CEU eTD Collection

POST-COMMUNIST ELITES ANDECONOMICREFORMS IN In partial fulfillment of therequirementsfor thedegreeof Master of Arts CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1989-1992 Supervisor: ProfessorAndrásBozóki Department of Political Science Central European University Budapest, Hungary Pavol Hardoš Submitted to 2009 by

CEU eTD Collection communist Czechoslovakia. economic reform furtherexacerbatedthe po them disposedtoamore gradualreform. Th program ofradicalreform,theSlovaks’more reform agenda. Thethesisargues thatwhile demonstrates howtheirideological beliefs and positioning in thepolitical field influenced the the configuration oftherespectiveCzecha the elitevariableineconomic transformation fr rich literature ontherole of political actors intransitions the workassertsthecrucial roleof economic reforms inCzechoslovakia shortlyaf The thesisdeals withthe roleofpost-communi

ABSTRACT ABSTRACT the Czechsembraced a homegrown neoliberal ambiguousrelationship ii nd Slovaknationalpoliticalelitesthethesis ter the fall ofcommunism. Acknowledgingthe litical andconstitutional dilemmas ofpost- om statesocialism. Followingthegenesisand st politicalelites in e ensuingdivergenceof e shaping andenactingthe with communism made eliteopinionson CEU eTD Collection COMMUNIST ELITES COMMUNIST ANDSLOVAKNATIONALPOST- OFCZECH 2–THEGENESIS CHAPTER CHAPTER 1–THEORYOFELITES INTRODUCTION REFERENCES CONCLUSION REFORM 3–ELITESANDECONOMIC CHAPTER 1.3 Questionsoftransition:path 1.2 Elitesinpost-communism 1.1 Elitetheory:classical andmodern 3.4 TheSlovakspecificity 3.3 Privatization 3.2 Thetransition reformstruggles 3.1 Thestateofthe 33 2.4 Conclusion...... 2.3 Slovakpost-communist elites 2.2 Czechpost-communist elites 2.1 Introduction .. oce rvtzto...... 42 3.3.1 Voucherprivatization...... 2.2.2 Thetechnocrats 2.2.1 Thedissidents 3.3.2 Othermethods ...... 54 ...... 52 ...... 1 ...... 19 ...... 41 ...... 19 ...... 21 ...... 44 ...... 35 ...... 23 ...... 46 ...... 10 ...... TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF ...... 20 ...... dependency orprimacy ofactors? ...... 27 ...... 36 ...... 6 ...... 6 ...... iii ...... 35 ...... 14 ...... CEU eTD Collection prospects and thepaceof reforms. newly emerged, divergentnationalelitesandthei remain relatively understudied. economic crucial;howevertheirmo reforms was origins, careerpaths,valuesandideologicalorientations. Theroleofelitesinbringingabout explain thechoicesofeconomic reform policies, configuration inCzechandSlovak partsofth narrative andproposetoanswerthefollowi Relyingon methods ofdescriptive, qual economic transformation was,toalargeextent, the paceof reforms. Thebasicproposition is therecognitionthat the tempo andmode of divergent nationalelitesandthei reforms intheformer Czechoslovakiaafter transition period. particular reform proposalsandtheirenactment, specifically intheareaof however limititself with onlya actions, in thisperiod and identify thefactor theory of elites. I intend toes after thefall of communism untilthebreak-up of thefederation through theprism of the descri to is work my of aim In my thesisIwillfocusontheroleofelites inbringing aboutthefirsteconomic Political elitesinpost-communist privatization,asIdonotwish be andexplainthetransformati tablish thekeyroleofecono The Czechoslovakcasepresents more generalandcursoryovervi r (re)configurationinfluencedtheshape,prospectsand INTRODUCTION countriesvarygreatlyin e Czechoslovak Federationpriortothe break-up 1 1989. Iwillarguethatthe newlyemerged, s thatshaped theirdecisions. Thework will ng questions: How does thenational elite ng questions:Howdoes determined bythedecisi nordoIintendtocove r (re)configurationinfluencetheshape, specificallywithregards toprivatization? itative analysis I will tives andreasonsfortheirsuccess/failure to dealwiththeminutiae ofall on processesinCzechoslovakia mic reformers, their beliefsand their reformers, mic a fascinatingexample ofhow ew of some initialreforms, their socialandhistorical ons oftheelites.The present ahistorical r thewholeof CEU eTD Collection the CzechandSlovakelites. Czechoslovakia itwillalsohelp serve asapotentialsourceofconflictsmaking example ofthe fundamental role ofpolitical configurations. Thechangeoftheeconomic or instead an attempt tointerpret theeconomic tran does notwishtoasserttheexhaustivenessan economic transitionpathsinCzechandSlovakrepublics? Can thedifferences in elite configuration (com 1 the periodof transitionpolitical phenomena.will present I a comparative snapshot of two post-communist Czechoslovakia as thedetermin successful installationofdemocratic regimes Burton &Higley1989)stressed elite research.Theactor-orientedappro authoritarian regimes intheso-called Thirdwa democratization, especiallyinitslong,hi economic modernizationhasbeenrepeatedly 73). AtleastsinceLipset(1959)thestructur alternately structuraldeterminants andactor theorizing. Thisdistin democratization ingeneralthequestionof been historically themost successful ones. For example, Burton and Higley (1987) point out that that out Higley (1987) point and Forexample, Burton In thiswork Iadoptthelatter,actor orie Looking atthetransitionprocessesinEa The paperoffersonlyapartialglimpseof ction hasproducedtwocompeting th

illustrate the extentof thedivergence of thedominant parts of the importance of the strategic elite interactions for the ach (Rustow1970,O’Donnell&Schmitter 1986, -oriented analyses(Teo 1 . 2 structure vs.agencyconfoundsmuch ofthe leaders intransition period, whileitwillalso storical variety.Howeverthecollapseof e, i.e.theeconomic development andsocio- d punctiliousnessofahistoricalwork,butis and breakingpoliticalalliances.Inthecaseof and ve ofdemocratization gaveanewimpetusto position) explain andhelp chartthediffering accentuated asanimportantdeterminant of the transitions where elites played a central rolehave acentral where elitesplayed transitions the ganization ofthecountrymayaprime offer nted approach andfocusontheelitesin sformation aspartlyare ing featureandkeyexplanatory concept for the events, asnap-shot,whichcannotand theevents, st CentralEurope inparticularand eoretical traditions, highlighting rell &Hadenius2007,69- sult of politicalelite CEU eTD Collection of economic reforms. as offeredbyEyal(2003) canofferconvincing e a judicious applicationofB show howmodernnewelitetheory astheori believe elite theoryismostfruitful whena each other wereCzechandSlovak show thatpost-communist politicaldevelopmen will showhowCzechandSlovakelitesdifferedin the wholecomplexity of theirinteractions andmutual interests. aim istoidentify the relevant eliteactors not onl demonstrate howtheirundersta their composition, outlooksandso national eliteconfigurations,th interests, butwasaproduct of to bearesult ofsome sinist resulting policies.Infactthe an outcome of theinteraction of the domestic eliteswhoseinterests were projected intothe some neoliberalproject(seeGreskovits1998,20-21) by westernadvisers,butitwasforemost shape ofthetransformation oftheeconomy in neoliberal reforms onhaplesspost-communist governments (Stiglitz1999,22).However,the by “market Bolsheviks”from theinternationa therapy’ andadoptionofprivatiz Joseph Stiglitz(1999)famous In doingsoIadoptHigleyandLengyel’s(2 ourdieu’s geneticstructuralis er plotonpartoftheoldcad “neoliberal” blueprintforeconomic cannot beevensaid reforms e respectiveCzechandSlovakpos nding ofandcommitment toeconomic reforms differed.The anextensivedebateamong cer ation practicesasdrivenbyfree-market ideology,promoted elites withantagonisticbeliefs cial trajectories thatleadthem totheirpositions and ly lambastedpost-communisteconomic reforms, ‘shock pplied toregimetransformations andI intend to 3 l communitywhowereaggressivelypushing zed byBurton,Higleyetal.combined with t producedan eliteconstellation where facing Czechoslovakia wasnotduetoanimportof xplication of political de y intheirset structural theirapproachtoeconomic policies. Iwill 000) conceptofeliteconfiguration and m (Bourdieu1985,Bourdieu1986) res following theireconomic self- tain economists insocialist t-communist political elites, and ideological profiles. I contextbuttoreveal cisions on thenature CEU eTD Collection political reforms inthe contextofaneces 1999, 16;Eyal2000) capitalism waspartofa thus mythic struggle reaction tothesinsofco presented asa part ofasystemic decommunisation, athorough divorce withthepast,a moral However, atthesame time, therewasalsoa teleological element; thereforms werealso clear-cut technicalsolutionstoeconomic ails of liberalization andprivatization we political and economic liberalization.The right politicalandeconomic prescr countries, who kepttrackwithwesterneconomic various stateenterprisesanda movement, consistedof“reformist” communi elite inSlovakia,whomanaged tosupersede parcel ofbroaderstruggleforSlovaknationa emerging newSlovakelites,whosawthequesti of economic transformation aswelldemocratic Czech partofthefederationandwere instrumental informingthefirst, most important steps political struggle.Theeconomic reformers, who necessity, thequestionsabout “technocratic” economic reformers wasabletoth intellectuals arguedforthe However, eveninthesituationwhen ec The Czechcaseoffersan example ofahome-grown neoliberalprogram. Thedissident mmunism throughwhichsocietymust purgeitself.Building small groupofnationalistintell moral caseofradicalreform particulars ofsuchatransformation wereopentodebateand re thusdevisedwithaninstrumental, rational approach,as iptions (Bockman &Eyal,2002). 4 l identity.Thisnewemerging post-communist Czech proposed economicreforms ofrapid against theforcesofoldregime. (Kabele, sarily broader reformoftheconstitutional sts, managerial “technocratic”cadresfrom the initial Slovakintellectual anddissident socialism, a result of onomic reforms havebecomeastructural scienceandwerecapableofsupplyingthe transition,sooncame on ofeconomic reform onlyasapartand have gainedpoliticalpre-eminence inthe eoretically outlineth ectuals, allofwhichunderstood s whilethesmall groupof technicalrationality. into conflictwiththe e radicalpoliciesof CEU eTD Collection distinctness”. organization ofthefederatedstateandenvisage social genesisandcomposition. Thethirdchapte then offerstheparticular overviewof Czech although ithasoftenspawnedcompelling empirical research” (Lazi observed; “elitetheoryhasbeentrivial,descri limits ofelitetheoryarealso present, withaspecialattention to elite proportionality ineconomic decision-making. representing Slovaknationaldi more ambiguous andwantedamore gradualch proposals, theSlovakeliteswerelessenthusia break withthepastviaatechnocraticdesignculminating intheirvoucherprivatization needs tobesupplantedbyamarket economy as design andintent,basedontheirconvictionthatsocialism isunreformable andimmoral attention onprivatization. why therespectivenationalelites proposedandopposedtheeconomic reforms, withspecial The thesisconsists of three chapters. Chapteronewillintroduce elitetheory, pastand As aresult, whiletheCzech duly acknowledged;asMladenLazi stinctness, theyoppos elites were more radical an theorizing ofpost-communist transformation. The and Slovakpost-communist nationalelite,their 5 ptive, andnon-analytical at theabstractlevel, d themselves asadvocates ofSlovak“specific stic. Theysawthelegacyofcommunism as r goesintomore detail ange; theirprimary concernwastheideaof quicklyaspossible, ed thereforms, arguingforpolitical d sweeping intheirreform ć 2000,126).Chaptertwo ć and describeshow arguingforaradical not entirely unfairly CEU eTD Collection that therulingminority ismore cohesiveandorganized,whichallows ittoholdpowerover appear, thosethatruleand thos 289-290, Michels2001).GaetanoMoscasaidthat in a response totheperceived‘naivety’ofdemocra attempt of ascientific analysis of theconcept Pareto hasattimes viewedelitesinnolessfa themselves. or nobility,whoaregenerallymen ofexcellen is aristocratic(OrtegayGasset1960,20).Heco that everysocietyneedstobear to suchreadings,theSpanishphilosopherJosé animated byegalitarianfeelings,asshadygroup particular fieldofexpertise. and powerful,thecrème delacrème ofthesociet 1.1 Elitetheory:classicalandmodern

