Südosteuropa 62 (2014), no. 3, 326-347
TONKA KOSTADINOVA
60 Years of Diplomatic Relations between Greece and Bulgaria: Challenges and Benefits of the Reconciliation Process
Abstract. In 2014, Greece and Bulgaria celebrate the 60th anniversary of the 1954 restoration of diplomatic relations . The history of the Greek–Bulgarian rapprochement after decades of hostility and national rivalry represents a unique case of postwar recovery and reconciliation, comparable only to the German–French example . Indeed, the course of Greek–Bulgarian relations is particularly interesting because it often transcends the specific aspects of bilateral developments and takes account of broader geopolitical processes, such as the conflicting uS and Soviet stances on key Cold War issues or the energy rivalry in the post-1989 period. Using the method of diachronic analysis, the article gives an overview of the development of Greek–Bulgarian relations, as it seeks to outline the major achievements of the past and the possible challenges for the future .
Tonka Kostadinova is assistant Professor at the National Museum of Military History, Sofia.
Greek–Bulgarian Relations in Times of Transition, 1954–1974
Greek–Bulgarian relations during the last six decades offer an interesting precedent in Balkan and European diplomatic history . Although they were “traditional” national rivals and were military and ideological opponents during the Cold War, Greece and Bulgaria managed during this period to overcome the burdensome legacy of the past and establish constructive political, economic, and cultural relations for the first time in their common history. This article seeks to reveal the major path dependencies in their relations and argues that the foundation for the post-1989 rapprochement and the role that the two countries assumed as partners in the EU was created during the Cold War era . The period between 1954 and 1989 constitutes a specific “transition” phase that prefigured the trajectory of cooperation and the ability to cope smoothly with key chal- lenges after the end of the Cold War, both internal (the fall of the communist regime in Bulgaria) and external (the dissolution of Yugoslavia) . The approach Diplomatic Relations between Greece and Bulgaria 327 to bilateral relations as a continuous process of reconciliation proves still more interesting as it reveals the role of the Cold War as a normalizing rather than a destabilizing factor, even though Greece and Bulgaria belonged to two op- posing military alliances and their common border was a NATO–Warsaw Pact boundary. These specifics make a diachronic overview of the Greek–Bulgarian reconciliation process a necessary step toward a better understanding of con - temporary bilateral relations within the context of the dynamic developments taking place on the national, regional, and global level . Shortly after the end of the Second World War, Greece and Bulgaria seemed fated to continue a course of hostility inherited from the nation-state for- mation period . Bulgarian postwar claims regarding an outlet to the Aegean, the reparations issue, and the Greek plea for a revision of the common border constituted the main obstacles to the re-establishment of diplomatic relations . These unsettled wartime issues, together with the beginning of the Cold War in the Balkans, threatened to harm the relations between the two neighboring states still further . The 1947 peace treaty, which regulated postwar relations between Greece and Bulgaria, obliged Bulgaria to demilitarize its southern frontier and to pay $ 45 million in reparations to Greece . The demilitarization of the common border facilitated Bulgaria’s assistance to communist guerrilla groups in the Greek civil war that had flared up in 1946.1 The civil conflict had multiple repercussions upon Greece’s relations with its northern neighbor. Geostrategically, the war gave the common Greek–Bulgarian frontier, which in the past had borne most of the nationalistic rivalry, an additional meaning as the border between the american and Soviet spheres of influence in the region. From a humanitarian point of view, the most serious effect was the influx of an estimated 6,880 Greek political refugees to Bulgaria in the aftermath of the conflict, which remained a “pending” issue in bilateral affairs until the beginning of repatriation in the 1980s (Fig. 1). During the entire Cold War period, Bulgaria followed a consistent policy of financial and administrative support for the Greek refugees, giving an estimated $ 25 million of aid.2 The legacy of the civil war is still present today, as Greek political refugees and their heirs continue to play a role in the cultural interactions between the two peoples in contemporary Bulgaria . Bulgaria’s assistance to the Greek communists and its support for Tito’s plans to unify the region of Macedonia within a single state deepened the hostility and mistrust that already dominated Greek–Bulgarian affairs. The legacy of
1 For more information, see Jordan Baev, Bŭlgaria i grazhdanskata voĭna v Gŭrtsia, Voennoistoricheski sbornik (1992), nos. 2–3, 88–117. 2 The data is based on official documentation of the Bulgarian Communist Party,Central State Archive Bulgaria (CSAB), Inventory 1- B, Record 32; Inventory 296, Record 2, quoted in: Georgi Daskalov, Grŭtskite Politemigranti v Bŭlgaria. Sofia 2008, 276. 328 Tonka Kostadinova
Number of Greek civil war refugees permanently settled in Bulgaria (estimated 6880)
Fig. 1. Greek Refugees in Bulgaria 1947-1950. Source: Central State Archive, Inventory 296, Record 2, Archive Unit 84 . the past, along with the impact of the Cold War, prevented the development of constructive bilateral contacts, and the two countries failed to re-establish diplomatic relations even though a peace treaty had been signed . Communism appeared as a new line of division, one reinforced by the two countries’ incor - poration into the political, economic, and military structures of the emerging blocs. In 1947, the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan brought Greece into the american efforts to contain communism by fostering healthy political and economic environment in postwar Europe. The leadership in Sofia, in turn, adopted a policy of “active defense” and signed treaties of cooperation with the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, thus placing Bulgaria’s security policy in the Soviet orbit well before the formal creation of the Warsaw Pact in 1955. The dependence of Greek and Bulgarian foreign policy on external powers appeared in the early 1950s during the process of normalization of bilateral af- fairs that was inspired by geopolitical rather than domestic factors . The NATO accession of Greece and Turkey in 1952 and the signing of the Balkan Pact in 1953 consolidated the Western influence in the Balkans. These events, along with the death of Stalin and the prolonged Soviet military effort in Korea, necessitated a new Soviet foreign policy course, one aimed at strengthening Moscow’s position in the region, including a consolidation along the common Greek–Bulgarian frontier . Soviet security considerations implied a political rapprochement between Bulgaria and Greece, and in 1953 Sofia initiated negotiations to restore diplo- matic relations with athens. The agreement, concluded