of democracy have found ready acceptance among the non-white people of South Africa. Despite rigid censorship of books and films, and despite an ideological decision not to have television, there has never been so great a flood of modern ideas into the minds of the voteless South Africans. Another gauge of the .situation is that some 100,000 non-whites own cars, and a rising class of business and professional men is inching its way upward against almost insuperable obstacles. The Africans are determined to win full status and dignity and power. Their determination is reflected in a remarkable ,growth recently in militancy and political courage. Two principal organizations have emerged: the Pan-Africanist Congress (of which I am a member) and an earlier protest movement, the African National Congress. PAC was founded in 1959 by a university lecturer named Mangaliso Robert Sobukwe, who completed a threeyear prison sentence onMay 5 but is still detained. It was born out of the imnatience of the younger and more ardent Africans with the A.N.C., which for some 40 years had voiced the protests of the Africans. Sobukwe and his followers claimed that the A.N.C. had failed too often in its ambitious protests and strikes, that it was dominated by Communists and whites, and that it paid too little regard to the African personality. He rapidly won the confidence of the masses and in March 1960 he launched the non-violent campaign of positive action that led to Sharpeville. Thereafter, both movements were outlawed, and the leaders of PAC were given heavy sentences. Both movements went underground, the PAG more effectively. Its committee functions in Basutoland, in the center of South Africa. There are about 100 cells, and at least one cell has 1,000 members. According to a recent 11 am indebted for the above facts on malnutrition to "The Coming Struggle for South Africa, by Sandor (Fabian Society, London, 1963)' "Sandor" is the pen name of a well known South African pUblicist specializing in rqsearch on labor conditions. 'For the wage study see the article ty Professor W.R.J. Steenkamp, Chairman of the Wage Board, in the SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, June 1962. public opinion survey conducted by the South African Institute of Race Relations, the Pan-Africanist Congress is the leading African party and has particular support among the more militant and the students. Crow11nZ Af'rican m-litancy has bred and will continue to breed growing gcverizc-t oppression. The extremes are nourishing each other at the exp inse of the middle. It is this that makes the coming clash inevitable unless the white South Africans can be affected by external pressures. The first of these is already being mounted. In May of this year at the Addis Ababa Conference, free Africa declared war on apartheid. It was this issue that made it possible for the 32 independent states meeting there to overcome every other divisive factor. All agreed that the emancipation of Africa and of Negroes everywhere could not be regarded as complete while there subsisted in Africa's most wealthy state a constitution based on the proposition that men are incurably unequal, and that whites alone deserve the vote. Subventions have already begun to flow into the Liberation Fund, a war chest for the extirpation of apartheid. Africa intends and is able to fight apartheid. Let those who doubt it, or who may underestimate the dimensions of such a war, bear in mind that apartheid treats as inferior not only South Africans of African origin, but also those of Indian and Chinese origin, and that the theory of apartheid has already stirred to anger the representatives of nearly three billion people. The danger of a world split on the basis of color has been feared for many years; it is a division that could destroy civilization and a great part of the human race. Already, if we are to attach weight to the July letter of the Russians to the Chinese Communists, the Chinese have used the racist argument to secure the expulsion of the Soviet Union from some organizations in the Afro- Asian world. As a result, some observers are predicting that the Chinese will attempt to build a Fifth International based on color. Such an attempt would be greatly assisted by the existence of a regime in South Africa whichprofesses to be leading a crusade against Communism, but which, in the name of "Western civilization," oppresses the colored races. It is, moreover, a government that displays most of the weaknesses which Marx and Engels predicted for capitalism: increasing poverty for the workers, increasing wealth for the capitalists, and aggressiveness against the outside world. II Hitherto American policy in Africa has tried to avoid making choices. Only in the Congo were choices made and strong policies executed. Elsewhere the Government of the United States has tried, and largely succeeded, in remaining friend to both the departing metropole powers and the emerging African nations. Wise though this may be when there is a continuing dialogue between contending parties, or when political movement is generally in the desired direction, or when either side is subject to persuasion, such a policy merely ensures the hostility of both sides when, as in the case of South Africa, none of these conditions applies.