The classical exposition ofelites Gaet The notionoftheeliteinpopularlexicon savour forhim unlesshemakes itc not thecommonman who Contrary towhatisusuallythought,itthemanofexcellence,and 63) by obligations,notrights. – thenoblelife.Nobilityisdefinedbydemandsitmakes onus– exigent, withwhichtocoercehimself. Thisislife livedasadiscipline grows restlessandinventssome newstandard, more difficult,more as anoppression.When, bychance,suchnecessityislacking,he transcendental. Hencehedoesnotlookuponthenecessityofserving CHAPTER 1–THEORYOFELITES Oftenenoughitcanbeunders e thatareruled.Thissimple em istocratic, ormore precisely, itisa societ lives inessential se Noblesse oblige nciful terms, althoughtheirswasthefirstmodern 6 Ortega yGasset,forexample,wasconvinced ntrasted the common mass manntrasted thecommon withtheelite, s withsuspect andulterior motives. Contrary tic theoriesoftheda of elites.Theirtheory y, orpeoplewhoarepotentially bestintheir onsist inservicetosomething ce, responsibletohighergoalsthanthey ano Mosca,Robert Michels andVilfredo views astherich,successful them usually all societiestwoclassesofpeoplealways . (OrtegayGasset1960, rvitude. Lifehasno pirical factandtherecognition tood ina negative context, y (seee.g.Mosca1967 of eliteswaspartly y onlyaslongsit CEU eTD Collection 2623). tensions anddestabilizingconflicts,whichmay tend, according toMosca andPareto,tobecome rigidandstagnantproducesocial possibilities ofascendingtopowerothers,such social change,thehistoryisbut described it,wherenew individu affairs (Parsons1949,279-280).Thecontinualpr former aredirectlyorindirec These werefurthersubdividedintogovernme elite weresimply theminority whoexcelledinth VilfredoParetoofferedasimple modelof 2001: 2623). bureaucrats whocanattimes of changeserveas technocratic stratum ofthesocietyconsistin 1987, 136).Moscaalsoemphasized thegrowing importance ofthesub-elite thelower the disorganizedmasses, forms thebasisof oligarchy (Michels2001, 241). power andresourcesconcentration andpowerpr tendencies are partly psychological, withtheir acquired positions comesthefurthering of leads toqualitative that theorganizational Law ofOligarchy necessity inanymodern, complex andstruct modern democraciesandpoliticalparties(Michels[1915]2001),showed Similarly, RobertMichels,inhissociolog onthe ostensibly egalitarian Social detachment ofthepersonalities. necessity oftheemergence oflead tly responsibleforinfluencingoradministering thegovernmental acirculation ofelites. Socie als stepupand forceoutthe elite theory(Mosca280;DunleavyandO’Leary ured socialorganizat 7 repositories of newelite recruitment (Akard, ntal andnongovernment lead toabruptsocial g mainly of intellectuals,managers and eservation. Anyorganizati eir particularareaof atwo-tiersocialst ical studyoftheoligarchictendenciesin asvariouscasteor aristocratic systems, ocess ofelite“circu democratic partyofGermany heargued (Michels,2001:240) ers throughthefunctionstheyadopt ties wheretheelites severeall older actorsisimportant for Iron ion. DemonstratinghisIron changes(Akard,2001: activityoverthemass. ratification, where the ratification, wherethe al elite,wherethe lation” asPareto on isthusalsoan thatelitesarea Theoligarchic CEU eTD Collection (Michels 2001,225). intermixture, theoldelements incessantlyat simple replacement ofone elite groupfora Pareto’s theory of elitecirculation mustbe of dancersexecutinga Latin America andSouthernEurope. Amove to (Zuckerman 1977,326)waschallenged byempirical Meisel’s three Cscharacterizing theelites (consciousness, coherence, conspiracy) Higley 1998,15).Nationaleliteis are capable ofregularly andsignificantlyinfl strategic positions inpowerful organizations understood asapurely positionalcategory. Thuspo to bethekeyexplanatoryconcept,whichhasb functional conceptdevoid ofa modern socialtheorists,e.g.BurtonandHi psychologistic interpretations(Lazic2000,123).Elitetheory tradition defined elitesbasedontheircapabilities andqualities,anapproach thatleadsto individual capabilities,whichc engage ingiganticbattlesupon the dominant minorities in antagonistic groups. military, professional media andcultural influential positions inthebiggestand most The popular,traditional andsomewhat cons The classicalelitetheorists,however, vi According toMichelsmosthistoricalconflicts canbeunderstood chassé croiséina quadrille”. (Michels2001,224).Furthermore, ny oftheearliernormative unde onstrained thetheory’s analytical the sceneofhistory[…]may t generallyoperationalizedasal organizations (Burton&Higley 1989,18). tempered byanobservation gley (1989),whoundersto and movements (dissident onesincluded) who tracting, absorbing,andassimilating thenew”. 8 uencing nationalpoliticaloutcomes & (Dogan influential political, administrative, economic, nother butalways“acontinuousprocessof procedural democracy bythesecountries was een ridofitsqualitativeconnotationsandis “Thesocialclasseswhichunderoureyes ewed elitesthroughtheprism oftheir piratorial viewofelites, summed by litical elitesaredefinedasholdersof research into democratictransitions in rpinnings. Elitesareunderstood hus becomparedtotwogroups potential.Thisindividualistic was updatedbytheworkof l thepersonsin that therenever was a od elitesasapurely as strugglesbetween strategically CEU eTD Collection tend leadtounconsolidateddemocracies with conduct andtheintrinsicvalueof also lackedvalueconsensus,i. inclusive formal andinformal networksofcommunicationandinfluenc the game. The disunifiedelitesinthesecountries democracy wastheconsensusamong politicalelit no guarantee ofa stable democracy, sincea key factoralsonecessary forthesurvival of 2 of unityindiversity consensual eliteswithoutsocial clos which MoscaandParetoregardedasessential – anditsmode, i.e.thespeedandmanner of are describedthroughtwokeyaspects,itsscope –i.e.the rangeanddepthofelitecirculation interaction (HigleyandLengyel200 particular configurations cangeneratedistinct of eliteconfiguration of consensual,fragme combining eliteunityanddifferentiation heterogeneous, organizationallydiverse andautonomous from eachotherandthestate.By communication andinfluence.Elit structural integration,thatissharedbeliefsystem andinclusivechannelsnetworksof normative andinteractive,whic unity ordisunity, differentiation,and circulation. configuration anditsrelationtopoliticalregimes. Thismodel distingui (Burton, Gunther&Higley1992,10-11) elite convergence. (see Burton, Gunther & Higley 1992, 13-30) 13-30) &Higley (seeBurton,Gunther 1992, elite convergence. Transformation of a disunified elite into a consensually aconsensually elite into a disunified of Transformation A wideanddeep&gradualpeacefulcirc Higley andLengyel(2000)

e. arelativeagreemen h aretantamount totheaforementioned valueconsensusand existing politicalinstitutions. e differentiationdenotestowhat 0, 3-4).Elite circulationispa offer acomprehensive modelofnationalelite circulation.(HigleyandLengyel2000,5) Higley andLengyelcome upwith4idealtypes 9 sets ofstrategiesadoptedbytheelites intheir for eliterenewalandisconducivetoanethos unified elite then can occur either via elite settlement or or via elite settlement elitethen either can unified occur nted, ideocratic anddividedelites. These the possibility of an imminent collapse. Eliteunity iscomposed oftwodimensions: lackedstructuralinte es regardingthebasic ulation isakin totheclassic circulation t ontherulesof thegame of political ure. Wide anddeepbutsudden Regimes with disunifiedelites rt ofthemode extentaretheelitegroups gration, i.e.relatively e betweenelites, and shes patterns ofelite values andrulesof l; itspatterns 2

CEU eTD Collection “contribute greatlytoelitefragment significant changein eliteprofiletakes placean its doctrinal stance inorder tosecure itsposit dominant elitegroupengagesinsome small po and socially shallowinscopebutgradual a configuration andusuallytakesaform of and sudden andcoercedquasi-replacement us peripheral counter-elitesweeps and coerced, i.e. replacement circulation is relations –sociologists, such power conversionandhis“field” specializing onthequestionsof different forms ofsocialcapital–conversion 1.2 Elitesinpost-communism political poweronlywhen itsawanopportunity 1986: 253). they canbereproducedindifferentform with Different capitalsdifferintheir“reproducibility preserve hiscapitalindifferentformandmain for strategiesofcapitalpreservationthr countries. The convertibility ofdifferentforms economic –hasinspiredmany e His theorieshavegained Pierre Bourdieu’stheoretic as Elemér Hankiss,postulated th elite composition andchange.A aside everyonepreviouslydo lite theoreticianstoexamine currency among thestudentsofdemocratic transitions of power–socialarenasinte al studyofpowerconversi ation”. (HigleyandLengyel2000,5-6) ough itsreproduction.Thecapital’sbearercan a coup.Finally,circul nd peacefulin modeistermed reproduction.A 10 ions. Afew dolosetheir positions, however no a morerevolutionary,vi what costsand levelofconcealment (Bourdie, of capitalis,according to Bourdieu,thebasis sitional changes andmaneuvers modifies ”, orhoweasilytheyaretransmitted, i.e.how d the hasty efforts to obtain safe places may may places safe obtain to efforts hasty d the tain alsohispositioninthe“socialfield”. of culturalcapitalto ually occurs inalreadydivided elite to convertitintoaneconomic one(cf. minant. Anarrowandshallow transitions inpost-communist at therulingelitegave up its pplying Bourdieu’sinsighton on theconvertibilityof rnally structuredbypower ation positionally narrow olent variant where a political, politicalto CEU eTD Collection reform asaninstrument of interest ofrulingelitesleadsthem toconvert newly dynamic corporatespace.The assertionof ex-communist cadresinthetransition periodtha Bozóki, 2003:223-224).Similarly, AkosRóna-Tas However, anotherCzech sociologistJi into amore tangibleformal one,asoneexpl Bourdieuan interpretation of th so ‘easily’,suggestedthatattheend,regime was more moderate”(Laneetal.2007,14). also changedwashighandtheinf relatively orderly like in theCzech, Polish andH the regime andsubsequentstateasse change countries cannotbelumpedtoge successfully asneweconomic elites isproblema (Staniszkis2006,68-69). communism. their owncapital, crossing theideological lim their ownbenefit;theybegan of thenomenclature beganusingtheirpositionin supposed to bedesigned specificallyaccording Capitalism” –JadwigaStaniszkis’term –is political situationtoconverttheir Czech sociologist Ivo Možný,whenasking However, thisideathatformer communistcadresreconstituted themselves Likewise, JadwigaStaniszkis(2006)expected maintaining theirinfluence. e desireofcommunistcadresto using theinstitutional possibilitie ther, therearesubstantialdifferences,butincountrieswhere iltration ofthe cadreeliteinto ř í Kabelecounteredthat suchanexplanationis t appropriationanddistributionwasthorough a phenomenon wheretheeconomic reforms were 11 capital intoaneconomicone.This“Political anatory factoroftr their politicalcapitaltoaneconomic onevia didnotsuitanyoneandalso subscribedtothe its of communism, theyspedupthe fall of the needsofold nomenclature. Members ungarian cases,“the degree to whichtheelite nks totheiraccumulated socialcapital inthe tic atbest.Ofcoursemostpost-communist many theoreticians was thatpragmatic self- the“mercantile structures” ofthestatefor the question whydidtheregime collapse (1994) wrote about the advantages of the (1994) wroteabouttheadvantagesof theoldpowereliteswouldusenew convert theirinformal capital businessandpropertiedelites s of the state toaccumulate ansition. (Možný1999, 62) CEU eTD Collection between elitecirculation andelitereproduc guided bysome ghostlyemanation ofth changing situationsdoesnotpresupposethatth may havebeen ingoodpositions toquicklyadap passing orenactment ofeconomic decisionsan transformation doesnotmean thattheywere regime had bestopportunitiesincashingon it necessary tostress, that thefactthatpeople highly uncertainandpot problematic, foritpresupposes market institutions”(Eyaletal.1998,46). appropriated thehistorictask of dissidentsandtechnocrati bearers ofculturalcapital,the culturalbourgeoisie,as‘ase development ofthenewpropertiedclass. communist managerialism ofanewregime, butaphaseontheroadto notasbeginning emerging post-communist regime. Inthis managerial-technocratic stratum (Szelényi 1995,1) economic decisions”.Theculturalcapitalhasbe owners orgroupsofarecapable production isclaimed onthebasi Ivan SzelényiandSzonja Szelényi(1995) Eyal etal.(1998)offerasomewhat mo Ivan Szelényi(1995)hasdrawnonthepost-Ma entially dangerousresults.(Kabel of thebourgeoisie:“civilizi c-managerial elite,asan emerging powerblocwhich that theeliteswould embark as the potentialnewdominant classwhichwouldformas the s of technical know-how of mas oftechnicalknow-how eir collectiveclassinterests. managerialism (Bozóki 2003,228)Theau 12 withsocialconnections come themain sourceofpowerandprivilege. in anywayresponsible ey hadaplanallalongandactedinunison tion andintheirexamination of social d reforms. Thatsome nomenclature cadres exercising effectivecontroloverstrategic thissocialcapitaland profitingfrom the t themselves and take advantage of the new re temperedre analysis,seeingthepost- reformulated theParetian differentiation rxist “newclass”theoriesandsawthe “thecontrol over thekey factorsof e 2005,280)Furthermore, Ibelieve cond Bildungsbürtum’, composed ng theirsocietiesandcreating on arevolutionary nagers“ and„noidentifiable andtiesfrom theold forthepreparation, thors presentedthe changewith CEU eTD Collection of thesetrendswasprev impossible since theoldelitesareusuallynot total ineventhemost revolutio exclusively, sinceneitherreproductionnorcircul and Szelényi1995,616)Thequestionobviouslycouldnotbewhichofthetwoishappening the socialhierarchyisbeingpopulatedbynew their politicalinfluenceforeconomic advantages, nomenclature hasmanaged tolargelysurviveth composition inpost-communistsocieties.Wh stratification incentralEuropethey studied Szelényi 1995,624),withelitereproductionthe elite recruitment wasthemiddle technocraticandpolitical they arequicklysupplantedbyonesfrom thes as “themethod ofdragonteeth” (Lipták 1999, (Szelényi andSzelényi1995,622-623)Thislattertypeofeliterecruitment hasbeendescribed have beennextinline,depu of influencein1988.However,thesedidnothavetobenecessarilyentirely“new”,butcould also beenconfirmed, whenmost ofthekeypo even 5yearsaftertheregime change,theirst Theirempirical findingsfromPolandRu reproductions andcirculations; many fromtheol Szelényi 1995,628) bourgeoisie. Unsurprisingly,circul technocratic management ofstat ailing incentralEurope. ties whohavebeenrushedto nary situations,while thetotal e enterprisesquicklyadaptedandbecame thenew propertied ation wasmostvisibleinpol atus mostly undiminished, whilecirculationhas 13 old inname only.Thequestionthenwas which econd row.Themain sourceofpost-communist litical actors in 1993have the fatesofcommunistcadresandnewelite people accordingtonew ile elitereproductionw ile 308) whereafterdilapidation and fallingout e politicalchangesat most relevantinec elite circulation wouldmean thatthetopof d guardsurvivedinpositions ofinfluence ation couldbeabsolute;circulationisnot ssia andHungaryhaveconfirmed both power byradicalpoliticalchange. reproduction oftheoldelitesis management (Szelényiand itical elite.(Szelényiand onomic areas,wherethe the toporexchanged notbeen in positions ould mean thatold principles. (Szelényi CEU eTD Collection transition period(Munck regime byaffecting the patterns of elite competit identity ofactorsandstrategi 1986, 4-5) the politicalleadership, thei contingencies, theshifts and structural factors may “filter down” thebehavior of political actors and limit the changing contextmay undergosignificantch actions, of theoutcomes, interactions andstra (O’Donnell andSchmitter 1986,7)marked byhi democracy consolidation, wheredemocraticnorms, structures and procedures needtoget entailing, apartfrom political,alsosocial,economic andculturaldevelopments the of 1.3 Questionsoftransition:path and structuralconditioning. based oneliteblueprintsandtowhat havetheybeenintrawl of theorizing hasconcerneditselfwiththequestiontowhatextenthavechangesbeenmade centers, cultures,ideas,discourses andintere cultural problems, withtheeliterivalries being basedindifferent institutional power sub- and discontinuities.Transitionperi power; systemic changehaseconomic andins Democratic transitionsunders Similarly, MunckandSkalnikLeffconceptual Transition isbasicallyjust But thepolitical transformation entailsmore than justachange inelite whichholds and SkalnikLeff1999,195) es theyemploy, insistingthat these modalities shapethe political r interests, ideals andintera variation onconfigurationofpow ods arerife withacuteelite conflicts over institutional and an intervalbetweenonepo tood inthebroaderperspectivearelong-term processes, dependencyorprimacyofactors? sts of elite groups. (Ágh 1996, 45) Much of the sts ofelitegroups. (Ágh1996,45)Muchofthe 14 anges aswell.Andeventhoughbroadmacro- tegies, whereactors,f titutional dimensions, w ion andtheinstitutiona gh indeterminacy ofresultspolitical ize the mode of transitioninterms of ctions. (O’Donnelland Schmitter er depend more thaneveron previoushistoricallegacies litical regime andanother acing highlyvolatileand l rulesdevisedinthe ith theircontinuities CEU eTD Collection democracy. political actors, thelatter remain themain unexpected collapseof the oldregime, haveal What wasremarkableabout theCzechoslovakcas particularistic interestsanddistributivepo technologies ofpowerThethirdha free political competition andenacted via comp second phase required thepreparationofdeta were preoccupiedmostly withthebroadlya vision ofanewregime andits that theelites,enjoyingvastautonomy,deconstruct based onthetasks laidout befo experience. Similarly to Rustow,Wasilewskidi developed furtherbyWasilewski(2001),ba broadly agreethatthoughthest been accentuatedby O’Donne democracy isfarfrom agiven. The actor-cente 352-357) havebeenincreasingly community (Rustow1970,351)andpoliticalacto 1999). Whilekeepingthelatterinmind, theque from economic, socialandcultu scientists have emphasized the becomes the onlygame intown.(LinzandSt embedded rulesandvaluesof and democracy

