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R E N I E K E G D b b t P ki S K R L. s ' R AAR , y o er er n A L F R E D N ORT H W H I T E H E D b N ma Pitt A , y or n enger by JOHN MAC' UARRIE

J O HN K N O ' P R E S S

I C M N ' I R G I N I A R H O D , ’ 5yfl i tfi British e ditio n publishe d by the Lutte rwo rth Press

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St andard Boo k Number : 8042 -0659-7

Library o f Co ngress Catalog Card Numbe r : 68 — 1 1 970

First published

Third printing 1969

TO

I A N H EN D ER S O N Contents

Preface

L I F E

T H O U G H T Being and Existence The Existential Analytic

Everyday Being- ih -the-world

A Further Explication Of Being-in - the -world

Toward Authentic Existence Temporali and History

The Meaning o f Being

Glossary

It may seem strange to include Martin Heidegger in a series of i i “ C ” books deal ng w th Makers Of ontemporary Theology , for i is i i is f He degger no theolog an but a ph losopher, and he O ten hl i reckoned to be a thoroug y secular ph losopher at that . Yet I think it would be true to say that one could hardly hope to advance very far in the understanding of contemporary theology ’ i k i u His i w thout some nowledge Of He degger s tho ght . nfluence seems to appear everywhere— in demyt hologizing and the problem o f hermeneutics; in the doctrine o f man ; in the ories of revelation ; in the debate about God ; and in other matters i n o t hi i is o f bes des . Though mself a theolog an , he a maker in in i P A i theology, the same way wh ch lato and r stotle and h e o S O Kant av been makers f theology . we make no excuse for ’ i i him in hi i i i is nclud ng t s ser es . He degger s ph losophy no i C ri i i it s subst tute for h st an theology, and certa nly hould not be i i it allowed to dom nate the work of the theolog an, but does provide the kind o f conceptual framework that the theologian needs if he is to state the Christian faith in terms intelligible to ’ today s world . i John Macquarr e .

Union Tbeolo iml S emina r g y , Nen' York Ci ty, A il 1 r 6 . p , 9 7

Y rti i be any standard, Ma n He degger must reckoned B among the greatest and most creative philosophers o f the His i fl twe ntieth century . n uence has spread far beyond i A his o wn i i . s i d sc pl ne well as ph losophers , there must i is i i be counted theolog ans , psychotherap ts , h stor ographers ’ wh o i i i i s and many others , have ga ned ns ghts from He degger i work and appl ed them to their o wn tasks . his i i in 1 88 . He degger was born at Messk rch, Baden, 9 Thus background is the countryside o f s outh- west Germ any and the o i i so hi sti life f the agr cultural commun ty . However subtle and p cat e d his hi i o f hi p losophy may have become, someth ng t s ’ o f i i hi simpler early way l fe remains . He degger s p losophy has i in o f i him i Off reta ned a k d earth ness , that prevents from fly ng i di s n s o f i so nto ta t realm speculat on, as many German sages have hi s u u done . It may have been co ntry backgro nd that enabled him i in at i i i to keep an nterest poetry, a t me when apprec at on for hi i ’ i i poetry has become largely atrop ed . He degger s or g ns may hi m t o i i his i i i also have helped ma nta n ndependent, cr t cal and l s i in n i fo r a mo t prophet c stance the tech olog cal age , although is so i u he much a man of the twent eth cent ry, he has not per mitt e d himself t o become simply the captive o f hi s own age o r t o it s i A e h as be dazzled by ach evements . bov all , he been o f o f in i aware some the dangers that, a mass soc ety, threaten the simple freedoms and dignities of human life and can make it i someth ng less than human . At i i s i first attracted to the pr esthood, He degger tud ed for a i in a i his i i . i t me Jesu t sem nary He dec ded, however, that vocat on in i il s hi s lay ph losophy, so he left . But he st l acknowledge that work in the seminary made its contribution to the development MA R T IN H E I D E G GE R o f his i it his i in thought, and espec ally that awakened nterest i His i i a hermeneut cs and language . ph losoph c l studies took place Uni i i i in at the vers ty of Fre burg, where the br ght star those i days was Edmund Husserl . It was from Husserl that He degger i b e it learned the phenomenolog cal method, though adapted his o wn His t o to purposes . permanent debt Husserl was i hi s S ein acknowledged when he ded cated own major work, and Zeit t o his A i , Old teacher . lready, however, another nfluence i o n i i was work ng He degger . When he was e ghteen, he had

’ ‘ ' on der tndnn aeben Bedeutun deg read Franz Brentano s book, igf g , “ ” S eienden bei A ristoteles— a treatise o n the meanings Of being in

Uni it o f it was the vers y Marburg, and du ring his professorship there that he published S ein and Zeit in 1 2 i i di him 9 7 . Th s work mme ately put among the foremost i al ph losophers o f the day . We may so recall that at Marburg he had among his colleagues two of the great Protestant theologians

— Of the twentieth century Rudolf Bultmann and Pau l Tillich . 1 i In 92 8 he returned to the University o f Fre burg . He i hi s i in i created a sensat on by famous naugural lecture, wh ch he “ ” The it i i . dealt w h noth ng , as the theme Of metaphys cs remainder o f his teaching and writing career has been lived out in o r i in hi near Fre burg, the Black Forest country to w ch he belongs . S t i i oon af er He degger went to Fre burg, Germany began to experience troubled times as the new National Socialist Party t o it i began make s nfluence felt . Though there seems to be little in hi s philosophy that would be sympathetic to the fan “ ” t astic pseudo - philosophy Of such Nazi intellectuals as A R i i lfred osenberg, He degger, l ke many other Germans , j oined the party in the belief that it Offered the best hope for the o f i n renewal the nat on . There has been much co troversy over ime r the question of his relation to the Nazi reg . The pa ty certainl y tried to exploit the advantage of having so illustrious L I F E

i i a member, and soon after H tler came to power, He degger i hi s f i i R U i . became ector of the n vers ty In O fic al capac ty, he i i i i o f S identified h mself w th the pol c es the government . ome ’ o f Heidegger s opponents have made as much a s possible o f hi s N i i s in m im ui az connect on , attempts (so et es q te unscrupulous) im o f hi s i i di h . ti to d scre t However, a study speeches and wr ngs during the time o f hi s Rectorship shows that although he was firm o f t did in it s i a supporter the par y, he not share fanat cal i ill i excesses . In any case , he very soon became d s us oned . He gave up the Rectorship and his favourable mentions Of the ’ i His f ai hi s i i i and reg me ceased . de enders pr se act ons at th s t me, claim that he left the party at a juncture when it was extremely i diff cult to do so . f o f i But a ter the end World War II, He degger was not in r n o w s o f his persona gra ta the new Ge many . He pent much i i i his in i l t me wr t ng at retreat the Black Forest, occas ona ly i in i hi i in . i s com ng to Fre burg order to g ve a lecture Meant me, f i i ame had become worldw de, and people from many countr es ’ t o i i him hi s i came v s t at mounta n home . Plans have been made for the translation into English o f ’ o f i i i At i i the entire body He degger s wr t ngs . the t me when th s is i i t he l i i book be ng wr tten, fol ow ng works Of He degger have appeared in translation (German titles and original publication ' in A n Introanetion to Meta l sies dates are shown brackets) p y , I Ein tibrnn in die Meta b sié I Kant and tbe Problem 959 ( f g p y , 95 ' o Meta b sies I 62 Kant nnd das Problem aer Meta b si/é I f p y , 9 ( p y , Bein a nd Time I 62 S ein and Zeit I Diseonrse on Tbiniéin g , 9 ( , g , 1 66 Gelassenbeit i i 9 ( , In add t on, several essays and shorter i Al has in p eces have been tran slated . ready there been the i - i i in Uni S Engl sh speak ng world, and espec ally the ted tates , ’ o f i in i i a remarkable surge nterest He degger s work, and th s interest is likely to grow as more of hi s writings are translated . Being and Existence

’ EI DEGGER S philosophy is concerned with the question of i o f B i 1 i was i i the mean ng e ng . Th s ndeed the quest on i i wh ch st rred the early researches ofWestern philosophy . But it is n o w a question that has fallen into neglect or is even - is regarded as a pseudo question . It true that we can hardly “ ” i i o f utter two sentences w thout us ng some part the verb to be , i al hi o r and one m ght most say that t s verb, whether expressed u d i . i nderstood, holds our scourse together We do ndeed speak “ ” is the t i i ul of as copula . Yet analy ical ph losophers in part c ar are highl y suspiciou s Of any inquiry into Being (especially when thi s is spelled with a capital letter ') Their nominalism leads them to suppose that anyone engaging in such an inquiry (ontology) has fallen into the error o f supposing that because “ ” i in m we have a noun Be ng the language, there ust be some

hi di t o o ut in . t ng correspon ng the word, there the world A s m Of i i c a atter fact , He degger has always been qu te lear in his mi i i o f it n nd that Be ng, however we are to th nk , ca not be i a i i His s s i i s . con dered a th ng, another ent ty or someth ng that philosophy is perhaps the most consistent attempt up till now to break away from the traditional domination o f Western u s hi hi s is thought by the category of s b tance (t nghood) , and t o ne aspect o f his thought that makes it so ex citingly new and i is fo rm u mportant for the modern world . He careful never to “ late the question Of the meaning Of Being in the form What is

1 “ The wo rd B e in g (ca pitaliz e d) will be used to translate da s S ein ; t he “ ” G e rman e x re ssio n do s S eiende tha t which is will b e ario u sl t ransla te d as p , , v y “ ” “ being (lo we r case ) o r e ntity T H O U G H T 1

Being ? fo r to ask this question would be to imply that “ ” “ ” i r i is o . Being a what , a th ng substance or ent ty But he recognizes that the prevailing climate o f thought is i o f i if i i n o t favourable to the quest on Be ng, and that th s quest on i s i is . to be heard aga n, ome prejud ces must be overcome He mentions 2 thr ee common prejudices that militate against a n in i intelligent interest the question about the mean ng of Being . “ ” The first prejudice is that Being is the most universal o f hi hi it concepts , for whatever we t nk about, we t nk of as some “ ” i is o r - thing that is . But Be ng not a property class concept li n it it i m c o m ke red ess If were, would ndeed be an al ost le te l s i i ui i it p y vacuou not on, so that to nq re nto would be a “ ” i n o t i waste o f time . The word Be ng does des gnate a class i i i i s but lies beyond all d st nct ons Of classes . Th s was already een “ ” A i in i i by r stotle, and also med eval ontology, where Be ng ’ transeenaens it n o t an was reckoned a , because does fall under y i o u o f the ordinary categor es f thought . A second prej dice ” is i is in efin a le follows from the first . It supposed that Be ng d b . ’ This would be true if definitions must be given by naming thé class (genus) and specific difference of that which is to be i hi i i if “ i ” defined, and Obv ously t s would be mposs ble Be ng ni - were understood as the most u versal class concept . But we “ ” have already seen that Being cannot be regarded as a class o r S o it hi universal property . the fact that cannot be defined by t s rather Old- fashioned method o f definition does not imply that i i i i ‘ i ’ there is no problem here . It s mply nd cates aga n that Be ng cannot be understood as another entity that might be defined in i i as k h o w can the convent onal manner, and dr ves us to we “ ” o f di i ni o f i i a f r o . look a way scuss ng the mea ng Be ng F n lly, ” is i i is - i there the prejud ce that Be ng a self ev dent concept . O is in hi s fo r i nce more, there some truth t , we cont nually use “ ” t o so i the verb be , and we must have some understand ng of it if e ni it . w But are asked about the mea ng, we find that becomes i A s i s si very elus ve . He degger understand the matter, the bu ness

2 Bein a i e tr ri S Ro bin n M d . . so SC o nd n nd T m . . Mac uar e an E o g , J q ( , L ; Har e r Ne Y r 2 2 - w o . p , k, pp . 3 6 M A R T IN H E I D E G G E R o f the philosopher is t o investigate some Of these dimly under i hi i o f stood not ons that we already have, such as t s not on “ ” i o f i u se i Be ng wh ch we make constant , and to clar fy them i i i and br ng them nto the l ght Of day, rather than just say they “ ” - i are self ev dent . To ask a question about anyt hing seems to imply both that i dim we already have some understand ng, however , of what we i s i are ask ng about, and yet at the ame t me that we lack an it Fo r understanding Of . every question has already some i i o t i w d rect on, and we could hardly ask ab ut any h ng unless e i i had at least some dea Ofwhat we were ask ng about yet we would , n o t trouble to ask about anything unless it were something did n o t i u that we know about . These remarks are Obv ously tr e i i i about the quest on Of Be ng . The very fact that we cont nually “ ” use the verb to be shows that from the outs et we already in i o f it hi stand an understand ng what means to be , and yet t s di t o it is understan ng, when we are challenged say what , turns o ut diffi in S o to be very vague and cult to p down . perhaps the answer t o the question about the meaning o f Being is to be reached simply through a process of clarifying and co n cept u alizing that vague indefinite understanding that we all already have . This suggestion is confirmed when we analyse further the i O i i a Ou i f . i b t quest on Be ng If we nqu re t any h ng whatsoever, we have to select and examine such data as will yield an under in o f i i i i i stand g what we are nquir ng about . If we are nqu r ng i o u r i about Be ng, then data would seem the th ngs that are, the particular beings which may be said to manifest o r exemplify i is i ni o f i — m Be ng . But there an nfi te range such be ngs ato s , ai s t i Of i it i h it mount ns , trees , star any h ng wh ch can be sa d t at i is i i is i s . i , a be ng Is there any part cular be ng that spec ally qualified to serve as the starting-point for an inquiry into Being in ? is r i general Heidegger thin ks that there . The pa t cular being that has to be interrogated with respect to its o wn ” is- is i i i i h . ood the quest oner h mself L ke the atoms , mounta ns , t rees stars i i i f and any other ent t es we may care to ment on, man T H O U G H T 7 is iff l is ; but he d ers from all these others because he not on y , “ ” i it i hi but has an understand ng Of what means to be . W t n is i is A i limi i . s ts , ndeed, he respons ble for what he He degger i 8 his is an i him . has Often says , Be ng ssue for Because man a of i ilit i measure of openness , freedom and respons b y, the quest on of is is i him i ti if who he , nescapable for but th s ques on, pursued in i i ine sca abilit i i a rad cal way, leads w th equal p y nto the quest on

Of Being in general . ff i is i is i In e ect, He degger say ng that man the ontolog cal e i hi n o t o f nt ty , T s does mean, course, that everyone pursues philosophical ontology (the explicit inquiry into Being) ; but it is it does mean that from the very way man const uted, he an co so m e e i i if l c not help ming t o d c s ons , even these are on y i i i in i i is r mpl c t the way he l ves , about the Be ng that al eady an i r i n n i fo him n is . Co nce r i ssue the very way he , g the ontolog cal “ i i s : Of is quest on, He degger remark Each us grazed at least i o f i once , perhaps more than once , by the h dden power th s ” i 1 4 if 18 n o t o f 8 i him . quest on, even he aware what happen ng to i When he talks about man, He degger generally employs the ’ German expression Das ein to draw attention to man s onto i hi i is f log cal constitution . T s German express on usually le t ’ untranslated in English discussions o f Heidegger s thought . “ ” i it i - in di i L terally, means Be ng there , though tra t onal German “ ” i it in the o f i 0 . ph losophy was used s sense ex stence T say that “ ” is i - all i hi s finit u de o ne man Be ng there c s attent on to , as the who always finds himself in a particular situation at the same “ ” “ ” time, he is there in the sense that his there is disclosed to him is hi s A as n i and centre o f reference . lthough D ei was trad “ ” t io nall fo r i l i i it y used ex stence genera ly, He degger restr cts to “ ” i i i is human ex stence , and th s very word ex stence also used in i in a restr cted sense for the kind o f Being that belongs to Dase . r i i i We have al eady not ced that wh le man, atoms , mounta ns , i i i a re is trees , stars , and nnumerable th ngs bes des , all , man