Two facts are generally overlooked by those who hold that time should be afforded to the South African authorities to solve the problem themselves, and that interference from outside merely aggravates the situation by making the supporters of apartheid more militant and unified. The first is that developments in South Africa are going the wrong way: where there were rights, these have been taken away; where there was a little integration, it has been abolished; where there was some hope in the minds of the ruled, it has given way to despair. The second is that there is no longer any effective opposition to apartheid within the South African electorate. Any legislation presented by the Nationalist Party can be passed in Parliament with almost no debate and but one or two dissenting votes. Indeed, it is probably no longer within the power of the government to reverse the trend toward increased oppression, for a fearful electorate would remove even Dr. Verwoerd's government if it showed a disposition to make concessions. Thus the initiative has already passed irrevocably away from the whites to the voteless, and to their friends and allies. For all these reasons, it is difficult to see how intervention can make matters worse than they are. If this analysis is correct, what can America--if it so wills-do about it? The question is often asked in a tone of despair that is unjustified. There are two main kinds of action that can be taken: small-scale measures that can be taken quietly and immediately, and that require no major policy decisions; and more telling actions that require major decisions of state. Having voted in favor of the arms embargo, the United States might use its influence to discouraae its NATO allies from supplying arms of any kind to the South African Government. Under pressure from Africa, the British and French have announced that they will no longer supply arms that could be used to enforce apartheid. The United States tried this policy from 1961 to 1963, and could point out to the British and French that the distinction is unreal, as it found when it refused licenses to the South Africans for supersonic jet combat-planes in 1961, yet allowed the export of Lockheed Hercules C-130 military transport planes in 1963. In any event, it is to be hoped that the recent undertakings by the British and French will be observed. The temptation to waver will be especially strong for the French, who have been the principal suppliers of helicopters and armored cars--weapons of particular value in the kind of war that is likely to occur in South Africa. Mr. Stevenson told the U.N. that "we have utilized our diplomatic and consular establishments in South Africa to demonstrate by words and by deeds our official disapproval of apartheid." With a nation that has taken the bit between its teeth, words have limited value; of deeds, only one has been made public. Although individual Africans have previously been entertained at the American Embassy, only this year, for the first time, were non-whites invited to the Independence Day celebrations--a secondary party to which South African Government representatives were not invited. While this partial desegregation of an official reception must be welcomed and applauded, one wonders why all entertainment at the embassy could not be integrated. To be sure, the last Soviet representative to South Africa was expelled from the country because he refused to accept apartheid in his consulate-general; but is this an argument for or against thet proposition? Cr again, might not a Negro foreign service-officer be posted-to the embassy? Is it necessary for American naval vessels visiting South Africa to have none but white officers? Miht "awkward" social situations be reduced if the American' Ambassador-were replaced by a consul-general who might'find it easier to establish contacts with all elements in the population? Similarly, it might be appropriate to end grants, student exchanges. and links of all kinds which involve the acceptance of segregationi Cf the various schemes, both governmental and private, for the-exchange of students and leaders', all involving South Africa are under the close control of the South African Government, for it exercises strict passport and visa control. It permits these schemes to continue, and uses them as propaganda to demonstrate its respectability in the eyes of the world,.. Strong opponents of the government are notallowed passports to travel, so the exchanges are limited to supporters of the government, to apolitical persons and sometimes to' people' who have become instruments of apartheid. In general, non-whites.: do not get passports for these exchanges unless they are regarded as politically safe. These schemes thus have value to the government, for they are regarded as plums to which supporters.. can aspire, as well as some innocuous opponents whose opposition is not embarrassing to the government. In the circumstances, it would not appear that the American dollars which so often finance these.schemes are working in American interests. As links with the white supremacist minority are attenuated, so links with the majority might be extended and strengthened. At this stage what is required is an increase in scholarship schemes for young people who manage to smuc-le themselves out of the country. America s record in this ield is good, but needs are growing fast. Such schemes could play an important part in strengthening democracy now and in assisting reconstruction later. Another useful move would be to discourage American investment in South Africa. It is true that investors have a concern for the country in which they have substantial economic interests, but understandably this concern is primarily to maintain the status quo, to avoid change which may adversely affect the climate for doing business. Moreover, each dollar that moves into the SouthAfrican currency control area is, in effect, a vote of confidence in the system, and builds currency reserves which are being built up for military expenditure against the coming;storm, Thus investment strengthens apartheid today and imperils the whole private-enterprise system tomorrow--for the African majority, when it votes, will vote against all who' did 'business with apartheid. In any case, since the Addis Conference it has become apparent that foreign businessmen will probably have to choose between South Africa and the rest of the continent. By,trading and investihg in South Africa- businessmen stand. to win a substantial (but brief) return at the cost of losing their whole pohition in a rapidly developing market of 250,000,000 people. American investment in all of southern Africa, from the Congo to the Cape, amounts to only $413,000,000, compared with a British stake in South Africa alone of over $2,800,000,000. The withdrawal of $413 million would not hurt the United States, but would be likely to make a considerable impact on the South African Government. Ill None of these recommendations could be called radical. It would be unreal, however, to expect that more far-reaching decisions leading to a world policy for South Africa can long be postponed. :one of the first big questions which will come before the U.N. is that of South West Africa, on which the World Court is expected to render a judgment some time in 1964. To summarize the case very briefly, the South West African question had its origin in the First World War, when the territory was taken from the defeated Germans and entrusted by the League of Nations as a mandate to the South African Government. The South Africans were permitted to administer the territory "as an integral portion of the Union of South