in May 1954, included a pledge from Bulgaria to fulfill its obligations under the 1947 peace treaty and obliged Bulgaria to provide a record of all Greek civil war refugees living within Diplomatic Relations between Greece and Bulgaria 329 its territory, with the aim of repatriating Greek nationals who were living in Bulgaria against their will .3 However, despite the restoration of diplomatic relations, Greece and Bulgaria failed to reach an agreement on the reparations issue and did not exchange am- bassadors for another ten years. Sofia claimed Greek financial duties from the interwar period (stemming from the 1927 Kafantaris–Mollov agreement) and demanded a reduction of the amount it had to pay, based on Bulgarian spend- ing to improve the infrastructure during the occupation of Western Thrace . The pending reparations issue in the aftermath of the Second World War was not exclusive to Greek–Bulgarian relations, but when added to Bulgaria’s postwar demands for an outlet to the Aegean, the result was additional distrust and hostility. To Greece, Sofia’s reluctance to adhere to the economic clauses meant a general rejection of the terms of the peace treaty, including those on disarma- ment. Greek fears of yet another attack from the North were thus reinforced. In fact, Sofia’s unwillingness to pay reparations was not so much a manifestation of revisionism as a consequence of the Bulgarian Communist Party’s reluctance to take responsibility for the wartime policy of the monarchist government . Such a move would have inevitably collided with the anti-fascist postulates in the ideology of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP), and, more importantly, with that of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) . In the early 1960s, the new Bulgarian leader, Todor Zhivkov, decided, “at his own risk”, to settle the reparations issue with Greece in order to secure Bulgaria’s uN membership and to escape the growing international isolation of the country 4. In May 1964, Greece and Bulgaria signed the so-called athens accords, which included an agreement regulating Bulgaria’s payments to Greece as well as 12 other agreements covering all spheres of economic and cultural cooperation . Bulgaria agreed to cooperate with Greece with regard to the use of the waters of rivers running through the territories of both countries, to restore road infrastructure in the border regions, to set up direct telecommunication links (until then created via Paris), and to establish a direct air route between athens and Sofia. In 1965, the railway systems of the two neighboring states were finally connected through the construction of a 20-km section between Kulata and Siderokastron . Thus, with a delay of half a century, Thessaloniki was finally connected by railway with Sofia and the rest of Bulgaria.5 Trade exchange and tourist flows between the two countries increased significantly. The number of Greeks visiting Bulgaria grew tenfold within two years: from 2,543 people in 1963 to 25,400 people in 1965. The number of Bulgarians visit-
3 Diplomatic and Historical archive of the Ministry of Foreign affairs of Greece, Bulgaria 4 a, Folder 69/1954/42929/fol. 5. Resumption of Diplomatic Relations. 4 Todor Zhivkov, Memoari. Sofia 2006, 416f. 5 Ekaterina Nikova, Bulgaria and Greece in the World Crisis of 1980–1982, Études Balkaniques 28 (1992), nos. 3–4, 3–17, 12. 330 Tonka Kostadinova ing Greece was much more limited, yet it rose by nearly five times from 1,150 people in 1963 to 5,111 people in 1965.6 The signing of 12 agreements between countries belonging to two opposing alliances was unusual in Cold War diplomacy, and the fact that it occured in the aftermath of the 1961 Berlin crisis and the 1962 Cuban missile crisis reflected the will of Bulgaria and Greece to normalize their relations despite the unfavorable international environment .7 The athens accords remained the most significant diplomatic breakthrough and the actual basis of bilateral relations between the two countries until the 1991 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and the sign - ing of another “package deal”, consisting of 14 agreements, in 2010. The accords as well as the fact that the two countries finally exchanged ambassadors, explain the perception of 1964 as the actual year of restoration of diplomatic relations. From a contemporary perspective, the failure of the two neighboring countries to establish any road, rail, telephone, telegraph, or air connections for 20 years after the end of the Second World War illustrates the impact of the Cold War upon Balkan affairs. During the first postwar decades, the military and ideo- logical implications of the East–West conflict had turned the geographic prox- imity and the spatial dimension of interstate politics into practically irrelevant features of international relations. The meaning of borders in regional affairs was burdened with new transnational dimensions, and their role changed from consolidating factors of national identity building to political markers fixing the great powers’ spheres of influence at local, regional, and global levels. The “Iron Curtain” border model, also known as the verlängerte Mauer (the artificially created “extended wall” along the NaTo–Warsaw Pact boundaries), included the shared Greek–Bulgarian border to prevent creation of a gateway for foreign citizens, mainly East Germans, to flee to the West. 8 Cold War escape attempts by East German citizens at the borders of Bulgaria have been estimated to number around 4,500. Many people met their death within the specific surveillance areas, that is, the 30-km internal security zones created by the communist regime along the frontiers of Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey to prevent trespass and flight to the West 9. The Greek government also maintained a surveillance zone with a special border regime for settlement and movement; it served as a buffer zone
6 Information on Tourist Exchange between Bulgaria and Greece, Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry of Foreign affairs of the Republic of Bulgaria (Da/MFaB), Inventory 29, archive unit no. 960, fol. 93. 7 Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, Negotiating With the Enemy: the Normalization of Greek– Bulgarian Relations, 1960–1964, Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 4 (2004), no. 1, 140–161, 155. 8 Stefan appelius, Tod in Bulgarien: Die vergessenen Opfer des Eisernen Vorhangs . Bonn 2007 . 9 Decision “B” No. 11 by the Politburo of the BCP With Regard to Strengthening the Defense of the State Borders, 28 june 1950, Central State archive Bulgaria (CSaB), Inventory 1–B, Record 64, archive unit no. 84, 1. Diplomatic Relations between Greece and Bulgaria 331 against the major military threat coming from the north until the late 1970s.10 The safeguarding of state borders during the Cold War had a far-reachi ng effect upon border areas that were neglected in political and socioeconomic terms until the introduction of the Eu cross-border policies in the early 1990s. Even today, the cross-border programs improve these areas, mostly in terms of infrastructure, while Greece and Bulgaria find it difficult to cope with the severe demographic crisis inherited from the Cold War politics of internal and external “fencing”.
