Copyright by James Ralph Martin 2019
The Dissertation Committee for James Ralph Martin Certifies that this is the approved version of the following Dissertation:
In Search of the Nixon Doctrine on Latin America: Levers of Influence and Resistance in Hemispheric Relations
Committee:
Jeremi Suri, Supervisor
Mark A. Lawrence
Virginia Garrard Burnett
Raúl L. Madrid
In Search of the Nixon Doctrine on Latin America: Levers of Influence and Resistance in Hemispheric Relations
by
James Ralph Martin
Dissertation
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of The University of Texas at Austin in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
The University of Texas at Austin May 2019 Dedication
To Laura. The one who was by my side for this ride.
Acknowledgements
All things must end, and as I see the conclusion of this project I feel nothing but gratitude for the numerous individuals and organizations that made this “modest” history dissertation possible. The hours spent on what often was a solitary, isolating project with countless nights, weekends, early mornings spent in front of a computer screen could not have been possible without the strong support of my family My children Stephen and Matthew rejuvenated me with their boundless energy. I wish I could take some of their spirit and bottle it up for consumption later. My parents always encouraged me to push myself, and their experiences growing up in Santa Marta Colombia encouraged my enthusiasm and passion for all things Latin America. Finally, my wife Laura encouraged, edited, and took on extra burdens so I could finish. I love you always, and I promise a long break before I pursue the next crazy idea that might come to mind. My teachers and committee members at UT Austin have been nothing but superb.
Jonathan Brown scared me straight in my first semester of graduate school and emphasized the importance of clarity in writing. I have definitely improved since then, but I still have much to learn. Matthew Butler and Seth Garfield brought expertise and passion in the study of the two largest countries in Latin America. Ginny Garrard always made equal time to both discuss the complexities of Central America as well as the tribulation of infants. Mark Lawrence involved himself with this project from the beginning. I have yet to meet a more professional historian. Will Inboden provided generously of his time as he ran the very successful Clements Center. Raúl Madrid somehow accepted the task of mentoring a field grade army officer with only an email. His willingness to take on more commitments is emblematic of the selfless service I have found in so many academics. Finally, Jeremi Suri v provided the perfect amount of space, support, and critique to move this project forward as my advisor. Next, I would like to thank my fellow students in the classroom and in my cohort for the stimulating discussions that helped expand my thinking. Kody Jackson, Elizabeth Obrien, Carl Forsberg, Jimena Perry, Samantha Rose Rubino, Simon Miles, Jo Parrott, and many more were critical to completing this journey. The learning I experienced from them, both inside and outside the classroom, were critical to my development as a scholar. A particular group of gentlemen I would like to thank are those who also took on the mantle of Soldier-scholar, or in one case Marine-scholar. Ben Griffin, Brandon Archuleta, Cameron McCoy, Mark Battjes, and Ian Lyles provided a road map showing the road to a PhD for a military professional was possible. My colleagues at the United States Military Academy, both uniformed and civilian, were true examples of professionalism. Thank you to Ty Seidule for being an energetic Department Head who managed to both encourage me to continue, while constantly reminding me of the myriad of other ways to be successful. Steve Waddell and Jason Musteen served as wildly different, yet no less successful bosses who encouraged my scholarship. Tony Salinas created the maps in chapter two purely out of love for military history and to help a friend. David Frey always provided ideas about anything and everything while. Christy Keating, Adam Chang, and Ben Brands graciously read drafts of works in progress. Amanda Boczar probably kept me from quitting, While Jen Kiesling made some of the best cookies. They were a trap. One that I willingly walked into sometimes daily. My tour in the History Department was far and away my most rewarding and satisfying assignment to date because of the people I worked with. I would like to thank the Omar Bradley Foundation, the Graduate History Department at UT Austin, and the Clements Center for History, Strategy, and Statecraft, vi the USMA History Department, the Army ACS program, and the state of Texas for funding portions of the research that led to this report. Knowledge is not free, and I appreciate the faith these organizations placed in my potential. Finally, I take full responsibility for all errors in this dissertation. I look forward to one day reading the next generation and finding out just how wrong I was.
vii
Abstract
In Search of the Nixon Doctrine on Latin America: Levers of Influence and Resistance in Hemispheric Relations
James Ralph Martin, Ph.D. The University of Texas at Austin, 2019
Supervisor: Jeremi Suri
Drawing on a variety of newly declassified U.S. government sources, congressional archives, published collections, oral interviews, records from Mexico, and other sources, this dissertation marks the first book length study of the Nixon administration’s interactions with Latin America. Highlighting the agency of countries in the region, as well as the multitude of viewpoints within the U.S. government, this study demonstrates the complexities inherent in crafting a comprehensive regional policy Divided into six chapters, this dissertation takes a chronological approach to the development of U.S.-Latin American relations during the Nixon years. The first three chapters cover his first year in office during which a robust policy debate took place within the administration. In the middle of the debates, Nixon faced his first hemispheric crisis with the rare event of open warfare in the hemisphere. He managed to use discreet levers of influence and, with the support of other international actors, kept the conflict a short affair. The policy debates ended with a major policy speech and a plan for action. The final three chapters explore the variety of ways that the administration and the region failed to viii develop a coherent policy. Although bilateral relations with most countries in the region remained strong throughout his presidency, Nixon never developed an actionable multilateral doctrine on Latin America.
ix Table of Contents
List of Illustrations ...... xiii
Introduction ...... 1
In Search of a Nixon Doctrine On Latin America ...... 6
Complexity and Failure ...... 12
Chapter 1: Tangled Web: In Search of a Hemispheric Policy ...... 17
A New Beginning ...... 17
Oil and Oligarchs: Expropriation Crisis in Peru ...... 20
Bureaucrats and Businessmen ...... 27
Lobbying from Abroad...... 32
Globe Trotting Rockefeller ...... 36
A Colombian Connection ...... 45
Catholics and Communists ...... 49
Multi-input Process ...... 53
Chapter 2: Nixon’s Other War ...... 54
War in Central America ...... 54
Lead up to War ...... 56
Hundred Hour War...... 68
Nixon the peace maker ...... 75
Aftermath ...... 81
The Guam Doctrine ...... 84
Chapter 3: Birth of a Strategy: Implementation of a Nixon Doctrine in Latin America .. 87
Building and Destroying Bridges of Friendship ...... 87
x Operation Intercept ...... 89
Reception of the Rockefeller Report ...... 95
Operation Intercept End Game ...... 104
Major Policy Address ...... 110
End of A Decade ...... 124
Chapter 4: Stillborn Policy ...... 127
Dawn of a New Decade ...... 127
Outlines of Change...... 129
Richard Nixon: The Struggle for the Catholic Church in Latin America ...... 135
Peru Earthquake ...... 138
Communists in the Global South: The Rise of Allende in Chile ...... 145
The Cuban Crisis at Cienfuegos that Never Was ...... 154
Insurgency in Bolivia ...... 160
Crisis Complete...... 165
Chapter 5: From Many to One: From hemispheric to Brazilian policy ...... 167
Picking up the Pieces ...... 167
Salvaging a Strategy ...... 170
The Long Grey Line: West Point Grad and Nicaraguan Dictator ...... 180
Overcome by Events ...... 183
Slow Death: Autopsy of the Alliance for Progress ...... 188
Yet Another Trip ...... 192
Brazil: Nixon’s Southern Partner in Power ...... 195
Bilateral Moves Solidified ...... 207
xi Chapter 6: The Dawn of the “New Dialogue”...... 209
Limits to Power ...... 209
Mexico: Clean Water and the Limitations of The Nixon Doctrine ...... 211
Brazil Friendship Strengthened ...... 219
In search of a Latin America Policy in Times of Strong Bilateral Relations ...... 224
Chile: September 11, 1973 ...... 234
The Education of Kissinger ...... 240
The Failure of the Architect...... 247
Conclusion ...... 250
Thoughts for Policy Makers ...... 254
Bibliography ...... 257
Archival ...... 257
Newspapers ...... 257
Published Primary Sources (Online) ...... 257
Published Primary Sources (Print) ...... 258
Unpublished Theses ...... 258
Secondary Sources ...... 259
xii List of Illustrations
Illustration 1: El Salvadorian Air Strike on Honduras July 15, 1969 ...... 69 Illustration 2: El Salvadorian Ground Invasion into Honduras July 16, 1969 ...... 70 Illustration 3: Honduran Counter Attack...... 72
xiii Introduction “On many occasions a report is made advocating a program for progress in Latin America; everybody gets excited for a few days or a few weeks; and then the report is quietly pigeon–holed and for the most parts forgotten. United States policy toward Latin America must have consistency, continuity, and follow-through.”1
-Richard Nixon 1955
Richard Nixon became president in 1969 as an already experienced global traveler. Among his many treks, he went to Latin America numerous times. His official trips as Vice President included two tours of the region, one to Central America and the Caribbean in 1955, and one to South America in 1958. In 1959, he was the highest-ranking U.S official to meet with Fidel Castro during Castro’s mission to the United States after the Cuban Revolution. As Vice President, he even once offered a spirited defense of the Good Neighbor policy, a hemispheric approach based on non-intervention championed by Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR). Nixon believed the Good Neighbor policy was a better example to the world than the Soviet Union’s use of satellites.2 As Vice President he sat at the briefing table when CIA officials explained the unmitigated success of PBSUCESS, the covert operation to remove the leftist leader of Guatemala Jacobo Árbenz. This operation caused one scholar to argue that policymakers, such as Nixon, “drew confidence from the belief that covert action could be used as a
1 Richard Milhous Nixon and United States Congress Senate Republican Policy Committee, Excerpts from the Speeches of the Vice President of the United States of America: The Honorable Richard M. Nixon, 1948 through 1959, 1959, 90. 2 “Nixon Denounces Soviet Satellites: Contrasts Control by Russia With U. S. Good-Neighbor Policy in the Americas,” New York Times, November 2, 1955; Marvin R Zahniser and W. Michael Weis, “A Diplomatic Pearl Harbor? Richard Nixon’s Goodwill Mission to Latin America in 1958,” Diplomatic History 13, no. 2 (1989): 163–90. 1 convenient, decisive final resort.”3 During the 1960 presidential campaign against John F. Kennedy, Nixon argued, in white house internal deliberations, for a more forceful policy against Cuba’s Castro. By so doing, he was attempting to counter Kennedy’s portrayal of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, and by extension his vice president, as full of “blunder, inaction, retreat, and failure.”4 Nixon later blamed the Cuban issue for his loss in the 1960 election.5 During his next election run in 1968 he attempted to get ahead of the issue. In one speech, he called for a “sweeping reevaluation” of the Alliance for Progress, the largest U.S. aid program to Latin America in history. Nixon recognized the declining nature of current hemispheric policy when he drew a clear contrast between himself and President Lyndon B. Johnson, accusing Johnson of being unable or unwilling to “give our neighbors the priority status and effective aid which they deserve.” The thrust of his overall message was that “trade instead of aid” should be the guiding principal in formulating hemispheric policy.”6 Nixon’s message also contrasted with that of his opponent, Hubert Humphrey, who emphasized the positive aspects of the Alliance for Progress and generally advocated maintaining the status quo without substantial changes to its basic structure.7 After his victory in 1968, Nixon entered office as the most experienced and informed U.S. president on Latin American issues in history.
3 Nick Cullather, Secret History: The CIA’s Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006), 109–10. 4 Michael Grow, U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions: Pursuing Regime Change in the Cold War (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2008), 47. 5 Ibid., 49. 6 Semple, Robert, “Nixon Urges Help for Latin Nations: Asks Major ‘Re-Evaluation’ of Alliance for Progress Nixon Urges Help for Latin Nations,” New York Times, October 15, 1968, 7 Welles, Benjamin, “Humphrey and Nixon Differ on Latin-American Aim,” New York Times, November 5, 1968. 2 His experience went beyond the professional. He had a personal connection with the people of the region, having grown up among Mexicans in his childhood home of Yorba Linda, California. His honeymoon with his new bride, Pat, in 1940 even consisted of a two- week overland trek to Mexico City and back. The humble circumstances of the couple meant they could not afford to eat every meal at restaurants, so they stocked up their car with canned goods. Nixon later recalled that his friends had played a prank on the newlyweds and removed the labels; “thus every meal became a game of chance,” and they
“ended up having pork and beans for breakfast and grapefruit slices for dinner.”8 However, even with his vast regional experience, scholars almost universally agree that his legacy in the region is one of failure. Compared to Nixon, Henry Kissinger, his National Security Advisor and later Secretary of State, had limited experience with the region. Before he joined the Nixon administration, his one visit south of the border consisted of giving a lecture to the Brazilian National Defense University in the early 1960s. There, with the contacts of his patron, Nelson Rockefeller, he met several influential Brazilians, including the famous anthropologist Gilberto Freyre and several military officials.9 With this limited experience, Kissinger entered his position as National Security Advisor reliant on his Latin American advisors.
Scholars have latched onto some of Nixon and Kissinger’s more dismissive comments when analyzing Nixon’s hemispheric policy. For instance, Kissinger, after listening to the Chilean foreign minister lecture on the United States’ general abuse of power in the hemisphere, told the minister over lunch, “nothing important can come from
8 Quoted In Evan Thomas, Being Nixon: A Man Divided (Random House, 2015), 28. 9 Niall Ferguson, Kissinger: 1923-1968: The Idealist (Penguin, 2015), 517. 3 the South. History has never been produced in the South.”10 Nixon, while giving career advice to the Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, Donald Rumsfeld, offered his opinion that “people don’t give a damn about Latin America.” He then continued, “The only thing that matters is Japan, China, Russia, and Europe.”11 One scholar even went as far as stating, “Nixon voiced contempt about all things Latin American.”12 These negative statements have historically been interpreted somewhat in isolation, but a broader context reveals a different perspective. Thus, the principle research question driving this project is to what extent the analytical depiction of Kissinger and Nixon’s contempt for the region was true when considered in the broader context of how hemispheric policy, particularly Nixon’s doctrine on Latin America, as it developed over time. The research on the U.S. perspective focused on the myriad cabinet secretaries, ambassadors, and advisors that shaped and implemented many of the day to day policy decisions. Drawing on a variety of newly declassified U.S. government sources, congressional archives, published collections, oral interviews, records from the Mexican government, and other sources, this dissertation marks the first comprehensive study of Nixon’s interactions with the region as he attempted to develop a signature hemispheric policy.13 While the primary analytical lens of this project is from the U.S. perspective, highlighted throughout are the agency and views of Latin American actors.14 Officials from
Latin American countries, both large and small, had their own foreign policy objectives
10Quoted in John D. Martz, ed., United States Policy in Latin America: A Quarter Century of Crisis and Challenge, 1961-1986, Latin American Studies Series (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1988), 30. 11 Quoted in Stephen G Rabe, The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 118. 12 Ibid., 13Comprehensive is defined as book length. For a note on lack of a book length study see Rabe, The Killing Zone, 227. 14For a perspective on Latin American agency see Max Paul Friedman, “Retiring the Puppets, Bringing Latin America Back In: Recent Scholarship on United States–Latin American Relations,” Diplomatic History 27, no. 5 (2003): 621–36. 4 and often came out the victors in the international arena. The return of the Swan Islands to Honduras, concessions on textiles to Nicaragua, and the resolution of a decade long water dispute between Mexico and the United States in Mexico’s favor all attested that Latin
American countries were not mere passive actors during the Nixon years. 15 The perspectives of the Cold War are also important. The two most studied aspects of Nixon’s Latin American policy, the response to Allende in Chile and the Cienfuegos
Crisis in Cuba, certainly had a Cold War element.16 However, not all problems revolved along an East West axis. Even relations with Castro in Cuba, the most prototypical Cold War government in the hemisphere, failed to improve for reasons beyond Cold War politics. A personal grudge against Cuba prevented Nixon from seeking improved relations with the tiny island nation. As Kissinger later remarked, it was not very logical to talk to communist China, but not to Cuba.17
15 Studies focusing on Latin American Agency in individual countries have become more common; see John Joseph Dwyer, The Agrarian Dispute: The Expropriation of American-Owned Rural Land in Post- Revolutionary Mexico (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008); Renata Keller Mexico’s Cold War. (Boston: Cambridge Univ Press, 2017); Kyle Longley, Sparrow and the Hawk: Costa Rica and the United States during the Rise of Jose Figueres (Tuscaloosa: University Alabama Press, 1997); James F Siekmeier, The Bolivian Revolution and the United States, 1952 to the Present (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011); Lawrence A. Clayton, Peru and the United States: The Condor and the Eagle, United States and the Americas (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1999); Matias Spektor, Kissinger e o Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2009); Tanya Harmer, Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011). 16 The literature, particularly on Chile is vast, for two of the better scholarly works on Chile and Cienfuegos see Tanya Harmer, Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011); Asaf Siniver, “The Nixon Administration and the Cienfuegos Crisis of 1970: Crisis-Management of a Non-Crisis?,” Review of International Studies 34, no. 1 (2008): 69–88. 17 Kissinger Telephone Conversations hereafter abbreviated (TELCON), [U.S. Relations with Latin America and Cuba], September 10, 1971. 5 IN SEARCH OF A NIXON DOCTRINE ON LATIN AMERICA In terms of global priorities, except in moments of crisis, Latin America never ranked at the top. However, other regions, such as Africa, ranked lower.18 One reason for this hierarchy was that while Latin America had traditionally been part of the U.S. sphere of influence, Nixon saw Africa as part of the European sphere of influence. While the administration paid attention to Central and South America, Nixon at times had trouble balancing his desire for a “low profile”19 in the region with his understanding of Latin
America as part of the traditional U.S. “backyard.”20 This tension within Nixon’s own thought process, also reflected among his advisors, continued throughout his term.
The Nixon Doctrine on Latin America developed and morphed over time depending on the situations at the time and on policy inputs. In the first year of the administration, a search for a bold, historic policy focused on developing a special community within the Western Hemisphere based on “trade not aid,” integrated into multilateral bodies such as the Organization for American States (OAS). However, this auspicious beginning eventually developed into a desire for a “low profile,” where Nixon
18 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 475-023, April 8, 1971, Oval Office. As an example of Nixon’s view of Africans “But those Africans, you know, are only fifty to seventy-five years from out of the trees.” In the same conversation he brought up Latin American dictators in the context of worldwide development with less derisive language. For a more quantitative perspective, one only needs to look at the number of records the government produced. Latin America had far more paper than Africa, more in line with Europe and the Middle East. 19 The “low profile” was the tagline that stuck in describing his hemispheric policy in his first term 20 For a traditional view of the “backyard” compared with a more balanced depiction of relations see: Greg Grandin, Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism (New York: Owl Books, 2007); Virginia Garrard-Burnett, Mark Atwood Lawrence, and Julio Moreno, Beyond the Eagle’s Shadow: New Histories of Latin America’s Cold War, 2013. 6 ceded the stage to Mexico and Brazil in an attempt to tamp down the hegemonic image of the United States.
One input was the lower levels of the bureaucracy which paid a significant amount of time and attention to the region even as the principles focused on other priorities. The United States at the time had an embassy in every major country in the hemisphere, minus Cuba, and an entire bureau within the State Department focused on all things Latin America. Kissinger also always had one or two civil servants dedicated to advising him on the region. Other major agencies, including the CIA, Treasury
Department, and the Department of Defense had scores of federal employees devoted to the region.
On top of the day to day operations at country desks, citizen services, and embassy functions, the bureaucracy wrote reports. In Nixon’s years as president, the executive branch wrote responses to three different regional National Security Study
Memorandums (NSSM), and eleven other NSSMs that covered either individual countries in Latin America, or related thematic issues in which the president was interested.21 These massive documents, some of them numbering hundreds of pages, carefully outlined multiple points of discussion and courses of action Nixon could elect to follow in the conduct of foreign affairs. Some could argue that these reports were mere exercises in distracting the bureaucracy from interfering in Kissinger and Nixon’s grand designs. While that may have been true in other parts of the world, it was not the case in
21 For a list of all the NSSMs see “National Security Study Memorandums (NSSM) [Nixon Administration, 1969-74],” accessed March 27, 2019, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nssm-nixon/index.html. 7 Latin America. Both Nixon and Kissinger often referred to the options presented in the
NSSMs for the region and used them as starting points for their analyses.
Some Latin American powers, particularly the military-run government of Brazil, acted as peripheral powers that were not very important globally in the contemporary
Nixon years. However, as Nixon and others often said, these countries had the potential of being “the key to the future” and were on a trajectory to become world players. Their actions and opinions affected U.S. policy decisions. In addition, the ever-present threat of another communist power, like Cuba, developing on the continent was often a factor in policy decisions. As part of the Nixon Doctrine on Latin America, the President was more than happy to support the Brazilian dictatorship, as long as they were supportive of his agenda in the hemisphere.
Advisors often highlighted the importance of the hemisphere. A gifted linguist,
Vernon Walters, who had accompanied Nixon on his 1958 trip to South America, warned
Nixon about the dangers of leftist subversion in Brazil, comparing the threat in the populous country not in terms of another Cuba, but in terms of another China.22
Another advisor in the National Security Council(NSC) warned starkly that the failure of the Nixon Doctrine in Latin America could be a bigger failure than even Southeast
22 “Memorandum From the Senior Military Attaché in Paris (Walters) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),” Washington, November 3, 1970, Foreign Relations of the United States hereafter known as FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d30. 8 Asia.23 Even if at times Nixon and Kissinger were not paying attention, other policy actors within the administration were.
Nixon also drew on both historical analogies and personal experiences to help him frame problems. One time he referenced developing a doctrine on Latin America in terms of the U.S. fighting the Battle of the Bulge. In other cases, particularly when he was frustrated by his advisors and implementers, he referred to the Eisenhower years. His ideas on governance in the region developed in part from a conversation he had with a
Puerto Rican governor after several drinks. Finally, he relied on relationships he had developed over the years to clarify his thinking, particularly those with Nelson
Rockefeller and Galo Plaza, the Secretary General of the Organization of American
States (OAS).
The development of Latin America policy also had multiple inputs from outside the government. The clearest example of this came from Nelson Rockefeller, at the time the governor of New York, who embarked on a grand tour of the region. His subsequent report served as the basis for Nixon’s plan of action for the region and his one major policy address devoted to the topic. Nelson’s brother, David, was also influential in highlighting the concerns of the business community and advocating for the nomination of Charles Meyer to be Nixon’s U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
Affairs. Finally, executives from companies such as the mining corporation Anaconda,
23 “SRG meeting on Latin America (NSSM 108 and Military Presence Study),” July 17, 1971, folder: NSSM-108, Box: H-178, National Security Council Institutional Files (NSCI), Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum(RNPL), Yorba Linda, California. 9 which had interests in the copper resources of Chile, were a minor part of the policy process.
International organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and OAS also had a vote. The OAS had the decisive role in ending the Soccer War of 1969 with the support and coordination of the United States. The increasing influence of Latin American countries and other smaller countries of the “third world” were variables in the complex policy making arena. As an example, one of the reasons Mexico received a State visit in
1972 was because of their support in the UN on a resolution pertaining to Nixon’s opening of China. Another example involved the Panama Canal negotiation where the
Panamanian leadership managed to make the status of the canal an international issue.24
Nixon also relied on and listened to foreign partners and allies more often than scholars generally give him credit for. During his presidency, Nixon developed an interest in leftist influences within the Catholic Church, sparked by a conversation he had with Colombia’s president. In a meeting with Nicaragua’s dictator, Nixon rewarded a longtime U.S. ally with a small concession on textile trade. Nixon happily listened to and sometimes acted on the advice of the smaller powers, but it was the larger hemispheric power brokers that grabbed Nixon’s attention.
Mexico’s role in cold war international history is generally understudied by scholars.25 From the beginning Mexico influenced Nixon’s Latin America doctrine in a variety of ways. After an initial dispute over the drug interdiction campaign, “Operation
24 Tom Long, Latin America Confronts the United States: Asymmetry and Influence, 2017, 74–88. 25For an exception see Renata Keller, Mexico’s Cold War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 10 Intercept,” good bilateral relations gave Nixon the confidence to try to convince Mexico to advocate for U.S. interests. Mexico, although occasionally supporting U.S. initiatives, took a different approach but still came out with some significant concessions from the
United States, including a resolution to a long running dispute over clean water.
The case of Brazil, unlike Mexico, has received some scholarly attention. One area where historians generally agree is that Nixon and Kissinger cared a great deal about
Brazil.26 Brazil, for most of Nixon’s presidency, remained the strongest partner in the region and the clearest example of the Nixon Doctrine on Latin America in action.
Whether it was maintaining the economic embargo against Cuba, potentially “rigging” elections in Uruguay, supporting the preferred dictator in Bolivia, or acting as a partner in setting the conditions for Allende’s ouster, Brazil was a clear friend to Nixon. This friendship came at a price. Harsh crackdowns against what the government considered subversive elements, including in some cases summary executions, sullied the legacy of close cooperation.
The various inputs into the decision-making cycle eventually translated to results.
These results, or levers of influence, varied over time and space. At times, Nixon attempted to use economic power, either threatening to withhold or actually withholding funding for a country. This economic coercion had a very specific limit because Nixon pushed very hard to protect military funds. Nixon had yet to meet a Latin American military he did not like. At times, the executive branch also used diplomatic power by
26 Brands, Latin America’s Cold War, 157; Rabe, The Killing Zone, 120; Matias Spektor, Kissinger e o Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2009). 11 trying to form alliances with the larger states of Brazil and Mexico so the smaller states would then fall in line. Most infamously of all, the executive used covert authorities to try to implement governmental changes. The most explored case was the overthrow of
Allende in Chile, but covert actions were also used in Bolivia and possibly in Uruguay.27
Even with a robust policy making process and all the instruments of national power at his fingertips, Nixon’s multilateral hemispheric policy was a failure. Other than during his first year and last years in office, the assessments of his multilateral Latin
America initiatives were almost universally grim, coming from critics both within the
United States and within Latin America. While this project makes no attempt to apportion blame, examining the causes of failure helps illuminate the complexity of this particular policy action and all the actors involved. The irony of his lack of hemispheric results in
Latin America is that bilateral relations with individual countries in the hemisphere were overall very positive. Across the governmental spectrum, from democracies to military dictatorships (more dictatorships than democracies), Nixon’s team handled individual issues competently. It was only on issues connecting the inter-American system, such as trade, that Nixon struggled.
COMPLEXITY AND FAILURE
As an example of the varied nature of failed programs, one of Nixon’s potentially historic ideas included the completion of the Pan-American highway across the Darien Gap between Panama and Colombia. Nixon’s plan was to be the first person to drive from
27 Uruguay is the one country still pending review in the authoritative Foreign Relations of the United States histories. 12 Central to South America on the newly completed road. After gaining the support of both countries, the project faced a setback because of the risk of transmitting a bovine disease found in Colombia but not in Panama. The newly formed Environmental Protection Agency, an agency Nixon signed into law, eventually scuttled U.S. participation in the project. 28 This was but one of many initiatives that never came to fruition. An examination of the principle actors, Nixon and Kissinger, points to the president as the obvious failure point. One could always make the argument that he should have spent more time and resources on the region, or taken a completely different approach, perhaps one more focused on building democracies. Although these statements are certainly accurate, they gloss over other issues at play. For instance, until he became Secretary of State, Kissinger had minimal interest in the region or people unless it touched on great power diplomacy. Nixon was far more nuanced, even if he was friendly with dictators and cautious about the potential for democracy in the region. Additionally, Nixon attempted to push multiple ideas that died within the executive branch. Two ideas seriously entertained included a visit to Latin America, probably Brazil, as an official state visit, and a visit to the region for a hemispheric heads-of-state conference. Nixon brought up both ideas on more than one occasion. Outside of two short trips to Mexico, Nixon never visited Latin America as president, preferring instead to send his wife, Pat, as his representative.29 While Nixon could have pushed both ideas harder, his subordinates wanted him to focus on other priorities. Kissinger, in his meetings with Nixon, also consistently steered him away from the region. While Nixon could have overcome this
28 Eric Rutkow, The Longest Line on the Map: The United States, the Pan-American Highway, and the Quest to Link the Americas (Simon and Schuster, 2019). This project does not sufficiently flesh out this case study. Future revisions may provide more details 29 The role of Pat in hemispheric diplomacy could make a fascinating article 13 inertia if he felt it was important enough, a president has only so much time and energy to shape the ever-expanding U.S. government.
Even in the age of the “imperial presidency” Congress still had power.30 A legislative body scarred by Vietnam and facing budgetary pressures was in no mood to fund Latin America initiatives. Additionally, a large block of protectionists in Congress fought against Nixon’s signature policy priority of generalized tariff preferences for Latin America. These Congressmen were influenced by domestic manufacturing businesses that did not want additional competition from abroad. Senator Frank Church, who later published multiple reports on the uses and abuses of covert action, also acted as a thorn in the side of the administration. Church acted as the conscience of the U.S. by holding multiple hearings on torture and military governments and was instrumental in reducing aid to the region. Church’s view of Latin America could best be described as isolationist. He advocated for a low-key response to expropriation and a reduction in foreign aid. The lack of Congressional support was the clearest reason Nixon’s policies failed, particularly some of the bolder options presented in the Rockefeller Report. International constraints, such as trade agreements, also limited Nixon’s options. In one of the biggest global economic crises of his presidency, Nixon initiated a ten percent global surcharge aimed primarily at Europe and Japan. Even though Latin America had nothing to do with the crisis, it still suffered due to global rules that did not appear to allow Nixon much flexibility other than lifting tariffs across the board, which he eventually did. Finally, the individual countries of the region were not powerless pawns on the global chess board. On an individual basis most countries did fairly well in resolving disputes. The fatal problems developed when Nixon’s government tried to devise a plan
30For the role of Congress in foreign policy see Robert David Johnson, Congress and the Cold War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Arthur M Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 2004). 14 for what a unified inter-American system should look like. Each country had different governments, economies, and visions for the future. Most of the countries had different perceptions of successful hemispheric unity. When the disparate parties could come together on an issue, as they did in 1969 and 1974, the administration began to make progress. When they did not, as was often the case, it became difficult to divine what a successful, historic policy could look like. A final influence was the Catholic Church in Latin America. The international actors in Colombia, Brazil, and Mexico viewed the leftward turn of the church, its Liberation Theology, with caution, if not outright hostility. Only Nixon, within the U.S. bureaucracy, appeared concerned with the move. By listening to his Latin American counterparts on this issue, Nixon foresaw the dangers this split within the church could have on U.S. foreign policy31 and ordered a CIA investigation into the communist subversion within the church.32 Although Nixon had an opportunity to improve multilateral U.S.-Latin American relations, he ultimately failed. After the initial efforts to focus on the region, other foreign policy priorities, such as Vietnam and China, overwhelmed the administration. Domestic budgetary pressures slashed foreign aid spending and forced the establishment of trade restrictions not only for Latin America but also for other regions. Even when focused on the region, such as the state visit of Brazil’s military dictator Emílio Garrastazu Médici in December of 1971, Nixon suffered domestic and international criticism for working with military dictatorships. Times had changed since FDR had worked closely with despots in his implementation of the Good Neighbor approach. For all the hard work and effort spent
31See Theresa Keeley, “Reagan’s Real Catholics vs. Tip O’Neill’s Maryknoll Nuns: Gender, Intra-Catholic Conflict, and the Contras,” Diplomatic History 40, no. 3 (June 1, 2016): 530–58. 32 The Study was NSSM 68. Declassification review from the request I submitted in 2014 still pending. 15 on creating a new Latin American policy early in the administration and the strong bilateral links forged over time, Nixon’s doctrine on Latin America is best viewed as a case study in the inherent limits and constraints of foreign relations and presidential power.
16 Chapter 1: Tangled Web: In Search of a Hemispheric Policy
“We seek an open world—open to ideas, open to the exchange of goods and people, a world in which no people great or small, will live in angry isolation.”33
Nixon
A NEW BEGINNING
On January 20, 1969, when he became the 37th president of the United States
Richard M. Nixon recited the Oath of Office on two family bibles held open to Isaiah 2:4,
“nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war anymore.”34
Nixon wished to portray himself symbolically as a peacemaker because he hoped to wind down an increasingly unpopular war in Vietnam. In his sweeping inaugural address, he communicated a grand vision to “make the world safe for mankind;” however, at no point in his address did he mention any individual country or region. The Latin American diplomatic community took note of his silence. They believed every inaugural address since Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) contained a reference to hemispheric relations, and they worried about what the silence meant.35 However, FDR’s first inaugural address also failed
33 “January 20, 1969: First Inaugural Address | Miller Center,” accessed March 9, 2019, https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/january-20-1969-first-inaugural-address. 34Full verse: “And he shall judge among the nations, and shall rebuke many people: and they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruninghooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war anymore.” 35 Richard J. Walter, Peru and the United States, 1960-1975: How Their Ambassadors Managed Foreign Relations in a Turbulent Era (University Park: Penn State University Press, 2010), 170. This dissertation uses the terms Latin America, Western Hemisphere, and Central and South America mostly interchangeably to refer to Spanish and Portuguese speaking countries in the Western Hemisphere. Occasionally Western Hemisphere includes Canada and or English-speaking Caribbean Islands. 17 to reference Latin America specifically. FDR was purposely vague in his one line on foreign policy, dedicating “this nation to the policy of the good neighbor.” It was only later in his administration that hemispheric policy co-opted the term “good neighbor.”36 Nixon would in many ways follow the lead of FDR when it came to the hemisphere, but due to changing historical circumstances, he was never able to implement a unified strategy at the same level of FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy.37
Although some diplomats feared that Latin American concerns would not be a priority under the new president, Nixon came into office with ideas and plans for his neighbors to the south. While the failure to mention hemispheric relations in his inaugural speech raised concerns among some, the administration’s next step should have somewhat ameliorated their worries. The day after the inauguration, Nixon held his first official meeting with a foreign dignitary, the head of the Organization of American States (OAS)
Secretary General Galo Plaza, who had served in Washington as Ecuador’s ambassador during WW2 and later as president of Ecuador. In an extensive conversation, the two leaders touched on social, political, and economic issues in the region.38 During the conversation, the secretary general made an interesting recommendation. When Nixon asked what his next move for Latin America should be, Galo Plaza’s responded succinctly,
36 George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776, 1st edition (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2011), 497. 37For Alliance for Progress see Jeffrey Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin America, New Ed edition (New York: Routledge, 2007); For Good Neighbor see Fredrick B. Pike, FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy: Sixty Years of Generally Gentle Chaos (University of Texas Press, 2013). 38 Welles, Benjamin, “President Talks With O.A.S. Chief: Galo Plaza Is Nixon’s First Official Foreign Visitor,” New York Times, January 22, 1969. 18 “Send Nelson Rockefeller there…his name is magic.”39 Nixon agreed and that same day called Rockefeller, who at the time was serving as governor of New York. Rockefeller, after a brief period of reflection, accepted the president’s request to lead a fact-finding mission to Latin America and the Caribbean. Rockefeller had campaigned against Nixon for the Republican nomination, but at the president’s call he was willing to serve. It would take several months of planning and logistical coordination before Rockefeller commenced his mission in May 1969, and several more months for him to file his report at the end of
August.
Percolating in the background, massive societal changes set the tone for Nixon’s presidency, and more specifically his Latin American policy. The large-scale student protests in 1968 had repercussions in all aspects of foreign policy, including relations within the hemisphere.40 Even more impactful would be the newfound focus of the Catholic
Church on issues of social justice. Militant priests and Marxist “contamination” of Catholic doctrines would take on a prominent role in influencing Nixon’s thinking when dealing with the United States’ Spanish and Portuguese speaking neighbors.
While he did not enter office with a plan to implement sweeping reforms to hemispheric policy, circumstances and seemingly routine personnel and policy decisions dictated the tone of his administration’s approach. For example, newly appointed National
Security Advisor (NSA) Henry Kissinger, who did not have much expertise or interest in
39 Joseph Persico, Imperial Rockefeller: a Biography of Nelson Rockefeller, 1st edition (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982), 100. 40 Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Detente (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press, 2005); Victoria Langland, Speaking of Flowers: Student Movements and the Making and Remembering of 1968 in Military Brazil, 2013. 19 the region, ordered a top to bottom review of hemispheric policy in National Security Study
Memoranda (NSSM) 15 before Rockefeller departed on his mission. Additionally, within three months of his inauguration, Nixon nominated Charles A. Meyer, a Sears executive with limited government experience, to the position of Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs. Meyer was an ineffective Assistant Secretary who never earned
Nixon’s respect. At about the same time, the administration prepared for the official state visit of democratically elected Colombian president Carlos Lleras Restrepo, one of the strongest U.S. allies in South America. However, before any of these actions could take place, Nixon inherited an expropriation crisis in Peru, complete with a statutory ticking time bomb, which forced him to engage with the region sooner than he would have liked.
OIL AND OLIGARCHS: EXPROPRIATION CRISIS IN PERU
On October 3, 1968, three months before the inauguration, the Peruvian military launched a predawn raid forcing the President of Peru, Fernando Belaunde, to flee. Aside from a short statement issued in the name of the three-armed services, the coup was a remarkably quiet affair. The leader of the military junta, Major General Juan Velasco, purposely kept a low profile in the first few days of the coup, offering no speeches, news conferences, or public statements.41 Velasco would soon break his silence as he outlined a new nationalist government policy that began with the seizure of an oil field and refinery complex owned by International Petroleum Company (IPC), a subsidiary of U.S.-based
41 “Peru’s Silent Leader Juan Velasco Alvarado,” New York Times, October 7, 1968. 20 Standard Oil of New Jersey. In announcing the seizure, Velasco proclaimed, “the revolution is on the march,” emphasizing the nationalistic overtones behind the confiscation. Peru, however, could not seize the property of a U.S. corporation without expecting some sort of reaction from forces within the United States. While Lyndon B.
Johnson began negotiations with the Velasco regime during the lame duck period of his presidency, the resolution of the crisis fell to Nixon.
Within ten days of Nixon’s inauguration, the State Department briefed National
Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and Nixon on the situation. A favorable resolution was doubtful due to constraints imposed by the Hickenlooper Amendment.42 The Hickenlooper
Amendment, passed in 1962 in response to the rise of Castro in Cuba, mandated the suspension of all U.S. foreign aid to countries that expropriated U.S. property without just compensation. The sponsor of the amendment, Senator Bourke Hickenlooper, stated the bill would serve as “preventive medicine” to discourage other leaders from expropriating
U.S. property without compensation.43 The amendment in practice failed as a deterrent because it did not provide the government with much needed flexibility.
In early February, the president ordered a review of US-Peruvian relations. The review specifically focused on the short-term policy options for the IPC expropriation issue
42 “Briefing Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State for the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),” Washington, January 28, 1969, FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969- 76ve10/d576. 43 Quoted in Johnson, Congress and the Cold War, 93. 21 over the next three months.44 In addition to initiating the review, Nixon, who in the future would rarely converse directly with his ambassadors to Latin American, met with his ambassador John Jones, Chief of Mission in Peru. During the meeting, while also discussing an ongoing fishery crisis with Peru, Nixon and Jones ruminated over the possibility of sending a presidential emissary to jumpstart negotiations in the IPC case.45
While Nixon seemed open to the idea, Secretary of State William Rogers wanted to wait because he had received intelligence that another coup might be in the works in Peru.46 The result of the Peru study and other intergovernmental processes and conversations led to a consensus favoring a “soft-line” approach to Peru.
The next month, the initial policy recommendations from the NSC came to Nixon.
The study outlined two major policy options, a “hard-line” and the “soft-line” approach.
The former would suspend all foreign aid to Peru in April, invoking the Hickenlooper
Amendment. The NSC, however, recommended taking the “soft-line” approach, noting the myriad ways that using the hammer of the Hickenlooper Amendment could backfire. The regional implications of a hardline approach were forefront. “The harder the line, the more the resentments and uneasiness that will be engendered in the rest of the hemisphere; the more difficult it will also be to isolate Peru in terms of hemisphere sympathies and
44 “National Security Study Memorandum 18," Washington, February 7, 1969, FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d578. 45 “Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon," Washington, February 14, 1969, FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at , https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d579. 46 TELCON, [Peru], February 14, 1969. 22 support.”47 The task force overall supported a cautious approach.
The CIA issued a concurrent report as part of the process backing many of the NSC recommendations. According to the CIA analysis, if the U.S. imposed sanctions, then the crisis would be “a major one—perhaps disastrous for Peru and for US-Peruvian relations.”
This situation might cause a “revolutionary situation” and greater instability. Sanctions would also negatively affect the regional context, likely leading to an “acrimonious” reaction and making other regional actors try “harder to broaden their foreign economic and cultural relations as a protection against dependence upon the US.”48 The NSC and the
CIA were in full agreement of the need to take a cautious approach.
After mediation by the Organization of American States decreased tensions between the two countries, Nixon appointed a special emissary, John Irwin.49 While he had some experience in government, serving as Assistant Secretary for Defense for
International Security Affairs from 1957-1961, his primary expertise resided in the private sector.50 While Irwin may not have had much governmental expertise, his appointment was another sign that Nixon was making a serious effort to resolve the expropriation issue without resorting to sanctions. Additionally, appointing a special negotiator, with authority
47 “Study Prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Inter-American Affairs, Washington, March 25, 1969,” FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d585. 48 “Report; Peru and the U.S.: the Implications of the IPC Controversy.” March 6,1969, Box: 795, Folder: Peru 1 APR-Vol II IPC Hickenlooper Amendment, National Security Council(NSC), RNPL, Yorba Linda, California. 49 “U.S. Names Envoy For Talks In Peru: John N. Irwin 2nd to Discuss Oil and Fishing Disputes,” New York Times, March 12, 1969. 50 “Memo, Meeting with United States Ambassador to France, John N. Irwin II, 16 January 1974,” Box: 65, Vice Presidential Papers, Gerald R. Ford Library. Irwin was a partner in the prominent New York Law Firm Patterson, Belknap & Webb 23 outside the normal governmental structure, demonstrated Nixon’s willingness to circumvent governmental bureaucracy when the need suited him.
Irwin made no substantial progress on compensation and recommended that the
United States defer sanctions to allow more time for negotiations to work. Nixon could not follow Kissinger’s advice of “sawing it[Peru] off and floating it in the Pacific;”51 rather, he would be forced to make a decision concerning sanctions quickly because the six-month window on the Hickenlooper Amendment would close within a few days. In justifying his decision, Nixon ultimately listened to the advice of Kissinger and the rest of the executive branch to defer sanctions by invoking an administrative “fig leaf” and stating that Peru was making progress on negotiations.52 Nixon, however, was quick to point out that he did not wish to see the deferral as a capitulation and wanted to see real pressure placed on Peru. In
Nixon’s own words:
Have in mind the purpose is not to negotiate, but purpose is to fight. Line up the troops and go after them every which way we can. Maybe it will take three months. If we could think of it in terms of a fight -- Irwin will have to know that.53
The deferral was, at least in Nixon’s view, not a failure, but a tactical pause.
One of the reasons Nixon chose to continue negotiating, despite his martial rhetoric, was because IPC was far from an ideal test case for the application of tough U.S. sanctions.
51 TELCON, [International Petroleum Company Preferences], April 5, 1969. 52 “National Security Decision Memorandum 11," Washington, April 11, 1969, FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d593. 53 “Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon in Key Biscayne, Florida and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)" Washington, April 5, 1969, FRUS, 1969- 1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d589. 24 IPC’s claim to oil rights in Peru stemmed from an instance of “gun boat” diplomacy by the
British in 1922. In 1924, Standard Oil of New Jersey acquired the company from the
British. One U.S. government official even acknowledged that the IPC land title was
“considerably clouded,” and the company had acted in an “intransigent manner in order not to jeopardize its positions in other countries.”54 Kissinger himself had great doubts about the company, calling IPC a “lousy company.”55
Although the executive branch near-universally supported the deferral, there were other critics. The loudest was the retired senator Bourke Hickenlooper. In a press account,
Hickenlooper insisted the president had no choice but to implement sanctions, stating, “It’s mandatory—and we wrote it that way.” He noted that while the United States had only invoked the amendment once, he felt that it served as an effective deterrent.56 The unstated assumption was that not invoking it in the case of Peru would encourage other countries to expropriate private U.S. property without compensation. Another senior government official also noted that there might have been “an element of brinksmanship in this whole situation.” The anonymous official then stated, “if so we blinked.”57 The criticism, however, was a minority view as several other officials supported Nixon’s decision. One senior congressional staffer, in speaking with Peruvian military attaché in Washington, DC,
54 Flanigan Peru Nixon Archive Memorandum, untitled for Dr. Kissinger, February 10, 1970, folder Flanigan, Peters, Box 814, NSC, RNPL, Yorba Linda, California. 55 TELCON, [Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon in Key Biscayne, Florida and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)], April 5, 1969. 56 “Hickenlooper Insists U.S. Halt Assistance to Peru,” New York Times, April 5, 1969. 57 “U.S. Withdraws Threat To Halt Its Aid For Peru: Rogers Discloses Extension Of Sanctions Deadline In Bid For Latins’ Goodwill Hope On Vietnam Seen In First News Conference, Secretary Finds Possibility Of Starting Troop Pullout U.S. Eases Threat On Aid For Peru,” New York Times, April 8, 1969. 25 noted that the Hickenlooper Amendment only required “appropriate steps” to avoid sanctions. While not offering specifics, he was sure that “there were a wide range” of policy options Peru could take “that would in no way infringe upon Peru’s sovereignty.”58
Additionally IPC also supported the administration’s decision, still hoping to settle with
Peru.59 The loud voice of Hickenlooper notwithstanding, Nixon had some breathing room in his search for a solution.
Certain members of Congress also played a role in the crisis, particularly Senator
Frank Church, chairman of the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, who was the most visible legislator on Latin American affairs. In the case of Peru, several of his statements friendly to the Peruvian government position made the headlines in the Peruvian press.60 Church went so far as to praise Nixon for not invoking the amendment in the case of Peru, and he offered to sponsor legislation to repeal the Hickenlooper amendment. He ultimately never introduced legislation, at least partly because he failed to receive encouragement from the State Department.61 While generally agreeing with Nixon’s handing of the Peruvian crisis, Church would later be one of Nixon’s most vocal critics.
Ultimately, the U.S. government increased pressure on Peru after the April deadline had passed, but in a subtle way favoring the “soft-line” approach. The initial pressure took the form of an integrated diplomatic effort. Kissinger thought that the initial impact of these
58 Boise State University, Albertsons Library, Special Collections and Archives, Frank Church Papers, MSS 56, Latin America- Peru, Memorandum of Conversation, February 7,1969. 59TELCON, [International Petroleum Company Preferences], April 5, 1969. 60 Boise State University, Albertsons Library, Special Collections and Archives, Frank Church Papers, MSS 56, Latin America- Peru, Howard Handleman letter, February 12, 1970. 61 Boise State University, Albertsons Library, Special Collections and Archives, Frank Church Papers, MSS 56, Latin America- Peru, Response to Clifford E. Landers, July 16, 1969. 26 actions would be “limited,” but over a longer time span less foreign investment, along with the threat of the deferred Hickenlooper provisions, would cause “great economic pressure on Peru.”62 The “soft-line” approach yielded no breakthrough, but it bought the administration much needed time to continue negotiations. It also demonstrated how Nixon was willing to be flexible with his approach to the region, and would not necessarily take the side of U.S. corporations over foreign partners.
