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Operation Artemis and Javier Solana: Eu Prospects for a Stronger Common Foreign and Security Policy

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Operation Artemis and Javier Solana: Eu Prospects for a Stronger Common Foreign and Security Policy STRATEGIC THOUGHT STRATEGIC @ European Community, 2007 @ European Community, European Union flags in front of the Berlaymont building, headquarters of the European Community. OPERATION ARTEMIS AND JAVIER SOLANA: EU PROSPECTS FOR A STRONGER COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY by Ryan C. Hendrickson, Jonathan R. Strand and Kyle L. Raney Introduction and security policy, but, rather, were rooted in domestic economic issues, including a backlash against liberal fter decades of discussion and considerable immigration policies, the potential of additional A“Euro-skepticism,” many European Union (EU) leaders “outsourcing” of labour, and the ongoing challenge and other observers maintain that the European Union of relatively high unemployment levels.2 In contrast, has begun to assert itself as a meaningful actor in European public opinion polls still suggest strong support foreign and security policy. The EU now oversees for a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), peacekeeping and observer operations in Bosnia and Georgia; it has completed operations in Macedonia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); and it has played Doctor Ryan C. Hendrickson is an Associate Professor of Political a lead diplomatic role in negotiations with Iran over its Science at Eastern Illinois University. He is the author of Diplomacy nuclear program.1 Important foreign policy differences and War at NATO: The Secretary General and Military Action after remain, however, among its members – especially with the Cold War, and The Clinton Wars: the Constitution, Congress and respect to the use of force and the ongoing political War Powers. His research has also appeared in journals such as crisis in Iraq. In addition, the French and Dutch rejection Parameters, the NATO Review, Security Dialogue, Journal of Strategic of the proposed European Union Constitution in the Studies, Armed Forces and Society, and Political Science Quarterly. summer of 2005, and the United Kingdom’s cancellation of Doctor Jonathan R. Strand is an Assistant Professor of Political Science its own referendum on this question, raise new challenges at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. His research has appeared in to Europe’s integrative efforts. journals such as World Development, the World Economy, International Interactions, and the Journal of European Integration. At the same time, recent observers of these events suggest that the failed referendums had little to do with Kyle L. Raney earned his MA in Political Science at Eastern Europe’s ambitions for a more unified European foreign Illinois University. Spring 2007 ● Canadian Military Journal 35 ECPAD photo C0D121AB-2D31-46F6-8232-3255A2D04D94 ECPAD In June 2003, EU High Representative Javier Solana arrives in Entebbe, welcomed by Colonel Louis-Michel Testaud and Colonel Eric de Stabenrath of the EU Stabilization Force. and the European Union’s High Representative for The case study that follows provides an assessment Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, of the European Union’s decision-making process continues to be an active promoter of Europe’s role that eventually resulted in Operation Artemis – the in global security. Thus, on security matters, the European European Union’s peacekeeping deployment to Union remains ambitious in striving toward common the DRC in 2003. Operation Artemis was the first positions. EU mission that took place outside of NATO assistance, and its troops engaged in combat soon after its Much research has been devoted to the cooperation deployment.6 Within the study, special emphasis is and integration witnessed in the European Union in recent devoted to Solana’s leadership and efforts in promoting years. Despite the array of theoretical and analytical a CFSP on the DRC. Such an emphasis fills a void approaches used to examine this evolution, very little in the existing literature on EU foreign policy research has been devoted to the potential role and research, but also has policy relevance – in that impact of the EU’s High Representative for CFSP. this focus addresses the EU’s ability to identify a This scholarly void may, in part, be explained by CFSP, and to act as an independent organization in the institutionally ambiguous role held by the High security matters. Representative, whose political authority and representative role can be both difficult to identify and challenging We first discuss the institutional role of the to research.3 This relative dearth of analysis on the High Representative for CFSP in the European High Representative’s leadership may also be attributed to Union, and then provide a brief