Institutionalizing Political and Economic Cooperation, 1967–1974
The 1967 uS-supported coup by a military junta in athens threatened to halt the fragile cooperation between Greece and Bulgaria 11. The military regime expressed its ideology in intense anti-communist, anti-Slavic and anti-Bulgarian propaganda and thus provoked a hostile response from the entire socialist bloc, coordinated by Moscow . Paradoxically, it was precisely during the rule of the Greek military junta that Greece and Bulgaria regularized and institutionalized their political, economic, and cultural contacts for the first time in their common diplomatic history. 12 This “anomaly” stemmed from a number of causes and reflected a growing need to address national issues rather than merely to translate the global US–Soviet antagonism in a local (bilateral) context . Despite its intense anti-communist political discourse, the military junta did not denounce the 1964 agreements with Bulgaria . To the contrary, seeking to avoid international isolation and to consolidate its position vis-à-vis Turkey, the Greek junta took a number of steps to develop further the bilateral cooperation with Bulgaria . Initially, the leadership in Sofia complied with the common socialist course of isolating the regime in athens and declined any move toward rapprochement, but in 1973 it eventually agreed to open political negotiations with the junta . Several factors justified Sofia’s “independent” policy toward Greece. Specifi- cally, the need to counterbalance Romanian domination in Balkan affairs, to prevent a potential Greek–albanian reconciliation, and to deflect China’s at- tempts to increase its presence in the Balkans were among the most important . The then Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov expected that encouragement of
10 Lois Labrianidis, “Internal Frontiers” as a Hindrance to Development, European Planning Studies 9 (2001), no. 1, 85–103, 91. 11 For more see James Miller, The United States and the Making of Modern Greece . History and Power, 1950–1974. Chapel Hill/NC 2009, 136–176. 12 For more see Jordan Baev, Bulgarian Policy Toward Greek Military Junta Regime (1967–1974), Études Balkaniques 41 (2005), no. 4, 147–157; Tonka Kostadinova, Ideologia kai diplōmatia sta chronia tēs diktatorias: oi ellēnovoulgarikes scheseis, 1967–1974, Ta Istorika 60 (2014), 205–226. 332 Tonka Kostadinova
Papadopoulos’s “independent stance” on key international issues such as the 1973 arab–Israeli conflict would only serve the common Warsaw Pact strategy of weakening the southern flank of NaTo.13 Most important, Bulgaria hoped to gain significant advantages in settling a number of controversial issues with neighboring Turkey 14. The 1973 visit to athens of the then Bulgarian Foreign Minister, Petar Mla- denov, was a significant diplomatic success. The two parties signed a consular convention that allowed Sofia to open a consulate general in Thessaloniki, as well as an agreement that regulated Bulgarian access to the port of Thessaloniki . Both issues involved long-term goals of Bulgarian foreign policy, which sought an increased political, economic, and cultural presence in Northern Greece . Greece in turn received the right to open a consulate general in Plovdiv, the second- largest Bulgarian city, which accommodated a large number of the Greek civil war refugees . In addition, the consular district of Plovdiv encompassed parts of the Black Sea area having compact Greek communities . The fact that Bulgaria was the only Warsaw Pact member country that was permitted to open a consulate general in Northern Greece becomes even more important if one considers the troublesome legacy of the past and the geopo- litical significance of the region during the Cold War. Not only was the area geopolitically charged by the Cold War boundary between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, but it also raised most of the disputed issues (territorial waters, gas, the continental shelf, and national minorities) between Greece and Turkey . The 1973 consular convention between Bulgaria and Greece can thus be viewed as a harbinger of the strategic consolidation of bilateral relations between the two countries in order to counterbalance Turkish policy in the region, discussed further below . Moreover, during Mladenov’s visit to athens, the two countries signed a po- litical Declaration on Good Neighborliness and Cooperation . The Greek–Bul- garian declaration was the first political agreement between a NaTo country and a Warsaw Pact country in the Balkans, and it remained the most important bilateral political document of the entire postwar period until the signing of another declaration on non–aggression and cooperation in 1986.15 Given that a political treaty between Greece and Bulgaria was not feasible until the 1991 dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the two declarations provided the relevant
13 Information in Regard to the Invitation by the Greek Government to the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Bulgaria to visit athens, 12 February 1973, Da/MFaB, Inventory 29, Folder 44, archive unit no. 959, 16. 14 CSaB, Inventory no. 60, archive unit no. 132, 17. 15 Sotiris Walden, Paratairoi etairoi. Ellēnikē diktatoria, kommounistika kathestōta kai valkania, 1967–1974, 1967–1974. athens 2009, 508. Diplomatic Relations between Greece and Bulgaria 333 mechanisms to offset Turkey’s foreign policy ambitions in the Balkans and sent an important political message to the leadership in Ankara . By the same token, it is important to consider the 1973 rapprochement in the light of the growing Greek–Turkish tensions over Cyprus . Bulgarian intelligence reports reveal that Sofia had closely followed the developments on the island throughout 1973 and had received information about a possible escalation of the Greek–Turkish dispute. In january 1974, the Intelligence Department of the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense notified the BCP Politburo that the Turkish Land Forces Headquarters had issued an order to the Turkish army to prepare a plan for an offensive operation against Greece under the code name Kılıç (Sword) . According to the intelligence report, the plan was intended for the preparation of Turkish land forces in the event of new complications regarding the Cyprus question as well as the existing controversy between the two countries over the exploration of oil fields in the eastern part of the aegean Sea. 16 The leadership in Sofia shared Greek concerns about Turkey’s policy goal of strengthening the rights of Turkish minorities abroad as a means for future territorial expansion because compact groups of ethnic Turks were residing in southeastern Bulgaria . Moreover, the information of a possible Turkish invasion of Cyprus coincided with violent outbursts by ethnic Turks in Bulgarian Western Thrace .at its February 1974 plenum, the BCP introduced a new strategy for “bet- ter integration” of Bulgarian Turks through political and ideological propaganda . The measures included a campaign on name-changing for Pomaks, the closure of mosques, and displacements. 17 From a foreign policy perspective, Bulgaria adopted a neutral policy even though its strategic interests suggested an align- ment with Greece in order to counteract the Turkish ambitions. In 1974, Sofia had to comply with the leadership in Moscow, which openly favored Ankara over athens because of Turkey’s geostrategic location in the Middle East and its higher level of political and economic freedom within NATO 18. The close relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey, in turn, increased the need for Greece to seek rapprochement with its northern neighbor .
