Establishment of IAEA Knowledge of Integrity of the Geological Repository

STUK-YTO-TR 207 / MAY 2004

ESTABLISHMENT OF IAEA KNOWLEDGE OF INTEGRITY OF THE GEOLOGICAL REPOSITORY BOUNDARIES AND DISPOSED SPENT FUEL ASSEMBLIES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FINNISH GEOLOGICAL REPOSITORY Experts’ Group meeting Report on Task JNT/C 1204 of the Member States’ Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards

Olli Okko (ed.)

STUK • SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS Osoite/Address • Laippatie 4, 00880 Helsinki STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN Postiosoite / Postal address • PL / P.O.Box 14, FIN-00881 Helsinki, FINLAND RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY Puh./Tel. (09) 759 881, +358 9 759 881 • Fax (09) 759 88 500, +358 9 759 88 500 • www.stuk.fi The conclusions presented in the STUK report series are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of STUK

ISBN 951-712-857-6 (print) ISBN 951-712-858-4 (pdf) ISSN 0785-9325

Dark Oy, Vantaa/Finland 2004 STUK- YTO-TR 207

OKKO Olli (ed.). Establishment of IAEA knowledge of integrity of the geological repository boundaries and disposed spent fuel assemblies in the context of the Finnish geological repository. Experts’ Group meeting Report on Task JNT/C 1204 of the Member States’ Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards. STUK-YTO-TR 207. Helsinki 2004. 14 pp. + Annexes 15 pp.

Keywords: safeguards, spent fuel, geological repository

Preface

The Geological Repository Safeguards Experts Group (Member State Support Programme tasks JNT/C1204 and C1226), agreed that annual meetings should be held to address interface issues between IAEA safeguards and radioactive waste management and to explore the use of safety and operational information to make International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards more effective and efficient for geological repository facilities. It has also been recognised that the safeguards measures for geological repositories are to be developed site-specifically. To address these issues to the planned Olkiluo- to repository in Finland a meeting of experts in safety, geological repository operations, and safeguards from 6 States, European Commission, and IAEA was held in Olkiluoto and Rauma, Finland, during September 29 – October 4, 2003.

The pre-operational phase of the Olkiluoto repository should be efficiently used by the parties involved in safeguards. The applicability and reliability of the potential new techniques and the efficient practices must be developed and proven before their implementation as safeguards measures to be applied at the subsequent stages of the repository development. The visit to the location of the proposed Olkiluoto repository and neighbouring areas and subsequent presentations enabled the working groups to discuss the various issues with reference to actual site conditions. The working groups were thus able to identify potential measurement and monitoring techniques and research and development requirements for consideration by the Finnish authorities, in addition to making recommendations to the IAEA on planned activities for carrying out before and during the early investigation phase of the proposed Olkiluoto repository. It was understood that all parties shall take good care of the implementation of the planned activities to ensure that proven means, approaches and the required verified information is at hand at the time the pro- jected facility will become a nuclear facility under construction. The working groups reports are presented in the Annexes of this report as discussed at Rauma and edited afterwards. The content of this report reflects the professional competence of the participants. The Executive summary was generated at the meeting. The drafting of the report was carried out mainly by Mr. Bruce Moran and Ian Upshall (Baseline requirements and knowledge-base development, Annex 3) and Tapani Honkamaa (Nuclear Material Charac- terization, Annex 4). This report was compiled finally by Mr. Juha Rautjärvi and Olli Okko according to the comments received from all of the participants.

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Contents

PREFACE 3

1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5 1.1 Issues 5 1.2 Recommendations 5

2 BACKGROUND 7 2.1 Geological repository safeguards overview 7 2.1.1 IAEA safeguards policy 7 2.1.2 IAEA safeguards approach development 7 2.1.3 Meeting structure and objectives 8

3 BASELINE 9 3.1 Definition 9 3.2 Establishment of knowledge base for the repository – Annex 3 9 3.3 Characterization of spent fuel assemblies – Annex 4 10

4 OLKILUOTO GEOLOGICAL REPOSITORY 11 4.1 Olkiluoto issues 11 4.2 Site description – ONKALO and Olkiluoto geological repository 11 4.3 State obligations to report/provide information 11 4.4 Finland–IAEA Information exchange/coordination 12 4.5 Availability of site characterization data 12 4.6 Proposed methods and technologies 12 4.7 Site-particular conditions affecting IAEA monitoring 12 4.8 Follow-up procedure 13

REFERENCES 14

ANNEX 1EXPERTS’ GROUP MEETING AGENDA 15

ANNEX 2LIST OF ATTENDEES 17

ANNEX 3EXPERT GROUP ON APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS IN GEOLOGICAL REPOSITORIES 18

ANNEX 4REPORT OF THE MEASUREMENTS WORKING GROUP 28

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1 Executive summary

1.1 Issues dures and measures need to be carefully devel- A geological repository is a unique facility type oped and tested. Substantial baseline data regard- from the perspective of international safeguards ing the integrity of the host bedrock has been because of its construction in suitable geological collected by the operator providing a basis for the formations, the long construction period, and the creation of the initial knowledge base. As the continuing safeguards requirement after facility ability to independently verify the baseline infor- closure. Because of these, the International Atom- mation will be lost when the excavation opera- ic Energy Agency (IAEA) should recognize that tions begin, IAEA activities must be initiated different design information verification time soon. schedules apply than have typically been used In order to facilitate the IAEA meeting its when applying safeguards to surface facilities. safeguards goals at Finland’s Olkiluoto geological These extended time frames apply not only follow- repository, design information verification activi- ing closure of the facility, but to the design, charac- ties should begin immediately and testing of meas- terization, and construction phases. If the IAEA is ures to maintain knowledge of the integrity of the to effectively and efficiently develop assurance of geological repository boundary should begin very the integrity of the perimeter of the geological re- soon. The early evaluations will determine where pository, the most advantageous way would be ear- the gaps are in the provided design information ly IAEA interactions with the repository operator, and verification capabilities, and allow these gaps the State, and, where relevant, Regional Authority to be closed. Effective safeguards will require a to generate and evaluate design information be- long-term commitment from the IAEA, albeit at fore excavations at the proposed repository loca- low effort levels, for the continual verification of tion begin. The IAEA safeguards policy statement design information at the geological repository. relevant to geological repositories recommends that design information verification activities be- 1.2 Recommendations gin during this early phase. The experts recommend the following: Although the proposed repository location does 1. Finland should immediately notify the IAEA of not meet the definition of a nuclear facility until it the status of the geological repository and pro- receives nuclear material and does not meet the vide to the IAEA safeguards-relevant informa- definition of being under construction until the tion on the geological environment and integri- location is qualified and licensed by the State, ty of the bedrock, on neighbouring locations excavation of safeguards-relevant shafts, ramps, and activities, and on the proposed design of and tunnels begins when excavation into the bed- the exploratory tunnel and geologic repository. rock is initiated. Although the generic safeguards 2. Finland, Posiva (the repository developer and approach for geological repositories has been gen- operator), Euratom, and IAEA should initiate erally accepted, the safeguards measures and pro- interactions and planning for IAEA safeguards cedures have not been applied to or tested under activities. We note that Euratom has main- site-specific conditions. Finland’s proposed tained a low-level involvement at meetings Olkiluoto geological repository presents the first related to geological repositories and that six site-specific case at which the safeguards approach IAEA staff attended the Geological Repository will be applied. Therefore, the site-specific proce- Safeguards Experts Meeting.

