Moodie 3

The Iran-Contra Affair An Interview with Dr. David Abshire

By William Moodie

Alexando^ Hai^t

February 12.2007 Moodie 4

Statement of Purpose

United States presidents face challenges on a daily basis and they are forced to

make decisions regarding a multitude of issues that could affect the lives of millions of

people. President Ronald Reagan faced one of these challenges during the second term of his presidency when he was confronted with news that his administration had covered up

illegal procedures regarding weapon sales to Iranimi terrorists and illegal funding of

Nicaraguan Contras. The purpose of this oral history project is to gain extensive

knowledge of how the President's administration hmidled the Iran-Contra scandal, through an interview with Dr. David Abshire. Interviewing Dr. Abshire, who was a key

special advisor to President Reagmi during the investigation, will provide a lesson in

civility, truth, and honesty in difficult times. Moodie 5

Biography

Dr. David Manker Abshire was bom on April 11, 1926 in Chattanooga,

Tennessee, where he lived until he was accepted at The United States Military Academy at West Point. He graduated from West Point in 1951 and then fought in the Korean War as a Company Commander. Upon returning home, he became an adjunct professor at

Georgetown University, from which he established a small non-profit organization in

1962, called the Center for Strategic mid International Studies (CSIS) (He received his doctorate in History from Georgetown University). Dr. Abshire served as an Assistant

Secretary of State for Congressional Relations from 1970 to 1973. In 1973, he was asked to become the chairman of the United States Board of International Broadcasting. During the transition of government in 1980, President Ronald Reagan asked Dr. Abshire to lead the National Security Group, which included the Central Intelligence Agency, the State and Defense Depmlments, and the U.S. Information Agency.

In 1983, Dr. Abshire was asked to become the United States' Ambassador to the

North Atlmitic Treaty Organization (NATO). He accepted and served from 1983 to 1987.

In 1987, Dr. Abshire was asked by President Reagan to become a Special Advisor to the Moodie 6

President during the investigation into the Iran-Contra scandal. Dr. Abshire, who held

Cabinet rank, was in charge of coordinating the Tower Board, the Independent Council, and the Congressional Investigating Committees, and he held authority to meet with the

President alone. After the affair. Dr. Abshire went back to CSIS and chaired the Board of

Trustees until 2005. He now runs the Center for the Study of the Presidency and the

Richard Lounsbery Foundation. He has received numerous medals and awards for his service both in the militmy mid the government, most significantly the Department of

Defense's Medal for Distinguished Public Service mid the President Citizen's Medal.

(These medals are the highest awarded to a civilimi). Dr. Abshire lives in Old Town

Alexandria, Virginia with his wife, Carolyn. He and Carolyn have five grown children. Moodie 7

What Did the President Know And When Did He Know It?

When the Iran-Contra affair exploded in 1986, twelve years after the national

nightmare of Watergate, the presidency was again in crisis. Could the country withstmid

another executive branch catastrophe? Was the United States system up to the challenge

of another scandal? The scandal of the Iran-Contra Affair erupted when news broke of an

illegal sale of military weapons to Iran in exchange for the release of hostages, the

proceeds of which went to support anti-communist Nicaraguan rebels, called Contras.

This sale to Iran was not legal, as Congress had passed laws during the Reagan

administration stating that the United States would not support countries that endorsed terrorism, and those laws prohibited arms shipments and funding. United States

government officials who supplied these arms also exceedingly overcharged for the arms,

and the excess profits were given to support the Nicmagumi Contras, despite the fact that

Congress had passed acts designed to limit the amount of money spent to fund the

Contras. These elements came together in a complex story of events that almost brought

down a president. In order to understmid the Iran-Contra affair, it is important to examine

both the history of the events in Iran mid Nicaragua, mid the events in Washington during the affair mid to gain the firsthand perspective from someone who was involved in the

event.

Historimi Lou Cminon outlines seven major elements in the Iran-Contra scandal,

as it has become known: first, the diminished political accountability of Reagan's

cabinet; second, Reagmi's anger at not being able to get United States hostages out of

Iran; third, a changing view of Iran by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) mid the

National Security Council (NSC); fourth, Israel's role in the Iran war; fifth, the Contras' Moodie 8 floundering in Nicaragua; sixth, the opportunity for U.S. profit from arms deals; and, finally, a reduced political competency of White House staff (Cannon 593). In Iran, a major shift in government had occurred in late 1979 as a revolution ousted the constitutional monarchy of Shah Mohmiimad Reza Pahlavi, which was replaced by a religious oligarchy under Ayatollah RuhoUah Khomeini. The new religious oligarchy began to try to spread its form of militant Islmii beyond Iran, through support of terrorists and challenges toward other Muslim governments, especially in the Arab world. In neighboring Iraq, a coup d'etat in 1968 had given power to the Sunni minority under

Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. This Sunni minority governed the much Imger Shiite population.

Sunni leader Saddmii Hussein took power in Iraq in 1979, and the Shiite-Sunni conflict contributed to other problems that created enormous tension between Baghdad and

Tehran. Saddam Hussein ordered a massive attack of Iraqi troops on the border meas of

Iran on September 22, 1980, in order to gain strategic resources. The war began well for

Iraq with limited resistance from the surprised Iranians. But as the Iraqis moved further into Iran, the Iranimis stmled to resist. By 1982, the Irmiians had successfully countered

Iraq's push forward and regained most of the lost land. For the remainder of the war, most fighting occurred on Iraqi territory, with occasional fighting in Iran. The war devolved into a stalemate, with Iraq entrenched in its own fortifications and Irmi sending armed "hummi waves" towards those Iraqi forces. Iran was funded and supported by

Syria, Libya, China, and North Korea during the wm, but as the war reached its critical stages in 1985 Iran's supply of arms was becoming seriously depleted.

As the Irmi-Iraq war raged, important events were happening in Central America.

With the resignation of Anastasio Somoza Garcia, dictator of Nicaragua from 1969 until Moodie 9

1979, a new wave of political fervor swept Nicmagua. The Frente Sandinista de

Liberacion Nacional (commonly referred to as Sandinistas) took over the country in 1979

with a wave of socialist reforms. The Sandinistas had been rebels against the Somoza

government, and when he resigned the Smidinistas quickly took over the government

after only a single day. The chmiges being made by the Sandinistas seemed to many to be

communist, and many miti-communist Nicaraguan citizens stmted revolting. In his

autobiography Ronald Reagan claims that communism was "a predatory system of

absolute, authoritarimi rule that had an insatiable appetite for expansion... it was against

everything Americans have stood for for more thmi two hundred years" (Reagan 471).

Having taken such a strong position against radical left movements, the Reagan

administration felt it had no choice but to act. The Reagan Administration contended that

in order for them to maintain a relationship with Nicaragua the Sandinistas must be

removed. The CIA began orgmiizing "freedom fighters" against the Smidinista

government into Contras, the term for military fighting forces funded and armed by the

United States. Not all members of Congress supported the Contras and, led by Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill, these Congressional opponents limited the amount of money the

United States could provide to the "freedom fighters" (Reagmi 477-80).

On January 20, 1985, Ronald Regan took office for his second term with over 60

percent of the populm vote and the electoral votes of 49 out of 50 states. The second term

was clearly going to be different thmi Reagan's first term almost from the moment

Reagan took office; in fact, two weeks before Reagan's second sweming-in. Cabinet

members Jim Baker and Don Regan met with the president and asked him to switch their jobs, with Regmi becoming Chief of Staff and Baker becoming Secretary of the Treasury. Moodie 10

President Reagan approved the chmige, which later would prove to be a critical mistake

in that mmiy analysts believe B^er would most likely not have gotten Reagan into the

Iran-Contra scmidal. Reagan notes in his journal, "I had no idea at the time how

significant my decision not to appoint Jim B^er as National Security Advisor.. .would

prove to be" (qtd. in Fitzgerald 233). Don Regan brought a very different style that

Reagan had not encountered before. That style enlarged Regan's power, restricted access to the president, and led to communication problems between Regan and the president

(Reagan 488).

Terrorism had also become a reason why President Reagan felt that something

had to be done to protect American civilians in the Middle East. During Jimmy Carter's

administration many terrorist orgmiizations began to increase activities, and one of the

most tragic events during his administration occurred when hostages were taken prisoner

in the United States Embassy in the Irmiian capital of Tehran and held for 444 days. They

were released during President Reagan's first inaugural ceremony. Yet, vmious groups in

Iran continued to take hostages. In order to combat these acts, on January 20, 1984, U.S.