16 Bulgarian Military Intelligence Report on Turkish Military Operation in Cyprus, 3 Jan- uary 1974, CSaB, Fond 378-B, File 886, Folder 15, transl. vanja Petkova, ed. Dr. jordan Baev. 17 Valeri Stoianov, Turskoto naselenie v Bŭlgaria mezhdu poliusite na etnicheskata politika. Sofia 1998, 201. 18 Van Coufoudakis, Greco–Turkish Relations and the Greek Socialists: Ideology, Nation- alism and Pragmatism, Journal of Modern Greek Studies 1 (1983), no. 2, 373–392, 380. 334 Tonka Kostadinova The Era of Rapprochement, 1974–1989
This need turned into policy action in the summer of 1974, when the Turkish invasion in Cyprus led to the fall of the military junta and Constantine Kara- manlis’s return to power in athens.Karamanlis prepared the ground for a more independent and multidimensional foreign policy, including a loosening of the close relationship with the united States and an improvement of Greece’s relations with the socialist world . The Greek leader sought to broaden the focus of Greek policy in the Balkans and took a personal interest in expanding politi- cal and economic cooperation between Greece and the socialist bloc 19. In this process, Bulgaria served as a precursor, even as a guarantor in Karamanlis’s Ostpolitik, particularly for the improvement of relations between Greece and the Soviet Union .20 Karamanlis first came to Bulgaria in 1975, the first Greek Prime Minister to officially visit the country ever. The fact that Greece and Bulgaria had never exchanged visits by the respective heads of state or heads of government during the 95 years of their common diplomatic history only underlines the significance of the post-1974 rapprochement and the close personal relationship established between Karamanlis and Zhivkov. The decision by Karamanlis to visit Sofia less than six months after he had formed a new cabinet indicated the strategic importance that the new Greek government attached to improving relations with Bulgaria .21 The leadership in Sofia was well aware of the Greek interest in securing stra- tegic partnerships in an effort to counteract Turkish policy in the region. In the preparatory documentation for the first Karamanlis–Zhivkov summit, Bulgarian foreign policy experts expressed the opinion that the Greek government would decide the extent to which it wanted to develop relations with the socialist states depending on the strength of these states’ support for the Greek cause in the Cyprus issue and their willingness to take on “certain responsibilities” in the matter.22 During his first meeting with Karamanlis, however, the Bulgarian party leader was careful to say nothing that might give umbrage to Turkey, and merely urged a peaceful settlement of the issue in accordance with uN regulations. 23 Until the escalation of tensions in Bulgarian–Turkish relations in the second
19 Idem, Greek Foreign Policy since 1974: Quest for Independence, Journal of Modern Greek Studies 6 (1988), no. 1, 55–81, 59. 20 Nikolay Todorov, The Ambassador as Historian: An Eyewitness Account of Greek– Bulgarian Relations in the 1980s. New York 1999, 24. 21 Karamanlis formed a new government in December 1974. The first official visit of the new Greek foreign minister, George Rallis, took place in Sofia, in january 1975. 22 Report on Greek Foreign Policy, june 1975, Da/MFaB, Inventory no. 31, Folder 71, archive unit 1075, 64. 23 Rumyana Marinova-Christidi, Bŭlgaria na Zhivkov I Gŭrtsia na Karamanlis – nachaloto na edno priiatelstvo, 1974–1981, Minalo (2008), no. 4, 63–74, 65. Diplomatic Relations between Greece and Bulgaria 335
Photo 1: Zhivkov’s first visit to Greece, april 1976.Source: CSaB, Photo archive B, 76-2214-2. half of the 1980s, Sofia complied with the Soviet policy of favoring Turkey, yet took steps to mediate a political rapprochement between Moscow and Athens . Karamanlis’s first visit to Sofia laid the groundwork for regular summits between the leaders of Bulgaria and Greece. In 1976, Zhivkov paid Greece the first official visit of a Bulgarian head of state. The visit, timed just after the uS announced an increase in its military aid to Ankara, was perceived as one of Greece’s means to exert pressure on the united States.In fact, the “Bulgarian card” was often used in Greek foreign policy and showed itself in Greece’s de- viation from the West’s policy on major Cold War issues, such as the 1979 Soviet invasion of afghanistan, the 1981 suppression of the “Solidarity” movement in Poland, and the shooting down of a Korean airliner by a Soviet fighter jet in 1983. The more important role of Bulgaria, however, was that of mediator between Greece and the Soviet Union, especially vis-à-vis the Greek–Turkish conflict over the aegean and Cyprus. In 1978,Karamanlis scheduled his second visit to Sofia right before the upcoming departure of his foreign minister to Moscow. 336 Tonka Kostadinova
He sought advice about how to improve relations with the Soviet leadership .24 The first signs of rapprochement between Moscow and athens followed shortly afterward. In 1979, Karamanlis became the first Greek prime minister to pay an official visit to the Soviet union. Greece and the uSSR signed a Declaration on Cooperation and discussed the construction of a pipeline through Bulgaria to supply Greece with Soviet natural gas .25 In fact, many of the most important en- ergy and transport projects that dominated post-1989 Greek –Bulgarian relations date back to the Cold War period . However, they were never realized during the Cold War period, owing to conflicting geopolitical and domestic interests. Relations between Athens and Moscow continued to improve after the Panhel- lenic Socialist Movement (PaSoK) assumed power in october 1981. PaSoK’s attempts to enhance economic cooperation with the uSSR and growing do - mestic anti–Americanism again distanced Greece from Western