UNITED NATIONS Distr. GENERAL GEEEBAL A/4711 ASSEMBLY 20 March 1961
OBIGINAL: ENGLISH
Fifteenth session Agenda item 85
'!'RE SITUATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
R~ort of the Un!ted Nations Conciliation Commission for the CongC?,
In paragraph 3 of 1ts resolution 1474 (EG-IV) of 20 September 1960, the General Assembly appealed. "to all Congolese w1thin the Republic of the CODgo to seek a speedy solution by peaceful means of ~ their internal con:fl.iets for the unity and integrity o~ the Congo, 'With the assistance, as appropriate, of Asian and Af'r1c~ representatives appointed by the Advisory Comm1ttee on the Congo, in
f1 consultation with the Secretary-General, for the purpose of' conciliat1on • In accordance with the terms of the resolution, the AdvJ.sory Committee decided on 5 November 1960 to establish a Concil.1ation Commission for the Congo consisting of represel\tatives of Ethiopia, the Federa.tion of Malaya, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Liberia, Mall, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Sudan, Tunisia and the United Arab RepUblic. At a later date Guinea, Indonesia, Mali and the United Arab Republic decided to withdra.w from the Commission. The Commission has now presented its report to the Advisory Committee on the Congo which has the honour formally to transmit it to the General. Assembly. This transmission is made "Without any prior consideration by the Advisory committee of the report or the recommendations contained therein and, thus, does not engage the COlIIlDittee or its members on any question of substance.
61-07999 I.·· REPORt! OF TBE OluTE!) NATIONS
CONCILIATION COlVlMISSrON FOR TBE CONGO
Re.;p;porteur: Mr. MeJJ.e.s AlmOM (Ethiopia.) i11
Table of Contents
Page ~ I. Introduction ••••• Ill e-. 1 &~ 11. Account of the Commission's .activities •••••••••••••••••••• •• 4
Ill. The Polltical Situat10n in the Congo 1lI " a- .. 19 IV. Views of Congolese Leaders •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 26 V. General C~ents ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ~ •••••••• 39 VI. Conclusions .•...... ••.••••....•... _...•.•••.....••...•... 43
Annexes
I. A. Telegram from Chairman of the Collll!lission to the Secretary General dated 26 December 1960•.•••••••••••••••••••••••••• , 52 B. Telegram from Secretary-General to the Chairman of the Commission dated 27 December 1960••••• ~ ••••••••••••••••••• 53 C. Lette:r dated 28 December 1960 from Mr. Justin Bomboko to tbe Chairman of the Commission •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 54 D. Letter dated 29 December 1960 from the Chairman of the Commission to President Kaaa-Vubu •••••••••••••••••••••••• 55 ll. ProVisional List of Congolese Leaders whom the Commission may wish to meet ••••••••••••• ~ •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• Ill. Letter dated 17 January from Mr. Joseph Kasa-VubU to the Chairman of the :Commission , . 58 IV. Letter dated 18 January, from Mr. Joseph Kaaa-Vubu to the Presidents of Provincial Governments ••• , •••••••••••••••••••••• 59 V. Letter dated 22 January 1961, from the Chairman of the Commission to Mr. Joseph Kasa~Vubu •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 60 VI. Address broadcast by Mr. Kasa-Vubu on 2 January 1961•••••••• ~ •• 61 VII. Ethnic Grouping (Document commUIlicated by the services of Mr. Kaea-Vubu) ••••••••••••••••••••• ~ •••••••••••••••••••••••••• VIII. Motion of the Provincial Assembly of the Orientele Province dated 20 January 1961 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 67 IX. Memorandum dated 20 January 1961, from the !'rovincial Government of the Orientale Province ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• x. Aide-mlfmoire aubmitted on 23 January 1961 by the Provincial Government of Kasai ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 71 XI. Memorandum dated 23 January 1961, from the Common Front of the Political Parties in Kasai••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 73 iv Annexes(continued) Table of Contents (continued)
XII. Address delivered by Mr. Kasa-V1lbu on .25 January 1961•••••••••• XIII. Letter dated 1 February 1961 from Mr. A. Pe1vaux to the Chairman of the Commission •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 81 XIV. Constitutional Legislative Pecr~. of 9 February 1961 concerning the· exercise of the legislative and executive powers by the . central authorities, and Ordinance of the same date app01nt:l.ng the provisional government •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 86 • ".• I ".'