BUREAUCRATS AND BUSINESSMEN
During the first few months of the Peruvian crisis, most of Nixon’s official Latin
American advisors were “hold overs” who had worked previously for Johnson. Many of his critics saw a failure to quickly replace officials in key positions early in the administration, such as the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, as emblematic of Nixon’s lack of concern for Latin America.63 The contemporary critics, however, were too harsh in their scorn for everything Nixon and Latin America. Nixon’s slow pace in appointing a leader for the Inter-American Affairs desk was in part due to a lack of consensus concerning who Nixon should pick. Additionally, in the first few months after his inauguration, Nixon was personally involved in the Peruvian expropriation crisis.
Also, Nixon, as part of his revamping of the NSC, had launched an in-depth review of Latin
62 “Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon," Washington, April 17, 1969, FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d595. 63 “Latin Americans disappointed with Nixon-policy priorities: No special attention seen Press reaction,” The Christian Science Monitor, Jan 25, 1969. 27 American policy.64 Results were not always visible, but the machinery of the bureaucracy moved steadily forward in developing a regional plan.
A representative from the Catholic Bishop’s Conference in early February passed along a recommendation through Special Assistant to the President Daniel P. Moynihan.65
The conference’s recommendation was for the respected statesmen George Lodge to become the chief Inter-American diplomat. Moynihan passed the recommendation to
Secretary of State Rogers since he felt the Bishop’s Conference was “deeply involved” in
Latin American affairs. In his extended commentary Moynihan stated that the conference was “continually surprised at the radicalism of some of their episcopal brethren.”66 Nixon would soon pick someone not named Lodge to be the chief hemispheric diplomat.
The nominee, Charles A. Meyer, served as a Sears Roebuck executive with some experience in Latin America. Meyer came from a distinguished background, graduating from Harvard in 1939.67 A native of Boston, he received high marks from his hometown newspaper touting his “impeccable credentials for a tough job.”68 Other newspapers were equally favorable to the appointment. One senior State Department official told the press
64 “National Security Study Memorandum 15," Washington, February 3, 1969, FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d1. 65 later become a Senator from New York 66 “Untitled Memorandum for Honorable William P. Rogers,” February 6, 1969, Folder CO 1-9 South America Beginning—9/11/69WHCF [Gen] CO1-7 2/1/70-2/28/70 through [EX] CO 1-9 12/1/69, Box:7, RNPL, Yorba Linda, California. 67 Official press release regarding the nomination of Charles Meyer as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and U.S. Coordinator for the Alliance for Progress. Also included is a profile of Meyer. Memo. Department of State. Issue Date: March 24, 1969. Date Declassified: December 18, 2002. Complete. 2 page(s). Reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System. Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale, 2015. 68 “Latin American challenge.” Boston Globe, March 12, 1969. 28 the administration chose him, “because we wanted someone who knew Latin America, who spoke Spanish, and who had broad administrative experience.” Finally, one Latin
American ambassador, while hedging that he was unknown, described him as a “first-rate appointment.”69
While a senior State Department official suggested Meyer was the choice of the
State Department, it is more likely that the idea to nominate Meyer came from within the
White House. The business tycoon David Rockefeller had personally lobbied on behalf of
Meyer at an event in November 1968. David Rockefeller felt that Nixon “could not possibly find anyone better able to represent the interests of the United States in Latin
America” offering his full support going forward.70 In hindsight Meyer’s business experience and dated understanding of contemporary Latin American issues created more liabilities than assets.
Meyer entered his confirmation hearing having resigned most of his private board positions including his membership on the board of the United Fruit Company made infamous due to its alleged role in the 1954 coup against the Guatemalan state.71 For the most part, his confirmation hearing was a polite affair. The one slightly confrontational moment came under the questioning of Church. Church who remarked, “there have been 7
69“New Diplomat Linking the Americas: Charles Appleton Meyer,” New York Times, March 11, 1969. 70 In a letter to President Richard M. Nixon, Council for Latin America (CLA) Chairman David Rockefeller praises the president for his appointment of Charles Meyer as Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America. CLA is an organization made up of leading U.S. businesses which invest in Latin America. Letter. Issue Date: April 9, 1969. Date Declassified: August 23, 2005. Complete. 2 page(s). Reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System. Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale, 2015 71 Literature on United Fruit is vast. A good place to start is Paul J. Dosal, Doing Business with the Dictators: A Political History of United Fruit in Guatemala, 1899-1944 (Wilmington, Del.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1995). 29 assistant secretaries for Latin America in the last 10 years,” questioning his ability to stay for the long haul. Church also took his moment on the stump to wonder aloud about the efficacy of the U.S. government’s chief aid program for Latin America, the Alliance for
Progress.72 The senator from Idaho noted that at the beginning of the program in 1961,
“180 million Latin Americans were living under some kind of legitimate government.”
Since then, “140 million…have lost that status and are now living under military regimes.”
Church’s point was that U.S. policy of generous military aid toward Latin America during
Kennedy and Johnson had only been effective in promoting military dictatorships. Church ended his questioning exhorting Meyer to take the opportunity a change of administration provided “to make significant policy changes.”73
While some of Meyer’s weaknesses would not manifest until later, some of his more glaring problems became obvious during his confirmation hearing. His liability as a businessman came again up during questioning with one of the Senators quoting a
Colombian Op-ed wondering about the advisability of appointing a businessman to the highest Latin America diplomatic post in the U.S. government. Additionally, his lack of recent experience with the region shone through during questioning. Besides having to
“plead ignorance” multiple times during his confirmation hearing, Meyer admitted it had been “9 years since” he had “been actively exposed” to the region.74 In the nine years since his “exposure,” the region had changed dramatically due to a rise in military governments
72 For more on the Alliance for Progress see Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy. 73 Nomination of Charles A. Meyer To Be Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, United States Senate, 91st Cong. March 25, 1969. 74 Ibid. 30 and demographic pressures. The dramatic governmental and demographic changes caused problems for the administration’s hemispheric policy, problems which Meyer would not be able to effectively manage. In a conversation with Soviet diplomat Vladimir
Chernyshev, a fellow specialist of Latin America, Pat Holt, the chief Latin American affairs expert on Fulbright’s Senate Foreign Relations Committee, admitted to not knowing anything about Meyer. Chernyshev remarked that he had to look up Meyer’s experience in
Who’s Who and wondered why “the Nixon administration seemed to have a bent for appointing people to foreign affairs posts with no experience in foreign affairs.”75
Paradoxically, the person Meyer replaced as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs was imminently more experienced.
Career Foreign Service Officer Viron Vaky served as the interim Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs at the beginning of the term. Over time he had developed a reputation as an intellectual straight shooter. For example, in a series of memos from when he served in Guatemala, Vaky urged a cautious U.S. policy when it came to supporting the government’s fight against Communist rebels. He rightly feared that without understanding domestic “political ramifications” of U.S. policy “we might unwittingly contribute to instability rather than help when we extend AID.”76 In one particularly strong memo, which he wrote immediately after leaving Guatemala, Vaky condemned the current U.S. policy toward Latin America which he defined as “murder,
75 Memorandum for File; Mar. 7, 1969; folder Chronological File 1969 January-March; Box 4; Pat Holt Papers; Herbert Hoover Presidential Library and Museum, West Branch, Iowa. 76Kate Doyle and Carlos Osorio, “‘U.S. POLICY IN GUATEMALA, 1966-1996’ National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 11,” accessed February 27, 2016, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB11/docs/. 31 torture and mutilation are alright if our side is doing it and the victims are Communists.”
What made his memorandum particularly effective was that he not only criticized, but also offered concrete suggestions for how to approach U.S. policy.77 While blunt language like
Vaky’s could end a government bureaucrat’s career, in Vaky’s case he received a promotion.
Kissinger, while looking to fill his staff on the NSC, decided that Vaky with his reputation as someone who would speak truth to power would be a good fit. However, before Vaky could join Kissinger fulltime, he served as the interim chief of the Inter-
American affairs desk until Meyer took over. Kissinger often spoke highly of Vaky’s efforts, calling them “terrific.” Additionally, Kissinger promised, “to give him the authority which he should have had as Under Secretary.”78 Vaky’s influence and intelligence helped drive Latin American policy for the first two years of the administration while he served on the NSC.
LOBBYING FROM ABROAD
While the Nixon administration attempted to develop its Latin American policy, several countries in the region shared their interests and concerns. One of these countries,
Argentina, was experiencing a rocky relationship with the United States. In June of 1966 a military coup elevated General Juan Carlos Onganía as the head of the Argentine government. The United States, at first, broke off diplomatic relations, but shortly after the
77 Ibid. 78 TELCON, [Meeting with Viron Vaky], July 8, 1969. 32 coup, in July, recognized the new military government.79 While relations between
Argentina and the United States under Johnson were cordial, some members of the
Argentine government saw the new administration as a chance to reset the bilateral relationship.
The Argentine ambassador, Mario Grondona, was particularly hopeful that U.S.-
Argentine relations would improve under the new administration. Grondona appeared to be quite optimistic that the United States and Argentina could work together. He noted that both countries shared a “surprise coincidence of views” on several issues. For example, both countries saw the Organization of American States (OAS) as inefficient and in need of reform.80 Besides new areas of cooperation, the Argentine ambassador was also optimistic about the tone that Nixon was setting in his first few months in office.
This new tone revolved around Nixon and Kissinger’s realist view of the world.
Grondona felt that that Nixon’s administration was “much more pragmatic” than the previous regime and was, “inclined to accept and deal with the world as it is.” Grondona seemed particularly enamored with Kissinger who he felt particularly “pronounced” this shift in U.S. policy.81 Grondona advanced the interest of a military government that had received a cool response from Johnson. A foreign policy forged along realist lines could open space for limited cooperation along shared interests such as trade. The ambassador
79 William Michael Schmidli, the Fate of Freedom Elsewhere: Human Rights and U.S. Cold War Policy toward Argentina (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), 39-43. 80 National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) II, RG 59, A1-5763, Box 13, Folder: Argentina, “Political-Security Talks with Argentina,” February 19,1969. The ambassador did qualify that both countries wanted the same thing, but for different reasons. In this case Argentina wanted to maintain its historic trade relations with Europe rather than trying to integrate into a hemispheric market. 81 Ibid. 33 also was content with Nixon prioritizing the “Middle East, Viet-Nam and relations with
Europe” stating that Nixon would then get an “opportunity to study U.S.-Latin American relations carefully in a calm and unhurried atmosphere.”82 Argentina’s low-key approach was not the only tactic Latin American countries used in engaging the nascent administration.
Brazil, also led by a military leader, decided to take a more proactive approach to engagement with the United States.83 While Argentina was more concerned with improving bi-lateral relations, Brazil took the lead in creating the framework for a more unified Latin American response. In an early February closed door meeting of the OAS called in response to “President Nixon’s initiative,” the members of the OAS provided
“Latin American views.” Brazil suggested a follow-up meeting held in Latin America to hash out differences among the OAS countries (excluding the United States). The purpose of the meeting would be to prevent the United States from presenting any future hemispheric policy as “fait accompli.” Several countries including Argentina, Bolivia, and
Mexico were hesitant to support the meeting because of the potential for “confrontation” with United States. Other countries such as the Dominican Republic and Chile were favorable with the latter offering to host the meeting.84 The meeting ultimately went forward.
82 Ibid. 83 For a good primer on U.S.-Brazilian relations before Nixon see “Introdução” in Matias Spektor, Kissinger e o Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2009). 84 NARA II, RG 59, A1-5763, Box 13, folder Brazil, “Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger, Brazilian Proposal for Presenting Latin American Economic Views,” February 7,1969. 34 Vaky, as he often did, provided sound analysis of the proposed meeting, finding several potential problems with the proposal, but also some potential advantages to U.S. interests. He began by cautioning Kissinger that the meeting could force “confrontation,” when the preferred position would be “dialogue.” However, the meeting could have some
“substantive” benefits if the countries took the opportunity to “hash out” a common understanding. Vaky then came up with an interesting “dumbbell” analogy to explain how the hemispheric relationship could be shaped. Rather than being lopsided in favor of the
United States, the “dumbbell” implied a more balanced but interconnected relationship.85
Vaky’s reasoned analysis proved fruitful later as Nixon incorporated some of the ideas into future initiatives concerning Latin American.
Lastly, the leader of Chile, President Eduardo Frei, attempted to share his views with the administration through a letter he sent to Nelson Rockefeller on 12 March, 1969.
While Rockefeller recommended sharing Frei’s assessment with the president, Kissinger thought better of it due to the president’s “sensitivities” regarding the Chilean leader.86
Frei’s analysis revealed a thoughtful leader who viewed “each day” with “greater concern.”
He appeared to be particularly worried that Johnson had muddled Latin American policy and unless the administration telegraphed a “clearly enunciated political intent” confusing policy would continue. He did not blame the United States solely, since the countries of
Latin America were “disunited;” however, he worried about a “continent [that] grows in
85 Ibid. 86 For a summary of Nixon’s sensitivities see Seymour M. Hersh, The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House (New York: Summit Books, 1983). 261-262 35 population, in poverty, and tensions.”87 Frei’s views were quite pessimistic since he appeared to be hoping for a quick, coherent policy response by the United States that was not forthcoming.
The variety of views expressed by leaders and officials across three different Latin
American countries demonstrated the complexity Nixon would face in articulating a clear hemispheric policy while balancing competing interests.
GLOBE TROTTING ROCKEFELLER
To understand Nixon’s attempt to formulate a hemispheric policy, one must understand Rockefeller’s long history with the southern continent, as well as Rockefeller’s history with Nixon. His formative experiences in the region came in 1935 with a trip to the oil fields of Venezuela. During his trip as a young man in his twenties, one aid later recounted his fascination with the “raw vitality and wild beauty” of the country and region.88 The self-imposed segregation of North American workers, few of whom spoke
Spanish, also unnerved him. Rockefeller, after a two-week crash course in Spanish before his trip, at least attempted to engage with the local population in their native language.89
He continued to improve his Spanish over time, eventually gaining more than basic fluency. Deeply involved in both business and philanthropic work in the region, his experience would lead to his extraordinary appointment to a post within the U.S.
87 “Memorandum to Dr. Kissinger,” April 7,1969, Folder CO 1-9 South America Beginning—9/11/69, Box: 7 WHCF [Gen] CO1-7 2/1/70-2/28/70 through [EX[ CO 1-9 12/1/69; RNPL, Yorba Linda, California 88 Persico, Imperial Rockefeller, 102. 89 Richard Norton Smith, On His Own Terms: A Life of Nelson Rockefeller, 2014, 125. 36 government by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt during World War II.90 Rockefeller would prove himself well suited to government work.
One of Rockefeller’s biographers recounted how his first position under Roosevelt introduced him to the intricacies of government work. Rockefeller made mistakes, but he
“learned more from his mistakes than his successes.”91 During his time in government,
Rockefeller developed an admiration for FDR that was second only to his grandfather.
Coincidently, coming in third was his admiration for General George C. Marshall.92 The position Roosevelt appointed him to was the newly created position of Coordinator of Inter-
American Affairs (CIAA), which increased his prominence among Latin American government officials. Essentially, his job was to counter the effects of Nazi propaganda in the Western Hemisphere. He sponsored a variety of programs including loan guarantees to
Walt Disney in order to create a South American themed cartoon to highlight American culture.93
His position as an outsider led to a certain amount of tension with the State
Department, which he regularly circumvented in planning his initiatives.94 For example, the CIAA launched one particularly disastrous advertising campaign where, among other mistakes, the agency sponsored Spanish language advertisements in Brazil. The CIA planned this campaign without coordinating with the State Department. Undersecretary of
90 For more on this period of his life see Darlene Rivas, Missionary Capitalist Nelson Rockefeller in Venezuela (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2002). 91 Smith, On His Own Terms, 144. 92 Smith, 145. 93For more see J. B. Kaufman, South of the Border with Disney: Walt Disney and the Good Neighbor Program, 1941-1948 (New York: Disney Editions, 2009). 94 Smith, On His Own Terms, 140–45. 37 State, Sumner Welles, received word of the botched campaign and briefed FDR. Roosevelt issued a rebuke to Rockefeller urging him to play nice with the State Department because in a “showdown between your office and the [State] Department” he would side with the
State Department.95
Although there was bad blood between Rockefeller and the State Department, he still accepted an appointment to become FDR’s Assistant Secretary of State for Latin
American Affairs in December of 1944 after a successful tour as CIAA. As an Assistant
Secretary, the Eurocentric bureaucracy continued to stifle him because they were suspicious of his Latin American concerns. Rockefeller fought hard to treat Latin America as a distinct region, shepherding the passage of the Act of Chapultepec, an informal defense agreement later formalized as the Rio Pact. In one of his last acts as Assistant Secretary,
Rockefeller attended the UN conference at San Francisco. During the conference, he lobbied for Latin American demands to recognize the Act of Chapultepec and remove the
Security Council veto. Later realizing he had gone too far in supporting the Latin delegation, Rockefeller, who submitted a customary letter of resignation after FDR’s death, soon found himself without a job.96
Active in Republican politics after his tour of duty in the FDR administration,
Nelson Rockefeller and Nixon crossed paths several times as competitors, most prominently in the 1968 contest for the Republican presidential nomination. While
Rockefeller faded early in the process, he outlined a comprehensive position on improving
95 Smith, 153. 96 Smith, 165–88. 38 relations with Latin America.97 Nixon, after winning the Republican nomination, did briefly mention Latin American relations on the campaign trail. During one speech, he called for a “sweeping reevaluation” of the Alliance for Progress, the largest U.S. aid program in history to Latin America. Nixon recognized the declining nature of hemispheric policy when he drew a clear contrast between himself and President Lyndon B. Johnson accusing Johnson of being unable or unwilling to “give our neighbors the priority status and effective aid which they deserve.” The thrust of his overall message was that “trade instead of aid” should be the guiding principal in formulating hemispheric policy.”98 While
Rockefeller may have lost the nomination, he would have an opportunity to bring his experience on Latin American matters to bear in the Nixon administration.
Before Rockefeller heard the news of his appointment to an official presidential mission for Nixon, he received word from his advisor on international affairs Berent Friela that Galo Plaza had recommended his name to Nixon to head the trip since the United
States had conducted “too many studies and investigations” without results.99 Rockefeller quickly accepted Nixon’s request and communicated with Plaza several times over the subsequent week.
Rockefeller later used his experience and contacts built under FDR and Truman over two decades in an attempt to reorient U.S. policy. Although Nixon originally
97 Press Release on Latin American Policy, July 2, 1968, Folder 101, Box 12, James Cannon, RG15, Nelson A. Rockefeller Gubernatorial, Rockefeller Archive Center. 98 Semple, Robert B. Jr., “Nixon Urges Help for Latin Nations: Asks Major ‘Re-Evaluation’ of Alliance for Progress Nixon Urges Help for Latin Nations,” New York Times, October 15, 1968. 99 Memorandum from Berent Friela to Governor Nelson Rockefeller, January 22, 1969, Folder 101, Box 12, James Cannon, RG15, Nelson A. Rockefeller Gubernatorial, Rockefeller Archive Center 39 envisioned a small-scale trip to a half a dozen countries or so, Governor Rockefeller planned to visit most countries in Central and South America and several Caribbean islands. Meyer, opposed the scale of the trip, arguing for a “low profile” approach and advised Rockefeller to avoid a “dog and pony show.”100 Meyer’s boss, Secretary of State
William Rogers, also desired a limited trip, advising the governor to “keep it small.”101
However, the governor ultimately convinced Nixon to support a larger scale visit with limited interference from the State Department and hired several experts to accompany him on his trip. All told, Rockefeller spent around $750,000 of his own money, consumed countless hours of his time, and staked his reputation on the success of the trip and subsequent report.102
Official goodwill and fact-finding trips to Latin America from the United States were nothing new. Rockefeller, in his governmental position under Roosevelt, sponsored several goodwill tours, while President Dwight Eisenhower sent his brother Milton twice to the region to write a series of reports. Eisenhower also sent Vice President Nixon in
1955 and 1958 and visited Latin America himself in 1960 after the announcement of a trade pact between Cuba and the Soviet Union. Both President Kennedy and President
Johnson also toured the region to gain publicity for the Alliance for Progress aid program.103 In many respects Rockefeller’s trip was similar to other official delegations
100 Peter Relyea Bales, “Nelson Rockefeller and His Quest for Inter-American Unity” (Ph.D., State University of New York at Stony Brook, 1992), 457. 101 Persico, Imperial Rockefeller, 100. 102 Persico, 107. 103 Ernesto Capello, “Latin America Encounters Nelson Rockefeller,” in Human Rights and Transnational Solidarity in Cold War Latin America (Madison, Wis.: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2013), 51–56. 40 sent by the United States, but what made Rockefeller’s trip different was the scale since he intended to visit twenty-three different countries.
Nixon and Kissinger originally wanted Rockefeller to begin his listening and fact- finding tour in February, fitting subsequent trips into his schedule as he saw fit.
Rockefeller, however, could not begin the tour as quickly as the administration hoped since he was facing budgetary issues back in New York.104 As planning for the presidential mission continued, Rockefeller periodically communicated with Kissinger on logistical and substantive matters related to the trip. One conversation conveyed Nixon’s hope that
Rockefeller’s trip could “put his Latin American policy on a new basis.” The Governor responded, “he is going to listen and to report to the President.” Continuing, Rockefeller suggested, “if his mission results in suggestions that will be useful, fine—then the President can announce policy.” The conversation subsequently turned to the security situation in
Guatemala foreshadowing some of the issues Rockefeller would face on his trip.105 The president continued to take a personal interest in Rockefeller’s preparations, at one point requesting that Rockefeller meet with Archbishop Raimondi, the Apostolic delegate to the
United States, since the president felt that he brought a unique perspective on Latin
America.106
In three intensive preparatory conferences in April 1969, Rockefeller received candid, off the record advice from many of the top Latin American experts in think tanks,
104 TELCON, [untitled], January 21, 1969. 105 TELCON, [untitled], April 16, 1969. 106 Memo; Viron Vaky to Henry Kissinger; 16 July 1969; folder Governor Rockefeller, July 1972: Box 831; NSC: Name File; RNPL. 41 government, and business. These experts included Nelson’s own brother David, Bryce
Woods of the Social Science Research Council, New York Times reporter Juan de Onis, and Secretary of State William Rodgers.107 Each of the three meetings had a different purpose. The first meeting focused on political questions, the second meeting on military and security concerns, and the final meeting on economic issues.
The first leg of Rockefeller’s trip (May 11 to May 19, 1969) consisted of Mexico and Central America and began with little fanfare in Mexico. At his first stop he began his speech on the tarmac with the following statement saying he came, “not to bring advice, but rather to take advice” he would continue with “I bring no new program, no simple answers, no easy slogans.”108 Exuberant crowds greeted him and news media recorded
Rockefeller and his wife touring a hospital where children met them with a traditional dance routine.109 Certain countries in Central America proved to be less inviting. In
Guatemala he could not stay overnight and he hosted his meetings with the government officials outside the city for his safety. In Honduras, he faced a protest group made up predominantly of students. Instead of disengaging from the crowd, he waded in and engaged the students in a debate. A newspaper reporter later quoted him as saying, “See.
Nobody laid a hand on me. But somebody lifted my wallet.”110
107 Group on Latin America Roster, undated, Folder 97, Box 12, James Cannon, RG15, Nelson A. Rockefeller Gubernatorial, Rockefeller Archive Center 108 New York (State) and Governor (1959-1973 : Rockefeller), Public Papers of Nelson A. Rockefeller, Fifty-Third Governor of the State of New York, 1969 (Albany N.Y., 1973), 1685. 109 Capello, “Latin America Encounters Nelson Rockefeller,” 58. 110Quoted in Bales, “Nelson Rockefeller and His Quest for Inter-American Unity,” 457. 42 While Rockefeller survived his first leg, he did so with minimal support from the
U.S. government. Rockefeller had felt that he could handle much of the prep work himself.
The State Department and the NSC inserted themselves into the process beginning with the second leg (May 27 to June 3, 1969) of the mission, which faced problems even before it began.111 Peru canceled Rockefeller’s visit in protest of sanctions imposed by the United
States in retaliation for the impoundment of U.S. fishing vessels seized in disputed waters off the coast of Peru.112 The situation in Bogotá, Colombia, his first stop, did not improve the tone of his trip. Students violently protested his arrival in the capitol city, as protestors clashed with riot police. In response, Colombian security rerouted Rockefeller’s motorcade around the worst of the violence along a route that had more riot police than well- wishers.113 Protests continued in Ecuador and Bolivia with the Bolivian president meeting with Rockefeller at the airport due to the volatile situation.114 By this point, Venezuela had canceled its portion of the visit, citing security concerns and likely remembering the disastrous visit of then Vice President Richard Nixon in 1958, when angry protestors surround his motorcade. One reporter, who was on the scene the day Rockefeller was supposed to arrive, reported that the city was covered with posters reading “Rockefeller,
Venezuela Repudiates You” placed by a leftist Catholic youth group.115 At the halfway
111 Arnold “Arnie” Nachanoff telephonic interview by author, West Point, NY, April 11, 2016. 112 Peru claimed sovereignty over all waters within 200 nautical miles of its coast. The United States only recognized territorial claims out to 12 nautical miles. 113 “Governor Starts 2nd Leg Of Mission: In Bogota, Street Clashes Precede His Arrival,” New York Times, May 28, 1969. 114 Bales, “Nelson Rockefeller and His Quest for Inter-American Unity,” 458. 115 “Rockefeller’s Mission: Governor Hopeful Protests Will Focus U.S. Leaders’ Attention on Latin Issues,” New York Times, June 4, 1969. 43 mark of his mission, Rockefeller reportedly took the protests in stride saying that while he did “not want his mission to leave a trail of bloodshed” he would not mind “being a lightning rod for Latin-American protest if this will focus the attention of United States political leaders on inter-American problems.”116
The military dictatorship of Brazil marked the first stop of the third leg of the presidential mission (16 June-22 June). Brazil, unlike many of the previous stops, was calm since the Brazilian government had rounded up thousands of potential protestors, releasing them after the governor had left.117 The roundup, while harsh and dictatorial, demonstrated the importance Brazil placed on relations with the United States. In Uruguay, the last country he visited on this leg of the trip, the firebombing of a General Motors plant greeted him. Additionally, due to security concerns, he could not meet with officials inside the capitol but instead had to meet in the virtually deserted resort town of Punta del Este.
Rockefeller continued his upbeat assessment—at least in public—stating that this leg marked a “turning point” and asserting “A pattern of consultation has now been established which is providing the points of view, the information and counsel which the President was desirous of obtaining as a basis for formulation of U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere.”
Rockefeller’s final leg included several Caribbean countries. However, his stop to
Argentina proved quite eventful. According to one of Rockefeller’s aides, “Argentina proved the worst.”118 The governor arrived to the near simultaneous firebombing of
116 Ibid. 117 Capello, “Latin America Encounters Nelson Rockefeller,” 58. 118 Persico, Imperial Rockefeller, 103. 44 seventeen Minimax grocery stores co-owned by his family. Ten thousand troops patrolled the capitol Buenos Aires, and Rockefeller, under the cover of darkness, met with six leftist leaders without the Argentine government’s knowledge.119 The volatile situation in
Argentina, while related to the turbulence in other Latin American countries, was also inflamed by local events, specifically, the Cordobazo, an extended and violent workers’ strike in the city of Córdoba where violence had peeked the month before Rockefeller’s visit. When the trip ended he reflected, “this Presidential Mission has brought home to the
American people that all is not well in the Western Hemisphere and that there is urgent need for changes in our policies.”120
While Rockefeller’s mission was the most public aspect of Nixon’s Latin American initiatives, the administration pursued several other efforts to develop a coherent policy.
Among these additional efforts was a choreographed plan to bring leaders from the region to the United States so Nixon could speak with them in person. The first to call on Nixon was the president of Colombia.
A COLOMBIAN CONNECTION
The selection of who should be the first Latin American head of state to visit may have come down to a recommendation by David Rockefeller. Nelson’s brother felt that
President Carlos Lleras Restrepo of Colombia was “without a doubt the best Latin
119 Ibid. 120 New York (State) and Governor (1959-1973 : Rockefeller), Public Papers of Nelson A. Rockefeller, Fifty-Third Governor of the State of New York, 1969, 1731. 45 American President.”121 While Rockefeller’s recommendation certainly carried weight,
Colombia’s role as a longtime democratic ally also played a role. Once Nixon had made his decision to invite Lleras, the State Department and the NSC developed an extensive briefing book for Nixon in preparation for his visit. Their assessment of Lleras was very positive. He was supposedly “competent and knowledgeable” as well as a “good economist and a superb politician.”122 Nixon would soon get a chance to make his own assessment of the Colombian leader when they met in Washington.
The day before the meeting Nixon met with a contingent of Latin American diplomats. They came to formally present Nixon with the Consenso de Viña del Mar (the
Consensus of Viña del Mar). This document was the fruit of the special summit Brazil had requested back in February. Twenty-one countries attended the meeting, with the largest diplomatic contingent from Chile as the host.123 Gabriel Valdés, the foreign minister of
Chile, was the lead official with the responsibility of formally presenting the Consensus of
Viña del Mar to Nixon. Rather than letting the document speak for itself, Valdés launched into a diatribe attacking the current status quo between the United States and the hemisphere. According to Armando Uribe, who was a Chilean official present at the meeting, “Nixon was caught off guard” by the tone of the speech, but quickly “pulled himself together.” Nixon then responded by giving a short speech emphasizing the importance of examining the relationship “on the same level” and not with one “looking
121 TELCON, [Proposal for State Visit from Colombian President Pastrana], March 05, 1969. 122 “President Lleras of Colombia June 12-13,1969,” Folder: Colombia State Visit Briefing Book, Box 913, NSC, RNPL, Yorba Linda, California. 123 Presidential Daily Diary (PDD), June 11, 1969; RNPL, Yorba Linda, California. 46 down on the other and the other looking up.”124 It appeared that even though Valdés entered the meeting with a confrontational mindset, Nixon managed to maintain his composure.125
Kissinger, who was undoubtedly furious that Valdés would take a belligerent tone against his boss in the Cabinet Room of the White House asked to meet Valdés for a private lunch. According to Valdés’s recollection Kissinger stated “Mr. Minister you made a strange speech. You come here speaking of Latin America, but this is not important.
Nothing important can come from the South.” Valdés responded, “Mr. Kissinger you know nothing of the South.” To which Kissinger retorted “No, and I don’t care.”126 While Nixon presented at least a veneer of concern when speaking about Latin American affairs, this exchange appears to accurately sum up Kissinger’s views of the region.
On June 12, 1969, halfway through the first year of his administration, Nixon met with Lleras. If he was at all irritated from the previous meeting it was not apparent in the official transcript of the meeting. In the wide-ranging discussion, Nixon and Lleras addressed a variety of issues, including military purchases by Colombia, coffee trade, fisheries, and the Pan-American Highway. Toward the end of the meeting, the subject of radical trends in Latin America came up. Lleras identified two trends. The first was
Communism, which in his view “could always count on small groups of university students, workers, and peasants.” The second were a group of revolutionary priests and a
124 Armando Uribe, The Black Book of American intervention in Chile (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975). 30- 31. 125 Uribe in his analysis of Nixon’s “improvised” speech comes to a different conclusion stating the speech was “embarrassing” and “filled with undeclared loathing.” Uribe, The Black Book of American intervention in Chile, 33. 126 Quoted in Seymour M. Hersh, The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House (New York: Summit Books, 1983). 47 small number of unnamed bishops concerned with “economic imperialism.” In his view, the second trend could possibly become “more dangerous in the future” since the ideas of the revolutionary clergy, while “unsophisticated,” were “simple” and “easy to put across to the masses.”127 Nixon, after considering the views of the Colombian president, called for another meeting the next day.
During one of the meetings, Lleras demonstrated his skill as a politician by understanding Nixon’s need for flattery.128 The Colombian president told Nixon he used excerpts from a speech Nixon gave in South Dakota in his own communication with the
Colombian people. Lleras recommended that the “speech should be widely circulated” within the United States, but also “among leaders abroad.” Nixon concurred and thought perhaps a “leading educator” could send out the speech to world leaders. Nixon’s speech, ostensibly to dedicate the Karl E. Mundt Library at General Beadle State College in South
Dakota, was a reaction to the activism centered around universities. 129
At the next day’s meeting, Nixon addressed many of the issues brought up the day before. He was particularly interested in hearing Lleras expand upon the issues of the
Catholic Church in Latin America. In Lleras view, the involvement of priests and bishops in the university and labor movements had caused some clergy to become influenced by
127 “Memorandum of Meeting," Washington, June 12, 1969, FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969- 76ve10/d150. 128 “Memorandum from The President for Henry,” June 16,1969, Folder: Colombia State Visit Briefing Book; Box 913; NSC; RNPL, Yorba Linda, California. 129 Richard Nixon: "Address at the Dedication of the Karl E. Mundt Library at General Beadle State College, Madison, South Dakota.," June 3, 1969. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2080. 48 Marxism, or at least start using the same vocabulary. He continued that some of the priests had “actually practiced violence and joined guerrilla bands.” Lleras also commented that many of the foreign missionary groups such as the Maryknoller priests had taken a
“revolutionary line.” The Colombian president did not think this movement was a result of
Communist infiltration, but of a “convergence of discontent, slowness in reform and desire to improve things which led the churchmen to simplistic thinking and to sympathy with the simplistic scapegoats the extremists suggested.” Nixon ended the visit by asking him to write him personally providing further analysis as he saw fit. Nixon had become intrigued with the idea of radicals in the Catholic Church, and starting after the second meeting with
Lleras asked for more information on the issue of the Church in Latin America.
CATHOLICS AND COMMUNISTS
The first task of studying the potential of Communist subversion in the Catholic
Church fell to Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Charles Meyers.
Nixon asked Meyers to prepare an analysis focused on what it was that “appears to have caused parts of the Church to become radical.” Nixon also mentioned that he would like to see an analysis of the Church in Latin America in Nelson Rockefeller’s Report.130 These insinuations of Communist corruption in the Latin American Catholic Church stayed
130“Memorandum of Meeting, Washington," June 12, 1969, FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969- 76ve10/d150.; the editors of the Foreign Relations of the United States stated,” no record of Meyer’s analysis was found.” However, an October 1969 RAND report Latin American Institutional Development: The Changing Catholic Church was written under contract by the Department of State and may have been contracted based of Meyer’s tasking 49 lodged in Nixon’s thinking about Latin America. While many in his inner circle minimized the importance of the Catholic Church, Nixon repeatedly brought up the issue in the future.
About a month after the meeting with Lleras, Nixon sent his aide, Peter Flannigan, to Rome to begin the process of reestablishing relations with the Holy See, Pope Paul VI.131
Flannigan had a wide-ranging discussion covering the entire globe. When it came to Latin
America, the Pope stated he “deplored the reception of the Rockefeller Mission” and that he had personally “preached against revolution.” He promised Flannigan he would use his
“considerable powers of persuasion,” to bring about “a ‘harmonious’ relationship between
South American governments and the government of the United States.”132 The president had found a new ally.
Nixon had his first National Security Council meeting focused on Latin America on July 9 1969.133 The purpose of the meeting was to provide “preparation and backdrop” for the future Rockefeller report. The gathering appeared to provide a good launching point for discussion of Latin American policy options. Kissinger praised the work of his advisor calling Vaky “terrific” and his products “one of the best efforts we have had in the NSC.”
He promised to give him the “authority he should have had as [acting] Under Secretary.”134
131 Nixon would be the first president in 18 years to send a personal representative. It was not until Reagan that the United States established full diplomatic relations with the Vatican 132 “Memorandum for The President from Peter Flanigan,” July 9,1969, Folder: Vatican, Vol I thru May 1970; Box 732; NSC; RNPL, Yorba Linda, California 133“Memorandum for the President,” undated, Folder: NSC Meeting 7/9/68-Latin America, Box: H-023, NSC, RNPL, Yorba Linda, California. stamped THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN. 134 TELCON, [United States. Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Non- Classified, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation], July 08, 1969. 50 Vaky had proven himself to be a capable and thoughtful diplomat, and would be able to fill in the large gap in knowledge and interest Kissinger had toward the region.
During the meeting, Nixon once again vocalized his concerns about the Catholic
Church in Latin America. He would order more study of the issue of the Catholic Church in Latin America with the issuance of National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 68.
NSSM 68 tasked the CIA with reporting on the Church in Latin America, which included the following elements: “a country by country analysis of the church establishment, its role in society, the trends within it and the leading personalities. It should also include an analysis of the role and significance of foreign clergy and non-Catholic groups and missionaries.”135
Less than two weeks after the publication of NSSM 68, the CIA provided Nixon an initial study entitled “The Church and Change in Latin America.” According to a summary of the report provided to the president by Henry Kissinger, the change “from a staunch defender of the established order to an outspoken advocate and agent of social change has been a dramatic development.” The changes within the Church according to the report came from both the Vatican and pressures for change within Latin America. The changes within the Church were not monolithic, but varied from country to country. While the study did not generally anticipate any dramatic results in the next few years, a decade or more down the line, change could “produce greater instability,” more frequent “revolutionary situations,” and strengthened anti-Americanism in Latin America. Nixon acknowledged
135 “National Security Study Memorandum 68," Washington, July 12, 1969, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. E-10, Documents on American Republics, 1969–1972 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2009), http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d7. 51 Kissinger’s summary and wrote in the margins “K—get this info to [Pat] Buchanan for some column and think pieces.”136
The available summary of the CIA report in response to NSSM 68 echoed many of the same points as the initial study. According to the report, the Roman Catholic Church was a force for change in Latin America due to “the influence of foreign priests and modern
European Catholic thought, social doctrines enunciated by the Popes, and the leadership of individual clerics and laymen.” However, the progressive forces were in the minority and fighting against the interests of the entrenched conservative establishment. For that reason, dramatic reforms at first were unlikely, according to the CIA, but as the reformist elements became frustrated over the lack of progress, “the forces operating for social change may cause unrest and turmoil.” Foreign priests would be an important influence in the direction of the Church since they made up the majority in fourteen of the twenty-three countries studied in the report. Lastly, the report touched on Protestants in Latin America including the rise of Pentecostals, and the alignment of “ecumenically-minded” Protestants with
Roman Catholic reformers.137 The Rockefeller Report, published before the final CIA analysis, gave a more cursory but positive view of the Catholic Church in Latin America.
136 “Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington," July 22, 1969, FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d8. 137 “Intelligence Memorandum 2609/69, Washington, October 9, 1969,” FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d13. 52 MULTI-INPUT PROCESS
At the halfway mark of the administration’s first year, Nixon’s methodical and slow-paced review of Latin American policy was well underway. Rockefeller would soon finish his grand listening tour of the region, and the plan was for the NSC and other organs of the foreign policy establishment to gear up and set the course for the rest of the administration’s tenure. While subject to critique, particularly concerning the relatively slow pace of action and Kissinger’s dismissive comments to the Chilean foreign minister, the administration’s Latin American policy was coming together well. Particularly influential in the development of policy was the advice Nixon received from a wide variety of influential actors such as the Rockefeller brother’s, Plaza, Lleras, and others. The advice from both domestic and foreign actors led to new initiatives such as his focus on Marxist corruption in the Catholic Church. Nixon would even take under consideration the more controversial recommendations of the Consensus of Viña del Mar in his future policy address on the region. While other foreign policy problems undoubtedly overwhelmed Nixon, particularly the war in Vietnam, Latin America remained relatively calm and stable. This gave Nixon the freedom to take his time. Even the Peruvian crisis had a relatively limited effect, particularly as the administration kept finding ways to waive the requirements of the Hickenlooper Amendment. However, the relative period of calm would end abruptly in July. The first major hemispheric crisis was a particularly rare event, a shooting war between two sovereign nations in Latin America. Honduras and El Salvador came to blows after decades of land disputes and migratory pressures reached a tipping point after El Salvador’s victory in a World Cup qualifying match launching the so called “Soccer War.” For the first time, Nixon had an opportunity to demonstrate to the world how to deal with a war that began under his watch. 53 Chapter 2: Nixon’s Other War
“We have a war of our own now.”138
Henry Kissinger
WAR IN CENTRAL AMERICA
Nixon’s first major Latin American crisis involved the rare event of open warfare between two sovereign nations in the Western Hemisphere.139 The Soccer War140 of 1969 between Honduras and El Salvador may have only taken approximately a hundred hours, but the subsequent damage included several thousand dead—mostly civilians—tens of thousands more displaced, and large scale property damage.141 The death and destruction appeared to yield very little for either side except for a return to the status quo ante bellum, and serious damage to a promising free trade network that was not even a decade old, the
Central American Common Market.142 Why would Honduras and El Salvador enter into a war where neither side appeared able to gain a decisive advantage and how would the
United States, with its long history of intervening in the region, respond? 143
138 TELCON, “Kissinger to Meyer,” July 14, 1969. 139 For the general rarity on war between states in Latin America see Miguel Angel Centeno, Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002). 140 While the term Soccer War is contentious since the war was about much more than tensions surrounding World Cup qualifying matches, I will use it throughout since it is a commonly used term for the conflict. 141 Lower end estimates in the immediate aftermath were about five hundred (see us army south history V- 5) immediately after the war. The higher end estimate here cited in Thomas P Anderson, The War of the Dispossessed: Honduras and El Salvador, 1969 (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1981). War of the Dispossessed seems more accurate due to better research after the war 142 William H Durham, Scarcity and Survival in Central America: Ecological Origins of the Soccer War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992), 1. 143 Classic examples of U.S. intervention in the region are Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States: a history of U.S. policy toward Latin America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003) and Peter H. Smith, Talons of the Eagle: dynamics of US-Latin American relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 54 While the conflict rated only minimal presidential level attention in the United States, the Soccer War allowed Nixon and the U.S. government a chance to test a nascent Nixon Doctrine on Latin America and provided a short respite from other global problems, particularly Vietnam. While neither spoken nor codified at this point in his presidency, Nixon appeared to have a vision of a hemispheric relationship that relied on increased economic trade and the transfer of responsibility to other regional actors, while still keeping the nation globally engaged. This conflict gave him a chance to voice and test his vision.144 The fighting, which lasted less than four days, would not rate highly in terms of major global or even regional conflicts. However, the role of the United States as the main arms supplier to each belligerent makes the war a unique case study for U.S. foreign policy since it falls outside of the usual Cold War dynamic. While unclear Latin American policy and a rogue U.S. actor may have helped ignite the war, the United States as the dominant power in the region, supporting the multilateral institution of the Organization of American States (OAS), led to the quick resolution of hostilities. The foreign assistance programs supplied ammunition, arms, and aviation assets to both countries before the war and the U.S. government was able to quickly cut off the supply chain, bogging down the El Salvadoran offensive and preventing a more robust counter attack. The limited war aims of the belligerent El Salvadoran government, more concerned about demonstrating political legitimacy at home than achieving any sort of long-term concessions for Honduras, also prevented the conflict from spiraling into a
144 The current literature on the topic almost minimizes the role of the United States and sees the conflict strictly from the perspective of the two belligerents, or from a regional perspective looking at the role of the OAS see Thomas P. Anderson, The War of the Dispossessed: Honduras and El Salvador, 1969 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1981); William H. Durham, Scarcity and Survival in Central America: Ecological Origins of the Soccer War(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1979); Mary Jeanne Reid Martz, The Central American Soccer War: Historical Patterns and Internal Dynamics of OAS Settlement Procedures (Athens: Ohio University, Center for International Studies, 1978). 55 prolonged war. El Salvador was less concerned with holding territory or causing damage to Honduras than it was in strengthening its own weak authoritarian government.
LEAD UP TO WAR
Tensions between El Salvador and Honduras had been building long before the
1969 shooting war. The roots of the conflict went back to colonial-era disagreements over the proper boundaries between the two sovereign states. The unclear borders, as well as lack of state presence on the boundary, served as a breeding ground for incidents and lawlessness that periodically caused problems and raised tensions. As an example, on May
25, 1967, about a year before war broke out, the El Salvadoran military seized a rancher in disputed territory and took him prisoner accusing him of trespassing. The next month, the
Honduran military retaliated and captured over forty Salvadoran Soldiers who somehow wandered into Honduran territory, likely due to the unclear boundary.145 While the events of 1967 certainly did not make conflict inevitable, they sowed the seeds for future tensions.
In the first months of 1968, Mexico’s president Gustavo Díaz Ordaz made a personal appeal to Oswaldo López Arellano, the leader of Honduras, offering his assistance in mediating the ongoing disputes. Díaz Ordaz had recently spoken to the El Salvadoran leader, Colonel Fidel Sánchez Hernández, and felt that the time was ripe for negotiations.
Díaz Ordaz promised to intervene, but only if asked. He was clearly worried about the stability of Mexico’s back yard, framing the problem in the context of the Cold War as,
145 David L Rousseau, Democracy and War: Institutions, Norms, and the Evolution of International Conflict (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005), 168–73. 56 “the difficult hours the world now lives through.” Díaz Ordaz did not need any additional instability within his neighboring countries because he felt, “now, more than ever, we have the obligation to solve our own problems in order to present a solid front without any cracks to the outside and maintain a close solidarity in this continental region.”146 Díaz Ordaz likely had the 1965 U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic on his mind and did not want the United States interfering in a part of the world where his government had influence.
In addition to the colonial border dispute and the newer problem of detainees, El
Salvador and Honduras had one other major unresolved issue. El Salvador at the time was the most densely populated country in the Americas. An estimated three hundred thousand
El Salvadorans lived in Honduras as migrants, a country that had more space and opportunities for El Salvadoran citizens.147 While the status of the El Salvadoran nationals in Honduras would later become a major point of contention, the prisoner dilemma took center stage in 1967.
Toward the end of March, the leaders of the two countries, Sánchez and López, had met and come to an agreement about the basic problems between them. First was the issue with political prisoners including the rancher and the wandering soldiers, followed by border disputes and problems with migrants from El Salvador streaming into Honduras.
Ironically, both sides felt the prisoner problem would be the more difficult to solve in
146 Acervo Histórico Diplomático (AHD), III-5912-I, “Letter to Oswaldo López Arellano from Diaz Ordaz,” January 30, 1968. 147 Durham, Scarcity and Survival in Central America, 6. Note that Durham, like many scholars, argues that population pressures were the primary driver of the war. 57 comparison to other friction points such as the border or migrants since the prisoner dilemma dealt with, “judicial controversy and particularly due to the political situation both countries had wrapped themselves in.”148 It appeared that the mediators had accepted that the long-term problems of the border and migrants would continue to simmer, but the prisoner dilemma had the potential to be uniquely damaging. The Archbishop of Honduras and El Salvador also pressured both governments toward a mediated solution with a
“friendly country,” likely suggesting Mexico should act as a neutral arbiter.149 Mexico continued to exert subtle pressure, acting as a middle man to end the diplomatic crisis amicably.150 While tense, it appeared that at this point the problems between the two countries were solvable.
While Mexico had been engaged with the prisoner dispute from the beginning, a visit by U.S. president Lyndon B. Johnson to both countries served as the tipping point that led to a final resolution on the prisoners. In his final year as president, Johnson toured several Central American countries culminating in a meeting of the presidents of the
Central American Republics on July 8, 1968 in El Salvador. On the eve of the meeting, both sides announced a prisoner exchange. The Johnson administration quickly took credit for the diplomatic breakthrough, writing that the “trip prompted the two sides to work out a quick solution.”151 While Johnson’s visit provided an opportunity for a breakthrough, other actors in the region and negotiations between the two parties had already laid the
148 AHD;III-5912-I, “Letter Coded Telegraph 523,” Tegucigalpa, March 29, 1968. 149 AHD;III-5912-I,”Tegucigalpa, Telegram 534,” April 2, 1968/ 150 AHD;III-5912-I, “Letter to the President of El Salvador,” May 15, 1968/ 151 “Outline For The President’s Report To The Cabinet On His Recent Central American Trip,” Johnson Library, Cabinet Papers, July 10, 1968. 58 diplomatic groundwork. Amplifying the role of larger regional powers, such as Mexico and international institutions, would serve as one of the lynch pins of the future Nixon
Doctrine on Latin America.
