DOCSLIB.ORG

Dynamic Development of Action, Thought, and Emotion

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Dynamic Development of Action, Thought, and Emotion dam1_c07.qxd 12/22/05 12:01 PM Page 313 CHAPTER 7 Dynamic Development of Action and Thought KURT W. FISCHER and THOMAS R. BIDELL DYNAMIC STRUCTURALISM 314 Starting in the Middle of Things: Implications Variability in the Middle of Things: An Example of for Design 348 Representing Social Interactions 315 Guidelines for Developmental Research 349 Dynamic Nature of Psychological Structure 317 Building and Testing Models of Growth Dynamic Structure in Living Systems 318 and Development 356 Variat ion and Order in Development: The BUILDING STRUCTURES: TRANSITION Constructive Web 319 MECHANISMS, MICRODEVELOPMENT, AND DYNAMIC STRUCTURE IN COGNITIVE AND NEW KNOWLEDGE 363 EMOTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 320 Relations between Micro- and Macrodevelopment 363 Psychological Structure as Dynamic Skill 321 Construction Processes: From Micro to Macro 364 Building a Constructive Web for Positive and Negative EMOTIONS AND THE DYNAMIC ORGANIZATION Social Interactions 325 OF ACTIVITY AND DEVELOPMENT 370 How Dynamic Skills Explain Variability Emotion and Cognition Together 370 in Development 329 Organizing Effects of Emotions 372 THE CRISIS OF VARIABILITY AND THE Emotionally Organized Development 376 CARTESIAN SYNTHESIS IN JOINING NATURE AND NURTURE: GROWTH DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE 336 CYCLES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL AND The Cartesian Dualist Framework 337 BRAIN ACTIVITY 382 The Tacit Modern Synthesis in Psychology: Nativism and Epigenesis of Action, Feeling, Thought, and Brain 382 Empiricism Together 338 Principles for Understanding Growth Patterns of Brain The Structure-as-Form Paradigm 340 and Behavior 383 The Stage Debate and the Discovery of Variability in Cycles of Reorganization in Development 385 Cognitive Development 341 CONCLUSION: DYNAMICS OF STABILITY AND Explaining Variability versus Explaining It Away 342 VA RIABILITY IN DEVELOPMENT 388 The Constructivist Alternative 346 REFERENCES 390 METHODOLOGY OF DYNAMIC STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 347 Human activity is both organized and variable, dynami- wealth of evidence on the constructive, self-regulating, cally changing in principled ways. Children and adults and culturally contextualized nature of human psycholog- are flexible and inventive in their action and thought, ical processes. If psychological function—the way people adapting old ideas to new situations and inventing con- act—is constructive, dynamic, and culturally embedded, cepts, formulating plans, and constructing hypotheses then psychological structure—the organization or pattern while participating in a wide variety of cultural prac- of activities—is equally so. Yet remarkably, the most tices. Few developmentalists today would disagree, as, for widely used conceptions of psychological structure and half a century, psychologists have been accumulating a its development do not reflect this dynamic, constructive, and contextualized picture of psychological processes. The opposite is true: The major models of development Preparation of this chapter was supported by grants from Ms. describe psychological structure in static, formal terms. and Mrs. Frederick P. Rose and the Harvard Graduate School Concepts like universal stages, innate linguistic modules, of Education. and innate cognitive competencies portray psychological 313 dam1_c07.qxd 12/22/05 12:01 PM Page 314 314 Dynamic Development of Action and Thought organization as fixed and unchanging, insulated from structure. Tools from dynamic systems analysis pro- variation in context and feedback from activity. vide ways of embracing the variability to find the order The hallmark of the dynamic nature of human behav- in it. ior is its pervasive variability: People act differently in With this chapter, we present a framework for con- different situations, with different people, in different ceptualizing psychological structure in dynamic sys- emotional states. Faced with the large and growing cor- tems constructed by human agents. We show how pus of research evidence for variability in activity and this model describes and explains patterns of develop- development, researchers guided by static models have mental variability in terms of the structures human be- been continually surprised to find that children’s ings build. The chapter begins with an introductory performance is nowhere near as stable as the static con- overview of dynamic structuralism as a general ap- ceptions predict. A child who can solve an arithmetic proach to development, elaborating a theoretical model problem (or a social problem) one day or in one situation of psychological structure as the dynamic organization frequently cannot solve the same problem the next day or of self-constructed, socially embedded skills and ac- in a different but apparently similar situation. Different tivities (actions and thoughts). We contrast this posi- children of precisely the same age often cannot perform tion with traditional static views of psychological the same cognitive tasks—sometimes in relation to cul- structure, which dominate scientific dialogue in what tural contexts or family environment, sometimes for rea- amounts to a modern synthesis of traditionally opposed sons that are harder to explain. Even from moment to viewpoints of nativism and empiricism. These static moment, a person performs a task differently as she or views derive from reductionist scientific theory inher- he adapts to variations in the situation, social context, or ited from