1 /32 den Daas 4333446 The Strategic Defense Initiative and the End of the Cold War: Reagan’s Bluff or a Genius Strategic Ploy? Bachelor Thesis American Studies R.J. den Daas S4333446 – Radboud University Nijmegen Supervisor: Dr. P. van der Heiden Second reader: Dr. J. van den Berk 16-06-2019 2 /32 den Daas 4333446 ENGELSE TAAL EN CULTUUR Teacher who will receive this document: Dr. P. van der Heiden Title of document: vanderHeiden_denDaas_BachelorThesis.docx Name of course: BA Werkstuk Amerikanistiek Date of submission: 16-06-2019 The work submitted here is the sole responsibility of the undersigned, who has neither committed plagiarism nor colluded in its production. Signed Name of student: Robbie den Daas Student number: S4333446 3 /32 den Daas 4333446 Abstract This thesis has set out to further investigate the role the Strategic Defense Initiative had in the ending of the Cold War. It has done so by investigating Reagan and his administration’s views on the USSR and the nuclear threat during his first term in office and by examining the rhetoric and foreign policies Reagan and his administration undertook in that first term. This was done to create a frame in which the thoughts behind the need for such a defense could become clear. Reagan changed his rhetoric from an aggressive and confrontational nature into a tone that was more open towards discussion between the United States and the Soviet Union. Thereby, showing that Reagan feared the possible consequences of a nuclear war and thought of the SDI as a way of making nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete. This thesis also explained the details surrounding the initiative providing the history in research preceding its implementation, detailing the importance of the ABM treaty of 1972, the initial goal and intended research by the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, a summary of important critiques and controversies surrounding the SDI and showing what has become of all the research. This was done to show that the idea of the SDI was not far-fetched. Furthermore, it discussed how the SDI was used, intentionally and unintentionally, as a political and diplomatic tool by detailing the most common held beliefs surrounding the ending of the Cold War. This thesis contends that it is highly probable that the thought of the United States gaining technological and military superiority via the SDI, thereby undermining the MAD principle, caused the new Soviet leadership to conclude that they would have to drastically reform their domestic and foreign policies. As their economy was failing and this renewed arms race would further destroy it. The unintentional role of the SDI was that of an important diplomatic tool. Keywords Ronald Reagan, Strategic Defense Initiative, Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, Mikhail Gorbachev, USSR, Nuclear Arms Race, Military Buildup, MAD Principle, ABM Treaty, Cold War 4 /32 den Daas 4333446 Table of Contents Abstract 3 Keywords 3 Introduction 5 Chapter 1: Reagan’s Views and Fears Concerning the USSR and the Nuclear Threat 8 Chapter 2: The SDI as a Defense Program 15 Chapter 3: The Role of the SDI During the End of the Cold War 21 Conclusion 27 Works Cited 31 5 /32 den Daas 4333446 Introduction On March 23rd 1983, then President of the United States, Ronald Reagan publicly announced that the U.S. would start the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Reagan called upon scientists and engineers to create a rocket shield in space capable of stopping ballistic missiles when they left earth’s atmosphere. This would be done by a string of satellites in outer space. A year later the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) was created as part of the Department of Defense so that they could oversee the project and allowing the SDIO to have access to more budget. Its main focus was research on a variety of scientific and engineering levels such as lasers, supercomputing and high-energy physics. The SDIO also worked closely together with universities and the industry. Since its announcement the SDI has been highly controversial and been dubbed by many of its critics as the “Star Wars Program”. There have been speculations that it was not only a military defense project but perhaps also used as a political tool concerned with ending the Cold War. For decades it has been highly debated and discussed among historians and academics who or what was responsible for the end of the Cold War and the eventual disbandment of the Soviet Union. Many historians claim it was Gorbachev and the new Soviet leadership that deserves more praise while Reagan also gathers his fair share of supporters. Also, the highly controversial SDI has been named as an important factor in the demise of the Soviet Union. This thesis would like to investigate the true motives behind this initiative and its relation toward the end of the Cold War. What was the role of the SDI in the ending of the Cold War? It is important to define what role means in this context. Role in this context not only means the feasibility of the creation of a rocket shield in space but also the likelihood that Reagan and his advisors knew that the Soviets could no longer finance their nuclear arms race. In other words, was it really meant for the military defense of the United States or was it a political tool? The first chapter will detail Ronald Reagan’s foreign policies towards the USSR and the Cold War as well as his views on how to affect the nuclear arms race due to the fact that these policies and views can give insights into how the SDI was thought of and to what end it could possibly be used. The second chapter will deal with the SDI from its conception to its end and will explain what made it controversial, how it evolved to a present day organization, what its goals were and are now and, if possible, summarize the total costs and effectiveness. In the third chapter a closer look will be taken into the role the SDI played in ending the Cold War. It will start with explaining the most common held beliefs among historians about who 6 /32 den Daas 4333446 or what played the most important role that caused the termination of the war. Then the intentional or unintentional effects the SDI, as a political and diplomatic tool, had on the USSR will be discussed. Thereby, trying to find out if it was effective or not. It is essential to begin with the moment the world, Americans and Soviets alike, heard of the SDI for the first time. On March 23rd 1983 Ronald Reagan made a historic television announcement that best described his and his administration’s view on the future of strategic nuclear war. An excerpt of his television speech taken from his biography Ronald Reagan: An American Life: Let me share with you a vision of the future which offers hope. It is that we embark on a program to counter the awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive. Let us turn to the very strengths in technology that sawned our great industrial base and that have given us the quality of life we enjoy today. What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies? I know this is a formidable, technical task, one that may not be accomplished before the end of this century. Yet, current technology has attained a level of sophistication where it’s reasonable for us to begin the effort. It will take years, probably decades of effort on many fronts. There will be failures and setbacks, just as there will be successes and breakthroughs. And as we proceed, we must remain constant in preserving the nuclear deterrent and maintaining a solid capability for flexible response. But isn’t it worth every investment necessary to free the world from the threat of nuclear? Tonight, consistent with our obligations under the ABM treaty and recognizing the need for closer consultation with our allies, I’m taking an important first step. I am directing a comprehensive and intensive effort to define a long-term research and development program to begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles. This could pave the way for arms control measures to eliminate the weapons themselves. We seek neither military superiority nor political advantage. Our only purpose – one all people share 0 is to search for ways to reduce the danger of nuclear war. (575) 7 /32 den Daas 4333446 There are many reasons why this is such an important and historic moment. Especially now in hindsight, scholars have been able to dissect certain parts and ascribe them to sincere personal beliefs of the president. It also shows what the long-term vision was and how Reagan and his administration were trying to change the future of the world. However, there are many parts that are still up for debate among which the claim that “we seek neither military superiority nor political advantage” (575). Even though this is a political speech made by one side in the Cold War, and must therefore be treated as such, it is an interesting starting point of what would later become the final years of the Cold War. Did Reagan really believe he could change a Mutually Assured Destruction era into a more benign one? Was it a bluff or genius strategic ploy? And more importantly, what were the Soviets thinking? 8 /32 den Daas 4333446 Chapter 1: Reagan’s Views and Fears Concerning the USSR and the Nuclear Threat The time period in which the SDI was first suggested and then later implemented was the early eighties till the late eighties.