Although for a time the results were positive and it appeared that the exchange of prisoners would help improve the bilateral relationship between El Salvador and Honduras, the issues of migration and the disputed border remained a festering sore and began to boil over in 1969. In April of that year, the Instituto Nacional Agrario (INA), the Honduran ministry of agriculture, ruled that all El Salvadoran farmers without legal status would be forcibly removed from their subsistence farms, even though many had occupied the same plot of land for years. By the beginning of June, the state, with little notice, had evicted about five hundred families from the farms they were working on.152 The repatriation efforts back to El Salvador took place with the support of the Honduran press, with particularly alarming headlines such as “SALVADOREANS CLEANSED FROM TEN
TOWNS IN YORO.”153 El Salvador was neither prepared nor equipped to reintegrate such a large number of its citizens back into an already overcrowded country. The dramatic press accounts provided El Salvador later a fig leaf of evidence in claiming that the Honduran government was sponsoring ethnic cleansing in the countryside.
In the midst of Honduras’s expulsion efforts, both countries met with New York
Governor Nelson Rockefeller who had begun his whirlwind hemispheric grand tour and fact-finding mission in May. Over a two-day period, between 13 and 14 May, Rockefeller
152 Anderson, The War of the Dispossessed, 92–94. 153 Ibid. 59 visited the leaders of both countries. In El Salvador, Sánchez briefly mentioned the problem of overpopulation and migration to Honduras, but focused most of the conversation on other topics. In the political realm, he was very much concerned about Communism, particularly the “arrangement” that he assessed the Christian Democratic Party had made with Communists. He also suggested he was in a weak political position because his political party was mired in debt with no way to pay it off.154 The conversation with López
Arellano in Honduras did not mention the issue of El Salvadoran migrants in Honduras and focused almost exclusively on economic development and the U.S.-owned fruit companies.155 Both leaders appeared to be rather candid with Rockefeller, so the minimal amount of discussion concerning the problems of El Salvadoran migrants in Honduras did not appear to be due to evasiveness by either side. The likely reason the subject did not come up was a belief that other bilateral issues had a greater sense of volatility since the problem of migration and the border had deep historical roots. It is also possible that the leaders did not believe the United States could be very helpful in resolving the situation, particularly since Mexico had already agreed to assist.
About a month after Rockefeller left Central America, the first of the three World
Cup qualifying matches served as a prelude and namesake of the “Soccer War.”156 The
154 RAC, RG III 4o, Box 121, Washington DC Files, “Conversations with Leaders of Twenty American Republics.” 155 RAC, RG III 4o, Box 121, Washington DC Files, “Conversations with Leaders of Twenty American Republics.” 156 Summaries of the events surrounding the games abound in the secondary literature. This summary will rely primarily upon a very good example of digital history, Lindsey Barrett, Colby Leachman, Claire Lockerby, Steven McMullen, Matthew Schorr, Yuriy Veytskin, “The Soccer War,” at Soccer Politics Pages, http://sites.duke.edu/wcwp (accessed on 30 December 2017). 60 countries played the first match on June 8, 1969, in the Honduran capital of Tegucigalpa where, “the El Salvadorian side were kept up all night by riotous fans outside their hotel.”157 After a hard-fought ninety-minute match, ending with a tied scored, Honduras managed to eke out a win in over time. The Honduran hooligans were far from gracious victors rioting in the stands, and carrying their drunken shenanigans into the streets.
The second match on June 15 in San Salvador upped the ante in terms of both pre and post-game confrontations. Irate fans immediately accosted the Honduran players in the airport the night before the match. General José Alberto Medrano, the leader of the
Salvadoran National Security Agency, led hardcore soccer fans down the streets of San
Salvador in order to interrupt the sleep of the Honduran players. The plan worked, since the Honduran embassy decided to relocate the national team in the middle of the night to a secret location, causing a fair bit of confusion among the team members. As a final bit of insult to the national Honduran pride, hooligans ripped up the Honduran flag forcing the national team to sing the pregame national anthems to a rag where their flag should have flown. In the face of adversity, the Honduran team failed to repeat their previous performance losing the second match. One of the Honduran players Enrique Cardona remembered stating, “We’re awfully lucky that we lost. Otherwise we wouldn’t be alive today.”158
In an effort to reduce tensions, organizing officials moved the final deciding match to Mexico City which would determine which of these two Central American countries
157 Ibid. 158 Ibid. 61 moved on to the World Cup. Before the deciding match, Sánchez Hernández invited the national team coach into his home. There, he told the coach that he “had to defend the national colors, because this match was for our national dignity.”159 In addition to salvaging the national dignity of El Salvador, winning the match could provide some much-needed diplomatic breathing room since El Salvador had decided to break off diplomatic relations with Honduras on June 26 due to a rise in tensions.160 A victory could potentially soften El
Salvador’s view toward their neighbor.
Between the second and the final tie breaker match, the OAS Subcommittee on
Human Rights launched an investigation into the actions surrounding the second game. El
Salvador, in fact, had requested a Human Rights investigation into the actions of Honduras on El Salvadoran citizens in Honduras several months prior, before the games had been played.161 The request from El Salvador for an investigation into Honduran actions specifically accused Honduras of genocide charging that the Honduran expulsion of El
Salvadorans from their country rose to the level of war crimes. American CIA analysts believed the El Salvadoran government had accused Honduras of genocide due to “political pressures within El Salvador” which stymied attempts to “ease tensions through quiet bilateral negotiations” between the two countries.162 The committee arrived in San
Salvador after the last match on July 4.
159 Ibid. 160 the CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), Weekly Summary, “Settlement of El Salvador Honduras Dispute Clouded.” Jul 3, 1969. 161 Anderson, The War of the Dispossessed, 96. 162 CREST, Central Intelligence Bulletin, “El Salvador-Honduras,” 27 Jun, 1969. 62 The day before the committee landed, another border incident added kindling to the smoldering fire between the two countries. A Honduran civilian airplane crossed into El
Salvadoran airspace and received a smattering of anti-aircraft fire. While some “hotheads” in the El Salvadoran military wanted to launch a “token military incursion,” it appeared that the imminent arrival of the OAS investigating committee caused cooler heads to prevail.163 The committee found blame on both sides. In the case of El Salvador, “during the second game in San Salvador there took place brutal aggressions against Hondurans who were attending the same, which led to serious cries and profound offenses…”164
Meanwhile, in Honduras, the committee found “a wave of aggression and violence against
Salvadorean residents… leading to brutal excesses and the commission of grave crimes.”165
The OAS body, finding both countries culpable, took a step back and allowed a Central
American team of mediators from Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Costa Rica to take the lead on mediating a solution to deescalate the crisis.
The negotiation team came up with an eight-point plan, which included the establishment of a six-mile buffer zone between the two states. Observers from the Central
American Defense Council would in the future embed with both sides, providing the stability to hold the entire agreement together. While both sides had objections to the plan,
El Salvador presented the strongest objections. The El Salvadoran Foreign Minister,
Francisco José Guerrero, found the plan “completely unacceptable,” since it would “lay
163 CREST, Central Intelligence Bulletin, “El Salvador-Honduras,” 5 Jul, 1969. 164 Quoted in Anderson, The War of the Dispossessed, 97. 165 Ibid. 63 blame equally on both countries.” Guerrero would further state that “the Sanchez government would not last 24 hours if the plan was accepted.”166 The attempts to find a mediated solution to the problems of the two parties had failed. The next step was war.
After the war, Sánchez Hernández claimed that the refugee situation had reached an intolerable point and he was hoping a quick strike would put pressure on the Honduran government to rethink the expulsion of El Salvadoran citizens from Honduras. Others, such as El Salvadoran General José Alberto Medrano, would later claim that the purpose of the war was to overthrow the Honduran government by seizing the Honduran capital
Tegucigalpa.167 Whatever the actual envisioned goal of the conflict, El Salvador launched an invasion, and it stands to reason that they would not have pursued armed conflict without some assurance that their plan was realistically feasible. While a surprise attack allowed the El Salvadoran military to catch the other side off guard, the El Salvadoran government felt that they had an even more powerful advantage on their side.
Rogue Colonel
Rumors of U.S. Government involvement in the war flew virtually simultaneously as the first bombs fell in Honduras. El Salvadoran Lieutenant Colonel Flores Amaya later claimed that American advisors were aware of the invasion plan, but many others appeared shocked at the insinuation.168 Well after the war, Jack R. Binns, later the Ambassador to
166 CREST, Central Intelligence Bulletin, “El Salvador-Honduras,” 8 Jul, 1969. 167 Anderson, The War of the Dispossessed, 111–12. 168 Ibid., 128. 64 Honduras from 1980-1981, offered up an account of the events surrounding the Soccer
War that suggested U.S. advisors played a decisive, if unsanctioned, role in planning the conflict.169 At the time of the conflict, Binns served as a Labor Officer in the U.S. Embassy in El Salvador. In an oral interview he conducted years later, Binns recounted a compelling story.
The Ambassador in El Salvador during his tour was Bill Bowdler. Binns recalled that Bowdler was an effective ambassador who worked well with his country team.170 As part of his duties, Bowdler encouraged the MilGroup, a detachment of defense department personnel tasked with training the host nation’s armed forces, to visit the armed forces and attempt to gain intelligence on their disposition and state of readiness for war. All the political contacts seemed to point to war and increasing tension, but the soldiers of the
MilGroup found nothing out of the ordinary in terms of mobilizations or training exercises.
The CIA was also unable to provide clarity to the situation since they “had not penetrated the military.”171 The failure to notice any sort of mobilization before the war could have been chalked up to good operational security on the part of the Salvadorans, or particularly poor work by the MilGroup—that is, until the U.S. Ambassador later discovered that certain members of the MilGroup had been holding back key information.
After the commencement of the war, the U.S. government, with little opposition from within the State Department or White House, quickly cut off military aid to El
169 Jack R. Binns, United States in Honduras, 1980-1981: an ambassador's memoir (Jefferson, NC: Mcfarland, 2014). 170 This section from oral history Jack R. Binns, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Arlington, VA, www.adst.org. 171 Ibid. 65 Salvador. U.S. law required this response since the military equipment was not used for self-defense or to stop the spread of Communism. The practical effect of these sanctions was the erosion of the Salvadoran military ability to make war since they received almost all their logistical support from the United States. A concrete example Binns mentioned was that “all Salvadoran planes were immediately grounded for lack of spare parts.”172
While he overstated the argument, since El Salvador launched some aerial attacks, the point still stood. Without logistical support, El Salvador did not have the industrial capacity for a long drawn out conventual campaign.
For reasons unknown at the time, the Salvadoran government appeared surprised by the quick suspension of aid and the forceful response from the United States. In response to the suspension of aid and after an angry meeting between Bowdler and the president of
El Salvador Fidel Sanchez Hernandez, the El Salvadoran government declared several members of the MilGroup persona-non-grata. In a break from protocol the MilGroup commander, an unnamed U.S. Army Colonel and West Point graduate, requested permission to make farewell calls to his El Salvadoran counterparts before he departed the country, a request that the ambassador granted.
The MilGroup commander attended his farewell calls with a Major from his command who acted as his translator and note taker for the Memorandum of Conversation
(MEMCOM). After drafting the MEMCOM, the commander did some heavy editing to the point of adding “in a lot of stuff that had not transpired.”173 The Major, presumably because
172 Ibid. 173 Ibid. 66 he did not want to be part of sending up a false report, brought his version of the MEMCOM and the edited version to the MILGroup Deputy Commander, a Lieutenant Colonel and also a West Point graduate. The Deputy could not believe how blatant his commander had been in changing the MEMCOM to hide what had actually happened during his farewell calls. In the original MEMCOM, for instance, was language blaming current tensions between El Salvador and the United States on Ambassador Bowdler.
The ambassador was shocked at the duplicity of the Army Colonel who had singlehandedly decided to take U.S. foreign policy into his own hands. The ambassador’s first reaction was laughter at the absurdity of the situation. He then gave the MIlGroup commander twenty-four hours to leave the country. The true nature of the commander’s relationship with the host government became clear at a subsequent event when the Chief of Staff of the Salvadoran military approached the ambassador and mentioned, “One thing about that war with Honduras that always confused us was your strong reaction when in fact you helped us plan the mobilization.”174 He then “proceeded to describe the activities of the American military officers, still puzzled why the Americans had helped to plan the invasion and then had cut off military assistance when it happened.”175 If Binns had more direct evidence of the unknown colonel helping launch the attack he did not share it in his interview. However, the very presence of a high-ranking American officer among the invasion planners must have implied a form of U.S. governmental support.176 The El
174 Ibid. 175 Ibid. 176 With only one oral history, more research is required to verify the accuracy of Binn's account. 67 Salvadoran government would not launch their armed expedition solely because of one rogue U.S. Colonel, but the balance could have been tipped in favor of armed conflict if the El Salvadoran government really believed that they had a powerful ally on their side.
HUNDRED HOUR WAR
The initial El Salvadoran invasion appeared to take both Honduran and most U.S. government officials by surprise. The U.S. Embassy in San Salvador reported the day before the invasion, “no indications of GOES [Government of El Salvador] intention to launch invasion.” The report came from the U.S. Army Defense Attaché who had finished meeting with the El Salvadoran military Chief of Staff General Guzman Aguilar.177 Aguilar insisted that any buildup on the border was purely in the interest of “maintaining defensive posture.”178 Aguilar was either mistaken, or more likely lying, since El Salvador soon attacked.
177 The Defense Attaché would likely be a different officer than the MilGroup commander. 178 NARA II, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files 1967-1969, Box 2065; Folder Political AFF& REL EL SAL-HOND 7/12/69, Telegram, Subject: REF: State 115708, 14 Jul, 1969. 68 Illustration 1: El Salvadorian Air Strike on Honduras July 15, 1969
The El Salvadorian Airforce launch air raids inside Honduras on targets to include Toncontin International airport located in the Honduran capital of Tegucigalpa as well as Santa Rosa de Copan. The Salvadorian method of utilizing C-47s as bombers was largely ineffective. After the initial El Salvadoran air and ground attack, Honduran government officials reached out to the United States for aid. Around midnight on July 15, the Honduran Ambassador in the U.S., Ricardo Midence, called John Breen, the State Department’s director for Central America, asking for ammunition and supplies. The ambassador was unaware of the particular needs of his country’s armed forces, outside of ammunition, but was looking for equipment “by daylight.” Breen remarked to Midence that such a quick turnaround was “improbable” and recommended Midence contact the
OAS.179 While the OAS as the regional body had jurisdiction, the hemispheric superpower, the United States, had a long history of intervention in the region. While the OAS would
Tegucigalpa 179 NARA II, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files 1967-1969, Box: 2065, Folder: Political AFF& REL EL SAL-HOND 7/12/69, Outgoing Telegram, REF Breen-Wilkowski Telecon, Tegucigalpa 2571, 15 Jul, 1969. 69 eventually prove its worth in deescalating the conflict, the long history of U.S. involvement in the region was foremost in the minds of the actors.
Illustration 2: El Salvadorian Ground Invasion into Honduras July 16, 1969 1) Initial El Salvadorian attacks at Amatillo met stiff resistance. 2)El Salvadorian attacks were successful at both Aramecina and Caridad. El Salvadorian ground forces continue their advance in Eastern Honduras as far as Langue. 3)El Salvadorian forces attack the border town of El Poy to seize an airfield. They continue their penetration and occupy the towns of Nueve Ocoteque and Valladolid.
The initial days of the war were quite chaotic, particularly in the Honduran capital of Tegucigalpa. Panicked residents of the capital quickly overloaded commercial voice circuits, and the embassy resorted to using private amateur radios owned by U.S. citizens in order to maintain communications with Washington D.C. Eventually, the embassy was able to temporarily reestablish communications with the assistance of locally attached U.S. military officers, but then ran into bureaucratic issues when Southern Command denied
70 them authority to use their communication system because it had recently been decommissioned.180 Under these chaotic conditions Arellano reached out to Acting U.S. Ambassador Jean Wilkoski in Tegucigalpa to see if the United States would sell Honduras military weaponry. López Arellano was clearly concerned that his country was unprepared and underequipped to repel an El Salvadoran invasion.181 While the Honduran government may have been concerned about the lack of weaponry and ammunition, they were able to successfully counterattack on the morning of the 16th. The most successful offensive involved the bombing of an oil storage facility in the Port of Acajutla where several oil tanks caught fire because of the bombing. Due to a lack of trained personnel and supplies, the El Salvadoran government was not able to contain the fires, thereby leading to fuel shortages.182 On the first full night of the war, President Sanchez broke the blackout in San Salvador and spoke at 12:50 AM on July 15. He repeated the litany of supposed sins the Honduran government had committed against El Salvadoran citizens claiming that a “river of blood” was flowing in Honduras and that some El Salvadoran citizens were in “Concentration Camps.” He then declared that Honduran pilots had purposely attacked civilian locations. He closed the speech by suspending the constitution for thirty days and declaring that the “cause of El Salvador was just.” At the end of the speech, the city
180 NARA II, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files 1967-1969, Box: 2065, Folder: Political AFF& REL EL SAL-HOND 7/12/69, Telegram, Subject: Honduran Salvadoran Hostilities: Administrative Backup, Tegucigalpa, 15 Jul, 1969. 181 NARA II, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files 1967-1969, Box: 2065, Folder: Political AFF& REL EL SAL-HOND 7/12/69, Telegram, Subject: Honduran Salvadoran Hostilities, Tegucigalpa, 15 Jul, 1969. 182 NARA II RG 59 Central Foreign Policy Files 1967-1969 Box 2065 Folder Political AFF& REL EL SAL-HOND 7/12/69; Telegram, Subject: Damage to Petroleum Facilities, San Salvador, 15 Jul, 1969. 71 returned to darkness.183 Sanchez, evoking genocidal imagery, attempted to legitimize his act of aggression.
Illustration 3: Honduran Counter Attack Honduras conducted aerial counter attacks on the key logistical centers of Acajutla and Illopango. Those attacks severely disrupted El Salvadorian resupply efforts.
While the claims of war crimes committed by Honduras were certainly overblown, El Salvador had evidence concerning the mistreatment of migrants in Honduras. Press reports indicated that one city in Honduras had been finding and detaining El Salvadoran citizens.184 In a pamphlet published by the El Salvadoran government and delivered to foreign governments, one caption of a group of El Salvadorans coming back across the border in El Salvador read, “men, women and children arriving, victims of abuse due to
183 NARA II, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files 1967-1969, Box: 2065, Folder: Political AFF& REL EL SAL-HOND 7/12/69, Telegram, Subject: President Speech San Salvador, 15 Jul 1969. 184 CREST, Central Intelligence Bulletin, “El Salvador-Honduras,” 18 Jul, 1969. 72 the crime classified as genocide.”185 The migrants they depicted in the graphic account appeared hungry and tired, but probably not mistreated enough to rise to the level of genocide. The initial attacks across the border near the town of El Amatillo met stiff resistance. Forces north of Amatillo were more successful, as they were able to take over the small towns of Aramecina and Caridad in the southern part of Honduras. In addition to the thrust near Amatillo, Arameicina and Caridad, the El Salvadoran Army also invaded Honduras near El Poy in order to capture a Honduran airstrip. State Department reports indicated that General José Alberto Medrano, the commander of the National Guard, led the attack.186 The initial thrust managed to seize Honduran territory with troops occupying the town of Nueva Ocoteque, Valladolid, and penetrating as far as Langue.187 While the El Salvadoran ground attacks had been relatively successful with soldiers gaining ground within Honduras, the lack of air superiority and the surprise lack of U.S. support caused El Salvadoran officials to start looking for a way to end the incursion. About twenty-four hours after the initial air attack by El Salvador, certain military officials inside the presidential palace in San Salvador signaled to the U.S. ambassador that “national honor has been vindicated,” and they would welcome “strong OAS intervention through [the] Rio Treaty.”188 The Rio Treaty, formally known as the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, requires the signatories to come to the aid of any nation under attack, much like NATO in Europe. The implication of invoking the Rio Treaty was that
185 AHD, III-5912-I, “Graphic Testimony of the expulsion and acts of vandalism committed by Hondurans against humble peasants and other inhabitants of El Salvador,” Stamped received by Mexican Embassy 9 July, 1969. 186 NARA II, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files 1967-1969, Box: 2065, Folder Political AFF& REL EL SAL-HOND 7/12/69; Telegram, Subject: GOES estimate situation, 15 Jul, 1969. 187 CREST, Central Intelligence Bulletin, “El Salvador-Honduras,” 18 Jul, 1969. 188 The Rio Treaty of 1947 was a defense compact functioning much the same way that NATO works in Europe 73 the El Salvadoran government would be able to shift blame to the OAS.189 Additionally, notwithstanding the poor performance of the El Salvadoran Air Force, the ground troops had performed at an acceptable enough level to save face and maintain the national integrity of the El Salvadoran government.190 While it appeared that both sides would quickly support a cease fire once the OAS intervened, it would take several more weeks and increasing pressure for El Salvador to finally respect a cease fire and withdraw forces back to the pre-conflict border. The OAS ordered a ceasefire to take effect at midnight on July 18 that should have been followed by a withdrawal of El Salvadoran forces. While the ceasefire was effective, in the sense that no major fighting occurred, El Salvador refused to withdraw. Reports indicated that the OAS contingent on the ground was “outraged” at the perceived “backsliding of earlier promises of compliance.” Honduran government officials feared either one last offensive or the organization of a “fifth column” among the El Salvadoran migrant population within their territory.191 Neither event happened, and within two weeks El Salvadoran forces withdrew back to their home country with guarantees from the OAS concerning the safety of El Salvadorans within Honduras.192 A deadly and costly war was now over. Other than the obvious loss of life, the destabilization of the Central American Common Market (CACM) had short term economic consequences on the region.193 The OAS, however, effectively acted to mitigate the effects of the war and began the long-term process of developing a lasting peace. From the time El Salvador fired the first shot, the OAS was the face of the peace keeping effort,
189 NARA II, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files 1967-1969, Box: 2065, Folder: Political AFF& REL EL SAL-HOND 7/12/69, Telegram, Subject: Honduran Salvadoran Situation, 15 Jul, 1969. 190 CREST, Central Intelligence Bulletin, “El Salvador-Honduras,” 18 Jul, 1969. 191 CREST, Central Intelligence Bulletin, “El Salvador-Honduras,” 19 Jul, 1969. 192 CREST, Central Intelligence Bulletin, “El Salvador-Honduras,” 31 Jul, 1969. 193 CREST, Special Report, “Central America: Regional Integration after the fighting,” 8 Aug, 1969. 74 allowing the multinational organization the opportunity to quickly impose peace. This was not a foregone conclusion as the long history of the United States dominating the diplomatic sphere of the region suggested it could have taken a much more muscular role. However, the U.S. remained in the background, taking a back seat to the regional body.
NIXON THE PEACE MAKER
On July 8, in a brief aside from his chief aid on Latin American affairs, Vaky,
Kissinger became aware of tensions between the two Central American countries six days before open hostilities broke out.194 The next day he received a more detailed report that summarized how the tensions between the two countries had grown after the ill-fated soccer match led to riots and the eventual diplomatic break initiated by El Salvador. The
State Department’s first position deemed the conflict, “a Central American problem in the first instance and that the primary responsibility rests within the Central American family.”
Kissinger passed on this basic position to Nixon.195 However, later that same day after receiving additional intelligence, Kissinger warned the president that there existed “some danger of an eruption into armed conflict.” The odds of a violent ending to the troubles had increased due to “the pressure of some hawkish young officers.” Following the advice of
Kissinger, and the President of Colombia, Carlos Lleras, with whom Nixon had developed
194 TELCON, “Kissinger to Vaky,” July 14, 1969. 195“Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon,” Washington, July 9, 1969. FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d641. 75 a relationship, Nixon sent a telegram to both countries in an attempt to reduce tensions.196
While a telegram, a few days before the war, was not a particularly bold move, the gesture at least demonstrated that Nixon had a modicum of concern for the situation and was willing to listen to his Latin American allies.
When hostilities broke out on July 14, the principal U.S. actors made a few critical decisions within the span of a few hours. After briefing the president, the first phone call
Kissinger made on the subject was to Ron Ziegler, the White House press secretary.
Kissinger understood the importance of framing the U.S. message for public consumption.
The points Kissinger wanted to emphasize were that the United States was supporting the mediation efforts of the OAS by providing a plane to send an investigative committee, and was “on top” of the situation since the president had sent a telegram to each country about a week before. The message was clear. The United States would not be acting unilaterally, but as a partner of the OAS. Even if the conflict continued to intensify, the next step was not more U.S. involvement, but more pressure from “the larger states, Mexico, Colombia,
Brazil.”197 The United States’ purpose not only aimed at conflict resolution, but was also intended to build upon international perceptions of legitimacy for the multilateral OAS.
Nixon’s instincts appeared to be to follow his National Security Advisor in that he wanted to keep a fairly low profile, but he also wanted to “take a little credit,” if possible.198
He wanted Kissinger to call Nelson Rockefeller, who had recently returned from the first
196 “Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon,” Washington, July 9, 1969. FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d642. 197 TELCON, “Kissinger to Ziegler,” July 14, 1969. 198 TELCON, “Kissinger to Nixon,” July 14, 1969. 76 leg of his Latin American mission.199 His thought process was in line with Nixon’s sincere wish to be seen as a peacemaker, a word he used in his conversation with Kissinger and a theme that devolved from his inaugural address. In line with the message in his initial telegram, Nixon was not suggesting anything earth shattering, a simple telephone call to each country’s president, at most. Ultimately, however, Nixon never made a call, either not finding the time or not believing it would be useful.
The clearest expression of U.S. options and the situation came in the conversation between Kissinger and Rockefeller. Rockefeller had a long history with Latin America and was in the middle of his fact-finding mission that would eventually produce policy options for Nixon concerning the region. Rockefeller recommended leaving the OAS in the lead in order to show “restraint.” If the OAS could handle the situation, according to Rockefeller, that “would be a great thing.”200 Allowing the OAS to take charge highlighted the United
States’ sensitivity to the perceptions of unilateral actions.
Finally, the last person Kissinger engaged with was Meyer, Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs. He paraphrased the opening line he gave to Ziegler, the
Press Secretary: “at last we have a war of our own.” Meyer, who played an insignificant role in most policy decisions despite being the top U.S. diplomat for Latin America, was coordinating logistics for the OAS team. By this point, Kissinger had a clear idea of what the U.S. response should be. He wanted small concrete actions, such as providing the plane for the OAS team, but did not “want to get the President’s prestige involved.” Important
199 Ibid. 200 TELCON, “Kissinger to Rockefeller,” July 14, 1969. 77 actions like providing logistics for the lead OAS element would help to quickly end the so- called “Soccer War.”201
Kissinger, who rarely wanted to focus on Latin America, added that “we didn’t want to get into a position where we have to settle every war in [the] America(s).”202 While this war was but one example of the countless crises that a modern presidency had to deal with, Kissinger clearly wanted to focus on other priorities, in particular Vietnam. Meyer assured Kissinger that the war would blow over quickly since the El Salvadoran ambassador had told him this conflict would be “just a little shot here and a little shot there.”203
By the end of the night Nixon had become exasperated with the, “silly damn business.” His overall concern continued to be with messaging, trying to get some “credit” for his administration in the press. He was also concerned about possible Congressional reaction, since Congress might “raise up and say stop sending arms” not just to the belligerents, but to the rest of Latin America.204 His concern was not without merit; just the month before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs had held hostile hearings on the topic of U.S. military aid to Latin America.205 This was one of many examples where Nixon had to consider the role of a Congress controlled by the opposition party.
201 TELCON, “Kissinger to Meyer,” July 14, 1969. 202 Ibid. 203 Ibid. 204TELCON, “Kissinger to Nixon,” July 14, 1969. 205 Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs; Committee on Foreign Relations. Senate, U.S. Military Policies and Programs in Latin America, 91 Cong., 1st sess. 78 Over the course of the conflict, the U.S. governmental response was a stated policy of neutrality. Additionally, the White House also issued a stern warning to the Soviet Union to stay out of the conflict. In order to emphasize his balanced position after the opening salvo, Nixon had the Senate Republican Policy Committee (SRPC) serve as his unofficial
“ears.” The SRPC sent the most junior staffer they had, Donald Dekieffer, a part time law student, to each embassy where he had “strict orders to express no opinions.”206 In this way, Nixon was able to maintain some contact with each country’s team, without involving any official organs of the state.
While Nixon had ordered against taking sides, it would be up to the civil servants within government to implement his plan. One particularly engaging story involved the acting Ambassador to Honduras Jean Wilkoski, who took charge of the mission when the
State Department recalled Ambassador Joseph Jova back to the United States to take a new job.207 High ranking female diplomats such as Wilkoski were relatively rare in the 1969
State Department, and traditional gender stereotypes made her job as an ambassador in a war zone even more perilous. One rumor that sprouted up around the time of the conflict was that Jova, knowing the attack was coming, left the country and had the nerve to put a woman in charge.208 As the artillery flew, Wilkoski recounted that Honduran prime minister Ricardo Zuñiga shouted in a telephone conversation “planes flying overhead…
206 Edward F Finch and Inc Recorded Books, Beneath The Waves: The Life And Navy Of Capt. Edward L. Beach, Jr. (New York: Naval Institute Press, 2013), 154. 207 Ironically, Jova would still serve a role in the conflict since he attended several of the OAS meeting in Washington D.C see Anderson, The War of the Dispossessed, 122–23. 208 Jean M. Wilkowski, Abroad for Her Country: Tales of a Pioneer Woman Ambassador in the U.S. Foreign Service (University of Notre Dame Press, 2008), 218. 79 and you MUST help us!” While Nixon, for very valid reasons, had declared that the United
States was not taking sides, Wilkoski acknowledged she was “somewhat annoyed” since
“the only troops that had crossed the borders were the Salvadorans.” Still, she carried on and implemented the official policy of neutrality.209
Over the course of hostilities, Nixon received regular updates on the conduct of the war. Kissinger and his staff continued to manage most of the heavy lifting by supporting the OAS. The “silly damn business,” as Nixon had previously dubbed the conflict, quickly deteriorated with El Salvador gaining ground in Honduras. Knowing the trouble Honduras was in, the U.S. government response continued to be support of an OAS-sponsored cease fire, even as Vaky assessed that “direct pressure from the US may be necessary to get El
Salvador to implement the cease-fire.”210
One concrete way that the U.S. government supported the cease fire, and indirectly pressured El Salvador, was the discouragement of the shipment of military equipment to the region. As the main supplier of arms to both sides, as long as the United States did not provide equipment, both sides would quickly run out of ammunition and spare parts. The
State Department also did its part to ensure that no equipment slipped in from other countries, instructing all European posts to lobby their respective governments in an effort
209 Wilkowski, 219. Emphasis in original 210 “Memorandum from Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),” Washington, July 16, 1969. FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d645. 80 to prevent the sale of ammunition and equipment to both El Salvador and Honduras.211 The lack of military resupply and the continued pressure of the OAS eventually led to a sustainable cease fire and the return of El Salvadoran troops to the barracks.
AFTERMATH
The eventual settlement and withdrawal of El Salvadoran troops came about as a result of OAS mediation. The OAS placed a prominent Nicaraguan, Dr. Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa in charge of the newly formed peace commission. Dr. Sacasa, and other members of the commission, flew on a U.S.-provided DC 10 between the two Central American capitals, eventually getting both sides to agree to a cease fire on July 20, a Sunday. At that point observers from multiple countries, including the United States, took monitoring positions throughout the country in order to enforce the cease fire agreements.212 The cease fire did not, however, come with an immediate return of occupying forces to El Salvador. It was not until July 29, after the OAS had unanimously agreed to a far-ranging embargo on El Salvador that included petroleum and several key exports such as coffee and sugar, that a cease fire would finally hold.213 While the United States played a supporting role in terms of providing men and equipment to implement the decision of the OAS, the OAS was clearly in the lead in terms of developing and implementing a reduction in tensions.
A strong supporter of the OAS peace effort was the U.S. military. Much of the initial relief efforts came from supplies stockpiled in the Canal Zone by U.S. Army South (USARSO) transported on military aircraft. In addition, the observers flew to remote
211 “Telegram 120464” Washington, July 20, 1969. FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969- 76ve10/d648. 212 Anderson, The War of the Dispossessed, 123–24. 213 NARA II, RG 530, “Historical Summary United States Army Forces Southern Command 1 January-31 December 1969,” Records of U.S. Southern Command, 1966 – 1999. 81 outposts on six UH-1B helicopters courtesy of the USARSO. While the observers came from multiple nations, the U.S. military provided four lieutenant colonels to serve as advisors to the effort. Finally, USARSO provided much of the technical assistance including photography, forklift operators, and long-range high frequency communication equipment and operators. 214 While clearly instrumental in supporting the peace effort, even the USARSO command historian gives the majority of the credit to the OAS, noting that “with its success in ending the violence in Central America, the OAS can no longer be so easily dismissed as a hemispheric debating society.”215 Other than the military, U.S. diplomats also played a large role in supporting the OAS. In the immediate aftermath of the conflict, Honduras had rounded up fifty thousand Salvadoran civilians, holding the majority of them prisoner in major sport stadiums. Initial reports stated no purposeful abuse, but also indicated a great need for basic necessities such as food and water. The supplies soon arrived on an air force cargo plane, with the acting Ambassador Wilkoski ensuring some of the supplies made it to the fifty thousand interred
Salvadorans.216 Wilkoski, much like other lesser known State Department civil servants, was instrumental in assisting the OAS in ending the Soccer War and supporting the hemispheric body in the creation of a sustainable cease fire.217 One outstanding issue that Wilkoski identified were the claims and counter claims of genocide and mass atrocities that flew from both sides. El Salvador’s government worried about the fate of the three hundred thousand Salvadorans living in Honduras, while the Honduran government attempted to shine a spotlight on the devastation the advancing
214 Ibid. 215 Ibid. 216 Wilkowski, Abroad for Her Country, 222–25. She would additionally include the problem of detention in her report on Human Rights in the country calling it “perhaps the most flagrant human rights abuse during the war” 217 For examples of sexism see Wilkowski, 225–29. 82 armies caused in Honduras.218 In a published photographic chronical of the war with the inflammatory headline “aggression,” Honduras painted the invaders as subhuman savages. The most graphic account showed the remains of a church with a caption that stated, “in front of the sacred objects of god horrible orgies were committed culminating with the rape of girls and grown women.”219 While the evidence for the occupation of the church is clear, the Honduran government provided no further evidence for the case of misconduct among
El Salvadoran military forces.220 Sometime after the implementation of the OAS-sponsored cease fire, Rockefeller’s team analyzed the conflict for possible inclusion in the team’s final report to Nixon. Like several other contemporary and future accounts of the conflict, the team placed much of the blame on demographic pressures. Other than apportioning blame, the other major conclusion was that “the very existence of the Central American Common Market… will be in jeopardy.”221 The focus on the economic problems, particularly a potential failure of a comprehensive free trade agreement, meshed well with Nixon’s vision of a new inter- American relationship focused on “trade not aid.” The consequences of the conflict lasted for years, and the family members of the dead would never forget it, but what little interest the American public may have had quickly faded. While much of the public indifference was likely due to the nature of the war, which did not fall neatly in the good-versus-evil struggle of the Cold War, the larger reason was the astronomical event happening overhead. Days after the war started, and
218 NARA II, RG 530, Historical Summary United States Army Forces Southern Command 1 January-31 December 1969; Records of U.S. Southern Command, 1966 – 1999. 219 AHD; III-5912-I,” Agresión.” Sep., 1969. 220 To my knowledge no official charges of war crimes or genocide were ever filed in an international or domestic court. 221 RAC, RG III 4o, Box: 190, Folder: 1651, Nelson A. Rockefeller, Personal “Implications and consequences of the El-Salvadoran-Honduras Conflict.” 83 days after it ended, the whole world became entranced with the truly historical event of a man walking on the moon. One political cartoonist highlighted the absurdity of the moment by depicting someone asking Neil Armstrong as his rocket sat on the launchpad, “do you think El Salvador and Honduras can come to an agreement?”222 Additionally, the calculated effort to put an OAS face on the peacekeeping effort may have sabotaged Nixon’s hope to receive some “credit” for the end of the conflict. If the United States was not directly involved, then why should the American people care?
THE GUAM DOCTRINE
Ten days after the opening shots of the small Central American war, overshadowed by the Apollo lunar landing mission, Nixon was in Guam after seeing the successful landing of the astronauts in the Pacific. Here in an informal press conference Nixon unveiled what the press originally called the Guam, and later Nixon Doctrine.223 During his remarks he spoke of an “Asia for the Asians” with the United States able to “assist” but not “dictate.” He continued that the United States would “keep our treaty commitments,” but would expect the majority of defensive action to be “taken by, the Asian nations themselves.” While the majority of his pronouncement focused on Asia, he did generalize his statement to the rest of the Third World, including “Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the rest.” U.S. policy should be, he continued, to “reduce American involvement. One of assistance, yes, assistance in helping them solve their own problems, but not going in and just doing the job ourselves simply because that is the easier way to do it.”224 While historians debate the significance of the Nixon Doctrine, what the President offered in an
222 AHD; III-5912-I; “Impacto.” 20 Jul., 1969, 223 Jeffrey Kimball, “The Nixon Doctrine: A Saga of Misunderstanding,” PSQ Presidential Studies Quarterly 36, no. 1 (2006): 59–60. 224 Richard Nixon: "Informal Remarks in Guam With Newsmen," July 25, 1969. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2140. 84 unguarded moment after the excitement of seeing America’s astronauts return safely to earth appeared to be a genuine expression of what he believed, unvarnished by the national security apparatus that had not vetted his remarks.225 The new born Nixon Doctrine aligned closely with the policy Nixon followed ten days earlier when determining what the U.S. response should be to the Soccer War. Even though El Salvador was clearly the belligerent, by maintaining complete neutrality, much to the chagrin of Wilkoski, the Honduran country team, and the government of Honduras, Nixon was able to keep the United States from picking a side, and potentially obligating more resources and extending the war. Additionally, by supporting the negotiation efforts of the OAS, the United States honored its commitments to the hemispheric compact. Finally, by providing technical assistance including food aid and military transport, Nixon was still able to involve the United States, just not in the interventionist way that historically categorized U.S. entanglement in Latin American affairs. While the Nixon White House would quickly pivot to other crises around the world, the aftermath of the Soccer War would last far past the cease fire. By September, while both sides had withdrawn to their respective borders, troops still remained encamped in the borderlands between the two countries and OAS efforts to return the soldiers to the barracks progressed only slowly. Additionally, several thousand Salvadorans remained in internment camps in Honduras, while one of the fundamental questions of the war involving the right of Salvadoran migrants to reside in Honduras remained unanswered. In addition, several months after the war, trade and communication between the countries remained frozen.226 By October, however, each side had released their respective civilian
225 Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 786; Jussi M Hanhimäki, The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 53–54. 226 CREST, Weekly Summary, “OAS Easing Central American Tensions,” 12, Sep, 1969. 85 detainees, reestablished economic ties, and reopened communication links. While far from resolved, the immediate fire had subsided, and the OAS and the Nixon administration could claim the role of peacemaker, if anyone had paid attention over the specter of Vietnam and the landing of a man on the moon.227
227 The final resolution to the border disputes did not come until a 1992 ruling by the International Court of Justice in the Hague 86 Chapter 3: Birth of a Strategy: Implementation of a Nixon Doctrine in Latin America228
“we must influence their leadership through close contact between our military and theirs. We should do it but not appear to be doing it.”229
Nixon
BUILDING AND DESTROYING BRIDGES OF FRIENDSHIP
On September 8, 1969, Nixon and the President of Mexico, Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, met for the dedication of the jointly built Amistad (friendship) dam, along the U.S. Mexican border on the Rio Grande. Nixon then ventured to the Mexican side of the border for a bilateral meeting, the first of Nixon’s two trips to Mexico, the only Latin American country he visited as president. Both leaders gave optimistic and enthusiastic speeches during the dedication ceremony. Nixon hoped for a “furtherance of an ideal friendship” and a continuation of the “special relationship” that bound the two countries together, while Díaz
Ordaz stated that whatever problems existed “will not become a barrier between us.” They each also commented that they were glad that their predecessors had agreed to change the name of the dam to Amistad away from the original name Diablo (Devil).230
228 This chapter is a revision of: James Martin, “Reincarnation of the Good Neighbor: Nixon and the Creation of Latin American Policy” (The University of Texas at Austin, 2015), http://hdl.handle.net/2152/32360. 229 “Annex A to a Paper Prepared in the Department of State,” Washington, undated, FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics available online at http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d15. 230 “Big Dam Dedicated By Nixon and Diaz On Mexican Border,” New York Times, Sep. 9, 1969; “Border Dam Dedicated by 2 Presidents,” The Washington Post, September 9, 1969. 87 A few weeks later, on September 21, 1969, Operation Intercept began. It was the largest peacetime search and seizure in U.S. history. Both sides quickly forgot their kind words as the border between the two countries became an unofficial battleground in the undeclared “War on Drugs.”231 Operation Intercept called for obtrusive searches on the frontier from Sept. 21, 1969 to its conclusion on October 10, 1969. The end of the operation, however, led to a return of cordial relations with Mexico, largely because of strong Mexican diplomacy and some soul searching within the administration.
The ill-fated Operation Intercept highlighted many of the sources of friction between U.S. government agencies. After the planning and execution, in the midst of the friction, the National Security Council (NSC) became more involved. In the immediate aftermath of Operation Intercept, Nixon gave the one major speech on Latin America during his presidency, on October 31, 1969. This speech, full of promises of change and preferential treatment for the hemisphere, was the culmination of almost a year’s worth of events, meetings, and reports that morphed into the White House’s strategic vision toward the region.
The execution of Operation Intercept took place as the Nixon administration was in the midst of formulating Nixon’s doctrine on Latin America, as well as demonstrating some of the fissures and factions within the administration, it highlighted the challenges of changing a relationship that had developed over time. While many civil servants, political appointees, and advisors within the administration, such as Vaky and Rockefeller, had
231 Nixon would not use the term “War on Drugs” until 1971; contemporary newspaper accounts were using the military language; see “Nixon Seeks French Aid in War on Drugs,” Los Angeles Times, October 18, 1969. 88 extensive experience on and knowledge of the region and wanted to make the region a priority, others such as Kissinger had limited knowledge of the hemispheric neighborhood and either pushed ineffective policies, or focused on other efforts. Other actors, such as
Congress and the sovereign leaders of hemisphere also had a vote. It was in this fluid and complicated situation that Nixon tried to refine his doctrine toward Latin America.
Two themes continued appearing as Nixon developed his approach on Latin
America. The first, was the need to consult with leaders of the hemisphere and keep them appraised of the changing situation. Nixon sent an apologetic letter to Mexico’s president helping heal a rift opened up by Operation Intercept. The second was Nixon’s continuous push to work with the region’s militaries and military dictators. This Instinct served him well when it came to eventually setting the conditions for resolving sovereignty over the
Panama Canal, but caused Nixon to cozy up to military leaders credibly accused of committing torture and summary executions among their citizens.
OPERATION INTERCEPT
Nixon’s emphasis on stopping the drug trade began during his presidential campaign. On September 16, 1968, candidate Nixon spoke to a capacity crowd in Anaheim,
California. While the broad theme of the rally centered on “law and order,” Nixon stressed the growing threat of narcotics. Among his ideas, Nixon advocated for a “multinational commission” to stem the tide of drugs. He also stated he would triple the number of border agents as recommended by a commission chartered by the Johnson administration. Finally, he would “accelerate the development of tools and weapons to detect narcotics in 89 transit.”232 While he also mentioned unspecified help to current addicts, his speech centered on interdicting and restricting supply.
In April 1969, Nixon instructed his Attorney General, John Mitchell, and Treasury
Secretary, David Kennedy, to assemble a task force to study the issue of drugs and narcotics. Their report, released two months later on June 6, reflected a consensus view of seven different government departments contributing to the report. Missing from the consensus was the State Department which participated only in “an advisory capacity” and did not contribute substantively to the final product. However, the report claimed that the
State Department was fully on board with “whole hearted support.”233
The core of the Task Force’s recommendations focused on unilateral U.S. actions on the border with Mexico. While several of the recommendations were somewhat trivial, such as building parking lots on the U.S. side of the border to allow pedestrians to cross into Mexico on foot, the report also advised larger efforts. For instance, it called for increased fencing where it would have “the most beneficial effect” and substantial increases in funding for the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Bureau of Customs.234 The Nixon administration wanted to implement a plan as soon as possible, most likely to demonstrate the president’s resolve to the American public. The largest border enforcement action in U.S. history
232 Bergholz, Richard. "Nixon Will Not Curb Issue of Law and Order." Los Angeles Times, Sep. 17, 1968. 233 "Special Presidential Task Force Relating to Narcotics, Marijuana and Dangerous Drugs", 6 June 1969, National Security Archive, available online at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB86/, accessed on Mar. 10, 2014. 32 Ibid., 21. 90 emerged from this ad hoc taskforce with very limited time to put together a complicated plan.
Before the U.S. government could implement the plan, the U.S. and Mexican governments met on June 9, 1969 at a conference focused specifically on the problem of illegal drugs. According to one high level Nixon aide, Gordon Liddy, the task force finished the report by June 6 in order to have it ready for the conference. Liddy, when recounting the results of the meeting, mentioned that the Mexican delegation, “using diplomatic language,” told the delegation in effect to “go piss up a rope.”235 One anonymous Mexican diplomat remembered the event differently. In his recollection, the strong tenor of the U.S. delegation surprised him since this was an informal meeting. Additionally, the Mexican contingent commented that in February the Mexican government had launched the largest marijuana eradication campaign in the country’s history, involving over 2,000 government troops.236 Whatever the true resolve of Mexico’s drug eradication effort, the American contingent left the conference ready to ratchet up the pressure on Mexico.
State Department officials generally opposed Operation Intercept, but their response was at best unorganized and fragmented. Gordon Liddy noted that the June 6 report “paid lip-service to the Mexican efforts—more so than we would have but for the
Department of State.”237 On September 12, 1969, Ambassador McBride cabled back to
Washington with major concerns about the operation. He noted that from his point of view,
235 G. Gordon Liddy, Will: The Autobiography of G. Gordon Liddy. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997). 134. 236 Quoted in Richard B. Craig, “Operation Intercept: The International Politics of Pressure,” 559–60. 237 Liddy, Will: The Autobiography of G. Gordon Liddy, 133. 91 “it appears that repeated leaks have now minimized possibilities of success of Operation
Intercept and that its value…seems to have decreased greatly.”238 As a further illustration of confusion within the State Department, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
Affairs Meyer, theoretically responsible for all of Latin America, was not involved with the planning of Operation Intercept. Even during the execution of the operation, Secretary
Meyer was often not part of the decision-making process.239 This spoke poorly both of the task force planning the operation and of the State Department for cutting out the highest- level cabinet official dedicated to Latin America. The supposed incompetence of the State
Department would become a recurring theme in the formulation of Latin American policy.