the Cartesian tradition in philosophy, which emotions of self and others. Indeed, when the data of leads to systematic misunderstanding of the nature of cognitive developmental research is taken as a whole, psychological structure and blatant failures to explain variability in the level of psychological performance is the extent of developmental variability. the norm, not the exception. The dynamic framework and research tools specifi- The task of developmental science is to detect and de- cally crafted for analyzing development and learning scribe patterns in this variability and to propose models provide a research methodology for the study of psycho- to account for data patterns that reflect both stability logical structures including both their variability and and variability. We show how the concepts and methods the order in the variation. These concepts and tools of dynamic structural analysis provide a framework and apply to both long-term development and short-term mi- tools for analyzing this variability and detecting the crodevelopmental variations in the building of dynamic order in it—key findings such as the emergence of qual- structures, providing powerful methods for testing dy- itatively new cognitive abilities or the transitions from namic hypotheses about variation, change, and stability. one behavior to another. Broad in scope and applicability, the dynamic structural In our view, performances vary so greatly because model and methodology elucidate relations between psychological structure is not static but naturally pro- cognitive, social, emotional, and neurological develop- duces variability in activity and development arising ment—which all work together in the activities of from people’s constructive self-organization of their human beings in all their rich complexity. own psychological structures in relation to situations, other people, meaning systems, and their own bodies. DYNAMIC STRUCTURALISM Far from being a problem, patterns of developmental variability are the key to understanding the organiza- One reason psychological structure has so often been tion of these dynamic systems and the constructive treated as static is that theorists have confounded struc- processes by which human agents create new interrela- ture with form. Structure refers to the system of relations tions and thus new structures. The complexity of these (Piaget, 1970) by which complex entities such as biologi- systems is not something to be controlled for but to be cal organisms and psychological activities are organized. described and understood. The patterns of variability Thereare systematic relations, for instance, between the that arise from the particular ways in which cognitive nervoussystemand the cardiovascular system such that systems are organized are the key to understanding that each supports and responds to the other. The relations organization and thus to understanding psychological between these systems are in a constant balance or equi- dam1_c07.qxd 12/22/05 12:01 PM Page 315 Dynamic Structuralism 315 librium, which can only be maintained by constant activ- formal conceptions of structure in the face of ever grow- ity onthepart of each subsystem. Thus, systems of rela- ing evidence of variability in cognitive performance has tions—structures—are necessarily dynamic. led developmental theorists into pointless arguments Form is an abstraction from structure—a fixed pat- over, for example, which of many varying performances tern that can be detected in a dynamic structure. An or- represent an individual’s “real” logical ability, or at ange has cellular and tissue-level structure, which lead what age children “really” acquire a concept like object to its cohesion in a spherical shape. The structure of the permanence. We demonstrate later how the confounding orange is dynamic, emerging developmentally, maintain- of form with structure has led to an explanatory crisis in ing a dynamic equilibrium for a time, and then decaying. developmental science with ever more tortured attempts The concept of sphere, on the other hand, is an abstract to explain the pervasive evidence of variability
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Inflated Praise Leads Socially Anxious Children to Blush
    UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository) When gushing leads to blushing: Inflated praise leads socially anxious children to blush Nikolić , M.; Brummelman, E.; Colonnesi, C.; de Vente, W.; Bögels, S.M. DOI 10.1016/j.brat.2018.04.003 Publication date 2018 Document Version Final published version Published in Behaviour Research and Therapy Link to publication Citation for published version (APA): Nikolić , M., Brummelman, E., Colonnesi, C., de Vente, W., & Bögels, S. M. (2018). When gushing leads to blushing: Inflated praise leads socially anxious children to blush. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 106, 1-7. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brat.2018.04.003 General rights It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons). Disclaimer/Complaints regulations If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: https://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible. UvA-DARE is a service provided by the library of the University of Amsterdam (https://dare.uva.nl) Download date:24 Sep 2021 Behaviour Research and Therapy 106 (2018) 1–7 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Behaviour Research and Therapy journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/brat When gushing leads to blushing: Inflated praise leads socially anxious T children to blush ∗ Milica Nikolića, , Eddie Brummelmana,b, Cristina Colonnesia, Wieke de Ventea, Susan M.