Dankwart Rustow’s classica ll &Schmitter (1986) orLinz andStepan (1996,66-72) who political factors,polit re the politicalelites basic institutions,employing mainly symbolicpolitics.They ructural conditions may limit th ral explanationsofdemocrat recognized asdecisive.Attheoutsetofregimechange bituation phasethenrequired l dynamic model ofdemocra litics becoming prevalent(Wasilewski 2001,137). nd freelyconceivedpublicdiscourse,whilethe 15 sed onthecentral-Europeanpost-communist epan 1996,5).SinceRustow(1970)political most coalesced andble vided thetransitionperiodintothreephases red variablesofdemocr determinants of successful transitions to iled programs ofreforms tobesubmitted to rs’ strategiesanddecisions(Rustow1970, internalized bytheactorsasdemocracy romise andpolitical coalitions using the e wasthatthefirsttwo phases, duetothe ical actorsandinstitutions,moving away in each ofthem. Thefirstphase required stion oftheviability Ancien Régime ic transitions(cf.Anderson elites ofconsolidation,with e optionsandstrategiesof tic transition (1970) was tic transition(1970)was and broadlyoutline the nded togetherleaving atic transition have ofthepolitical CEU eTD Collection institutionalization ofreforms. the eliteswithadoubletaskofsymbolic Just asitisimpossible todoavivisection of has beencompoundedby themanifold transitory processes ofpolitical after 1989.However,theresearch objection failstofullyacknowle the questionintoanassumption (Szelenyia discoveries andreducesallvariationinsoci institutional elements ratherthan result shouldbeadynamic transformation, the existing setofinstituti long establishedroutinesandrestructuretheno economic transformations aremarked by rationalist fallacy similar totheearlier impl states” (Stark1992,22)asserting capitalism) asa perspectives dependsontheque dilemma, achickenand aneggproblem that shape thesechangestook.Theactorvs.structur be trends andconstrainedbyinstit would befollytoassert thatactions areno done Historical and socialdeterminism arenotfully capableof illuminating thechanges However, asSzelenyiandKostellonote, Sociologist DavidStarkhowever,rejected theverynotionofatransition(to bysomeone, thissomeone and –theelite teleological constructinwhich“concepts onal resources”limiting theirfiel utions, howeverthechangesthatmanifestly tookplacehaveto stion wewishtoanswer. theirreplacement (Stark1992, 22) dge theimpact ofindividual that anattempt to“design” er’s taskofstudyingthecomp path dependency.Actorswhoseektodeparturefrom t conditioned bylongterm al phenomena ontoasinglelinearscale,turning has norealsolutionand ementation ofsocialism. Instead,Starkargues, 16 nd Kostello1996,1086).Hismeta-theoretical rms thattheirchoicesareconstrainedby “find struggle foranewregime andpragmatic adaptation andreconfi asociety toseeitsinner workings, itis e dichotomy is in certain respects a false e dichotomyisincertainrespectsafalse Stark’sapproach actors –arelargelyresponsibleforthe aredrivenbyhypothesizedend- d ofaction (Stark1992,21).The capitalism byagrandplanis human action.Ofcourse,it lexity ofsocialphenomena choosing betweenthese precludes making new and economic changes. guration ofexisting social andhistorical CEU eTD Collection unforeseen outcomes” (Wacquant2005,7). capacity “totranspose,invert,andinsome cases relative autonomy oftheactor belong to,andinstitutionsne their socialization andexperiences, aswell personalities withtheirownidiosyncrasies,rema environment and deprivethem oftheirde impossible tosimply pluckindividualactorsfr commitments oftheelites. (HigleyandBurt in fact they tendtoshape the beliefs, limit factors feature prominently. Historical legacies a and most significantvariable, howevertheyar of thedemocratization processes stress the beliefs andactions of the elites as a preeminent experiences, theirsocialization, actors didnotappear are becoming unstuckinrestructured field ofrelationsandcanactinrelativeautono the socialbases and determinants oftheirsoci political strategies.Politicalactorsdorepresent social positions,identities,tastesandpercei struggles. Guidedbyconsiderations ofpolitical ideological packages,whichthey wouldassemble and employ in the upcoming power the question ofeconomic quicklybecame reform adefiningfeatureinbuilding their Yet despitetheuniquedisjointedanduprootednatu As weshallsee,forthekeypoliticalactors out ofnowhere.Thenewelites s wecanobservealongwithWacquant thattheyhavethe their socialnetworksandwo tworks theyareembedded in. novel ways.(Eyal2003,136- 17 ved enemies, thepolitical al context, theyoccupypositions in acomplex and influencetheactions e farfrom thewholestory,sincemany other fining features.Elite my, especiallyintimes whensocialrelations theheritage andmemory of societies they on 2006,3)Elitestudies om theirsocio-historical context,from their social interests,yettheydon’tsimply reflect nd structuralvariablesal in aproductoftheirhistorictime andplace, andelectoralreasoning, butalsobytheir subvertthesocialdi in SlovakandCzechpartsofthefederation are conditionedbytheirprevious re of the transito rking experiences.Manyscholars visions […]leadingto members, asunique actorscrafted their 138) Owingtothis so playalargerole, andre-inforcethe haverevealeda ry processes,the CEU eTD Collection changes. (MachoninandTu also indicatedtheimportance andtheactualinterdependence of elitesandwidersocial massively important role ofelites,especiallyin groups inCzechoslovakia.Thiswillbela these decisions,itmight proveinst to understandwhythesedecisionswere made a question. Inotherwords,tofu dismiss thelarger structural configuration and hi I amconvincedthatnoactor-orientedpers č ek 2000,26) lly understandtheroleofelit rumental to lookatthesocial rgely thetaskofth 18 nd whatbeliefsystems andinterestsanimated theearlyphases oftransition, but these have storical experiences that pective caninitsanalyticalframework e followingchapter. es ineconomicreform decisions, genesisofparticularelite shapedthe actors in CEU eTD Collection to beemphasized. (Deegan-Krause2006,19) the optionselitesfaced, themalleability of pot strategies chosenbytheelites.While theunde sent Czech andSlovakpoliticsinseparate wa fact, atthetime theCzechandSlovaksocieties result of mere political rivalrie divisions that initially shaped politicsin Sl communist regime makes thequestionofelite 2.1 Introduction for agency.Thismaneuvering space isfurther extendedas elitesenjoyed more latitude of to a certain extent;they provided a framewor reforms andpoliciesenacted. Institutions andhistorical legacies played a large role,butonly trajectories onwhichtherespecti who formed thenewpolitybytheiractionsorin understand thetransitionperiod political resultsaremore thaneverdependentonthedecisionsmade bykeyactors.Tobetter dynamically changing politicalconditions in wh transition towardsliberal democracy and market economy present circumstances of forging the newdemocratic regime wasthetask towards regime changeinCzechoslovakia, but CHAPTER 2–THEGENESISOFCZECHANDSLOVAKNATIONAL The configurationofthenationalelitesin The peaceful demise of Czechoslovakia just The popularunrestduringthewintermonths of1989mayhavebeentheimpetus POST-COMMUNIST ELITES POST-COMMUNIST s, nordidtheynecessarily reflect only societal differences. In this chapterwillconcentrate ve countriesheadedanddetermined theshapeandscopeof ovak andCzech parts ofthefederation werenot k, inwhichanample ma 19 rlying culturalandeconomicdifferenceslimited ofthenewelites.Thefallcommunism and action andlefttheirmark onthenewregime. were attheirmost similar. Thedivides which ys emerged largely becauseofthepolitical the main task of steering thetransition and actions even more pertinent. The growing ential politicalconflict ich old ruleslosetheir applicability and fluenced toa large extent thepolitical threeyears afterthecollapse ofthe on some oftheseactors–elites neuvering spaceexisted s attheirhandsneeds CEU eTD Collection Lengyel 2000,2) choice andaction,whenmostinstitutionswere should beruled.Theyshared a sense ofmora but whatunitedthem wasashared perception of dissidents &neo-liberaleconomists coalition ofdissidentintellectualsand“internally alliance. conception ofhowsocietyshouldberuledan economists), exemplified byVáclavHavelan with apowerfulclaim topower,thedissidents and internallyexiledtechnocrats(monetarist account (2000),Iwillpresentapictureofhow were shapedduringthecommunist past. TheCzechnascent politicalelite,their discur 2.2 Czechpost-communistelites fragmented eliteconfiguration,albeitsoon elites followedthelinemore closelyassoci configuration coalescedquitesooninaconsensu the Czechelitesadheredmore closelytoth their ownseparatepathsofdevelopment resultingindifferenteliteco emergent post-communist elitesand showho Eyal contends thattheCzech To understandtheconfigurationofCzech In thischapter Iwillpaycloserattenti normalization period.Inthis , bankers).Theyseemed tocome from differentworlds, counter-elitesthatemerged after1989wereanunlikely dominated byonepartic 20 w the CzechandSlovaknationalelitefollowed w the l dutytocreateinstitutions ofcapitalism and the twomajor groupings ina regime-change sparkedflux.(Higleyand on tothe respectivenational members of the ated witheliterepr d VáclavKlaus, came toshareacommon e classical elitecircul d craftedatemporary, yetformidable elite intellectuals’ role in al mold, thefateofSlovakpost-communist exiled” technocrats sive strategies andtheir socialtrajectories, political eliteweneedto lookin the section, relyingonGilEyal’s ular elitealliance. oduction, resultingina society and howsociety

