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THE ORIGINS AND IMPACT OFTHE FuNCTION OF CRIME INVESTIGATION AND DETECTION INTHE BRITISH POLICE SERVICE
by
LawrenceThomton Roach,QPM B. Sc (Econ)
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
of Loughborough University
June 2004
(DLawrence T. Roach2004 Acknowledgments
ACKNOWLEDGMETSM
My decisionto re-launchmyself as a researcherafter a lifetime spentin operational policing could not havebeen contemplated let aloneachieved without the encouragement,support and active assistanceof many people. I will try briefly to conveythe extentof my indebtednessto them here.
My thanksmust first go to ProfessorSue Cox, formerly headof the Centrefor Hazardand Risk Managementat LoughboroughUniversity andnow Deanof the ManagementSchool at LancasterUniversity. Without her warmth,encouragement and patienceI doubt I would havemade the diff icult transitionfrom nearthe top of one careerto the foot of another. Certainly, I could not havemade the necessary personaland academicadjustments. In that connectionProfessor John M. Wilson, playedan indispensablepart. Without his ability to find solutionsto the impossible administrativeand organisational problems set by my research,and his calmness and sureguiding handat momentsof stress,this thesiswould not and could not have appeared.
I suspect that every research student owes much of any successthey might have to the support and guidance of their supervisors. I am no exception to that rule. Professor Adrian Wilkinson of the Business School at Loughborough University and Professor John Baldwin, Head of the Law School at the University of Birmingham kindly undertook that task for me. The extent of the problems they so ably and efficient resolved is amply shown in the fact that senior members of two different Universities were required properly to supervise my work. I am more gratefulthan I can easilyexpress for the value andthe robustnessof their guidance, and for their unfailing supportin difficult circumstances.
For different reasonsI also owe a greatdeal to the late Sir Karl R. Popperwith whoseviews and methodsI becameacquainted while taking my first degreeon a police scholarshipto the London Schoolof Economicsand Political Sciencein the later 1960's. I recognisedthen his powerful influenceon the social sciences,but only when I beganserious work on this thesisdid I fully appreciatethe depthand strengthof his scholarshipand the high standardshe setfor research. His views and,I hope,his standardshave much influencedmy approachto this work.
In additionto my other difficulties, my researchwas donepart-time, at homeand more than one hundredmiles from my University campus. I havetherefore been dependent morethan usually on the supportof librariesand their staff. The Acknowledgments ii custodians of the Pilkington Library at my own University were considerate to the point of indulgence of a student unwilling to return a book with anything less than a fortnight's notice and only able to transact business by 'phone and fax. Astothe libraries that dealt with me in person, the British Library of Political and Economic Science at the London School of Economics and the Learning Resource Centre at the University of Hertfordshire could not have been treated me with greater courtesy or given better assistance. Elsewhere I was granted a pass to the British Library Newspaper Library at Colindale in London, and what was more important, an excellent introduction to its contents. And the staff of what, perforce, became my main source of accessto books, the British Library in Euston Road, London, excelled themselves. Much of the sparseliterature on early policing is either unavailable or out of print, but the British Library rarely failed to produce a reference, however old or obscure. I am particularly grateful for the interest and enthusiasm of its staff in supporting a demanding, and sometimes troublesome, mature student researcher.
I discoveredmuch of the original materialused in this researchat the Public RecordsOffice (now the National Archive) at Kew in London. Everyoneand anyonevisiting that treasurehouse for researcherswill find themselvesconstantly in conversationwith its staff. Successfulresearch at the PRO is impossiblewithout their support. I found it expert,understanding and ever-available.
I havealso hadthe advantageof accessto materialheld at the MetropolitanPolice Museumat Blackwall in London and in the MetropolitanPolice Libraries at New ScotlandYard and at the Training Schoolat Hendon. In that regardmy special thanksgo to Ellie Haynesfor her personalinterest and support.
Finally, let me thank my family and friendsfor their fond, firm (if sometimes uncomprehending)support. Specialthanks in that regardmust go first to my wife, Sandraand then to the membersof the MetropolitanPolice Traditional Aikido Club undertheir (andmy) Chief InstructorDenise Holmes, a groupto which I belong both as a participantand asHonorary President. Not only did they keepme informedand on the right track in developmentsin policing, but they also endured my sometimesincomprehensible musing and occasionalcross-examinations about policing and its problemswithout too much complaint. Forthat, andforalithe other help and supportI havehad, I give muchthanks. For sucherrors, omissions and mereincompetence as may be discoveredin this work, I take full responsibility.
LawrenceT. Roach,QPM June2004 (A) Keywords ii
Keywords
" Detectives
" History of policing
" Police reform
" Crime prevention
" Crime detection
" Crime investigation
" Peacekeeping
" Public order Abstract ii(a)
LOUGHBOROUGH UNIVERSITY
ABSTRACT
THE ORIGINS AND IMPACT OF THE FUNCTION OF CRIME INVESTIGATION AND DETECTION IN THE BRITISH POLICE SERVICE
by LawrenceT. Roach QPM B.Sc. (Econ. )
In this thesisthe processby which crime investigation,detection and prosecution becamean integral function of the British police serviceis analysedthrough an examination of public records, contemporary papers and documents, and by reference to the literature on policing. The impact of the adoption of that function on the role, organisation and management of modem British policing is then assessed.
It is established that at its foundation by Robert Peel's Metropolitan Police Act of 1829, the British professional police service was intended to be a purely preventive and protective body of uniformed patrolling constables. The function of crime investigation, detection and criminal prosecution was then subsequently added to its responsibilities by government using administrative rather than any democratic or legislative means, thus creating the present dual crime prevention and crime detection role of the police.
Major recurrentproblems experienced by the modemBritish police serviceare identified as arising from that changein its original functions and purposes,and proposalsfor action to resolvethem are set out. il .( lo
Contents
Chapter Title Pages
1. Introduction Ito 11 Background 1
Origins of professional policing 2
Constables and Justices 4
Bow Street Runners and Patroles 8 The New Police 10
2. Sources and Methods 12 to 30 Practical difficulties 12 Sources 13
Public and Parliamentarypapers 14 British Library Newspaper Library 15
Risks of history 16 Literature on policing 18 Libraries 18 Uses history of - the historians view. 19 Sociological methods 21
Sociology ofpolicing 21
Organization studies 23
-paradigms and incommensurability 23
- methodologicalproliferation. 24 Popper and the scientific method 25
Science as a method 26
Sources and Methods - conclusion 27 Submission 29 3. Foundations of Professional Policing 31 to 44 Peel's New Police 31 Select Committee of 1828 32 Crime in 1829 33
Unreliability of Crime Statistics 34 Peel and the Causes of Crime 35 The parochial authorities 36
A pleafor co-ordination 36 The Watch House system 38 Peel and the London Magistrates 40 Contents iiýp)
Peace Preservation Police 42
Peel as Reformer 42 'One Head Presiding' 43 4. First Commissioners 45 to 59 45 Peel's neglect Political context 46 47 Peel and policing Peel and his Commissioners 47 51 The magistrates and the New Police influence of Colquhon 51 Constahle Culley 53 The Press 54
Importance ofPatrol 55 First Instructions to the New Police 56 Other Instructions 58 Responsibilities of the New Police 59 5. Select Committees 60 to 76 The 'Popay' Select Committee of 1833 61 Use of Spies 63 Police of the Metropolis Select Committee, 1833/1834 65 Evidence to the 1833 Police Committee 65
The prevention ofcrime 66 The detection of offenders 67 Instructionsfrom Home Secretary 69 Common Informers 70
Reports of the Select Committees 71 'Executive' and 'Judicial' functions 74 Detective duties 75 6. Turning Point 77 to 93 Police Offices Select Committee of 1837/8 77 Edward Gihhon Wakefield 81
The Commissioners and amalgamation 83 The Commissioners and the duties of the magistrates 86 The Commissioners and crime 87 Misunderstandings 93
7. Acts and Consequences 94 to 104 The hasty Acts of 1839 94 The Royal Commission of 1839 98 Contents iii
Enquiry into crime 99 Public prosecutions 100 Consequences 102
Effects of the Acts 103 Year of turmoil 104 8. Emergence of the Detectives 105 to 118 Mayne's letter of 1842 105 The Detective Branch 108 The first detectives 110
Detective Branch expansion
Postscript - alternate interpretations 112 Conclusion 118
9. Fergusson and the Detective Branch 119 to 130 Mayne as sole Commissioner 119 Mayne's opposition 120 The Fegusson Report 123
Fergusson and the detectives 124 Significance of Fergusson 125 Aftermath 129
10. Ibbetson and the Criminal Investigation Department 131 to 148 Implementation of Fergusson Report 132 The Ibbetson Commission 133
Henderson's response 135 The lbbetson Report 137
Emergence of the CID 140 The culture ofprofessionalpolicing 141 Significance of the 'Turf Fraud case' 144 The Commissioners'contribution 145 A changed magistracy 146 Concealment 147 11. Consolidation 149 to 159 Fall of Henderson 149 Childer's Select Committee 150 Sir Charles Warren 151 Warren and the Home Office 152 Significance of dispute 158 12. Triumph of the Detectives 160 to 172 Warren's departure 160 Contents iv
Warren and the CID 162 Resignationof Warren 165 The Importanceof Warren 169 Arrival of Monro 169 13. The Dual Role of Professional Policing 173 to 191 The Home Office and the dual role 173 Under-SecretaryLushington 174 Thefirst Commissioners 176 Henderson 177 The 'Primary Objects' 178 The 1873Instruction Book 179 The law and the dual role 180 Precedent 183 The Commissionersand the HomeSecretary 185 The Courts 189 Conclusion 190 Toward thepresent problems ofBritish policing 191 14. Findings and Conclusions 192 to 208 Findings 192 Conclusions 193
On corruption 193 On the managementofpolicing 196 On police and communityrelations 199 On performancemeasurement 202 The searchfor a new role 204 15. Recommendations 209 to 214 Policing reform 209 The Crown ProsecutionService 212 A RenewedPolice 213 The wayforward 213
Appendix Publication 215 to 216
Bibliography 217 Introduction
1
Introduction
If it is the role of the police serviceto preventcrime and detectcriminal offenders, as both the British public and their politicians firmly believe and as its leaders accept,why has it not long ago beendisbanded or replacedby somethingmore effective?
In 1970there were some97,000 police officers in Englandand Wales. By 2000 that figure was 26% higher at 124,000'while expenditureon policing had increasednearly six-fold, from ;E1,400million' to E7,952million? Yetinthat sameperiod of rapid growth in the resourcesdevoted to policing, offencesin the categoriesmost likely to createfear of crime in the minds of the public (theft of and from vehicles,burglary in dwelling and robbery) almosttrebled, from 520,162to 1,535,059.4Having failed so grossly,why is the police servicestill with us?
This researchchallenges basic assumptionsabout the role and purposesof the police serviceand what it can be expectedto achieve. Original public records and contemporarydocuments show that, contraryto commonbelief, the British police servicebegan as a purely protectiveand preventiveuniformed patrolling force with no responsibilityfor levels of crime. Plain clothesdetectives investigatingcrime and employedto identify, detectand prosecutecriminals (criminal investigationdepartments or CIDs) are a later, and improperly instituted, addition to British policing.
In the light of that finding the presentrole, organisationand structureof the police serviceis examinedto showthat the addition of a detectivefunction is a major causeof its failure to haveany sustainedimpact on levels of crime, and is the sourceof someof its more intractableproblems. How that conclusionis reached andjustified, and what needsto be doneto restorepolicing to its proper place in our criminal justice systemis the subjectmatter of this thesis
Background
Government,Parliament and the greatmass of the British public take the existence,present duties, and activities of the full-time, paid, professional,police
I Home Office www.statistics. gov. uklExpodatalSpreadsheetsID3574. xls 2 Home Office Circular 114/1983paragraph 2 3 Home Office Annual Report2000/2001 Section 6, Financial Tables8 and 9 4 op. cit ID4853.xIs Introduction
officer for granted. The media and other institutionsthat market and distribute information and commentaryabout social issuesand eventsare equally unquestioning. Politicians,press and public are alike proneto criticise their police service,and to subjectit to verbal and evenoccasionally physical attack. But rarely, if ever, is its history and development,or its place as a vital elementin the health and stability of society seriouslyquestioned or challenged. The British public and the politicians who representthem, and the overwhelmingmajority of thoseacademics and commentatorswho havean interestin policing, simply assumethat the modem police servicehas alwaystaken its presentform and had its presentresponsibilities. Indeed,there is a tendencyto believethat the direct alternativeis anarchyand the collapseof civilisation. Yet it has not always been so and the changehas been relatively recent.
Origins of professional policing
Up to and even beyond the 1830's the people themselves were responsible for the ' tasks and functions now reserved to the profession of policing. Alfred, and his Saxon and Viking successors,moulded the old Saxon society into something peculiarly diverse and English. Under a surface of complexity its system of peacekeeping and law enforcement was essentially direct local and based on simple principles. Frankpledge bound the head of each family to be responsible for the good conduct of the others. Families (tythes) grouped together in tens (decennaries) to elect one of their number to represent and have authority over them. ' Ten decermaries made a hundred with responsibility to hold regular courts 7 to deal with local disputes and delinquencies. A sheriff had the power in each county to hold an annual court to renew the frankpledge of the hundreds. That court also examined and settled disputes and feuds, as well as the more serious crimes and breachesof the peaceof the shire. The sheriff had authority to raise the whole county in the pursuit of delinquentswhere necessary(the posse comitas),and actedas the Kings representativein enforcing his laws and in keepingthe peaceof the county.'
William the Bastardinherited this soundsystem of law enforcementand peacekeepingwhen he replacedthe rulers of Englandafter 1066. He was wise enoughto try to preserveits bestfeatures. ' However, his imposition of a
5 Reith, C (1948) page 1 6 ibid page 2 7 ibid page 3 8 Tobias, J. J. (1970page 16, coL 1 9 Reith, C (1943)page 14 Introduction 3
controlling Norman elite on a system that was in essencethe outcome of a long and often bitter battle to agree a peace between Saxon and Viking equals, created formidable problems. " The fragile stability of Saxon society depended on the principle of collective responsibility for peace and good order coupled with a broad consensus on the legitimacy of the rule of their Kings. The Conquest cut through that delicate balance, dividing England between those who ruled and those who now had to obey. There could be no reconciling their interests and no London unity between them. As the Deputy Keeper of Records at the Tower of noted in the nineteenth century;
'Notwithstandingthe ordinancesof the Norman kings to insurethe conservancyof the peacethrough the medium of free pledges,it is evident that thoselaws were disregardedby the Saxonsas well as the Normans;for how could it be reasonablyexpected that peopleso diametrically opposedto, and entertainingso thorougha dislike for eachother, would cordially unite in "' commonoffices of friendship,or evenof mutual intercourse?
The social division and enmity createdby the Conquestdestroyed the communal built. No unity on which Saxonpeacekeeping and law enforcementhad been longer was there broad agreementabout who, or what should be condemnedor punished. Or what was or was not to be regardedas a 'crime' and therefore subjectto the rigours of the law. Suchmatters no longer dependedsolely on precedentand local opinion. They were now also to bejudged by what best reinforcedthe King's authority over his subjects.
The structureand form of peacekeepingand criminal justice in England underwentdrastic change,with King's officers appointedto enforcehis laws and protect his interestsoverlaying and distorting the Saxonsystem of freely elected citizens responsiblefor the behaviourof their neighbours.'2 But elements of the old structuresand customspersisted, and the idea of local responsibility for local delinquencynever quite disappeared." The systemof frankpledgefell rapidly into disuse,principally becausethe Norman lords and clergy were exemptfrom it. "' The headof the decennaryand the Sheriff did not, however,share the demiseof the pledgesystem. They gradually shifted in characterfrom being
10 Critchley, T. A. (1978)page 3 It Report of the Royal Commissionon the Establishmentof an Efficient ConstabularyForce (1839) Parliamentary Papers (169) vol XIX ](1839) Appendixno. 4 page 191 12 Critchley, T. A., op cit, page 16 13 ibid page 4 14Report of the Royal Commissionetc., op cit, Appendix4 page 192 Introduction
purely local administratorsand representativesof the community to take on many of the characteristicsand duties of royally appointedofficers. They became much more concernedwith the enforcementof the King's edicts and the punishmentof offendersand delinquents,although they retainedan overall responsibility for the maintenanceof the peacein the county.'s
ConstabIesand Justices
By 1285the functionariesthat had emergedfrom the intermingling of the Saxon pledgesystem with the enforcementof the King's laws included officials describedas 'constables'. Theseofficers held a highly regardedplace as King's officers in their local community despiteretaining many of the characteristicsof the Saxonhead of decennary. They were not appointedby the King's representativesin the county but were still selectedor electedby parishioners from amongstthemselves in the Saxontradition. As suchthey were, and remained,an integral part of the local community."
Up to and beyondthe establishmentof the professionalpolice servicein the nineteenthcentury, locally convenedcourts (hundredcourts and courts leet) also continuedto meetthroughout the realm. Thesecourts either selectedor approved the appointmentof constablesto keepthe peacein the old tradition, and dealt with minor delinquencyand local administration." Sheriffs meanwhileevolved in a different direction, becomingincreasingly concerned with the maintenanceof the King's authority in the county and, as thejudicial systemrefined and developed, with more ceremonialand representativefunctions. "
The post-Conquesttension between local loyalties and central power was a persistentthreat to peacekeepingand to the King's rule, always able to bring both to the edgeof collapse. In an attemptto imposesome order on an increasingly fissiparoussystem, knights and other officers appointedby the King's commissionwere regularly despatchedto the countiesand localities to try to restorethe peaceand properobservance of his laws."' In the Justicesof the Peace Act 1361 (34Edw. of 111,c. 1) the practicewas formalisedby the appointmentof justices permanent of the peacewho took up the main burdenof local crime detection prevention, and punishmentas well as peacekeepingin the King's name. Locally electedconstables were drawn, if only reluctantly, into assistingthe
Is Critchley, T. A., op cit. page 5 16 ibid 17 ibid pages 12-13 18 Stead,P. J. (1985)pages9-10 19Critchley, T. A., op cit. page 8 Introduction
in that 20 For developed justices work . that purpose the practice of requiring constables to take an oath of office before the Justice, to serve not only as representatives of their community, but also as King's officers in the conservancy of the peace in their local ity. 21
The relationshipbetween justices and other peacekeepingofficials, particularly local constables,is a particular focus of this research. The Statuteof Winchester of 1285(13Edw. 1 cap 6) containedmany radical innovations. Among them was a provision to ensurethat every citizen betweenthe agesof 15 and 40 kept arms in his houseto enablehim to do his part in peacekeepingand crime prevention should needarise. Local constableswere given the power to enterthe homesof citizens to inspectsuch arms. 22 They were requiredby the Act to 'present' the namesof defaultersto the local justices for punishmentof any neglect. Thisis probably the earliestformal exampleof the relationshipbetween the Norman appointedjustice and the Saxonelected constable which was to becomean enduringfeature of the developingEnglish criminal justice system.
The Statuteof Winchesteralso containedprovisions to establisha systemof nightly 'watch and ward' in towns." Rate-payinginhabitants manned the watch on a rota systemdirectly derived from the Saxontradition. The purposewas to control the movementof itinerant criminals and other miscreants. The watch did not replace,but rather supplemented,the work of local constables,who continued to provide crime preventionand deterrencein both towns and rural areas. Seriousoffenders fleeing the watch or local constablesstill arousedthe whole county under the old systemsof the 'possecomitas' and 'hue and cry'. "
Successivemonarchs and then their parliamentsgrafted new functions and responsibilitieson the watch/constable/justice/sheriffsystem as social and economicdevelopment imposed ever greaterpressures on the peaceand order of the realm. But the ancientSaxon principle of collective responsibility for local peaceand good order survived,despite many changes.
The division of labour betweenthe constableand thejustice also remainedclear. It was for the constableto supportand overseethe 'watch and ward' of his citizens, to quell disordersand riotous behaviour,and to detain anyonefound in breachof the peacein his locality. Constablesdid not havethe sole right, nor any
20Kcnt, J. R. (1986)pages55-56 21 ibid 67 22 page Critchley,T. A, opcit. page 6 23 ibid 24 ibidpages 11-12 Introduction specialresponsibility, to bring misconductand criminal offencesbefore the courts. That duty still restedwith individual aggrievedcitizens who, for that purpose,had direct recourseto thejustices. " All citizens had a duty to prosecute miscreantswho did them harm, and the right to bring complaintsto thejustices forthatpurpose. The early English criminal justice systemlaid prime responsibility for the preventionand suppressionof crime and for the detention and prosecutionof known offendersagainst the criminal law, firmly on individuals and their communities."' Only where that first line of defencefailed did it chargethe justices with inquiry into reportsof crime, and with responsibility for the identification, detectionand pursuit of criminals and other offenderswho had escapedthe local community and their constable.
A Royal Commissionsitting in 1839,reviewing the developmentof policing arrangementsin Englandand Wales,reported that:
'It will be found that the function of inquiry was shared as a principle of the action of the whole executive agency for the preservation of the peace. It is specified in those of the later commissions of the justices of the peace, which invested them with the distinct functions of conservators of the peace and charged them to inquire diligently respecting offences committed; implying functions, like those of the coroner, of inquiry on the occurrence
of an infraction of the law, i. e. inquiry before the offender is ascertained or apprehended, as well as thejudicial functions of hearing and determining on the sufficiency of the evidence.927
In common law it was the duty of the constableand his community to maintain the peaceand preventoffences in their locality. They were alsojointly responsiblefor the 'quick and fresh pursuit"' of offendersand for raising an immediate'hue and cry' where the miscreantsescaped them. 29 It was then left to the justices to identify, seekout and prosecutecriminals who had escapedthat instant pursuit. Whetherthe miscreantwas apprehendedby the community or subsequentlydetected by thejustice, it was still for the victim of the crime to prosecutehim, and to presenthim beforethe justices for that purpose." Inthat processneither the local constablenor any other representativeof the community
25 ibid page 7 26 Royal Commissionetc., op cit. page 93para. 106 27 ibid. para. 103pages 91 to 92 29ibid. para. 105page 92 29 Critchley, T. A., op cit. page 7 30 Royal Commissionetc., op cit. page 97para. 119 Introduction had any specialor specific role. The evolution of the office of constableafter the Conquest,and his growing peacekeepingand instantpursuit responsibilities,did not absolveindividual citizens from their ancientresponsibility for the good conductof their neighbours. The same1839 Royal Commissionreported the Elizabethan,Sir ThomasSmith, as saying,in praiseof his own time, that:
'The parish which doth not his dutie, but letteth,by their negligence,the theife to depart,doth not only pay a fine to the King, but must repay to the party robbedhis damages. So that every Englishmanis a serjeantto take the theife, and who shewethnegligence therein do not only incurre evil "' opinion therefore,but hardly shall escapepunishment.
Despitehaving beenelected by his peers,and having no greateractual obligation in law than his neighboursto keepthe peacein his community,the constable Elizabethan neverthelessranked high in the social order. The same writer reports " that he was given an importanceequal to that of thejustices.
But not for long. The 1839 Royal Commission, commenting on the sorry state of the constables and watchmen in its own time, observed that:
'We apprehendthat the office of constablemust havevery early fallen into inferior hands,from the difficulty of finding in the poorer and lesspopulous districts a sufficient numberof personsqualified or inclined to perform the duties.
As society advanced,the dutiesthemselves became more heavy and The by [earlier complex. groundsof complaintmade ... commentators]... of the increaseof the statutes,with the executionof which the constableas well as thejustice of the peaceis charged,are enormouslyenlarged in [nineteenth times, the these... century]... when statutoryenactments of one year equalthe whole of the statutoryenactments of two or three centuries precedingthat in which the complaint was made.$33
As a consequence,'When personswho may be consideredqualified in respectof station are chosen[to hold the office of constable]they almost all pay for substitutes,and avoid serving.""'
31 ibid. page. 93, para 106 32 ibid. para. III 33 ibid. page 108, para. 134 34 ibid. page 109, para. 135 Introduction
The decline in the quality of constables paralleled a fall in the standards and reputation of the watchmen who were paid substitutes for the ratepayers required to keep night-time watch and ward in the towns. The latter became figures of ridicule while the former, regretfully, became associated with drunkenness, indolence and even corruption, in the enforcement of the law. So serious did the problem become" that the justices (or magistrates, who were the permanent, paid justices in the towns) took matters into their own hands. They despaired of the locally elected constables, and began to appoint their own officers to act under "' their authority to 'inquire' into crimes and offences within their districts. These by new additions to the forces of law and order were swom as constables the magistrates to equip them with all the common law powers of that ancient office, but they were not selected or elected by the local community. The magistrate's fellow officers were his agents rather than representatives of their citizens, and detection they were employed to assist the magistrate in his crime and prosecution 37 work .
The most famousof thosemagistrate's officers were undoubtedlythose appointed by the Bow StreetMagistrates, Henry, and (later) John,Fielding, in London after 1750. Their appearancemarks the start of modem British professionalpolicing.
Bow Street Runners and Patroles,
In 1750Henry Fielding recruitedsix Westminsterhouseholders to serveas regular, paid, constablesto assisthim in his work as Chief Magistrateat Bow 38 Street. Successcame quickly to 'Mr. Fielding's people', as they became known, and they removeda numberof notoriouscriminal gangsfrom the streets 31 famous of London. In time they evolvedto becomethe (and later, infamous) Bow StreetRunners under the guidanceof John (later 'Sir John') Fielding, the 'blind beak' of Bow Street. John Fielding succeededto the Chief Magistrate's post on the retirementof his half-brotheron groundsof ill-health in 1754.4' The plain clothesBow StreetRunners, and their uniformed 'Patrole' colleagues, developeda national reputationand significancein the effort to control crime and disorder in early industrial England. Contemporarycommentators were careful to distinguishbetween the Runnersand Patroles,who were swom as constables
35 Reith, C. (1943)page 16 36 Heron, F.E. page 1 37 Maguire, et al (2002)page 212 and Browne, D. G. (1956)page 2 7128 38Armitage, G. (1935)page 47 39 Browne, D. G. op cit. page28 40 Armitage, G. op cit. page 60 and ibid page 29 Introduction
by their magistrate employers, and the local and parish constables who continued to patrol the capital. The former were generally termed 'officers' while the latter continued to be called 'constables'. The distinction was important at the time and the practice will be followed, so far as is possible, in this account of my research.
The Runnersprovided a model for othersto follow. Police Offices along the lines developedby the Fieldings sprangup acrossLondon, and then spreadto other cities following the passageof the Middlesex JusticesAct of 1792(3 Geo III cap 53)."' However, Parliamentwas neverquite convincedof the propriety of this developmentin the English criminal justice system. The Police Offices Act, its At as it cameto be called, alwayshad a time limit on operation. regular intervals it returnedto Parliamentfor review and renewal. 42 Fielding's innovationsspread throughout the nation but their influence on the The Fieldings did criminal justice systemwas evolutionarynot revolutionary. not layer to the reshapeor reform the system. They merely addedyet another leet, incoherentstructure of parish constables,watchmen, courts private watch host associations,bailiffs, sheriff s men, beadlesand the of other petty officials local to and placementhat had emergedfrom the various and national attempts disruption combatthe seeminglyinexorable and unpredictablegrowth of crime, and disorderin British society.
SinceHenry Fielding's action in employing officers and so creatingthe Bow StreetRunners did not directly departfrom the line of developmentof policing from its Saxonand Norman origins the innovationenjoyed general, if " justices had long occasionallygrudging, acceptance. By Fielding's time the a tradition of relying on locally electedor selectedconstables to assistthem in their work.44 His Runnersdid no more than formalisethat arrangementin the person of the full-time, paid, magistrates'officer.
Under the Police Office systemthe magistratesremained wholly responsiblein law for the conductand actionsof their officers." In time, the Fielding's and their successorsand imitators beganto publish lists of wanted criminals and circulateddescriptions of fleeing felons."" They thus firmly established themselvesas the foundersand predecessorsof the intelligencesystems and
41 Browne, D. G. op cit. page 45 42 Tobias, J.J. (1970)page 34 43 Browne, D. G. op cit. page 47 44 Hart, J.M. (1951) page 23 45 Radzinowicz,Sir L (1956)page 127 46 Stead,P. J. (1985)page 25 Introduction 10 criminal recordsdepartments that are now so much a part of all modem police services.
Police offices on the Bow Street model had their successes,and they continued to attract a strong body of support even after their limitations were exposed. inevitably however, they soon became part of the muddled, localised system of crime control that failed, in the minds of both public and politicians, to bring peace and order to the lives of ordinary people. The full onset of industrialisation and urbanisation finally overwhelmed these increasingly ramshackle arrangements."' A dramatic increase in the geographic and social mobility of the British scattered the stable communities of like minded citizens, equally willing to support each other and their elected constable or watchman, that was the foundation of Saxon peacekeeping and crime suppression.
The new industrial towns in particular becameincreasingly uncontrollable and a havenfor criminal communities.
'Manchester's40,000 people in 1770were 187,000by 1821; Leeds, Sheffield and Birmingham all doubledin thirty years. Outsidethese great concentrationsthe whole face of the country altered. In the century ending 1821,for all practical purposes,all that was left of its medievalcommon- fields and commonswas enclosed,or some6 million acres.""
In truth, 'We have,then, a peoplefundamentally changed in spirit but enclosedin an ancientgovernment frame. "'
Between 1805and 1817the numberof committalsto prison and executions orderedby the courts in Englandand Walesrose from just under 4,000 to more than 30,000per year.'O Drastic reform in peacekeeping,and in crime prevention and detection,was deemednecessary to avoid social breakdown. That was a real possibility at the time of revolutionaryevents unfolding on the Continent. From that impetusthe modernBritish professionalpolice servicewas bom. The New Police
The startingpoint of my thesis is here; at the point of the emergenceof a full-time professionalpolice servicefrom the collapseof the uncomfortableamalgam of Saxonself-regulation with Norman views on kingship, underthe enormous
47 Reith, C. (1943)page 15 48 Feiling, Sir K. (1950)page 798 49 ibid page 797 50 Report the Royal Commission of etc., op. cit. Appendixno. I Introduction 11 pressuresof social changeand industrialisation. I begin with a re-examinationof the establishmentand developmentof the London Metropolitan Police Force since that was the progenitorand model for the modem police servicein mainland Britain. I then move on to look at the issuemost clearly connectedwith the police in the modem mind. That is, how thosenew arrangementsdealt with, and continueto address,the problem of the control and suppressionof crime and criminality in an increasinglyurban, democraticand industrialisedsociety. I concludewith an assessmentof the effect of the involvementof the professional police in the attemptto suppresscrime, and on the consequencesof that developmentfor policing and the criminal justice system.
The emergenceof the London 'Bobby' and the equally, or perhapseven more, famous ScotlandYard detective,as the twin bastionsof the security of the citizen and the bafflementof wrong-doersin British society is, by any standards,a major event in the history of the nation Arguably, it hashad an impact throughoutthe Westernworld. This work has its origins in a retired insider's opinion that its deepsignificance has not yet had the rigorous,critical attention its importance deserves. Sourcesand Methods 12
2
Sources and Methods
I begin with an examination of the history of British professional policing. The sources used are principally those documents and other contemporary material now preserved in the public record, supplemented by the literature on policing. From that research I draw new conclusions about the origins and early development of present-day policing and frame proposals for its reform designed to improve its performance and to resolve some of its major problems. Clearly, development British the methods used will need to link the history and of policing draw find to the solution of its present problems; that is, together and common historians field. ground between the contributions of and social scientists to this difficulties faced by both I start with a short r6sum6 of the my research, practical for I discuss the and in using historical sources these purposes. then views of find historians on the value and utility of a study of history as a means to solutions divergence to present-day problems, and show that there is considerable among lying them on that issue, with the generality regarding my purposes as somewhere between controversial and impossible on any reasonable scale of feasibility. Next, I consider the views of those social scientists interested in policing as a social institution to show that there is no consensusamong them on how the objective I have set myself might best be achieved. Finally, I set out my solution to these problems, giving the reasoning that led me to it.
Practical difficulties
In 1943Charles Reith, a prolific and widely respectedwriter on British policing, said,
'In the recordsof the nationsthere is, surely, no more curious phenomenon by British historians it is than the neglect of the study of their police ... possibleto examinethousands of volumesof history, biography and finding, best, memoirs ... without at more than a cursory statementof the fact and date of police establishment.Writers on the subjectof legal and constitutionalhistory are equally unimaginative.'
In a footnote he adds,'Even more deplorablethan the silenceof historianson this subjectis the absurdityof their occasionalmisstatements. "
I Reith (1943)page 31 Sourcesand Methods 13
His view of the neglectedcondition of British policing history is supportedby Sir JohnMoylan, a high (AssistantUnder-Secretary of State)Home Office official who, during his long and distinguishedcareer in government,held the important and influential post of Receiverfor the London Metropolitan Police from 1919to 1945. Speakingas someonewith a wide experienceof and long intimate contact with British professional policing, be said in 1946;
'The detailedstory of the difficulties which the new police had to surmount in their first ten yearshas been told for the first time by CharlesReith in [his 1943] 'British Police and the DemocraticIdeal. " by Robert Reith's view has beenmore recentlyand authoritativelyconfirmed Sir Mark, Commissionerof the London Metropolitan Police from 1972to 1977,who said,
'there is scarcelya single book in GreatBritain dealingwith the police ,3 which can be said to be worth seriousconsideration. 'no In addition, in the Guide to the Public RecordsOffice it is notedthat, "' calendarsof Home Office paperslater than 1775have ever beenpublished.
Taken together these comments give some indication of the practical difficulties I faced. My research discovered few authoritative sources of enquiry into, or analysis of, the origins and development of British policing. It also revealed that the records of government relating to an event' so important, so significant and so far-reaching in its consequencesfor the nation" are not collated in any form that will aid research.
Sources
In thesecircumstances a deliberatedecision was madeto return to what Arthur Marwick calls 'primary sources',i. e. thosesources 'that come into existence during the actualperiod which the historian is studying" rather than to place relianceon 'secondarysources' or 'those accountswritten later by historians looking back upon a period in the past! Two main sourceshave thereforebeen used. First and principally, referenceis madeto the original working documents and other material producedby the civil servantsand other public officials
2 Moylan (1946)page 3 3 Critchley, T. A. (1978) Foreword 4 Public RecordsOffice ZBox 2 Introductionpps. 1-2 5 Reith (1943) op cit 6 Marwick (1989)page 199 7 ibid. Sourcesand Methods 14 engagedin the creationand establishmentof the British professionalpolice service,and now storedin the Public RecordsOffice (PRO) at Kew in London (now renamed the National Archive). Secondly, contemporaneous Parliamentary papers relating to these events have been examined, using copies also available at the PRO. Only marginally are these principal primary sources supplemented by reference to other contemporary material, e.g. newspapers, hand-bills, and the like, and then to subsequent, secondary commentary by historiansand other writers.
Public and Parliamentary papers by The main sourcesused are thereforethose created in the nineteenthcentury day-to-dayduties, public officers and other officials acting in the courseof their is and for their own purposesas they saw them. There no reasoneither to future supposeor expectthat they had the needs,interests or concernsof Hence, researchersinto the history of policing in mind as they worked. whilethe its context of this researchmayjustify recourseto original material, use raises other problemsand difficulties.
The documentsexamined at the PRO deal with eventsmore than a century and a half ago and havebeen in storage,with varying degreesof success,for more than a hundredyears. Understandably,some of them are closeto disintegrationfrom mere age,and most are now in very fragile condition. Many were found to be jumbled, damagedand even incompleteas a result of sometimescareless handling.
In addition, the material examineddates from well before any application of technologyto personalcommunication. The documentsand other papersare almost entirely handwritten,those intended for private circulation, as most were, being recordedin the writer's informal hand rather than the more readily readable copperplatereserved for public papers. Matters of considerableimportance are often discussedby meansof hastily scribblednotes between people familiar with eachothers business hand, and using the written colloquialismsand linguistic mannerismsof the day. Decipheringthem has sometimesbeen as much art as science.
The fundamentalproblem with the use of theseoriginal, working documentsfor the purposesof researchis however, that by no meansall official papersfind their way into the Public RecordsOffice. Every Governmentdepartment had (and has) a systemof archiving documentsno longer in active use,and a policy for Sourcesand Methods 15 deciding when and how to activateit. Suchpolicies and practicesare subjectto constantreview and revision, not all of which is fully recordedfor the benefit of posterity. And even if suchalterations in policy are included in departmental recordsthe relevantdocuments describing disposal policies and alterationsto them are not necessarilyor regularly amongthose selected to be sentfor permanentstorage.
In generalthen, the systemthat has producedthe massof documentsand other material now held in the Public RecordsOff ice is simple enoughin principle but far from ideal from a researchviewpoint. It beginswhen official papersreach the stageat which they are no longer consideredto be of value to the government department(s)in which they were created. At that point they are sortedinto one of two basic categories;those which, for various (and varying) reasons,are to be sentfor permanentretention, and othersthat are to be destroyedforthwith. Thoseto be retainedmay then be subjectto additional filtering processesin which (then) current perceptions of sensitivity, secrecy, importance, etc. may be applied, and some material removed, creating otherwise inexplicable gaps and discontinuities in the papers that eventually arrive at the PRO. The difficulties in drawing reliable conclusions about the course and nature of past events from such material as happensto be found in the Public RecordsOff ice are obvious; are recognisedby this research,and are more broadly discussedlater in this chapter.
The position with ParliamentaryPapers is somewhatdifferent. Politicians have a generallyhigh opinion of the importanceof what they say and do. What occurs in Parliamentis thereforeusually fully recorded,and in somedetail, which creates its own problem- that of sheervolume and its corollary of sorting wheat from chaff. The chief difficulty for researchershowever, is that Parliamentaryrecords tend to be classifiedand filed primarily in the date sequencein which they were createdrather than by topic or subject. Following a threadof social or political developmentthrough the recordsof Parliamentover time, which is a common task for researchersand commentators,can thereforepresent wearisome difficulties. Neverthelessthe virtues of comprehensivenessand completenessare sometimesinestimable.
British Library Newspaper Library
The contentof the British Library NewspaperLibrary at Colindale in London unavoidablycombines the difficulties for researchfound in the material held at the Public RecordOffice and ParliamentaryPapers. The NewspaperLibrary is Sourcesand Methods 16 simply massivein volume and almostentirely cataloguedby date. Titles of papersand publicationsare listed, but only thosetitles that are physically present in the collection are cataloguedrather than all thosepublished, and then only those issuesof thosetitles that haveactually beenfound and preserved. The result is an erratic and incompletepatchwork of newspapersand periodicalsof truly intimidating size which can be of greatvalue and interestonly if a specific issueor event and a short period of time are the researchparameters.
Otherwisethe difficulties are immense,especially if, as is also the casewith ParliamentaryPapers, the interestis in a continuing social problem,trend or process. Helpfully, the London 'Times' has a separateand very useful subject index, but it is compiled on an annualbasis leading to a troublesomeprocess of listing and sifting entriesacross a numberof separatevolumes if any subjectis to be examinedover more than a year or two. Additional difficulties are causedby the journalistic habit of reclassifyingan issueas it develops. Acolumnist's gossipcan metamorphosethrough a newsworthyscandal into a full-scale political crisis, its descriptionand position in the format of a broad-sheet,and henceits place in the subsequentannual index, sometimeschanging almost daily in the process. However, if a referenceto a subjector issuein 'The Times' can be found it often gives the true flavour of, or a new perspectiveon, a long-forgotten controversy,as well as a valuablepointer to other contemporarypublications.
The risks of history
In any event and whateversorts of original material,papers or documentsare chosenfor research,reliance on contemporaryrecords has its own well- recognisedand inherentdangers. The unpredictableeffect of fortuity in what does,or doesnot, survive from the record of the past is always a factor in drawing conclusionsabout historical events,and has alreadybeen identified as a particular problem for this research. In addition, researchersare bound to haveto rely not only on what chanceprovides, but also on that often small sectionof those involved in the eventsunder review who havethe habit, inclination or responsibilityto record what they do, say or see. Their memory, opinions and views may be preservedwhile that of other lesswell-informed or perhapsless literate participants,which may or may not be of greatersignificance, are simply not available.
But evenwhere the researchercan be confident of the validity and significanceof a contemporaryrecord he is still facedby a subtleand awkward problem in Sourcesand Methods 17 drawing conclusionsabout the natureand meaningof the eventsdescribed, and one that appliesparticularly to this study; that of 'present-mindedness' (Commager,1965). When we look at past eventswe do so with our present eyes. We tend to judge and interpret pastactions and decisionsfrom our own standpointrather than from that of the participants! More importantly, we it. cannotdo other than to look at the past in the light of our presentknowledge of We often have a rangeof receivedopinion on how the eventswe are looking at progressedand turned out and what their consequenceswere, information and conclusionswhich were not, and could not havebeen, available to the participants.
Our difficulties in seeingevents through the eyesof the participantsand our decisions privileged knowledgeof the outcomeof the actionsand we are leading, consideringinevitably colours our interpretationof them, amongother hoc errors, to a very real dangerof 'a post hoc [, ergo) prompter attitude toward long involvement history', ' a problem of particular relevanceto this research. My in in the practiceof policing, which has beenso greatan advantage other aspects I have had of my work, is a potent sourceof potential error in this respect. constantlyto be on guardagainst 'present-mindedness' in reachingmy interpretationsand conclusions. In that endeavour,I am especiallygrateful for the supportand guidanceof my supervisors.
Particular care in the useof contemporarysources has also beennecessary in this researchbecause the actionsand decisionsmost closely examined;that is, the creationand establishmentof the British professionalpolice servicein the early and mid-nineteenthcentury, aroused passionate social and political opposition at the time. Indeed,four Parliamentaryattempts between 1793 and 1822to introducea disciplined, paid, professionalpolice force into the British criminal justice systemfoundered on formidable reefs of public outrageand vehement vestedinterest. It is unsurprisingtherefore, that suchrecords and documentsas are now available for research,even those produced at the time by the most detachedand dedicatedof public servants,were found to reflect the political and social sensitivity of the subjectmatter as well as the prejudicesand biasesof their authors. Both specialpleading and partisanpolitical attitudesare detectablein the public recordsexamined, and they havehad to be treatedaccordingly.
8 Collingwood, R.G. (1946) and others 9 Commager,(1965) page 46 Sourcesand Methods 18
Literature on policing
My primary research decision to return to original sources was reinforced and amply justified by an almost immediate discovery. I found that the original purpose of professional policing is wrongly stated, widely and authoritatively, in the literature on the British police. The definition used, known to generations of policing professionals as the 'Primary Objects', is incorrectly attributed to one of founding fathers of the modem police service, Richard Mayne. Further, my research has now shown that the sentiments expressed in the statement are contrary to the quotedsource's own publicly recordedviews on the issueof the purposesof policing. The origins and effects of that double error, togetherwith the provenanceof the 'Primary Objects', are fully exploredin this thesis.
A consequenceof that discoveryis that only after, and not before,my analysisof original and contemporaryrecords was well advancedwas referencemade to authorsand commentatorson the history of British policing. Suchrecourse to academicliterature and commentthen found it, regrettably,to be largely unhelpful if not, as Reith predicted,occasionally positively misleading.
Libraries
Dealing with the literatureon policing posedits own problems. As a part-time researchstudent working from home some 100 miles from campusI have,of necessity,had to makeuse of library facilities beyondthat provided by my own University. In addition to the Pilkington Library at Loughborough,those visited with the help of my supervisorsand the kind permissionof the appropriate authoritieswere; the British Library of Political and EconomicScience at the London Schoolof Economics(LSE); the Learning ResourceCentre at the University of Hertfordshire,and the British Library in EustonRoad, London, where I was granteda Reader'sticket.
The three University libraries provided a solid basefor the sociologicalaspects of my researchand for the discussionof the presentproblems of policing. The British Library's comprehensivecomputerised cataloguing system immediately producedsome useful supportfor Reith's complaintthat the history of British policing is a much neglectedsubject. A searchof the referencematerial in the computercatalogue on the word 'police' producedno lessthat 10,242entries. Refined to 'metropolitan police' 367 entriesremained. Further narrowingto $metropolitanpolice, history' reducesthe numberto a mere 75, of which only 37 could make any claim to deal with the origins and developmentof that Sourcesand Methods 19 organisation,which is the principal subjectof the historical part of my research. I am informed by my calculatorthat thesefigures show that only 0.36% of the literature in the British Library on policing relatesto the early history and developmentof that most important elementof our criminal justice system. My hope is that this work may add at leasta little to that meagrestore.
Usesof history - the historians view.
Beyondthe risks of error or omission,the broaderissue of what reliancecan be put on eventhe most accurateand completerecord of, or commentaryon, the past has long beendebated. On the one hand a considerablebody of historiansfollow 'established what hasbeen described as the professionalpractice ... of reasonand to the historical sources"' For this group, 'in the main the rationality... applied in notion of historical researchimplies research primary sourcematerial ... without "' primary sourcesthere is no history. This 'establishment'school acceptsthat is This is to 'what is crucial to historical study the natureof evidence... evidence "' be found in the sources,relics andtraces left by the past.
On the other hand it hasbeen argued that both the historian and his sourcesare necessarilyproducts of the societythey inhabit and that therefore,'The belief in a hard core of historical facts existing objectively and independentlyof the interpretationof the historian is a preposterousfallacy, but one which is very hard " This' hold that 'The history though toeradicate'. subjectivist' school we read... basedon facts, is, strictly speaking,not factual at all, but a seriesof accepted judgements."'
Both schoolsof thought acceptthat the conceptof 'facts' in historical researchis a contentiousand ultimately irresolvableissue; a view few would dispute. After all, we can never revisit the past in order to checkour interpretationof it. Even the outcomeof historical eventsis subjectto the samecaveat as any examination of the literature of history will quickly show. Indeed,an inability to test interpretationsin any objective way is commonly said to distinguishhistory from the natural sciences.The debateamong historians is thereforenot aboutwhether indisputablehistorical facts do or do not exist, but rather how we should approach
to Munslow, A. (2002) WhereDoes History ComeFrom in History Today, VoL 52,3 March 20OZ page 18 11Marwick, A. (1989)page 199 12 ibid. page 380 at 4. 13Carr, E.H. (1986)page 2 14Barraclough, G. (1955)page 14 Sourcesand Methods 20 whateverevidence and information we have aboutthe pastand what use we can make of it.
Using the already quoted examples, Carr, a principal representative of the that 'History is in individuals subjectivist view ... a social process, which are engaged as social beings', " regards the dual function of historical research as, 'To enable man to understand the society of the past and to increase his mastery over the society of the present."' Carr and those who share his opinion therefore agree with Lord Acton's remark that, 'History properly so-called can be written "' only by those who find and accept a sense of direction in history itself In this view it is both possible and appropriate to draw broad generalisations about the past nature and future direction of human progress from a study of history.
By contrast Arthur Marwick well expressesthe 'established' view that historical research can only be 'an interpretation of the past, one in which a serious effort has been filter fable, to the to the made to out myth and ... open up past, make known "" Marwick's belief is therefore, that 'there are past ... and comprehensible. no general laws, is no over-arching theory, in history"' and hence that 'History is "" a very poor predictor of future developments and future events. Indeed, and to illustrate the breadth and depth of the dispute about the uses of history, a 'post- modernist' school of historians " take a separate and extreme line on these matters, arguing that since 'History can never reconstruct the past as it actually its is (relatively) therefore, 'historians [should was' content unimportant and ... form (the historical 'history) to (the place] ... representation of as prior content reality of 'the past')'. " For historians of this school, style and manner of presentation is an essenceof history which evidence and content can only supplement.
The problem is that none of these views precisely meets the needs of this research which seeks to discover whether a connection can be made between the history of the development of the British police service and its present problems. Clearly, any research method adopted for that purpose will not only need to accommodate the divergent views of Carr and Marwick and the post-modernists'rejection of
is Carr, E. H. (1986) page 49 16 ibid. 17 Carr, op cit. page 126 18 Marwick, A. (1989) page 3 19 Marwick, op cit. page 380 at 3 20 Evans, R, in Carr, op cit. Introduction, page xxiv 21 e.g. Hayden White, Richard Rorty, Keith Jenkins and others. 22 Alan Munslow 'Where does history comefrom'in History Today, VoL 52 issue, 3 March2002, page 19 Sourcesand Methods 21 both, but must also provide a link betweenhistorical analysisand the solution of current social problems.
The methodologicalchallenge is thus that set out at the beginningof this chapter; to draw togetherand find commonground betweenthe study of history and the presentmethods of the social sciences.Fortunately, a review of the current views of historiansallows a cautiousfirst stepto be taken in that direction by adopting Marwick's view that 'both historiansand scientistsare concernedwith discovery involving "' That ... rigorous checksof evidenceand conclusions. step is possiblebecause, while it amountsto a rejection of the post-modemist approach, it doesnot totally dismissCarr's views on the predictive value of his to 'answer foolish history, eventhough statedpurpose was ... the remarksof Popper,Isaiah Berlin etc. abouthistory' and 'in the nameof reason'to reject their '[scientific] way of doing things.924
The first stagein finding a solution to my methodologicaldifficulties is therefore completedby a decisionto recogniseand acceptthe commonground betweenthe historian and the scientistidentified by Marwick, and adopthis evidenceand outcomes-basedapproach to the history of the developmentof British policing. On that base,I then proposeto examinethe Carr-stylequestion of what consequences,if any, its history has had for the currentorganisation, structures, culture and behaviourof the professionalpolice service.
Sociological methods
Given that decisionthe next phasein my methodologicalinquiry must be to identify suitable and compatiblemethods from amongthose in use by sociologists interestedin policing. That will encompassa review of the sociological field of policing and the researchdomain in which it can be included;that of organisation studies.
Sociology of policing
ProfessorP. A. J. Waddingtonis both widely experiencedin the practiceof policing and a well-respectedand significant British contributor to the sociology of the police. He hashowever, been less than complimentaryabout the methods and approachof othersat work in his field. He has said that sociologists constantlyclaim that, 'The police are unfair, they enforcethe law partially, discriminateagainst those of low status,violate civil rights, createrather than
23 Marwick, op citpage 152 at 10 24 Evans,op cit. page xix Sourcesand Methods 22 preventcrime and are the unwitting dupes,if not the willing accomplices,of capitalist oppression. Suchis the dominantimage of the police which sociologistspresent as fact establishedby research."' He addsthat, 'In fact, most sociologistshave not botheredto examinehow and why the police act as they do for the is to the but to bring ... many sociologists aim not understand police them into disrepute.""
The latter part of ProfessorWaddington's comments on his sociological it colleaguesis of particular interest. It showsthat the sociology of the police, as is commonly practised, hascharacteristics in commonwith the study of history. ProfessorWaddington clearly considersthat a major (or the) purposeof social 'understanding' researchin his field is the anthropologicalobjective of policing, informing i. e. to observe,describe and report policing activity with the object of his both the researcherand his readers. In this view of subjectmatter is Waddingtonis supportedby Sir Karl R. Popperwhose broader opinion that, 'Today has itself more and more to becomingone element ... sociology resigned form within social anthropology;that is, the social anthropologyof a very specific industrialisedWestern European. "' and that, 'The of society- of the highly be happyto find employmentas a former theoreticalsociologist ... must fieldworker his function is to and describethe totemsand taboosof the ... observe United States."" white nativesof the WesternEuropean countries and of the divide Using Popper'ssocial anthropologicalperspective it is possibleto writers describe on policing into two categories. One group, the larger, attemptsto the role and functions of police officers in someway or from a particular perspective, and then to explain how and why thoseroles and functions are, or are not, carried out." On the other hand sociologistswhom Poppermight wish to describeas having an inclination toward field-work generallyadopt a 'fly-on-the-wall' or 'participant-observer'stance in order to discoverwhat the police actually do, rather than what they claim (or are supposed,or are suspected)to be doing."' I should say at oncethat, while this Popperiancategorisation may be illuminating and even instructivethe readershould not put too much weight or relianceon it.
25 Waddington,PAJ (1983),page 1 26 ibid page 15 V Popper,K. R. (1996)page 68 28 ibid. page 69 29 e.g. Banton (1964); Bittner (1975);Black (1980); Cain (1973);Dixon (1997);Fleming (1995);Goldstein (1977) and (1996);Lambert (1970);Manning (1977);Punch (1983) and (1985); Reiner (1991) and (2000);Skolnick (I 996);Waddington (I 999);Whitaker (I 979);Wilson (1968). 30 e.g. Brown (1988); Holdaway (1983); Kemp, et al (1992); McClure (1981); Reiss (198 1); Waddington(1996); Young (1991). Sourcesand Methods 23
Somewriters will fall into both categoriesif their whole output is considered (ProfessorWaddington is an example). And I suspectthat few, if any, of the authorsmentioned will necessarilyeither acceptPopper's view or the usemade of it here.
All that is implied by this tentativeexercise in methodologicalclassification is that while it is to be expectedthat sociologistsof the police will shareMarwick's view of the value of scientific methods,some objective supportexists for Popper'scontention that a social anthropologicalperspective will cover the majority of their researchinto policing. Unfortunately,that approachhas too much in commonwith the 'interpretation' purposesof historiansto supply the necessarypresent-day, problem-solving, element required to meetthe needsof my research.
Organization studies
Turning then to the broaderfield of social enquiry into which policing can be set, i.e. the study of organisations,it can be said at oncethat the police serviceclearly satisfiesthe definition of an organizationused by Blau, P. in his influential 1974 work, 'On the Nature of Organizations',i. e. 'The defining criterion of a formal for is for organisation- or an organisation short - the existenceof procedures mobilising and co-ordinatingthe efforts of various,usually specialized,sub- groups in the pursuit ofjoint objectives."' Equally, the police serviceaccords with Thompson'sview of 'the organisationas a problem-facingand problem- solving phenomenon."'
- paradigms and incommensurability
Regrettablyhowever, the diversity of methodologiesnow in usewithin organisationstudies, and the specificity of their applicationpresents an immediately identifiable obstacleto their use in this research.For example,the Handbookon OrganisationStudies lists at leastsix, and possibly as many as sixteen,differing 'paradigms' in current use in the study of organisations 33 dependingon how that conceptis defined. The problem is that there is little, if any, common ground betweenthe various paradigms. Responding,it would seem,to the combined(but not joint) influenceof Kuhn, T. (1970) and Feyerabend, P (1974) sociologistsof organisationshave arguedthat eachof the
31 Blau, P. (1974)page29 32 Thompson,J. D. (1967)page 9 33 Clegg, et. al (1996) Introduction Sourcesand Methods 24 paradigmsthat have emergedin their field are not simply different approachesto the samesubject but amountto a separateand distinct 'scientific revolution'. As such,the methodologyarising from such revolutions 'is not only incompatiblebut actually incommensurablewith that which had gonebefore. "" It is therefore arguedthat there can be no compatibility, and indeedno reliable communication, betweenthe various 'paradigms' in the study of organizations.
Moreover, 'we are unlikely to find a "solution" to the "problem" of paradigm incommensurability. Even if we did find a "solution", there is no guaranteethat defences individuals believe it would be accepted;not if it let down the that some So, for do believe necessaryto protect "alternative" work. thosereasons we not The is the bottle."' Indeed, the paradigmdebate can be resolved.... genie out of the diversity and proliferation of theoreticalparadigms, coupled with the spreadof has,in times, the the view that they are incommensurate recent reached point at has which 'a plethoraof alternativeapproaches' to the study of organizations functionalism gemergedwhich directly challengethe supremacyof and normal science."'. It is The 'paradigmic' approachis not confinedto the study of organisations. also Unbecoming:A Social identifiable in the sociologyof policing. In his 'Conduct ' Maurice Punch 'Underlying Constructionof Police Devianceand Control. says, for this is my selectionof dataand my interpretationof material study a Working the Symbolic Interactionist 'paradigm' theoreticalperspective ... within my approachparticularly builds upon and extendsthose authors who adoptan "' interactionistperspective on the police.
- methodological proliferation.
While it would seemthat Kuhn and Feyerabendboth proposea conceptof 'incommensurability' as betweenthe paradigmsof organizationalstudies, Feyerabendis individually responsiblefor promoting and encouragingan unrestrainedproliferation in the wider field of the methodsand theoriesof the social sciences. In an essaypublished after Feyerabend'sdeath in 1994,Paul Hayningen-Huenecredits Feyerabendwith this developmentsaying,
'The theory if facts from weakness of a ... may only appear as seen an alternative theory are allowed. This idea is the core of Feyerabend's view
34 Kuhn, T. (1970),page 517. 35 Clegg, S. R. et al, op cit. page 8, coL 2 36 ibid. page 2, coL 112 37Punch M. (1985) Introduction,pages 1-2 Sourcesand Methods 25
of the necessity of theory proliferation. If it is the case that theories are mainly testable through reciprocal confrontation, then his (Feyerabend's) empiricist persuasion demands that alternative theories should be at one's disposal. ' "'
When coupledwith Kuhn's conceptof 'incommensurability' the effect on the sociologistsof organizationsand othersengaged in social researchis apparentand has alreadybeen described. It is, indeed,in full accordwith Feyerabend'sown preferredmethodological slogan, 'Anything goes!'
It must be clear from the precedingdiscussion that there is little or no common ground betweenthe various methodological'paradigms' of organisationstudies, and that to selectone will raiseobjection, or evenrejection, by every other. As Jacksonand Carter(199 1) put it, 'What it (incommensurability)implies is that eachparadigm must, logically, developseparately, pursuing its own problematic "' and ignoring thoseof other paradigmsas paradigmallyinvalid. Paradamic incommensurabilityand methodologicalproliferation thus standin the way of attemptsto find commonground amongthose engaged in organisationstudies. That being so, it must surely also precludeany attemptto establisha link with other academicdisciplines, including thereforethe study of history even if it is of a 'scientific' kind.
Popper and the scientific method
Thankfully, despitethe disappointmentsjust described,my review of the methods used in the sociologyof policing and in organisationstudies eventually pointed me in a more fruitful direction andtoward Sir Karl R. Popper. His views had cometo my attentionin two different contexts. First in the discussionof Carr's views on the usesof history, and secondas a methodologicalsource for Blau's study of organisations.In following up on thosetwo contactswith PopperI discoveredthat he had delivereda lecture in Oxford in November, 1967in which he discussedthe possibility of drawing social scientific hypothesesfrom historical data. Significantly for my purposeshe had said on that occasionthat, 'all those historians and philosophersof history who insist on the gulf betweenhistory and the natural scienceshave a radically mistakenidea of the natural sciences.'"
39Preston, J et al, (2000).page 10 39 Jackson,N and Carter,P (1991) page I 10 40 Popper,KF, (1994)page 139 Sourcesand Methods 26
Popper'sview in his lecturewas that in the interpretationof history 'you have to start from a problem', and that 'A historical document,like a scientific is document to historical And like [a observation, a relative a problem. ... it has be interpreted.'41 scientific] ... observation, to He suggestedthat a scientific historian shouldattempt 'to reconstructthe problem situation in which the acting personfinds himself, and to show how andwhy his action constituteda solution the he it., 4' This 'situational [approach]... to problem as saw analysis... permits the critical discussionof our tentativesolutions - of our attemptsto reconstruct is indeed, the the the situation... this ...... much... actualmethods of natural sciences."" Popper also specifically accepted that, 'in the social be by historical sciences... situational analysis can sometimes provided research'"
Popper'slecture seemsprecisely to addressthe areaof my interest,i. e. the commonground betweenhistorians and social scientists. At first sight his 6situational logic and analysis' methodsshould provide a completeanswer to my methodologicaldifficulties. They are claimedto be entirely appropriateto a study of the history, including thereforethe development,of British professional policing, and are equally acceptableas legitimate in the social sciences.However and on closerexamination, Popper's methods are not as unproblematicas they appear. A major problem had to be addressedbefore they could properly be applied to my purposes.
Scienceas a method
Popper'sis a scientific methodand althoughscience is recognisedand acceptedas appropriateand applicableamong sociologists, including thoseworking in the field of policing, it is not so readily acceptableamong historians. While 'establishment'figures can be found to say 'that scientific method is the approach to be followed in doing history',"' they sharewith the generalityof historians grave doubtsabout its full applicationto their subject-matter.
On this issuePopper talks in his Oxford lectureof history being properly 'interestinghistorical if concernedwith problems... we want to understandthe in " world which we live', and of the historian being required, 'to give objective
41 ibid page 145 42 ibidpage 147 43 ibid page 148 44 ibidpage 170 45 Munslow, A. (2002) WhereDoes History ComeFrom in History Today, VoL 52,3 March 2002, page 18 46 Popper,K. R. (1974)page 138 Sourcesand Methods 27 arguments in support of his situational analysis. "' He claims in his lecture to have solved 'the problem of historical relativism', in that in situational analysis 'There is no criterion of truth. But there is something like a criterion of knowledge through This is how error ... can grow the critical elimination of error. we get nearer the truth'. "" But a careful reading of his script also shows that, while he advocates scientific objectivity in historical research, he does not specifically describeor discusshow the validity of historical conclusionsor interpretationsmaybe objectively tested. By that omissionhe left unanswered the view of many historiansof all schoolsof thought that a scientific approachto history is ultimately impossiblefor that reason.
Neverthelessand on the other hand,he did acceptthat therewas no objection to the use of historical data asthe sourceof his situationalanalysis. And he also recognisedthe possibility that;
'many [historical] conjecturesthat may appearto us to be true at one stage may be discoveredat a later stageto be erroneous. New documentsmay force us to reinterpretold documents.Or they may raise new problems""
of interpretation. And it is that view of the relationshipbetween historical evidenceand the conjecturesthat can be drawn from it, coupledwith his other views on the role of criticism in the elimination of error which provides,I suggest, the commonground with Marwick and 'established'historians on which I can developan approachto my researchthat will resolvemy methodological difficulties.