background of the international relations scholars’ general reluctance legal and political context of the mission. We then to examine specific individuals in foreign policymaking.4 assess more specifically the EU’s decision-making Javier Solana, NATO’s secretary general from 1995 process and Solana’s role in the eventual deployment to 1999, has served as the EU’s High Representative decision, which has implications for future for CFSP since 1999. Although Solana has generated EU interventions. Broadly, this case examines the widespread media and journalistic attention while at the EU, EU’s ability to act toward a common foreign and very little research has assessed his leadership record.5 security policy in an operation that Solana himself 36 Canadian Military Journal ● Spring 2007 referred to as “EU military progress.”7 The findings In many respects, Solana was an ideal selection suggest that Solana’s personal impact on EU’s foreign for this position, given his previous leadership and policy coordination cannot be neglected; yet, Operation diplomatic experiences. As NATO secretary general, Artemis stemmed primarily from France’s willingness Solana gained much experience in political negotiation to exercise leadership within the European Union and diplomacy among the NATO allies, and at an for the deployment. organization that provides little formal legal authority to the secretary general. Moreover, as Spain’s foreign The EU High Representative for Common minister, Solana served during that country’s six-month Foreign and Security Policy presidency of the European Council of Ministers, which heightened his international and regional visibility.12 he position of the EU’s High Representative for T CFSP was created at the EU’s summit, held in As the EU’s High Representative, prior to Operation Amsterdam in June 1997. Article 18 of the Treaty calls Artemis, Solana has been credited with a number for a High Representative to assist the EU to speak of diplomatic achievements. Solana was a central with one voice. The High Representative would assist negotiator for the EU during the Macedonian crisis in “formulation, preparation and implementation of in 2001, when ethnic-Albanian rebels and the Macedonian policy decisions, and when appropriate, and acting government clashed over constitutional questions. THOUGHT STRATEGIC on behalf of the Council at the request of the presidency, This crisis was averted with the deployment of through conducting political dialogue with third parties.”8 NATO troops to the region, coupled with a weapons An individual was not appointed to this position exchange program that was agreed upon by the until June 1999, when Solana, NATO’s acting secretary warring factions.13 Journalists also credit Solana general and former foreign minister of Spain, accepted with assisting in the negotiations to end the Church the position. Solana came to the EU in October 1999 of the Nativity Crisis in 2002, which involved the with impressive leadership credentials, arriving only exile of 13 Palestinian militants to Cyprus.14 In months after NATO’s prolonged yet successful bombing addition, observers maintain that Solana was helpful in campaign against Slobodan Milosevic. Solana was inducted encouraging Turkey to support the “Berlin Plus” agreement formally as the EU’s High Representative for CFSP made at the EU Summit in Copenhagen during on 18 October 1999.9 December 2002, which allowed EU member states to use NATO assets in EU peacekeeping missions.15 Additionally, The High Representative’s role was articulated Solana was at the centre, if not the main architect, and expanded upon further at the Helsinki European of the agreement between Serb and Montenegro leaders Council meeting in December 1999. In revised form, not to separate into independent states in March 2002.16 the position was supposed to assist the EU presidency in coordinating the Council; to assist the Council in While Solana accrued these many diplomatic the creation of policy options; and to assist in the successes, other evidence suggests that he was left implementation of EU foreign and security policy on the diplomatic sidelines during the months leading decisions of the Council, the EU Commission, and up to Operation Iraqi Freedom, as political differences the member states. Besides these activities, the High among EU members were wide and pronounced. Representative was charged with overseeing the By one account, Solana was “irrelevant” to EU leaders, Policy Planning and Early Warning in what was arguably the most Unit (PPEWU). The PPEWU would “The findings important international issue of the be staffed by personnel contributions fall and winter of 2002-2003. Solana from EU member states, who would suggest that Solana’s was not consulted as EU members assist the High Representative in personal impact formed and eventually announced their identifying crises, policy options, and on EU’s foreign
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