(bohemians, moralists, nfigurations. Sowhile ation andtheir elite that emerged in1989 CEU eTD Collection 2.2.1 Thedissidents footmen became thebearers oftheideology ofthesp sacrifice. Theirnewsocialsitu substituted thisbyembracing anew,cultura jobs, asworkers,stokers,orva an “existentialattitude”,notaprofession.Thei of livinginconformity whichwasrequiredbyso examination, and,most importantly, “livingintr self-betterment. Theyworkedonthemse to thepurgesandcrisisof1968was“technology them tobeginperceivetheworldinmora “their taste for ‘dissent’ asalife-style […] but CharlesUniversityanditsphilosophylawfaculties.Theywerephilosophers(Ji playwright, anartist;howeverthetypicalbr came toepitomize thisgroupheisnotacompletelytypicalembodiment. wasa He 1968, unabletocontinuetheirworkinpa Žantovský) andjournalists,edito Dienstbier), historians, jurists (Petr Pithart, PavelRychetský), social scientists (Michael The purgemeant acompletedisconnect from regime the andthepoliticalcapital.They Their dissidence wasnot quitetheirclearmoral choice,but theinverseis more likely: The groupof dissidents originated mostly fromthehumanities. Though VáclavHavel “holdingthedooropenfora[propertied]cl rious freelancejobs.(Eyal2000,60-62). ation, theirisolation,c rs andwriters(MilanUhde) di l terms” (Eyal2000,59).Thedissidents’response ushered them intoamoral universe,conditioned eeding groundfordissidencewasnotthetheater 21 rticular field,black-listed.(Eyal2000,57-58) lves throughespousin r ‘professions’,forthetimebeing,weremenial irit ofcapitalism, appointingthemselves the l one,emanating from cialism. Theirdissidence wasa“calling”and uth”, asopposedtothecorruptinginfluence ass thatisyetto onditioned them tope of theself”,Foucault’sterm forasortof smissed from theirjobsafter arrive” (Eyal2000,49). g authenticity,self- their willingness to rceive theworldin ř í CEU eTD Collection (Havel 1985,48). must […]appearasathreattothe the regime. Moralphenomena thushaveapoliticaldimension andto“livewithinthetruth, authentically, inaccordance withone’strueiden hypocritical ritualsholdingittogether.Tofollowtheseistolivealie,so communist statepowerisath the human spiritwereentirelyirreconcilable.ForHavel somewhat utopiansenseoftheword,sinceforKonrad power ofthestate and thepower of Václav Havel’s particular state canstandtrialbeforeone’s privateconscience.(Pynsent conscience asnotan entirely private affair,but Václav B authenticity, againsttheluresofprivatein moral stance,itisnotmeant responsible forthemeaning oftheirlivesandencouragemoralin want tochallengethepoliticiansorformulate clear moral terms. Theirsituation endowed themwith moral authority. 3 missing intheofficialones–asecond culture.Th philosopher VáclavBendatheorizedasparallel culture, they hadtocreate thei metaphorical ‘strangulationinthedark’byregime, andwhilebeingshutoutoftheofficial guidance and willingness to sacrifice forthe good of the flock WhatFoucault“pastoral power”, cameto call thepower In orderfor dissidents to maintain their cult The dissidents embraced anti-politics,t According totheCzech philosopherJanPato ě lohradský, foundtheroleof the dissidenttobeinrealizingconceptionof brand ofanti-politics.

r own culturalsphere.Theyhad to criticizetheestablishment, ick mechanism ofcontroland system […] something whichispolitical 22 terests. Similarly, anot political programs, buturgethepopulacetobe structures, capableofsupplementing functions a basisforaccusingthe‘objective’state.The tity, within thetruth,meansposingathreat to of a shepherd over its flock, based on the shepherds ey werenolongertobe concerned onlywith hough notentirelyinKonrád’s(1984) ural capitalandnotsu č ka, theintelligence isalwaystiedto a (1985, 38-48) the nature of the (1985, 38-48)thenatureof buttoseekfortruththrough 1996, 36)Thiswasthebasisof manipulation withprescribed to engage in whatdissident her Czechphilosopher, tegrity. (Eyal2000,65) 3 However,theydidnot ccumb tosilencing, par excellence ” CEU eTD Collection 2000, 68) they wouldgoabouteducating,informing andin their ownauthenticity,butstrivedtocreate particularly rebellious,however, were evendemoted (KlaushadtoworkasaclerkintheStateBank).Theywerenot sciences. Most of themwerestalledinthei either bytheStateBankoreconomic resear men withformal economic training,some of 2.2.2 Thetechnocrats institutions andindividual devising suitableinstit distance”, thatis,notbyco superior. Thisentailedtheideaofshaping truth”) confrontedtheregime withaself-org idea ofaruleindividualsgoverningtheirconduct morally andauthen heterodoxy and“internal exile”reinforcedeachother. Tomáš Ježek,toname afew.Theyformed a comprised alsoKarelDyba,DušanT retreated outside of politics,into theprivate second group:thetechnocrats. dissident arsenalwasatechnologyofgovernment The groupofso-called Asserting their cultural authority meanttu utions. Theyintendedtoestabl moralities (Eyal2000,70-71).The mmanding, butbased onthe knowledgeofhuman natureand technocrats their reactionwas a ř íska, Vladimír or Dlouhý,JánStráský,JanTošovský wascomprised ofeconomists andfinanceexperts, r career after1968, their the conductofindividuals a moralcommunity–acivilsociety –inwhich 23 which wasdoneabroad.Theywereemployed anized society, apolis morallyandrationally sphere. Apartfrom VáclavKlaus,thegroup ch institutes of theC fluencing themoral conductofothers(Eyal rning itintoapoliticalweapon –posingthe tightly knitsocialgr , which,asEyalargues,wassuppliedbythe strategy ofan“internal exile” and they ish congruencebe only thinglackingfrom the ascendance blocked, some ascendance blocked,some andpopulations“from a zechoslovak academy of oup; theirideological tically (by“livingin tween political CEU eTD Collection country (JežekinHusák, 1997:57;cf.Myant2003,12).Dyba,Dlouhý, JežekandT the institute andgathered here the “intellect nomenclature. (Šulc,1998:66)ValtrKomárek reform communisteconomist withthesupport academy ofsciencesisturned prevalent economic ideologyofthetime (Šulc1998,40). valuable onlybythevirtueofitscritical economic reform ofcommunism asproposedbyOt Klaus wasalreadyavocalnon-Marxisteconomic theoretician. Heconsideredtheprogram of Husák 1997,31)AlongsideTomáš Ježek,Karel young economic avant-gardeandtheoldergenera preceding andduring thePragueSpringargume in thesixties, Economic instituteoftheCzechoslovak academy ofsciences, where “miraculous formula” (Ježekin: Husák,1997:36) economists tosolvetheeconomic ailsofsocial amount andacademic ofrespect freedom. communist The nomenclature lookedup tothe Furthermore, since theeconomists werethe‘h precisely becauseitwasneverdirectedto needs toberemoved. Surprisingl economic theories theyunderstoodthatcommun not ‘co-opted’norweretheyreforms either.Throughtheir communist In 1986theCabinetofprognosticsEc According toTomášfuture reform Ježek,thecoreof beganforming team already They wereneither dissident, for they continuedtoworkintheinstitutes, buttheywere into theInstitute ofPrognostics,headedby ValtrKomárek, a y, theirinterestin ward reforming communism. (Eyal2000,72-73) ward reforming communism. , de-mythologizing force,slowlyerodingthe 24 ual elite”ofthebest ism andcountedonthem tocome up withthat attempted tobuildhisownpowerbasefrom of theperestroika-sympathizing communist eirs’ ofMarxandEngels,theyhadsome Dyba orVáclavKupka,theyoung ism isnotcapableof beingreformed and nts alreadybeganbetween “theemerging a Šikandothercommunistreformers tobe capitalist economic theo tion ofreform economists”. (Ježekin: onomic instituteoftheCzechoslovak economic brains inthe interest inWestern ries wastolerated ř íska CEU eTD Collection civil self-organization.(Eyal2000,79-83) conduct andthatsocietyneedstoberulednot Finally, theysharedthebeliefthatprocedural which basedontherationalunhinderedpricing mechanism equalthetruth. shouldalso people togovern themselves, through living abiding citizens.Theyalsos blacklisted reform communistsfromthe60s joined the institute andsoonmanaged tobri Their affinitywasrooted intheir similar respon population inthevirtues ofresponsibility.They moral authority tolegitimate the newlyrest While thedissidentsneededtechnocra create their ideal,inclusive con pastors, teachersand basis toplansociety.They bothembraceddiffere shared senseofpurpose.They both rejectedtheideathatin individuals” toactautonomously economic life,seekingtocreate“self-organi practical reasonandaction.It technology, whichEyalterms and rationalmacro-economic policy withemph a detailed reform plan.Whatthey advocated we eminence of non-Marxist neo-cl The affinity onwhichthetechnocrats and di What thisyoungergenerationofeconomists sh civilizers ought to createconditions underwh monetarism cept ofa civil society, monetari whogivelaws topeoplea andresponsibly(Eyal2000,74-76) is understoodasa(neo)-li assical economic theorybut a rejection oftheidea (i.e.,nottheeconomic doc alsofoundworkhere.(Šulc,1998:66-67). ng Klausaswell.Apartfrom thisgroup,many 25 zing spheresofsocialaction,andtoempower in truthandmorality throughthemarket, bycommand andrepressionbutbyfostering ses tothe normalization exercise ofpoweristhebestwaytogovern ored capitalistic order andtoeducate the re simple, fixed,genera asis onstrongmarkets. Theyembraceda nt aspectsofciviceducation,their rolesof shared discursivestrategies andidentities. ts andtheirtechnology ssidents could form analliancewastheir ared wasnotonlythebeliefinpre- nd teachthem tobecome law- tellectual knowledgecouldbea beral technologyofgoverning sts needed dissidents fortheir ich itwould bepossible for trine), atechnologyof l rulesandprinciples purges, theirstrategy of monetarism to CEU eTD Collection 81). machine Klauswasintenttobu “president’s men” like Pithart choice fortheleaderofCivicForum in communists” whowereperceivedasuntrustworthy,ortainted. politics’ andbothworkedhardtodisassocia of dissent,andopting-out,orinternalex lecturing abouttheirnecessity 165) Hisrelentlesspaceofpromoting, defendingtheeconomic reforms andhispublic effectivel “To theleft–orwithKlaus?”, slogan froma1998electioncampai political field andsetthe tone liberal rhetoricandultimately social-democ who wouldredefinetheCzechpoliticallandscape. post-communist politicalelite.ItwouldbeVáclav playwright turnedrespectedpresident; hewas no strategy and thoughVáclavHavelbecame the professionalism. (Ágh1996,46)However,thisdi opposition to“routineprofessionalpolitics”; “post-modern politicians”,basedonanalmost opposing thecommunistregime andre-inventing morals”, specializing inmoralizing politics(o astute. VáclavHavelbecameÁghcalled“thepoliticianof of what Attila theembodiment Václav Klausprovedtobeaveryadep The subsequentpoliticaleventswould show have wonhim alotofsupportan and Dienstbier,whodislikedth of politicaldiscourseformost ofthe90’s.Asapre-election ild outoftheloosealliance gn cartoonmemorably presented y labelingallhisopponentsasleftist(Appel2004, October 1990.Howeverhesoonclashedwiththe ile. Bothgroupsembraced thepowerof‘anti- 26 ratic practice,managed todominate Czech philosopher-king, world-renownedintellectual te anddistinguishthemselves from “reform t post-communistpolitician,who, usingneo- ‘aristocratic’ intellectual moralizing andan r theirspecific variant of anti-politics)in t byfarthe mostrepresentativeofthe Czech Klaus,theeconomist fromthe“greyzone”, themselves inthepost-communist periodas i.e., making a virtueoutoftheirnon- d notprovetobeanentirelyeffective thetechnocratstobemorepolitically of theCivicForum (Stein2000, d hequicklybecameanatural e ideaof ahierarchical party the choicetovoters: CEU eTD Collection 1989. Thenew‘mass-elite’, incontrast,“hadno ethnic anti-communists, andwhopresidedoverth the bearersofpre-communistal She distinguishedbetweentwoty narrative influenced post-communist politicsand illuminating analysisof howfascist andcommunistpast and alackof commonhistorical Slovakia untilth configuration destabilizedthe elites lackedacommonunderstandingof was afragmentedpolitical elite,whereoneel experience wasverymuch different.Theresultof socialization experienceduringthenormalizati 2.3 Slovakpost-communistelites 2004, 453-456;Eyal2003,156). Benda) andaprogrammaticdivorce here and arhetoricofanti-communism (allied in their execution (contrasting itwith theimpoten the past, and offersanideologicalpackage of outmaneuver theliberaldissidentsandreform successor ofCivicForumwith most oftheCivicForum leavetostart theCivi Shari J.CoheninherstudyofSlovakpos Similarly to theCzechcase,Slovakeliteswereverymuchdetermined bytheir The disagreements finallyleadtoasplit e late90s. political sceneandprolongedthe most ofitspoliciesandpublic support.Klausmanages to ternative ideologies, democrat pes ofelitesinSlovakia.Th with thepastembodied inthelustrationlaws(seePšeja 27 ite alliancecametopre-eminence; howeverthe radicaleconomic reforms, pragmatical realism c Democratic Party, which becomes adefacto with conservativedissidentssuchasVáclav how politicsshouldbeconducted.This on period.However,asweshallsee,this connectiontoanyalternative ideologyand shaped thestrugglesbetweennewelites. t intellectualizing of so in February1991whenVáclavKlausand communists, presentingthem communists, aspeopleof the political processes intheearly90sthen e beginningsofthe t-communist politics e ideological elites, who were e ideological elites,whowere consolidation ofdemocracyin ic andnationalist,civic me ofthedissidents) transition processin (1999) providesan CEU eTD Collection generationally closedand educatio be described asan‘upperclass’, firstasaso dissidents andtechnocratsfollowe individuals remaining in vicious withmany socialties purge constitutedanalmostcompleteturnove country. Alsothenormalization purgesafter1968 nationally-accommodative andmuch but waspartlycausedbythenatureofcomm (Cohen 1999,59).Thiswasn’tbecauseofsomeinherentlackrebelliousnessinSlovakia, underground church.Thesethreewereamong samizdat church andcoalescedaround came todominate thepoliticallandscape. elites; howevertheysoonlostthepoliticalba former, atleastitscivicdemocratic part, […] weresolelyformed bytheofficialLeninistsocializationpro then thedissidentsinCzechRepublic. personal andfamily ties.(Cohen1999,57)Theywerefarlessnumerous andlesscohesive the coreofPublicAgainstViolenceorgani founded theChristianDemocratic Movement Tied tothiswasthenatureof elitestrate The catholicnationalistswere Pre-communist ideologiescouldbefound Bratislavské listy tact (Eyal2003,35). ), FrantišekMikloško,orBishopJánKorec,thefounderof between thecommunistnomencl personalities suchasJán d astrategyofanti-politics, nally andpoliticallyprivileged connected withthe less repressivethantheoneinCzechpartof had much incommon withtheemerging Czech cial milieu ofaninterconnectedinter-and intra- 28 ttle againstthe‘mass-elite’, whichbythe1992 and thedemocrats whofoundedandcomprised r ofelites,theSlovakpurge wasmuchless zation. Theirideologies gy inSlovakia.While, aswesaw, theCzech unist rule inSlovakia,whichwasmuch more the veryfewbonafideSlovakdissidents only among thecatholicnationalists,who differed intheirseverity. While theCzech activities ofthe Č arnogurský (whopublishedthe the Slovakelitestrategycould ature andthereform-minded socialclassandsecondly as cess“. (Cohen 1999,5).The were formedthrough secret underground CEU eTD Collection communists visited the same the cafés. Bratislava visited communists of Slovakpolitics(Eyal2003,97). prison forabriefmoment in1989,stillremaining signatory incourtonly meant to overcometheirmore charitableinstin throw him fullyintoafull-fledgeddissidence, Slovak nationbyrepresentingthevariouses a mode ofrepresentation wheredifferent fractions oftheupper class allclaim torepresent the 4 associated democracy withtheunion withC democratic ideologybasedontheCzechoslovakinterwar Zajac, SoňaSzomolányi, MartinBútora,JánLangošetal.).Theycame toespouseacivic generation of artists,social scientists (sociologists) andenvironmentalists (FedorGál, Peter disillusion intocivicdemocrats(suchas Part ofthem wereformer communistswh could latercarrythedaybywres however may havehelpedunleashapoliticalchangewhere the more irrational nationalists Slovakia byastrategyofsmall stepswithin the historical mission”, arationalist nationalist, Husák was nevertheless allowed to study law thanks tohisfather’s acquaintance with Gustáv from theworst excessesofnormalization purges. ‘upper class’inSlovakiawasandhowthenetw It is a well known anecdotic featureof Itisawell the soci 4 The secondsmall groupwhoboreananti-co Ján Eyal (2003,96-97)showsJánČ . Later,beingacatholicactivistandpublisher ofasamizdat wasnotnearlyenoughto Č arnogurský wouldalsobecomeanexample ofapost-communist“politician