Africa," but must "promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the territory." Despite this injunction the South African Government has ruled the non-whites of South West Africa as they have ruled the non-whites in South Africa. The basis of this rule vls defined by Mr. J. G. Strijdom, the South African Prime Minister who prededed Dr. Verwoerd, as follows: "The European is the master in South Africa, quite apart from his economic hold on the country, and quite apart from his culture and civilization, because he is the ruler of the country...The entire position of the European is based on discriminatory legislation in so far as the races in South Africa are concerned.'" Since then Dr. Verwoerd has introduced apartheid more definitely into the mandate by placing the nonwhites of the territory under the South African Department of Bantu Administration and Development, and by creating segregated townships. The South West African question has been debated at the United Nations annually since 1948 without any material results. Now the matter has been taken to the International Court of Justice at The Hague. The plaintiff countries are Ethiopia and Liberia, which, having been members of the League of Nations as well as of the U.N.,were felt to be the most suited for the role. They have asked the Court for a declaration that the introduction of the apartheid policy is inconsistent with the terms of the mandate. The Court has not been asked to issue any order, merely a declaration. The judgment, when I.t is handed down, is expected to favor the plaintiffs, ii. -;iK ! a e.n interesting and unprecedented situation will exist. C-c possibility is that the South African Government will then make a virtue of necessity by abandoning its mandate and transferring it to the Trusteeship Council. This may depend very much on whether the South African Government believes the United States is prepared--if the mandate is not surrendered--to support collective U.N. action against South Africa, with economic sanctions or force if necessary. If South Africa does not respond favorably to the Court's judgment, the matter is almost certain to go to the Security Council where a resolution will probably be introduced to detach the mandate from South Africa. Then the position of the United States and the Council's other permanent members will be crucial. A veto in the Security Council would not necessarily affect the outcome, because action by the General Assembly would still be possible and probable. But it would remove American and European influence from the action; even to abstain would greatly xedueq the capacity of the United States to influence CVCntC;* It seems eviddnt that the Soviet Union will strongly support a U.N. resolution on South West Africa. But the experience of the Congo should discourage both of the major powers from trying to frustrate United Nations action on this issue. In the Congo the United States supported, though with great difficulty, the T6ajority of member states, and paid a large part of the costs. The Soviet Union tried to boycott the operation and has refused to pay its share of the costs. It is no coincidence that Russian policy in central Africa lies in ruins, whereas the United States attained its major objectives. If sanctions are likely to be used, or threatened, over the Routh West African question, are they likely to be used or threatened over the question of apartheid? In the Security Council in August the United States opposed sanctions against South Africa, and Mr. Stevenson called for the examination of peaceful alternatives to the use of force. But Chapter VII of the Charter identifies sanctions as the principal alternative to the use of force. The continued call for sanctions by free Africa is not mere trouble-making, but is on the contrary a sincere attempt to handle.-in a manner provided for by the U.N. Charter--a situation which the United States itself acknowledges is a threat to peace and security. In any case there is a ground swell running for sanctions, and spontaneous trade-union boycotts are growing in Britain and Scandinavia. It is thus reasonable to expect that, even apart from South West Africa, the world will shortly be seeking effective methods of pnnning up and weakening the apartheid system. Cf all possible trade embargoes, only one has any chance of being truly effective: a blockade of oil imports. South Africa is more than self-sufficient in foodstuffs and clothing, and can even make automobiles. But it has no petroleum, though an oil-from-coal industry supplies about 10 percent of its gasoline needs. Cutting off oil imports would have unpredictable results, but it may be said that it would make the continued administration of the coiintry eithr pILr-mey e fficult or impossible. 2Hansard, 1352, v. 77, col. 252. There are of course many arguments against the use of sanctions. One of the most frequently heard is that "they will hurt the very people they are designed to help." But there is not one African eader in South Africa who would not welcome effective action of this sort, and there are few non-whites who would not accept great inconvenience and suffering if apartheid could thereby be ended. Another argument heard in America is that the United Nations should not call for sanctions against apartheid, because the resolution would be ignored. This prophecy is in some degree selffulfilling. But if the United States were willing to adhere to an oil embargo, and assuming that the Communist countries followed suit, the pressures that could be mounted on the remaining oil producers would be overwhelming. What would particularly distinguish this effort to impose sanctions from earlier, unsuccessful efforts is the unusual degree of unanimity that exists throughout the world on the apartheid issue. And it is because intervention of some kind is almost inevitable--whether or not the West wills it--that controlled intervention under the aegis of the United Nations offers the best hope of the human race of escaping from the worst consequences of apartheid. As the crisis grows one hears voices increasingly being raised in America in favor of a "just" partition. Put there is no just partition, for any scheme would remove some innocent individual from their homes and employment. In particular, there is no just partition that could leave the white territory with any sizable infrastructure. For it was the whites who unified a naturally partitioned South Africa in the nineteenth century, and who forced the non-whites to cooperate in building the industries, farms and mines. If now it is the whites who wish to destroy the partnership and undo the union, they could not reasonably expect to keep what was built in partnership. In any event, partition has no hope of being accepted by either side. Mr. Stevenson ended his August 2 speech with a comparison between the South African question and the nuclear test-ban treaty. The comparison is just, for South Africa like the atom contains potentialities for great good or for great evil. A democratic and non-racial South Africa could do much to conquer the backwardness of the entire continent, and could ease the relationships between black and white everywhere. But if apartheid were to continue much longer, or if the world were to stand aside from South Africa while the races mutilated each other and ruined the land's productive capacity, race relationships everywhere could be poisoned. Between the possibility of great good and the possibility of great evil lies a field awaiting the exercise of creative world statesmanship. Here, as in so many other areas of world tension, nothing is possible without an American lead.

UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS Press Release No. 4328 December 4, 1963 Excerpts from statement by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, United States Representative, in the Security Council, on the Questionkof Apartheid in South Africa. The questions before us here are not, unfortunately, solved by saying once again how thoroughly we reject apartheid. They can be resolved only by practical steps that will really contribute towards its elimination in conformity with the Charter. Speaking recently in the Special Political Committee, Ambassador Plimpton ot r- 1ined 'certain principles ,that bear repetition for they are the heart of our approach to the impasse in South Africa: First , an enduring solution carnot be imposed from the .outside for, in the last analysis, the change must be brought about primarily by the South Africans themselves, white and black. We do not consider that the present situation in South Africa falls within the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter. Accordingly we would not consider a recommendation for coercive action as appropriate under or authorized by the Charter. The transformation of the resolution of August 7 from Chapter VII to Chaptej VI language was the tdecisive" step, as we said at the time, that made it Posible for the United States to support the reanlution. We support the pendng resolution for the same reasons. (Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter is entitled: "Pacific Settlement of Disputes". Chapter VI! is entitled: "Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression." Article 41 of chapter VII reads: "The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. Theae may include complete or partial interruption of economic- relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, anfi other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relatici ..... '. + e 42 of chpt.. Ii reads: "Should the Security Qouncil consider that mre~ e ipr!mie for :in Article 41 would be. inadequate 'or have prov7ed t be inafqu~te,' it may take such action by air, sea, or land forca; as may be necesaary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action mjy include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations. "' The United States will carry out the. policy on restricting arms and * equipment to South Africa contained in this resolution as a corollay of the policy ich we announced'in August, and would do so even in the absence of such a reolution. We will act under this paragraph, of the resolution and in accordance with our own law on the basis of materials and -equipment whose primary uses are connedted with the manufact and maintenance of arms or ammunition. Thus we will no longer, for exaz~ie, seU or provide to South Africa equipment such as artillery and aumrv tion lathes, shell tampers, rifle and rifle working machines, military type Jigs, hydraulia cpresses equippe to manufacture arms and artillery casting machines and equipment for the production of iilitary explosives. We do not regard multi-purpose items, such as petroleum products or raw materials, as being within the scope of this policy. Now, gentlemen, action by the Security Council and the United Nations generally is only one part of the total effort of members of the Organization to hasten the end of Apartheid in South Africa. We all have an obligation under the Charter and in accordance with the resolutions of the General Assembly to act individually, to use our own influence tQ bring about a change in South Africa. The United States accepts this responsibility. We realize that, as one of the countries maintaining diplomatic, consular and other relations with South Africa, we bear a responsibility. For if the massive change we all seek is to come--- and it will - it must come from within. It will come when the supporters of Apartheid realize that the way they have chosen is, in the eyes of the world in which South Africa must live, morally intolerable, politically unviable, and economically unprofitable. The conviction that this is so will come through more - not less -- contact with the realities of the modern world, including the realities of this Organization. We are determined to have the Embasssy of the United States in South Africa represent our national principles of racial equality. All - white or black -- who enter its doors will be treated as always in the same dignity and respect as they are in our embassies and consulates in every country. This, however, is only one Part of the story. Another aspect is education. We firmly believe that no people can grow and develop without the advantages pf higher education now denied to so many South Africans. The United States through both public and private resources -- has done and will continue to do what it can to help provide such education for those permitted to seek it. It is a source of pride to me that already many young South Africans, not to mention young people from South West Africa, have availed themselves of these opportunities. The number may be small, but the impact will be great, and both, I hope, will grow. Press Release No. 4277 October 25, 1963 Excerpts from statement by Ambassador Francis T. P. Plimpton, United States Representative in the Special Political Committee, on Apartheid in South Africa, October 25, 1963. South Africa is only one place where racial discrimination is practiced. But South Africa is almost alone in transforming the practice into a philosophy. By giving apartheid the dignity of a state doctrine, it leaves this body no choice but to place this doctrine under the spotlight of world attention. My Government has repreatedly condemned Apartheid and its systematic denial of human rights and freedoms. Mr. Chairman, the fateful consequences of Apartheid and of the consistent failure of the South African Government to appreciate those consequences gives us a heavy. responsibility. For we must exercise the greatest care to avoid sten- w- ;-, may increase the danger of racial explosion. We must channel our conc X . a heightened effort to break the impasse in South Africa. First, I believe we can accept the presmise the chpvnge must be brought about primarily by the whit black - an enduring solution cannot be side. that in the last analysis, South Africans themselves, imposed by force from out-