3 Cf. Bei e Ti . 2 6 n a nd m . g , p 3 4 A n Introdnetzon to Meta b sies tr Ral h Manheim Yale Un i e rsit p y , . p ( v y Pr N H n e ss e w a e . 1 , v , p . 8 MA RT I N H E I D E G G E R di i ui is ha s st ng shed from all the rest because he not only , but m a in o f i i i wh o i so e underst nd g and some respons b l ty for he s . “ ” “ ” i i is s out In th s sense , he alone ex sts , that to say, he stand ” (ex - sists) from the general run Of beings as the particular being “ i i is i . asein i in who has to dec de about Be ng D a be ng for wh ch, ” i is i 5 i i x it s i . i Be ng, that Be ng an ssue In restr ct ng the e press on “ ” is t o asein i is n o t fo r i ex tence D , He degger a moment deny ng i t o i s real ty atoms , mounta ns , trees , stars and the re t . These are a but n o t a i o f i re l enough, they do h ve the k nd Be ng that lets “ ” “ ” o ut in i Of i i them stand the pecul ar sense ex st ng . “ ” i is l i i is i He degger Often ca led an ex stent al t , and certa nly hi s hi s is is i u fo r i i p lo ophy ex tent ally based . The q est Be ng beg ns i o f s i hi the asein from the Be ng the que t oner mself, human D , a nf e o hi s is nd proceeds to u old the structur f ex tence . But Heidegger is n o t an existentialist in the narrow sense Of one ’ w i i is in o r o ne a hose pr mary nterest man, who makes m n s A th e subjectivity the measure o f all things . lthough man is exemplary being that is to be interrogated with respect to it s i so i ui i i o ff t o Be ng as to get the nq ry nto Be ng the ground, so ’ s e i i o f i m i as p ak, He degger regards th s task explor ng an s Be ng “ ” u a a s - i f ndamental ontology , rather th n a self conta ned study ’ m an m t o hi i s o f . Fro first last, the goal toward w ch He degger is i is i of i o f i thought thrust ng the quest on the mean ng Be ng, in the widest sense . There is a good deal o f discussion about the relation of ’ i t o hi s a 6 a i is Heidegger s earl er work l ter work . The e rl er work e i i in it is i i i s x stent al , the sense that dom nated by d scuss on o f m is s a re x u ni u s hu an ex tence , and the e e pected to f r sh the cl e i t h at will lead into the understandin g Of the meaning o f Be ng . is i a in it is mi e The later work o ntolog c l , the sense that do nat d

di i i i o f i m , by a more rect confrontat on w th the dea Be ng, and hu an i i iff existence is now un derstood in the l ght of Be ng . The d erence between the two styles o f philosophizing is sometimes so sharp

5 Bei a ime 2 6 n nd T . . g , p 3 6 ’ “ ’ Cf the re sent write r s a rticle He ide e r s Earlie r and a te r W o r . p , gg L k ” - 6 li a Tbeolo i l eview o l xlix . 1 . C o m are d in A n c n t a R v . p , g g , , pp 3

I O MA R T I N H E I D E G G E R is r i i i i i i al eady g ven w th human ex stence, as tself a k nd Of Be ng, allows the inquiry to get started but finally existence itself can in i o f i be understood only the l ght Be ng . i i i i i i Thus the d alect c between ex stence and Be ng, the ex stent al ’ i is u in i and the ontolog cal, set pat an early stage He degger s i thought . Those who compla n that they cannot see h o w the earlier and later work are related have become bogged down in details so that they fail to perceive the vast strategy that i i ’ hil un fies He degger s p osophy .

Th e Existential A nalytic

We have seen that the inquiry into Being is to take it s de parture from an ex amin ation o f the particular being that raises i o f i asein o r the quest on Be ng, namely, from D the human i i . o f i is ex stent The quest on Be ng, therefore, to be approached o f i o f i in o f i by way the quest on ex stence, the k d Be ng that

asein. asein belongs to D Because every D has to be, and has to decide about it s o wn existence and t o understand itself in one asein is i in way or another, then every D already nvolved the i o f i in i quest on ex stence a very concrete way . Th s concrete , inescapable question which everyone has concerning h o w he is t o understand and decide about hi s own existence is called by “ ” i s l i i i i He degger the exi tentiel question . Th s s to be dist ngu shed “ ” i i i hi is x i i i from the ex stent al quest on, w ch an e pl c t theoret cal i i i o i i nqu ry nto the structures f ex stence generally . Wh le every body is faced with the existentiell question o f deciding about his o wn i nl i i x i i ex stence, o y a few ph losophers ra se the e pl c tly existential question and reflect o n the basic constitution of i i i i is human ex stence as such . But the ex stent al quest on rooted in i i is i i i the ex stent ell one, that to say, the theoret cal nqu ry it takes s rise from the concrete situation o f existing in the world . Heidegger shares the common existentialist distrust o f abstract i a is i i is o t si in rat on l m . The quest on of Be ng n to be con dered s s a i b u t sis o f o wn terms. of ab tract pecul t on , on the ba our T H O U G H T I

r i i i in i fir sthand pa t c pat on ex stence . Men are not spectators o f i i i in it if is i Be ng but part c pants , and there to be a ph losophy o f i i o n i o f Be ng, th s cannot be reared any k nd detached observa nl i ur i i i i o . t on, but o y on the bas s Of total part c pat on What is to be done then is to set forth the basic structures o f i di in o ur human ex stence as these are sclosed to us o wn existing . This task of mapping o ut the constitution o f the Dasein is called “ ” i i i t i is by He degger the ex stent al analy c . It an attempt to lay “ ” existent ialit o f i is t o bare the y ex stence, that say, the core of distinctive characteristics that mark Off the existent from other i i k nds o f be ngs . i t i The method Of the existent al analy ic is phenomenolog cal . One i o f is l m ght say that the essence phenomenology carefu , i ’ i i 8 analytic description . He degger s expos t on of phenomenology o ne o f hi s i is proceeds by favour te methods , that to say, by a ” discussion of the et ymology of the word ‘ ‘ phenomenology i di hi “ tself. He scusses first the phenomenon , that w ch shows ” “ ” itself o r lets itself be seen for what it is then he turns to the “ ” “ ” hi is i logos , w ch, as speech, also a show ng . Thus pheno menology is fundamentally a showing of that which shows i s i i of lm i rti tself, a tr pp ng away concea ents and d sto ons , such as will let us see that which lets itself be seen for what it is . ’ ’ “ In i i ' uent n Lauer s words , The phenomenolog cal method “ ” is n o t o ne it is o ne i i i of proof rather, of descr pt on, where n it is boped that others will see things the same Although i is a i the allus on here to Husserl rather th n to He degger, the i i ’ remark woul d hold for both o f these ph losophers . He degger s existential analytic does in fact consist o f detailed descriptions of i ct i i o f i some bas c chara er st cs human ex stence, and the test of his descriptions is to compare them with what we ourselves actually know of existence through o ur o wn firsthand partici atio in it p n . Yet to furnish and to test a description of the basic structures

8 Bein a nd Time 61 g , p . 4 9 . 9 p Pbenomeno/o : it s Genesis a nd Pros ect Ha r e r Ro w New Yo r gy p ( p , k, I 6 9 5) p 84 . 1 2 MA R T I N H E I D E G G E R o f existence is not nearly so simple a matter as it may s ound i when first mentioned . Ex stence is not an Object that we can set i i it before us and descr be from the outs de, as were . We our i a are i l - selves are the ex stents th t to be descr bed, and se f know difli ult P xi ledge is notoriously c . erhaps the e stent has even a is s o i tendency to conceal what he really , and we find He degger saying that the phenomena have t o be wrested from the tendencies m inl n o t be o ff that cover the up , and are certa y just to read by an

un re fle ctive . r sa u beholder Fu thermore , what are we to y abo t

” the individual differences between one person and another ? Could there be an analysis o f existence that was valid fo r everyone ’ I i e Thus , before we plunge nto He degg r s actual analyses , we must think a little more about the enterprise of an existential a t i Can m i i mi an ly c . we see ore clearly how such an nqu ry ght it i ? proceed, and what results m ght hope to reach Perhaps these questions can best be answered by ta king a e closer look at the concept of existence . It has already be n “ ” pointed o ut 1 ° that Heidegger does n o t use the word existence in its traditional sense but restricts it to the kind Of Being that “ ” m i s o ut - i s asein . belongs to D , the hu an ex stent He stand ( ex s st ) in is s i m in the sense that he not ju t another te the world , but a i t o i l his i i be ng open h mse f and open to world so that, w th n li i s i i i fo r o f s m t , he has respons b l ty both the e and can shape is di i i in o f them to some extent . What st nct ve the concept ” e xistence may be seen if we contrast t h e existent with the other beings which are found within the world— be ings that are “ asein i n o t is in just as real as D , but wh ch do ex t the sense of the word employed by Heidegger and existentialist philosophers

generally . t i i is (a ) Dasein is never complete in i s Be ng . To ex st always o n wa so o ne a s it in to be the y, that can never , were , p down t he existent at any precise m oment and give an exhau stive d s i i is i si i i i a e e cr pt on . He const tuted by pos b l t es r th r than

10 Séc ab o e . v , p 7 T H O U G H T 3

O i s h m o r properties . ther be ng have essences t at are ore les s m A i i i . fixed , and g ven to the p ece of rock, for nstance , can be fairly adequately described by listing s u ch properties as it s s i si i i B u t colour, hardnes , chem cal compo t on and the l ke . O fa r Da sein has no fixed essence o f this kind . S a s we can talk “ hi s e sa about essence at all , we would hav to y that he makes it as i hi s i i i i o r i e he goes along, fulfill ng poss b l t es lett ng th m m m o ne i u i s i the e x . l p , but always on the ove fro s t at on to n t “ This is what is meant by saying that the essence o f Da sein lies ” 1 1 i i i ill in it s existence . Thus the ex stent al analyt c w not describe “ ” i s i i i s in i the un ver al propert es , but s mply poss ble way wh ch i a s Of i a sein i . i i e D may ex st These poss ble w y ex st ng, He degg r a a calls the ex istenti lia . These may be compared ( nd likewise “ ” a i di i i s a contr sted) w th the tra t onal categor e , the most gener l r e i i i a concepts used fo d scr b ng be ngs other than D sein. (b) The existence o f Dasein is characterized in every case by a “ ” ’ minene ss it is s is e unique always someone own ex t nce . This uni que individu ality of the Dasein is hard to express is i it in o u r i i is a prec ely, but we recogn ze ord nary exper ence . It m atter o f indifference which particular copy o f the morning a i t o o ne is newsp per I get, for they are all al ke , and have read to l t o ne a sein n i have read the o . But D can ot be subst tuted for m a sein is s a another as a atter of indifference . The D addre sed by as ein is s s i s personal pronoun . The D not ju t a pec men of a clas i To s s i t of be ngs . some extent, the e remark all flow from the po n asein s x i made above , that D doe not have a fi ed essence g ven to - t i it ss u it o r i s s . B t if asein , that ex stence precedes e ence the D a a im a a ss is hi c nnot be treated as spec en Of cl , how then anyt ng like an existential analyt ic possible We have already seen that the existential analyt ic will not describe universally occurring it i si i liz i i o f the properties . But s pos ble to v sua e a descr pt on i o f i i i is i i ssi i i i hor zons poss b l ty (that to say, the ex stent al po b l t es) within which the concrete (existentiell) possibilities o f any ° as i a actual D e n would f ll .

1 1 Be a nd Time in . 6 g , p 7 . 1 4 MA R T IN H E I D E G G E R

(e) A Dasein can either choose itself o r lose itself ; it can i i o ut di i i i i it is o r it e ther ex st (stand ) as the st nct ve be ng wh ch , can be submerged in a kind o f anonymous routine manner of if in hi it s i ili i a e di it l e, w ch poss b t es r taken over and ctated to by o r i u circumstances by soc al pressures . Thus there are two f nda of i antbentie i in i asein mental modes ex stence ex stence, wh ch D i o f its o wn i ili i i has taken possess on poss b t es Of Be ng, and inantbentie i e in hi i ili i ex st nce, w ch these poss b t es have been r P i asein relinquished o suppressed . resumably each ndividual D i o f its i in an i n i inl ex sts for much t me nauthe t c way, and certa y i i is n o t i i all authent c ty someth ng that can be ga ned once for , but must be decided for in new situations as they come along . The existential analytic has the task o f filling o ut in detail the i o f i i it in schemat c concept ex stence, as we have outl ned the i i i last few paragraphs . He degger beg ns w th what he calls “ i i i everyday ex stence, the k nd that l es nearest to hand but the kind that is also most routine and most likely t o be inauthentic . o n t o i i t i i From there, he goes descr be the authent c s yle of ex st ng,

it . his as breaks out beyond the everyday We shall follow order, and begin by considering everyday existence .