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3. Finland and IAEA should develop top-down 6. Following iterative interactions with Finland, awareness and support for IAEA safeguards the IAEA should identify what information is interactions and safeguards-relevant activities safeguards relevant information to establish- at the proposed Olkiluoto geological repository ing knowledge of the integrity of the geological site. repository perimeter and document procedures and guidance to be used for future interactions. 4. The IAEA should develop its competencies to be able to evaluate information provided by 7. The Member State Support Programs should Finland related to the geological repository, to provide expertise to the IAEA and should un- determine gaps in the information, and to inde- dertake technical tasks to develop, test and pendently verify the accuracy of the informa- validate the verification methods. tion. These competencies could be quickly established through cost free experts and con- 8. The IAEA member states’ support programmes sultants. should to the extent possible provide assistance to the IAEA’s geological repository safeguards 5. The IAEA should initiate new or extend exist- activities in the following areas: ing tasks to confirm the ability of satellite • Funding imaging, geophysical monitoring, and environ- • Equipment mental radiological sampling to generate • Expertise knowledge base of the proposed site and to be • Human resources. able to maintain that knowledge base.

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2 Background

2.1 Geological repository safeguards of continuity of knowledge on the nuclear ma- overview terial content.” In comparison to above-ground facilities, at which the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) “3.1.4 Safeguards requirements should be inte- has experience verifying design information and grated into the repository design at an early implementing safeguards monitoring and verifica- stage in order to establish functional, non- tion measures, geological repository safeguards intrusive, and cost-effective safeguards meas- present unique challenges. First, the space, into ures. Consultations between the State and the which the repository will be constructed and the IAEA should, therefore, start at an early stage underground areas contiguous to the boundaries to agree on the safeguards measures in of the repository, cannot be directly observed. Sec- the repository.” ond, once emplaced, the IAEA will no longer be able to reverify the inventory of nuclear material “3.1.7 The State should provide the following contained in the repository because of the backfill- information as early as possible: ing of the emplacement drifts. Thus, should conti- • draft plans of a geological repository site; nuity of knowledge of the nuclear material content • description of intended exploratory under- of the repository be lost, that knowledge cannot be ground works for the geological repository; restored. • information on existing local mines; and • any other information that might be iden- 2.1.1 IAEA safeguards policy tified by the IAEA as relevant for the International Atomic Energy Agency, Policy Series purpose of safeguards. Number 15, dated June 1997, states the following policies, among others, with respect to geological “3.3.1.2 The Agency, in collaboration with the repository safeguards: State, should establish all pertinent information about the original undisturbed site (i.e., “3.1.1 Spent fuel disposed in geological repositor- zero-point checking), preferably before excava- ies is subject to safeguards in accordance with tion begins, in order to plan for safeguards the applicable safeguards requirements. Safe- measures.” guards for such material are maintained after the repository has been back-filled and sealed, 2.1.2 IAEA safeguards approach development and for as long as the safeguards agreement In 1988, the IAEA held its first Advisory Group remains in force. The safeguards applied should meeting to address safeguards for the final dispos- provide a credible assurance of non-diversion.” al of spent fuel in geological repositories. The IAEA’s Programme for the Development of Safe- “3.1.2 The safeguards system for such a reposi- guards Approaches for the Final Disposal of Spent tory should be based on: verification of design Fuel in Geological Repositories (SAGOR) was be- information during design, construction, and gun in 1994 and, in 1998, provided recommenda- operation; verification of receipts and flow that tions to the IAEA on generic safeguards approach- no nuclear material is removed by any declared es for spent fuel conditioning facilities and for op- or undeclared access routes; and maintenance erating and closed geological repositories. Nine

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Member States and two international organiza- that should be undertaken by the IAEA, Finland tions contributed to the SAGOR Programme rec- and Euratom, and the Member State Support Pro- ommendations. In 1999¹, the IAEA established the grams. Geological Repository Safeguards Experts Group Numerous presentations were made with the to provide advice on safeguards technology devel- objective of stimulating further discussion by the opment for geological repositories and on imple- experts. The meeting agenda (Annex 1) lists the menting the generic safeguards approach at spe- presentations made. Working Groups were formed cific facilities. by the participants to examine some specific is- In a number of meetings this experts’ group, sues related to site characterisation and the estab- named at Rauma ASTOR (Application of Safe- lishment of a knowledge base and the characteri- guards TO Repositories) discussed specific topics: sation of spent fuel. All issues discussed were the use of geophysical techniques, the definition directly related to the proposed Olkiluoto facility. and establishment of baseline knowledge, and the During the meeting, experts from the Finnish, interface between safeguards and safety monitor- Swedish, German, Canadian, UK, US, Euratom ing activities during the construction and opera- and IAEA delegations discussed the use of radio- tion of a repository. All of the meetings arrived at metric measurements, satellite imagery and geo- the same conclusions. Namely that the final set of physical technologies and their potential in sup- safeguards measures must be developed and de- port of site evaluation characterization pro- fined for specific repository projects and that ge- grammes. Safeguards and information manage- neric discussions should now be replaced with ment experts separately considered two related site-specific considerations. That is why this ex- topics; the production of Olkiluoto site baseline perts’ meeting was held; i.e., to discuss site-specif- information and the broader data and information ic needs for the Olkiluoto geological repository. requirements for a knowledge-based system. In order to better understand the features of the 2.1.3 Meeting structure and objectives undisturbed site, a visit to the location of the The objective of the experts’ group meeting was to proposed Olkiluoto repository and neighbouring identify what knowledge the IAEA should estab- areas was undertaken on the first morning of the lish during the pre-operational phase of the meeting. The visit and subsequent presentations Olkiluoto geological repository to have assurance enabled the working groups to discuss the various of the integrity of the geological repository bound- issues with reference to actual site conditions. The aries and spent fuel assemblies and to determine working groups were thus able to identify poten- what activities are recommended to the IAEA for tial measurement and monitoring techniques and acquisition of that knowledge. A second objective research and development requirements for con- was to ensure that the required knowledge base sideration by the Finnish authorities, in addition will exist when a repository begins nuclear mate- to making recommendations to the IAEA on rial disposal operations. Through evaluating the planned activities for carrying out before and knowledge and information base against the Fin- during the early investigation phase of the pro- land-specific situation, actions will be identified posed Olkiluoto repository.

1 The 1st Experts Group Meeting took place in Helsinki during October 19–21, 1999.

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3 Baseline

3.1 Definition vegetation, fauna, seismic and social factors. This Baseline information is that information which, work, which was supported in part by the use of when evaluated, can be used to create a knowl- approximately 25 boreholes in the vicinity of the edge base of the site features and characteristics proposed repository, will be further enhanced fol- against which changes can be identified, analysed lowing the construction of an underground rock and compared. characterisation facility (Onkalo) comprising a The same set of information can be used for ramp, a ventilation shaft and drifts reaching a different purposes, to establish different subordi- depth of approximately 500 m. Construction of nate baselines, depending on the data used to this facility will start in mid-2004. create the information. For example, geophysical Construction of a fifth Finnish nuclear power data collected by the repository developer may be reactor at the neighbouring Olkiluoto site may used to establish a knowledge base on the geologi- start as early as 2005 lasting about seven years. cal medium to provide assurance that suitable Consequently, there exists only a relatively short containment will be provided for certain radionu- time window for the IAEA to establish techniques clides over a specific length of time. These same and to study the resultant data under relatively data could also be used by the IAEA to establish undisturbed site conditions. This challenging an understanding of the integrity of the geological timescale was recognised by the working group repository boundary. and as a result, it attempted to identify those activities which the IAEA should be encouraged to 3.2 Establishment of knowledge base carry out to establish a knowledge base that may for the repository – Annex 3 support the realization of specific IAEA safeguards The Finnish project represents an opportunity for goals (IAEA 1997, 2003). the IAEA to follow the State investigation and The definition of baseline data in relation to construction of the repository from almost undis- safeguards was discussed together with the moni- turbed conditions up to the arrival of the first toring and measuring techniques necessary to nuclear material items, to establish sufficient generate the required data for the establishment knowledge about the characteristics of the site, and maintenance of a knowledge base. The results and to develop and test the safeguards approach of the discussion are summarized below with some necessary to ensure IAEA goal attainment. detailed issues presented in Annex 3. From 1989 to the present, numerous investiga- In particular the following subjects were ad- tions have been performed by the operator TVO, dressed: and later by Posiva, the company entrusted with 1. the use of data acquired since 1989 including the investigation and design of the national repos- environmental, geological, and satellite infor- itory, and its contractors. The purpose of these mation; investigations has been to establish a knowledge 2. the selection and follow up of safeguards rele- base of information on which a judgment could be vant data during the construction of Onkalo; reached on the suitability of the bedrock for radio- 3. the development and testing of specific safe- nuclide containment and environmental protec- guards instrumentation during the early inves- tion. The investigations focused on numerous are- tigation phase. as such as hydrology, rock dynamics, and climate,

