Conditional Consociationalism: Electoral Systems and Grand Coalitions∗ Nils-Christian Bormanny March 25, 2011 Abstract Consociationalism is a complex set of rules and norms that is sup- posed to enable democratic governance and peaceful coexistence of different social segments in plural societies. Statistical studies of con- flict often reduce it to either a PR or federalism dummy in a regression. I extract the core definition of consociationalism from Lijphart's writ- ing and explicitly link its institutional and behavioral dimensions. I also address the possible endogeneity of electoral systems and show that once endogeneity is accounted for PR has a positive effect on eth- nic elite cooperation although historical, socio-structural and interna- tional factors exert a more robust influence. A history of violence in a country seems to antagonize elites and hinder cooperation. ∗Paper to be presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions workshop on Political Violence and Institutions from 12-17 April in St. Gallen, Switzerland. I thank Manuel Vogt and Julian Wucherpfennig for helpful discussion and comments. yCenter of Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich, Switzerland. Email:
[email protected] 1 1 Introduction Was Lijphart (1977, 238) correct in pronouncing that \[f]or many of the plural societies of the non-Western world (. ) the realistic choice is not between the British normative model of democracy and the consociational model, but between consociational democracy and no democracy at all?" The appraisal of the alleged blessings of consociationalism has been incom- plete and/or hotly disputed. Most studies focus on the application to single cases, and large-N studies have only gained systematic insight at the expense of conceptual clarity.