Sources and Methods - conclusion
In this researchI shall apply Popper's'situational logic and analysis' to Marwick's 'established' that the 'evidence be view a rational examinationof ... to found in the sources'is the correct approachto the study and interpretationof history. I shall then add an elementof testableobjectivity to the combined methodologyby formulating my findings and conclusionsin such a way as will allow thoseresponsible for social policy to apply them to a reform or restructure of present-daypolicing whoseoutcome and consequencescan be observed, examinedand aboveall, criticised. My proposalsfor police reform will therefore be opento ajudgement of validity on the basisof whetheror not they resolvethe
47 ibidpage 147 48 ibidpage 143 49 ibidpage 142 Sourcesand Methods 28
problemsto which they are addressed. In effect, the findings and conclusionsof my historical researchwill give rise to proposalsfor police reform that will amountto predictionsof the outcomeof future eventsand thus be open,at least in theory, to objective criticism and assessmentboth by the academiccommunity and by policing policy makersand practitioners.
By this meansI am able to find myself in agreementwith Steuerthat,
'Political decisions,and the public policies which result in them, are often basedon little more that hunch and guesswork,combined with political bias Policies housing immigration, ... on suchmatters as crime, and with serious social consequences,are often plucked out of the air, with no apparent effort madeeither to draw on existing knowledge,or to investigatebefore It is do better by acting... possibleto adoptinga scientific approachto social questions."'
Thankfully, the commonor layman's conceptionof a scientific approachis adequateand acceptablefor my purposes;i. e. what T. H. Huxley once called 'nothing but trained and organizedcommon sense', " and Popperdescribes as 'the methodof trial and the elimination of error'."' That is so because,pace both Hume and Popper," the epistemologicalissue of the validity of the inductive methodsof scienceremains, by commonconsent, unresolved. " Science,as it is commonly practisedand understood,therefore remains the most widely recognisedand acceptedway of finding solutionsto problemsboth within and, importantly for my purposes,beyond the academiccommunity.
I should make it clear however,that I do not claim, at this stage,that my methods will apply in any context other than this research,or that they have any wider significance. In particular I do not say that this thesisconstitutes or containsa 'scientific history' of British policing. That is an enterprisefar beyondthe scope of this work.
But, put briefly, my methodswill:
a) be scientific to tile extent that they are basedon empirical evidenceand observationand apply 'situational logic and analysis' to an identifiable
50 Steuer,M. (2003)page 3 51 Huxley, T. H. (1894) TheMethod ofZadig 52 Popper,K. R.(l 994) Chapter I page 3 53 Hume, David (1776) IV. U.32, Popper,K. R. (1959)page 20 54Honderich, Ted (ed) (1995)pages 405-406 Sourcesand Methods 29
issueor problem;" that is, 'What we haveto do... [is] to reconstructthe problem situation in which the acting personfinds himself, and to show how and why his action constituteda solution of the problem as he saw it. "" By this approach,'science is much more like history than historians think. "'?
b) result in findings and conclusionsformulated in a way that will allow reasonedand critical examinationof them by othersactive or interestedin field; is, 'What be is the that may called the methodof science...... the critical discussionand the critical examinationof our theories."" and that, ,... what we vaguely call the objectivity of scienceand the rationality of scienceare merely aspectsof the critical discussionof scientific theories.'
and,
c) producerecommendations for social changeor action that will be opento critical testing by;
i) the discoveryof historical or other objective evidencethat contradictsor is incompatiblewith my findings or conclusions;and/or
ii) a comparisonbetween the predictedeffect of any proposalsfor social changearising from my findings and conclusionsand their actual outcome.
Given thesecriteria I suggestthat commonground and a viable connection betweena study of the history of policing and solutionsto its presentproblems is establishedfor the purposesof this research- which is the identified methodologicalrequirement.
Submission
In the preparation of this thesis my subject and my purposes have led me away from other, perhaps more complex and specific, methodologies toward an historiographical modification of Popper's simpler and more practical critical rational, falsificationist scientific methods. The approach that I have developed is no better expressed than in some remarks made by Popper in July 1948 during a lecture entitled 'Towards a Rational Theory of Tradition' delivered to the Third
ss Popper,K. R. (1994) Chapter 7page 141 56 ibid. page 147 57 ibid. Chapter 7page 140 -18ibid. Chapter4 page93 at 3 59 ibid. Chapter8 page 159 Sourcesand Methods 30
Annual Conferenceof the RationalistPress Association at MagdalenCollege, Oxford. While discussing the wider issueof the methodsof the social sciencesas a whole he said;
'It is the task of social theory to explain how the unintendedconsequences of our intentionsand actionsarise, and what kind of consequencesarise if peopledo this that or the other thing in a certain social situation. Anditis, especially,the task of the social sciencesto analysein this way the existenceand functioning of institutions (such as police forces or insurance companiesor schoolsor governments)and of social collectives (such as statesor nationsor classesor other social groups).""
The accountof my researchbegins with a re-examinationand new analysisof the processesby which British professionalpolicing cameto be involved in the problemsof crime and criminality and so gradually emergedin its modem form. It concludeswith an examinationof the major, and apparentlyinsoluble, problems that are identified as the legacyof that early history. To the extentthat I suggest that the contemporaryproblems of policing are only seeminglyinsoluble, and that a scientific approachto the history and foundationsof British policing will show how thoseproblems may finally and permanentlybe resolved,this thesis hasthe potential to makea significant contribution both to the body of knowledgeon, and to the methodsused in the study of, its subject-matter.It is presentedfor considerationon that basis.
60 Popper,K. R. (1963) Chapter 4page 125 Foundations 31
3
Foundations of Professional Policin
Professionalpolicing becamea permanentpart of the British social scenein 1829. On 29th. Septemberthat year Robert Peel's Metropolitan Police Act brought his New Police to the streetsof London for the first time. Some 1000uniformed policemenbegan to patrol five London Divisions in their distinctive dark-blue swallow tail uniforms and reinforcedtop hats.' But what were they there to do? What was Parliament'spurpose in introducingthis new elementinto the criminal justice system?
Peel's New Police
There had beendemands in Parliamentfor improvementsin the systemof policing for the capital going back to 1770. In that year the first Parliamentary Committeesat and reportedon the problemsfaced by the metropolis. But, neither its Report and recommendations,nor thoseof similar committeesin 1793, 1812,1817and 1822resulted in any action.
At 3prn in the afternoon of Wednesday 15'hApril 1829 the Home Secretary, Robert Peel, rose in the House of Commons to speak in support of his Metropolis Police Improvement Bill. The consummate politician knew that although opposition to his Bill lay mainly outside the House it was also strong within it. Anti-government feeling was high in the aftermath of the passageof his Catholic Emancipation Act, which had received royal assentjust two days earlier. Peel had had to steer the Bill through a stormy passage in the Commons. He then watched his Prime Minister, the Duke of Wellington, perform the same duty in an acrimonious two day debate in the Lords. Against that background any proposal to tackle the anarchic condition of the policing of the nation's capital was likely to attract fierce public opposition. Resistance was particularly strong amongst the Government's political opponents in the Anti-Catholic League. Their fear was;
'that the Duke of Wellington's military government was about to introduce into England the despotic police of the continental states, with all the detestable details of espionage and domestic interference. "
In the preceding few days a pamphlet entitled 'An Address to the King' had been circulating. Amongst other things it,
I MetropolitanPolice Museum - exhibit 2 Cooke-Taylor,W. (1851) VoLII, p. 4-5 Foundations 32
'called on GeorgeIV 'to awakein the nameof eternalGod, and rally his peopleround his throne' becausea plot had beenformed to set asidethe Houseof Hanover,and raisethe Duke of Wellington to the throne by the aid of the Irish Catholicsabout to be enrolled in the new police."'
Peel recognisedthat powerful sectionsof the public opposedhis proposalsfor a gnewpolice'. Yet, on the other hand,years of agitation aboutthe safetyof London's citizens had unsettledtheir representativesin the Houseof Commons. The riotous disturbancesthat had bedevilledthe debateon Catholic emancipation had crystallisedthat concern. Membersof Parliamenthad seentoo much of the inability of the existing police authoritiesto keep good order in the capital. Peel judged that a sufficient numberof them were now finally in a mood to support positive action.
Select Committee of 1828
The committeewhich Peelhad appointedin 1828to considerthe problemsof policing in the metropolishad reachedmuch the samebroad conclusionas all its many predecessors!There was a clear needfor urgent, drastic reform. In contrastto the fate of all previousreports however, events now conspiredto make the mood of the Housereceptive to the idea of change. In openinghis address Peel gently touchedon thoseevents. He said that;
'he was desirous,now that the attentionof the houseand the public was no longer directedto a subjectwhich had so long excited the warmest feeling and the most anxioussolicitude of all classesof his majesty's subjects,both Catholic and Protestant,of leading the Houseto the considerationof a topic of considerableinterest as respectedthe preservationof the rights of property,as well as the protection of the personsof his majesty's subjects,"
by which he meantthe 'existing police establishmentfor the preventionof crime as well as its detection."
Reportingthe findings of the 1828 SelectCommittee that he had established,Peel said,
3 ibid. page.10 4 Report of the Select Committee into the State of Police of the Metropolis and of the Districts adjoiningthereto (1828) Public RecordOffice, ParliamentaryPapers (533) VI,page I et seq. 5 ParliamentaryReports 1829, pages 867-868 6 ibid page 868. Foundations 33
'It had beenpretty clearly ascertainedthat it was altogetherunsafe, and that it had beenso for a long period, to commit the care of the lives and propertiesof the peopleof the metropolisand its vicinity to the chargeof the parochialwatch, during that part of the twenty four hourswhich constitutedthe object of their very lax and inefficient protection."
Peel knew that the report of his own committeethat lay beforethe Housewas not enoughto ensurehe would carry the Commonswith him. Many membersof Parliamentshared the popular opinion that the emancipationof Catholics and the creation of a new police for London were two parts of the samegovernment plot to destroythe ancientliberties and privileges of the British nation. So, in introducing his Bill to the HousePeel was careful to say that;
'He might rest his caseon the report of the [1828] police committee which lay on the table, and which clearly showedthe necessityof some alteration in the existing meansfor the preventionand detectionof crime; but he thought it would be more satisfactoryto the Houseand the public, to stategenerally the groundson which he felt himself imperatively called upon to inducethe Houseto abandonthe presentsystem of protecting property and guardingthe safetyof the person."
Crime in 1829
Having begunby identifying crime as his target he turned to statisticsto reinforce his case. There were no databasesor complex governmentinformation gathering systemsin 1829. Information on levels of crime and ratesof detectionof offenderswas of dubiousvalue, and kept only fitfully by local authorities. Its connectionwith the real situationwas tenuous,and its value in political or social decision-makingquestionable. '
In the absenceof any proven or reliable sourceof information on levels of crime, the 1828Committee had decidedto usethe recordsof tile numbersof persons committedto prison in eachof the court areasin Englandand Wales during the decadeup to 1828. Their reasoningwas that the numberof committalsto prison madeby a court dependedupon, and was thereforesome measure of, the number of active criminals living in that court's area. Peeltold Parliamentthat these primitive statisticsshowed that 'the proportion which the numberof bore to the in London Middlesex 'not less than criminals ... population' and was
7 ibidpageM a ibid 9 Gatrell,V. A. C. andHaddon, T. B. (1972) Foundations 34 one personin every three hundredand eighty-three'. For the entire population of Englandand Walesthe figure was much lower and was 'found to be one criminal in every eight hundredand twenty-two."'
He rejectedthe possibility that the disproportionatenumber of criminals found in London and Middlesex was a consequenceof growth in the population of that area. He reportedthat,
'the result of a comparisonbetween the rate of increaseof population and the rate of increaseof crime in the metropolis showedthat the former was not in proportion to, and could not accountfor, the great increasein the latter; for there was an increaseof forty-one per cent in the numberof committals in 1828over 1821;while there was an increaseof population of only fifteen and a half percent."'
In contrast the figures for England and Wales showed that committals from the criminal courts increased by twenty-six per cent and population by eleven and a half per cent over the same period. "
Unreliability of Crime Statistics
Regrettably,though Peel and his fellow membersof Parliamentdid not know it, the information they were using was worthless. The 1839Royal Commissionon the Establishmentof a ConstabularyForce madethat discoveryten yearsafter theseevents. The Royal Commissionersthen reportedthat:
'At the beginningof (our] enquiry it becameevident to us that the returns of the numberof personsprosecuted or convicted,which in the reasonings in Parliamentare usually assumedas correct indications of the stateof crime within any district, cannotbe relied upon for that purpose."'
Even without the benefit of that hindsight,Peel's use of thesestatistics in the early part of his speechstill looks odd, especiallywhen his later remarkson the subject are considered. Toward the end of his speechPeel returned to thesenumbers to report that, taking Englandand Walesas a whole and despitean increasein population,the total numberof committals in had actually fallen comparing 1827 with 1828(from 17,921to 16,556). Indeed,the fall in someareas was 'very remarkable'. In Lancashirethere had been2457 committals in 1827and only
10Parliamentary Reports, op cit. page 869 It ibid 12ibid page 8 70 13Report of the Royal Commissionon the Establishmentof an Efficient ConstabularyForce (1839) ParliamentaryPapers (1839), vol. XLXatpage 8 Foundations 35
448 in 1828." In fact, by 1828 the level of committals for some felonies in England and Wales was below that reported at the beginning of the century. " But perhaps we should be charitable and assume that Peel's Committee did not pursue their enquiries far or long enough to discover those less helpful facts.
For whateverreason Peel did not dwell too long on thesestatistical points but quickly moved back to his main theme. He repeatedthat the overall decreasein committals acrossthe country reportedby his Committeewas in strong contrastto the situation in the metropolisof London.
Peel and the causes of crime
As to the causesof 'this frightful differencebetween the increaseof crime and the increasein population' in the metropolishe said that;
'Many intelligent gentlemen,who took an interestin the subject,had endeavouredto investigateand determinethose causes; but he must still say - and he spokein the presenceof many hon. Memberswho had taken an active part in the police committee- without having arrived at any satisfactoryconclusions to the real natureof thosecauses. "'
The Housewould haveknown that Peelwas amongthe 'many hon. Members' who had beenactive in this field in the past. Six yearsearlier he had been Chairmanof the 1822immediate predecessor of the 1828Committee whose Report he was now presentingto the House. But earlier failures to identify the causesof crime, including his own, did not deterPeel from exercisingthe privilege many of his successorsin the Home Departmenthave also found difficult to resist. He offered the Househis own views on the reasonsfor an increasein criminality. He thought perhaps,
'that the mechanicalimprovements which so much distinguishedthe country, and were a great sourceof its prosperity,so aidedthe perpetratorsof crime, by enablingthem to travel a greatdistance in a few hours,and to use great caution in the selectionof time and manner,that the meansof detectionwere very much lessened.""
This is a factor all earlier commentators,including Peel himself as chairmanof the 1822 SelectCommittee, had apparentlyoverlooked. Wisely perhaps,Peel did not
14Parliamentary Reports, op cit. page 870 Is ParliamentaryPapers (169)XIXI (1839)Appendix 16Parliamentary Reports, op cit. page 871 17 ibid Foundations 36
explore precisely how he thought 'mechanical improvements' might cause a disproportional increase in committals to prison from the London criminal courts. Had he done so he might have raised some uncomfortable questions in the minds of his listeners. Such as, what proportion of those committed to prison from the London courts were, in fact, not residents of the capital? It will be remembered that Peel's earlier use of statistics on levels of crime rested on the assumption that those committed to prison from an area were resident in it. That would clearly not sit comfortably with the view Peel now put forward as to the cause of the disproportionate increase in crime in the capital
The parochial authorities
With the detachmentof an historical perspective,Peel's attemptto use an increase in crime to justify his proposalsfor a reform of the policing of the capital looks very weak. He was however,in greatneed both of this foray into criminal statisticsand his highly selectiveinterpretation of them. Without a crime wave in the capital he could not have laid much of the blame for it on 'the very unsatisfactorystate of that branchof our police which was chiefly controlled by the parochialauthorities! Despitethere being in reality no reliable evidence, statisticalor otherwise,either for the existenceof an increasein crime or, for that matter,the conclusionhe was now aboutto draw, Peelannounced himself satisfiedthat, 'so long as the presentnight watch systemwas persistedin, there would be no efficient police preventionof crime, nor any satisfactoryprotection for property or the person.""
It is difficult, evennow, to seequite how he managedto reconcilethose commentswith the apparentfall in committalsbetween 1827 and 1828,which had obviously occurredunder the systemhe was criticising. Or how he dealt in his own mind with the remarkablesuccess achieved by the Lancashireparochial authoritiesusing the traditional methods.
A plea for co-ordination
There is someevidence that he was, in fact, not entirely comfortablewith his own argument. In a style that the modernreader might recognise,Peel tried to neutralise,in advance,any attack on his crime statisticsor mention of examplesof successby the existing watch system. He did so bya politician's ruse. Heasked a leading questionin order to get his retaliation in first and so steerthe debatein
Is ibid page 872 Foundations 37 the direction he wanted. To forestall any mention of examplesof falling crime or the achievementsof the Lancashireparochial authorities he said,
'What advantagefrom a generalpoint of view could be derived from one well regulateddistrict, surroundedby five or six neighbouringparishes in which no attemptshad beenmade to remedythe presentinefficient watch-housessystemT
To which contrived conundrumhe provided his own answer:
'Would not the necessaryeffect be to drive the thievesand robbersfrom the protectedparish into thoseparishes on its skirts on which the authoritieswere indifferent about providing efficient security for the property &c., containedin it? "'
But his rusewill not bear critical examination. Peel's is an argumentmany modem police officers, criminologistsand other social commentatorswill recognise. It is a standardcriticism of crime preventionschemes called 'the displacementeffect'. Modem detractorsof crime preventioninitiatives commonly arguethat the only consequenceof suppressingcrime of one type or in one areais to causean increasein other crimes or elsewhere. While this may be a widely held view, the exactprocesses of the effect, and even its existence,are still subjectof disputetoday. In Peel's time, and from the crime figures on which he depended,the displacementeffect he predictedcould neither be detectednor measuredin any satisfactoryway.
By now however,Peel's speechwas moving on from the task of generatingfear of crime amongMPs and toward his true objective - the needfor uniformity and integration in policing. His 'displacement'argument was essentialto that objective despitethere being no solid evidencein his speechto support it.
Where Peelwas leadinghonourable Members was toward the,
'conclusion which every one who had inquired into our presentwatch house The systemmust arrive at... chief requisiteof an efficient police were unity and responsibilityof its agents- both of which where not only not ensuredby the presentparochial watch-house system, but were actually preventedby it. "'
19ibid pages872-873 20 ibid page 8 72 Foundations 38
In the absenceof any facts or argumentto justify this proposal,he resortedonce more to the device of a leadingquestion. 'Could there,then, be any unity of designunder such a systemT His answerwas, 'Certainly not; nor responsibility until all the parochialpolice was concentratedunder one responsibleand efficient head."'
The Watch House system
At this point in his speech it becomes clear that Peel's real target is not crime itself but rather London's version of the 'watch and ward' system established in the reign of Edward I by the Statute of Winchester of 1285. That Act required that, in all 'great towns being walled' the inhabitants 'shall watch the town continually all night. $22
Later Acts of ElizabethI, and George'sIl and 111,amended and addedfurther provisionsto the statuteto enablehouseholders in urban areasto avoid 'watch and ward' duty by paying a rate into a fund to provide substitutes. This was the systemwhose image was (and largely still is) of drunkards,sluggards and other inadequatecharacters forming a wholly ineffective parish watch systemin every city in nineteenthcentury England, including the capital itself. However, there were many at the time (and somesince, e. g. Emsley,C. (1991)) who took a contrary view of the effectivenessof the 'watch', which is perhapswhy Peel producedno evidenceto supportthe dismissiveassertions he madeabout it in his speech.
But the main difficulty Peel had in launchinghis attack on the capital's watch systemis that none of the Committeeshe mentioned,including the 1822 Committeewhose chair he had occupied,had proposedeither to do away with the existing parochialwatch, or to 'unify' policing. Only his latest 1828 Committee had done so. As subsequentcommentators have noted, 'Except for the select 1828 for drastic committeeof ... noneof the other committeescalled any change in the parish system."' Peelwas thereforein gravedanger of misleadingthe Houseby suggestingthat all previouscommittees 'must' also have reachedthe conclusionthat policing in the capital be united. They had clearly done no such thing, as Peelhimself well knew.
21 ibid 22Feiling, Sir K. (I 950)page 180 23 Smith,P. T. (I 985)page21 Foundations 39
In particular, the 1822immediate predecessor of the 1828Committee had, under Peel's chairmanship,also 'inquired into the Stateof Police of the Metropolis"" and had then expressedstrong reservations about any radical alterationto the existing parish-basedsystem. After noting the admittedflaws of the existing arrangementsthe Committeehad said that:
'If a new systemof police were to be constructedab initio for the regulationof a greatcity, such defectswould no doubt be remedied;but Your Committeehave the satisfactionof thinking that, constitutedas the presentsystem is, the obstructionto public justice and to the maintenance of the peaceexists practically in a much lessdegree than might have been apprehended,and certainly not to that degreewhich would warrant them in recommendingany fundamentalchange in it. "'
Mr. ChairmanPeel and his 1822Committee nevertheless recommended that the various uniformed patrols employedby the magistrates'offices of the capital and thosemaintained by the parochialauthorities be better integratedand co- ordinated. To that end they proposedthat the existing day patrols and nightly watch of the metropolisbe brought 'under the samesuperintendence'.
But the 1822Committee was also careful to say that, 'each [magistrates]office should undertakethe duty of patrolling its own district', only then addingthat,
'Your Committeeare of opinion, however,in order that the several offices of police may have full information on what passeswith their respectivedistricts, that there ought to be a full and unreserved communicationbetween the Magistratesand the officers under whose superintendencethe patrol is placed."'
This is a structureof generaloversight and good communicationbetween the various policing units in the capital that would certainly help to improve the preventive impact of their existing systemof patrols. It is a proposalhowever, that falls far short of Peel's proposalfor a 'unity' of policing.
In addition, the 1822Committee significantly reinforcedtheir cautiousapproach to reform later in their Report. In relation to the other main elementof the policing arrangementsfor London, i.e. the magistratesoffices modelled on the innovationsintroduced by the Fieldings at Bow Streetand the officers they
24 Report of the Parliamentary Select Committee on the Policing of the Metropolis (1822) ParliamentaryPapers (440) IV. 91 (1822ý, Public RecordsOffice HO 6111 25 ibid. page 9 26 ibid. pageJ0 Foundations 40 appointedand directly employedin patrolling and in the investigationand detectionof reportedcrime, the Committeesaid that,
'After a full enquiry into and considerationto the stateof the several police offices (in the metropolis),Your Committeeare not disposedto submit any important changesin their establishments."'
Any remaining doubtsabout the conservativeapproach of the 1822 Select Committeemust disappearin the face of the careful caveatit addedto its final recommendations. In an important paragraphthat well expresseswidely felt reservationsabout the reformsPeel was subsequentlyto proposein his Metropolis Police ImprovementBill of 1829,the 1822Committee said that,
'It is difficult to reconcilean effective systemof police with that perfect freedomof action and exemptionfrom interferencewhich are the great privileges and blessingof society in this country and your committeefeel that the forfeiture or curtailmentof suchadvantages would be too great a sacrifice for improvementsin police, or facilities in detectionof crime, howeverdesirable in themselvesif abstractlyconsidered. "'
Peel and the London magistrates
Even Peel's one sure supporterin his call for unity in policing, the 1828 Committeethat he had appointed,was lessthan totally committedto the idea of a single professionalpolice force for London. On that issueit was not too far from the position adoptedby the 1822Committee. It recommendedthe establishment of a single headoffice for the police but it framed its proposalsto tread very carefully aroundthe powersand responsibilitiesof the magistratesof the metropolis,thus;
'Your Committeeis fully awareof the difficulty of interfering with the discretionof Magistratesin the performanceof any duties of a strictly judicial nature....
But the Police Magistrate,in a great city, may be consideredas an executiveas well as ajudicial officer, and one of the chief advantagesof the establishmentof a headOffice of Police would consist,in the opinion of Your Committee,in its possessinga general superintendingauthority in mattersofPolice, which should remedythe inconveniencethat at
27 ibid. 28 ibid. page 11 Foundations 41
presentresults for the independentand unconnectedaction of the several Police Offices. "'
Most significantly, the 1828Committee decided that they should therefore 'Abstain from enteringinto a considerationof the detailedRegulations which should be formed for the constitutionand managementof the new Police Department.""
It is clear then, that eventhe 1828Committee did not seeits proposalsas sweepingaway, or evenunifying, the existing policing arrangementsof the capital. Like all its predecessorsincluding that led by Peel himself, it was careful not to trespasson the responsibilitiesof the magistratesand the officers they employedto assistthem in carrying out their judicial duties. TheCommittee identified the patrolling elementin the policing of the metropolis,and in particular, the parochialnight-time 'watch and ward' as its principal target for reform. Of all the SelectCommittees that had consideredthe issuethat of 1828 alone recommendedthat theseelements be brought under a single head,but then only in a 'superintending'capacity.
To do full justice to Peel,a forensic readingof his speechto the Houseshows that he did not quite say that all earlier committeeson the policing of the capital had concludedthat 'unity and responsibilityof its agents'was the prerequisiteof an efficient police for the metropolis. He very carefully referredonly to the day and night time patrols existing in the capital, and eventhen said that that was the conclusionwhich thosecommittees 'must arrive at' not that they had actually done so.
Adding togetherthe doubtsabout the validity and consistencyof Peel's descriptionof a crime wave in the capital; his unsupportedassertions of the inefficiency of the existing watch arrangements;and his misrepresentationof the conclusionsreached by the SelectCommittees that had examinedthe problemsof policing the metropolis,the real backgroundto Peel's Metropolis Police ImprovementBill can perhapsbe glimpsed. The truth seemsto be that the necessityfor unity and responsibility in policing in the capital was not a conclusionto be drawn from the growth of crime, nor had it beenreached by the many committeesappointed by the House. It is much more likely to have beena
29 Reportof the ParliamentarySelect Committee on the Policing of the Metropolis(18281 op. cit. page 31 30 ibid. Foundations 42
decisionPeel himself made,perhaps with the active encouragementof his advisersand Home Office officials.
Peace Preservation Police
It is highly likely that Peel'sexperience during his earlier period in governmentas Chief Secretaryto Ireland influencedhis thinking on the policing of the metropolis. He enteredParliament in 1809and, after a short spell as Under Secretaryfor War went to Ireland as Chief Secretaryin 1812,where he spentsix years. In June 1814he introducedinto the Houseof Commonsa 'Bill to provide for the better executionof the laws in Ireland' that proposed,
'to createsalaried [Dublin] Castlecontrolled police forces as neededin disturbeddistricts in Ireland [for All to be by ... which] ... costswere paid ratepayersin the disturbedareas. "'
Thesenew bodiesbecame known as the PeacePreservation Police. They were put under the control and direction of the magistratesin troubled areasto assist them to restoreorder and then to keepthe peace. Peel's experiencein Ireland must surely have cometo his aid in dealingwith the troublesomedisorder of the metropolis. It is almost certainly true that,
'the actual organisationof the Metropolitan Police probably owes as much to Peel's experiencein Ireland and to the PeacePreservation Forces "' there ... as to anythingelse.
Peel as Reformer
On the availableevidence it is reasonableto concludethat Peel always meanthis Metropolis Police ImprovementBill to apply a unified professionalbody of paid constablesalong the model of the PeacePreservation Police to the safety and good order of London. His speechto the Housein supportof his Bill revealsthat he meantto substitutethem for the disorganisedand disreputablerabble of locally appointedwatch and ward. The importanceof this explanationfor Peel's approachto the reform of policing is that it showshis proposalswere not the revolutionary approachsubsequently widely attributedto him He did not intend radically to alter the systemof crime prevention,detection and prosecutionin the capital, but merely to reform one failed part of it - the parochialwatch and ward.
31 Palmer,S. H. (1988) pages200-201 32 Smith,P. T. (1985)page 24 Foundations 43
This is most immediatelyapparent from his concernnot to interferewith or disturb the prerogativeof the London magistratesto inquire into reportsof crimes and to employ their own officers to pursueand apprehendcriminal offenders. Thosefunctions were to remainthe preserveof the magistratesand their officers. Indeed,if there can be any doubt aboutPeel's intentionsin this respectin 1829, 10 Geo. 4 cap. 45 must dispel them. That Act emanatedfrom his Home Departmentand passedinto law on the sameday (I 9thJune 1829)as his Metropolitan Police Act. Its purposewas to continueunchanged for yet another three yearsthe Police Offices Act which was the successorto the original 1792 Middlesex JusticesAct. Parliamentariansthereby preserved and continuedall the rights, statusand privileges of the magistratesof the police offices of the metropolis,and the patrolling and plain clothesdetective off jeersthey employed, at the very momentthey introducedthe New Police.
Peel's addressin supportof his Metropolis Police ImprovementBill is not a call for a revolution in policing. Nor is it an attemptto launcha campaignagainst crime and criminality despitehis relianceon criminal statisticsin the early part of his argument. Ratherit is a politician's speech,resonant with demandsthat someoneor somethingother than the confusionof parish authoritiesshould take responsibility for the burdenof protectingproperty and personsin the capital from harm, and for preventingoutbreaks of crime and disorder.
'One Head Presiding'
Peelexposes his true unifying and centralising intent later in his speech. Inan unguardedmoment, when speakingextemporaneously in responseto a question from a Mr. Bernal, Peel ignoredthe reservationseven of his own 1828Committee and admittedthat to,
'effect the in It objects view .... was .... absolutelynecessary that there should be but one headpresiding over and directing the operationsof this new police."'
By his 'principle of unity and responsibility' Peelwent far beyondhis view when chairmanof the 1822Select Committee. He did not meanto stop at a co- ordinating administrativelayer over the existing watch and ward arrangementsof the parochial authorities. His purposewas to replacethe whole systemwith a unified body of police patrols for the capital. In future, those in chargeof the New Police would havethe duty to preventcrime and disorder,and protect
33Parliamentary Reports, op cit. page 883 Foundations 44 citizens and their property in the metropolis,rather than thoseresponsibilities being lost in a bewildering confusionof local parishjurisdictions.
Peel went on to brushaside the few commentsand questionsasked by Members, someof them marvellously ill-judged and misinformed,to win the vote to give his Metropolis Police ImprovementBill a first reading. He then handedthe project over to the 1828Police Committee,now reformedas a Committeeof the whole House,to deal with the 'many details' of his proposal. He subsequentlyspoke occasionallyand briefly on the subject,chiefly in answerto questions," but never at any length or depth,either in the Houseor elsewhere.Indeed,
'Peel had little to do with the police after 1829. The Commissioners were the oneswho shapedthe Metropolitan Police."'
34 ParliamentaryDebates (Hansard) New Series Vol. XXIV col 1200(28 May 1830ý VoIAxvcoI 356 (15 June 1830) 35 Smith,P. T. (1985)page36 First Commissioners 45
4
First Commissioners
Both Peel's speechin supportof his Metropolis Police ImprovementBill and contemporarycomment show that the full-time professionalMetropolitan Police Force was to replacethe parochialwatch and ward systemof the capital rather than the whole of its policing arrangements. Peel arguedthat the watchmensystem had failed to protect Londonersfrom crime and disorderon their streetsand in their homes. When the Bill reachedthe Houseof Lords on June51h, their Lordships had no doubt aboutthe Government'slimited intentions. Lord Holland said, in reply to the Prime Minister's speech,
'when their Lordshipsconsider that the bill was intendedfor the protection of the property,the preservationof the peaceand the generalsecurity of the metropolis,no-one could doubt the propriety of it's introduction"
The Police Offices underthe boardsof magistratesof the metropolis,with their crime investigationand detectionresponsibilities, remained untouched as did the two types of officers they employed,the plain-clothesdetective 'Runners', and the uniformed 'Patroles'. The magistratesretained all their criminal investigative, detectiveand prosecutionpowers and duties underthe provisions of the Police Office founding Act of 1792and its successors. For the time being at least therefore,the Bow StreetFoot and Horse patrols,with their distinctive red waistcoats,appeared on the streetsof London alongsidethe uniformed preventive constablesof the New Police. Significantly, the appearanceof the New Police also did not in any way affect the position of the small group of plain clothes 'Runners', nor their employmentby the magistratesto investigatereports and allegationsof crime in order to identify and detectthe offender(s)., These remainedthe only officially recognisedbody of full-time detectivesavailable in the capital.
Peel's neglect
Peeltook little direct interestin his creationafter the passageof the Metropolitan Police Act. He left the administrativedetails to others,and particularly to the two men selectedjointly to headthe new organisation,Charles Rowan and Richard
I ParliamentaryDebates (Hansard) New Seriesvol. XXI coL 1752 2 Stead,P. J. (1977)page 78 First Commissioners 46
Mayne, who becamejustices of the peacefor the metropolis andjoint 'Commissioners'of the new 'Metropolitan Police Force'.
Peel's nameappears on the list of membersof a SelectCommittee on the policing of the metropolis,' and in the list of thoseenquiring into 'the Petition of Frederick Young and others' in 1833,concerning the activities of ConstablePopay of the Force.' Almost a decadelater he servedas a memberof a SelectCommittee on the Metropolis Police Offices that sat in 1838. That Committeehad a powerful influence on the developmentof British policing. Its impact is dealt with and examinedin a later chapter. There is however,nothing in the reports of any of thoseCommittees to indicatethat Peelmade any major contribution to their deliberations,or that he chaired,or otherwisesignificantly influenced,any of their meetingsor deliberations.
Political context
Peel's 1829Metropolitan Police Act cameas little more than a Parliamentary interlude betweenCatholic emancipationand the naggingquestion of electoral reform. It was a turbulent time in British politics with much to occupy the governmentof the day. Agitation for reform at home fed on constitutional upheavalabroad. The Frenchdrove CharlesX into exile in August 1830,and the Belgiansbegan their revolt to gain separationfrom Holland the samemonth. At home agricultural labourersand the dispossessedcombined in revolt that spread from Kent to the North and west as the year progressed. In the midst of all these troubles GeorgeIV died, precipitatingan election that gravely weakened Wellington's government.
The Iron Duke was narrowly returnedas Prime Minister in the new Parliament. He then flatly refusedto countenanceany Parliamentaryor electoralreform despite the Houseof Commonsand the country being combinedagainst him. His opponentsin the new Housethereupon forced him from office and put Lord Grey in his place in November 1830. Melbournecame to the Home Office in the new administration,removing Peel from any further direct responsibility for the New Police. He had had Parliamentaryauthority over his new creationfor just over one year. In neither his subsequentshort ministry of 1834/1835,nor in his final occupancyof the Prime Minister's off ice between1841 and 1846,is there any
3 Report of the SelectCommittee on the stateof the Police of the Metropolis and the Stateof Crime thereinParliamentary Papers (1834) VoLXVIpage I et. seq. 4 Report the SelectCommittee the Petition ' ParliamentaryPapers (1833) VoLXIIp, 407 of on ... etc. First Commissioners 47
indication that Peel sought to make any further significant contribution to the evolution of the emerging professional police service.
Peel and policing
Contemporaries did not regard Peel's contribution to the establishment of the professional police service as an important part of his illustrious career. Thefirst his of his biographies, by William Cooke-Taylor, appeared in 185 1, the year after death.' In the 'Preface' to that four volume work Cooke-Taylor says that, -
' "Cash, com and Catholics" have occupiedthe attentionof the country for more than half a century,and the nameof Sir RobertPeel is identified with all the great legislativemeasures by which the settlementof many of the many important subjectsand interestshave been effected. "
Cooke-Taylordoes not mentionthe Metropolitan Police Act in his summaryof Peel's achievements. Onlypages4to 10 of Volume Il of his morethan2000 page eulogistic treatmentof Peel's greatcareer deal with the establishmentof the New th Police. Reproductionsof extractsfrom Peel's speechto the Houseon 15 April 1829fill almostthe whole of that small space.Cooke-Taylor's peroration at the end of the biographydoes not mentionthe subjectof policing at all! He praises Peel for his contributionsto Catholic emancipation;for the repealof the Corn Laws, and for his successesin foreign policy. He ignorescompletely Peel's contribution to the foundationof the Metropolitan Police.
None of Peel's other contemporarybiographers make much of his involvement in the appearanceof the New Police. His fame as founder of the British police serviceis a much more recentdevelopment. Having got his Metropolitan Police Bill through ParliamentPeel, far from being the father of modernpolicing, seems to have left it to others,and particularly the officials of the Home Office and the first Commissioners,to lay the foundationsof the modernpolice service;including, it would seem,allowing them to set the functions and purposesof the new organisation.
Peel and his Commissioners
Years later, Richard Mayne, the longer lasting of Peel'sjoint first Commissioners, wrote a memorandumto the then Home Secretary,Sir GeorgeGrey, on the subject
5 W. Cooke-Taylor, W. (185 1) 6 ibid Volume IPreface 7 ibid. Volume Xpage. 648 First Commissioners 48
of the office of Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis. In it he complained that:
'When the CommissionersOffice was establishedit could not have been foreseenwhat the duties would become. The Secretaryof State[Sir Robert Peel] left it entirely to the Commissionersthemselves to arrangefor the perfonnanceof their own duties."
Among subsequentcommentators Reith's view is,
'The inexcusable [his] Peel's to most of all ...... short-sightedness,was refusal regulateand determinethe status,and eventhe duties,of the Commissioners as public servants,in spite of their urgent requeststo him to do so."
Other contemporarysources support this picture. None recordsany direct involvementby Peel in the important decisionsneeded in the early days of the New Police. The registerof confidential letters sentbythejoint Commissioners between8 April 1830and December1833, contain only one entry of a letter directly addressedto Sir Robert Peel. Only 15 otherswent to the 'principal secretary'at the Home Office, SamuelMarch Phillipps." Those letters invariably deal with 'incidents' on which the Home Off ice wantedreports. Only two letters from Peel appearin Richard Mayne's personal'Register of Letters'." The first is a note dated5h July 1829asking Mayne to cometo Whitehall Gardenson the occasionof his appointmentas one of the first two joint commissioners. Theother is a brief congratulatorynote on Mayne being nominatedfor a knighthood in January1848.
The Public RecordOffice hasa documentthat may perhapsthrow somefurther faint light on theseissues. Its date and provenanceare unclear. The note seemsto be a private record madeby Mayne of 'consultationswith Sir R Peel'." Hebegins by listing the following subjectsas having beendiscussed:
'numbers,ranks, pay, dress,equipment, duties, whether to be confined to nights, classfrom which men to be selected,portion of town to be first taken chargeof.
9 Memorandumon the office of Commissionerof Police. 26th November 1849 Public RecordOffice: MetpoI12134 9 Reith, C, (I 943)page39 10Public RecordOffice MEPO 1144 11Metropolitan Police Museum Cat no. 1996-684 12Public RecordOffice MEPO 2132 First Commissioners 49
Police division, how laid out. Parish boundaries not regarded. Population
and local circumstances considered... ' etc. etc.
Mayne then goes on to note the 'Difficulties' facing the new service:
'public jealousy, parochial opposition, various interests patronage taken away, unfriendly feeling at police officers, some of the magistrates openly opposing, unfitness of many of the men, inexperience of all, correspondence laborious very ..... ; and in a side note at this point,
'Police not seen in boxes as watchmen nor crying the hour, supposed absent, want of confidence in, much complaint about. '
It would seem that the note is not a record of initial 'consultations' about the New Police becauseMayne later notes 'Proofs of success' which he lists as,
'Public opinion shownby newspapersunfriendly at first now changed
Very many lettersand testimonials
Presentmentsof grandjuries
Testimonyofjudges, chairmenof sessions
Applications from placeto be taken under protection
New patrolling [?] of City Police and further alterationproposed
Criminal Registers
Witnessesfrom all partsto speakas to former and presentstate of the town
Prostitutesand drunkenpersons
Applications for officers from many parts of the country'
It is revealingto the modem eye that this meetingbetween the Home Secretaryand his Commissionersof Police of the Metropolis doesnot seemto have dealt with the stateof crime in the capital. The Secretaryof Stateoffers no comments, exhortationsor adviceon that issue. For his part Richard Mayne makesno claim that Metropolitan Police patrolshave had any impact on the incidenceof crime or disorder. Nor doeshe draw attentionto any exampleof successby the Force in the detectionor pursuit of criminals.
It is not possibleto determinehow frequently Peelmet the Commissionersor the extentto which he discussedwith them the problemsthey faced. Thepublic First Commissioners so record of the correspondencebetween Peel and his Commissionersincludes no directions or instructionson the purposesor strategiesof the new police organisation. It is reasonableto supposethat, in the atmosphereof the time, such important and sensitiveissues would havebeen recorded somewhere and in some form had they beendiscussed. The conjectureis therefore,that Peelgave no such formal advice or guidanceto his Commissioners.
At the sametime lack of any surviving record of discussionsbetween the first Commissionersand Peelon theseissues is not proof that such exchangesdid not take place. Nor doesit give groundsfor criticism of the conductof Peel or his successorsas Home Secretary. The SelectCommittee 'appointed to inquire into the Conductof the Metropolitan Police on 13th May last, in dispersinga Public Meeting in Cold Bath Fields', an eventwhich resultedin the deathof constable Culley, askedRowan and Mayne;
'All the instructionsyou are in the habit of receiving from the Secretaryof Stateare verbal, are they not? - (Answer) We havenever receivedany written order, I think. "'
Rowan and Mayne are not quite correct in their answerto this question. ParliamentaryPapers for 1830include a copy of a written Instruction issuedby Peelto the Commissionerson 10"' December1829 dealing with appointmentsto, and within, the New Police."
Rowan and Mayne did, however,accurately report the customof the day in their answerto the SelectCommittee. Peeland his successorsas Secretaryof Statefor Home Affairs followed establishedministerial practicein failing to record any instructionsand directionsthat might havebeen given to the Commissioners. It was always for thoseattending on ministersto maketheir own note of what took place. Mayne clarified this point in his evidenceto the Cold Bath Fields Select Committee,when he said that it was the Commissionerswho had the habit of making a memorandumon their return to their office in Whitehall Place." That practiceprobably explainsthe private note preservedin the Public RecordOffice referredto earlier. Rowan and Mayne did not normally expect,nor apparentlydid they ever rememberreceiving, written instructionsfrom the Secretaryof State. The consequenceis that, even if they were given, instructionsor directionson the
13Report of the SelectCommittee on the Conductof the MetropolitanPolice etc. (18331 Parliamentary PapersVol XIIIp. 603 (at 108) 14Parliamentary Papers (1830)(505)XYIII. 405 Is Reportof the SelectCommittee etc., op cit. page.603 (at 109) First Commissioners 51 proper purposes and functions of the New Police would not necessarily be preservedin the public record.
The magistrates and the New Police
While there is a distinct lack of any record of official guidanceto Mayne and Rowan, a tide of commentand criticism from both public and pressswept over them. Tempersand debateran hot in what was essentiallya political dispute about the form of British civil society in the post-Napoleonicera. Oppositionto the New Police force was not confinedto Peel's political opponents. Significant parts of the British establishmentwere disturbedby the development. In addition, the Metropolitan Police Forcetook to the streetswith an old-establishedand powerfully supportedpolicing organisationstill firmly in place in the capital, and one that did not look kindly on Peel's newcomers. The police offices established underthe successorsto the 1792Act scatteredaround London underthe direction of local boardsof magistrates,had many powerful supporters.
Thosealarmed by Peel's innovationshad the benefit of having that active and long- establishedsystem of policing to contrastwith the Peelers. Theytookfull advantage. By long engagementin both investigativeand patrol policing the police offices had accumulatedunrivalled experiencein dealingwith the problems of crime and criminals in London. And they continued,by statute,to play a key role in that important aspectof the policing of the capital. Section42 of the 1829 Metropolitan Police Act had specifically provided that 'nothing in this Act containedshall affect or alter' the legislation supportingthe existing police offices. Parliamentthus deliberatelyand specifically protectedand insulatedall their rights, status,powers and privileges from any interferenceby the New Police.
For their part Bow Streetand the other police off iceswere naturally suspiciousof the 'Peelers'. They saw them as rivals for the attentionand supportof the capital's citizens, and as a potentialthreat to their prestigiousand lucrative monopoly of the detectionand pursuit of criminals. The police office magistrates,and their supportersin Parliamentand elsewhere,prompted and publisheda fund of critical commenton the new organisation. They constantlysought to provoke friction betweenthe Metropolitan Police Force and newspapers,politicians and public, especiallyin the early days.
Influence of Colquhon
Peel's opponentsamong supporters of the Police Offices drew heavily on the writings of Patrick Colquhon,perhaps the best-known,and most influential, of the First Commissioners 52
London magistratesafter the Fieldingsthemselves. Colquhon's 1796work, 'Treatise on the Police of the Metropolis', played a significant role in the public debateabout policing. He strongly influencedall the partiesinvolved, not exceptingPeel and his advisers. More than 30 yearsbefore the Metropolitan Police Act, he has a good claim to have first proposedthe establishmentof a unified police servicefor the metropolis.". His 'Treatise' says,
'is it not fair to conclude,that the insecurity which the public experiences with regardto life and property, and the inefficacy of the Police in preventingcrimes, are to be attributedprincipally to the following causes?
2. The to ... want of an active principle, calculated concentrateand connect the whole Police of the Metropolis and nation, and to reducethe general managementto systemand methodby the interpositionof a superintending agency,composed of able, intelligent and indefatigablemen, acting under the direction of His Majesty's principal secretaryof Statefor the Home Department,on whom would devolvethe subordinatecare and direction of the generalPolice of the Metropolis,"'
However, in contrastto the 'watch and ward' target of the 1828Select Committee and the Metropolitan Police Act that was its outcome,Colquhon's reforms aim at the identification, detectionand prosecutionof criminals active in the capital. His proposednew police establishmentwas to be basedon the police offices, and would create 'a completehistory of the connections,and pursuits of all or most of the criminal and fraudulentpersons who resort to the Metropolis' and a 'complete register of every known offender andthereby establish a clue for their detection."' Colquhon's 'Treatise' is clearly aboutthe detectiveaspect of the magistrates responsibilitiesrather than the protectiveand preventiveeffect of 'watch and ward' and other forms of uniformed patrolling.
Colquhon's impact on the debateon the policing of the metropolis was neverthelessconsiderable. The extentof his influencecan be seenin the recommendationof Peel's 1822and 1828 SelectCommittees that a 'general superintendingauthority' be set up underthe Secretaryof Stateto co-ordinateand integratethe activities of the off ices. The idea was not implemented,but it is taken almostword for word from the 'Treatise'.
16Colquhon, P. (1796) 17ibid. page 29 18ibid First Commissioners 53
Opponent'sof Peel's reformsalso drew on Colquhon's 'Treatise' to emphasisethe local natureof the contribution madeto the reduction of crime and disorder in the capital by both the magistrates'officers and by parish constablesand watchmen. They played heavily on the distinction betweenthose locally basedarrangements, independentof governmentcontrol, and the direct accountabilityof the New Police to a governmentminister. They soughtto exploit public fearsthat Peel'sNew Police, in contrastto the parochialsystem, sought to impose'a despoticsystem of surmises,low artifice, anonymouscharge, and popular perversionwhich characterisedthe worst spirit of the worst times of France' on the British public, along the lines then being createdby the oppressiveNapoleonic regimes of the continentalpowers. In Peel's time and afterwardpress and public alike were thus led to link supportfor the old systemof policing with oppositionto Continental style despotism,both being describedas a patriotic duty.
Constable Culley
A widespreadpublic senseof a despotictendency or potentiality in the appearance of the New Police, fuelled by the supportersof the old police offices, is probably sufficient to explain the most infamousepisode in the oppositionto Peel's reforms. During the dispersalof the Cold Bath Fields meetingof the National Union of the Working Classeson 13th May 1833,a sectionof the mob attackedand stabbed three of the large numberof Metropolitan Police constablesemployed on the event. ConstableCulley of the Metropolitan Police Force died from his wounds in CalthorpeStreet. The more violent quartersof British society greetedthe crime as a blow struck for freedomagainst the tyranny of 'Peel's Police, Raw Lobsters, Blue Devils, Or by whateverother appropriateName they may be known'. " A jury of Londonerssubsequently acquitted those accused of the murder.
Opponentsof the New Police existedat every level of society,not simply among the rougher elementsof the mob. Nor did the opposition gain its strengthsolely from the misplacedpatriotism of the magistratesand otherswhose position or patronagePeel's reformsthreatened. There was also a body of informed opinion that continuedto voice a thoughtful and deeply felt concernabout the creationof;
'a Force unknownto the British Constitution,and called into existenceby a Parliamentillegally constituted,legislating for their individual interests, consequentlyin oppositionto the Public good'20
19 Metropolitan Police Museum - Poster c. 1830 20 ibid. First Commissioners 54
The Press
A month after the establishmentof the Metropolitan Police Force,the 'Morning Journal' printed an article on the New Police underthe headingof 'The Gendarmerie'. It repaysreproduction at length. It not only recalls the old Saxon traditions of local peace-keeping,but well expressesthe very real reservations about Peel's reforms felt by many otherwisewell-disposed citizens.
'It is a characteristicof the British constitution,and it is the salt that has preservedthat constitution,that the whole interior governmentof the people shall be left to the peoplethemselves.... Our forefatherswould have seen with extraordinaryjealousy the erectionof a power in our streets,which neither conferring with the magistracy,nor guidedby the feelings belonging to civil life, would accountfor its proceedingsto none but a memberof the executive, who might, in process of time, be a tyrant, or a tool in the hands of a tyrant, and would take its immediate stamp not from a man of civil knowledgeor civil habits,but a soldier.'
Having madethe political point, the 'Morning Journal' then touchedon an issueof the most profound importanceto it readers,and one that strikesa chord even in thesemuch changedtimes.
'It is mere ignoranceor merechicanery to say that a changeof city watch is of no great importance. The liberty of the subjectdoes not consist in the greatmachinery of empire,but in the little provisionsfor personalsecurity. The foundationof all English freedomis in the single law which prescribes that no man shall be kept undercharge untried, but that his caseshall be decidedbyajury. The whole comfort of English life dependsupon that other simple provision, that a man's houseis his castle. Thosethings may makeno great figure besidethe pompouscodes of other nations,but they are the essenceof English liberty; for while life, limb and property are safe underthe shield of the law, man may defy despotism."'
On the sameday the 'Morning Herald' said in its leader:
'We certainly object to the new police in principle, as we objectedto the old systernindetail. The latter was good in its principle, for it was in strict accordancewith the English Constitution,but it was bad in practice. We are
21 ibid. PressCuttings - 1829 page 5. First Commissioners 55
have beenleft of opinion... that the principle ought to untouchedand the practicerefonned. ' "
The London 'Times' took a different view, describingthe New Police as 'an important and valuable improvementupon the former systemof 'ancient, reverend' and most inefficient watchmen."' But eventhat stalwart defenderof Peel's reforms basedits supportnot on the demonstrablesuccesses of the new systembut on the perceiveddefects of the old.
Importance of Patrol
All sidesof the argumentabout the improvementof the police of the metropolis agreedon one point. Therewas an urgent needfor a systemof regular visible uniformed police patrolling for the protectionof citizens and the deterrenceof crime. Even the most fervent supportersof the parochialwatch and police offices systemdid not deny that effective preventivepatrolling was an essentialelement in the policing of the metropolis. The Bow Streetmagistrates themselves employed both Foot and Horse Patrolesfor that purposein and aroundthe capital. The magistratesclearly appreciatedthe importanceof the visible or imminent presence of officers of the law as a deterrentto crime and a reassuranceto the public. Their patrols were, like their plain clothescolleagues among the magistrates'officers, empoweredto investigatecrime and pursuecriminals but had an entirely preventiveremit.
The 1821version of the 'Rules and Regulationsof the Foot Patrol Belonging to the Public Office at Bow Street' said that;
'the Primary object of the Establishmentis by prompt, regular and vigilant performanceof the PatroleDuty to preventas much as possiblethe commissionof crimes,particularly streetrobberies and burglaries.""
As to the horsepatrols, the magistratesdirected that:
'The Duty of the HorsePatrole stationed on the roadsis for the protection of personstravelling on the high roads."'
Under Peel's chairmanship, the 1822 Parliamentary Select Committee on the Policing of the Metropolis recognised the value of, and strongly supported, the
22 ibid. page 7 23 ibid. -1830 page 32 24 Public RecordOffice HO 6111item I 2s Ordersand Directionsto be Observedby HorscPatrols (1822) Public RecordOffice HO 6111item 2. First Commissionas 56
patrolling activities of the magistratesuniformed officers. Its Reportto Parliament saysthat;
'Your committeeconsider that the chief recommendationof a patrol consists of its tendencyto harassand banishthe offender, by preservingan annoying scrutiny, and thus preventthe commissionof crime."'
That wholly preventiveprecedent for policing and its wide public supportdid not go unnoticedby the foundersof the New Police.
First Instructions to the New Police
In the atmosphereof violent controversythat existedat the time, any public commentby CharlesRowan and RichardMayne, thejoint first Commissionersof the Metropolitan Police, on the issueof the duties and functions of the new organisationneeded very careful handling. Supportersof the existing police offices could be expectedto give the closestcritical scrutiny to every action or statementon the issue. Accusationsof political chicanery,or even subversionof the constitution,were likely to fly from all sidesand on the lightest excuse.
In the circumstancesRowan and Mayne adoptedthe only safecourse. Working with the grain of public opinion they decidedto emphasiseand reinforce the clear intentionsof Parliamentfor the new organisation;that it should be no more than an efficient replacementfor the 'very unsatisfactory'and ineffectual patrol service formerly provided by the capital's parochialwatch and ward. The wording of the 1829Metropolitan Police Act was wholly preventive. Itsaidthat;
$asufficient numberof fit and able men shall from time to time, by the direction of one of His Majesty's Principal Secretariesof State,be appointed as a Police force for the whole [the Metropolitan Police District] of ...... who be in by the [Commissioners] for shall sworn one of ...... to act as constables, preservingthe peaceand preventingrobberies and other felonies, and apprehendingoffenders against the peace,'"
The geniusof the foundersof the Metropolitan Police lay in finding a way to blend togetherthe words of the legislatorsand the precedentof the remit of the Bow Streetuniformed Patroles,to formulatea statementof the purposeof the Metropolitan Police Forcethat set the new organisationsecurely off in the tradition of the old Saxonconstables. Mayne and Rowan drew a skilful line through all the
26 Report SelectCommittee of the on the Policing of the Metropolis (1822) page 99; Parliamentary Papers(1822) (440) VoLIV 27 10 GeoIV capXLIV SectionIV First Commissioners 57 disquiet surroundingtheir new organisationwhen in 1829,with the 'approbationof the Secretaryof Statefor the Home Department',they adopteda strictly preventive view of the purposesof a professionalpolice establishment. Their first Instructions saythat:
'It should be understood,at the outset,that the principal object to be attained is "the Preventionof Crime"
To this greatend every effort of Police is to be directed. The security of personand property,the preservationof public tranquillity and all the other objectsof a Police establishment,will thus be better effectedthan by the detectionand punishmentof the offender,after he has succeededin committing the crime."'
For the avoidanceof any error the dutiesof eachindividual Constableof the Force are set out later in the Instructions. Rowan and Mayne tell eachman that,
'He will be held responsiblefor the securityof life and property, within his Beat, and for the preservationof the peaceand generalgood order, during the time he is on duty."'
Identical versionsof that definition of policing appearin the 1836,1851and 1862 revisions of thoseInstructions. " It will be notedthat nothing in the wording trespasseson the criminal investigativeand detectiveresponsibilities or functions of the magistratesand their officers.
The magistratesof the police offices and their officers continuedto be solely responsiblefor 'the detectionand punishmentof the offender after he has succeededin committing the crime', a function that Rowan and Mayne explicitly excludefrom the activities their Force. Nowhereelse in their original Instructions to the Metropolitan Police Force is any mention madeof the Force, or any of its individual constables,having any responsibility for the investigationof reports or complaintsof crime, or for the investigation,detection or prosecutionof unidentified criminal offenders. In all mattersof crime the aim of the New Police is preventionand deterrence,and on the protectionof citizens from the harm crime can do, rather than the identification and pursuit of offenders. It is a distinction
28 MetropolitanPolice InstructionsOrders etc. (September1829) pages I and 2. Metropolitan Police Museum. 29 ibid. page 38 30 Metropolitan Police InstructionsOrders etc. (I Feb. 1836) Public Record Office MEPO 812, and (18511 (1862)Metropolitan Police Museum. First Commissioners 58
Rowan and Mayne well understoodbut which, as will subsequentlyappear, they found difficult to maintain or to get othersto accept.
Buttressedand protectedby the wording of the Metropolitan Police Act as a justification for their view of their duties,Rowan and Mayne focusedtheir Instructionsto the Force on the primacy of preventivepatrolling. In so doing they lodgedthemselves and their constablesfirmly in the long tradition of the English common law as the successorsto the citizensand watchmenwho dischargedthe responsibility of every communityto keep its own peaceand good order. The Commissioners'definition of their role in the criminal justice systememphasises their concernwith the protectionand supportof the citizens of the capital, and makesno mention of their formal connectionto government.
Other Instructions
Rowan and Mayne's Instructionson other mattersare a mundanemass of detailed bureaucraticdirections, advice, and orders,distinguishable from their modem counterpartsonly by the beautyof the handwriting in which they are recorded. They fill the pagesof leatherbound tomes, ready for transferby hand into books on eachDivision, where Superintendentswould readthem to all ranks at regular intervals. Directions and instructionson every imaginablesubject follow one anotherin bewildering succession. Reportsof quite trivial disciplinary offences prefacenotices of the dismissalof the constablesinvolved. In the early days, before Mayne found a lawyer's way of avoiding the draconianwording of the disciplinary provisionsof the 1829Act, dismissalwas the only penalty for even the most minor infractions.
The Instructionstherefore note dismissalsfor gossipingwith servants;for 'quitting his beat for a few minuteson a false pretence';for failing to wear the regulation armlet on their uniform; for 'using highly improper languageto a gentleman',etc. etc. Endlessly,and perhapsmorejustly, they announcedismissals for improperly entering public houses,consorting with women and being intoxicatedon duty." Nowhere amongstall theseinstructions and directionshowever, is any amendment or revision madeto the definition of the natureor purposeof the duties performed by thesenew public servants.
Equally, the Instructionsset no objectivesfor the Force. Rarely is the task of combatingcrime and disordermentioned. When it is, almost invariably it is in connectionwith the receipt of a complaint or a report of an individual crime or a
31Public RecordOffice MEPO 7/1. First Commissioners 59 particular type of offender,to which patrolling constablesshould pay attention. The Instructionscontain no crime statistics. They do not even updatethose used by Peel in his speechto the Houseon the Metropolis Police Bill. The Commissionersapparently see no needto demonstratethat their new Force has any impact one way or the other on levels of crime or disorder in the capital. Nor do Rowan and Mayne feel the needto include exhortationsor initiatives to urge constablesto improve their performanceagainst any of the many other policing problemsfaced by the Force.
Rowan and Mayne's ordersand instructionsare aboutthe structure,organisation and administrationof the Force. They demandgood housekeeping,good discipline and the prompt and propercompletion and filing of records. The Commissionerspay particular attentionto the appearanceof constables,and the duties of their supervisorsin that regard. Famously,an instruction of 16thOctober 1829directs that: '
'[The men] are likewise to be oncemore cautionedthat if they are seen lounging aboutwith their handsin their greatcoat pockets,the pocketswill be taken away."'
Responsibilities of the New Police
Rowan and Mayne clearly seetheir prime responsibilityto be the good administrationand good discipline of the new Force,and their ordersand instructionsreflect that view. If there is an underlying strategyfor the New Police, a 'mission statement'or 'managementvision' as a modem observermight call it, it , is that crime and criminals are to be banished,or at least brought under control, by the mere disciplined presenceof the New Police on London's streets.
This is a picture of the purposeof the new organisationfully and forcefully expressedby the 1822Parliamentary Committee. It believedthat a unified police for the metropolis shouldbe solely concernedto 'harassand banishthe offender by preservingan annoyingscrutiny' in order not to come into conflict 'with that perfect freedomof action and exemptionfrom interferencewhich are the great privileges and blessingsof society in this country.' Rowan and Mayne were clearly concernedto seetheir new 'Peelers' entirely devotedto that laudableend, and to no other.
32 ibid. page 12 SelectCommittees 60
5
Select Committees
There is nothing in any of the Ordersand Instructionsgiven to the Metropolitan Police Force in its first 40 yearsto indicatethat the first Commissionersfelt any needto further discuss,expand upon or otherwisedissect the 'prevention of crime' as a completestatement of purposefor the Force.' Rowan and Mayne never alteredor amendedthe statementof purposeset out in the original 1829 book of Instructionsthat, with the 'approbationof one of His Majesty's Principal Secretariesof State, they issuedto eachand every memberof the New Police.
Their decisionnot to further explain their first definition of the role and function of the New Police was publicly and politically expedientat the time. It has however,created difficulties for later commentatorson the developmentof British policing. The problem is that the expression'the preventionof crime' can have a numberof radically different meanings. It can also be attachedto a wide rangeof actions; from changesin the curriculum of infant schools,to the publication of learneddiscourses on moral topics; from charitablework amongpoor, to the transportationand executionof offenders;and from supportingand defendingthe rights of the individual, to amendingthe law to ensurethe conviction of reputed criminals.