On September 21, 1969, at 2:30 p.m. Pacific Standard Time, Operation Intercept officially commenced. By this time, leaks and press briefings on the U.S. side had removed the element of surprise. On the first day of the operation, inspections of vehicles leaving
Tijuana for the United States backed up traffic for six miles with a peak wait time between three to four hours. The morale among the U.S. citizens in the group was, according to one report, “high” with one mother expressing her opinion that the tougher the inspections, the less she would have to worry about her kids. The enforcement action made no significant arrests on the official start day of the operation. Two days before, however, one of the newly installed radars on the border diverted an unregistered plane filled with 532 bricks
238 Leaks Reducing Chances of Operation's Success U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, secret telegram", June 12, 1969, National Security Archive, available online at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB86/, accessed on 17 March 2014. 239 “Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),” Sep. 30, 1969, FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d442 92 of marijuana weighing over a thousand pounds.240 The U.S. government made no other significant arrests after the start of Operation Intercept.
The two largest Mexican newspapers, El Universal and Excélsior, were largely silent in the first days of Operation Intercept. According to the State Department, this was a deliberate effort by the government-dominated press to strike a tolerant tone about the operation.241 However, The Mexican government took a more confrontational stance when on September 25 Operation Intercept became front-page news on El Universal. The story emphasized the human suffering of Mexican migrant workers, saying some of them had lost their jobs due to delays at the border. Additionally, the article mentioned that commercial interests on both sides of the border were protesting the unilateral move as not conducive to business.242 Excélsior also ran the story on the front page with the headline reading, “Not a Single Gram of Marijuana Found by U.S. Border Agents.”243 The next day, the story once again dropped off the front page of the Mexico City press as the United
States and Mexico began initial negotiations in New York City to end Operation Intercept.
The accounts of the operation in Mexicali’s newspaper La Voz de la Frontera were much more forceful than the coverage out of Mexico City because of the city’s location close to the border and the long distance from the central government. The front-page of the paper led with a picture of the long line of vehicular traffic and an account of the effects
240 Belair, Felix, “Drug Drive Opens At Mexico Border,” New York Times, Sep. 22, 1969. 241 Operation Intercept Department of State, confidential memorandum, 2 October 1969, National Security Archive, available online at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB86/, accessed on 07 Apr. 2014. 242 Rosales, Alberto, “Aumentan Las Problemas Por La Operación Intercepción,” El Universal: El Gran Diario de México, Sep. 25, 1969. 243 Isigo, Alejandro, “Bajo a La Mitad El Turismo de EU a Tijuana,” Excélsior, September 23, 1969. 93 of the operation on ordinary Mexicans.244 The coverage continued throughout the next few days with multiple newspaper articles. For example, on September 26, the paper noted pressure placed on the federal government by the trade union Confederación
Revolucionaria de Obreros y Campesino (CROC) and its hopes for the upcoming summit.245 In addition to the news items, multiple editorials and letters to the editor appeared in the paper just days after the commencement of Operation Intercept.
Besides news reports, the mood of the population was clear in the advertisements that appeared in the border paper. One two-page advertisement sponsored by the chamber of commerce depicted a long line of cars and implored Mexicans to buy locally and avoid the hassle of intrusive searches at the border. The ad promised the reader that local products were the same price, variety, and high quality, and “above all no one will frisk you!”246
Another advertisement in the paper placed by the chamber of commerce and other entities such as the Bureau for National Tourism asked Mexican citizens to stay home in order to allow “tourists, students, and people with urgency and necessity” to cross the border expeditiously.247 A jeweler provided his own spin on the trend by sarcastically thanking
Nixon for making locals see that it was better to shop in Mexico than the United States.248
While the events of Operation Intercept were in full swing, the Nixon administration was nearing the end of its review on Latin American policy. Before the implementation of the unilateral enforcement action, Nixon received Governor Nelson
244 “Minuciosa Revisión Se Realiza En La Frontera Con EE. UU.,” La Voz De La Frontera, Sep. 23, 1969. 245 “Juntas de Emergencia Para Modificar La Intercepción,” La Voz De La Frontera, Sep. 26, 1969. 246 “Advertisment1,” La Voz De La Frontera, Sep. 26, 1969. 247 “Advertisment2,” La Voz De La Frontera, Sep. 26, 1969. 248 “Advertisment3,” La Voz De La Frontera, Sep. 27, 1969. 94 Rockefeller’s long-awaited report on the region. Nixon and his staff, however, did not begin to fully read or process the report until the week that Operation Intercept kicked off.
RECEPTION OF THE ROCKEFELLER REPORT
Governor Nelson Rockefeller initially briefed Kissinger and Nixon about his findings on September 3, before Nixon’s dedication of the Amistad dam.249 Before the briefing, however, one item relating to Panama required Nixon’s attention. Panama’s leader, General Omar Torrijos, in his meeting with Rockefeller, had requested certain technical assistance to “re-establish the democratic process.” His request on the surface was a bit odd since he came to power in a military coup d’état just a year earlier. Rockefeller recommended appointing a political advisor to assist Torrijos, but also requested more guidance from Nixon. Kissinger advised against appointing an advisor for multiple reasons.
He was concerned about the risk of sidelining the State Department, undermining Nixon’s new ambassador to Panama, and the lack of clarity of Torrijos’ true motives.250 In making his recommendation, Kissinger followed the advice of his chief advisor on Latin America,
Viron Vaky. His advisor was much more colorful in his advice calling the situation
“delicate...embarrassing,” and “unnecessary involvement in other nations’ domestic matters.” He strongly advised against Rockefeller playing “Secretary of State this way.”251
249 Presidential Daily Diary, September 1969. 250“Memo, Henry Kissinger to President Nixon,” Sep. 2, 1969, Folder: Governor Rockefeller, Jul. 1972, Box 831, National Security Council (NSC): Name File, RNPL, Yorba Linda, California. 251Memo Viron Vaky to Henry Kissinger, August 30, 1969, Folder: Governor Rockefeller, Jul. 1972, Box 831, NSC: Name File, RNPL, Yorba Linda, California. 95 Rockefeller’s final written findings focused on the forces of progress in Latin
America. In his view the region, like the rest of the world, was experiencing rapid change, and while the United States could not “control” change, the United States had to
“understand” change in order to “shape intelligently and realistically our relationships.”252
Rockefeller defined change as the “crucial characteristic of our time.” He saw change as disruptive and saw the result in stark terms as either “tremendously constructive or tremendously destructive.”253
In Rockefeller’s analysis, two of the main contributors to change were ironically two of the more traditionally conservative institutions. The first of these institutions was the Catholic Church.254 This propensity for change was a new role for the Church because, as the report noted, it had worked “hand in hand with the landowners to provide ‘stability.’”
Rockefeller did temper his remarks, noting that the Church in some situations was
“vulnerable to subversive penetration.” He concluded this section of the report unsure of the role the Church would play in the future. Elements within the Church might be “ready to undertake a revolution,” but he was not sure “as to the ultimate nature of the revolution itself or as to the governmental system by which the justice it seeks can be realized.”255
The other avenue of change was the military. Rockefeller took direct aim at the many U.S. critics of military governments, such as Senator Frank Church, when he stated
252 Nelson A. Rockefeller, The Rockefeller Report on the Americas: The Official Report of a United States Presidential Mission for the Western Hemisphere, New York Times edition (Quadrangle Books, 1969), 24. 253 Ibid. 254 For more of Rockefeller’s analysis on the Catholic Church see Theresa Keeley, “Nelson Rockefeller’s 1969 Mission to Latin America and the Catholic Church,” 2011 ,https://web.archive.org/web/20140108152712/http://www.rockarch.org/publications/resrep/keeley.pdf. 255 Rockefeller, The Rockefeller Report on the Americas, 31. 96 in the report, “we will have to give increasing recognition to the fact that many new military leaders are deeply motivated by the need for social and economic progress.” He continued: in “many cases, it will be more useful for the United States to try to work with them in these efforts, rather than to abandon or insult them because we are conditioned by arbitrary ideological stereotypes.”256 Ironically while he argued that the average Latin American military leader had changed, his policy prescription looked very similar to Roosevelt’s treatment of military dictators. Rockefeller’s recommendations reproduced what one historian has argued was a built-in irony of the Good Neighbor policy, “aiding dictators next door for the sake of fighting other dictators overseas.”257
The recommendations in the report included both economic issues and organizational changes within the U.S. government. Many of the economic recommendations paralleled the Consensus of Viña del Mar, including refinancing of debt and preference for Latin American trade goods. Possibly the boldest part of the recommendations were the proposed reorganizational changes within the U.S. government bureaucracy since, according to the report, hemispheric policy could “neither be soundly formulated nor effectively carried out” under the current U.S. governmental structure. The report explained that current divided decision-making within the U.S. government led foreign governments in the hemisphere to become “frustrated and humiliated” because their representative could not find a person who could “make a final decision” in the maze
256 Ibid., 31–33. 257 Eric Paul Roorda, The Dictator Next Door: The Good Neighbor Policy and the Trujillo Regime in the Dominican Republic, 1930-1945, (Durham: Duke University Press Books, 1998), 224. 97 of bureaucracy.258 One of the key recommendations was the creation of a Secretary of
Western Hemisphere Affairs to coordinate all U.S. policy. This new secretary would be the
“focal point” for all hemispheric matters. While not stated specifically in the recommendations, this new position would privilege the Western Hemisphere in the bureaucracy since no other region would have a similar secretary. Additionally, the report called for more government employees dedicated to Latin American issues in the White
House, including a special office in the NSC.259 Nixon received these recommendations in early September, but, according to the available documentary record, did not read the report until a few weeks later in mid-September.
The report and its reception were set against a background of mixed professional relationships among the major actors. Rockefeller and Nixon were old political rivals competing for the Republican nomination in the 1968 presidential race. Rockefeller sponsored Kissinger’s research when he was a professor at Harvard. As one biographer wrote about the relationship between the two in the 1950s, “behind Nelson’s back,
Kissinger sometimes mocked his patron for failing to do his homework. Within earshot, he was deferential to the point of sycophancy.”260 Kissinger maintained many of these mannerisms when discussing issues with Rockefeller during his tenure as NSA.
By September 19, Kissinger had read the report. In a conversation with Governor
Rockefeller, Kissinger said his final product was “excellent.” Rockefeller reemphasized
258 Ibid., 43-44. 259 Ibid., 22, 45–55. 260 Smith, On His Own Terms, 254–55. 98 his strong opinion that unless the State Department underwent a serious reorganization and refocused on Latin America, the region would be “lost.” Kissinger agreed with his point and took particular aim at Assistant Secretary Charles Meyer, whom he called a “weak man.” At this point, it appeared that Nixon had not read the report, but Kissinger was confident he soon would.261 Eventually Nixon engaged with Rockefeller’s treatise on Latin
American relations, and was prepared to “speak very highly” of it if asked to do so. The president wished to discuss the issue further and invited Rockefeller to a meeting at Camp
David on September 29.262
Between Rockefeller and Nixon’s first meeting on September 3 and their next meeting on September 29, the president refocused on Latin America. In addition to the events of Operation Intercept, which began on the September 21, the president took interest in how his Latin American policy was playing in the press. One article was highly critical of current U.S.-Latin American policy, accusing the administration of placing hemispheric relations, “low on its agenda of priorities.” The author was particularly critical of the administration’s decision to keep the contents of the Rockefeller Report a secret. According to an unnamed Latin American diplomat, “It all boils down to the fact that Richard Nixon has little interest in doing anything constructive in Latin America.” 263 Nixon’s attempt to counter the narrative of the article suggests he was concerned about Latin American policy, or at a minimum, concerned about the public’s perception of his policy.
261 TELCON, September 19, 1969 262 TELCON September 24, 1969. 263 Memo for the President, October 4, 1969, folder October1-15: Box 3, Hand Writing File, RNPL, Yorba Linda CA. 99 The one-hour meeting on September 29 featuring Nixon, Kissinger, Meyer, and
Rockefeller provides one of the most expansive views of Latin American policy from
Nixon in the documentary record. While Nixon expressed his views about Latin America freely in the two National Security Council meetings dedicated to Latin America in 1969, the small group setting at Camp David allowed him to speak more extensively. In this setting, he laid out a vision for the region as he attempted to overcome the current constraints of U.S. policy. The meeting began with the President noting that “Latin
America was in trouble as indicated by such things as the Peruvian problem, the Bolivian
Coup, [and] Elbricks abduction.”264 Nixon continued by echoing the thinking of Goodell’s article. He stated. “Justified or not, people feel Latin America is on the back burner.”
Continuing with somewhat paternalistic language, he reasoned that the “Latins,” 265 whom he called “sensitive,” felt “they should not only be on the front burner, but on front burner
No. 1.” He felt that the administration should validate their assumptions and “treat them with special concern.”266
Continuing with his monologue, Nixon emphasized his search for “action on Latin
American policy.” The President wanted “new ideas.” He wanted to “express the special relationship.” Anticipating a critique, he told his distinguished audience, “Oh, but the
Africans might not like it,” and then promptly told them, “Forget that, forget the
264 Domestic dissidents in Brazil kidnaped the U.S. ambassador to Brazil, Charles Elbrick on September 4th and held him for four days. 265 Nixon in private conversations would call not only residents of South and Central America “Latins”, but also residents of Spain, France, and Italy casting a very wide net of stereotypes. 266 Unless otherwise stated the following section are based on Memo, Memorandum of Conversation, September 27, 1969, folder Governor Rockefeller, July 1972: Box 831, NSC: Name File, RNPL, Yorba Linda, California. 100 bureaucracy.” Nixon was primarily referring to the State Department, which he held in particular disdain. He stated that “in the 23 years” he had worked with the State
Department, they “had not had one imaginative, bold new idea.” He then reiterated, “he was going to get a new Latin American policy,” and “if it did not come from the State
Department, it would have to come from within the White House.”
Returning to the subject of bureaucracy, Nixon seemed sympathetic to
Rockefeller’s recommendation to create a Secretary for the Western Hemisphere, which
Nixon envisioned as a “first among equals” in the State Department. He believed that this move would be a way to “show our special concerns” to the region. As part of this reorganization, he believed that the new secretary should also have in his or her portfolio
Canada, which at the time was the responsibility of a different arm of the State Department.
He emphasized that he was flexible with what the policy would look like, but wanted
“something special,” and “special handing” of all substantive issues. Nixon likened the situation to one in World War II, stating it was time to “break out like Patton breaking out of the Battle of the Bulge.” He did not want his upcoming speech on Latin America to be just “nice words,” he wanted “to do things.”
Switching gears, the president wanted to discuss an important issue raised in the
Rockefeller Report, how to handle the military. Working with the military was important in so far as it was in the nation’s interest “to keep things stable.” Nixon felt the United
States could be “selective” in providing aid to military goverments, but should not condemn “the military a la Senator Church.” Determining which government to support was a simple calculation which Nixon summed up as, “Are they friends or enemies, will 101 they be stable, will they accept private investment.” Rockefeller agreed with the president, providing a personal example of how he convinced the military government of Paraguay to chose a better qualified American company over a French company that had been paying bribes. The governor chose this example to illustrate how a policy of engagment could lead to real gains even with a military government..
During the conversation, Nixon engaged with specific policy issues listed in the report or otherwise on his mind. Foreign aid, in his view, was “finished” unless “drastically reshaped.” It was therefore important to look at Rockefeller’s recommendations on foreign aid “carefully.” Meyer then called the current foreign aid program “an export promotion program rather than development assistance.” Nixon agreed with his assessment and told him to “say that,” noting he was willing “to be very liberal in aid measures if something new is proposed.” The participants also discussed other recommendations in the report including several new regional institutes and a recommendation to form a joint
Congressional Committee on the Western Hemisphere.
The conversation then turned toward two specific countries, Panama and Cuba. The topic of discussion concerned the ongoing treaty negotiations needed to determine the long- term fate of the Panama Canal. Rockefeller felt the U.S. could work with Torrijos, but
Meyer countered with the State Department’s concern about negotiating with an unconstitutional government. Nixon took Rockefeller’s position and as a show of goodwill told the state department to “get out of the mill” two helicopters Torrijos wanted. Nixon had one final point. Contrary to feelings elsewhere in the bureaucracy, “he wanted to follow a very tough line of Cuba.” He could possibly work with Cuba on issues such as “hijacking 102 matters,” but otherwise he wanted a “tough line,” and did not “want to hear press speculation that we are considering a new policy.”
As the long meeting continued, Nixon also engaged with the principal critique of some of the press accounts about his failure to publicly release the Rockefeller Report.
Nixon’s concerns revolved around perception. He did not want the report’s recommendations, and the eventual policy direction the White House took, to become a matter of “historic record.” He planned, however, to release portions of the report once he made the final policy determinations. Until then, he wanted a “disciplined” and “positive” response emphasizing the report’s contribution to policy, and not the report itself.
Eventually, however, after later determining the report’s release would maintain interest in
U.S.-Latin American policy, Nixon agreed to release the report in full.
The report played a major role in the ultimate formulation of U.S. policy toward
Latin America in Nixon’s upcoming Latin America policy speech. While not without controversy, Rockefeller’s trip and report provided ideas for the bureaucracy to ponder over the next month as the NSC began drafting. Many of Rockefeller’s ideas originated with his experience under Roosevelt. Some of his ideas, such as better relations with military dictators, came directly from the Good Neighbor Policy. Others probably came from speaking with Latin American leaders who trusted him due to his experience under
FDR. Nixon soon incorporated many of Rockefeller’s suggestions into the major policy address. Until then, the administration still had the pesky issue of Operation Intercept hanging over its head.
103 OPERATION INTERCEPT END GAME
As Operation Intercept continued, some opposition began to surface within the
White House. In a strongly critical reprisal of the original plan for Operation Intercept, the
White House Budget Bureau laid out an argument for its inherent weaknesses, calling the plan “grossly inadequate” and “likely to result in embarrassment to the president.”
According to the Budget Bureau report, Operation Intercept underestimated the damage to
U.S.-Mexican relations, the political backlash of border community residents, and the long- term monetary cost.267 The misgivings of the Budget Bureau added to critical voices within the State Department.
The Mexican government soon noticed the lack of U.S. governmental unity in the planning and execution of Operation Intercept. On September 26, U.S. Secretary of State,
William Rogers, and Mexico’s Foreign Secretary, Carrillo Flores, met in New York City where the topic of the interdiction effort arose. During their meeting, Rodgers insisted that
Operation Intercept was “initiated on the orders of some Assistant Secretary within the
Department of the Treasury,” and launched with no consultations with the State
Department.268As Intercept continued, Mexico increased its efforts to end the operation diplomatically. On September 29, the Mexican ambassador spoke to Assistant Secretary of
State Meyer and other U.S. diplomats to deliver another official protest from Mexico.
267 "Budget Bureau Comments on Marijuana Policy", September 29, 1969, National Security Archive, available online at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB86/, accessed on March 10, 2014 268 AHD, Resumen de la Entrevista Sobre la “Operation Intercept,” September 29, 1969. 104 According to a summary of conversation from Mexico’s Foreign Ministry, the Mexican
Ambassador’s position was quite clear. In terms of stopping the marijuana trade, the operation was a “failure.” However, the operation was “an excellent instrument to destroy the environment of goodwill prevalent along the border.” By the end of the meeting, the
Mexican entourage had come to two sobering conclusions. First, the United States “seemed inclined to maintain ‘Operation Intercept’” since the U.S. delegation seemed “uninformed and very distant from the border.” Second, Secretary Rogers was either “not informed” about the operation or “lied” to Foreign Minister Flores. If he had not been informed, the diplomats reasoned, “that would demonstrate an absolute lack of organization within the
State Department, and irresponsibility (on the part of Rogers) of leaving such an important decision in the hand of a subordinate.”269
The day after the meeting between Meyer and Mexican diplomats in Washington
D.C, Díaz Ordaz remarked that a “somber curtain”270had fallen between the two countries, even while toasting American astronauts who had recently returned from landing on the moon.271 The Mexican president’s remarks made front-page news in Mexico City. The coverage in the Mexican press emphasized another point he had made in his toast when he referred to the operation as a “bureaucratic error.” He continued saying he did not want to
“cast a shadow over” what should be a joyous celebration, but his obligation to his people
269 Ibid. 270 A more accurate translation of the phrase muro de sospechas is wall of suspicion 271 Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) September 30, 1969, FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d442 105 was to make this “misunderstanding go away as soon as possible.”272 His foreign minister continued fighting to end the operation by circumventing normal diplomatic channels.
Foreign Minister Flores, possibly after learning about the internal divisions in the
State Department over Operation Intercept, broke diplomatic protocol and wrote directly to Nixon. In the letter, which he wrote by hand, he asked President Nixon “to review that operation and to order its excesses be corrected.” He additionally noted how terrible the optics of this operation were since the Mexican people “simply cannot understand that two weeks after you met with our President, the most drastic, and for many, unfriendly measure against Mexico was taken.” He ended by writing how it was “totally unorthodox to address you (President Nixon). I will never do it again. But in this case I am convinced you have the opportunity of doing something for which all Mexicans will be grateful.”273 Foreign
Secretary Flores continued negotiating once he returned to Mexico.
After he delivered his letter and flew back to Mexico, Flores found the situation much worse than what he had gathered from New York. In a meeting with Ambassador
McBride on October 2, 1969, Flores remarked that Operation Intercept was the worst problem to materialize in U.S.-Mexican relations in his eleven years of public service. In order to solve the problem, he suggested skipping the gesture proposed by the Nixon administration to send a delegation to Mexico City, and instead meet in New York City.
The recommendation to have the talks in New York City was mainly a practical one. Díaz
272 Jose Manuel Jurado, “‘Un Error Burocrático’ Daña Las Relaciones Con EU: Diaz Ordaz,” Excélsior, September 30, 1969. 273 "Antonio Carillo Flores to Nixon Secretariat of Foreign Relations, personal letter", Undated, National Security Archive, available online at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB86/, accessed on March 10, 2014 106 Ordaz and Flores felt that the U.S. delegation would be “attacked” in the press and
“hounded” by reporters. Concerning the start date of the negotiations, the Mexican government wanted to begin as soon as possible with an announcement on Friday October
3, 1969, with actual talks beginning on Monday October 6. Ambassador McBride agreed and recommended the proposed timeline to the State Department.274 Talks would start one day after the proposed timeline on October 7.
Even as negotiations were ongoing, the operation showed no signs of slowing down. While U.S. officials touted the doubling of marijuana prices as a success, these same officials also admitted to major weaknesses in the execution of the operation. In addition to smugglers avoiding checkpoints on land, obsolete radar technology meant that drug dealers were still able to traffic drugs into the U.S. via air corridors. Despite the limited effectiveness of the operation, U.S. customs officials vowed to continue their efforts, and even planned an intensification of the operation.275
While the negotiation between Mexico and the United States were ongoing,
Kissinger became more directly involved. Although he was briefed on the situation,
Kissinger did not take a direct role in Operation Intercept until he drafted the response to
Secretary Flores’s letter. Kissinger may have become involved due to Flores’s letter bypassing the State Department and landing on his desk. Kissinger’s memorandum to
President Nixon focused on the “unorthodox nature of such a letter,” noting that the
274 Telegram 5388 From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of State 02 October, 1969, FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d442. 275 Felix Belair Jr “Operation Intercept: Success on Land, Futility in the Air,” New York Times, October 2, 1969. 107 “unusual step does, in fact, underline the intensity of the Mexican feeling about Operation
Intercept.” Kissinger also reminded the president about Ordaz’s “somber curtain” remark during the toast to the U.S. astronauts. Kissinger believed that the Mexican government was worried about a “cooling off” by the United States to Mexico, and felt that Operation
Intercept was “becoming a serious problem in our relations with Mexico.” He concluded his memorandum by informing the president that the State Department had agreed to a bilateral meeting and recommended that the President sign a “warmer” response to the
Foreign Minister than protocol would normally dictate.276 On October 7, the same day as the bilateral meeting between the United States and Mexico, Nixon signed the “warm” letter to Foreign Minister Flores. He also sent a note to his aid, John Ehrlichman, asking for a status update. He ended his request for information by dictating, “this is the time to negotiate since we have proved our point pretty effectively.”277 The strong reaction of
Mexico, as suggested by Flores’ letter, prompted Nixon’s reaction. Nixon, as he often would when engaging with foreign leaders and dignitaries, changed his position. Operation
Intercept soon ended.
On October 10, 1969, Operation Intercept officially culminated earlier than the month originally envisioned by the plan’s architects. The plan finished with assurances by the Mexican government that it would improve drug enforcement on its side of the border with assistance from the United States dubbed “Operation Cooperate.” The result of
276 Letter to you from Mexican Foreign Minister on Operation Intercept White House, memorandum", Undated, National Security Archive, available online at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB86/, accessed on March 10, 2014. 277 “Untitled Memorandum from the President", 7 October, 1969, National Security Archive, available online at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB86/, accessed on March 10, 2014. 108 Operation Intercept was the arrest of forty-four low-level smugglers, or one smuggler per one hundred thousand people searched, and the mass disruption of commerce along the
U.S.-Mexican border. While the protests and inconveniences were by no means small on the U.S. side of the border, they were larger on the Mexican side of the border.
Another front-page announcement in the Mexican press heralded the end of
Operation Intercept and the beginning of Operation Cooperate. The two parties would negotiate the details of Operation Cooperate over the next several months in a series of bilateral meetings.278 The details, which included monetary assistance from the United
States, were less important than the realization that respect for Mexican sovereignty ensured greater cooperation. Both the United States and Mexico would soon be touting the program. Mexico’s running tally of destroyed marijuana plants and poppy fields, reminiscent of Vietnam body counts, were the measure of success.279 Soon the hard work of rebuilding trust and diplomatic relations between the two countries would begin.
On November 18, 1969, President Nixon sent a highly apologetic letter to Díaz
Ordaz. In the letter, Nixon highlighted several Mexican priorities on which his administration had made progress. The most important part of the letter, however, reflected his regret about the damage Operation Intercept caused to the bilateral relationship:
In this connection, Mr. President, I want to express my personal regret for the friction which Operation Intercept has caused in the relations between our two countries. Operation Intercept was conceived as one element in a major campaign to combat the traffic in narcotics from whatever source. It was not intended to single out Mexico, nor to give offense to Mexico. I want to give you my personal
278 Antonio Barragan, “Fin a La ‘Intercepción’: Es Substituida Por La Cooperación Mediante Acuerdo de Los 2 Gobiernos,” El Universal: El Gran Diario de México, October 11, 1969. 279 Craig, “Operation Intercept: The International Politics of Pressure,” 577. 109 assurances on this point. When it became apparent to me that this operation was being viewed by your Government as an affront to the Mexican people, and that it was causing economic hardship for border communities, I asked that the intensity of inspection be reduced to a point where the major frictions, and irritations which the operation had caused in our relations with Mexico could be eliminated.280
It would take more than one letter however, to repair the relationship between the two countries.
While Nixon’s team had poorly timed and poorly conceived Operation Intercept, its termination came at an opportune time for Nixon’s hemispheric policy. Nixon and his team would spend the rest of October preparing and writing his one and only large-scale speech on Latin American policy. The speech would chart a new course of intra- hemispheric affairs, basing many of its talking points and concepts on the Rockefeller
Report.
MAJOR POLICY ADDRESS
The idea for a major speech on Latin American policy came from Secretary of State
William Rogers in a July 9, 1969 NSC meeting on Latin America. The Nixon administration had yet to make any major policy changes on Latin America and was receiving criticism from Latin American diplomats and the press. Kissinger concurred with
Rogers and suggested early October as a possible date for the speech. Nixon agreed, but
280 Letter From President Nixon to President Diaz Ordaz of Mexico, Washington, November 18, 1969, FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics (Washington, DC: Department of State), available online at http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d451. 110 remarked that he would emphasize “realism,” and not “generalities or platitudes.”281 The president ultimately gave his speech on October 31, 1969, to a receptive audience, the Inter-
American Press Club, a group he had addressed previously as Vice-President. The speech would be the first major policy address he would give on Latin America during his time in office. As it turned out, it would also be his last.
The likely reason for the change in dates from early to late October was to give the government a chance to staff and approve the recommendations from the Rockefeller
Report for their inclusion in the speech. Kissinger’s guidance on this point was clear:
“There would be no specific decisions on the policy issues before Rockefeller’s views were submitted.”282 Once he submitted his report, the bureaucracy would have about six weeks to make its objections clear to the president and present its own ideas. Nixon’s cabinet would express its thoughts during the next NSC meeting on Latin America on October 15,
1969.
The day before the NSC meeting, Kissinger talked with Under Secretary of State
Elliot Richardson to discuss his plan for the next day. As was often the case when Latin
America was the main issue, Kissinger planned on speaking only in generalities while someone else, in this case Richardson, spoke to the more technical details. Kissinger advised Richardson to be careful about how he brought up the speech since “the President is sensitive about speeches. The President looks at a speech as a way of making the
281 Hand Written Notes NSC Files, Box H–23, Folder: NSC Meeting 7/9/69, NSC Institutional Files (H- Files), RNPL, Yorba Linda, California. 282 Minutes of an NSC Review Group Meeting, Washington, July 3, 1969, FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E- 10: Documents on American Republics (Washington, DC: Department of State), available online at http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d3. 111 bureaucracy do something he thinks it should.”283 During the NSC meeting, the president verbally expressed his frustrations with the bureaucracy that would implement his policy, continually prodding it to take “risks” in Latin American policy.
First on the agenda for the NSC meeting were trade preferences and tariffs. Nixon was highly skeptical of the recommendations which the Cabinet offered, with several exceptions and caveats. Nixon emphasized that he was willing to “take political risks,” and all recommendations should “zero in on Latin America.” What Nixon wanted was a system of generalized tariffs to help the developing countries of Latin America. Generalized tariffs would allow the United States to lower tariffs on developing countries while maintaining higher tariffs on more advanced economies. Secretary of State Rogers would dampen
Nixon’s enthusiasm somewhat by warning about “empty gestures” in the upcoming speech.
He was worried about overpromising and underdelivering. However, when the agenda turned to moving more funds through multilateral organizations, Nixon was much more skeptical, “It would be money down a rat hole.”284
The discussion then turned to some of Rockefeller’s recommendations. For example, Nixon brought up the issue of integrating Canada more deeply into the hemisphere. In response, Rogers stated, “The Canadians are thinking of joining the OAS,” to which Nixon responded, “do it.” While the conversation on the subject became a bit glib—for example Nixon wanted to, “Bring Trudeau (prime minister of Candida) in. Give
283 TELCON, October 14, 1969. 284 Minutes of National Security Council Meeting, Washington, October 15, 1969, FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics (Washington, DC: Department of State), available online at http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d14. 112 him a beard, and let him play with Castro”— the integration of Canada into the hemisphere was one of Rockefeller’s recommendations that Nixon had accepted. The participants of the meeting received several other of Rockefeller’s recommendation favorably, such as the untying of AID loans and grants that would allow the use of AID funds for local manufactured products, as opposed to the previous rule of requiring U.S. goods.
One recommendation that Nixon could not support was a blanket debt rescheduling policy. The Rockefeller Report noted that many countries were “having to make new loans,” in order to, “pay interest and amortization on old loans,” and this situation should be a “major concern” to the United States.285 The Treasury Department was adamant that it did not “want it (debt rescheduling) in the speech.” Nixon, aware that he was already asking the U.S. government to move outside of its comfort zone, responded, “I even understand we can’t cover it in the speech.” Nixon, however, felt the need to give
Rockefeller a heads up of his decision, stating “I do not want to give the impression we ignored the Rockefeller report. Go to the Rockefeller people and explain it must be done country by country.”
Finally, the meeting ended on a long discussion of the role of the military in the region. Nixon likely had in mind the late 1968 coup in Peru whereby General Juan Velasco
Alvarado took power when he observed, “Coups have brought to power Nasser types. They don’t come from the elites. They are nationalistic, revolutionary, and anti-American.”
Nixon was referring to the new military leaders in Peru and Paraguay. The new type of
285 Rockefeller, The Rockefeller Report on the America, 87. 113 military strongmen were not communist but were willing to accept Soviet aid and support.
Nixon expressed somewhat mixed feelings about military governments. On one hand, he thought that the U.S. government should attempt to “lower our profile.” On the other hand, he mentioned, “we must influence their leadership through close contact between our military and theirs. We should do it but not appear to be doing it.” Nixon came up with three factors to be considered when responding to Latin American governments: “their attitudes toward us, their chances to survive and the degree of stability. Not included in his test was whether a country was democratic, calling it a, “knee-jerk reaction that a democratic government in Chile is more to be admired than another.” Nixon’s final notable comment foreshadowed some of the significant military coups during his tenure: “Don’t cut off contact between our military and theirs. They may run the place someday.”286 Once the meeting concluded, the next step was preparing the bureaucracy to initiate any changes
Nixon wanted to announce in the speech.
The first action was the untying of U.S. aid ordered as National Security Decision
Memorandum (NSDM) 28. The NSDM, published on October 20, five days after the NSC meeting, was the official presidential order to change policy. Nixon had fought off a challenge from AID that recommend the untying be limited to the acquisition of the minimum amount of local currencies needed for development programs in the region.287
286 Annex A to a Paper Prepared in the Department of State, Washington, undated, FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d15. 287 National Security Decision Memorandum 28, Washington, October 20, 1969, FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d16. 114 The quick turnaround between the NSC meeting and the NSDM was necessary since Nixon wanted something concrete he could point to in his speech. He would attempt to build up expectations for his foreign policy address over the next ten days.
In a conversation with Kissinger, Nixon seemed very enthusiastic about the speech.
He felt that the elites of Latin America would feel that the speech “was the most meaningful one that they have heard in years.” The speech in his words had “no new promises, only new action.” Nixon wanted to “build up” the speech and asked Kissinger to see if “Rocky”
(Nelson Rockefeller) would be “willing to come down and background the press.” Nixon, somewhat uncharacteristically, also said, “it wouldn’t matter if it leaked,” and, if he was not clear enough, he asked Kissinger to work with H.R Haldeman to build up the speech and “get leaks out.”288 Additionally, in a separate conversation the same night, Nixon wanted the speech sent to every Latin American ambassador. Once again, he emphasized,
“we don’t give a damn if it leaks.”289 Around the same time Nixon was providing his guidance, drafts of the speech bounced within the government as each Cabinet level department received a chance to provide their input.
One early cause of concern among some of the government officials was
Rockefeller’s recommended organizational changes within the State Department and NSC to streamline Latin American policy. Rogers did not agree with the recommended restructuring, but felt if the president was going to with them then, “he shouldn’t just take
288 TELCON, October 24, 1969, If Kissinger contacted Haldeman it did not make it into his edited diary collection. The topic of concern for the week prior to the speech was a big upcoming Vietnam speech. 289 TELCON, October 24, 1969. 115 1/3 of the recommendations but do it all the way through.” Even with his halfhearted recommendation, the Secretary of State felt that there was no “chance in the world that
Congress would pass this anyway.”290 Nixon, when commenting on early versions of the speech, seemed generally pleased with the way it was shaping up. He still felt, however, that the speech failed to “emphasize strongly enough that the time for slogans and promises has ended and the time for action has come.”291 As the date for the speech drew closer, the
State Department began to have more serious reservations.
Rogers made one last effort to influence the speech and overall Latin American policy with the help of Kissinger. Rogers wanted to change the title of person in charge of
Western Hemispheric affairs from Under Secretary to Deputy Secretary moving the person farther down the chain of command. Kissinger stated, “that was tried,” but “the President didn’t want it that way.” Kissinger then later asked Rogers for his opinion on whether
Rockefeller should be a part of the press background briefing. The Secretary of State answered in the negative and Kissinger appeared to agree with him.292 Rockefeller ended up not providing background information to the press, therefore depriving the president of his most visible ally in advocating for a new hemispheric policy. In a subsequent conversation, Rogers seem exasperated about the speech saying he “didn’t understand what the President is doing.” Kissinger attempted to reassure Rogers that the president was only trying “to be as close to the Rockefeller recommendation as possible;” however, he offered
290 TELCON, October 23, 1969. 291 TELCON, October 25, 1969. 292 TELCON, October 27, 1969. 116 to “hold” the implementing memo on certain technical issues in order to allow Rogers to raise his concerns.
On another matter, both Kissinger and Rogers were constraining the president’s proposed course of action. Rogers, “didn’t agree with putting the Canadians” in the same portfolio as the rest of the Caribbean and Latin America as Rockefeller and Nixon wanted.
Kissinger promised to “send out a rephrasing,” which would make the issue of Canada
“subject to study,” since he validly noted, “This is not something we want to do without talking to the Canadians.”293 While Kissinger’s reasoning may have been sound, the
Canadian issue provides another vignette were the bureaucracy fought against changes
Nixon wanted to implement.
The day before the speech, much to the president’s annoyance, personnel in the
State Department were still making changes to the speech, highlighting what Kissinger noted were their “kamikaze impulse.” Meyer seemed to understand Kissinger’s concern, but felt the last-minute changes were necessary since “some nuances…had to be cleared up.” In Meyer’s opinion, “the speech was pretty damned good—it will sound like a full symphony in Spanish.” Continuing rather boldly, he felt, “It would be well received; in fact, they will think they wrote it.” The two men also discussed the next day’s press background briefing. The National Security Advisor admitted again, “he doesn’t really know the Latin American issues very well,” even after close to a year on the job and offered
293 TELCON, October 28, 1969. 117 to brief the “conceptual” portion of the background while Meyer “would present the operational part.”294
On the day of the speech, October 31, 1969, at 3:30 PM, Kissinger and Meyer provided the press with a background “not for attribution” briefing prior to the president’s speech that night. Meyer had just arrived from a short meeting in the Roosevelt Room in the White House where the president had briefed several key congressional leaders on his speech, including Senators J.W Fulbright and Frank Church.295 While Meyer spoke extensively, Kissinger made the most interesting and provocative comments. Kissinger began as he had previously discussed, with the conceptual underpinnings of the speech in slightly grandiose language. Latin American policy was an “extremely important aspect of overall American foreign policy.” Additionally, he continued:
There is a special relationship in the Western Hemisphere. It is the most consistent expression of American foreign policy. It is the area with which we are geographically closely linked. It is an area which is also of profound significance…296
Further explaining the government’s approach, Kissinger nested Latin America in Nixon’s larger foreign policy vision as “reflected in the President’s Guam statement,” and “the general policy statement announced on his Asian trip.”297 While Vietnam remained the
“immediate preoccupation,” Kissinger hoped that the administration was remembered for
294 TECLON, October 30 1969. 295 Presidential Daily Diary 31 October 296 Press Background Briefing, October 31, 1969, Box 5, Folder: Latin American Speech, White House Special Files: Ronald Ziegler, RNPL, Yorba Linda, California. 297 Kissinger was referring to the “Nixon Doctrine” of which the most well-known portion expressed the position that the United States would keep its treaty obligations, and would provide military assistance, but expect host nations to take the lead in providing troops. See. William P. Bundy, A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency (Hill and Wang, 1999), 68. 118 building “a structure of peace.” He then continued, “what we are trying to do in the Western
Hemisphere is the first step in this direction.”298
Nixon’s speech later that night marked the first time a presidential speech was beamed live via satellite to Latin America courtesy of the United States Information
Agency.299 Nixon began the speech by downplaying the influence the United States could have in changing the region. “For years” he remarked, “we in the United States have pursued the illusion that we alone could remake continents.” After citing “the dramatic success of the Marshall Plan of postwar Europe,” he ended on a sobering note: “experience has taught us better.” Nixon hoped to move to a “mature partnership” and “toward a more balanced relationship” in the region.300 He then proceeded to list five influences that shaped his thinking about hemispheric policy.
First, was his personal experience of having “visited every nation in this hemisphere.” Second were the recommendations of Governor Rockefeller, which he called
“farsighted.” Third were the proposals in the Consensus of Viña del Mar. The final two factors were the advice of other government officials and what Nixon called “the concern of the people of the United States.” After laying out how his thinking had evolved, he continued with one of the many applause lines: “Tonight I offer no grandiose promises and
298 Press Background Briefing, October 31, 1969, Box 5, Folder: Latin American Speech, White House Special Files: Ronald Ziegler, RNPL, Yorba Linda, California. 299 Robert B. Semple Jr, “President Urges Latins Take Lead To Spur Progress” New York Times, November 1, 1969. 300 Richard Nixon: "Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the Inter American Press Association.," October 31, 1969. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2302. 119 no panaceas. I do offer action.”301 The “action” that Nixon referenced was generally modest in scope, but realistically achievable during the course of his administration.
He introduced his plans with another applause line certainly appreciated by Latin
America leaders, “Our partnership should be one in which the United States lectures less and listens more.” His first proposal was to move foreign aid to a multilateral system under a new agency, whereby the countries of the region had more input into the allocation of aid. Trade would also be a priority, with the United States “lead[ing] a vigorous effort to reduce the nontariff barriers.” Nixon also noted growing regional trade integration in the region, such as the Central American Common Market (CACM). In sticking to a lower key approach, he said, “The decisions on how far and how fast this process of integration goes, of course, are not ours to make,” while still helping if requested. He also introduced his reorganization plan “raising the rank of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
Affairs to Under Secretary--thus giving the hemisphere special representation.” Nixon in the speech also announced the untying of aid funds, allowing recipients to use funds for goods produced in the hemisphere. Recognizing many of the constraints on his policy,
Nixon went off script saying there were “not too many occasions when the President can accomplish something by just ordering it to be done.”302 Future initiatives would require the acquiesce of Congress.
301 Ibid. 302 Comparison between final marked up draft and live speech: October 31, 1969, WHCF, Subject: speeches, Box 113, RNPL, Yorba Linda, California and speech transcript 120 Nixon’s speech finished on a topic he often brought up, peace. As Kissinger stated in the background briefing, the Western Hemisphere could serve as the model for building a more peaceful world. Nixon reinforced Kissinger’s point: “we can have lasting peace and progress only if the nations directly concerned take the lead themselves in achieving it.”
He suggested that a “successfully progressing Western Hemisphere” could be “an example for the world.” He then continued, “Understandably, perhaps, a feeling has arisen in many
Latin American countries that the United States really ‘no longer cares.’ Well, my answer to that tonight is very simple. We do care. I care.”303 In a speech filled with somewhat modest proposals, Nixon would finish by setting a rather high visionary bar. Even so, his vision never reached the level of Rockefeller’s Good Neighbor policy or even the much- maligned Alliance for Progress.
In a major policy speech, it can be difficult to tease out the different competing voices within the text. In the case of this speech, the availability of Nixon’s final draft with his personal corrections highlights several points of emphasis. At one point, Nixon expressed a “preference” for democracy, but also offered to “deal realistically with governments in the inter-American system as they are.” Nixon personally wrote the evenhanded verbiage; however, the day before the speech, instead of expressing
“preference” for democracies, his changes indicated he actually “favor(ed) dictatorships.”304 Another change to the speech made by Nixon included the removal of a
303 Richard Nixon: "Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the Inter American Press Association," October 31, 1969. 304 Quotes and analysis from Mark Lawrence, “History from Below: The United States and Latin America in the Nixon Years,” in Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969-1977, ed. Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008): 274. 121 section establishing a Latin America advisor in the NSC, likely at the behest of Kissinger.
The most interesting editorial choice was the removal of another section of the speech.
While the speech espoused U.S. humility and Latin American partnership, Nixon edited out the following, “We have learned that we lack the power to remake the world in our image; and if the principle of non-intervention has meaning, we must also accept the fact that we lack the right to do so.”305 Nixon still reserved the right to intervene in the hemisphere.
The reaction to the president’s speech among his critics in the domestic press was generally poor.306 The response in Latin America, however, as documented by the White
House, was more positive. A summary of newspaper reports and the private opinions of
U.S. ambassadors and embassy personal found the reaction to the speech to be “generally quite favorable.” The praise tended to focus on the tone of the speech, trade measures, and
“emphasis on the US talking less but listening more.” Criticism tended to focus on the need for more specifics, social development, and lack of endorsement of democracy.307 Further reports continued to emphasize the generally positive reaction to the president’s address.
In Mexico, an estimated four million people tuned in to watch a voiced-over Spanish version of the speech translated without commentary. In the Mexican press, Excelsior credited Nixon with a “brilliant speech” and a “profound understanding of Latin American conditions.” The newspaper continued, hoping that his speech would not be “obscured by
305 Ibid. 306 Lawrence, “History from Below,” 273. 307 Viron P. Vaky to Ronald Ziegler “Preliminary Reports on Reactions to President’s Speech,” November 1, 1969, Box 5, [Folder: Latin America 3 of 3], White House Special Files: Ronald Ziegler, RNPL, Yorba Linda, California. 122 Congress.” The news in Brazil followed a similar trajectory. A former government official
Roberto Campos called the reduction in trade barriers and untying of U.S. loans and AID funds “a noble proposal,” while also commenting that in the United States, “Congress has the last word.” Unsurprisingly the most critical reaction to the speech came from Cuba with one radio broadcast calling the speech “pompous” and full of “hypocritical breast- beating.”308 While the White House undoubtedly reveled in the generally positive coverage, the administration needed to build momentum for change.
Nixon continued to sell his vision by releasing the full Rockefeller Report ten days after the speech. The press widely praised the move. The Washington Post led with the headline “Rockefeller’s Report: Worth Waiting For.” They acclaimed the report, calling many of Rockefeller’s proposals “excellent.” The editors also correctly highlighted the strong signal the release of the report sent: “Mr. Nixon in effect applies a blowtorch at his own back; he builds into the Latin-policymaking process a strong outside impetus for change.”309 Another newspaper, The New York Times, also praised the report calling the recommendations “ground-breaking.” Continuing, the newspaper reported that Nixon’s speech, while lacking the Rockefeller Report’s “sense of urgency,” realistically “espoused the report’s philosophy of a new partnership.”310 The positive press would be useful in the short term as the Senate began oversight hearings. Over the longer term, however, Nixon’s
308 “President’s Speech on Latin America Summary,” November 2, 1969, Box 5 [Folder: Latin America 3 of 3], White House Special Files: Ronald Ziegler, RNPL, Yorba Linda, California. 309 “Rockefeller’s Report: Worth Waiting For,” The Washington Post, November 11, 1969. 310 Tad Szulcs, “Rockefeller Fear of New ‘Castros’ Voiced in Report’” New York Times, November 9, 1969. 123 “blowtorch” would backfire when it came time to implement many of the proposals from the Rockefeller Report and his speech.
Rockefeller continued to advocate for the president and his policy proposals before a skeptical U.S. Senate Subcommittee hearing on November 20, 1969. Rockefeller took particular criticism from Senator Church on his view that the United States must continue providing military aid to Latin American countries. Rockefeller strongly felt that many countries in the region, citing Uruguay as an example, would “face chaos and anarchy” without U.S. assistance. Rockefeller additionally faced criticism for not making stronger recommendations on birth control, to which he responded that any imposed solution would be “resented and perhaps counter-productive.” 311 While the Senate was skeptical of some changes, and supportive of others, overall, the president had begun to build some momentum, albeit short-lived, in implementing his Latin American policy vision.