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3.3 Characterization of spent fuel Olkiluoto disposal facility does not allow a great assemblies – Annex 4 deal of time to develop and implement advanced Nuclear materials characterization is a R&D pri- characterization methods. It is noted that some ority and is likely to provide a source of baseline nuclear material characterization methods and data of primary importance. Information leading processes may influence facility design decisions. to improved knowledge about the properties of This specific issue was taken on the agenda in this spent fuel items should therefore be derived be- meeting. Summary of discussions held in a work- fore they are designated for underground disposal. ing group B “Requirements for nuclear material Bearing in mind the currently proposed timescale, characterization for final disposal” are presented the fifteen year period between now and the re- in Annex 4. ceipt of the first spent fuel assembly at the

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4 Olkiluoto geological repository

4.1 Olkiluoto issues 4.2 Site² description – ONKALO and In 1983, Finland began site investigations rele- Olkiluoto geological repository vant to the candidate geological repository at The Onkalo underground rock characterisation fa- Olkiluoto. Following the detailed site investiga- cility and the planned Olkiluoto geological reposi- tions at six candidate sites in 1992 – 1998, the tory are located in Eurajoki near, and on the same Olkiluoto site was accepted to represent typical island as, the Olkiluoto Nuclear Power Plant. Also Finnish bedrock and was proposed to be the suita- located nearby, are the Olkiluoto NPP low-level ble site for final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. In and intermediate level waste repository rock cav- May 2001, the Finnish Parliament endorsed the ern. These underground constructions are located Decision-in-Principle to construct a geological re- in old Precambrian bedrock consisting mainly of pository at Olkiluoto. Construction of the reposi- deformed mica gneiss. Similar bedrock conditions tory is conditional on the results of site characteri- are reported also from the site characterisation zation. In May 2004, construction of the Onkalo studies for Onkalo. Therefore, the experience of exploratory underground rock characterization fa- applying drilling and blasting techniques with re- cility will begin at the repository location to pro- inforcement methods can be applied also for Onka- vide data for the site characterization. In 2012, if lo and the safeguards approach adapted to this the location is determined to be acceptable, the procedure. The island is also under review for con- license application for the construction of the re- struction of another nuclear power reactor and the pository will be issued. After the construction li- spent fuel encapsulation plant. In addition to the cense has been granted, construction of tunnels human induced activity there is natural activity and drifts for the final disposal can be continued. (e.g. rock quarry, waves striking the shore, ice Spent fuel emplacement operations are scheduled breaking, etc.) that could affect the implementa- to begin in 2020. At present, emplacement is ex- tion in a conclusive manner of the required safe- pected to continue for 90 years. guards measures. Until the construction of the Onkalo exploratory facility is initiated, the geological location re- 4.3 State obligations to report/provide mains undisturbed except for the boreholes used information for initial site characterization. Coordination It is not intended that the Onkalo exploratory fa- meetings between Finland, Euratom, and IAEA cility is to be licensed as a nuclear facility. Howev- were initiated in 1999 to begin discussion of what er, once the geological characterization phase is information the IAEA should assess and what complete, and assuming that the results are satis- activities IAEA should perform to apply effective factory, ramps and tunnels of the Onkalo will be- safeguards to the geological repository. The bene- come components of a licensed disposal facility. At fits of the early Finland-IAEA cooperation are to present, the proposed excavation is licensed ac- ensure that information that is required on the cording to Posiva’s application referring to the civ- undisturbed repository site is collected before ex- il construction legislation (not even mining legis- cavation of the Onkalo exploratory underground lation) by the municipality. Therefore, the report- facility begins in 2004. ing towards the State is based on voluntary deliv-

2 The concept ‘Site’ used hereby refers to the geological conditions, not to the Additional Protocol.

11 STUK- YTO-TR 207 ery of information with respect to the recommen- 4.5 Availability of site dations given by the State authorities. The aim of characterization data these efforts is to secure conditions for safe and Engineering geological site characterization was safeguardable disposal of spent nuclear fuel. carried out at the western end of the Olkiluoto Island for over 30 years in order to demonstrate 4.4 Finland–IAEA Information the suitability of the site for the two NPP facilities exchange/coordination and their accompanying installations including Timely and good communication is essential, and the underground storages for low and intermedi- the desired coordination of activities can be ex- ate level waste. The site characterization, design pected to happen. The information requirements and construction were reviewed by local and na- are determined by the needs of the involved par- tional authorities. Moreover, the site characteriza- ties. First of all, the parties to be involved should tion for the final disposal facility was carried out identify themselves. Certainly these include the by the operating companies for more than 15 years producers of the Finnish spent nuclear fuel, the and this has also been reviewed by the national repository development and implementing compa- authority, STUK. In addition, international review ny, and the responsible authorities, in Finland, at groups are regularly consulted in the fields of en- the IAEA, and probably also at the Euratom.- gineering-geological bedrock modelling, rock sta- What does any particular party need to know, and bility, hydrogeological and geochemical analysis. why? The review groups have been supported by the The law, treaties and agreements, as negotiat- site characterization data collected by the opera- ed, will identify the parties and their respective tor or its subcontractors, presenting the qualified rights and obligations. The safeguards regime and, national or international experts. particularly, the system implementation will call for clear roles and functional responsibilities so as 4.6 Proposed methods and technologies to ensure efficient performance. The national authority started independent envi- It is evident that due to the nature of the ronmental monitoring at the NPPs one year before undertaking there are information needs to ena- the operation of the first reactor. In Olkiluoto, the ble efficient implementation of particular safe- progamme started in 1977 with radioecological guards measures in order to build and document background studies being initiated as early as the assurances of the absence of any safeguards 1972. Continuous monitoring is carried out at the relevant undeclared excavations at the Onkalo distance of 0–10 km from the power plants. exploratory underground tunnels. The national experts group on the safeguards Further to this, there are information needs for final disposal was founded in 2002. The group associated with tasks that must be initiated to possesses data on seismicity and satellite imagery develop required reliable technique, procedures for national knowledge base on absence of unau- and practices as well as to obtain prove of the thorized activities near the repository. Also, this usefulness and the reliability of any existing ones. site characterization data can be used by interna- Additional information requirements are asso- tional review groups. The different environmental ciated with the activities aimed at obtaining prove monitoring, satellite imagery and geophysical of the reliability of the information provided and methods were discussed during the meeting. of the parties generating that information. Fin- land is obliged to establish and maintain a nation- 4.7 Site-particular conditions affecting al system, to implement its safeguards relevant IAEA monitoring functions (SSAC functions) in a manner as to The Olkiluoto site is located in a crystalline bed enable the IAEA to carry out its verification activ- rock area where the soil cover is minimal. The ities efficiently. The IAEA is therefore requested to final disposal facilities are planned to be construct- express its interests and fit these to the repository ed on the property of the operating company. The development time schedule. company can provide access to the territory and