Secretary of State George Shultz deemed Iran "a sponsor of terrorism," and three days

later many export controls were put in place to prevent United States arms going to Irmi.

Reagan reached his highest approval rating at this point in his term when he signed the

bill restricting the sale of mms to Iran. By the summer of 1984, the last year of President

Reagan's first term, Iran was desperate for weapons. But when Hezboll^, an Iranian terrorist group based in Syria, took seven hostages to try to persuade America to remove troops from the Middle East, Reagan's stance towmds terrorist states changed (Reagmi

490). According to Secretary of State George Shultz "'He [Reagan] wanted to get the Moodie 11 hostages out, and his staff people who worked with him, I believe, did exactly.. .what staff people shouldn't do. They knew he had a soft spot for hostages and they exploited it'" (qtd. in Cminon 610). The hostage crisis weighed heavily on Reagan's mind, and the men under him only made the problem worse.

Willimii Casey, head of the CIA, felt that the threat of the Cold War was advancing in the Middle East, and he longed for a stronger, more stable relationship with

Iran. He pushed Reagan mid his administration to find a new approach toward Iran. In

1985 the opportunity to do so arose. In a meeting between the U.S., Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, the Middle Eastern countries' representatives agreed to help fund Irmi if the

United States provided them with weapons (Reagan 492). Bud McFarlmie, the National

Security Advisor, met with Prince Bandar of Saudi Arabia, who promised one million dollars a month if Saudi Arabia received arms. McFarlmie was then presented with an opportunity that would be the catalyst of the Iran-Contra disaster (Cannon 386).

In a meeting with David Kimche, director of Israel's Foreign Ministry, Bud

McFarlane heard that the Israelis knew moderate Iranians who were interested in receiving arms in exchmige for negotiation for the release of the seven hostages (Cannon,

613). Lou Cannon, Reagmi's biographer, said that Reagan saw the McFarlmie-Kimche plan as "a new approach to getting the hostages out regardless of the strategic initiative in

Iran" (Cannon 613). At an ensuing meeting of the cabinet on August 6, McFarlane pitched the sale of tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) weapons to Iran, arguing that the U.S. government could deny all pmlicipation. George Shultz disagreed, calling it "a very bad idea.. .we were just falling into the arms-for hostages business and we shouldn't do it" (qtd. in Cminon 615). Jim Baker also disagreed with the plan, saying. Moodie 12

"We cannot do indirectly what we can't do directly" (qtd. in Cannon 382). Despite the disagreement within his Cabinet, Reagmi agreed to the plan, but he insisted that the

Israelis would be the ones to supply the arms and that the U.S. hostages had to be freed.

As the days passed. Bud McFarlane continued to do most of the work in dealing with the Israelis. When no hostages were released after more than 100 TOW missiles were sent, McFarlmie set up another meeting with the Israelis. When he returned he said the Israelis' demands were extremely high and it was putting the moderate Iranimis in jeopardy, so the United States decided to stop supplying the arms mid the deal for the release of hostages was off.

The President was shocked when Bud McFmlane, citing family problems, submitted his resignation on December 5, 1985. Many analysts and newspapers took his resignation at face value and accepted the reasons he gave, but as time progressed and more information became known about Iran-Contra, many suspected that McFarlane was resigning because he knew that the United States was getting too involved with weapons and hostages. Nevertheless, Reagan appointed John Poindexter as National Security

Advisor (Cannon 623). Poindexter, a graduate of the Naval Academy, quickly went to work at attempting to get the hostages back from Iran. Within the first month of being appointed, Poindexter presented the President with a memo stating that it would be easier to sell arms to Iran directly and not through Israel. Reagan agreed, noting in his journal,

"I agreed to sell TOWs to Iran" (qtd. in Cannon 638). The new plan was a disaster and provided more incentive for the kidnapping of hostages. But the United States continued to sell the arms to Irmi, despite the fact that hostages were still being taken. (As the old hostages were released, more were taken in Iran). Moodie 13

Lt. Col. Oliver North began his NSC career doing staff jobs working on Latin

American issues. But North was a hmd worker, mid he quickly worked his way through the ranks mid became a prominent member of the NSC staff (Abshire 56). Poindexter

saw an ally in North, and he saw that North could think "outside the box" on a variety of

issues. North was issued a fake passport and a secure channel on the NSC computer "in

connection with the hostages in Lebanon" (Cannon 617). When the first attempt at selling

TOWs failed. North sent Poindexter a memo saying that 3,300 TOWs and 50 HAWK

(ground launched miti-aircraft) missiles should be sold to the Irmiians in order to make them agree to release hostages. (The deal arranged for one hostage to be released after

every 300 TOWs were sold) Lt. Col. North turned to retired Air Force Major General

Richard Secord to help cmry out the plan without direct government involvement (Wall

Street Journal 12). On July 26, one hostage was released, leaving four in Hezbollah's

hmids. (Due to the varying waves of weapon sales, hostages were released, but

subsequent to that, more were captured). In total, Iran was supplied with 2,004 TOW

missiles and more than 200 spare parts of HAWK missiles (Cannon 592).

On October 5, 1986 a cargo plmie carrying mms to Nicaraguan Contras was shot

down. Documents within the plane raised suspicion of the U.S. involvement with the

arms inside the plane. President Reagan claimed that there was "no government

connection with the plane at all.. .absolutely none" (qtd. in Fitzgerald 381). But the FBI, the press, and the Customs Service investigated the crash. Attorney General Ed Meese

also appointed a committee to look at the NSC mid the Central Intelligence Agency,

especially CIA director Bill Casey.

Secord later refused to testify at the Congressional hearings and the Tower Board, invoking his Fifth Amendment rights. Moodie 14

Then Iran-Contra broke into the news. On November 3, 1986, when miother

hostage was released from Iran, a small magazine in Beirut published a story claiming that the United States had traded mms with Iran for hostages, directly contradicting the

U.S. embargo against weapons sales to countries supporting terrorism. The next day,

Poindexter released a statement claiming that "as long as Irmi advocates the use of terrorism, the United States arms embargo will continue" (qtd. in Fitzgerald 382).

Poindexter, at the smiie time, sent a note to McFarlmie assuring him that Regan would

"agree to keep his mouth shut" (qtd. in Cannon 679). After numerous stories mid

fabrications mostly crafted by North, President Reagmi addressed the nation on

November 13. He stated that, "We did not, repeat, did not trade weapons, or anything

else, for hostages, nor will we" (qtd. in Reagan 520). This statement did not help resolve the issue, as many had hoped, but rather caused more questions.

The breaking of this story caused Congress, the press, and the public to put

massive amounts of pressure upon the President. Just ten years after Watergate, this issue

could have destroyed not only Reagmi's reputation but also the institution of the

presidency as a legitimate government structure. A public poll taken after Reagan's

speech showed that 56 percent of the population thought that Reagan abandoned his

previous policies and "has been negotiating with terrorists by supplying Iran with arms"

(Cannon 685). Mmiy cabinet members, along with the first lady, Nmicy Reagan, urged

President Reagan to fire Regan, Poindexter, and Shultz. In a Washington Post article an

unnamed official said that "a White House staff shakeup is still needed to rescue what

one source called a 'decimated presidency'" (Hoffman). This shakeup was still to come. Moodie 15

What should the embattled administration do to save the presidency? Shultz

himself, in the pressure of the moment, suggested to Reagan that the President should

admit that he had made serious errors in his speech, especially in denying the initiative,

describing Israel's role, and citing Iran's relinquishing of terrorist acts (one of Reagan's

reasons for supplying Irmi with arms was that they had claimed to stopped funding terrorists) (Cannon 691). Meanwhile, Don Regan suggested setting up a bipartismi bomd

of inquiry, which was later to become the Tower Board, headed by former Texas Senator

John Tower. He also suggested bringing in a "special counselor" to help discover the

whole truth, regardless of the implications.