Direct evidenceon what Rowan and Mayne meantby the words is sparse. It is fortunatetherefore, that Parliamentappointed three SelectCommittees in the early yearsof the New Police to 'inquire' into various aspectsof its performanceand activities. Rowan and Mayne gaveevidence to all thoseCommittees. For the most part the questionsput to them do not directly addressthe functions and purposesof the new police organisationor its involvementwith crime and criminality. Neverthelesssome of the evidencegiven by the Commissionersto those inquiries is significant. It gives an insight into their thinking on those subjects. Two of the three early SelectCommittees are of specialinterest in this respect;the 1833/34Police of the Metropolis Committee,and the 1833Popay Committee. The third, the 1833Cold Bath Fields Committeedealt with the incident in which a mob murderedconstable Culley. it looked closely at the conductof the public order maintenanceduties of the Metropolitan Police on this occasion,but its Reportcontains nothing of direct relevanceto issuesof crime.
Public RecordOffice MEPO 711,2,3etc. SelectCommittees 61
The 'Popay' Select Committee of 1833
The 1833 SelectCommittee set up to consider'the Petition of FrederickYoung and others' (the PopayCommittee) ' was not the first to be appointedthat year, but it was the earliestto completeits work. The petitionersmentioned in its title were leading figures in the National Union of the Working Classes.They complainedthat sergeantPopay of the Metropolitan Police Force had spiedon the meetingsof the Union; hadjoined the Union under a false nameand identity; had taken an active part in its meetings;and had encouragedmembers to advocate revolution and the overturn of the constitution.
In its Report the Committeesolemnly conclude that it should 'mark [Popay's] courseof behaviourwith their most graveand decidedcensure'. More seriously, it also criticises his supervisorsfor their, 'lack of caution not always exercised... [in]... warning him againsthaving recourseto unduemeans' to obtain information aboutthe businessof the National Union of the Working Classes.'
The significanceof the work of the PopayCommittee lies in the attention it paid to the policies and practicesof the New Police in the employmentof its constables in activities other than their basic duty of preventivepatrolling in uniform. The final conclusionof its Reportresolves that;
4with respectto the occasionalemployment of Policemenin plain clothes, the system,as laid down by the headsof the Police Department,affords no just matter of complaint,while strictly confined to detectBreaches of the Law, and to preventBreaches of the Peace,should those ends appear otherwiseunattainable; at the sametime the Committeewould strongly urge the most cautiousmaintenance of those limits, and solemnly deprecate any approachto the Employmentof Spies,in the ordinary acceptanceof the Term, as a practicemost abhorrentto the feelings of the People,and most alien to the sprit of the Constitution."
Rowan and Mayne gaveevidence to the Committeeon three occasions. On their first visit on 10 July 1833the Committeeasked directly about the employmentof their officers in plain clothes, 'What is the rule of the serviceas to the wearing of the uniform? - (Rowan and Mayne) That they shall wear it, exceptallowed to do otherwise. As to
2 Select Committeeon the Petition of Frederick Young and Others (1833) Parliamentary Papers (1833)vol. Mpages 407 el. seq. 3 ibidpage409at] 4 ibidat3 SelectCommittees 62
the in to have use of patrols plain clothes,... guard against... robbery;... we found it better done by personsin plain clothes,who were not thus known to the thieves,both in preventingthem and in catchingthem when they have beengoing in. "
On the specific caseof the employmentof Popayin plain clothes,the Committee asked,
'SupposingPopay allowed himself to be thought other than a policeman, and knew he was consideredin the light of a drawing-master,and under that assumedcharacter attended these meetings, would he have your sanction?- (Rowan and Mayne) 'Certainly not.'
'Would it not be in direct oppositionto the rules you think necessaryto Jay down for the conductof the partiesT - (Rowan and Mayne) 'Most decidedly so. We haverepeatedly cautioned the superintendentsand the men, if we have seenthem aboutdoing anythingwhich could be representedthat they were acting in the odious senseof the word spies. On all occasionswe havemost strongly told them they must not do so."
Finally the Committeetook the Commissionersback to the founding of the New Police. The Chairmanput to them that,
'I believe the original rules of the police force did not comprehendthe employmentof men in plain clothes?- (Rowan and Mayne) There was a discussionwith the Secretaryof Statewhether they should put on a uniform or not. The questionwas discussedat greatlength, and the advantagesand disadvantagesof the two systemswere weighed; it was thought more desirablethat be in but had beenin they should uniform; ... after they uniform someshort time, it becameclear that someof the police could not perform their duty in uniform so well as they could out of it.... someof the magistratesthought would be a dangerousprecedent, and that mischief might arise from it; but the Secretaryof Stateauthorized the Commissionersto do so. The Commissionershad nothing but the public good in view in doing it, and believethe public have beenbetter protected by it. "'
5 ibidpage 485 atpara. 1833 6 ibid pages4851486 atparas. 1837andl838 7 ibid page 486 atpara. 1841 SelectCommittees 63
Use of Spies
The issueof the employmentof the New Police in plain clotheswas only indirectly of concernto the PopayCommittee. It is not the main focus of its inquiry. Its real fear was that the governmenthad usedRowan and Mayne's constablesto obtain information aboutthe activities of its political opponents. The possibility of the use of the New Police for suchpartisan purposes seriously alarmedthe Committee. That feeling becameclear when Rowan and Mayne appearedbefore it for a secondtime, a fortnight later on 23rd. jUly.
In the interim the Committeehad questionedPopay about his activities, and obtainedcopies of his reportsto his superiors. This showedthat the Commissionershad, in truth, personallyseen and approvedreports prepared by Popay. Even more damagingwas that his reportsincluded material clearly falling outside any duty he had to 'prevent Breachesof the Law, or Breachesof the Peace'. The Chairmanput the Committee'sfears directly to Rowan and Mayne.
'Had you ever any object in view to gain any information for the Governmentor to employ spiesto pry into people's private lives? - (Colonel Rowan) I will ventureto say there are no two gentlemenin the town that would more abhor suchan action then the two Commissionersof Police, and they would not obey any such instructionsfrom any imputation Government- (Mr Mayne) I must be allowed to say, that the that we could have sanctionedor allowed any such practicehas been painful to us in the highestdegree. '
'As gentlemenand men of honour,you would have felt it an insult to be requestedto conductsuch a system?- (Mr. Mayne) Yes, and I would undoubtedlyhave quitted the office ratherthan comply with any such direction."'
Theseexchanges expose the reality of theseconcerns for parliamentariansin the early days of the New Police. They also show Rowan and Mayne's obvious anxiety to allay them and to asserttheir independencefrom governmentcontrol. The Commissionersare at painsto assurethe Committeethat their men did not adoptthe guiseof 'spies' to 'pry into people'sprivate lives', or represent themselvesas being anything other than constableswhen going abouttheir duties. Both Commissionersassert that, even if governmentwere to direct them to
8 ibid. pages5771578 atpara. 3917to 3918 SelectCommittees 64 employ their men on suchduties, they would refuseto obey the instruction and resign rather than acceptit.
It would seemthat Rowan and Mayne dealt successfullywith theseissues on this occasion. The Committee'sReport doesnot criticise their policies and practices for the occasionalemployment of constablesin plain clothes,and wholly supports their view of this aspectof their duties. However, in its Conclusionsthe Committeetakes the opportunity forcefully to remind both the Commissioners and Parliamentthat the constablesof the New Police should only be out of their uniform in order 'to detectBreaches of the Law, and to preventBreaches of the ' Peace',and eventhen only when 'those endsappear otherwise unattainable'.
The grey areain all this lies in the Commissioners'evidence about their deployment of constablesin plain clothesto deal with specific problemssuch as robbery. Clearly, suchplain clothesactivity deceivesthe public aboutthe status and intent of thoseconstables. The Commissionerscertainly meantto deceive is thosemembers of the public who might be temptedto commit crime. But it is also apparentfrom the Commissioners'evidence that this type of employment exceptionaland that it was not detectivework as was practisedby the magistrates officers or as a modem observermight understandthe term. Insofar as it was to detectoffenders, it was aimed at them 'when they havebeen going in' rather than after they had committedtheir crimes. Thus the adoptionof plain clothesby the Peelerssimply enabledthem to catch,prior to or in the act, offenderswho would otherwiseescape immediate arrest. Their deploymentin this guisewas also a responseto demandsfor action from the public or their representatives,and was undertakenonly where uniform patrolling provedto be ineffective in the preventionof particular crimes.
Rowan and Mayne also madeit clear that plain clotheswork formed no part of the ordinary duty of their constables. In no sensedid their men undertakethe detectiveand investigativeduties performedby the officers employedby the magistratesof the metropolis. Nor did their constablesuse their temporary anonymity to associatewith criminals or their compatriotsin order to gather information about offenders,as was the practiceof the plain clothesBow Street Runners. The Commissionersleft absolutelyno room for doubt on theseissues. They were adamantthat any attemptto imposethose duties on their men would be
ibidpage409at3 SelectCommittees 65 met by blank refusal, and promisedtheirjoint resignationif governmentinsisted upon it.
Police of the Metropolis Select Committee, 1833/1834
In April 1833,prior to the Cold Bath Fields incident in which constableCulley of the Metropolitan Police was murdered,and beforethe start of the work of the PopayCommittee, Parliament appointed a SelectCommittee to 'inquire into the Stateof the Police of the Metropolis within the Metropolitan District, and the Stateof Crime therein."" RobertPeel appearsin the list of membersof this Committee,but he doesnot seemto haveplayed any major role in it. The terms of referenceof this 'Police of the Metropolis' Committeeare identical with those of the 1828 SelectCommittee that had beenthe precursorof Peel's Metropolitan Police Act. This 1833/34Select Committee explicitly acceptedthat its inquiry continuedthe work of that earlier Committee. It set out to review the operation of the New Police, and to examineits 'managementand conduct'." The appointmentof the Committeecoincided with one of the periodic renewalsof the legislation that supportedthe police offices still operatingin the metropolis alongsidethe New Police. Parliamentneeded guidance and advice on the renewalof the legislation supportingthe offices now that the New Police were up and running strongly.
The work of the Committeespread over two yearsand two separatesessions of Parliament. Four monthsinto its hearings,on 16'hAugust 1833,the Police of the Metropolis SelectCommittee decided to suspendits inquiry. The reasongiven was that since its appointmentthe Popayand the Cold Bath Fields Select Committeeshad startedwork on specific aspectsof the activities of the Metropolitan Police Force. In the circumstancesthe Committeeoffered no Report, suggestingthat it be re-appointedto completeits inquiry in the next Parliamentarysession. 12
Evidence to the 1833 Police Committee
Before it adjourned,the 1833/34Committee called Rowan and Mayne to give evidenceon four occasions;on 29'hApril, I" May, and on 2nd and 15'hJuly, 1833. Appearancesbefore SelectCommittees heavily engagedthe Commissionersin this period. Their final appearancebefore the first sessionof the Police of the
SelectCommittee 10 on the Policeof the Metropolisetc. (1833)Parliamentary Papers (1833) vol. XIII pages401 et. seq. ibid Report,page 3 12 ibidpage403 SelectCommittees 66
Metropolis Committee on 15Ih July fell between their last two visits to the Popay hearings, and just after the death of constable Cul ley and the consequent appointment of the Cold Bath Fields Select Committee.
The prevention of crime
In their first two examinationsthe Police of the Metropolis Committeequestioned Rowan and Mayne abouttheir generalstewardship of their responsibilitiessince the foundation of the Metropolitan Police Force in 1829. Nothing of intereston the subjectsof crime and criminality aroseon thoseoccasions. But when they appearedon 2nd July the Commissionersresponded to complaintsby the parochial authoritiesof St. Luke's that the Metropolitan Police did nothing aboutthe burglariesthat plaguedthe parish.
Rowan and Mayne's first responsewas to arguethat the offenceswere not preventableby any action of their patrolling constables. They then pointed out that there was no evidencethat the burglarieswere due to negligenceby the any of the constablesposted to the beatson which they had occurred. When askedto give an exampleof 'negligence' by a constablein thesecircumstances, they replied, 'if the property is of greatbulk, that is a strongreason for thinking the to blame [since] havebeen in allowing the thief police ...... there must negligence to passalong the beat."'
What might be surprisingto the modernobserver is that the Committeedid not then pursuethe matter further. It did not go on to examinewhat stepsRowan and Mayne, or the constablesresponsible for the parish of St. Luke's, took to investigateand detectthese offences. Their moderncounterparts would not have escapedso easily. They would be askedto explain what they had done to identify and catchthe burglars,or to recoverthe stolenproperty. But the 1833/34 SelectCommittee did not put thosequestions to Rowan and Mayne becauseit recognisedthat that duty did not rest with them. In 1833only the magistratesof the police offices of the metropolisand the officers they employedhad any responsibility for, or interestin, suchmatters.
The SelectCommittee's restricted view of the responsibilitiesof Rowan and Mayne's officers is explicit elsewherein its Report. At a later stagein their evidenceon this occasionthe Commissionersdealt with complaintsfrom the magistratesof the metropolisthat officers of the Metropolitan Police had exceededtheir duty by questioningwitnesses and inquiring into chargesbrought
13 ParliamentaryPapers (1834) vol XVI, page 317otpara. 4128 SelectCommittees 67
to their Station Houses."' The magistrates alleged that the Metropolitan Police regularly usurped their responsibilities by discharging people from their custody as a result of such 'inquiries' into criminal offences. They complainedthat, in law, the officers in chargeof stationhouses should insteadbring all such accused personsbefore the courtsfor examination.
Rowan and Mayne were at greatpains to explain that no such 'inquiries' into the offence took place. They said that officers in chargeof station housessimply took stepsto discoverwhether the offence allegedwas a felony. That was necessaryto justify the detentionof the suspect. No inquiry into the strengthof the evidence,or the truth or otherwiseof the accusationtook place." This exchangedemonstrates how keenRowan and Mayne were to reassurethe Committeethat they both clearly understoodand energeticallymaintained the distinction betweentheir legal statusand responsibilitiesand thoseof the magistratesof the metropolis.
The detection of offenders
Rowan and Mayne appearedbefore the Committeeon 15th jUly 1833 for the last time before its adjournmentto the following year. The Committeequestioned them aboutthe conductof a certainInspector Bullock who had obtaineda warrant to searcha housein Lambethin connectionwith a 'coining' casebeing investigatedby the Royal Mint. " Mayne took the opportunity to set out the Commissioners'views on the involvementof their constablesin the detectionof crime. He explainedthat in this particularcase and underthe directions of the Mint someof their men had donnedplain clothesto keep surreptitiousobservation on the house,later enteringit to purchasefalse coins without revealingtheir identity. Mayne informed the Committeethat he had subsequentlywritten on the papersin the casethat,
'Mr. Thomas(the Divisional Superintendentin chargeof the officers) has beenacquainted, that I neverapproved of the employmentof his men in the mannerhere stated;in future, no stepsshall be taken without the immediate sanctionof the Commissioners."'
The CommitteeChairman then askedthe Commissioners,
14ibid page 325 atpara 4181 Is ibid page 326 at para. 4183 16ibid pages331-333 atparas. 4200et seq 17ibid page 333 atpara 4205 SelectCommittees 68
'Now will you statewhat was your objectionto that course?- (Rowan and Mayne) Our objectionwas, that it was entrappingthe party into committing an offence; we did not chooseto employ police to inducethe partiesto commit the offence in order to obtain a conviction againstthem. We have in every caseproceeded on the principle (where it was in our power) to preventthe offence,and not to inducethe partiesto commit the very act for which they were afterwardsconvicted. "'
The Committeewent on to refer to the officers employedby the magistratesand asked;
'Do you apprehenda different systemwas pursuedby the Bow-street officers and patrolsprevious to the establishmentof the Metropolitan Police?- (Mr Mayne) I haveheard so; and it hasbeen reported to me that Mr. Powell comparingthe Metropolitan Police with the former Bow-street officers complainedof the Metropolitan police spoiling cases,by not acting upon the sameprinciple asthe former police officers had done."'
Later on this occasionRowan and Mayne further clarified the distinction between the duties and responsibilitiesof the officers employedby the magistratesand the constablesof the Metropolitan Police. When discussingthe possibility that the 'whole executivepolice [of the metropolis] were placedunder the control of the Commissioners',Mayne was asked,'do you see[in thosecircumstances] any objection in appropriatinga certainnumber of men to attendconstantly at each office, and thereto be underthe completecontrol of the magistratesT Mayne said 'No, "' an answerwhich he subsequentlyamplified by agreeingthat, when so employed,such constableswould be 'consideredas in the confidential employ of the Police Magistrates."' Indeedhe then removedany doubt aboutthe sharp difference betweenthe duties of his constablesand the activities of the officers employedby the magistratesby remindingthe Committeethat what it proposed was alreadycommon practice, and that
catpresent, when one of the Metropolitan Police is employedin any particular caseby the magistrates,we do not require him to report what is done underthe direction of the magistrates.t22
18 ibid atpara 4207 19ibid atpara 4209 20 ibid atpara 4285 21 ibidatpara. 4287 22 ibid atpara. 4289 SelectCommittees 69
Instructions from Home Secretary
At their final appearancebefore the 1833/34Police of the Metropolis Select Committeeon 26th June 1834Rowan and Mayne were given an opportunity to respondto the evidencepresented by other witnesses. In advanceof their attendancethey receivedcopies of what othershad said to the Committee. One suchwitness was the Chief Magistrateat Bow Street,Sir FrederickRoe. In dealing with a complaint he had madeagainst them Rowan and Mayne repeated and confirmed the evidencethey gaveto the PopayCommittee about their relationshipwith the Home Secretary. The Committeeasked,
'6177. In referenceto orderswhich you receivefrom the Secretaryof State'soffice, at any time, are they in writing, or are they verbally given? - (Rowan and Mayne) I do not rememberthat we have ever had any ordersas to our conduct,or the generalmanagement of the Police, in writing.
Any orderswhich involves expenseis alwaysgiven in writing? - (Rowan and Mayne) Yes, if not in the ordinary line of Police duty.
But orderswith referenceto the managementof conductof the Police in generalare not given in writing? - (Rowan and Mayne) Not in general;I do not rememberany instancewhere it was done."'
Almost immediatelyafter theseexchanges the Committeeinvited Rowan and Mayne to set out any alteration in the law they wished to propose. The Commissionersasked for the unification of the policing patrols of the metropolis."' They suggestedthat the Bow Streethorse patrols be incorporated into their Force;that the City of London constablesand the ThamesRiver police be brought under their control; and that the officers attachedto the police offices of the metropolis acting underthe control and direction of the magistratesbe 'replaced' by their constables. At the sametime they madeit clear that they did not seekany additional powersfor their own constablesbeyond those they already possessed.They also saidthat 'common informers... might be beneficially superseded'in their district, and that the right to lay informations before the courts be to 'constables under penal statutes confined ... or to the party actually aggrieved by the offence committed'.
23 ibid page 384 atparas. 6177to 6179 24 ib id page 385 atpara. 6183 SelectCommittees 70
Common Informers
In this last matter Rowan and Mayne draw attentionto a troublesomeand contentiousaspect of the criminal law of Englandas it stood in 1834. At that time, in principle and in the ancient Saxontradition, an aggrievedparty was still responsiblefor the prosecutionof a criminal offender. He or shehad to apply to ajustice (or a magistratein metropolitandistricts) who would examinethe allegationand any witnesses. Ina prima facie casethe justice would bind the complainantover to prosecutethe allegedoffender before a grandjury and at his trial if necessary. Henry Fielding's innovationsof 1750bad had an important impact on that process. The plain clothesdetective officers employedby the magistratesundertook investigative work in the metropolis on behalf of their employers. But they did not take on every case,and had no obligation in law to do so.
The magistrates'officers were also availablefor private hire, althoughthe practice was officially frowned upon. In any case,only the wealthier sectionsof London society could afford to employ them. Most peoplewere unwilling to spendeither the time or the moneyrequired to pursuethose who had offendedagainst them. The common informer had long filled that gap in the criminal justice system. Thesewere peoplewilling to 'inform' thejustices aboutthe perpetratorsof crime and to acceptan obligation on behalf, or in place,of an uninterestedor impecuniousvictim, to prosecutethe criminal through the criminal justice system. The 'informers' reward was a portion of any fine or other penalty imposedon conviction. The opportunitiesfor collusion, corruption and perjury are obvious, and were freely taken.
In their evidenceRowan and Mayne intimatedas much when they expandedon their objectionsto the 'common informer' system. The Committeeasked,
'Now you have stated,that in your opinion, it would be advisablethere should be no commoninformers allowed within the metropolitandistrict, but that the Police shouldtake that duty on themselves; will you stateyour reasonsfor that to the Committee?- (Rowan and Mayne) I ventureto recommendthat the power of laying information should be confinedto constables,or to personsinterested or aggrievedfor having suffered some damage loss in the The Police do or subjectof complaint... at present not interfere so much as they might in laying informations, insasmuchas many SelectCommittees 71
of the magistrateshave stated,that it is not the duty of the Police, and that they will not convict partieson their evidence."'
Thesepassages in Rowan and Mayne's evidenceto the SelectCommittee shed a clear light on the role of their Force in the investigationand detectionof reports and allegationsof crime in the metropolisin the 1830s. The New Police had no direct part in it at all. Victims of crime had the first, and prime, responsibility to bring such mattersbefore the courts. Then thejustices (or magistrates)and any officers they, or the local parish or citizens association,employed had a role. Finally the 'common informer' madehis contentiouscontribution to the detection and punishmentof offenders. Only on the peripheryof the processdid the Metropolitan Police Forceunder Rowan and Mayne play their preventionof crime, deterrenceand peacekeepingpart, and their determinationnot to seekany additional powersfor their constablesshows they had no ambition to increase their involvement in thesematters.
The attitude of the magistratesof the metropolisalso supportsRowan and Mayne's view of the role of their men. Many magistrateswould not examinea suspectedcriminal offender solely on an information laid by one of the New Police. Somewould not evenallow a Metropolitan Police constableto lay such an information againsta suspect,holding that it was no part of their duty to do so. It was that anomalyand the corruption causedby the commoninformer system that Rowan and Mayne wished to removewhen they askedthat their men be given the right to lay information beforethe magistrates. There is no sign that they wished to usurpthe detectiveand investigativefunctions of tile magistratesor any of their off icers.
Reports of the Select Committees
The SelectCommittee on the Police of the Metropolis completedits Report on 13'hAugust, 1834,having receivedcopies of the Reportsof the SelectCommittees on Popay,and on the ColdbathFields Riots of 1833. As has alreadybeen noted, no issuesof importanceon the questionof the involvementof the New Police in crime and criminality arosefrom the Cold Bath Fields CommitteeReport.
The Report of the 1833/34Police of the Metropolis SelectCommittee is highly complimentaryto Rowan and Mayne. The Committeereport to the Houseof Commonsthat,
25 ibid page 392 atparas. 6252to 6256 SelectCommittees 72
'Your Committeehave perused the Evidenceand Reportsof these Committees deemit duty to their that the ... and... their express ... opinion... Metropolitan Police Force,it's management,and the principles on which it is conducted,deserve the confidenceand supportof The House. That it is well calculatedto checkcrime and to maintain the peaceand order of the Metropolis, both The the effectively and constitutionally. ... conductof Commissionersthroughout these enquiries was highly honourableto them; and from the Evidenceof various Witnesses,Your Committeeare of opinion, that the conductof the Men generallydeserves the approbationof the Public."'
On the specific issueof the relationshipbetween Rowan and Mayne's New Police and the magistratesof the police off ices in the metropolisthe Committeefudged shamelessly. It said,
'Your Committee immediate are of opinion, that... the generalcontrol over the ConstabularyForce ought to be vestedexclusively in the Police Commissioners. Your Committeedo not proposeto curtail by law the powerswhich the Magistratesof the severalPolice Offices possessas Justicesof the Peace,or to define the exactboundaries by which the power of the Police Commissionersis to be separatedfrom that of the Police Magistrates."'
The Committeedid however,make one major point aboutthe differencebetween the plain clothesdetective officers employedby the magistratesand the constables of the New Police in the conclusionof their Report. They say,
'Your Committee this Expression their Opinion; ... concludewith of viz. that the Metropolitan Police Force,as respectsits influence in repressing crime, and the security it has given to personand property, is one of the most valuable of modem institutions. And the high characterof thosewho now direct it, and the consequentimprovement in the moral characterand discipline of the Men, togetherwith its successfulworking in practice,has clearly shown,that what, underthe old Police, was consideredby the Magistratesand the most experiencedofficers as a necessaryevil, viz. flash houses,where the most vicious and desperatecharacters were allowed openly to assemble,hardening each other in their careerof crime, and
26Report of the SelectCommittee, etc. (18341 op cit. atpage 21 27 ibid atpage 17 SelectCommittees 73
seducingothers, in order that they might be more readily securedwhen an adequatereward was offered, and the associationof the Police Constables with low and infamouscharacters as a meansof obtaining information, is not a necessary part of a system which has as its object only the prevention and detection of crime. 128
In theseconcluding paragraphs the Report of the 1833/34Select Committee make explicit the distinction both in law and in practicebetween the officers (who were also legally constables)attached to the police off icesof the capital under the' magistrates,and Rowan and Mayne's constables. The magistrates'officers had a unique position in the criminal justice system. They alone amongall the constablesof the capital, had the power
'to act as Constablesfor the Preservationof the Peace,and for the Security of Propertyagainst felonious and other unlawful Modes of obtaining the same,and for apprehendingOffenders Against the Peace,as well as by Night as by Day""
The Committeewas glad to note that such specialisedinvestigative and detective duties formed no part of the policy or practiceof the Metropolitan Police Force under Rowan and Mayne. In particular,it was pleasedto find that the constables of the Metropolitan Police did not associatewith active and known criminals in order to cultivate them and their acquaintancesas sourcesof information about crime in the capital, a practicewhich the SelectCommittee determined to condemn.
To the contrary,the hope of the Committeewas that Rowan and Mayne's New Police:
gmay carry into practice, to the utmost extent, every measure which can augment the difficulty and multiply obstructions in the way of the depredator, as well as every arrangement best calculated to diminish the chances of a profitable conversion of property when dishonestly obtained. The former will tend to prevent, the latter diminish the motives to commit crime. '"
No better proof of the existenceof that distinction can be given than that the Committeerecommended, and Parliamentenacted, no important changesin the
28 ibid atpages21-22 293 Geo.IV cap55 (1823)at sectionUW 30Report of the SelectCommittee, etc. (18341 page 22 SelectCommittees 74 legislation supportingthe powersand duties of the magistratesof the metropolis when the Police Offices legislationwas renewedfor a further 3 yearson 18"'.June 1833.31
'Executive' and 'Judicial' functions
Apart from what the Report of the 1833/34Select Committee reveals on the issue of Rowan and Mayne's views on the employmentof their men in the detection and prosecutionof crime, one other aspectof the Committee'swork is of interest. It is an apparentlyinnocuous matter, but the involvementof the Committee in it had long term, complex consequencesfor the developmentof policing in Britain.
At the behestof Rowan and Mayne the 1833/34Select Committee looked closely at the possibility of unifying all the remnantsof the parochial constableand watch and ward systemsstill cluttering the policing of the capital. It did so as part of its understandingthat it was the successorto the 1828Select Committee, whose Report had led to the foundationof the Metropolitan Police Force in 1829. The Committee,like all its predecessors,jibbed at the policing fence still existing betweenthe City of London and the rest of the capital. And it did not follow up Rowan and Mayne's suggestionthat the magistrates'officers be 'replaced' by their men. But it decidedstrongly to recommendthe amalgamationof the River Police, the constablesappointed by the Westminsterparochial authorities, and the horsepatrols maintainedby the police offices, with the Metropolitan Police Force.
Both Rowan and Mayne were eagerto encouragethe Committeealong these lines, if only the removethe irritation and confusionthat theseseparate jurisdictions causedwithin their bailiwick. Indeed,so anxiouswere the Commissionersabout this problemthat they had expressedconcern about it well before the appointmentof the 1833/34Select Committee. On 20"' June, 1832 Rowan had written a letter to Under SecretaryPhillipps at the Home Off ice on the subject. In his and Mayne's evidenceto the Committeeon 15th July 1834Rowan mentionedhis letter to Phil I ipps."A copy subsequentlyappeared as an Appendix to the Committee'sReport. "
Rowan's letter complainsof 'a want of cordial co-operation'from the magistrates off icesand the officers they employedtoward the new Metropolitan Police, and the 'embarrassments'that resultedfrom it. He soughtPhillipps' supportfor some amendmentto the Bill then being preparedto renewthe Police Offices'
31 3&4 Will IV cap.XIX (1833) 32 ParliamentaryPapers (1834) vol XVI at para. 4269 33 ibidatAppendbcNo. ]2pps. 473and474 SelectCommittees 75 legislation. In particular he askedthat 'a distinct line be drawn, defining the duties to be performedby the Police Magistratesand by the Commissioners respectively.' Rowan suggestedthat,
'it should be declaredthat the duties of the Magistratesand the public offices should, in future, be purely judicial, whilst the duties of the Commissionersand the Metropolitan Police should be altogether executive.'
In this connectionthe earlier discussionof the position of the officers attachedto the police offices shouldbe remembered. When the Commissionersasked that the Metropolitan Police be given the 'executive' dutiesof the magistratesthey clearly did not include the duties performedby the officers employedto act as agentsfor the magistratesin their 'judicial' functionsof investigatingreports and allegationsof crime in order to identify and prosecuteoffenders. It is important, as will appear,that Rowan's letter is understoodin this way, i. e. that it doesnot imply that the Commissionerswere willing to absorbeither the criminal investigativeand detectiveduties of the magistratesor the officers specially employedon them.
In the event,neither Rowan's letter nor the rest of the Report of the 1833/34 SelectCommittee led to any immediateaction on the issue. As has beennoted, the problem of the relationshipbetween the magistratesand the Commissioners was deliberatelyfudged in the SelectCommittee's Report. Nor, it would seem, was any action taken on the Committee'srecommendation that all the different preventiveand streetpolice of the capital, including the uniformed foot and horse patrols attachedto the Bow StreetOff ice, be put underthe direction of Rowan and Mayne. But Rowan's suggestionthat a clearerdivision should be madebetween judicial and executiveactivities in the respectiveresponsibilities of the magistratesof the metropolisand the Commissionersof the Metropolitan Police Force was not completelyforgotten. It survived to have long term consequences for the future of policing.
Detective duties
One thing is unmistakablefrom a study of the evidencegiven by Rowan and Mayne to the SelectCommittees in 1833and 1834. It is that the New Police had no responsibility for, and no desireto take on, the crime investigativeand detectiveactivities of the magistratesand the officers they employed,not even as part of the creationof ajudicial/exccutive division betweenthem. Thesearc SelectCommittees 76 duties in which the plain clothes 'Runners' specialised,and which both the 1833/34Select Committee and Rowan and Mayne were more than happy to leave as the exclusiveresponsibility of the magistrates.For their part the Commissionerswere no doubt pleasedthat, by their evidenceto the Committees, they had managedto preserveand reassertboth the independenceof their Force from governmentcontrol, andtheir purely preventiveplace in the battle against crime and disorderin the capital. Turning Point 77
6
Turnin Point
There the issueof the role and purposesof the New Police and its involvement in crime and criminality resteduntil 1837when the policing arrangementsfor the metropolis againcame on the Parliamentaryagenda. Oncemore the legislation supportingthe activities of the magistratesof the police offices and the officers they employedcame due for renewal. By this time circumstanceshad altered radically. Rowan and Mayne's Metropolitan Police Force now had the confidence of the vast majority of Londonersand their Parliamentaryrepresentatives while the reputationand standingof the magistrates'officers had declined. When yet anotherSelect Committee was appointedto enquireinto the police offices it did so 'with a view to improvementof the same."
Police Offices Select Committee of 1837/8
On 24th April 1837the new SelectCommittee on the Police Offices of the Metropolis called its first witness,Samuel March Phillipps, the long serving Under Secretaryat the Home Office. He was one of thoseprincipally involved in the first foundationof Peel'sNew Police and had beenin post since its inception. The Committeeasked about the recommendationsof the 1833/34Select Committeeon the amalgamationof the various bodiesof police in the metropolis. Phillipps said that the Metropolitan Police had absorbedonly the Bow Streetfoot and horsepatrols. The local constablesappointed by the Westminsterparochial authorities,the River Police, and the City of London remainedoutside the control of the Commissioners!
Pressedon that that issuePhillipps revealed,perhaps unintentionally, the reason for the delay. He trenchantlydefended the old system. He rejectedthe idea of amalgamatingthe River Police with the Metropolitan Force when it was suggestedthat might bring about 'unity of purposeand action' betweenthem. He dismissedthe idea, saying,'I am persuadedthere is more of soundthan of substancein that remark." He went onto supportthe traditional role of the magistratesof the metropolisas both investigatorsand adjudicatorsin cases brought to them and in employing plain clothesofficers to assistthem in that work. When asked,
I SelectCommittee on the MetropolisPolice Offices (1837) ParliamentaryPapers (1837-8) (45 1) Vol XVpages. 309etseq 2 ibid. page 313 atparas. 1-6 3 ibid. atpara. 19 Turning Point 78
'Do you conceive in reference to other offices that objections might arise, that such a course is objectionable, namely to the Magistrate interesting himself in the detection of that criminal whose case he has to decide upon afterwardsT he replied, 'I should say not; decidedlynot. "
The Committeethen turned to the possibility, raisedby the Commissionerswith the 1833/34Select Committee, that the magistrates'officers should be 'replaced' by Metropolitan Police constables. The 1833/34Select Committee had decided not to recommendthe idea,suggesting instead that the Commissionersshould take over responsibility for the 'pay, clothing and generaldiscipline' of the magistrates officers while leaving them 'under the immediateand direct control of the Police Magistrates'.' In a seriesof questionsthe 1838Select Committee put this 'replacement' suggestionto Phillipps. He saw no benefit in the idea. The Committeepressed him to explain his objectionsto this and the other amalgamatingproposals of the 1833/34Select Committee. Phillipps defended the existing arrangementsas accordingwith both the law and the principles of the English criminal justice system.' The Chairmanthought he saw an opportunity in this answerto get round Phillipp's obduracy:
'The Committeeunderstand, correctly, from your evidence,that there is no practical objectionto that consolidation[of the policing of the metropolis] recommendedby the [ 1833/34]CommitteeT
He got a dusty answer. 'I think it would fail. '
Phillipps also gaveevidence about the relative merits of the officers attachedto the police off icesand the constablesof the Metropolitan Police in the detectionof criminal offenders. The issuearose from an earlier answer. Phillipps had mentionedthe growing practiceof sendingofficers from London to assistin cases of seriouscrime committedelsewhere in the country. The Police Offices Select Committee expressed surprise that the Bow Street Magistrates met all such appeals,and that Metropolitan Police constablesnever responded to them. Following along the consolidatingand amalgamatingline being taken by the Committee,the Chairmanasked;
4 ibid. atpara 21 5 Report of the SelectCommittee on the Police of the Metropolis (1833/1834)Parliamentary Papers (1834) VoLXVI,page 16 6 SelectCommittee, etc (18371 op. cit. atparas. 44 to 56 Turning Point 79
'Would it not be most advisablefor all applicationsof that kind referredto the Commissioners,who havea much wider selectionof men to furnish the demandyou have spokenof, and would it not therebyprevent that interruption to the systemof consolidationwhich is desiredT i. e. to the 'replacement'idea.
In a reply that supportedhis position on the magistrates'officers but which, though true andjustified, offendedRowan and Mayne's pride in their Force and arousedtheir ire, Phillipps said;
'The officers attachedto the police offices would be more expert in the detectionof crime than the commonMetropolitan Police officers; they are more practisedin that particular business,more exercisedin looking for and searchingout proofs, andtherefore more expert in tracing out and detecting crime, than the commonMetropolitan Police officer. "'
Four days later, on 281h April, the Committeerecalled Phillipps to continuehis evidence. It askedif the Home Departmentplanned to put forward amendments to the Police Offices Act when its renewalwas consideredduring the current Parliamentarysession. Phillipps said that only minor matterswere contemplated. The Chairmanasked,
'No alteration in the law, and nothing to improve the administrationof in justice? - (Phillipps) None to improvethe administrationofjustice the police offices.
It was not contemplatedthen, to extendthe jurisdiction, in any way, of the ' Magistrates?- (Phillipps) That was not intended.
Subsequentlyin his evidencethat day Phillipps reinforced and confirmed the Home Office position. He said that the Home Off ice neither requirednor expectedmajor changesin the legislationon the policing of the metropolis, despitethe appointmentof the SelectCommittee. The Chairmanthen put to him a whole seriesof radical proposalsthe Committeeapparently had in mind, aimed at a review and restructureof the work of the police offices.' He then asked Phillipps,
'Would it not be desirable,in the presentAct, to introducea few clauses embodyingthese improvements that you have expressedyour opinion on?'
7 ibid atpara. 83 8 ibidparas. 125to 151 Turning Point 80
He got a typically defensive mandarin response;
'They might be introducedinto the Police Bill, if determinedupon and settled,but I think the bestcourse will be to introducea temporaryBill in the presentsession to continuethe Police Act which is aboutto expire, to the end of the next session;the alterationssuggested, if they are to be adopted,will require a greatdeal of careful consideration,and ought not to be got up in a hurry."
Toward the end of his evidenceon 28h April Phillipps madean important concessionto the ambitionsof the Committeeon the issueof reform. It came in responseto a questionon somethingthe SelectCommittee clearly saw as a persistentproblem, i. e. what shouldbe the proper relationshipbetween the magistratesof the metropolisand the Commissionersof the Metropolitan Police. The framing of the questionshowed its origins in CharlesRowan's letter to Phillipps in 1832on the subjectof ajudicial/executive division betweenthe functions of the magistratesand the Commissioners,which had found its way into the Appendicesto the 1833/34Select Committee's Report. The1837/38 Committeeput their questionon this letter to Phillipps in sucha way that he had the unappetisingchoice of disagreeingwith Rowan,or retractinghis earlier supportfor the existing structure. Forcedinto that comer Phillipps agreedthat,
'the generalprinciple is right, that thejudicial businessshould go to the magistratesof the police offices and the administrativeor executiveshould go to the Commissioners.""
This was a significant concessionto the reforming intent of the Committee,as subsequentevents were to prove.
There is more than a suspicionthat the Committeeambushed Phillipps on this appearancebefore it. His answersto the Committee'squestions and suggestions bearthe mark of a man ill-preparedand under pressure. Hemisjudgedthe reforming mood of the Committee. He revealedself-satisfied inertia in the Home Office on the issueof the policing of the capital. He certainly underestimatedthe determinationof the SelectCommittee to usethe opportunity of the imminent expiry of the Police Offices legislationto conducta comprehensivereview of the whole of the criminal justice arrangementsfor the metropolis.
9 ibid. para 152 10 ibidpara 162 Turning Point 81
Edward Gibbon Wakefield
In that ambition the Committeefound an ally in the personof Edward Gibbon Wakefield, Esq.whom they called in and examinedon V June 1837. Wakefield is acolourful figure. His claim to the attentionof the SelectCommittee rested on two books. The first was an ambitiousproposal for the colonisationof South Australia by meansof cheapland salesto the labouringmasses newly generated by urban and industrial growth. The secondwas a treatiseon capital punishment in London and its lack of effect on the criminal propensitiesof the population. Both books drew on his experienceas a prisonerin NewgateGaol while serving a three year term for the abductionof a 12 year old heiresswith intent to marry. On releasefrom prison in 1829he embarkedon his SouthAustralian colonisation project and later stood as MP for Birmingham in the 1836Parliamentary election. He was disappointedin both schemes.
Wakefield strongly criticised the performanceof the Metropolitan Police Force in the detectionand punishmentof criminals. He thought the Force effective in 4maintainingorder, in preventingnuisances, in driving out of sight many evils which still exist."' But he did not think it had had any effect in rooting out the 'prompters of crime', by which he meantthose who recruitedyoung peopleto take up a criminal way of life. Suchcharacters are immortalisedby Charles Dickens' Fagin in 'Oliver Twist'. In Wakefield's opinion the Force had not restrictedthe activities of thesereceivers of stolenproperty in the capital."
It is notablethat the Committeedid not pressWakefield on thesecriticisms of the Metropolitan Police. The earlier 1833/4Select Committee had clearly confirmed that it was no part of the duty of Rowan and Mayne's men to seekout and prosecutethe 'prompters' of crime. That was the duty of the plain clothesand other officers employedby the magistrates. Indeedthose officers had beengiven specialpowers in law not availableto Metropolitan Police constablesto enable them to carry out that work. Thoseearlier findings must surely have beenknown to the membersof the 1837Select Committee. If not, then they ought to have been. They provide a completeanswer to Wakefield's comments. But they were not put to him.
it ibid page 433 at para. 1192 12 ibid page 434 at para. 1194 Turning Point 82
Having beenallowed to launchthese unjustified and indeed,unwarranted accusationsagainst Rowan and Mayne, Wakefield was then askedabout the opinions expressedin his secondbook. He said that punishment,even public executions,had little or no deterrenteffect on criminal behaviour. He therefore dismissedthat approachto the reductionof criminality.
That forthright declarationled the SelectCommittee to draw him out on the subjectsof the investigationof crime and the detectionof offenders. The exchangesare lengthy but are worth reproducing. They show that, from his own knowledgeand despitehis earlier disparagingremarks, Wakefield recognisedthat Rowan and Mayne's men had no responsibilityfor the investigationand detection of criminals. The exchangesalso shedan illuminating light on the practiceand understandingof crime control in nineteenthcentury England.
The Chairmanasked Wakefield,
'There being, therefore,so many fertile sourcesof crime in the metropolis, is it not desirablethat somemuch more efficient meansof detectionshould it for be afforded?- (Wakefield) Most desirable,as appearsto me; although one cannotsay that the detectionof crime in London is exactly nobody's business,still it is very difficult to point out whosebusiness it is; if a person is robbed in London, it seemsto be nobody's businessbut his own; at least there seemsto be no public functionarieswhose business it is to detectthe personwho commitsthat crime.'
The Chairmanpressed him on that point.
'In fact you would confine the businessof detectionto personsproperly qualified, having a duty of that naturespecially intrustedto them?- (Wakefield) It has always appearedto me that there should be someclass of police officers apartfrom all the others,...whose sole businessshould be as far as possibleto hinder the commissionof crime by rooting out the nurseriesof crime, and to detectcrime by pursuingthieves and tracing stolen goods,and by all the other methodsin which crime is detected."'
Wakefield's answersto the Committeeaccurately report the situation in the metropolis in 1837. No one individual or organisationhad overall responsibility for the investigationof crime, or for the identification, detectionand pursuit of criminal offenders. The magistratesofficers might be persuaded(by promisesof
13 ibidpage437at paras. 1205and]206 Turning Point 83 rewards)or directed(by the magistrates)to pursueoffenders, but they had no overall responsibilityfor the detectionof crime in the metropolis. Wakefield's evidenceis also that responsibilityfor the investigationof reportsand allegations of undetectedcrime did not fall within the remit of the Commissionersof the Metropolitan Police Force,even by default. Yet the SelectCommittee did not take him back to his earlier criticisms of Rowan and Mayne's allegedfailures in this respect,as they might well, and indeedought to, havedone.
Taken as a whole it is possibleto infer from Wakefield's evidenceand from his characterthat he saw the situationhe describedto the SelectCommittee as an opportunity. The conjectureis that Wakefield had somehope that he might be appointedto undertakethe responsibilityfor 'rooting out of the promptersof crime' in the capital. Given his lack of successin other attemptsto establish himself in a worthwhile career,the suggestionmust be that Wakefield was not simply aiming to inform the SelectCommittee. He was also trying to get himself ajob as public prosecutor,and/or pursuerand rooter-outof criminals.
Shortly after hearingWakefield's evidence,and in an odd parallel with the experienceof its 1833/34predecessor, wider eventsinterrupted the Select Committee'swork. On this occasionit was the suddendeath of the King and the accessionof the eighteen-yearold Victoria to the throne. On 28'hof Junethe Committee reportedthat, 'the unexpectedand melancholydemise of his Majesty have inducedYour Committee the further the Inquiry'. ... to suspend progressof The SelectCommittee then closedits proceedingswith a recommendationthat Parliamentshould renewthe Police Offices Act as a temporarymeasure and re- appoint it to completeits work in the next session.
The Commissioners and amalgamation
When it resumedthe next year, the SelectCommittee called Rowan and Mayne back beforethem on I" and 91hof March. They put two issuesto the Commissioners. One wasthe amalgamationof all the patrolling police establishmentsin the capital with their Force,which they had earlier discussed with Under SecretaryPhillipps. The other was the evidenceof Wakefield about the lack of an effective meansof detectingcrime in the capital.
Dealing with the first issue,Rowan and Mayne were still in favour of incorporatingall the remnantsof the old parish-basedpolicing systeminto their Force. They had, after all, askedas much of the earlier 1833/34Select Committee. Yet the police offices, the River Thames,the parish of Westminster Turning Point 84 and the City of London still had their own constables. Rowan and Mayne were eagerto usethe opportunity presentedby the appointmentof the Committee finally to removethe anomaliesand irritations causedby theseseparate police establishmentsoperating within their area. The City was exemptfrom the provisions of the founding 1829Metropolitan Police Act. It had stubbornlyused its powerful financial and economicposition to remain an island of the old system surroundedby the New Police. NeverthelessRowan and Mayne were ready to indicate their willingness to absorbit and all the other existing police establishmentsin the metropolis."
The initial suggestionby the SelectCommittee on this occasionwas a straightforwardtransfer of all theseparochial constables into the Metropolitan Police Force. The suggestionmet with a surprisingly cautiousresponse from the Commissioners. They merely askedif the funding for all thosemen would follow their transfer." The Chairmanthen tried to clarify their view by the tactic he had usedwhen dealingwith the evidenceof Under-SecretaryPhillips and at this point mattersbegan to get confused. He asked,
'You seeno practical objection,then, to your being investedin fact with all the executiveduties of the police of the metropolis,taking that in its largest and most practical extentT
The questionclearly againreturns to Rowan's letter of 1832to Under-Secretary Phillipps that now formed an Appendix to the 1833/34Select Committee Report. That letter had advocatedjust sucha division of work as betweenthe magistrates of the metropolis and the Commissionersof the Metropolitan Police. The Commissionersfollowed Phillipps line in dealing with it. They said, 'We do not think that any practical difficulty exists'."'
Richard Mayne then went on to expandand clarify that answer. He madeit clear that what the Commissionerswanted was for the magistratesto give up responsibility for all the practical work arising from theirjudicial functions; i. e., the execution of warrants, the service of summonses, etc. That would end the confusion of the existing arrangements in which the magistrates either kept such work to themselves, i. e. assigned it to the officers they employed, or allocated it at their whim to one of the other police establishments in the capital, including, of
14 Reportof the SelectCommittee on the MetropolitanPolice Offices, ParliamentaryPapers (1837/8) VolXV pages440 to 442 atparas. 842 to 857 is ibid. para. 858 16 ibid. page 442 atpara. 859 Turning Point 85 course,to the Metropolitan Police Force. Predictableconflicts and clashes resulted,usually from failures in communication. Mayne said, in supportof the proposition in Rowan's letter and the evidencegiven earlier by Under Secretary Phillipps, that,
'such an arrangementwould more completelyeffect the proposed separationof thejudicial and executiveduties of police, and would prevent interferencebetween the any prejudicial ... the magistrates'offices and generalbody of the police,'
He then describedthe supportthe magistratesmight expectunder this arrangement,saying,
'that, if such a plan were adopted,the entire body of the police would then feel it their duty and be equally interestedto act in executionof the warrantsof the magistrates,and assistin getting up the evidencein cases before the magistrates,or in any other way that might be useful.'
In further exchangesthe Committeesuggest that the existing police office officers might remain in their postsbut be strippedof their police powers,so that they would 'be more in the natureof ushersand door-keepersthan officers of police."" Rowan agreedwith anothersurprisingly modest response. Instead of simply acceptingthe suggestion,as well he might, he said,
'It would be idle to say we imaginethe greatmass of the metropolitan police officers are equal in skill to the chosenbody of officers the magistrateshave had undertheir orders;but I believe (and we can corroboratethat fully) there are a numberof men in the metropolitanpolice more than equalto the numberof thosein the magistrates'off ices,who are quite equalto any duty, be it what it may.' adding,
'There is no sort of police duty which we could not find an officer well
qualified to perform.-And thoseofficers of the metropolitanpolice are underthe observationof the magistratesas much as the officers under their more immediateorders. "'
Clearly, in thesetwo responsesRowan and Mayne are encouragingthe Select Committeealong its amalgamatingand unifying line. But in view of the widely
17ibid. page 443 atpara. 862 18ibid. otpara. 864 Turning Point 86 differing duties and functionsof the magistratesofficers and the constablesof the Metropolitan Police theseexchanges cannot amount to an agreementby Rowan and Mayne either that they shouldabsorb all the remainingmagistrates officers into their Force (the Committeesuggest some should be retainedas 'ushersand door-keepers'),or, more importantly, that all the activities thoseofficers could be, or should be, transferredto their men. The Commissioner'sfocus is on the need for ajudicial/executive division as betweenthemselves and the magistrates;and on the problem of 'prejudicial interference'between the 'executive' activities of their constablesand the magistratesofficers arising from a failure to make that division. And it shouldalso be notedthat Mayne's claims for the skills of his constablesrelates to their performanceof duties 'under the observationof the magistrates',i. e. while they are engagedin thoseshared 'executive' functions.
The present-dayobserver might regardthis as a subtle distinction, but the Report of the 1833/34 SelectCommittee with its condemnationof any 'use of spies' by the Metropolitan Police, on which the Commissionersand the Committeewere agreed,makes the matter clear. In 1838 'executive' duties in the policing of the metropolis did not includethe magistrates'judicial' function of the investigation of reportsand allegationsof crime in which their own employedofficers (which might on occasioninclude one or more of Rowan and Mayne's constableson loan or attachment)acted as their agents.Thus, in their responseto the Select Committeeon this occasionRowan and Mayne do not accept,nor doesthe 1838 SelectCommittee propose, that they or their constablesshould take over any of the magistrates'existing judicial responsibilitiesin relation to crime investigation and criminal prosecutions. There are signshowever, that the SelectCommittee did not quite grasp,or perhapsnever understood, either the complexitiesof the subjectthey were discussingor the subtletiesof the Commissioners'position on it.
The Commissionersand the duties of the magistrates
Symptomsof a misunderstandingbetween the Commissionersand the Committee appearalmost at oncewhen the Committeetried to deal with the implications of the proposedchanges in the relationshipbetween the magistratesand the Commissioners. Rowan and Mayne demurredwhen the Committeesuggested that Superintendentsof the Metropolitan Police shouldtake chargeof all cases 'sent before the magistrates,or to trial from his division', in effect to becomethe Turning Point 87 public prosecutorfor their districts." Pressedby the Committee,the Commissionersagreed that such a public officer was desirable,and allowed that it was possiblethat he might be an officer of police. Rowan and Mayne were able to give that ground becausethe Committeerevealed at this point that it was thinking in terms of the continentalsystem of public prosecutors. This was the systemalready operating in Scotlandand Ireland wherebya public official undertookresponsibility for the investigationand prosecutionof criminal cases before the courts."' Rowan and Mayne could safely agreewith that proposal. It was similar to one put forward by Wakefield. He had proposedthat a new and separateelement be addedto the English criminal justice systemto undertakethe identification, pursuit and prosecutionof criminal offenders. Sincethe Commissionerswere alreadyclear that they did not have,and had not agreedto undertake,those responsibilities, such a developmentcould take place without touching upon, or addingto, any of the existing dutiesand functions of the Metropolitan Police."
Later the SelectCommittee further exploredthe themeof a division between judicial and executivefunctions in the criminal justice systemof the metropolis. They suggestedthat the Commissionersmight wish to take on one of the main responsibilitiesof the magistrates,and issuewarrants in casesof felonies and other offences. Now Rowan and Mayne took alarm and dug in their heels. They flatly rejectedthe idea saying, 'We do not think it would be desirableor convenientfor the public."' Significantly, they also rejectedoutright a proposal to give them control of someof the 'nestsof crime' mentionedby Wakefield. The Committeethen offered to give them power over low brothels and lodging houses." This was also rejected. It is a pity that the SelectCommittee did not go on to clarify why the Commissionersrefused these offers of greaterpower. Had it done so it might havediscovered Rowan and Mayne's unwillingnessto become involved in the criminal investigative,detective and prosecutionresponsibilities of the magistratesand their officers.
The Commissionersand crime
The reasonfor that reluctancewas revealedbut, it would appear,not graspedby the Committeewhen Rowan and Mayne returnedto the hearingsa week later on
19 ibid. atpara. 866 20 ibid. atparas. 8671o871 21 ibid. page 444 atparas 872 and 873 22 ibid. page 445 atpara 880 23 ibid, page 445 atparas 885 and 886 Turning Point 88
90'March. In the interim they had receiveda copy of the evidencegiven to the Committeethe previousyear; that is, beforethe deathof the King and the interruption of its proceedings. The SelectCommittee wanted Rowan and Mayne to review their position after consideringthe evidenceof other witnesses. Rowan and Mayne may by then havehad secondthoughts about the extent of their earlier concessionsto the amalgamatingambitions of the Committee. They may also have baulkedafter readingwhat others,especially Phillipps, had said earlier. Or it may simply be that both they and the SelectCommittee recognised a needto clarify their evidenceor clear up somedifferences between their evidenceand that of other witnesses. But for whateverreason the proceedingsof the Committeedo not follow their usual patternon this occasion. After somepreliminary inconsequentialinquiries aboutthe treatmentof vagrants,the Committee interruptedits questionsto invite the Commissionersto commenton the evidence given by earlier witnesses."
Rowan and Mayne's responseto this opportunity showsthat, for their part, they were anxiousto correctany misunderstandingarising from their agreementto a judicial/executive division of responsibilitiesbetween themselves and the magistratesof the metropolis. They beganby respondingto the evidenceof Edward Gibbon Wakefield and his criticisms of the New Police as failing adequatelyto deal with either the preventionor the detectionof crime in the metropolis. They then went on, in a unique and importantpassage, " to set out their view of what the New Police could, and should,do in the battle against crime in the capital, and the limits of their powersand responsibilitiesas they understoodthem. They are clearly speakingfrom a carefully preparedscript and their remarkson this occasionshould have clearedup any earlier ambiguities in their evidenceto the Committee.
Dealing first with Wakefield's chargethat 'the metropolitanpolice have not been useful in preventingcrime' the Commissionersbegan by explaining that, insofar as they understoodtheir duties,they did not follow the distinction betweenthe preventionof crime and its detectionwhich was madeby other commentators, including and especiallyby Wakefield. They had a specific and unique view on that issue,based firmly on their Force being a purely preventiveelement in the criminal justice system. Theysaid,
24 ibid. page 462 atpdas. 1087and 1088 25 ibid. page 462 atpara. 1088 Turning Point 89
'We by is distinction would remark ... that many personsthere a wider drawn betweenthe preventionof crime and the detectionof crime than is warrantedby a considerationof the subject,at least as regardsthe operationsof a streetpolice; which we would explain thus: Suppose,for a moment,a police to be so numerousas to renderthe commissionof crime in the streetsimpossible, without being seen,and the party detectedin the act; this would be decidedprevention, but merely by fear of instant detectionand subsequentpunishment. On the other hand, supposethat every crime committed,without exception,were detectedimmediately, or within a certainnumber of hoursafterwards, the effect in the preventionof crime would be nearly, and the principle altogether,the sameas in the first supposedcase, viz. the fear of being immediatelybrought to justice. If this view be correct,detection, as far as it goes,is prevention,as regardsa street police. '
As to the preventionof crime the Commissionerswent on to say,
'It being impossible,however, in sucha district as that of the metropolitan police, to preventcrime by the actualpresence every where of the constable,we would advertto a simple modeof preventionof another kind. '
They then presentedto the SelectCommittee a papershowing the number of offencesagainst property committedin the metropolisfor the previousyear (1837). The total was 8,821. Of thoseoffences the Commissionersestimated that some6000 'might havebeen prevented by a little precautionon the part of thoseupon whom the losshas fallen;' They say that;
'this is the preventionto which we refer, and which is so much the more desirable,as theseare chiefly caseswhich it is next to impossiblefor any vigilance on the part of the police to prevent'
This is an importancepassage in the Commissioners'evidence. It showsthat they had an entirely different view of the distinction betweenthe preventionand detectionof crime from that madeby other commentators. Insofar as they understoodtheir responsibilitiesthey regardedthe patrolling activities of the uniformed constablesthey employedas adequatelyserving both purposes. As they had tried to makeclear to the earlier 1833/134Select Committee, their 'street police' could do no more that determiscreants by their presence,and detain those caughtin the act of crime. The preventionof 'caseswhich it is next to Turning Point 90 impossiblefor any vigilance on the part of the police to prevent' was a responsibility of others,not one they bore alone.
For the sakeof clarity, the Commissionersthen set out the extent of their contribution, as a streetpolice, to the detectionof crime in the metropolis." They say that when any of their constablesdiscovers, or receivesa report of, a crime, croutepapers' are preparedand circulated. The systemwas that the police division where the offenceoccurred initiated theseroute papers. The Superintendent(or the Inspectoron duty if the Superintendentwas not available) then circulatedthem to all the other divisions of the metropolitanpolice. Each division through which they passednoted the time of receipt on the back. In the morning all route papersarrived at the Commissionersoffice for perusaland comment. Providedno further immediateaction arosefrom the papers,a report of the crime went to the Bow StreetPolice Office for inclusion in the printed daily police report preparedand publishedby the Chief Magistrate,together with 'any facilitate the detection the clue... or any thing which they think will of offender'. In addition, the Commissionerssent descriptions of any property stolen to all pawn brokersand marine storedealers in the metropolis,with a warning not to receivethe property described."
The 'route papers' also recorded'the nameof the police constablewho was on the beat felony the where the took place... and the nameof constablewhose particular businessit was madeto tracethe offiender'." Whetheror not this aspectof the droutepapers' systemconfused the SelectCommittee is not clear from its subsequentproceedings. Rowan and Mayne do not mention at this point the occasionalemployment of their constablesto work under the directionsof the magistratesin specific cases,an ad hoc arrangeenitwhich they had describedto the 1833/34Select Committee, although for completenessit might have been helpful had they done so. But the strictly limited extent of the involvement of the constablesof the Metropolitan Police in the investigationand detectionof crime ought to havebeen apparent in the Commissioners'answers to the next two questionsput to them.
In answerto Lord Hotham,Rowan said that the processdescribed was 'in all casesfollowed if the circumstancesare suchas to permit of it being employed with any hope of a favourableresult', to which Mayne added,'And to the proper
26 ibid. pages462 and 463 atpara. 1088 27 ibid. page 463 atpara. 1088 28 ibidpara. 1089 Turning Point 91 extent in every case."' After further remarksby the Commissionersthe Chairman(Mr. Benjamin Hawes)then asked,'Are there not classesof crime which arise from causesbeyond the reachof police regulationsT Rowan's responsewas to refer to the paperon crime in the metropoliswhich the Commissionershadjust discussedwith the Committeewhen setting out their view of their responsibilitiesfor the preventionof crime. He pointed out that only 12 of the 26 categoriesof crime listed on that papercould properly be regardedas being within the responsibilitiesof a 'street police', i. e. could in any way have been preventedor detectedby a patrolling constable."
What the SelectCommittee may have failed to understandis that the Commissioners'route paperssimply put the old Saxon'quick and fresh pursuit' and 'hue and cry' on a formal basis. Their systemdid no more than communicatenews of the crime to all the constableson duty in the Metropolitan Police district and then ensurethat all necessaryaction to detain nearbyor immediatelyavailable offendershad beentaken. By an extensionof those responsibilitiesconstables might be assignedto the attemptto trace a fleeing offender or eventemporarily employedin plain clothesto identify him where, as the Commissionersput it, there was 'any hope of a favourableresult' and 'to the proper extent in every case'. But if, by a further extensionof the system,a Metropolitan Police constablewas employedby a magistratefor the investigation and detectionof an escapedor unidentified offender,then the Commissionerstook no interestin what he did, nor had any responsibility for it, as Mayne had told the 1833/34Select Committee. But noneof thoseextensions or exceptionsaltered the essentiallylimited natureof the Commissioners'route papers' system,which was very much more concernedwith mollifying victims and answeringany subsequent criticisms of the immediateactions of their Forcethan with the identification and detectionof the perpetratorsof crime, which remainedthe responsibility of the magistrates.
If the SelectCommittee was unclearon thesepoints it was not helpedby Richard Mayne. He was unableto resistthe temptationto add a final flourish to the evidenceof the Commissionerson thesematters and rebut the slur earlier cast on the abilities of his constablesby Under SecretaryPhillips. He endedhis remarks on the route paperssystem by boastingthat it had had somesuccess in crime detection. He said;
29 ibid 30 ibid para 1090 Turning Point 92
'We have had degree several... cases... which shewthere was as great a of skill availableon the part of the officers concerned,as could be shown by any other body of police"'
All Mayne meantto imply in this codicil to the Commissionersevidence at this point is that where Metropolitan Police constableswere employedto pursue offendersunder the 'route papers' systemand its extensions,they were as good at catchingcriminals as any othersengaged in the work in the metropolis,such as parochial constablesand the like, including presumablytherefore, the magistrates officers and not exceptingthe plain clothesdetective 'Runners' themselves. He doesnot suggestthat the Commissionershad any responsibility for such work, or that it formed any part of the normal duties of their constables.And in their other answersto this, and previous,Select Committees the Commissionerssought to make it clear that they had no reasonor any wish to take it up.