Everyday B eing-in-th e-world

Dasein is in i al i always a world, and He degger t ks of Be ng ” - - i i i 12 in the world as the bas c const tutive state o f Dase n. Thus the Das ein is i in i i n o t cons dered concrete, embod ed ex stence, and as i i i i i a bare th nk ng subject . He degger does not waste t me try ng to r is S p ove that there a real external world . uch a proof would be required only if o ne began from the erroneous idea that man is ri i is i i i p mar ly a thinking subject . But man nconce vable w thout a hi i e Dasein is world to w ch he already stands in relat on . Th from i i i - - - the beg nn ng Be ng in the world . is i i in -in- - t a It th s hyphenated express on, Be g the world, h t

1 O it 5 c 8 . p. ., p . 7 T H O U G H T 1 5

i o f i i t i also determ nes the shape the ex stent al analy c, at least i i A i -in - - i i in it s in . s n t al stages lthough Be ng the world a u ty, i i it we can dist nguish three factors that go to const tute . The ” first is the notion Of Being-in what kin d o f relation is this N is i is i vir ext , there the not on of the world what th s en onment o r in i i is i is i context wh ch ex stence set F nally, there the quest on o f it i i the self what does mean to be a self, const tuted by Be ng in-the-world ’ i i i i Of i -in We beg n w th He degger s explanat on Be ng , though for the present this explanation is provisional only and will i is have to be expanded later . The po nt he makes that when we “ ” i - ia — - in i talk about Be ng the world , we have m nd a much richer relation than merely the spatial o ne of being located in the “ ” A s i is in world . we can see from such express ons as He love “ ” “ ” o r in i i i in He was the consp racy , the prepos t on , when used o f is imi i i it is personal subjects , not l ted to spat al relat ons , as “ ” is in hi i i o f when we say There water the glass . T s w der k nd “ ” personal or existential inh o o d implies the whole relation o f ” \ i in i dwell ng a place . We are not s mply located there, but a re it i i ff ti bound to by all the t es of work, nterest, a ec on and

so o n . The Being- in which characterizes o u r everyday relation “ ” is l hi to the world ca led by Heidegger concern . T s word covers all the ways in which we relate ourselves to o u r environ — hi i i i . ment produc ng, construct ng, enj oy ng and so forth T s

- fundamental kind of Being in is therefore very practical . The relatively detached and theoretical relation to the world that is developed in the sciences is a derivative and highly specialized i in i i i k nd of understand g, atta ned by d mm ng down the element o f practical concern so that we approach the point at which we sim o r ply behold Observe the world . How then are we to understand the concept of world itself ? Heidegger approaches this problem by considering how n us we u derstand any particul ar Object within the world . Let

i i i . suppose, for nstance , that we are confronted w th a mounta n f it There are at least two ways in which we can think o . We may 1 6 M A R T I N H E I D E G G E R

i o f It i i u t i th nk as just someth ng ly ng aro nd, some h ng we have m in in i i is in co e across the world , th s case , the mounta n , ’ ‘ ‘ ” - - i 5 a at . He degger langu ge , merely present hand We are related t o it in i i ki a it is ul i e only a m n mal nd Of wy, and not f ly ncorporat d B ut s hi o f i a into o u r world . we can al o t nk the mounta n in rel tion to our practical concerns— as a quarry which can yield i i a i i a i r bu ld ng m ter al, as a recreat on are wh ch can se ve for s s - o u in i rt a t o f a s . w nter spo , a look post, and dozens other w y ” No w the mountain has become ready- to- hand and h as i i i i r i become an tem w th n the doma n of p act cal concern . The everyday world is therefore articulated in term s o f the ’ i n t i u a s Dasein s practical concerns . Each tem i i s nderstood an instru ment which can be u sed fo r the furthering and s atisfa ction is n o s a s is a o f these concerns . But there uch thing an ol ted i its i nl i i instrument . Each nstrument has mean ng o y w th n a i i of s all . context tasks , and these ta ks are themselves nterlock ng i i i s i o f a n d t Every nstrument mpl e a whole ser es others , even ually the whole instrumental system that pract ical hu man concerns

i . hi s s . have bu lt up For the most part, we take t sy tem for granted

We onl y become aware o f it when s omething goes wrong . i is i For nstance, when there a power fa lure , we suddenly realize how complex and interdependent is the m an - made world in which we live . Thus the world is understood by Heidegger a s a vast instru ’

it a sein s . mental system, held together, as were , by D concern is in o f hi i s i i i i e It terms t s concern that th ng rece ve the r s gn ficanc , imi as they are incorporated into the world o f man . In a s lar ” f i ni i m o f — we ash on, space gets orga zed nto a syste places

acutel ' aware o f hi i a become y t s when, for nstance , we h ve moved into a new house and to begin with can no longer find anything in its v i i in s o f o u r a t i place . E en t me gets organ zed term pr c cal s— a i i i im concern t me to get up , a t me to beg n work, a t e to eat, o n and so . m i s i hi of In so e respects , th ph losop cal theory the world i h i i a e m an m ght seem rat er appropr ate to the technolog cal g , for is in fact transforming the merely natu ral world into a world

1 8 M A R T I N H E I D E G G E R the au tomated societies o f the future with their possibilities for i u unprecedented le s re . ’ B ut the main reas ons for Heidegger s estimate o f everyday i lie i Of ex stence elsewhere, and are ndependent the above i i i s is cons derat ons . The n trumental world a common world . in it hi i We encounter not only the t ngs wh ch we use, but also u he di i i other people . J st as d not waste t me try ng to prove i o f e i the ex stence an external world, H degger does not trouble On a s to prove that there are other selves . the contr ry, he hold “ ” that community o r Being- with is a basic ex istentiale o f the is is a a s a sein. n o r o D Just as there ex tence p t from a world, there is is i i no ex tence apart from other ex stents . But the other ex stent i i e - s not seen as an Object w thin the world but as a o Dasein. Thus we are related to the other existent not in terms of the “ ” a i i i hi concern (h ndl ng, produc ng and the l ke) by w ch we “ ” a hi s in o r o licitu de rel te to t ng , but terms of a personal concern s i i that character zes relat ons between selves . A n authentic s olicitude for the other helps him to hi s freedom hi s u m f and to own uni q e possibilities for selfhood . But ore o ten the relation to the other is o ne o f indifference or is even an attempt to dominate him an d to ta ke his distinctive existence i i i u a al n i a i him . r di from In pa t cular, the n v d l f ls u der the dom n t on o f i His s hi s o f if the collect ve mass . standard and whole way l e i are set for him by the conventions o f his soc ety . To choose ssi i i i is di i i i i po b l t es what belongs st nct vely to ex st ng, but the si i i i s o f h i ia l in a pos b l t e c o ce are taken away . Espec l y the m ss s i i th e a i i s - oc et es of contempor ry world, w th the r mas products m ss— i i i a nd in i and a med a Of commun cat on enterta ment, a k nd of u u a ll if drab niformity and conformism is imposed pon . Yet we it is h as hi it is im si i i ask who , that done t s , pos ble to dent fy “ ” in i i ni u anyone part cular . The ndefi te , anonymo s they have ’ “ t — da x s i i s Man in i s . done , He degger e pre s on They are “ ” pu shing ahead with the armaments race they are spending “ ” billions o n space exploration they a re saying that In all hi is i i i i t s , there no genu ne commun cat on and no authent c B ein hwit -o ne - g h another . T H O U G H T 1 9

o f asein i is The self everyday D , declares He degger, the ‘ ’ - i di i i ti — they self , wh ch we st ngu sh from the authen c self that ”15 is of in it s . , from the self that has been taken hold own way

A Furth er Explication o f B eing-in-the-world

it Of i i We have completed, as were , the first round the ex stent al ill i u i a t i in i . naly c, but much st rema ns need Of f ller expl cat on i i i nl i ro In part cular, follow ng He degger, we gave o y a br ef p isi o f i -in hi i v onal account Be ng , and t s relat on must now be mi in il it is o f i exa ned more deta , for clearly paramount mportance i ti t i is o f i in for the ex sten al analy c . It because the pecul ar way “ ” “ ” hi is hi s i -in o r i w ch he related to the world, Be ng dwell ng , “ ” that man exists and is distinct from entities that are simply - - it — r i i hi o f . o s w t n the world as parts Man , more tr ctly, the asein— is i -in- - hi s i -in is h it is D Be ng the world, but Be ng such t at also a standing— o ut (ex- sistence) in hi s awareness and responsi bilit the ai y, he has an openness to world and a cert n transcendence o f the world . Heidegger does not develop an epistemology in the traditional s i it ni ense . He expl c ly rejects such a task when he de es that “ ” Dasein is a thinking subject that somehow has to go o ut and i o f i i relate tself to a world Objects . He beg ns nstead, as we have s i i -in- - i een, w th Be ng the world, a concrete and many s ded i o f hi h i n is i i relat on, w c theoret cal k owledge a der vat ve and a 1 6 if i i bstract mode . But even we beg n w th man and the world t t in in -in - - in i i o f oge her concrete Be g the world, the vest gat on the kind of openness that belongs to Being-in woul d constitut e a i li i i task someth ng ke the ep stemology of Older philosoph es . G rantin g that we are already in the world and tha t o u r first -hand u in o f it o f r i i i i i nderstand g comes by way pa t c pat on, str v ng, i n e i i i pract cal co cern rather than th oret cal Observat on, we st ll h i i i hi i is i ave to nqu re nto t s openness , wh ch ndeed what

1 5 O cit 1 6 p . ., p . 7 . 1 “ Se e ab o e 1 v , p . 5 Z O M A R T I N H E I D E G GE R

i i i s a sein i i n d st ngu she D from all the other ent t es that we k ow . “ ” a i it s sclo se e 1 7 Heidegger can say : D sein s di dn ss . Da sein h e can i i i in st also descr be as a clear ng, l ke an open place a fore “ thro u h He t o o where the light gets g . talks often of the trans ‘ a s i paren cy o f D sein. He sees all of the e deas as related t o the “ ” a i i i o f i in is i tr d t onal doctr ne a natural l ght man . It th s “ ” “ ” natural light o r clearness o f Being- in -the - world that

i s i i i -in — t h He degger proceed to nvest gate . He holds that Be ng e world is disclosed to itself in two basic and equally primordial — t he ffe an ways through a cts d through understanding . i s the ff i s hi i He cons der first a ect ve tates w ch, at any g ven im e r e i u a i e o u . S s a s t , colour xper ence ch st tes He degger r gard “ s i a u a x i t tia i con t tuting f nd mental e s en le. They l ght up the ” e O i s s s o mi a re s . i f way we find our elv s rd nar ly, the e tate nd a im a s i i i i s a reg rded s ply moods , elus ve and fug t ve feel ng th t m e ai o n o i s i i s in f . co and go , and cert nly ph lo oph cal ntere t Yet ’ Heidegger s view these m oods may light up o u r Being-in - the in A m s we world very fundamental ways . ood reveal how are a r i is i m i ttuned to o u env ronment . It not just a subject ve e ot on but an i i i si it o f si i apprec at on from the n de, as were , the tuat on in i e m si in s wh ch we find ours lves . The ode of apprehen on uch ff i a is i i i e r a ect ve st tes ne ther Object ve nor subject ve , but rath m s co es before the eparation of subject and object . It belongs to “ ” “ ” t he a i o f o u r i it i s tot l ty be ng there , and l ght up the there

fo r u s .

A s m e o f the ff i s i is i exa pl s a ect ve tates Of wh ch he speak ng , i m i s in i s an d He degger ent on var ou places fear, j oy, boredom i A s s see in due u s i si i anx ety . we hall co rse , a pec al gn ficance s xi B ut o f s i i h attache to an ety . all these state of m nd l g t up the si ua i t t on in which we find ourselves . The expression which Heidegger us e s to cha racterize t he “ ” is s is a i i hi s d closure that comes in affective state f ct c ty . T does n o t an d cannot mean that Das ein is just another fact in ’ i as in s o f e i is is . s e the world In ay ng that D mode B ng ex tence ,

1 7 Bei e n a nd Tim . 1 1 g , p 7 . T H O U G H T 2 1

Heidegger has already implied that Da sein is not another in a t o f i u object the world, not just another f c wh ch acco nt “ ” i i is m asein a must be taken . By fact c ty eant that the D lways i i i ” finds itself n a s tuat on where it has “ro b e . It never begins i i i w th w de open hor zons , so to speak, for at any moment there “ ” s S o f are already a great many given . ome these may have ’ a is asein s o wn i b ut i r en from the D past cho ces , there w ll be it n o t a i others that has chosen at all , and th t w ll have been determined fo r it by society o r history or heredity o r other i U i is im i agenc es . p t ll now we have talked of the ex tent pr ar ly in m o f i i i hi i i i ter s poss b l ty, but at t s po nt we are be ng rem nded that the possibilities o f existence are always conditioned by o f is i is i i i i i . the fact c ty ex tence The ex stent never pure poss b l ty, fact ical i i i Of i im i i in but always poss b l ty . course , th s was pl c t o was i i the first rough sketch f existence . It sa d then that ex stence “ ” is charact erized by minene ss ; I have to be this particular “ ” e xi i n o hi a stent that expresses tself as I , and other . T s me ns that I have t o take over whatever i s already given in this particular i — i i i i a i it ex stence factors l ke race , sex, ntell gence , emot on l stab l y “ ” i so s o ut o f hi and all the raw mater al , to peak, w ch I have i in o r i m e ther to atta myself fa l to be yself. Another expression which Heidegger uses in connection with “ ” s i is t ro nn e ss Aff i i the e deas the word h w . ect ve states l ght up “ ” o f a sein i u a i in hi the there D , the actual s t t on w ch he finds himself ; but where he comes from and where he is going remain i e u i i o f hi s i s s o ut a i s h dd n, and the br te fact c ty ex stence tand ga n t “ ’ hi s h i u hi i i o f asein s i t dden backgro nd . T s character st c D Be ng “ ” “ ” “ ” i it is — is i in it s i e t th s that ve led whence and wh ther , y “ disclos e d in itself all the more u nveiledly; we call it the thrown ” “ ” ness o f thi s entity into it s there indeed it is thrown in such ” a i -in - — it is e way that , as Be ng the world, the ther These remarks show u s the important role played by m oods ’ o r a ff c i s i i ia a t i e t ve state n Heidegger s ex stent l an ly c . We cannot e at i e a m m nl produc a mood w ll , and p rh ps we co o y evade

it . O . c . 1 . p , p 74 2 2 M A R T I N H E I D E G G E R

tai s i i hi cer n mood and the k nds of d sclosures w ch they bring . B ut in ff i a s we are always some a ect ve st te or other, and mood “A i in u s . i i keep break ng on mood assa ls us . It comes ne ther ‘ ’ ‘ ’ i m i i is i -in - from Outs de nor fro ns de , but ar es out of Be ng the ’ i 1 9 a s Of . world , a way such Be ng i We turn now from moods to understand ng, the other funda a in hi i - in — - is i i ment l way w ch Be ng the world d sclosed to tself . U i is a ex istentia e All t nderstand ng too n l . understanding has i s i i it s o wn i moods , and l kew se every mood has understand ng, even if this is kept suppressed .

f If moods have to do primarily with the disclosure o f the i i o f as ein n i i di fact c ty D , understa d ng has to do w th the sclosure o f it s i ili i in mi poss b t es . Here we have to bear nd that when we “ ” o f i i i in is ial talk poss b l ty an ex tent sense, we do not mean a i i mi asein bare cont ngency, someth ng that ght happen to the D we mean rather a way of Being that is open to the Dasein in i i i o r hi it . some s tuat on other, and nto w ch can move forward Si i i i ili i asein nce then understand ng d scloses the poss b t es of D , is such understanding founded o n practical concern . The “ fundamental kind o f understanding has to do with being able ” “ ” “ t o a i i fo r it i man ge someth ng , be ng a match , be ng competent ” hin 2 0 i i is to do somet g , and a purely theoret cal understand ng derived from this broader existential kind by a process o f ’

i in hi asein s i i i imi . abstract on, w ch D pract cal nterests are m n zed

The characteristic structure o f understanding I S the projection . i i t o Das ein s always projecting . The express on seems get used in various ways by Heidegger : Dasein projects itself into it s i ili i it it s i ili i hi s poss b t es , but also projects poss b t es upon the t ng it i in hi is it s is that d scovers the world . Indeed, t s how world A s asein its i ili i i built up . D projects poss b t es upon th ngs and i in i i ili i i o r it d scovers them the r serv ceab ty and usab l ty ( , may be , in i i it i i i the r detr mental y) , these th ngs are ncorporated nto the i i s gn ficant world , and are understood . The notion o f projection also helps to explain more fully