policy on key international issues . With regard to the events in Poland, for example, the then Greek Prime Minister, Andreas Papandreou, refused to join in Western reactions against the Soviet-inspired imposition of a military regime in Warsaw, and the Greek veto blocked several declarations condemning the policy of suppress- ing Solidarność .26 In 1982, when the EEC finally decided to impose sanctions on Moscow in the form of a partial trade embargo, Greece was partly exempted from the application of the measures 27. PaSoK’s balanced policy toward the socialist bloc increased the prospect of a further consolidation of relations between Bulgaria and Greece 28. In 1986, Sofia and athens signed another Declaration on Cooperation and Friendship, thus confirming what had been their actual policy since the 1974 Turkish inva- sion of Cyprus . The common stance taken by Greece and Bulgaria on major international and regional issues, as well as the deterioration of both coun- tries’ relations to Turkey in the late 1980s, gave the impression of an emerging
24 Information on Karamanlis’ visit to Bulgaria, Da/MFaB, Inventory 34, Folder 973, archive unit no. 27, 208. 25 Michael Boll, Greek Foreign Policy in the 1980’s: Decade for Decision, Parameters: Journal of the U.S. Army War College 10 (1980), no. 4, 72–81, 79. 26 Report on the Greek Government’s Position in Regard to the Events in Poland, Da/ MFaB, Inventory 38, archive unit no. 906, 94. 27 Joakim Kreutz, Hard Measures by a Soft Power? Sanctions Policy of the European union 1981–2004. Bonn 2005, 22. Records of the Bulgarian Foreign office claim that the EEC (inspired mainly by Germany and the United Kingdom) even imposed economic sanctions on Greece: in September 1983, the Commission for the Integrated Mediterranean Program decided not to grant a $ 9 billion package for infrastructure projects in Greece. See Information on Relations between Greece and the EEC, Da/MFaB, Inventory 40, archive unit no. 1202, 15, 72f. 28 Report on Developments in Greece after the Parliamentary Elections on 18 october 1981 and on the State of Bulgarian–Greek Relations, Da/MFaB, Inventory no 38, archive unit no. 906, 18, 26. Diplomatic Relations between Greece and Bulgaria 337
Photo 2: Karamanlis’s visit to Zhivkov’s native home in the village of Pravetz, 1980. Source: CSAB, Photo Archive B, 80-3253-6 .
Greek–Bulgarian axis in the Balkans .29 This impression corresponded with the actual development of bilateral relations until 1989, when both Zhivkov and Papandreou lost power . In fact, the ability to develop bilateral relations and to influence regional ones in the interplay between the conflicting interests of the two superpowers was the main source of the geopolitical importance that both Bulgaria and Greece enjoyed during the Cold War. This influence faded away soon after the transition from a bipolar to a multipolar world order .
The Challenges of Transition: Greek–Bulgarian Political Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Period
The end of the East–West conflict and the abrupt collapse of state socialism in Eastern Europe substantially changed the spectrum of Greek and Bulgarian foreign policy, depriving the two countries of their geopolitical importance as balancing factors in the confrontation between the two superpowers in the
29 Jorgos Christidis, aktsenti i tendentsii v grŭtzo – bŭlgarskite otnosheniia sled 1990 godina, Mezhdŭnarodni otnosheniia (2005), nos. 2–3, 155–164, 155. 338 Tonka Kostadinova
Balkans. The geopolitical reconfiguration of the international order coincided with significant territorial changes in the European political map and the (re-)awakening of the national questions in the Balkans. During the 1990s, two established states, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, disappeared from the map of Eastern and Southeastern Europe and 12 new countries were born. The dissolution of the Soviet Union deprived Bulgaria of its major political and economic partner, while the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact left the country in a specific “security vacuum”, a possible way out of which seemed only the integration into the European and transatlantic structures. In the early 1990s, however, the integration of the former socialist countries appeared hardly fea- sible, owing to the lack of a concrete strategy for NaTo’s enlargement to the east and the continued strong political resistance by Moscow. Greece’s national interests were also disregarded in the approaches adopted by NATO and the EU toward the dissolution of Yugoslavia . Thus, the effort of Greece and Bulgaria to underline the continuity in their course of bilateral cooperation seemed to be the most relevant political strategy for both countries after the end of the Cold War 30. In 1991, athens and Sofia signed a Treaty of Friendship and Security, which included arrangements in the fields of economy, security, industry, banking, technology and science, hydro-economics, and ecology. The strategically significant part of the Treaty was Article 6, which stipulated that in case one of the two countries was under direct attack or was threatened by a third country, the other country should not provide the third country with any political, military, or other assistance and support 31. The Bulgarian decision in 1992 to recognize the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) however, opened a tangible breach in bilateral rela- tions . The Bulgarian decision was followed by a corresponding one by Turkey, creating the impression of a turn of Bulgarian foreign policy toward Ankara . This impression was reinforced by Bulgaria’s efforts to mitigate the effects of Zhivkov’s mistreatment of the Turkish minority in the late 1980s by granting more rights to the Turks of Bulgaria and by moving toward rapprochement with Turkey itself. In fact, the most fundamental parameter influencing the policy options of Bulgaria and Greece in the early post-Cold War period continued to be the delicate balance of the relations of both countries with Ankara . Maintain- ing this balance was particularly difficult for the government in Sofia, because