    [Show full text]
  • Historical Thinking As a Tool for Theoretical Psychology on Objectivity Thomas Teo
    Part II Historical Approaches 9 Historical Thinking as a Tool for Theoretical Psychology On Objectivity Thomas Teo In this chapter, I discuss the relevance of historical thinking for theoretical and philosophical psychology. In particular, I am interested in how historical thought styles (Fleck 1979) can be used as tools for theoretical psychology. In the follow­ ing reconstructions, five approaches of historical thinking that contribute to an understanding of psychological problems are discussed: history of science, history of the present, history as reconstruction, history of the politics of difference, and historical psychology. I use the concept of objectivity as an example to demonstrate the relevance of these approaches to theoretical psychology. It should be mentioned that the relationship between the history of psychology, which may incorporate some of the above‐mentioned thought styles, and the theory of psychology, is a complicated one (Teo 2013). The term historical thinking encompasses more approaches than the subdiscipline of the history of psychology. I suggest that temporality and professional histories are not sufficient to theoretical thinking in psychology and that professional history, as important as it is, is only one element in the discussion of temporality. Rather, I recommend that theoretical psychologists should include various historical thought styles in their endeavors as they were developed by historians as well as philosophers, social scientists, and psychologists, many of whom have engaged in critical approaches to the problem. History of Science Histories of science are sometimes presented by trained historians, but also by scientists‐turned‐historians. In this thought style, history has primacy but there are often theoretical implications that have major consequences for various The Wiley Handbook of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology: Methods, Approaches, and New Directions for Social Sciences, First Edition.
    [Show full text]
  • Stephen Pepper's World Hypotheses: Season 1, Episode 1 Welcome To
    Stephen Pepper’s World Hypotheses: Season 1, Episode 1 Welcome to the first episode of the Stephen Pepper thread. The focus of this post is World Hypotheses, Chapters 1-4. My reflections today are largely confined to definitional matters, but I also hope to set the stage for an examination (in my next post) of Pepper’s “root metaphor” theory. Perhaps the clearest path into Pepper’s thought is to consider the place where most of us began our intellectual journey: common sense. For Pepper, common sense includes “the sorts of things we think of when we ordinarily read the papers…or the sort of things we see and hear and smell and feel as we walK along the street or in the country…” (p. 39). Pepper considers common sense as a loose synonym for Plato’s notion of “opinion” (p. 39). I’m also reminded of the “natural attitude” described by phenomenologists. For Pepper, the world of common sense can be characterized as “secure” in the sense that it is “never lacking” – i.e., we can always fall back on it: • “No cognition can sink lower than common sense, for when we completely give up trying to Know anything, then is precisely when we Know things in the common-sense way. In that lies the security of common sense” (p. 43). But, in spite of its security, common sense is also “cognitively irritable”: • “The materials of common sense are changing, unchanging, contradictory, vague, rigid, muddled, melodramatically clear, unorganized, rationalized, dogmatic, shrewdly dubious, recKlessly dubious, piously felt, playfully enjoyed, and so forth.
