Moodie 3 The Iran-Contra Affair An Interview with Dr. David Abshire By William Moodie Alexando^ Hai^t February 12.2007 Moodie 4 Statement of Purpose United States presidents face challenges on a daily basis and they are forced to make decisions regarding a multitude of issues that could affect the lives of millions of people. President Ronald Reagan faced one of these challenges during the second term of his presidency when he was confronted with news that his administration had covered up illegal procedures regarding weapon sales to Iranimi terrorists and illegal funding of Nicaraguan Contras. The purpose of this oral history project is to gain extensive knowledge of how the President's administration hmidled the Iran-Contra scandal, through an interview with Dr. David Abshire. Interviewing Dr. Abshire, who was a key special advisor to President Reagmi during the investigation, will provide a lesson in civility, truth, and honesty in difficult times. Moodie 5 Biography Dr. David Manker Abshire was bom on April 11, 1926 in Chattanooga, Tennessee, where he lived until he was accepted at The United States Military Academy at West Point. He graduated from West Point in 1951 and then fought in the Korean War as a Company Commander. Upon returning home, he became an adjunct professor at Georgetown University, from which he established a small non-profit organization in 1962, called the Center for Strategic mid International Studies (CSIS) (He received his doctorate in History from Georgetown University). Dr. Abshire served as an Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations from 1970 to 1973. In 1973, he was asked to become the chairman of the United States Board of International Broadcasting. During the transition of government in 1980, President Ronald Reagan asked Dr. Abshire to lead the National Security Group, which included the Central Intelligence Agency, the State and Defense Depmlments, and the U.S. Information Agency. In 1983, Dr. Abshire was asked to become the United States' Ambassador to the North Atlmitic Treaty Organization (NATO). He accepted and served from 1983 to 1987. In 1987, Dr. Abshire was asked by President Reagan to become a Special Advisor to the Moodie 6 President during the investigation into the Iran-Contra scandal. Dr. Abshire, who held Cabinet rank, was in charge of coordinating the Tower Board, the Independent Council, and the Congressional Investigating Committees, and he held authority to meet with the President alone. After the affair. Dr. Abshire went back to CSIS and chaired the Board of Trustees until 2005. He now runs the Center for the Study of the Presidency and the Richard Lounsbery Foundation. He has received numerous medals and awards for his service both in the militmy mid the government, most significantly the Department of Defense's Medal for Distinguished Public Service mid the President Citizen's Medal. (These medals are the highest awarded to a civilimi). Dr. Abshire lives in Old Town Alexandria, Virginia with his wife, Carolyn. He and Carolyn have five grown children. Moodie 7 What Did the President Know And When Did He Know It? When the Iran-Contra affair exploded in 1986, twelve years after the national nightmare of Watergate, the presidency was again in crisis. Could the country withstmid another executive branch catastrophe? Was the United States system up to the challenge of another scandal? The scandal of the Iran-Contra Affair erupted when news broke of an illegal sale of military weapons to Iran in exchange for the release of hostages, the proceeds of which went to support anti-communist Nicaraguan rebels, called Contras. This sale to Iran was not legal, as Congress had passed laws during the Reagan administration stating that the United States would not support countries that endorsed terrorism, and those laws prohibited arms shipments and funding. United States government officials who supplied these arms also exceedingly overcharged for the arms, and the excess profits were given to support the Nicmagumi Contras, despite the fact that Congress had passed acts designed to limit the amount of money spent to fund the Contras. These elements came together in a complex story of events that almost brought down a president. In order to understmid the Iran-Contra affair, it is important to examine both the history of the events in Iran mid Nicaragua, mid the events in Washington during the affair mid to gain the firsthand perspective from someone who was involved in the event. Historimi Lou Cminon outlines seven major elements in the Iran-Contra scandal, as it has become known: first, the diminished political accountability of Reagan's cabinet; second, Reagmi's anger at not being able to get United States hostages out of Iran; third, a changing view of Iran by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) mid the National Security Council (NSC); fourth, Israel's role in the Iran war; fifth, the Contras' Moodie 8 floundering