12 STUK- YTO-TR 207 assist in mounting any required monitoring in- open at a time. Tunnel construction and emplace- struments considered relevant for the safeguards ment activities are concurrent. It is planned, that purposes. The excavation of the underground ex- drilling for new emplacement tunnels will take ploratory galleries will begin in 2004 and are place in campaigns. During one drilling campaign, planned to continue for several years. The prepar- which may last a year, tunnels for several years of atory works including removal of vegetation and emplacement activities are excavated. soil cover, and construction of supporting installations for electricity and ventilation accommoda- 4.8 Follow-up procedure tion near the entrance were initiated in 2003. The editing of the minutes was agreed to be car- The pre-operational phase will begin with the ried out by the participants during the autumn excavation of the non-nuclear gallery. The excava- 2003. The final editorial work shall be undertaken tion work will continue through out the construc- by the Finnish Support Programme. Finally, the tion phase until the end of the scheduled emplace- German delegation was asked to organise the next ment operations after the required licensing. Dur- meeting of the ASTOR Experts Group in Germany. ing the operation of the disposal facility, only A visit to the Gorleben investigation mine, being small parts of the disposal tunnels will be kept under moratorium, would be desirable.

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References

International Atomic Energy Agency, Policy Series International Atomic Energy Agency, Safeguards Number 15, dated June 1997. Technical Report, STR-338, July 2003.

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ANNEX 1 EXPERTS’ GROUP MEETING AGENDA

Experts’ group meeting in Rauma end safeguards – projects, plans and 29.9.–3.10.2003 research. Presentation + paper to be Initial state characterisation of Olkiluoto site for included in the report, Participants safeguards purposes: methods, techniques and Technological implications of safeguards procedures requirements for geological repositories for Venue: Hotel Cumulus, Rauma radioactive waste. S. Hossain, IAEA Chair: To be selected The safeguards – safety interface Drafting group: To be selected J. Rowat, IAEA Possible features of safeguards measures Sunday, September 28 at final spent fuel disposal Y. Abushady, Arrival – STUK can help in organizing transports IAEA from airport to Rauma Tuesday, September 30 Monday, September 29 9:00–11:00 Introductory presentations 08:30 Bus leaves hotel Cumulus for transport to “Baseline”-conceptual definition and the Olkiluoto role of the concept in implementation of 09:00 Arrival at Olkiluoto safeguards (B.Moran & P.Button) -presentation by Posiva and TVO Information management and knowledge 10:30 Guided tour to repository of medium and creation (J. Rautjärvi, STUK) low level waste (VLJ) and Posiva 11:00–11:20 Coffee investigation area 11:20 – 12:30 Baseline data and information 12:30 Lunch generation: 13:30 Transport back to Hotel Cumulus, Rauma Posiva data generation and 14:30–16:00 management, information technology tools Opening of the meeting, Chair, Juha (A. Ikonen, Posiva) Rautjärvi Satellite and airborne imagery for Welcome by IAEA, Alfredo Olkiluoto (T. Häme, VTT) Diaz-Mosquera, IAEA IAEA present practices and use of Introduction of participants and short satellite and airborne imagery (F. Claude, opening remarks, Participants IAEA) Introduction of the subject, Objectives of 12:30–14:00 Lunch Break the meeting, FINSP 14:00–16:00 Baseline data generation session cont. Approval of the Agenda, Participants Spent fuel characterisation prior 16:00–16:20 encapsulation – Proposal for a good – Coffee practice applicable for Finnish conditions 16:20–18:00 Status Updates & Introductory (A.Tiitta, VTT) presentations Radiological monitoring and surveillance Status update by participating countries program at Finnish power plant by STUK concerning spent fuel disposal and back (S. Klemola, STUK)

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Seismological data collection in the 15:00–17:00 Discussions in three working groups. vinicity of Olkiluoto (M. Tarvainen, Preparation of draft document Institute of Seismology) 17:00–18:00 Experts Group future activities 3D Rock model for Olkiluoto as Demonstration of electronic performance a presentation tool (K. Jakobsson, STUK) support tool for group activities, discussion 16:00–16:20 Coffee Discussion of potential member state 16:20–17:50 Round table discussion (Workgroup support programme tasks necessary to stimulation) assist the IAEA in further developing and Satellite imagery application to Olkiluoto testing the safeguards measures before case they must be implemented in a country. Role of seismic techniques: safety and safeguards Thursday, October 2 17:50–18:00 Dividing the participants into three 09:00–11:00 Plenary session, sharing the results groups of the groups and identification of major Groups: outcomes A) Olkiluoto site characterisation for safe- 11:00–11:20 Coffee guards purposes 11:20–13:00 Finalization by the groups of the draft B) Requirements for nuclear material documents characterization for final disposal 13:00–14:30 Lunch C) Data and information requirements 14:30–16:00 Final plenary for a knowledge based system. Presentation and discussion. Next meeting: objective, agenda, Wednesday, October 1 a tentative host country and location. 09:00–13:00 Discussions in three working groups. Closing remarks. Preparation of draft document 13:00–14:00 Lunch Break Friday, October 3 14:00–15:00 Guided walking tour through Old 09:00–12:00 Finalising the meeting document Rauma (Drafting group).

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ANNEX 2 LIST OF ATTENDEES

Canada Matti Tarvainen Peter Button University of Helsinki CNSC Institute of Seismology

Germany Pekka Heikkinen Helmut Kranz University of Helsinki Bundesamt fuer Strahlenschutz (BfS) Institute of Seismology

Irmgard Niemeyer Antero Tiitta Freiberg University of Mining and Technology VTT Processes Institute for Mine Surveying and Geodesy Sweden Arnold Rezniczek Göran Dahlin UBA Unternehmensberatung GMBH Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI)

Knut Seidel Per H. Grahn Geophysik GGD mbh Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB AB) Finland Tuomas Häme Öivind Toverud VTT Information Technology Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI)

Tapani Honkamaa United Kingdom STUK – Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority Ian Upshall Nirex Ltd Ari Ikonen Posiva Oy United States Bruce Moran Kai Jakobsson Nuclear Regulatory Commission STUK – Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority European Commission Seppo Klemola Wolfgang Hilden STUK – Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority DG Transport and Energy Directorate H

Olli Okko International Atomic Energy Agency STUK – Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority Yousry Abushady Frederic Claude Juha Rautjärvi Alfredo Diaz-Mosquera STUK – Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority Shaheed Hossain Helgard du Preez Käthe Sarparanta John Rowat Teollisuuden Voima Oy / Olkiluoto NPP

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ANNEX 3 EXPERT GROUP ON APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS IN GEOLOGICAL REPOSITORIES