Unfortunately Mayne in particular had too often over-complicatedthese matters. Neither the evidenceof the Commissionersto the SelectCommittee in the session before its adjournmentin 1837nor their subsequentattempt to clarify their attitude toward detectivework in their later appearancesbefore the Committee was sufficiently clear or coherent. The Commissionershad overreached themselvesin their anxiety to bring aboutan amalgamationof the 'executive' policing of the capital and to reject Under SecretaryPhillipps' adverseview of the detectiveability of their officers. So they allowed themselvesthe luxury of boastingand in the processconfused the SelectCommittee.
Subsequentevents give weight to the conjecturethat the Committeemay have gainedthe false impressionfrom the Commissionersevidence that they were both able and preparedto absorball the criminal investigativeand detective responsibility of the magistratesofficers, including all the plain clothesactivities requiredfor thejudicial function of identifying, detectingand prosecuting criminals. The Commissioners'later efforts to explain the subtletiesof their position on theseissues seems to have fallen on stony ground. Their explanation that their Force was a 'street police' with a field of effective action limited to preventableoffences and the 'quick and fresh pursuit' of offendersmay not have registeredwith the Committee. Nor did Committeemembers seem quite to grasp, or simply could not understand,that Rowan and Mayne regardedthe uniformed patrolling activities of their constablesand their immediateefforts to detain
31 ibid. page 463 atpara. 1088(end) Turning Point 93 offenderswhen they failed to preventa crime as a full descriptionof the responsibilitiesthey were preparedto accept,and as adequatelyand successfully serving both the preventionand the detectionof crime as they understoodit.
Misunderstandings
For whateverreason the 1837/1838Select Committee seems to havewrongly concludedthat the Metropolitan Police both could and would take up all the whole of the policing of the capital including providing replacementsfor all the officers presentlyemployed by the magistrates. The error may have been avoided had the exchangesbetween the Commissionersand the 1837/3 8 Select Committeedealt explicitly with the work of the specialistdetectives among the magistrates'officers -the 'Runners' and their imitators - or their criminal- associativeand informant-cultivating activities. But they did not do so and there are two good reasonsfor this unfortunateomission. First, those activities had a dubiousbasis in law and were only unofficially sanctionedby the magistrates. And second,the Commissionersand the Committeewere in agreementon the issue. They both condemnedthe close involvementof the magistrates'officers with the criminal classesand wished to seeit ended.
It is also reasonableto assumethat the SelectCommittee and the Commissioners believedthat thejudicial/executive division of responsibilitythey proposedto establishin the capital, coupledwith the growing successof tile New Police, would make such work unnecessary. That however,was a seriousmisjudgement. Growth in both the quantity and complexity of crime led to an increaserather than a decreasein the demandfor the detectiveduties of the magistrates'officers, and especiallyfor the specialisedskills of the plain clothes 'Runners' and their imitators. That understandablemistake had the most seriousconsequences for the future of Peel's New Police.
Rowan and Mayne were amongstthe last of the witnessescalled before the Select Committeeon the Police Offices. Its Report was publishedto Parliamentin July 1838. Its findings and conclusionswere the startingpoint for a revolution in the developmentof policing in Britain. Acts and Consequences 94
7
Acts and Consequences
By order of Parliamentthe 1837/38Select Committee on the Metropolis Police Offices publishedits Report on ll'h July 1838. The Committee'sterms of referencefocussed on the needto review and reform the magistratesoffices of the metropolis. The chief influenceon its conclusionsand recommendationswas the emergenceand successof Peel'sNew Police underCommissioners Rowan and Mayne.
Government,as representedby Under SecretaryPhillipps and the Home Office, had expectedlittle to comeof the Committee'swork but the imminent expiry of the legislation that supportedthe police offices gavethe Committeean opportunity it exploitedto the full. It decidedon a radical restructureof the functions and duties of the magistratesof the metropolisand to raisetheir status and pay accordingly. At the sametime the SelectCommittee took the far- reachingdecision that henceforwardthe magistrateswould perform purely judicial functions and rely on the Metropolitan Police for the dischargeof their traditional executiveduties. The outcomewas the passageof two Acts of Parliamentin the following year, the Metropolitan Police Act (2&3 Vict. Cap. 47), and the Metropolitan Police CourtsAct (2&3 Vict. Cap.71).
The hasty Acts of 1839
Regrettably,despite Under SecretaryPhillipps' warning to the 1838 Select Committeethat changesto the police offices legislation 'ought not to be got up in a hurry', neither Act receivedthe drafting and careful considerationthey deserved. The SelectCommittee Report was with Parliamentin July 1838. The Bills to implementits recommendationswere delayedfor sevenmonths; first, by the Home Office unpreparednessrevealed in Under SecretaryPhillipps' evidenceto the Committee,' and secondby the difficulty of drafting their complex, contentiousand interlocking provisions. The Bills finally cameon the Parliamentaryagenda in February1839. Time was by then short. The Session was due to end in Octoberand both Bills were contestedmeasures. Each had to passthrough both Housesof Parliamentbefore the end of the sessionelse they would fail and needre-introduction. Speedwas necessarybecause the legislation supportingthe existing Police Offices was aboutto expire. The
SelectCommittee on the Metropolis Police Offices (1837)ParliainentaryPapers (1837-8) (451) Vol XVpages. 309 et seq,atparas 125to 1.51 Acts and Consequences 95 problem was that the Bills were inseparable. Sincethey dealt with the redistribution of activities betweenthe magistratescourts and the police they stood or fell together.
When the Bills cameinto the Houseof CommonsMembers of Parliament(MPs) complained about their clumsy drafting. During the Committee stage of the Metropolitan Police Bill;
'Mr. Duncombecould not but think that the whole of the bills which had been introducedfor the improvementof the metropolitanpolice very clumsy and bungling piecesof legislation. Already had the Housebeen favouredwith no fewer than three or four editions of thesebills. The first was scarcelyintelligible and the resolutionthey were now called upon to sanctionpartook largely of the samecharacter. "
He was speakingon the clausethat dealt with the relatively simple matter of an increasein the salariesof the Commissioners.
When the sameMetropolitan Police Bill reachedthe Houseof Lords, Lord Ellenbroroughcomplained that it mixed togetherfar too many different kinds of legislation. He thought it ought to be at leastfour separatebills. But, 'because there had beengreat difficulty in getting this Bill throughthe Houseof Commons, as it was, and he might therebyendanger its passingat all, ' he would not propose any amendments.3
But neither the complexity and incoherencethe Bills, nor that too little time had beenallowed for Parliamentto considerthem was the principal difficulty facing government. It was that the Bills arousedpassionate opposition. The Metropolitan Police Bill proposedto amalgamateall the differing police establishmentsof the metropolis into Rowan and Mayne's Force as recommended by the SelectCommittee, thus endingall local involvement in the policing of the capital. The plan includedthe City of London, with predicableresults. The City Corporationand its many supportersin Parliamentlaunched a weighty and well-constructedcounter-attack. As a result MPs almost immediately struck out the first ten clausesof the Police Bill in order to preservethe independenceof the City police.'
2 ParliamentaryDebates (Hansard) (1839)vol 48pps 711-712 3 ibid. vol 49page 92 7 4 ibid. voL 48page 133 Acts and Consequences 96
Seriousthough that set-backwas, it was not the main objection to the legislation. MPs took alarm at what they perceivedto be an increasein the power and jurisdiction of the magistratesjustas they were coming under the authority of the Secretaryof State. The Bills were thus seenas combining an assaulton the right of trial byjury to an intolerableextension of the powersof the government. The combinationallowed MPs to wrap their attack on the Bills in a cloak of freedom and the liberty of the subject. They madethe most of the opportunity.
The Courts Bill proposedto replacethe police offices of the metropolis with police courts headedby paid magistrates. The new magistrateslost their executivefunctions but gainedsummary jurisdiction to hearand determinecases, including minor crime. In addition it was proposedthat a single magistratecould hear any case. The Secretaryof Statewas given power to appoint all the magistrates;could makeregulations for their conduct;and could dismissthem if he found them unsuitable. In parallel, the Police Bill greatly extendedthe authority of Rowan and Mayne's men to arrestcitizens and bring them before the new government-appointedmagistrates. The combinedeffect of theseproposals provoked outrage.
Mr. Law, speakingin the Commonsduring the Committeestage of the Courts Bill 'He did former said that, not apprehendthat suchpropositions ... would, at any period of the history of the country, have beenentertained for one hour'. ' Colonel Sibthorp objectedto the Third Readingof the Police Bill because,'a more noxious and oppressivemeasure never had beenintroduced to Parliament',' while Mr. GeorgePalmer opposed the Third Readingof the Courts Bill becauseits do, 'more destroythe the passagewould ... to constitution of country than could be accomplishedby all the efforts of the Radical reformers."
Lords Broughtonand Lyndhurst madedesperate attempts the delay the Bills in the Houseof Lords. Their aim was to hold them up to the end of the sessionand so kill them. Their Lordshipsfocussed their main effort on the Courts Bill since it containedthe provisionsthat most clearly increasedthe role of governmentin the criminal justice systemof the capital. Their Lordships allowed the Police Bill through its Third Readingto await Royal Assent,and then Broughtonand Lyndhurst launcheda savageassault on the Courts Bill in its CommitteeStage, managingto mangleit sufficiently to drive it back to the Commonsfor s ibid. voL49page534 6 ibid. page 435 7 ibid. page 1385 Acts and Consequences 97 reconsideration! But by desperateimprovisation both it and its companion Police Bill scrapedthrough beforethe close of the Session. The Police Bill receivedRoyal Assenton 17'hAugust 1839and the Courts Bill becamelaw nine days later on 26th August 1839,the very last day before the prorogationof Parliament. Four days later Henry Phippsreplaced Lord John Russellas Secretaryof Statefor Home Affairs.
Someof the exchangesthat markedthe last despairingeffort of their Lordships to thwart the Bills are worth reproducingconsidering the importanceof this legislation for the future of policing in Britain. One suchtook place during the Committeestage of the CourtsBill. Their Lordshipswere debatingClause 3. It dealt with the paymentof magistrates. Lord Broughamobjected in principle to the clause,picking up the point that it gavegreat power of patronageto the Secretaryof State.' Lord Lyndhurstjoined in to say,
'Now consideringthe time at which the bill had come up from the other House,was it not reasonableto askto continuefor anotheryear the present system?"'
Viscount Duncannon,the governmentminister responsiblefor getting the Bill through the Lords, rejectedthat idea. Lord Lyndhursttried anothertack.
'If this Bill really was foundedupon the reportsof the Committeeof this and the other House,it ought to havebeen brought forward at an earlier period, so that its provisionsmight havebeen compared with those reports and the evidenceon which they were founded."'
Clearly Lord Lyndhurst is complainingthat the Bills were before Parliamentwhen membershad had no opportunityto readand absorbthe Committeereports on which they were based. The legislatorshad to implementconclusions drawn from information they did not have.
Again Viscount Duncannonrefused to budge. Lord Broughamthen returnedto the fray.
'When the money [for the magistrates]was voted by the Houseof Commons600 membersat leasthad goneaway. In fact it was voted by a Housewhich hardly existedbut by a barequorum'
8 ibid. vol. 50 pps 183 to 192 9 ibid. page 185 10ibid. page 186 11ibid. pages 186-187 Acts and Consequences 98
Viscount Duncannonreplied that, 'the Bill had beena long time before the other Houseand he neverremembered any bill to haveundergone more discussion.'
Broughamsnapped back.
'I beg my noble Friend's pardon. The bill got into Committeein the other Houseonly a fortnight since,and it was then discussed. The stateof the Houseon that discussionwas shownby the divisions upon it, which consistedof ten or fifteen to thirty Members."'
Theseexchanges illustrate how hurried and ill-informed was the thought given to theseimportant Acts. Both Housesof Parliamentrecognised how radical they were. It is apparentthat both Commonsand Lords felt that insufficient time had beenallowed fully and carefully to discussand examinethe Bills as they passed through their stagesin Parliament. That fault must lie with government. The SelectCommittee of 1837/38published its Report in July, 1838. Sevenmonths later the rush to get the Bills throughParliament began. It endedwith the Courts Bill going through all its stagesin the Houseof Lords in elevendays. But the unreadinessof both the Commonsand the Lords to debatethese important matters is also due, at least in part, to their own neglect.
The Royal Commission of 1839
On 27th March 1839just after the Police and CourtsBills first appearedon the Parliamentaryagenda a Royal Commissionsitting to 'inquire as to the best means of establishingan efficient ConstabularyForce in the countiesof England' presentedits First Report. Full-time, paid, police forces on the model of the Metropolitan Police were alreadyemerging in British cities. Former Metropolitan Police officers commandedmany of them. The remit of the Royal Commissionwas to examinethe implications of an extensionof Peel's New Police to rural areas. Membersof the Royal Commissionwere CharlesShaw Lefevre (soonto be Speakerof the Houseof Commons); Edwin Chadwick, the well-respectedsocial reformer,and Lt. Col. CharlesRowan, joint Commissioner (with Richard Mayne) of the Metropolitan Police Force.
The Royal Commissionwas in sessionthroughout the proceedingsof the 1837/38 SelectCommittee and its first Reportwas presentedto Parliamentduring the passageof the 1839Metropolitan Police and Courts Bills. In parallel with the SelectCommittee, the Royal Commissionersexamined the respectiveroles of
12ibid., page 197 Acts and Consequences 99 justices and constablesin the English criminal justice system. UnliketheSelect Committeethe Royal Commissionundertook a detailedand comprehensive analysisof the history and developmentof policing in Britain. On that much better baseits proposalsfor the future of the criminal justice systemdiffered significantly from thoseof the SelectCommittee.
Two important points madeby the Royal Commissiondo not appearin the Report of the SelectCommittee. First, the Royal Commissionidentified a needfor legislative action if ordinary constables,rather than officers working under the direction of the magistrates,were to undertakeeven 'preliminary enquiries' into reportsof crime or offences. And second,Chadwick and his fellow Royal Commissionerssaw the vital importanceof the appointmentof a 'public prosecutor' if responsibilityfor the pursuit and detectionof offendersno longer fell on the magistratesand their officers."' It is not clear from the available public recordswhether or not thesefinding of the Royal Commissionwere known to Rowan when, with Mayne, he gaveevidence to the 1838 SelectCommittee on the Police of the Metropolis.
Enquiry into crime
On the first point, the Royal Commissionclosely examinedthe historic relationshipbetween constables and justices. It found that the common law had originally assignedthe 'function of enquiry' to constablesin relation to crimes committed within their bailiwick. However,constables progressively lost that function over the centuriesfollowing their first regulationby the Statuteof Winchester."' In that period the King's justices gradually assumedthe prerogativeto make 'preliminary inquiries' into criminal cases. Later, Henry Fielding and his successorsexpanded and developedthat activity of thejustices. They introducedthe investigativeand detectivework of the officers attachedto the police offices, but they ensuredthat theseofficers worked under the direction, and usedthe powers,of the magistratesrather than their own as constables. The Royal Commissionerscontrasted that developmentwith the procedurestill in force in casesof suspiciousdeath. They found that the coroner still relied on local constablesto gatherevidence for his inquest.
In their Reportto Parliamentthe Royal Commissiondrew attentionto this anomaly,and proposedthat the old powersof the constablesto enquire into
13 First Report of the Royal Commission on Establishing an Efficient Constabulary Force, ParliamentaryPapers (1839) voL AUpage 100atpara. 114 14 ibid. page 101at para. 116 Acts and Consequences 100
crimes reportedto them shouldbe restored. Under the heading 'Abandonment of the principle of preliminary enquiry', it said that,
'it appearsto be highly desirablethat additional powersfor securing important evidenceshould be given by the legislature,and that the principle should be uniformly put into practical operationby virtue of a legislative enactment. The speedyenquiry gives operationto the other principle of "quick fresh if' by the " and pursu ... constables'. When Membersof Parliamentwere consideringthe legislation to establisha judicial/executive division betweenthe magistratesof the metropolis and the Metropolitan Police Force,the Royal CommissionReport was availableto them. The report told them that, due to the passageof time, Rowan and Mayne's constablesno longer had any power in law to make evenpreliminary enquiries into reportsand allegationsof crime beyondthose needed for the dischargeof their 'quick and fresh pursuit' responsibilities.
Elsewherein their First Reportthe Royal Commissionersnote many similar examplesof decayin old system." They usedthat evidenceto justify their conclusionthat the meansto preventand detectcrime in rural areashad declined to a point beyondlocal remedy. The only way forward was the adoption of full- time paid constableson the model of the Metropolitan Police Force and their being given power by statuteto inquire into reportsof crime."'
Public prosecutions
The secondpoint madeby the Royal Commissionand ignored by both the Select Committeeon the Police of the Metropolis and the Parliamentarylegislators of 1839was the 'Constitutional arrangementsfor public prosecutions'."' The Royal Commissionreported that,
'one subjectstrongly pressedupon our attentionhas beenthe necessityof recommendingthe appointmentof public prosecutors. From all parts of the country we havereceived suggestions of the necessityof providing for the appointmentsof someofficer to prosecutethose casesin behalf of the community at large "in which no individual has any special interest,and in which the community has a specialinterest of its own, superaddedto that of individuals"'.
Is ibid. page]16 16ibid. pages 102 to 107, paras 117to 12.5 17ibid. page 114atpara. 134et seq 18ibid. page 94 atpara. 114 Acts and Consequences 101
No such official existedin 1839. Prosecutionin criminal caseswas the responsibility of the aggrievedparty or a commoninformer. It remainedso, with minor exceptions,right up to and beyond 1879and the first establishmentof the office of Director of Public Prosecutions. This unsatisfactorystate of affairs thus continuedfor decadesafter the 1839Royal CommissionReport despitesome later, evenmore trenchant,comments on the subjectfrom the Royal Commission on the Criminal Law. For example,the Eighth Report of the Criminal Law Royal Commission(1845) says;
'It is obviously of the highestimportance to the due administrationof criminal justice, that provision shouldbe madefor the effectual prosecution by bound to the duty. of offenders agents and properly qualified execute ... The intrusting the conductof the prosecutionto a private individual opensa wide door to bribery, collusion and illegal compromises.""
The direct and obvious remedyfor suchdefects would be to appoint public prosecutorsto bring criminal casesbefore the courts.
The Royal Commissiondrew attentionto the fact that no public authority, including thereforeRowan and Mayne's force, had any responsibility for criminal prosecutions.Under the prompting of Edward Wakefield the 1838 Select Committeeon the Police Offices had discussedexactly this problem with Rowan and Mayne who had then rejectedan offer of that authority from it. But neither the Metropolitan Police nor the Courts Bill madeany provision in 1839to lay responsibility for the conductof prosecutionson the Metropolitan Police. Nor did either of the subsequentActs provide Rowan and Mayne's men with the necessaryinvestigative powers to do so. All the Acts did was to permit, for the first time, Metropolitan Police constablesto lay informations beforethe magistratesif they so chose. But they were given neither the right nor the obligation to do so.
In sum,the Royal Commissionof 1839made available to Parliamenta well- researched,authoritative and timely descriptionof the law and the English criminal justice systemthat ought to havebeen a significant factor in the drafting and passageof the 1839Metropolitan Police and Metropolitan Police Courts Acts. The Royal Commissionersestablished two vital mattersthat ought to have been recognisedand dealt with in the legislation. First, they found that Rowan and
19Royal Commissionon the Criminal Law, Eighth Report. ParliamentaryPapers (1845) Vol.XIVpps. 24 to 25 Acts and Consequences 102
Mayne's men lackedany power to enquireinto or investigatereports or allegationsof crime and criminal offences. And second,the Royal Commission identified the needfor the appointmentof public prosecutorsas a remedyfor the endemiccorruption and inefficiency they found in the processof bringing criminal offendersbefore the courts.
Consequences
III-drafted, desperatelyrushed and passedby a tiny minority of ill-informed MPs, the Metropolitan Police and the Metropolitan Police CourtsActs nevertheless mark a watershedin the history of British policing. Togetherthe two Acts aimed to set a new patternfor the prevention,detection, prosecution and control of crime, first in London and then throughoutthe nation. The new dispensation restedon a principle of separationbetween judicial and executivefunctions in the criminal justice system. Parliamentadopted that principle in order to clarify the relationshipbetween the magistratesof the metropolisand the Commissionersof the Metropolitan Police. In fact, due to the misunderstandingsand confusions createdby the proceedingsof the 1838Select Committee on the Police Office the Acts of 1839fatally underminedthe relationshipbetween justices and constables that had gradually emergedfrom the long developmentof English common law.
Section5 of the Courts Act allowed the magistratesto have sworn constableson theirstaff. However, it confinedthe jurisdiction of thoseofficers to the precincts of the Court buildings and to the securityof the magistrates. SectionsII and 12 of the Police Act removedany further possibility of 'prejudicial interference' in the executivework of the magistratesby directing the Commissionersto ensure that a 'sufficient number' of their constablesattended on the magistrates'for the purposeof executingsuch Summonsesand Warrantsas may be directedto them'. The Sectionsthen providedthat only constablesof the Metropolitan Police could undertakesuch work in the metropolitanpolice district. However, the Act does not give Rowan and Mayne's constablesthe powersor authority grantedto the magistrates'officers who had formerly carried out this function. Finallyinthis connection,Section 18 gaveexclusive rights to the magistratesof the metropolis as defined in the Act, to issuewarrants or summonsesfor executionin the metropolitanpolice district.
The Courts Act greatly enhancedthe statusof the magistrates. Section3 made sevenyears' experienceas a practisingbarrister a pre-conditionfor appointment to the bench. Section9 increasedtheir salaries. Section2 strictly limited their Acts and Consequences 103 numbersto a maximum of 27. Other parts of the Act extendedthe powersof the magistrates. Section21 gavethem power to issuewarrants 'on good grounds, statedon oath' thus allowing suchdocuments to be issuedon the sworn information of any of the constablesof the Metropolitan Police. Other sections of the Act empoweredthe magistratesto compel the attendanceof witnesses;to order the searchof premises,etc., andto deal with receiversof stolenproperty and goodsfound in their possession.Sections 15 and 16 broughtthe magistratesof the metropolis firmly underthe direction of one of Her Majesty's Principal Secretariesof State(in practicealways the Home Secretary). In both the Courts Act (section 55) and the Police Act (sections74 to 80), the interpretationclauses require that the two Acts be construedtogether.
Effects of the Acts
Rowan and Mayne no doubt quietly welcomedthe SelectCommittee's determinationto removeall their competitorsin the metropolis. Most subsequentcommentators on this developmentin the policing of the Metropolis agreethat the Commissioners',
'confusion ofjurisdiction [with the police offices] was sensiblyeliminated in 1839when the police authority was removedfrom the magistrates, "" leaving them only with judicial authority.
The overall intent of the Metropolitan CourtsAct was to confine the magistrates to judicial, rather than executive,functions in the criminal justice system. The Metropolitan Police Act then soughtto transfertheir executivefunctions to Rowan and Mayne's Metropolitan Police Force. In this, regrettably,the legislatorsfollowed their SelectCommittee into error. Neither the Courts Act nor the Police Act of 1839makes the necessaryprovision to enablethe constablesof the Metropolitan Police to carry out enquiriesinto reportsof crime. Hencetheir new right to lay informationsbefore the courts was of little value sincethey had no authority to inquire into the case. Unless,that is, they did so underthe directions of the magistratesin which caseRowan and Mayne took no responsibility for their actions. Thesefacts must have beenknown to both Commissionersthrough Rowan's membershipof the Royal Commissionthat discoveredthem. More importantly, neither Act makesany provision for, recognisesor even mentionsthe specialisedcriminal-associative and informant-
20 Smith, P.T. (1985)page 26 Acts and Consequences 104 cultivating detectivework of the 'Runners' which was thus truly 'discontinued' without replacement.
Year of turmoil
There is no real excusefor this legislativemuddle although 1839was undoubtedly a year of political turmoil aswell as economicdepression. Melbourne's weak governmentoffered its resignationover the issueof a constitution for Jamaica, precipitating the 'Bedchambercrisis' which momentarily openedthe prospectof power to Robert Peel's Tories. But the excitementshould not have distracted Parliamentfrom the importanceof the policing Bills, although it may have preoccupiedRobert Peel himself at a crucial momentin the history of his creation. In particular, the failure of Parliamentariansto take full advantageof the wealth of excellent information readily availableto them on policing issuesin the Royal CommissionReport during the debateon the Bills is censurableto say the least.
Both the SelectCommittee and Parliamentignored the important issuesraised by the 1839Royal Commission. Significantly, no proper preliminary or preparatory considerationwas given to the extent and importanceof the work of the magistrates'officers in gatheringinformation about,and cultivating informants among,active criminals and their associatesbefore it ceased.That work of the magistrates'officers, and particularly the 'Runners' and their imitators, endedin the capital after 1839but the needfor it did not. Ratherit grew with rising crime while the only organisationeither availablefor, or capableof undertaking, any of thosevital and troublesomedetective duties continued under Commissionerswho neither recognisednor acceptedthat they had either the powersto carry them on, or any obligation to dischargethem. Emergenceof Detectives 105
8
Emergence of the Detectives
Mayne's letter of 1842
Three yearslater, in 1842,the problem causedby the 'discontinuance'of tile magistrates'officers beganto cometo a head. In July of that year the near revolutionary Chartist movement,which so troubled governmentwith its radical programmeof reform and its tendencyto use public disorderto further its aims, reachedone of its periodic peaks. Itpresentedall/4million signaturepetition to Parliamentin supportof its six-point Charter. Against that backgroundMayne wrote a Memorandumto his Home Secretary,Sir JamesGraham, dated 14thJune, on behalf of himself and his fellowjoint Commissioner,Charles Rowan., In it, under pressurefrom the Home Office, he respondsto somequite fierce criticism of the Metropolitan Police Force. However,his subjectit is not the performance of his Force againstthe public order threat posedby the Chartists. It is its handling of a sensationalmurder case.
The offender, Daniel Good, had escapedfrom the custodyof one of the constables of the Metropolitan Police. He then remainedat liberty for sometwo weeks despitehis guilt and identity being widely known. Mayne complainsthat the publicity given to the casehad 'assumedto show a want of skill in the Metropolitan Police and a defect of generalorganisation applicable to detective duties.' In particular Mayne wishesto rebut a painful assertionof the 'greater efficiency of the Bow Streetofficers' I in finding and arrestingfleeing offenders, doing so later in his Memorandumby recordingthat 'The Commissionerscannot find any proof of suchassertions. '
He addsthat he,
4cannotfind that any documentsare in existenceof the casesof murder or other crimes occurring within the limits now forming the Metropolitan Police District prior to the establishmentof the Metropolitan Police, to enable[him] to form any comparisonof the total numberof casesthat occurred,or of the proportion in which the partieswere detected.' 3
I 'Memorandumrelative to the Detectivepowers of the police' Public RecordsOffice HO 451292 2 ibid. page 2 3 ibid. pages9 to 10 Emergenceof Detectives 106
Mayne then makessome other fairly telling defensivepoints on the caseof Daniel Good in this very importantdocument, before reminding his Home Secretaryof his understandingof the limitation put on the responsibilitiesof the Metropolitan Police at its foundation. In so doing he clarifies and confirms his own and Rowan's view of the properrole and activities of his Force - an issuethat the 1838 SelectCommittee on the Police Offices had misunderstoodand which the Acts of 1839had consequentlymishandled. He tells the Home Secretarythat,
'The organisationof the Police was madein the first instancewithout any direct provision for the performanceof such detectiveduties, as at that time the officers of Bow Street,the Magistratesofficers and others,were consideredexclusively applicable to this branchof the Police14
He 'one [of his saysthat when, or more... constables]... were specially charged with each... case', 'This employmentof the men, howeveruseful and necessaryfor the purpose,interfered with the regular routine of duty assignedto each individual in the police; and where the enquiry is prolongedand requires his be devoted it inconvenience the whole of time to to ... considerable arisesin supplying the placeand carrying on the other Police duties of the individuals so employed."
However, the problem for Mayne's position on this issuein the year 1842 is transparentlyobvious. Three yearsearlier Section5 of the Metropolitan Police Courts Act of 1839 had 'discontinued' the magistrates'officers without effective replacement. Thosewere the men, and especiallythe detectiveRunners and their imitators, who were bestequipped and preparedto seekout a fleeing felon. They did so by applying their knowledgeof criminal communitiesto the task, and by activating the informantsthey had carefully cultivated in the 'flash' houses they ran with the connivanceof their employers,the magistratesof the old police offices. Thesehowever, were preciselythe specialistdetective duties that both Rowan and Mayne and the SelectCommittee of 1833/34had condemned,and which the Commissionershad rejectedas any part of the responsibilitiesthey were preparedto accept,when they had given evidenceto the 1838Police Offices SelectCommittee. After the demiseof the magistratesofficers, no-onehad
4 ibid. page 13 5 ibid. page 14 Emergenceof Detectives 107 carried on or taken up that work. In the Good case,it would have been invaluable.
The Commissionershad madesome adaptation to their systemof crime detection after 1839,but the importancethey attachedto it can be best seenin their actions. They did not assignany of their constablespermanently to such duties. They continuedwith their tried andtested system of allowing Superintendentsof division to employ constablesto investigatereports of crime, or to work under the direction of the magistrates,as necessary. But the Commissioners'focus remained,as it always had been,on preventionand on the primacy of uniform patrol and 'quick and fresh pursuit' ratherthan on the detectionand prosecutionof unidentified offenders.
The Report of the SelectCommittee of 1838had beenhighly complimentaryto Rowan and Mayne and of the methodsadopted by their Force. The Commissionerstherefore took at its word and were contentto rely on regular uniform patrolling as their principal meansboth to preventand to detectcrime. However, 'When detection the ... the of criminals also was gradually cast upon Police" after 1839,the demandfor constablesto fill the gap openedby the loss of the magistratesofficers fell ever more heavily on the Metropolitan Police Force.
The Commissionerscareful, and to every appearancegrudging, responsewas to expandthe 'route papers' systemthey had describedto the SelectCommittee. That had always allowed local divisional Superintendentsto respondto local demandsand the Commissionersbegan to allow them to employ a few of their constablesin plain clothesfor limited periodsto took into specific or troublesome crimes. But it was unusualfor thoseofficers to be in engagedin such work for more than a month at atime. They invariably returnedto their 'normal' duties at the end of their spell in detection.
This ad hoc addition to the 'Divisional system' could still bejustified in terms of the original purposesof the New Police and had the great presentational advantageof reproducingthe precedentof the local control exercisedby the magistratesover their officers, without in any way duplicating it. The Commissionersthemselves had no direct involvement in the detectivework of their officers. Their 'Divisional system' of detectivesthus avoidedthe worst of the criticism that it was a covert introduction of the 'continental' systemof governmentspies into the community. Unavoidably however,this local and
ibidpage 14 Emergenceof Detectives 108 informal systemof crime investigationand detectionbad someother, less desirable,characteristics. Not only did it not developthe necessaryintimate Force-wideknowledge of criminals and their habits, haunts,weaknesses and strengths,but it also lackedeffective co-ordinationand the benefitsthat good communication,shared best-practice, pooled knowledge and accumulated experience,can bring.
The Detective Branch
In 1842therefore, the Commissionerswere in a corner. Their much amended Divisional systemwas alreadybuckling under the pressurecreated by such movementsas the Chartistsand other social manifestationsof the effects of industrialisation and urbanisation. And it had failed completely in the caseof Daniel Good. So, despitethe developmentbeing contrary to the purposeof the New Police as he understoodit, Mayne reluctantly proposed,on behalf of both Commissioners,to set up a headquartersDetective Branch staffedby constables employedas full-time detectives. His misgivings aboutthat development neverthelessremained serious and well-founded,and are fully and clearly set out in the latter part of his 1842letter to his Home Secretary.
Having remindedhis Home Secretarythat his Force had never beengiven responsibility for the investigationor detectionof reportsof crime at its foundation in 1829,Mayne draws attentionto the fact that the magistratesofficers had continuedto havethat duty right up to the end of 1839. Ile then moveson to raise perhapsthe most potent argumentagainst the permanentemployment of his constablesin such detectivework. In a passagethat is as relevanttoday as it was in 1842he points out that the employmentof his men on such duties would bring tile corruption associatedwith the activities of tile old Bow Streetofficers into the Force. He says;
'That these[Bow Street]officers had advantagesin tracing out somesorts of casesis true:- the Commissionersbelieve it is well known, that, by at least someof them, a communicationwas kept up with thievesor their associates,from who occasionallythey receivedinformation that led to detections,that might not otherwisehave taken place. Upon the propriety of returning to such a system,the Commissionerswill make no observation, as, in a moral point of view it hasbeen repeatedly denounced. But even upon the considerationof merepecuniary loss and gain, a balanceagainst the Public would necessarilybe the consequence;for such an understanding Emergenceof Detectives 109
betweenthe officers of the Police and criminals in practice,causes the officers to allow a numberof casesto remain unnoticedin order that now and then in a caseof greatnotoriety, the partiesor their associateswhose caseshave beenconnived at on other occasions,may be inducedto give the information.
That the thieveswill not continueto act on such a system,unless they find it upon the whole for their commonadvantage, will readily be believed."
Having madethat powerful point he then goeson to raise a secondimportant issue. He saysthat,
'The Commissionersare awarethat there is somedanger in establishing such a Branch of Police,to whom the duties of a detectivecharacter would more immediatelybelong; of causinga relaxationof the exertionsof the Police in generalfor the samepurpose, which havehitherto beensuccessful to so greatan extent; - and it may be diff icult to defme the exact point of time and the exactcircumstances under which the advantageof pursuit by the whole body of the Police is to be abandoned;"
In this passageMayne raisesa secondfundamental difficulty createdby the formation of a full-time, specialistdetective branch within the professionalpolice service,and one which, evennow, troublesBritish chief police officers. He asks when, how and in what circumstanceshe is to decidewhen to transferthe investigationof a crime from his uniformed patrolling constablesto one of the officers of the specialist detectivebranch. In askingthat questionMayne touches,without actually raising, a wider issuestill unresolvedto this day. How much time, effort and resourcesshould the police put into an attemptto prevent crime from being committed in the first place or to catch offendersin the act, and how much into the investigationof alreadyreported crimes in order to identify and prosecutethe criminals responsible?Mayne hasno answerto either his or the wider questionin 1842,but saysthat tile Commissioners,'apprehend that arrangementsmay be madeto preventsuch a result',' i.e. a diminution in the effectivenessof the New Police in their preventive/immediatepursuit role.
In sum, Mayne's letter tells his Home Secretarythat full-time detectivework will bring the corruption associatedwith the old Bow StreetRunners into his Force.
7 ibid. pagesH to 12 9 ibid. page 15 9 ibid. Emergenceof Detectives 110
At the sametime it will makethe managementof crime investigationby his officers much more difficult. Nevertheless,as a result of the errors of the 1839 Acts he now has no option other than to proposethe he should set up a detective branch at ScotlandYard. It was a proposalthat, 'the Commissionerssubmit for the decisionof Sir JamesGraham, how far it may be desirableas an experimentto try the effect of sucha plan.'"
Other contemporarysources confirm that Rowan and Mayne's acquiescencein the creation of a body of full-time detectivesin their Forcewas reluctant. Sir Edwin Chadwick, the principal mover of the 1839Royal Commissionwhich was the precursorof the spreadof the New Police idea to the whole nation, is quotedas saying in 1840that,
'I know from Sir CharlesRowan and Mr. Richard Mayne that they disliked detectionon principle and only yielded to its adoptionon what they deemed superiorauthority. "'
The first detectives
All through his long careerMayne, in particular, fought hard to retain the characterof the Metropolitan Police Force and to preserveits primarily preventive,uniformed patrolling role. But in 1842the combinationof the legislative errors of 1839,the social disruption causedby the Chartists,and the Good incident, defeatedhim. Under 'superior authority', he and his fellow Commissioneraccepted that they should now establisha 'detective branch'. For the first time they would employ two Inspectorsand six sergeantspermanently in plain clothesfor the investigationof crime.
But it is clear from the way in which the new branchwas structuredand managed that the Commissionerswere determinedtile ScotlandYard detectivesshould not replicatethe now-discontinuedmagistrates' officers and specialistdetective 'Runners'. Nor did they want the detectivebranch to signal an abandonmentof the preventiveand protectiveprinciples on which their Forcewas founded. The Commissionersdid not give the branchany generalresponsibility for the investigationof crime reportedin the metropolis. That remainedat the discretion of local Superintendentsunder the amendeddivisional systemthey controlled. The headquartersdetective officers were assignedonly to exceptionalcases, and solely at the discretionof the Commissioners,or were employed,again with the
10ibid. page 17 11Public RecordOff ice 110 4517361;Richardson, Sir B. (1887) voL II page 394 Emergenceof Detectives assentof the Commissioners,on enquiriesrequested by governmentdepartments. And the new detectiveswere not encouragedto cultivate informantsamongst the criminal classes,nor were they directedor allowed to associatewith criminals for that purpose." Rowan and Mayne's responseto the pressuresthey were put under in 1842was essentiallyminimalist. Unfortunately it was sufficient to causea significant shift in both the public and the political perceptionof the role of the New Police.
SamuelMarch Phillipps, the long servingUnder Secretaryof Stateat the Home Department,replied to Mayne'sproposals in a letter dated20th June, 1842." He told the Commissionersthat the Home Secretaryhad agreedto the employmentof a small numberof full-time detectives. ConsideringPhillipp's own fierce oppositionto the disbandmentof the old police offices and the officers they employed,so forcefully expressedby him to the 1838Select Committee, this letter no doubt causedhim as much trouble as it did the Commissioners. But the Detective Branch of the Metropolitan Police neverthelessthen appearedunder InspectorsHaynes and Pearcewith a strengthof six sergeants
Detective Branch expansion
Shortly after he becamesole Commissionerfor the Force,and we may surmise still grudgingly, Mayne allowed a temporaryincrease in the strengthof the DetectiveBranch of one Inspectorand one Sergeantin 1856. He eventually madethose additional appointmentspermanent in 1864. In the sameperiod, Mayne formalisedthe occasionalemployment of uniform police officers in plain clothesto look into particular crimes. In 1862he gavewritten authority for divisions to employ, at their discretionand strictly on a non-permanentbasis, up to a limit of 200 men in plain clothesat any one time. This expansioncompleted the final structureof his 'Divisional' systemof detection.
Theseare profoundly important developments,both for the emergingpolice serviceand for the public it served. Yet no record exists of any form of public debateor discussionof this significant extensionto die activities of the police servicebefore its implementation. In particular, no action was taken on the recommendationof the 1839Royal Commissionthat constablesshould be given the power to make 'inquires' into reportsof crime, and the post of public prosecutorremained unfilled.
12Smith, P. T. (I 985)page 6112 11Public RecordsOffice 110 4510S.29212 Emergenceof Detectives 112
No new Bills to regularisethis changein the criminal justice systemof the metropolis appearedon the Parliamentaryagenda. Nor were any amendmentsto existing legislation proposed. ParliamentaryPapers contain no record of this decision. Graham,the Home Secretaryat the time, seemsnot to have informed his colleaguesin governmentabout the first appearanceof the Detectivebranch. His Prime Minister was Sir Robert Peel. Even he doesnot seemto have noticed or mentionedthe event,although he may perhapsbe excused. He was at the time deeply embroiled in the political consequencesof his post-ReformAct transformationof the Tories into a new ConservativeParty. "' But the fact is that the recordsof Parliamentdo not include the emergenceof the full-time police detective,and it did not appearas an issue,nor was it debated,in either House. ParliamentaryDebates (Hansard) for the monthsof Juneand July 1842,when the letters on this subjectwere passingbetween Mayne and his Home Secretary, contain no referenceto thosehighly significant eventsin the history of British policing."
On an issuewhich a dozenyears earlier had arousedferocious debate both in the Houseand in the press,and only three yearspreviously had outragedboth Houses of Parliament,no public discussionfollowed the first tentativemanifestation of that 'despotic police of the continentalstates, with all the detestabledetails of espionageand domesticinterference' that had earlier so exercisedtile fears of Englishmenfor their freedom. The Governmentminister responsiblefor the developmentdid not evenmention it in Parliament,nor did lie publish it or otherwiseexpose it to public commentor debate.
Postscript - alternate interpretations
It must be said that this interpretationof theseevents will not be found in extant histories of, or commentaryon, British policing. It is, despitethe quantity and strengthof the evidenceavailable to supportit, unprecedentedin the literature on the emergenceof the full-time professionaldetective in the British police.
CharlesReith, the respectedand alreadyquoted author on the history of the British police service, is no counter-example. At the end of ChapterXIII of his 'A New Study of Police History' publishedin 1956,lie turns to the 'baffling problem' of the emergenceof the British police detective." Hebeginsby reproducingthe quotationmentioned earlier in which Edwin Chadwick claimed
14Eastwood, David (1992) 15Parliamentary Debates (I lansard) Third Series vols. URI andLXIV 16Reith, C. (I 956)page221 Emergenceof Detectives 113 that Rowan and Mayne 'disliked detectionon principle' and that they 'only yielded to its adoption' on 'superior authority', before going on to say:
'It is very difficult to imagineanyone forcing Rowan and Mayne to yield, againsttheirjudgement and principles, in a matter of this kind, and if they did yield, it could have beenonly to dictatesfrom the Home Off ice, backed possibly by the Cabinet. On the other hand,the fact that Rowan and Mayne strongly disliked detectionin comparisonwith preventionis clearly seenin the wording of earlier police documents,and they had very good reasonfor their views."'
He quotesliberally from those 'earlier police documents'to establishhis point before making an attemptto explain the disparity betweenthe strong contrary views of the Commissionersand their actionsin settingup the Detective Branch. His blamefirmly in 'the hands Home Office [by argumentputs the of officials ... [of function.' whom the] ... policing principle... preventionwas] ... confusedwith According to this view, by conflating 'principles' with 'functions' Home Office officials introduceddetection into the statedactivities of the professionalpolice serviceand, indeed,persuaded or cajoledthe Commissionersinto founding the Detective Branch.
Clearly, Reith's argumentdepends upon establishinga distinction betweentile 'principles' followed by the New Police and the actual 'functions' they performed. This device enableshim to describethe emergenceof the Detective Branch as merely a shift in emphasisamong the various 'functions' of the police rather than a departurefrom the preventive'principle' on which the whole organisationwas based. Somesupport for that interpretationof Reith's views on thesematters is given by consideringhis later remark that:
'Detection is a function of police, and a necessaryone, but, togetherwith all other police functions for the control of crime and disorder, it must be constantlyco-ordinated in serviceto the principle of prevention,and in no circumstancesbe allowed, as a function, to supersedeit. '"
However, no evidenceis presentedto supportthis conjecture. IndeedReith's discussionof theseissues effectively endswith that comment.
It is greatly to Reith's credit that he is both awareof tile disparity betweenthe apparentviews of the Commissionersand their action in first creatingthe
17ibid, page222 11ibid. pages223-224 Emergenceof Detectives 114
DetectiveBranch, and that his commandof the literature and sourcesleads him to recognisea needto suggestan explanationfor it. And his identification of the Home Office and its officials as prime suspectsin the matter is well-judged, as will be later shown,if not for the reasonshe gives. The weaknessof his explanationis however,two-fold. First, he doesnot apply to his problem the conceptof detectionas it was understoodby the Commissionersat the time. Secondand more importantly, his explanationdepends on both the preventionand the detectionof crime being functions of the British professionalpolice serviceat its first foundation.
As to the first point, Reith doesnot give due weight to the uniqueviews of the Commissionerson issuesof preventionand detectionin crime, set out in their evidenceto the 1833/34Select Committee on the Polis of the Metropolis. Put simply they saw no distinction betweenprevention and detectionin the operations of a streetpolice, and regardedtheir single function as being more than adequately servedby their patrolling constables.And on the secondpoint, contemporary sourcesestablish that the provisionsof the founding statuteof the New Police specifically excludethe Commissionersfrom any involvement in what the modern observerwould describeas criminal investigationand detection,and the public record showsthat they fought very hard to remain so. Equally, Under Secretary Phillipps' evidenceto the 1838Police Off ices SelectCommittee shows that, at the relevanttime, there was no unanimity or enthusiasminside the Home Office for the creationof a detectivebranch to carry out thosefunctions within the Metropolitan Police in 1842. Indeed,as will be shown, there is clear evidence the Home Office were fully awarethat such detectivework was not and was never intendedto be amongthe functionsof the New Police. HenceReith's conjecture of a distinction between'principles' and 'functions' in policing within the Home Office as an explanationof the emergenceof the full-time professionaldetective in the British police service,while useful and interesting,is not consistentwith tile evidencepresented here.
By comparisonwith Reith other authorsare far lessaware of tile problem. Clive Emsley,who takesa more sociologicalview of the history of policing saysin his 'The English Police: A political and social history', 'It was, aflcr all, Mayne who in June 1842persuaded the then Home Secretary,Sir JamesGraham, to authorise Emergenceof Detectives 115 the appointmentof two inspectorsand six sergeantsfor detectivework', " quoting as his sourceSmith, P. T. (1985).
Smith however,after describinginstances of the operationof the Commissioners' 'Divisional system' of detection,merely says:
'Few details are known aboutthe founding of the ScotlandYard detectives exceptfor a letter from Mayne to the Home Office recommendingthat two inspectorsand six sergeantsbe selectedfor "their abilities and general qualifications for thosepeculiar duties". The new band of detectives,freed from jurisdictional restraints,investigated crimes of a more seriousnature. They were sometimesdespatched to other parts of the country or even abroad."'
Although Smith seesno reasonto give the appearanceof the detectivesany specialthought, he accuratelyreports that:
'At first there was no full-time force of men trained specifically for detectionbecause for It there seemedno obvious need such... was after 1839 Runners for detectives with the abolition of the ... that the need was felt. "'
He seemstherefore to take somethingof Reith's position, i.e. the assumptionthat all aspectsof the detectionand preventionof crime were functions of tile New Police ab initio, without sharingReith's recognitionof the needfor an explanation of any of the Commissioners'behaviour or decisionsin settingup the Detective Branch.
It may be that Ernsley'sview is also colouredby that of other authorsin tile field. DouglasBrowne for instance,in his otherwisemagisterial 'Tile Rise of Scotland Yard' (1956) writes that following the Good incident and anothernotorious case;
'It is known that within a fortnight, their deliberationshastened by this seriesof events,the Commissionershad decidedto pressfor the immediate establishmentof a separateDetective Department at ScotlandYard. A 'Memorandum to DetectivePowers Police relative the of the ... was forwardedto the Home Office on Junethe 14"'."'
Browne claims that;
19 Emsley, C. (1991)page 72 20 Smith, P.T. (1985)page62 21 ibid 22 Browne,D. G. (1956)pagel2O Emergenceof Detectives 116
'the Commissioners' Memorandum has disappeared, but it ... seems that they asked for the appointment of two inspectors and eight sergeants to the new Detective Branch. $23
Indeed,in defenceof both Emsley and Browne, the ideathat the Commissioners, and particularly Richard Mayne, were advocatesand instigatorsof the emergence of the detectivesis widespreadin the literatureon British policing. Historians and commentatorsas diverseas Moylan (1946), Cobb (1957), Ascoli (1979) and Petrow (1994) take that line on the provenanceof the detectives. Cobbin particular developsthe hypothesisinto a full-blown, long-term conspiracyby Mayne to overcomethe oppositionof the Home Office and the reluctanceof Rowan to introducedetectives into policing. The penultimateparagraph of his chapteron 'The DetectiveDepartment' says;
'Thus did the DetectiveDepartment of the Metropolitan Police come into being. Its though had been creation- very suddenand sharpat the end... a long, slow and gradualprocess guided by the undeviatingdetermination of Richard Mayne."'
His conclusionis however,reached by reasoningthat, on the evidenceavailable in the public record, is inconsistentwith Mayne's views on this issue,.
It is difficult now to be certainhow this strandof thinking on the origins of the detectivesbegan but somesuspicion must be attachedto Sir John Moylan. He is amongthe earliestof modem authorson policing and his credentialsas an authoritative sourcecan hardly be questioned." His position as Receiverfor the Metropolitan Police bridgeswhatever gap there might be betweenthe Home Office and professionalpolicing. His post in the Metropolitan Police was, until recenttimes, equalto that of the Commissioner,and even now is regardedas secondin the commandstructure while being at the sametime to someextent outside it. Moylan's last position at the Home Off ice was equally at tile pinnacle of that hierarchy. So who should doubt him when he assertsthat;
'In 1842 the Commissioners Home Secretary, ...... persuadeda reluctant Sir JamesGraham, to sanction,as a cautiousexperiment, tile formation of a small detectivebranch'? "
23 ibid page 121 24Cobb (1957)page2071208 25Moylan, Sir J. (1934) 26 ibid. page 181 Emergenceof Detectives 117
Coupledwith the fact that Mayne, as a lawyer, carried on such correspondenceon crime as the Commissionerswere called upon to deal with, and that he alone signedthe 'Memorandumrelative to the detectivepowers of the police' (for which an explanationcan be given arising from a significant, but at the time undiscovered,drafting error in the Metropolitan Police Act of 1839),an assumptionthat Mayne in someway promptedor fosteredthe emergenceof the professionaldetective may be understandable.However, it is not ultimately defensibleor compatiblewith the availableevidence.
On the other side it might well be arguedthat the contrary now needsan explanation. If Sir John is so well placedto know the truth about thesematters, why should he lie or dissemble? That question,which connectswith the issue of the role of the Home Office and its officials in thesematters, will be addressed in a later chapter,when the relative contribution of the Home Off ice and the Commissionersof the Metropolitan Police to the appearanceof the professional police detectiveis examinedand assessed. For the presentpurpose it is enough to say that all Home Office officials can be shownto havea strong and continuing motive to minimise the extentof their involvementin the creationof a Detective Branch within the Metropolitan Police, and to emphasisethat of the Commissioners.
Finally, I could not leavethis discussionof the myth of Mayne and the Commissionersas the progenitor(s)of the professionaldetective without mentioning F. E. Heron, a regular contributor to the magazineof the Metropolitan Police Training Schoolat Hendonin London. Writing on the origins of detectivesfor the benefit of the staff and studentsat that Training School lie said;
'The Commissionershad wantedfor sometime to have a body of men trained to investigatethe in 1842 specially more seriouscrimes ... and they managedto persuadethe Home Secretaryto approvesuch a section."'
Othersfar well lessacquainted with, or concernedabout, the history of policing than Heron can hardly be blamedfor mirroring his error.
Other writers, such as Brogden(1982), Bayley (1981), Critchley(1967), and Prothero(1931) are, in their various ways, useful and valuable contributorsto the literature on the history of British policing. But they are also amongthose who, like Smith (1985), take the function of crime detectionby the police for granted
27Heron, F. E. (dateu/k) page 18 Emergenceof Detectives 118 and thereforesee no needto give any specialattention to, or explanationfor, the emergenceof a full-time DetectiveBranch.
Among suchwriters are somehowever, who deservespecial mention. The categoryincludes at leasttwo, Stead(1985) and Tobias (1970), who were active academicmembers of the staff at the National Police College (as it was then known) at the time of their writing. Given that suchwell-placed expertsin the history and businessof policing are contentthat the appearanceand presenceof a large and constantlygrowing body of full-time detectiveswithin the professional police serviceneeds no specialexplanation or discussion,it is hardly surprising that the wider body of academicsand commentatorsinterested in the subjecthave tendedto take the sameview. That lacunain the study of the developmentof the British police servicewill, I hope,now beginto be filled.
Conclusion
This last part of this chapterpresents alternate views on the processby which criminal investigationand detectionbecame accepted as a full-time function for British professionalpolice officers. My interpretationhas beengiven together with its sourcesso that the whole of the material on which it is basedis readily available for critical inspection. It is now for the readertojudge which of the many availableexplanations for the first emergenceof the British professional police detectiveis to be preferred.
What is truly surprisingabout alternativeaccounts of the origins and development of the modem detectivehowever, is the lack of any real appreciationof the significanceof the reportsof the two Home Office departmentalcommittees examinedin the next chapters. As will be shown,neither the presenceof detectivesin, nor their impact on, British professionalpolicing can be properly understoodor assessedwithout referenceto them. Fergusson 119
9
Fergusson and the Detective Branch
Mayne as sole Commissioner
CharlesRowan retired, honouredand deeplyrespected, on groundsof ill-health at the beginningof 1850. After an uncomfortableperiod with his undistinguished successor,Captain Hay, who died in office in 1855,the founding 1829Act was amendedto allow RichardMayne to becomesole Commissioneron 20th August that year. The DetectiveBranch of the Metropolitan Police grew very little under Mayne. Only in 1867,twenty-five yearsafter its inception,did the small seed planted in 1842end its long gestationand begin to grow.
In that year Mayne, as sole Commissioner,found himself again under heavy pressurefrom the Home Office. Two problemsfuelled public and political unrest aboutthe work of his Force. First, the long running agitation associatedwith the demandfor electoralreform, a campaignthat culminatedin the passageof the secondReform Act that year. Second,the disruption and outright terrorism associatedwith the activities of Feniansand other Irish insurgents. Of the two, Fenianism.had the larger impact.
'The Times' of London first mentionsthe 'Fenians' in March 1864. For the next couple of yearsthey are the subjectof commentas causingtrouble in Ireland, the USA and Canada. In early 1866there are reportsof them being responsiblefor disturbancesin Bradford.' They are first mentionedin Parliamentin Junethat year! By March 1867 'The Times' reportedfears of a Fenianrising in Liverpool." Public disquietcame to a headon 18th September, 1867 when Police SergeantBrett was murderedduring an attemptto rescueFenian prisoners in Manchester.
The Queen'sSpeech to the new sessionof Parliamentthat year included a condemnationof Fenianism. Shesaid;
'I rely for [its] effectual suppressionupon the f inn administrationof the law and the loyalty of the greatmass of my subjects.'
In a 'Humble Addressto Her Majesty' readto the Houseof Commonsthe next day (20th November 1867)Mr. Pryce said;
I 'The Times', 3 April, 1866page4 col 4 2 ibid. 2 June1866page 6coL 4 3 ibid. 15March 1867pageIOcoL 6 Fergusson 120
'We assureYour Majesty of the deepregret with which we learn that the treasonableconspiracy commonly know as Fenianism, baffled and repressedin Ireland, has assumedin Englandthe form of organised violence and assassination.
We beg to convey to Your Majesty our participation in the opinion which Your Majesty expressesthat such outrages require to be rigorously put down, and to express our confidence that Your Majesty may rightly rely, for their effectual suppression, upon the firm Administration of the law and the loyalty of the great mass of Your majesty's subjects. "
In an editorial dealingwith the debateon the Queen'sSpeech, 'The Times' heartily endorsesthe Sovereign'splea for firmnessin the face of insurgency.' In the samearticle it reportsan incident in which GathorneHardy (later, Earl Cranbrook),the Home Secretary,was 'beardedin his office' on 18thNovember. A group of protesters,on behalf of the three Fenianscondemned to deathin Manchesterfor the murder of SergeantBrett, soughtan audiencewith the Home Secretary. He refusedto meetthem. They then invadedhis office to put their plea personallyfor a commutationof the deathsentences. SuchJacobite behaviour,said 'The Times', madeall too clear the needfor the firm action promisedin the Queen'saddress to Parliament.
later, 13th December, Fenianbomb killed 12 injured Three weeks on . a peopleand 126 othersin a botchedattempt to rescuetwo of their membersfrom Clerkenwell Prison. That incident, coming so soon after the failure of the Metropolitan Police to protect him from the mob even in his own office, convincedHardy that the Metropolitan Police was neither ableto protectLondoners from the dangerand damagecaused by domesticand Irish insurgency,nor capableof dealing with the conspiraciesunderpinning such movements. With public and political pressure intensifying he determinedto resolveboth problems. The f irst was relatively easily addressedby a decisionto review the strength,structure and organisationof the Force. But the secondpresented more complex difficulties.
Mayne's opposition
Agitation for electoralreform and Fenian insurgencywere both driven by groups of hard-coreactivists. They differed in their degreeof willingness to break the law or to use violence to achievetheir objectives. But both movementsdepended
4 Journalsof the Houseof Commonsvol 123page6 5 'The Times' 201hNovember 1867, page 6 coL I Fergusson 121 for their successon tight-knit secrecyamong the leadership. Mayne'spolicing methods,his focus on preventablecrime and his insistencethat his men should never 'take on the guiseof spies', were incapableof dealingwith such movements. The solution to the problem is to be found in what Mayne had described 'duties detective [which] in as of a character...... a moral point of [had] been denounced', developed view ...... repeatedly suchas those and practised by the Bow StreetRunners and the other magistrates'officers. Skill in information-gatheringand informant-cultivatingis requiredfor successin dealing with all forms of criminal conspiracies,including insurgencyfrom whatever source. But Mayne's oppositionto any proposalto imposethe 'detective duties' of the magistrates'officers on his Forcewas predicable,well-known and immovable. Indeed,on the evidencehe and Rowan had given to the 1837/38 SelectCommittee on the Police Offices he would be likely to view the conspiraciesof reformersand Feniansas non-preventableif not political, and thus of no direct concernto his 'street police'.
Understandably,Secretary of StateHardy 'found Mayne's views on detection "quite inapplicableto the times and the circumstances."" He may evenhave been awareof the legislativedifficulty in expandingor extendingthe work of the detectivebranch of the Metropolitan Police that had beenraised with his predecessors,first by the 1839Royal Commission,and later by Mayne himself in his 1842letter. Hardy must surely also haveanticipated that any aftemptto create a plain clothesdetective unit within the Metropolitan Police Force capableof dealing with conspiracieswould not only meet implacableobjection from his Commissioner, but might, despitethe Fenianoutrages, arouse all the old political fears of despotismthat had accompaniedPeel's original efforts to found the New Police. Yet to combatdomestic or Irish insurgencyon the English mainland,that is what Hardy needed;a body of plain clothesdetectives capable of coping with 'treasonableconspiracies'.
It would be wrong however,to assumethat the reformersand Fenianswere the sourceof, or eventhe main elementin, pressureon Mayne to increaseor expand his detectivebranch. Simple growth in crime and disorderhad a major impact on the New Police. Well beforethe eventsof 1867Mayne had respondedto the increasingworkload falling on his small group of headquartersdetectives. He had appointeda Chief Inspectorto haveoverall commandon the Detective Branch and increasedits strengthby four Sergeants. He later addeda Clerk
Emsley,C (199I)page 72 Fergusson 122
Sergeantto deal with its growing administrativeburdens, thereby almost doubling the size of the unit." But evenat this size, its maximum under Mayne, the full time DetectiveBranch still comprisedonly 16 officers out of the more than 8,000 strengthof his Force. 'Quick and fresh pursuit' and local crime investigation remainedat the discretionof local Superintendents,employing their own officers as part-time 'divisional detectives'for that purpose. Mayne's expansionfell a very long way short of meetingHardy's need,but it was as far as he was likely to go. And his standingwith the press,public and politicians as the sole remaining founder of the Force protectedhim from being bullied or ignored on this issue.
After struggling with the problem for sometwo monthsHardy found a way round it. He decidedto appoint Sir JamesFergusson, MP, a stalwart memberof his Parliamentaryteam, to headan enquiry into the structureand organisationof Metropolitan Police. He presentedthe move as a preliminary to an expansionof the Force by one thousandmen but madeno mention of any intent to solve the problem of criminal conspiracies. Significantly, he did not seeka publicly accountablebody such as a ParliamentarySelect Committee, still lessa Royal Commission,to carry out the work. He might well havedone. The importance of this increasein the size of the Force and public interestin the effectivenessof governmentin dealingwith agitation for reform and the Fenianthreat certainly justified that level of inquiry. Insteadhe madethe enquiry an internal or Departmentalcommittee working directly under his control, and reporting to him rather than to Parliament. If Hardy's purposein adoptingthat form of enquiry was to ensurethat his plansfor a counter-insurgencycapacity within the Force could be concealedfrom public scrutiny it was well-judged.
On 8th February 1868Hardy issuedan 'order of reference'to the inquiry.
'I think it desirableat a time when the police force is being so largely increased,to enquireinto its condition, its governmentin its several divisions, the dutiesdischarged by the AssistantCommissioners, and how far their time is occupiedin clerical work, the advisability of appointing personsof higher position and educationas officers betweenthe Superintendentsand the AssistantCommissioners and Chief Commissioner."
7 Reportson the MetropolitanPolice Force. 1868-1878-1879 Public RecordsOffice H045IA4946312, and Report of the DepartmentalCommittee 1868 Metropolitan Police Service Library, page 15 (fooo 8 ibid (top) Fergusson 123
The 'order of reference'says nothing whatsoeverabout the needto form or expanda specialistdetective branch, nor doesit mentionthe problem of the conspiraciesbehind the public disorderand the Feniansoutrages. Indeed,it makesno specific referenceto the organisationof crime investigationand detectionat all.
The FegussonReport
BesidesSir JamesFergusson, MP as Chairman,members of the committeewere Mr. Henry Thring and Mr. GeorgeEverest. The DepartmentalCommittee completedits work in three months,delivering its Reportto Hardy on 8th. May 1868. After paying tribute to 'the greatpublic servicesthat have beenrendered by the Commissionerduring a period of serviceextending over 39 years, and frequently in circumstancesof greatanxiety and difficulty', the Report beganwith the main issueon the Committee'spublicly announcedagenda.
Despite its expressedadmiration for (now Sir) Richard Mayne and his contribution to the developmentof the Metropolitan Police,the Committeesaid that it was, 'however, of opinion that a systemadapted only to the governmentof 3,000 men may well be found to be defectivewhen applied to the governmentof 8,000men', ' and that sucha systemcould not copewith 'the evils that arise from the greatextension of the Metropolitan Police force in numbers, and the Metropolitan Police District in area, without a correspondingchange in the organisationof the force, especiallyin referenceto the numberof superior officers."' Again, the Committeedoes not mention the evils occasionedby the activities of Feniansor other agitatorsand insurgents. Nor doesit criticise the arrangementsmade by the Metropolitan Police for the investigationof crime.