David Abshire, President Reagan's ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO), was brought in to be a special counselor to Reagan during the

investigation. A former Assistant Secretary of State, Abshire had served as Director of

Foreign Policy mid Defense Issues during the Reagan transition. But most important for the Reagmi administration was that he also had very good relations with key

Congressional members on both sides of the aisle. Abshire experienced the beginnings of the Iran-Contra scmidal while still at NATO and knew that most foreign countries

believed that the affair could become miother Watergate, which had led to the resignation

of President Richard Nixon. Seeking to avoid another presidential disaster, Abshire came

back to Washington with seven rules:

1) He must talk to the President before miyone else

2) He must have cabinet rank

3) A chmler must be worked out for protecting Abshire's "temii"

4) Judge Chmles Brower would be brought on to help him with legal parameters Moodie 16

5) He would need a group of "wise men" with whom to discuss the event

6) He must have strong administrative support

7) He wanted to keep his NATO ambassadorship (which he later gave up)

Meanwhile, Ed Meese, Reagan's Attorney General, and Don Regan informed the

President that one of Meese's assistants, Kenneth J. Kreig, had discovered amemo from

North to Poindexter indicating that they had diverted pmls of the Iranian weapons

payments to the Contras in Nicaragua, directly violating Congressional laws passed to

limit such support. The memo proposed the following:

Two million dollars will be used to purchase replacement TOWs for the original

508 sold by Israel to Iran for release of Benjmiiin Weir [a hostage]. This is the

only way that we found to meet our commitment to replenish stock.... $2 million

will be used to purchase critically needed supplies for the Nicaraguan Democratic

Resistance Fighters. (Qtd. in Cannon 695)

Two Congressional Committees were formed to investigate the scmidal. Reagan, taking the advice of Abshire and others, decided to waive his executive privilege, a move that

many regarded as smart to avoid similarities to the Watergate scandal's cover-up (Reagan

533).

Bill Casey and John Poindexter met on November 20 and agreed upon a false

story, crafted mostly by North, to try to divert attention away from the President. They

stated that no one knew the shipments to Iran contained arms. Furthermore, they said that

Reagan only learned about the shipments later after destroying most of the documents that implicated Reagan. Poindexter also lied to the Congressional Committees by saying that only 1,000 TOW's were sold when actually 2,004 were shipped to Iran. He also Moodie 17

stated that the United States met with the Israeli middlemen only three times when

McFarlane actually visited them more thmi five times (Cannon 680).

Reagan knew that what was happening with Iran and Nicaragua could turn out to

be another scandal as big as Watergate. Reagmi did what Abshire regarded as a noble act

by telling his cabinet, staff. Congress, and the press that the "worst thing we could do was try to cover it up" (Reagan 530). Reagan went beyond this, however, by asking for the

resignations of John Poindexter mid Lt. Col. North, essentially firing them. Reagan then took Don Regan's suggestion of a bipmtisan board of inquiry and he appointed John

Tower, Edmund Muskie, a former secretmy of state, and Brent Scowcroft, a former

National Security Advisor, to investigate the entire scandal from beginning to end. This

committee later became known as the Tower Board and was crucial to Reagmi's success.

At the first Tower Board meeting. Bud McFarlane testified that he was involved

in the Contra issue as early as February 1984, stating that "the President directed him to

help hold the Contras together 'body and soul'" (qtd. in Cannon 385). But the most

dmiiaging statements cmiie when Don Regan falsely testified that the President did not

give prior approval. He testified that Reagan only learned later that the shipments were

being sold to Iran mid that he did not know about the Contras in Nicaragua. Abshire says that the reason Don Regan made these false statements was because he truly felt that

what he was saying was correct, and he was also fervently anti-McFarlane. (Cannon 709)

The President then met with the bomd, and his testimony damaged Don Regan beyond

belief. The President stated that he knew about the first TOW shipments and that he had

authorized their sale. This discrepancy caused a stir, mid another meeting was scheduled.

After a major mistake by Reagan at the second Tower Board meeting at which he read a Moodie 18

statement that he was not supposed to read, Abshire knew that the President was not

being as honest as he could be. Abshire met with Reagmi and after much discussion with the President, Abshire suggested to the President that Reagan put down in writing that he

could not remember much about the authorization and he was being influenced by a

number of people, especially Regan, to tell their side of the story. The statement read:

Dear John,

This really should be addressed to all three of you.. .I'm trying to recall events

that happened eighteen months ago, and I am afraid that I let myself be influenced

by others recollections, not my own.... The only answer is to state that, try as I

might, I cminot recall anything whatsoever about whether I approved an Israeli

sale in advmice or whether I approved replenishment of Israeli stocks last August.

My miswer therefore and the simple truth is, 'I don't remember—period.' I'm

sorry to have made things more difficult for you and thanks for what you are

doing, (qtd. in Abshire 123)

John Tower, in his summary to the Board, stated that Reagmi truly believed what he had

been saying. He said, "If the President had been put on a polygraph test and had been

asked the question whether or not he exchanged arms for hostages, he would have

answered in the negative and would have passed the test, because he was genuinely

convinced that he had not traded arms for hostages" (qtd. in Cminon 715). This statement

helped to resolve the issue but had not cleared the air within the White House.

Don Regan's fate was sealed after the Tower Board released its statement. He had

already turned Abshire against him by insisting that he be allowed to attend Reagan-

Abshire meetings, even though Abshire had authority to meet with the President alone. Moodie 19

When the Tower Board released its statement saying that Regan "asserted personal

control over the White House mid he must bem primary responsibility for the chaos [of

Iran-Contra]" (qtd. in Cminon 729), Regan knew that his future was over as Chief of Staff

and he resigned, bearing the brunt of the Iran-Contra scmidal. Howard Baker Jr., a senator from Tennessee, Senate majority leader, and a major figure in the Congressional

investigation of the Watergate scandal, was his replacement and he quickly helped to

rebuild Reagan's reputation.

On Mmch 4, 1987, Reagmi gave mi address to the nation in which he accepted full

responsibility for Iran-Contra. In the speech, written by Reagmi, Abshire, Shultz, and

Howard Baker, Reagan spoke the truth. He said, "A few days ago, I told the American

people I did not trade arms for hostages. My heart and my best intentions tell me that was true, but the facts and the evidence tell me it is not... [and] as President I cannot escape

responsibility" (qtd. in Abshire 149). The speech turned the situation around. As New

York T/me^ journalist R.W. Apple Jr. wrote, "President Reagan spoke tonight in a spirit

of contrition that has not been heard from the White House in a quarter century" (qtd. in

Abshire 149). The scmidal started to die down, but many changes occurred in Reagan's

administration. William Casey resigned as head of the CIA, later replaced by Judge

Willimii Webster. John Poindexter, who did not testify at his own trial, was charged with

five counts of conspiracy, obstruction of Congress, and lying to Congress. Oliver North

was also chmged with three counts of obstructing Congress, destroying vital documents,

and accepting mi illegal gratuity (Cannon 591). More than 14,000 documents were

revealed, not counting the hundreds more destroyed in North's famous "shredding

pmties," (long evenings in which North and aides destroyed hundreds of documents Moodie 20

relating the President to Iran-Contra in order to "protect him.") Regan had resigned and

been replaced. Howmd Baker was now Chief of Staff and Frank Carlucci had been

appointed National Security Advisor. Vice President George Bush came away from the

scandal relatively unscathed, although many people believed at the time that he was

really involved in some way. The Wall Street Journal printed a story in which it claimed that, "he [Bush] played a significmit role in shaping Reagmi's administration policies towards both the Contras mid terrorism" (Mayer 3). Nevertheless, Bush survived

politically, and he was later elected President.

Because there is such a shroud of mystery around Iran-Contra, one cannot expect

a clear, precise definition of the facts. In the yems following the Iran-Contra scandal,

many historimis were unable to prove their theories of what had happened because

documents had been shredded or not been released. Most historians commenting on Iran-

Contra agree that the crisis should not have happened and that the fault mainly lies with

Reagan and his subordinates for a failure of character. As historian Howmd Zinn said,

[the event] illustrated the fmiiiliar governmental device of 'plausible denial,' in which the top official, shielded by subordinates, can plausibly deny involvement" (Zinn 428). But

in the years following the event, and as more information became clear, some historians

have viewed the event as a failure of the United States government system, due to the fact that the conduct of foreign policy is not equally distributed through the three branches of

government, but is Imgely a function of the executive branch. Historian Arthur

Schlesinger viewed the event as a "manifestation of a long term development" of the

failure of the executive branch not to share foreign policy m^ing with the other

branches. The event was caused by "a presidential monopoly in foreign policy Moodie 21

embolden[ing] Reagan, Poindexter, and North to play fast and loose with constitutional

constraints "(qtd. in Hicks). This difference in opinion, over whether the event happened

because of a failure of morality or a failure of government, is the main controversy

resulting from Iran-Contra but it does not chmige what happened. The bottom line is that

Reagan made mistakes, whether it was knowledgeable or not, and he paid the

consequences for it.