Rauma, Finland 29 September to 3 October 2003 Report by Working Groups A & C

1 Working group objectives The information we now have concerning the The objectives of working groups A and C were: burn-up is of some use, but what is its relevance? How might this data impact on a specific scenario Working Group A – Olkiluoto Site and what are the implications? If, by way of Characterisation for Safeguards Purposes and example, we consider its safeguards impact we can Data and Information Requirements for a make a number of suppositions. For example, we Knowledge-based System can infer that this fuel assembly is of relatively To determine the methods and tools for character- low burn up and that it will contain plutonium. We ising the Olkiluoto region. cannot say how much because we do not know the characteristics of the fuel assembly, such as its Working Group B – Requirements for Nuclear original enrichment or material composition. How- Material Characterization ever, even with the limited information available To determine the information required to charac- we can assume that any activity involving this terise the site and to populate a knowledge data- fuel assembly will have a safeguards implication. base with safeguards relevant data. It follows, therefore, that we will need to accurate- The original intention was for three working ly determine the nuclear materials content and groups to be formed. However, after the initial record any movement of the assembly. discussion and presentations it was decided to com- By establishing an association between the bine the membership of working groups A and C. information we have on the fuel assembly and our implicit understanding of potential safeguards im- 2 Definition of baseline knowledge plications we have made the transition between The principal precursor of knowledge is data. Data data, information and knowledge. This knowledge can exist in a number of forms and is derived from can then be used for the decision making process. many sources. In isolation, raw data may have Whilst it is not the purpose of this paper to limited value as characteristics such as their prov- provide a detailed examination of the creation of enance and accuracy may not be defined. A certain knowledge it is worth noting that a final stage amount of supplemental, or contextual, data is exists and that is wisdom. Wisdom comes about therefore necessary to support the raw data and to through developing an understanding of the sig- give them a sense of value and timeliness. For nificance of knowledge and its subsequent applica- example, 4000MWd/teU is an item of raw data. In tion. its present form, it has little meaning or relevance For reasons which will be expanded upon later other than the fact that we can assume that it in this paper, it is desirable to create a knowledge refers to the burn-up of a fuel assembly. We do not database related to the disposal of spent fuel in a know if it is an integrated value, an average value, deep geological repository. Spent fuel assemblies if it has an accuracy of ±1000MWd/teU or destined for the future repository are discharged ±10MWd/teU, or indeed, the identity of the fuel on a regular basis and their unique data is contin- assembly to which it relates. We therefore need to uously created. The purpose of the knowledge base add contextual data to give it meaning and rele- is to help understand what safeguards relevant vance. In summary, raw data with the addition of data and, ultimately knowledge, is necessary to relevant contextual data provides us with infor- safely manage the disposal of the spent fuel. mation.

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3 The repository system 4 Requirement for a baseline report This working group took generic information and The working group next turned to discussing how knowledge and applied it to the specific scenario of baseline knowledge should be collated and the proposed development of a deep geological re- communicated to stakeholders. It is suggested that pository in Finland for the final disposal of spent the most accessible form would be some type of fuel assemblies from its Olkiluoto and Loviisa report that contained not only the data but some NPPs. interpretation of it. Posiva Oy is proposing to construct an under- It should be made clear that there is no inter- ground rock characterisation facility (URCF), national, regional or State regulatory requirement named ONKALO, on the island of Olkiluoto adja- to produce a Baseline Report. Consequently, there cent to the two BWR units. ONKALO is not a must be a clear purpose for such a document. After nuclear facility but, subject to further investiga- much discussion, the working group agreed that tion and the satisfactory outcome of tests and there were a number of areas to which the Base- support of the Finnish State, the URCF could line Report had the potential to contribute. These eventually become part of a larger, purpose built, included: licensed repository. In order to better understand the concept of (a) Initial identification of safeguards baseline information and identify sources of data relevant aspects of the system and information, it is assumed that ONKALO will The Baseline Report could be used to identify and in time become an integral part of the final reposi- further expand on the features of the system that tory. However, the outcome of this study could be may impact on the safeguarding of the nuclear applied equally to any other site or facility. material. In this way it could highlight design fea- This paper will make reference to “The Sys- tures and provide a basis for discussions with the tem”. In this context, the system is assumed to safeguarding authorities. comprise four interrelating components: human actions, the environment, the proposed facility (b) A record of the start conditions of the and institutional controls. Each component can be system considered in isolation but to obtain a full and Clearly, the Baseline Report should provide a comprehensive picture it is necessary to under- record of the ‘start state’ of the repository system; stand that two or more components will be inter- in particular, the undisturbed geological, hydro- acting at any one time. The nature of these inter- logical and environmental features. In addition it actions is not necessarily defined but their signifi- may describe the pattern of human activities in cance and impact are nonetheless relevant. the vicinity of the proposed site. Human action around and in the repository It was suggested that the Baseline Report site is inevitable at all stages: pre-operation, oper- could be structured in such a way that it provides ation, post-operation and post-closure. All human start state information on the four aspects of the actions must be considered including those direct- system (human actions, the environment, the pro- ly related to the repository. Therefore the impact posed facility and institutional controls). Alterna- of, inter alia, neighbouring industry, daily com- tively it could be structured in three sections muting, construction and recreational activities examining above surface, near surface and deep will all impact on the system. Similarly, the envi- rock characteristics. ronment will determine to some extent the location, layout, method of construction and lifetime of (c) Identification of weaknesses in the the repository. The facility is clearly a fundamen- system knowledge base tal part of the system and this will have an impact Not all information will be immediately available on the environment and on human actions. The and some sources of information will be less relia- fourth component, institutional control, will deter- ble than others. The production of a Baseline Re- mine to a degree how the human actions will port would encourage a ‘knowledge stock take’ to impact on the facility operations and on the local be conducted. This would enable the operator to environmental conditions. direct future work or focus on particular aspects

19 STUK- YTO-TR 207 ANNEX 3 EXPERT GROUP ON APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS IN GEOLOGICAL REPOSITORIES in order to improve the accuracy and reliability of opment company (Posiva) and the operators (TVO, the information. Fortum). In addition, the Finnish community will have a stake in the report. (d) Identification of research & development The IAEA and Euratom should be encouraged needs to have a stake in the Baseline Report although it An understanding and recognition of the unknown should be made quite clear where ownership lies. is as important as stating the known. The Base- Much of the information contained in the report line Report could be used to identify features or will contribute to the development of the safe- characteristics where more data and information guards approach, and this needs to be reflected in are required and thus provide a key input into an subsequent versions. R&D plan. This is linked to the previous goal. In the interests of popular support, openness (e) Input into formal declarations to safeguards and transparency, the local community should be authorities encouraged to comment on the Baseline Report. At an early stage and some considerable time before the first waste item is received, the State 5 Baseline report evolution will be required to inform the safeguards The report provides a starting point for longer authorities of its intent. It is preferable that term interactions between the stakeholders. It is formal notification be preceded by discussions vital that there is a common understanding of this between the two parties in order that a common start point. Baseline information is dynamic and safeguards and complimentary approach is is expected to change as the project develops. It is adopted. The Baseline Report could be used as the therefore necessary that the report owner employs basis of these early discussions and as a key input a robust system of change control to ensure that into the formal declaration. subsequent versions of the report are properly ref- erenced and that the changes are clearly docu- 4.1 Ownership of the repository mented. the baseline report There has been no attempt to define the end- The baseline report will both contain and refer to point at this stage. However, it is expected that the data, information and knowledge generated by a baseline report will provide one of the key inputs wide range of sources. However, its compilation, to subsequent declarations made to regulating accuracy and comprehensiveness will be clearly authorities and the safeguards inspectorate. the responsibility of the organisation charged with co-ordinating the system activities. In this specific 5.1 Means for data acquisition case it is suggested that the Baseline Report is The following sections provide an indication of the owned by STUK. range of technology that has been used to date to Ownership includes the responsibility for the acquire data on the site and the activities being contents of the report, its control in terms of undertaken. Many of these technologies are well distribution, its review and updating. The established and there are examples of their use in management of the Baseline Report should be similar circumstances elsewhere. However, their made a specific responsibility of a team within limitations are also well understood and there is a STUK. Collection and compilation of the data is need to improve certain aspects in order to pro- likely to be a complex and time consuming process vide more accurate or conclusive data. Where this and one that will require the application of sound is the case, this section recognises the need for project management principles. Changes to the further research and/or development. data or the information will have to be carefully This section examines the various data collec- controlled and recorded. tion techniques either employed in the Olkiluoto region or expected to be used to support future 4.2 Baseline report stakeholders site characterisation related to the ONKALO facil- In Finland the principal stakeholders are The ity. State, the industry regulators (STUK), the devel-