30 For more on this topic, see Kyriakos Kentrotis, Die griechisch-bulgarischen Beziehungen nach dem Ende der Ära Zhivkov (1989–1992), Südosteuropa 42 (1993), nos. 7–8, 420–433. 31 Kyriakos Kentrotis, Greece and Bulgaria: From the Experiences of the Past to the Challenges of the Future, Journal of Modern Hellenism 15 (1998), 31–50, 37, 45. Diplomatic Relations between Greece and Bulgaria 339 both Greece and Turkey tended to interpret Bulgaria’s contacts with the other country as a threat to their own security .32 another important reason for Sofia’s decision to recognize the Republic of Macedonia was the fragile configuration of political forces in post-socialist Bul- garia. The october 1991 elections gave the union of Democratic Forces (uDF) a narrow victory over the socialists and made the newly emerged Movement for Rights and Freedom (MRF), a party representing the interests of the Turkish minority, the decisive factor in forming a government .33 The first non-communist Bulgarian cabinet since the 1940s relied heavily on the parliamentary support of the MRF, and presumably took into account ankara’s intention to recognize FYROM . The fact that the decision was announced during a parliamentary session, in the absence of Bulgaria’s foreign minister, suggested that it was premised on intricate domestic political factors rather than a proper evalua- tion of the Bulgarian national and strategic interests and the consensus of all institutions in the country . officially, Sofia justified recognition of the Republic of Macedonia by the con- clusions of the Badinter Commission and the need to comply with the policy of the international community, yet the decision hampered relations with Greece and broke with the common Greek–Bulgarian approach on the Macedonian issue, which the two countries had shared for the previous 30 years . In an at- tempt not to alienate Greece, which was both an increasingly important trade partner and a potential advocate of the Bulgarian cause in the European Com- munity, the Bulgarian government did not recognize the existence of a separate Macedonian nation and language, but this move did little to appease athens. 34 In 1995, the new socialist government in Sofia prioritized relations with athens as a preferred partner in the Balkans and took measures to intensify diplomatic contacts between the two countries . The Bulgarian foreign minister and Jean videnov, Bulgaria’s prime minister, visited athens in april and june 1995, re- spectively. visits by Greek officials also became more frequent: the then Greek foreign minister, Karolos Papoulias, visited Bulgaria three times (30–31 March 1995, 23 october 1995, and 22 December 1995), and the then Greek president, Konstantinos Stefanopoulos, paid an official visit to Sofia in November 1995. Greece and Bulgaria discussed the possible future Bulgarian membership in NA- To and the Eu, as well as the conflict on the territory of former Yugoslavia and the economic repercussions of the embargo against Yugoslavia upon both states .
32 Ibid ., 32f . For more information, seeidem, anazētoumenes isorropies sta valkania. Ē voulgaria anamesa stēn Ellada kai tēn Tourkia, in: Christódoulos Giallouridis / Panayotis Tsakonas (eds.), Ellada kai Tourskia meta to telos tou Psyxrou Polemou. athens 1999, 259–278. 33 John S . Koliopoulos / Thanos veremis, Greece. The Modern Sequel. From 1821 to the Present. New York 2002, 315. 34 Richard j. Crampton, a Concise History of Bulgaria. Cambridge 2005, 221. 340 Tonka Kostadinova
a closer look at the development of regional affairs, however, reveals yet another reason for the unprecedented intensity of diplomatic contacts between Greece and Bulgaria in 1995. Turkey’s unilateral decision in 1994 to impose strict regulations on tanker traffic through the Bosphorus made a priority of Russia’s plans to construct a pipeline for the transport of Russian oil and natural gas from the Bulgarian port of Burgas to the Greek port of Alexandroupolis (the so-called Burgas–Alexandroupolis project) 35. Following Turkey’s restrictions, Russia signed a trilateral technical protocol with Bulgaria and Greece in Decem- ber 1994, foreseeing an acceleration of the pipeline construction. 36 The victory of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) in the parliamentary elections that took place the same month created a fertile environment for Russia’s more asser- tive policy on the issue. In october 1996, Russia signed two agreements with Bulgaria and with Greece on the construction of the pipeline, but subsequently failed to reach a consensus on the share and the distribution of the oil flow. In Bulgaria, the realization of the project became dependent on the configuration of the political landscape and was delayed after the center–right government of Ivan Kostov came to power in 1997. The project was given a new impetus with the signing of a trilateral agreement in 2007, but it eventually failed, owing to a set of conflicting geopolitical and domestic interests. The 1995 rapprochement renewed Greek–Bulgarian efforts to play a leading role in the stabilization and consolidation of interstate relations in the Balkan region 37. In 1996, a joint initiative of the two governments to work toward a “balanced ending” of the Yugoslav conflict inspired the first post-Cold War meeting of all Southeast European foreign ministers in Sofia.38 The Sofia meet- ing provided a new model of intraregional cooperation that included two novel elements: the involvement of all countries of the region that upheld the basic principles of democratic government and respect of human rights, and the link between intraregional forms of cooperation and the declared will to achieve full EU membership .39 The second all-Balkan meeting was held in Thessaloniki in 1997 under the chairmanship of the Greek minister of foreign affairs, and it