1 9 t 6 O i 1 . c . . , p 7 2° it . 1 8 . C . c g ., p 3 T H O U G H T 2 3

in o f i it what was meant when , the first sketch ex stence, was said that Dasein is never complete in it s Being but is always o n its it in it way, so that we can never, as were , p down and i it s . asein grasp essence We can say that at any g ven moment, D is o f i it i i ahead tself, for has already projected tself nto some i i i i o f it s i can poss b l t es Be ng . Thus we also say that at any given asein is it i i moment, D more than actually appears on nspect on, supposing that someone had come along and was tryin g to make ’ i asein s r i i in an nventory Of the D prope t es , as he m ght the case

- r- o f an Object that was simply present a hand . i s i hi Understanding also impl e nterpretation . T s follows from what has already been said about the way Da sein under stan in l i s d g y ncorporates things into hi world . Whatever he encounters gets related to the totalit y o f understandin g that he al i is o f i i i ready has . But th s an act nterpretat on . We have ass gned the thing a place in o u r world and related it to the other things

an d in i i it nin . there, so do ng, we have also ass gned a mea g Meanings are n o t just arbitrarily stuck o n to things ; they ‘ consist in relating things to the world o f understanding which i i we already br ng w th us . There are two structures o r moments necessary to inter ret atio One o f is — : p n . these the fore structure before we can i i i o f nterpret, we must br ng along some k nd of frame reference, i An i some way o f seeing and conce ving phenomena . nter pret atio n is never a presuppositionl ess apprehending o f some ” hi 21 i i u s . t ng presented to In other words , nterpretat on always i takes place o n the basis of a pr or understanding . The second structure in interpretation is the as - structure we interpret hi i i n i somet ng as someth ng, and ndeed o ly then can we be sa d it Fo r i i di o f . to have appropr ated an understan ng nstance, we interpret a moving light in the sky as an aircraft o r as a meteorite o r in some other way . It is worth noting that Heidegger distinguishes two levels o f i r i i in m i . s f nte pretat on There an or al, almost unconsc ous

21 O it - c . 1 1 2 p . . , pp 9 . 2 4 MA R T I N H E I D E G G E R

i o n all im i o f i . i a k nd nterpretat on that goes the t e For nst nce , we rarely o r never hear a pure noise— it is heard as already i i a ffi nterpreted, so that we say that we hear the w nd or the tr c i i i i or whatever t may be . Th s nformal k nd o f interpretation would seem to be present n o t only in the simplest acts o f i in i understand ng but even our everyday percept on of the world . B ut is i i i s there also formal nterpretat on, as , for n tance , when i it o f i i o r a we take up the expl c task nterpret ng a poem a pl y, o r i i i i Fo r even of nterpret ng an h stor cal event or man himself. i o f i i ie o ut i th s kind nterpretat on, men have tr d to work defin te ti i i an d o f hermeneu cal pr nc ples , we have already taken note ’ Heidegger s interest in hermeneutics and his awareness o f the “ ” o f i i hermeneutical circle . The nature th s c rcle and it s ine vit a bility has been further clarified through this discussion of di i i fo r i li a understan ng and nterpretat on, He degger be eves th t what holds fo r the in formal type o f interpretation is valid als o i i fo r the more sophist cated k nds . Bein and Time his is o n i i In g , stress the pr or understand ng i t o i i o n i that we br ng nterpretat on, and the need to clar fy our i i it i o u r i s o n presuppos t ons and, as were , tra n s ght properly “ is i i is ut what is t o be interpreted . What dec s ve not to get o of i i it in i i i o f the c rcle but to come nto the r ght way . Th s c rcle understan ding is n ot an orbit in which any random kind o f knowledge may move it is the expression Of the existentia l - is n ot fore struct ure o f Das ein itself. It to be reduced to the i i i of i i is level Of a v c ous c rcle, or even a c rcle wh ch merely i is i i i i ilit of m s tolerated . In the c rcle h dden a pos t ve poss b y the o t i i To m i i o f . i pr ord al k nd know ng be sure , we genu nely take of i i i i in o ur i i hold th s poss b l ty only when, nterpretat on , we n an d is have u derstood that our first, last constant task never to a o u r - i - i - i n llow fore hav ng, fore s ght and fore concept o to be t o i i presented us by fanc es and popular concept ons , but rather t o make the scientific theme secure by working o ut these fore ” structures in terms o f the things themselves 2 2

O it . c 1 . p . , p . 95

2 6 M A R T I N H E I D E G G E R

ni is expression and commu cated . It the matter itself that is i i i in i . i llum nated d scourse Truth, He degger th nks , does not lie in the proposition or judgment (as in the traditional corre spo ndence theories o f truth) but is rather the making-unh idde n hi i hi is o f . as it the t ng tself T s truth the Greeks understood , “ ” - — hi i a letbia un hi . s i ia , ddenness T s at any rate the most pr mord l “ ” i o f - kind of truth . He degger can also talk truth as lettin g be this is understood in a positive way as the act which lets some “ i it is o r i i is th ng be what really , wh ch exposes tself to what , ” 2 4 as such . ’ But Heidegger finds tha t Dasein s possibilities for genuine discourse and fo r the unco nce ale dne ss into which it leads get i in i Di r i d verted everyday ex stence . scou se has degenerated nto - is is t i e l . i . i b o f i it dle talk In th s , there no le t ng the th ng as real y “ ” it in Instead, we understand the way that they have already it is i i in hi i interpreted . There no genu ne communi cat on t s k nd o f i i o f i i is talk e ther nstead l ght ng up what talked about, the t u i s language rather closes i Off . The lang age tself gets pas ed t s i i o f i i i u t . along, and often attended by amb g y Instead lead ng m i it . to d sclosure and unconcealment, rather prevents the The i in i i i i i var ous ways wh ch, as we have seen, the poss b l t es o f Dasein can be perverted are summed up by Heidegger in the “ ” phenomenon which he calls the falling o f Dasein. The word “ ” i i i it wh ch he uses means deter orat on , and to most readers will suggest a comparison with the theological doctrine o f a “ ” o f i is i it a fall man . But He degger at pa ns to make clear th t he ’ is not makin g an assertion about man s spiritual condition . is i i i i i i i t he He rather po nt ng to ontolog cal poss b l t es , though at i it his i in same t me seems clearly bel ef that for the most part,

his i i asein is i o r i . everyday ex st ng, the D ndeed fallen deter orated hi i in s i T s does not mean that he has ceased to ex st, the pec al o f it i i a sense the word, but does seem to po nt to a fall ng aw y s I s o ne from what i most distinctive in existence . There on the i i o f r hand an absorpt on nto the world objects , th ough pre

24 S e e his e ssa On the E nce o f Truth in istenee a nd Bein ed . y sse Ex g, H R r W . B r c . e ne hi a o C c o 06. k ( g y, g , p . 3 T H O U G H T 2 7 occupation with the tasks and concerns o f the instrumental world and o n the other hand there is a deprivation o f freedom “ ” mi o f i through the do nance the they , the depersonal zed collective anony m ous mass . The fallenness of the Da sein is described by Heidegger in is i o f tran uil/ in it i . var ous ways It a k nd q k g , for takes away from Dasein responsibility and the anxiety that goes with it ; it isr also aliena tion it i asein i an , for has d verted the D from authent c selfhood and also from authentic community and furthermore ’ it is sca tterin asein s i ili ti di a g , for the D poss b es are ctated by factors outside o f himself and there is lacking the cohesion and i unity that belong to authent c selfhood . The time has n o w come when the analysis o f existence that has been set forth up to this point can all be gathered up in a i i r comprehensive concept . The analys s has d sclosed a th eefold structure in existence (a ) Dasein is ahead- o f-itself— here o f i ili i i belong the phenomena poss b ty, project ng, understand ng (b) Das ein is already-in -a-world— here belong the phenomena o f i i th ro wn ne ss ff i c asein is - fact c ty, , a ect ve states ( ) D close to it s- it it is in it — world, so close to that absorbed here belong m li “ ” i i ili the pheno ena Of fal ng, the they , the scatter ng Of poss b Of i i i i i . i i i t es Th s threefold structure poss b l ty, fact c ty and fall ng, it i i o f D i i l const ut ng the Be ng everyday ase n, He degger ca ls “ ” care . An d i i i i i here , He degger cla ms , the ex stent al analyt c gets confirmation from the way man has interpreted himself through in hi is the ages . For have not the poets seen care that w ch i l i i i o ff essent a ly and dist nct vely human, and that wh ch marks “ ” man from the carefreeness o f animal life Is this then the end Of o u r search No w that it has been i i is i sa d that ex stence const tuted by care , and we have seen the i its r r t hi i outl nes of th eefold st ucture , does any ng further rema n i i i is U i l n o w to be sa d He degger th nks that there . p t l , we have been considering Dasein for the most part in terms o f everyday i i i rout ne ex st ng, and we must now attempt to get a deeper and i i i o f i more pr mord al understand ng ex stence . 2 8 MA R T I N H E I D E G G E R

Toward Authentic Existence

Ho w can the existential analytic be extended beyond the point that has been reached There are two ways in which this i l fin d m ght be attempted, though we may wel that these two is asein ways eventually converge . The first way to try to see D as a whole rather than in his fragmented aspects and the second is t o i i i D asein fo r so had nqu re about the authent c , far we have in view the everyday Dasein and we have seen how much o f o u r everyday existing is moulded by patterns imposed o n it from “ ” si is i in in out de, and therefore not authent c , the sense of be g ur o wn hi ni i o . , somet ng that we have defi tely chosen He degger seeks to break o ut of the limitations belonging to the earlier part o f the analytic by turning attention to t wo further pheno m : i i of i ena death, the cons derat on wh ch enables us to grasp asein in its n i i i D wholeness and co sc ence, wh ch d scloses to the as e n it s i i fin d D i authent c poss bility . Yet we shall that these

two are closely related . i l i i But before we d rect y cons der death and consc ence , let us cast o ur thoughts back fo r a few moments to those affective i i i i states wh ch, accord ng to He degger, play an mportant part

in the proces s whereby the Dasein becomes disclosed to itself. o f i i i i in These states m nd, we have seen, l ght up the s tuat ons hi i i w ch we find ourselves at any g ven t me , for we are always already in some factical situation that delimits the possibilities i o m i open to us at that t me . Fear, j y and boredo were ment oned a s o f of mi it i examples such states nd, and was ment oned that

Heidegger attaches special importance to the state o f anxiet y .

We must now try to see what this special importance is . is i n i is i o f i o r in It cla med that a x ety the bas c state m nd, way hi i t is ex eri w ch we find ourselves . But true anx e y very rarely p

e n ced . li Of Dasein is his The fal ng , that to say, tendency to let his i i o r i ex stence be absorbed nto the world the collect ve mass , i i S o can also be cons dered as a fl ght from himself. he flees also i i is i i l in from anx ety, for th s the very mood that d scloses h mse f i i iff i t the most bas c way. The ma n d erence between anx e y and T H O U G H T 2 9 other related states o f mind (such as fear) is that anxiet y seems i is i to have no spec al Object, as fear has . It not some part cular situation that gets disclosed in anxiety (though it may well be a particul ar situation that arouses it on any given occasion) ’ but man s total situation as the existent thrown into a world “ i i in is . where he and has to be When anx ety has subs ded, then ‘ o ur everyday way o f talking we are accustomed to say that it was really But it may be that this everyday talk o f “ ” hi of is the not ng says more than we are aware , and already an acknowledgement of t he radical nullity and finit u de of in is if asein i its i di nx i . n ex stence , sclosed a ety It as D , very

i di hi i . Be ng , has an awareness of a stan ng threat to t s Be ng “ ” The word anxiety is not perhaps a very good English i i A n st . O equ valent for the German word g ther translat ons , such “ ” i as t . dread , are even less sat sfac ory The trouble about such words is that they seem to suggest that this state of mind is a weakness o n the part Of the Das ein— a weakness that perhaps ul in he co d overcome, and that some people do fact seem to ’ i is i i o i overcome . But th s a m sunderstand ng f He degger s hi i lf is i concept, w ch (as he h mse acknowledges) cont nuous ’ i i k i Of nxi In w th K er egaard s dea a ety, though also some regards i it A o f it dist nct from . study both of these writers makes clear that o ne needs quite a lot o f fortitude to be able to endure the kind o f anxiety of which they speak— and presumably it is for this reason tha t we commonly try to avoid this mood o r to i iz it it t . As , tranqu ll e when _ hreatens to trouble us related to death anxie ty asks us to face and accept the transient character of o u r i hi is hr ni ex stence , w ch through and t ough fi te and threatened i . i is i w th annulment But anx ety also related to consc ence , and here it asks us t o face and accept responsibility for o u r exis tence -a i ili hi it it respons b ty w ch, the more deeply we feel , the more o f must destroy every trace complacency . An i di finit ude i x ety, then, scloses , and the most Obv ous mark o f a finit u de is a I t is i hum n de th . in terms of death that He degger

25 Bein a nd Time 2 1 g , p . 3 . 3 0 MA R T I N H E I D E G G E R tries to make good the first o f the two defects in the earlier D it is i is n s . a aly es eath, cla med, the phenomenon that allows

the Dasein to be grasped as a whole . But ho w can this be ? Surely death is a purely negative is i phenomenon . It the end and ndeed the destruction o f the asein i -in - - In i it D as a Be ng the world, and th s respect seems to be n i i ex istentia lia ff i s utterly u l ke the var ous (a ect ve tates , under s i i i r i o tand ng, d scourse and the l ke) unde wh ch we have s far i di o f o f i tr ed to reach an understan ng the structure ex stence . it is i asein is a i Yet so long as al ve , ther D lways ncomplete and

“ o f i i i i it s i i it i h ili . SO ahead tself, project ng tself nto poss b t es m g t s i asein is li it s in eem that wh le the D a ve, can never be gra ped it s asein i s completeness yet when death supervenes , the D t elf h as i n all d sappeared, and can ot be grasped at . ’ Heidegger s long and subtle discussion o f death and dying constitutes o ne o f the most interesting chapters Of Being a nd Tim 2 6 n is ot e d in e. He freely ack owledges that death n an n the sense di o ff o f i fo r i of a roun ng ex stence, death frequently str kes ’ t before a man s powers have ma ured, and perhaps even more ’ it i f r n i D often delays unt l a te a ma s powers have decl ned . eath does not complete existence in the sense o f bringing it to the

i s t i i i . a u a i s bg nd r . r pene s of potent al t es But death does set f y o ff asein i -in-the=WOrld m n Othin It marks the D , as Be ng , fro the g into which he disappears when he ceases to be in the world and t o be marked o ff from nothing in this way is precisely to ” - i t o ut it is t o . i is stand from , that say, to ex s st Moreover, to i i fo r o ne m o f ex st authent cally, when has beco e aware the o f is o ne i hi is boundary ex tence, t hen has also recogn zed that t s ’ ow i i in o f h one s n ex stence . He degger does fact often talk deat ’ a s one s ownmost possibility and an existence that is authentic ’ is xa n e ctly an existence that has been made one s very o w . is o f is If there no thought death, and the future regarded a s i o ut i ni is stretch ng ndefi tely, then there no great sense of u r i i i rgency o responsibility n life . In the nauthent c mode Of