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5.1.1 Commercial satellite imagery Thus, a combination of satellite imagery showing different spectral and spatial resolutions 5.1.1.1 General description would ensure an optimum basis. Particularly, an The technology of satellite imagery is well proven improved spatial resolution of SAR images would and has been used by the military community for guarantee detailed information of the site and its many years. Its use has now spread to commercial activities even in times of significant snow cover. activities and is used on a daily basis for a wide range of applications from crop analysis to miner- 5.1.1.4 Safeguards-related objects to be al deposit identification. There are a number of verified using satellite imagery sensor systems available giving users the ability For evalution of the surface conditions, satellite to remotely observe earth based objects in all imagery (WGS84) and aerial imagery should be weathers and conditions. provided to the Agency (the type and quality of The increase in the use of satellite imagery has data will have to be discussed). Moreover, digital resulted in several national programmes to con- maps and models should be delivered to the Agen- struct and launch satellites equipped with a wide cy for a detailed site description: A high-resolution range of sensors and to subsequently make the digital elevation model, digital maps and a digital imagery available. Therefore, there are a number geological map. The data should be accompanied of sources from which imagery can be obtained. by reports on the background of the data and their From 1991 onwards, the IAEA recognised the potential use with regard to safeguards-related potential of using commercially available satellite tasks. In order to check, in particular, the limits of imagery to support their safeguards activities. A optical data and to consider the specific weather principal objective is to monitor the activities at conditions at Olkiluoto, meteorological statistics declared nuclear facilities. In order to study the with information on monthly cloud cover, snow geological area, the resolution and imagery tech- cover and sun elevation should be taken into ac- niques should be evaluated owing to the site- count as well. specific targets. Taking into account the improving spatial and spectral resolution of satellite imagery and re- 5.1.1.2 Known limitations related to site garding the lack of extended research for the specific use monitoring of repository sites, R&D should focus The spatial resolution of commercially available on image analysis, interpretion and visualization optical satellite image data is presently limited to techniques with respect to the usability for the 0.58m (Nadir Quickbird PAN [initialise acronym]) Olkiluoto site. and will be enhanced in the future. Since a spatial resolution of 1m seems to be sufficient for most 1. Radar imagery purposes, the today’s high-resolution satellites For the use of radar (SAR) data, image analysis provide the relevant background information for a techniques have to be investigated concerning general site characterisation – in cloud-free and the improving spatial resolution. In order to snow-free image acquisition times. In order to be simulate the future spatial resolution, airborne independent of the weather conditions limiting the campaigns should be organized and carried use of optical data, the improved SAR [initialise out. The potential and use of L-band data, acronym] image resolution would allow similar showing a better penetration because of a low- levels of confidence. er frequency, should be studied. Seasonal variations and impacts have also to be checked. 5.1.1.3 Improvements identified and development requirements 2. Hyperspectral data Due to technical improvements in the near future, The use of hyperspectral image data has to be a better spatial resolution will be available, for analysed in detail. An initial estimation will be optical data as well as for thermal, hyperspectral possible by the analysis of HYPERION image- and radar imagery. ry (NASA). To be prepared for the future devel-

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opments for satellite-based hyperspecral sen- 2. Research for Olkiluoto repository site sors, an airborne campaign should be carried • Radar (SAR) image analysis techniques out with hyperspectral cameras. Moreover, a • concerning the improving spatial reso- field spectrometer campaign should be per- lution formed, the field spectral measurements can • concerning L-band data (better pene- then result in a database of reference spectra tration to canopy than present instru- to be used for classification purposes. ments due to lower frequency) • concerning seasonal impact 3. Thermal data • organization of airborne campaign to Today, satellites like LANDSAT 7 (channel 6, simulate future satellite instruments 60m) and ASTER (channels 10–14, 90 m) pro- • Hyper-spectral data analysis techniques vide thermal images data with a relatively low • airborne campaign to simulate future resolution. For the very near future, innovative satellite instruments improvements cannot be expected, but should • field spectrometer campaign to build a not be excluded. The potential of thermal data reference spectra database may be determined by case studies based on • Thermal data analysis techniques ASTER image data, more detailed with air- • airborne campaign to simulate future borne thermal image data gathered during a satellite instruments campaign over Olkiluoto. • concerning seasonal impact

Digital imagery has a high potential to the inter- 3. Involve IAEA member states’ support pro- national safeguards of a repository. The Finnish gramme environmental conditions (winter, frequent cloud • Funding cover) limit the use of the optical and thermal • Equipment data. They are, however, the principal information • Expertise source in earth observation domain for the base- • Human resources. line. Radar (SAR) data applications should be developed to ensure all-weather capability in the in- 5.1.2 Environmental sampling ternational safeguards. Airborne imagery should be part of the baseline data but it is not used for 5.1.2.1 General description continuous monitoring purposes. The accumulation of environmental data over a period of several decades may be of great assist- 5.1.1.5 Recommendations for actions ance in assessing the suitability of the land above a repository for alternative land uses. 1. Provide baseline information to the Agency Parameters of potential relevance are: • STUK should provide the baseline data to • meteorology; the Agency (copyright issues should be • hydrology, drainage, water usage, water quali- examined) ty; • Satellite imagery (WGS84) • concentration of radionuclides and other pol- • Aerial imagery lutants in various environmental compart- • Digital elevation model of high resolu- ments including biota, sediments and waters; tion • local ecology; • Digital base map • geomorphological processes, such as denuda- • Digital geological map tion, localized erosion, slope evolution; • Research reports • tectonic activity such as vertical and lateral • Meteorological statistics (monthly earth movement rates, seismic events; cloud cover, snow cover, sun elevation) • geothermal heat flow; • land use in the surrounding region.

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Use of earth observation techniques in the safeguards of a repository with a special reference to the Olkiluoto site.

Optical data, visible Optical data (panchromatic (multi-spectral) Thermal IR Radar (SAR) Hyperspectral Possible & potential Possible & potential Probably possible & Possible in the near Probably possible & potential must be future & seems to potential must be shown have high potential shown Highest resolution Highest resolution May be of high Potential not yet Possibly mineral possible (and possible (and potential but not yet clear, need high due detection of affordable), 10 km affordable), 10 km known to environmental quarried rock radius from radius from (underground conditions. repository, principal repository constructions vs. Resolution data thermal response), presently resolution presently approximately 10– poor 20 meters, will improve to 1–3 meters by end of this decade. Visual analysis, Thematic Operative First research No operative possibly combined classification? instruments? priority instruments? with multi-spectral • Intensity data data (in Finland of • Interferometric particular value data because of • Ground vegetated/non- penetration vegetated surfaces) Application for Application to Research on Research on Research on visual classification thematic possibilities & possibilities & possibilities & classification potential potential potential For every sensor type the specific application/information should be defined later (case study)

5.1.2.2 Site specific use 5.1.3 Radiological monitoring Environmental monitoring has been carried out on the Olkiluoto site for 30 years. In addition, sam- 5.1.3.1 General description pling has been carried out over a 10 km radius. To Radiological monitoring is a key tool that provides date, the principal requirement for this wider sam- assurance to authorities and the local community pling has been to monitor the environmental im- that nuclear facilities are being safely operated. It pact of the two BWR NPPs. is a well understood technology with a large ex- Historic information may be used to character- pert base. In broad terms, radiological monitoring ise the ONKALO site. will be carried out remotely by installed devices or Changes in the baseline data may be deter- other suitable means. mined through the analysis of these sample results. 5.1.3.2 Site specific use Any attempt at re-processing within the reposi- 5.1.2.3 Known limitations of related to site tory will release both particulate and volatile radi- specific use onuclides. Particulate is likely to be contained by The environmental information gathered to date HEPA filters, but detectable amounts of volatile has been focused on demonstrating the impact of isotopes, such as 3H (as a gas or as tritiated water), the two BWR units on the Olkiluoto Island. Envi- 85Kr (gas) and 129I (as an iodide) could escape from ronmental characterisation of the ONKALO site the hot cell and leave the repository in exhaust air may require a different series of samples to be or in wastewater. Small quantities of volatile radi- taken over a different area. It will also be impor- onuclides would also be released if a used fuel tant to gather data throughout the entire year in canister were opened within the repository. order to detect seasonal variations and fluctua- Naturally occurring radionuclides will be en- tions. countered, particularly in granite and clay; ele-