Iran-Contra is the most criticized foreign policy blunder in Ronald Reagan's

presidency and sometimes overshadows his successes in resolving the Cold War. This

crisis could have been tragic for the United States executive branch. Following the twenty

years of Johnson's Vietnam War, Nixon's Watergate scandal, and Carter's failure to get the American hostages released, the United States could not bear to see another president

fall to scandal or failure. Ronald Reagan, in his autobiography, stated that "If I could do it

over again, I would bring both of them [Poindexter and North] into the Oval Office and

say 'Okay John mid Ollie, level with me. Tell me what really happened and what it is that

you have been hiding for me. Tell me everything'" (Reagan 543). The President clearly thought that the event had been humiliating for everyone involved, especially the White

House and Reagan's administration. And yet, Stuart Spencer, a political analyst, summed

Iran-Contra up by saying, "The Iran-Contra thing went away awful fast. The people all thought he was guilty. He made a goddamn mistake, that's all. They gave him the benefit

of the doubt—he made a goddmiin mistake, now let's go on!"(qtd. in Cannon 738).

Despite his initial mishandling of the situation, Ronald Reagan's courageous acceptmice

of guilt solidified his legacy and provided a precedent for all presidents to follow: If the Moodie 22

President is involved in a failure of conscience on any level, it is wiser morally and politically to confess and take responsibility, rather thmi try to craft a cover-up. Moodie 23

Interview Transcript

Interviewee: David M. Abshire Interviewer: William Moodie Location: Dr. Abshire's office, Washington D.C. Date: December 20*, 2006 This interview was reviewed and edited by William Moodie

WiUiani Moodie: This is William Moodie, interviewing Dr. David Abshire. The

interview took place on December 20 , 2006 at Dr. Abshire's office. So cmi you tell me

about your childhood?

David Abshire: My childhood? My childhood was in Chattanooga, Tennessee. My

grandmother had a big house on the top of Minnekada Hill mid I looked out over the

battlefields of Mission Ridge and Lookout Mountain.

WM: Who were some of your idols when you were growing up?

DA: Robert E. Lee. I studied militmy history, reading military history when I was in the

seventh grade. And I knew all the Civil War military history. And Napoleon, Alexander,

Hannibal, and Caesar. And I never had the great pleasure of the greatest teacher of all of this at the Baylor School, who was Dr. Masterson who was ^ead of me and then he

went off to wm. But he was still a legend while I was enrolled at Baylor.

WM: Is that what inspired you to go into the militmy?

William Moodie's grandfather Moodie 24

DA: Absolutely.

WM: Did your background in the military help you live your life afterwards?

DA: Absolutely, because I was not smart enough to be an engineer. I wouldn't have wanted to be mi engineer miyway. But I led a platoon, a company in battle, in Korea, and that was the best leadership experience I ever had. And I've taught at the infantry school, the officer candidate school, then and the advanced corps after the wm at the infantry school.

WM: How did it help you live your life during Iran-Contra?

DA: I think that of all the military experiences--the Navy might contest this mid say that in the submmine you've got teamwork that is extraordinary--but that the human intensity in an infantry platoon and the company is so great. Unless you're a jackass, it teaches you a lot to deal with people mid to interface with people. And I think the successes I had in government came as a result of those people skills that I learned as a junior officer in command.

WM: What was your initial reaction when President Reagan asked you to come back from NATO? Moodie 25

DA: Of course, it was a total surprise. I had been in the papers as the lead cmididate to

replace Admiral Poindexter. I think I was the lead candidate until Bill Casey intervened

and proposed that Frank Cmlucci be brought in. He argued that Carlucci had been the

deputy to both [Secretary of Defense Casper] Weinberger mid to [Secretmy of State]

George Shultz in different capacities and that he would be able to work with those two

people. By the way that's right, I think it was an excellent choice.. .1 had been in the news

and the other ambassadors were saying, "Well you're leaving for Washington." So I did

leave for Washington, mid then it was a surprise and just really a couple weeks later I got the call that President Reagan was going to phone me.

WM: And how did you feel when he did phone you?

DA: Between the time that Don Regan phoned me to tell me that he [the president] was

going to call me, and I said, "Don, hold off, I need to think this through." And my book

goes into the things that I thought about and the people I consulted. So I developed my

framework because I was moving into totally uncharted waters. I felt I needed [to define] the conditions for success and I needed those agreed to. So it wasn't until I went back to

Regmi, and he in his book says I was sort of contentious, that I gave him those terms of

reference, mid one of those was to be in the cabinet. It was [Former Presidential Advisor

and Ambassador to the UK] Anne Armstrong who advised me on that mid I'm sure

Regmi didn't like that because he wasn't in the cabinet. So when Reagan called me mid

asked me to do this and I said. "Mr. President I had mentioned that I felt that I should be Moodie 26

only reporting to you, and to be in the cabinet was importmit." So he says "Approved,

cabinet" Like he checked it. "Approved!" So I guess Don Regan solved that.

WM: Why do you think he picked you?

DA: Don Regan in his book says initially that he wanted a lawyer that he had mentioned to come in there and identify with Nancy. But then actually Don Regan wanted me to do this and George H. W. Bush wanted me to do it. I was on very good terms with [Don

Regmi] then, I'd known him at Merrill Lynch. But I think there were two things: I think they felt that I had the people skills in a very difficult situation because I was dealing

with a special counselor; I was dealing with Congress. And by the way I think it would

have been a mistake for them to put a lawyer in that position. I brought a judge in as my

deputy and I had lawyers working for me, but my job was not legally to protect the

president. It was to restore integrity to the White House. And it memit being successful in

interfacing with the Congress, which was a Democratic Congress, and with Judge

[I^awrence] Walsh and others; in other words a good facilitator. And I think a lot of

lawyers would not quite have that training, going a little more adversarial in a situation. I think the way we treated those people was the reason that after I got to know Judge

Walsh, he said "we're not going to use subpoenas; we'll move this process forward." And that was quite a concession. And you know I had been Assistmit Secretary of State [for

Congressional Affairs], been very successful with Congress.. .1 had a lot of dealings with

Congress when I was miibassador to NATO, and your Dad was with me.

Judge Lawrence Walsh served as Special Prosecutor during the investigation. Walsh served in tandem with the Tower Board and was instrumental in the investigation due to his decision to not subpoena executive documents; he only requested them. Moodie 27

WM: When you left NATO, did you think that Reagmi had a chance at surviving?

DA: I did, because I felt that he did not know about Ollie North. I took that at face value,

and in my book—in that first chapter—I say that when Richard Nixon wanted me to come

into the White House when they got into Watergate, I didn't believe Nixon. And even though I had been involved in the transition of government for Reagan, running the

National Security Complex, I did not know him well. I knew Nixon very well, knew him

as vice president when I was on Capitol Hill. And although he was brilliant and he was

shrewd, looking at all the angles, I just felt that he wasn't telling the truth. And I didn't

feel that Reagan was a schemer. I felt he really was apple pie with a scoop of vmiilla ice

cremii on it, that he was incapable of a conspiracy. And that was mi intuition, and it was

correct.

WM: So on your first day in Washington, how were you feeling on your first day back

starting as a special advisor?

DA: I flew back and I stayed at the University Club because they had the facilities. And

my family stayed on for a month or longer at [the Ambassador's residence] Truman Hall,

but it was a sudden change. As I say that first morning, when I went out they insisted on

sending a car and chauffeur even though it was only two blocks; all the press was out there coming at me in ten different directions. But they had come to Truman Hall before I

came back, CNN, everybody was there. "How are you going to get along with Don Moodie 28

Regmi?" You know. "Is he going to block you from the things you need to do?" They

didn't know I had worked with him before. I'd known that we would work well together.

WM: What were your attitudes towards the media throughout the entire affair?

DA: I had cut off the Noon Hour show, where the (pause), when [Senator David]

Durenberger chaired the intelligence committee, they had done a hasty study that then

had not been released and that was leaked to NBC. Every night NBC was bringing out a

little morsel, and the White House at noon was playing into this and trying to refute this

and that. So I eliminated that, I had the authority and I said, "We've set up, in place of

flawed process, due process. My office is not investigating, it's facilitating three or four

other investigations and we're going to wait and get the result." But what I did do with

my pressman, [Dr. Roman] Popadiuk, who now runs the Bush library, we began to bring them in privately and I began to get good press. You know I got very good press. But I

did it, not by going down at the noon hour, mid getting in all this business, because, in my

view, the White House cmi't comment because they don't know the facts.

WM: So when you started as special advisor, what were the most important things that

you wanted to have settled and resolved?