- O . it 2 1 1 c . . . p , pp 7 9 3 T H O U G H T 3 1

xi i asein it s s e st ng, D covers up the fact of death and concretene s . A s i o f i i i ev dence th s , He degger po nts to our everyday ways of i i . talk ng about death Frequently we use euphem sms , and the i is i whole matter is treated mpersonally . It recogn zed that ’ i o wn is i i everyone d es , but one s death cons dered as belong ng t to the indefinite fu ure . Heidegger does not indeed encourage a meditative brooding ’ u is o wnm o st i i i pon death, but because death one s poss b l ty, the o ne that belongs to each person inalienably and that marks o ff hi s i i i i i o f i be ng, he ass gns to the ant c pat on death a spec al i o f i i All i role in his dea an authent c ex stence . ex stence may be i i - — i in cons dered as a Be ng toward death, an ex stence the face of ni hi it is the end, but to recog ze t s fact rather than to flee from i i A to have turned toward an authent c ex stence . lthough i u se s i i He degger does not the expre s on, we m ght say that what “ ” in i is i i is he has m nd an eschatolog cal ex stence, that to say, an existence that knows the urgency and responsibility o f living i i is ni it s before the mm nent end, and that shaped and u fied by h ave ‘ se en o e i i awareness o f the end . We that n of the character st cs of a fallen o r deteriorated existence is that its possibilities are i 27 i i scattered and ncoherent . But to ant c pate death and to ’ recognize the boundary o f one s existence is to achieve a n

overarching unity that gathers up the possibilities o f existence . We may think o f all the possibilities of life as lying this side o f i i i i i o f it is in o f the final, dec s ve poss b l ty death, so that the face death that they must be organized into a coherent pattern . ’ A i ex re ss10n is n o t i o wn it ga n, the p He degger s , but may be “ ” helpfu l to u s to thin k o f death as a kind of perspective just a s a pict ure is organized and unified by the convergence of it s i i i - i s o in i perspect ves toward the van sh ng po nt , human l fe death is the unifying point around which the possibilities o f i e a re i l f to be organ zed . Is this philosophy o f Heidegger then a kind o f philosophy o f ? ‘ death Is it an expression o f despair o r nihilism ? W e are not

27 Se e a b o e 2 v , p . 7 3 2 M A R T I N H E I D E G GE R

i ti A i hi in i . yet a pos t on to answer these ques ons dm ttedly, t s i i i looks l ke a somewhat gr m ph losophy, yet we can hardly help i i i i becom ng mpressed w th the fact that death, from be ng a a i s i is i in merely neg t ve and de truct ve phenomenon, rece v g i t i something like an affir mative character in the existent al analy c . The claim is being made that it introduces a wholeness and i i o f a sein unity nto the ex stence the D . ’ fi8 But now we must look at Heidegger s account o f co n scien ce . Just as the phenomenon of death was supposed to overcome a the deficiency of the earlier analyses by allowing us to se e asein in it s it is i Of D wholeness , so, cla med, the phenomenon i i a i i i consc ence w ll allow us to see D sein n its authent c ty . C i in onsc ence ( most languages , the word seems to have “ ” i i i i is i ff i or g nally meant s mply consc ousness ) , l ke a ect ve n n i o ne in i asein states and u dersta d ng, of the modes wh ch the D is i i C i is i is d sclosed to tself. onsc ence prec sely the d closure to t t i One o f th e o f on b o hi s l . someone what he g be , of authent c se f i i i s of i it i is bas c character st c ex stence, w ll be remembered, that i i hi i of hi the ex stent has a relat on to mself. He has an dea mself,

and can either be at one with himself or estranged from himself. i i r He can e ther atta n or fall sho t . ha s Conscience is the awareness of how it is with oneself. It of o r hi is i the character a call a summons , and t s s mply the call of the authentic self to the self in it s actual absorption in “ ” n o t the world or lostness in the they . We need suppose that i o o f the call comes to one from outs de f himself. The call conscience can be adequately understood in terms of the complex o f i i i i o f structure the human ex stent h mself. Th s consc ence which Heidegger speaks is to be distinguished from the everyday i hi i i o r u ere o . s i i t s consc ence T s s mply the vo ce of soc e y, the p g , ’ “ ” in i i s Freud s term nology . It reflects the convent on that they 8 0 his is i ti have adopted . t everyday conscience ne ther authen c i n o r i u i is is tself conduc ve to an a thent c ex tence . It just another “ ” in i i i i i i way wh ch they st fle and dom nate the nd v dual, and

23 Bein a nd Time 1 2 - 8 g , pp . 3 4 .

54 MA R T I N H E I D E G G E R concept o f care gathered up the phenomena that had been x in is 3 0 e plored up to that stage the analys . But now that some thing has been said about t he Dasein in it s wholeness and u i i i m im i i i a thent c ty, can there be g ven a ore pr ord al nterpretat on o f the basic constitution of existence ? Can we penetrate st ill is s further, and ask what the fundamental tructure that makes c are possible A in imi s o f is i lready the prel nary ketch ex tence , He degger had rejected the supposition that the existent can be conceived as a substance o r understood in the categories appropriate t o “ ” s o ne a o f s t o ubstances . When t lks sub tance , the model, so s is i i i i is n o t peak, the sol d endur ng th ng, and th nghood a useful i o i category for the understand ng f personal ex stence . When i it ex stence got defined as care , was clear that we had moved i t i i i far from any not on of a substan al soul as the bas s for ex stence , an d care itself seems so elusive and volatile that we are left i s i th e wonder ng j ust what does con t tute hum an existence . In of i i h subsequent sketch an authent c ex stence, we have seen t at genuine selfhood is n o t something ready- made (like a sub st antial soul that is there from the beginning) b ut is rather a condition that may be either gained o r lost in the concrete act s i i s i an and dec s on o f ex stence . C we then find a clearer model that will help us t o understand the struct ure o f existence and self hood and that will be more adequate to the complex and dynamic character o f personal life than was the traditional model o f the substantial soul hi i ff is i The new model w ch He degger O ers us temporal ty , i it s im i o f h a w th three d ens ons the present, what has been, and w t is i it is i u a to come . These make care poss ble , and Obv o s th t the three dimensions o f temporality correspond to the threefold o f a s i ili i is structure care, poss b ty (the project ng of what to i it ki i come) , fact c y (the ta ng over of what has been) and fall ng i hi i o f i as (the concern w th the present) . T s not on ex stence temporality helps to sharpen the distinction between the Dasein

3 ' S e e ab o e 2 . v , p . 7 . T H O U G H T 3 5

i a i and the thing o r even the an m l . The th ng (substance) endures is in ti i i i . it s through t me It me , and changes w th t me . But “ ” i i is o f i o ne t o relat on to t me that mov ng from now another, “ ” so i it s is it s that at any g ven moment, past no longer and ” i i is is . ne future not yet Its relat on to t me thus an external o . i o n is n o t im n The ex stent, the other hand, s ply co fined to the “ ” A s i is in u i now . project ng, he already the f ture , wh le as i o ne t thrown he s always who has already been . He is no ” i in ti i o ne t o s mply me , mov ng along from now the next ; i an im Of i d . n i i rather, he takes t me has t e course , the nauthent c o f i asein in i i mode ex stence, the D , as he gets scattered mmed ate i i i i i “ ” concerns , tends to be l ke those ent t es wh ch s mply hop i is o r i from moment to moment . But th s a fallen deter orated i s asein ex stence . In any ca e, we may suppose that the D never i i i . qu te becomes just another Object, endur ng through t me But clearly it is in an authentic existence that the dimensions Of temporality are most fully unified and that true selfhood is t i i t hi l o n h as a ta ned . The ex stent who has projec ed mse f death alrea dy penetrated to the boundary o f what is to come while in responding to conscience by taking over in responsibility hi s fa i al i hi ct c i i . gu lt ness , he has appropr ated that w ch has been “ It is through this appropriation o f both the ahead and the “ ” already that he is freed for authentic resoluteness in the “ i u i i asein i ni o f present s t at on . The authent c D d splays the u ty a future which makes present in the process of having been ; ‘ ’ i it as a i 3 1 we des gnate tempor l ty . The central place which Heidegger gives to t e mpo ralit y m his i i i hi s i o ne in analys s mpl es that ph losophy is a secular , the “ ” i i i is str ct mean ng o f the word secular . Yet although the ex stent i i his i o n e o f const tuted by temporal ty and although l fe is care , ” i in i I I S n o t i . n term nated by death, he s mply t me so far as he ‘ ‘ r n o w i i is t anscends the and atta ns to genu ne selfhood, he “ ” iz i i i real ng a k nd 0 eternal life in the midst of t me . To r ecognize the fundamentally temporal character o f

3 1 Bein a nd Time g , p . 3 74 . 3 6 M A R T I N H E I D E G GE R

i is ni it is hi i Our ti ex stence also to recog ze that stor cal . atten on i i di i i s has been mostly d rected to the n v dual ex stent, and perhap in Heidegger as in other philosophers of existence there is a i i i u i u is is i in i tendency toward nd v d al sm, tho gh th ma nly react on against that false collectivism which stifles the possibilities o f i i i asei it ill the nd v dual D n. But w be remembered that the existential analytic found that Being- with belongs intrinsically ’ i i o f is asein s is to the const tut on ex tence , and that D world a it i i i common world . Hence the temporal y o f every nd v dual i is in i o f i ex stence caught up the w der movement h story, and every individual shares in the destin y o f hi s generation o r of hiS ‘ is i u n . i i i age Furthermore, there d sclosed to the nd v d al not o ly o f hi s o wn i i i the past, present and future ex stence, but l kew se o f i i i t o the past, present and future the h stor cal commun ty which he belongs . i u in H story has been nderstood many ways . The very word is i it fo r hi i t i amb guous , for we use both the stor cal ac ual ty, o f hi i it the stream story, as we somet mes call , and also for the o f i i i i nf i i study h story . He degger avo ds th s co us on by us ng two distinct words in German Gescbicbte for the actual historical wo Historie Of i . t process , and for the study th s process But the it is nl a o f are closely connected, because o y on ccount the fact that he is himself through and through historical that the human i o f i i hi ex stent can undertake the study h story . In mak ng t s s i is i tatement, He degger acknowledges that he follow ng the i o f i Dil dis i i teach ng W lhelm they, who made a sharp t nct on

between the natural and the human sciences . The human sciences are possible onl y because we directly participate in i - t u hi as the r subject matter . We can only s dy story because, i i i first - i h stor cal ex stents ourselves , we have hand acqua ntance i hi i i it is i w th the stor cal real ty . We know what to del berate , to A hi i i i i i i o n . dec de, to asp re , to cher sh amb t ons and so stor an who onl y reported facts o r connections and concatenations of li One facts would n o t be penetrating to the rea ty o f history . could spend a lot o f time and ingenuity in discovering h o w n i P i i Si i ma y t mes lato v s ted c ly, but the knowledge of such T H O U G H T 3 7 facts alone does n o t even begin to open up the historical reality 3 2 o f Plato . Heidegger is concerned to make two main points about is is in i i hi history. The first that we are m taken th nk ng that story i hi i h as i . is to do w th the past Human ex stence always stor cal , i i a nd i i . i ndeed h story is or ented to the future In study ng h story, i i in we are study ng man , and we are study ng man order to i i o f hi s i i learn about the poss bilit es ex stence . The hermeneut c c ircle comes into view once more in this discussion of history . It is because we are ou rselves historical in o u r being that we can t ake up the study o f history yet in so far as this st udy discloses t o i i i i o f i us what the poss b l t es human ex stence are , we reach i e lf - i P t hr ough t an nlarged se understand ng . erhaps one could cite a man like Sir Winston Churchill as ill ustrating the kind o f i i i C hill th ng that He degger has in m nd . hurc was a keen student o f i his o wn i o f ff ir him dis h story, and exper ence a a s made a i i i o f i i a i his i i al c r m nat ng judge the h stor c l mater al . Yet h stor c s tudies were in turn brought to bear on the contemporary i i i i h t o pol t cal problems w th wh c he had deal, and what they disclosed of human existence contributed to the decisions which ’ h e i i l . made . He degger s second po nt fol ows from the first If history has to do primarily n o t with past fact s but with human e i o r i x stence whether past, present future, then h story must be s t i i ti is hi i ud ed ex sten ally . It true that the stor an has to concern hi i i mself w th documents , monuments and many other th ngs t in i i hat have come down from the past, and that deal ng w th t s i i i he e, he must use, as far as poss ble, the methods of emp r cal s i i i is i . nl i c ence But these th ngs are o y secondar ly h stor cal, that t o i i i i i i say, they are h stor cal only through the r assoc at on w th h i i is i uman persons . The human ex stent h mself the pr mary hi i i is i stor cal, and the human ex stent to be understood ex sten t ially rather than in the categories appropriate to empirically o bservable objects . So H i i ff o f hi e degger seems to be say ng that the stu story, so

3 3 Cf . Bein a nd Time 2 g , p . 4 5 . 3 8 MA RT I N H E I D E G G E R

a i ssi i i e a is s s . s is to pe k, po b l ty rath r than f ct But doe th not abol h the distinction between history a nd fict ion or myt hology ? e i i hi . e s i He degger does not t nk so Ind ed , he b l eve that h story is i s u a s a a i it iff in just as str ct a t dy m them t cs , though d ers is i a i 3 3 i having broader ex tent al found t ons . What we see n history actica l i i i i s i n o t are the f poss b l t e of ex stence , and these are to be n i i o r im i i i i i co fused w th merely utop an ag nary poss b l t es . Presumably the historian is not interested in all the fact ical i ili i a re e x i i in s m a i poss b t es that h b ted the tory of nk nd . He selects those th at stand o ut from the routine and the everyday and that disclose n e w and unsuspected dimensions o f t he i i is i i o f Dase n. H story concerned above all w th the explorat on i ssi i i i i u i the authent c po b l t es of ex stence . Here we m st not ce another idea which Heidegger introduces in the course o f hi s “ discussion of history— the idea o f repetition History revea ls i si i i the authent c repeatable pos bil t es o f Dasein. The word “ ” repeatable is perhaps rather t o o weak to translate the German Ri o n ti o f t he wiederbolbar . Father chards gets the ac ve sense “ ” i it i 3 4 R ti i is word better by translat ng retr evable . epe t on not ni a i b u t i i just a mecha c l reproduc ng, rather a go ng nto the past in such a way that o ne fetches back the possibility which it

- contains and makes present this possibility in our existence now .