    [Show full text]
  • Chapter 11: Behaviorism
    Chapter 11: Behaviorism Megan Davis, Nicole Pelley and Stephanie Quinlan Behaviorism (1892-1956) ● Psychology has been the study of the mind since the Greeks ○ The definition of the mind has been debated extensively ○ 20th century: Shift from what the mind was to what it did ■ Mind causes behavior ● New field of research ○ Psychology was redefined with help from animal psychology ○ People started believing humans evolved from animal forms ○ Had to rethink Descartes’ definition of the mind New Directions in Animal Psychology New Directions in Animal Psychology Animal psychology as Romanes begun it, used 2 methods: 1. Anecdotal Method → Collect data 2. Method of Inference → Interpret data Close examination in late 19th, early 20th century. Anecdote → Experiment From Anecdote to Experiment ● Experiment replaced anecdotes and informal, naturalistic experiments ● Aim of animal psychology - produce natural science and anecdote not the path to science ● Two important research programs: ○ Thorndike ○ Pavlov From Anecdote to Experiment Edward Lee Thorndike (1874-1949): ● Initially wanted to study children ● Not many readily available, took up animals ● Studied with William James ● Developed “connectionism” ○ Methodological and theoretical approach to animal learning ○ Formulation of an S-R psychology he called “connectionism” ○ Anecdotal method overestimated animal intelligence From Anecdote to Experiment Thorndike’s Puzzle Boxes ● Trap cat inside box ● Each box opened by cat in different way ● Rewarded with salmon for escaping ○ Ex. of instrumental
    [Show full text]
  • Understanding and Sharing Intentions: the Origins of Cultural Cognition
    BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2005) 28, 000–000 Printed in the United States of America Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition Michael Tomasello, Malinda Carpenter, Josep Call, Tanya Behne, and Henrike Moll Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, D-04103 Leipzig, Germany [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Abstract: We propose that the crucial difference between human cognition and that of other species is the ability to participate with others in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality. Participation in such activities requires not only especially powerful forms of intention reading and cultural learning, but also a unique motivation to share psychological states with oth- ers and unique forms of cognitive representation for doing so. The result of participating in these activities is species-unique forms of cultural cognition and evolution, enabling everything from the creation and use of linguistic symbols to the construction of social norms and individual beliefs to the establishment of social institutions. In support of this proposal we argue and present evidence that great apes (and some children with autism) understand the basics of intentional action, but they still do not participate in activities involving joint intentions and attention (shared intentionality). Human children’s skills of shared intentionality develop gradually during the first 14 months of life as two ontogenetic pathways intertwine: (1) the general ape line of understanding others as animate, goal-directed, and intentional agents; and (2) a species-unique motivation to share emotions, experience, and activities with other persons.
    [Show full text]
  • The ICD-10 Classification of Mental and Behavioural Disorders : Clinical Descriptions and Diagnostic Guidelines
    ICD-10 ThelCD-10 Classification of Mental and Behavioural Disorders Clinical descriptions and diagnostic guidelines | World Health Organization I Geneva I 1992 Reprinted 1993, 1994, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004 WHO Library Cataloguing in Publication Data The ICD-10 classification of mental and behavioural disorders : clinical descriptions and diagnostic guidelines. 1.Mental disorders — classification 2.Mental disorders — diagnosis ISBN 92 4 154422 8 (NLM Classification: WM 15) © World Health Organization 1992 All rights reserved. Publications of the World Health Organization can be obtained from Marketing and Dissemination, World Health Organization, 20 Avenue Appia, 1211 Geneva 27, Switzerland (tel: +41 22 791 2476; fax: +41 22 791 4857; email: [email protected]). Requests for permission to reproduce or translate WHO publications — whether for sale or for noncommercial distribution — should be addressed to Publications, at the above address (fax: +41 22 791 4806; email: [email protected]). The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the World Health Organization concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Dotted lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full agreement. The mention of specific companies or of certain manufacturers' products does not imply that they are endorsed or recommended by the World Health Organization in preference to others of a similar nature that are not mentioned. Errors and omissions excepted, the names of proprietary products are distinguished by initial capital letters.
    [Show full text]
  • An Analysis of Existential Psychology Arthur Erwin Wolfgarth University of Nebraska at Omaha
    University of Nebraska at Omaha DigitalCommons@UNO Student Work 6-1961 An analysis of existential psychology Arthur Erwin Wolfgarth University of Nebraska at Omaha Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork Part of the Psychology Commons Recommended Citation Wolfgarth, Arthur Erwin, "An analysis of existential psychology" (1961). Student Work. 125. https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork/125 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UNO. It has been accepted for inclusion in Student Work by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UNO. For more information, please contact [email protected]. AN ANALYSIS OF EXISTENTIAL. PSYCHOLOGY by Arthur Erwin Wolfgarth A Thesis Presented to the Graduate Faoulty of the Department of Psychology University of Omaha In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts June 1961 UMI Number: EP72773 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dtsssrtslioni Publishing UMI EP72773 Published by ProQuest LLC (2015). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 PREFACE The purpose of this thesis is to trace the thread of existential psychological thought from its first system­ atic statements in Denmark through its expansion in Europe to its influence in contemporary thought in the United States, This study begins with S^ren Kierkegaard who cast existential expression into molds that have not broken to the present day.
