Institutional Variance of the Democratic Peace, 1816-2002
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INSTITUTIONAL VARIANCE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE, 1816-2002: ELECTORAL, EXECUTIVE, AND FEDERAL SYSTEMS IN TIME AND SPACE by Anita Schjolset A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS) August 2008 Copyright 2008 Anita Schjolset Dedication In Memory of Hayward R. Alker, 1937-2007, who taught me that stories can be written in many languages, that realities have many truths, pointed at issues never raised and to connections never drawn. ii Acknowledgements This dissertation is about the role of governmental institutions in the making of politics between states. It is an effort to show that the effects of spreading democratic institutions to promote peace are more complex than commonly perceived by politicians and academics today. It is motivated by the hope for a more peaceful world, a peace built on tolerance and the acknowledgement that demo- cratic governance must be vested in local cultures and histories. Democracy and democratization may be many-faceted tools for achieving peace. My aim in this dissertation is to start unwrapping some of these relationships. The starting point of this dissertation is the Democratic Peace theory, which provides the most referred to and relied upon ideas of the role regimes play for peace. I argue that this status of the Democratic Peace theory is premature. Despite having uncovered an apparent empirical pattern, the research program1 has by no means provided qualified theoretical explanations. Theory offers clear and comprehensive descriptions of the relations between phenomena. Given the world’s complexity, a theory can only explain parts of an observation, leaving other parts out. This dissertation starts from the view that too much has been left out when seeking to explain the absence of conflict between democracies. Consequently, Democratic Peace theory cannot automatically be assumed useful for understanding states’ conflict behavior vis-a-vis other states. This study takes seriously the suggestion that political decision-makers face structural con- straints when choosing their actions internationally. Rather than merely assuming that structural constraints shape decision-making, this work points to the political relevance of such a proposition and suggests empirically exploring it by looking at behavioral variation between different types of 1The term ‘research program’ refers to a series of theories linked by a set of constitutive and guiding assumptions (Lakatos, 1970). Whereas the Democratic Peace theory refers to the main theoretical argument about how norms and institutions constrain democracies in their behavior internationally, the Democratic Peace as a research program embrace all theorizing and empirical work related to to the main argument. iii democracies. Furthermore, this dissertation underscores the importance of understanding the com- plexities of this variation within regional sub-systems within which democracy and conflict have been subjected to the same historical trajectories. The strong descriptive focus of this work un- covers some of these patterns and raise awareness of generally ignored complexities in the analyses about democracy and peace. When I first started writing about governmental institutions and conflict more than a decade ago, I largely saw the world through the lenses of positivist research methodologies. My academic upbringing was in the spirit of scientific quantification of the world and the belief that this is the best way to acquire reliable knowledge. Meeting Hayward R. Alker contributed to changing my perspective. There are many ways to describe Alker’s contribution to this work, most notably his questioning of categories and assumptions that often remain unchallenged in the academic field of International Relations. Not only did I benefit from his encyclopedic mind, he also introduced me to ideas that he developed as a young scholar at MIT, which unfortunately went largely unheard in the community of international relations scholars. Having evolved scholarly from econometrics at MIT to hermeneutics at USC, Alker understood and respected my epistemological base. Intellectually inspired by Alker’s early work on the problems of non-additivity (Alker, 1965, 1968, 1969) combined with his later work on dialectics of world order (Alker, Biersteker, and Inoguchi, 1989:159) and non-linearity (Alker and Christensen, 1972), my work emphasizes the uniqueness and thus non- additive nature of every region as well as the interrelated ‘orders’ between the regions in the world, the dialectic between democratic institutions, and finally the dynamic of regimes, institutions and interstate conflict over time and within regions. My quest for understanding the behavioral variation among democracies forced me to search outside the mainstream literature of international relations for answers. This cross-cutting approach enabled me to draw on rich and relevant work from a whole range of disciplines, especially from comparative politics, history, foreign politics and economic theory. My original plan was to look for institutional variation among all states, not only democracies. Through the collection of this information I came to realize that the institutional classifications that I relied on for the coding were largely aspects of democracy and would not capture variation in decision-making constraints among autocratic leaders. I had wanted to detach my analysis from the binary democracy versus autocracy framework in order to avoid relying on assumptions about the value of these regimes. The realization iv that my project was already vested in these binary conceptions led me to drop the differentiation of autocracies. The analysis of constrained autocrats would need to be based on differentiation of other structures than those focused on here. As a mentor, Alker was very encouraging of this dialectical process of working in the interface between theory development and data collection. At the same time as respecting the application of sophisticated quantitative techniques, Alker always emphasized the importance of knowing your data. Relying on other people’s data, created for different purposes than your own, is sometimes necessary. However, my decision to create a new dataset met his idea of understanding the substance behind numbers. The strong emphasis on descriptive analysis of the data further supported this approach. Although the extensive duration of this project has been frustrating at times, it did give me time to reflect and internalize ideas that I was exposed to and working with at the University of Southern California (USC). As a result, I have removed myself from a somewhat inhibiting starting point and hopefully become a more informed scholar. I hope that some of this transformation shines through in this work, even though I have chosen to follow an approach which largely conforms to the most recent advances of the quantitative methodologies as defined by scholars studying regimes and conflict. Rather than imply that this is the only way to go about gathering knowledge about govern- mental institutions and interstate conflict, it signifies an attempt to master one research technique. I believe in the virtue of utilizing and combining both quantitative and qualitative research methods. Rather than assuming that one is correct and the other is incorrect, I believe they complement each other. Whereas the generalization of quantitative methods can provide useful insight about trends in phenomena across states, regions and over long time spans, they cannot automatically be assumed accurate for individual states and peoples. The conditions affecting whether or not a state will engage in conflict with other states are far more complex and must be contextualized in order to be useful as an instrument for policy-making. The essence of this argument therefore is that generalizations are best suited in the initial stages of studying a phenomenon, but needs to be complemented with disaggregated analyses, based on factors like regions, states, or time periods. Because of the great challenges I encountered when undertaking this work, such as collecting data on governmental institutions, I opted not to include the type of qualitative analyses that I find crucial to understand relations between governmental institutions and international conflict. The generalizing nature of this work should serve as a starting point for future research in this field v by suggesting the potential importance of governmental institutions when democratizing for peace. Furthermore, this dissertation should serve as a starting point for qualitative analyses of institutions and conflict, such as case studies and comparative case studies, or of systemic analyses. What I do not claim is to have established the final answer to what the association between governmental institutions and conflict is. My guiding principle in this work has been that of making everything as clear as possible. My goal has been to present thoughts in ways that are clear, logical, easy to follow, and keep the focus on the ideas. Recognizing that the quantitative methodologies in International Relations have become very sophisticated, but for some scholars also complex, difficult, and often expressed in inaccessible terms, I try to present my choices and procedures as explicitly as possible for myself, as well as for the reader and critic. It is my hope that this work will raise awareness of the policy