DA: First, with all parties to know that we were playing it squarely. The framework of so

much of this preceded me, the setting up of the Tower Board and the waiving of

executive privilege, and it's interesting that that waiving of executive privilege—there Moodie 29

were 3,000 documents that were FBI-mmked related to this—it was unpmallel in

American history. By the way the minority of the investigating committee on Capitol

Hill, chaired by Dick Cheney— (jokingly adding) You heard of him—They were, in their

final report, they said that that was a mistake. And I said in my book, they still didn't get

it, the greatness of Ronald Reagan. He knew he had to t^e decisive action, and that did

so much to m^e his transparency, to m^e his recovery possible.

WM: So when you arrived there, cmi you explain the ways in which you helped to resolve those issues?

DA: We had Bob Gates, who's back in the news; Lee Hamilton was the chairman of the

House investigating committee; Cheney was the ranking member. And at one point his

staff man was saying we were stonewalling on getting some of these things up there. But

what they had to do on these documents, those that were very sensitive on what we call

methods and sources, they would remain in a safe haven down in the Executive Office

Building and the staff and members could look at them.... So, this staff man said we were

stonewalling so I called Bob Gates who was the acting head of CIA and told him this

(laugh). Bob said, "Well, Dave, if I ordered, I'd get him up there right away but we will

not be able to sort out and to ensure that we protect methods and sources." So I called

Lee and told him that. I'd known Lee from Chattanooga because we went to the

Methodist church. (It was only later we became Episcopalians after my grandmother

died. She was such a staunch Methodist.) But Lee said, "I'll tell my staff mmi to knock it

off if you and Gates get him up here when you're satisfied, and you can tell him of the Moodie 30

proper process." But that's the kind of attitude we have, mid I say in the book that when

Judge Brower and I go in to see [Senator David] Inouye, chairman of that committee. He

says "If you find anything that we 're doing that is out of line, I want to hear it directly

from you." I mean that's.. .that's patriotism. But they felt we were legitimate. The current

people can learn a lot from doing their congressional relations that way. If you level with

other people, they'll level with you. If you don't level with them, they won't. If you reach

out, they're cooperative. If you don't reach, out they won't. It seems obvious, doesn't it?

WM: Yes. So what was it like meeting alone with the president in the Oval Office?

DA: I enjoyed it. He didn't tell a lot of jokes. I think Evans and Novak wrote a column that all we did was swap jokes; I don't know a lot of jokes. And they say Don Regan

would come in with a joke a day. But I went in with a sheet of paper doubled-over with

my little agenda, and I'd go right down it. And he was very attentive; some other people

say, "Well he was inattentive at meetings." He never was with me. I'm very sensitive to a

person, their body language mid whether they're listening to me, and I've got their

attention and I had his total attention at every one of my twelve meetings.

WM: So what was atypical day like when you were Special Counselor?

DA: It was busy; it was 7:30 in the morning to 7:30 in the evening because we had a lot

of Hill visits and other visits. It was extremely, extremely busy. Moodie 31

WM: And how did your family deal with that?

DA: The family came back. My oldest three children, they were in college and my

youngest two daughters were with us. And Phyllis stayed over there [in Belgium] because

she mmried a Belgian. But the deal we had is that I would be double-hatted for about a

month mid a half, so it didn't look like I was suddenly pulled out. I went back for a week to say goodbyes, I think towards the end of January. And by that time we had been able to repossess our house in Alexandria so Caroline could move into it.

WM: So what was your initial perception of Oliver North mid John Poindexter?

DA: I never met Oliver North. I've still never met him and I'm glad that I've been spared

meeting him because I think he dishonored the honor code of Annapolis. He went up

when he testified—and if you were writing a medieval morality play—he's the person who

said that the ends justify whatever memis you want. And that's the opposite of the honor

code of Annapolis or West Point. He made himself ahero...propagating...that message.

WM: Is that why President Reagan called him a national hero?

DA: No I think it was before that. Reagan, I think, when he fired them both, wanted to

recognize his wartime service because he was decorated in combat. He was a good

soldier in combat. But some of these CEOs that me going to jail were good Chief

Executives in certain ways. But they violated the laws as Oliver North did. John Moodie 32

Poindexter, I knew him quite well, and he was an enigma. This person had been an aide to two secretaries of defense, and had been sort of a high level. But he was such a sort of

recluse. He was the only National Security Advisor whose door was always closed. He

was in there; of course everybody's doing this now because of the computer. And

everybody wasn't, he was always constantly if I was in there talking to him, he'd be

going at his computer and that was before the computer age. And he was a nerd; he was the wrong man for the job. And it's interesting because it was in the papers when Bud

McFarlane was being replaced, that I was coming back as National Security Advisor so I

met with him two times, and I, (pause) in this morality tale, when I cmiie back, right and

wrong was so clear cut it made it easy. If one piece of paper (holds piece of paper up)

relevmit to those 3,000 [documents] was withheld from investigators, that's something

called obstruction of justice. There's no ambiguity, and in so many moral cases there's

ambiguity, there's two rights (pause), lying before a grand jury. So I knew that, and when

I had my blowups with Don Regan that are in the book, you know, I knew where I stood.

I was not equivocal. I knew I was on the proper ground. And so, had I been called back

after Bud McFarlane left, before Poindexter came in, as National Security Advisor, I

would have had a much tougher situation because President Reagan, naively, was behind the arms for hostages. He didn't think, he justified it, there's nothing illegal about that.

But John Wayne would never have traded with terrorists. But he said we're dealing with

one group in Lebmion and one group in Iran so it's not state-to-state. That's the way he justified it in his mind. And then you had Bill Casey mid others pushing in that direction.

So would I have had the gumption mid the chmacter when I got back, looking at this to Moodie 33

say, "No this is wrong, this doesn't work. We got to get out of it." That would have been

a lot harder than knowing if you withhold something that's obstruction of justice.

WM: You mentioned Bud McFarlane; can you explain his role in the affair a little more?

DA: He's a good guy that maybe was a little over his head and he sort of saw Kissinger

going to China and he was going to Irmi. The whole thing was after the first trade of arms

where we didn't get hostages; we were had. It's like the Wild West; we were had. And then. Bud, after that last meeting in London realized that and tried to get it stopped. Then

you've got this peculiarity that Poindexter comes in and picks up on it again. And of

course Casey is pushing the whole thing.

WM: So what did you think of the President during the investigation?

DA: I greatly admired this president. This was a low point; he had gone to the hospital; that picture on the front of the book, he looks weak, he's frail. Nancy orders the picture

not released when she saw it because he looks so bad. When I sent her the book she says

"David, that's the picture I ordered not to be published." And I said, "Nancy, did you

look on the back cover, everybody's happy." (Laughs) So we were at a low point,

Gorbachev was on the move, and Reagan was down, and only 14% of the people

believed what he was saying. And about a year and three months ago, David Brooks

published that piece when my book came out saying that Bush is in trouble and that he

ought to take a leaf out of Reagan's story and m^e a big breakout and do it decisively Moodie 34

not piecemeal. That's a lesson to presidents. And that's too bad they don't learn. I talk to

young people, and I say all of us.. .me going to get in a hole, mid the issue is whether we

dig deeper or get out.

WM: So how did your relationship with congressional leaders and members on the hill

help?

DA: It was excellent. Right across the board. They felt we had restored integrity to the

process, mid all of them, the most liberal, because we had called on all members in the

investigating committee, said we don't want to lose another president at this point in the

Cold Wm. They felt integrity had been restored. And after I left, we get into the Oliver

North hemings and close to the election and everything politicizes. That good era and

good operations ended. But by the smiie token by then Reagan was out of trouble. Judge

Walsh had moved to other things but Reagan, our three months, Reagmi was out of trouble.

WM: What were your views of Nancy Reagan during your time?

DA: I thought she was great. And you've heard what [Presidential Historian Richard]

Neustadt said about the Nancy factor. And I think that the Nmicy factor, her with her eyes

and ears, more curiosity, her little entourage—from the liberal head of The Washington

Post mid conservative George Will— she was out there and she was very concerned about

his place in history. Moodie 35

WM: Did your relationship with her help you understmid the president?

DA: Yes, right, and of course he was being stubborn, didn't wmit to tell Don Regan to leave because he felt that Don had not known about Oliver North mid he hadn't. But we knew that he was a weight around the neck of the president. And he had to be induced to leave before the Tower Board report came out.

WM: So who, apart from yourself, were some of the most helpful people during the investigation, helpful to you and helpful to the president?