The Committeeis however,highly critical of the organisationof the Force and particularly its apparentfailure to adaptto the rapid social changesin which it had becomea significant factor. There are signsthat the sharpnessof this critique deeply disturbedRichard Mayne. He must have felt particular pain in readingthe conclusionthat:
'the managementof the police is extremelycentralised, nothing of importancebeing done exceptunder the direction of the commissioneror assistantcommissioner. "'
9 ibid. page 16 10 ibid. page 16 It ibid. page 12 Fergusson 124
and that,
'We think it impossiblethat, with so limited a numberof superiorofficers who are engagedin consideringminute details of discipline and of general management,there can be sufficient contactand acquaintancebetween officers and men to secureconfidence or proper supervision, and the inquiries we havemade have justified us in our conclusionin this respect."'
To solve that problemthe Committeerecommended, among many other things, that the Metropolitan Police areabe divided into four police 'Districts'. Each District would compriseof a numberof parishesto be commandedby an 'Assistant who would be chargedwith the whole responsibility of protectinghis District In district form in for ... short, the police would somerespects, police purposes,almost a separatetown. "'
Studentsof police history will recognisethe proposal. It is almost exactly, after many experimentsand variations,the structureadopted by the Metropolitan Police Servicetoday. The bulk of the remainderof the Report dealswith a range of administrative,recruiting, disciplinary, financial and even educationalmatters arising from a decisiongreatly to increaseits strength.
Fergusson and the detectives
Having thus dealt with the public part of Hardy's plan, the Committeeturned to his second,undisclosed, problem. It devotedthe last six paragraphsof its 'General Account' to the 'Detective Force' and two paragraphsof its 'Recommendations'to the samesubject. Despitethere being nothing in their publicly announcedinstructions from the Secretaryof Stateto authoriseit, and without adducingany substantialargument or evidenceto justify it, the Committeeproduced a two-prongedrecommendation. that:
'The detectivepolice, having regardto their number, appearto the Committeeto be very efficient for the detectionof ordinary crime, but their numbersare wholly inadequateto the presentrequirements of the [and] metropolis,...... their constitution scarcelyadapts them to cope with conspiraciesand secretcombinations. '
Accordingly the Committeebaldly statethat:
12ibid. page] 7 13ibid. Fergusson 125
'the detectivepolice shouldform a separatedivision underthe control of a specialsuperintendent and underthe immediatecommand of the headof police.""
The Committeewas not contentwith overturningthe clear wording of the original Act of 1829on the definition of the functions and purposesof the New Police. It decidedto contradictthe one and only GeneralOrder ever issuedby Robert Peel, the political progenitorof the Metropolitan Police. It recommendedthat,
'The officer in commandof the detectiveforce shouldhave the power to recommendmen for his division, whetheror not they have filled the office of constable."'
By thus introducingthe ideaof men being recruiteddirectly into the plain clothes branchof the Metropolitan Police without having first serveda period in uniformed preventivepatrol, the Committeecontravenes Peel's dictum of 10th December1829 that;
tno personshall be qualified to fill a superiorstation unlesshe shall have serveda given time in a subordinatestation'. "
All this was anathemato RichardMayne. The Committee'srecommendations ignore all the reservationsabout the employmentof detectiveshe had voiced in 1842. To have his opinions on that issuerejected in a report that also reflected badly on his stewardshipof the Force,must havebeen particularly galling. But neither his evidence(if he appearedbefore it) nor any other commentshe madeto the Committeehave been discovered. Neither the copy of the Committee's Report in the Public RecordOffice nor that currently held in the Metropolitan Police ServiceLibrary includesa record of the evidenceit heard.
Significance of Fergusson
Two important points ought to be raisedon this latter 'detective' part of Fergusson'sReport. First, before reachingits conclusionsand recommendations aboutthe 'Detective Force' of the Metropolitan Police the Committeeclearly knew that there was no legislative authority for its existence. Second,its terms of reference gave it no remit even to consider the criminal investigative activities of the Force.
14ibid. pages21 - 22 Is ibid 16Parliamentary Papers (1830) voL U71page 408 Fergusson 126
On the first point in its Preliminary, GeneralAccount of the Force, oppositethe side-heading'Duties of police', the Committeedescribes and confirms the role and responsibilitiesof the Metropolitan Police Force in this period. The Committeesays;
'The ordinary dutiesof the police force consistin patrolling the streetsand preventingcrime; their extraordinaryor specialduty is in acting in masses for the purposeof quelling riots or insurrections, and keepingorder on the occasionof stateprocessions, state parties, and other public occasions.
A subordinate,but not unimportant,part of their duty as connectedwith the preservationof the public peaceis attendingat Police Courts and giving evidenceagainst offenders. "'
No mention of any kind of 'detectiveduties' in madein this section,and the involvementof Metropolitan Police constablesin the detectionand prosecutionof criminal offendersis shownas arising directly from their peacekeepingduties and as being confined to them giving evidenceas witnesses. The Committeethen reportsthat 'Other distinct branchesof duty are attachedto the police force by Act of Parliament,as for example,' - giving a list of other such duties requiredof the police force - before pointing out that, 'These duties form a separatebranch, having little in commonwith the ordinary duties of the police." Again there is no mention in the Reportat this point of the Detectivebranch among the list of 'distinct branches'of the Force.
Clearly the Committeehad found no Parliamentaryauthority for the employment of constableson 'detectiveduties' under any legislation,otherwise it would have beenmentioned at this point in the Report. By default therefore,the Committee's finding must be that not evenMayne's strictly limited employmentof men in plain clothesin a DetectiveBranch engagedsolely on the investigationof exceptionalcases of crime, or on governmentenquiries, was authorisedby statute. The Committeedoes not evennote the 1842agreement between Mayne and his Secretaryof StateBruce to 'experiment' with a Detectivebranch.
The Committeedeal with the detectiveaspect of the activities of the Force under the entirely separateheading of the 'Detective Force'. It gives a fairly good accountof Richard Mayne's Divisional basedsystem of crime investigation, saying,
17Report of the DepartmentalCommittee, etc (18681 op. cit. page 10 18 ibidpagell Fergusson 127
'the superintendentsof every division are allowed to employ a certain numberof constablesin plain clothesto makeenquiries and hunt up offenders.
Theseplain clothesmen receivethe samepay as ordinary policemen,and are not employedcontinuously in plain clothes,but are changedfrom time to time.'
The Committeefailed to recognisethe strictly limited remit of theselocally employeddetectives but confirmedRichard Mayne's assertionin his 1842letter that, 'The organisationof the Police was madein the first instancewithout any direct provision for the performanceof... detectiveduties. "' The Committee endorsehis view, reportingthat, 'In the original constitutionof the police no provision was madefor the establishmentof sucha force."' It also echoesthe view of the 1822and 1833/34Select Committees by addingthat, 'The English jealousy of any police force at all would not hearof anything approachingto what was called the "spy system""' Equally, the Committeemake no mention at this point of any statuteauthorising or empoweringthe constablesof the Metropolitan Police to make inquiries into reportsof crime or other offences,such as were grantedby the magistratesto their 'discontinued' officers and as was recommendedby the Royal Commissionof 1839. This surely, would be the place for any such finding. The Committeemerely acceptthat what it called 'Obvious necessity"' had led to a gradualincrease in the level of crime investigationactivity undertakenby Metropolitan Police constables.
The DepartmentalCommittee does not explorethe natureor extent of that 'obvious necessity',though had it discoveredMayne's 1842Memorandum it may have identified its cause. In his MemorandumMayne had pointed out to his Home Secretarythat his 'divisional system' had emerged,'When [after the Acts of 1839]the entire responsibilityof the detectionof criminals was gradually cast upon the police'." Fergusson'sCommittee simply reportsthe establishmentof the 16 person,full-time detectiveforce they found in Mayne's reluctantly introduced permanentdetective ranch without further amplification or explanation."
19 ibid. page 15 20 ibid. page 14 21 ibid. pages14-15 22 ibid. page 15 23 Memorandumrelative to the Detectivepowers of police' (1842)Public RecordsOffice HO 451292 24 Reportof the DepartmentalCommittee, etc (18681 op cit. ibid. Fergusson 128
Neither its findings nor its lack of them troubled the Committee.Nor was it in any other way deflectedfrom its intent to increaseand expandthe detectivework of the police. The Committeepressed on to recommendthe establishmentof a centralised,full-time detectiveforce within the Metropolitan Police 'under the control of a specialsuperintendent and underthe immediatecommand of the head of police."'
The secondimportant point aboutthis Report is familiar but bearsrepetition. The Committee'sorder of referencefrom the Secretaryof Stategave it no authority to considerthe organisationof crime investigationin the Metropolitan Police Force. Mr. SecretaryHardy's publicly announcedorder to the Committeementions only his wish for information aboutthe structureand organisationof the Force at a time when he proposedgreatly to enlargeit. He gave Sir JamesFergusson and his colleaguesno public remit to review its employmentof detectives. Even when answeringa Parliamentaryquestion shortly after the appointmentof the Committee,Hardy gaveno hint of the possibility of a reorganisationof the detectivework of the Metropolitan Police. In fact, he doesnot mention the enquiry then being conductedby Sir JamesFergusson at all.
On that occasion, in answerto what would probably be instantly recognisedby modernParliamentarians as a 'Planted' questionfrom Viscount Enfield about plans to increasethe size of the Metropolitan Police Force, Hardy says;
'I haveto statethat I discoveredlast Novemberthat the police had an amountof work castupon them which preventedtheir obtaining what I consideressential rest in order to do their work efficiently. In consequence I authorisedan addition of a thousandconstables to be madeto the force."'
Yet despitethis answerin Parliament,the CommitteeHardy appointedto report on the consequencesof the increasein the strengthof the Force devotes considerableenergy to radical recommendationsabout the systemfor the employmentof full-time detectives. It could not so far departfrom its ostensible remit without the encouragement,or at leastthe connivance,of its sponsor. The suspicionmust be therefore,that the creationof a large full-time detectiveforce was always part of the Committee'spurpose. Furthermore,its internal Departmentalformat ensuredthat that aspectof its work could be concealedfrom both Parliamentand the public. And so it proved.
21 ibid. pages21122 26 'The Times' 22 February1868page 6 coL I Fergusson 129
At the cost of belittling Mayne's greatachievements, and no doubt swept along by the political aftermathof the Brett murder and the Clerkenwell bombing, the Committeeput forward proposalsfor a far-reachingcentralisation and expansion of the detectiveactivities of his Force. The recommendationssuited their sponsor'sends perfectly. Hardy and the Home Office not only had a much strengthenedand better organisedForce in London but they also had their counter-insurgencyunit.
In a final flourish, which is of somesignificance in the history of the professional police detective,the Committeeeven went to the trouble of offering a revolutionary remedyfor any legislative or regulatorydifficulties lying in the path of their proposalsas well as for Mayne's opposition. In a long forgotten, eventually ignored, but significant recommendationthe Committee,'propose that, as soonas practicablethe police force shouldbe placedby Act of Parliament absolutelyunder the control of the Secretaryof State' thus oncemore fundamentallycontradicting the intention of the legislatorsof the original Act that had foundedthe Metropolitan Police. "'
Aftermath
There can be little doubt that Richard Mayne found the outcomeof Sir James Fergusson'sinquiry totally unacceptable. His views on policing are incompatible with both its conclusionsand its recommendations.Its criticisms of his personal conductof affairs must havecaused him greatpain. Whetherthe resultantstress was a factor in his untimely deathshortly after the publication of the Committee's Report is impossibleto determine. It would be remarkableif he did not feel subjectto unfair attacktoward the end of his life.
But his loss, the coincidentreplacement of SecretaryHardy by a new man, Henry Bruce, in the samemonth, coupledwith continuing public disquiet over the Fenianthreat, probably explainswhy Sir JamesFergusson's Report doesnot occupy the place it ought in the history of the developmentof the modem British police service. In the circumstancesit would, perhaps,have beenfelt insensitive to draw too much attentionto a documentso critical of Richard Mayne and his conductof his office. More probably,the Home Office might not havewished to advertiseeither it plansto counterFenianism, or the Committee'sradical recommendationsabout the future structureof the Metropolitan Police Force.
27Report of the DepartmentalCommittee, etc (18681 op cit. page 17 Fergusson 130
In any event, and in a patternthat was to becomefamiliar, the Home Office did not publish Fergusson'sreport, or releaseit to Parliamentfor scrutiny by MP's. Mr. Harvey Lewis MP put a Questionin the Houseto the Home Secretaryon 8th June 1868about this Home Office CommitteeReport. He askedif the Secretary of Statewould lay a copy of it 'upon the Table of the House' for the information of MPs. Hardy declinedto do so, saying 'for the reasonthat the witnesseswere informed that their evidencewould not be madepublic. "'
By taking that stance,Hardy departedthe Parliamentaryview of the founder of the Metropolitan Police Force,Robert Peel, on theseissues. When faced, on 28th May 1830, with a similar questionin the Houseabout those employedin the Force, Peel said;
'All havebeen issued, both I the orderswhich generalas well as secret... should be most willing to lay on the Table of the House. There is no sort of information connectedwith the Police that I am not ready to give.... I am convincedthat the efficiency of the Police would be increasedin proportion as it is exposedto the scrutiny of the House."'
But then Peel's New Police did not, at that stage,include a detectivedepartment. Nor did he have any plansto createone.
Mayne's deathalso explainswhy the detectiveproposals of Fergusson's1868 Committeewere not subjectto the informed and committed public opposition they merited. The deathof Mayne, Hardy's concealment,and his replacementby a new Secretaryof State,overshadowed the Report. But thosecircumstances did not dilute or delay its implementation. In the untimely and unexpectedabsence of Mayne, and after the departureof the Hardy from the Home Office, the new Commissioner,Lt. Colonel EdmundHenderson, carried into effect much of Fergusson'srecommendations for the detectivebranch of the Metropolitan Police. More significantly, the spirit of the Committee'swork lived on to have a revolutionary influenceon the developmentof the professionalpolice service. Yet the constablesof the Metropolitan Police Force still lacked any statutory power or authority for their involvementin the investigationand detectionof crime, other, that is, than when they actedunder the control and directionsof one of the magistratesof the metropolis.
28Parli=entary Debates(Hansard) vol CXCI cot 1222 29 ibid. New SeriesvoL XYIVcols. 1200and 1201 Ibbetson 131
10
Ibbetson and the Criminal Investigation DeDartment
Sir Richard Mayne died, in post but at home,on Boxing Day, 1868. He could not have chosena more unfortunatemoment. Mayne had had sole commandof the Force for 13 yearsfollowing the retirementof CharlesRowan (also 'Sir') on P January1850, and the deathof Rowan's successor,Captain Hay, in 1855. Mayne's loss cameat the end of the year in which Gladstonefirst mobilised the new electorateproduced by the Reform Act of the previousyear to lead the Liberals into power with a comfortablemajority. The new administration embarkedon a vigorous programmeof change. Its Home Secretary,Henry Austin Bruce, played his full part. A test of his fitnessfor high office came almost immediately. Seventeendays after his appointment,he heardof Mayne's suddenpassing.
Just when continuity was vital, Mayne's deathremoved the last link with the foundersof British professionalpolicing. Peelhimself resignedfrom the Commonsin 1846and died after a fall from his horseon ConstitutionHill in 1850. SamuelMarch Phillipps, the Home Office mandarinwho saw the Force through its formative years, departedon pensionin April 1848, and Rowan had passedon in 1852,a meretwo yearsinto his retirement. Even the original Receiverof the Metropolitan Police, John Wray, a powerful and independentpost in the organisation,went in 1860. None of the original 'top team' remainedto protect the founding traditions of the Metropolitan Police. The new Home Secretaryfaced an immediatecrisis with no precedent,procedure or experienced guide to help him.
His solution was to makethe only ever Acting appointmentto the Commissionershipin the history of the Force. After a four day interregnum Bruce askedthe senior of the two AssistantCommissioners, Colonel D. W. P. Labalmondiere,to be Acting Commissioner. He then embarkedon a searchfor a permanentsuccessor to RichardMayne.
It proved difficult to find someonenot only able but willing to step into Richard Mayne's shoes. Eventually Bruce settledon a man alreadywithin his Department,Lt. Col. EdmundHenderson, the Surveyor-Generalof Prisonssince 1863. Henderson,a soldier by training and a Royal Engineerby profession,had risen to prominencein governmentservice in the Convict Department. He had Ibbetson 132
madea good impressionas Superintendentof the last British penal colony in WesternAustralia, and subsequentlyin the top prisonjob within the Home Departmentitself.
The Home Office had every reasonto hopethat the arrival of Hendersonin the Commissioner'soffice would easethe implementationof the recommendationsof Fergusson'sCommittee. That is probably a sufficient explanationfor his selection,although the official record throws little light on what process,if any, led to him being offered the post. His long backgroundin the prison service certainly containednothing to preparehim for the protectiveand peacekeeping responsibilitiesof his new command. If anything it seemedlikely to bias him againstprevention in mattersof crime and toward detection,prosecution and punishment. If that was indeedthe reasonfor his appointmentthose who chose him were destinedto be disappointed.
Implementation of the Fergusson Report
Hendersonfound Mayne's small headquartersdetective branch already in existenceon his arrival in the Commissioner'soffice on 1P February 1869. As a result of his predecessor'sreluctant acquiescence to the promptingsof his Secretaryof Statein 1842the branchnow had a respectabletradition behind it. In the twenty or so yearsprior to Henderson'sappointment detectives had gradually becomean integral, if small, part of the Metropolitan Police Force. Hendersonalso found a radical Home Office DepartmentalReport aboutthe structureand organisationof his new Force lying on his desk awaiting action. It included important changesin the size, natureand importanceof the detective aspectof his responsibilities.
In his first year Hendersoncreated the devolvedstructure for the Force recommendedby Fergusson's1868 Committee. Four District Superintendents becamean intermediatelayer of commandbetween headquarters and divisions. In addition, and no doubt underthe urgent promptingsof the Home Off ice, he increasedconsiderably both the numbersand the pay of the officers attachedto the DetectiveBranch. He also raisedthe rank of the off icer in chargeto Superintendent,and appointedthree new Chief Inspectorsto it. Six first class sergeantsjoined the strengthtogether with an additional secondclass sergeant. At the sametime he significantly modified Richard Mayne's 'divisional' system by supplementingit with lbbetson 133
'a detectivesergeant and a number(fixed in every instanceby the Chief Commissioner)of constables,permanently stationed in eachdivision,... [to The investigation in the division in the first instanceis whom] ... of all crime entrusted."
To his credit however, and perhapsto the disappointmentof his sponsors, Hendersondid not groupthe detectivestogether into a separatedivision, nor he did not do away with the key principle that local divisions should be responsible for the proper investigationof crimesoccurring on their patch. Under Henderson,as underMayne, local Superintendentsremained responsible for deploying constablesto crime investigationeven though someof those constables were now employedpermanently in suchwork
In other matters,Henderson did not implementFergusson's concept of direct entry into the detectiveforce. Nor did either he or the Home Office follow up the proposalto bring in legislationto put the Force 'absolutely under the control of the Secretaryof State'. Both were quietly droppedor ignored. But eventhat partial and incompleteimplementation of Fergusson's1868 Report set a precedent that coloured all subsequentviews of the role of the Metropolitan Police. It also had a significant impact on the developmentof policing throughoutthe nation.
After an initial flurry of activity, the organisationand control of crime investigationand detectiondrifted off the list of the Commissioner'spriorities until almost a decadelater. Then in 1877all Mayne's misgivings aboutthe corrupting consequencesof establishinga permanentdetective branch in the Force camespectacularly home to roost. His vindication camelate, but it was complete. A scandalouscase of corruption involving the headquartersdetectives of the Metropolitan Police burst on the pagesof the broadsheets.
The caseoriginated with the conviction of two major criminals, William Kurr and Harry Benson,for a fraud againsta Madamede Goncourtand others. Their methodwas a version of the time-honoured'get-rich-quick' confidencetrick of an 'infallible' horserace betting systemdressed up with all the usual flourishes of hints of insider-informationand owner-involvement. When Kurr and Benson landedin prison, they madeserious allegations of police corruption. Their target was a group of the most senior detectivesin the Metropolitan Police; three of the
Report the DepartmentalCommission to inquire into DetectiveForce the Metropolitan of ... the of Police (1878).Public RecordOffice, HO 45166692,page jv lbbetson 134
Chief Inspectorswho were attachedto the Detectivebranch at ScotlandYard as a result of the implementationof Fergusson's1868 recommendations.
On Tuesday20'h November, 1877at the Central Criminal Court, at the conclusion of what cameto be popularly called the 'Turf Fraud case' or the 'CaseAgainst the Detectives', Chief InspectorsDruscovich and Palmerand InspectorMeike1john, togetherwith a solicitor namedFroggart, were convictedon an indictment for a conspiracyto preventthe apprehensionand conviction of personscharged with crime. The Court sentencedeach of the police officers to imprisonmentfor two years. The jury acquitteda third Chief Inspectorof the Detective branch,Clarke, on the sameindictment!
The lbbetson Commission
With committal for trial proceedingsin the 'Turf Fraud case' going on at Bow StreetMagistrates Court, Disraeli's Home Secretary,Sir Richard Assheton- Cross,appointed another internal Home Office enquiry. This time it took the form of a DepartmentalCommission. The earlier FergussonCommittee had concealedits purpose. The new Commissiondisplayed no suchreticence. Its terms of referencespecifically directedit 'to inquire into the State,Discipline and Organisationof the DetectiveForce of the Metropolitan Police'. Assheton-Cross selectedSir Henry Selwyn lbbetsonBt., MP to be Chairman.'
Hendersonhad every reasonto expectthe Commissionto be critical of the lack of interesthe and his seniorcolleagues had taken in the activities of their high ranking detectives. Newspaperreports of the committal proceedingsat Bow StreetMagistrates Court showedthat the detectivesappeared to havebeen accountableonly to eachother. Fortunatelythe corruption seemedto be confined to the small body of headquartersdetectives at ScotlandYard. Hendersoncould expectthat the Commissionwould focus its enquiry, and its criticisms, on those officers rather than the divisional detectivesemployed locally by Superintendents. The Commissionmight evendecide to do away with thoseheadquarters officers. At the very least it must recommendthat they be more closely controlled and directed. Hendersonacted quickly to pre-emptthe Commission'sdeliberations and neutralisethe bad presshis Forcewas getting.
2 The Times Wednesday21" November,1877page9coL 2 3 Public RecordOffice, HO 45166692.papers, item I lbbctson 135
Henderson's resPonse
Before the Commissionhad time to begin its work, Hendersonproduced a report, dated 14th September 1877, in which he undertookto reorganisehis detectivesto makethe supervisionof their work more effective.' Heproposedtodosoin ways that would preserveand protectthe principles of Mayne's divisional system. Returning to hitherto neglectedaspects of the Report of Fergusson's1868 Committee, Hendersonsaid that he would now form,
'a SpecialDetective Division underthe control of a Superintendent, stationedat the CommissionersOff ice, selectingthe bestmen in the existing DetectiveForce and leaving the remainderto act as patrols in their respectiveDivisions, a work in which they haverendered excellent servi e.2
Bending somewhatin the direction he thought the Committeewas likely to go, and building on the District structurewhich the 1868Committee had also introduced,he went on to 'proposeto appointfour District Inspectors,one to each District for the generalcharge of the Detectivesin the District. ' He hoped 'that the alterationsI now submit will result in the better supervisionof the work of Detectivesboth by the District and Divisional Superintendentsand also from the Commissioner'sOffice, '. He concludedby suggestingthat the Commission's work be delayedto allow it to considerthe effects of thesechanges.
Insofar as his latter plea succeeded,Henderson achieved his objective. Following receipt of his report, the Chairmanput back the start of the Commission's deliberationuntil after the end of the Assizeson 3rd November. Subsequent eventsthrow somedoubt on the Chairman'smotives, however. Hiq consentto a delay may have had more to do with the presenceof two well-known and active QC's on the Commissionthan with any wish to give Henderson'sreorganisation of his detectivesa fair run.
When the Commissionbegan its delayeddeliberations, it called Hendersonto give evidence. His examinationcovered two days, I 9thand 20thDecemberl 877, and not totally unexpectedlybegot a rough ride. He now had nearly 10 years practical experienceof the effect of the implementationof Fergusson's1868 recommendationson the full-time employmentof his men in the investigationof crime. And he now confoundedany sponsorshe might have had on his
ibid. item 19 lbbetson 136
appointmentby making no effort to concealthe low opinion he had formed of the value of his detectives. Consideringthe natureof the casethat had causedthe appointmentof the Commissionhe no doubt expectedits membersto sharehis view. In exchangesthat begin to reveal how much the Detective Branch had changedunder his command,Henderson was askedif detectivesought not to be better paid. He replied,
'Yes; if their numberswere limited I should not object to seethem much better paid than they are at present, but I do not think that the generalbody of the force havethe sameexalted opinion of the detectivesas the detectivesthemselves. "
Later, when askedabout the expensesincurred by detectivesin obtaining information about criminals he said,
'As for information [detectives] to paying people which the...... are very fond of talking about,I must saythat I have never known a casein which information hasbeen much worth.... You authoriseyour officers to bribe people,and you are very much surprisedthat they fall themselves occasionallyunder temptation. "
He also said on the samesubject, that 'I do not believevery much in a systemof obtaining information." And in a remarkwhich Mayne would have heartily endorsed,and which many a later seniorpolice officer might echo,he said that 'the necessityfor detectivesto drink with evildoersis rubbish."
Finally, on the central issueof the usefulnessof detectivesHenderson was even more forthright.
'But details detection when you cometo the of the of crime ... there are certainly not more than half a dozencases out of the whole lot that might not have beenjust as well doneby men in uniform, and better too,... I confessthat my own experienceis rather againstkeeping those men continually in plain clothes,as you must do with men who belong to the regular detectiveforce. "
Evidenceto the DepartmentalConunission to inquire into DetectiveForce Metropolitan ... the of the Police(1878), Public RecordOffice HO 45166692page209 at 5190 6 ibid. at 5194 7 ibid. at 5195 8 ibid. page 222 at 5456 9 ibid. page 211 at 5213 Ibbetson 137
Colonel Labalmondiere,the long servingAssistant Commissioner (and former InspectingSuperintendent and latterly Acting Commissionerof the Force), gave evidenceto the Commissiontwo days later on 22d December. As someonewho had served12 yearswith the Forceunder Richard Mayne and 10 yearswith his successor,Labalmondiere was in a uniqueposition. He could remind the Commissionof the argumentsagainst the employmentof full-time detectives engagedin the investigationof crime that the first Commissionershad put forward, and which they would no doubt have forcefully repeated. He might have remindedthe Commissionof the founding principles of the New Police and of the reasoningbehind thejoint first Commissionersvigorous defenceof them. But he did not. Instead,he did not demur from the Commission'spraise of the centralised detectiveforce maintainedby the Dublin authorities." Hewent further, and positively agreedthat therewould be benefit in centralisingLondon's detectives." Labalmondiere'scareer with the Metropolitan Polie had not much involved him in crime detection,so his failure to supporthis Commissionermight thereforebe excusedon that ground. But, in any event,his opinions probably madeno real differenceto the outcomeof the Commission'sinquiry.
Consideringthe natureand extent of the corruption exposedin the 'Turf Fraud case', Hendersonhad every right to expectthat the Commissionwould sharehis low opinion of his detectiveofficers. For the samereason, he could anticipate that his views on the usefulnessof the centraldetective unit would be reflected in the Commission'sReport. He was to be severelydisappointed in both respects.
The lbbetson Report
Only by looking at the proceedingsof the Commissionfrom the perspectiveof its final report doesthe reasonbecome apparent. Membersgenerally frame their questionsas propositionsbased on the assumptionthat a centralisedand separate departmentwas the bestway to improve the performanceof detectives. Indeed one of the members,Colonel Fielding, gives the gameaway at one point by referring to such a proposalas 'Sir Henry's plan'." The Chairman,Sir Henry Ibbetson,himself madethe samemistake (if that is what it was) when questioning a witnessabout the commandstructure for detectives."
10ibid. page 244 at 6048 It ibid. at6104 12ibid. page 219 at 5374 13ibid. at 5389 lbbetson 138
Clearly, the Commissionhad, like its 1868predecessor, made up its mind before witnesseswere examined. The corruption that had beenthe immediatecause of its appointmentsolely involved men permanentlyemployed in a centralised detectiveunit. The Commissionnot only did not diminish or removethat unit, they decidedgreatly to increaseit, and its influenceand standingin the Force.
When lbbctson's Reportappeared, it beganby setting out an accountof the evolution of the detectiveactivities of the Force. The Commissiondoes its credibility no serviceby misunderstandingthis aspectof the history of the Metropolitan Police. Evenallowing for Labalmondiere'ssilence, its graspof the essentiallocally-based continuity that characterisedthe developmentof criminal investigationand detectionin the Force is lamentable. Surveyingthe condition of the Forcethe Commissionmade brief referenceto Mayne's approachto the detectionof crime, sayingwithout further expansionthat, 'in the earlier days it had beenthe customfor men to be taken out of uniform for a month at a time in plain clothesto inquire into particular crimesas they arose.' It then misrepresentedHenderson's modification of that systemby sayingthat, 'in 1869 this systemwas abandonedand the presentdivisional systemestablished. "'
Far from abandoningthe locally-basedapproach to crime investigation, Hendersonhad merely modified Mayne's alreadywell-established 'Divisional' systemby adding a few full-time detectivesto it. He had however,left local Superintendentsin control of thosedetectives and had not shifted responsibility for police involvement in crime detectionfrom them. In accordwith Mayne's view, Henderson'ssmall group of ScotlandYard detectivesmerely provided supportto divisions.
Compoundingand confirming the impressionthat it did not fully appreciatewhat it was looking at, underthe heading'Duties of Detectives',the Commission notedthat, 'The duties of the divisional detectivesare divided into the enquiries into crimes reportedto haveoccurred in the Division and the patrolling of the streetsin plain clotheswhen not so engaged.' while 'the duties of thoseat the ScotlandYard branchare very different."'
On the duties of thoselatter officers, the Commissionreported that:
14Report DepartmentalCommission (1878)opcitpagetv of the etc.... Is ibid. page v lbbetson 139
'With one or two exceptionsthe officers of that body, unlessspecially sent by the Chief Commissionerto take up somecase already inquired into, do not occupythemselves in preventingor arrestingthe ordinary classof crime.
They are principally engagedin either Governmentor official enquiries, naturalisationcases, searchingfor missingpersons or on what are called the higher classesof crime suchas heavyforgeries, murders, turf frauds, loan office and post office swindles."'
In its report therefore, althoughit had earlier claimed that Mayne's 'divisional' systemhad beenswept away, the Commissionnevertheless describes much the samedivision of responsibilitiesas betweenlocal ly-employed and centrally-based detectivesas had existedin Mayne's time, and which was a main featureof his crime detection arrangements. The only important changemade by Henderson was to add a few full-time detectivesto eachdivision. Thoseofficers supplemented,rather than replaced,the constablesput out in plain clothesfor crime investigationand detectionpurposes as requiredby local circumstances. Even that differencewas not significant in practice,however. The permanence of Henderson'sadditional full-time detectiveofficers was not certain. Just like all their predecessorsthey were selectedby divisional Superintendentsfrom amongtheir own local uniform patrol constables,to whoseranks they could be returnedat any time. And Henderson,in his evidenceto the Commission, evinced a strong aversionto constablesbeing employedtoo long in detective duties."
Remarkably,the Commissioneven seemsto confirm Henderson'sjaundiced view of the value of his detectives. The ScotlandYard contingent, from whom the 'Turf Fraud' conspiratorsemerged, was the most permanentunder his Commissionership. The Commissionnoted that;
'Their [the ScotlandYard detectives'] Superintendentnever even seesthe reportsof crime from the different divisions except in the caseof one of the central officers being employed.'
16ibid. page v to vi 17Evidence, etc., op cit. atpage 211 at 5213 lbbetson 140
In confirmation of Henderson'sview of the value of theseheadquarters detective officers, the Commissionthen went on to report that when employedto deal with divisional cases,their successrate was miserable.
'In 69 enquiriesin the pasttwo yearsonly 19 personshave beenarrested, of whom 3 were discharged."'
Thesecomments also show that as late as 1878the DetectiveBranch at Scotland Yard had no overall responsibilityfor crime investigationand detectionin the Force.
Emergence of the CID
The Commissionfailed to understandthe systemon which it reported. It also ignored facts that demonstratedthe truth of Henderson'saversion to the full-time, centralisedemployment of his men in the detectionof crime. Neverthelessits Report plunged into the creationof a highly centralised,separate, full-time professionaldetective force.
While its inquiry displaysmanifest weaknesses and omissions,the Commission's recommendationsare explicit and coherent. They set a pattern for the organisationof criminal investigationin London that becamethe model for police criminal investigationdepartments throughout the nation for almost 100years. The Commission 'the first improvementis concludedthat, condition of any ... the establishmentof a united and distinct force, for that particular branchof police work. "'
Echoesof Peel's plea to the Houseof Commonsin April 1829for the reform of the fragmentedapproach to policing which characterisedthe 'watch and ward' predecessorsof the Metropolitan Police are uncanny. On both occasions,lack of unified action is identified as the problem. Again the diagnosisis a lack of communicationbetween the units and individuals involved. Once more the solution is to centraliseand unite the organisationand appoint a suitably reliable and qualified candidateto havecharge of it. The Commissiondecided to,
4stronglyrecommend that an AssistantCommissioner, who should be a lawyer having magisterialexperience should be placedat the headof the
18Repoil etc, op cit. page vi 19ibid. pagesxv to xvii lbbetson 141
Detective branch, ranking next to the Chief Commissionerand having chargeof the whole force in his absence.' 10
The recommendationsof lbettson's Commissionthus completethe destructionof the ancientdivision of responsibilitybetween locally electedconstables and royally appointedmagistrates. The faulty drafting of the 1839Metropolitan Police and Metropolitan Police CourtsActs had narrowedthe distinction. The consequentemergence of the professionalpolice detectiveafter 1842then blurred it. And the 1878lbbetson Commission obliterated it by proposingthat a lawyer with magisterialexperience should be recruited into a senior operationalrole in ranks of the Metropolitan Police Forceto commandits crime investigationand detectionduties.
The culture of professional policing
But the 1878Ibbetson Home Office DepartmentalCommission went beyond thoseadministrative changes, profound in effect thoughthey were. It transformedthe culture of policing. After lbbetsonthe investigationof reported crime and the identification, detectionand prosecutionof criminal offenders became,not just one of the functions performedby the professionalpolice service, but its pre-eminentactivity. In a recommendationwhose consequences were to resonatethroughout the whole subsequenthistory of the modernpolice service, the Commissionproposed that 'a detectiveshould rank higher in his classthan a preventiveman' and that his pay should be 'considerablyin excessof the other branch of the service.'
The profundity and persistenceof that cultural changein professionalpolicing can be detectedeven today. In an article in 'The Times' on 4"' August 2003, its Legal Editor, FrancesGibb, reportsthe successof a servingpolice officer in being placed first in an examinationto qualify as a solicitor. The officer gavebirth to triplets during her coursebut still completedevery part of it, making her achievementquite remarkableenough to justify its announcementin 'The Times'. However, despitedecades in which the police servicehad treatedand paid uniformed and detectiveofficers as equivalents,and indeedfostered and encouragedinterchange between them in a effort to havetheir work seenas merely different but equally important aspectsof policing, in the biographical backgroundto the article the officer is describedas having gained 'a 2.1 degreein
20 ibid. pagexvi Ibbetson 142
geneticpathology and virology' and to havethen 'joined the police force and worked her way upfrom a bobhy on the heat to a detective.' In fact, of course, the off icer had merely decidedto specialisein that branchof the servicerather than the many othersopen to her. But the shadowof lbbetson lingers on in the public mind.
The IbbetsonCommission also finally struck down the principle that a detective should be locally appointedand controlled, sayingthat recruits to the detective branch, 'should be selectedentirely by the headof the detectivedepartment and his '2' The it Henderson chief officers. only point on which agreedwith was on the questionof detectivesbeing engagedon patrolling. Accepting his view, the Commissionproposed that the duties of the 'detectiveforce' should continueto include patrolling in plain clothes."
Sir Henry's report went to the Home Secretaryon 25'h.January 1878. ByApril Instructionsto the Metropolitan Police Forcehad incorporatedits main recommendations. Metropolitan Police Office Police Ordersof 6th April 1878 begin by saying,
'From Monday next, April 8th the whole of the DetectiveEstablishment will form one body underthe director of Criminal Investigation."'
The Order detailsthe new ranks and pay scalesof the 'detective force', implementingthe Commission'srecommendations about their enhancedstatus.
Already, in the previousmonth, C. E. Howard Vincent, a witnessto the Ibbetson Commission,had becomethe first Director of Criminal Investigationat Assistant Commissionerlevel and he went to work with a will. By 1886,at the end of Henderson'sreign as Commissioner,the Metropolitan Police Force employed313 detectiveswholly on criminal investigationduties. They included a headquarters departmentat ScotlandYard composedof 32 officers under the commandof a Chief Superintendent. Divisions had a further 281 full-time detectiveofficers nominally attachedto them. In practice,those officers answereddirectly to ScotlandYard.
The contrastwith Richard Mayne's view of the priorities and purposesof policing could hardly be more stark. He and his fellow first Commissioner,Charles Rowan, had always seenthe New Police as a purely preventiveforce, reducing
21 ibid. pagexvi 22 ibid. pagexv 23 Public RecordOffice H045166692 item 59 Ibbetson 143
crime by the deterrentand interventionisteffect of their uniformed presenceon the streets. Richard Mayne clung fiercely to that view of the functions of the police throughouthis long tenureof the Commissioner'soffice. He held that crime detectionwas a peripheralpart of the work of a 'street police' related only to its 'quick and fresh pursuit' responsibilities,and with no placebeyond that in the role and structureof policing.
When, after 1839,he agreedthat someof his constablesshould be engagedin the identification and detectionof offendersin supportof the magistratesof the metropolis,he ensuredthat they shoulddo so only under their direction and control. Even under the most severepressure from Governmentand the press, he kept his own complementof detectivesdown to a minimum - just 16 officers out of a maximum total of some8,960 - and all under his direct command."' Yet within ten yearsof his death,and despitethe strongreservations of his successor Henderson,the detectivefunction expandedto cover all crime reportedin the metropolis and had emergedas one of the major activities of the police. It actually took 'precedenceof the uniform or preventivebranch of the service."' And the proximate causeof that profound changein the statusof the detectivein policing was a seriouscase of corruption involving the most senior and powerful detectivesin the Force.
The practical effect of Ibbetson'sReport, and its obvious intent, was to separate the detectivefrom the ordinary uniformed police officer. The recommendations giving sole right to selectnew detectivesto thosealready in post in the new criminal investigationdepartment, or 'CID' as it rapidly becameknown, saw to that. Yet by the Commission'sown accountthat was the root of the scandalthat had first causedit to be appointed. It was preciselythat separationof detectives from the main streamcommand structure, their inward-looking isolation and lack of outsider supervisionthat had openedthe door to corruption. Henderson warnedthe Commissionof the corrupting effect of leaving professionalpolice officers too long in detectivework. Its answerwas to createa careerstructure that guaranteeda detectivea whole police careerin plain clothes,and solely under the commandof other detectives.
24 Report of the Committeeon the Metropolitan Police Force etc.(18681 Public Record Office 110 451A49463,item 2 (at rear), page 9 25 Reportetc, (18781 op cit. pagexvlxvi Ibbetson 144
Significance of the 'Turf Fraud case' lbbetson's Report and its transformationof the DetectiveBranch of the Metropolitan Police into the first modernCriminal InvestigationDepartment is the most obvious and direct consequenceof the 1877Turf Fraud case. But the trial and conviction of the Turf Fraud conspiratorshas anotherimportance not fully recognisedor evenmuch noticed in the literatureon British policing
The Turf Fraud casebegan when, in the courseof their work, the detectives involved formed an associationwith Kurr and Benson,both of them active major criminals, that developedinto a corrupt conspiracyin which the criminals acquiredimmunity from prosecutionfor their offencesin return, in this case, for cashand other financial rewards. Many other suchconspiracies were to follow that precedent,and were to include benefitsfar wider than thosegained by the Turf Fraud conspirators. A supply of information about criminals' plans, associatesand contacts;the identity of the perpetratorsof undetectedor imminent crimes; and even a shareof the proceedsof crime or of the rewardsoffered for the return of stolen property,came in time to be the currencyof such arrangements.
Theseconspiracies against the public becameand remain depressingly common in the history of the full-time professionaldetective. The Turf Fraud caseis not notable in the natureor scaleof the corruption involved. The old Bow Street officers had a considerablereputation for this kind of closenessto, and co- operationwith, the criminal classes.26 The casecaused a scandalamong public and politicians at the time becauseof the rank and prominenceof the police officers involved, and for that reasonit has frequentlybeen the subjectof subsequentcommentary and analysis. But its true significancein the history of British policing is quite different. The caseis important becauseit is an unmistakableindication that a major changehad taken place in the views, practicesand purposesof the Metropolitan Police since its foundation,and specifically, in the degreeto which the Force had becomeinvolved in crime investigationand detection,and in the identification and prosecutionof criminal offenders.
How and why that changetook place is not clear from the public record and is yet anotherissue not much discussedin the literature on British policing. But by
26 Reith, C. (1943)page 49 lbbetson 145
adopting 'the methodof bold conjecture"' chosenfor this researchsome conclusionsabout the processesthat brought detectivesto pre-eminencein British policing will be drawn.
The Commissioners' contribution.
In their evidenceto the 1838Select Committee on the Police Offices, from whose Report the Acts of 1839emerged, Rowan and Mayne asked,among other things, for two changes. First, that the officers employedby the magistratesto assist them in the executiveaspects of their crime investigation,detection and prosecutionwork be 'replaced' by their constables. That was accomplishedby three provisions in the 1839Acts. One 'discontinued' the plain clothesdetective officers employedby the magistrates,while anotherdirected that warrantsand summonsesissued by the magistratesof the metropolisfor executionin the capital could only be addressedto the constablesof the Metropolitan Police Force. The Commissionerswere then directedto makea sufficient numberof their constables 'available' to assistthe magistratesin their work. Rowan and Mayne's other requestwas that 'common informers' be removedfrom the courts systemin the metropolis. That was effectedby the provisionsof the legislationthat restricted the laying of 'informations' aboutoffences before the magistratesto the person aggrievedor a constable.
The effect of theseprovisions was to removeboth the plain-clothesmagistrates' 'Runners' and commoninformers from any active role in the criminaIjustice systemof the capital. That indeed,seems to havebeen the intent. The problem is however,that althoughboth groupsenjoyed an unsavouryreputation, they also serveda useful purposeand there were good reasonsfor their existence. The 1839Royal Commissionon the Establishmentof an Efficient ConstabularyForce had notedthe unsatisfactoryprovisions made for the prosecutionof criminal offenders,and the wide-spreadreluctance of victims of crime to go the trouble and expenseof pursuingoffenders through the courts. The Royal Commissioners reportedthat much harm was doneto the criminal justice systemthereby, and that the situation poseda seriousthreat to law and order as well as an inducementto corruption and unlawful collusion. The magistrates'detective off iccrs and common informers were a responseto that problem,and the pressuresthat had given rise to them did not disappearafter 1839. They persistedand in fact, increased.
27 Poppcr,K. F- (I 979)page81 lbbetson 146
ConsequentlyRowan and Mayne's successfuleffort to removethe magistrates' officers and commoninformers from the criminal justice systemin London had an effect they did not anticipateor intend. It left their constablesas the only possiblealternate source of the essentialpublic servicesformerly provided by thosedisreputable characters. The Metropolitan Police Force was therefore bound to haveto take up suchduties however objectionable the Commissioners might find them.
A changed magistracy
At the sametime the post-I 839 magistratesof the metropoliswere equally bound to encouragethat development. They not only had to avoid what the 1838 Select Committeehad describedas,
9 Magistrateinteresting himself in detection objectionable,namely ... the the of that criminal whosecase he hasto decideupon afterwards.' but 1839also marksthe start of a period of rapid changeand growth in their powersand responsibilities. The Metropolitan CourtsAct greatly widenedthe rangeand scopeof their jurisdiction, and
'In 1855the Criminal JusticeAct permittedall minor larceniesto be tried Alongside the force, the summarily... the creationof new police expansion of summaryjustice was arguablythe most important factor in increasingthe ability of the courtsto handlethe bulk of crime in an increasinglyurbanised society."'
Increasingworkloads combinedwith reluctanceto involve themselvesin criminal detectionand prosecutiongradually, and perhapsimperceptibly, caused the magistratesof the metropolisto shift their work of investigatingcrime and detectingcriminals to the Metropolitan Police constableswho, by statute,had replacedtheir former officers. After the coincidenceof Fergusson'sReport and Mayne's deathin 1868nothing and no-one in the hierarchyof the Metropolitan Police stood in the way of that process. AssistantCommissioner Labalmodiere may have noticed the developmentand drawn attentionto the difficulties it could causebut he did not do so, as hi's evidenceto Ibettson's Commissionshows. Hendersonhimself could not be expectedto seeeither the significanceor the implications of it. He almost certainly never discussedpolicing or its problems and purposeswith Mayne before his predecessor'sunexpected death.
28 Storch,R. D. (1980)page 33 lbbetson 147
The rapid increasein the involvementof Peel'sNew Police in crime investigation and detectionin the early yearsof Henderson'sCommissionship is therefore probably no more than might be expectedin the circumstances. But it culminated in the constablesof the Metropolitan Police becomingthe successorsto the magistrates'officers of the capital; crime investigationand detectionemerging as a secondfunction of British policing; and, the 'Turf Fraud case'. That is its true significance.
Concealment
Fergusson'sReport in 1868produced the careerpolice detective. Time and circumstancesallowed his activities to expandand evolve. The Turf Fraud case in 1877marks the point at which he can first be recognisedin his modem form. With Ibbetson'screation of his strongholdin the Criminal Investigation Departmentin 1878all memory of the New Police as a purely preventiveforce, with only a minor part to play in the detectionand punishmentof offenders, beginstofade. Henceforwardthe detectivebecame a key figure in the structure of the police serviceand occupieda centralrole in its activities, althoughthere continuedto be no formal legal or regulatorybasis for his work.
As with the earlier Fergussonreport of 1868,Parliament gave no scrutiny to these fundamentalchanges in the structureand purposesof the New Police. Sir William FraserMP put down a Questionfor Home SecretaryAssheton-Cross in the Houseof Commonson 26'hFebruary, 1878. Following the precedentset by his predecessor,Hardy, Assheton-Crosssaid, in relation to lbbetson's Report, that,
'he had receiveda report, which, of course,in his opinion deservedto be corrected. Someof thesehad beencorrected already, and the rest were under considerationby the Secretaryof State;but it would be obviously unwise,until certain points had beencorrected, that thesematters should be publishedso that advantagecould be taken of them."'
The Home Secretaryspoke in thesevague and inconclusiveterms more than a month after the dateprinted on the final version of the IbbetsonReport, a copy of which restsin the Public RecordOffice. A radical re-organisationof the Detective Branch of the Metropolitan Police into a new Criminal Investigation Departmentwas in progresseven as he spoke. Eight days after the Home
29Parliamentary Debates (Hansard)(1878) Third Seriesvol. CCULVVIIIcol 377 lbbetson 148
Secretary'sreply to Sir William Fraser, Hendersonpublished the Metropolitan Police Order announcingthe appointmentof Howard-Vincent. The Order announcedthe transformationof the DetectiveBranch into a separatecriminal investigationand detectiondepartment (CID) with a pre-eminentposition in British policing. No further mention of the Report appearsin the proceedingsof Parliament."
30 ibid. vols. CCMIX CCXI and CCXLI Consolidation 149
11
Consolidation
Fall of Henderson Having presidedover a fundamentalchange in the role of the New Police, Henderson fell from office eight yearslater in 1886. On Monday 8h Februarythat year a meeting in Trafalgar Squareattracted many of the 'dangerousclasses' so fearedby the Victorian establishment. The meetingdegenerated into a confusedriot that spread westwardsfrom the Squarein shop-lootingand generaltumult. Preparationsmade for the meetingand the responseof the Metropolitan Police to the outbreakof disorder fell far below the need. As a result, the crowd got the upper hand of the large body of constablesemployed on the event. Hendersonhimself was presentat the Squareat the time, but not in chargeof the police arrangements.That was deputedto District SuperintendentRobert Walker, a 74 year-old veteran. His method of riot command and control was to get himself so embroiledin the crowd that he could neither receive nor transmit any orders. His contribution to the police operationwas to get his pocket ' picked while the crowd broke into mayhemat the centreof the nation's capital.
There was evidenceof confusionin the arrangementsfor the event; of failures in communicationand leadership;and of indecisivenessin dealing with the disturbances and their aftermath. Initially governmentwas too occupiedwith a resurgenceof the Irish questionto pay much attentionto the failings of Hendersonand his Force. Ministers soughtto let the matter drop quietly because'there was considerablefriction betweenthe Home Office and ScotlandYard. ' at the time. Consequently'there was somefoundation for the suppositionthat Sir EdmundHenderson's dispositions and ordershad beendisallowed and countermanded'by his mastersat the Home Off ice.2
Public confidencewas badly shakenhowever, when it emergedthat no deepsocial distressor continental-styleinsurgency lay behindthe riot. It soon becameapparent that police loss of control of the meetingwas due to mere incompetence. A changeof governmentjust two days beforethe Trafalgar Squareincident brought a new Secretaryof State,Hugh Childers,to the Home Office. The coincidenceworked againstHenderson. Childers receivedthe Sealsof Office for his new post on the Saturdaypreceding the riot. At a subsequentmeeting in his office with a delegation of tradespeople anxious to ensureno repetition of the Trafalgar Squaredisorders, lie
Report of a Committeeto Inquire and report as to the Origins and Characterof the Disturbanceswhich tookplace in the Metropolison Monday8 Februaryýl 886) ParliamentaryPapers (Cmnd4665)p. 426 t 2 The PoliceReview andParade Gossip - Obituary. 16'. December,1896 Metropolitan Police Museum. Consolidation 150 said that, 'I was hereto take over the duties of the office betweenII and 12 noon on Monday',` i. e. while the meetingin the Squarewas in progress.
The new Secretaryof Statewas thereforeable to distancehimself from any responsibility for the failure of the arrangementsmade between the Metropolitan Police and his predecessor. When public disquiet rose over the handling of the incident, he orderedan enquiry into the disturbancesthat startedworkjust one week after the event. This was however,to be no lbbetsonor Fergusson-style departmentalinquiry reporting behind closeddoors. Childers askedfor, and got, a SelectCommittee of Parliamentto deal with the Trafalgar Squareincident. It is notablethat the Home Office chosea publicly accountableParliamentary Select Committeeto deal with Henderson'shandling of a single meeting in Trafalgar Square, when both Fergusson'sand lbbetson's internal departmentalcommittees had been consideredperfectly competentto examineand decidefundamental issues of the structureand purposeof the whole Force. That inconsistencyin approachis surely enoughto indicate the relative importanceof policing activity as opposedto police organisationin both the public andthe political mind, and of the differential degreeto which governmentand its officials were preparedto exposeeither issueto public debateand scrutiny.
Childer's Select Committee
The Report of Childer's SelectCommittee condemned the police responseto the riot, criticising, 'the lack of overall leadership,the poor communicationbetween different sectionsof the force and the inflexibility of the police responseto an unexpected occurrence.' In addition, 'It identified, as the main single fault, the lack of arrangementsmade for managingthe mob after it had broken up,"' concluding that, 'had the police authoritiesshown greater resource, acting upon a good and well understoodsystem, the mob might have beeneffectively headed, and easily broken up at an early period of their progress.' '
Childers held office forjust 6 months. In that short time he managedto producea report that forced Hendersonto resignhis post. There is little doubt that Henderson was sacrificedto assuagepublic disquiet. The decisionto appoint a SelectCommittee saysmuch aboutthe political sensitivity surroundingthe Trafalgar Squareriot. But in fact no real injustice was done. Hendersonhad devotedmuch time and effort to the perfection of the uniform, preventiveand protective,branch of the Service,placing
3 Public RecordOffice HO 144IA42380C 4 Bailey, V(1988)page]02 5 Report Committee (1886) 386-388 of a ... etc. op. cit. pages. Consolidation 151 little value on the investigationand detectionof crime. It is not altogetherunfitting therefore,that it was a failure of his Force in its prime peacekeepingrole that cost him his post. It was the aspectof policing on which he had put the greatestemphasis.
Hendersonresigned in March 1886. His departuredid not bring about any general review or reconsiderationof the organisationor dutiesof the Metropolitan Police. Nor did it trigger any public debateabout the role, structure,or functions and purposes of the Force. The aftermathof the Trafalgar Squareincident producedno move to try to clarify or changegovernment or public expectationsabout the servicesprovided by the professionalpolice. Childer's SelectCommittee Report dealssolely with the failure of the Metropolitan Police asthe prime peacekeeperin the capital, and producedonly suggestionsaimed at improving its performancein that role.
Sir Charles Warren
The dismissalof Hendersonand the appointmentof an evenmore militaristic figure to the Commissionershipmollified public disquiet and political unease. The new man, GeneralSir CharlesWarren, took up leadershipof the Force on 29'hMarch 1886,the day Henderson'sresignation became effective. He had beena memberof the Select Committeethat had brought about Henderson'sfall, and it was reasonablethat he should supposehis recall from servicein Africa indicatedthat he was expectedto shake-upthe Force in the light of the SelectCommittee Report.
A strongwilled, opinionatedand energeticsoldier, Warren's appointmentcould only re-emphasiseand reinforce the militaristic policing associatedin the public mind, howeverunfairly, with Henderson. At the sametime Warren brought his own combativeand imperiousstyle both to the post of Commissionerand to his relationshipwith the Home Office. The tensionsof that latter relationship,and the attitudesof the Home Off ice that it revealed,are important to an understandingof the subsequentdevelopment of the full-time professionalpolice detective.
Warren madeit clear at once that he would haveno truck with the involvement of $civilians' in the running of his Force, not eventhose very senior civil-service officials who were employedwithin it. He developeda particularly intensedislike for the Receiverfor the Metropolitan Police, a civilian memberof the top commandof the Force who rankedequally with the Commissionerand had responsibility for its budget andresources. The object of his animosity,Richard (later Sir Richard) Pennefather, had beenappointed Receiver in 1883. He was only the third holder of this important post. His position, like that of the Commissioner, had a statutorybase and had, since 1829, actedas an independentfinancial and administrativecheck on the Consolidation 152
Commissioner'scontrol and direction of the Force. The Receiverwas, and is, widely regardedas the Home Office's 'man' in the organisation.
Pennefatherwas not only vestedwith legal ownershipof all Force property but also had a responsibility for all moniesspent by the Force,with authority to ensurethat it was applied to proper purposes. Sincealmost anything Warren might chooseto do involved expenditure,Pennefather had the power to oversee,and occasionallyveto, much of Warren's activity. This immediatelyrankled with the new Commissioner.
The problem was also not helpedby Warren's objectionto the intervention of the equally new Under-Secretaryat the Home Office, Godfrey Lushington, and his subordinateofficials, in his contactswith the Home Secretary. They had the annoyinghabit of subjectingthe Commissioner'scorrespondence with his Home Secretaryto their usual bureaucraticprocedures and supportingPennefather in the process. Warren found all this irksomein the extremeand in strongcontrast with his experienceof a very different relationshipwith off icials at the War Office.
The acrimony and friction of thesepersonal and professionalrelationships is a significant factor in the history of the developmentof the British professionalpolice detective. In addition, the public recordof Warren's dealingswith his Home Office and its officials providesdirect evidenceof the attitudesand purposesof those in governmentresponsible for the evolution of British professionalpolicing into its presentform.
Warren and the Home Office
Signsthat Warren's uneasyrelationship with the Home Office officials and his Receiverhad begunto go seriouslyawry cameas early as the beginning of 1887and can be detectedin a long (24 page)letter from the Commissionerto the Home Secretary, Henry Matthews, dated9"' April. ' In it Warren complainedthat his understandingwas that 'no official could intervene' betweenhim and his Home Secretary, 'this intervention [which] his behalf yet still occurs...... paralyse efforts on of the efficiency and re-organisationof the Police Force.' He directedhis critical shaftsat both his Receiverand Lushington's men in this respect.
The letter provokedLushington into preparinga briefing note for Matthews on 18"' April 1887which revealsthe acrimony of the growing dispute! In a beginning that saysmuch about Lushington's attitudetoward Warren and his Force, the Under Secretarysays;
6 Public RecordOffice HO 144IA47288item 1 7 Public RecordOffice H014412081A48403item I Consolidation 153
'The papersin this box will convinceyou how rapidly mattersin the Met. Police Departmentare coming to a deadlock.'
His referenceis to the 'Met. Police Department'rather than the 'Force' which is its propertitle, and the significanceof that choiceof nomenclatureis revealedin his next sentencewhere he setsout his view of the properrelationship between his Home Office and the police. He says,
'It is impossiblefor that Departmentto be properly carried on, if the Comm. and the Receiverdo not work togetherin somedegree of han-nony,or if the Comm' doesnot fully recognisehis subordinationto the HO.'
Lushington's view is simple. The Metropolitan Police Force is just another Departmentof the Home Office, no different from all the others,and equally subordinateto the Home Secretaryand his officials. He thereforeadvises Matthews that he should write to Warrento say,
'that in the exerciseof all his functionswithout exceptionas Comm".of Police, he is subjectto the instructionsof the S of S and that theseinstructions must ordinarily be conveyedto him by official letter signedby the Under- Secretary'...[and [from the Commissioner] must pass that all] ... applications...... HO [to be dealt all other off icial off icially through the ... with] ... as in this for can be correspondence... and that respectno proposal change entertained.'
He endshis note to his Home Secretaryby recommending,as a sop to Warren, that Matthewsmight say that if the Commissionerthinks there is an exceptionto these rules then he should submit a memorandumso that it can be 'carefully examined'. The extent of Lushington's influenceover his Home Secretaryin thesematters is unmistakable On the day the briefing was delivereda note in Matthews hand endorsesLushington's advicewith a simple 'I agree'. A letter closely following the lines advisedwas sentto Warrenon 23rd April 188V
The doctrine of subordinationof the Metropolitan Police to the Home Office, and the statusof the Force as merely one amongmany 'departments'under the control of the Secretaryof State,set out in this 1887note betweenthe top official of the Home Office and the Home Secretaryis not supportedby any argumentor justification based on referenceeither to law or to precedent. To the contrary, the founding Act of 1829 had beencarefully framedto avoid the criticism that the New Police were, or could
Public RecordOffice HO]44120SIA48403item 2 Consolidation 154 become,an agencyof governmentpower, and Fergusson'sDepartmental Committee had earlier noted and confirmedthe independenceof the Metropolitan Police from Home Office control. Fergussonhad actually recommendedthat the situation be correctedby an Act of Parliamentto put the police 'absolutely under control of the Secretaryof State', a recommendationthat had however,never beenacted upon. Yet somehowLushington seemsto havecome to the conclusionthat the Metropolitan Police Forcewas just anothersubordinate department of the Home Office subi ect, through officials, to the directionsof the Secretaryof State.
Unsurprisingly Warren did not take this responseto his complaintsquietly. He acceptedthe invitation to submit a memorandumand commissionedhis Legal Adviser (Mr. Davies) to preparea paperthat would summarisethe law on his relationshipwith the Home Office and make proposalson how businessbetween them might best be conducted. On 7Ih June 1887he submittedthe resultant 150page 'Scheme' with a covering letter addresseddirectly to the Secretaryof State.'
On its affival at the Home Office Warren's 'Scheme' is describedas 'a curious document'" but its first part (up to page 144) is, by commonconsent, a good summaryof the law on the respectiveduties of the Secretaryof Stateand the Commissionerof Police. At that point however,the style of the 'Scheme' changes. It turns from legal descriptionto demandsand clearly goestoo far. Warren (for a changein handwriting at this crucial point seemsto indicatehis hand directly in, or behind,the contentof this later section)wants everythingwritten or said to the Secretaryof Statethat toucheson the managementof his Forceto be 'laid before the Commissionerfor his remarks."' He wants any 'official proposalsaffecting the Metropolitan Police Commissionerfor his before ... referredto the observations receiving the final determinationof the Secretaryof State."' He demandsthat 'any disapproval intervention Secretary State [be or other of the of ... bearing the Secretary State."" communicated]... the autographsignature of of
Clearly, in the light of Lushington's letter of 23d. May which, in accordance with normal practice, would have been written with the full approval of the Home Secretary, the Home Office would not be prepared even to discuss these proposals, as Warren must surely have realised. It must also be said that the discontinuity between the first part of Warren's 'Scheme' setting out the law, and the later section
9 Public RecordOffice H014412001A47288item 2 10ibid. atMinute Sheet It ibid. item Z document,p. 144 12ibid. p. 146 13ibid. p. 147 Consolidation 155 demandingchanges in procedures,is complete. The descriptionWarren gives of his legal relationshipwith the Home Office in no way conflicts with (but at the sametime doesnot necessarilysupport) the existing arrangementsabout which he wishesto complain.
While Warren's 'Scheme' was in preparationand before its arrival at the Home Office, Lushington senta letter to Warren on 23d. May in which he said, 'once for all' that Warren shouldaccept letters from him as expressingthe views the Secretaryof State,a missive that undoubtedlysharpened the dispute."'