END OF A DECADE
All the executive branch agencies understood Nixon’s guidance when it came to the implementation of his “First Among Equals” principle. Meyer asked all his ambassadors for help in finding situations appropriate for “preferential treatment.” In particular he asked for any areas where “U.S. world-wide policies” could be modified in preference of the country.312 The Inter-American desk at the State Department was onboard
311 For a general history about the unintended consequences of developed countries hawking population control solutions see Matthew Connelly, Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2010). 312 NARA II, RG 59, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs Subject and Country Files 1962-1975, Box: 17, Folder: Chiefs of Mission Conference, “Execution of First Among Equals Principle”, 17 Nov, 1969. 124 with the proposed policy changes and the mood within the administration was one of cautious optimism. By the end of the year, according to one news account, the Nixon administration, speaking on background, was generally disappointed in its foreign policy achievements. Among the “disappointments” were lack of progress in negotiating an end to the Vietnam War, the Nigerian Civil War, and Arab-Israeli conflicts. However, among its accomplishments, which included troop withdrawals from Vietnam, the unnamed White House official touted “new policies toward Asia and Latin America—outlined respectively at Guam last summer and in a speech…in which American involvements in those areas should diminish” as potential positive developments in the administration.313 The conflation of the Guam, later Nixon Doctrine, with Latin America was no accident. Both initiatives involved reducing U.S. presence and influence in an effort to chart a new relationship with the “third world.” December 30, 1969, Kissinger issued a memorandum outlining the president’s position on future U.S.-Latin American negotiations meant to implement the points of Nixon’s speech. Kissinger relayed the president’s specific instructions to “present specific and concrete proposals.” The president wanted the proposals of the U.S. government to be “imaginative and positive,” while maintaining a “style of partnership and dialogue.” He also relayed a large list of specific initiatives the president wanted to work on, including the removal of “nuisance duties,” generalized trade preferences, multilateral aid frameworks, and debt services.314 The memorandum appears to demonstrate a sincere effort by Nixon to engage and improve the U.S. relationship with the region. The year
313 Tom Lambert, “Nixon Reviews Year’s Foreign Policy Results,” Los Angeles Times, December 21, 1969. 314 “Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee,” Washington, December 30, 1969, Box 831, Folder Governor Rockefeller, Jul. 1972: NSC: Name File, RNPL, Yorba Linda, California. 125 therefore ended with Nixon and his team attempting to implement in good faith the essence of his speech. Unfortunately, the dawn of a new decade saw Nixon’s nascent Latin American policy implode due to a variety of factors, many of them beyond the control of the president.
126 Chapter 4: Stillborn Policy “One of the more conspicuous hypocrisies of the American way in foreign policy is our combination of vocal solicitude about the inter-American system with visceral indifference to the Latin American ordeal…deep down most North Americans do not give a damn about Latin America”315
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr
DAWN OF A NEW DECADE
On New Year’s Day 1970 Vaky took some time to reflect on the administration’s
Latin American policy. Almost a year into the job, Vaky, as the senior Latin America advisor in the NSC, had influenced much of Nixon’s Latin American policy, most significantly Nixon’s major speech on the region outlining what he saw as his vision of a new policy for a new administration and a new decade. Vaky felt good about the framework, calling it “realistic, reasonable—even historic,” but was concerned about buy- in from the rest of the U.S. government, which would require acceptance of “some policies that are politically difficult domestically, and money.”316 Even if Nixon’s vision concerning Latin American moved relations with the region forward, Vaky foresaw a rocky road toward implementation. Among the problems he saw coming was a conflict between the administration’s desire for “bold and dramatic policies,” and “the truth of the matter,”
315 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.,” The Lowering Hemisphere”, The Atlantic, January, 1970. Quoted in “Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs,” Washington, January 1, 1970. FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d21. 316 “Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs,” Washington, January 1, 1970. FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969- 76ve10/d21. 127 which was that “the problems the Latins insist on dealing with us about are the undramatic things—trade and loans.” Nixon could have made some progress with these problems, but larger changes would have required congressional approval. Vaky struggled with the details of foreign policy implementation, while Nixon and Kissinger wanted a bigger show and vision outside the resources dedicated to the endeavor. Vaky noted how Kissinger,
“often cited Rockefeller’s Report correctly as having caught people’s imagination as bold and decisive. But the reason it seems dramatic is precisely because it implies commitment of substantially increased inputs of resources and efforts.” If Nixon wanted his dramatic policy, then, Vaky counseled, “we cannot, in short, do anything in this area if we are not willing to seek the resources,” meaning more funding and authorities from Congress. “All right, how do we get it?” wrote Kissinger.317
Nixon would never have his dramatic policies. His Nixon Doctrine on Latin
America failed for a variety of reasons. First, because of domestic resistance and a lack of prioritization for the region, Congress never approved many of the more sweeping changes and needed resources. When he did prioritize the region during his second year in office, it came in response to a crisis that shifted the focus from the important but “undramatic” items essential for changing policy. The lack of resources and authorities from Congress, along with the reaction to the various friction points in the region, meant that Nixon’s hemispheric approach, which relied on trade preferences for countries in the hemisphere, more emphasis on multilateral institutions, and a lower profile for the United States, failed
317 Ibid. 128 before he even hit the halfway point of his first term. This failure of his original Nixon
Doctrine on Latin America caused a shift to a reworked focus on bilateral relations directed towards the larger countries in the region.
The first crisis, a major earthquake in Peru, reinforced the theme of multilateralism
Nixon displayed during the war between El Salvador and Honduras, with the United States acting in concert with other countries to provide aid. This cooperation was not a foregone conclusion as Peru and the United States were still dealing with issues of expropriation.
Other crises in 1970, however, such as the election of leftist Salvador Allende in Chile, nuclear warships in Cuba, and a coup in Bolivia, had different results as Nixon took more unilateral action. A somewhat promising first year in office, when it came to understanding and developing an approach for the hemisphere, stalled in the face of challenges and multiple crises.
OUTLINES OF CHANGE
Within months of the new year, one attempt to nest hemispheric policy within the broader national strategy came in the First Annual Report to the Congress on United States
Foreign Policy for the 1970's. In the report, Nixon’s team recaps many of his ideas from his big Latin American policy speech the previous October. Among the proposed actions is the acknowledgements of a “special meaning” of the bonds between countries within the hemisphere. Improving and maintaining the “special” relationship, Nixon emphasized, would require “new partnership in the Americas” where “all voices are heard and none is predominant.” The mechanism to make these vague words actionable revolved around a 129 key shift in the administration’s policy, a change from bilateral accords, to a multilateral approach.318 Leaders within Bolivia, Chile, and Venezuela saw “’positive aspects’ in the report,” while certain editorialists only saw “rhetoric.”319 What the report did, however, was lay out a blueprint for congressional action required to implement Nixon’s policies.
In preparation for a special meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social
Council, Organization of American States (IA-ECOSOC) in September, Nixon approved multiple tariff reductions and directed an increase in development funds toward “technical assistance” for economic projects. He also codified his previous pledge to “untie” aid, thus allowing the donor countries to purchase goods in Latin America instead of requiring the purchase of U.S. materials with assistance funds. He also reemphasized his commitment to finish the Pan-American highway.320 It was a good first effort in making changes to improve trade relations and make foreign aid policy slightly more effective. Allowing the purchase of local goods with aid dollars was a particularly welcome change.
As the August IA-ECOSOC meeting approached, Nixon received four options on how to proceed with the question on trade. The first option included “insignificant imports” which were already subject to “relatively low duties,” and, in deference to acknowledged congressional skepticism, “would probably evoke little domestic opposition.” Option two
318 “First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970’s. | The American Presidency Project,” accessed November 29, 2018, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/first- annual-report-the-congress-united-states-foreign-policy-for-the-1970s. 319 CREST “Press Reaction to President Nixon’s Report on U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s,” 26 February, 1970. 320 “Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon,” Washington, January 29, 1970. FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d24. 130 raised the total number of imports subject to reduced tariffs by sixty-two million dollars and increased the risk of domestic backlash slightly, but would “probably arouse concern from competing domestic producers.” Every government agency except for the State
Department and U.S. AID opposed this option. Options three and four were even more robust, so much so that the Agriculture and Interior departments listed the proposed tariffs as “impossible” to remove.321 Nixon chose option two, showing his willingness to take some risk with the domestic producers to advance his Latin American agenda outlined in the October 1969 speech.322
Members of Congress approached Nixon’s agenda with skepticism at best. Senator
Frank Church offered some praise of Nixon in working with his subcommittee, noting that he “is aware of much of the work of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on
Western Hemisphere Affairs.” He also approved of much of his October speech, particularly trade preferences; however, he did not like the emphasis on military assistance which was already becoming a hallmark of Nixon’s policy.323
The Senate’s chief Latin American staff member, Pat Holt, was more skeptical of
Nixon’s attempted changes. The most significant proposal that Nixon sent to Congress was legislation to upgrade the current chief position of Latin America in the bureaucracy to
321 “Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee (Samuels) to President Nixon,” Washington, August 29, 1970. FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d28. 322 “National Security Decision Memorandum 83,” Washington, September 7, 1970. FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d29. 323 Boise State Library HSS 56 Frank Church Collection: Series 2.2; Bos 45; Folder 1 Latin America #1 ; Letter from Church to Kim Mills, January 13, 1970.
131 Under Secretary of State for Western Hemispheric Affairs. This legislation was a compromise between Rockefeller’s advocacy for a separate cabinet officer for the region and the current organizational structure. Holt was concerned that this would prioritize the hemisphere more than other important regions such as, “the only other power in the world present[sic] capable of blowing us up.”
He also saw the entire exercise as a gimmick “to cover the lack of substance.” Holt, who clearly did not have a high opinion of Latin American politicians, used condescending language to claim that they were already, “completely bewildered by the organization of the U.S. government,” continuing that “Latins are even more beguiled by political rhetoric than we.” He walked back his rhetoric somewhat when he noted that they would understand
“the difference between form and substance.” His strongest objection was that the position was less a matter of organizational change and more about “forcefulness of his [the position holder’s] personality and the degree to which it is clear to all concerned he has White House support.” According to Holt if he has these qualities “you can call him Assistant Janitor and he will still get the job done.”324 Ultimately, though, Congress would not enact Nixon’s requested changes, leaving Nixon with more limited options for how he could effect change.
At least part of the issue was a disagreement over how to evolve hemispheric foreign policy. Senator Church’s vision, for instance, agreed with much of what Nixon and
324 “Memorandum to Senator Church from Pat M Holt,” Untitled, January 20, 1970. Folder Chronological File 1970 January-March; Box 4; Pat Holt Papers; Herbert Hoover Presidential Library and Museum, West Branch, Iowa.
132 the Rockefeller Report identified as the problems in the region, but differed on some key details. Church agreed with aspects of the Rockefeller report, noting the problems of previous programs, especially the Alliance for Progress, which by 1970 had turned into primarily a loan program and not an aid program. He also agreed with the administration that much of the change in the region had to come from within, noting that “success or failure may be marginally influenced, but cannot be bestowed from without—by the US or any other foreign power.” Like Nixon he also saw the Catholic Church as an agent of change in a “Latin America, steeped in the Christian tradition.” He continued by arguing that “those in the forefront of the struggle for radical, even revolutionary, reform today are more likely to be found wearing Roman collars than carrying red banners.”325
Many of the current problems in dealing with the region, according to Church, were not due to Nixon or any other presidential administration, but were generated by Congress: namely, poorly structured “punishments” such as the Hickenlooper Amendment and the necessity of creating a “a package of contradictory arguments” because that is what was required to “get the needed votes,”326 Overall, Church argued, current policy toward the region was a net negative, particularly the amount of military aid provided to the governments of Latin America.
Church’s solutions in many ways overlapped with Nixon’s. First, give countries a
“better break” in terms of trade regulation. Second “start to observe, as well as praise, the
325 Boise State Library HSS 56 Frank Church Collection: Series 2.2; Bos 45; Folder 1 Latin America #1 ; Christianity and Crisis Vol. XXX, No 3, March 2, 1970; “Toward a New Policy for Latin America.” By Frank Church 326 Ibid. 133 principle of non-intervention.” Third, transition away from bilateral aid to multilateral aid, namely the newly established “Inter-American Social Development Institute.” The final point was the agreed upon need to “lower the silhouette of the U.S,” a concept not so different from Nixon’s “mature partnership” concept outlined in his October speech before the Inter American Press Association.327
Senator Church and Nixon, even though they agreed in principle on several points, were never able to make much progress in implementing a trade-based multilateral policy.
The reasons varied: part was due to resistance in Congress and to a decreased emphasis by the executive branch on fighting for changes as 1970 became more about crisis management in the region; and part was due to a fundamental difference of opinion concerning the role of the military in the region. Church was particularly adamant on the need to end military assistance programs and training, arguing that; “after all, the recent war between El Salvador and Honduras was possible, in large part, by our gift of arms and training programs eagerly extended to both sides.”328 Nixon consistently supported military training and assistance for the region and was not willing to move much on that issue.
Regardless of the reasons, the implementation of the Rockefeller Report’s recommendations through normal congressional actions was a failure. Without the ability to influence the regions through new funds and congressional authorities, the Nixon administration would search out other levers of influence.
327 Ibid. 328 Ibid. 134 RICHARD NIXON: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN LATIN AMERICA
One such lever of influence was the Catholic Church. The Rockefeller Report identified the Church, along with the military, as the two traditional forces that brought
“stability” to the region.329 Nixon agreed with this sentiment, and had become particularly concerned about “subversive” elements within the church, to the point that he had ordered the CIA to investigate the extent of communist infiltration within the Catholic Church.330
Nixon was only able to enact small programs to support the traditional church, but his actions demonstrated an awareness of the complexity of the region and an understanding of some of the less obvious sources of power and influence. These less conventional foreign policy tools became more predominant in the administration as more overt methods, such as those suggested in the Rockefeller Report failed to materialize.
Sometime in the month of February 1970, Henry Kissinger received a document from Nelson Rockefeller’s brother, David, reporting Communist subversion in the Catholic
Church. A clandestine organization Sint Unum, primarily made up of French and German
Catholics, authored the study, entitled “an Analysis of Subversion Within the South
American Church.” with an eye toward countering the subversive elements within the
Church. The study, while ostensibly focused on Latin America, dealt with subversive elements in the entire Roman Catholic Church. The opening line of the study mentioned,
“it is impossible to comprehend subversion in the South American Church, without also
329 Nelson A. Rockefeller, The Rockefeller Report on the Americas: The Official Report of a United States Presidential Mission for the Western Hemisphere, New York Times edition (Quadrangle Books, 1969), 31. 330 See Chapter 1 135 understanding subversion in the Catholic Church at a global level.”331 The study proposed an action plan to fight the subversive elements over five years at the cost of $13.4 million.
The cost would cover three monthly publications published from Rome, Paris, and
Montreal, along with eight information/action centers in Latin America. David
Rockefeller, acting as the middleman, passed on the plan to Kissinger to see if the U.S government would fund any part of the campaign.332
While Kissinger felt that much of the report was “probably true,” concerning subversive elements within the Catholic Church, he felt that “it is too risky for the U.S to become involved in financing a counter-movement within the Church.” He suggested, if
President Nixon approved, that he could have the president’s advisor, Peter Flannigan, talk to the Archbishop of New York, Terrence Cooke. Cooke, whom the Vatican had recently named a Cardinal, might have understood “the general situation of subversion in the
Church and what measures the Church itself might undertake.”333 President Nixon agreed with Kissinger and had Peter Flanigan make discreet inquiries to Cardinal Cooke. Flanigan later wrote he had also asked to meet with the representative of Sint Unum Jean Violet.334
While Kissinger and Nixon wisely chose not to fund a theological movement within the
331 The Report was written in French entitled “Analyse de la subersion dans l’Eglise d’Amérique du Sud” The first line is “est absolument impossible de comprendre la subversion dans l’Eglise Sud-Américaine si l’on ne commece pas par une vision d’ensemble de la subversion communiste dans l’Eglise Catholique á l’échelon Mondial.” Rockefeller received the report from unnamed “friends” 332 “Memorandum for the President: Study in Subversion in the Catholic Church”, Undated, Vatican File; RNPL, Yorba Linda, California. 333 Cabot Lodge Reports on his Second Vatican Tour, December 31, 1970, Vatican File, RNPL, Yorba Linda, California. 334 Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger from Peter Flanigan, February 24, 1970, Vatican File, RNPL, Yorba Linda, California. 136 Catholic Church, Nixon did fund some pilot humanitarian aid projects in conjunction with bishops from Peru and Guatemala using the church as one lever of influence to advance
U.S. interests.335
Nixon, in a departure from Johnson, had reestablished limited diplomatic relations with the Vatican. The experienced diplomat Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., formerly the ambassador to Vietnam, found himself leading the delicate mission of reopening dialogue with Vatican. Lodge’s discussion with the Vatican spanned the globe, in keeping with the worldwide influence of the Holy See. With respect to Latin America, Ambassador
Lodge proposed a program to work with a Catholic humanitarian charity in a Latin
American country. The country chosen should have an Archbishop “in the progressive camp, but also willing to engage in talks with those who did not agree with him.” Lodge continued by stating this program would not be contingent on a “quid pro quo,” but stated,
“the proposal is stimulated by the hope that it might discover some points of agreement on which common action in the future would be mutually advantageous.”336 While not mentioned in his memorandum, Lodge presented his plan to the president in the presence of Peter Flanigan.337 The emphasis of trying to find leftist Bishops who could be persuaded to change their minds for government projects was a novel idea that came from outside the usual internal government channels.
336 Cabot Lodge Reports on his Second Vatican Tour, December 31, 1970, Vatican File, RNPL, Yorba Linda, California. 337 See presidential daily diary 6 August, 1970. 137 Before the State Department could fully implement Lodge’s plan, President Nixon traveled to Vatican City to meet with Pope Paul VI. According to Henry Kissinger’s memoir, visiting the Vatican allowed him to perform a “review of the international situation with one of the most sensitive and thoughtful men [Pope Paul VI] I encountered in my public service.” According to Kissinger the Pope was, “better than almost any leading figure I encountered, he understood the moral dilemmas of a period in which tyranny marched under the banners of freedom, and how "reform" ran the risk of creating soulless bureaucracies.” During his audience Nixon brought up the situation in Chile, calling it “serious but not lost,” and asked the pope to “discreetly influence the situation.”338
Nixon also at one point according to Kissing was “waxing eloquent” about the leftist inclinations of many Latin American priests when the Pope interrupted him and said “Mr.
President, this is even more of a problem for us than it is for you.” 339
PERU EARTHQUAKE
As the Nixon administration tried to influence Latin America through a broader multilateral approach and attempted to move legislation through Congress, they faced a series of crises in the latter half of 1970 that caused them to lose focus on multilateral issues and instead focus on regional actors on a bilateral basis. The first of these challenges occurred in Peru, still embroiled in an expropriation crisis that began under President
338 Quoted in Tanya Harmer, Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War (Chapel Hill, N.C: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 61. 339 Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 924. 138 Johnson with Standard Oil and the United States. Nixon had not imposed any direct sanctions on Peru, but sponsored a policy that restricted Peru’s access to funds. Since April,
1970 U.S. agencies, or international agencies which the U.S. controlled, had not approved any new loans to Peru, and U.S governmental agencies, including AID and the embassy, were on minimal staffing. The Peruvian ambassador even remarked that "it was generally believed that Hickenlooper Amendment already applied since no credits and no loans [are] forthcoming from us [the United States]."340
The harshest action, however, came from suspension of loans from the World Bank and the Export-Import bank.341 The unofficial sanctions and diplomatic pressure reached such a point that by May of 1970 Peru felt the need to go on the offensive and fight what they considered an “attack” on Peru. This offensive included meetings with diplomats and favorable newspaper reports calling out the “imperialists.”342 The escalation in rhetoric would likely have led to a harsher response from the United States, but on May 31, 1970, disaster struck the small Andean country.
On a Sunday afternoon, an earthquake initially measuring 7.75 on the Richter scale, with the epicenter in the Pacific Ocean about two hundred miles off the coast of Lima,
340 “Telegram 3904 From the Embassy in Peru to the Department of State, May 27, 1969,” in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, vol. E-10, Documents on American Republics, 1969–1972, available online at http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d602. 341 “Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 29, 1969,” in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, vol. E-10, Documents on American Republics, 1969–1972 available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d611. 342 “Peru Is Attempting to Improve Her Image Abroad: Government Seeks to Counter Criticism by Explaining Expropriation Policy Government Formed in Coup,” New York Times, May 24, 1970. 139 struck the country of Peru.343 Within a few days of the earthquake, the estimated death toll stood at thirty thousand with the majority lost in the town of Yungay. Initial aerial surveillance spotted an avalanche that buried the town almost completely. Authorities estimated that only about twenty-five hundred of a population of twenty thousand survived.344 Later more accurate accounting would show this estimate was optimistic. In a town of approximately 25,600, only about 350 people survived, three hundred of whom were children who were on higher ground attending a circus and were led to safety by one of the clowns.345
During this awful tragedy, political differences subsided, and the international community responded to help. As one newspaper stated, the earthquake led to a “giant chain of human solidarity” in support of the “victims of the earthquake.”346 One of the first messages of condolence and monetary assistance came from Pope Paul VI. While the ten thousand dollars he contributed personally would not go very far, his words of comfort would have a spiritual impact on the overwhelmingly Catholic country.347 Other countries soon followed, offering more material aid.
Planes laden with relief supplies flew into Lima from all over the world. The flights carried medicines, blood, food, and other necessities. Chile, for example, flew in an entire
343 Measurements in the documentary evidence range from a low of 7.0 to a high of 8.0 on the Richter scale. The differences are likely due to the different measurements at different seismograph sites. 344 “Han Muerto 30 Mil Caraz y Yungay Arrasados; Gobierno Fija 705 Mllns. Para Ayudar a Toda la Zona,” La Prensa, June 3, 1970. 345 “Yungay 1970-2009 Remember the Tragedy of The Earthquake,” The Peruvian Times, May 31, 2009, http://www.peruviantimes.com/31/yungay-1970-2009-remembering-the-tragedy-of-the-earthquake/3073/. 346 “Afectados Reciben Ayuda Nacional y del Extranjero,” La Prensa, June 2, 1970. 347 “Papa Envía mensage de Pesar Y Aporte de Diez Mil Dólares,” La Prensa, June 3, 1970. 140 field hospital in four planes to help tend to the wounded. Other countries that sent supplies included Argentina, Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Italy, Colombia, France, and Great
Britain. The International Red Cross also quickly mobilized, sending to Peru two hundred and thirty thousand dollars in emergency aid.348 Even IPC, embroiled in a bitter dispute with Peru, donated considerable resources to the relief effort.349
The United States was the most generous contributor to Peru. As with the rest of the world, the scope of the damage horrified U.S officials. One U.S Army officer working in the canal zone recounted how he received a cable from Lima claiming “twenty-five thousand dead”, and thought to himself “the text was garbled.”350 Unfortunately the message came through correctly. The initial response by the U.S was a military one, but unlike the armed Latin American interventions of the past, this military response was a coordinated recovery effort.
The U.S military generated relief efforts from military installation located in the
Panama Canal Zone. A small overtaxed seven-person Military Assistance and Advisory
Group (MAAG) coordinated all U.S efforts on the ground until the embassy could set up a command post.351 Unfortunately, the “informal” reduction in U.S personal in Peru made the U.S coordination effort more challenging. Within a few days, the U.S military began introducing other assets including fixed wing and rotary wing aviation. Helicopters from
348 “Llegarón Más Aviones Con Ayuda del Extranjero,” La Prensa, June 5, 1970. 349 Lawrence A. Clayton, Peru and the United States: The Condor and the Eagle, United States and the Americas (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1999), 307. 350 Clayton, Peru and the United States, 306. 351 Headquarters U.S Army Forces Southern Command: Historical Summary 1970, FRC 31, Record Group 530, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD., VII-4. 141 both the Canal Zone and the continental United States, in coordination with the Peruvian
Air Force, helped ferry relief supplies to isolated communities where the earthquake had made roads impassable. The Navy had also re-tasked the amphibious assault ship the USS
Guam and her sixteen helicopters to aid the Peruvian government. The ship arrived on 11
June and immediately began assisting in the relief effort.352 The next few days, 12-16 June, marked the high point of the operation with 211 military personal on the ground, excluding the crew of the USS Guam, processing and delivering medical aid and supplies throughout
Peru. The government of Peru recognized the efforts of the U.S military by awarding the
Peruvian Cross for Military Merit to fifteen U.S military personal in recognition of their efforts to save lives.353
While only a small part of the larger U.S aid package, the Department of Defense spent almost 1.3 million dollars and moved almost two million pounds of cargo. Even if the overall mission was a success, the military ran into some execution problems. In addition to the issue of reduced embassy presence, the military had no in-country disaster plan and had to improvise. The improvisation caused basic coordination issues, such as lack of passports and diplomatic status for the servicemen on the mission. The initial confusion led to some unfortunate events, such as a skilled neurosurgeon who flew into
Lima from Miami, sitting for three days in Lima before leaving in disgust, and the case of a French plane full of rotted frozen chickens because the plane sat on the runway waiting
352 Ibid., VII-5. and “Portaviones de EU Viene Hacia Chimbote,” La Prensa, June 6, 1970. 353 Ibid., VII-7. 142 on Peruvian customs. 354
The U.S response took other forms besides sending military units to provide and distribute aid. The Peace Corp director Joseph Blatchford, for instance, took a keen interest in what he characterized as “the worst tragedy ever in South America.” Many Americans had been communicating with his agency, and he was concerned that four days after the tragedy Nixon had not made a public statement on the Earthquake. Kissinger promised
Blatchford that he president would soon be releasing some sort of message.355 The message came on 8 June when President Nixon announced a ten million dollar grant package to
Peru Nixon concurrently announced the appointment of Robert Finch to coordinate and lead the relief efforts. It was also the same day that the Peruvian government revised its death toll upward to fifty thousand.356 Additionally, many Congressmen set-aside politics and introduced resolutions of condolence for the victims of the Peruvian disaster.357 The outpouring of support overlooked serious issues, such as expropriation, which at least for the moment was not on the agenda.
Nixon, however, wanted to send a stronger message than mere dollars and a bureaucratic appointee. At first, he considered a presidential visit and had his staff draw up an itinerary and begin initial planning.358 However, Nixon decided against making the trip personally and instead sent his wife Pat, explaining that he wanted the trip to show a more
354 Ibid., V-9-10. 355 TELCON,“[Earthquake in Peru],” June 3, 1970. 356 “Stricken Peru Given $10-Million by U.S.,” New York Times, June 9, 1970. 357 Richard J. Walter, Peru and the United States, 1960-1975: How Their Ambassadors Managed Foreign Relations in a Turbulent Era (University Park: Penn State University Press, 2010), 231. 358TELCON, “[President Nixon to Visit Mexico and Peru],”, June 14, 1970. 143 personal concern. It was Mrs. Nixon’s first major overseas trip by herself. While Nixon billed the trip as personal, the first lady still received shrewd diplomatic advice and constructed an itinerary that allowed her to see the damage and interact with the predominately-indigenous victims instead of sequestering herself in Lima.359
The Peruvian government welcomed Pat Nixon’s visit with Velasco, labeling the visit a “noble gesture” before the First Lady arrived.360 Pat landed on 28 June in Air Force
One which was filled with close to ten tons of relief supplies.361 General Velasco’s wife
Consuela Gonzales de Velasco and First Lady of Peru greeted her on the tarmac. Over the next three days, Pat participated in official events in Lima and also visited the disaster victims in Huerta, Peru, meeting with many of the local children.362 Mrs. Nixon’s final act before she left Peru was to visit a children’s hospital where many of the youngest victims of the earthquake were recovering. As she left the country, Peru’s First Lady remarked,
“She is a marvelous woman who has conquered the heart of all of Peru.”
While the human toll was incalculable, with the generosity of the international community, particularly the United States, the Peruvians stood to gain economically. The earthquake did not damage the major industrial areas of Peru that were predominately in the south. These included the larger cotton and sugar farms, mining operations, and fishmeal factories. What the earthquake did damage were low cost adobe homes, which the
359 TELCON, “[Itinerary for Patricia Nixon’s Trip to Peru],” June 26, 1970. 360“ La Señora Nixon Llega en Visita Por el Sismo Hoy,” La Prensa, June 28, 1970. 361 Jonathan Movroydis, “Pat Nixon Launches Humanitarian Effort in Peru - The New Nixon,” accessed December 5, 2014, http://blog.nixonfoundation.org/2014/06/pat-nixon-launches-humanitarian-effort-peru/. 362 “The First Ladies of U.S. And Peru See Quake Area,” New York Times, June 30, 1970. 144 government expected the poor indigenous population to replace without any help.363
Nixon was fully aware of the strength Velasco drew from the earthquake, noting in a memorandum on further aid to Peru “I want to give Velasco just as little as we can—in specifics—He is using the earthquake to build his socialist state.”364 Nixon was correct, but ultimately the earthquake, and a later 1972 flooding disaster, meant that Nixon would not be able to push tough measures for the rest of his presidency.365
The response to the devastating earthquake in Peru provided a relief valve for the tensions between the two countries and Nixon was able to use the international power projection capacity of the United States to help alleviate suffering. The unintended, but not unforeseen, consequence of the humanitarian response was a decline in diplomatic pressure on the expropriation crisis.
COMMUNISTS IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH: THE RISE OF ALLENDE IN CHILE366
After the earthquake in Peru, a series of crises in the region developed in the fall of 1970 that would overlap and feed off each other. One such crisis was a developing political situation in one of the more traditionally stable countries in the region—Chile. The
363 “Quake Brings Gains To Peru With Loss,” New York Times, June 14, 1970. 364 “Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, October 12, 1970,” in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, vol. E-10, Documents on American Republics, 1969–1972, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d620. 365 For a different viewpoint see Hal Brands, “The United States and the Peruvian Challenge, 1968-1975,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 21, no. 3 (September 2010): 481. He argues that tensions ratchet back up in 1972. This is true, but temporary. NSSM 158 drafted in late 1972 recommends some gentle pressure, but also eased up on export-import credits, and the final settlement with IPC in 1974 by most measures clearly favored the Peruvians. Additionally, Peru had little problem finding foreign credit acquiring a foreign debt of three billion dollars by the end of Velasco’s rule. 366 The true complexity and scale of the U.S. involvement in Chile was a particularly massive undertaking, for the purpose of this section the focus will be on the key decision makers in the executive branch around the events of the election of Salvador Allende. 145 arguments over the events in Chile from 1970-1973 for a variety of reasons, including a major congressional investigation and legal challenges, have captured the imagination of multiple scholars and activists in a way that no other area of Latin America during the time of Nixon has.367 In 1970, Salvador Allende ran as the consensus candidate of several left-wing parties, including the Communist party, and won the majority of votes in the Chilean presidential election on September 4, 1970. The election of Allende was not a complete shock to the United States government. By June of 1970, the 40 Committee, which oversaw U.S. covert and clandestine actions abroad, had begun to show some concern that Allende could win. U.S. intelligence indicated that the two U.S. preferred candidates, Radomiro Tomic and Jorge Allesandri, were “slipping,” due to ineffective messaging, while Allende “seemed to be gaining a head of steam.” As the committee members debated providing more money to sabotage a potential Allende victory, the State Department representative in the room, Alexis Johnson, the Undersecretary for Political Affairs, relayed the dissent from the Inter-American desk led by Assistant Secretary Meyer and his own “philosophical reservations.”368 Kissinger, who chaired the 40 Committee meeting, wanted a more forceful response stating: “I don’t see why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people.”369 In this one statement, Kissinger managed to reinforce
367 See for example the following: Tanya Harmer, Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War (Chapel Hill, N.C: University of North Carolina Press, 2011); Lubna Z Qureshi, Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010); Jonathan Haslam, The Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende’s Chile: A Case of Assisted Suicide (New York; New York: 2005). For a short article that covers many of the key points of the debate see “Fleeing the Chilean Coup: The Debate over U.S. Complicity.” Foreign Affairs, Jan./Feb. 2004. 368 The 40 committee had already provided some funds for advertising and propaganda on 25 March 1970; see “Memorandum for the 40 committee,” Washington, August 31, 1970. FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume E-16: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve16/d16. 369 DNSA, “Chile—Political Action Related to 1970 Presidential Election,” June 27, 1970. 146 both his preoccupation with communism and the low regard in which he held the people of Chile. Ultimately, the committee chose to approve a $300,000 “infusion” of money in an attempt to sway the election. A week before, the election polls indicated that Alessandri was leading, but Allende was within striking distance. The consensus government view was that a victory by Allende would lead to an “authoritarian Marxist state” and subsequently a parade of horribles, including: “suppression of free elections, the state ownership of all or almost all business enterprises, the establishment of state farms, and the imposition of police-backed labor discipline.”370 Alessandri’s lead in the opinion polls vanished on election day, and it was now up to the Nixon administration to determine a suitable response. A week after the election of Allende, Nixon and Kissinger discussed the “big problem” that was Chile. By that point several outsiders had contacted either Kissinger or Nixon. Among these personalities were ex-CIA director John McCone, who was now on the board of Chile’s telephone provider International Telegraph and Telephone (ITT), and future PepsiCo CEO Don Kendall. These outside voices were the ones pushing for a forceful response since the government civil servants were more cautious in the handling of Allende’s victory.371 In addition, Augustine Edwards, the owner of the conservative Chilean newspaper El Mercurio, also communicated directly with Kissinger and Nixon himself, advocating for a strong response to a military coup to prevent Allende from taking the mantle of leadership in Chile.372
370 “Memorandum for the 40 committee,” Washington, August 31, 1970. FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume E-16: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve16/d16. 371 TELCON, “President/Kissinger” December 9,1970. 372 See “Agustin Edwards: A Declassified Obituary | National Security Archive,” accessed November 14, 2018, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/chile/2017-04-25/agustin-edwards-declassified-obituary. 147 Some voices within the administration, however, argued for a more measured reaction. Vaky, for instance, reported and emphasized the CIA conclusions that, “Military action is impossible.”373 Vaky was one of the few officials thinking of the unintended consequence of keeping Allende from the presidency, arguing that; “If Allende is defeated in the run-off, he and his supporters are most likely to go to the streets.” He continued with, “violence and even insurrection is a possibility.”374 He was also very concerned with what would happen to Nixon and the administration due to the consequences of “exposure of US involvement” calling such an outcome “this Administration’s Bay of Pigs.”375 What Vaky recommended instead was supporting the longshot political solution that the lame duck president of Chile, Eduardo Frei. The novel Frei plan, was a moonshot maneuver to resign the presidency and then run in a special election to undercut Allende. 376 Vaky ends with perhaps his most damning indictment of potential action against Allende:
What we propose is patently a violation of our own principles and policy tenets. Moralism aside, this has practical operational consequences. Are they rhetoric or do they have meaning? If these principles have any meaning, we normally depart from them only to meet the gravest threat to us, e.g., to our survival. Is Allende a mortal threat to the US? It is hard to argue this.
373 Emphasis in original see “Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),” Washington, August 31, 1970. FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume XXI: CHILE1969-1973, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d86. 374 Ibid. 375 Ibid. 376 Frei would later deny ever supporting such a plan. See Kissinger, White House Years, 672. 148 Furthermore, Vaky was not convinced that the election of Allende would serve as any sort of communist foothold in the region calling his “Marxist state” as “containable.”377 It is unclear whether Nixon ever received any of Vaky’s warnings, or if they sat on Kissinger’s desk.
A September 14 meeting of the 40 Committee approved support of the Frei plan with the codename “Rube Goldberg” and set aside $250,000 to support the scheme. This would eventually become known as Track I.378 Track II, which Nixon would direct the next day, involved the sort of covert adventurism that Vaky recommended against. In a meeting with only Nixon, Kissinger, CIA director Richard Helms, and Attorney General John Mitchell,
Nixon ordered a CIA operation in support of actions to prevent Allende from ascending the presidency independent of the Frei gambit and independent of the embassy. Nixon admitted perhaps a “1 in 10 chance” of success, but was “not concerned [about] risks involved.” He included with an exhortation to “make the economy scream.”379 It was now up to the bureaucracy to implement the president’s impulsive guidance.
Vaky, who had made his case two days before, appeared to understand that he had lost the bureaucratic battle, and it was now up to him to try to salvage what he could. He was clearly concerned, calling U.S. plans a “long-shot,” but hoped to avoid “unprofessional activism” and” bureaucratic resistance.” He offered a plan to either set up a coordination
377 “Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),” Washington, August 31, 1970. FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume XXI: CHILE1969-1973, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d86 378 Kissinger, White House Years, 672. 379 Nixon’s orders came from Helm’s handwritten notes, NSA, “CIA, Notes on Meeting with the President on Chile,” September 15, 1970, available online at https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/docs/doc26.pdf 149 cell or send “an expert” to manage the covert operations in Chile.380 On the same day he offered his expertise, Vaky’s boss Kissinger provided one of his routine background briefings to the press. When the subject of Chile came up he predicted that should Allende officially become Chile’s president after the congressional vote, it would “present massive problems” for the United States, “and indeed to the whole Western Hemisphere.”381
Management of this crisis was now underway, though at this point it was unclear how far the United States government was willing to push in order to prevent Allende’s election.
As the situation developed over the next several weeks, Vaky, with his usual analytical astuteness, advised Kissinger that he saw “no chance” that any actions supported by the Nixon administration could “prevent Allende’s election” from being finalized on October 24, and any thoughts to the contrary would be only “kidding ourselves.” This is not to say that Vaky recommended doing nothing since he recommended a range of actions such as “cut[ing] aid,” and “cold but correct” diplomacy toward Allende which would include “consultation with key states—Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela—to build a de facto entente.”382
Vaky, was no dove when it came to accepting Allende and clearly saw him as a threat to the region and the United States; however, he had a much more analytical and experienced view on the situation than either Nixon or Kissinger did.
380 Nothing ever came of his recommendations. “Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),” Washington, September 16, 1970. FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume XXI: CHILE1969-1973, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d95 381 Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-Third Congress, Washington: GPO, 1973, Part2, pp. 542-3. 382 CREST, “40 Committee Meeting—Chile—October 6, 1970,” 5 October, 1970. 150 In the next day’s 40 committee meeting Meyer, laid out the economic problems companies such as Ford and Anaconda were expected to face under Allende. He offered no new ideas for how to stop Allende’s accession. Kissinger, breaking strongly from Vaky, called for “drastic action” to “shock the Chileans into action.” Kissinger then stated that “higher authority” wanted “no stone left unturned.”383 While no major new initiative came out of the meeting, it was clear that Vaky’s call to accept the election and move on to managing Allende had fallen on deaf ears.
Eventually Kissinger realized the folly of supporting a coup at this stage and on
October 15 he informed the president that he assessed a coup as “hopeless” and had “turned it off.” Nixon appeared to accept the failure of a coup, but did not trust his own bureaucracy to maintain pressure on Allende and was afraid that “Charles Meir[sic] (phonetic) will get him in his clutches and continue a lot of AID.”384 Others outside the administration also began to notice that Meyer was not a particularly effective or influential chief official of hemispheric policy. An ITT analysis of Meyer found him to have “great personal charm, elegance and wit,” but found him to be “ineffective in the bureaucratic infighting,” having “bad judgement in dealing with the press,” and “only secondary or tertiary relations with the President” who “from the beginning has relied on his National Security Council team, Henry Kissinger, and Latin
America specialist Viron Vaky for top guidance.”385
383 “Memorandum for the Record,” Washington, October 6, 1970. FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume XXI: Chile, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d138 384 TELCON, “The President/Mr. Kissinger,” October 15, 1970. 385 DNSA, “[Opinion about Charles Meyer],” November 4,1970. 151 The Foreign Relations Committee and Congress meanwhile knew about some of the surface issues in Chile, but not the full extent of the CIA’s planning and involvement.
In September 1970, Pat Holt, one of the lead U.S. congressional staffers on Latin America, received information from a newspaper reporter that Ambassador Ed Korry was acting like a “crazy man,” “conjuring up visions of Prague in 1948,” insinuating a communist takeover.386 Holt also recalled that Congress asked the State Department for correspondence to Chile and the State Department refused to give it. As the Chilean situation heated up in October, Senator Fulbright had a conversation with Helms stating something to the effect that “Look, we don’t have any means to accomplish this even if we wanted to,” talking about stopping Allende from taking power. While Helms may have believed that, Track I and II were designed to do just what he said was not possible. The belief in Congress was that while the “Nixon administration never made any secret of its dislike of Allende,”387 the official line was that Chile was a poor credit risk, which Holt agreed with stating, “God knows [it] was true.” Finally, Holt believed that the situation in
Chile had minimal effects overall on working Latin American relations, even if “it contributed to the already well-developed paranoia in the Third World about the CIA.”388
On the same day that Chile’s Congress ratified Allendes victory, Nixon’s longtime translator and confidant on the region, Major General Vernon Walters, framed Latin
386 Herbert Hoover Oral History Program: Interview with Pat Holt; Pat Holt Papers; Herbert Hoover Presidential Library and Museum, West Branch, Iowa. 387 Ibid. 388 Ibid. 152 America as a “key area” in the “mortal struggle” that is the nature of the Cold War.389
Walters privileged Latin America because “its resources, the social and economic problems of its population, its proximity to the U.S. and its future potential make it a priority target for the enemies of the U.S.”390 Walters argued for a forceful response stating that the policy of “coddling of leftists as in Chile has been proven a failure.”391 Nixon particularly focused on Walter’s recommendation concerning the military where he argued that the United
States “can give them a sense of participation and consultation as we give our European allies” continuing with an argument to “collaborate with friendly regimes and help them solve their grave economic and social problems….” The argument that really drew Nixon’s eye was a call to “move actively (not necessarily openly) against our opponents, they will respect us for it.” The longtime spy appealed to Nixon’s instincts to both look tough and use covert means to secure U.S. interests in Latin America. It is not surprising therefore that Nixon underlined the preceding quote and scribbled in the margins, “this should be our line.”392
During an NSC meeting on Chile, Nixon heard and commented on several ideas on how to approach an Allende administration, including economic proposals to sell copper from the strategic stockpile. However, at the end of the meeting Nixon went into a monologue that highlighted his evolving doctrine on Latin American relations. First, he refocused on the larger
389 “Memorandum From the Senior Military Attaché in Paris (Walters) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),” Washington, November 3, 1970. FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d30. 390 Ibid. 391 Ibid. 392 Ibid. 153 powers in the region, saying “the game is in Brazil and Argentina.” Nixon had a true sense of the importance of Brazil, noting that “Brazil has more people than France or England combined.” Second, he doubled down on support of the military, stating he would “never agree with the policy of downgrading the military in Latin America.” Following Vaky’s advice,
Nixon’s overall intent was a relationship that was “very cool and very correct.”393
Nixon’s initial instincts to try to solve the “problem” of Allende via covert means had failed. Nixon understood the CIA tactics in Chile did not have a realistic chance at success, but he took the chance anyway. Chile was a place where U.S. unilateralism had failed, and Nixon at the NSC meeting seemed to understand that, which is why he wanted to focus on developing military relationships in the region and bringing some of the larger powers such as Brazil onboard. However, before he could move the administration to refocus efforts on Brazil, several more crises were either developing, or were already brewing in the region.
THE CUBAN CRISIS AT CIENFUEGOS THAT NEVER WAS
On the southern end of Cuba, the city of Cienfuegos, with its natural port and colonial-era buildings, became a Cold War flashpoint in the Autumn of 1970. On September 16 an Air Force U-2 reconnaissance plane found evidence of a significant Soviet buildup at Cienfuegos, including “new barracks and administrative buildings.”394 Additionally, the surveillance photos showed evidence of recreation facilities, such as soccer and basketball courts. Kissinger saw the photos two days later and took the intelligence files from CIA director Richard Helms and dropped them on Nixon’s chief of
393 “Memorandum of Conversation of a Meeting of the National Security Council,” Washington, November 6, 1970. FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume XXI: Chile, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d173. 394 Kissinger, White House Years, 638. 154 staff Bob Haldeman’s desk. “These soccer fields could mean war, Bob.” When Haldeman asked why, Kissinger responded, “Cubans play baseball. Russians play soccer.”395 Even though Cubans also played soccer, Kissinger would continue defending his phrasing in his memoirs, “as an old soccer fan I knew Cubans played no soccer.”396 The evidence, however, was stronger than sports fields, since the location and the design of the facilities was assessed by U.S. intelligence as similar to other soviet bases, including the location of the soccer fields.397 The fear was that the location of the base could serve as a staging or repair base for Soviet nuclear submarines. Nixon faced another crisis, and this time it was personal. Cuba had been a particularly sore spot for Nixon since he blamed his 1960 election loss to Kennedy on the rise of Castro and his inability to match Kennedys tough anti-communist rhetoric.398 Additionally, early in his presidency, when Cuba appeared to want to improve relations,
Nixon responded to the State Department with just two words: “absolutely not.”399 Here, well into his second year in office, was a Cuban issue popping up again. While ultimately fizzling out, the Cienfuegos crisis was another example of the difficulty of breaking free from the Cold War paradigm and of how crisis situations diverted time and energy away from longer term political objectives. The NSC staff became concerned about the marked improvement in Soviet-Cuban relations months before the surveillance photos. Some of the disconcerting events included
395 Quoted in Jussi M Hanhimäki, The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 99. 396 Kissinger, White House Years, 638. 397 Arnold “Arnie” Nachanoff telephonic interview by author, West Point, NY, April 11, 2016. 398 Michael Grow, U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions: Pursuing Regime Change in the Cold War (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2008), 49. 399 “Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Cole) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),” Washington, September 25, 1969. FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d210. 155 increased Soviet fleet visits, landings of Soviet Bear aircraft, and increased verbal support of the USSR by Fidel Castro. Vaky asked Kissinger to reach out and send “at least a quiet word to the Soviets about their fleet units.” Kissinger agreed to study the issue.400 While Kissinger did not reach out at that time, he was concerned enough about the situation that he informed Nixon on June 1 about his assessment that, “the Soviets could conceivably wish to maintain Soviet naval units in the Caribbean-Southern Atlantic on a more or less permanent basis.”401 Two months later Soviet representative, Yuli Vorontsov, reached out to Kissinger about the “validity of [the] 1962 understanding.”402 The 1962 understanding was an informal agreement that essentially meant that the USSR would not put nuclear forces on Cuba and the United State would not launch an invasion against Cuba. This was not a formal agreement per se, but a series of parallel statements. Vorontsov appeared concerned about Cuban exiles outside of Cuba conducting operations against Castro and Soviet vessels.403 The response to Vorontsov was that the “U.S reaffirms [the] 1962 understanding,” and that Kissinger suggested “that [the] atmosphere would be enhanced if aircraft and naval visits are kept to ‘absolute minimum.’ ”404 Puzzled at the time, the Nixon administration interpreted the diplomatic approach differently once evidence of military construction surfaced in early September.