23 STUK- YTO-TR 207 ANNEX 3 EXPERT GROUP ON APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS IN GEOLOGICAL REPOSITORIES ments in the 238U and also 40K decay chains are Current passive monitoring includes the tem- common. While analysis can clearly identify these porary installation of short period seismometers. naturally occurring radionuclides, it would be wise For evaluation purposes three stations have been to establish a baseline. Radium-226 decays to installed on the surface and a fourth one is to be radon gas, an alpha emitter (half-life 3.825 days), installed shortly. Six others have been installed by which is commonly encountered in mines, and also the Operator (Posiva). Raw data is logged at the at the present Olkiluoto underground facilities. seismometer stations; there is no central logging New excavation can lead to a significant release of or source location. The objective is to gather data radon. Any radon anomaly would be associated on local noise patterns, which is known to include with new excavation possibly an illegal one. Typi- noise from turbines and generators, wave noise cal radon levels and behaviour should be estab- from the sea and breaking ice during the winter. lished. Spectral analysis is currently carried out on the Observations of radionuclides in the air and data. Future data of interest will be noise from water should start as soon as possible during the borehole coring and drilling during excavation. It development of the facility. While high background is believed that these signals can be selected by from natural and manmade radionuclides is not using suitable filters. expected, early observations will ensure that any The data currently being collected is useful, but trends in background levels are well understood in the future we will need to focus on data needed and future anomalies can be addressed quickly. to demonstrate the effectiveness (or non-effective- Good knowledge of underground water movement ness) of a system intended to detect drilling activi- would help in identifying critical sampling points, ty in progress. This may be more effectively car- for this reason knowledge of hydrology is impor- ried out using higher frequencies such as those tant. used by micro-seismic monitoring. It is recom- Environmental sampling for radionuclides will mended that higher frequency seismometer equip- likely be carried out to provide a baseline for ment be installed prior to the excavation of the safety purposes. Reports on the analysis of water exploratory shaft/tunnel. The information collect- and soil samples collected during the site selec- ed on signal characteristics and attenuation in the tion/characterization phase should be provided as host rock would be invaluable in evaluating any baseline data. Since excavation will disturb the proposed future passive monitoring system. ground water circulation, the baseline will need to In a further step, the source location capability be updated during development. of such a monitoring system should be investigat- Instrumentation for the detection of low levels ed, because this capability will be vital, if there is of 3H (as a gas or as tritiated water), 85Kr (gas) and a need to distinguish legal from illegal activities 129I (as an iodide) in the exhaust air stream should during the operational phase. The use of seismic be identified or developed. arrays to determine the location of the seismic or acoustic activity (with respect to direction, depth, 5.2.4 Geophysical monitoring and distance) should also be evaluated as these techniques will permit identification and tracking 5.2.4.1 Passive seismic of activities in the zones of interest. Passive seismic monitoring is carried out at various frequencies. Short period (0–50 Hz) seismic 5.2.4.2 Active seismic monitoring is often carried out by national author- Various active seismic methods could in theory be ities to monitor natural seismicity. Micro-seismic used to image the sub-surface. It is the opinion of monitoring (1–100’s of Hz) is used to monitor rock the experts that this method would not be capable stress during intensive mining. of sufficient resolution at the depth being consid- Micro-seismic monitoring is a likely method for ered for the repository to be capable of detecting the detection of illegal excavation. If this capabili- undeclared tunnelling or cavities. It is of value in ty is required by the Agency, its suitability for the determining geological details of the site to be de- proposed environment will need to be demonstrat- veloped and will be used by the operator for that ed. purpose. It will contribute to geological map of the

24 ANNEX 3 EXPERT GROUP ON APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS IN GEOLOGICAL REPOSITORIES STUK- YTO-TR 207 sub-surface that will assist the Agency with its site evaluation to determine conductivity at depth, general knowledge of the facility. which in turn can be used to assist in the develop- Reflection seismic surveying, which directly ment of a hydrological model for the repository. produces profiles of the sub-surface is not an Although electromagnetic/electrical techniques effective technique due to the rocky and uneven could be used for detecting both non-conducting overburden, which provides poor acoustic cou- areas such as tunnels and conductors such as rails pling. Vertical Seismic Profiling (VSP) is being and electrical wires these techniques are not carried out using boreholes. This data is being thought to be practical for safeguards purposes. used to establish detailed geological knowledge of Acquisition of electromagnetic or electrical data proposed repository volume, which is of interest to for safeguards purposes alone is not requested. Its the Agency. contribution to the development of hydrology map- ping is of value to the IAEA as a contribution to its 5.2.4.3 Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR) general knowledge of the site. Under favourable conditions, Ground Penetrating Passive electromagnetic techniques should be Radar (GPR) will detect cavities within a short evaluated to determine the capability to detect distance of a rock face. The potential role for GPR signals from electromagnetic sources (e.g., motors, is in design information verification (DIV), in par- electrical wiring, etc.) located at depths. However, ticular revealing undeclared cavities or tunnels. these methods will also be affected by the conduc- (For this purpose, it is proposed that it should tivity of the host geology. have a demonstrated ability to detect a 2 metre cubic void at 5 metres behind a rock face.) It 5.2.4.5 Recommendations should be noted that GPR performance will de- Initial baseline from geophysical data: pend on the physical properties of the host rock Collection of passive seismic data should be and the radar frequencies used. extended by micro-seismic data. Report submitted GPR data collected during site evaluation and should include a review of findings on noise sourc- construction (using boreholes and tunnels) could es, their characteristics and any information on be used both to show the potential for the detec- acoustic propagation in host rock. tion of undeclared voids in different parts of the Recommendations for evaluation of geological future repository and to provide confidence that conditions from geophysical data: no undeclared voids are in the vicinity. A GPR • Collection of passive seismic data should be baseline for the whole of the repository may not be extended to include micro-seismic data. Report needed, since the reference is the declared reposi- submitted should include a review of findings on tory design. noise sources, their characteristics and any in- Some GPR data has been collected from bore- formation on acoustic propagation in host rock. holes. This data is of value since it may be used to • Seismic arrays should be tested to determine demonstrate the performance of GPR in the host their ability to identify the location of a seismic rock. There will be particular interest in its per- or acoustic source in the Olkiluoto environ- formance at repository depth. It is anticipated ment. (These techniques have been tested in that salinity of the rock will increase and perform- the Yucca Mountain environment.) ance/range of GPR will decrease. Opportunities to • A geological map of the volume to be occupied make further determinations of the effectiveness by the repository of GPR (for the detection of voids) should also be • A hydrological map of the volume to be occu- exploited when the exploration tunnel has been pied by the repository. Electrical conductivity excavated. The data should be compiled in a report map if available. to the IAEA. • Report on GPR should include a review of effective range particularly at the planned re- 5.2.4.4 Electromagnetic and electrical pository depth. There are a variety of methods for measuring the • Studies on passive EM to determine ability to electrical properties of the sub-surface. Electro- detect EM signals generated from electrical magnetic and electrical methods may be used in devices at repository depths.