On I O'hJuly, three days after the 'Scheme' arrived at the Home Office, Lushington preparedyet anotherbriefing for his Home Secretaryon the stateof affairs at Scotland Yard." Ina long Memorandumthat makesno mention of Warren's 'Scheme' he beginsby telling Matthewsthat;
'I haveto call your attentionto thesevarious papers;they show a stateof things in ScotlandYard which urgently requiresthe personalinterposition of the S of S and I feel it my duty to speakto you on the subjectwithout any reserve.'
He then lists five (or perhapssix) incidentsin which Warren is said not only to have usurpedthe functions of his Receiver,but also to havefailed to comply with the instructionsof the Secretaryof Stateon the properprocedures to be followed. Lushington urgesMatthews to stop Warrentaking over the functions of the Receiver 'regardlessof both the statuteand the regulationsof the S of S'. He saysthat 'this stateof things seemsto me to be intolerable'; that, 'the Commissionerhas some inflated notion that his Departmentstands on somepeculiar footing of independence different from that of other departmentssubordinate to the Home Office'; and that 'he recently disputedthe sufficiency of the Under Secretary'ssignature as authenticating official instructions.'
Lushington has no doubt aboutwhat needsto be done. His Memorandumsays,
'It is plain that there is only one way to restorematters to a proper footing. This is for the S of S to seethe Commissionerand give him plainly to understandthat he must alter his conduct: that so far as concernssubordination to the Home Office the Departmentof Met. Police is no way different from any of the other departments(e. g. the Prison Department)subject to the authority of the S of S: that the Comm'. must be preparedat any time to give to the Under
14ibid. (rear ofpapers) Is Public RecordOffice H014412081A48043item I (memorandum) Consolidation 156
Secretarysuch explanations,whether written or oral, as he may require, in order to lay the mattersproperly beforethe S of S.'
Lushingtondoes not mention Warren's 'Scheme' at this or any other point in his Memorandum, nor doeshe give any indication that he had read it, but the style and tone of his remarksto Matthewsreveal the personalnature of his disputewith the Commissioner. Lushington is clearly exasperatedby Warren's disregardof proper Home Office procedures;his circumventionof normal channelsof communication; and his tendencyto act without consultation. But he is outragedby Warren's refusal to acceptLushington's position as the voice of the Secretaryof State,and the gate- keeperof accessto him. Warren in his 'Scheme' may have gone too far to one extreme,but Lushington goesequally too far in the oppositedirection. Warren at least quotesthe statutesin an attemptto justify his demands,even where they do not in fact fully supporthim. Lushingtondisdains any sourceof authority other than himself. His off ice as Under Secretaryof Stateseems sufficient for him to assume he direct Commissioner'to he that can the give ... suchexplanations as may require' and to issueinstructions to the Commissioneron behalf of the Home Secretary.
The official record is not clear on whetherMatthews took Lushington's advice on this occasion. No note of the suggestedmeeting with the Commissioneris attachedto the file now storedin the Public RecordsOffice. The indication is that Matthewsthought better of confronting his Commissionerat that stage,leaving Lushington to continue to monitor and record Warren's indiscretions.
That picture fits well with the next item on the file, a letter from Home Secretary Matthews to Warren four monthslater on 30'hOctober, 1887."' By now Matthews had a sufficient stock of ammunitionto convincehim he ought to try to settle matters with his troublesomeCommissioner. He tells Warrenthat this later information, 'has confirmed an impressionleft upon my mind by other incidents,that you do not fully appreciatethe limits to your authority as Commissionerof Police, or your relationsto the Home Off ice'.
Matthews then lists five 'incidents' in which on the Home Office (i. e. Lushington's) view Warren had exceededhis authority, particularly where Warren appearedto have independentlyissued instructions to his men or had written to magistratesin the metropolis on policing matters. Matthews says,'I needscarcely remind you that under the Metropolitan Police Act no Order as to the GeneralGovernment of the Force can be madeby the Commissionerexcept with the approbationof the Secretary
16ibid. item I (papers) Consolidation 157
of State', which is a true referenceto the relevantprovision in the 1829Metropolitan Police Act, showingthat he must havehad his attentiondrawn to the legislation on his relationshipwith his Commissioner.
But he is not contentto leavethe matterthere. The Home Secretarygoes on to say that,
'Apart from this, the Commissionerof Metropolitan Police is in the same position with relation to the Secretaryof Stateas the Head of any other Home Office Department: and no rule is betterunderstood in the Civil servicethan that the headof a Departmentis not at liberty to take a step involving public policy without first obtaining instructionsfor the Secretaryof State,or other superiorauthority'
This is the view arguedby Lushington in his earlier July Memorandum, but Mathews doesnot seemto be preparedto take the line of action advocatedin that document,i. e. to seeWarren 'and give him plainly to understand[his] subordinationto the Home Office'. Instead, the Home Secretarycloses his letter with a mollifying assurance that he would always consult Warrenbefore giving him instructionson mattersof 'public policy', and that he would, 'attach the fullest weight to any representation coming from you.'
The very next day, Ist November,Warren's reply was despatched.17 Hetookspace and trouble to deal with the whole of Matthews' list of causesfor complaint. In each casehe quotesthe relevantstatute which, he thinks,justifies his action. Inparticular he points out to his Home Secretarythat the constablesunder his commandare themselvespossessed of powersand duties underthe law, with which not even he could interfere. But on the main issuehe is trenchant. He says;
'You say also that the Commissionerof Police is in the samerelation to the Secretaryof Stateas the Headof any other Home Office Department; I beg your attentionto the fact that I am in no way whateverunder the direction of tile Home Office; in somematters I am directly under the authority of the Secretary of State; in other mattersI have my duties and responsibilitiesdefined by Act of Parliamentjust as a Constable, a magistrateor a Judgehas, and I know of no power by which I can be deprivedof thoseduties and responsibilitiesas long as I remain Comm".and the Act continuesin force.'
17ibid. item 2 (papers) Consolidation 158
It should be rememberedthat Warrenhad not yet had a responseto the proposalsset out in his 'Scheme', and it takescareful readingto realisethat at a critical point in his letter he makesdistinction betweenthe authority of the Home Office and that of the Home Secretaryhimself. He accepts,as he must, that Secretaryof StateMatthews has authority over him in somematters. The 1829Metropolitan Police Act provided that the new Justices(Commissioners) appointed to control the Force should act 'under the authority of the Secretaryof State' for somepurposes. But Warren rightly rejectsthe ideathat he is part of, or subjectto, the Home Office hierarchy as Lushingtonwould have it. Unfortunately,that importantsubtly is lost in the combativemanner of its expression.
Two days after receiving Warren's letter, on 3rd November, Matthews replied. His irritation at Warren's defianceis apparent. He rejectsall Warren's appealsto law and disputesWarren's version of eventsin detail. He repeatshis view that, 'the Commissionerof Police is in the samerelation to the Secretaryof Stateas the Head of any other Home Office department,for instance,the Chairmanof the Prison Commissioners,' again, at this point, drawing on the wording of Lushington's July briefing Memorandum. But he then goesbeyond Lushington to say;
'I conceivethat in all mattersconcerning the performanceof your duties under the Metropolitan Police Act you are liable to receiveinstructions from the Secretaryof State, to which you are boundto conform, whilst in certain mattersyou cannotact without the authority of the Secretaryof State' before concludingwith a slightly more conciliatory paragraphacknowledging Warren's specific powersand dutiesunder the law, and his own wish to interfere as little as possiblein the 'administrationof the Force'.
Significance of dispute
Theseexchanges are extraordinary. Their contentowes much to somebitter personal relationships,between Warren and his Receiver,between Warren and Lushington, and eventuallybetween the Commissionerand his Home Secretary. It is unfortunatethat Matthews allowed himself to be drawn into all this, but drawn lie was, and surely into error. It was neverthe intention of Parliamentthat the Metropolitan Police Force should be underthe control of the Secretaryof State, as Fergusson's1868 Committee identified. Nor that any governmentminister should, 'in all mattersconcerning the Commissioner's'duties Act', be issue performanceof the under... the able to 'instructions [he is] boundto That in ... to which ...... conform'. would put government a position to employ the Force for its own partisanends if it so chose, which was Consolidation 159 preciselythe fear that so arousedthe 1833Select Committee on the Popaycase, and causedRowan and Mayne to declarethat they would refuseto obey any such order, and resign if it was ever given.
As was anticipatedearlier, the true value of theseexchanges lies in the light they throw on the attitudesand opinions of thosein power in governmentand the civil servicein the 1860sand 1870swhen the Fergussonand IbettsonHome Office committeeswere creatinga criminal investigationdepartment within Peel's New Police. In that period, and especiallyunder Lushington and Matthews,the openly and strongly statedview of the Home Office was that the Commissionerof the Metropolitan Police Forcewas merely one amongmany headsof departmentwithin the Home Office, answerableto and underthe directionsof the Secretaryof Stateto exactly the samedegree as any of them, and accordinglysubject to the direction and control of the Secretaryof Stateand his staff.
That view directly contradicts the intention of Parliament in setting up the Metropolitan Police Force as it is expressed in the debate on the passageof the Act of 1829 and in the wording of the legislation itself. It is significant that in neither Lushington's memorandum of I OthJuly 1877 nor in Mathews letter of Yd November 1877 to Commissioner Warren is any attempt made to justify that view of the relationship between the Secretary of State and the Commissioner(s) of Metropolitan Police Force, either by reference to law or to precedent. Since Warren had recourse to quotations from law at every point in the dispute the conclusion must be that no legal justification or precedent was put forward by the Home Off ice because no such support for its position was available or ever existed.
Unfortunately, with Mathews' letter of P. November 1887and Warren's 'Scheme' of 7'h.July 1887lying unansweredon the desksof their respectiverecipients, tile issue of the relationshipbetween government and the emergingprofessional police service must, perforce,be left for other, and wider, research. There is neither spacenor needto explore it further here since it is the significanceof the disputesbetween CommissionerWarren and the Home Office for the involvement of Peel's New Police in the investigationand detectionof crime that is of interest. Pursuit of that line of enquiry now requiresa stepback in time to the start of Warren's occupationof the Commissioner'soffice. Triumph of Detectives 160
12
Triumph of the Detectives
Warren's departure The ramifications of Warren's resentmentof 'civilian interference'in the running of the Force and his abrasiverelationship with the Home Off ice and its officials toucheddirectly on the placeand provenanceof his detectives. On his appointment,Warren found JamesMonro, a former high official in the Indian (Bengal) Civil Service,as AssistantCommissioner of the Criminal Investigation Department. This post was the successorto the Director of Criminal Investigationrole first createdin 1868for C. E. Howard-Vincent. Monro had come direct from India into the Metropolitan Police Force in July 1884,following Howard-Vincent's decisionto pursuea Parliamentarycareer. To have a former careerIndian civil servantas one of his key operationalsubordinates linked Warren's disputeswith the Home Office to his day-to-daycommand of the Force and played an important part in the emergenceof the professionalpolice detective.
All went reasonablywell betweenthe new Commissionerand his headof detectivesfor the first 18 monthsor so, despitesome overspill from the rumbling disputebetween Warren and Lushington. There was however,a constant undercurrentof tension betweenWarren and Monro over the degreeof independenceMonro assumedin his dealingswith the Secretaryof State. The problem was that Monro's immediatepredecessor, Howard-Vincent, had enjoyed a direct personalrelationship with his Home Secretary.' When Monro succeeded Howard-Vincentas headof the CID his position had beenrcgularised to make him an AssistantCommissioner of the Force and hence,directly under the commandof the Commissioner. Someof the warmth of that earlier closeness betweenthe headof CID and the Home office neverthelessremained as a contrastto Warren's factious contactswith officials.
The differencebecame a specific causeof friction betweenWarren and Monro when, as is describedin the previouschapter, Warren's battle with the Home Office intensifiedtoward the end of 1887. Matters finally cameto a headat the beginning of 1888 in a confrontationthat reflects little credit on either man, but whose legacyprovides an importantpiece of evidenceabout the introduction of
I PetrowS. (19931page95 Triumph of Detectives 161
criminal investigationdepartments into British professionalpolicing. The details of the disputeare complex,convoluted and unimportantin themselves,and can be viewed in a single bulky file now in the Public RecordsOffice. '
For the presentpurposes it is enoughto note that the relatively simple processof finding a replacementfor Monro's deputy(Chief ConstableWilliamson) during a prolongedperiod of absencedue to illness (Williamson beganto suffer from intermittent fits of fainting), degeneratedinto a ferociousconfrontation between Warren and Monro. The problem arosein January,1888 while the main dispute betweenWarren and the Home Office remainedunresolved. All the principal players in the conflict betweenWarren and his despised'civilians' were drawn into the fray, with temperson all sidesbeing inflamed by the wider dispute.
An increasingacrimonious exchange between Warren and Monro over the selectionand appointmentof the latter's temporarydeputy culminated in a stiff requestfrom Warrenthat Monro shouldforward 'copies of any correspondence that hastaken between Home Office [together place you and the ... with] ... any record of communicationsverbal or otherwiseof the subjectof an Assistantto you or the appointmentof [your deputy].93 When Monro flatly refusedto comply' Warren issueda formal written instructionthat henceforwardMonro was to keep a record of all correspondenceor verbal communicationswith the Home Off ice, and to 'let me havethem every day in order that I may know what transpires" an order that so affronted an incensedMonro that he declined in writing either to acceptor to obey it. '
Warren'sfurious responseon 7th May 18881 was to withdraw his support,not just for the appointmentof a temporarydeputy for Monro but for any addition to his top team at all -a volteface he compoundedtwo days later in a letter to the Home Secretary in which he complainedthat,
'Mr Monro appearswith the last few daysto have beenacting independentlyof the control of the Commissioner, and in correspondence which I encloseof this daysdate, declinesto furnish me in future with
2 Public RecordOffice HO 144IA46472B 3 ibid. page 69 4 ibid. Page 72 5 ibid. item 9, papers, Warrenmemorandum 6 ibid. Monro's reply 7 ibid. item 8, papers Triumph of Detectives 162
copiesof all coffespondencewhich passesbetween himself and the Home Office... '
He told the Home Secretarythat 'I cannotexercise my responsibility while an AssistantCommissioner asserts his independence."
Under SecretaryLushington no doubt sawthe irony of CommissionerWarren complaining aboutthe 'independence'of one of his subordinates,but nevertheless did his duty and found a way through the messybusiness. On the basisof his advice,Home SecretaryMatthews informed Warrenthat despiteearlier notice to the contrary Monro was not, in fact, to have a new temporarydeputy, at the same time advising Monro to passall mattersof importancethrough the Commissioner.
Any hope the Secretaryof Statemay havehad that his action might get Warren and Monro to rub along togetherwas disappointed. Following his falling out with Warren, Monro left the Metropolitan Police in August 1888to take up an appointmentas 'Head of Detectives'within the Home Office. In that post he sat on the sidelinesthrough the subsequentperiod of difficulty Warren and the Metropolitan Police had with the Whitechapelmurders (popularly known as the 'Jack the Ripper' case). He thereforeavoided the public and Parliamentary opprobriumthat fell on the ScotlandYard detectivesformerly under his command.
Warren and the CID
The incident of Monro's temporarydeputy was an altogethernasty episode betweenWarren and his headof CID, the significanceof which extendsbeyond its outcome. With Monro out of the way, Warren decidedto embarkon a root and branchreview of his large Criminal InvestigationDepartment. He saw that action as serving severalpurposes. It was first and foremosta reassertionof his commandover his Force and a meansto reclaim control of his detectivesfrom the handsof 'civilians'. At the sametime it was a welcomeand timely way of respondingto the adversepublicity the detectivepart of his Force was getting in the 'Ripper' case. From the perspectiveof the involvementof Peel's New Police in the investigationand detectionof crime however,the importanceof Warren's decision is that it openeda further window on the processesby which criminal investigationdepartments became established in the British professionalpolice service.
9 ibid. item 9, papers, Warrenletter 9.5.1887 Triumph of Detectives 163
As part of his review, Warren wrote to the Home Secretary,Henry Matthews, on 5th November 1888.' He refersto 'a Reportof the DepartmentalCommission appointedon the 18th August, 1877', i. e. lbbetson's transformationof the detectivebranch into a full-scale criminal investigationdepartment during Henderson'sCommissionership. Warren's letter is worth quoting at length. It gives a good impressionof the tone he generallyadopted in his dealingswith the Home Office. More importantly, it throws light on inner workings of tile processesby which full-time detectivedepartments were built into the structureof British professionalpolicing.
Referring to Ibbetson'sthen ten-yearold 1878Departmental Commission Report, Warren says;
'I have to say that this Reportappears to be quite unknown in the CommissionersOffice as a document,and neverappears to have been brought to the notice of the Commissionerfor any action to take place on it.
Yet for all this the greaterpart of the recommendationshave beenmore or lesscarried out. So far as this office is concerneda new Criminal InvestigationDepartment sprang into being without any action on the part of the Commissioner,and its origin is involved with mystery. Under the Statutethe whole of the changesought to havebeen first proposedby the Commissioner.'
In confirmation of the conclusionsreached earlier on the dubiousvalue and relevanceof Ibettson's Report, Warrencontinues by saying:
'I enclosea copy of the Reportwhich I haveannotated; but I have to observethat the Report showsa rather imperfect knowledgeof Police discipline It is difficult to requirements, and organisation... thereforevery say in a few words exactly what hasbeen done or evento describeit; in fact somepersons might say that the divisional systemwas never alteredsince it was first started,while othersmight say that it has beenentirely transfortned'.
He concludeshis letter with an oblique dig at Monro, by this time safely installed in the Home Office.
Public RecordOffice HO 45IA4946312 Triumph of Detectives 164
'I think we have every prospectnow, with Mr. Andersonas Assistant Commissionerto help me, of obtaining a real DetectiveDepartment has been efficient to an extentwhich never as yet contemplated;... thoughif the Criminal InvestigationDepartment does not succeedat the end of two yearsfrom now in giving satisfactionin a generalway to all, exceptthose connectedwith criminals and rogues, I think it may fairly be said there is somethingwanting in its organisation, and the whole systemshould be considered.'
In the context of the provenanceof the British professionalpolice detective,this letter is significant in threeways. It graphically describesthe irregular mannerof the creationof the Criminal InvestigationDepartment at ScotlandYard. It revealshow little thought governmentgave to that radical innovation in policing. And it showsin the clearestpossible way the lack of any seriouspublic or political attentionto the decisionsinvolved.
By the time of theseevents and in contrastto the verbal dealingsthat characterisedRowan and Mayne's relationshipwith their successiveSecretaries of State,government was becomingbureaucratised. Contactbetween ministers and officials was now much more commonly noted and the record filed. Yet in founding the full-time professionalpolice Criminal InvestigationDepartment Warren reportsthat the Home Secretary(Sir RichardAssheton-Cross) dealt directly with Howard-Vincent. The man in chargeof the Force,the Commissioner,Sir EdmundHenderson, took no part, giving only 'verbal concurrence'to what took place. That mannerof proceedingis surprising in the circumstances. Assheton-Crosshad sponsoredlbbetson's controversialReport and had, no doubt, a hand in ensuringthat it reachedthe 'right' conclusions. Yet when it cameto the implementationof his Commission'srecommendations, it would appearthat Assheton-Crosswas contentto keephis Commissionerat arm's length from what he must haveknown was a controversialdevelopment.
Warren's letter also demonstratesthat his predecessorHenderson, whose evidence to lbettson's 1878Commission was scathingon the value of the professional detective,equally clearly washedhis handsof the implementationof the Report. By Warren's accounthe seemsto havebeen content to leavethat work to the new Director of Criminal Investigationand the Home Secretarywho appointedhim. But Warren was wrong to think that Hendersontook no direct part in those activities. Triumph of Detectives 165
In fact Hendersonenclosed a plan for the creationof the Criminal Investigation Departmentat ScotlandYard when he wrote formally to the Home Office on 3rd March 1878,following the publication of Ibbetson'sReport. He addressedhis letter, not to the Home Secretaryhimself, but to Lushington's predecessoras Under Secretary,the Ton. Sir. A. Liddell. '
'I havethe honour to submit for the considerationof Mr. SecretaryCross, a Memorandumembodying the views of the Director of Criminal Investigation [Howard-Vincent]and of myself on the future organisationof the DetectiveForce in the Metropolitan Police, and I haveto requestthe sanctionof the Secretaryof Statefor the numbersof officers and ratesof pay as herein set forth.""
A note on the paperssays 'Scheme approved 6/4.78. Corres. referredprivately to Comm'.of Police 6/4.78'. Warrenwas right to concludethat Hendersonhad little to do with the implementationof the 1878Report. But he cannotclaim to have had no hand in it at all.
Resignation of Warren
WhateverWarren's causeor motive in raising the provenanceof his Criminal InvestigationDepartment, his timing and his mannerin presentingthe issuewere bound to causeoffence. The contextwas the long-runningdispute with the Home Office exacerbatedby public dissatisfactionwith the performanceof his Force in the Ripper case. His observationthat Ibbetson'sReport 'showed a rather imperfect knowledgeof police Requirements',coupled with his assertion that the 'whole of the changesought to have beenfirst proposedby the Commissioner'could only strike ajarring note with Lushingtonand his colleagues. And the implied criticism of Monro in Warren's expressedhope of now 'obtaining a real DetectiveDepartment efficient to an extent which hasyet never beencontemplated' was surely intemperategiven that tile object of his critical shaft was at that momentoccupying a seniorposition in the Home Off ice.
But it was surely his promisethat the 'whole systemshould be considered'if its performancedid not improve 'at the end of two yearsfrom now' that must have most alarmedthe Home Secretaryand his senior advisers;politically, personally and strategically. Politically, becausecriticism of the conductof the Ripper case was not confined to Warrenand his men. Matthewswas 'unpopular with all
10Public RecordOffice HO 45166692item 43 Triumph of Detectives 166
his in 1888' political parties... and resignationwas eagerlycanvassed over the failings of the Metropolitan Police detectives." Warren's suggestionthat he might disbandor reform the CID could well be seenas a pre-emptiveattempt to divert criticism away from himself. It could then only fall on Monro and perhaps then on Matthews. Personally, becausethe tone and contentsof Warren's letter was a re-assertionof his independenceand his authority over his Force (or at least the detectivepart of it), and hencea rejection of the Home Office view of his 'subordination' to the instructionsof the Secretaryof State. Strategically, becauseWarren's threat to his CID would undo, or at leastexpose to public scrutiny, the convert effort of the Home Office to transferthe work of the 'Runners' to the New Police.
It is a matter of regret therefore,that Warrendid not last long enoughin his post to seethrough his intention to review, reform and perhapsdisband his CID. He was on the brink of bringing to a headthe whole issueof the presenceof detectivesin policing when he fell into a trap of his own construction. When the three issuesof his long-runningand increasinglybitter conflict with the Home Office; his explosivedispute with Monro; and public disquiet over the 'Ripper' case, were coupledwith the ill-judged and combativetone and contentof his letter on the Criminal InvestigationDepartment, a crisis ensuedin which he offered his resignationin what looks very much like a fit of outraged exasperation.
On the 8"' November 1888,just three days after he had deliveredhis letter on the CID and before he had had any reply, Warren receiveda letter from one of the Home Office officials, E. Leigh-Pemberton." Ile informed Warren that the Home Secretaryhad seenan article in 'Murray's Magazine'. InitWarrenhad madesome vaguely critical commentswith regardto previousgovernment policies on the Metropolitan Police. Leigh-Pembertondrew Warren's attention to, and enclosed,a copy of a nine-yearold instruction issuedon 27"' May 1879; that is, almost sevenyears before Warren's appointmentto the Commissioner's Office. The instruction directedthat no officer of the Home Departmentshould publish any work relating to the Departmentwithout prior sanctionfrom the Secretaryof State.
11Begg, Fido and Skinner(1991)page 287 12Public RecordOffice H01441A48043,item 3 Triumph of Detectives 167
The missive infuriated Warren. It assertedLushington's long-fought claim that Warrenwas no more than, and in the samecategory as, any other Home Office official. It also came,not from the Home Secretaryas Warren demandedin his 'Scheme' and had frequently assertedwith vehemenceany such communication ought to have originated,nor evenfrom Lushington,the Under Secretary,who at least claimedthe right to speakfor the Secretaryof State,but from an official whom Warren would regardas well below him in both rank and importance.
Against the backgroundof all the strainsand pressuresbetween Warren and the Home Office, timing and tactics sharpenedthe impact of the admonition. To have such a minor matterraised at sucha time by sucha lowly minion amonghis opponentsbrought Warrento the end of his habitually short fuse. He dashedoff a strongly worded letter of resignationthat very evening,in a hand shakingwith rage. That he had much more than merely his article in 'Murray's Magazinein his mind as he wrote is evident from the injudicious opportunity he took to ignite the long-smoulderingdebate about his relationshipwith Home Office. Ile included the belligerentassertion that the Secretaryof State,'had not the power under the Statuteof issuing ordersfor the Police Force', " concludingwith an offer to resign that the Home Office were more than grateful to accept.
Lushington's influence is clearly visible in the affair. A minute in his hand appearson Warren's resignationpapers. In it Lushingtonforwards to his Home Secretarycopies of a preliminary exchangeof notesbetween Warren and another Home Office official, Ruggles-Brise,on the subjectof the 'Murray's Magazine' article, saying,
'Pleasesee the attachedletter from the Commissionerto Mr. Brise, marked Private.
If this impudentletter doesnot openthe eyesof the Secretaryof stateto the fact that the Commissioneris, and has long beenout of hand, in a stateof completeinsubordination, ignoring the authority of the S of S, nothing I can say will be of any avail."'
Examinationof thesesame resignation papers reveals Lushington as the sourceof the complaint that Warren's article in Murray's Magazinehad breacheda departmental instruction,and also showsthat Warren's letter on the CID was
13 ibid. item 4 14 ibid item 3 (papers) Triumph of Detectives 168
seenby Home Office as yet anotherexample of his insubordination. These papersalso recordthat it is Lushingtonwho suggeststhat Leigh-Pemberton,rather than himself or the Home Secretary, shouldwrite the resignation-precipitating letter of admonition.
The inferenceto be drawn is of a direct connectionbetween Warren's letter of 5t" November 1888on the irregular mannerin which the Criminal Investigation Departmenthad beencreated and the possibility that its future might be 'considered', and the disciplinary action institutedby the Home Office over an article in Murray's Magazinewhich had the predictableresult of Warren's resignation. A merethree days separatethe two events;Lushington's hand can be detectedin both, and the outcomesuited his, and his Secretaryof State's, purposesadmirably. They were both finally rid of a troublesomeCommissioner. If, as seemslikely, the Murray's Magazineincident was a riposteto Warren's CID missive it could not havebeen better aimed or delivered.
In a debatein Parliamenton the Reportof Supply, Metropolitan Police, shortly after theseevents, Secretary of StateMatthews refers to his conflict with Warren. He revealshis mind when he tells the Housethat, in his view,
'It would be totally unconstitutionalthat there shouldbe a police force in such a town as London, the commanderof which force should hold irresponsibleauthority, and be able to disregardthe instructionsof the personwho had to answerin Parliamentfor the conductof the men under his command."'
Henry Matthews ignoresthe early history of a professionalpolice force in London in theseremarks. It was preciselythe possibility of the New Police coming under governmentcontrol that had so exercisedthe minds and arousedthe fears of ordinary citizens and thosewho representedthem in the Housewhen Peel first brought his proposalsto Parliament. Equally Matthewsseems to have forgotten, or not beenproperly briefed about,Henry Fergusson'srecommendation in his Home Office Departmentalcommittee Report of 1868that Parliamentarytime be found for legislation to bring the Metropolitan Police under the control of the Home Secretary." No suchaction had beentaken. Sincethat advice emanated from his own department,Matthews has no excusefor being unawareof it. Ile
Is ibid. item 712 16Reports on the MetropolitanPolice Force. 1868-1878-1879Public RecordsOffice H045IA4946312, page 15 Triumph of Detectives 169
was surely wrong therefore,to claim that he had authority to issue 'instructions' to the Commissionerabout the 'conduct of the officers under his command'.
But despiteWarren being clearly in the right in the content,if not the tone, of both his CID and his resignationletter, the Home Office was more than grateful to let him return to his military career. Unfortunatelyfor him, and for historianswho may havewished to promoteor protecthis reputation,he subsequentlycovered himself with controversyat the battle for Spion Cop during the Boer War," and was removedfrom commandof the 5th Division to the governorshipof Bechuanalandin April, 1900to live out the remainderof his life under a permanentcloud.
The Importance of Warren
Warren was not long in the Commissioner'soffice and he has since largely been disregarded,even ridiculed. But historiansought to be grateful to him. His conflict with his political mastersover the appointmentof a deputyfor Monro and the provenanceof his CID causedthose in governmentwho had responsibility for policing to reveal their minds and their intentionsfor the police service. Nowhere else in the public record is the Home Office view of the emergingpolice servicemore clearly displayedthan in the documentsand paperscreated during its disputeswith Warren. Under SecretaryLushington, in particular, is revealedas a strongpartisan of the detectives;as a prime mover in the effort to subordinate the police serviceto governmentcontrol; and as the sponsorand protector of a criminal investigationdepartment within the Metropolitan Police. In the incident of Monro's deputy he went so far as to supportthe headof the criminal investigationdepartment in his defianceof a direct (and lawful) order from the Commissioneron an important issue.
Arrival of Monro
It cannotbe by happenstancethat Warren's successorin the Commissioner's office on 3rd. December1888 was JamesMonro Esq., CB, the former 'civilian' AssistantCommissioner and now full time 'Head of Detectives' at the Home Office, from whom Warren had so recentlyparted on fighting terms. The senior AssistantCommissioner was Colonel R. L. 0. Pearson. The Home Secretary overlookedhim on this occasion.
17Doyle, Sir Arthur C. (1900)Chapter 15 Triumph of Detectives 170
Monro's experienceof police work was mostly Indian, and confined to the headquartersdetective branch at home. He was said to have displayed 'a flair for detectivework"' and predictablyproved to be a compliant Commissioner,at least at the outset. He was also the strongestexponent yet of the importanceof detectivesin the work of the professionalpolice. With the appointmentof Monro the Home Office replaceda troublesomeCommissioner with one much more to their taste. They also buried the last real threatto the existenceof the British police detective.
The reversalin the fortunesof the Criminal InvestigationDepartment caused by Monro's appointmentwas immediateand complete. Under Warrenthe future of the whole systemof detectiveswas underthreat of being 'considered' if its performancedid not improve. Even its provenanceand legality might have come into questionhad Warren survivedas Commissioner. Yet within a month the new Commissionersent a report to Henry Asquith, the equally new Secretaryof Statewho had appointedhim, seeking'a large augmentationof the staff of the Criminal InvestigationDepartment'. He said that, 'The proposalwas considered by me more than a year ago' and he encloseda copy of a report he had prepared on the sub. ect dated I VhNovember, 1887,that is, while he was the Assistant Commissionerin chargeof the CID under Warren's command."
Monro ignored the adverseview of the value of detectivestaken by his predecessorsand basedhis bid for an expansionof his detectivestrength on argumentsthat were to becomefamiliar in the subsequentrise and expansionof the CID. He cites pressureof work causedby growing public expectationsof his detectiveforce. He assuresthe Home Secretarythat, 'in any schemeto improve our criminal administrationI am surewe shall be thoroughly supportedby public opinion.'
He naturally omits any mention of the needfor detectivesto prove their value through an increasein their performancein dealingwith crime and criminals. That view of the CID died with the departureof his predecessor,Warren, and was not resurrectedfor almosta hundredyears. Monro adoptsinstead what was to becomea standardapproach of British chief police officers to any questionof an increasein police manpower. He merely saysthat since the purposeof detectives is to catch criminals and the public demandis for the captureof more criminals,
18Petrow, S (I 993)page96 19Public RecordOffice HO 4SIA4946313and 4 Triumph of Detectives 171
then having more detectivesmust not only be a 'good thing' but also what the public wants. A line of argumentwhose circularity and fatuity was only noticed by ministersand officials when Prime Minister Thatcher's 'value for money' revolution hit the public servicesalmost a century later.
Broadly, Monro proposedto haveCID officers availableat every station in the Metropolitan Police area,with a room dedicatedto their use. In addition and entirely unsurprisingly,he soughtto appointan AssistantChief Constableto deputisefor the headof the Criminal InvestigationDepartment when necessary. Monro costedhis proposalsfor the expansionof the CID, including the recruitmentof anew deputyhead of the CID, at someE14,000 per annum. Inthe event, and in a patternthat also becamefamiliar, the Home Office subjectedtile proposalto its bureaucraticprocedures and on 41h May 1889gave Monro E5,000 to spendas he thought fit on additionsto his detectivestrength. "
The arrival of Monro concludedthe last major chapterin the developmentof tile modem police service. It markedan end to all oppositionto the addition of the criminal investigativeand detectivefunctions formerly performedby the old magistratesand their officers to the role of the professionalpolice. Allthose activities, including associationwith criminals and informantsto facilitate crime detection,now fell exclusively to the successorsof Peel's New Police. Members of Criminal InvestigationDepartments and thosesenior police officers responsible for them lost all senseof there being anything unusualor controversialabout tile employmentof detectiveswithin the professionalpolice service,or their engagementin the investigation,identification, detectionand prosecutionof criminal offenders. Never againwould the questionof their validity in, or usefulnessto, policing be raised. With the aid of lbettson's 1878Report, CID officers quickly became,in their own estimationas well as that of tile public, the elite of the police service,a position they occupiedbeyond the scandalsof the 1960s.
Following the Municipal Reform Act of 1835towns beganto acquirc the new style of regular police forces. Countiesfollowed with the passageof the County and District ConstabulariesAct of 1839(2&3 Vict. cap. XCIII) which provided for the appointmentof constabulariesunder Chief Constablesin every county where thejustices wished it and the Home Secretaryapproved the arrangements. All commentatorsagree that,
20 Public RecordOffice HO 45IA4946317 Triumph of Detectives 172
'They were largely modelledon the Metropolitan pattern. Anincreasing uniformity followed, sincethe watch committeeswhich controlled tile municipal police receivedsubsidies which dependedon their forces conforming to standardsrequired by the Home Office. "'
Given the views of the Home Office discoveredby this research, it is not surprisingthat those 'standards'should include the maintenanceof a full-time criminal investigationdepartment along the lines initiated in the Metropolitan Police.
Finally the County and BoroughPolice Act of 1856(19&20 Vic. c.69) 'made it compulsoryfor all countiesand boroughsto establishpolice forces', " as well as establishingan Inspectorateof Constabulary(HMIC). TheseInspectors had, and still have,a programmeof visits to police forces. They visit in order to assess whether or not the force should continueto receivethe governmentfunding that early becamea major elementin local police budgets. No police force could long withstand the threat of the withdrawal of governmentgrant.
Inspectionsthus rapidly becamethe principal meansby which the Home Office guided and shapedthe developmentof the professionalpolice service. Under penalty of loss of funding, HM Inspectorsrequired every police force in Britain to acceptresponsibility for the investigationand detectionof crime and the prosecutionof criminal offenders,and to maintain a criminal investigation departmentfor that purpose.
11Chesney, K(1970)page32 22 Bailey, V (1988)Introduction page]5 Dual role 173
13
The Dual Role of Professional Polici!! g
The the 'simple, direct history British precedingchapters complete ... of the... professionalpolice service' promisedearlier. It has beenestablished that the function of criminal investigation,identification, detectionand prosecutionformed no part of the original purposesof British professionalpolicing. That task was addedto the purely preventiveand protectiveduties of Peel's New Police at a much later date,thus creatingthe presentdual crime preventiveand crime detectiverole of the British police service. It has also beenfound that governmentthrough the agencyof the Home Office originated,fostered and completedthe transferof responsibility for the investigationand detectionof criminal offendersfrom the magistratesof the metropolis and their officers to the Metropolitan Police Force during the 1860sand 1870s. It then usedthe budgetarypower inherentin its constabularyInspectorate systemto spreadcriminal investigationdepartments to every British police force.
The Home Office and the dual role
There can be little doubt when and how the functions,and then the role, of the British police servicechanged. It happenedin the three decadesbetween the passageof the Metropolitan Police and Metropolitan Police CourtsActs of 1839and the 'Turf Fraud case' of 1877with its consequencein the report of Ibbetson's Home Office Commissionthe following year. In that period, Mayne's 1842'Memorandum relative to the detectiveduties of the police' and Fergusson's1868 Committee laid a foundation for the detectivewithin the police serviceon which Ibbetson's Commissionreport built his strongholdin the Criminal InvestigationDepartment. But it is also clear that neitherMayne's Memorandumnor the Fergussonand Ibbetson Home Office inquiries were the causeof the addition of crime investigation,detection and prosecutionto the functionsof the Metropolitan Police and consequentlythe creation of a dual crime preventionand crime detectionrole for the whole British policeservice. They were merely landmarksin the processby which Home Office officials broughtthat changeabout without Parliamentaryor legislative sanction.
Fortunatelyfor thoseofficials, and perhapsunfortunately for our criminal justice system,the public at large,then as now, showedlittle understandingof thesematters and less interestin them. In the period under review crime and criminality were growing fast and the threat of the Fenianseffectively neutralisedall the old public fears aboutthe developmentof a 'spy system' basedon Peel's New Police. The Dual role 174 creationof a body of detectivesto supplementand complementthe existing preventive and protectivework of the constablesof the Force seemeda natural and uncontroversialdevelopment. In reality however,the developmentwas a transformationin which professionalpolicing underwentmajor organisationaland structuralchange in the 1860sand 70s,which greatly expandedboth its purposesand its activities, without any correspondinglycomprehensive alteration in the law. This is so eventhough the findings of the 1839Royal Commissionand Fergusson's1868 Report provided clear evidencethat preparatorylegislative action was needed. An examinationof contemporarydocuments and recordsshows that responsibility for that departurefrom normal Parliamentaryand democraticprocesses rests with Home Off ice, both politicians and officials. Thoserecords also identify the principal actors in that irregular activity.
Under-Secretary Lushington
Of the Home Off ice officials in the period of the emergenceof the modem police detectivethe most interestingin this regardis Liddell's successoras Under- Secretary, Godfrey Lushington. Lushingtonqualified as a barristerin 1858,and joined the Home Office as its Counselin 1869just after the implementationof Fergusson's Departmentalreport. He becameAssistant Under-Secretary in 1876,this time just beforethe establishmentof Ibbetson'sCommittee. Finally he took the top job as Under-Secretaryin 1885before retiring ten yearslater in the calmer days of Colonel Sir Edward Bradford's Commissionership.
Lushington occupiedimportant and influential postsin the Home Office throughout the developmentand emergenceof the professionaldetective. Ile was Legal counsel to the Home Secretaryat the time of the first establishmentof the Detective Branch ill the Metropolitan Police. He was a seniormember of the Office when the Force instructionsrelating to the appointmentof thoseofficers were drafted and published, As a barristerhe was in a position to advisethe Secretaryof Stateabout the legality of that action, and the transformationin the role of the police within the criminaljustice systemthat it represented. Indeed,as Counselto the Home Office that must surely have beenone of his functions. But no direct evidencehas yet beendiscovered to show that he madeany suchcontribution.
We can be fairly certain however,that he did not adviseagainst that significant developmentin the functions of the New Police. He certainly did not opposeor obstructthe expansionof the Criminal InvestigationDepartment when lie had the opportunity to do so as Under-Secretaryin the later stagesof his career. And lie Dual role 175
showedno sympathywith the problemsof the senior officers of the New Police, nor did he supporttheir aims. On a personallevel he could be extremelydifficult. Sir RobertAnderson, AssistantCommissioner (CID) during the Whitechapelmurders, recordsin his memoirsthat, 'With his many excellentqualities Godfrey Lushington's interventionand influence as Under Secretarywere generallyprovocative, and his manneriffitating. " Coming from a fellow memberof the London Bar, such a commentis more likely to be an understatementrather than an exaggerationof Lushington's attitude toward his professionalpolice colleagues.
He was no friend to them as his correspondencewith, and attitude toward, CommissionerWarren amply demonstrates. Indeed,Lushington's view was that the Commissionerof the Metropolitan Police shouldrecognise and accepthis, 'subordinationto the Home Office'. His remarksin the internal minutesattached to Warren's resignationpapers are particularly revealingin this respect,as has already beennoted. Other examplesof his unhelpful attitudetoward his police colleaguesare available in the public record. It is shownfor instancein his dealingswith Warren's claim for expenseson his taking up the position of Commissionerin 1886,' and his commentson the contentiousissue of military aid to the Metropolitan Police in February 1888.3
The available Home Office papersdo not record Lushington's attitudetoward the specific issueof the performanceof the 'detective duties' of the magistrates'officers by the Metropolitan Police Force. But his occupancyof the higher levels of the Home Office hierarchycoincided with the addition of a detectivefunction to British policing and he must thereforeat leasthave acquiesced in that fundamentalchange in the responsibilitiesof the police. During his bitter disputeswith Commissioner Warren in 1887and 1888his fiercest commentson his adversary'sbehaviour are reservedto the momentwhen the Commissionerfirst turned his full attention to his Criminal InvestigationDepartment. Warrenwrote to the Home Office querying its origins andjust two days later Lushingtondecided that a relatively harmlessarticle by Warren in the Novemberedition of Murray's magazineshould be the subjectof a confrontationaladmonition. He then choseto delegatethat task to ajunior memberof his staff. 4 The result was one that he must havebeen able to anticipate,and which lie thereforemust be suspectedof having wished to provoke. At this distancein time from theseevents conjecture cannot be anything other than speculation, but
I Anderson,Sir R (1910)page 129 2 Public RecordOffice HO 144IA42763 3 ibid. HO 144IA4840912 4 ibid. HO 144148043item 3 Dual role 176
Lushington's behaviourmust openhim to the suspicionthat he was seekingto protect the detectivedepartment in the Metropolitan Police Force from too close public or parliamentaryscrutiny.
Lushington, in his character, in his views, in his opportunitiesand by his actions appearsto be the most likely candidatefor the role of sponsorof the professional detectiveamongst the Home Office officials involved in that development. But he could not have succeededin that purposealone. The leadersof the professional police servicealso played a part.
The first Commissioners
Rowan and Mayne, thejoint first Commissionersof the Metropolitan Police, unintentionally laid the first foundationsfor the modem police detectiveand his home in the Criminal InvestigationDepartment. They did so in a campaignto eliminate all their competitorsin the policing of the metropoliswhich successfullyremoved the 'Runners' employedby the magistratesand commoninformers from the capital's criminal justice system. The Commissionersregarded the suppressionof thesepeople as not only eminently sensiblebut also morally justified. In their view both groups containedindividuals who, as the Eight Reportof the Royal Commissionon tile Criminal Law describesit, took advantageof the 'wide door to bribery, collusion and illegal compromises'left openby the absenceof a public prosecutor. In seekingto do away with or replacesuch people the Commissionersclearly felt themselvesto be performing a neededpublic service.
Unfortunately, the Commissionersnever understood that, when performedwith integrity, their targetsplayed a vital role in the policing of the capital, and in the criminal justice systemas a whole. In particular,the acquisitionof reliable information about, and informantsamong, active criminals and their associates,and the developmentof an accurateunderstanding of the workings and interrelationshipsof criminal sub-cultures,matters in which both the 'Runners'andcommon informers had long experienceand considerableskill, are an indispensableelement in any effective systemof crime detectionand punishment. Theseduties could not be discontinued without effective replacementwhich, regretfully and due to the adverseattitudes of the Commissionerstoward suchwork, was what happenedafter 1839. To that extent, Rowan and Mayne must bear someresponsibility for the emergenceof the dual role of the modernpolice service.
In their defencehowever, even when the Commissionerstook positive action to introduce detectivesinto their Force in 1842they did so reluctantly, under pressure Dual role 177
from the Home Office and as an experiment.In all, the direct contribution of the first Commissionersto the emergenceof the police detectivewas either unintendedor madeunder protest. At the very worst therefore,it was a mistake for which they should not be too heavily criticised.
Henderson
On the other hand,all the decisivesteps in the appearanceof the moderndetective occurredin Henderson'stime as Commissioner. He implementedFergusson's recommendationfor the formation of the first DetectiveBranch and was still in post when the Branch was expandedinto a full-blown Criminal InvestigationDepartment in 1878. Hendersonwas thereforethe Commissionerwho oversawthe incorporation of a criminal investigationand detectionfunction into the role of Rowan and Mayne's New Police. On the evidenceof his letter of 3rdMarch 1878to Liddell, when he soughtHome office authority for the employmentof the detectivesrequired to man the new Criminal InvestigationDepartment created by C. E. Howard-Vincent, he did more than acquiescein that development. He took an active part in it.
However, no direct evidencehas beenfound to show that he either initiated or sponsoredthe creationof a Criminal InvestigationDepartment within his Force. Examinationof the relevantdocuments assigns that role to the Home Office and its officials. Hendersonmay thereforebe able to makea mitigating plea of superior ordersbut he cannotescape all criticism. He has 'negativeresponsibility" i. e. his liability arisesfrom his failure adequatelyto opposethe development.
Had Hendersonanticipated and adoptedWarren's stancetoward his Home Secretary when the formation of a CID was first proposedin 1868,or when tile 1878Ibbetson Commissionrecommended the centralisationof the systemof criminal investigation, he may have savedRowan and Mayne's original designfor the New Police. By adopting Warren's stoutly independentapproach to the dictatesof tile Home Office lie may at least havepreserved the 'divisional' system. Its locally controlled investigationof crime as a discretionaryactivity for the police servicemight then have becomethe pattern for the developmentof modernpolicing. But lie failed to oppose or exposethe radical changesproposed by Lushingtonand the Home Office, of which he had full knowledge. On the samebasis, he must also acceptresponsibility for his subsequentindifference to the enlargementin size and enhancementin statusof the criminal investigationdepartment within the Metropolitan Police with all that followed from it.
5 Fuller, S (2003)page189; andHonderich, Ted (1995)page 772 Dual role 178
But Henderson'sinactivity is not his only, nor evenhis most significant, contribution to the emergenceof the detectivesas an integral part of the modernpolice service. He has a personaland direct responsibilityfor the destructionof Rowan and Mayne's vision of the New Police as a purely protectiveand preventiveforce, and for its replacementby a definition of the role of the professionalpolice servicethat includes the investigationand detectionof criminal offenders. His direct culpability in this respectarises from his publication and promulgationof what later generationsof policing professionalswere to call the 'Primary Objects'.
The 'Primary Objects'
Sometime after his appointment,Henderson put in handwork to codify and consolidatethe growing numberof instructionsissued to the Force. For the first time since 1829all the Instructionsapplicable to the work of constableswere separatedout and gatheredtogether in a single book. Other, more general,Instructions to the Force were codified into a second,larger volume for the information and direction of senior ranks. Who, or what, first promptedthis mammothtask is unclear,but the needfor it isnot. In his Reportto the Home Secretaryfor the year 1872Henderson mentions thesetwo new volumes of instructions. He saysthat,
'A work of very considerableimportance affecting the daily and hourly responsibilitiesof the Police has beencompleted during the year in the consolidationof all the Police Ordersissued since the formation of the force in 1829and now extant. They havebeen arranged under alphabetical heads and with a comprehensiveindex and will prove a greatboon to the service A Instruction Book has been in conciseform generally... small also prepared and issuedfor the use of candidatesand constables,and a compendious Instruction Book bearingon the personalduties of Sergeantsand Constableson mattersconnected with the generalworking of the Service. Acopywillbe suppliedto every man."
In contrastto the practiceadopted by Rowan and Mayne, Hendersondid not attach a copy of the contentsof the new Instruction Books to his Annual Report to his Home Secretaryfor the information of Parliament. This is an odd, and unexplained, omission. His Annual Report for the year has no fewer than 54 Appendiceson other, much less significant, subjects. The Home Secretaryin post at the time was Henry
Reportof the Commissionerof Policeof the Metropolis for the year 1872, ParliamentaryPapers page 3: 1873(C. 839), =. 291,page 2 Dual role 179
Bruce. ParliamentaryDebates in the period give no indication that Bruce mentioned the new Instruction Book in the House,or eventhat he was aware of it.'
The 1873 Instruction Book
It is fortunatefor the history of the British police servicethat copies of Henderson's Instruction Book for constables,first issuedon 28th April 1873, have survived.' His Instruction Book is importantbecause it containsthe first fundamentaldeparture from the 1829definition of the role of the professionalpolice set down by Rowan and Mayne with the 'approbation' of RobertPeel. Significantly, and in contrastto Rowan and Mayne's invariablepractice, the new definition doesnot form part of the main body of the Instructions. It appearsas a Prefaceto them, a featureunknown in any earlier version. Its statusis therefore,ambiguous. Whetheror not this novel Prefaceis a GeneralInstruction to the Metropolitan Police madeand publishedunder the Commissioner'spowers set out in the 1829Act is uncertain. What is clear however, is that whateverits formal statusHenderson's statement of the role of his Force replacedRowan and Mayne's earlier Instruction on thesematters since their version doesnot appearin the new codified and collectedInstruction Book.
Rowan and Mayne derivedtheir wording from the legislationthat foundedthe Metropolitan Police Force. It was clearly a GeneralInstruction to the Force and appearedin its proper place amongtheir other Instructions. It said that;
'It should be understood,at the outset,that the principal object to be attainedis 'the Preventionof Crime'.
To this greatend every effort of the Police is to be directed. The security of personsand property,the preservationof the public tranquillity, and all the other objectsof a Police establishment,will thus be better effected, than by the detectionand punishmentof the offender, after he has succeededin committing the crime."
Thosewords were 'laid on the Table of the House' and enteredinto tile Parliamentary record. All subsequentversions of the Instructionsto the Force issuedin Mayne's lifetime repeatthem without variation.
By a subtle processof re-wording and re-arrangementof Rowan and Mayne's original statement,the Prefaceto Henderson'snew Instructionsabandons the principle that the
7 ParliamentaryDebates (Hansard) ThirdSeries vols. CCA7V,CM CCWI, C= CCxv1 and CCkv11 8 Metropolitan Police Instruction Book for the Governmentand Guidanceof the Metropolitan Police Force (1873) Public RecordsOffice, MEPO 8180 9 MetropolitanPolice Instructions, Orders &. &. (1829)Metropolitan Police museum Dual role 180
preventionof crime was alwaysto be preferredto the detectionof offenders. In its place is the view that the purposeof policing is both to preventand to detect crime.
So was bom the phrasingthat every recruit to the professionalpolice servicewas subsequentlyrequired to commit to memory. It was, and is, universally known to them as the 'Primary Objects' and was to be an unchallengedstatement of the role of the British professionalpolice servicefor more than one hundredyears.
'The primary object of an efficient police is the preventionof crime, tile next that of detectionand punishmentof offendersif crime is committed.
To theseends all the efforts of Police must be directed. The protection of life and property, the preservationof public tranquillity, and the absenceof crime will alone prove whetherthose efforts havebeen successful and whether the objectsfor which the Police were appointedhave been attained. "'
Taken at face value, it might be objectedthat the subtlechange of wording between Rowan and Mayne's definition of the purposesof policing and Henderson'sPrimary Objectsis of little significance,or eventrivial. After all, Rowan and Mayne's 'route papers' and 'divisional' systemsassigned constables to the investigationof reportsof crime and the detectionof offenders. But the true natureand extent of the transformationin the functions and purposesof the professionalpolice service representedby the Primary Objects,and its placeas the first formal statementthat Peel's New Police now had a dual, two-function, role in British the criminal justice system,is not to be found in the words it usesbut in its effect and consequences. Thoseare most clearly to be seenin the 1877 'Turf Fraud case', alreadyidentified as a landmarkevent in the history of the police detective.
In publishing his 1873'Primary Objects', or allowing it to be publishedin his name, Hendersonmust accepta heavyresponsibility of the destructionof the original purposesand functions of the New Police, and its replacementby the dual crime preventionand crime detectionrole that cameto be applied to the modernBritish police service.But by what or on whoseauthority did he issuethat pivotal changein the definition of policing?
The law and the dual role. In 1873the only proper categoryinto which publication of Henderson's'Primary Objects' could fit was, as it alwayshad been,Section 5 of the Metropolitan Police Act of 1829. That Sectiondivides responsibility for the issueof instructionsto the
10 Metropolitan Police Instruction Book etc.(I 873). op cit, Preface Dual role 181
Metropolitan Police Forcebetween the Commissionersand the Secretaryof State,a duality of authority that is a featureof this Act.
Systematicdivision of power betweena governmentminister and the head(s)of a public body is notjust a quirk of this statute. It is an important principle of it that reflects contemporaryconcern to take every possibleprecaution to preventthe New Police becomingan instrumentof governmentrepression or of partisanpolitics. At the sametime the legislatorswanted to put the Secretaryof Statein a position to accountto Parliamentfor the conductof the new organisation. In drafting the Act an attemptwas madeto createa relationshipbetween the Commissionersand the Secretaryof Statewhich met both objectives. The duality of responsibility approach is the chosenmethod. Unfortunately,as in the disputebetween Commissioner Warren and the Home Office officials underLushington, it left room for differing interpretations.
Section5 of the Act empoweredthe Commissioner(s),
'subU. ect to the approbationof one of His majesty'sPrincipal Secretariesof State [to] frame they deem ...... suchorders and regulationsas shall expedient, relative to the generalgovernment of the men to be appointedmembers of the Police force.'
The duality of responsibilityof the Act is achievedin this sectionby the provision for retrospective'approbation' by the Secretaryof Stateof actionsdecided upon, or indeedalready taken, by the Commissioners. There is no doubtthat the addition of a full-time detectiverole along the lines of the functions formerly performedby tile officers employedby the magistratesof the metropolisand by common informers to the duties of the constablesof the Force (which is the effect of the 'Primary Objects') is a matter 'relative to the generalgovernment of the men appointedto be members of the Police force'. It would seemthat any suchchanges in the ordersand instructionsto the Force ought to originate with the Commissionersas Warren assertedduring his disputewith his Home Secretary. Only then, under the duality of responsibility principle, needtheir Instruction be subsequentlysubject to approbation by the Secretaryof State. This is not what happenedwith the 'Primary Objects'.
In that casethe processwhich led to the publication of that new definition of the purposesof policing beganwith the errorsand omissionsof the Metropolitan Police and Courts Acts of 1839. The consequentHome Office pressureon Mayne in 1842 resultedin his 'experiment' with a detectivebranch. On that basethe 1868Home Office DepartmentalCommittee under Fergussonconstructed the headquarters Dual role 182
DetectiveBranch with its sprinkling of full-time detectiveson Divisions. Henderson, the Commissionerof the day, implementedthose recommendations with no apparent enthusiasm,delegating the work to a subordinate,C. E. Howard-Vincent. Five years later Hendersonpublished the 'Primary Objects', not becausehe deemedit expedient underhis statutorypowers, nor, it would seem,as a formal Instruction,but as an unprecedentedPreface to a newly collated edition of the ForceInstructions. This is neither the mannernor the processfor the issueof instructionsenvisaged by the legislators. Publication of the Primary Objectsdid not result from a decision of the Commissionereither to announceor to establisha changein the natureof the functions of the Force. It merely expressedwhat had alreadylong sincetaken place at the behestof the Home Office.
If that is a true accountof the appearanceof the 'Primary Objects', then those responsiblecould conceivablyargue that it was not a 'generalinstruction' to the Force underthe provisionsof Section5. That would also convenientlyexplain their decisionto makethe publication in a Prefaceand, incidentally, accountfor there being nothing in the public recordto show that Henderson'sredefinition of the functions of his Force received'approbation' from the Secretaryof State.
But on that interpretationthe 'Primary Objects' is indeednot a lawful Instruction to the Force under the relevant legislation and cannottherefore, of itself, authorisethe changein the natureand functions of the Metropolitan Police that it describes. And sincethe new Instruction Books contain no other descriptionof the role and purpose of the Metropolitan Police,then after 1873the Metropolitan Police Force and those parts of the emergingBritish police servicethat followed it as a model would be left with no authoritativedescription of its duties and responsibilitiesat all.
The oppositeview, i. e. that the 'Primary Objects' is a generalinstruction to the Force under the Act, is equally problematic. The processby which the crime investigation and detectionduties of the magistratesand their officers were addedto thoseof tile Metropolitan Police can readily be shownto havebegun prior to the issueof tile bring 'Primary Objects' - by at least five years. Consequently,any attemptto that new definition of policing within the scopeof an instruction underthe Act must involve somesort of reverseprocess in which the Home Office initiates and brings about a changein the dutiesperformed by the constablesof the Metropolitan Police that is then retrospectivelyformalised by an Instruction issuedby the Commissioner. The problem with that processis first, that it is unprecedented,and second,that it is arguably also unlawful. Dual role 183
Precedent
At the outsetof Peel's New Police the processwas indeedthat all changesin the generalInstructions to the Force originatedwith, and were proposedby, the Commissioners. Only afterwarddid they receiveapprobation by the Home Secretary. ParliamentaryPapers include copiesof all GeneralOrders issued to the Metropolitan Police Force during the first two yearsof its existence." Only one such Instruction issuesdirectly from Sir RobertPeel. It refersto the arrangementsfor appointments to, and within, the Force,a matter reservedto the Secretaryof Stateby Section4 of thel829Act. That Sectionprovides that, 'a sufficient Number of fit and able men shall, from time to time, by the direction of one of His Majesty's Principal Secretariesof State, be appointedas a Police Forcefor the' Metropolis. This is a specific power grantedto the Secretaryof Stateto give directionsto the Force found nowhereelse in the Act.
ParliamentaryPapers also show how the foundersof the New Police divided the responsibility for the issueof Instructions. Peel's only instruction dealswith the appointmentof officers to 'superior rank'. Rowan andMayne's Instructionsinclude the original definition of the functionsand purposesof the Force,as well as its founding structureand organisation. Mayne quite properly followed that precedent when he initiated the Instructionsthat formed the DetectiveBranch in 1842,albeit under pressurefrom the Home Office. He proposedan 'experiment' and his Home Secretary,Graham, then agreedto it.
For the sakeof completenessat this point it should be said that eventhis seemingly proper first step in the introduction of the dutiesof the magistratesand their detective officers into the role of the New Police is opento questionas a result of yet another curious quirk in the drafting of the 1839Metropolitan Police and Courts Acts. Prior to the passageof thoseActs, Rowan and Mayne had complainedto the Home Office that the dual structureof the 1829Metropolitan Police Act requiredjoint action by both Commissionersin any and every case. They found this hopelesslycomplex and inefficient. They sensiblyasked that the legislation be amendedto allow one Commissionerto act on behalf of both. When the Metropolitan Police Act of 1839 was drafted a provision was included intendedto that effect. The Interpretation Clauseof the Act said, amongother provisions,'that all Things herein authorizedto
"Parliamentary Papers(505)AWIII. 405 (1830)and (340) V111.265(1830-31) Dual role 184
be done by the Commissionersof Police of the Metropolis may be done by either of them."'
The problem is that this Clausebegins with the words 'And be it enacted,That in the Constructionof this Act', and its relevantpart includesthe word 'herein'. At the time of the passageof the 1839Act it was not recognisedthat this form of words meantthat the 'single Commissioner'provision appliedonly to thosepowers and duties of the Commissionersspecified in the 1839Act, and not thosegranted and given in 1829. Thus the InterpretationClause did not apply to many of the most important powers of the Commissioners,including their authority to issueGeneral Instructions to the Force; a categoryinto which the settingup of a DetectiveBranch undoubtedlyfell. And, as was noted in an earlier chapter,the letter of 1842in which Richard Mayne acquiescedin the formation of a DetectiveBranch is signedby him alone.
The Home Office cannotclaim to havebeen unaware of this additional Interpretation Clauseproblem. It was noticed in 1855when the Law officers were askedto commenton a Memorandumfrom Richard Mayne askingwhether it might be possible to divide the powers and duties of thejoint Commissionersappointed under the Act of 1829." Mayne did not get on well with CharlesRowan's successor,Captain Hay, and wantedto reserveall important decisionsto himself. In dealingwith that request (which the Home Office vehementlyopposed) officials discovered,to their horror, that 'acts must have beendone by one Comm. over and over againwithout lawful authority'14due to the faulty drafting of the Act of 1839. The mistakewas only finally correctedin 1856."
In sum therefore,the legislation and all precedent,including precedentin relation to the instructionson the employmentof constablesas detectiveofficers, points in a single direction. It indicatesthat any generalinstruction to the Force ought to be proposedby, and originate with, both Commissionersand only afterward be approved by the Secretaryof State. By that criterion only one step in the processthat led to Ole formation of the Criminal InvestigationDepartment in the Metropolitan Police was correctly taken, i. e. Mayne's establishmentof the DetectiveBranch in 1842. And eventhat action is opento questionon technical groundsarising from tile faulty drafting of the InterpretationClause of the 1839Metropolitan Police Act.
12Metropolitan Police Act 1839(2&3 Victoria cap.47) section78 13Public RecordOffice OS6093 item 12 14 ibid. Is 19Victoria 2, cV(1856) Dual role 185
The problem with Henderson's'Primary Objects' and the revision of the definition of the purposesand objectivesof policing that his new Prefaceto the Instructionsto the Forcerepresents is that, contrary to both legislation and all precedent, it is retrospective. It improperly purportsto regulatechanges in the 'general government of the men appointedto be membersof the Force' that had alreadytaken place,and which had not beenoriginated by the Commissionersthemselves.
The Commissioners and the Home Secretary
If it is acceptedthat Section5 of the 1829Act doesnot supply the necessaryauthority for the issueof Henderson'sPrimary Objectsthen SectionI of the Act is the only other possiblesource. As with Section5, it displaysa duality of responsibility. Its importancein this contextjustifies its extensivereproduction.