DA: Judge Brower was enormously helpful to me because he had all the legal skills that I didn't have. But I had a lot of friends; I had friends on Capitol Hill and little outside advisors like Bob Strauss. But I had a little group on the outside that stayed in touch with me, anything that I was doing wrong or so forth. Chmlie Wick was very helpful. He was very close to the president. He along with Bob Strauss, you know, first told me "well, you're not seeing Nancy." And I had immediately wanted to run up to her qumters because at that point initially I had a good relationship with Don Regan and I thought it was important to maintain. For me to run up and see her would put him off. But I realized

I had made a mistake in judgment so I went up. We then bonded.

WM: You mentioned in your book that your relationship with Regmi kind of soured... Moodie 36

DA: You can drop the "kind of.... When we had the blowup before the Tower Board

meeting it went south. I stood him down. And I had the power to do it mid it was

necessary to do it.

WM: Why do you feel he was being difficult to work with?

DA: Because he wanted to protect himself, and he wanted to see the report in advance,

and he wanted to go into the President to give him a cue card to say that he disagreed

with the finding on Don Regan. (Laughs) And that night in my kitchen, when I said I

agreed with Tower that this is the president's report and it doesn't need to be vetted by the staff, we got in that shouting match. Sol won. I had to win. There was no out, he had to retreat but he didn't like it.

WM: What did you think of the Tower Board?

DA: I thought it was excellent. I thought it was a very fine report. The Very Thin Line:

The Iran-Contra Ajfairs by [Theodore] Draper, he trashes it. But I don't agree at all with

his. I've got a big long footnote on that, it's the one thing the B^er-Hamilton thing that

we co-sponsor didn't do: to look back at flawed process.

WM: During the second Tower Board meeting, when the president was asked about his

reaction to the discovery of the sale of arms to Iran, he responded, he read a statement

Dr. Abshire is referring to the Iraq Study Group Report that was, in part, supported by his Center for the Study of the Presidency. Moodie 37 that said, "If the question comes up at the Tower Board meeting, you might want to say that you were surprised."...

DA: (Laughs) What was your question again?

WM: Why do you think he said that? Do you think he was confused or he wanted to read the statement?

DA: You're talking about the second Tower Board Meeting?

WM: Um-hum.

DA: (pause) He fumbled, and in this preliminary session we had with him, after Don

Regmi came in and said, "Well I remember you said that you were surprised." And he

said "Well that's right". And so that's really what he thought. We thought he shouldn't

keep going back and forth, so that's when the counsel to the president made that memo to

keep him from going back and forth. And when he fumbled, you know, I used to think

well, gee, you've got to make allowmices for this, he's a 76 year-old man. I used to think that was old, now I don't. (Laughs) But he had come back from his operation--you can

still have effects from an operation—and he just fumbled. He picked that thing up mid he

was sort of careless. It was a low moment.

WM: How did you help resolve the aftermath of that statement? Moodie 38

DA: Again, I guess that's when I (pause) sort of brought Don Regan because I got the

counsel to the President, Peter Wallison, who would stick with me on that even though he

had been Regan's man. And we went to the president and said "Now everybody's

confused because you've gone back and forth. The Tower Board is confused. You've got to resolve this." So I brought the question up again of the Tower Board meeting, and at that point John Tower was so exasperated he said, "I don't think it will work. If you've

got anything put it in writing." So I went with him mid he wrote out in hand on a yellow

piece of paper his statement: I depend upon the recollections of others. And I asked him

when I saw that, because I thought it might have been Bud McFmlane's recollection. He

said it was Don Regan's.

WM: How did you feel when he said that it was Regmi's?

DA: I figured probably it was, but of course that was sort of the death down the creek.

WM: I was hoping that you might be able to explain this image. Ivloodie 39

DA: Who are the people?

WM: Yes and what was going on?

DA: Look over my shoulder and ITl explain. This of course is Tower, this is the

President, this is IVIuskie, this is Scowcroft, this is Peter Wallison, this is Brower, this is me to the right of the president, and Fm not sure who this was. So that's the second meeting of the Tower Board. The first meeting of the Tower Board occurred when I had gone back to NATO so that was the second one. How did you fmd that?

WM: The Internet.

DA: The Internet? Amazing what you can fmd on the Internet.

^ The picture is identified as (clockwise from President Reagan on the bottom right), John Tower, Edmund Muskie, Brent Scowcroft, Peter Wallison, Charles Brower, and Dr. Abshire) Moodie 40

WM: So when the Tower Board released its final report what were your initial reactions?

How did you feel?

DA: It was a good report.

WM: So you were pleased?

DA: Yes I thought they did a superb job. I said that contrary to Draper's book (you know

he trashes it) I thought it was an excellent report when you consider it was done in just a

little over two months. I was over at the White House seeing the National Security

Advisor and the Chief of Staff on miother matter and [Steve] Hadley was on that staff.

[Steve], National Security Advisor I reminded him of that. And we felt it was important that Reagan accept this full report, even the things he didn't agree with, that he would

start to argue. It was a good prototype for dealing with the Baker-Hamilton report. You

can have some things you don't fully agree with, but you say this is the frmiiework and

accept it. If you don't accept it you don't have something to tip it on and turn around.

WM: So what day was the first day you spent in Washington as special advisor, what

was the date?

DA: I think I came back on the 6 of Janumy. And I forget when I met with the President

whether it was the 8 or 9 ,1 think I got back here on the Saturday. Moodie 41

WM: Were you anxious about leaving NATO because, I mean, for NATO that was a

pretty important time?

DA: I was turning 60 mid I felt it was time to get back to CSIS mid to get back on some

corporate bomds, while I was that age. So, contrary to my wife, I wanted to come back. I told George Shultz that and it sort of made him mad. So it was just a matter of time when

I would be coming back and this just memit it was abrupt and quicker.

WM: What do you think was the worst repercussion of the event from the original arms

sale to Irmi to the end of the Tower Bomd? What was the worst repercussion of that?

DA: Oliver North remaining, to some people, a hero.

WM: Really?

DA: Yes we had a big program at Washington and Lee on chmacter-based leadership.

Next yem were going to hold it at Annapolis. Whether it's in the field of athletics or

public service or business, you need role models of people who have walked the talk of the honor code. And he went up there; this was after I left government, these adulations

were sad because he's a poor role model. I'm not usually that black and white on people.

I try to balance off good and bad. Moodie 42

WM: Do you think he was a poor role model all mound or just in a position of

leadership?

DA: He was valiant in combat, an inspiring leader. But you know we've got a lot of

inspiring leaders that headed the wrong way, did great damage, Stalin, Hitler, others.

You've got to have principled leadership. And I don't think he's that.

WM: We have a book in my history class that we read by Historian Howard Zinn. He

claims that the Iran-Contra affair was "only one of many instances in which the

government of the United States violated its own laws in pursuit of some desired goal in

foreign policy." What do you think about that claim?

DA: I think he overstates and over-generalizes things. Reagan's motivations for getting

involved in Iran-Contra were understandable. They were not bad motivations. He had these hostages there, he felt like a crippled giant; he couldn't get these seven people out.

And so it was good motivations but it was naive in the process. I think that people,

because of certain bre^downs in government, try to broadbrush everything as a mistake.

And the idea of some kind of opening to Iran is understandable. I think we should try to tip some kind of opening in Iran today. That was part of the thrust of the Baker-Hamilton

report so I can understand how they got into that initially. It was not having the judgment

and then of course not sticking within the law. That was Oliver North; it was never part

of the original concept. Moodie 43

WM: So going back to the beginning of the affair, do you think that the reason Reagmi

agreed to sell the arms to Iran was to get the hostages out and the reason it happened was

because they didn't have judgment on the affair?

DA: Yes, they thought there might be some good guys. I understand that but it was naive.

When Ayatollah Khatmiii was here and I was at a little dinner at the National Academy

for him, so I asked him, I said that I was involved in examining the Iran-Contra affair

officially, and he indicated he knew that, he knew my background. So we talked about an

opening to Iran which he would like to see, he's on the more liberal side, and I said "Why

did it so fail?" and he said, "Because it was complicated by the hostages situation and

you were dealing with third parties rather than being.. .when Kissinger went to China it

was straight, uncomplicated." I thought it was an excellent miswer: that if you were going to try mi opening to Irmi, don't mix it up with this other thing. I thought it was a superb

answer. You know if I were rewriting my book that would be my big fat footnote. That

can be your big fat footnote.