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5.2.5 Hydrogeologic monitoring sources that has been published or is otherwise available for access by the general public and com- 5.2.5.1 General description munity. At one extreme the open source informa- The geosphere surrounding a repository will re- tion can include technical reports produced by ex- spond in a number of different ways to the pres- perts and made available through thesis, confer- ence of the repository, e.g. hydraulically, chemical- ence presentations or web-sites to telephone direc- ly. Relevant measurable parameters are tempera- tories identifying local companies and their capa- ture, groundwater chemistry, groundwater pres- bilities. sure, solute chemistry and mineralogy. These pa- Open source literature can be used to gain a rameters will often be measurable using boreholes better understanding of the State or local commu- drilled during the site characterisation and under- nity technical expertise and competence. ground investigation phases. Many mineralogical changes in response to repository ventilation are 5.3 The contents of the baseline likely to be confined to the immediate vicinity of information report the repository. Of particular interest are changes to the hy- 5.3.1 Baseline report structure draulic and mechanical behaviour of rock struc- This section provides some suggestions on the con- tures that may have a direct bearing on the long- tents of the Baseline Information Report. The re- term performance of the isolation system e.g. the port should be structured and contain sufficient connectivity of major water conducting fractures. detail to enable a reader with a reasonable under- Again, investigation of these features is likely to standing of the concept to gain an understanding be by boreholes drilled during the site characteri- of the proposed facility, its impact on the environ- sation and underground investigation phases. ment and the interrelationships of the four compo- For repositories in the saturated zone, ground- nents of the system. water flow will be towards the repository while It is expected that the report will contain a the repository remains open. However, following limited amount of data for the reasons expressed repository resaturation (or perhaps resaturation above (in relation to the need to develop under- of part of the repository) groundwater will flow standing in order to gain knowledge). However, through the repository back into the geosphere. the report will reference out to the considerable This will produce geochemical changes in the wealth of data and information that has been geosphere. For some repository concepts e.g. those gathered on the site and the proposed facility over that make extensive use of cement, the changes many years. may be profound. For convenience, the descriptive part of the Monitoring of these effects may be difficult, in Baseline Report will be structured such that it part because of problems of access to the affected contains the following: rocks, but mostly because the monitoring times- • Description of system component; cales are likely to extend into the post-closure • Source and prominence of data; period. Nonetheless, these issues may be relevant, • Limitations in the current knowledge; both to model testing and to a societal decision to • Planned enhancements to the current knowl- close a repository. edge base; • Relationships to other system components; 5.2.5.2 Site specific use • Identification of technical development; Monitoring of local groundwater flow has been un- • Safeguards relevance of the information. dertaken by the operator. The following section provides some suggestions 5.2.6 Open source information concerning the type of information to be provided The term Open Source Information is used to de- for each system component. scribe information available from a wide range of

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5.3.2 Human activities • Facility flowsheet • Centres of population • Facility throughput • Industrial activities • Shift patterns • Recreational activities • Lifetimes • Movement (i.e. commuting). • Verification Methods • Entity identification 5.3.3 The environment • Emplacement philosophy The report should provide a reasonably detailed • Monitoring proposals description of the proposed site in as much detail • Retrievability philosophy as possible. It is unnecessary, however, for the re- • Closure proposals port to contain measurement or monitoring data • Extent and Detail of Project Plans as much of this would require interpretation. It • Ownership and Location of Project Plans may be advantageous to describe the surface of • Project Plan Change Control the site, the near surface and sub-surface features. • Key Events and Timings. Meteorological conditions (seasonal variations) • Flora 5.3.5 Institutional controls • Fauna • Relevant laws • Rare breeds. • Relevant treaties • Regulations 5.3.4 The proposed facility • Organisational structures • Purpose of the facility • Roles and responsibilities • Method of construction • Security measures. • Management and planning of construction activities 5.3.6 System Component Relationships • Testing and commissioning activities Controls • Ownership and operation of the facility Triggers • Principal components of the facility (e.g. re- Monitoring of relationships. ceipts railhead, verification facility, encapsulation plant, transfer facility, repository)

27 STUK- YTO-TR 207 ANNEX 3 EXPERT GROUP ON APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS IN GEOLOGICAL REPOSITORIES

ANNEX 4 REPORT OF THE MEASUREMENTS WORKING GROUP

SAGOR II: WG on “Requirements for nuclear materials characterization process if veri- Nuclear Material Characterization” fication decisions get delayed down at IAEA Head- Composition of working group: quarters. It was suggested that this could be Tapani Honkamaa, STUK avoided if inspectors could make final verification Yousry Abushady, IAEA without having to defer to IAEA Headquarters, or John Rowat, IAEA if alternative verification arrangements could be Käthe Sarparanta, TVO developed. Any reverification after emplacement Per H Grahn, SKB of assemblies in copper casks is regarded as highly Antero Tiitta, VTT undesirable. IAEA remarked that alternative procedures for verification will likely be in place in 15 Spent fuel pins (not assemblies) are the target for years time. safeguards verification. IAEA current requirement is verification at partial defect level. Such technol- Answers to major questions: ogy does not still exist. “Advanced” methods, like 1) Why verify? Material going into final dispos- tomography, would permit verification even at the al cannot be re-verified. Comprehensive verifica- pin level. tion of the fuel assemblies on the partial defect In the interim storage phase it is expected that level has not been performed so far and this is the technical means to detect partial defects will be last chance to do so. developed. Present methods for verification – 2) What to verify? Spent fuel will be verified CVDs and FORK – do not detect partial defects. with best possible method applicable. Pin level Advanced verification is also not performed, be- verification is also possible. Partial defect meas- cause such a possibility does not exist. urement is a requirement by the Agency criteria. Nuclear materials characterization is a R&D Such a method is not yet available. priority. Fifteen years may not be a lot of time to 3) When to verify? Verification should be made develop and implement advanced characterization as soon as characterization methods permit detec- methods. Some facility design decisions may de- tion of partial defects. However, reverification pend upon methods/processes used for nuclear would likely be required at time of transfer to material characterization. encapsulation plant. Posiva’s plans for operating the encapsulation 4) Where to verify? At the interim store (wet plant and the repository are based on “just-on- store) – although a discussion of alternatives was time delivery” concept that is common in manufac- not undertaken. turing industry. The Finnish concept for safe- 5) How to verify? Best applicable method guarding the encapsulation process (Rautjärvi et should be used. The tomographic method deal., 2002) is adapted to this operational concept. scribed at this meeting appears to be promising. The concept requires that a buffer store area be Further development of tomographic method is to created for temporary storage of about 100 assem- be encouraged. Also other methods should be de- blies at interim storages. The efficiency of trans- veloped. We should not bind ourselves into a fers to encapsulation plant could be affected by specific technology.

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Recommendations: od should be found where the equipment provides Measurement technology should be developed. To- on-site analysis of fuel assemblies. With respect to mography seems to be a very promising method Finland, the measurement should permit flexible for partial defects determination in spent fuel as- and efficient management through facilitating semblies. Other NDA methods (e.g. enhanced characterization of the spent fuel in the interim FORK detector) also need to be investigated to wet store. The present characterization scheme in perform similar partial defects measurements. Finland is in accord with this recommendation. Current safeguards criteria require partial defect When partial defect detection equipment be- verification of spent fuel assemblies before placing comes available it is recommended that this equip- them in difficult-to-access areas or no access areas ment be put into service immediately in interim (as is the case for final disposal of spent fuel). stores. It is recommended that the calorimetric IAEA in collaboration with MSSPs is encouraged calibration for radiometric determination of decay to develop verification methods to the pin level. heat, deemed necessary for safety reasons, should The development objective is to find a method be accomplished shortly before the start of the where the equipment provides on-site analysis of disposal activity as at that time the most reliable measurements to permit inspectors to draw con- calibration could be achieved. clusions without undue delays. Therefore, a meth-