a demotionandonlymuch laterwa tling theagendaoutofhis arnogurský asoneexample ofhowtightlyknitthe Miroslav Kusý)andpartcamefrom theyounger cts” (Eyal2003,97).De al life in the 1940s Slovak state that fascist( statethat Slovak 1940s the al lifein tates whichcomprise it.(Eyal2003,29-30) zechs andwerelessconc erned abouttheSlovak 29 he needed“toprovokeau the constitutionallimits (Ágh1996,48).This whohadavisionofachievinganindependent o transformed from truebelieversthrough orks andconnectionsprotectedindividuals tied symbolically andsociallytothecenter Son ofafascistSlovak mmunist ideologywere control. (Szomolányi1994,75) democratic tradition.They s hefiredandfinallyputto fending aCharter77 thorities severaltimes state politician, he thedemocrats. ľ udáci ) and CEU eTD Collection economic irrationality),whichthey saw ascr socialist planningforthem were knowledge intendedtoprovidemaps forthelongterm of thesociety.Theailsof objectives so much representativesofany alternative pointofview”(Cohen1999,163[emphasis appeal was “reflective enigmatic andmercurial Vladimír Me together byadiscursivestrate 84) Theywouldsoonlearnthatthepopular politicaldiscourselayelsewhere. however provedtobeamisguided strategy regime in the populace,aswellmoral a translated intowiderpoliticalrealm. This,thei believing that ideologies developed inpriv national identity(Cohen1999,70).Similarly they Marián Húska,RudolfFilkus reforms andeconomic sovereigntyofSlovakia.(MichalKová elites with therulingcommunist work ‘forthegoodofnation’Theyremained “calling” orasenseofduty–theydidn’topt didn’t gointo dissent,but liketheCzechdissidentstheyalsofelt areresponding toa “reform Unlikethe ofcommunism”. Czechdi can bebetterunderstoodasaco Like Czechs theyhad theirown technology – First ofthesewerethetechnocratsandprognosticians,whochosestrategy The ‘mass elite’thatemerge ofsociety’slackcommitment ratherthan etal.).(Eyal2003,100-103) gy ofrepresentingspecificSl particular viewpointsbutofthe and waitedinresearch‘safe-ha alescing ofthreeparticulargr connected withitscentralis d asthedominant partof č iar, theydidn’tpossessomuch anideology,their in theSlovakpolitical 30 ate andthroughpersona eating adisproportionality harming the Slovak r beliefingeneralopposition tothecommunist for dissentafter1968butinsteadcontinuedto ssidents, thereform communistsamongthem nd politicalissueswhichtheyaccentuated connected,keptsocial embraced thestrategy ofanti-politics, in theoriginal]).Infact,theywerenot prognostics, whichwastechnical ovak interests. Embodied by the ovak interests.Embodied bythe č estates oups oftheupperclassjoined vens’, dreaming aboutgradual , HvezdoňKo Slovak post-communist elites Slovak post-communistelites t, directivenature(and not context. (Cohen1999,83- oftheSlovaknation. l networks could be l networkscouldbe representative tiesandnetworks č túch, Augustín ofan CEU eTD Collection the secondrowofdragon’s teeth, toreca formal andinformal powerstructure” (E positions theyoccupied“important nodesinthevastnetworksofrelations thatconstituted the Slovak statehood(Húska2006,6). June 1992electionsandthusw Vladimír Me of HZDSandlater the first presiden Research. He joinedPublic AgainstViolenceand became financeminister, Slovak co-founder clerk intheStatebankandlater democratic Slovakia[Hnutiezademokr Meč succeeded inApril1991 byIvanMikloš)inspri chairman oftheOfficeforprivatization the VPN’selectionprogram. Since1990hewasthe Against Violence [Verejnos Trade asascientificresearcher A.M. Húskaworkedin TheInstitute forthe 2003, 109-114;114). and Slovakrelations.Forthem proportionality requiredaneconomic reform but interests inmostsectors,be weren’t touchedbythenorma comprised thesecondmajorgroup.Theyweren’tatightlyknitsocialgro iar andbecame ofthefoundersandal one The nomenclature managers ofvariousstateenterprises co-opted by theregime Augustín MariánHúskaandMichalKová č iar, werealsothemembers oftheHZ ť it industry,environment, resource protinásiliu, VPN]andbecame amember of theteam preparing lization purges(exceptforMe . In1990hewasco-optedinth “[t]rue proportionality as aresearcherintheCentra ould afterwardsalsobecome t ofSlovakia.Bo atické Slovensko,HZDS].MichalKová yal 2003,117),however theywerealso Economics andOrganizati ll Lipták’s phrase (1999, 308). They were notin ll Lipták’sphrase(1999, 308).Theywere 31 and administration ofthenationalproperty; ong-time vice-chairman oftheMovement for ng of1991leftPublicAgainstViolence with also thefixingofth č aretwoexemplary personsofthisgroup. first Slovakminister DS political negotiationteam after the requiredeconomic sovereignty”(Eyal th HúskaandKováč č l InstituteforNationalEconomic iar). Throughtheirnomenclature s orhuman development. True e Slovakparliament forPublic the “foundingfathers”of e disproportionalCzech on oftheConstruction up, andmost ofthem of privatization(i.e. č only , alongwith workedasa deputies, CEU eTD Collection that “theideology of each dominant statecreatesitsow Húska was quite unabashedly forthright when he expressed his opinion, congruent with the nationalist historians, Ján Ducký,Ľudovít agriculture andindustry,the reforms proposed byKlausetal.,claiming “revolution ofthedeputies”. charge andcouldclaim expe 5 Miná ethnogenesis ofSlovaks,theGreatMoravia, “national memory”, i.e.theyconstructed nationalist myths official communist structures.Heretheycam reformers norinternally exiled–they chosea representing the“nation”.Th narrowly adissident,heneverthe considered theidealrepresentativeof theSl into apotentalliance.(S Slovakia (HZDS), tyingthenationa After anunsuccessfulbidfortheVPNleadersh However, hesoonclasheswithhiscoalitionpartners the firstelectionheisnominated bythePub With thesupportofreform communistshebecome state company lawyer,keepingsocialtiesa

historic roots [...]”(Húska 2006, 11). embellishment ofhistory, but isalso an and a heroization only isnot mythologization The existence. itsown mythologizes also extent certain What is more, this mythologization ex was to alarge ismore,mythologization this What č , DušanSlobodník,etal.).(Eyal2003,120-124) And finally, thethirdwere thenationalist in Vladimír Me Č č iar isthemostprominent ofthis ernák, PeterBaco etal.).(Eyal2003,115-120) tein 2000,83;cf.Leško1996) specificity oftheSlovak‘nationaleconomy’. (Vladimír Me

a legitimate conditionoflinking of one’s historical consci Soon after1989theyentere rtise indispensabilityafte ese humanistic intellectuals wereneither dissidents, nor less managed tofinishstudyi list and reform-communist stra ovak post-communistelite. nd connections with manynd connectionswith 32 lic AgainstViolence(VPN) astheSlovakPM. strategy ofco-optation tent aconscious programmatic e topromote anewhistoricalorthodoxyof n statedoctrine, by help of or theSlovakNationalUprising.(Vladimír to advocateSlovak“specific”interests in ip hefoundstheMovement forDemocratic s Slovakminister oftheinteriorandafter tellectuals and histor andalsotheVPN’sliberalleadership. particular group,thoughhecouldbe r 1989andthusaccomplishthe d politics, opposing the liberal d politics,opposingtheliberal ng lawinthe70’sandbecame a 5 onarangeoftopics:the nds ofSlovakpoliticalfield and workingwithinthe which itadducesa andto Areformcommunist, reformcommunists. effort. Augustín Marián ians concernedwith ousness to itspre- č iar, CEU eTD Collection occur (seeGould&Szomolányi 2000). decade andtheoustingofMeč were bitterlyopposed,lackingacommon understa The democrats (nowjoinedbytheChristiande became deeplyfragmented and divided around th nomenclature cadresre-emerging withanation only wastheelitecirculationmore akinto peaceful andgradual,yetdeepwide.No elite configurationdescribedbyHigleyandLengyel. Theelitecirculationwasalsomore economy andciviceducation.What wesawemerge the past,achieved viamoral andtechnocraticmean 2.4 Conclusion 2003, 131-132) ‘translate’ andrepresenttheinterestsofparticularesta coalition. They didn’tseekuniversal,objectiverule wait forbettertimes. Thesecommonunderstandings facilitated theirpost-communist arrangement, insteadofopting discursive strategies and after1968, although agreement withthedissidents andoffer them some, likeMarián The Slovakeliteconfiguration tookadifferent The newCzechpoliticaleliteembraced aba These threestrandsof afuturepolitical Č alfa (whoremainedasafederalprime minister until1992),couldfind out theychose toembed themselves withintheregime and iar from poweruntilagradual convergence ofelitescould their services,came tokeeptheirpositions. 33 reproduction,withreformcommunistsand t allcommunists were alist discourse,butthepost-communist elite heavilydisillusioned withthefederative mocrats) and theemancipatory nationalists e issueofnationalism andstateformation. s oflustrations,rapid transition to amarket elite sharedidentities,socialbondsand s, butinsteadas‘exp nding ofpolitics.Itwouldtakethenext herethencame closetotheconsensual sic taskofasymboliccondemnation of shapethanthe Czechcounterpart. Not tes andtheSlovaknation.(Eyal immediatelyremoved, erts’ theywantedto CEU eTD Collection or mute tendenciesforpolari context inmoredetail. communist leaders. Thefollowingchapter willex however severelyunderestimate theimportance ofideologicalcommitment ofpost- policy makers responsiblefordesigninginstitutionalreforms” 2004,10).These (Appel economic andpolitical‘stakehold actors toexplainthedesigna countries andprivatizationinparticularusuallyfocusedonthe such anissueofcontention.Th One of thelessonsof elitetheory has beenthatthestrategies of politicians canamplify zation. Economic reform inCzec nd development ofthereforms. Thestudies“revolvearound e standardexplanation ofeconomic reforms inpost-communist ers’ whosoughttoimpose thei 34 amine thisissue ofeconomic reform inelite hoslovakia wouldprovetobe r material preferences onthe material interests ofthekey CEU eTD Collection 3.1 Thestateofthe 6 homogeneity line,unwavering,motiv oftheparty regime andtheunsustainability of the socialist Throughouttheyearsbetween1969and1989 leadership of thecommunistpartywereatti 1989 nature oftheregime alsomeant noliberaliz circumstances anddidn't trytoevolve, itjust (Dvoř passivity, apathyandformal loyaltywererewardedwitharelative lackofrepression of life, instead there was analmost ideology-free silentpactofpol regime wasstalled,deathlyafraidof anychange 1968 Sovietinvasion's suppressionofreformis regime, whichunderwent“detotalitarization nevertheless alsounhappyin Czechoslovakia, althoughsimila communistregimeunhappy families beingeachunhappyinitsownspecialway.The in (2002, 40)poignantlyrecalledtheTo the regime ended. After the 20 year 2002, 57). 57). 2002, possible” (Aslund slateappear aclean making compromises, by leastbound was “the Czechoslovakia regime in accepted, and since the communists time hadno totransform (theyfailed, or This rigidity ofthe regime alsomeant that there were fewer qualms about aradical divorce with the past when 6 áková andKunc1995,128).Theregime didn't . The communistregime inCzechoslovakia was asclerotic,rigid, post-totalitarian When describingthevariednatureofcris CHAPTER 3–ELITESANDECONOMICREFORM itsownspecialways.