WM: Do you think the third pmty of Israel was a mistake?

DA: The Israeli intelligence was faulty, and Ghorbmiifar was a shyster. And if Bill Casey

knew that, he couldn't pass the lie detector test and he withheld that. He was saying this

was good evidence, of course, he was a fabricator, and they were taken for a ride.

WM: So if there was one thing that you would do differently what would that thing be? Moodie 44

DA: You mean when I was in there?

WM: Yes

DA: I don't want to sound like George W. Bush, but I was lucky and I had the good

fortune of a great support staff. The good fortune, grace of God, I like to think, but we

were highly successful. And I can think of so many ways that we could have failed, could

have fallen into a ditch. But we didn't. And so, you know, I wouldn't change really one thing that happened. It all fell into place. Great good luck. It all fell into place those three

months. Nothing really went wrong. I had a terrific staff put together. You read the book;

it's very difficult to do it. But we did it. But because we reached out mid dealt with

people on the level and convinced them that we were trying to do the right thing it paid

off.

WM: So if you don't want anything to be changed, what do you want to be remembered

most?

DA: You mean about Irmi-Contra?

WM: Um-hum.

DA: If you get into a hole, don't dig it deeper; get out. Moodie 45

WM: And you think Reagan accomplished that pretty well.

DA: He accomplished that. Who saved the Reagan presidency? First, the character of

Ronald Reagan and second, his wife, his eyes mid ears, realized the danger of being destroyed, his heritage. And Don Regmi even had a role in setting up this original architecture. I try to give him credit where credit is due, even though he ended up in the wrong direction trying to protect himself.

WM: When Reagan started his second term in office, there were a couple of shifts in his cabinet. Do you think those shifts had anything to do with the resulting affair?

DA: Oh absolutely, absolutely. He had a very able chief of staff, Jim Baker, and Ed

Meese was in there, David Gergen on communications, in the middle part of his presidency he didn't have that. He had the wrong people. Don Regmi was a good

Secretary of Treasury. That's the tragedy of it. Good Secretary of Treasury. But not good for that job of Chief of Staff.

WM: So today there are major issues surrounding character in leadership within the presidency, within the cabinet, mid within the congress. What would be your advice to someone trying to resolve that character failure? Moodie 46

DA: I think were right in the middle of the situation now, where this president's got a big

opening, he's got the Baker-Hmiiilton report somewhere analogous to the Tower Board. I think he should bring in a special counselor to deal with Capitol Hill, a high level person.

Maybe somebody of distinguished military history, a diplomat, so he gives the priority to

working with a Democratic congress, because if we don't have unity of effort at home,

we'll go down the chute. But he's got to do it decisively. You know, Kennedy after the

Bay of Pigs debacle, went on television and said, "It's all my fault" and brought in

General Maxwell Taylor as his special assistant. And Bill Clinton, after his indiscretion,

he didn't do anything like that, and he ended up with an impeachment mid trial, which I think was not appropriate to what happened, but because when he got into this trouble he

didn't come clean. And had he done it immediately, the country would have been

disgusted for two weeks and moved on. And Nixon didn't know about the Watergate

bre^-in; five days later he's back from Key Biscayne and leading the cover-up and taping the downfall of his presidency. Shakespeare lived in the wrong period. This is

more drmiiatic material than they ever had back then.

WM: Well that about wraps up my questions.

DA: Okay, you're a good interviewer. I was just thinking you should be on television as

an interviewer.

WM: Thank you. Moodie 47

DA: I'm serious. You've done a great job.

WM: Is there anything that we missed that you feel is important to know about the affair?

DA: No.

WM: Okay. Moodie 48

Interview Analysis

On November 6, 1986, The Washington Post printed an article detailing how

United States government officials secretly sent military arms to Irmi in exchmige for

hostages. The nation shook as the story stmted to unravel and the world watched as the

United States government braced for another catastrophe just ten years after the

Watergate scandal. So on December 26, 1986, President Ronald Reagan, with his

presidency unwinding mound him, phoned Ambassador to the North Atlmitic Treaty

Organization Dr. David Abshire. The President told Dr. Abshire, "David, I want to get to the bottom of things. I wmit to ensure that there will be no cover-up" (Abshire, 22). Dr.

Abshire agreed to become a special counselor to the President, but he also made it clear that if the circumstance arose, Reagan would not be safe from an inquiry. As Dr. Abshire

said in the interview, "my job was not legally to protect the president. It was to restore

integrity to the White House" (Abshire, 25). Dr. Abshire was a pivotal chmacter during the Iran-Contra investigation and his account of the event is especially important in order to understand what happened. Historian Donald Ritchie said, "the job of the historian is to pull together a multitude of evidence from documents, objects, interviews, and other

sources to create a narrative that m^es sense" (Ritchie, 10). Such a nmrative would

include oral history, a biased but deeper mid more personal understanding of an event.

Therefore, in order to create an account that "makes sense," an oral history of Dr.

Abshire's role in Irmi-Contra deepens the understanding of the events of Iran-Contra.

Furthermore, this interview contradicts some historimis' views on Iran-Contra as a

deliberate attempt at pursuing illegal foreign policy goals. Moodie 49

The oral history interview with Dr. Abshire began with his explanation of his

childhood mid his life experience before becoming involved in Irmi-Contra. Dr. Abshire

discussed his experience in the Korean War and his dealings while he served as a

company commander. He explained that his "successes.. .in government came as a result

of those people skills that [he] learned as ajunior officer in command" (Abshire, 23). Dr.

Abshire then went on to talk about his initial reactions to being offered the position by

President Reagan. Dr. Abshire said that it was a "total surprise" (Abshire, 24). He

explains that he felt the reason Reagan picked him was because he "had the people skills

in a very difficult situation" mid he had good relations with Congress. He spent most of

his time reflecting on his experiences with other members of the cabinet and

administration such as [Chief of Staff] Don Regan, [National Security Advisor] John

Poindexter, [CIA Director] Bill Casey, and most importantly the President.

Dr. Abshire said that Regan was initially a very strong ally and Regmi helped to

get Abshire appointed, but that later their relationship went south because "[Regan]

wanted to protect himself (Abshire, 35). Abshire then went on to talk about Poindexter

saying that he was "an enigma," and Casey, who took advantage of the president's

distractions to push towmds a deal with Iran. Abshire then answered questions about the

Tower Board, appointed to investigate Iran-Contra, and his daily activities as special

counselor. Abshire said that the Tower Board was "excellent. [He] thought it was a great

report" (Abshire, 35). He then goes on to explain about his daily routine saying that it

was "extremely busy; it was 7:30 in the morning to 7:30 in the evening because [they] had a lot of Hill visits and other vis its "(Abshire, 29). As the interview closed Dr. Abshire talked about his reactions to current historiography of the affair, as well as his own Moodie 50 reflections on the event, saying that the worst repercussion of the event was "Oliver

North remaining, to some, a hero" (Abshire, 40). Dr. Abshire finished the interview by addressing current government issues and spoke on how he felt they should be handled, saying that, "if we don't have unity of effort at home, we'll go down the chute" (Abshire,

45). Dr. Abshire continued to say that presidents in the future should view the handling of

Iran-Contra as a success and learn to accept responsibility for their actions.

Dr. Abshire's interview provides a different perspective on an event in American history that some might see as discrediting and murky. In fact, historian Howmd Zinn says that the Iran-Contra affair was "only one of mmiy instances in which the government of the United States violated its own laws in pursuit of some desired goal in foreign policy"(Zinn, 428). David Abshire, a centrist, whose past in government and foreign affairs affects his own bias towmd the event, counters Howmd Zinn, usually a far-left analyst and outsider. Dr. Abshire grew up studying the United States military and has spent most of his life as a person deeply involved in Washington's policies. Dr. Abshire disagreed with Zinn's statement, saying that it was "overstated and over-generalized"

(Abshire, 41). Dr. Abshire said that Reagan's motivations were understandable and it was not originally a malevolent strategy to try to break U.S. laws. Instead, he says that it was a reasonable strategy to try to find an opening to Iran.