There is even a kind of violence in s u ch interpretation o f history . i it s The past has to be se zed and broken open, as were . It become si ni fo r u i i t o g ficant the f ture , and m ght almost be sa d get integrated with the future in the moment of vision and decision . Certainly Heidegger has in mind a much more lively a n d intrinsic relation to history than just that o f searching in the past fo r “ s mi i o f ome parallels that ght be im tated today . The theme historical stu dy is neither that which has happened just once fo r al l n o r i i s it b ut s i i i someth ng un ver al that floats above , the po s b l ty i fa ti all i hi s i i i n o t wh ch has been c c y ex stent . T s po s b l ty does get — is sa in i repeated as such that to y, understood an authent cally

3 3 it O . c . . 1 . p , p 95 3 4 de e tbr n b Pbenomenolo to Tbon bt Ni ho ff The Ha ue : Hei gg r . o g gy g ( j g

8 . p . 9 T H O U G H T 3 9 historical way— if it becomes perverted into the colourlessness O hi st r a o f a supratemporal model . nly by o ic lity which is fact ical t i i t - - and au hent c can the h s ory of what has been there, as a i in in i i resolute fate, be d sclosed such a manner that repet t on ‘ ’ ’ the force o f the possible gets s truck home into one s factical i — in it i ex stence other words , that comes toward that ex stence ” 3 5 in it s futural character . ’ Heidegger s underst anding o f history may best be ill ustrated Of the hi r o f from hi s o wn treatment sto y Western philosophy . As is - k - S i i i i u well nown, the pre ocrat c th nkers , espec ally Heracl t s i P i i i o n hi s mi . and armen des , have exerc sed a great fasc nat on nd t i is i is t But his interes n them not merely ant quarian . It an attemp to repeat o r retrieve the seminal insights o f Western thought in i such a way as would renew the ph losophy Of o u r own time . In the words Of a scholar who has devoted special attention to ’ “ i i - S i He degger s relat ons to the pre ocrat cs , we return to the origins o f this o u r Western tradition o f philosophy in order to i i in i i i rebu ld anew, to bu ld an authent cally h stor cal manner s ’ i o f i i . i upon the bas s these or g n In other words , He degger s restudy o f the pre- Socrat ic origin s o f Western thinking is meant i i in the ull i i o f a to be h stor cal f He degger an sense th t word, ” i i ili i o 3 6 f asein . namely, creat ve for the future poss b t es D i P i i Heracl tus and armen des are often contrasted, but He degger sees them as at o ne in raising the question o f Being in a funda i di i mental way . But almost mme ately the quest on began to be

- i i i i . s de tracked, and nterest moved from Be ng to the be ngs is i P A i sub se Th began to happen w th lato and r stotle , and the quent history o f Western philosophy has been o ne o f the fo r i i n t i getting Of Be ng . Thus He degger does o think of the h story o f il i of is ph osophy as a h story progress . It , he declares , a “ basic fallacy to believe “that history begins with the primitive

and i is t . backward, the weak and helpless . The oppos te rue i s s The beg nning i the strongest and mightie st . What come

3 5 Bein and Time g , p . 447 . 3 “ Ge o r e o se h Se ide l Martin Heide er and tire PreJocratics g J p , gg in o ln Uni r it f Ne b ra P 2 c : e s o s re ss . . (L v y ka , p 9 4 0 MA RT I N H E I D E G G E R afterwards is no t development but the flattening that results from mere spreadin g out ; it is inability to maintain the beginnin g; the beginning is emasculated and exaggerated into a caricatu re o f greatness taken as purely numerical and quantitative size ” i 3 7 a nd extens on . ’ It was Heidegger s intention at o n e time to write a pa rt o f Be n a n Time i Destrtoétion der Ontolo ie i g d that would bear the t tle g . “ ” This should not be understood so much as a destruction as a “ ” i o f di m t li i is o f k nd s an ng , a go ng back through the h tory philosophy to find where the forgetting o f Being h as taken so i i i i ed place that, once aga n, the genu ne ns ghts may be recover a n i in wn i A u d made creat ve our o t me . ltho gh the formal ’ estruktion der Ontolo ie i i s D g was not wr tten, He degger many writings o n the outstanding philosophers o f the Western t radition show us clearly how th e dismantling and reconstruction His i o f i proceed . interpretat ons these ph losophers are often hi hl u i i i g y nconvent onal , and show that v olence or break ng open which he considers an essential part o f the hermeneutic i nl i a rt . The true nterpreter has to hear not o y what was sa d but ’ t i S i i hi i what was lef unsa d . ome cr t cs t nk that He degger s in terpretations are purely arbitrary and gui ded by hi s own i i is in s presuppos t ons , but there no doubt that many way he does gain remarkable insights from his attempts at repetitive hi i C i s Destrnktion is t nk ng . erta nly hi by no means a purely i t hi i negat ve approach o the phil osop cal tradit on . f x His A good e ample is afforded by his treatment o f Kant . o n 3 8 i in 1 2 the book Kant was first wr tten 9 9, and reflects i i hi o f Bein a nd Time l i ti h stor cal teac ng g , as wel as po n ng forward i ’ P i i to He degger s later thought . robably the most nterest ng ’ part o f the discussion concerns Kant s obscure doctrine o f the “ s i o f i i in o f chemat sm the categor es , that h dden art the depth the soul ” whereby the bare intellectual categories become

3 7 A n Introduction to Meta b sics t r Ral h Man h eim Yale Un i ersit p y , . p ( v y P re N Ha n ss ew e . 1 ; v . p 55. 3 3 Ka nt a nd tbe P oblem Meta b si s tr am e hu rchill In diana Uni er r c . s C of p y , J ( v s ir Pre ss Blo o min to n : y , g

4 2 M A R T I N H E I D E G G E R

in i o is i no w understood the l ght f Being . It th s later phase o ur which must n o w engage attention . Already in the inaugural lecture which Heidegger gave when his i ib in 1 2 he took up dut es at Fre urg 9 9, we find both some Of the charact eristics of his later thought and the links that connect i his i i i i i i hi this w th earl er ex stent al nvest gat ons . T s lecture “ ” i i is i ? 4 ° did dealt w th the quest on, What metaphys cs and i i i i so concretely by tak ng up a part cular metaphys cal quest on, for Heidegger held that every metaphysical question involves l the whole o f metaphysics . But the particu ar question which he o ne i it is i o f took up seems a strange ndeed, for the quest on nothing ' ’ i i i ni He degger s lecture was g ven before the academ c commu ty, made up o f the professors o f the various sciences and particul ar i i i it i l d sc pl nes , and m ght we l seem nowadays that when the i i in i i spec al zed scholars the var ous fields have done the r work, is i i t i then there ndeed noth ng lef for the ph losopher . But perhaps only a very bold philosopher would blandly announce that he proposed to take fo r the theme of hi s lecture precisely this nothing . Heidegger began his lecture with a mention o f the wide i o f di in ni it o f var ety subjects stu ed a u vers y. The total field is di i i knowledge today broken up among many sc pl nes , yet they all have o ne characteristic in common —they claim to deal

i is i i i hi . w th what , w th the be ngs , w th the t ngs that really are is i i i i o f i Man, who h mself a be ng, rrupts nto the world be ngs and tries to understand them both for what they are and how

i i ci al . they are . Modern sc ence cla ms to be do le before the re

is is i . i . It object ve and factual It treats of what , and noth ng else ’ This is the cue fo r Heidegger s discussion Of nothing . How “ ” about this nothing else ? The sciences are n ot interested in it i o f it i ir , though ndeed they speak when, to emphas ze the

4° Wa s ist Meta b sik ' itto rio Klo ste rmann Fran furt -am -Ma in p y ? ( , k th e ditio n with in tro ductio n and o stscri t The re is an En lish 7 , p p , g

e W . B ro c t ransh tio n o f the le cture and o stscri t in Ex is tence a nd B in ed . p p g , k Hen r Re ner Chica o : ( y g y, g T H O U G H T 4 3

i i i i i is and notbin Object v ty, they cla m to be deal ng w th what g i i “ i ” i else. The quest on about th s noth ng else , left as de by the

i is i i . sc ences , a metaphys cal quest on ’ The beginning o f Heidegger s lecture is so paradoxical that i i we may feel we are be ng somehow mesmer zed . Is there not a i f hi l ” verbal tr ck here, when a casual re erence to not ng e se i i Or i is gets exalted nto a metaphys cal theme aga n, there not “ ” in i u hi an elementary error log c, whereby the prono n not ng “ ” is getting understood as if it denoted something ? These i i i i i i cr t cal quest ons , I th nk, must be la d as de for the present il i his unt we see how He degger develops the theme of lecture . ’ “ ” i is i o f i is no t He degger s argument that the dea noth ng , is i i as commonly supposed, der ved from a more general dea of “ ” R it is r i . . negat on ather, the othe way round The general idea of negation is derived from the concrete encounter with “ ” asein in it s i is nothing that the D has very be ng . It here that the definite link between the ontological and the existential ’ i i is i aspects of He degger s ph losophy establ shed . We remember the importance which Heidegger attached to the disclosive o f hi i mood anxiety, and how t s mood l ghts up for us the “1 o f m i is character hu an existence as del vered over to death . It this concrete encounter with the nothingness that essentially belongs to a Being- toward-death that is claimed by Heidegger as the fundamental meaning Of “nothing” and the existential i i ti basis for the log cal dea of nega on . i o f nxi is In But the not on a ety developed further. a genuine of i nl is o ne of finitu de o f mood anx ety, not o y aware the human existence : it is claimed that the totalit y of beings sinks into All i hi . i i i i of not ng th ngs , and we w th them, s nk nto a k nd indifference The only thing that remains and overwhelms us ‘ ’ il i i is i i A i re wh e the be ngs sl p away th s noth ng . nx ety veals hi ” 4 2 not ng . hi i i n t r i i Is t s someth ng l ke an encou e w th noth ng, a pre . logical nothing rooted in the very way we are and makin g

41 bo e - See a . 2 8 v , pp 9 ‘ 3 a s ist Meta i 2 W pbys kfi p . 3 . 44 M A RT I N H E I D E G G E R

i i i ? r n poss ble log cal negat on Fu thermore, whe one talks of an ” i hin i n o t e encounter w th not g , th s does mean just that ther has been no encounter at all . The nothing that is encountered is “ ’ ’ ai so methin fi o r i cert nly not a g an Object . In He degger s way i hi is of express ng the matter, the not ng not even apprehended, is but it is manifest . It manifest not as alongside the beings o r di i in if in s it ad t onal to them, but and through them, as a sen e o f O i i s i . if were a con t tuent them bv ously, we th nk of the matter fo r n i mi i a a moment, all fi te and deter nate be ngs are wh t they t i are only to the ex ent that we can recogn ze what they are not . Pure undifferentiated Being would act ually be indistinguishable is nihilatio o e from sheer nothing . It the n f th nothing that is i i asein i i as i sa d to br ng D face to face w th the be ngs be ngs . it is in o f hi In other words , only aga st the background not ng s A i i i that anyt hing stands out as something that i . ga nst th s fo l i i o f i tbere is s ometbin . noth ng, we not ce the wonder that g He degger reformulates the ancient dictum ex nibilo nibil fit as ex nibila “ a t 4 3 His u i omne ens qn ens fi . lect re ends w th the question Why i i be ngs at all, rather than just noth ng The questions and objections that spring to mind as Heidegger unfolds his lecture o n nothing are dealt with in the later post i S i i his i i scr pt . pec fically, he faces three object ons , and d scuss on Of these goes far toward clarifying the lecture itself and toward showing how it anticipates the later developments of his philosophy . The first objection is that the lecture presents us with an i i i hi o f t un mitigated n h l sm . It makes not ng the theme me a physics an d seems to exalt it to a key position . It even seems to be i m o f i iff suggested that everyth ng becomes a atter nd erence , so r i i that it hardly matters whether o ne lives o d es . But He degger ihili i i . n strongly contests such an nterpretat on The true sm, he i s is i Of i t i nl r cla m , the forgett ng Be ng hat a ms o y at the maste y f i “ i ” i i o . h be ngs For the not ng of wh ch He degger talks , the “ ” hi i is i i s not ng else wh ch of no nterest to the sc ences , turn

0 3 i O . t . . 0 c . p , p 4 T H O U G H T 4 5

i out to be nothing less than Be ng . We have been clear from the in i “4 i i i i beg n ng that Be ng cannot be cons dered as tself a be ng, hi i is i o f i is somet ng wh ch therefore , from the po nt v ew that i in is hi i nterested only what , and not ng else , Be ng belongs to ’ in i i i i the nothing else . Just as death He degger s ex stent al analys s o n i i i i i took a pos t ve role as the factor wh ch ntegrates ex stence , “ ” so in hi s metaphysic nothin g is not sheerly negative but i i is - ti likewise plays a pos t ve role . It the non en ty which never t heless i it it is i has more be ng than any ent y, for the Be ng that i in ir hi t i i comes before every ent ty and v tue of w ch any en ty s . “ ” i is i it is tra nscendens Be ng wholly other to the be ngs , the i i i Yet that cannot fall under the categor es appl cable to be ngs . it is i it is b ein ful all so far from be ng nugatory that the most g of . A second Objection allege s that by giving an important place in the analysis to the mood o f anxiet y and the expectation o f i i death, the whole argument has a morb d subject ve character . i - i It may appeal to the neurot c, but hardly to the healthy m nded . This kind o f objection is o ne that already came to o u r notice when we considered at an earlier stage the claim that anxiety is si ff 4 5 o e the ba c a ective state . We saw then that n would need to be strong- minded rather than timorous to endure a genuine i i . in o f ontolog cal anx ety But the context the present argument, Heidegger develops the notion o f anxiety further by relating it t o the sense o f awe aroused when man becomes aware of the “ o f i — o f i mystery Be ng that wonder all wonders , that the be ngs ” 4 6 are.

i a is the i i F n lly, there object on that log c has been abandoned, in it i and there has been put s place a ph losophy of feeling . To his cti those who find t Obje on cogent, then perhaps the whole of Heidegger’s philosophy will seem problematical and an offence ai s ag n t the canons of logic and ordinary commonsense . Yet if we accept that a philosophy o f Being mu st be built o n the basis Of o u r total confrontation with Being o r o u r total pa rtici

4 4 Se ab o e e . v , p 4 45 See ab o e 2 v , p . 9 ‘ 6 O cit - 6 . p. . , pp . 4 7 4 6 M A RT I N H E I D E G G E R

ri in i o f i i t hen it pa on Be ng, throughout the range our ex st ng, m ay not seem so strange that this kind o f philosophizing will burst o ut o f the logic that applies in o ur thinking about objects i ’ within the world . We m ght even come to accept Heidegger s claim that the logical idea Of negation itself is made possible only through a more immediate and preconceptual awareness “ ” in s i o f i . is i the noth ng But any ca e, He degger not abandon ng i A i o f i ifi i i is i log c . lthough the log c sc ent c nqu ry not appropr ate i i i i i i it s o wn i to ontolog cal nqu ry, th s nqu ry has log c, and Heidegger does in fact offer a description o f the thinking that is t i s peculiar to i . The not on that there i a plurality o f logics and that all languages do n o t conform to the same criteria is nowadays a commonplace . Ho w then does Heidegger describe the thinking that is appropriate to the understanding o f Being We get a clue first o f all from the distinction which he makes between this thinking (which he will call “primordial” or “ essential” thinking) “ ” and the calculative thinking that is characteristic Of the i o f o ur i i i in C u i sc ences and everyday act v t es the world . alc lat ve e tifie s is i thinking Obj c and breaks up the whole . It d rected i o i hi toward the handl ng and mastery f the things w t n the world . s o f i i is i i n ot It i , course, a th nk ng that concerned w th be ngs , S i i i l it is with Being . omet mes He degger w ll hard y allow that hi is hi i is i t thinking at all . T s the t nk ng that typ cal of the echno i it is i of i i log cal age , and presumably the k nd th nk ng that may i i fo r hi i be ncreas ngly done us by mac nes , just as mach nes have already relieved us o f the drudgeries o f heavy manual labour . “ ” We have already made acquaintance with repet itive hi i i i i hi i t nk ng, the k nd that enters nto some authent c stor cal “ - r i possibility and makes present its disclosure fo o ur own t me . Thi i i i i i i i o f i s repet t ve th nk ng m ght be a th nk ng Be ng, and indeed it is precisely such a thinking o f Being that Heidegger in - S i i is di sought the pre ocrat cs . In such cases , Be ng me ated B ut through the historical possibility that gets repeated .