s since 1989, the unreformable nature nature thes sinceunreformable 1989, r inmost respectstoothe lstoy's famous openinglinefrom by decay”(Linz &Stepan1996,294).Sincethe “froze”(Linz&Stepan1996,319).Thisfrozen 35 ations oftheeconomy we economic model. However,theyadheredtothe mes aware of the limited possibilities of the . Therewere noattempts tocontrolall aspects t movement, forthenexttwentyyears ated byfearsoflibera es insocialistcountries,Anders Aslund undergo anychanges,itdidn't respondto some more perceptivepartsofthe r regimes in theregion,was of the socialist economy waswidely were unable todoso),the new itical quiescence, where Anna Karenina lization andalsoby re possiblepriorto about CEU eTD Collection Václav Havel, under 'the dead weight of inertia'. (Rondinelli 1994,1). suitable conditions for thedevelopment of sm privatization of theseoverly large and ineffici monopolies. (Mejstrik&Burger1994,136-37)Thetaskbeforethem requiredthe monopolies andoligopolies,weresuperv dominated byartificiallylarge,integratedstateownedplants maintained withouttheircontinued the communist cadre’s experience that thehomogene 7 rudimentary oppositiongroupingsdoes post-totalitarian regime inCzechoslovakia with by theimportance ofelitebe took place(Welsh1994,Wasilewski 1998),thetran communist leaders(Linz&Stepan1996),and 3.2 Thetransitionreformstruggles services, remained nationalized 136). Thewholeoftheeconomy, from largefact private enterprisesandjust private sectoroutsideoftheSovietUnion, the classical centrallyplannedsystem.Asare communists Czechoslovakia, could in have beencharacterised hidden inflation and only limitedmonetary overhang (Kupka et al. 1993, 43). The economy, asrun by the government pursued relatively sound fiscal andmonetary policies with balanced budgets andlow(er) open and Onthe plus side, the economy wasrun with surprising balance. There were no extensive foreign debts, the Like inPoland,wherea‘pactedtransition’wasagreeduponbytheoppositionand The reformers facedaneconomy characterized The communistswerethusabletopreserveaneconomic system closelyresembling 0,7% fromnon-farm privateenterprises(Mejstrik&Burger1994,

haviour. However,unlikethefo 7 . presence init.(Turek1995,75) notquiteallowtoclassifyitasanegotiatedtransition. with onlysome3%oftheGDPcontributedby 36 ent stateownedenterpri sult, Czechoslovakia could 'boast' thesmallest Hungary, whereasimilar negotiatedtransition a mostly inflexible party leadership andonly all andmedium sizedprivatefirms sector ised andcoordinatedbyadministrative ories tosmall retailtradeandconsumer sition inCzechoslovakiawasalso marked asanorderlydecline,su ity ofthepartyleader bylackofalmost anyprivatesector, rmer cases, therigid, ‘frozen’ and enterprises thatformed ses andthecreationof ffocating, to paraphrase ship might bealso CEU eTD Collection collapsing. (MunckandSkalnikLeff1999,207) rallies and a brief symbolic strike” made theCommunist leadership realize their power was isolated dissident leaders received validation in regime’s repression ofstudent accurately asareform through (Szomolanyi 1999,20-21)Thetransitionin C struggles betweenthe changes, includingthequestionofeconomic reforms, werenowsubjecttonegotiations and mutualdialogue and concessions”(Szomolányi 1999,25).Allthesubsequentinstitutional politics ofcompromise andnegotiations assumption ofpowerbythenew elitesmeant power isaccomplished withonly minimal institutional changes.Thisrelatively fast Chairman oftheAssemblybeforeend prowess VáclavHavelisunanimously Václav Havelbytheold-regime FederalAssembly.Thanksto Marián see alsoHanzel1991). about asimpletransferofpower(Suk2003,24 even despitetheopposition’slackofaclearpo hope ofbolsteringtheirshakenposition. Howeve were unable todealwiththecrisis andhesitate activists ledbyVáclavHavelwerepossibly The newPrime Minsterofthe“government ofnationalunders The round-tabletalksbetweenthePrime Č alfa, wasinstrumental inspeedingthepow new elites,and newlyemerging centersofpower (Bureš2004,18-19). demonstration.Inthefollowingwinter rupture elected president and AlexanderDub , ignitedbythepopular of theyear.(Suk2003,27-28)Thetransfer 37 only afterthemass protests.Thecommunists -25; Bureš2004,13;Szomolányi1999,22-23; didn’t learntoreachaconsensusbywayof theapprobationofcr d toemploy violence. They agreedtotalksin litical strategy, thenegotiations soon became that they “werenotforcedtoembrace the Minister LadislavAdamec andopposition zechoslovakia could bedescribed more r, situation acceleratedveryquickly,and er transferbyinsuringtheelectionof Č alfa’s technocraticpower mobilization againstthe tanding”, communist owds atalmostdaily weeks“previously č ek is elected new CEU eTD Collection 8 planning, respectively.The newgovernment’s Klaus andVladimír Dlouhý,whobecome thefina economy, Marián that theywere more “reformi (2003, 146)theywerepartlyaTrojanhorse,becausedifferedfromCzechdissidentsin movement VPN(PublicAgainstViolence),Civi emphasizing theneedforeconomic reforms. (Burian1997,500) the roundtabletalks did notthreatenthesy from thepublicatlarge,wh ‘grey zone’meant abreakingofthepotentialis proposals foreconomic reforms. (Bureš2004,4) Komárek) from theInstitute ofPrognostics, who are offering their services in drafting economists (VáclavKlaus,Tomáš Ježek,Vladim government’s longerperspectiv ValtrKomárek1989 statedthatVPNconsiders to Č the newgovernment ofnationalunderstandingre negotiations –againstthe wishesoftheCzech aforementioned reform communisteconomist, be formed toshowabitmore continuity.It (Hanzel 1991, 13) thisVolf”. isdoctor know from television, “...you probably thusly: Klaus Václav Havel gaffes, introducing Athe very firstmeeting of Civic Forum delegation and the delegation of the goverment, 26.11. 1989, Václav arnogurský, whoatthejointmeeting ofVPNandOFcoordi Apart from thereformist ValtrKomárek,w Joining theroundtabletalkswerealsodissidentsfrom theSlovakopposition Already onNovember 22theOF(Civic Č 8 andalsohelpeddraftthefirstprogrammaticproposalsofmovement, alfa’s government of national unders alfa’s government ofnational mbolic power ofdissidents.(Eyal2003,147)They immediately joined ile atthesame time, the economists mostly non-communist past

st” thanradicalandwantedth e inthesphereofeconomic policy”(Hanzel1991,350). 38 was their insistence that Valtr Komárek, the program 1989 hadamong fromDecember its dissidents –andlaterbecome themember of olation ofthemostly dissidentCivicForum c Forum’s apparentally.ButasEyal notes ír Dlouhý,followedfewdayslaterbyValtr invitedtothefina sponsible foreconomic reform. ItwasJán nce minister anddeputyprime minister for be “the key – the cornerstone […] of the be“thekey–thecornerstone[…]of The arrivalofeconomic expertsfrom the ho becomes thedeputyprimeminister for Forum) movement is joined byseveral tanding isalsojo e newgovernment abouttobe nation centersonDecember8 l roundsofround-table ined byVáclav th

CEU eTD Collection which heduped people”. (in: Husák 1997, 106) 57), who didn’t really have a conception of reform, only an “unending procession of rhetorical exhibitions with an unregulated capitalistsyst in: Husák 1997, 105) and later attacked the economic reform proposals as a“militant program ofthe renewal of around Klausandthefinanceministry. (Šulc1998,73;Suk2003,401;Myant16) any concreteplansandmostof proposals foragradual reform, pacedoverthenext Klaus. Komárek’soutput atthistime consiste reform pace. economists who werebehindthereform atte and the'old boys' (an Englishnickname reformers likeVáclavKlaus,KarelDyba,Tomáš Ježek,DušanT antagonists howeverwerenotthe not imply aconsensusonthecontentofreforms (Burian1997,505). andpubliclydemonstrthe necessityofreforms main goals theunequivocaltran 10 9 team, consistingmainly ofthe'old boys' econom worsening economic situationleadstoaforma sidelined liberalization withaten-yearhorizon –ineffective andpoliticallyunskilled economic reform ashismain agenda,hemaintained aproposalofgradualreforms and Although, from theoutset,hewasdeputyprime minister the firstpointofcontentionbe Tomáš Ježekhad harsher words, describing Komárek as Komárek resented his sidelin This initialdisunityofthefederalgove Valtr Komárek became thefirst loserin As itturned out,this decision aboutthena 10 byhissubordinate,themuchmore dyna em” (Komárek 1991, 103). ing, seeingitasabetrayalby hiscoll

