Orthographic Odds and Ends Content Vs. Meaning, and Metaphor Vs
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Orthographic Odds and Ends Content vs. Meaning, and Metaphor vs. Metonymy: Content and Meaning; Iser, Rosenblatt.wpd Content vs Meaning Lamarck, Ryle, Kauffman.wpd Content, Meaning – and the Passionate Coefficient.wpd Metaphor and metonymy a la Freud and Lacan.wpd Metaphor and metonymy and their frustrations.wpd Metaphor and metonymy via Jakobson, Frazer, Lacan.wpd Metonymy & metaphor_LeviStrauss, Aristotle, associationism.wpd Metonymy metaphor and the number system.wpd Ricoeur re content and meaning.wpd Searle on metaphoric and literal meaning.wpd Linguistic Evolution Contents: Center and periphery in language.wpd Chronotypes, Notes and Drafts.wpd Darwin on the evolution of language.wpd Examples of French Lemon Rule at Work.wpd Global vs local rules; evolutionary recycling; syntax.wpd Kauffman_evolution, new niches, attractors, lexical evolution.wpd Lakoff’s Radial Categories, changing content, polysemy, cognation.wpd Latin words with the sense “4" & their descendants.wpd Margulis, symbiosis, symbiogenesis, compounding.wpd Mayr on variation, selection, genotype, phenotype.wpd On speciation & extinction.wpd Orthographic evolution, high vs popular culture, chreodes.wpd Searle on consciousness, intention, evolution.wpd Searle on intentionality.wpd Smith and Szathmáry on biological and linguistic evolution.wpd Things lost and gained as old forms change to new.wpd Thoughts on the Emergence of Orthographic Codes.wpd Wilson’s Consilience and the emergence of attractors.wpd Explication Explication; processes vs procedures.wpd Fess1 Nuclear Paradigm, Simplicities, Articulation.wpd Gestalt and Relations.wpd Lakoff’s Radial Categories & Explication.wpd Ralph Emerson_On his article & syllables; explication.wpd Syntax, arbitrariness, motivation, deep processing.wpd A whole lot on the suffixes spelled ly.wpd Concerning the proposed suffix eon] as in surgeon.wpd Final ‘le’ vs ‘el’.wpd On Affix Strings in Lexis.wpd The endings ex, ices, ix, ax.wpd The family arc, arch.wpd To and From Ruthie Nathan From Ruthie_Applying CommonWords for BookHead Ed.wpd Ruthie_On Spelling Bees.wpd Ruthie_Applying CommonWords for BookHeadEd.wpd Ruthie_Assumptions Behind the Basic Speller.doc Ruthie_ The Basic Speller & a California Dean of Education.wpd Ruthie_Doubling vs twinning; derivational constancy.wpd Ruthie_Hirsch and Teaching Metonymy Metaphor.wpd Ruthie_More Uses for CommonWords.wpd Ruthie_On Two Spelling Texts and Readiness in General.wpd Ruthie_Orthography as a Discipline; Arbitrariness, Alienation.wpd Ruthie_syllable juncture vs derivational constancy and strings.wpd Ruthie_Syllables vs elements.wpd Ruthie_Teaching Critical Thinking Philologically.wpd Ruthie_Uses for CommonWords.wpd Miscellaneous A Lot About gh.wpd Cassirer on Symbolic Expression.wpd How CommonWords got written.wpd Misspelling and correct spellings in a letter from Carly.wpd Old rhetorical names and terms.wpd On Spelling the Names of Really Big Numbers.wpd Piaget & Bruner on learning and structure.wpd To Civilize our New Teachers.wpd Earliest Etruscan alphabet.wpd Teaching English Spelling to Spanish Speaking Students.wpd Content and Meaning; Iser, Rosenblatt.wpd From Trish Goedecke’s E587 paper (p. 7): “Iser argues that the true location of a literary work is neither in the text nor in the reader, but in a dynamic in-between. He names the two poles of this position as the artistic, referring to the text which is created by the author, and the esthetic, which is the text’s realization, accomplished by the reader. Rosenblatt similarly contends that a literary work exists somewhere between the text and the reader. She posits that: ‘The poem’ comes into being in the live circuit set up between the reader and ‘the text. Not the words, as uttered sounds or inked marks on a page, constitute the poem, but the structured responses to them. (The Reader, the Text, the Poem, 14)” I believe that what Trish calls Iser’s ‘dynamic in-between’ and Rosenblatt’s ‘live circuit’ are different ways of conceptualizing what I am calling the edge of chaos between content and meaning, between order and potential chaos. Rosenblatt (p. 12) talks about ‘the magnetism of the ordered symbols of the text’ interacting with the ‘stuff of memory, thought, and feeling’ to form a new order. ************ Metaphor as inter-categorial vs. metonymy as intra-categorial. Just another way of setting up the synthesis-analysis distinction. Content vs Meaning Lamarck, Ryle, Kauffman.wpd @10-18-95. Lamarck found that “Organisms could best be understood...in terms of their interaction with and adaptation to the environment” (Jordanova 1 [I have lost this reference]). That is also obviously true of a lexical system as well, and that is precisely why the failure to maintain the content-meaning distinction causes problems: By speaking, loosely and generically, of ‘meaning’ one obscures the important dynamic with the environment. The pragmatic world of user, intention, and reference is part of the environment of the