35 Due to frequent accidents, Turkey itself had repeatedly urged Russia to reduce the tanker traffic through the Straits by building pipelines. under the 1936 Montreaux Convention, the vessel of any nation carrying any cargo can pass freely through the Straits in peacetime; this allows Russia to use the Straits as a toll-free maritime “highway”. 36 After Papoulias Bulgaria is Expecting Papandreou, Capital, 30 october 1995. 37 On the role of Greece and Bulgaria in the process of regional integration during the Cold War see Tonka Kostadinova, Bŭlgaro-grŭtski otnosheniia i regionalnata integraciia, in: Iskra Baeva / Evgenia Kalinova (eds .), Evropeiski integratsionni protsesi prez 70-te godini na XX vek. Sofia 2014, 135–153. 38 Bulgaria and Greece to Help Settling the Yugoconflict, Capital, 3 april 1995. 39 P. C. Ioakimidis, Greece, The European Union and Southeastern Europe: Past Failures and Future Prospects, in: Van Coufoudakis / Harry Psomiades / andré Gerolymatos (eds .) Greece and the New Balkans. New York 1999, 169–191, 183f. Diplomatic Relations between Greece and Bulgaria 341 focused on the integration of Southeast Europe into European and transatlantic structures. The Thessaloniki declaration reaffirmed these goals. 40 In the next year, Greece and Bulgaria participated as partners in another intraregional initiative: the creation of a Balkan peacekeeping force . Meeting in Skopje in September 1998, the defense ministers of Italy, albania, Bulgaria, Greece, FYROM, Romania, and Turkey agreed to establish a joint force num- bering 3,000 soldiers for deployment in peacekeeping or aid operations in the Balkans 41. The signing of an agreement that projected cooperation among the Balkan states was more significant than the actual size of the small contingents participating 42. Even though the regional initiatives did not prevent the escala- tion of interethnic tensions in Kosovo, they did provide solid ground for the adoption of a multilateral approach toward the Balkans after the end of the Kosovo war in 1999. Greece and Bulgaria shared common concerns regarding the possibility of changing the territorial status quo in the Balkans that emerged with the escalation of the Kosovo conflict, but they followed different approaches regarding the cri- sis. Greece argued firmly against a military solution and even considered using its veto against a NATO intervention, while non-member Bulgaria declared its full support for NaTo’s policy in the region. 43 In the spring of 1999, the Bulgar - ian National assembly decided to provide a land and air corridor for NaTo’s air strikes against Serbia . The pro-Western policy of Bulgaria on the Kosovo issue stemmed mainly from the willingness of the center-right government to demonstrate its full commitment to Bulgaria’s Eu and transatlantic integration, yet it faced the strong disapproval and opposition of Bulgarian society . The EU response to the crisis in Kosovo was to launch the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, a conflict-prevention policy designed to include Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, and FYRoM. Even though Bulgaria officially supported the initiative, Sofia’s inclusion in the Southeast European group, which came just after the 1998 deci - sion of the European Commission to postpone the beginning of membership negotiations with the country, raised significant concerns that the pact would eventually delay Bulgaria’s European and transatlantic integration. It is note- worthy that in april 1999 the then Greek prime minister, Kostas Simitis, arrived in Bulgaria directly from Brussels, where the German government had just introduced the Stability Pact, and promised to “lobby” for a quick accession of
40 Ibid, 184f. 41 Crampton, a Concise History of Bulgaria, 241. The initiative dates back to 1996, when the Southeast Defence Ministerial (SEDM) was inaugurated, with the US providing the momentum . 42 Victor Papacosma, NATO, Greece and the Balkans in the Post-Cold War Era, in: Coufou- dakis / Psomiades / Gerolymatos (eds .), Greece and the New Balkans, 47–67, 64 . 43 Heike Krieger, The Kosovo Conflict and International Law. Cambridge 2001, 405. 342 Tonka Kostadinova
Bulgaria to both the EU and NATO .44 Later on, Greece pledged $ 100 million to the Stability Pact, with nearly 1/3 of the total amount to be allocated to Bulgaria. In july 1999, the same month when the Stability Pact was signed in Sarajevo, the Bulgarian prime minister visited athens in another attempt to ensure Greece’s support for Bulgaria’s European integration. During the visit, Greece commit - ted itself once again to support the opening of membership negotiations with Bulgaria and to lobby for removing Bulgaria from the Schengen blacklist . The pro-Western position of Bulgaria during the Kosovo conflict aided the country’s Eu integration process and brought about the opening of member- ship negotiations in December 1999. In 2001, Bulgarian citizens received the right to enter and travel in the Schengen Area without special visa regulations . The decision had an enormous impact on the development of Greek–Bulgar- ian relations. The two countries removed visa restrictions for the first time in their diplomatic history, thus opening the way for an intensive economic and cultural exchange . Bulgaria’s accession to both NaTo (2004) and the European union (2007) moved Greek–Bulgarian affairs to a broader, supranational, and differently institutionalized level of cooperation.