Dr. Abshire's views on Iran-Contra differ from historians because he is able to speak on a more personal level about the president. Historian Noam Chomsky says in his book:

The question that dominated the Iran-contra hearings — did Reagmi know, or

remember, what the policy of his administration had been? -- was hardly a serious Moodie 51

one. The pretense to the contrary was simply part of the cover-up operation; and

the lack of public interest over revelations that Reagan was engaged in illegal aid

to the contras during a period when, he later informed Congress, he knew nothing

about it, betrays a certain realism. (Chomsky, 1)

This differs from Abshire's view because Chomsky believes that Reagan did know about the funding of money to the Contras mid he deliberately tried to cover it up. Abshire, on the other hmid, believes that Reagan was not intent on this foreign policy scheme mid he

did not know about the Contras beforehmid. Abshire says, "I felt that he did not know

about Ollie North. I took that at face value... And I didn't feel that Reagmi was a

schemer. I felt.. .that he was incapable of a conspiracy"(Abshire, 26). Abshire is able to

provide firsthmid information about details that people do not know. For example, mmiy

people say that the president was a recluse and was very inattentive during his time in

office. Dr. Abshire met with the president twelve times and many of those meetings

involved just the two of them. Dr. Abshire says in the interview that, "some other people

say, 'well he was inattentive at meetings.' He never was with me. I'm very sensitive to a

person and.. .1 had his total attention at every one of my twelve meetings" (Abshire, 29).

This is an illustration of Dr. Abshire's private perspective on the president in contrast to

historians who did not meet with him privately. Neither can really know what the

President was thinking and how he felt towards the situation, but Abshire at least met

with him and has personal knowledge of his actions.

Mmiy historians also say that the president was not a highly qualified or strong

chief executive. Chomsky says, "Reagan's duty was to smile, to read from the teleprompter in a pleasmit voice, tell a few jokes, and keep the audience bemused. His Moodie 52 only qualification for the presidency was that he knew how to read the lines written for him by the rich folk"(Chomsky 1). Dr. Abshire disagrees with this belief by saying that he "greatly admired" him and that he also felt that Reagan saved the foundation of the

Presidency. Dr. Abshire asked, "Who saved the Reagan presidency? First, the chmacter of Ronald Reagan"( Abshire, 44). This shows that Abshire believed that Reagan was a good person chief executive, contrasting the viewpoint of many historians. To some extent perhaps this difference reflects alternative values, since Abshire places priority on

Reagan's character while the historian emphasizes his executive talent.

Abshire's views fit very well into the history of the entire period because he provides a viewpoint of someone who was instrumental in the resolution of the affair, but was not directly involved in the illegal procedures. Many important figures during Irmi-

Contra, such as President Reagan, Oliver North, Regmi, and Poindexter, tried to rationalize their intentions and gloss over their mistakes in an effort to look better to the public. Dr. Abshire, on the other hand, is able to present an understandable, realistic viewpoint, from someone who does not have to cover up for any mistakes. This is a unique perspective because it is from a person who originally was on the outside but later became instrumental in the affair.

Dr. Abshire's values of integrity mid honor were evident in the interview as he displayed his personal reaction to a few of Reagmi's cabinet and staff members. When asked about his feelings toward Oliver North, Dr. Abshire responded that he was glad he never had the opportunity to meet him. Dr. Abshire, along with most historians, felt that

Oliver North "dishonored the honor code of Annapolis" (Abshire, 30). Throughout the Moodie 53

interview North becmiie the face of wrongdoing during Iran-Contra in Dr. Abshire's

answers.

The interview provides a lesson to young people that many textbooks could not

accomplish and therefore shows the importance of oral history. Dr. Abshire compmed the

event of Iran-Contra to the issues surrounding the Iraq war today. He said that "Bush is in trouble and he ought to take a leaf out of Reagan's story and m^e a big breakout and do

it decisively." Dr. Abshire then went on to give a lesson on history and character to many

young people. He said, "all of us are going to get into a hole, and the issue is whether we

dig deeper or get out"(Abshire 33). This perspective would not have been provided through a textbook and, without oral history, may not have ever been suggested.

I learned a great deal from this interview. The interview provided a viewpoint

from someone whom I respect and see great strength in. My perspective is biased though

due to the fact that Dr. Abshire employed both my parents and also me mid has been a

great friend to the family. If I had interviewed Oliver North, my perspective of the

interview would be very different but the interview would still be very important to

understanding the time period. The value of the interview also changes depending on the

person who reads it, because a relative of Oliver North would find Dr. Abshire's

interview different than someone who respects Dr. Abshire.

When asked whether President Reagan accomplished a restoration in the

presidency, Abshire answered by saying that he did. He said, "Who saved the Reagan

presidency? First, the character of Ronald Reagan and second, his wife, his eyes mid ears,

realized the dmiger of being destroyed" (Abshire, 44). The interview allowed me to see the event in a more positive light because Dr. Abshire presented a valid argument about Moodie 54

why Reagan initially agreed to sell the arms even while saying that decision was a

mistake. Dr. Abshire wrapped up the interview very well, comparing Reagan to Clinton,

who should have come clemi about his chmacter failures, and Nixon, who should never

have been involved in the Watergate scandal. He concluded by saying, "Sh^espeare

lived in the wrong period. This is more dramatic material than they ever had back then"(Abshire, 45). But like Sh^espeare, Abshire realized that even with all the faults

and mistakes that a person can m^e, the values of honor, truth, and respect could still

prevail. Moodie 55

Appendix

President Reagan (on right) meeting with (from left) Secretary of Defense Casper

Weinberger, Secretary of State George Shultz, Attorney General Ed Meese, and Chief of

Staff Don Regan.

President Reagan flanked by the Tower Board Co-Chairmen Senator John Tower and

Senator Edmund Muskie. Moodie 56

President Reagan at the public release of the Tower Board Report with Board chairmen (From left) Edmund Muskie, John Tower, and Brent Scowcrowft.

Oliver North testifying at the Tower Board hearings. Moodie 57

President Ronald Reagan

News clippmgs of Iran-Contra Moodie 58

Audio Time Indexing Log

1. Interviewer: William Moodie

2. Interviewee: Dr. David Abshire

3. Date of Interview: December 20, 2006

4. Location of Interview: Dr. Abshire's office, Washington D.C.

5. Recording Format: Cassette Tape

Minute Mark:

1 Minute Childhood

5 Minute Dr. Abshire's first experiences with Iran-Contra

10 Minute Dr. Abshire's initial feelings on Returning

15 Minute Dr. Abshire's plan for resolving issues

20 Minute Dr. Abshire's views on Poindexter and North

25 Minute Dr. Abshire's view on the McFarlane and the President

30 Minute Dr. Abshire's views on Nancy Reagan Moodie 59

35 Minute Tower Board Reports

40 Minute Dr. Abshire explaining photographs

45 Minute Dr. Abshire's views on the worst repercussion of Iran-Contra

50 Minute Dr. Abshire's views on Israel's role in the affair

55 Minute Dr. Abshire's views on today's affairs

60 Minute Farewell remarks Moodie 60

Works Consulted

Abshire, David M. Saving the Reagan Presidency: Trust is the Coin of the Realm.

College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2005.

Cannon, Lou. President Reagmi: The Role of a Lifetime. New York: Simon & Schuster,

1991.589-738.

Chomsky, Noam. "The Reagan Era." Deterring Democracy. New York: Hill And Wang,

1991.

Fitzgerald, Frances. Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars, and the End of the

Cold War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000. 380-387, 411-415.

Hicks, Bruce D. "Presidential Foreign Policy Prerogative After the Iran-Contra Affair: A

Review Essay." Presidential Studies Quarterlv 26.4 (FaU 1996): 962-978.

Hoffman, David. "Reagan Staff Sh^eup Advised." The Washington Post [Washington

D.C. ] 29 Nov. 1986: All.

"Iran Contra Photographs." Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. University of Texas. 10

Feb. 2007. http://www.reagmi.utexas.edu Path: Photographs; Irmi Contra.

Mayer, Jmie. "Bush Concedes 'Mistakes' Made in Iranian Affair." Wall Street Journal 4

Dec. 1986: 3.

Pincus, Walter. "Secret Talks With Iran Described: 3 Hostages Freed Over 14 Months of

Negotiations." The Washington Post 6 Nov. 1986: Al.

Reagan, Ronald. "Irmi-Contra." An American Life: Ronald Reagan The Autobiography.

New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990. 469-544.

Ritchie, Donald. "An Oral History of Our Time." Doing Oral History: A Practical Guide.

New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Moodie 61

Walcott, John. "Arms Sold to Iran Said to Be Overpriced Deliberately to Raise Funds for

Contras." The Wall Street Journal 18 Dec. 1986: 3.

Walcott, John, and Jane Mayer. "Poindexter Approved Transfer of Profits From Arms

Sales to Contras, Sources Say." The Wall Street Journal 8 Dec. 1986: 3.