1899 (XVIII). QUESTION OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA The General Assembly, Having considered the question of South West Africa, Having considered the report on this question submitted by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, Having heard the statements of the petitioners, Bearing in mind the principles of the Declaration on the granting of Independence tc colonial countries and peoples, set forth in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, Recalling all its resolutions relating to South West Africa, especially resolutions 1702 (XVI) of 19 December 1961 and 1805 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, Considering the decisions relating to decolonization adopted at the Summit Conference of Independent African States, held in May 1963 at Addis Ababa, particularly those concerning South West Africa, Deeply regretting that the Government of the Republic of South Africa has taken no steps to implement the resolutions of the General Assembly on South West Africa and, in particular, that it has refused to allow a United Nations technical assistance resident representative to be stationed in that Territory, Further deploring the refusal of the Government of South Africa to cooperate with the Special Committee, which has prevented the Committee from discharging the tasks assigned to it by General Assembly resolution 1805 (XVII), Noting with deep concern the continuing deterioration of the situation in South West Africa resulting from the intensification of the policies of apartheid, which has been unanimously censured and categorically condemned by the General Assembly in resolutions 1761 (xvii) of 6 November 1962 and 1881 (XVIII) of 11 October 1963, Observing with profound regret that the Government of South Africa has persistently and deliberately failed to fulfil its international obligations in the administration of the Mandated Territory of South West Africa, Considering that any attempt by the Government of South Africa a part or whole of the Territory of South West Africa would be contrary to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 11 July 1950 and would constitute a violation of that Government's obligations under the Mandate and of its other international obligations, Considering further that the continuing support received by the Government of South Africa from certain Powers or certain financial groups encourages it to persist in its attitude and enables it to do so, Deeply concerned at the present critical situation in South West Africa, the continuation of which constitutes a serious threat to international peace on security, Taking into consideration the special responsibilities of the United Nations with regard to the Territory of South West Africa, 1. Approves the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples on the question of South West Africa, particularly its conclusions and recommendations, and express keen appreciation for the work of the Committee; 2. Solemnly reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of South West Afric2 to self determination and independence; 3- Con&cmns the Government of the Republic of South Africa for its persistent refusal to co-operate with the United Nations in applying the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and implementing the resolutions of the General Assembly;

4. Considers that any attempt to annex a part or the- whole of the Territory of South West Africa constitutes an act of aggression; 5. Requests the Secretary-General: (a) To continue his efforts ;ith a view to achibving the objectives stated in p, - ..phs 5 and 6 of General Assembly resolution 1805 (XVII); .(b) To invite the Government of South Africa to inform him of its decision regarding the provisions of those paragraphs not later than 30 November 1963; (c) To report to the General Assembly immediately after he has received the reply of the Government of South Africa; 6. Decides to draw the attention of the Security Council to the present critical situation in South West Africa, the continuation of which constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security; 7. Urges all States which have not yet done so to take, separately or collectively, the following measures with reference to the question of South West Africa: (a) Refrain forthwith from supplying in any manner or form any arms or military equipment to South Africa; (b) Refrain also from supplying in any manner or form any petroleum of petroleum products to South Africa; (c) Refrain from any action which might hamper the implementation of the present resolution and of the previous General Assembly resolutions on South West Africa; 8. Requests the Special Committee: (a) To continue its efforts with a view to discharging the tasks assigned to it by resolution 1805 (XVII); (b) To consider, in co-operation with the Secretary-General and the agencies of the United Nations, the implications of the activities of the mining industry and the other international companies having interests in South West Africa, in order to assess their economic azd political influence and their mode of operation; (c) To report on these questions to the General'Assembly at its nineteenth session; 9. Decides to maintain the question of South West Africa on the agenda of its eighteenth session and to resume consideration of this question in the light of the reply of the Government of South Africa, given in accordance with paragraph 5 above, and immediately after receipt of that reply. 1257th plenary meeting, 13 November 1963. RESOLUTION ON APARTHEID ADOPTED BY THE ASSEMBLY The Security Council, Having considered the race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa, Recalling previous resolutions of the Security Council and of the General Assembly which have dealt with the racial policies of the Government of the Republic of South Africa, and in particular the Security Council resolution S/5386 of August 7, 1963,