‘ 7 See a o e . 8 . b v , p 3 T H O U G H T 4 7

primordial o r essential thinking seems to be more direct

i i hi i . i i i than even repet t ve t nk ng It has the same pass ve, med tat ve — it is hi i i di i c character a t nk ng that l stens , as st n t from the - i o f ul i hi . in i i di hi i busy ness calc at ve t nk ng But th s pr mor al t nk ng, it would seem that the historical intermediary is no longer i P i i i i is i o f requ red . r mord al th nk ng sa d to be an occurrence i i i in i . i Be ng the person who th nks In such th nk ng, Be ng has i is r i i i i . o the n t at ve Fragmentar ness overcome, and the / truth i is i l unveiledness Of Be ng preserved . He degger sees a para lel to this primordial thinking in the composing of the poet and in Hi s i i the thanking of the religious devotee . deep apprec at on o f i H l e rlin i l - i o f O d s . The s poetry, espec ally that , we l known poet i in his i i o f it i i recept ve nterpretat on the world . He lets mp nge

him in it . upon , and stands an openness to A re we then to think that Heidegger abandons phil osophy in i i ? C ainl order to jo n the poets and the myst cs ert y, he sees a parallel between the philosophical quest fo r Being and the work

o f i i i i . poets and myst cs , but he does not s mply dent fy them Presumably the difference between the primordial thinking of the philosopher and the composing o f the poet is that the i l il former st l seeks conceptual structures , wh e the latter employs i i i . evocat ve mages . Both, however, are concerned w th language Perhaps this last point serves in turn to differentiate the philo o f i i i i sopher Be ng from the myst c . He degger does ndeed use a i- i i i i i . quas myst cal and rel g ous language The pass ve, recept ve thinkin g which he advocates fo r the philosopher is called by “ “ ” him o r 4 8 abandonment releasement , a word that was used by Meister John Eckhart and that has a long his tory in Christian i i i w i i i i o f sp r tual ty . But hereas the myst c may claim a d rect v s on i hi o f i i o ne God, He degger t nks the encounter w th Be ng as i i i s i i that is med ated through language . He degger very ns stent that lan guage is not something that man invents . It is as much a “ r o f pa t environing Being as is nature and its phenomena . The ’ iff i s nl i d erence o y that the latter, the power that is man s env ron

See e ll h Ande o n and s ecia i Dis se bi tr o hn M . rs s cour on T nk m . p y g, J Freund Ne Yo r Ha r Ro w w . e r ( k p , 4 8 MA R T IN H E I D E G G E R

i i inflames him hi i ment, susta ns , dr ves , , w le the former re gns i i him i i i w th n as the power wh ch he, as the be ng wh ch he ’ ” i hi 4 9 his i s . o n h mself , must take upon mself In essay ni 5 ° i iff i hi s i i huma sm, He degger sharply d erent ates pos t on from that o f French existentialists such as Sartre who think o f man as o f i is the measure all th ngs . Man rather understood as the i i i i i part cular be ng to whom Be ng commun cates tself, and “ ” is i o f language understood as the house Of Be ng . In some i ’ i i i He degger s late essays , he seems to come near to dent fy ng

i . At n o w u language and Be ng least, he says about lang age what m i i . i he formerly sa d about Be ng It s language itself that speaks . ” o is The essence f language the language of essence . Much of this teaching seems like a reversal of the doctrines o f Bein and Time o f i i g , and, course, we do ndeed here meet w th “ ” the so - called later Heidegger in all hi s elusiveness and para as ein hi i i do xicality . The human D w ch began by ask ng quest ons about Being now stands before Being and receives answers — o r i is perhaps just wa ts for answers . Truth now understood as the t i - be o f is i dis i of le t ng what , rather than as the act ve cover ng a ei N i i what is by the D s n. ature is an emerg ng presence reveal ng i i o r opening itself to man . He degger ndeed claims that the ‘ ‘ ” fo r b sis i in i Greek word nature, p y , or g ally meant emerg ng i it i bainomenon and he tr es to connect also w th p , appearance H o w well- founded o r ill-founded such etymological specula tions may be is a question that can be left to the classical i i philologist to decide . But th s style of argument in He degger “ illustrates what he means by calling language the house o f i ” Be ng . is o f i i It clear too that these ways talk ng about Be ng, truth, i i o f language, nature, open up d mens ons the world that were in Bein a nd Time i left concealed when, g , the world was descr bed i i i ni as an nstrumental system, art culated by the s g ficance pro ’ e e it as i hi j ct d upon by D e n s pract ical concerns . But t s does not

49 A I trod tio to Meta b si s n n uc n c . 1 6. p y , p 5 5° ' Brie u ber de Huma nismus ' Kl t rm Fran furt - -Main n . o s e ann am : f ( , k 51 z Unter n e s ar S racbe Nes e Pfullin en : . 1 2 . g g p ( k , g p

50 M A R T I N H E I D E G G E R

i i i it i o f rem n scent of negat ve theology, as tr es to talk the mystery d o f G o . i is Be ng, as we have already learned, the absolute t 53 ranscendons and the wholly other . But just as no theology is ’ i i so i n Of content to rema n purely negat ve, He degger s accou t i i ffi i i i in i Be ng ntroduces more a rmat ve not ons , albe t an elus ve ti S i and evoca ve fashion . ome Of these not ons come from etym ological considerations concerning the various Indo “ i ” i i “ i ” European roots that express be ng . Thus deas l ke dwell ng , “ ” “ ” i i i i o f i . emerg ng , presence g ve h nts the mean ng of Be ng Other notions are derived from such traditional contrasts as i i o r e i and those between Be ng and becom ng, between B ng A s i i it i is i i i appearance . He degger th nks of , Be ng ndeed d st nct i i i is from becom ng, but ncludes becom ng, and thus not a i n B i o f in o f t he stat c, eter al e ng, but has to be thought terms i i i i is dis i temporal hor zon ; l kew se , Be ng t nct from appearance , is hi is m yet not ng apart from what appears , and so not so e “ ” hi -in - i l ki And t ng tse f lur ng behind the phenomena . perhaps this i s as far as o n e can go in the elucidation Of the meaning o f

Being . An d o f r i i what man, the pa t cular be ng from whom the inquiry set out If it appeared at first that man was to be ma de hi thi is i i the measure of all t ngs , s trend reversed by the d alect c hi al i ni u w ch fin ly subjects man t o Being . Man rema ns u q e as the i i o f . ex stent, the place openness among all the be ngs But the notion of autonomous man yields to the notion of man as the o i i is resp ns ble steward, and perhaps th s by far the more mature o i i n t on, and one that has great relevance as technolog cal man increasingly subjects the world to his control and has its re u sources more and more at hi s disposal . Is he the absol te is o ne i i s master, or he rather the to whom Be ng has grac ou ly entrusted itself and o n whom it has conferred an almost ’ frightening responsibility Heidegger s answer is clearly given “ ” 5 4 Man is o f i is o f i not the lord be ngs . Man the shepherd Be ng

53 See a bo e . v , p 4 5 5‘ Bri ber den Hnm i s 2 u an smn . ef , p . 9 3

Significancc

befo re u s i i ow that we have \ an expos t on of the main i ’ hi themes of He degger s p losophy, we must ask about his significance and try to justify what was simply “ i i i o f hi : asserted r ght at the beg nn ng t s book that, by any s r i i tandard, Ma t n He degger must be reckoned among the greatest and most creative philosophers o f the twentieth ” t 55 cen ury . ’ Perhaps the first thing to say about Heidegger s significance is that he shows us the possibility o f a philosophy which is thoroughly contemporary and yet which does n o t shirk the i il hi i is - i tradit onal ph osop cal problems . He degger post Kant an -Ni u i in his and post etzschean, not j st chronolog cally but

i i Old - t i th nk ng . He has overcome the s yle metaphys cs , but he a i o f i i i if has not f llen nto the error pos t v sm, as that were the nl fo r i is o y way left Western ph losophy . It true that he renounces i i i etern ty and or ents hi s ph losophy to time and history . He abolishes any supposed invisible world be hind the world o f i s i phenomena . He replaces God w th Being . He sub t tutes for stable substances and essences the flui d categories of existence . in hi e ni i Yet all t s he finds a wholeness and m a ng, a k nd of int rmsm i transcendence, that rescues the world from the absurd ty o r triviality that characterizes a mere coming-into- being and i - ut - - pass ng O of bein g . But ho w does he do this ? He does it by attempting to shift rti - i o e i o f the sta ng po nt f philosophy . Th ph losophy the object in i i i a i is is ends up pos t v sm, yet the lternat ve to th not sheer i hi i subject vism . The p losophy of ex stence attempts to overcome

55 See abo e . 1 v , p 52 MA R T I N H E I D E G G E R

- i i i i the subject object split . It beg ns from concrete part c pat on in no t i i the world, from e ther observat on of the phenomena “ ” outside o f us o r from introspective investigation o f our o wn i is i i i in minds . We know that He degger not an ex stent al st the his i ir i narrow sense, for nterest has always been d ected to Be ng . Yet this should not blin d us to the ext raordinary contribution that he has made to ophers who have little ’ use for Heidegger s ontology acknowledge the value o f his i i t i in i it ex stent al analy c . For stance, Marjor e Grene has wr ten “ If we leave o ut of consideration the religious problems raised i i hi ri i of i i is by K erkegaard, the ph losop cal cont but on ex stent al m ’ was most purely and intensely formulated in Heidegger s in a Tim s a Be nd e. A o f Bein nd Time g the author g , therefore , Heidegger occupies a unique place in the intellectual history of ” o u r i 5 3 t me . i m hi s We have seen, of course, that He degger moves fro existentialist starting-point into ontological reflections that i may seem far removed from it . Many ph losophers are doubtful ’ i i of i o ur about the s gn ficance He degger s later work, though o wn view has been that the earlier and later work constitute a unity and reflect a dialectic that is intrinsic to the ques tion o f i Be ng . di u i o f i ni o f his a The sc ss on the s g ficance work, both e rly n ni ni i and late, may be co ve ently orga zed around four top cs ( 1 ) the doctrine of man ; (2 ) the problems of language and ti hermeneu cs (3 ) thinking (4) the notion of Bein g . 1 i i i o f i t ( ) We beg n w th the doctr ne man, espec ally as set for h in Bein a i i g nd Time. He degger radically departs from such trad tio n al notions as the substantial soul and the essentialist under in of i stand g human nature . Ex stence takes precedence over is in m hi i essence, and man to be understood te poral and stor cal a u m i i terms . Yet Heidegger equally eschews p rely e p r cal t o i i approach the quest on o f man . The metaphys cal self or soul o f i i di i is i is n o t the ph losoph cal tra t on set as de, but the self

56 ar tin Heide er in the se rie s Studies in Mo de rn Eu ro ean ite ratu re gg , p L ” an d - o u ht B o wes B o wes o ndo n . 1 1 1 2 . g ( , L , pp S I G N I F I C A N C E 5;

is i i i in d solved nto a success on of exper ences , as happened the i ’ hi philosophy o f Hume . He degger s remarkable ac evement is to have provided an account o f man that bursts out o f the o ld i i i ti metaphys cal categor es , and yet that st ll does jus ce to the i i o sp ritual (existential) constitut on f man as a person . This understanding of man is neither metaphysical nor t i i it i i na ural st c , and demands to be cons dered alongs de i ni i i Freud a sm, Marx sm and whatever other understand ngs of ’ m ni i i man co pete for recog t on today . It may be that He degger s existential interpretation o f man is the o ne that will best safeguard what is distinctively human and protect this against the thr eat m i of dehu an zation . Of all the views o f man that have been current in the West perhaps it is the Chr istian doctrine o f man that stands nearest ’ s is i i to Heidegger . It surely no acc dent that He degger finds common ground in hi s analysis o f existence with such Christian

A i i . i St . th nkers as ugust ne, Luther and K erkegaard The “ i i i o r ex istentia lia i He degger an categor es , , rather, , such as poss ” “ ” “ ” “ ” bilit i i i i - - s y , fact c ty , fall ng , be ng toward death and other express in a modern idiom insights into man that can be found in i in i the B ble, though there they get expressed the ant quated i n e i i . Fo r nfi i o f hi o term nology of an earl er t me co rmat on t s , ’ ’ t P may compare Heidegger s existential analyt ic with S . aul s o f n i i r way u derstand ng man, as th s has been set fo th by 5 7 Bultmann . N to i iff eedless say, there are very cons derable d erences too ’ i o f C i i i between He degger s account man and the hr st an doctr ne , o ne o f i i i i i i and must be aware mak ng overs mpl fied dent ficat ons , ’ fo r i s i o f li n tance , between He degger s concept fal ng and the i i i l 5 8 B i and Time o f . i in e n b bl cal dea of a fa l man Espec ally g , man seems to be represented as havin g an autonomy that would be hard to reconcile with such biblical doctrines as those o f

57 ‘ be lo ew Test me t t n G r SCM Pre ss Cf . T o o tbe N a n r Ke dric o be l gy f , . k , n do n - l . e e iall I z 6 o vo I s c . 0 . L , p y pp 9 9 58 ’ th A M P o ndo n Cf. e re sent write r s n Ex istentia list Tbeolo SC re ss p gy ( , L 1 00- 1 1 pp . 1 . 54 MA R T I N H E I D E G G E R

i i hi S creat on and redempt on, and w ch artre and others can be fo r i i i i excused hav ng nterpreted as a thoroughgo ng human sm, o f ni with man as the creator all mea ng and value . But the later i i i i i i o f ni a n d wr t ngs br ng the expl c t reject on such a huma sm, we ’ have seen that man s position is represented as that o f a steward o f i is rather than that a master, and clearly th s much closer to the d Christian understan ing . ’ 2 n o w i i ( ) We turn to our second top c, He degger s treatment f i i o ne o f o . the problem language and hermeneut cs Here aga n, has to take account o f the different emphases found in the earlier i i and later wr t ngs . Bein a nd Time i in In g , what seems to be mportant the treatment o f language (o r discourse) 59 is the insistence that it be under r tia N i i stood as a human phenomenon o an ex isten le. atural st c j accounts e f language have concentrated att ention o n the question o f how language refers to things and events in the inl hi is o ne di i o f . C r a world e t y t s mens on language, but there di i it is t o Bein and are other mens ons as well, and these that g i Time di o ur vi . rects ew In language, man expresses h mself, is his o wn i - in - - i i that to say, be ng the world ; and l kew se he ni i t i ni i commu cates w th the o her . Express ng and commu cat ng i is e i i are just as essent al to language as r ferr ng, but express ng and communicating have a distinctly human and existential i i i i t i character . He degger correlates language analys s w th ex sten al i i is r inl o f i analys s , and th s ce ta y a more concrete way tak ng ne i i language than o finds in abstract log cal analys s . The later ’ Wittgenstein seems to have moved in the direction o f Heidegger s concreteness when he insisted o n setting language in it s living context and when indeed he went so far as to call language “ a form o f i o f In any case, to understand language as the express on existence is to allow fo r possibilities o f interpretation which are ruled o ut where empirical referring is taken to be the