in Nicaragua; sixth, the opportunity for U.S. profit from arms deals; and, finally, a reduced political competency of White House staff (Cannon 593). In Iran, a major shift in government had occurred in late 1979 as a revolution ousted the constitutional monarchy of Shah Mohmiimad Reza Pahlavi, which was replaced by a religious oligarchy under Ayatollah RuhoUah Khomeini. The new religious oligarchy began to try to spread its form of militant Islmii beyond Iran, through support of terrorists and challenges toward other Muslim governments, especially in the Arab world. In neighboring Iraq, a coup d'etat in 1968 had given power to the Sunni minority under Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. This Sunni minority governed the much Imger Shiite population. Sunni leader Saddmii Hussein took power in Iraq in 1979, and the Shiite-Sunni conflict contributed to other problems that created enormous tension between Baghdad and Tehran. Saddam Hussein ordered a massive attack of Iraqi troops on the border meas of Iran on September 22, 1980, in order to gain strategic resources. The war began well for Iraq with limited resistance from the surprised Iranians. But as the Iraqis moved further into Iran, the Iranimis stmled to resist. By 1982, the Irmiians had successfully countered Iraq's push forward and regained most of the lost land. For the remainder of the war, most fighting occurred on Iraqi territory, with occasional fighting in Iran. The war devolved into a stalemate, with Iraq entrenched in its own fortifications and Irmi sending armed "hummi waves" towards those Iraqi forces. Iran was funded and supported by Syria, Libya, China, and North Korea during the wm, but as the war reached its critical stages in 1985 Iran's supply of arms was becoming seriously depleted. As the Irmi-Iraq war raged, important events were happening in Central America. With the resignation of Anastasio Somoza Garcia, dictator of Nicaragua from 1969 until Moodie 9 1979, a new wave of political fervor swept Nicmagua. The Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (commonly referred to as Sandinistas) took over the country in 1979 with a wave of socialist reforms. The Sandinistas had been rebels against the Somoza government, and when he resigned the Smidinistas quickly took over the government after only a single day. The chmiges being made by the Sandinistas seemed to many to be communist, and many miti-communist Nicaraguan citizens stmted revolting. In his autobiography Ronald Reagan claims that communism was "a predatory system of absolute, authoritarimi rule that had an insatiable appetite for expansion... it was against everything Americans have stood for for more thmi two hundred years" (Reagan 471). Having taken such a strong position against radical left movements, the Reagan administration felt it had no choice but to act. The Reagan Administration contended that in order for them to maintain a relationship with Nicaragua the Sandinistas must be removed. The CIA began orgmiizing "freedom fighters" against the Smidinista government into Contras, the term for military fighting forces funded and armed by the United States. Not all members of Congress supported the Contras and, led by Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill, these Congressional opponents limited the amount of money the United States could provide to the "freedom fighters" (Reagmi 477-80). On January 20, 1985, Ronald Regan took office for his second term with over 60 percent of the populm vote and the electoral votes of 49 out of 50 states. The second term was clearly going to be different thmi Reagan's first term almost from the moment Reagan took office; in fact, two weeks before Reagan's second sweming-in. Cabinet members Jim Baker and Don Regan met with the president and asked him to switch their jobs, with Regmi becoming Chief of Staff and Baker becoming Secretary of the Treasury. Moodie 10 President Reagan approved the chmige, which later would prove to be a critical mistake in that mmiy analysts believe B^er would most likely not have gotten Reagan into the Iran-Contra scmidal. Reagan notes in his journal, "I had no idea at the time how significant my decision not to appoint Jim B^er as National Security Advisor.. .would prove to be" (qtd. in Fitzgerald 233). Don Regan brought a very different style that Reagan had not encountered before. That style enlarged Regan's power, restricted access to the president, and led to communication problems between Regan and the president (Reagan 488). Terrorism had also become a reason why President Reagan felt that something had to be done to protect American civilians in the Middle East. During Jimmy Carter's administration many terrorist orgmiizations began to increase activities, and one of the most tragic events during his administration occurred when hostages were taken prisoner in the United States Embassy in the Irmiian capital of Tehran and held for 444 days.