    [Show full text]
  • The Rationality Postulate in Economics: Its Ambiguity, Its Deficiency and Its Evolutionary Alternative
    Walter Eucken Institut ORDO Constitutio in Libertate The Rationality Postulate in Economics: Its Ambiguity, its Deficiency and its Evolutionary Alternative Viktor J. Vanberg 03/3 Freiburger Diskussionspapiere zur Ordnungsökonomik Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics Institut für Allgemeine Wirtschaftsforschung Abteilung für Wirtschaftspolitik Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg i. Br. ISSN 1437-1510 The Rationality Postulate in Economics: Its Ambiguity, its Deficiency and its Evolutionary Alternative Viktor J. Vanberg 03/3 Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg und Walter Eucken Institut, Freiburg [email protected] Freiburger Diskussionspapiere zur Ordnungsökonomik Freiburg Discussionpapers on Constitutional Economics 03/3 ISSN 1437-1510 Walter Eucken Institut, Goethestr. 10, D-79100 Freiburg i. Br. Tel.Nr.: +49 +761 / 79097 0; Fax.Nr.: +49 +761 / 79097 97 http://www.walter-eucken-institut.de Institut für Allgemeine Wirtschaftsforschung; Abteilung für Wirtschaftspolitik; Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, D-79085 Freiburg i. Br. Tel.Nr.: +49 +761 / 203 2317; Fax.Nr.: +49 +761 / 203 2322 http://www.vwl.uni-freiburg.de/fakultaet/wipo/ The Rationality Postulate in Economics: Its Ambiguity, its ∗ Deficiency and its Evolutionary Alternative by Viktor J. Vanberg Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg Wirtschafts- und Verhaltenswissenschaftliche Fakultät Abteilung Wirtschaftspolitik und Walter Eucken Institut 1. Introduction 2. Rationality Principle vs. Rationality Hypotheses 3. Gary S. Becker’s Economic Approach to Human Behavior: Rationality Principle or Rationality Hypothesis? 4. The ‘Economic Approach’ Between Rationality Principle and Rationality Hypotheses 5. An Evolutionary Alternative to the Rational Choice Paradigm 6. J.H. Holland’s Theory of Rule-Based Adaptive Agents 7. Rationality and Markets 8. Conclusion Abstract: Though the rationality postulate is generally considered the paradigmatic core of economics, there is little agreement about its specific content and methodological status.
    [Show full text]
  • Kuhn Versus Lakatos, Or Paradigms Ver Su S Research Programmes in the History of Economics
    [HOPE Vol. 7 (1975) No. 41 Kuhn versus Lakatos, or paradigms ver su s research programmes in the history of economics Mark Blaug In the 1950’s and 1960’s economists learned their methodology from Popper. Not that many of them read Popper. Instead, they read Friedman, and perhaps few of them realized that Friedman is simply Popper-with-a-twist applied to economics. To be sure, Friedman was criticized, but the “Essay on the Methodology of Positive Economics” nevertheless survived to become the one arti- cle on methodology that virtually every economist has read at some stage in his career. The idea that unrealistic “assumptions” are nothing to worry about, provided that the theory deduced from them culminates in falsifiable predictions, carried conviction to economists long inclined by habit and tradition to take a purely instrumentalist view of their subject. All that is almost ancient history, however. The new wave is not Popper’s “falsifiability” but Kuhn’s “paradigms.” Again, it is un- likely that many economists read The Structure oj Scientific Revolu- tions (1962). Nevertheless, appeal to paradigmatic reasoning quickly became a regular feature of controversies in economics and “paradigm” is now the byword of every historian of economic thought.’ Recently, however, some commentators have expressed misgivings about Kuhnian methodology applied to economics, throw- ing doubt in particular on the view that “scientific revolutions” characterize the history of economic thought.* With these doubts I heartily concur. I will argue that the term “paradigm” ought to be banished from economic literature, unless surrounded by inverted commas. Suitably qualified, however, the term retains a function in the historical exposition of economic doctrines as a reminder of the Copyright 1976 by Mark Blaug MARKBLAUG is Head of the Research Unit in the Economics of Education at the University of London.