59 Se abo 2 e e . v , p 5 6° P iloso biml Investi a ti s tr G E M o m e Blac ell Oxfo rd on . . . . Ansc w b p g , b ( k , 1 6 p . 9 S I GN I F I C A N C E 55

o i i i standard function f language . It makes poss ble the ex stent al i i o f t i nterpretat on such language forms as my h, wh ch appears to be fantastic if we take it s statements as objective empirical i i b ut i propos t ons , wh ch can make very good sense when these ’ same statements are interpreted as expressions o f man s di - i i understan ng . The best known example of such ex stent al ’ interpretation is Bultmann s demyt hologizing o f the Ne w in o f i is i i Testament, the course wh ch he able to nfuse new l fe i i i i and mean ng nto such not ons as eschatology, by translat ng t hese o ut o f the archaic Objectifying language o f myt h into an o f s - in A i l existential language elf understand g . nother good l us st ratio n o f this kind o f existential interpretation is provided by ’ i i in o i i it Hans Jonas br ll ant work the field f Gnost c sm . But ’ might be worthwhile posing the question whether Bultmann s ’ use o f Heidegger s philosophy as an interpretative tool could have been successful unless there had been, as we have suggested, ’ a n affinity between Heidegger s understanding o f human existence and the biblical doctrine of man and likewise whether ’ Jonas use ofthe Heideggerian concepts was n o t made possible by f ni t i i i ' 1 the even closer a fi ty be ween ex stential sm and Gnost cism . ’ Heidegger s later thoughts o n language and hermeneutics shift attention away from the existential characteristics o f o f i i i i language . Instead ns st ng that man expresses h mself a u n i l o r l ng age, we are told that la guage tse f speaks , that language is i i i the vo ce of Be ng . Interpretat on demands that we be open o f i i ial to the address Be ng, rather than that we attempt an ex stent s i o f is i i tran lat on what sa d . It follows that the hermeneut c rules which one might lay down fo r demythologizing are inadequate i is ni i i o f i ti i to th s l te ng, pass ve k nd nterpreta on, wh ch could u l S i i is hardly be form ated in rules at all . uch nterpretat on not m s i o r eba rismo . so uch a c ence as an art, perhaps even a The ’ significance of this shift in Heidegger s thought is that it makes room fo r the notion o f interpretation that o ne finds in Karl ’ r i Ba th . There are some remarkable parallels between He degger s

61 o n as him se lf ha an in t r tin di i n o f e o in t See Toe J s e e s g scuss o th p . eli i ea P t 2 0- 1 nosti R B ditio . G c on co n re ss B o s o n : and e n . g ( , , pp 3 56 MA R T I N H E I D E G G E R

’ teaching o n language as the voice o f Be ing and Barth s co nce p

he Word o f God . But in so far as both styles of interpret ation are embrace d ’ i i i i i m a i i w th n He degger s d alect c, he y be sa d to po nt to a more adequate solution to the hermeneu tical problem than either ’

l o r . i i i s Bu tmann Barth, taken separately He degger s solut on l e o f h i s iz i t e beyond both t ese theolog ans , and ynthes es the r t e i i spe c iv ns ghts . (3 ) The remarks o n langu age and interpretation lead straight ’ i t o u r hi i i hi i i i h n o t rd top c, He degger s account of t nk ng . He nr c ’ Ott has indeed made use of Heidegger s concept o f thinking for precisely the purpose o f bridging the gulf between Barth a n d ul 6 2 B tmann . ’ Let us remind ourselves o f the m ain point i n Heidegge r s A u di i is s i view o f thinking . ltho gh he st ngu hes everal k nds of i i i is i hi i th nk ng, the pr mary contrast between calculat ve t nk ng C i hi i has i and primordial thinking . alculat ve t nk ng to do w th s din i i li i i s under tan g, pred ct ng and control ng emp r cal event , a P i di i i t and it has an active char cter . r mor al th nk ng reflec s on ’ i o n i i i e Be ng rather than the be ngs , and has a recept ve , pass v character . ’ i i i t i i o f To some cr t cs , has seemed that He degger s exaltat on primordial thinking and hi s corresponding depreciation o f calculative thinking amount to a rejection o f sci ence and tech n o lo i i i gy, and even to an rrespons ble w thdrawal from the l di i factica i r . con t ons of the twent eth centu y To some extent , h i i s i i i his t is cr t cism may be ju t fied . Yet He degger may cla m

ifi i t o o His is i . n just cat on . role almost a prophet c one The tech o logical era has so many uncritical admirers an d has awakened so many hopes that may never be realized that we need the critic who will point o ut it s limitations and it s ambiguities if it mi i o f i in m and how, pro ses enr chment human l fe so e i it di a im s i i i in . d en ons , threatens d m nut on others The extraor n ry thing about Heidegger is that he accomplishes thi s critique not

611 Cf . D enken and S ein E an elischer ' erla Zo lli o n ( v g g , k

58 MA R T I N H E I D E G G E R

a i it . U i hi ti the sts , and renders obsolete p to a po nt, t s observa on i is a t o is correct . If the the st t ken mean that there exists a being o f r i t i i i hi possessed ce ta n at r butes and the athe st den es t s , then ’ s uch a dispute has n o place in Heidegger 3 philosophy and has is i i i been superseded . It s gn ficant that he h mself is unwilling i i r i i to be called either the st c o athe st c . The dispute over the e xistence o r n o n - existence of the substantial God has been left i i i o f beh nd w th the metaphys cal concept substance itself. Yet the question is not so simple as to be answered simply by i i -oersns - i di say ng that the the sm athe sm spute has been overcome . i i i it di in e We have seen that Be ng, as He degger conce ves , has v i i i t i . i i a tr butes Where Be ng tself can be cons dered so d v ne,

a n i i u . it is y add t onal God has become superfl ous But then, possible to conceive Being without divine attributes— Being as a i i in S i it di l en and oppress ve, as fact artre conce ves . The spute between the theist and the atheist has n o t so much been over i i il c ome as shifted nto a new conceptual ty . There are st l the i i i i : i is i i o f two poss b l t es that Be ng d v ne, worthy trust and i c hi o r i is i iff . onfidence and wors p that Be ng al en and nd erent) An d il i i men w l st ll scan the world, look ng for patterns and ill n e i r clues that w support o nte pretation or the other . The i i i S i i i He degger an v ew, the artrean v ew, the Marx st v ew, the i i C i i i — Freud an v ew, the hr st an v ew these all read the character o f i in diff a it il ll Be ng erent w ys , and st l makes sense to ca some i i i i o f these ways the st c and some of them athe st c . Perhaps the theism (and theology) of the fut ure will more a nd more operate with a conception o f G o d not unlike ’ i s i o f i n o t m He degger concept on Be ng . I do ean that such i o f i x i it i i concept ons God w ll be e pl c ly der ved from He degger, a i u is i but th t, as far as the r formal struct re concerned, they w ll h i A it . ave a fam ly resemblance , as were lready we have had a powerful exposition o f s u ch an idea o f G o d in the philosophical the ology o f Pau l Tillich and have been able to j u dge from hi s w o rk e s o m ething o f the possibilities of such an idea of God for e xpressing and articu lating the Christian faith in contemporary t m s er . S I G N I F I C A N C E 59

If theism is nowadays to be understood in the ma nner that I ’ h i i u o ne i i ave nd cated, then wo ld say that He degger s ph losophy i s i i ? P it is if i s o f the st c erhaps , he regards Be ng as the ource S o n i . mean ng and grace artre, the other hand, would be the t i if i i o f i rue athe st, he regards Be ng as devo d mean ng and grace s o that m an has to create his own meanings and values in an is n o t i indifferent environment . But clearly there just a s mple dichotomy between theism and atheism . There seem to be i i i i in i ntermed ate pos t ons , just as the past there were var ous P kin ds of theism with their corresponding atheisms . erhaps Heidegger (as he himself woul d seem to suggest) stands some i u w . here between the two camps The Marx st, too, wo ld present a n intermediate case in so far as he believes in a dialectic o f i i o f i in h story, he acknowledges an object ve ground mean ng t he i i is way th ngs are , and does not accept that Be ng absurd or c r i hi s o wn i ti ompletely amo phous (extreme athe sm), yet fatal s c i un belief would hardly qualify as the sm . I would myself be i in i i i o r i w ll g to call He degger e ther a the st an athe st, and I h ti r i t o hi i ave men oned the Ma x st strengthen t s po nt . It seems to me there is little sense in saying (as we sometimes hear it s aid) t hat the existentialist o r the Marxist is a theist at heart o r an anonymous Christian o r whatever phrase may be used ; or c onversely that a modern theologian like Tillich is really an a i S o i t nl i diff the st . uch ways f talk ng n o o y blur genu ne erences i i but mpugn the ntegrity of the persons concerned . I do not think we need be in the least surprised that o u r discussion of the significan ce o f Heidegger has turned largely o n i i A i hi o ut theolog cal quest ons . ph losophy w ch sets from ’ ’ man s quest for Being and ends up by talking o f Being s con d i man is i i i escens on to clearly a rel g ous ph losophy, however f ar it s iff i al i concepts may d er from those of tradit on metaphys cs . ’ I have tried to show elsewhere 6 3 that Heidegger s ideas provide t he framework for the construction of a foundational theology t hat might carry the weight once placed upon the now

“3 P rinci les o Cbristion Tbeolo Scribner New Yo r : 1 66 and p f gy ( , k 9 , S CMPre ss o ndo n : . ff , L p 3 9 . 6o MA R T I N H E I D E G G ER

i discredited natural theology . Yet I th nk one woul d also have to say that Heidegger’s philosophy can stand by itself as an inde o f i i i i C i i pendent system bel ef wh ch m ght be a r val to hr st anity . r i h as ffini i C i i i e t a It ce ta nly a t es to hr st an fa th, and y , as alre dy i di it ffini i i i n cated, has perhaps even closer a t es to Gnost c sm . n o t i i i i I do bel eve , as some people cla m, that we are com ng nto i i R i i is an age o f no rel g on at all . el g on too much an intrinsic it m fo r part of what means to be hu an that . But I do wonder i whether we are perhaps com ng into an age when, among some i i i ill i i people at least, pr vate rel g ons w ncreas ngly oust the i i i i i ’5 traditional dogmat c and nst tut onal forms . He degger philosophy could be considered as an attempt to work out a u o i contemporary faith O tside f the tradit onal forms o f belief . is i o n e In any case, we have to acknowledge th ph losophy as o f the most significant attempts in our century to explore and vindicate the spiritual dimensions of human life in face of the threats that confront them . Glosso ty

A liena tion is the condition o f being diverted genuine

possibilities o f existence .

A nx ie is i ff t o i n ty held to be the bas c a ect , and reveals the ex ste t his i finit u e rad cal d .

A uthenticity is attained when the existen t takes hold o f the di i o f his o wn i in inoutbentic i rect on l fe, whereas an ex stence, i i i fo r him x th s d rection s determined by e ternal factors .

Bein i i in i o f g s an amb guous word Engl sh . When we talk “ ” “ ” i o r o f i t i a be ng the be ngs , we can mean any h ng at all “ ” is: h i im that w en we talk of Be ng s ply, we mean that t i in in in i o f hi charac er exempl fied all the be gs , v rtue w ch r they a c a nd stand o ut from nothing .

Ca re is i i i i o f i sa d to be the bas c const tut on human ex stence ,

f t o f i i it i it li . and has a three old struc ure poss b l y, fact c y and fal ng

Concern is o ur relation to things (n o t persons) ins ofar as this

i ms i i i . takes such act ve for as us ng, handl ng, produc ng, etc

Eoetj dqyness is the routine m ode o f existen ce in which we move

‘ from o ne task to the next in accordan ce with habit and i convent on .

Ex istence i u hi t . Th s word was traditionally sed o f anyt ng wha i s i i i i i ever that , but in He degger and other ex stent al st wr ters , is i i i the word restr cted to the human ex stent . Th s does not im it o n r o f i s ply any unreal y the pa t other be ng , but draws attention to the fact that the human being stands o ut (ex sists) a s the only being that is open to and responsible fo r 62 G L O S S A R Y

t i i as i i is . S e n what m larly, the German word D , usually left s in i i i s i i l fo r untran lated Engl sh wr t ng , trad t onal y stood any i o f i is i in i k nd ex stence , but restr cted He degger to the human i i “ ” i . Of i ex stent the adject ves der ved from ex stence , tential s i t s o f i refer to the un versal struc ure human ex stence , i ex istentiell ni a i i wh le refers to the u que , p rt cular ex stent .

Facticity denotes all these elements in a human existence that

si i s . are mply g ven , not cho en

i i i Fallenness is the cond tion of be ng al enated and scattered .

t e t u is ai o t lo ieiil On ology is th s dy o f Being . Man s d to be n o g au if n i i i i h as bec se , even he ever expl c tly stud es Be ng, he to i his i in i dec de about own be ng the very act o f ex stin g .

Pbenomenolo is i i i hi gy a ph losoph cal method, character zed c efly by careful an alytic description of that which shows itself (the

phenomenon) .

’ P ossibilit in i n o t y , He degger s thought, does mean j ust any i m a r cont ngency that y happen, but refers to the open futu e a a i fo r which the D sein c n dec de .

Proj ecting is the activity by which the Dasein throws itself i i forward into it s poss bil ties .

Significa nce is acquired by things as they are incorporated into a o a the instrument l world f D sein.

Tem ora li i it s di i o f t is p ty, w th mens ons past, present and fu ure ,

the most basic characteristic o f human existence .

Tbron/nness is i i o f i in i the cond t on find ng oneself a world, w th “ o ut knowing where o ne has come from o r where one i s i go ng .

62

u nt ranslat i kind o f e x

existent . tential ref while cx ii

Facticity de i are simpl

Fallenness is

Ontology is u beca se, decide al

Plyenomenoll careful phenom

ibili Poss ty, c o ntin g u fo r whi

Proj ecting fo rwart

the m 1

Tbron/nne

o ut k

going .

The bo o ks in this se rie s a re de signe d to intro du e a me n to t e o o ia ns c l y h l g ,g who do mina te Christia n tho ught o C mbinin bre vit it t da y . o g y w h de t a nd im i it wit s o a rs i p h s pl c y h ch l h p, the y help me n a nd wo me n co me to g rips with tre nds in co nte mpo ra ry o the ol gy .

DR JOHN MAC UARRIE fo rme r . ' , ly a lecture r in the Unive rsity o f G a s ow is no w Pro fe sso r o f l g , Syste ma tic The olo gy a t Unio n

The o logica l Se mina ry in Ne w Yo rk. ' He tra nsla te d He ide gge r s Be ing and Time i w , a nd ha s wr tte n T e ntie th Ce ntury Re ligio us Tho ught a s we ll as ma ny o the r bo o ks de a ling pa rticulaw with e xiste ntia lism a nd I o iz i demythol g ng .