'WhereasOffences against Property have late increasedin and nearthe Metropolis; and the local establishmentsof Nightly Watch andNightly Police have beenfound inadequateto the Preventionand Detectionof Crime, by reasonof the frequentunfitness of the Individuals employed,the Insufficiency of their number,the limited sphereof their Authority, and the want of connectionand co-operationwith eachother. And whereasit is expedientto substitutea new and more efficient systemof Police in lieu of such Establishmentof Nightly Police within the limits herein-aftermentioned, and to constitutean office of Police which, acting under the immediateauthority of one ofHis Majesty's Principal SecretariesofState, shall direct and controul (sic) the whole ofsuch systemofPolice within theselimits. Beittherefore by That it be lawful for His Ma to a Police enacted ... shall esty cause new Office to be establishedin the City of Westminsterand to appoint two fit personsas Justicesof the peace...to executethe Duties of a Justiceof the Peace at the said office'.
Two things of significancearise from this preambleto the Act. First, tile preamble describesthe new organisationas being 'in lieu of the Nightly Watch andNightly Police of the metropolis. It doesnot replacethe whole of the policing arrangements for the capital. In particular it will be rememberedthat the magistratesand their police offices, with their responsibilityfor the investigationof reportsand allegations of crime, and the detectionand prosecutionof offenders,remained in place with all their powersand prerogativesspecifically preservedin this Act. Clearly that has major implications for the rangeof activities that the new organisationhad Parliamentaryauthority to perform. Dual role 186
Second,the preambledistinguishes between the power to take action in the new organisationand the authority requiredfor that action. The Act puts the New Police 'under the immediateauthority' of the Secretaryof State. But it is the Justicesof the new Police Office who act under that authority to direct and control the whole of the new organisation. The original Justiceswere Rowan and Mayne. Their successors are the Commissioners,including both Hendersonand Warren,who inherited all their powersand privileges laid down in the Act. Suchpowers include their authority to issuesuch GeneralOrders to the Force as 'they shall deemexpedient for rendering such Force efficient in the dischargeof all its Duties'.
Whether or not Section I providesan authority for the changesin the duties of the Metropolitan Police Forcethat led to the 'Primary Objects' thereforedepends on the relationshipbetween 'the immediateauthority' of the Secretaryof Stateand the power of the Justices('Commissioners') appointed to direct and control the Force. Unfortunately this is an issueon which the wording of the 1829Act is imprecise.The first part of the Section 1, quotedearlier, goeson to saythat the Justicesappointed to the new Office to 'executethe Duties of Justiceof the Peace'within it, should also execute'such other duties as shall be herein after specified, or as shall be from time to directed Secretaries State for time by one of His MajestiesPrincipal of ... the more efficient administrationof the Police'.
The preliminary point to be madeabout this part of the Act is that it dealswith the authority of the Secretaryof Stateto alter the dutiesof the Commissioners. It does not refer to the duties of the constablesthey employ. Warren, in his disputewith the Home Off ice madethe strongpoint that his constableshad dutiesand responsibilities under the law with which he could not interfere. In addition there is an immediate limitation on the extent of the Secretaryof State'sauthority to changethe duties of tile Commissioner(s). It is that the changemust be 'for the more efficient administration of the Police.' Thus any power of the Secretaryof Stateto alter tile duties of the Force as a whole under this Sectionwill haveto be exercisedthrough the Commissionersand apply to the administrationof the Force. Under the statutelie cannotdirectly commandthe Force or give ordersto any of its constables,as Warren rightly pointed out in his resignationletter in November, 1888.
Turning then to the powersof the Commissioners,Section I also dealswith their statusand the extent of their authority. In effect it is a proviso limiting their powers as Justicesof the Peacefor the metropolis. It says, Dual role 187
'that no suchperson shall act as a Justiceof the Peaceat any Court of General or QuarterSessions, nor in any Matter out of Sessions,except for the Preservationof the Peace,the preventionof Crimes, the detectionand committal of offenders, and in carrying into executionthe purposesof this Act'.
The 1829Act thus makesan important distinction betweenthe Commissionersand tile other Justicesappointed for the metropolis. The Commissionersand their constables are not just anothermagistrates' police office along the lines first developedby the Fieldings and later enshrinedin the Act of 1792and its successors.In confirmation of that important distinction the 1829Act also saysat Section42 that, 'Provided always, and be it enacted,that nothing in this Act containedshall affect or alter' the legislation dealing with the Police Offices of the Metropolis underthe control of the magistrates. The effect of theseprovisions is to prohibit the Commissionersfrom exercisingany of the criminal investigative,detective and prosecutionpowers and functions grantedto the otherjustices of the metropolisi. e. the magistratesof the police offices.
That view of theseissues is also clear in the Parliamentaryrecord. Parliament renewed,unaltered, the separatepolice offices legislationfrom which the London magistratesderived their powersand authority at the sametime as it passedthe Metropolitan Police Act. The obvious intent is to createtwo different types of Cpolice'establishments in the metropolis,with different duties and responsibilities. Indeed,and in confirmation of the point, the legislationdealing with the Police Off ices specifically mentionsthe 'apprehensionof offenders' in settingout the duties of the magistratesof the metropolisand hence, of the officers they employed. Section 15 of the original 1792Act which first set up the Police Offices providedthat,
'the Justices be fit to appointedmay ... retain and employ a sufficient numberof Constables and able men... to act as ... which said constables... shall obey all such lawful commandsas they from time to time receivefrom the said Justices for the apprehending[ofl offenders'
The constablesemployed by the Commissionersunder the 1829Metropolitan Police Act were not given this duty to apprehendoffenders. Equally significantly, nor did tile 1829Act bind the constablesof the Metropolitan Police to obey tile commandsof their Commissionersfor that, or any other, policing purpose. Which clearly suggests that Parliamentregarded the New Police as 'constables' in the Saxontradition, rather Dual role 188 than intendingthem to be agentsof the Justices(Commissioners) on the Norman model of the Bow StreetRunners and other magistratesofficers.
Later Acts in the regular seriesof renewalsof the Police Offices legislation make that distinction evenmore explicit. For example, an Act passedin 1823(3GeoIV cap.55), empoweredthe Chief Magistrateat the Bow StreetPolice Office to administeran oath to the officers employedin his Office to:
'execute Office Constable Persons,being the of ... and eachof such sworn, shall have Power to act as a Constablefor the Preservationof the Peace, and for the Security of Propertyagainst felonious and other unlawful Modes of obtaining the same'
The Commissionersof the new Metropolitan Police Forceand the magistratesof the police offices both well understoodthe statutorydistinction betweenthem. Rowan and Mayne could not, and did not, take up the investigativeand detectivefunctions of magistratesinto reportsof crime either when offered to them by the 1838 Select Committeeor after the 1839Acts had 'discontinued' the Bow StreetRunners. Rowan and Mayne never knowingly permittedthe constablesof the Metropolitan Police to associatewith criminals or otherwiseundertake the detectiveduties of the magistrates officers. At the very earlieststage of the New Police,when Peel's Metropolis Police ImprovementBill was before Parliament, his Prime Minister, the Duke of Wellington, said in the Houseof Lords in answerto a questionduring the debatein June 1829, that, 'The Justices(Commissioners) were to haveno power beyondwhat was necessaryto protect the peaceof the country and to carry this measureinto effect."'
A SelectCommittee of Parliament,of which Sir Robert Peelwas a member(the 'Popay' committee),also consideredthe issueof the employmentof the constablesof the Metropolitan Police in plain clotheson crime detectionin 1833. I'llat Committee resolved,
'That it is the opinion of the Committeethat with respectto the occasional employmentof policemenin plain clothes, the systemas laid down by tile headsof the Police Departmentaffords no just matter of complaint while strictly detectBreaches Law PreventBreaches Peace confined to of the and to of the , should thoseends appear otherwise unattainable; ""
16Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) New Seriesvot XYI cot 1752 17Parliamentary Papers (1833) (627) Vol. XII page 407 Dual role 189
In addition, the first book of Instructionsissued to Force by Rowan and Mayne told eachconstable they he was only responsible'for the securityof life and property, his Beat, for during he is within and the preservationof the peace... the time on duty."'
It must be clear then that, even if they wished, neitherthe Secretaryof Statenor the Commissionersof the Metropolitan Police had authority under the relevant legislation to direct the constablesof Forceto undertakethe criminal investigativeand detective functions and duties of the magistratesof the metropolisor their plain-clothesofficers. The conclusionmust be that Henderson'saction in publishinghis 1873'Primary Objects' was unlawful or at the least ultra vires given that by the time the 'Primary Objects' appearedthe magistratesof the metropolisno longer exercisedtheir former duties in this respect.
The Courts
Additional evidenceto supportthat conclusionis availableelsewhere in the history of the criminal justice system.Throughout the nineteenthcentury the courts refusedto recognisePeel's 'New police' as having any part to play in the identification, detectionand prosecutionof offenders,apart that is from bringing immediately detainedpersons before the magistratesand giving evidenceat any subsequenttrial. For example,' In 1838Patterson J threatenedwith dismissalfrom the force an officer in the habit of interrogatingprisoners. "' and, 'Prior to Jervis's Act [Indictable OffencesAct, 1848),ajustification offered by thejudges for [that] rule was that police questioningwas a usurpationof the function of the examiningmagistrate, without any of the safeguardswhich attendeda magisterialexamination. '"
Following the passageof Jervis's Act thejudges modified their view of this type of police activity, but they still did not approveof it. They arguedthat sincethe courts could not questiona prisoner(which was the caseat the time), no inferior officer of justice should do so. At the sametime;
'Another questionwas that of how far [police] officers might legitimately questionpersons against whom there was suspicion,but who had not yet been arrested. To this thejudge's answerwas that, once an officer had taken the decisionto take a suspectinto custody,it was not proper for him to put questionsto him. Until that point was reacheda suspectmight be questioned
18Metropolitan Police Museum Instructions, 1829, page 38 19Bentley, D (19981page 230 20ibid. Dual role 190
after a proper caution,although even here the power should be exercised sparingly."'
The essentialpoint, for the purposesof this discussionof the lawfulnessor otherwise of the adoptionof the criminal detectiveduties of the magistratesand their officers by the constablesof the Metropolitan Police, is that at the time thoseduties were being transferredto the Forcethe judges did not regard its constablesas having any special role to play in the detectionand prosecutionof criminal offenders. That is so even after the passageof Jervis's Act in 1848which somewhatloosened that restriction on the conductof constables. Had thejudges consideredPeel's New Police to have any special or particular lawful authority to investigatecrime or pursuecriminals they would certainly havementioned that specialposition in theirjudgementson such matters. No such statutoryor legislativeprovision hasbeen discovered that predates the publication of the Primary Objectsin 1873.
Conclusion
There are three groundstherefore, on which to arguethat both the publication of the 'Primary Objects' and the creationof a Criminal InvestigationDepartment (CID) within the Metropolitan Police that it representswas either unlawful or ultra vires. First, no Commissionerof the Metropolitan Police originatedor deemedexpedient either step underthe provisionsof the Act of 1829. Second, the relevant parts of that Metropolitan Police Act strictly limit the power of the Secretaryof Stateto changethe duties of the Commissioners. Specifically, he is precludedfrom directing them to take up the criminal investigativeand detectivefunctions of the magistratesof themetropolis. Finally, neitherthe Secretaryof Statenor the Commissionershad power to direct the constablesof the Metropolitan Police to take up any duty other than those laid down in the Act of 1829. Nevertheless,despite these apparent statutory prohibitions, the criminal investigationand detectionduties of the magistratesemerged as the pre-eminentactivity of the Metropolitan Police. The evidenceis that it did so not becausethe Commissionerseither wished it or deemedit expedient,but rather as a responseto overwhelmingpressure from the Home Office.
No record has beenfound of that changein the functions of the professionalpolice serviceever having beenbrought to the attentionof Parliamentfor approval or debate. Nor was it included in legislation. The decisionto transferthe detectiveduties of the magistratesofficers to the constablesof the Metropolitan Police appearsto have made entirely within the Home Department. It was then implementedusing the devicesof
21 ibid. page232 Dual role 191 internal departmentalcommittees and an administrativechange in the form of the Instructions issuedto the Forcerather than by any publicly accountablemeans. Tile evidenceis that the Home Office then deliberatelyscreened those actions from scrutiny by Parliament.
Toward the present problems of British policing
However, the intention is not to condemnthose responsible. The methodsused in this research'recognise that only a minority of social institutions are consciouslydesigned while the vast majority havejust "grown" as the undersignedresults of human actions."' Hencethe working assumptionis that criminal investigationdepartments in their modem form emergedwithin the professionalpolice serviceas a result of attemptsby hard-pressedand often ill-informed officials and politicians to find solutionsto the problemsof crime and disorderassociated with industrialisationand urbanisation. No large-scalesocial movement,conspiracy or processis identified as accountingfor the development.And no motive has beenattributed to the actors involved other than a simple desireto deal with the immediateproblems they faced. The contrastwith the approachof much of the existing commentaryand academic literature to this subjectis, in this respect,complete.
22Popper, K. R. (2002)page 59 Findings and Conclusions 192
14 Findings and Conclusions
The precedingchapters describe the processby which the British professional police servicedeveloped its presentdual role. That dual role consistsof two functions:
a) uniform patrolling to preventand detercrime and disorderand protect citizens from harm ('peacekeeping'by 'peacekeepers');and,
b) plain clotheswork to investigateincidents and reportsof crime and identify criminal offenderswith a view to their prosecutionand punishment('crime detection' by 'detectives')
The first function was laid down by CharlesRowan and Richard Mayne, thejoint first Commissionersof the Metropolitan Police, in 1829. The secondwas added by CommissionerHenderson's 'Primary Objects' Instruction to the Force in 1873. It should not be assumedthat either the existenceor the natureof the dual role of modem police officers is widely recognisedor understood, evenwithin the professionof policing. Henderson'sdefinition is commonly attributedto Richard Mayne even in otherwisecredible and reliable academicliterature on British policing,' and confusionon the issuecan be found at the highest levels of the policing profession. For example,in a Handbookon the Principles of Policing issuedto every Metropolitan Police officer in 1985the Deputy Commissionerof the Servicequotes Rowan and Mayne's 1829version, ' while in a Foreword his Commissionerquotes Henderson's 1873 Primary Objects.' Both give their sourceas 'Sir RichardMayne, 1829'.
Clearly, this researchopens a new perspectiveon the history and developmentof the professionalpolice servicein Britain and raisesa rangeof previously unconsideredissues and problems. Not all of them can be addressedhere. The findings and conclusionsdrawn are thereforefocussed on the researchpurpose set out in the Abstract and Introduction.
Findings
Tile following findings havebeen made:
I e.g. Smith, P.T. (1985) Chapter3 page 6112;Moylan (1929) ChapterlIpage 34 2 Laughame,A (I 985)page 9110 3 ibid. page 6 Findings and Conclusions 193
i) At the foundationof the British professionalpolice service in 1829the function of the investigationof criminal offencesto detectoffenders in order to prosecutethem beforethe courtswas the prerogativeand responsibility ofjustices of the peaceand any officers they employedfor that purpose.
ii) The legislation of 1829on which the professionalpolice servicewas foundeddid not removethat function or responsibilityfrom the justices or their officers, nor did legislatorsintend that the constablesof the newly-formed professionalpolice serviceshould take it up.
iii) That function and responsibilityof thejustices and their officers for the investigationand detectionof crime was subsequentlytransferred to the professionalpolice serviceby administrativemeans and without parliamentaryor other legislativeauthority in the period prior to 1888.
iv) That transferwas effectedprimarily by the Home Office and its officials and only secondarilyby the Commissionersof the Metropolitan Police Force.
v) As a consequence,the definition of the role, purposesand activities of the professionalpolice servicewas improperly changedfrom Rowan and Mayne's original 1829peacekeeping definition to the presentdual peacekeepingand detectiverole first publishedin the 'Primary Objects' Prefaceto Henderson's1873 edition of the Instructionsto the Metropolitan Police Force.
Conclusions
The broad finding of this thesis is that the British police servicehas, improperly and, as will be argued,to its detriment,been given a dual role consistingof both peacekeepingand detectivefunctions. In the light of that finding the presentrole, organisationand managementof modernpolicing have beenexamined and the following four specific conclusionsdrawn.
1. On corruption
The addition of crime detection duties to its peacekeeping purposes and functions has introduced persistent corruption into British professionalpolicing.
This conclusionreflects the first of the reservationsexpressed by Mayne in his 1842 'Memoradurnrelative to the detectivepowers of the police' when his Force Findings and Conclusions 194
was under pressureby the Home Office to take up the detectivefunctions of the magistratesand their officers. He said then,
'That these[former Bow Streetdetective] officers had advantagesin tracing out somesorts of casesis true:- the Commissionersbelieve it is well known, that, by at leastsome of them, a communicationwas kept up with thievesor their associates,from who occasionallythey received information that led to detections,that might not otherwisehave taken place. Upon the propriety of returningto sucha system,the Commissionerswill makeno observation,as, in a moral point of view it has beenrepeatedly denounced. '
DespiteMayne's misgivingsthe Home Office built the Criminal Investigation Departmentwith its apparatusof criminal intelligence,investigation and detection,into the Metropolitan Police Force. The effect, evidencedby the 1877 'Turf Fraud case',was to draw Peel'sNew police into the 'detective duties' of the magistrates'officers and commoninformers, so openinga nation-wide door to the corruption also associatedwith thoseactivities
Mayne's prediction that the involvementof the New Police in detectivework would createa potential for corruptionwas consistentlysupported by the early Commissionersof the Metropolitan Police. Mayne's successoras Commissioner, Edmund Henderson,shared his view and said so when giving evidenceto Ibbetson's Home Office DepartmentalCommittee in 1878. Sir CharlesWarren, who followed Hendersoninto the Commissioner'sOffice, was never directly concernedwith the issueof corruption,but he embarkedon a review of the whole idea of a criminal investigationdepartment within the Metropolitan Police Force in 1888. He promisedthat its 'whole [future] position would be reviewed' if its performancedid not improve. Only his precipitateand prematureresignation preventedhim from fulfilling that ambition.
Even the normally supportiveLondon 'Times' gaveearly warning of the corrupting effect detectivework was likely to have on the professionalpolice service. In a leaderpublished while the 'Turf Fraud' conspiracycase was before the courts, 'The Times' said:
'A DetectiveForce may be necessary,but, we repeat,it is a very unpleasant the dangerthat its is If necessity,and attends employment clear... the temptationof his [the detective's] life are too strong for him and lie forgets to any degreehis true allegiance,the mischief he may do is well nigh Findings and Conclusions 195
incalculable. The most potentweapon ofjustice is turned againstjustice. It is the rogue who escapesand the honestman who are baffled and confounded. The want of security,the dreadof the presenceof a spy, is transferredto the wrong camp. All this may happenat any time, and from the natureof the casemust happensome time. 14
One of the most effective recentCommissioners of the Metropolitan Police, and a man whose intellectual standingand devotionto the integrity of the serviceis undoubted,was Sir RobertMark. He confirms the truth of 'The Times' prediction in his autobiographypublished in 1978,one hundredyears after lbbetson's Report on the 'State,Discipline and Organisationof the Detective Force'. Having dealt with someof the more seriousallegations of corruption madeagainst the modem police service, Sir Robertreminds his readersof his Dimbleby Lecture given at the British BroadcastingCorporation's headquarters five yearsearlier, on 3d November 1973almost exactly one hundredyears after the publication of Henderson's'Primary Objects'. Dealing with the criminal prosecutionprocess he then said:
'It is hardly surprisingthat a policeman'sbelief in its fairnessshould decline as he gathersexperience, or that he shouldbe temptedto depart from the rules. The detectiveis the personmost affectedbecause it is he who regularly bearsthe brunt of the trial process. In theory he's devoted only to the causeofjustice. He likes to think of himself as having no personalinterest in acquittal,conviction or sentenceand that his careeris not affectedby the outcomeof his cases. In practicethis is a grossover- simplification. Most detectiveshave a strong senseof commitment. It would be unnaturalif they did not feel personallyinvolved in someof their casesand it would be untrue to suggestthat they are not sometimes outragedby the results. All are under occasionaltemptation to bend tile believe be A few rules to convict thosewhom they to guilty ... may sometimesbe temptedalso to exploit the systemfor personalgain. A detectivewho finds generalacceptance of a systemwhich protectsthe wrongdoercan cometo think that if crime seemsto pay for everyoneelse, why not for him?"
4 The Times 15* August 1877page 9 col. e 5 Mark, Sir R(1978)page 157 Findings and Conclusions 196
Confirmation of Sir Robert's views and conclusionsis readily available in the steadyflow of popular literature on casesof police corruption.' Equally, present- day researchersin policing havefound that the culture and organisationof policing as it relatesto crime detectioncan inculcatean ethosof corruption and devianceamong police officers. As Punch(1985) says:
'dilemmas in producingsatisfactory work - owing to pressurefor results, ambiguouslegislation, vulnerability to legal sanctionsand precarious bargainswith criminals, informantsand lawyers- can lead to short-cut methods,lies, covering-up,falsification of evidence,and intimidation of These in decipheringdeviance in the suspects. ... can aid as rooted everyday,organizational reality of policing."'
The problem of corruptionresulting from the dual peacekeepingand detective role of the modem police serviceextends beyond the behaviourof individual officers. The dual role also actsto exacerbateand magnify corruption's damagingeffects. Any disreputeassociated with detectivework inevitably contaminatesevery police officer, not only throwing doubt on the credibility of all police evidencein casesbefore the courts,but also discrediting,and thus weakening,the standing,status and credibility of thoseengaged in the peacekeepingand protectiveactivities of the service.
2. On the management of policing
A dual peacekeepingand detectiverole generatesirresolvable problems for the efficient and effective management of policing.
This conclusionis suggestedby the secondof the reservationsraised by Mayne in his 'Memorandum' of 1842. When discussingthe difficulties that an addition of the detectiveduties of the magistratesofficers to the responsibilitiesof his Force would bring, he said;
'The Commissionersare awarethat there is somedanger in establishing such a Branch of Police, to whom the duties of a detectivecharacter would more immediatelybelong; of causinga relaxation of the exertionsof the Police in generalfor the samepurpose, which havehitherto beensuccessful to so greatan extent; - and it may be difficult to define the exact point of
6 Laurie, P. (1970); Cox, B. et al. (1977);McNee, Sir D. (1983) Chapter9; Jennings,A. et al (1990) 7 Punch(1985) Introduction, page 3 Findings and Conclusions 197
time and the exactcircumstances under which the advantageof pursuit by the whole body of the Police is to be abandoned.'
In the context of his time and as he understoodthe responsibilitiesof his 'street police', Mayne's purposein theseremarks was to draw attentionto the problem he would have in deciding when the 'quick and fresh pursuit' of an offender by his patrolling constablesshould be abandonedand the casehanded over to a specially employeddetective. But he also here first raisesa wider problem for the managementof a dual role police servicethat remainstroublesome to this day. How much time and effort shouldthe police devoteto the preventionof crime, and how much to its detection?
That this is a real and continuing problem for police managers,and that it has adverseeffects on the efficiency and effectivenessof policing has, in recenttimes, been most notably confirmed by Lord Scarmanin his Report of an enquiry into the Brixton Disordersin 1981(Cmnd. 8427).
In his Report Lord Scarmanidentifies and discussesthe dual role of the modem police service. He says:
'the primary duty of the police is to maintain "the Queen'sPeace" which has beendescribed as the "normal stateof society"... since it is inevitable that there will be aberrationsfrom normality, his secondduty arises,which is, without endangeringnormality, to enforcethe law"
Lord Scarman,following it would seemthe lead of his colleaguesamong the Law Lords,' describesthe secondof the two functions of the police as 'law enforcement'rather than 'crime detection'. However, his 'aberrationsfrom normality' will include, and indeedlargely consist in, breachesof the criminal law. The view of the dual role of the police developedby this researchis thereforenarrower than, but consistentwith, Lord Scarman's.
In the next paragraphof his Report, Scarmanconfirms that difficulties are caused by the existenceof the two police functions he identifies.
'The conflict which can arise betweenthe duty of the police to maintain order and their duty to enforcethe law, and the priority which must be given to the former, have long beenrecognised by the police themselves,
8 Scarman(198 1) paragraph 4.57 9 R. v. MetropolitanPolice Commissioner exParte Blackburn (1968) 1 All E.R. page 769at 1,and 777 atD Findings and Conclusions 198
though they are factorsto which commentatorson policing have in the past often paid too little attention.'
The conclusionsof the ScarmanReport then go on fully to substantiateMayne's view that seriousproblems are causedby requiring the police to act both as peacekeepersand as detectives. Lord Scarman'sfinding in relation to the Brixton disorderswas that a police operationto identify, detectand arreststreet robbers, which was fullyjustified in crime reductionand detectionterms, was also the principal causeof a three-dayriot that causedwidespread destruction of buildings and other property, as well as hundredsof injuries to police and public. The ScarmanReport is therefore,a most authoritativeaccount both of the inherent conflict betweenthe police activities of crime detectionon the one hand and peacekeepingon the other, as well as of the priority of peacekeepingin the presentdual role of the service.
In its internal structurethe modem police servicefurther illustratesthe perceptivenessof Scarman'sfindings and Mayne's earlier advice. Every modem police force can be seento be broadly divided into two friendly but competing camps. One, the uniform branch,is composedof officers engagedin peacekeeping,crime deterrence,and community protection;the other, the criminal investigationdepartment (CID), holds plain clothesdetectives waging war on crime and criminals. As Banton (1964) has describedit;
'A division is between departments(detectives, traffic ... apparent specialist officers, vice and fraud squads,etc. ) andthe ordinary patrolman. The former are 'law officers' whosecontacts with the public tend to be of a punitive or inquisitorial character,whereas the patrolmen... are principally 'peaceofficers' operatingwithin the moral consensusof the community'"
The problem not fully discussedby Banton or other commentatorsis that the two groupshave conflicting objectives,tactics and strategies. Detection and prosecutionas an objective dependsupon criminals committing, or at leastbeing allowed to attemptto commit, crimes. As Richard Mayne put it in his Memorandumin 1842referred to earlier, 'detective duties',
'causesthe officers to allow a numberof casesto remain unnoticed in order that now and then in a caseof greatnotoriety, the parties or their associates whosecases have beenconnived at on other occasions,may be inducedto give the information.'
10Banton, M (I 964)page6 Findings and Conclusions 199
Public protectionand peacekeepingon the other hand,aims to deter or prevent all crime in any circumstances.A dual peacekeeperand detectiverole thus createsa perpetualdilemma for the managersof the police servicesince there is no easy compatibility betweenpolice actionsdesigned to keepthe peaceand those intendedto detectand arrestactive criminals; an issueexemplified in Lord Scarman'sReport. Equally, the selection,training, equipment,deployment and even clothing and hours of duty requiredfor peacekeepingand public protection are entirely different from thoseneeded for the detectionof criminal offenders. Moving individual police officers from one task to anotheris thereforeextremely difficult and impossibleat short notice. Certainly no individual officer can perform both taskseffectively at one and the sametime. As a result, behind a public front of unity peacekeepersand detectivesengage in incessantinter- departmentalcompetition for influenceover force policy and accessto resources. This is notjust an exampleof corporatepolitics. It is a manifestationof the deep structural divide recognisedby Lord Scarman.
When public or politicians are consultedon thesematters however, they invariably demandthat the police serviceprovide both effective peacekeepersand successfuldetectives. Indeed,they find it difficult to distinguishbetween, let alone prioritise, the two activities. That is because,first insofar as they are aware,no other agencycan, or ever did, supply either essentialservice; and second,there is a vague,unexamined but generallyaccepted feeling that tile two activities are connectedin that they are both assumedto contributeto the reduction of crime and disorder, and to the control of criminality. It is thus tile duality of the policing role which generatesthe insoluble dilemmasfaced by the managersof the police service. How are they to decidethe priority to be given to eachfunction? Which shouldcome first, catchingcriminals or keepingthe peace? And, to return to Mayne's questionwith which this sectionbegan, in pursuing both when shouldone activity stop and the other start?
3. On police and community relations
A dual peacekeepingand detective role hinders the creation and maintenanceof good relationsbetween police and public.
As a result of the developmentof their dual role in the period after 1839 professionalpolice officers now act both as guardiansand as prosecutorsof the public they seekto serve. In that dual role the police serviceis required to presentitself as responsibleboth for the protection and support of all citizens, and Findings and Conclusions 200 for the detection,prosecution and punishmentof thosesame citizens if and when they commit crime. The two functionsare understandablydifficult to reconcile, both by police officers and by the public they seekto serve,creating formidable obstaclesto mutual trust and the free flow of adviceand information. Examples include not only the Brixton disordersin London in 1981on which Lord Scarman reported,but also the recentdifficulties faced by the Metropolitan Police in dealing with the murdersof StephenLawrence and Damilola Taylor and their continuing aftermaths,and thosestill afflicting the Royal Ulster Constabulary (now the Police Serviceof Northern Ireland) as a result of its investigationof the Omaghbombing.
The StephenLawrence inquiry conductedby Sir William MacPhersonof Cluny, whose Report was presentedto Parliamentin February1999, " is a good illustration of the complex,interlocking community relationsdifficulties created for the police serviceby its dual role. Sir William's termsof referencewere:
'To inquire into the mattersarising from the deathof StephenLawrence on 22 April 1993to date, in order particularly to identify the lessonsto be learnedfor the investigationand prosecutionof racially motivated crimes.'
Two issuesrelevant to this researcharise from the Inquiry. First, the Inquiry is a further exampleof the negativeeffects the dual role of the police can have on its relationshipwith its diversecommunities. It showsthat damagecan be done to the peacekeepingfunction of the police by an adversefeedback from a failure in its detectiveactivity, especiallywhere that activity relatesto crime acrosssocial or ethnic divisions.
Second,the Lawrenceinquiry seemsto havetaken little or no accountof the effects and consequencesof the duality of the police role in reachingits conclusionsand recommendations.This is surprisingsince the Inquiry quotesthe ScarmanReport extensivelyand usesLord Scarman'sobservations and conclusionsto sharpenand justify many of its criticisms of police action." Itis unfortunatetherefore, that Sir William did not give full weight to Lord Scarman's warning that the dual role of the police and the conflicts that can arise from it ' are factors to which commentatorson policing have in the past paid too little attention'
11Macpherson (1999) 12ibid. Chapter46 Findings and Conclusions 201
That oversightmust raisethe possibility that the LawrenceInquiry may have reachedjudgements about the conductof the Metropolitan Police as a whole, and of the behaviourof individual officers carrying out their separatepeacekeeper and detectivefunctions, without taking full accountof the difficulties causedby their dual role. That doesnot however,reduce the significanceof the Stephen LawrenceInquiry as an indicator of the severedifficulties the police have in establishingand maintaininggood relationswith minority communities. In fact and rightly, the Inquiry paid considerableattention to the broad issueof police/communityrelations.
Commentingon thoseaspects of the Inquiry, John Lea first notesthat:
'Scarman for training the ... called aimed at an understandingof cultural background Macphersonfound however, 18 of ethnic minority groups... later in 1998had years that not a single officer questioned... receivedany training of significancein racismawareness and racerelations. "'
But he then recognisesthat, 'The [police) strategyof liaison with 'respectable' membersof minority communitiesstretches back to the Community Relations Councils of the 1960s"'
In effect, MacPhersonfound and reportedthat, after more than 30 yearsof effort the leadersof the police servicehad failed to solve, or evenmuch ease,the problem of the relationshipbetween the police serviceand all the diverse communitiesit seeksto serve. At bestthere had beenno identifiable improvement. A fuller appreciationof the problemscaused by the dual role of the police may have helpedthe Inquiry to explain why this is so.
The ScarmanReport and the LawrenceInquiry are important landmarksin tile history of the relationshipbetween the modernpolice serviceand its public. Both enquiriesarose directly from the detectivefunction of the police. Both reachhighly critical conclusionsabout the effect of that activity on the peacekeepingwork of the police serviceand its relationshipwith its communities. John Lea's criticisms shows,if nothing else,how long and yet how ineffectively the professionalpolice servicehas struggledwith that seeminglyintractable problem.
13Mathews and Young (20031page 53 14 ibid. page 54 Findings and Conclusions 202
4. On performance measurement
Dual peacekeeperand detective functions militate against accurate or reliable measurementand assessmentof police performance.
The debateon police performanceand its measurementbegan in earnestwith Prime Minister Thatcher's 'value for money' revolution during her premiershipin the 1980's. Under that regimeboth governmentand public beganto require the police serviceaccount for the resourcesallocated to the supportof its crusade againstcrime. The demandwas for measurableresults from the public money spenton policing. Departingfrom every precedent,Thatcher's Cabinet set out to link police budgetsto performance. In retrospectmost chief police officers and other informed observerswill recognisethat the turning point for policing came in November 1983with the publication of Home Off ice Circular number 114/83, entitled 'Manpower, Effectivenessand Efficiency in the Police Service'.
This Circular madethe first explicit connectionbetween the resourcesdevoted to policing and the performanceof the police servicein dealingwith crime and disorder. With its appearancethe lessrigorous regimespreviously enjoyedby many Chief Constablesended. From now on they would haveto show that their, 'force's existing resourcesare usedto the bestadvantage' before making any application for an increase. To do so they would haveto satisfy Her Majesty's Inspectorsof Constabulary, all of them ex-seniorChief Constablesand Home Off ice appointees,that 'resourcesare directedin accordancewith properly determinedobjectives and priorities"'
Later the Circular reinforcedthe point sayingthat,
'The Home Secretarytherefore attaches importance to the determinationof objectivesand priorities in the police service, and to the allocation of resourcesand the deploymentof police and civilian manpowerin a way that will most effectively and efficiently securethose objectives and priorities."'
Sir LawrenceByford, then Her Majesty's Chief Inspectorof Constabulary,spoke about the impact of the Circular on Chief Constablesin a seminarat the National Police Collegethe following year. He said that, from the issueof the Circular,
Is Home Office Circular 114/83para. 4 16ibid. para.6 Findings and Conclusions 203
'It follows that there needsto be thorough planning, and effective deploymentof manpowerin accordancewith thoseplans, and, aboveall, on results- on getting them and, equally importantly, on being able to demonstratethat you havegot them."'
The decadesof the 1980sand 1990ssaw the full flowering of the resultant 'policing by objectives' managementstyle in the police service, and the consequentattempt to developperformance measurement for policing. To begin, chief officers and othersturned to Henderson's1873 Primary Objects as the accepteddefinition of what the police serviceseeks to achieve. By that definition the primary purposesof policing are to preventcrime, and to detectand punish offenders. Unfortunately eventhe Home Office had elsewherealready come to a conclusion reachedby Rowan and Mayne in 1838;the preventionof crime was not somethingwholly within the power of the police to achieve.
It had done so in anotherequally importantcircular issuedin 1984dealing with the Home Office view on the problem of crime prevention." Echoing,without acknowledging,Rowan and Mayne its first paragraphreads,
'A primary objective of the police hasalways beenthe preventionof crime. However, since someof the factors affecting crime lie outsidethe control or direct influenceof the police, crime preventioncannot be left to them alone. Every individual citizen and all thoseagencies whose policies and practices can influencethe extent of crime shouldmake their contribution. Preventingcrime is a task for the whole community.'
A clear implication of this Circular is an acceptanceby the Home Off ice that no police force or unit is in control of, or able directly to influence,all the factors that determinethe level of crime in the areafor which it is responsible. Yet its earlier (1983) Circular proposedlevels of crime as a fair or proper measureof police efficiency or effectiveness,and demandedthat improved performanceagainst crime should be a significant criterion in the allocation of resources.
Coincident with the issueof thesetwo Circulars, a Prosecutionof OffendersBill, also sponsoredby the Home Office, was before Parliament. Its effect (perhaps unintended)was further to reducethe opportunitiesto measurepolice performance. The Bill containedradical proposals. Despiteall the effort made
17National Police College 21st. Senior Command Course Seminar, ClosingAddress, 22ndAugust 1984 Is 'Crime Prevention', Home Office Circular 8/1984 Findings and Conclusions 204 by the Home Office to transferthe detectiveduties of the magistratesofficers to the professionalpolice in the 1860'sand 1870's, the Bill now proposedto removethe conductand control of prosecutionsof offendersagainst the criminal law from the functions of the police. An independentCrown ProsecutionService would undertakethe processof bringing offendersbefore the Courts. Unfortunately the prosecutionand punishmentof offendersare two of the very few aspectsof policing whoseoutcome can be measuredwith any accuracy. The Home Office decidedto removethat responsibilityfrom the police just when the servicemost neededa simple and reliable meanstojustify its budgets."
The search for a new role
The outcomeof the pressureof the ThatcherGovernment for financial efficiency and effectivenessin policing was to propel the serviceinto a searchfor a new definition of its role, one that would carry it forward into its new performance- related environment. The crusadefor economybecame a searchfor purpose simply becauseneither chief police officers nor Home Office ministersand officials were able to derive practical measuresof police performancefrom the Primary Objects. Yet anothernew definition of the purposesof policing was needed
Unfortunately, the issueof what to include in sucha definition and what to omit degeneratedinto a long and sometimesacrimonious dispute. The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and other interestedparties examined it exhaustively. The debategenerated so little light that a high-poweredHome Office Committeewas appointedin December1993, under the title of the 'Review of Police Core and Ancillary Tasks', to clarify the question. The Committee'sterms of referencewere;
'To examinethe servicesprovided by the police, to make recommendationsabout the most cost-effectiveway of delivering core policing servicesand to assessthe scopefor relinquishing ancillary tasks'"
In the Introduction to its Final Report, the Review Committee refer to the White Paper on Police Reform (Command no. 2251). The Committee notes that the White Paper says,
'that the Governmentconsidered that it would be useful in future to define more clearly what the police serviceshould regardas its core
19 Prosecution of Offenders AM 1985 20 Home Office (1995) page 7, para. 1.2 Findings and Conclusions 205
responsibilitiesand thosethings which are to a great extent ancillary to their main responsibilities"'
In effect, in 1993,one hundredand sixty-four yearsafter its first foundation, governmentdecided to try to lay down preciselywhat the professionalpolice serviceought to be doing, and what role it shouldplay in society.
The outcomemay be predicted. After two years' work the Committeeconcluded its in 1995 26 in 'specific [of proceedings with recommendations areas... in look policing] ... where somechange working arrangements potentially beneficial to the police servicein freeing up resourceswhich could be usedin other ways.'". However, the Committeehad to admit that;
'6.5 It is not expectedthat any of the changesrecommended - even if they were all to be implemented- would alter the natureof the police serviceoffered to the public. The changesunder discussion here are often concernedwith inter-agencyrelationships rather than with the police service's relationshipwith the public."'
Regrettably,the Review Committeecould not completeits task of defining the core responsibilitiesof the police asthe Government'sWhite Paperhad hoped. The consequencesof that failure are bestseen in the developmentof individual statementsof purposeand valuesby police forces. The reactionof the Metropolitan Police, the founding model for the professionalBritish police service,illustrates the spreadand depthof the resultantconfusion about the role of the police. Rowan and Mayne's Metropolitan Police Force is now the Metropolitan Police Service. It was amongthe first to issuea 'Statementof Common Purposeand Values' to fill the needfor a new basison which its performancemight be publicly assessed.The current definition of the role of the Metropolitan Police as it is reproducedon its website"'is:
21 ibid. para. 1.1 22 ibid. Conclusionspage25, para 61 23 ibid. para.6.5 2Ahttpl/www. met.police. uk/about/mission. html Findings and Conclusions 206
MPS Mission, vision and values
MAKING LONDON SAFE FOR ALL THE PEOPLE WE SERVE
Our Mission Our Values Our Vision
To fairly To make placessafer treat everyone To London the To be honest make To cut crime and the fear of openand safestmajor city in the crime To work in partnership world To uphold the law To changeto improve
Such statementsclearly do not provide any sort of measureby which police managementdecisions and actionscan be compared,assessed or objectively judged, nor do they assistin estimatingthe relative efficiency or effectivenessof various police units. In truth, they shareall the limitations of the 'Primary Objects' without its admittedly vagueand impracticalground-level priority- setting benefits.
While police forces were strugglingwith the problem of the definition of their role, governmentpressed on with the specific issueof police performance measurement,but now from a different direction and with anotherperspective. In 1997a Labour governmentcame to power after 13 yearsof Thatcher's Conservatives. It madea radical and energeticstart to its first term of office. Among its reforming initiatives was a review of the public services,and particularly their funding arrangements,under the title of the Comprehensive SpendingReview (CSR). Included in that review was the police serviceand its host department,the Home Office.
However, despitethe appearanceof a vast and ever-growingmonitoring and budgetarybureaucracy within the police serviceand more than five yearsof the CSF, identifiable progressin termsof the developmentof useful, applicableand reliable measuresof police performancehas been negligible. Even to discover where governmentis in its searchfor measuresof the value for money gained from spendingon policing presentsa formidable and frustrating challenge.
Thirteen policing performanceindicators are indeedto be found on the current 'The Home Office website in the sectionentitled National Policing Plan 2003 - Findings and Conclusions 207
2006', at paragraph10.3 under highlighted headings." For the purposesof this discussionthe precisewording of thoseindicators is unimportant." What matters is the sourceor sourcesfrom which they are drawn and on which they depend. That information is not included in the Plan itself. It is to be found in the Home Office Annual Report, and specifically in the performancemeasures agreed with the Treasuryand set for the achievementof the Home Office's Public Service Agreement(PSA) 'targets' I and 2 relating to policing.",
There, finally, it will be discoveredthat the baseon which the current systemof measurementand assessmentof police performanceprincipally restsis three-fold: the British Crime Survey;the Home Office StatisticalBulletin, and the annual report of Her Majesty's Chief Inspectorof Constabulary,all of which have been available, and have beenused for thesepurposes since before Prime Minister Thatcher's launch of the idea of value for moneyin policing in 1983. Four'other indicators' are mentionedin the National Policing Plan but for various reasons they are not included in the performancemeasures used for PSA 'targets' I and 2. In effect, no new measuresof the value for moneyobtained from the public funds devotedto policing have beendeveloped or agreedin the entire twenty-year history of the policy.
The lack of progressin the searchfor a viable and useful replacementfor the 'Primary Objects' which this revealsneeds no further emphasis. What can be said however, is that the presentannual police planningand reporting process, with its heavy focus on crime detectionand prosecution,is a complex,convoluted bureaucracythat must representa serious,continuing, but not yet assessedor measured,drain on police manpowerand resources. Thosewith sufficient staminaand determinationcan bestgain a senseof the full extent of the burgeoningweight of that bureaucracyby a visit to the 'Police Best Value Indicators 2003/04' pageof the Home Off ice website.1'
In all, a survey of recentdevelopments in the managementof the police service identifies its dual role as a significant and continuing obstacleto the measurement or assessmentof police efficiency and effectiveness. That objective requires,as a preliminary, a clear understandingof what the police servicecan do, and a statementfirmly basedon that understandingwhich setsout what it is then expectedto achieve. Unfortunately,neither that understandingnor any policing
25 http://www. policereforrrLgov. uk/docstnalýpoLplanO2. pdf 26 ibid pages35 to 37 27httpY/www. policerefonyLgov. uk/docs/perform]2. html 28 http://Www. homeoffice. gov. ukldocs2lpolicebvidefinitions2OO3-04. pdf Findings and Conclusions 208 objective that can properly be derived from it presentlyexists in any generally agreedor acceptedform.
It remainsnow to considerand developrecommendations for action that can provide a solution to the problemsand issuesjust discussed. Recommendations 209
15
Recommendations
The conclusionsset out in the precedingchapter identify four major problems presentlyfacing the British police service. They are; persistentincidents of corruption; inefficiency in the managementof policing; difficulty in maintaining long-term good relationsbetween police and public, especiallyin the caseof minority communities; and, lack of effective and reliable measuresof police performance. This thesisattributes those problems wholly or in part to the dual peacekeepingand detectiverole of the police. An outcomeof this researchis thereforea prediction that the major problemsit identifies will persistso long as British police officers retain their presentdual role. An appropriate,acceptable and effective end to that dual role is thereforethe objective of the recommendationspresented.
Policing reform
In view of the primacy and primordiality of peacekeepingin the functions of British policing identified by this research,action to endthe dual role of modern police seivice should involve the removal of its detectivefunction as defined. What is required for a resolutionof the problemsnow facing the police service is a return to an option that was availableto the Home Off ice in 1839. Government should acceptthe recommendationsthe First Reportof the Royal Commissionon the Establishmentof an Efficient ConstabularyForce, appoint a public prosecutor and revert to Rowan and Mayne's 1829purely peacekeepingdefinition of the role of the police.
The effect of that reform would be to give back to the police serviceits intended original role. It would keepthe peace,prevent crime and disorder,protect citizens from harm, and respondto calls for assistancefrom the public. In the tradition of their Saxonconstable forbears the overriding duty of police officers, at all times and in all circumstances,would be to safeguardthe personsand property of all citizens. In that role police officers would continueto have the 'quick and fresh pursuit' dutiesdescribed by the 1839Royal Commissionand will respondto reportsof crime from the public. Their duty to prevent crime would be restrictedto the 'preventable' categoryadopted by Peel's New Police, as describedby Mayne in his evidenceto the 1833/4Select Committee on the Police of the Metropolis on 2nd July 1833,i. e. they would be held accountableonly for Recommendations 210
those crimes or offencesthat could havebeen prevented by a body of uniformed patrolling constables.
Those immediateduties would mark the limit of police responsibility for the control of crime and criminality and involvementin the prosecutionof offences againstthe criminal law. Police officers would seekto detain offendersonly where they are presentor immediatelyidentifiable. Even then, the police would only take that action where it was neededto keepthe peaceor to protect the rights and liberties of other citizens. Considerationwould haveto be given to whether the reformedpolice servicewill needto be equippedwith specific powersof enquiry to carry out that limited involvementin the detectionof offenders.
Responsibility for the subsequentinvestigation of reportsor allegationsof crime, however defined and from whateversource, and for the identification, detection and prosecutionof offendersagainst the criminal law will revert to its Norman origins with government,which will be requiredto identify or createagencies to undertakeall the processesrequired, including gatheringintelligence on crime and active criminals, and the cultivation and managementof informants. Like their predecessormagistrates in the old police offices, thosebodies will be able to employ, control and direct agentsto carry out thosetasks. Existing professional detectiveswill no doubt provide an ample pool of trained and experienced investigatorsfrom which theseagents can be recruited.
Thosenew criminal investigatorswill not needthe statusof sworn constables,nor any of the individual discretionarypowers of arrest,investigation or search presentlygranted to police officers. The agenciesthat employ them can readily supply, control and superviseany authority they may needto gatherinformation, cultivate informants,interview witnesses,detain suspects,etc., and to searchfor and seizeevidence. The final elementin a properly reconstructedpeacekeeping and criminal justice systemis therefore,a governmentagency responsible for tile investigationof crime and the identification and prosecutionof offendersagainst the criminal law. The one remainingneed is for the appointmentof a public prosecutor.
The necessityfor suchan appointmentin an emergingindustrial, urbanisedand democraticsociety has long beenrecognised. It was noticed by the 1839Royal Commissionon the Establishmentof a ConstabularyForce, and the 1845Eighth Report of the Royal Commissionon the Criminal Law emphasisedtile damage done to the 'due administrationof criminal justice' by the absenceof such an Recommendations 211 official. Both also notedthe opportunitiespresented for corruption. Parliament cannotclaim that the appointmentof public prosecutorsis unprecedentedor that it has had no opportunity to considerthe proposal. In 1856a ParliamentarySelect Committeeon Public Prosecutorslooked at the criminal justice systemsin America, Scotlandand Ireland. It recommendedthat,
cagents be for shall appointed... the purposeof preparingand conducting The duty be to prosecutionsto the time of trial, ... of suchagents should prepareand conductprosecutions through the stagespreliminary to trial. Where it comesto their knowledgethat an offencehas been committed, and that no stepshave been taken to bring the offenderto justice, itwillbe their duty to take the necessarysteps for apprehendingor for otherwise bringing the offender before a magistrate."
Nothing cameof the SelectCommittee's proposal when a Bill to implementit was put before Parliament. The Prosecutionof OffendersAct of 1879which later establishedthe post of Director of Public Prosecutionsdid not addressthe issue and was only a limited measurein this respect. It confinedthe Director to a mainly supervisoryrole in the conductof prosecutionsby the police serviceand others. Under the reforms proposedhere a public prosecutor'srole would be to undertakethe investigationof all reportsand allegationsof crime, including those reportedby the police where their 'quick and fresh pursuit' was unsuccessful. The public prosecutor'sduty will be to identify and detectoffenders, and to prepareand undertakeall criminal prosecutionsin which there is a public interest.
Present-daypolice officers will not readily abandonfunctions and dutiesthat, by long use, havebecome their exclusivedomain, and which the public instinctively looks to them to provide. Nor will governmenteasily acceptthat a public prosecutor,or someother agencysubject to Parliamentaryscrutiny, should take responsibility for the investigationof reportsof crime and the identification, detectionand prosecutionof criminal offenders. Yet the proposalthat the police should hand their detectivefunction to a public prosecutoris not as revolutionary asitmayseem. Recentdevelopments in the British criminal justice systemhave all beenin that direction.
Report from the SelectCommittee on Public Prosecutions(1856) ParliamentaryPapers (1856) Vol VIlpage 351 Recommendations 212
The Crown Prosecution Service
The emergenceof the Crown ProsecutionService (CPS) and the creationof national criminal investigativeand intelligencebodies has alreadyremoved large areasof criminal investigation, intelligenceand detectionfrom the handsof local chief police officers. Units controlled,directly or indirectly, by government ministersalready have many of thosefunctions. The penetrationof the CPS back down the line of investigationinto the offices of local police detective departmentsgrows ever deeper. It would be a bold, or foolish, detectivetoday who did not ensurethat he had clearedhis methodswith his local CPS office before embarkingon any major investigation.
A report on the CPSby Sir lain Glidewell in May, 1998clearly soughtto move the British prosecutionservice further in exactly that direction. Sir lain and his Committeerecommended the amalgamationof someof the functionsof the CPS with police administrationunits. The aim was that the laying of a formal charge againstan offender would mark the point at which responsibilityfor the case passedto the CPS. His Report says;
'Such a single integratedunit, which we havecalled a Criminal Justice Unit, could be either a police unit with one or more CPS lawyersworking permanentlyin it, or a CPSunit with somepolice staff. Wefirmly recommendthe secondoption. ' I
Following a recommendationby Lord JusticeAuld, 'the Crown Prosecution Serviceconducted an experimentin May 2003 involving six police force areasin which Crown Prosecutorstook responsibility for chargingsuspected offenders, rather than allowing thosedecisions to be madeby police officers. Conviction ratesrose and the numberof casesthat collapsedor were abandonedat trial fell. The experimentis now to be extendedto the whole of Englandand Wales.' These proposalsof the CPS,and their associateddevelopments show that the British criminal justice systemis alreadymoving in the direction proposedhere.
As a postscriptto this sectionof my Recommendations,it was reportedduring the last stagesof preparationof this accountof my researchthat the Home Secretary proposesto renamethe Crown ProsecutionService, the 'Public Prosecution
2 The Times 28h May 1998page 12 3 Review of the Criminal Courtsof Englandand Wales(200 1) Chapter10, para. 162 4 The Times 13'hMay 2003page 9 Recommendations 213
Service'. The reasongiven was that the new namewas likely to make the purposeof the organisationclearer in the public mind.
A Renewed Police
The proposednew structurefor British criminal justice will simplify and clarify the system. It will removea major sourceof corruptionfrom a vital public service. At the sametime a clear distinction will be createdbetween the agencies responsiblefor the preventionof crime and disorderand the protectionof the public, and thosecharged with the identification and punishmentof criminal offenders. It will thus provide a betterbasis on which to developmeasures of the efficiency of the criminal justice systemas a whole. Both governmentand the public should be able to judge whetherthe police servicemakes effective use of the growing sumsof public moneyentrusted to it. No suchjudgement is possible while the police are requiredto pursuethe conflicting aims of protectingcitizens from crime, and of detectingand prosecutingthem when they commit it.
The sequenceof eventsleading to a reform of the police must begin with an open discussionwhose aim should be to establisha new consensuson the functions and purposesof the modem police service. No suchpublic discussionhas taken place since the 1840s. Governmentministers and thosewho advisethem can give structureto the debateby reopeningthe work abandonedby the Home Office Review of Police Core and Ancillary Tasks. The purposewill be to producea clear and agreedstatement of the properduties and functions of a reformedpolice service. That is likely to trigger someinteresting exchanges, particularly in view of the effects of government'scontinuing ComprehensiveSpending Review. Becauseit must be clear by now that no-onecan expectthe police to bear responsibility for both peacekeepingand the punishmentof crime and criminality inoursociety. Nor can the value of the work of police officers bejudged by their effect on levels of crime.
The way forward
The way forward in the control and reductionof crime in British society lies in tile removal of the police servicefrom its presentposition as primary agencyin the identification, detectionand prosecutionof criminal offenders. Exactly what might then be expectedof a newly focussedpolice devotedsolely to peacekeeping and the protection of citizens awaits the conclusionof the debateand discovery processjust advocated. Recommendations 214
However, whatevermay be the outcomeof that public debate,reform of policing should never go further than that requiredto bring it fully into line with the needs of the public it serves. The Royal Commissionof 1839better than any later commentatorunderstood the purposesand functions of a truly preventivepolice. Among the Conclusionsto its First Reportthe Commissionsays,
'the main purposeof a preventivepolice [is) the protectionof private individuals in the enjoymentof their rights againstinfractions by depredatorsand others"
In our times the inclusion of 'and others' shouldstrike an especiallyresonant note. It reminds us of the vital importanceto the health of our form of democracyof the operationalindependence of the police servicefrom any outsideinfluence other than the law itself. Including and especiallygovernment and its agents.
Royal Commissionon the Establishmentof an Efficient ConstabularyForce (1839) First Report, page 185:and Parliamentary Papers (1839)vot NX. page]71 Appendix 215
Publication
On the advice of my supervisorsand with their encouragementand supportI have taken stepsto exposethe main themes,findings, conclusionsand recommendationsof my thesisto review by informed practitionersof policing and others academicallyor otherwiseactive in the field.
The Criminal Law Review.
In 2002 a two part article outlining my main ideaswas publishedin the Criminal Law Review under the title 'Detecting Crime'.
Part I; 'Detection and the Police' appearedin the May edition on pages 379 to 390, and
Part 11;'The Casefor a Public Prosecutor'in the July edition on pages 566 to 577.
I am not aware,as yet, of any adverseor dissentingcomment arising from either article. Copiesof thosearticles, aspublished, are attached.
Centre for Studies in Policing, Canterbury Christchurch University College.
As a consequenceof the appearanceof my articles I was invited by Dr. Dominic Wood to addressstudents taking a Batchelorof Sciencedegree in Operational Policing at the Centrefor Studiesin Policing at Canterbury. I attendeda week- end study courseon 31' May2003 and spoketo some20 to 30 students. Most were serving police officers or membersof police civil and supportstaffs. I understandthat my talk was well received,and while questionswere askedno seriousobjections to my researchfiriding or conclusionswere raisedeither by studentsor membersof the staff of the Centre. I am informed that my articles are included in reading lists for the course.
National Police Trainine Centre. Bramshill.
Bramshill Housenear Hook, Basingstokein Hampshireis the site of what was formerly called the National Police College,and remainsthe premier training centreof the British police service. Selectionfor and attendanceon its Command courseis a requirementfor promotion to the highestranks of the service. On 19"' February2003 1 spoketo the Librarian at Bramshill, PeterLevay, and confirmed that my articles were availablein the National Police Library. He told me that they were 'very popular' with studentsattending the Centre. Again, as yet I have Appendix 216
not beenmade aware of any adversereaction to my articles either from officers aftendingcourses at the Centreor from its staff.
White Paper on Police Reform (2002) Cmnd. 5326
On 20th January, 2002, during the consultation period on the White Paper on Police Reform entitled 'Policing a New Century: a Blueprint for Reform. ', I submitted comments on the proposed Police Reform Bill based on my research. My submission was acknowledged by Mr. Ben Bradley of the Police Reform & Bill Unit who informed me that my 'comments have been noted and will be given careful consideration by Ministers. ' A copy of my comments, as forwarded, is attached.
There is however,nothing in the Police Reform Act, which receivedRoyal assent on 24h July 2002, to indicatethat my commentshad any effect on the drafting of the Bill.
Letters to 'The Times', London
During the period of my researchletters based on my findings were publishedin the London 'Times' on:
291hDecember, 2000 30'h January, 2002 18th February, 2002 20 April, 2002 27'hApril, 2002 25'h September, 2002 22 ndSeptember 2003 240'January, 2ý64, and I othApril, 2004.
Apart from the irrelevant and incoherentcorrespondence such lettersseem to attract, reactionhas beengenerally supportive and, as yet, neither critical nor dismissiveof the points made. PAG ;
NUlVI RIN-G
AS ORIGINAL Crim. L. R. Detecting Crime Part I: Detection and the Police 379
Detecting Crime Part 1: Detection and the Police
By Lawrence T. Roach, QPM
Summary: The Metropolitan Police Act of 1829 specifically precluded Robert Peel's New Police from any involvementin the investigation and detection of crime. It is contended in this article that the subsequentimposition of those duties on the Metropolitan Police by the Home Office in the 1860s and 1870s was both improper and an error. In particular, a pattern and precedent was therebysetfor the British police service with damagingconsequences.
Peel's New Police
When Robert Peel rose in the House of Commons at 3 pm in the afternoon of WednesdayApril 15,1829 to speak in support of his Metropolis Police Improve- ment Bill, he did not intend to disturb the power and prerogative of the magistrates of the metropolis. The Bow Street Chief Magistrate, Henry Fielding, had first recruited six Westminster householders in 1750 to act as his agents in his responsibilities under the common law to investigate crime and detect criminal offenders. The Bow Street Runners, as they quickly became known, developed a considerablereputation in the identification, detection and pursuit of criminals, and MagistratesPolice Offices on Fielding's model were establishedthroughout London following the passageof the Middlesex JusticesAct in 1792. The Offices and their plainclothes officers enjoyed a monopoly as tile only professional detectives available in the capital. Peel's Metropolis Police Improvement Bill did not touch that monopoly, or the special position of the detective officers acting under tile magistrate'sauthority. This is made abundantly clear; first, by the preamble to the Metropolitan Police Act (10 Geo IV cap. 44), which identifies the capital's system of parochial watchmen as its target, saying: "Whereas Offences against Property have late increased in and near tile Metropolis; and the local establishmentsof Nightly Watch and Nightly Police have been found inadequate Prevention Detection Crime. to the and of ... And whereas it is expedient to substitute a new and more efficient system of Police in lieu of such Establishmentof Nightly Police within tile limits herein- after Be it therefore " (etc. ); mentioned, ... enacted... etc. and second,in section 42 of the Act which: C SWM-7 & NLAXVaL 380 Criminal Law Review 120021
"Provided that in this Act (3 Geo ... nothing contained shall affect or alter ... IV 55) (6 Geo IV 21) 11, cap. ... or ... cap. ... Le the statutesrenewing, continuing and expanding the investigative and detec- tive powers of the magistratesof the metropolis and their officers first set out in the Act of 1792. Peel intendedto apply a unified body of full-time paid constablesto the problems of peace-keepingand crime prevention in the capital. His speechto Parliament in support of his Bill shows that he meant to substitute his new body for the disorganisedand disreputablerabble of locally appointedwatch and ward. His was not therefore, the revolution in policing subsequentlyattributed to him. He neither intended,nor did he achieve,a radical alteration in the pattern of peacekeepingand crime control in the capital. He merely reformed one failed part of it-the system of parochial watch and ward. Indeed, if there can be any doubt about Peel's intentions in this respect in 1829, 10 Geo 4 cap. 45 dispels them. That Act emanatedfrom his Home Department and passedinto law on the sameday (June 19,1829) as his Metropolitan Police Act. Its purposewas to continueuncharged for yet anotherthree yearsthe Police Offices Act which was the successorto the original 1792 Middlesex Justices Act. Parliament thereby preserved and continued all the rights, status and privileges of the Magistrates Police Offices in the metropolis at the very moment it introduced the New Police. By their actions the first joint Commissionersappointed by Peel to commandthe new Metropolitan Police Force, Charles Rowan and Richard Mayne, confirm that the New Police had no role in the identification, detection or prosecution of criminal offenders. In their first Instructions to the Force in 1829, issued with the ". Secretary State for the Home Department. 11,they .. approbation of the of .. adopt an entirel7 preventive view of the purposesof a professionalpolice establish- ment. They say "It should be understood,at the outset, that the principal object to be attained is 'the Prevention o Crime To this great end every effort of Police is to be directed. The security of person and property, the preservation of public tranquillity and all the other objects of a Police establishment, will thus be better effected than by the detection and punishment of the offender; after he has succeededin commit. ting the crime." They then go on immediately to make their intentions and ambitions unmis- takable: "This should constantly be kept in mind by every member of the Police Force, as the guide for his own conduct. Officers and Police Constables should it difficult for to endeavourto ... render extremely any one commit a crime the town The within that portion of under their charge ... absenceof crime be the best the Police will considered proof of complete efficiency of the ...
Metropolitan Police InstructionsOrders etc. (September1829) pages I and 2. Metropoli- tan Police Museum.