The Economic Dimension of Bilateral Relations during Bulgaria’s Transition to a Market Economy
Greece contributed to the post-communist transition across the region of Southeastern Europe not only by launching the well-publicized political initia- tives for regional cooperation described above, but also by intensifying its region- al trade and investment, which facilitated the Southeastern European countries’ accommodation with the European Union and increased their freedom from the influence of the united States. 45 Greek–Bulgarian economic relations reached their peak after the collapse of state socialism and the beginning of Bulgaria’s transition from command to market economy 46. Shortly after Zhivkov’s fall from power, the Greek government provided Bulgaria with a $ 50 million loan
44 The Greek PM announced a New Plan for Kosovo in Sofia,Capital , 17 april 1999. 45 John Lampe, Balkans into Southeastern Europe . New York 2006, 286f . 46 The two countries tried to develop sustainable economic relations during the Cold War . During the 1970s, the amount of trade exchange increased tenfold, reaching 439 million dollars in 1980. See Todorov , The Ambassador as Historian, 275 . Yet the rigid Bulgarian command economy and the Greek integration into the EEC were serious obstacles to the bilateral economic cooperation . An interesting example of the politicization of economic interests during this period was the Greek initiative to promote cooperation in wine production. In 1981, the Greek prime minister suggested the establishment of a Greek–Bulgarian joint venture for wine production under the condition that the enterprise should not be located in Southwestern Bulgaria, in order “not to create a precedent for Yugoslavia”: Nikolai Todorov, Dnevnik (1966–1998). Sofia 2008, 516. Today Bulgaria produces one of its best wines, symbolically named “No Man’s Land”, in this area. Diplomatic Relations between Greece and Bulgaria 343 to support its efforts to tackle the consequences of the dismantling of the com- mand economy model. In March 1993, the two countries signed an agreement on the promotion and mutual protection of investments, which facilitated an intense penetration of the Bulgarian market by Greek public and private en- terprises. By the end of 1993, Greece had acquired the highest level of foreign direct investments (FDI) in Bulgaria and represented nearly 50% of Bulgaria’s imports from all Balkan countries. In 1994, the trade exchange between the two countries amounted to 500 million dollars, with Greece becoming the third- largest trade partner for Bulgaria, after Germany and Russia. By the mid-1990s, there were more than 900 Greek–Bulgarian joint ventures operating in Bulgaria . Between 1996 and 2013, the share of Greek FDI amounted to 8.5% of the total FDI inflow to Bulgaria. Today, Greece remains among the five most important trading partners of Bulgaria, with bilateral trade exchange amounting to 2 .98 billion Euros in 2013.47 The role of Greece was particularly important with respect to the privatization of the Bulgarian banking sector that began in the early 1990s. Initially, Greek banks concentrated on trade finance and on serving Greek companies that had already entered the Bulgarian market . Some institutions, such as Piraeus Bank and Alpha Bank, represented a classic case of banks following clients who had entered a foreign market 48. others, the “opportunistic investors”, managed to acquire bank assets by taking advantage of loose regulations during the process of transition by the Bulgarian banking sector, but their involvement ended when the 1997 banking crisis triggered a sector “clean-up” that eventually eliminated most of the small-sized and unsustainable banks in Bulgaria . Other Greek banks, such as the National Bank of Greece, participated actively in the privatization of the Bulgarian banking sector and managed to consolidate their positions in the market. By the end of the first decade of transition, Greek banks had estab- lished a network of about 20 subsidiaries, which accounted for nearly 30% of the banking sector . The low prices of bank assets, the branch network already established in the country, the presence of the IMF and the World Bank, and the Eu conditionality requiring Bulgaria to observe theacquis communautaire all created an investment-friendly environment that made the banking sector still more appealing to Greek investors 49. The market share of the Greek banking
47 Republic of Bulgaria, Ministry of Economy and Energy, Trade and Economic Relations between Bulgaria and Greece, available at
50 Cf . the data provided by the Supervision Department of the National Bank of Bulgaria, Banks in Bulgaria, for the respective years, available at
Prospects for the Development of Greek–Bulgarian Relations
In 2010, Greek–Bulgarian relations were given new impetus by the decision of the two governments to establish a High Level Cooperation Council consisting of Greek and Bulgarian prime ministers and key sectoral ministers . The Council was set up in order to provide an opportunity for annual summit meetings to reinforce political decision-making. The first session of the Council in December
52 Constantine Svolopoulos, Ē Ellēnikē Politikē sta valkania, 1974–1981. athens 1987, 58. 346 Tonka Kostadinova
2010 focused exclusively on economic issues. Greece and Bulgaria signed 14 intergovernmental agreements in key areas such as energy, maritime security and environment, the fight against organized crime, environmental protection, transportation, water management, agriculture, culture, and tourism 53. From a historical perspective, the progress in 2010 represented the second break- through of major significance in the diplomatic history of Greek–Bulgarian affairs, comparable to the signing of 12 bilateral agreements in 1964. In regional terms, the idea of political consultations at annual bilateral sum- mits has the potential to play a stabilizing role in light of the recent rise of nationalistic rhetoric and populist discourses in the Balkans . In a joint political declaration, Greece and Bulgaria linked their initiative to the integrated develop- ment of Southeast Europe and expressed their determination to work together in promoting peace, stability, and good neighborly relations throughout the region . In addition, the two countries agreed to share responsibility to promote the internal security of the European Union, in particular by reinforcing the security of the Eu’s external borders in Southeastern Europe.54 The next few years, however, brought serious challenges to the political goals declared by Bulgaria and Greece . As a result of its prolonged economic crisis, Greece has become less diplomatically active in the region, while its for- eign policy has shifted toward a revival of past notions and misconceptions . Bilateral disputes, such as the issue of FYRoM’s name and the disagreement on maritime borders with Albania, have begun to dominate the Greek foreign policy agenda once again 55. Bulgaria for its part has also returned to a more acrimonious discourse in its relations to FYROM, and has far opposed any decision to set a date for the opening of EU accession talks with that country . Bulgaria has thus adopted a position that is now closer to that of Greece . The Bulgarian stance is expected to overcome the effects of the 1992 collapse of the common Greek–Bulgarian approach to the Macedonian question, and this result will draw the two countries even closer together . The deterioration of relations between Bulgaria and FYROM, along with the establishment of a summit council by athens and Sofia, is an important signal of a re-emerging Greek–Bulgarian axis in the Balkans . Today, Greece and Bulgaria continue to develop constructive interstate rela- tions as reliable partners within the EU and NATO . Sixty years after the resump-
53 Petar Kadrev, Ē voulgaria kai ē Elada: Philia kai Koina Sympheronta, Balkan Horizons Magazine 17 (2010), 6–13, 7. 54 Joint Political Declaration on the Establishment of the High Level Cooperation Council between the Hellenic Republic and the Republic of Bulgaria . Sent to the author by the Greek embassy in Bulgaria by request. 55 Besar Likmeta, Greek Crisis “undermined Balkan Eu accession Hopes”, Balkan Insight, 4 july 2014, available at