tween newlydevelopingcenters sition toamarket economy. Theemerging consensusabout his potentialco-workerswentto workfor the team forming old regime versusnewregime employed bytheradicalyoungergeneration), employed 39 mpts in1968andarguedforamore gradual d mainly of critiques of“shocktherapy”and d mainly ofcritiques tion ofa'rival' groupingofeconomic reform ated unityoftheprognosticianshowever did a “slacker” anda “loudmout ture and extent ofeconomic reforms became rnment andfearsbyOFleadershipover 4to10years. Hehowever failed tosubmit ists connectedwithth the politicalfightforeconomic reform. mic federalfinanceminister, Václav eagues from thePrognostics institute(Ježek of thenewgovernmentwith of politicalpower.Themain representatives, but 'radical' representatives, but'radical' ř íska orVladimír Dlouhý h” (in:Husák 1997, 56- e reform in process 9 , hewasquickly CEU eTD Collection blueprint ofeconomic reforms. (Suk2003,403;Šulc1998,73) rejected Komárek's gradualist approachand the deputyprime minister oftheCzechgovernment 1968, suchasKarelKouba,ZdislavŠulc,OtaTurekandevenŠik,undertheauspicesof economists opinedthatprivatiza firms buttocreatemarket structuresenc standard approach toprivatizat inequitable andcouldarousepopul potential 'spontaneous' privatizationbymana domestic capital resources. Theaimof aquick,formal privatization wastostop/prevent if thisshouldentail'non-st program arguedforquickandcomplete privatiz contention layinthequestion price liberalizationandthesequ (Suk 2003,403-404,Šulc1998,75). proposal, the'Federal' proposalar Dlouhý, wereputforwardtotheFederalgovernment ''Strategy forradicaleconomic reform'') writte sequenced transitiontowards amarket economy in finalized competing proposals, thefirst'sequenced' (fulltitle''Thepropos quickly reactsandinAprilproposeshis action of the state tomake the process more As Tomáš Ježekobserved, thebehavior Between thetwoproposalsthere This initiativehoweverthreatenedthesupr andard' methods (i.e.vouchers) ion; thepurposewasnottoincr tion wouldhappeneither way, encing ofexternaltradeliberalization,butthemain pointof of ownershiptransformation – gued foraquickandradicalli ar backlash(Aslund2002,257). were onlyslightdifferences ouraging privatebusine own conception(Suk2003,403).InMaythe 40 equitable, transparent andcomprehensive. The already inMarch(1990)proposedtheirfirst n undertheauspicesofministers Klausand gers, whichwouldbebothinefficientand ation, includinglarge-scaleenterprises,even emacy ofthefederalgovernment, soKlaus of managers required aquick and non- FrantišekVlasák(a . Inanexplicitpolemic withthe'Czech' Č SFR''), the second'radical' (fulltitle what wasrequireda swift required bythe beralization andprivatization ease efficiencyofparticular privatization. The'Federal' ss (Ježek1997,180).The inpoliciesregardingthe 68-er himself). They al for a strategy of a al forastrategyof fact oflow CEU eTD Collection managers andpoliticiansfosterstherest various voucherprograms. (Boyc allocation schemes ofsharesthe statecanpurs bymaincrease ofprivatecashflowownership the commercialization, i.e.the managerial assets.Secondchangerequiredforaprivatizationprogram seizureoffirm's thenis when inaweakstatethedeclining power turning overthecontrolofcompanyto would bethecorporatisation, meaning aseveringofthecomp Privatization canbeunderstoodastwoparallel but apreconditionforthecreationofma only privatizelaterwhenprope along withpriceliberalization,sothatfirms can 'Czech' program, ontheotherhand,argued foratwo- transformation hingedonthegovernment’s ability economy wasrigid–there 3.3 Privatization 407; cf.Myant2003,16-21) the endfederaloneprevaile Klaus' team reform hadthemain say.Although ideasfromincorporation ofafew theCzech Reform program wasconstructedasflex Privatization isnotonlyapolitical strategy In May1990theFederalprogramprevailed,government recommendedthe r institutionalframework isbuiltaswell.(Suk 2003,404-405) reduction ofcashflowownership d becauseithadalsobetterpoliticalarguments. (Suk2003, ko etal.1996,313-314)This wi little disagreement onitsnecessity –thesuccessof ructuring ofthefirm (Boyckoetal.1996,316) managers. Thiscanalsohappenspontaneously, 41 of bureaucracycreates proposal (e.g., National propertyfunds), but nagers andshareholders changesundertakenbythereformers. First rket economywherenoneexistedbefore. ue, itcansellthem orgivethem awayvia both sidesofferedvalideconomic points,in first 'learn' howtoope to reduce inefficiencyofpublicenterprises ible, onlythegoalofrestructuring totransform thestateenterprises(Dyba step process:doing corporatizationfirst, any's tieswiththestateand dens theseparationbetween by thestatetreasuryandan conditions suitable to rate inamarket, and . Therearedifferent CEU eTD Collection collapsed aswellandprivatization w importantly, withthe collapse of thecommuni reform could just aswellbe“s be thedefiningfeatureofec the main originator of the conception of the voucher privatization, consideredprivatization to and Švejnar1991,19).Forthisreason,DušanT only berelativelyfastand eas population andwereexchangeable forsharesin for severalfollowingreasons transformation. VáclavKlaus,DušanT 2000, 77),foritwasanelegantandpracticalso sale, auctions,tenders,andtransfer more standardmethods oflarge by economists LewandowskyandSzomburg (Ježekin:Husák 1997,101-103).However, Švejnar, whowerealsoinspiredbyasimilar main one.InCzechoslovakiaitwas firstproposedbyeconomists DušanT the endallofthem wereused,althoughthevoucher (coupon)privatizati corporatization anddivisioninto volume actsneeded,theselectionofen oflegal thatlay and getstarted.Thenumberoftasks 3.3.1 Voucherprivatization Vouchers weretobedistributedfreely Voucher privatization wastheperfectexam The large(mass) privatizationalthough"quick onomic transformation, sincepri (Mejstrik &Burger1994,151). y toenact(withtheemphasis on ome ‘radical’variantofthe refo smaller units.Anumber ofmet enterprise privatizationwere s ofpropertytomunicipalities. ould thus“happennomatter what”.(T ř íska, Vladimír DlouhýandTomášJežekadvocatedit 42 – foranominal feeof1000Crowns–inthe proposal raisedinPolandafewmonths earlier ahead ofreformers wasenormous, giventhe selectedcompanies.This method would not st powertheownershipclaim ofthestate terprises to beprivat lution fortheproblem ofpropertystructure ř íska, oneofKlaus’economic advisorsand ple ofthe“monetarist”technology(Eyal andrapid"tookalotoftime toprepare ce liberalizationandmonetary relatively also employed, suchasdirect rm of‘real’socialism”. More hods were consideredandin hods were ized, theirpre-required ) (Aslund2002,273), on waschosenasthe ř íska 2006) ř íska andJan CEU eTD Collection desert of communism (Eyal 2000,80). desert ofcommunism (Eyal the pastoral roleoftheCzechelite’stask civiceducation, leadingthenation out of the citizenry intheprinciplesof were supposedtoworkasan undeniably psychologicalandeducationalaspect many citizens/shareholders thanagainst those of afew capitalists. Finally,therewas alsoan for potentialre-nationalization.Itismostlikelyha insurance that the reform their intent toparticipate. Thismass partic enterprises, andatthebeginningoffirstwa more then60%oftheCzechpopulationagreed popular –atleastthebeginning.AsVe popular (Mejstrik&Burger1994,143). nomenclature with potential illegal backing of the onlyoneswithenoughdisposablecash.Th elements (e.g., peopledealinginillegalmoney prevailing viewswerethatdi too littlewealthinthe generalpopulation capital didn’tallowtryingothermoredirect methods –thereweresimp participate andbuysharesinformerly stateownedenterprises.Furthermore, thelackof bulk. Itwasdeemed fairanduni but alsotrulymassive, allowinga politically popular, acceptablea Popularity wasalsoamajor concernandthe All these points presented analluringpoli s wouldbehardertorevert–itwa the market economy. Vouchersthus instrument ofentrenchingcap rect salesandauctionswouldattractonlycertain'shady' versal since everycitizen woul nd sustainable, tosurvive in high fractionofstateassetsto č erník documents (1996,154), bytheendof 1990 43 for attempting direct sales. Additionally, the ve ofcouponprivatizatio ipation also servedas afuture institutional exchanges) and/orcommunistswhowouldbe exchanges) foreigninvestorswouldnotturnoutvery idea of voucher privatization was immensely idea ofvoucherprivatizationwasimmensely e prospectofblack tothewholeproposal rder electorallytogoagainsttheinterestof tical package.Privatizations hadtobe onthedesirability ofselling large s perceived asagreater constraint italist valuesandeducatingthe anewlycreatedcompetitive d haveachance and arightto seconded asaninstrument in be privatized at marketeers andcorrupt ly toomanyly assetsand n, some 50%declared . Massshareholdings onceandin CEU eTD Collection long agencychain would lead not only fail to change the behavior of firm managers, but the lack of a proper legal framework and the apparent resulting at the main wasaimed criticism government, the Husák 1997,103)anditisfinallyapprovedin monthsproposal. Inthesummer DušanT starts topublicly present itas a solution an structures of thepastandasteponpathofreturntociv construction ofanewidentityembedded ina emergent political elites; itwasa symbolic tool for the deconstruction of political environment. Privatization wasthusa part of an ideological project of thenew 11 specialists'. Howeverthereformers wereadam and privatizationofexisting 'technocratic' arguments infavorofinsiderprivatization,favoring gr mainly atretailtradeand consumer services 3.3.2 Othermethods a lynchpinofeconomic reform, sinceit spontaneous privatizations.AsEarleandGehl sector and(re)distributingstateownedassetsre

asset stripping, orwhatcame tobe colloquially known Apart from the recognition that voucher privatization would bring only very limited (if any) revenue for the the revenuefor (ifany) very limited bring only would privatization that voucher Apart recognition from the Despite some criticisms Unlike themass privatization,thedecisionab Voucher privatizationenteredthepublic economic dislocation.(Earle andGehlbach2003,2) sustainability andirreversibility of widespread benefits,th policies thatdrawinpopularpar [B]y ‘‘sweetening’’ the bittermedi to poor corporate governance andpotentia 11

, itwasanimportantfacilitating step, allowingto builda private structures, buildingonthe' e policymaker may beable to increase the built supportforthereform process: ř , waspassedrelativelyeasily.Thereweresome íska worksonadetailedconception(Ježekin inCzechoslovakia as 'tunneling'. (Svejnar 2002, 6) 44 theFederalassemblyinFebruary1991. bach (2003,2)argue,voucherprivatizationwas reforms evenduringaperiodof d itis alsoincludedin ticipation andcreateimmediate, discourse in March 1990 when Václav Klaus discourse inMarch1990whenVáclavKlaus cine ofstructuralreforms with ant intheirsupportfo latively fairly,diminishing thepotentialof market society, aradicaldivorce withthe unclear and dispersed ownership structure. It would structure. It would ownership dispersed and unclear out the'small privatization', directed knowledge oftheexpertsand lly (as often proved to be the case) to tocase) be the proved lly (asoften ilized world(Eyal2000). adual decentralization the‘federal’ reform theoldregime anda r rapidprivatization CEU eTD Collection 69) proceed. Unsold assets went to asecond round in which foreign buyers could also participate (Earle et al. 1994, could normal bidding afterwhich made was abid until 10% by priceswere progressively decreased where Given the low capital holdings ofthe domestic population a variant of the Dutch auctionmethod wasemployed, momentum oftheeconomic tr et al.note, “Czechoslovak reformers werealways wanted todemonstrate theirabilitytocarryoutreforms (Ježekin:Husák1997,131).AsEarle when publicimpatience grewwiththepace was alsotodosomething quickandvisiblein when preparationforthelargeprivatization support thereform program ofthenewgovernment” (Earleetal.1994,47). nomenclature andcreateanewclassofsm approach toprivatizationin without anypreferencesforthetradeinsiders 12 including Klaus,wereagainstrestitutions.(Ježekin: Husák 1997,117)Theythus long toovercome –itcoulddelayotherreforms considerably.Forthisreasonmany reformers, offering toomany potentialtechnical,legalandbur problems wereexpectedinthei andmediumthe development sizebusinesssector ofsmall the retailsectorandalongwithrestitutionsit 1991 andfinishingbythe endof1993thisprogr with littlecontroversyorprotest,safeforso kiosks, stores,restaurants,bars,hotelsetc.Th

The units were sold in an uniform process of public auctions, open to only domestic buyers in the first round. the firstround. in domestic to buyers only open auctions, uniformpublic an of process in weresold units The Restitutions, however,werenotconsidered by reformers atfirst,because major Small privatizationincludedsaleofsma Small privatization met withrelatively litt

ansformation” (1994,59fn.17). Czechoslovakiaingeneral: r potentialrealizati was goingslow.Theaim ofsmall privatization 45 was responsibleforthecreationofbasis me ofthelosing'insiders'. Beginninginearly is wasprobablytheeasiest sector toprivatize all-scale entrepreneur thesummer monthsafterthe1990elections of economic transformation. Thereformers am waslargelysuccessful atdemonopolizing – thiswasconsistentwiththepredominant ll tradeandconsumerservices,mostshops, on. Themethod viewedasimpractical, was le disagreement andwaspreparedinhaste veryattentive tomaintaining the political eaucratic complications thatcouldtaketoo 12 (Earleetal.1994,59). “tobreakthemonopoly of s whowouldtherefore CEU eTD Collection compensation. demonstrated theirtechnocrati intellectuals. Soonthey had of human resources;therewere only somany Slovak PM).PublicAgainstViolence,CivicFo Slovak parliament, whileMilan the Central Committee of theCo but withthehelpfromsome reform-mindedcommunists (Rudolf Schuster,afunctionaryof 3.4 TheSlovakspecificity et al.1994,53-59). the criticalmass ofprivatebusiness andmaintain The resulting restitution turned out tobeafairly quickandefficient date ofthecommunist putschonFebruary25 wrongdoings andalthoughtherehavebeenprior it asanMPinitiative(J colleagues andpasseshisversi this reason,Tomáš Ježek,freshlydesignatedCzechprivatizationminister, defiessome ofhis perceived asamatter ofjusticeandfairness 77% oftheCzech(and63%Slovak)population(Ve stolen bycommunist nationalizat The transition inBratislava wasalso initia Points ofcontentionoriginallyaroseabout However, therewereverystrongpublice ežek in:Husák1997,118-120). program wasthemost extensive in on oftherestitution to co-optandrecruit many reform communists, including c concern by givingprecedence Č ions. Restitutionsassuchwe mmunist partyofSlovakiabecomes thechairman ofthe i č , thecommunistminister ofjustice,becomes thenew – torightthewrongdoingsofnationalization.For way tocreate abasisfor small-business sector. 46 th 1948.Despitethereformers' fearsrestitutions rum’s Slovak counterpart, sufferedfromrum’s Slovakcounterpart, lack nationalizations thedeadlinewassetfor publicsupportofthereform process(Earle ted by liberal intellectuals and dissidents, law totwoMPswhosuccessfullypropose xpectations aboutreturningtheproperty boththeextentandtimeline ofthe trusted dissidents,so CEE, andmayhavehelpedcreate č erník 1996,156).Itwasalso re later appreciated bysome to practicality over a just cial scientists and CEU eTD Collection 1999b, 437;Šútovec1999,239). communist economists suchasHvezdo conception ofaCzecho-Slovakfederation the Slovak reform, onelittlenoticed socialism, buildingonpresumed Czechoslova comeback, begantorevivetheir20yearoldpr the normalization andhavebeenwaitinginid adherents andsupportersofthe“socialism with the Slovaknation.(Eyal2003,146) popularity ofthenationalistChristianDemocrats Against Violencedecidedtoincludethem inth with ahuman face”wereinitiallymuch more Czech republic, representatives ofthereform already mentioned Augustín MariánHúska, epitomize theideologyofSlovaknationalec (Koč desired constitutional order of Czechoslovakia. DatedFebruary 2 the programmatic thinkingof (Szomolányi 1999,45). Dub č túch etal.1990)itwasrichonrhetoricandpoorspecificpro ek, whilethefirstcandidateonlis Even beforetheformulation oftheCzech Soon aftertheNovemberev Another reasonforthispersonalcontinuity Literary Weekly articlepublishedintwoparts wouldfor thefirst time come to much ofthenewSlovakelite First onthelistwasli ents, theinformal grouping ň Ko č k andSlovakspecifities.(Šútovec 1999,205) 47 túch andAugustín Marián Húska(Szomolányi popular thantheunknowndissidents, soPublic oposals forathirdwaybetweencapitalism and under theconditionsofmarketmechanism communism andthepeople of“thesocialism his colleaguefrom theeconomic research ahuman whohavebeensidelinedby face”, t withoutacommunist pastwasonly9 eir electionlisttoc onomic distinctness.Theauthorswerethe eological isolationfortheirchance fora and earnthemselves theclaim torepresent andtheFederalconceptions ofeconomic of communistswasthat unlikeinthe the firsttwoMarch1990issuesof about economic reformsandthe ving symbol of1968,Alexander state, inarudimentary fashion, nd andentitled Obroda (Revival)ofthe ounterweigh thegrowing posals, butcame to The suggested th

