Between Identity and Crisis
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View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by NORA - Norwegian Open Research Archives Between Identity and Crisis Discourse surrounding peace operations and reactions to discourse challenges Petter Hojem Master’s thesis, Master’s Programme in Peace and Conflict Studies, Department of Political Science UNIVERSITETET I OSLO 3 November 2010 Index 1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................4 1.1 Aim ....................................................................................................................................................................4 1.2 Research questions and scope .........................................................................................................................6 1.3 Structure of the paper......................................................................................................................................7 2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ...............................................................................8 2.1 From Rationalism to Social Constructivism..................................................................................................8 2.2 Identity, norms and expectations....................................................................................................................9 2.3 When narrative and reality do not match ...................................................................................................11 2.4 Methodological considerations......................................................................................................................16 3 DISCOURSES ........................................................................................................25 3.1 Swedish Foreign Policy Identity ...................................................................................................................25 3.2 Discourses, Operation Artemis and EUFOR Tchad/RCA .........................................................................34 4 CONTROVERSIES AND REACTIONS..................................................................55 4.1 Torture in the DRC........................................................................................................................................55 4.2 Colonial collaborators?..................................................................................................................................68 5 ANALYSIS..............................................................................................................79 5.1 Theoretical insights ........................................................................................................................................79 5.2 Cases of dissonance and reactions ................................................................................................................80 5.3 Actors, roles and reactions ............................................................................................................................84 5.4 Alternative frameworks.................................................................................................................................88 6 CONCLUDING REMARKS ....................................................................................91 6.1 Real-world implications?...............................................................................................................................91 6.2 Future development .......................................................................................................................................93 7 REFERENCES .......................................................................................................94 2 Acknowledgements This master thesis has been written part-time over the time period of October 2009 until November 2010, mostly in Stockholm, Sweden. I would like to express my gratitude towards FORES and my colleagues there for their flexibility and cooperation in giving me a workplace and endless amounts of copy paper. Thank you as well to the numerous of other offices and facilities which have kindly lent me their space for me to work in, including the Swedish Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and Communications, the Centerparty in Norrbotten, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Stockholm. In addition to the providers of paper and physical space, I would like to extend my gratitude to those persons who have made this work possible. They include Robert Egnell, Anders Nyberg, Aashild Ramberg, Johanna Martin and Frank Nilsson. Obviously any mistakes or shortcomings are my own. 3 1 Introduction When Sweden decided to send troops to participate in the European Union (EU) military operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) as well as to Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR), the decisions were approbated by unanimity in Parliament. Members of all political parties stressed the importance and valour of sending troops to stop conflicts and to protect civilians in Africa. The United Nations (UN) had officially mandated the EU to intervene, and the Members of Parliament (MPs) expressed how proud they were that competent Swedish soldiers would put their lives at risk in order to protect others. Sweden had a moral obligation to participate. But some things went wrong. Five years after Operation Artemis in the DRC was completed, Swedish media uncovered the fact that Swedes had witnessed fellow soldiers engaging in torture. Furthermore, the Swedish Armed Forces had hushed the whole incident down. Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA1 was authorised in late 2007, deployed the following year and completed in March 2009. From its conception, the operation was criticised for taking sides in the conflict and for merely being an excuse for France to increase the legitimacy of its military presence in the country. In Sweden, voices were raised concerning the political delicacy of the situation. Sweden is a country that identifies itself as a peace-supporting, human rights-respecting and historically neutral country. How then, were these apparent challenges to the country’s self-image handled by the Swedish media and decision-makers? 1.1 Aim The aim of this paper is to increase the understanding of Swedish identity, norms and images in relation to peace operations, and in particular the recent EU missions in Africa. The paper will look at the source of Swedish identity and norms and consequent discourse surrounding participation in peace operations, what behaviour it dictates, and 1 République centrafricaine (RCA), French translation of the Central African Republic (CAR). In this paper the EU peace operation in Chad and the CAR will be known as EUFOR Tchad/RCA following its official French name. 4 how the media and decision-makers react when expectations are not met. An additional though secondary aim is to show how social constructivist theory can be employed in a pragmatic and novel way in order to achieve the former. There has been surprisingly little public debate about Swedish participation in peace operations under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). According to Jan Joel Andersson, Swedish representatives in Brussels, Paris and London have more or less flauntered Swedish participation in Operation Artemis, while neither Government nor opposition have been interested in discussing it at home (Andersson 2005: 17). This is worrying for at least two reasons: firstly, if the Swedish population to a large extent is uninformed of why their country is sending troops to Africa, it may weaken the possibilities for popular control over Swedish foreign and security policy. Secondly, and as a consequence of the former, Swedish popular support for participating in peace operations might erode. Though historically a strong contributor, engagement can be brittle. While a majority of the Swedish people still support their country’s participation in peace operations, support has slowly and steadily declined during the last couple of decades (Swedish National Board of Psychological Defence 2010: 156). Scandals or traumatic shocks might further weaken support. One textbook example is the revelation of torture at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq in 2004 and its effects on the public opinion and support (Voeten & Brewer 2006: 819). Another might be the US engagement in Somalia in 1993, where scenes of American soldiers being dragged around in Mogadishu led to a quick pullback of troops. However, despite the purported “body bag syndrome”, the general public is actually willing to make sacrifices as long as they know why and that the cause is worthwhile (Dauber 2001). My hope is therefore that this paper might serve as valuable information concerning the knowledge, expectations and support of participation in peace operations. In turn, this may contribute to a public and committing debate about why and how a country like Sweden (or other countries for that matter) should participate towards peace and development in the world. 5 1.2 Research questions and scope This leads me to pose the following research questions: 1. What is the dominant contemporary discourse surrounding Swedish participation in peace operations? 2. How do key actors react when that discourse is challenged? I have limited myself to look more closely at two cases: Swedish participation in Operation Artemis and in EUFOR Tchad/RCA. Both were completed under EU command and were located in Africa.