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The Convivir Were Ours” 1 COMISIÓN COLOMBIANA DE JURISTAS Organización no gubernamental con estatus consultivo ante la ONU Filial de la Comisión Internacional de Juristas (Ginebra) y de la Comisión Andina de Juristas (Lima) PERSONERÍA JURÍDICA: RESOLUCIÓN 1060, AGOSTO DE 1988 DE LA ALCALDÍA MAYOR DE BOGOTÁ Bulletin No 27: Series on the rights of the victims and the application of Law 975 “All the Convivir were ours” 1 According to the paramilitary commander Éver Veloza García, alias “HH,” the “Convivir” have acted, since their inception and until today, under the protection of the military forces. This member of the paramilitary made this declaration between March 26 and 28 in the course of his “free-version” or voluntary confession hearing, in the framework of the procedure foreseen for the reduction of sentences favoring paramilitaries by Law 975 of 2005. Alias “HH” revealed that the “Convivir” Papagayo, based in the Urabá region, always had its base behind the 17th Brigade of the National Army, and to reach its facilities it was necessary to go through Army checkpoints. He said himself that in order to enter the Brigade, he needed only to identify himself as “the blond Veloza,” as he was known in Urabá, and immediately he was allowed in.2 Likewise, the paramilitary bosses Salvatore Mancuso and Éver Veloza confirmed that the present mayor of the municipality of Carepa (Antioquia), Arnulfo Peñuela, was a member of the “Convivir” Papagayo and had strong links with paramilitary groups.3 According to alias “HH,” these links became concrete in the help provided by Peñuela for the creation of several “Convivir” in Urabá, and in channeling the funds contributed by the banana-producing companies in the region to paramilitarism through the “Convivir” Papagayo, directed by Peñuela. 4 On March 30th past, Arnulfo Peñuela and other representatives of the “Convivir” Papagayo were detained by order of the special prosecutor 29 of Medellín for their links with paramilitarism and accused of conspiracy to commit a crime. 5 Éver Veloza’s declarations and the investigations being carried out by the Prosecutor’s Office in the case of the “Convivir” Papagayo show the real scale of what the “Convivir” have meant throughout the country. This “Convivir” had the help of various sectors for its creation and consolidation: the determined support of the 17th Brigade of the National Army, the direction of Arnulfo Peñuela, who today wields power as a regional politician and is being investigated for his links with paramilitary groups, and the financial support of the banana- producing companies with the contributions they made to paramilitarism. 1 Free-version hearing of Éver Veloza García, alias “HH,” March 26, 27 and 28, 2008. The “Convivir,” (Living Together) also known as “rural security cooperatives,” were associations permitted by Decree-Law 356 of 1994 to bear weapons of war. The norm that allowed this (paragraph, Article 39) was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in November of 1997 (Sentence C-572/07). The “Convivir” were used intensively for the development of paramilitarism 2 Free-version hearing of Éver Veloza García, alias “HH,” October 30, 2007. 3 Free-version hearing of Salvatore Mancuso, May 17, 2007; Free-version hearing of Éver Veloza García, alias “HH,” October 30, 2007. 4 Free-version hearing of Éver Veloza Garcia, alias “HH,” October 30, 2007. 5 In an interview with a Colombian newspaper, Arnulfo Peñuela denied emphatically his links with paramilitarism: “I was administrative director of the Association Convivir Papagayo until five years ago. It was created with the authorization of the national and departmental governments, but saying that we had any kind of link is a lie. I never had a relationship with him and that group.” El Colombiano daily newspaper, “Mayor of Carepa detained for supposed links with AUC,” April st, 2008, on line version. Calle 72 Nº 12-65 piso 7 PBX: (571) 3768200 – (571) 3434710 Fax: (571) 3768230 Email: [email protected] Website: www.coljuristas.org Bogotá, Colombia The “Convivir” Papagayo is only one example of what these associations of “private oversight and security” really were: veritable paramilitary groups under the protection of the State, or organizations that acted jointly and in a coordinated manner with the paramilitary groups. This situation had been denounced for years by human rights organizations, by some State entities, and by international human rights protection bodies who saw in these groups the legalization of paramilitarism.6 This has been confirmed also by other paramilitaries, such as Salvatore Mancuso, who, in the course of the “free-version” hearings stated that they – the paramilitaries – promoted the creation of at least ten of the “Convivir” that operate in the North