Having considered the Socretary-General's reports contained in-S/5438 and Addenda, DePloring the refusal of the Government of tho*Ropublic of South Africa as confirmed in the reply of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Africa to the Secretary-General received on October 11, 1963, to comply with Security Council resolution S/5386 of August 7, 1963, and to accept the repeated recommendations of other United Nations organs Notin with appreciation the replies to the SecretaryGeneralls communication to the member states on the action taken and proposed to be taken by their governments in the context of that resolutionts operative paragraph 3, and hoping that all the the member states as soon as possible will inform the SecretaryGeneral about their willingness to carry out the provisions of that paragraph, Taking note of the reports of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of Government of Republic of South Africa contained in document A/5497, Notig with deep satisfaction the overwhelming support for the resou ion A/RES/1881 (XVIII) adopted by the General Assembly on October 11, 1963, Takin into account the serious concern of the member states w-,ith regard to the °poi-cy of ajartheid as expressed in the general debate in the General Assembly as well as in the discussions in the Special Political Committee, Being strengthened in its convictibn that the situation in South Africa is seriously disturbing international peace and security, and strongly deprecating the policies of the Government of South Africa in its perpetuation of racial discrimination as being inconsistent with the principles contained in the Charter of the United Natibns and with its obligations as a member stat3 of the United Nations, RecognizinG the need to eliminate discrimination in regard to basic human rights and fundamental freedoms for all individuals within the territory of the Republic of South Africa without distinctibn as to race, sex, language or religion, Expressing the firm conviction that the policies of apartheid and racial discrimination as practiced by the Goverhment of the Republic of South Africa are abhorrent to the conscience of mankind and that therefore a positite alternative to these policies must be found through peaceful means, 1. Appeals to all states to comply with the provisibns of Security Council resolutibn S/5386 of August 7, 1963; 2. Urgentlrequests the Government of the Relublic of South Africa to cease forthwith its continued imposition of discriminatory and repressive measures which are contrary to the principles and purposes of the Charter and whibh are in violation of its obligations as a member of the United Nations and of the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 3. Condemns the non-compliance by the Government of the Republic of South Africa with the appeals contained in the abovementibned resolutions of the General 'ssevbly and the Security Council; 4. Again calls upon the Government of South Africa to liberate all persons imprisoned, interned or subjected to other restrictions for having opposed the policy of a artheid; 5. Solemnl* calls upon all states to cease forthwith the sale and shipment of equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition in South Africa; 6. Re vests the Sedretary-General to establish under his direction and reporting to him a small group of recognized experts to examine methods of resolving the present situation it South Africa through full, peaceful and orderly application of human rights and fundamental freedoms to all inhabitants of the territory as a whole, regardless of race, color or creed, and to consider what part the United Nations might play in the achievement of that end; 7. Invites the Government of the Republic of South Africa to avail itselfof the assistance of this group in order to bring about such peaceful and orderly transformation; 8. Reavests the Secretary-General to continue to keep the situation under observation and to report to the Security Council pich new developmints as may occur, and in any case not later than Jine I. 1964, on the ImpIAM4ntation of this resolution. (December 4, 1963)

AMERICAN FIRMS, aJ BSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES REPUBLIC OF SOUTH-AFRICA This designation and list does not purport to be authoritative as to legal status or relationship existing between the American firms and individuals involved and their business enterprises in the Republic of South Africa. The information is based on the latest reports available prior to or on the date of publication of this list. It is given with the understanding that these conditions are subject to change without notice. This list includes only those firms in which American forms or individuals have a substantial direct capital-investment in the form of stock, as the sole owner, or as a prtner in the enterprise. No attempt has been made to include foreign firms operating under a contract, license or comission basis, where no actual American capital is involved, and in which American firms participate solely on a royalty or profitsharing basis. Small or anonymous investments are not encompassed and the lst cannot be regarded as all-inclusive. The non-comercial enterprises and institutions such as churches, missions, schools and hositals, financed or operated by American charitable or religiuus organizations, have also been omitted, Per Basic Information The most up-to-date official information in United States investment in the Republic is tc 5outh Urican Reserve Bank's 1961 figure of $505 million ($306 million equity and $199 million portfolio investment). The estimated figure for current American holdings is between $575 and $600 million, also in the proportion of 2/3 direct and 1/3 