CEU eTD Collection state arrangement models and their social symmetry, stating that the title two are optimal. (Šútovec 1999, 97-98) 1999, 97-98) (Šútovec areoptimal. the titletwo that symmetry, stating social andtheir models state arrangement become the Slovakminister fortheenvironment. of the institute 14 13 and emancipating theenterprises. This however, disadvantages” oftheSlovakeco markets, amenable tostateactions.Owingspecificproblems and“comparative arguing fortheprimacy ofthestate need forsynergyofeconomic mechanisms ifan of economictransformation.Afterhistoricalandgeopoliticalex human face intheeconomic areabyadvocatingagr 1999, 237) context, deprivingSlovakia of have thedesired “synergic”effect, butin harmful toSlovakia.A non-autonomouscentra reforms (thoughnosuchconceptionwasputto mechanism bestsuitedtoSlovakneeds.They political relationsinthe federation, theau Hvezdo Trade. Construction the of Economicsand Organization the for Institute The Revival They argueforaradical changeinownershi The authors triedtoadvance thenotionthatthere aremultiple forms andvariantsof The authors attempted toresuscitatethethirdwayidealsof 68’ssocialism witha 13 ň Ko andmember of the the mechanism canbeaninstrument fo not fromthemost solidCzechandSlovakfundaments. market Butthe The actionsofthefederalgovernment (Koč čtúch also wrote a study , andtheeconomist MilošD.Plachtins Č túch etal1990,12) SF [Czecho-SlovakFederation],

Revival its truenationalidentity.(Ko Federation? Confederation? nomy, whichwerepartlyare arrangements overtheeconomic ones. group,HvezdoňKo stead putSlovakia in Czechoslovak, i.e. 48 thors argued for the ‘creation’ of a marketthors arguedforthe‘creation’ofa r therealizationandfunctioningof feared thatafederalconceptionofeconomic lized economic policy did not and could not lized economic policydidnotandcould arebuilding‘from theroof’and in theirframework, didn’tnecessarilyentail paper yet)might bemore“pro-Czech”and and nottheotherwayaround! “authentic federation” is tobe achieved, adual and defactomarket-socialist policy p structure, endingthe“statecapitalism” ký and Ivan Tirpák, who would later ký andIvanTirpák,whowouldlater in 1968,discussed where he somepotential č túch č túch etal.1990,12;Šútovec 14 , IvanLaluha,thechairman cursions theyexhortedthe sult ofanasymmetry in Czech , CEU eTD Collection criteria oftheirresultingsynergy”(Ko enterprise, thecommunal, thenational, thepr bytying“theindividual,the forms shouldbringabouta“symphonyofeffectiveness” alienation ofworkersfromownership”(Ko “intersection ofindividualandenterpriseow state enterprisesbeco privatization; intruespiritofmarket socialis and planning.Sincethis knowledg specialized inmathematical modeling, input- TheSlovakprognostics economists andre intellectually preparedtof creating an artificialmarket as researchers wereweddedtotheideaofre conceptions atthefederallevelinPrague. in Prague(Szomolányi 1999b,427).Thereforeitmade moresensetoproposeanddevelop virtue ofthefactthat, as th Despitethisandsimilarly wordedproposal of economic reforms developedinSlovakia.This monetary policyatth would thusbelongtothenationalgovernments, giving thenationalgovernments economic soverei needed tobeorganizedasaloosefederation administration localmarket ofa structures institutional administration. Therefore,the This wholesome constructi e federal level. (Ko ming self-governing,sociallyowne ace thecollapse ofthiseconomic modelandrespondaccordingly. e Slovak nationalists rightlyobse an addition tothe politicsof state planning, theywere notfully on ofthe market mechanism requires acomplementary e wassupposedtobethe most useful inreforming the č túch etal.1990,13). č túch etal.1990,13) forming communism bymolding theeconomy and requires regionalself-governance, Czechoslovakia č túch etal.1990,12).Thepluralityofownership 49 However, sincemost oftheSlovakeconomic output analyses,cybern m theauthorssuggestedalsopossibilityof ivate andthemixed ofownershipbythe forms not onlypolitically,but nership”. Thisshouldhelpalleviate“today’s authors suggested,sincethecreationand gnty. Originalcompetences intheeconomy is, ofcourse,partlytobeexplainedbythe s therehavebeennodetailedconceptions leaving onlydefense,foreignaffairsand form communisttechnocratswere rved, thepowercenterwasindeed d enterprisescreatedinan etics, andprogramming economically aswell, CEU eTD Collection and irritated him.” (Húska 2006, 141) deliberately used professional cybernetic-informatics an expectationthatthehighly self-c Slovak post-election negotiations of summer 1992: “My useofsystem-cybernetics argumentation was based on footing their Slovakcounterpartsanddeniedthem th economists notonlyhaddifferent (Eyal 2003,108-109). of economic trends,partofafeedbackloop market. Themarket forthem wasjusta‘simulat communist economy, theycontinuedtosearch 15 right intotherhetoric of Vladimír Me more prevalent. Inresponse to the transition (Ježek in:Husák 1997,229). communists “wasoutofthequestion.Theirs counterpart A.M.Húskaismost telling: ‘”mentoring” and“professorial”intheirmutual dealings(Húska2006,141) something like cybernetics”(Húska2006,142)andcomplainedthatKlauswastoo enamoured withelegantmathematic economic theo Augustín MariánAugustín Húska (2006)wouldtr 15 This, however,didnotprecludetheSlovak Effectively, fortheCzecheconomists They wouldlatercome tobemoan thef . Inthisregard, Tomáš reac Ježek’s He startedtodrawforme thos Husák 1997,225) respect, listeningtohimandthoughtmyself: ohmy. (Ježekin: on hiskneeapieceof paperandIwa meaninglessness. [...]A.M.Húskast always made me wanttopukebecauseof theiremptiness and my life of aresearcher Ihaveseen amillion toomany andwhich “feedbacks”, squareswithlittlearrows intertwined, diagrams, whichin

onfident and eloquent Václav Klaus was not afan of cybernetics. […] I viewsabouttheeconomic reform, theyeffectivelysnubbed y to applythis general disregard to his side’s advantage atthe Czecho- č iar, whoafterhisunsuccessful bidfortheVPN jargon,which made our negotiating partner nervous […] 50 e systemic diagrams withthose recession pains theseeconomic views tapped and ourworldviewswerelogicalskewlines” e collegialrecognition theeconomic system, atooloftheplanner arted todrawtheseloopybeasts or’, asensitiveinstrument forthemeasuring tion uponmeeting hisSlovakministerial any communicationwith Slovak reform for a synthesis of state planning and the for asynthesisofstateplanningandthe act thattheCzecheconomists were“too reform communists’ views from becoming s politely,atfirstfulloftimid ries oftheWest to of anequal‘expert’ pay dueattentionto . TheCzech CEU eTD Collection nationalists andthelibe managers was abletomaneuver himself onthepoliticalfield in-between the Slovak prognosticians andtechnocrats(Húska,Ková into hisMovement fordemocratic Slovak which staggered withthe thankless taskof enacting painful reforms. Me popularity growsinproportiontothedecliningsupportofJán leadership andthesubsequentoustingwasnowfree to followhispolitical instincts.His soon becomefulfilledto theletter. to beappliedindifferentre illustrate theevilsof‘centralism’, indicatingth government whofollowedhim toHZDSusedth quickly becoming thedominant player tactics, making itmore palatabletovoter responsible fortheeconomic woes,butatthesame European nations’.”(Húska2006,8)Finally,af rhetoric ofthetime, “[W]eunreservedlywanted Slovak nationalsovereigntyand remedy theyadvocatedanequalpartnershipof HZDS raisedtheissueof an‘authentic fede ral remnants of VPN. gions isinessenceakinto ‘subjectivity ininternational law’.AsHúskasummedupthe intheSlovak politicalfield.Me s ofbothVPNandnationalists(Eyal2003,173) 51 č at thequestfor universaleconomic principles , Ko ia (HZDS)bymost ter theJune1992electio e economicreform from package Pragueto nations(presumably inaconfederacy), tohaveourown‘chair’atthe‘tableof time criticizedthepreviousregime andits ration’ and criticizedPrague centralism as č túch) andsupportedbystateenterprise communism (Eyal2003,175).Asa Č arnogurský’s government č reform communists, iar andmen from his n theirdesirewould č iar, nowfollowed CEU eTD Collection capital they werecapable todom compatible enoughtoform apoliticalalliance and usingtheirsymbolic powerand cultural political reactiontothenormalizationperiod and restoring thelost culture ofcapitalism. Thankstotheir personal anabasis andsimilar anti- creation and(re)distributionbutalsoasamo ral toolofundoingthewrongs ofcommunism program. Theyproposedvoucherprivatizationno experts aprogram quickandradicalpriv ofa politically successful, recruited mostly from mostly ofdissidents,in loyalist eliteagainsta‘mass’, emancipatory should account fortheirdecision-making. experience duringcommunism. Theirpersonalgene the collapseofcommunism. Theirresponsewa systems anddifferentpoliticalst key featurefor theexplanationof configuration andideologicalp on post-communisttransitionan federation. Theimportance oftheelitevari explain thedifferentapproach The Slovakpost-communistelitesoonbeco For theCzechpost-communisteliteconsisti The respective Czech andSlovak national In my thesisI described howthedifferen tellectuals, social scientistsand activ to economic reforms priortoth ackages thepolitical inate theCzechpoliticalfield. rategies inresponse to the shap political decisionsintransitions. d drawingonthisscholars CONCLUSION able hasbeenexpoundedin numerous literatures 52 the reform communists andnomenclature the the dissidentsandeconomists weremutually nationalist elite. While theformer consisted atization became a lynchpin oftheirreform t onlyasapragmatic mechanism ofproperty ces ineliteconfigurationandcomposition s partlytempered bytheirsocialization elites came toespousedifferentbelief actors came tobeendowedwithasone ng mainly ofdissidentsandeconomic sis thus could not be neglected if we sis thuscouldnotbeneglectedifwe me fragmented, pi ists, thelatter andultimately more e break-upoftheCzechoslovak ing ofthepoliti hip Iemphasized theelite tting ‘democratic’ cal fieldafter CEU eTD Collection 1968 programof‘market socialism’. program reform andtheestablishment of self-g nomenclature managers andreformcommunist arguing thatthesereforms domoreharmdueto They largely rejectedtheCzecheconomic refo advocating nationalsovereigntyofSlovakia,in questions of thereformandpropershapeof managers and technocrats.Theirsuccessreside order, butwas beyondthescopeofpresentwork. republics upuntiltheiradmission totheEU.Such afurtherexamination wouldindeedbein republics, offeringapotentialforcomparison continued influenceoftherespectiveelitesinnewlyindepe independent variables.Theworkasitnowst become theobjectsof changeenacted bypolit example oftheimportance ofelite composition. The changeoftheeconomic organization 53 cluding thesovereigntyineconomic realm. the constitutionalorderoffederationand rm proposalsastooradicalandcentralistic, overning enterprises,la ands opensfurtherquestionsregardingthe Slovakeconomy’s specificities.Insteadthe During transition theinstitutions themselves ofeconomicreform processesinthetwo ical actorsandcannot d intheirstrategyto concentrateonthe advocatedamore gradual,phasedout during transition canserve asan ideal ndent CzechandSlovak rgely inspired bythe beconsideredas CEU eTD Collection theory oftransition].Pol [Opening ofthetransitiontodemocracy inCz Cambridge (UK):Cambridge UniversityPress. Anderson, Lisa.1999. Macmillan Reference USA. Montgomery eds.EncyclopediaofSociology,Vol. 4., 2nd Akard, Patrick.2001.SocialandPoliticalElites. in:EdgarF.Borgatta ed., and Rhonda J.V. 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