400 “Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),” Washington, May 11, 1969. FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d218. 401 Kissinger, White House Years, 637. 402 “US-SOVIET UNDERSTANDING ON SUBMARINE BASE IN CUBA,” Undated, folder: Latin America Cuba 1 of 3, Box: 128, NSC; RNPL, Yorba Linda, California. 403 Asaf Siniver, “The Nixon Administration and the Cienfuegos Crisis of 1970: Crisis-Management of a Non-Crisis?,” Review of International Studies 34, no. 1 (2008): 69–88. 404 “US-SOVIET UNDERSTANDING ON SUBMARINE BASE IN CUBA,” Undated, folder: Latin America Cuba 1 of 3, Box: 128, NSC; RNPL, Yorba Linda, California. 156 The initial response to the Soviets was through the press in one of Kissinger’s many background briefings. He emphasized the difference between normal ship visits and nuclear-powered Polaris subs.405 As the situation developed in mid-September Nixon called for a NSC meeting on the subject and the ongoing crisis in Jordon. This would be the first NSC meeting on a topic even tangentially related to Latin America in almost a year, and unlike the last meeting, this one did not focus on long term policy, but on crisis management. In keeping with his views, likely shaped by his belief that Cuba was responsible for his loss in 1960, Nixon’s opening statement during the meeting was that the conversation “was limited to a strictly need-to-know group” since this could be a “a major election issue which opponents could seize upon for their own domestic political advantage.”406 As the meeting continued, the intelligence community appeared to have solid intelligence on the transfer of nuclear components. CIA director Helms stated that Soviet vessels heading to Cuba had: overflown with detection aircraft one of the Soviet vessels enroute to Cienfuegos and had received positive evidence [text not declassified] from the vessel. However, following departure of the vessel from Cienfuegos a similar flight did not pick up such [text not declassified] The President stated that this suggested that they have already stored some nuclear components in Cienfuegos.407
While the redactions could have changed the meaning, the implication appears to be that intelligence sensors picked up evidence of nuclear components.
405 Ibid. 406 “Minutes of a Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington,” Washington, September 23, 1970. FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d226. 407 Ibid. 157 Kissinger, who of all the participants in the room viewed the problem through a
Cold War lens, tried to link Cienfuegos to Chile asking: “What is the relationship with this action and the situation in Chile and what are its implications should Chile go Marxist?”
Kissinger’s statement is further evidence that one of the chief architects of Nixon’s foreign policy only cared about Latin America as far as the region affected the greater geo-political context.408 Kissinger years later would reflect that he had “a distorted geographic perspective” concerning Latin America, “London, Paris, Rome, and Bonn seemed close;
Mexico City seemed far away, Rio de Janeiro or Buenos Aires beyond reach.”409 It was only years later as Secretary of State that Kissinger began to see the importance of the region.
As the crisis management of what one scholar called a “non-crisis” developed, the only person in the administration who appeared to consider Cuban agency in the Cold War standoff was Vaky.410 Using Canadian diplomatic cables and CIA analysis, Vaky argued that Cuba feared another exile invasion, and, by agreeing to allow the Soviets to build a base on Cienfuegos, “increased military assistance is probably part of the price.” Castro’s worry about exiles would mean he “wants some kind of capacity to project his own military strength.”411 While U.S policy did not officially support Cuban exile incursion, since the
CIA had made sure that the “capability had been dismantled,” Nixon did nothing to
408 Ibid. 409 Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1999), 706. 410 Siniver, “The Nixon Administration and the Cienfuegos Crisis of 1970.” 411 “Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),” Washington, October 5, 1970. FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d228. 158 discourage them.412 While Vaky was not so bold as to suggest the United States publicly disavow exile operations against Castro, he did ask a pointed question: “do we have any well-thought-out purpose for encouraging exiles?”413
An event that could have led to another Cuban missile crisis had a relatively quick resolution with direct diplomacy between Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly
Dobrynin.414 In a summary of his conversations to Nixon, Kissinger credited his “firm tone” for what he saw as a “satisfactory resolution.”415 This resolution included a reaffirmation of the 1962 understanding and conciliatory language explaining the purpose of naval facilities on Cuban soil. Throughout 1971 and into 1972 the USSR would test the limits of the 1962 agreement with various submarine visits such as the nuclear-powered E-
II class sub, which Kissinger declared was “at best… at the very edge of our understanding,” but overall no major developments or further friction points came from
Cienfuegos.416
412 “Minutes of a Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington,” Washington, September 23, 1970. FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d226. 413 “Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),” Washington, October 5, 1970. FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d228. 414For the detailed records see State Dept, Dr Henry Alfred Kissinger, and Anatoly Dobrynin, Soviet– American Relations: The Détente Years, 1969-1972, ed. Edward C. Keefer, David C. Geyer, and Douglas E. Selvage, 1st edition (Washington, DC: United States Department of State, 2007), 193–208. 415 “Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon,” Washington, October 14, 1970. FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d230 416 “US-SOVIET UNDERSTANDING ON SUBMARINE BASE IN CUBA,” Undated, folder: Latin America Cuba 1 of 3, Box: 128, NSC; RNPL, Yorba Linda, California 159 While essentially resolved by the end of October, this crisis, like the other fall crises
Nixon experienced, sucked up much of the energy of the administration. His agenda on
Latin America, laid out in his Halloween speech, had stalled due to domestic Congressional resistance, and with the continuation of crises he would never regain the initiative on Latin
America policy.
INSURGENCY IN BOLIVIA
Another of the many crises to hit in the fall of 1970 was the overthrow of one Bolivian military dictator, Candia Ovando, replaced by another, Juan Jose Torres, in early October of 1970. While dictators in the region were common, Bolivia held special concern for the Nixon administration because of intelligence reports indicating guerrilla activities in the country.417 While U.S government officials did not rate Bolivia’s sudden change of government as a major crisis, it was one more point of instability in what appeared to the actors at the time as a never- ending stream of problems. In the latter half of 1969, the United States government began to encourage more “moderate” elements inside the Bolivian government, since, much like Peru, Bolivia had begun an expropriation campaign. Secretary Meyer, in a back-channel message to the U.S Ambassador to Bolivia, Ernest Siracusa, instructed him to develop “useful contacts” with people who might “have a positive influence on Ovando.” Although Meyer certainly suggested a degree of influence shaping, he made clear that he did “not have in mind
417 By 1973 only Costa Rica and Venezuela had free and fair elections by U.S. standards. see Mark Lawrence, “History from Below: The United States and Latin America in the Nixon Years,” in Nixon in the World; American Foreign Relations, 1969-1977 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 273. 160 preparations for replacing the present Government but rather working with moderate and constructive elements on the scene to influence the present Government.”418 Assessing the effectiveness of encouraging “moderate” voices to influence was difficult to measure without better intelligence, but by April of 1970 the U.S. interests appeared on relatively sound footing. The expropriation of Gulf Oil interests on October 17, 1969 triggered the six-month clock on the application of sanctions under the Hickenlooper amendment. Unlike Peru, however, Bolivia appeared to be acting in good faith to compensate Gulf Oil, even going as far as to hire “a reputable French consulting firm” to determine a fair value for the oil fields. As a reward for their good faith negotiations the United States slowly began to reestablish certain aid programs beginning with military aid.419 As compared to the negotiations with Peru, Bolivia had found a way to nationalize assets without antagonizing U.S. business interests or the United States. While the expropriation crisis appeared under control, Nixon later became concerned about reports of leftist insurgent operations in Bolivia. On July 24, 1970 Nixon “expressed concern over the reports of renewed guerrilla activity in Bolivia” to Kissinger.
Kissinger, as he often did, then tasked the State Department with writing a report.420 The initial findings a month later came across as relatively benign. The report’s main conclusion was that there was “no need for special United States efforts at this time,” aside from potentially accelerating some military assistance already “in the pipeline.” The reason for the subdued response was the State Department’s assessment that the insurgency group
418 “Backchannel Message From Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Meyer) to the Ambassador in Bolivia (Siracusa),” Washington, January 9, 1970. FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d85 419 “Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State, Washington,” Washington, April 7, 1970. FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d89 420 CREST, “Insurgency in Bolivia,” July 24, 1970, LOC-HAK-292-2-3-2. 161 in Bolivia, the Ejército de Liberación Nacional de Bolivia (ELN), only consisted of “60– 70 men.” However, intelligence sources were unsure of where the guerillas were receiving much of their support and suggested a “separate study of the degree and nature of links among insurgent groups across national boundaries in Latin America.”421 In his analysis, Vaky focused on the lack of information regarding the ELN, calling the intelligence void “striking.” Without more information “especially about urban apparatus,” the government lacked the knowledge to “assess ELN’s capability.” Additionally, Vaky was concerned about “increasing evidence of international participation with the Bolivian guerrillas” and evidence pointing to guerrilla groups across the hemisphere as having indications of “disturbing sophistication.” Vaky’s recommendation to Nixon was to give “immediate priority to intelligence collection effort to confirm this information and learn as much as we can on the situation.”422 Nixon signed a directive about a week later ordering the CIA to give higher intelligence collection priorities to the question of “international links among Latin American insurgent groups” and “the question of subversion and international coordination” of this group.423 The U.S. government would go from worrying about guerrillas to larger scale political instability in Bolivia when Ovando faced a military led coup. What one CIA analysis saw as a “long expected show down” began on 4 October with elements of the
Bolivian Army, led by the Army Chief of Staff General Rogelio Miranda, demanding
Ovando’s resignation.424 Within two days Miranda had successfully deposed Ovando, but
421 “Memorandum From the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to President Nixon,” Washington, August 22, 1970. FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d90. 422 CREST, “Insurgency in Bolivia and Latin America” September 7, 1970, LOC-HAK-292-2-3-2, , 423 I have yet to come across the results, if any, of this increased focus of insurgents see CREST, “Insurgency in Bolivia and Latin America” September 15, 1970, LOC-HAK-292-2-3-2. 424 “Bolivia: CIA Information Report as of 1300 EDT 4 OCT 70,” October 4, 1970, folder:2 [Bolivia], Box: 770, NSC; RNPL, Yorba Linda, California. 162 in the chaos of the coup he had failed to isolate another contender vying for political control of Bolivia, General Juan Jose Torres. Torres, whom Kissinger assessed as “radical and ultranationalist” had gained the support of student groups and labor organizations and labeled himself the “leader of the ‘revolution’” and the natural successor of Ovando. By October seventh members of the military junta, led by Miranda, had either joined Torres, or resigned, leaving Miranda still nominally in charge, but “with a rapidly diminishing force under him.”425 The unforeseen rise of Torres was one of many logs feeding the flames of instability in Latin America. The initial concern of a Torres regime that would be “leftist and anti-US” began to fade when Torres stated he would “respect” Ovando’s plan “to pay compensation for the
Gulf properties.426 In order to test the waters with Torres and see if he was “not unredeemable (as, by contrast, Allende might be),” the CIA pitched a plan to reach out to
Torres about establishing “a sensible modus vivendi.”427 Over the next week Kissinger became less concerned about the situation and saw Torres as more of a “Latin Caudillo” than Communist agent. Kissinger marshaled as evidence the composition of Torres’s cabinet, which was generally moderate and “most of them holdovers from the Ovando government.” As an initial nudge to keep him on a moderate course, the State Department continued foreign relations with Bolivia under the “legal fiction” that Torres continued the
“mandate of the Armed Forces,” just like the previous regime.428
425 “Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, “Washington, October 7, 1970. FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d93. 426 Ibid; “Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),” Washington, October 8, 1970. FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d94. 427 Ibid. 428“Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon,” Washington, October 15, 1970. FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d95. 163 As the administration attempted to come to terms with the new Torres government, Nixon initially provided Torres a small gesture of economic support. The United States at the time owned a stockpile of certain base metals. One of these metals was tin which Bolivia mined in significant quantities. In an attempt to provide Torres some breathing room, the State Department initially recommended a ninety-day moratorium on the sale of stockpiled tin to the open market.429 This moratorium was an extension of a previous moratorium in support of Ovando’s government and was recommended by the State department due to Bolivia’s government transitioning into a “particularly unstable phase.”430 Additionally, Kissinger linked the issue to the recent election of Allende in Chile writing that resuming sales might “align them more closely with Chile,” and recommended extending the moratorium. Nixon demurred, writing, “forget it—It will happen inevitably anyway—if it’s going to happen—Tin will not do it.”431 About a month later Nixon reconsidered his decision and suspended tin sales after receiving information that “the
Bolivian situation has deteriorated markedly.”432 While smaller and more regional than the Cienfuegos crisis, and not as impactful to perceived U.S. interests as Allende’s election in Chile, the October coup in Bolivia added another situation for the U.S. government that further moved policy and regional results away from Nixon’s vision as outlined in his speech one year earlier on October 31, 1969.
429 “Information Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs (Crimmins) to the Acting Secretary (Irwin),” Washington, December 5, 1970. FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d96. 430“Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon” Washington, December 14, 1970. FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969–1972, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v04/d437. 431 Ibid. 432 “Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon,” Washington, January 20, 1971. FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969–1972, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v04/d439. 164 CRISIS COMPLETE
Any semblance of a Nixon Doctrine on Latin America involving a regional strategy focused on reimagining the current relationship between the United States and the region had atrophied almost beyond recognition by the end of 1970. Nixon himself probably felt as much when he ordered another review of U.S. policy toward Latin America on December 10, 1970. National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 108 marked a shift from the President’s speech and the recommendations of the Rockefeller Report. Rather than focus on sweeping changes to more multilateralism, the top factor Nixon was looking for was how to “improve bilateral political relations.”433 The appetite for any sort of wholesale change to hemispheric policy had significantly diminished by the close of 1970. Nixon’s nascent policies became derailed because of the twin obstacles of lack of congressional support and the energy and time consumed by the large number of crises in the fall. In the world of 1970, Vietnam was still the pressing foreign policy priority, and the Middle East had also flared up. The crises in the region also clearly moved the emphasis from a future looking policy to managing the situation of the day. Ultimately, lack of any major support from Congress toward enacting any of the Rockefeller Report initiatives was the largest factor in the failure to make a course correction in hemispheric policy. While Nixon had a larger amount of discretion and power with foreign affairs as compared to domestic policy, the executive branch was certainly not all powerful and could only make limited changes without Congressional support. Other domestic factors such as opposition from industry and domestic agencies also tempered the amount of change Nixon could enact, regardless of his own policy preference.
433 “National Security Study Memorandum 108, Washington,” Washington, December 10, 1970. FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d32.
165 By the end of the year, the Nixon Doctrine on Latin America was in shambles. Outside of the lack of progress, Vaky prepared for a new job as Diplomat in Residence at Georgetown. While he was ignored when it came to Chile, he left the NSC honorably and well respected. After the election of Allende, Kissinger made inquiries about Vaky’s future status in the State Department. He worried about career progression for Vaky, stating that he hated “to see my people get punished for having been here.”434 Even after he left, Kissinger continued to look out for Vaky’s career going so far as to oversee the forced resignation of Ambassador Walter Ploesser in Costa Rica so Vaky could become ambassador there.435 As Nixon moved away from a comprehensive policy approach in the region, he did keep one part of his doctrine on Latin America intact—a preference for working through regional powers. His one White House visit with Venezuelan president Rafael Caldera touched on the value Venezuela could bring to the region in terms of trade and development projects. He also supported efforts to modernize the Venezuelan military.436 Supporting Latin American militaries was another part of his foreign policy approach that would not change in the future. While Venezuela, Mexico, and Colombia continued to be important bilateral partners, the future of Nixon’s bilateral approach to the region would run through one country—Brazil.
434 TELCON, “Asst Secy Willam, Macomber, State,” Nov. 6, 1970. 435 “Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger,” Dec 1, 1971, Folder: Flanigan, Peter-Memos, Box: 814, NSC Name Files; RNPL, Yorba Linda, California. 436 “Memorandum of Meeting, Washington,” Washington, June 4, 1970. FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d666. 166 Chapter 5: From Many to One: From hemispheric to Brazilian policy
“Brazil, thank God, has some stability”437
Richard Nixon
PICKING UP THE PIECES
After the fall full of crises in the region, and with Nixon’s failure to shepherd any serious hemispheric initiatives through Congress, the administration went back to the drawing board in 1971. Failing to make any progress on the Rockefeller Report recommendations, or any other substantive policy, the administration shifted focus and tried to breathe new life into relations with the region. Instead of aspirational visions of a privileged Western Hemisphere bonded together in a “special relationship” with the United
States, the executive branch looked toward improving a handful of bilateral relationships with key players in Latin America while simultaneously making the United States a less visible player in the arena. This policy shift more close resembled the Nixon Doctrine as conceived in Guam, relying on regional allies in the hemisphere to maintain the post WWII order and prevent the spread of Communism.438 The most important ally, by far, would be the largest country in the hemisphere—Brazil.
437National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 490-14, May 4, 1971, Oval Office. 438Nixon saw his Doctrine going past Asia. see Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (Simon and Schuster, 2013), 395. 167 While Nixon’s policy team generally supported the change in strategy, Nixon had some problems working with the principal Latin American advisors in the executive branch. Viron Vaky, Kissinger’s main advisor on Latin American issues, and one of the most competent Latin American policy actors in the administration, left at the end of 1970.
This left the much younger and less experienced Arnold Nachmanoff in charge of the NSC
Latin America desk. The State Department kept continuity with Charles Meyer as the
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, but while universally recognized as a “nice guy,” neither Nixon nor Kissinger respected him, making him a particularly poor advocate for his region’s priorities.
Nixon’s failed 1970 Latin American policy and the need for a strategic shift reverberated within the Soviet Union. The Soviet propaganda machine attempted to capitalize on the troubles of 1970 in the region by seeing “the United States as being on the defensive in Latin America.” The Soviets focused on the example of Cuba as opening
“a new chapter in Latin American history.” In Chile, the coverage of Allende was
“prominent and self-congratulatory.” The Soviet press gave most of the credit for his victory to the Communist party. With regards to the future, the Soviets saw hope for the spread of Communism into Bolivia and Uruguay. 439 The press reports from the Soviet
Union rightly saw the weakness of U.S. policy toward the region. What they failed to appreciate was the countervailing force of U.S. partners in the region.
439 NARA II; RG 59; Subject Numeric Files 1970-1973; Box 2423; Folder POL LA; Telegram, Subject: “SOVIETS LOOK TO 1971 AS BIG YEAR IN LATIN AMERICA,” 20 Jan, 1971. 168 While Nixon’s policy response in 1971 still lacked focus and support from key stake holders within the government, he had some success in shifting responsibilities to allies in the region. Brazil, for example, worked with Nixon to weaken Allende and intervene in both Uruguay and Bolivia to prevent leftist leaders and groups from establishing a foothold in their backyard. They did so for their own reasons independent of the United States, but promised to continue serving as a U.S. ally in the region for the immediate future. This example of the Nixon Doctrine in Latin America demonstrated effectiveness as far as providing some protection from claims of Yankee intervention, but required working with military dictators with questionable commitments to human rights.
One area that remained consistent in 1971, and throughout his presidency, was
Nixon’s personal interest in training, funding, and keeping good relations with militaries in the region. When a plan to shutter the major geographic combatant command for the region USSOUTHCOM reached his desk, he stopped it because he felt it might show less of a commitment to the armed forces to the south. He also consistently raised funding levels and authorized foreign military sales to militaries in the region as a way of maintaining influence.
Finally, 1971 provided more evidence into Nixon’s unvarnished thoughts since that was the year he ordered a series of secret audio tape recording systems installed. Hearing his voice and his conversations provided an additional window into his thought process.
For instance, Nixon’s racial views of what he called the “Latins” developed at least in part from the trip he took as Vice President to the region. In a late-night chat with the Puerto
Rican governor Luis Muñoz Marín, the governor confided in him. “My people…have 169 never been very good at governing.” Nixon conceded, however, that Latin American governments had an “orderly way…[and]they have been able to run the damn place.” 440
His skepticism about governments of the neighboring countries contrasted with his generally positive view of their citizens. When speaking about “Latins,” Nixon once remarked that they portrayed “warmth that is very real. I mean, most of the Latins are poets.” He continued that he “went to school with them, of course, in California.”441 This contradiction between his espoused affection for the people of Latin America and the relatively low regard he held for their ability to govern democratically led to policies that privileged the military and dictators in efforts designed to prevent the spread of
Communism and support stability.
SALVAGING A STRATEGY
Compared to the original policy guidance for the region issued in the first months of the administration, almost two years later in December of 1970 NSSM 108 shifted the focus from multilateral policies, such “regional economic integration,” to an emphasis on how to “improve bilateral political relations.”442 Some regional or multilateral projects continued, such as a project to improve the Pan-American highway by constructing a
440 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 010-16, October 7, 1971, Oval Office. 441 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 498-3, May 13, 1971, Oval Office. 442 “National Security Study Memorandum 108,” Washington, December 10, 1970. FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d32; “National Security Study Memorandum 15,” Washington, February 3, 1969. FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d1. 170 segment connecting Panama and Colombia through the Darien Gap, but that project would be more of an exception in 1971. Nixon needed to tone down the expectations for a region where his administration had struggled to develop a realistic and coherent strategy that could translate into a policy success. As was the case with many of the larger reviews and reports, it took the bureaucracy several months to put together their recommendations for the president.
In the meantime, Nixon expressed his views of the problems during meetings with his advisors and explored some of the potential solutions for the region. In a conversation with his Task Force on International Development, Nixon continued to express his desire to be “flexible on trade” which meant a “special preference if we can’t get a general preference” on tariffs. Nixon continued philosophically, stating “that special trade preferences aren’t going to make a heck of a lot of difference over the next five years, ten years, or even twenty years... the important thing about Latin America is therapy… you just give them a little smidge of something…something that makes them special.”443 His thinking focused more on messaging than on substance, likely because he knew that after the failures to implement the recommendations of the Rockefeller Report, he had limited options.
A subsequent conversation with Kissinger and CIA director, Richard Helms, demonstrated the importance he placed on maintaining a tough line with Cuba. In an unprompted remark, Nixon stated “my conviction is very strong that we cannot give up in
443 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 441–4, March 2, 1971, Oval Office. 171 our policy toward Cuba.” He continued arguing that making concessions to Cuba meant that “the effect on the rest of Latin America could be massive.” Nixon found a supportive ear in Helms, who had supported Nixon’s tough line on Cuba previously, and emphatically stated, “I’m just as opposed today. In fact, even more so.”444 Kissinger stayed quiet throughout the exchange, but months later in the context of opening relations with China he offered his opinion that “it isn’t extraordinarily logical to say we want to talk to China but we won’t talk to Cuba.”445 With respect to Cuba, emotion likely overcame logic for
Nixon. He continued to blame his 1960 loss to John F. Kennedy on Castro’s rise to power in Cuba, something he was never able to look past.446
In the same conversation Nixon once again brought up his concern about the
Catholic Church in the region. Since his conversation with Lleras almost two years earlier,
Nixon consistently circled back to this issue.447 According to Nixon the most important
“single event in terms of, of ideological and philosophically” over the last decade was “the deterioration of the attitude of the Catholic Church.” He saw the changes in the church, which would later become known as Liberation Theology, as a cancer. He continued, “the
Catholics, at the present time, as some people have said to me, they’re—in Latin
444 “Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), the President’s Assistant (Haldeman), the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig), and Director of Central Intelligence Helms,” Washington, March 5, 1971. FRUS, 1969- 1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d36 445 TELCON, [U.S. Relations with Latin America and Cuba], Sep. 10, 1971. 446 Michael Grow, U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions: Pursuing Regime Change in the Cold War (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2008), 49. Cuba was also a strong supporter of Allende which did not help their case 447 See chapter 1 172 America—they’re about one-third Marxists, and the other third are in the center, and, the other third are Catholics.” Although a crude heuristic of a complicated theological and social movement, Nixon’s analysis of the fault lines and the importance of the various movements within the Catholic Church was generally accurate.448 In a particularly
Nixonian monologue, the president phrased his support of the more traditionally established Catholic Church in personal terms, stating: “I am probably pro—the strongest pro-Catholic who is not a Catholic; the greatest admirer of Catholic traditions.”449 While continuing to diagnose the problem, he never came up with a workable policy solution, if such a solution even existed.450
As part of the initial review, NSC staffer Arnold Nachmanoff, who took over the day to day operations of the Latin America section in the NSC, began to shape the strategy.
As a much younger government employee, with less experience than his predecessor Viron
Vaky, Nachmanoff had a good understanding of the region, but was far less adroit in fighting the bureaucracy.451 His initial points of exploration followed much of the administration’s previous policy, including finding ways to “help our allies raise their
448For a primer on Liberation Theology see Leonardo Boff and Clodovis Boff, Introducing Liberation Theology (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1987). 449 “Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), the President’s Assistant (Haldeman), the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig), and Director of Central Intelligence Helms,” Washington, March 5, 1971. FRUS, 1969- 1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d36 450 He had earlier suggested working with friendly bishops on humanitarian projects, but that was a small, short-lived initiative. 451 Other than the quality of his memorandums, which were longer and less clear than Vaky’s, in a review of Kissinger telephone conversations his name rarely appears as compared to Vaky’s who Kissinger always mentioned very favorably 173 profile while we lower our own.”452 In the year that Nachmanoff led the Latin America desk, he failed to help Kissinger conceptualize a workable plan to accomplish this objective, assuming Kissinger had any interest in putting effort into Latin American policy in 1971—a somewhat dubious assumption.
Once the initial response to NSSM 108 came back, Kissinger requested a larger report, in keeping with a long-standing pattern. The question then became, what does the administration do with what one staffer called a “herculean effort.”453 While much of the report validated the administration’s current priorities, it continued to struggle with the inherent tension of the U.S. wanting to lead in the region, but still maintain a “lower profile.” For example, one section of the report called for, “maintenance of the confidence of Latin America and the world in the effectiveness, maturity, and responsibility of our leadership as a great power in our relations with Latin America, with due considerations for the ‘mature partnership’ concept.” This struggle, one staffer noted, was a “circular monstrosity.” Nachmanoff was unable to have the report vetted by the Senior Review
Group (SRG) until August, by which time the analysis in the report was out of date. Other priorities pushed Latin America to the back burner of the SRG schedule, causing countless hours of analysis to go to waste.
Another issue developing in the first half of 1971 was a Department of Defense plan to shut down U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). 454 An outgrowth of the U.S.
452 “Sulxberger article in Times (16 April) on U.S. and Latin America,” April 17, 1971, folder: NSSM-108, Box: H-178, NSCI, RNPL, Yorba Linda, California. 453 “NSSM 108-U.S. Policy Toward Latin America,” May 7, 1971, Folder: NSSM-108, Box: H-178, NSCI, RNPL, Yorba Linda, California. 454 Also referred as USSOUTHCOM 174 Caribbean Command, Panama based SOUTHCOM had responsibilities for defending the
Panama Canal and administering military assistance to Central and South America. While having significantly fewer resources, in theory, SOUTHCOM was coequal to other geographic commands and was responsible for responding to military contingencies in
Latin America.
The plan for shuttering SOUTHCOM, which called for moving most of its functions to Washington D.C., was the brainchild of U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense
David Packard who developed the initiative in response to Nixon’s request for ideas on how to project a “lower profile.” From the conceptual stages of the reform effort, Nixon did not like the plan. Kissinger told Packard’s boss Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird as much, offering his “strong impression” on the subject “that the President does not want
SOUTHCOM phased out.” Laird responded with “the Senate and House Committees have both recommended it. And we have to upgrade somehow.”455 Kissinger, afraid that Laird would use the upcoming budget process to close SOUTHCOM, reached out to George
Shultz at the newly formed Office of Management and Budget to make sure that “crooked”
Laird had not asked Shultz to put the closing of SOUTHCOM in the upcoming budget. In a response to the closing of other commands, Kissinger was emphatic; “I don’t care about the others but SOUTHCOM we do not want closed this year.”456
455 TELCON,” [Military Assistance Program for Latin America; Study of Culebra Island],” December 26, 1970. 456TELCON, “[Concerns about Southern Command and Office of Management and Budget],” December 26, 1970. 175 Despite Kissinger’s insistence that Nixon did not want to shutter SOUTHCOM,
Laird and Gates moved forward and presented their plan to the president in a bid that ultimately failed. Laird was not happy about the president’s decision, feeling that it was
“like a bolt out of the blue” especially since in his opinion, “Southern Command isn’t worth a damn.” Attempting to placate Laird, Kissinger offered to “talk with the President about an appeal.”457 Kissinger kept to his word and arranged an appeal a few days later.
When the subject came up, Kissinger was not a neutral arbiter. He broached the appeal in terms of an effort to “overrule” the president’s decision and made sure to remind
Nixon that the “ambassadors feel strongly” about the issue and so did the military.
Additionally, Kissinger felt that Nixon needed to retain SOUTHCOM in Panama to provide a “focal point where the Latin Americans can deal with us.”458 Nixon agreed to an appeal and asked Kissinger to set it up next week.
During the appeal meeting, Nixon listened attentively to Gates and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas Moorer. Nixon began by framing the region as a “hell of a mess” full of “successful dictators.” The one exception was Brazil which
“thank god has some stability.” Gates laid out his argument clearly in a professorial manner on why the United States had “no reason to have a unified command in that part of the world.” He thought that having a “big strong command” implied that the United States government would “respond with a military plan” to any sort of crisis in the region. Packard
457TELCON, “[Reorganization of Southern Command],” April 22, 1971. 458 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 488–15, April 27, 1971. 176 assessed the risk of any sort of military operation in the region as low, which was another reason to shutter the command and replace it with something else. In his view, that something else would be an organization based in Washington D.C. which could “handle the day to day as well from here as from SOUTHCOM.” Finally, he appealed to the president’s call for a “low profile” in the region as another reason to disestablish the command.459
Admiral Moorer disagreed with Packard and confidently asserted that the Joint
Chiefs were “unanimous” in agreeing that the current organization had led to the establishment of “an excellent rapport” with the militaries in the region and were not in favor of shuttering the command. Moorer noted how many of the political leaders in the region were military including “about six graduates of the Air American Defense college.”
The Chairman was also not so sure about the low risk of military operations and the need to coordinate with allies, noting that Brazil had provided forces for the U.S. military intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and that they “had provided a division [of soldiers] during WWII.” He was concerned about alienating “a big country with lots of potential” and saw value in the current structure of SOUTHCOM which allowed the militaries to “maintain close contact.”460 In a conversation with Laird the next day, Nixon again brought up his concerns. One issue was about the prestige of the new command and what level it should be, with Nixon noting that “the military assistance guy should be a
459 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 490-14, May 4, 1971, Oval Office. 460 Ibid. 177 four-star man…it’s a hell of important thing under the Nixon doctrine.” He also continued undercutting his State Department telling Laird, “Meyer and his group are not for military assistance, but I am.”461 Nixon told Laird he would continue to maintain a neutral stance, even though it was clear he had made up his mind, and would wait for the official briefing memorandums to cross his desk before deciding.
Despite the pushback from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Laird and Packard continued to back their proposal. They agreed with the Joint Chiefs and others with the basic concept that “military ties with Latin American countries must be improved and strengthened,” but continued to argue that disestablishing SOUTHCOM would be a better way to reach that goal. Laird continued to appeal to Nixon’s request “for imaginative ideas on the Western
Hemisphere,” and thought closing SOUTHCOM would qualify. Laird also argued that
Packard’s plan would assist in efforts to “revitalize our Security Assistance program in
Latin America in support of the Nixon Doctrine.”462 Laird also reminded Nixon that the
State Department supported the closure of SOUTHCOM. Under Secretary of State John
Irwin, for example, referred to SOUTHCOM as an “anachronism in the 1970’s” and not a
“security shield against external aggression,” but “as an instrument of US hegemony.” The continued existence of SOUTHCOM, Irwin continued, “belies what they believe to be the
461 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 002-86, May 5, 1971, Oval Office. 462 “Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon,” Washington, May 22,1971. FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d39. 178 more positive thrust of the Nixon Doctrine.”463 Irwin and the State Department clearly supported the defense department recommendations.
When it came time for Nixon to officially decide, Kissinger again argued in favor of keeping SOUTHCOM, citing “risks…at this time.” Nixon appeared particularly confused by Laird’s claim that closing SOUTHCOM would “improve significantly the opportunities for furthering vital U.S. interests in Latin America.”464 Concerning the arguments of the JCS and others in support of the status quo, Kissinger summarized the points as the inability to maintain “close ties” from Washington, better “control and coordination of security assistance” from Panama, and most importantly a representation of “diminished U.S. interest in and commitment there. It might well be interpreted as a further manifestation of U.S. distrust of the Latin American military and contribute further to extreme nationalist solutions on their part.”465 Nixon unsurprisingly decided to keep
SOUTHCOM.
While he kept his reasoning private, based on his previous comments about military dictators, he likely felt that retaining SOUTHCOM in Panama gave him better relations with Latin American militaries and the generals in charge of many of the governments in the region. He could engage them from a political level, but he could also engage them with the military on a general to general basis. He was not downplaying the Nixon Doctrine
463 Ibid. 464 Nixon circled the word improve and put a question mark next to it. See “Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon,” Washington, July 6, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d44. 465 Ibid. 179 in the region as Irwin argued, but chose not to dilute it by closing one of the more visible symbols of U.S. power in the region focused on supporting and training allies. While closing the command would have certainly sent a message, and many groups traditionally opposed to Nixon would have supported it, it would only have fueled critics who saw the
“low profile” of the United States in the region as disengagement.
THE LONG GREY LINE: WEST POINT GRAD AND NICARAGUAN DICTATOR
Nixon had one important state visit with a Latin American leader later in the year when he hosted the Brazilian head of state, Emílio Garrastazu Médici. Before then, however, he met Nicaragua’s leader Anastasio Somoza Debayle, the third Somoza to rule the small Central American country. The State Department supported this visit because
Somoza was a “steadfast friend of the United States” and “special attention by President
Nixon” would be very meaningful to Somoza. Referencing the “25th anniversary of
President Somoza’s graduation from West Point,” the executive branch framed the conversation as “private” to avoid much of the pomp and circumstance of a formal head of state visit. 466
American leaders from FDR to Nixon himself during his mission to the region in
1958 called on the Somoza family and considered them allies in Central America. Nixon used this visit to hear Somoza’s analysis of the region. First, Somoza was “pleased with
466 “Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Meyer) to the Acting Secretary of State (Irwin)”, Washington, April 12, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d503. 180 President Nixon’s policies towards Peru.” He felt that the President’s, “patient and understanding approach to the unfriendly actions taken by Velasco had been highly effective.” At this point in the administration, Nixon was still engaging with Peru diplomatically over the IPC expropriation controversy, but neither the rhetoric nor sanctions were nearly as strong as those imposed on Chile’s expropriation actions.467
Somoza additionally expressed concerns about “past U.S. attitudes towards the Latin
American military.” Nixon responded, stating “he agreed with President Somoza’s analysis and noted that he did not share the attitude held in many U.S. circles about the military.”
Once again, Nixon’s fondness for the military in the region came through clearly.
Switching topics, Nixon brought up how “he was very pleased with the performance of the military regime in Brazil.” He revealed that he was “contemplating asking President Médici to visit the United States” and asked if “he [Somoza} thought this would be a constructive step.” While Nixon had made up his mind to invite Médici at this point and the planning process was well under way, hearing Somoza answer in the affirmative probably reinforced his view concerning the importance of the visit. Somoza then asked for some help for his country including “increased textile quotas and increased quotas for sugar, meat and tobacco.”468 While Nixon doubled Nicaragua’s textile quota, that was all he could provide because of constraints imposed by existing multilateral agreements or the need for congressional legislation. Even this small gesture came with a
467For more on Peru see Hal Brands, “The United States and the Peruvian Challenge, 1968-1975,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 21, no. 3 (September 2010): 471–90. 468 “Memorandum for the Record,” Washington, June 2, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d504 181 strong objection from the Commerce Department. 469 Nixon’s commitment to maintaining the relationship with Nicaragua was more important than the objections of domestic textile industries.
Somoza also met with Secretary of Defense Laird and continued to push for close cooperation with the U.S. military. Somoza “strongly praised the value of US military training” especially “that conducted at the School of the Americas” which he thought was
“extremely good from a public relations point of view.” Laird responded with his full- throated endorsement of Somoza and his military stating, “Nicaragua has many friends in the Pentagon and that we will do what we can here to help our friends.” Continuing, Laird assured Somoza “we do not take our friendship lightly.”470
Somoza’s visit demonstrated support of both military leaders and autocrats in Latin
America. This came in contrast to the visit of Colombia’s president in 1969 and
Venezuela’s president in 1970, both of whom came from relatively democratic countries.
Although not rising to the level of a state visit and being met with some restraint from the bureaucracy in supporting a dictator, Somoza still received his requested textile quota increase and all the benefits of a state visit, minus some of the pomp and circumstance.
After the events in Cienfuegos Cuba and Allende’s election in Chile, the administration’s viewpoint had subtly shifted. While still searching for a changed dynamic, the tone of the
469 “Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon,” Washington, August 13, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d506 470 “Memorandum of Conversation,” Washington, June 8, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d505. 182 administration’s action favored the perceived stability of the military and dictators over any sort of bold but potentially destabilizing policies.
OVERCOME BY EVENTS
Half a year after the slow, painstaking review of hemispheric policy prompted by
NSSM 108, and without even an SRG meeting, many of the issues brought up in the study, including problems related to Chile, trade, and military aid, had developed into old news.
One of the biggest events, for instance, revolved around Nixon’s decision on August 15,
1971 to impose a ten percent surcharge on all imports due to a balance of payment crisis.
While the surcharge applied worldwide, the poorer countries in Latin America felt targeted unfairly since they had trade deficits with the United States, and were therefore not part of the problem Nixon was trying to solve. Additionally, the Nixon administration did not freeze all decisions regarding Latin America and continued fiddling with policy around the edges, particularly when it came to military assistance. As the wheels of the bureaucracy turned slowly, Nixon appeared to become more concerned about his administration’s approach to the region.
With regards to Chile and the region, Nixon felt hemmed in by his options. He kept hearing from his advisors to avoid making “martyrs of them,” an opinion he was “a little tired of hearing.” He was tired of being blamed for events in Chile that he was not involved in, including a failed assassination attempt. “If we had attempted it, we’d have done it,” continuing that “We’re poor at the CIA, but not that poor.” He called the Latin America desk in the State Department “a damn disaster area” and reminisced about Eisenhower’s 183 Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American affairs Henry Holland who he called a
“good man” who “knew what this was all about.”471 These were all themes Nixon had brought up previously, but the reiteration on the tapes sounded a bit more desperate than the more aspirational view of the region Nixon had in 1969. He felt hemmed in by his staff and longed for the Latin America policy of the Eisenhower days when he was Vice
President. However, despite the obstacles, Nixon directed some small change around the edges with programs he controlled.
Reinstating the Military Assistance Program (MAP) Grant Material Assistance, which provided U.S. military equipment to the region’s security forces, was one such change. The forces had faced a reduction to zero in Latin America due to the need for the funds in Cambodia. DOD, led by Packard, advocated for transferring some funds to support the Bolivian military, as well as other small countries such as Nicaragua and
Paraguay.472 Nixon agreed with Packard’s assessment and approved a $5.2 million package for Bolivia and other countries in the region.473 When the State Department found out about the increased funding, they asked for a reconsideration, worried that the possibility of a cut in funds in the future could be “disruptive.” They were concerned about “a negative
471 “Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), the President’s Assistant (Haldeman), and Secretary of the Treasury Connally,” Washington, June 11, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d43 472 “MAP Grant Materiel Assistance for Selected Countries in Latin America,” June 21, 1971, folder: NSSM-108, Box: H-178, NSCI, RNPL, Yorba Linda, California. 473 “MAP Grant Materiel Assistance for Latin America in FY 71,” June 28, 1971, folder: NSSM-108, Box: H-178, NSCI, RNPL, Yorba Linda, California. 184 reaction in Congress,” which could dampen enthusiasm for other programs.474 Nixon reviewed the request for reconsideration and decided to continue with the MAP funding.475
With regards to Latin America policy, Nixon had essentially given up on trying to convince
Congress.
On the issues of aid, trade, and economic relations, Secretary of the Treasury John
Connally proposed a much tougher “hard-line” toward foreign expropriations and more liberal use of the Hickenlooper amendment to cut foreign assistance to countries that failed to provide adequate compensation to U.S. companies for the seizure of private property.
Uruguay’s ambassador to the United States, Hector Luisi, noted how “domestic events sometimes permit foreign policy to be made by the Treasury” leading to a “credibility gap” since it was difficult to tell who spoke for the administration.476 This observation came before the ten percent surcharge, which only raised tensions more. Luisi’s assessment at this point was accurate. It was almost as if Nixon listened to the foreign policy advice from every department except the State Department.
In preparation for the SRG meeting on NSSM 108, Nachmanoff made some interesting observations, buried in an overly long briefing memorandum to Kissinger. The original study called for a “very low possibility of a strategic threat from any Latin
American country (excluding Cuba),” an assessment the NSC staffer saw as “fair,” but not
474 “MAP Grant Materiel Assistance for Selected Countries in Latin America,” July 3, 1971, folder: NSSM-108, Box: H-178, NSCI, RNPL, Yorba Linda, California. 475 “FY 71 MAP Grant Materiel Assistance for Selected Countries in Latin America,” July 17, 1971, folder: NSSM-108, Box: H-178, NSCI, RNPL, Yorba Linda, California. 476 “Latin America,” July 29, 1971, folder: NSSM-108, Box: H-178, NSCI, RNPL, Yorba Linda, California. 185 one nested within “global foreign policy.” Nachmanoff assessed that a “loss of US influence in Latin America,” to the Soviet Union in particular, was potentially damaging in “political and psychological terms.” He argued that the failure to look at Latin America from an integrated perspective and forestall Soviet influences in the region could potentially lead to increased pressures to intervene in the region more overtly. “If Southeast
Asia is the most imminent test of the Nixon doctrine,” wrote Nachmanoff, “Latin America may well be its most serious test in time. The pressures for intervention should there be two or three Chiles or Cubas in our backyard would undoubtedly be high.”477
Nachmanoff’s invocation of the Nixon Doctrine demonstrated that another official was cognizant of Nixon’s efforts to generalize his foreign policy vision outside of the Southeast
Asia context.
When the NSC Senior Review Group meeting finally took place on August 17,
1971, the meeting was less about the study, which Kissinger acknowledged had been “more or less overtaken by events,” but more about trying to forge a new consensus of how to move forward. One area where the participants appeared to be in accord was the creation of a separate policy for the English-speaking Caribbean. Jamaica’s Prime Minister, Hugh
Shearer, had earlier brought up in an audience with Nixon “that the Caribbean countries constituted a special problem” because their citizens were “largely black and English speaking and had no historical connection with Latin America.”478 While the discussion
477 “SRG meeting on Latin America (NSSM 108 and Military Presence Study),” July 17, 1971, folder: NSSM-108, Box: H-178, NSCI, RNPL, Yorba Linda, California. 478 “Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting,” Washington, August 17, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d48 186 centered mostly on duty free imports by tourists and taxes on rum, the special treatment of the Caribbean ran counter to Rockefeller’s original idea of a unified Western Hemisphere, a theme that ran through much of the early administration’s thinking about the region.
One area where the senior leaders disagreed was over the meaning of the “low- profile” policy. State Department representative John Irwin saw it as a way “to reduce the hegemony of the United States in Latin America.” Kissinger countered that the purpose was to “reduce our visibility, not to reduce our influence. We were trying to achieve this by less unilateral action on our part.” Kissinger, however, acknowledged that the current approach was floundering. “There has been no Presidential address on Latin America in two years. There has been no legislation on general tariff preferences. We have not been responsive on sugar quotas.… All of this has had a deleterious effect on our relations with
Latin America.” The consensus in the room for fixing some of the issues included “policy leadership” and a refocusing on bilateral relations. Irwin summarized it best when he stated: “We talk about a hemispheric approach, but each country has special interests. I think we confuse ourselves by emphasizing multilateralism.” To refocus on the issue
Kissinger wanted “another SRG meeting” followed by “an NSC meeting in September.”479
Neither meeting happened, and this was the last high level NSC meeting on Latin America until after Nixon’s resignation.
What the participants had agreed to in the counsel included concrete action on military aid and an agreement refocusing Latin American policy from a multilateral
479 Ibid. 187 approach to one focused on individual countries. The final number for military aid increased to 9.3 million dollars, with a commitment to seek more in future fiscal years.
Additionally, the NSC ordered a study on the “utilization of differential bilateral approaches “including “specific steps” on how to implement such a strategy.480 Before the administration could begin the shift toward more bilateral actions, they had to engage with an inherited piece of multilateral policy—The Alliance for Progress.
SLOW DEATH: AUTOPSY OF THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS
The Alliance for Progress (AIP) began under John F. Kennedy in response to
Castro’s rise in Cuba. The AIP was an economic development package designed to lift
Latin America out of poverty and reduce the appeal of Communism in the region. Some likened the program to a Marshall Plan for Latin America, a lofty point of comparison and one which the alliance could never live up to. Over the years, the program had some limited success, but by 1971 patience for the ten-year-old initiative had worn thin in the United
States.481 With efforts to switch away from multilateral to bilateral commitments, particularly with a Congress inclined to reduce foreign aid, maintaining the Alliance for
Progress soon become untenable.
480 “US Policy Toward Latin America,” August 18, 1971, folder: NSSM-108, Box: H-178, NSCI, RNPL, Yorba Linda, California. 481 Jeffrey Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin America, (New York: Routledge, 2007). 188 In what Kissinger called a “grudging statement” on the ten-year anniversary of the alliance, Nixon clearly demonstrated a lack of support for the program.482 While acknowledging some of the positive aspects of the endeavor, such as a reduction in poverty and improvements in educational opportunities, the statement also stated, “each nation must take the initiative and primary responsibility for meeting the challenges of its development,” and called for a “more balanced relationship.”483 Most Latin American newspapers gave the statement front page coverage with mixed reactions. Some conservative newspapers, like EL Universal in Mexico, saw the statement as candid and realistic. O Jornal in Brazil called the announcement, “a realistic appraisal in which
President Nixon does not seek to disguise the failures that have contributed to a certain feeling of dejection.” Other publications such as O Estado de Sao Paulo had a less favorable impression, calling the statement a completion of “the task of burying the hopes aroused ten years ago” and continued with “the Nixon Doctrine, combined with his ‘low profile’ policy…has led relations between the U.S. and Latin America to the lowest point in history.”484 While certainly not the lowest point, downplaying the last major U.S. initiative in the region without a substitute plan would not help repair strained relations.
482 “Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting,” Washington, August 17, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d48 483 Richard M. (Richard Milhous) Nixon, Richard Nixon: 1971: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President., 2005, 891–92, http://name.umdl.umich.edu/4731800.1971.001. 484 Quotes and analysis from “Latin American Press Coverage of President Nixon's Alliance for Progress Anniversary Statement,” September 4, 1971, folder: Alliance for Progress, Box: 307, NSC Subject Files, RNPL, Yorba Linda, California. 189 Dr. Carlos Sanz de Santamaria, Chairman of the Inter-American Committee for the
Alliance for Progress (CIAP), met with Nixon in conjunction with the ten-year anniversary of the program. He expressed his worries “about the impact of the 10% surcharge and the
10% reduction in foreign aid,” and the lack of movement on “generalized tariff preferences,” among other issues. Santamaria’s meeting did not come at a high point of relations and a tepid official statement of support for the Alliance for Progress did not help.
Nixon demonstrated some sympathy to his concerns stating, “that the United States should not build a wall around itself. That would be a grave mistake, certainly a mistake with regard to Latin America.” He continued stating he understood “that those problems were not caused by Latin America,” and “that Latin America is like an ‘innocent bystander’ which is receiving some of the stray flak.”485 The Alliance for Progress would sputter along for two more years until the OAS officially shut down the program in 1973.