indirect investment. Although there was a considerable outflow of American capital after the Sharpeville incident in 1960 it will be noted that United States investments have increased between 15 and 25 per cent since 1961. A factor contributing to this continued iuvestment is the South African Government's policy of economic nationalism, which has made it seem desirable to several United States firms to initiate or expand manufacturing activity in the Republic in order to obtain or retain a share of the market. Prior to June 19, 1961, there was free transferability of profits, dividends and capital by non-residents. Dividend payments are still freely transferable but there are certain restrictions on repatriation of equity and loan capital. These restictions are subject to change and prospective investors are advised to ascertain the current position from the United States Department of Commerce, Washington 25, D.C. or from any of its Field offices throughout the United States. south African firms are classified in this report as large, medium or small. Only those classified as large are listed below. Name and address of the American firm and the South African affiliate are providedl. From "American Firms, Subsidiaries and Affiliates - Republic of South Africa' U.S. Lep't of Commerce, Bureau of International Commerce, May, 1963.

ABBOTT IABORATORIES 14 & Sheridan North Chicago, Illinois ADIMESSOGRAPH-MULTIGRAPH CORPORATION 1200 Babbitt Road Cleveland, Ohio ALLIS-C HAIMERS INTNATIONAL Milwaukee 1, Wisconsin AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY 65 Broadway New York 6, New York AMERICAN YPTAL CLIMAX INW. 1270 Ave- ' ,f the Americas New Yo%.- N'ew York BRISTOL LABORATORIES INT'L CCRPo Syracuse, New York Abbott Laboratories S.A. (Pty) Ltd. P.O. Box 1616 Johannesburg Addressograph-fMultigraph (Pty) Ltd. P.O. Box 282 Johannesburg Edward L. Bateman Limited P.O. Box 1671 Johannesburg The American Express Comparm Inc* 104 Commissioner Street Johannesburg Tsumeb Corporation Limited Main Street, P.O. Box 40 Tsumeb, South West Africa B.L. Pharmaceuticals (Pty) limited P.O. Box 2515 Johannesburg BUDD COKPANY (THE) Philadelphia 32, Pennsylvania Unioh Carraige and P.O. Box 335 Nigel, Transvaal Wagon Co. (Pty) Ltd, BURROUGHS CORPORATION Second Avenue Detroit, Michigan Burroughs Machines Limited P.O. Box 3996 Johannesburg CHESEBROUGH-POND, S IN[ORPORATED 485 Lexington Avenue New York 17, New York COCO-COLA EXPORT CORPORATION 515 Madison Avenue New Yorp, New York COLGATE-PALMOLIVE COMPANY 300 Park Avenue New York 22, New York COLUMBUS McKINNON CORPCRATION P.O. Box 72 Tonawanda, New York DORR-OLIVE INCORPORATED Havemeyer Lane Stamford, Connecticut DUN AND BRADSTREET COMPANY 99 Church Street New York 8, New York Chesebrough-Ponds P.O. Box 512 Germis tons Transvaa International Ltd. The Coco-Cola Export Corporation Mobil House, Rissik Street Johannesburg Colgate-Palmolive Limited P.O. Box 1002 Johannesburg McKinnon Chain P.O. Box 7770 Johannesburg (So. Afr.)(Pty) Limited Edward L. Bateman Limited P.O. Box 1671 Johannesburg Dan and Bradstreet (Pty) Limited 127 President Street Johannesburg

Edward L. Bateman Limited P.O. Box 1671 Johannesburg FIRESTONE TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY Akron, Ohio GENERAL ELKETRIC CQMPANY 570 Lexington Avenue New York 22, New York GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION Detroit, Michigan GOLD SEAL COMPANY Camden, New Jersey THE GOODYEAR INTERNATIONAL CORP. 3-144 East Market Street Akron 16, Ohio GRANT ADVERTISING INCORPORATED 919 N. Michigan Avenue Chicago, Illinois HEYWOOD WAKEFIELD COMPANY Gardner, Massachusetts HUMPHREYS ENGINEERING COMPANY 818 17th Street Ddnver 2, Colorado Firestone South Africa (Pty) Limited P.O. Box 992 Port Elizabeth South African General Electric Co. (Pty) Limited P.O. Box 1905 Johannesburg General Motors P.O. Box 3137 Port Elizabeth South Africa (Pty) Ltd. Hill and Murray Limited P.O. Box 3070 Johannesburg The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, (S.A.) (Pty.) Limited P.O. Box 3062 Port Elizabeth Grant Advertising (Pty) Limited Empire State Building 44 Plein Street P.O. Box 1529 Johannesburg Union Carrigge and Wagon Co. (Pty) Ltd. P.O. Box 335 Nigelp Transvaal Edward L. Bateman Limited P.o. Box 1671 Johannesburg INGERSOLL-RAND COMPANY 1 Broadway New York 4, New York INTERPUBLIC INCORPORATED 485 Lexington Avenue New York 22, New York JOHNSON AND KOHNSON New Brunswick, New Jersey JOY MANUFACTURING COMPANY 333 Oliver Building Pittsburgh 22, Pennsylvania Ingersoll-Rand Co. P.O. Box 1809 Johannesburg Afamal Advertising P.O. Box 7256 Rohannesburg (S.A.)(pty) Limited (Pty) Limited Johnson and Johnson (Pty) Limited P.O. Box 727 East London Joy-Sullivan (Africa) (Pty) Limited P.O. Box 4070 Johannesburg DURIRON COMPANY Dayton l, Ohio

KELLOGG COMPANY Battle Creek, Michigan IXNK-BELT COMPANY 17th floor, Prudential Plaza Chicago I, Illinois. MINE SAFETY APPLIANCES COMPANY 201 N. Braddock Avenue Pittsburgh 8. Pennsylvania MOBIL PETROLE)UM COMPANY, INC. 150 East 42 Street New York 17, New York MOORE-McCORMACK LINES INCORPORATED 2 Broadway New York 4, New York THE NATIONAL CASH REGISTER COMPANY Dayton, Ohio NEWMONT MINING COMPANY 300 Park Avenue New York, New York OHIO BRASS COMPANY Mansfield 1, Ohio OTIS ELEVATOR COMPANY 260 Eleventh Avenue New York 1, New York PARKE-DAVIS AND COMPANY Detroit, Michigan PEPSI-COLA INTERNATIONAL 500 Park Avenue New York 22, New York PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY Bartlesville, Oklahoma THE SINGER MANUFACTURING COMPANY 30 Rockefeller Plaza New York 20, Nw York STERLING DRUG INCORPORATED 1WO Broadway New York 18, New York tellogg Company of South Afr. (Pty)Ltd. P.O. Box 309 Springs Link-Belt Africa Limited P.O. Box 287 Springs Mine Safety Appliances (Pty) Limited P.O. Box 1680 Johannesburg Co. (Africa) Mobil Oil Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd. Boston House, 44-46 Strand Street Cape Town Moore4McCormack Lines Inc. P.O. Box 8453 Johannesburg The National Cash Register Company, South Africa (Pty) Limited 6 Bertha Street, Braamfontein Johannesburg 01okiep Copper Company Limited P . Box 17 Nababeep, Namaqualand, Cape Province Edward L. Bateman Limited P.O. Box 1671 Johannesburg Otis Elevator Company Limited 222 Marshall Street Johannesburg Parke, Davis Laboratories P.O. Box 24 Isando, Transvaal Pepsi-Cola Africa P.O. Box 7916 Johannesburg. Phillips Carbon B P.O. Box 862 Port Elizabeth (Pty) Ltd. (Pr) Limited Lack Company (Pty)Ltd. Bourne and Company Limited P.O. Box 736 Johannesburg Sterling Drug (S.A.)(P) Limited P.O. Box 7S Mobenis Durban