    [Show full text]
  • The ICD-10 Classification of Mental and Behavioural Disorders Diagnostic Criteria for Research
    The ICD-10 Classification of Mental and Behavioural Disorders Diagnostic criteria for research World Health Organization Geneva The World Health Organization is a specialized agency of the United Nations with primary responsibility for international health matters and public health. Through this organization, which was created in 1948, the health professions of some 180 countries exchange their knowledge and experience with the aim of making possible the attainment by all citizens of the world by the year 2000 of a level of health that will permit them to lead a socially and economically productive life. By means of direct technical cooperation with its Member States, and by stimulating such cooperation among them, WHO promotes the development of comprehensive health services, the prevention and control of diseases, the improvement of environmental conditions, the development of human resources for health, the coordination and development of biomedical and health services research, and the planning and implementation of health programmes. These broad fields of endeavour encompass a wide variety of activities, such as developing systems of primary health care that reach the whole population of Member countries; promoting the health of mothers and children; combating malnutrition; controlling malaria and other communicable diseases including tuberculosis and leprosy; coordinating the global strategy for the prevention and control of AIDS; having achieved the eradication of smallpox, promoting mass immunization against a number of other
    [Show full text]
  • List of Phobias and Simple Cures.Pdf
    Phobia This article is about the clinical psychology. For other uses, see Phobia (disambiguation). A phobia (from the Greek: φόβος, Phóbos, meaning "fear" or "morbid fear") is, when used in the context of clinical psychology, a type of anxiety disorder, usually defined as a persistent fear of an object or situation in which the sufferer commits to great lengths in avoiding, typically disproportional to the actual danger posed, often being recognized as irrational. In the event the phobia cannot be avoided entirely the sufferer will endure the situation or object with marked distress and significant interference in social or occupational activities.[1] The terms distress and impairment as defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV-TR) should also take into account the context of the sufferer's environment if attempting a diagnosis. The DSM-IV-TR states that if a phobic stimulus, whether it be an object or a social situation, is absent entirely in an environment - a diagnosis cannot be made. An example of this situation would be an individual who has a fear of mice (Suriphobia) but lives in an area devoid of mice. Even though the concept of mice causes marked distress and impairment within the individual, because the individual does not encounter mice in the environment no actual distress or impairment is ever experienced. Proximity and the degree to which escape from the phobic stimulus should also be considered. As the sufferer approaches a phobic stimulus, anxiety levels increase (e.g. as one gets closer to a snake, fear increases in ophidiophobia), and the degree to which escape of the phobic stimulus is limited and has the effect of varying the intensity of fear in instances such as riding an elevator (e.g.
    [Show full text]
  • A Brief Introduction to Philosophy of Science As It Applies to Clinical Psychology
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Ghent University Academic Bibliography Hughes, S. (in press). A Brief Introduction to Philosophy of Science as it Applies to Clinical Psychology. In S. Hayes and S. Hofmann (Eds.), Core Competencies of Behavioral and Cognitive Therapies. Oakland, CA: New Harbinger Publications. A Brief Introduction to Philosophy of Science as it Applies to Clinical Psychology Sean Hughes Ghent University Authors Note SH, Department of Experimental Clinical and Health Psychology, Ghent University. The preparation of this chapter was made possible by Ghent University Grant BOF16/MET_V/002 to Jan De Houwer. Correspondence concerning this chapter should be addressed to [email protected]. 1 A Brief Introduction to Philosophy of Science as it Applies to Clinical Psychology Although it may seem like a strange way to begin a chapter on the philosophy of science, stop for a moment and imagine three intrepid explorers. Each has set out to expand the limits of human understanding in some respect. The first is an astronaut busy analyzing soil samples on the cold, dark surface of the moon. The second is a marine biologist, trying to find ways to get penguins more active and engaged at a large public aquarium. The third is a primatologist deeply interested in the courting behavior of silverback gorillas, who finds herself wading through a tropical forest in Central Africa. Although all three use the scientific method to understand a specific phenomenon, they approach their goals in very different ways. The fundamental questions they are interested in (e.g., what is the lunar soil comprised of; how can the behavior of captive penguins be changed; how do primates behave socially in the wild) will guide the procedures they use, the theories they generate, the types of data they collect, and the answers they ultimately find satisfactory.
    [Show full text]