Kissinger and Nixon made a token concession to the region by reversing the ten percent cut in foreign aid shortly after Nixon’s meeting with Santamaria. Kissinger shared his support of the reversal with Connally since, in Kissinger’s words, “we haven’t done anything for Latin America” and it would be a “cheap gesture.” Connally agreed to
“helping some of these countries down there,” since it would be about twenty million dollars at most. 486 When Kissinger told Meyer about the Latin American exemption from the ten percent cut, he made sure to emphasize the true purpose of the gesture, which was
485 “Memorandum of Meeting,” Washington, September 4, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d49. 486 TELCON, “[Foreign Aid Recommendation for Latin America],” September 10, 1971. 190 “the President gets the credit.” Meyer responded enthusiastically; “Damn right.”487 While no doubt a welcome gesture, the token nature of the policy reversal did not fool any of the
Latin American stakeholders.
Meyer and his subordinates tried to spin the foreign aid exemption as an offer to help strengthen the “special relationship” with the region, but with the ten percent surcharge on imports still in effect, most Latin American officials were not impressed.
When Meyer made the announcement at a regional conference in Panama, Santamaria called out the administration’s action as “a violation of U.S. commitment to the rest of the
Western Hemisphere.”488 As one reporter noted, after a week of fruitless negotiation in
Panama “any lingering doubts about the harshly realistic nature of Washington’s new policy toward Latin America have been thoroughly dispelled.”489 As one unnamed Latin
American delegate said, they had come to Panama in September of 1971” to perform an autopsy on the Alliance for Progress and apply what we hoped to learn in formulating a new program;” instead they had ended the conference with “no conclusions.”490
If the administration’s policies of a more interconnected Western Hemisphere had been on life support, by September of 1971, Nixon succeeded only in uniting the hemisphere against the United States. As the administration looked for a way to mollify the region, Nixon reached into the standard playbook and ordered one of his cabinet
487 TELCON, [U.S. Relations with Latin America and Cuba], September 10, 1971. 488 Berger, Marilyn “Latin Americans Get Aid Exemptions.” The Washington Post, September 14, 1971. 489 Kent, Francis, “U.S. Trade Stand Stuns, Hurts Latins: Talks in Panama End Today With No Retreat on Surcharge Issue Latins Baffled, Hurt by U.S. Trade Policy,” Los Angeles Times, September 20,1971. 490 Maidenberg, H.J.,” Latins and U.S. are Divided as Parley in Panama Winds Up,” New York Times, September 20, 1971 191 officials, Robert Finch, to tour the region on his behalf. Other than the similarity of visiting multiple countries in the region, this trip was the antithesis of the Rockefeller tour and clearly showed Nixon’s shift from multilateralism to a more bilateral policy focus, aimed particularly at the larger countries in the region who in turn could influence the smaller countries in the region—the Nixon Doctrine adapted for Latin America.
YET ANOTHER TRIP
The origins of Finch’s trip to the region began on a long flight from Alaska, where
Nixon greeted the Emperor of Japan on U.S soil, back to Washington D.C. The president envisioned the mission as “a handholding thing in, in Latin America” and wanted to send
Finch because he did not “have the time” and the possibilities of demonstrations against him made the trip “too goddamn dangerous” for him to go. Nixon wanted this tour to be the antidote to the Rockefeller Mission, which was “too broad and everything” and “got us all committed in a lot of things.” Nixon provided detailed guidance to Finch about what he wanted. He directed him to “go to major countries,” continuing “don’t worry about whether they’re dictators or not, because, there, the only friends we’ve got are the dictators.” As an example, he wanted “more emphasis on Brazil” because, according to Nixon, “Brazil is a country that matters.” Lastly, he reemphasized the low-key nature of the visits, wanting no
“big press” stories.491 Nixon was grasping for ways to build any sort of credibility or
491 “Conversation Among President Nixon, Attorney General Mitchell, and the Counselor to the President,” Washington, September 30, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d50 192 goodwill, since the weight of the ten percent surtax was strangling the already tenuous ties with the region.
About a week later, on October 5, 1971, Nixon still had Latin America on his mind as he attempted to regain the foreign policy initiative. Possibly because he knew the Finch trip only demonstrated token interest, Nixon brought up with the Secretary of State a potential “heads of state meeting” with all the key leaders of the hemisphere similar to one
Eisenhower did when he was Vice President. “Latin America, nobody has been there.” He continued, “Latin America really ought to have something done on the president side.” He had even given some thought to the location, “a rather safe city…maybe in Paraguay.”492
While Nixon was clearly thinking about ways to improve the current relationship between the region and the United States, he did not seem willing to grapple with the largest issue, the ten percent surcharge, and appeared to suggest they were only facing a messaging problem. “Just a little attention to those people is terrific.”493 Nixon, outside a brief trip to
Mexico, never had a chance to test his theory since he did not follow through with an actual trip during his presidency.
On the eve of Finch’s two-week trip in November of 1971, Nixon’s counselor made news by attempting to break with the policies of the past. Rather than trying to recreate
Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor policy or Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress, which Finch characterized as policies that “lumped the Latin-American countries together as banana
492 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 010-040, October 5, 1971, Oval Office. 493 Ibid. 193 republics” the United States dealt with Latin American countries bilaterally “as we find them,” with no “litmus tests” regarding their form of government.494 Latin American experts from previous administrations were quick to critique Finch’s characterizations.
William D. Rogers, a former coordinator of the Alliance for Progress, called Finch’s arguments “ridiculous” and an attempt “to make up for the Nixon policy vacuum.”495
The trip itself made very few headlines with Finch keeping his meetings with foreign ministers and government leaders low key. The one aspect of the trip that made news in the United States came after Finch, along with White House Director of
Communications, Herbert Klein, had an informal briefing with reporters in Washington.
At the press conference Klein stated that he had a “feeling” that Allende’s government would not last long. When pressed, Klein stated the source of his “feeling” were some of the officials they had met on their trip, who felt Allende would fall due to economic problems.496 While this drew an official protest from Chile, Finch’s low profile helped quell the sort of protests Nixon had faced as Vice President and Rockefeller had faced on his trip two years earlier.
Finch’s final report struck a generally positive tone. He found “a vast residue of friendship and cooperative spirit in Latin America with respect to the United States on the part of the great majority of the people as well as their governments.” Most of the officials he met with had a positive reaction to “mature partnership,” but he also argued that the
494 Welles, Benjamin, “Finch, on the Eve of Tour, Defends Nixon’s Latin Aims,” New York Times, November 10,1971. 495 Ibid. No relation to the Secretary of State William P. Rogers 496 Associated Press, “Chile Protests Klein Statement,” New York Times, December 02,1971. 194 “mature partnership is a goal and not a means,” and the administration had not yet found the means to properly effect the strategy. This continued to be the Achilles heel of the administration’s regional policy. The rhetoric and the overall strategy were sound, but for a variety of reasons, such as lack of focus and resources from Congress, the means to achieve the strategy never developed.
The report’s recommendations focused on Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina as “the chief pillars of our Latin American strategy.” Finch also recommended, “high-level consultations with the Congress on Latin American problems” and “increased high level visits in both directions.”497 Overall, the modest recommendations, except for working with a hostile Congress, were more achievable, at least as compared to Rockefeller’s grandiose vision. The importance of Finch’s report, which became a part of the official Latin
American policy review in the NSC, had less to do with any specific recommendations, and more to do with the general focus on bilateral relations with the larger countries in the region. This policy was already in the works, at least when it came to the most populist country in the region—Brazil.
BRAZIL: NIXON’S SOUTHERN PARTNER IN POWER
Nixon’s shift away from regional to bilateral policy had as its lynchpin efforts to improve relations with Brazil. This effort faced a fair amount of resistance from the U.S
497 “Memorandum From the Counselor to the President (Finch) to President Nixon” Washington, Drafted December 02, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d52. 195 Congress, but Nixon still pushed ahead with his efforts to strengthen and support the
Brazilian military government. believing they could act as a bulwark against Communism and as an ally of the United States when it came to other initiatives. While the
Congressional efforts to shed light on the support of torture, extrajudicial killings, and sequesters of activists and other enemies of the state were important, they ultimately made little difference for Nixon. Unlike other initiatives in the region, Nixon did not need
Congress to acquiesce, but only to not actively oppose him.
By the end of 1970, and after a formal review of policy toward Brazil in the form of NSSM 67, Nixon began the process of refocusing on relations with Brazil. Kissinger, while not opposed, appeared at best indifferent to the move. At an SRG meeting on NSSM
67 he even asked a question to the group, “why is Brazilian development in the interest of the U.S.?”498 His question implied he had trouble visualizing the importance of Brazil for the United States. This continued Kissinger’s pattern of questioning the importance of the region.
Nixon, however, did see the importance of Brazil, having visited it on multiple occasions before he became president. When meeting with his ambassador to the country,
William Rountree, he “stressed his strong desire to maintain close relations with the
Government of Brazil.” He continued, while “some people were critical” of the military dictatorship, he felt “we must be realistic and deal with Governments as they are.”
Roundtree responded positively, but cautioned Nixon that Senator Church was holding
498 “Minutes of a Senior Review Group Meeting,” Washington, December 1, 1970, FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d132. 196 hearings on Brazil, “which might cause some problems for our relations.” 499 Even before the meeting, Nixon wanted more focus on Brazil, writing in earlier December, “I want a stepped-up effort for closer relations with Brazil’s government—order Meyer to carry out.”500 While the grand strategist Kissinger failed to see the importance of Brazil, Nixon clearly did.
Senator Church had long been skeptical of the Brazilian government and opposed
Nixon’s wishes for improved relations with the largest country in South America. Shortly after taking over as chairman of the Western Hemisphere affairs subcommittee, Church called the government “no ordinary Latin America military Junta” and “a group of humorless military technocrats.”501 The hearings he oversaw in 1971 demonstrated his commitment to exposing the ills of the Brazilian government while calling into question the billions of dollars in aid provided by the United States to the country.
Church’s call for hearings on the Brazilian military junta’s repressive tactics drew letters of support from various organizations throughout the United States and abroad, such as Amnesty International; however, the largest outpouring of support came from religious organizations, many of which had missionaries on the ground in Brazil who had witnessed the brutal tactics of the regime.502 The United Presbyterian Church wrote Church,
499 “Memorandum of Meeting” Washington, Drafted December 14, 1970, FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E- 10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d134. 500 Ibid. Comment from a December 3rd briefing memorandum noted in footnote one of the FRUS page 501 Laine, Pete, “Senator Blasts Brazil’s Rulers, Seeks Aid cut,” Detroit Free Press, August 13,1971. 502For more on actors in the United States trying to influence U.S. foreign policy toward Brazil see James Naylor Green, We Cannot Remain Silent: Opposition to the Brazilian Military Dictatorship in the United States (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010). 197 “dismayed by the stories of repression and torture” and the “intimidation, abuse, and torture of our fellow churchmen in Brazil.“503 The Senator also received personal stories of atrocities from other religious leaders, such as that from James Armstrong of the United
Methodist Church who shared the arrest of Dr. Ernest Hamburger, secretary of the
Brazilian Society of Physics, and his wife; they were “taken from their children, the youngest of whom was only a few months old.”504 The American Friends Service
Committee, an arm of Nixon’s childhood Quaker faith, also sent a letter of support to
Church commending him for his planned hearing. They noted that the “State Department tells us one prime goal of our Latin American policy is to foster democracy” and questioned
“how that aim is being fulfilled…or betrayed–by our total U.S. impact on the Brazilian scene.”505
These organizations and individuals perceived Senator Church as sympathetic to their concerns and attempted to influence him in a variety of ways. Associate Professor
Brady Tyson from American University invited Church to meet the outspoken Brazilian cleric Dom Hélder, who had been a thorn in the side of the Brazilian Junta for several years.
While Church was not available, he clearly respected Dom Hélder, responding that he was,
“one of the great men in the world today.” His letter also demonstrated support for previous
503 Boise State University, Albertsons Library, Special Collections and Archives, Frank Church Papers, MSS 56, Latin America Brazil Torture Hearings, TBD, TBD. 504 Boise State University, Albertsons Library, Special Collections and Archives, Frank Church Papers, MSS 56, Latin America Brazil Torture Hearings, James Armstrong to Church, January 4,1971. 505 Boise State University, Albertsons Library, Special Collections and Archives, Frank Church Papers, MSS 56, Latin America Brazil Torture Hearings, Bronson Clark to Church, February 18,1971. 198 materials provided by Professor Tyson which he had “read with interest.”506 Church, through his correspondence with Tyson and others, received information outside of the official government channels. These information sources allowed him to challenge the official executive branch narrative, which advocated closer ties with Brazil.
When Church held his hearing in May he did so in an executive session closed to the public. The stated reasoning for the closed session was a hope for “a full and free flow of information,” but some evidence suggests it may have been pressure from the Nixon administration to not hold public hearings.507 If the Nixon administration did pressure
Church to keep the hearings private, it would be in keeping with Nixon’s objective to improve relations with Brazil. It would also allow the executive branch some control over the subsequent message since they would be able to remove classified information, which in this case they did multiple times throughout the final transcript. Church made clear in his opening statement that his hearing would focus not on what the various Brazilian factions did internally, as those were “no proper concerns of the U.S. Senate,” but on the conduct of “the various agencies of the U.S. Government.”508 For the most part in the hearings, Church advocated for a more isolationist policy of pulling support from the
Brazilian government.
506 Boise State University, Albertsons Library, Special Collections and Archives, Frank Church Papers, MSS 56, Latin America Brazil Torture Hearings, Church to Brady Tyson, April 30,1971. 507 One letter to Church wrote about “pressures upon you not to go beyond this kind of public hearing.” Boise State University, Albertsons Library, Special Collections and Archives, Frank Church Papers, MSS 56, Latin America Brazil Torture Hearings, L.M. McCoy to Church, June 11,1971. 508 United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs. United States Policies and Programs In Brazil: Hearings Before the Subcommittee On Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee On Foreign Relations, United States Senate: Ninety-Second Congress, First Session, May 4, 5, And 11, 1971. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1971. 199 Theodore Brown, chief of the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) public safety program in Brazil, was the first witness called. In his testimony he emphasized that his program trained 641 police officers. He stated he had no personal knowledge of torture, but acknowledged the reports made in the news and by activists. In terms of training, the U.S. only trained “psychological, nonphysical methods of interrogation” since the police “certainly cannot use torture methods.” Proud of the work he had done, in response to a question about whether he thought “the situation has been better than it would have been had we had no program,” he responded enthusiastically; “I am certain of that, Senator.”509 While ignorant or purposely evasive about the atrocities committed by the Brazilian state, Brown appeared to think that U.S. efforts, at least with his program, had been beneficial.
The panel next heard from Major General George S. Beatty and Colonel Arthur S
Moura, both defense officials working in Brazil. Less pointed in their questions than with
Brown, the Senators on the panel still asked about reports of torture in Brazil. Beatty acknowledged the accusations, but insisted he had investigated some of the reports dealing with the military and found no confirmation of torture. Senator George Aiken offered his thought that “we should pay more attention to Brazil than to most countries, because Brazil has tremendous potential.” Nonetheless, Church, as he did with the other witnesses, repeatedly brought up the issue of torture and violations by the Brazilian government. The last administration member to speak to the committee was Ambassador William
509 Ibid. 200 Roundtree. Roundtree was well prepared for the questions, noting that the Brazilian government received “outspoken criticism from various quarters in Brazil, including in particular members of the clergy concerning excesses of this sort.” When asked if he had confronted the Brazilian government “about the torture in question,” he responded in the affirmative with an unequivocal “yes.”510 Not satisfied with the response, Church lectured
Roundtree. “Young people” in college had asked Church “why have we spent $2 billion in
Brazil when the government there is dictatorial in character, run by military men, any number of Brazilians are said to be mistreated in the jails, where there are recurrent reports of human torture.” Roundtree responded with talk of “humanitarian interest” and the importance of the relationship.511
After the hearing, but before the release of the sanitized transcript, Nixon’s attempt to improve relations with Brazil hit a snag. Brazil, like other countries in the region, such as Peru, claimed two hundred miles of territorial water instead of the fourteen miles recognized by the United States. As Nixon became involved with the issue, what he called
“some fishing thing,” he expressed his concern about the strained relations. He asked that
Roundtree share his wish to smooth over relations with the Brazilian government. “Don’t look at what our Congress does, but look at what we do.” He continued, “we are just the best friend Brazil has had in this office,” and “our biggest investment in the Americas.”512
510 Ibid. 511 Ibid. 512 “Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and President’s Assistant (Haldeman)” Washington, June 11, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d139. 201 Nixon was willing to overlook a problem that affected U.S. fishermen so he could signal to the Brazilians that he was willing to work with them regardless of what Congress did.
When Congress released the redacted transcript on 22 July, the Brazilian press noticed the conflict between Senator Church and the administration witnesses he called to testify. While the coverage of the hearings was generally “low-key and straightforward” according to State Department analysis, some of the editorials were “quite specifically critical of Senator Church.” Certain unnamed newspapers attempted to erase Church’s criticism by calling Church “ill-informed” and “unwilling to accept the good information” that the witnesses provided.513 Church also received less than favorable coverage in an interview he conducted with the news magazine E Leia Veja. The main caption underneath a less than flattering picture of the Senator quotes him as saying “foreign aid is bad for all.”
Later in the interview he stated; “I am against the continuation of bilateral programs,” because, he continued, they tend to become “political.”514 The various press accounts through a variety of different methods attempted to blunt Church’s criticism and marginalize his concerns, even though he had a large number of organizations and individuals in the United States pushing him to investigate the atrocities of the military regime.
513 Boise State University, Albertsons Library, Special Collections and Archives, Frank Church Papers, MSS 56, Latin America Brazil Torture Hearings, “Press Reaction to Release of Church Herrings Testimony”, August 3,1971. 514 Boise State University, Albertsons Library, Special Collections and Archives, Frank Church Papers, MSS 56, Latin America Brazil Torture Hearings, “Um senador contra a a política da árvore de Natal” November 10,1971. 202 At the end of the year, the long-planned visit with Brazil’s leader Médici transpired over three days in early December. Nixon had praised Médici before the meeting as “a strong man” who was “an activist kind of a fellow… he runs a tight shop.” He attributed his success to “tight shop” tactics which may have been a metaphor for torture. Nixon advised that the administration should not underestimate the importance of Brazil: “they are going to make or break the place.”515
Médici was very familiar with Washington, having served as the Brazilian military attaché a few years earlier. He stated that he had gained the job on the recommendation
General Walters. Walters acted as the administration’s official translator for this meeting, the same role he held when then Vice President Nixon traveled to South America in 1958.
In his initial meeting with Nixon, Médici highlighted his anticorruption campaigns and his push for foreign investment, comparing Brazil to the United States. Earlier in his career, a
U.S. military commander told him that U.S. success had “been developed by foreign capital, largely British and French, in the 19th century.”516 In the same vain, Médici was very open to foreign investment.
The heart of the conversation revolved around Brazil’s role in the region. Always interested in the views of foreign leaders, Nixon expressed concern about “the situation in
Argentina, in Chile, and in Uruguay.” Médici’s view of the region was “pretty bleak to him outside of Brazil.” In Uruguay the leftist “Broad Front” only received twenty percent of
515 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 012-001, October 20, 1971, Oval Office. 516 “Memorandum for the President’s File,” Washington, December 7, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d141. 203 the vote, but that was up from five percent. Argentina had issues with stable governance, and Médici said he was “concerned” with “the situation in Chile.” He then brought up
Bolivia which Nixon had not mentioned. “Bolivia was in desperate straits” said Médici.
Failure of the Bolivian government could force the country to “fall into the arms of the
Communists and become another Cuba or Chile.” To prevent this, Brazil provided
“assistance to Bolivia,” which likely meant the military coup that took over the country in
August. Nixon knew about Uruguay, but was unware of Brazil’s help in Bolivia. Hearing about their support made him “very happy.”517 The meeting likely went better than Nixon expected. The largest country in the hemisphere appeared on board with his vision for the region, willing to interfere in the internal affairs of its neighbors to thwart leftist movements.
The Uruguayan issue the two leaders discussed revolved around the Frente Amplio, or Broad Front, a leftist coalition with some similarities to the coalition that led to Allende’s victory in Chile. The U.S. had several counterinsurgency programs in the country designed to defeat the Tupamaros, one of the main leftist guerilla groups in the country. Despite some strong polling data, the Frente Amplio ended up a distant third place behind the two more mainstream political parties in the November elections.518 While unclear exactly what support Brazil provided in defeating the leftists at the ballot box, Nixon viewed Brazil’s intervention as a clear win for the Nixon Doctrine. He even bragged about Brazil being,
517 Ibid. 518 “National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 71,” June 20, 2002, accessed March 01, 2019, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB71/. 204 “the key to the future,” telling the British Prime Minister Edward Heath “the Brazilians helped rig the Uruguayan election.”519
Concerning the situation in Bolivia, which recently had another military backed coup, the role of the United States is somewhat clearer. The deposed president Juan José
Torres had, in the views of the administration, started a “leftward trend.” In July of 1971, the 40 Committee debated what sort of strategy the executive branch should pursue. As part of the debate, some members of the 40 Committee, particularly Admiral Moorer, argued that covert action could “force a favorable outcome.”520 Eventually some money passed hands through the CIA to elements opposed to Torres’s rule in Bolivia, ostensibly to “cement relations” as they plotted a coup.521 This support, plus whatever support Brazil provided to elements in Bolivia may have served as the tipping point that led to ouster of
Torres on August 21, 1971.
Brazil’s ambassador to the United States, Joao Castro, asked a big picture question about how “Latin America and Brazil fit into the global foreign policy concept of the
United States.” After dancing around the question for the moment by bringing up Castro’s love of philosophy, Kissinger admitted that the administration had “not been able to do as much with regard to Latin America as we would like” due to “various constraints,
519 “Memorandum for the President’s File,” Bermuda, December 20, 1971, DNSA, available online at https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB71/doc15.pdf . Note the FRUS section on Uruguay is still pending security classification review. 520 “Memorandum for the Record,” Washington, July 6, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d105 521 “Memorandum From Arnold Nachmanoff of the National Security Council Staff to President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),” Washington, August 19, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d107 205 Congressional and bureaucratic.” It was because of these constraints that Kissinger felt improving the bilateral relation with Brazil was important: “the United States particularly needs the advice and cooperation of the largest and most important nation in South
America.” Kissinger felt Brazil could help the United States with regional problems, “such as the situations in Uruguay and Bolivia,” arguing “close cooperation and parallel approaches” could help both sides reach “our common objectives.”522
Nixon ultimately asked for Brazil’s help with Cuba. Médici agreed with Nixon, and even offered to work against a Peruvian resolution in the OAS to begin the process of readmission into the organization for Cuba. Upon hearing this, and because Nixon felt they
“had gotten along so well” he asked to set up communications “outside of normal diplomatic channels,” one of Nixon’s many back channels.523 This was the only back channel opened within Latin America.
The two leaders also saw their views align on the issue of Chile. Médici was unambiguous when asked for his assessment, “Allende would be overthrown” and the “the
Chilean Armed forces were capable of overthrowing Allende.” In case it was unclear what level of support Brazil would offer the Chilean military, Médici assured Nixon “Brazil was
522 “Memorandum of Meeting,” Washington, December 8, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d142. 523 “Memorandum for the President’s File,” Washington, December 9, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d143. 206 working towards this end.” Nixon, while not committing to a course of action, wanted
“Brazil and the United States to work closely in this field.”524
BILATERAL MOVES SOLIDIFIED
A high-level commander in the Brazilian Army, “General Vicente Dole Coutinho,” and “other field grade officers” had their own assessments of the new relationship forged between Médici and Nixon. Coutinho’s response was, “the United States obviously wants
Brazil to ‘do the dirty work,’” which would come with “great responsibilities,” but also
“some disadvantages.”525 The disadvantages were the risk of alienating Brazil’s neighbors.
Nixon publicly stated “we know that as Brazil goes so will go the rest of that Latin-
American continent,” but Médici tried to downplay Nixon’s public comments, stating
“Brazil has declined the role of leader in Latin America.” This came after multiple countries. including Venezuela, Peru, and Argentina, publicly denounced the insinuated
“United States approved hegemony.”526
Not all members of the United States government wished to support the Brazilian military government, but in this case, Congress had limited options. Church shined a spotlight on some of the atrocities of the Brazilian military government, but the closed- door hearings and the delayed transcripts limited the effectiveness of his bully pulpit. He
524 Ibid. 525 “Memorandum From the Acting Director of Central Intelligence (Cushman) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),” Washington, December 29, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E- 10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d146. 526 Associated Press, “Medici Denies Brazil is Seeking Domination Over Latin America,” New York Times, December 31, 1971. 207 could not even gain access to the NSC Brazil Study NSSM 67. After “six or eight” months of trying, since an internal NSC memo stated he had not “earned” the study.527 This incident demonstrated the limits of Congressional power. While Congress could block new programs by failing to fund administration priorities, the executive branch had a much larger analytical arm to digest issues.
The strategic shift from multilateral programs to increased focus on bilateral issues continued into the next year and the run-up to Nixon’s reelection in 1972. The focus continued to be on Brazil, but also on the more traditional partner of choice, Mexico, which the administration had neglected with the focus on Brazil. This new emphasis on bilateral relations would see some small diplomatic victories, particularly with Mexico, but nothing dramatic. Not satisfied with modest improvements in relations, Nixon continued to search for a way to build a legacy in the region for the rest of his presidency.
527 “Church request for NSSM 67 Brazil Study,” December 9, 1971, folder: Church, Frank, Box: 811, NSC Name Files, RNPL, Yorba Linda, California. 208 Chapter 6: The Dawn of the “New Dialogue”
"Jack, I want you to take as much time as you need to straighten out those problems in Latin America for me. Take two weeks, if you want to!"528
-Nixon
LIMITS TO POWER
Taking a retrospective view of Latin American policy in 1971, the Nixon administration, in a report to Congress, expressed cautious optimism. The report acknowledged that Latin America required a different approach and could not be, “simply another region of the developing world,” and that current policies reflected “the new thrust of United States foreign policy under the Nixon Doctrine.” Concerning achievements, the report noted consultations with Médici of Brazil and Somoza of Nicaragua, relinquished claims of sovereignty over Swan Islands to Honduras, and the abrogation of the Bryan- Chamorro Treaty, which had given the United States the authority to build a canal, one “which we no longer require.” In terms of administrative priorities, Nixon continued to seek “generalized preference legislation,” and more financing for the completion of the Darien Gap portion of the Pan American Highway, which would link North and South
America for the first time by land. The overall assessment was that the administration had pursued a policy with elements of “realism and restraint.”529 Although it was an overly optimistic political document, designed to put the administration’s policies in a positive light, the report pointed to some real, if relatively
528 Jack Kubisch, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Arlington, VA, https://www.adst.org. 529 U. S. Foreign Policy for the 1970’s: The Emerging Structure of Peace; a Report to the Congress (Washington: 1972), 90-100.
209 small, bilateral initiatives. While few people in the United States likely cared about the Swan Islands, the settlement of the issue likely mattered a great deal in Honduras. At the same time, the report also demonstrated the lack of movement surrounding regional or multilateral policy. Ironically, Nixon found himself in a situation where he had relatively good relations with the individual countries of Latin America and relatively stale relations with the inter-American system as a whole. Nixon acknowledged this conundrum, and would again work to develop a hemispheric approach in the last years of his administration. Latin America as a whole never took center stage for the administration due to priorities in other parts of the world. Nevertheless, Nixon became frustrated with the lack of recognition of the attention he had paid the region. “We’ve been around this track a number of times. I had the Latin American heads of state here. Nobody gives one tinker’s damn about Colombia, Venezuela, et cetera. We try! You know, they don’t even care about
Mexico. Not much.”530 His frustration continued throughout his final years remarking that
“new initiatives” in the region were “damn near impossible without money.”531 Congress never appropriated large sums of money; however, Nixon was able to make some progress on both bilateral and multilateral issues. His biggest bilateral success in 1972 involved setting the conditions for resolving an ongoing dispute over clean water, which by treaty, the United States was obligated to provide to Mexico. By solving the dispute with the new president of Mexico, Luis Echeverría Álvarez, Nixon thought he had found an ally in the region who could lead on regional initiatives in keeping with the Nixon Doctrine. While Echeverría proved useful in advancing some U.S. interests, his actions also demonstrated the limits of the Nixon
530 Transcript of conversation available online at https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB95/mex18.pdf. 531 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No 867-034, Mar. 2, 1973. 210 Doctrine. Echeverría pushed his own Echeverría Doctrine advocating for a “third world” coalition against the developed world, which included both the USSR and the United States, Nixon saw the drawbacks of his “low profile” approach which purposely provided a platform for actors such as Echeverría. At the same time, Echeverría’s actions demonstrated the inherent agency of Latin American actors. Nixon, after his reelection, also improved the quality of his advisors. He replaced his much-maligned advisor Charles Meyer with the career diplomat Jack B. Kubisch as the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs. Kubisch had served with distinction in Mexico and supported the Paris peace talks with Vietnam. On a lower level, new advisors to Kissinger on the NSC and a new lead negotiator in Panama, on issues relating to the Panama Canal, had positive effects. Finally, Kissinger himself, upon his appointment as Secretary of State, developed a new focus on the region launching a “new dialogue,” which at first appeared promising. The resolution of a major bilateral issue with Mexico, different voices, and new initiatives would all fail in the storm that became the domestic scandal of Watergate, the crisis that prematurely ended the Nixon presidency on August 9, 1974.
MEXICO: CLEAN WATER AND THE LIMITATIONS OF THE NIXON DOCTRINE
Even as Brazil received the most attention from the Nixon administration in 1971, efforts to improve bilateral relations with other influential countries in the region, such as
Mexico, continued. By the end of 1971, Nixon had repaired most of the damage from
Operation Intercept, and had even convinced the new president of Mexico, Luis Echeverría
Álvarez, to vote with the United States on a UN resolution regarding the future of China in the assembly. As a gesture of goodwill to Echeverría, the U.S. embassy in Mexico recommended an official state visit for Mexico in 1972 to balance the one made by Brazil
211 in 1971.532 After the visit by Brazilian President Médici in December, the embassy again urged Washington to invite Echeverría to counteract “some Mexican jealousy” and
“sensitivities.” The embassy based their assessment on the “rather terse coverage” in the
Mexican press focused on Médici’s visit. In particular, the coverage keyed in on a particular statement by Nixon where he mused that Brazil would become a “great power of Latin America and one of the most intimate friends of [the] United States in [the] hemisphere.”533 The embassy’s assessment of the Mexican reaction turned out to be correct.
Mexican ambassador to the United States, José Juan de Olloqui, informed his country about the impact of Médici’s visit. Olloqui viewed Brazil as a competitor, “because of its landmass, large population, and its impressive economic growth in the last few years.” He continued, “Brazil could in a moment replace Mexico from its natural position as the United States’ most important relationship in Latin America.” He further assessed that there is no reason, “Mexico should allow, or even insinuate, loss of primacy with respect to Latin American affairs for the United States.”534 Olloqui’s appraisal likely made it to the highest levels of the Mexican government. While the bilateral relationship between
Mexico and the United States was not perfect, it was one that had been traditionally strong
532 “Invitation to President Echeverria to visit U.S,” Subject Numeric Files, 1970-73 Political & Defense, RG 59, Box: 2473, Folder: POL 7 MEX Oct 28, 1971. 533 “Invitation to President Echeverria to visit United States,” Subject Numeric Files, 1970-73 Political & Defense, RG 59, Box: 2473, Folder: POL 7 MEX, Dec 8, 1971. 534AHD, III-3155-5, “Algunas consideractiones acerca de las relactiones entre Estados Unidos y Brasil. Informe No. 2,” Dec. 22, 1971. 212 in the post WWII era. Anything that might weaken that relationship could damage both sides due to close economic and cultural links.
By February, Nixon, likely in an effort to calm Mexican fears, had invited
Echeverría to Washington on an official state visit. By far the largest bilateral issue involved salinity levels in the Colorado River. The US-Mexico Treaty of 1944 required the
United States to provide Mexico with 1.5 million acre-feet of clean water. The dispute began in 1961 when the salt content rose due to a drainage project in Arizona draining dirty water into the river. While the two sides had reached several interterm agreements since
1961, a permanent solution remained elusive because of cost concerns and water access in the United States.535 According to Mexico’s foreign secretary, Emilio Rabasa, “[the] salinity problem was [the] number one issue between [the] united states and Mexico.”536
Perhaps in a bid to remain relevant after Nixon’s improved relationship with
Médici, Echeverría prebriefed the U.S. embassy on the issues he would bring up with
Nixon. His first focus was on sharing his “impressions about South America.” He continued, “the situation in Chile was bad enough,” but “the most urgent problem in the hemisphere was Argentina,” since “Peron seemed to be running things from Madrid.”537
Echeverría also joined the list of leaders concerned about “the role of the Catholic Church
535 “Study Prepared by William J. Jorden of the National Security Council Staff,” Washington, undated. FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d674. 536 “Telegram 718 From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of State,” Feb 12,1972, FRUS, 1969- 1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d473 537 NARA II, RG 59, Subject Numeric Files, 1970-73 Political & Defense, Box: 2473, Folder: POL 7 MEX, “Views of President Echeverria on the Hemisphere in Mexico,” Apr 23, 1972. Juan Perón was the deposed populist leader from Argentina who was exiled to Madrid. 213 in Latin America.” He thought that “in some cases, an alliance between Marxism and [the]
Catholic Church appeared to have been forged.” Continuing, “the church…was becoming a possible danger.”538 Echeverría’s focus on hemispheric issues demonstrated his commitment to staying relevant as a regional player.
As the official state visit approached, the administration appeared closer to a solution to the salinity crisis. What Kissinger called a “knotty, long-standing problem,” appeared solvable after Kissinger and Rabasa had cleared out much of the technical problems through “frank talk.” One area they had not yet reached agreement on involved arbitration for damages caused by the salty water and the failure of the United States to meet its treaty commitments. Kissinger did not want to agree to arbitration because he conceded that the U.S. “legal position on salinity is weak.” However, Kissinger and the
Interior Department had come up with a plan to potentially “shelve the idea of arbitration altogether.” The solution involved building desalinization plants to improve the water quality on both sides permanently.539 A solution to the issue for both sides was within reach. The deadline of the upcoming visit by Echeverría and the expectation of some sort of joint statement on the problem had pushed both sides to a solution to a problem that had festered since 1961.
The official visit began with both presidents having a productive and cordial meeting. Nixon attempted to assuage Mexican pride by stating that “the first
538 Ibid. 539 “Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon,” Washington, May 6, 1972, FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d477. 214 meeting…after I returned from Moscow is with the President of Mexico” calling the event
“very appropriate.” He continued to flatter Echeverría by offering to have Kissinger brief him in Mexico City on the results of his China visit scheduled for later in the year. He claimed he could not offer such a consultation with everyone, but with “Mexico and, like,
Japan and the European countries and Canada, we try to have that kind of communication.”
540 Moving on to the salinity issue Nixon offered to “tackle that problem right away,” and waited for Echeverría to lay out his thoughts. As Echeverría established a framework for solving the issue, he was aware that it was an election year in the United States. He went to great length to try to not cause “any immediate problem for you… either in
California or in Arizona,” two important electoral states with large Hispanic populations.
Nixon appreciated his feedback, and made “a personal commitment…” to solve the issue
“before the end of the year.”541 With both sides coming to a consensus on the salinity issue, the conversation turned toward geopolitics.
Echeverría wanted to, “reiterate” his “principles of the Third World vis-á-vis the great powers of the world.” He argued that he had to lead “because if I don’t take this flag in Latin America, Castro will.”542 Echeverría knew that the overarching objective of
Nixon’s policy toward Latin America was preventing the spread of communism in the hemisphere. By presenting the situation of the hemisphere as a binary choice between his
540 Transcript of conversation available online at https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB95/mex27.pdf. 541 Ibid. 542 Ibid. 215 vision and Castro’s, he hoped to gain space for what Nixon called the “Echeverría
Doctrine.”
Nixon appeared receptive to the viewpoint since it nested with his vision of a “low profile” for the United States. Continuing to flatter Echeverría, Nixon brought up how an unnamed “very big businessman” stated he would invest in “only two countries” in the region; “he would invest in: Mexico and Brazil. And the reason is that each of these countries, each in its different way, provides stability – stability without the fear of violent takeover or expropriation.” Understanding his audience, Nixon quickly mentioned he was
“not suggesting that the answer is dictatorship to the right.” In fact, he wanted “more countries to follow the example of Mexico.”543 In Nixon’s mind, however, Mexico while not a dictatorship, was also not a democracy. Nixon had previously called Mexico “a one- party government,” not a country whose “present leader [is] there as a result of a contested election.”544 What Nixon really wanted in the hemisphere was stability for private enterprise and strong allies against Communism. Overall, he was ambivalent as to the governmental form as long as it met his objective.
Nixon also appeared appreciative of Mexico’s efforts. He referred to Mexico as
“the bridge – the bridge between the United States and the rest of Latin America. I think for the President of Mexico to take a leading role in speaking about the problems of the hemisphere is very constructive.” Echeverría argued for a more unified approach to Latin
543 Ibid. 544Transcript of conversation available online at https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB95/mex10.pdf. 216 America, which Nixon had been trying to move away from. Nixon steered the conversation back to Mexico offering that it “would be very helpful,” if he focused on “stability in government, and some guarantee for the protection of the right kind of private enterprise.”
He continued, “nobody in the United States can say that because then it looks as if we are interfering in Latin America.” On the other hand, if the “President of Mexico speaks out on this subject” then, Nixon implied, the countries of the hemisphere might listen. He then concluded, “let the voice of Echeverría rather than the voice of Castro be the voice of Latin
America.”545 Thus Nixon pushed his doctrine for the region by encouraging an ally to act as a spokesperson for U.S. priorities.
Nixon, much as he had with Médici, left the meeting impressed with Mexico’s leader. He told Haldeman he was “an awfully nice guy;” continuing, “He’s got enormous energy and, and drive, honest – I think he’s honest.” Haldeman concurred “more powerful guy than Díaz Ordaz,” the previous president of Mexico.546 While Nixon may have shown some level of interest in Echeverría’s rhetoric as a form of diplomatic politeness, he appeared genuinely interested in Mexico taking a leading role in the hemisphere, just as he appeared interested in Brazil doing the same. In a conversation with his CIA director he stated, “I don’t know what games we’re playing there, but... He’s strong – he wants to play the right games.” In his quest to prevent more Cubas and Chiles in the hemisphere, Nixon thought he had another ally. “He’s on our side, all right.”547
545 Ibid. 546 Transcript of conversation available online at https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB95/mex28.pdf. 547Transcript of conversation available online at https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB95/mex31.pdf. 217 The joint statement at the end of the visit set an overall positive tone, “advancing new approaches to Latin America and the less developed nations of the world.” It praised the new “spirit of frankness, with Mexico… which they hoped would characterize intra-
Hemispheric relations.” Concerning the salinity issue, Nixon agreed to “undertake certain actions immediately to improve the quality of water going to Mexico.” While the United
States eventually funded a series of desalinization plants along the river, the immediate change in water flows had the most drastic effect on the cleanliness of the water delivered to Mexico.548
The Mexican press gave Echeverría’s visit a positive reception. The coverage was
“voluminous, laudatory, and generally uncritical.” Across the board radio and television stations gave the president “2 hours per day” of live coverage.549 The press conditioned the
American public to a reset of relations with the United States, more to Mexico’s favor.
While it is unclear how much Nixon knew about the Mexican press reaction, he likely was not concerned with Echeverría receiving the lion share of the credit.
Echeverría did not need much prodding, but in the aftermath of the successful trip, he took the title of hemispheric leader to heart. He believed Nixon would be reelected and wanted him to consider a summit sometime in the new administration. He offered to host a hemispheric chiefs of state meeting, “excluding Castro, of course.” Nixon’s ambassador
548 These actions involved improving the salinity of the water by diverting the drainage from Arizona away from the Colorado river. For more see “Yuma Area Office | Lower Colorado Region | Bureau of Reclamation,” accessed March 16, 2019, https://www.usbr.gov/lc/yuma/facilities/ydp/yao_ydp_history.html. 549 NARA II, RG 59, Subject Numeric Files, 1970-73 Political & Defense, Box: 2473, Folder: POL 7 MEX, “Mexican Reaction to Echeverria Visit,” Jun 21, 1972. 218 to Mexico assessed this offer as a sign of the “increasingly active role which Mexico is seeking to play in the hemisphere.”550 Almost a year before when a similar idea came up in the White House, Nixon appeared receptive, but did not want it in Mexico. When
Haldeman mentioned having a summit in South America rather than Mexico, Nixon concurred: “I agree, oh we won’t go to Mexico.”551
At the end of the year, after Nixon had comfortably won his reelection, U.S.-
Mexican relations were strong. The salinity issue was well on its way to a permanent solution. While one idea, that of a nuclear desalinization plan, never materialized,
Echeverría expressed “satisfaction” with the process. He also saw no other major issues with the United States calling the salinity issue “the last purely bilateral problem which we had of any significance.”552 However, signs of tensions with Echeverría’s desire to take a stronger leadership role in hemispheric and global affairs were already starting to show.
The white house received his suggestion of a chiefs of state meeting with skepticism. These tensions continued to escalate beginning in Nixon’s second term.
BRAZIL FRIENDSHIP STRENGTHENED
While Mexico took the leading role in 1972 for Nixon’s hemispheric policy, the executive branch continued to pay attention to Brazil. A 1972 National Intelligence
550 NARA II, RG 59, Subject Numeric Files, 1970-73 Political & Defense, Box: 2432, Folder: POL LA, “Views of President Echeverria on the Hemisphere in Mexico” Aug 2, 1972. 551Transcript of conversation available online at https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB95/mex18.pdf. 552“Telegram 7204 From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of State,” Dec. 16, 1972, FRUS, 1969- 1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d485. 219 Estimate on Brazil, which served as the consensus analysis of various intelligence agencies, gave more background on Brazil. According to the analysis, “the military intend to dominate Brazilian politics for some time to come.” Additionally, the agencies predicted that “the economic outlook for the next five years or so is good.” The analysts did warn of
“potentially destabilizing factors at work in Brazilian society,” especially “the Church,” which “might come to oppose the regime more vigorously.” Analysts assessed that, along with “an increasingly nationalistic and independent line in foreign affairs,” Brazil would seek “a bigger role in hemispheric affairs” in an effort to “fill whatever vacuum the US leaves behind.”553 Both Mexico and Brazil taking a larger role in the hemisphere was in keeping with Nixon’s doctrine on Latin America. As long as Brazil continued to be a strong ally against Communism, and remained open to U.S. business, Nixon was happy to keep a
“low profile.”
The Brazilian ambassador to the United States confirmed the outsized ambitions of
Brazil in February of 1972. Brazil, “is not small nor medium, but is destined to think like a large[state].” He continued, “our general objective is to transform Brazil into a developed country in one generation.”554 As a small gesture of support the FBI opened a field office in Rio de Janeiro to support counternarcotic and police training efforts.555 Here was a confident country ready to take its rightful place as a major power with the support of the
United States.
553 “National Intelligence Estimate 93–72,” Washington, Jan. 13, 1972, FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d146. 554 AP-ANSA-JB, “Araújo diz que Brasil seråá logo uma potencia,” Jornal do Brasil, 12 Feb, 1972. 555 UPI, “FBI to Open Rio Office,” Brazil Herald, Jan 25, 1972. 220 Feeling ambitious, the Brazilian state began a crackdown on the one part of civil society that could freely criticize it, the Catholic Church. While the government had previously allowed church organs, such as official church newspapers, to self-censor, in
April the state sent “an official censor” to review and edit church publications. In protest, when the censor stopped one article about a land dispute from printing, the paper, O São
Paulo, left a large blank spot where the article would have appeared. Days later, the diocese printed the article in the official “Bulletin” which went out only to clergy, “and a few other interested readers,” which included U.S. diplomatic officials.556 The crackdown on the church was not condoned by the United States, but the Brazilian state’s felt need to suppress its critics likely was influenced by improved relations with the Nixon white house.
Elements of the church continued to resist despite the increased formal censorship.
O São Paulo wrote a strong editorial in October condemning the current military government and calling for a return to democracy. The editor managed to evade the censor by publishing without their knowledge or consent.557 While the state may have increased the pressure on the church newspaper, the editor was willing to fight back, suggesting that as an institution the church still had some heft in society. A smaller or less prominent paper likely would have been shut down after such a direct affront to the government.
556 NARA II, RG 59, Subject Numeric Files, 1970-73 Political & Defense, Box: 2132, Folder: POL 17-5 BRAZ, “New Frictions in Church-State Relations” Jun 8, 1972; For more see Romero, Sigifredo, "The Progressive Catholic Church in Brazil, 1964-1972: The Official American View" (2014). FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 1210. http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/1210. 557 NARA II, RG 59, Subject Numeric Files, 1970-73 Political & Defense, Box: 2129, Folder: POL AFF&REL, “Church Newspapers Calls for Democracy” Oct 20, 1972. 221 In what was becoming a yearly ritual, a high-ranking Nixon government official was tagged with visiting key countries in Latin America. In 1972, the lot fell to Treasury
Secretary John Connally. Connally’s trip, which also included “third world” countries outside of Latin America, had the following theme as directed by Nixon:
as you know, I have made several speeches to the effect that there are five major economic and political power centers in the world today -- the United States, Western Europe, the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China, and Japan. Some may interpret this as meaning that those are the only countries I thought that mattered. That is only true insofar as their present industrial and potential military capacity is concerned. The so-called third world…will prove to be decisive down the road as they develop their resources and play the role on the world stage of which they are capable”558
As initial reports filtered in, Kissinger’s deputy Alexander Haig called the South
America leg “an outstanding success for U.S. policy in the area,” stating that Connally was
“warmly received.” He continued, the official visit “refuted the charges that the U.S. has lost interest in Latin America or is indifferent to its problems.” The lack of protests and the enthusiastic reception by the leaders in each country were evidence of “gradual improvements” which had developed “over the past year.”559 The more modest goals and re-engagement with the bilateral issues likely contributed to the improved relations.
With regards to specifics, Connally had an exceptionally successful visit in Brazil, one in which Médici, “reaffirmed Brazil’s policies with respect to Cuba” and “support for
558 “Memorandum From President Nixon to Secretary of Treasury Connally,” Jun. 6, 1972, FRUS, 1969- 1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d53. 559 “Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to President Nixon,” Washington, Jun 23, 1972, FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d55. 222 your initiatives in the international arena.” Concerning Chile, he stated “the tide has turned against Allende and the best course is for us to simply let the situation deteriorate without becoming involved in any way.”560 With the double threat of Chile and Cuba well contained by Brazil, Nixon’s quest to keep communism in a narrow part of the hemisphere appeared successful.
As a country with global ambitions, Brazil made a push overseas, strengthening relations with Africa, while still improving relations with the United States. The Brazilian foreign minister, Gibson Barbosa, called Africa “our eastern neighbors,” and planned to expand economic cooperation into the region by launching an eight-country, twenty-seven- day tour, beginning at the end of October. This new “globalist policy,” was planned in conjunction with a future visit to the Middle East.561 The next month would also see
Nixon’s Transportation Secretary John Volpe visit Brazil. During his three days on the ground he toured multiple transportation projects sponsored by the government.