code. To fail to maintain the content-meaning distinction is to confuse the distinction between the lexical system and its environment and thus to ignore the dynamic between system and environment. Is the pragmatic environment part of the system or part of the environment? Previously I’ve spoken as if it’s part of the system. Now I am speaking of it as part of the environment. There is a hierarchical perspective at work here: It all depends on the level of description. At one level, that in which the lexical code is the focus, the phenomenological pragmatic realm is the environment. At the next higher level the two merge into a single focus (call it the lexical phenomenological) and the environment is defined by the next horizon out: let’s say it is the horizon of bio-chemical and bio-physical interactions that underlie the realm of the phenomenological pragmatic. As one continues to move out to wider horizons, one finally arrives at the cosmic-quantum realm as environment. 10-23-95. Ryle’s Category-mistakes and the Content-Meaning Distinction. Ryle describes a category-mistake as something that “is entirely false, and false not in detail but in principle. It is not merely an assemblage of particular mistakes. It is one big mistake and a mistake of a special kind” (16). He says further that category-mistakes are “made by people who [do] not know how to wield” certain key concepts. “Their puzzles arose from inability to use certain items in the English vocabulary” (17). And later, “The theoretically interesting category-mistakes are those made by people who are perfectly competent to apply concepts, at least in the situation with which they are familiar, but are still liable in their abstract thinking to allocate those concepts to logical types to which they do not belong” (17). The parallels with the content-meaning distinction are striking. For instance, at one point Ryle says, “Doing long division is a mental process and so is making a joke. But I am saying that the phrase ‘there occur physical processes’ does not mean the same sort of thing as ‘there occur mental processes’, and, therefore, that it makes no sense to conjoin or disjoin the two” (22). In parallel couldn’t we say something like, “Texts are symbolic structures and products and human meanings are symbolic structures and products. But the phrase ‘humans have meanings’ does not mean the same sort of thing as ‘texts have meanings’, and therefore it makes no sense to conjoin or disjoin the two by talking about the meanings of texts and the meanings that humans have or create.” Ryle’s first three examples of category-mistakes seem to be category-mistakes based on metonymic errors: To treat the university as a parallel counterpart to the constituent departments and colleges would appear to be a failure of inclusion — that is, an error of synecdoche, or metonymy: confusing the whole for one of its parts. The same would seem to be true of the parade example in which the overarching division is mistaken as a parallel counterpart to its constituent squadrons and battalions. The third example, dealing with the mistake of looking for the person on the cricket team responsible for team spirit is also a error of metonymic relations: in this case confusing an emergent global attribute with the constituents of the whole out of which emerges and which it characterizes. His fourth example does not seem to me to involve an error in metonymic thinking; it seems rather to involve an error of metaphor — that is, forcing a similarity in such a way that a third thing (the British Constitution) is categorized with two others that are of an entirely different type (Parliament and the Church of England). It is a error of similarity, or perhaps more accurately a failure to recognize a crucial difference. In either case, positively or negatively, it seems to me to be an error of metaphoric thinking. In this respect his fourth example is the most like the category-mistake involved in the failure to maintain the content-meaning distinction, in which two entirely different types of things get categorized under the overarching rubric “meaning.” The parallel between Ryle’s fourth example and the content-meaning distinction is striking, too, because in each case the two things being collapsed actually have a relationship of mutual effect and determination, or perhaps as Haken would say, mutual enslavement: It would seem that Parliament and the Church of England are, on one hand, affected in their operation and nature by the British Constitution, but the Constitution is itself the residue of past actions by the Parliament and Church (I think). So the relationship here is exactly that existing between content and meaning. 10-29-95. Kauffman argues that Darwinian selection works on the natural “order for free” that he sees operating in all sufficiently complex systems. If we assume that the orthography is such a system, then we have three factors with which to deal: (1) There is the natural “order for free.” (2) There is the role of selection, though in this case it is more Lamarckian than Darwinian.