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Identical versions of that definition of policing appearin the 1836,1851 and 1862 2 revisions of those Instructions. Nothing in the wording trespasseson the functions of the magistratesand their officers. The MagistratesPolice Offices continued to be responsible for "... the detection and punishment of the offender after he has in ", function Rowan Mayne succeeded committing the crime ... a that and explicitly excluded from the activities of their Force.
The Royal Commission of 1839
Confirmation of the legal position of Peel's New Police in the criminal justice systemsis also to be found in the work of the Royal Commissionappointed in 1836 "to inquire as to the best meansof establishing an efficient Constabulary Force in the counties of England", whose First Report was published on March 27,1839,10 years after the foundation of the Metropolitan Police Force. Among many other things that report told Members of Parliament was that, due to the passageof time, constables,including those employed in London by Rowan and Mayne, no longer had any independentlegal power to make even "preliminary inquiries" into cases appearing before the magistrates. Under the heading "Abandonment of the 3 principle of preliminary inquiry", it said that: it appears to be highly desirable that additional powers for securing important evidence should be given (to constables)by the legislature, and that the principle should be uniformly put into practical operation by virtue of a legislative enactment." If therefore, Parliament ever intended Rowan and Mayne's constablesto take up the "inquires" into criminal casesperformed by officers acting under and with the authority of the magistrates,the findings of the 1839 Royal Commission showed that legislative action was required to give them the power to do so. In addition the same Royal Commission said that, if police forces on the Peel model were to be generally establishedin Britain, they strongly recommended"the in behalf appointment of public prosecutors ... to prosecute those cases of the community at large 'in which no individual has any special interest,and in which the community has a special interest of its own, superaddedto that of individuals'. " The Royal Commission clearly considered the new constabulary forces they proposed to establish on the Metropolitan model to have no role in those matters.
1839 - Acts and consequences
While the Royal Commissionwas at work and before it producedits First Report, the policing arrangementsfor the Metropolis once more came onto the Parliamen- tary agenda.This time the emphasiswas on the legislation supporting the activities of the MagistratesPolice Offices of the Metropolis, and the detective officers they controlled. By now the constables of Rowan and Mayne's Metropolitan Police
2 Metropolitan Police Instructions Orders etc. (February 1,1836 et seq.) Public Record Office MEPO 8/2, and Metropolitan Police Museum. 3 First Report of the Royal Commissionon the Establishmentof an Efficient Constabulary Force (1839) page 95 para. 116. Parliamentary Papers(1839) vol. XIX page 101. 4 ib id, page 100, at page 94 para. 114.
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Force had gained the support of the vast majority of Londoners and their Parliamentary representatives,while the Bow Street Runners and the other magis- trates' officers had developedan unsavoury reputation for corruption and collusion with criminals. When, in 1837, a Select Committee was appointed to inquire into the Police Offices its remit was to do so "... with a view to improvement of the same."s The changedcircumstances created by the successof the Peelers,the decline of the Runners and the imminent expiry of the Police Offices legislation allowed the 1837 Select Committee to embark on a comprehensivereview of the whole of the policing arrangementsfor the Metropolis. The members determined to raise the status of the magistrates,confine them to purelyjudicial functions, and to do away with their investigativeand detectiveofficers. They found an ally in Edward Gibbon Wakefield, Esq. "... in; Examined " June 1,183 7. whom they called and ... on Wakefield thought the Metropolitan Police Force to be effective in, maintaining order, in preventingnuisances, in driving out of sight many evils which 6 But he did think it had had in the, still exist ...... not any effect rooting out ", The Chairman Wakefield: prompters of crime ... asked "There being, therefore, so many fertile sourcesof crime in the metropolis, is it not desirable that some much more efficient means of detection should be for afforded?-(Makefield) Most desirable, as it appearsto me; although one cannot say that the detection of crime in London is exactly nobody's business, still it is very difficult to point out whose businessit is; if a person is robbed in London, it seemsto be nobody's businessbut his own; at least there seemsto be no public functionaries whose business it is to detect the person who (i. Peel'sNew Police) to commits that crime ... the new system e. appears me be deficient detection; 0 to almost as as the old one as to the meansof ... Rowan and Mayne confirmed Wakefield's account of the role of their constables in their evidence to the Committee on March 9,1838.8 However, they then injudiciously and unnecessarily added their personal view that the uniformed patrolling activity of their "street police" was both preventive and detective in its effect. They told the Select Committee that their patrolling officers not only deterredcriminals, but that they also often arrestedoffenders at the scenesof crime or shortly afterward. Unfortunately, the Select Committee put these somewhat boastful remarkstogether with Wakefield's evidenceto concludethat it could safely do away with the magistrates'offices and leavethe whole of the control of crime and criminality in the capital to Rowan and Mayne's men. Accordingly, with the support of Parliament, that is what the Committee set out to do. The outcome was the passageof two Acts in 1839, the Metropolitan Police Act and the Metropolitan Police Courts Act. Critically, section 5 of the Metropoli- tan Police Courts Act transformed the officers employed by the magistrates into door keepers and security guards, with no detective or investigative powers. Unfortunately, as will shortly appear,sections II and 12 of the Metropolitan Police Act merely directed Rowan and Mayne to ensurethe attendanceof a"... sufficient
, Select Committee on the Metropolis Police Offices (1837) ParliamentaryPapers (1837/38) (451) Vol. XVpps. 309 etseq. 6 ibid, page 433 at para. 1192. 7 ibid, page 437 1205. 8 at para. ibid. (1838) page 462 at para. 1088.
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" to "... for number ... of their constables attend on the magistrates the purpose Summonses Warrants be directed ". of executing such and as may to them ... These sections also provide that only constablesof the Metropolitan Police could execute such warrants and summonses in the metropolitan police district. By neutering the magistrates' detective officers these provisions consigned Henry Fielding's innovations, including the Bow Street Runners and their imitators, to history. The problem with this legislation is that neither the Metropolitan Courts Act nor the Metropolitan Police Act of 1839 deal with the issuesraised by the First Report of the 1839 Royal Commissionon the need for wider powers for constablesif they were to replace the magistrates officers, and for the appointment of a public prosecutor should they do so. This was despite publication of the Royal Commis- sion's First Report during the passageof the Acts, and in defianceof Mr Wakefield's evidence, generously quoted by the Select Committee. No preliminary or prepara- tory legislative action therefore took place to empower Rowan and Mayne's men to carry out inquiries into reports of crime, or for them to undertakethe investigative and detective duties hitherto performed by the Magistratesofficers, before the Bow Street Runners and their imitators were "discontinued" in 1839. That error was compounded when no-one troubled to tell Rowan and Mayne they were now the only ones left to carry on that vital, and troublesome,duty in the capital. For their part the joint Commissionersof the Metropolis made no move to do so. Three years later that problem began to come to a head.
The "experiment" of 1842
In 1842 the near-revolutionary Chartist movement reached one of its periodic peaks. Against that background Mayne wrote a Memorandum dated June 14,9to the then Home Secretary Sir James Graham, as a responseto some quite fierce criticism of the Metropolitan Police Force. However, his subject was not the performance of his Force against the public order threat posed by the Chartists. It was its handling of a sensationalmurder case. The offender, Daniel Good, had escaped after having been briefly in the custody of one of Mayne's constables. He then remained at liberty for two week despite his guilt and identity being widely known. Mayne complained that the publicity given to the case had; "... assumed to show a want of skill in the Metropolitan Police and defect to detective duties "10 In a of general organisation applicable ... particular Mayne wished to rebut assertions of the: "... greater efficiency of the Bow Street tin officers ... He pointed out, in a passagethat is as relevant today as it was in 1842, that the employment of his officers on such duties would bring into his Force the corruption associatedwith the activities of the old Bow Street officers. He said: "... That these (Bow Street) officers had advantagesin tracing out some sorts of casesis true: the Commissionersbelieve it is well known, that, by at least some of them, a communication was kept up with thieves or their associates,
9 Memorandumrelative to detectivepowers of police (June14,1842). Public Records Office H045/OS.292/1. ibid, page2. ibid, page10. C SWEET& MAXWELL 384 Criminal Law Review 120021
from who, occasionally they received information that led to detections, that have taken (however) might not otherwise place ...... such an understanding betweenthe officers of the Police and criminals in practice, causesthe officers to allow a number of casesto remain unnoticed in order that now and then in a caseof great notoriety, the parties or their associateswhose caseshave been connived at on other occasions,may be induced to give the information. That the thieves will not continue to act on such a system, unless theyfind 12 it upon the wholefor their commonadvantage, will readily be believed it (emphasisadded) Having made that powerful, and still relevant, point Mayne went on to raise a second important issue. He said that: "... The Commissioners are aware that there is some danger in establishing such a Branch of Police, to whom the duties of a detective character would more immediately belong; of causing a relaxation of the exertions of the Police in general for the same purpose, which have hitherto been successful to so great be difficult define time an extent; -and it may to the exact point of and the exact circumstances under which the advantage of pursuit by the whole body Police is be it 13 of the to abandoned-,... In this passageMayne raised a second fundamental difficulty created by the formation of a full-time, specialist detective branch within the professional police service. Mayne asked how he was to decide, in any particular case, when the preventive effort of his officers should stop and their detective work start. In so doing he also raised a wider and still unresolvedquestion. How much time, effort and resources should the professional police service put into peacekeepingand protecting citizens from harm, and how much into investigating reported crimes in order to identify and prosecutethe criminals responsible? In sum, Mayne's letter told his Home Secretarythat detective duties would bring the corruption associatedwith the old Bow Street Runners into his Force. At the sametime it would make it impossible ever again to focus his constableson their peacekeepingrole. Nevertheless,as a result of the errors and omissions of the 1839 Acts, he now had no option other than to proposethat he should set up a small, and strictly controlled, full-time detective branch at Scotland Yard. It was a proposal that: "... the Commissionerssubmit for the decision of Sir JamesGraham, how far 04 it may be desirable as an experimentto try the effect of such a plan (emphasisadded)
The Fergusson Committee of 1868
There matters rested for some 25 years. In that period Mayne, who became sole Commissioner shortly after the retirement of Rowan in 1850, developed and enhanced a "Divisional" system of crime investigation in which local Super- intendentswere given discretionto employ a few of their constablesin the detection
12 13 ibid, pagesII to 12. 14 ibid, page 15. ibid, page 17.
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of local crime on a temporary(normally monthly) basis,as and when circumstances demanded. Then, in 1867 with public agitation over the growing threat of the Fenians at its height, Gathome Hardly (later Earl Cranbrook), the Home Secretary,was "bearded in his office" by protesterspleading for commutation of the death sentencesof three condemnedmembers of the movement.He immediately determinedto increasethe Metropolitan Police Force by one thousand constables,and to use the opportunity to strengthen its ability to identify, detect and prosecute those engaged in "treasonableconspiracies", particularly the Fenians. Unfortunately Mayne's oppo- sition to his Force having any involvement with such work was predictable, well known and immovable. He had once promised a Select Committee, on his honour, never to employ his men in plain clothes as "... spies to pry into people'sprivate ". 15 actions. .. Hardy found a solution to his problem by appointing Sir JamesFergusson, MP, to head an inquiry ostensibly concernedonly with the structure and organisation of the Metropolitan Police. He made the inquiry an internal or Departmental committee directly under his control, reporting to him rather than to Parliament. Fergusson's 1868 Home Office Departmental Committee noted the existence of Mayne's small group of headquarters detectives and his "Divisional" system of crime investigation. However, it found no statutory or other formal regulatory basis for the performance of any of these duties by the constables of the Metropolitan Police Force. The Committee reported that; "In the original constitution of the for force " 16However, police no provision was made the establishment of such a ... the Committee went on to accept that what it called; "... Obviously necessity 07 had led increasein the level investigation detection ... to a gradual of crime and activity undertakenby the Metropolitan Police. The Departmental Committee did not explore or set out the nature or extent of that "obvious necessity". It simply reported Mayne's reluctantly introduced head. quarters branch as a result of his 1842 letter, without further explanation. The conclusion is inescapable.As late as 1868 both the Home Secretaryof the day and the officials who supportedhim were awarethat there was no legal or statutory basis for the permanent employment of Metropolitan Police constables in any form of plain clothes detective work, let alone the specialised investigative and detective duties formerly performed by the magistrates'officers. Nevertheless, the bulk of Fergusson'sReport went on to deal with its covert purpose; the creation of a centralised detective branch to combat conspiracies, insurgency and the Fenian threat. Despite there being nothing in their formal instructions ftom the Secretaryof State to authorise it, and without adducing any substantial argument or evidence to justify it, the Committee recommended" that: "... The detective police, having regard to their number, appear to the Committee to be for the detection 11 very efficient of ordinary crime, ...
15 Select Committee on the Petition of Frederick Young and Others (1833) paras3917/8. ParliamentaryPapers (1833) (627) vol. XII p. 407 16 et seq. Report on the Metropolitan Police Force (1868), page 14. Public Record Office H045/A49463/2. ibid. 15. , page 8 ibid, pages21-22.
C SWEET & MAXWELL 386 CriminaI Law Review 120021 but that: "... their constitution scarcely adapts them to cope with conspiracies and ". secret combinations ... Accordingly the membersbaldly statedthat: "... the detective police should form a separatedivision under the control of a special superintendent and under the immediate command of the head of " police ... The Committee went on to contradict the only General Order ever issued by Sir Robert Peel, the political progenitor of the Metropolitan Police. They said that: "... The officer in commandof the detective force should have the power to recommendmen for his division, whether or not they have filled the office of " constable... There can be little doubt Richard Mayne found the outcome of Sir James Fergusson's inquiry both hurtful and unacceptable. Whether the resultant stress was a factor in his untimely death at home on December 26,1868, seven months after the publication of the Report, is impossible to determine. Subsequent commentatorshave, however, alluded to his feeling subject to unfair attack toward the end of his life. The death of Mayne and Hardy's replacementby a new Secretaryof State, Henry Bruce, in the same month overshadowedFergusson's Report. But those circum- stancesdid not dilute or delay it. In the untimely and unexpectedabsence of Mayne, and after the departure of the Hardy from Home Office, the newly appointed Commissioner, Lt. Colonel Edmund Henderson, carried into effect much of Fergusson's 1868 Departmental recommendationsfor the detective branch of the Metropolitan Police. No copy of Fergusson'sreport is to be found however, in the records or Parliament.
The "Primary Objects" of 1873
Some time after his appointment as Mayne's successorin 1868, Henderson put in hand work to codify and consolidate the growing number of instructions issued to the Metropolitan Police Force. Why he did so is unclear. Copies of Henderson's 19 new Instruction Book for constables, first issued in 1873, have survived. it contains a fundamentaldeparture from Rowan and Mayne's 1829 definition of the role of the professionalpolice. Significantly, the new definition does not form part of the main body of the Instructions. It appears as a Preface to them, a feature unknown to any of the earlier versions.Its statusas a formal Instruction to the Force is therefore, ambiguous. Rowan and Mayne's original definition of the purpose of the New Police has already been noted. Theirs was clearly a General Institution to the Force, and appeared in its proper place among the other Instructions. It will be remembered that it said, unequivocally:
19Metropolitan Police histruction Book for theGovernment and Guidance of theMetropolitan PoliceForce (1873) Public Records Office MEPO 8/80.
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"... It should be understood, at the outset that the principal object to be is "the Prevention Crime Police attained of ... all the ... objects of a establish- ment, will thus be better effected, than by the detection and punishment of the offender, after he has succeededin committing the crime (emphasis added) By a subtle process of rewording and rearrangement,however, the Preface to Henderson'snew version of the Instructions in 1873 abandonedthe principle that the prevention of crime is always better than the detection of offenders. In its place it adopted the view that the purpose of policing is both the prevention and the detection of crime. So was bom the phrasingthat every recruit to the professionalpolice service was subsequentlyrequired to learn by rote. It was, and is, universally known to them as the "Primary Objects". "The primary object of an efficient police is the prevention of crime, the next that of detection and punishment of offenders if crime is committed. To these ends all the efforts of Police must be directed. The protection of life and property, the prevention of public tranquillity, and the absence of crime will alone prove whether those efforts have been successful and whether the 20 objects for which the Police were appointedhave been attained." There are three grounds on which to argue that, at the time, both the publication of the "Primary Objects" and the employment of full-time detective officers within the Metropolitan Police which they representwere questionableif not actually ultra vires. First, the power to initiate and issuethe necessaryGeneral Instructions to the Force was confined solely to the Commissioner(s)by section 5 of the Act of 1829. In 1873 full-time detectives were already at work in the Force and, in any event, their presencewas due to a report of a Home Office Committee rather than as the result of any initiative of the Commissioner. Secondly, section I of the 1829 Act strictly limited the power of the Secretary of State to change the duties of the Commissioner(s) and hence the activities of Metropolitan Police constables they employed. Specifically, it precludedhim from directing them, or their constables,to take up the detective and investigative functions of the magistratesof the metrop- olis. Finally, neither the Secretaryof State nor the Commissionershad the power to give directions to the constablesof the Metropolitan Police that they should take up any duty other than those laid down in the Act of 1829. The independenceof both the Commissionerand his constablesin this respecthas been frequently confirmed, 21 particularly in R. v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, ex p. Blackburn, and 2 Fisher v. Oldham Corporation? However, from thesesame cases it could be argued that CommissionerHenderson's issue of the necessaryinstructions to give effect to the decisions of the Home Office legitimised those changesin the functions of the police, if only retrospectively. Provided that is, he had authority under the relevant statuesto do so. Thankfully, that is a questionthis article can leave open for further research.
20 ibid. Preface. 21 (196 8) (1 All ER, page 769 at D/E). 22 (1930)(2 KB. 364).
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Because whateverthe outcome of that further inquiry, it is enough to note for the purposes of this article that, despite there being contemporary common law and statutory provisions to the contrary, by 1873 criminal investigation had emergedas an integral part of the structureof the Metropolitan Police. As a consequenceof the annual inspection system by Home Off ice appointed Inspectors of Constabulary introduced by the County and Borough Police Act of 1856, the Home Office was able to impose the Metropolitan model on every police force in Britain.
The lbbetson Committee of 1878
The final stagesof the processof transferring the investigative functions of the magistracy to the professional police service took place in 1878. In the previous year, and in confirmation of Richard Mayne's worst fears for the consequencesof imposing detective duties on his Force, a scandalouscase of corruption erupted involving the full-time detectivesof the Metropolitan Police. In August 1877, with committal proceedingsgoing on at Bow Street against some of the highest ranking detectives in the Force, Disraeli's Home Secretary, Sir Richard Assheton Cross, appointedanother internal Home Office inquiry. AsshetonCross selectedSir Henry Selwyn lbbetson Bt., MP as Chairman. Sir Henry's report went to the Home Secretaryon January 25,1878.23 By April Hendersonhad incorporated its main recommendationsinto the Instructions to the Metropolitan Police Force and a full scale Criminal Investigation Department (CID) had been created. By 1886, at the end of Henderson's reign as Commis- sioner, the Metropolitan Police employed313 officers wholly on criminal investiga- tion duties. They included a headquartersCID unit at Scotland Yard composed of 32 officers under the command of a Chief Superintendent.Divisions had a further 281 full-time detective officers nominally attached to them. In practice, those officers acted independently of local superintendents and answered directly to ScotlandYard. As with the earlier Fergussonreport of 1868, MPs gave no scrutiny to these fundamental changesin the structure and purposesof the New Police. No mention of the Report appearsin either the proceedingsor the records of Parliament.24
Finale - Sir Charles Warren and the Home Office, 1888
Henderson lost his post in March 1886 following the failure of his Force to control a riotous meeting in Trafalgar Square. His successor was General Sir Charles Warren, a military member of the Select Committee whose Report had brought Hendersondown. However there was an immediate problem. Warren took a combative attitude toward the involvement of "civilians" in the running of his Force, particularly the officials of the Home Office. It was unfortunate therefore, that on his appointmentWarren found JamesMonro, a former Indian Civil Service high official, under his command as Assistant Commissioner of the Criminal Investigation Department.
23 Report on the State, Discipline and Organisation of the Detective Force of the Metropolitan Police (1878) Public RecordsOffice H045/66692. 24 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) (1878) Third Series, vols. CCXXXIX, CCXI and CCXLI.
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The importance of Warren's view of "civilians" is that it led to the indignant departure of Monro in 1888, prompting Warren to embark on a root and branch review of his large Criminal InvestigationDepartment. As part of that review, Warren wrote to the Home Secretary,Henry Matthews, on November 5,1888 25referring to Ibbetson'sradical transformation of the detective branch into a fullblown criminal investigationdepartment during Henderson'sCommissionership. In his letter Warren said: "... I have to say that this (Ibettson's)Report appearsto be quite unknown in the CommissionersOffice as a document,and never appearsto have beenbrought to the notice of the Commissionerfor any action to take place on it. Yet for all this the greaterpart of the recommendationshas beenmore or lesscarried out. So far as this office is concerneda new Criminal InvestigationDepartment sprang into being without any action on the part of the Commissioner,and its origin is involved with mystery. Under the Statutethe whole ofthe changesought to have heenfirstproposed hy the Commissioner..." (emphasisadded) The Warren episodedemonstrates that as late as 1878 the origins and provenance of criminal investigationdepartments in the modernpolice service,and the detectives they employed,were opento doubt. Three days after sending his letter Warren's dispute with the hated "civilians" came to a head causing him to resign in what looks very much like a fit of exasperated pique. He took the opportunity of his resignation letter to revisit and inflame, the debate about his relationship with the Home Office. Quite unnecessarily, he included the belligerent, but perfectly justified, assertion that the Secretary of State, "... had not Statute issuing for Police Force 06 the power under the of orders the ... concluding with an offer to resign that the Home Office were more than grateful to accept. With the departureof Warren, never again would the question of the validity or usefulnessof Criminal InvestigationDepartments in policing be raised. CID officers quickly became,in their own estimationas well as that of the public, the elite of the police service,a position they occupiedup to and beyondthe scandalsof the 1960s. Postscript
CommissionerHenderson's action in issuing the necessaryinstructions to carry the recommendationsof the Fergussonand Ibbetsoncommittees into effect abrogatedany impropriety by the Home Office. Under the statute, as his successorpointed out, Hendersonought to have initiated the changesin the functions and activities of tile professionalpolice servicethat his "Primary Objects" and the emergenceof the full- time professionaldetective represent. He did not do so, and madeno issue of it at the time. His neglecteffectively undid all the good work Peeland Parliamenthad put into assuringthe independenceof the new police from governmentcontrol. But although Henderson'spusillanimity may have retrospectively legitimised the actionsof the Home Office, it could not, and doesnot, absolvegovernment from 25Public Record Office H045/A49463/item 2. 26 PublicRecord Office H0144/A48043letter at item4.
C SWEET & MAXWELL 390 Criminal Law Review [20021 responsibility for the long-term consequencesof the dual peacekeepingand criminal detectionrole so createdfor the emergingpolice service,or for the adverseeffect the presence of criminal investigators and prosecutors had on the structure and developmentof policing in Britain.
(Part II of Mr. Roach's article will appear in a forthcoming issue: Ed.)
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Detecting Crime Part 11: The Case for a Public Prosecutor
By Lawrence T. Roach, QPM
Summary: This is the second part of an article on "Detecting Crime'ý The first, "Detection and the Police", describedthe addition of the detection of crime to the original peacekeepingfunction of the police by the Home Office during the 1860s and the 1870s, thereby creating the present dual peacekeepingand crime detection role of the modern British police service. This part examinesthe consequencesof that dual role on levels of corruption amongpolice officers; on police management structures;on police performance measurement,and on police1public relationships. It is contendedthat all those effectsare adverse,generating continuing difficulties for the managementand control ofpolicing. It is argued that, contrary to thepresent intentions of the Police Reform Bill, those problems can best be resolved by the appointment of a public prosecutor, so returning the professional police service to its originalpurelypeacekeepingandprotective role.
The Dual Role of the Police
Part I of "Detecting Crime" was published under the sub-title "Detection and the Police". It described how, in the decadesfollowing the foundation of the modern British professional police service in 1829, crime detection was added to its original preventive and protective function to create its present dual peacekeeping/crime detection role. "Peacekeeping"is best expressedin the oath of office currently taken by every British police constable on appointment. It is substantially unchanged from that sworn by Robert Peel'sNew Police at their first creation in 1829:
I do solemnly and sincerely declareand affirm that I will well and truly serve our SovereignLady the Queen in the office of Constable;without favour or affection, malice or ill-will, and that I will to the best of my power causethe peaceto be kept and preservedand prevent all offences against the personsand properties of Her majesty'ssubjects; and while I continue to hold the said office I will, to the best of my skill and knowledge, discharge all the duties thereof faithfully according to law."
"Crime detection" duties were subsequentlyand, it is contended, improperly added to the original peacekeepingfunction of the police by the Home Office in tile 1860s and 1870s,thereby creating the present-daydual role of the police. Those 0 SWFEr & NtkXWELL Crim. L. R. Detecting Crime Part 11 567 additional duties consistof the identification, investigationand detectionof criminal offenderswith a view to their prosecutionand punishment. Part Il of "Detecting Crime" now examinesthe impact of a dual peacekeeping/crime detectionrole on the modernpolice service,and contendsthat it has had, and continuesto have,adverse and damagingconsequences in urgent needof correction.
The predictions of Richard Mayne
Thirteen yearsafter the foundationof the modem British professionalpolice serviceby the establishmentof Robert Peel'sLondon Metropolitan Police, Richard Mayne, one of the first joint Commissionersof the Force,was pressedto appoint a few of his constables to be full-time plain-clothesdetectives. Hitherto professionalpolicing had been confined to uniformed preventive and protective patrolling ("peacekeeping")both by statute and by the will of Parliament.Mayne's prognosis in a "Memorandumrelative to detective powers of police" written in June, 1842 was that the addition of detective duties to the peacekeepingrole of his Force would bring two major problems.First, it would import the corruption associated with the detective officers formerly employed by the Magistrates of the metropolis (the Bow Street Runners and their imitators) into his organisation. Secondly,the additional function would create irresolvable dilemmas for the managementof professionalpolicing. He arguedthat it would be difficult to reconcile police actions designedto keep the peaceand protect the public from harm, with those aimed at the detection of criminal offenders.For both reasonshe only very reluctantly agreedto form a small detectiveunit "as an experiment". His pessimistic expectations haveproved perceptive.
The Origins of Police Corruption As Mayne pointed out in 1842, there is considerable potential for corruption in a police detective role, both in terms of perversions to the course of justice and in opportunities for personal gain and abuse of authority. Mayne's view was that the addition of the detective duties formerly performed by the old Bow Street Runners and their imitators to the functions of his Force would bring with it an "... understanding between the Police and thieves in " from "... officers of practice ... which, a moral point of has been denounced ,n view... repeatedly ... His prediction of a link between detective work and corruption has proved only too accurate. Major scandals associated with the detection of criminals began with the "Turf Fraud" case against the most senior Metropolitan Police detectives in 1877, and show no sign of ending. Even the normally supportive London 'Times' gave early warning of the corrupting effect detective duties were likely to have on professional policing. In a leader on August 15,1877,2 while theTurf Fraud' conspiracy case was before the courts, 'The Times'said:
"... A Detective Force may be necessary, but, we repeat, it is a very unpleasant the danger that its is if necessity, and attends employment clear ...
Memorandumrelative to detectivepowers of police (June 14,1842). Public RecordsOffice H045/0S. 292/l. 2 The Times, August 15,1877 p.9 col. e.
(D SWEET& MAXWELL 568 Criminal Law Review [20021 the temptationsof his (the detective's)life are too strong for him and he forgets to any degree his true allegiance,the mischief he may do is well nigh incalculable. The most potent weapon of justice is turned againstjustice. It is the rogues who escapeand the honest men who are baffled and confounded.The want of security, the dread of the presenceof a spy, is transferredto the wrong camp.All this may happenat any time, and firom the nature ofthe casemust happen some time... " (emphasisadded). In recenttimes Sir RobertMark, one of the better known Commissionersof the London Metropolitan Police, has confirmed the truth of 'The Times' prediction in his autobiography published in 1978.3Having been faced with some of the most serious allegationsof corruption madeagainst the professionalpolice service, Sir Robert reminds his readersof his Dimbleby Lecture given at the BBC's headquartersfive years earlier, on November 3,1973. Dealing with the criminal prosecutionprocess on that occasion he said: "... It is hardly surprising that a policeman'sbelief in its fairness should decline as be he be depart from Most gathers experience,or that should tempted to the rules ... detectiveshave a strong senseof commitment.It would be unnatural if they did not feel personally involved in someof their casesand it would be untrue to suggestthat they are not sometimesoutraged by the results. All are under occasionaltemptation to bend the rules to convict thosewhom they believeto be guilty,... A few may sometimesbe tempted also to exploit the systemfor personalgain. A detectivewho finds generalacceptance of a system which protects the wrongdoer can come to think that if crime seemsto pay for for him? oo4 everyoneelse, why not ... Regrettably,neither governmentnor the leadersof the police service seemaware that the dual role of the service lies at the root of police corruption. Instead, Mayne's successorsand their political mastersseem irrevocably committed to a 'bad apples'theory. In that view, corruption can be eliminated from policing by the identification and elimination of the few officers who bring the police service into disreputeby their failure to resist the temptationsof their work. No connectionis madebetween corruption and the duties performed by the 'bad apples',who are too often found to be officers engagedin detectivework of various kinds. And so, episodesof corruption continue to shakepublic confidencein the police. The dual peacekeepingand detectiverole of the modem police service exacerbatesand magnifies the damaging effects of corruption. Any disrepute associatedwith detective work inevitably contaminates every police officer, not only throwing doubt on the credibility of all police evidencein casesbefore the courts, but also discrediting, and thus weakening,the peacekeepingand protective activities of the service.
Managementofthe Police Mayne's prescienceabout the adverseeffect a dual peacekeepingand detective role would have on managementof the emergingpolice servicewas most notably
3 In the Office of Constable(Collins, 1978). 4 ibid. 157.
C SWEET& MAXWELL Crim. L. R. Detecting Crime Part 11 569
confirmed by Lord Scarmanin his Report of an inquiry into the Brixton Disordersin 198L' In that Report Lord Scarmandiscusses the dual role of the modem police service.At paragraph4.57 he says: "... the primary duty of the police is to maintain 'the Queen'sPeace' which has been described 'normal it is inevitable be as the stateof society#6... since that there will aberrationsfrom normality, his secondduty arises,which is, without endangering normality, to enforcethe law... " Lord Scarmandescribes the secondof the two roles of the police as "law enforcement" rather than "crime detection". However, his "aberrationsfrom normality" will include, and indeed largely consist in, breachesof the criminal law. The view of the dual role of the police developedin this article is thereforeconsistent with Lord Scarman's. In the next paragraphof his Report, at 4.58, Scarmanemphasises and reinforces the disparity betweenthe two roles of the police. "The conflict which can arise betweenthe duty of the police to maintain order and their duty to enforce the law, and the priority which must be given to the former, have long been recognisedby the police themselves,diough they are factors to which commentatorson policing have in the pastoften paid too little attention... " The conclusionsof the ScarmanReport then go on fully to substantiateMayne's view that serious problems are causedby requiring the police both to keep the peace and to detect and prosecute criminals. Lord Scarman'sfinding in relation to the Brixton disorderswas that a perfectly proper police operationto identify, detect and arrest street robberswas the principal causeof a three-dayriot which causedwidespread destruction of buildings and other property, as well as hundredsof injuries to police and public. The ScarmanReport is therefore, a most authoritative account both of the inherent conflict betweenthe police activities of crime detectionon the one hand and peacekeepingon the other, and of the priority of peacekeepingin the role of the service. In its internal structurethe modem police service further illustrates the perceptiveness of Scarman'sfindings and Mayne's earlier advice. In Scarman'slight every police force can be seen to be divided into two friendly but competing camps. One, the uniform branch, is composed of officers engaged in peacekeeping,crime deterrence, and community protection. The other, the criminal investigation department (CID), holds plain clothes detectiveswaging war on crime and criminals. The problem is that the two groups have conflicting objectives, tactics and strategies.Detection as an objective can only be achievedif criminals commit, or are allowed to attemptto commit, crimes. Public protection and peacekeepingon the other hand, aims to deter or prevent all crime in any circumstances.As a result, behind a public front of unity the two camps engage in incessantinter-departmental competition for influence and accessto resources.This is not just an example of corporatepolitics. It is a surfacemanifestation of the deep structural divide identified by Lord Scarman.
Crand. 8427/1981. 6 Sir Frank Newsam,The Home Office (2nd ed., Allen and Unwin, 1955). CSwEEMMAxwELL 570 Criminal Law Review 120021
Chief police officers thus face complex decisions on manpower deployment and resource allocation as they attempt to strike a balance between the competing demands of peacekeepersand crime detectors. And, to pose a question first put by Richard Mayne, if both are to be pursued when should one activity stop and the 7 other start? Difficulty in transferring police officers between their differing roles complicates such decisions. The duties of peacekeeping and crime detection are so disparate, requiring such differing training, skills and deployments that constables can neither be engaged in both at the same time, nor can they readily move from one to the other. Indeed, on a day-to-day basis constables must in general be posted either in uniform as peacekeepers,or deployed in plain-clothes to detect offenders. In all, management of the dual role of the police presents an array of interlocking yet conflicting tasks and objectives, which must be met using highly inflexible manpower and resources. Few will sensibly envy the task faced by modem police managers. Contemporary Issues
The problemspresently caused by the dual role of the police have ramifications far beyond those imagined by Richard Mayne, and merit further research.Their extent and complexity are such that spacepermits the discussionof only two of the more important here. Valuefor moneyandperformance measurement The Thatcher Governmentof the 1980ssought to apply "value for money" to expenditure on the police, requiring that measurableperformance should be obtainedfrom all public funds allocatedto policing. Every subsequentadministra- tion up to the presentday has adoptedthat policy. However, a major and as yet unresolved problem has emergedin its implementation. As yet, no agreed or acceptablemeasures of police performancehave been developedor established. Every effort to do so (and there have been several) has failed, at least in part becauseno allowanceis madefor the dual role of the police and for the impact of increasedemphasis on one policing role on progressin the other. Failure to understandthe dual role of the police not only slows progressin the developmentof reliable police performanceindicators, it also producesconfused thinking on the effectivenessor otherwise of police activity. An example can be 8 seen in the White Paper on Police Reform (December, 2001). In Chapter 1, paragraph 1.24 describes recent police successesin the detection of crime. However, paragraph 1.25 then complains that "Although recent crime figures should (emphasisadded) provide considerablereassurance, public fears about crime remain high", adding in the next paragraph,1.26, that "The persistenceof a high level of fear of crime is not causedby the public simply refusing to believe the crime statistics.Unruly youngsters,anti-social behaviour and environmental neglect can all createa senseof local disruption and insecurity that feeds the fear of crime." In paragraph 1.29, the White Paper identifies all this as a cause for concern saying, "Over the next few years we must tackle these problems and createa real senseof order and security
Memorandumrelative to detectivepowers of police June 14,1842). Public RecordsOffice H045/OS.292/1, p. 15. 8 Policing a New Century: A Blueprint for Reform (Cmnd. 5326). C SWEET & MAXWELL Crim. L. R. Detecting Crime Part 11 571
in local communitiesso that the fear of crime can fall in line with crime itself." (emphasisadded) However, an understandingof the duality of the role of the police reveals a simple explanation for the apparently complex problem identified by the White Paper. An improvement in police performance against crime may well have been, and almost certainly was, achievedby diverting resourcesfrom peacekeepinginto crime detection.If that is so, then such a shift in police priorities can be predictedto have the adverseeffect on public insecurity and fear of crime noted by the White Paper.It should also be said that it is highly likely that any such general shift in police resources,whether from peacekeepinginto crime detectionor vice versa,will be a responseto outside pressureon the service- in all probability, from the Home Office itselP
Crime Preventionand Police Performance A more fundamentalsource of confusion in the discussionof police performanceand its assessmentarises from the misuseand abuseof the conceptof 'crime prevention'.In a policing context 'crime prevention' is indistinguishable from crime reduction and/or deterrence.Used in that omnibus sensecrime prevention is often regardedas a unifying objective to which all police activity, whether it be peacekeepingor crime detection, contributesdirectly, and hence as a potential measureof the efficiency of, or value for money obtained from, the police service. However, whatever its value may be as a definition of social policy in relation to policing, no variety of the concept of crime preventionwill serveas a reliable measureor test of any aspectof police performance. In the first place,any estimateof the numberof crimes preventedby police action is an attempt to measurewhat has not happened.That requires two very high hurdles to be cleared. First, an accurate and reliable calculation has to be made of the difference betweenthe number of crimes actually committed in the period or place under review, and those which would otherwisehave occurredin that period or place. There are good groundsto doubt that any such calculation has ever beenmade or is possible,but for the purposesof this article it is enoughto note that, in commonwith many anothersuggested measureof police performance,no reliable or agreed method of estimating the non- occurrenceof crime presently exists. The second,and even more testing hurdle, is to calculatehow many of thosenonexistent crimes can be shownto have failed to occur as a result of any form of police activity, whether it be peacekeepingor crime detection. This presentsinsurmountable obstacles as the Home Office implicitly recognisein an important circular on crime preventionissued in 1984.9The first paragraphof the circular says,
"... A primary objective of the police has always been the prevention of crime. However, since some of the factors affecting crime lie outside the control or direct influence of the police, crime prevention cannot be left to them alone. Every individual citizen and all those agencieswhose policies and practicescan influence the extent of crime should maketheir contribution. Preventingcrime is a task for the whole community..." (emphasisadded).
Crime Prevention Home Office Circular 8/1984.
0 SWEET & MAXWELL 572 Criminal Law Review [2002]
The rest of the circular is devotedto advice and guidanceon how best to organiseand coordinate crime prevention activities between police and other local and voluntary organisationsand agencies. The circular has had a powerful effect on police managersand has drawn a wide range of other agenciesinto crime preventionwork. As a result, police action aimed at crime prevention is almost invariably taken in parallel or in cooperationwith other bodies and agencies,adding another layer of complexity to the already extremely difficult task of connectingpolice activity to an identifiable crime preventioneffect. Not only is it necessaryto assessthe influence of those other "... factors affecting crime which are admitted to be not under "... the control or direct influence of the police but as a result of the "Crime Prevention" circular, the impact of police action on levels of crime must now be distinguishedfrom that of a wide range of other bodies and organisations.The Home Office's own advice and guidanceon the issue therefore, has contributed to the impossibility of using crime prevention as a reliable means to assesseither the value for money obtainedfrom policing or the efficiency of the police, whether as a whole or in respectof any of its units or activities. In sum, the conflicts inherentin the dual role of the police createdby the Home Office in the 19th century are a fundamentalcause of the difficulty in now assessingthe value for money obtained from policing, and in setting accurateand useful measuresof police performance. It is also clear that those problems cannot be avoided by using crime prevention,reduction or deterrenceas a measureof the effect of any form of policing. It may be possible to find a solution to these complex performance measurement difficulties in relation to one or other of the presentpeacekeeping and crime detection functions of the police. But while the police serviceis required to pursuethe contrasting, and indeed conflicting, objectives of peacekeepingand crime detection, and to select, train, organiseand deploy its officers into two disparateand competing parts in order to do so, no satisfactoryresolution of the problemsof the overall value for money the police service provides, or of its general efficiency and effectiveness, can reasonably be expected.
Community Confusion A dual peacekeeping/detective role has potentially serious consequences for police/community relations, especially among disadvantaged sections of our society. Examples are the recent difficulties faced by the Metropolitan Police in dealing with the murders of Stephen Lawrence and Damilola Taylor and their continuing aftermaths, and those still affecting the Royal Ulster Constabulary (now the Police Service of Northern Ireland) as a result of its investigation of the Omagh bombing. The problem is that the dual role of the police requires the service to present itself as responsible both for the protection and support of all citizens, and for the detection and punishment of those same citizens if and when they commit crime. The two functions are, understandably, difficult to reconcile by both police officers and the public they seek to serve, creating formidable obstacles to mutual trust and the free flow of information. In several respects the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry conducted by Sir William Macpherson of Cluny, whose Report was presented to Parliament in February
(D SWEET& MAXWELL Crim. L. R. Detecting Crime Part 11 573
1999,10is a good illustration of the complex, interlocking community relations difficulties createdfor the police serviceby its dual role. Sir William's terms of reference were: "To inquire into the matters arising from the death of StephenLawrence on April 22,1993 to date, in order particularly to identify the lessonsto be learned for the investigationand prosecutionof racially motivated crimes." Two issuesarise from the Inquiry of relevanceto this article. First, the Inquiry is an exampleof the negativeeffect the dual role of the police can haveon its relationshipwith the diverse communities with which it deals. It shows that damagecan be done to the peacekeepingrole of the police by an adverse feedback from a failure in its crime detection activity, especially where such activity relates to crime across social and/or ethnic divisions. Secondly,the Lawrence inquiry seemsnot to have taken accountof the duality of the police role in reaching its conclusionsand recommendations.This is surprising since the Inquiry quotes the Scarman Report extensively, and indeed, uses Lord Scarman's observationsand conclusionsto sharpenand justify many of its criticisms of police action in the Lawrence case." It is unfortunatetherefore, that Sir William seemsnot to have heededLord Scarman'swarning that the dual role of the police and the conflicts that can arise from it "... are factors to which commentatorson policing have in the past paid too little attention..." That oversight must raise the possibility that the Lawrence Inquiry may have made judgments about the conduct of the Metropolitan Police as a whole, as well as of its individual officers carrying out their crime investigationand detection function, without taking full account of the problems of the dual role describedboth herein and by Lord Scarman.If that is so, the Inquiry Reportmust lose someof the impact it might otherwise have had.
The Case for a Public Prosecutor The police service is faced with a number of major long-term problems arising from its dual role. It remainsnow to suggest,however briefly, how those problems might best be solved. Unfortunately, existing academicliterature on police and policing provides little assistance. Researchinto the police and policing has tended to focus on its social and political context in order to explain why the police service takes its present form. Much less interest has been shown in how changes in the service take place or the processes involved. As a consequence,the importanceof the reports of the Fergussonand Ibbetson Home Office committees of 1868 and 1878 respectively, which are the source from which police criminal investigation departmentssprang, has not been much noticed. Indeed, a leading authority on policing, Professor Robert Reiner, recently published a comprehensivereview of the literature on policing12 which found no need to discussthe impact of those committees;or to examine the effects of the resulting dual role of the police as they are describedin
10 Cm4262-1. 11 Cmnd. 8427(1981), Chap.6paras. 6.7to6.15. 12 The Politics of the Police, Robert Reiner (3rd ed., OUP, 2000).
C SWEET & MAXWELL 574 Criminal Law Review 12002] thesearticles, or to include that developmentin a chronologyof significant eventsin police history.13
An End to the Dual Role In its two parts 'Detecting Crime' identifies the creation of a dual peacekeeping/crime detection role by the improper imposition of a responsibility for crime investigation and detectionon the police by the Home Office in the late nineteenthcentury, as the sourceof the major, continuing and seemingly insoluble problems now facing the service. The primordiality and priority of peacekeepingin the role of the modem British police service has also been authoritatively established.Taken together these two findings strongly suggestthat any long-term solution to the problems presently facing the police service should end its dual role by removing its responsibilities for the investigation and detectionof criminal offenders. Clearly, the investigation, identification, detection and prosecution of criminal offenders is a vitally important part of our system of criminal justice. It cannot be altogetherabandoned. If therefore,the police withdraw from those activities alternative arrangementsmust be made. Fortunately,this is by no meansa novel proposal.The need for the appointmentof a public prosecutor to undertake the criminal investigation, detection and prosecution duties now performedby the police servicewas noticed by the 1839 Royal Commission on the Establishmentof a ConstabularyForce. The appointmentof public prosecutors with investigativeand detectivepowers was also advocatedin 1845by the Eighth Report of anotherRoyal Commission,on the Criminal Law. Parliamentcannot claim that it has never had an opportunity to consider the idea. In 1856 a SelectCommittee on Public Prosecutorslooked at the criminal justice system in America, Scotlandand Ireland.14 It recommendedthat; be for "... agentsshall appointed... the purposeof preparingand conducting prosecutionsto the time of trial, ... Where it to their knowledgethat has been committed, ... comes an offence and that no stepshave beentaken to bring the offender to justice, it will be their duty to take the necessarysteps for apprehendingor for otherwise bringing the offender before a magistrate..." An attemptto legislateon the SelectCommittee recommendations foundered. The proposal that the police should hand their present detective duties to a public prosecutor is also not as revolutionary as it may seem. Recent developments in the criminal justice systemhave all been in that direction.
The Crown Prosecution Service The emergenceof the Crown ProsecutionService (CPS) in 1985 removed large areas of criminal investigation and prosecutionfrom the responsibilitiesof local chief police officers. Consequentlythe CPS has penetrated ever deeper back down the line of investigationinto the offices of local police detectivedepartments (ClDs).
13 ibid. Appendix, pp.221-223. 14Report from the SelectCommittee on Public Prosecutions(1856) p.viii. Parliamentary Papers(1856) Vol. VHp. 351.
(D SWEET& MAXWELL Crim. L. R. Detecting Crime Part 11 575
A review of the CPS by Sir lain Glidewell published in June, 1998 illustrates the extent of that development." Sir lain and his Committeerecommend the amalgamation of someof the functions of the CPSwith police adminstrationunits. The Review says; "Such a single integrated unit, which we have christened a Criminal Justice Unit, could be either a police Unit with one or more CPS lawyers working permanently in it, CPS Unit We firmly or a with some police staff. recommend the second option. . vv16
Earlier, in the main body of the Review, Sir lain and his colleaguessay; "Such a unit will need to be able to call on the police to take action in obtaining more evidenceand so a senior police officer will needto be part of the unit, which 17 would be housedin or nearthe relevantpolice station." The CPS plan to have 73 such "... co-locatedCriminal JusticeUnits... " open by March 31,2002.18These developments are a very short stepfrom the proposalsmade here.
A renewed Police Service In sum, a long-term permanentsolution to the problemsfacing the police requiresthe serviceto withdraw from the investigationof crime, and the identification, detection and prosecutionof criminal offenders.In its place a national public prosecutiondepartment should be createdwithin the Crown ProsecutionService under the direction of a public prosecutorsupported by a staff of full-time crime investigators.
Benefitsand Precedents The proposalis firmly rooted in the British criminal justice system,and does not draw upon, or imitate, other legal traditions. As such it has many beneficial side-effectsand is by no meansunprecedented. It would, for instance,provide an immediate reservoir of highly trained and experiencedpolice detectivesto staff the new prosecutiondepartment. The people presently engagedin the investigation and detection of criminal offenders would continueto do so, but under new management.There is an abundanceof precedent for sucha non-policecriminal investigativebody. Detective work is not, and never has been, solely confined to the professionalpolice service, as ProfessorReiner and others helpfully note. The Atomic Energy Authority, British Transport,the Armed Forcesand many other bodies such as parks constabularies, independentlymaintain bodies of detectives. Other organisations, such as the Inland Revenue,Customs and Excise,the Post Office and the immigration and benefits services, carry out criminal investigation,detection and prosecutionactivities indistinguishablein practice from those of police detectives.A CPS public prosecutordepartment will find a wide rangeof establishedprecedents.
15The Review of theCrown Prosecution Service (June 1998) Cm 3972. 16 ibid. Recommendation14. 17ibid. Summaryof theMain Report,etc., para. 29. 18 AnnualReport of theCrown Prosecution Service 2000-200 1, p. 1 1.
(D SWEET& MAXWELL 576 Criminal Law Review [20021
On the other hand,effective peacekeepingby the police doesnot require the serviceto be involved in the detection and prosecution of crime, as Peel's New Police amply demonstratedduring the first 40 years of their existence.The proposalsof this article would merely refocus the police service on its original patrolling, protective and preventive role and relieve its officers of the onerousburden of paperwork causedby their presentinvolvement in the prosecutionof criminal offenders.Police officers would then be wholly devotedto peacekeepingand crime reduction by the proven and powerful deterrent effect of their visible presence in our streets and public places. All contemporaryevidence and commentsuggests that sucha presenceis both conspicuously absentand sorely missed.
The Police Reform Bill
Regrettably,government policy, as it is reflectedin the recentWhite Paperand Bill on Police Reform, is moving in the oppositedirection. Ratherthan seekingto reducepolice involvement in their secondary role of the investigation and detection of criminal offenders, the present Police Reform Bill aims to distance the police service from peacekeepingin order to enhanceits performanceagainst crime. To that end the Bill proposesto give Chief Constablespower to 'accredit' any of their existing staff with 19 limited police powers,either as peacekeepersor as 'investigatingoffices'. Significantly for the purposesof this article however,the Bill goeson to reveal its true intentions for the future role of the professionalpolice serviceby extendingthe accreditationprocess to non-police commercial organisationsand their employees, but only in a uniformed, peacekeepingrole. 20 The Bill therebyruns the risk of resurrectingthe disreputablerabble of local watch- and 'charley-' men contemptuouslyswept away by Robert Peel in 1829, while simultaneouslyignoring the lessonsto be learnedfrom the history of policing and rejecting the authoritative findings of Lord Scarmanand others on the proper priority of the role and functions of professionalpolice officers.
Finale
If however,reform follows the proposalsset out in this article it would give the Royal Commissionof 1839 - that constantsource of referencein this context -a final word on the future of the British police service.It, better than any later commentator,understood the purposesand functions of a truly peacekeepingpolice. Among the Conclusionsto its First Reportthe Commissionsays, 21 "... (is) the main purposeof a preventativepolice ...... the protection of private individuals in the enjoyment of their rights against infractions by depredatorsand " others ... This identifies the task of a properly constitutedprofessional police service and chimes well with the wording of the oath of office taken on appointment by every modern constablewith which this article began.In our times the inclusion of and others in the words usedby the 1839Royal Commissionshould 19 20 PoliceReform Bill 2001, cl. 33. ibid. cl.34(2). 21 FirstReport of theRoyal Commission on theEstablishment of an EfficientConstabulary Force(l839) p. 185 para. 301. Parliamentary Papers (1839) vol. XIX p.171.
(D SWEET& MAXWELL Crim. L. R. Detecting Crime Part 11 577 strike an especially resonantnote. It reminds us of the vital importance,to the health of our form of democracy,of the operationalindependence of the professionalpolice service from any outside influence other than the law itself. Including and especially, as both Robert Peel and Richard Mayne wisely recognised,government and its agents.
C SWEET& MAXWELL White P er on POLICINGA NEW CENTURY: A BLUEPRINTFORREFORM (Cmnd.5326)
Comment by LawrenceT. Roach,Esq. QPM Deputy AssistantCommissioner (1990-1996) Metropolitan Police Service (Retired)
Secretary of State 1. My commentswill fall undertwo main heads: a) the validity of the evidencepresented in Chapter I on'The needfor Police Reform', and b) the appropriateness of the programme of reform proposed in subsequent Chapters.
My main purpose is to draw attention to sources of relevant information which may either not have been available, or have been overlooked for some reason, in the drafting of the Paper. A subsidiary objective is to suggest a beneficial shift of emphasis in the proposed police reforms, to more accurately and effectively focus them on the White Paper's aim to improve the standard of security and protection provided by government to all citizens. Two sourcesare drawn on in thesecomments; i) the Report of an enquiry into the Brixton Disorders 10-12 April 1981, by Lord Scarman,O. B. E. (Cmnd.8427)
ii) an unpublishedpaper, on the history and significance of criminal investigationdepartments in the British Police Service.The paper is based on an examinationand analysisof Parliamentaryand public records,and is presentlyunder consideration for publicationby the Criminal Law Review. Validity of evidence in Chapter I on 'The Need for Police Reform' 2. The Foreword to the White Paperstates its purpose.Paragraph 3 saysthat the intention is to'.. substantiallyimprove the standard,reliability, consistencyand responsivenessof the (police) service....' Paragraph6 saystwo things, Comment by: LawrenceT. Roach,QPM
a) 'Our task is clear. We want to prevent,detect, apprehend and convict the perpetratorsof crime.', and b) 'We needand will havea processthat enablesthose undertaking the basictask of protectingour homes,our streets,and our personsto do thejob more effectively'. 3. Sincethe White Paperdeals at various points both with the responsibilitiesof the police servicein relation to crime, and with its duty to deal with 'anti-social thuggish behaviour',disorder etc., I havetaken thesesentences in paragraph6 of the Forewordto the White Paperto be its view of the functionsof the police service(i. e. its role) for the purposesof the reforms it proposes. I therefore acceptand shall usethis definition of the role of the police in thesecomments. For convenienceI shall refer to the function 'prevent,detect, apprehend and convict the perpetratorsof crime' as 'crime reduction', and shall use 'peace keeping'when referring to the function 'protectingour homes,our streets,and our persons'. 4. The White Paperfollows Lord Scarmanin making a distinction betweenthese two main functionsof the police role. The existenceof a division in the role of the police, and the problemsthat arise from it, were authoritatively identified and discussedin his Reportof an enquiry into the Brixton Disordersmentioned at 1) above. In his ReportLord Scarmansaid: 4.57 '.. Aheprimary duty of the police is to maintain'the Queens'sPeace', which has beendescribed as the'normal stateof society"...Since it is inevitable that there will be aberrationsfrom normality, his secondduty arises,which is, without endangeringnormality, to enforce the law...' YheHome Office,Sir FrankNewsarn, Allen and Unwin, 1955(2 nd edition) However, and materially for the purposesof thesecomments on the White Paperon Police Reform, Lord Scarmanwent on to set out the importanceand significanceof this division in the role of the police. In the next paragraphof his Reporthe says: 4.58 'The conflict which can arisebetween the duty of the police to maintain order and their duty to enforcethe law, and the priority which must be given to the former, have long beenrecognized by the police themselves, though they are factorsto which commentatorson policing have in the past often paid too little attention....' 5. Lord Scarmanconcludes that the Brixton Disorderswhich were the subject of his enquiry were an exampleof conflict betweenthe peace-keepingduties of the police, and their obligation to reducecrime. He found that a perfectly proper police operationto preventstreet robbery and to detectand arrestthe offender was a major causeof an outbreakof urban rioting. Paragraph4.21 of the Report is of particular interestin this respect. Lord Scarmannotes that uniformed officers were deployedin Brixton to preventcrime and detercriminal offenders. However, despitethe intentionsof the local police commanders,that action did not reducestreet robberies in the areaover the long term, but was itself a significant factor in the later outbreakof disorder. 6. Lord Scarman'sReport shows that crime reductionand peace-keepingare distinct and evenconflicting tasksfor the police, requiring different. ii Comment by: Lawrence T. Roach, QPM deployments,policing skills andtactics. That createsa constantproblem for police managerswho haveto decidehow to divide their availableofficers betweenthese differing activities. The Reportalso found that if police, either individually or as a unit, are requiredto achieveboth objectives,they must be given clear directions on which task has priority. The Scarmanenquiry Report and its findings havean impact on the validity of the evidencepresented by the White Paperon the needfor reform of the police. In particular,Chapter I describesrecent police successin the detectionof crime, adding however that (paragraph1.24)'... we must reversethe trend for the crime ratesthat are rising, and continueto drive down the ratesfor other crimes.... In the next section,at paragraph1.25, the Papersays that'Although recentcrime figures should provide considerablereassurance, public fears aboutcrime remain high.', going on to say (paragraph1.26) that'We expectthe police at every level.. to clamp down on thuggish,brutal and uncivilised behaviourwherever it occurs'. My commenton this part of the Report is that, in the light of Lord Scarman'sReport it should be apparentthat the recentsuccess of the police in reducingcrime is, in all probability, a causeof continuinghigh public insecurityand fearsof crime. What the White Paperpresents as puzzling, i.e. that police successin reducing crime has had little or no effect on levels of fear of crime, is, in fact, no more than might be expected. Crime has beenreduced by police activity, but public fear of crime and/or insecurity has beenadversely affected by the consequentshift of policing resources from peace-keepinginto crime reduction.Crime reductionand peace-keepingare not complementaryeither in principle or in the practiceof policing, as Lord Scarman pointed out This is an interpretationof the evidenceput forward in the White Paper for which there is also a good deal of anecdotalevidence, and to which credenceis given by the'Average percentagesatisfaction' charts set out in paragraph1.48. This conclusionhas someinteresting consequences. It leadsfor instance,into a search for the reasonsfor the generalor wide-spreadshift in policing priorities identified by the White Paper. One suchobvious avenueof enquiry is the extent to which priority and resourceallocation decisionsby chief police officers are influenced by ministerial priorities and objective setting. In effect, Lord Scarman'sReport indicatesthat the Home Office itself may be the causeof the problemsit identifies in its White paper. In addition, this alternativeinterpretation of the facts presentedin the White Paper extenuatesthe criticism of unduevariability in performanceas betweendifferent police forces set out in paragraphs1.39 to 1.42. It raisesthe possibility that such variations in successagainst crime targetsmay not be the result of differing levels of competenceor efficiency in combatingcrime, but merely the outcomeof legitimate, defensibleand evencommendable differences in local priorities as betweencrime reduction and peace-keeping. The White Paper'sfailure to take accountof priorities when criticising the performanceof police units is compoundedby its disregardof the importanceLord Scarmanattaches to establishinga priority betweenpeace-keeping and crime reduction where the police are requiredto pursueboth. The White Paperproposes to imposejust such a dual requirementon the police serviceas a
iii Comment by: LawrenceT. Roach, QPM
whole, yet it neitherdiscusses nor recognisesthe issueof priorities, nor doesit give any adviceor guidanceon it. 12. In all, the absenceof any discussionin the White Paperof the authoritative conclusionsand findings of Lord Scarmanin his Report on the Brixton Disordersis surprising. The omissionseriously undermines the caseon which the argumentfor radical refonn in the police serviceis based. Equally the White Paperrequires the police serviceto improve its performancein the reduction of crime and in the maintenanceof order, yet it fails to give any guidanceon the priority to be given to thosevery different, and potentially conflicting, tasks. The appropriateness of the proposed prol! ramme of police reform 13. The Parliamentaryand public record, as it is set out and examinedin my unpublishedpaper, makes it abundantlyclear that, at their origin, Peel'sNew Police were intendedto be a purely protectiveand preventiveforce, specifically excludedfrom any involvementin criminal enquiriesor procedures,i. e. 'peace keepers'within the definition usedin the White Paper. The foundersof British professionalpolicing may have usedthe words'the prevention of crime' when describingtheir objective in their Instructionsto their newly appointed constables,but their evidenceto a SelectCommittee in 1833 showsthat their actual contribution to that end was confined strictly to the deterrenteffect causedby the visible presenceof their patrolling officers. 14. The public record then goeson to show that the 'crime reduction' activities associatedwith police criminal investigationdepartments were subsequently imposedon the police servicein the late nineteenthcentury by the indirect and concealedmeans of Home Office internal committees,often in the face of fierce objection from the early leadersof the police. My paperconcludes from the evidenceof the public recordthat the action of the Home Office in this matter was almost certainly ultra vires, and probably unlawful. 15. Against that background,the White Paperon Police Reform proposesto solve the presentdifficulties of the police by reducingtheir involvementin the duty to which they were originally dedicated,i. e. that of peace-keepingand protection of the public, in order to refocusthem on their later, and secondary,role of crime investigationand detection. The White Paperthereby flies in the face of the intentionsof the first foundersof the police serviceand the Parliamentarians who were so careful to specify the task Peel'sNew Police were to perform. It also contradictsthe interpretationof the priory of the differing roles of the police consistentlygiven by the Law Lords, and best articulatedby Lord Scarman.
16. That being so, if radical reform in the duties of the police must be made,it will more consistentlyaccord with the tradition of the service,and more accurately reflect the commonlaw andthe history of (and recentdevelopments in) policing, if it is the crime investigationand detectionwork of the servicethat is reducedrather than its peace-keepingfunction. My unpublishedpaper expands on and fully arguesthe casefor the conclusionthat the best solution to the presentdifficulties of the police will be to transferall the crime investigation, detectionand prosecutionduties presently performed by the police serviceto an executivearm formed within the Crown ProsecutionService, leaving the police iv Comment by: Lawrence T. Roach, QPM
with the sole task of keepingthe peaceand protectingcitizens from harm. Under that system,the contribution of the police to the preventionof crime would be the deterrenteffect of their visible, active presencein public places,as was the caseat their first foundation. 17. The benefitsof that approachto the reform of the police are many and considerable. They not only include compliancewith the traditions of policing and coherencewith modem developmentsin the criminal justice system,but will leavefully trained and experiencedprofessionals engaged in every aspect of crime prevention(i. e. a truncatedand refocusedexisting police service),and crime investigation,detection and prosecution(i. e. an enhancedand expanded Crown ProsecutionService). It will also simplify performancemeasurement and value for moneyassessment in the police service,and improve relations betweenthe police and local communities,especially ethnic and other disadvantagedgroups, since the police will no longer be seenas the agencyby which membersof the communityare prosecutedand punishedthrough the criminalcourts. My unpublishedpaper more fully examinesand assessesthe beneficial consequencesof this alternateapproach to police reform. Conclusion 18. Much of what is said in these comments arises becausethere is, at present, neither an agreedlist of the proper functionsof the police service,nor a generallyaccepted definition of its role. A greatdeal hasbeen done in recent yearsto try to correctthat omission,but nothing of substancehas emerged. If recentexperience with the problemsof developingaccurate and useful performancemeasures for policing has any relevanceto the matter, the White Paper'sproposals for a new National Policing Plan and a complementary StandardsUnit will cometo nothing unlessthese questions are answered authoritatively. As the Home Office minister, Alun Michael MP, said in August 1998,'We can only measurethe successof the police if the service knows the outcomesit is trying to achieve...'. Regrettably,the White Paper neitherrecognises the weakeningeffect on its criticisms of the police causedby that lacunain public policy, nor doesit deliver on that crucial issue.
20d'January2002 L. T. Roach
V 217
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