of country.7 The worrisome aspect of these paramilitaries’ confessions, beyond the confessions in and of themselves, is the fact that neither the State nor the present Government has recognized or acknowledged its responsibility for the human rights violations that these groups have committed from the day of their creation to this day. On the contrary, the national Government continues to back initiatives that are similar to the so-called “Convivir,” thereby denying the violence that these associations caused, as well as the responsibility that belongs to the State for their creation and their actions, thus reproducing the conditions for the repetition of the atrocities. In fact, the Convivir were promoted enthusiastically by the then Governor of Antioquia and today President of Colombia, who authorized the establishment of a considerable number of them. It must be pointed out that the Governor of Antioquia had no faculties to grant such authorizations, since this was the responsibility of the Superintendence of Oversight and Private Security of the Ministry of Defense. 8 In any case, several of the Convivir authorized by the then Governor were led by, or made up of, well-known paramilitary bosses when they were already part of the paramilitary structure. This reality became evident on April 17, 2007, when Congress held a debate regarding paramilitarism in Antioquia, during which it became manifest that while he was Governor of Antioquia, Álvaro Uribe Vélez authorized the creation of at least the following “Convivir” 9: - The “Convivir Horizonte” and the “Convivir Guaymaral,” both led by the paramilitary leader - Salvatore Mancuso. - The “Convivir Avive,” to which Jesús Ignacio Roldán, alias “Monoleche,” belonged. - The “Convivir Costa Azul,” of which the paramilitary Arnoldo Vergara TresPalacios, alias “el Mochacabezas [the Headchopper],” was a member. - The “Convivir Nuevo Amanecer,” made up of, among others, Rodrigo Pelufo, alias “Cadena.” - The “Convivir Los arrayanes,” of the paramilitary Juan Francisco Prada. - The “Convivir Bellaván” of the paramilitary Rodrigo Pérez, alias “Julián Bolívar.” - A “Convivir” directed by the paramilitary boss José María Barrera Ortiz, alias “Chepe Barrera.” - The “Convivir Papagayo,” directed by Arnulfo Peñuela. 6 The involvement of the civilian population in activities that are the responsibility of the State security forces is not a new practice in Colombia. Beginning with the norms that gave rise to the creation of paramilitary groups in 1968 until today, the Colombian State has systematically implemented mechanisms to involve civilians in the development of military tasks such as the “self-defense councils, ”the “Convivir” associations, and the resent implementation of the “democratic security” policy. Through Sentence C-572 de 1997, the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional the norm that allowed the “Convivir” to use weapons of war and arms of exclusive use by the State security forces (paragraph of Article 39 of the Statute of Oversight and Private Security). 7 Free-version hearing of Salvatore Mancuso, May 15, 2007. 8 Statute of Oversight and Private Security, Decree 356 of 1994, art. 3 9 Congress of the Republic, debate on paramilitarism in Antioquia called by Senator Gustavo Petro, April 17, 2007. 2 Álvaro Uribe Vélez, while Governor of Antioquia in 1996 was one of the staunchest defenders of the “Convivir” and justified providing these groups with long-range weapons, as well as their participation in military tasks, as follows: “We asked Porce’s Convivir to collaborate until the troops arrived, but they answered that they did not have resources because, while the guerrilla had all kinds of weapons, they had only revolvers and sawed-off shotguns.” 10 Even today, the national Government continues promoting policies tending to arm the civilian population and get it involved in the armed conflict through its participation in intelligence work and military operations. At present, through the “democratic security” policy, President Álvaro Uribe Vélez is once again setting into motion mechanisms to involve the civilian population in military tasks through the implementation of programs such as the “informants’ network,” the “peasant soldiers,” or the integration of the “demobilized” combatants in private security organizations. These three initiatives were designed under the guidelines of the policy of “democratic security.” This policy establishes that “the citizenry shall play a fundamental role in information gathering” (for military intelligence). One of the main programs in this policy is the “network of informants and helpers,” which aims to make the 44 million inhabitants of Colombia carry out military intelligence functions. Likewise, the Government planned
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