TWENTIEH CENTUEJ FOX FIlM CORP. 444 West 56th Street New York, New York Fox Theatres South Africa (Pty) Ltd. oloss Building / Commissioner Street Johannesburg African Consolidated Theatres (Pty)Ltd. (same address) African Consolidated Films (Pty) Ltd. (same address) Filmlets (S.A.) Limited (same address) UNION TANK CAR COMPANY 228 N. La Salle Street Chicago, Illinois Union Carraige & Wagon P.O. Box 335 Nigel, Trasvaal Co. (Pty) Ltd. UNDERWOOD CORPORATION 1 Park Avenue New York 16, New York UNITED ARTISTS CORPORATION 729 Seventh Avenue New York 19, New York UNITED SHOE MACHINERY CCR PORATION Boston, Massqchusetts UNITED STATES RUBBER COMPANY Rockefeller Center New York, New York WARNER BROS. PICTURES INT'L CORP. 666 Fifth Avenue New York 19, New Yotk WESTERN STATES MACHINE COMPANY Hamilton l, Ohio WILBUR ELLIS COMPANY 320 California Street San Francisco 4, California Underwood Africa (Pty) Limited P.O. Box 17 Johannesburg United Artists Corp. (S.A.)(Pty) Ltd. P.O. Box 7582 Johannesburg Bostick (Pty) Limited P.O. Box 2034 Port Elizabeth "British United Shoe Machinery S.A. (Pty) Limited P.O. Box 388 Port Elizabeth United States Rubber Co. (S.A.)(Pty)Ltd. 133B Eloff Street Extension Johannesburg Warner Bros. First National Pictures (S.A.)(Pty) Limited P.O. Box 6523 Johannesburg Edward L. Bateman Limited P.O. Box 1671 Johannesburg Wilbur Ellis Company (Pty) Limited 1-5 Loop Street P.O. Box 4258 Cape Town

FILMS ON SOUTH AFRICA 1. Report from Africa: PYart I 'With Edward R. Kurrow. Available from- Contemporary Films inc. (See address list below.) 2. Come Back Africa. Lienel Rogosin. Available from Contemporary Films Inc. 3. Angola: Journey to a War. A White Paper on Angola; 45 minutes; 015. rental fee. Narrated by Huntley, Young, and VcCormick. Available from Contemporary Films Inc. or the American Committee on .ifricas 4. Black and Thite in South Africa. 30 minutes. Available from the University of Indiana Film Library. (USNSA 1962 Film List, P. 48.) 5. Sabotage in South Africa. 45 minutes; only charge is for transportation. Available from the American Committee on Africa. Contemporary Films Inc. American Committee on Africa 267 West 25th Street 211 Bast 43rd Street New York, New York 10001 NeIT York, New York 10017 (ORegon 5-7220) (TN 7-8733) University of IndianaFilm Library University of Indiana. Bloomington, Indiana

A PARTIAL B33LIOGRAPHY A Candle in the Night, Leiden: COSPCwWUS, 1961. Carter, GwandoIlyn C., Politics -of Inenality. ahe. Ljondon:v Pall M1a1 Press, Courtney, Winifred. South West Africa: Thb Uo N.'s Stepchild. N6* York: The American Conmitee on Africa, 1960.' Cowen, Donis V., Foundation of Freedom. With Special erence to South Africa, New York: OXFORD University Press, l61. Delius, Anthony. "The Intellectual's Plight in South Africa." Africa Report. 8:4j,63. Duncan, Patrick. WShould the West Intervene With Force., Current. June, 1963. Duncan, Patrick. "Toward a World Policy for South Africa." Foreign Affairs. October, 1963. Gonze, Colin; George Hauser; and Perry Sturges. South African Crisis and United States Policy. New York: American Committee on Africa, 1962. Graff, de Villiers, Sir. "South African Prospect." Foreign Affairs. July, 1961. La er," bert S.' A -stbrical Development of the South African Stratification System. Detroit; Michigan Region, USNSA. 1963. Lewin, Julius. Politics and Law in South Africa. London: Merlin Press, 1963. , , T Lcuw, EriH'- The Case:or S outh'Arica, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962. Lowenstein, Allard K. Brutal Mandate. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1962. Luthuli, Albert J. "Africa and Freedom." Africa Today. February, 1962. Luthuli, Albert J. Let My People Go, New York: McGraw Hill, 1962. Mansegh, Nicolas. South Africa 1906-1961: The Price of Magnminity. New York: Frederick Praeger, 1962. Marquard, Leo. Tue Peoples and Policies of South Africa. London: Oxford University Press, 1962. Neame, L. E. The History of Apartheid. London: Pall Mall Press, 1962. Paton, Alan. Cry, the Beloved Country, New York: Praeger, 1957. Paton, Alan. Hope for South Africa. New York: Praeger, 1959. Phillips, Norman C. Trarjedy of Apartheid New York: McKay, 1960.

-2 The Progress of the Bantu Peoples Toward Nationhood. Johannesburg: Department of Information, 1960. ' Reeves, Ambrose. Shooting at Sharpeville. Boston: Houghten Mifflin Com. pany, 1961. Rubin, Neville. History of the Relations Between NUSAS, The Afrikaanse Studentebond and the Afrikaans University Centres. NUSAS, 1960. South Africa. Report of the Research and Information Commission. Leiden: COSEC, 1962. South Africa and the Rule of Law. Geneva: International Commission of Jurists, 1960. Southern Africa in Transition. Papers from the Fourth International Conference of the American Society of African Culture, April ll-13, 1963 (to be published by ANSAC). South West Africa. Working paper for the 10th International Student Conference. Research and Information Commission. Leiden: COSEC, 1962. Telli, Diallo. "Report of the Special Comiuittee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa," 16 September 1963, Office of Public Information of the United Nations. Van Rensburg, Patrick. Guilty Land. New York: Frederick Praeger, 1962. Verwoerd, H. F. The Price of Appeasement in Africa. Pretoria: South African Information Service, 1960. 2ofoll=!iM pexibaiea ato alto rcmrz lo ,fores:pa to thistopict~ Africa Diest Africa Report Africa Today United Nations Review