Administrators at the highest levels, including Médici and multiple state governors, received him.562
The attention paid to Brazil in 1972 continued to demonstrate the importance Nixon placed on them as a partner. While reports of internal suppression, particularly the renewed vigor the military government took in responding to the Catholic Church, may have caused consternation at some levels, for Nixon it was just the price of doing business. Compared
560 Ibid. 561 Howe, Marvin, “Brazil Mission to Africa is Set,” The New York Times, Oct 24, 1972. 562 AHD, III-3189-6, “Relaciones Entre Brasil y Estados Unidos,” 22 Nov., 1972. 223 to the atrocities committed by China and the USSR, two places where he was actively trying to improve relations, the crackdown of the Brazilian government on a free press likely seemed irrelevant. The Brazilian government, with its global ambitions, also appeared happy to play the game.
IN SEARCH OF A LATIN AMERICA POLICY IN TIMES OF STRONG BILATERAL RELATIONS
After his decisive reelection, Nixon again tried to fine tune his doctrine for the region. Launching a third major review of foreign policy toward Latin America suggested that Nixon was not satisfied with just improved bilateral relations vis a vis Mexico and
Brazil. The search for the historic Nixon Doctrine on Latin America, one that could solidify
Nixon’s place in history, continued as Nixon began his second term. With Vietnam winding down and major gains made in relations with the USSR and China, Nixon thought perhaps he would have a good chance to leave his mark on the hemisphere. He said as much in a message to the OAS when he promised “priority attention” to the region. While any new policy would not “be made in a few days or a few weeks,” he promised to work on
“reconciling our differences.”563 Nixon managed to make some headway on reconciliation in the Central American country of Panama.
Renegotiating the status of the Panama Canal was a subject that came up from time to time in U.S-Panamanian relations. As part of his efforts to solve bilateral problems while he continued to search for a regional policy, Nixon turned his attention toward a solution
563 Quoted in AP, “Nixon: Latin America Will Get Priority Now,” Washington Post, Feb. 2, 1973. 224 to the issue of the Panama Canal. Negotiations, the latest round of which began in the
1960s, had been stalled until Nixon’s second term. However, 1973 began a period of discussions that eventually led to the Torrijos-Carter Treaty in 1977, ceding the Panama
Canal and the Panama Canal Zone to the local government by the end of the millennium.564
In this case, Nixon’s willingness to work with the military dictator Omar Torrijos, helped set the condition for a successful handover of U.S. imperial territory.
Kissinger’s third Latin America advisor, William J. Jorden, a competent State
Department foreign service officer and future ambassador to Panama, went to Panama to help set the conditions for talks. Jorden assessed his three day visit with Torrijos as highly successful, calling his visit a “new chapter” and “a new beginning” for negotiations which had stalled in early 1973. Torrijos wanted to reinvigorate treaty negotiations and set up a
“dual track” approach where the United States provided small confidence-building gestures to smooth over some of the “big questions.” Jorden supported this approach. He also recommended “picking a first-class Ambassador to Panama” as well as selecting an “able, full-time negotiator” for the treaty negotiations565 Kissinger was intrigued by his suggestions, but due to his ignorance of the issue, was not prepared to recommend either option to the president.566
564 The history of the Panama Canal is vast. Two representative examples are: Ovidio Diaz Espino, How Wall Street Created a Nation: J.P. Morgan, Teddy Roosevelt, and the Panama Canal (New York; London: Basic Books, 2003); Noel Maurer and Carlos Yu, The Big Ditch: How America Took, Built, Ran, and Ultimately Gave Away the Panama Canal (Princeton University Press, 2010). 565“Memorandum From William J. Jorden of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)” Washington, Feb. 23, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, VOLUME XXII, PANAMA, 1973–1976, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v22/d3. 566 Ibid. see footnote 8 225 Recognizing the stalled nature of negotiations, the long-time lead on negotiations,
Robert Anderson, resigned after nine years. Nixon accepted his resignation, thereby giving the slow-paced talks a new face and impetus to reach agreement.567 The new lead negotiator, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, an experienced diplomat who had served as ambassador to the OAS and several Latin America countries, demonstrated Nixon’s seriousness in solving the issue. Nixon’s guidance to Bunker was “guarantee the continued effective operation of the Canal while meeting Panama’s legitimate aspirations.”568
Recognizing that Panama had legitimate grievances helped push negotiations along.
Other than a reinvigoration on the Panama Canal treaty negotiations, Nixon pushed for more emphasis on Latin America within the executive branch. When he brought up the lack of formal NSC meetings he thought a meeting at least once a month to keep everyone on the same page could be useful. In this context he asked; “why not a [NSC] meeting on
Latin America?” Kissinger responded he could have his meeting, but first they needed to discuss the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), then Europe, and only then could he recommend a meeting on Latin America.569
One recurring and constant theme during Nixon’s presidency was his desire for greater military cooperation and support of the regional armed forces. Fearing that “the
567 “Letter From the Special Representative for Interoceanic Canal Negotiations (Anderson) to President Nixon,” New York, Jun. 20, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, VOLUME XXII, PANAMA, 1973–1976, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v22/d12. 568 “Letter From Secretary of State Rogers to Panamanian Foreign Minister Tack,” Washington, Aug. 6, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, VOLUME XXII, PANAMA, 1973–1976, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v22/d16. 569 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No 866-04, Mar. 1, 1972. The Meeting on Latin America never happened. Nixon only had two NSC meetings in all of 1973. 226 French and others” were in the process of displacing the United States as provider of choice for military equipment and training, Nixon called on his Joint Chiefs of Staff to bring “U.S. military programs back in Latin America.” During the discussion, Nixon abruptly, and without any context, mentioned that “Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America will be departing.”570 His comment suggested that he had no confidence in Charles Meyer, something he had suggested on more than one occasion.
Nixon constantly pushed for military assistance programs, which he argued were
“very much in [the] interest of the United States.” He most clearly articulated his reasoning in a conversation with Kissinger. He supported military assistance, “not because we want the money, not because we want them to have wars and so forth but because, god dammit, it gets our technical people in, our training and all the rest, some of our best friends are military people.”571 The military was the most consistent lever of influence Nixon used to advance national interests in Latin America.
The administration’s third major Latin America policy review, NSSM 173, again shifted the focus to the region as a whole. The language of improving bilateral relations was removed, replaced by directives to examine the U.S. place in “the future of the inter-
American system,” to manage “rising nationalism in Latin America,” and to minimize the
570 “Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) for the President’s File,” November 30, 1972, FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d57. 571 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 916-014, May 11, 1973. 227 risk of “unfulfilled U.S. commitments (especially trade preference).”572 The implication of this approach favoring a regional policy made sense in so far as Nixon had solved, or managed, many of the bilateral issues with the larger countries in the region, and many of the current problems, such as nationalism and trade preferences, transcended national boundaries and required a multilateral approach.
One-way Nixon managed to have some regional influence was by relying on his allies. In the one documented use of the established “back channel” with the Brazilian head of state Nixon asked for some assistance. Nixon had received certain unspecified
“indications” that Venezuela and Ecuador might be conspiring to have sanctions lifted on
Cuba in an upcoming OAS meeting. In the private message, he made known that
“anything President Médici is able to do in support of the United States position will be deeply appreciated.”573 He received an affirmative response which stated, “Brazil’s position will also be firm and resolute,” Médici also promised to “oppose any indirect attempt” to get around the sanctions.574 While Brazil, in Nixon’s view, had developed into a strong ally, Mexico was starting to cause problems on the world stage.
Echeverría’s foreign policy views largely consisted in having the countries of the
“third world” band together against the developed countries such as the USSR, Japan, and
572“National Security Study Memorandum 173,” Washington, Mar. 7, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents On Mexico; Central America; And The Caribbean, 1973–1976, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p1/d1. 573 “Backchannel Message From President Nixon to Brazilian President Médici,” Washington, Mar. 6, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, 2, Documents On South America, 1973–1976, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p2/d83. 574 “Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Walters) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),” Washington, Mar. 8, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, 2, Documents On South America, 1973–1976, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p2/d84. 228 the United States.575 Speaking to Kissinger in Mexico City, he noted that the region faced many “common problems.” Echeverría was looking for something bold and new; “We have had the Kennedy era and the Roosevelt era and they are not the roads to follow.” Kissinger agreed that “we need a new Latin American policy.” Admitting that he had been “very occupied with Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and China,” he was looking forward to starting a “new relationship.” He also appreciated “Mexican independence,” continuing, “We know that we cannot remake the whole world. It is impossible to have an international system in which all orders come from Washington. That would not be good for us or for others. We appreciate your independence. When you agree with us, it means something. When you disagree, we can speak openly.” Turning to the subject of the “Echeverría Doctrine,”
Kissinger saw “positive” outcomes if his work led to “understanding of the developed and underdeveloped” nations. However, the useful could also be counterbalanced by the
“dangerous if they are a charter for the underdeveloped to use against the U.S.”576 Kissinger may have appreciated Mexican “independence,” and the usefulness of a strong ally to support U.S. interests, but Nixon showed some annoyance with the situation, and
Kissinger’s action later demonstrated his discomfort with countries outside of the normal east west great power historical continuum attempting to chart an independent foreign policy.
575 For more see Hal Brands, “Third World Politics in an Age of Global Turmoil: The Latin American Challenge to U.S. and Western Hegemony, 1965–1975*,” Diplomatic History 32, no. 1 (January 1, 2008): 1965–1975, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.2007.00669.x. 576 “Memorandum of Conversation,” Mexico City, March 26, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents On Mexico; Central America; And The Caribbean, 1973–1976, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p1/d49. Discussed also during this meeting where ways to move forward on salinity, and another possible head of state summit. 229 Jorden, the NSC Latin America advisor, laid out four basic options on how to respond to the Echeverría Doctrine. The most restrictive option was “to fight hard and try to prevent its acceptance in any form,” while the least restrictive option, and the one
“almost certainly” favored by the State Department was to “take a fairly low-key approach.” Kissinger favored the second approach to “water it down” and added a statement about “the rights of developed countries and the duties of developing countries,” which Jorden called “the reverse of the Echeverria approach.”577 Nixon also felt that
Echeverría had been “particularly obnoxious” and asked the CIA to see if he himself was anti-American, or using rhetoric to advance his own interests.578 The CIA assessed much of his rhetoric as “Pressures from the Mexican Left,” and concluded that “Echeverria is not viscerally anti-American but reflects the traditional love-hate relationship of Mexico for the U.S. (with perhaps a little less “love” than some previous Mexican Presidents have felt).”579
During a reception for members of the OAS, Nixon made news by announcing an official visit to Latin America by the Secretary of State. Rogers would be the highest profile member of the administration to make a public visit, since Kissinger had kept his visit to
Mexico low-profile. He also raised expectations by suggesting he would re-engage
577“Memorandum From William J. Jorden of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),” Washington, April 11, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents On Mexico; Central America; And The Caribbean, 1973–1976, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p1/d51. 578 “Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon,” Washington, April 24, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents On Mexico; Central America; And The Caribbean, 1973–1976, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p1/d51. 579 Ibid. 230 Congress to approve his proposal to develop preferential tariff treatments for Latin
America and other developing countries.580 In preparation for the visit to the region, Rogers spoke to several senior business leaders. After admitting that “Latin America is the one area of the world where I am a little disappointed in what we have done…[because] we promised them that we would give them generalized preferences,” he continued, but “we couldn’t get the legislation through the Congress.” However, Rogers promised to continue trying “to get generalized preferences through for them” and working on building a relationship where the people of Latin America could “trust us when we say that we are interested in cooperating and helping and working with them.”581
The official announcement of Roger’s two-week trip to Latin America laid out as its main objective a desire to make “Inter-American partnership as firm, as realistic, and as equitable as friends can make it.” Additionally, Rogers hoped to correct what he considered an “erroneously perceived” idea that the Nixon administration had attempted “to disengage from our close association with the hemisphere.” He wanted to emphasize a plan to
“strengthen” the relationship on the “sounder basis of equality.”582 Analysts within the
State Department, however, countered Roger’s relatively positive message and assessment.
In a report titled “Latin American-US Relations: A Trying Period Through 1976,” the analyst’s conclusions were: “US ability to affect Latin policies and decisions will continue
580 “Nixon Announces Rogers Will Visit Latin America,” the Washington Post, Apr. 14, 1973. 581 NARA II; RG 59; Subject Numeric Files 1970-1973; Box 2434; Folder POL LA; “Secretary Rogers National Foreign Policy Conference for Senior Business Executives, Latin American Portion,” Apr. 23, 1973. 582 NARA II; RG 59; Subject Numeric Files 1970-1973; Box 2434; Folder POL LA; FLASH, Subject: “SECVIST LA,” May 8, 1973. 231 to diminish, and the period of readjustment of the relationship will be trying.” Part of the reason, the report argued, was that Latin America was undergoing a period of change with
“expanding Latin ties with extra-hemispheric powers and economic entities.” Partly, the increased friction came from current actions. “Encouraged by our own policies, Latin
Americans will try to turn the ‘mature partnership’ concept to their advantage.”583
Whatever future frictions with the region might be, Rogers assessed his two-week, eight country trip as successful. He was particularly impressed with Brazil writing that the bilateral relationship was “probably the best they have ever been.” In a meeting with
Allende in Buenos Aires he mentioned that Allende had “high respect and regard for the
US Government and people,” as well as offering a “prompt” resolution to some of the open expropriation cases.584 While some problems, such as issues with territorial waters came up, the overall positive tone by Rogers suggested that bilateral relations appeared to be fairly good, and even Chile was receptive to improving relations.
As relations in the region improved, Nixon was already becoming distracted; this time by domestic events. “I was awfully glad you went on your trip” Nixon explained. He continued with, “we cannot allow Watergate to deflect us on what we need to do in the future.”585 The rest of the conversation revolved around Watergate with no more mention of Latin America, although the meeting had been scheduled for Nixon to receive Roger’s
583 NARA II; RG 59; Subject Numeric Files 1970-1973; Box 2434; Folder POL LA; Telegram, Subject: “Latin American-US Relations: A trying Period Through 1976,” May 8, 1973. 584 “For the President from the Secretary,” Jun. 22, 1973, Folder: SEC. Rogers Latin American Trip, Box:963, NSC CIP, RNPL, Yorba Linda, California. 585 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No 927-7, May 29,1973. 232 thoughts on Latin America. In a later meeting with congressional leaders, Rogers talked more about his trip. After Nixon assured the Congressmen that “we are still looking south as well the Middle East,” Rogers gave his perspective to the audience. He was happy to state that there had been “no riots at all.” His overall assessment was that the “trip was very successful.” He continued, “relations with Mexico very good.” Colombian relations were
“excellent” and “relations with Peru improving.” “Brazil has had a miracle of economic recovery” and, he continued, “our relations couldn’t be better, we don’t have any problems.” He ended on the same positive note he began with. “I don’t know how the trip could have been more successful. We established a new approach to the hemisphere” 586
Gone were the gloomy reports of a failed policy from earlier in the administration, replaced by a general attitude of optimism.
Shortly after Rogers returned from his trip, the NSC released the results of the latest
Latin America policy review NSSM 173. In a particularly honest reflection; “Much of our focus on Latin America was negative in effect.” Much of the blame went to lack of
“Congressional actions” which led to “the impression of indifference, if not antagonism.”
At the same time, the report argued, “many Latin Americans have been ambivalent” about changing U.S. policies, “wishing to continue to reap benefits from a special relationship but being wary of domination by the United States.” While the report laid out three basic strategies to move forward, the recommended focus involved giving “Latin America a higher priority within the U.S. Government.” As a major caveat to this approach, the
586National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Cabinet Room, Conversation No, 124-003, May 29, 1973. 233 Treasury Department agreed as long the approach included a “more positive style” and not more resources, since “given the mood of the Congress, our inflationary pressures at home, and our balance of payments constraints,” more funding was not likely.587 While the report acknowledged the challenges of a regional policy approach, it was lacking in specifics on how to proceed. The lack of detailed specific proposals was problem in the administration ever since the recommendations of the Rockefeller Report became politically untenable.
CHILE: SEPTEMBER 11, 1973
As part of the reshuffling of presidentially appointed officials, the new Assistant
Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Jack B. Kubisch, replaced Charles Meyer. Unlike
Meyer, Kubisch was a diplomat who had risen through the ranks of diplomatic service, but who also had some private sector experience. He accompanied Rogers on his trip through
Latin America as acting secretary and was officially confirmed in May of 1973. Other than his extensive governmental experience, what differentiated Kubisch from Meyer was his personal relationship with Kissinger. Kissinger knew Kubisch from his time as chargé d'affaires in the embassy in Paris where peace negotiation over Vietnam took place. During one of Kissinger’s trips to the embassy he told him that Nixon wanted him to “come back to Washington and occupy a key position in his second term.” After he accepted the position Kubisch recalls Nixon taking him aside remarking “there were a lot of problems
587 “Study Prepared in Response to NSSM 173 by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Inter-American Affairs,” Washington, n.d., FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents On Mexico; Central America; And The Caribbean, 1973–1976, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p1/d5. 234 down there” he continued, "Jack, I want you to take as much time as you need to straighten out those problems in Latin America for me. Take two weeks, if you want to!"588 While obviously said in jest, Nixon understood the problems he faced in the hemisphere, and likely thought placing one of the few State Department diplomats Kissinger trusted in the position could help him correct the course.
One of the first crises Kubisch dealt with were issues with Chile. Upon his confirmation in May, Kubisch made his reservations known about supporting more covert actions. From 1970-1973, the CIA had spent at least seven million dollars in Chile on a range of covert programs.589 The consensus CIA forecast at that time was that a military coup “was not held to be a serious possibility.” Therefore, without a strong probability of a coup, Kubisch wondered if the proposed covert program would be counterproductive by giving the opposition, “the means to keep barely alive, encouraging them in an ineffective opposition.” Other than the practicality, Kubisch “was not persuaded that a vital US interest of the sort that would justify our covert assistance really was involved,” continuing, “the benefits outweighed the potential cost.”590 Kubisch eventually threatened to resign if
588 Jack Kubisch, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Arlington, VA, https://www.adst.org. 589 Stephen G Rabe, The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 134. 590 “Memorandum From the Director of Operations Policy, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Gardner) to the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (McAfee),” Washington, Jun. 14, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume XXI, Part 1, Chile, 1973–1976, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d329 235 Kissinger continued to push for more covert assistance. Rather than risking the loss of the chief Latin American diplomat so early in his appointment, Kissinger backed down.591
With the low likelihood of Allendes removal, normal diplomatic maneuvers continued. The opening Rogers saw in his conversation with Allende continued to develop in a secret meeting in Peru. This time, however, the secret negotiations did not involve
Kissinger or the NSC, but Kubisch and Assistant Secretary of the Treasury John Hennessy.
During the meeting, Kubisch offered to settle all existing expropriation disputes using “an impartial third party” tribunal. Both sides would have an opportunity to agree to the basic rules and composition of the tribunal.592 The diplomatic gesture demonstrated some attempt to improve relations with Allende even after all the covert operations designed to destabilize the regime.
The negotiations never really took off because shortly after, on June 29, 1973,
Colonel Roberto Souper of the Chilean army launched a coup with a small number of soldiers and four tanks. Initial intelligence reports indicated “the coup was an isolated and poorly coordinated effort.”593 In the aftermath of the abortive coup, Nixon remarked “that
Chilean guy may have some problems.”594 Some members of the administration such as
591 Jack Kubisch, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Arlington, VA, https://www.adst.org. 592 “Telegram From the Embassy in Peru to the Department of State,” Lima, Jun. 25, 1973, FRUS, 1969– 1976, Volume XXI, Part 1, Chile, 1973–1976, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d331. 593 “Editorial Note,” FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume XXI, Part 1, Chile, 1973–1976, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d334. 594 “Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and President Nixon,” Jul. 4, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume XXI, Part 1, Chile, 1973–1976, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d335. 236 Kissinger’s Latin America advisor Jorden were not so sure. He thought the “uprising may have strengthened Allende’s position.”595 An unnamed CIA source ended up as the most accurate with his assessment “that Allende could not last another six months in view of the rapidly deteriorating economic situation and mounting pressure on him from all sides.”596
Not even three months later, General Augusto Pinochet ousted Allende in a bloody coup. The initial reaction within the Nixon administration was one of caution. Kubisch noted how “hasty recognition of military regimes” had caused problems in the past. Nixon agreed with this assessment and cautioned “we should not rush in as the first country to recognize.”597 In further developing the U.S. position on Chile, Kissinger recommended keeping “a low-key posture to allow time for Latin American governments and possibly some Europeans to announce the continuation of their relations.” Nixon highlighted and underlined the recommendation and wrote at the bottom of the page, “K[issinger]—good— as we discussed it.”598 Nixon would not have to wait long, as one of the first countries to recognize the new regime was Médici in Brazil who Nixon noted was “moving on a parallel
595“Memorandum From William J. Jorden of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),” Washington, Jul. 10, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume XXI, Part 1, Chile, 1973–1976, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969- 76v21/d336. 596 “Memorandum From the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of the Directorate of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency (Phillips) to the Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency (Karamessines),” Washington, Aug. 13, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume XXI, Part 1, Chile, 1973–1976, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d341. 597 “Minutes of a Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group,” Washington, Sep. 12, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume XXI, Part 1, Chile, 1973–1976, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d348. 598 “Minutes of a Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group,” Washington, Sep. 12, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume XXI, Part 1, Chile, 1973–1976, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d349. 237 track [to United States] concerning Chile.”599 In the aftermath of the coup Nixon and
Kissinger were busy discussing the poor reaction in the press to the coup. Kissinger assured the president that the bad coverage was a consequence of the historical moment. “In the
Eisenhower period we would be heroes,” Nixon responded pensively. “As you know—our hand doesn’t show on this one.” Kissinger responded, “We didn’t do it.” But he continued,
“we helped them. Created the conditions as great as possible.”600
In the weeks and months after Pinochet took charge, the State Department received conflicting reports over the number of violent deaths caused by the military. Numbers ranged from a low of 284 to a high of twenty-seven hundred. Kubisch urged “caution” because he did not want the administration to become “too closely identified” with the regime, and he did not want to put the United States in “the position of defending what they have or haven’t done.” While Kissinger in theory agreed with Kubisch’s assessment, the analytical Kissinger still made clear, “that however unpleasant they act, the
Government is better for us than Allende was.”601
Kissinger had almost no concern for the violence in the aftermath of the violent overthrow of Allende. In a private meeting with Chile’s new Foreign Minister, Admiral
Ismael Huerta, he made his position very clear. The Nixon administration would not “tell other countries how to run their business.” he continued that the starting assumption should
599 “Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and President Nixon.” Sep. 16, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume XXI, Part 1, Chile, 1973–1976, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d357. 600 Ibid. 601 “Transcript of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting,” Washington, Oct. 1, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, 2, Documents On South America, 1973–1976, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p2/d142. 238 be that “the changes effected in Chile were beneficial to the Western Hemisphere,” and
“the United States therefore would help the new government.” While stating the administration would occasionally “make our views known on a confidential basis,” the
“basic philosophy was to be supportive and helpful.”602 In another meeting, months later, he continued to support taking a hands off approach to the internal affairs of Chile arguing against the “strong conviction that we know better what’s good for other people than they do”603 Kissinger was more than happy to fight against Allende, but now that a friendly government was in charge, strict nonintervention was in order.
Not everyone in the State Department thought the same way. Kubisch remarked that “more awareness of the pressure of international opinion” had mellowed some of
Pinochet’s worse instincts, which had included mass executions of Allende supporters.
Future progress on preventing excess violence he continued, “will be influenced to some degree by outside opinion, and particularly by ours.”604 Kubisch saw the benefit of diplomatic pressure in ameliorating some of the worst excesses of the new military government.
The policy direction in the months before the coup does not paint a unified picture of the Nixon administration shaping the Chilean political battlefield and just waiting for
602 “Memorandum of Conversation,” Washington, Oct. 11, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, 2, Documents On South America, 1973–1976, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p2/d145. 603 “Transcript of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting,” Washington, Jan. 31, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, 2, Documents On South America, 1973–1976, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p2/d157. 604 “Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Kubisch) to Secretary of State Kissinger,” Washington, Nov. 16, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, 2, Documents On South America, 1973–1976, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969- 76ve11p2/d153. 239 Pinochet to take charge. Due to the moral courage of Kubisch in opposing increased covert operations in the country, combined with a diplomatic push to solve the issues of expropriation, similar to what Nixon did in Peru, the United States, if anything, had placed
Allende on firmer ground in the months leading up to the coup. Other factors, not the least of which was Pinochet’s own initiative, then likely had more of an effect on the fall of
Allende.
THE EDUCATION OF KISSINGER605
After the Allende coup, Kissinger won Senate confirmation and became the first, and so far, the last, person to simultaneously hold the position of Secretary of State and
National Security Advisor. Kubisch spent a significant amount of time working with
Kissinger on Latin America issues. Early on, Kissinger admitted “he knew very little about
Latin America,” but with a meeting of the foreign ministers of Latin America coming up in February, 1974, he was willing to learn. This led to what Kissinger referred to as the
“Kubisch Tutorials,” where either Kubisch or a member of his staff tutored Kissinger on the region “two or three times a week…for about three months.”606 This significant investment of time and energy led to a better-informed Kissinger, even if his heart was still on great power politics and diplomacy.
605 The emphasis of this section shifts to Kissinger due to the available documentary record. By this point Nixon had disabled his taping system. Nixon may well have taken an active role in Latin American policy while Kissinger was Secretary of State, but those records, if they exist, are still sealed 606 Jack Kubisch, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Arlington, VA, https://www.adst.org. 240 Before the conference in February, Kissinger spent time with the foreign ministers of the two largest countries in Latin America—Brazil and Mexico. Of all the countries in the region, he was most familiar with these two. Brazil’s foreign minister Mario Gibson
Alves Barboza saw “no real problems” in the bilateral relation, a position Kissinger humorously shared since the Brazilian ambassador to the U.S. “has not been scolding me lately.” One area Barboza wanted to emphasize on the “expression called Latin America,” was the “tremendous variations and differences among the countries in the Hemisphere.”
Another subject that came up was Mexico’s proposal to host hemispheric leaders in
Mexico. Barboza saw this proposal as “not a great idea,” with which Kissinger agreed, thus killing the possibility of the meeting. Kissinger at this point saw no changes to the Nixon
Doctrine as it related to Brazil. He “understood that Brazil would be conducting its own policy.” He continued; “We will occasionally mention problems to you, if you permit us to, but this will be done in a spirit of working together, not trying to tell Brazil what to do.”607 The U.S. Brazilian alliance remained strong. Additionally, Brazilian doubts of a strong inter-American system played into Nixon’s conception of using Brazil to advance
U.S. interests. A weaker multilateral framework was useful for Brazil since a strong Latin
America framework could balance against Brazilian ambitions.
The discussion with Mexico’s Foreign Secretary Rabasa took a completely different tone. While the only major bilateral issue that came up involved “the problem of illegal immigrants.” Kissinger brushed of Rabasa’s concerns stating “he did not understand
607“Memorandum of Conversation,” New York, Sep. 26, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, 2, Documents On South America, 1973–1976, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p2/d92. 241 the problem,” and asked for “a few months” to see “what can be done.” Unlike Brazil, however, Rabasa emphasized the problems of the hemisphere. Rabasa “unfolded a large map of South America and another of Central America,” and proceeded to lecture
Kissinger on the problems of the hemisphere and suggested “it would be good if the
Secretary told them he wanted to hear their advice regarding policy in Latin America.” He also cautioned that without action in support of constitutional governments, “blood will flow. and many Latins would blame the United States.”608 Fearful of “getting into every dispute in the hemisphere,” which is what a push toward constitutional government would be, Kissinger was not receptive to Rabasa’s argument; however, he did listen to his advice regarding a call for dialogue.
The next day at a luncheon with the Latin American foreign ministers, Kissinger called for a “new dialogue with our friends in the Americas.” He emphasized that any new policy “should be a policy designed by all of Latin America for the Americas.”609 The initial State Department impressions of Kissinger’s performance were positive, with one assessment stating his speech was, “just the right vehicle for the turn-around we so badly need in Latin America.” The report continued that the administration had “been unable to establish a satisfactory new kind of relationship to replace the old one.” The “low profile” term, in particular, had “come to mean neglect, if not disdain.”610
608 “Memorandum of Conversation,” New York, Oct. 4, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, 2, Documents On South America, 1973–1976, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p1/d61. 609 Department of State Bulletin, October 29, 1973, 542–543. 610“Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Kubisch) to Secretary of State Kissinger,” Washington, Oct. 6, 1973 FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, 2, Documents 242 In response to the “New Dialogue,” Latin American countries quickly met in
Bogotá Colombia to determine what issues they wanted to bring up to the United States.
While the country’s representatives eventually settled on an eight-point plan, the debates were rather contentious with the Brazilians acting as the “conciliators.” The Bogotá meeting, was “hailed by many of its participants as a turning point in hemispheric relations.” Unlike previous conferences, the U.S. official was more optimistic that the
“responsibility and moderation on the part of the participants, count heavily in its favor.”611
Assessments were also positive within the NSC, with Kissinger’s Latin America advisor stating the upcoming meeting could be “highly constructive.”612 Overall, the positive and optimist outlook of both Latin American and U.S. officials was a marked change from the pessimistic reports that typically covered Latin American policy. The next step would be a meeting in Mexico City to continue the “New Dialogue.”
Before the meeting in Mexico City, Kissinger continued to work on the issue of renegotiating the status of the Panama Canal. Kissinger on Christmas Eve, 1973, reported
“highly positive” steps in the talks. As a gesture of goodwill, he suggested “a few unilateral gestures to Panama.” Besides showing the Panamanians that the U.S. was negotiating in
On South America, 1973–1976, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969- 76ve11p1/d7. 611 “Telegram 9439 From the Embassy in Colombia to the Department of State,” Bogotá, Nov. 19, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, 2, Documents On South America, 1973–1976, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p1/d8. 612 “Memorandum From William Jorden of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),” Washington, Jan. 28, 1974 FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, 2, Documents On South America, 1973–1976, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p1/d9. 243 good faith, it would have the additional benefit of reducing “international criticism.”613
Nixon approved the incentives and the negotiations moved forward. Understanding the importance of Congressional buy-in, the administration arranged meetings with influential senators and congressmen with the lead negotiator, Ambassador Bunker. One example involved a conversation with Senator Hulbert Humphrey of Minnesota. Bunker received assurances of sympathetic treatment of a new canal. The senator said; “Perpetuity and sovereignty and the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign nationals—these are out of step with the mood of the world and, especially, the mood of the American people.”614 After the many failed initiatives of the past, the administration went to great lengths to keep
Congress informed.
In a major breakthrough in negotiations, Kissinger went to Panama City, Panama on February 7, 1974, along with several Congressmen. Kissinger began by praising the lead negotiator Bunker as “one of his best diplomats.” Torrijos then stated that the two sides “were on the way to [a] solution.” Both sides also signed a brief declaration of principles to continue working toward a permanent solution.615 The appointment of a new negotiator, Nixon’s flexibility, and Kissinger’s involvement set the conditions for the
613 “Transcript of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meeting,” Washington, Apr. 25, 1974, FRUS, 1969– 1976, Volume E–11, 2, Documents On South America, 1973–1976, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v22/d28. 614 “Memorandum of Conversation,” Washington, Sep. 21, 1974, FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, 2, Documents On South America, 1973–1976, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v22/d23. 615“Editorial Note,” FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, 2, Documents On South America, 1973–1976, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v22/d32. 244 eventual success of the negotiations. Up next on the agenda was the Mexico City conference.
As the Mexico City conference approached, Kubisch felt optimistic about the outcome, stating the atmosphere was” just about right.” Always the analyst, Kissinger saw the problems in the region as one of alliances. The objective, according to Kissinger, was
“to prevent Latin America from sliding into the non-aligned bloc and compounding our problems all over the world.” In Kissinger’s view, Latin America continued to matter only so far as it hindered other more important policy objectives of the United States. The lack of respect was shared by Nixon’s top Middle East envoy Joseph Sisco who attempted to flatter Kissinger; “I think your training in the Middle East, in terms of hand-holding and everything else, will go very well in your meeting in Latin America.” One positive aspect of Kissinger’s strategy was involving Congress and bringing with him a “six-man congressional delegation.”616 Developing closer relations with Congress on Latin America issues continued to be a priority for the administration.
On the eve of the conference February 20, 1974, the buoyant assessments continued. Kissinger wrote that “the present atmosphere is perhaps more positive than at any time in the recent past.” Understanding Nixon’s focus on trade, Kissinger turned down the geopolitics and stated that the top priority of the conference was “to increase significantly our consultation and coordination of trade policies with the Latin American
616 “Transcript of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meeting,” Washington, Feb. 14, 1974, FRUS, 1969– 1976, Volume E–11, 1, Documents On Mexico; Central America; And The Caribbean, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p1/d10. 245 countries.”617 The administration was still searching for the elusive preferential treatment and increased private development in the region.
After the conference, the message sent to the diplomatic posts in the hemisphere continued the string of positive assessments. For example, the cable stated that the meeting
“marked a significant shift in U.S. policy toward Latin America.” The analysis continued stating there was a “sense of excitement regarding the future of U.S.-Latin American relations.” The credit for the successful conference “was engendered by the Secretary’s frankness and directness, as well as his personal engagement in addressing underlying
Latin concerns.” One of the few problems noted at the conference was the “unhelpful role played by Brazil. The cable writer stated that “Brazil appears to be playing a double game in which it wishes to have a strong positive bilateral relationship with the United States, while at the same time eschewing excessive inter-American multilateral cooperation.”618
The interests of Brazil, Nixon’s strongest partner in the region, and the United States appeared to be diverging. The cable writers may have written the positive assessments of the direction of U.S. policy with a motive to flatter the new Secretary of State.619 However, that argument is unlikely due to the near universal nature of the accolades. The Latin
617 “Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon,” Washington, Feb. 20, 1974, FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, 1, Documents On Mexico; Central America; And The Caribbean, 1973–1976, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p1/d11. 618“Telegram 47899 From the Department of State to All American Republic Diplomatic Posts” Washington, March 9, 1974, FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, 1, Documents On Mexico; Central America; And The Caribbean, 1973–1976, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p1/d14. 619 Multiple people signed off on the cable with the final approval coming from Kubisch 246 American specialists in the executive, and Kissinger himself, appeared genuinely optimistic about the direction of U.S. policy.
An appropriate criticism of the administration’s policy was its acceptance of human rights violations. Occasionally in Nixon’s first term, ambassadors and other State
Department officials at least pushed better behavior and democratization privately and discreetly. In Nixon’s second term such admonishment appeared to cease. Even a CIA memo to Kissinger, stating that in 1974 “about 104 persons…had been summarily executed by the CIE”620 and that the extrajudicial killings would continue for the foreseeable future, appeared to receive no response.621 While the United States almost certainly has to work with diverse partners, at least a mention of human rights would have been appropriate as the interests of Brazil and the United States diverged.
THE FAILURE OF THE ARCHITECT
Kubisch recalled that Kissinger was “a very bright man and a thorough, hard- working man who needs very little sleep, does very little drinking or very little recreation.” In the days after the Mexico City conference Kubisch could not remember an issue “that he wasn't immediately able to deal with as Secretary of State. ”622 As hard working and
620 CIE Centro de Informações do Exército, the internal intelligence and security service of the Brazilian Army 621 “Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Colby to Secretary of State Kissinger,” Washington, Apr. 11, FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, 2, Documents On South America, 1973–1976, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p2/d99. Many of the relevant historical records remain closed, so a future researcher may find evidence supporting a stronger stance against extrajudicial killings 622 Jack Kubisch, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Arlington, VA, https://www.adst.org. 247 intelligent as Kissinger was, his Latin American initiatives, like the vast majority of the Nixonian era policy proposals, failed. Through Nixon’s resignation in August 9, 1974 and beyond into the presidency of Gerald Ford, Kissinger kept up the “New Dialogue,” only to see the initiative end. The breaking point, as explained by Kissinger in his voluminous memoir, was the passage of the Trade Act of 1974. The new law finally included a generalized system of preferences as long promised, but contained a poison pill for the hemisphere when “Congress voted to exclude from the system of preferences all members of OPEC (whether or not they had participated in the oil boycott).”623 The provision, which affected Ecuador and Venezuela, both members of OPEC who had not participated in the embargo, was perceived as “backtracking on liberalized trade, the single most important American economic commitment to Latin America.” Kissinger took no blame for the failings of the “New Dialogue” remarking curtly, it “was the forerunner of an idea whose time had not quite come.”624 The failure of the “New Dialogue” was a complicated affair with many actors having a role. The most critical actor was Congress, which had consistently acted to counter Nixon’s and later Ford’s policies. The one major policy success of the second term, the reinvigoration of the Panama Canal negotiations, was only possible because Congress was onboard. While Nixon and Kissinger may have served in the era of the “imperial presidency,” that did not make their power absolute. Kissinger, however, is not blameless. In his analytical study of the region, which since he did not know well, he missed many of the nuances of the people and supported
623 Boycott referrers to the Arab oil embargo of 1973. See “Oil Embargo,” available online at https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/oil-embargo. 624 Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1999), 729–30. 248 regimes engaged in human rights violations. His silence in the months after Allende’s coup was particularly striking. While the reality on the ground was still hazy after the coup, his policy of strict nonintervention, along with generous, likely emboldened some of the worst actors of the Pinochet regiment. Only under pressure from lower level officials and other international powers did some of the worst excesses die down in the Nixon years. Nixon’s view of the brutality of the Pinochet regime are less clear. While he was no strong advocate of human rights, at times he at least grasped the humanity (even if tinged with racism) of the people in Latin America. Kissinger, even when he finally focused on the region as Secretary of State, never appeared to see the global south as anything but pawns on a chessboard.
249 Conclusion
Several years after Nixon resigned in 1977, he agreed to a series of sit-down interviews with British journalist David Frost. On the fourth and final airing of the interviews, Frost brought up the subject of Chile. As he had attempted to do with his broader Latin America policy, Nixon attempted to place the situation in context. To explain the lack of money for Allende, he framed the result in terms of “international organizations where we have a vote,” implying that the U.S. was but one player in the international effort to isolate Chile. He also depicted Chile as a force for instability: “There wasn't any question that Chile was being used by some of Castro's agents as a base to export terrorism to Argentina, to Bolivia, to Brazil.” Frost then asked if “the Chileans were a better judge of what would preserve their democracy than you were?” An exasperated Nixon responded;
“Who do you think overthrew Allende?”625 Here Nixon demonstrated his understanding that Chile was part of the interhemispheric system, a member of Latin America and also an individual country with its own agency. However, he also did not apologize for authorizing CIA activities in the country. In one short segment of one interview, Nixon encapsulated the complexity of U.S.-Latin American relations. Nixon’s quest for a Latin America legacy began on the campaign trail and continued through his first year in office as he developed his strategy. In a robust policy making process, Nixon received advice from a variety of actors, including government officials, private businessmen, foreign leaders, and the much-publicized result of Nelson Rockefeller’s grand tour of Latin America, the Rockefeller Report. In the midst of Rockefeller’s tour, Nixon managed to successfully maintain a “low profile,” while helping the OAS stop a war between El Salvador and Honduras. He also skillfully managed an
625 “Excerpts From Nixon Interview on Agnew Chile and His Decision to Resign,” The New York Times, May 26, 1977. 250 expropriation crisis in Peru, allowing space for negotiations to continue, but less skillfully attempted to seal the border in the ill-fated Operation Intercept. However, the administration learned from its mistakes and transitioned to a more cooperative security agreement with Mexico. The culmination of the robust exchange of ideas was an October speech laying out an approach for a “mature partnership” and advocating for special tariff preferences for the region and an increased role for multinational organizations. In the face of a recalcitrant Congress and a series of regional crises, the administration’s focus changed away from a fundamental rethinking of the inter-American relationship to a search for levers of influence to manage the myriad crises they faced. In Peru, which dealt with a terrible earthquake, the preferred method was soft power diplomacy and aid. In a case involving possible nuclear submarines making port stops in Cuba, quiet back channel diplomacy was the preferred course of action. Finally, with the near certainty of Allende becoming Chile’s president, Nixon authorized a covert effort to replace him. Nixon’s conception of a less paternalistic policy toward the region stumbled in the face of these perceived crises. Beginning in 1971, the malleable Nixon Doctrine on Latin America changed to focus on bilateral relationships. The focus began with Brazil, a country with great potential, but also a military dictatorship. Nixon additionally made a special effort to further bind the close ties of friendship between the United States and Mexico. While Mexico’s leader would not prove as amenable, the goal of this new strategy was to have regional powers act as a spokesperson in advancing U.S. interests. This led to one of the great ironies of the Nixon administration’s regional approach. While the multilateral “mature partnership” idea had failed, bilateral relations with the majority of the countries in the region were good. One last effort to create a “new dialogue” and an improved multilateral framework began when Kissinger became Secretary of State. The “new dialogue” showed some initial 251 signs of success, such as the reinvigoration of long-stalled negotiations over the Panama Canal. The Kissinger Secretary of State era also brought fresh perspectives with new, competent Latin America advisors working for Nixon and Kissinger. Nixon would resign before seeing the results of the “new dialogue” come to pass, but like the other initiatives, it also failed. Latin American countries were not passive actors in these endeavors. Occasionally the disparate regional actors could unify around a common problem or theme, but the normal status quo involved sharp divisions over strategy or policy. The United States government bureaucracy divided the world into regional areas, which is one reason policy was often made at the regional level. However, the differences between the countries of the hemisphere were vast, making a unified Latin America vision or initiative difficult except under extraordinary circumstances.626 The one constant throughout the Nixon years was a desire by the administration to maintain close contacts with the militaries of the hemisphere. In Chile, even as economic aid slowed dramatically, the administration continued to fund and maintain close contacts with the military. An effort to close the regional command SOUTHCOM failed because Nixon wanted to maintain military influence. The “low profile” policy the administration took in many other areas of foreign policy did not apply there. In some situations, this close contact was useful since the U.S. supplied El Salvadoran and Honduran troops could not maintain a protracted war without resupply from the United States. Other examples were at least questionable, such as Nixon’s close relationship with the brutal military dictatorship in Brazil.
626 Something like the Good Neighbor policy with the twin shocks of the Great Depression and WWII may be an example 252 This study had its limitations. Many of the relevant records remain sealed and classified, including portions of the Nixon tapes which provide the scholar with unique insights into Nixon’s thoughts and deliberations. After the scandal of Watergate, this privilege will likely never come again. Future tools, transcriptions, and openings will undoubtedly lead to new research and insights. In terms of prioritizing future research, the clear frontrunner would be documents in the Gerald Ford Library. The Ford Library contains many records from the Nixon era, and it would be fair to examine the Ford administration’s Latin America policy as an extension of Nixon’s due to the large number of shared advisors and a general continuation of foreign policy programs such as the Panama Canal negotiation. On balance, the legacy of Nixon in the region is mixed, if such a judgement is even worthwhile, Nixon, more so than his chief advisor, Kissinger, cared a great deal about the hemisphere, or at least his historical legacy in the region. He was open to advice, and after his first year a competent advisor within the administration saw the potential for a truly
“historic” policy.627 His sensible interactions with a variety of leaders in the hemisphere, outside of Cuba and Chile after Allende, demonstrated his willingness to work with a variety of governments and interests in the region. In turn, foreign leaders were often able to achieve their objectives. The United States may have been one of the two global superpowers, but it did not mean that they prevailed with every foreign relations gambit. At the same time, he was never able to focus on the region, and his hemispheric policy quickly became bogged down after the crises in the fall of 1970. The use of covert operations in Chile, Bolivia, and possibly Uruguay was a clear stumbling point because the
627 “Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs,” Washington, January 1, 1970. FRUS, 1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics, available online at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969- 76ve10/d21. 253 problems in these countries did not rise to the level of core national interest. If Nixon deserves blame for excessive covert adventurism, it is important to note for context that so do Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson, who each relied on the CIA in Latin America. Nixon and Kissinger had become trapped in the historical cycle of relying on CIA operations as a lever of influence after the perceived success of a covert operation in Guatemala under Eisenhower.
THOUGHTS FOR POLICY MAKERS
History, bureaucracies, power struggles, culture, and a myriad of other factors limit any one individual’s ability to make lasting changes. Even the president of the
United States is subject to a host of limitations. However, individuals still matter in the system. Some of the actors in this study were more successful than others, and it may be useful to point out some patterns that became apparent as this study unfolded. The following four characteristics of the successful foreign policy professional, while not intended to be all encompassing, are a good starting point.
First, a successful foreign policy professional understands the nation’s interest and how to use the current international system to their advantage. Emilio Rabasa, first as
Mexico’s ambassador to the United States and later as foreign secretary, understood the importance of clean water and, more importantly, international norms that gave Mexico a strong hand in pushing for a solution. The Mexican government also understood the constraints Nixon was under. Luis Echeverría, Mexico’s president, promised not to make water salinity a problem for Nixon in his reelection campaign. The Panama Canal situation is another one where both sides understood that they needed to come to a 254 solution. Panama, by using the UN and the OAS, helped push the issue forward. The
United States reciprocated since the strategic value of the canal had decreased over the decades, and the Nixon administration was open to a solution.
Second, individual relationships matter even at the highest levels. Nixon, because of his strong bond with Brazil’s leader, was able to maintain an economic blockade against Cuba, even as certain officers within the military junta cautioned against overly close relationships with the United States. Panama’s leader, Omar Torrijos, was also able to develop a relationship with William Jorden, NSC advisor and later ambassador to
Panama. Finally, of any Latin American official, Rabasa had the closest relationship with
Kissinger, having worked with him as ambassador and foreign secretary.
Third, a successful foreign policy professional needs to be respectful and a strong advocate for the priorities of the job. Pat Holt, the chief Latin America advisor to the
Senate, advocated against preferential treatment for Latin America, arguing about the message it would send to European allies. Charles Meyer, Nixon’s first Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, had become convinced by the end that
“God helps those who help themselves and the Latin Americans don't... their sensibilities are a great deal more acute than their abilities.”628 Even if the accusations are true, blaming working partners is not a recipe for policy success. Jack Kubisch, Meyer’s successor, was a good example of advocating strongly for his position’s advantages, while still remembering his nation’s interests.
628 Quoted in Peter Relyea Bales, “Nelson Rockefeller and His Quest for Inter-American Unity” (Ph.D., State University of New York at Stony Brook, 1992), 471. 255 Finally, a successful foreign policy professional needs to have a strong ethical and moral foundation. Viron “Pete” Vaky advocated vociferously against covert action in
Chile. Kubisch went so far as to threaten resignation. Rather than being punished for their candor, both men found continued success in government service. Vaky became ambassador to Costa Rica with the support and recommendation of Kissinger, while
Kubisch became the ambassador to Greece, a position he wanted.
Current hemispheric problems mirror many of the issues discussed in this study.629 Concerns over Russian influence, drug smuggling, trade, even water rights define U.S-Latin American relations. That is not to say that the issues are exactly the same. They are not. What is similar are the geographic truths entwining the fates of the
Western Hemisphere and the need to continue building relationships for a better nation, region, and world. Now, as then, the ability to confront vacillating political doctrines and manage complexities to solve pressing problems will require highly capable, flexible, and dedicated players on all sides.
629 Divergent Options, “#NatSecGirlSquad: The Conference Edition White Paper — The Future of U.S. Relations and Security in the Western Hemisphere Panel,” Divergent Options, March 18, 2019, https://divergentoptions.org/2019/03/18/natsecgirl-squad-the-conference-edition-white-paper-the-future-of- us-relations-and-security-in-the-western-hemisphere-panel/. 256 Bibliography
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