.. • . . XV. Address delivered by Mr. Joseph neo on 16 February 1961 •••••• 88 ..... ", . XVI. .Press Release issued by the COllIlldssion on 20 February 1961 • ••• 92 . - . '", . . xvn:. Press Release issued by the Colll!llission on 1 March 1961 •••••••• 93 XVIII. Telegram of 17 February 1961 to the Advisory CODIlIl1ttee about the death of Mr. Lumumba •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 94 XIX. . Maps Ethnic GroupingS ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 96 Linguistia Map ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 97 xx. Observations by the. representative of Ghana regarding the report of the Conciliation COllIlldssion ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 98 XXI. Note of clarification by Mr. Rameshwar RaO (India) •••••••••••• 99 XXII. Notes and Raser.vations on the Report of the Con Addellda - 1. Documents communicated by Mr. Joseph Kasongo (Issued as A/4711/Add.l) .2. Documents commun:l.cated by President Kasa-Vubu (Issued as A/4711/Add•.2) .. I. INTRODUCTION 1. III operative paragraph 3 of its resolution 1474 (E8-IV), a.O.opted on 20 Septembel 1960, the General Assembly appealed to all Congolese within the ~epublic of the Congo to seek a speedy solution by peaceful means of all their internal conflicts for J~he unity and integrity of the Congo, w11.h the assistance, as appropriate, of Asian and African representatives appointed by the Advisory Commit.tee on ,the COllgo, in consultation with the Secrete.ry~nere.l, for the purpose of concilietion. 2. ~cting under the terms of this resolution of the General Assembly, the Advisory Committee, in consultation with theSecretary-General, decided on 5 lifovelllber 1960 to establish a conciliation C?mmission for the Congo consisting of representatives of Ethiopia, the Federation of liiale.ya, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Liberilt, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Pe.kistan, Senegal, 'Sudan, Tunisia and J~he Unit.ed J..rab RepUblic, with the following terms' 01 referencel liThe Commission. should study the situation, such study to cover the, entire territory of the Congo, ,and should direct their efforts, without in'berference in the internal affairs of the Congo, towards the 'attainment by the Congolese of solutions of present difficulties in the Congo which will be conducive to the maintena.nce and strengthening of the unity, . ,territorial integrity and political independenoe of the Republic of the Congo, within the fr_ork of the constitutional and legal stZ'Ucture of the Republic of the Congo an~ of the resolution of the emergency special session of the General Assembly. In particular, the, Commission will endeavour to a.ssist in decisions being reached with a view to the speedy restoration of parliamontary institutions in the RepubliC of the Congo. The Commission is xeques~ed to proceed to the Congo ~ to submit a report to the Advisory Committee on the Congo as early as possible." - 2 - 3. Guinea, Indonesia, Mali and the United Arab nepub1ic having decided to wi'chdraw from it, the Commission actually consists of the following eleven members: Mr. Jajc. j,. Wachultu, iIl.P., Minister of (Nigeria.) - Chairman Eoonomic Development ~~. (Federation of Moha.med Sopiee - Vice-Chairman Malaya) Mr. Malla.s l.ndom (Ethiopia) - Rapporteur I..{r. Ale~ Quaison-Sackey (Ghana) , JAr. Re.meshwar Rao (India) M:r. G. Flammil. Sherman (Liberia.) Mr. Ahmed Snoussi (Morocco) Mr. A.gha Shahi (Paki s·~o.n) lW. A1io=e Cisse (SenegoJ. ) Mr. Fad1 Obeie. (Sudan) Ur. Taieb Sahbani (Tunisia) 4. The Advisory Committee first asked the Conciliation Commission to leave for the Congo in the week beginning 21 November. However,:tn the course of the consultations held with Mr. Joseph Kasa-Vubu, the President of tAe ~epub1ic of the Congo, the latter stated tha.t while he reg",rded the Commission's task as part of ·~he ll.Ssistance given to the Congo by the United Nations, his view was that the usefulness of 'the Commission depended on the extent to which the Congolese people were prepared to accept such assistance. He asked for -Oime to prepare the Congolese to cooperate with the Commission. On 23 November 1960 the Ldvisory Committee deoide& to postpone the date of the Commission's departure in view of the President's request. 5. On 6 December 1960 the advisory Committee requested the officers of the Commission, i.e. the Chairman, the Vice-Chairman and the Rapporteur, to proceed as an advance party to Leopoldvi11e on 13 December 1960 and make preparations for the arrival of the ma.in body of the Commission. The three officers of the Commission left New York on that day and arrived at Leopoldvi11e on 19 December 1960. They had several meetings with President Zase.-Vubu, a.s a result of which it was a.greedthat the Commission could arrive in the Congo on 3 January 1961. - 3 - 6. The Commission arrived in Leopoldville on :3 January 1961, It held its la.st meeting in the Congo on 20 February 1961 and then proceeded to Geneva to draft its report, which was approved on 10 March 1961. A detailed account of the Commission's work in the Congo is given below. 7. The Commission was assisted in its task by eleven members of the SecretariatI Mr. Dragoslav Protiteh, Principal Secretary; :Mr. F.T. Liu, Secretary; :Mr. P. Dufour and Mr. Fred Ronkin, interpret.ers; Mr. George Sergeev and Mr. David Fynes-Clinton, precis-writers; !vIr. Joseph El Haj and Mr. &cbert Kaminker, administrative officers; and Mrs. Rosemary Chevalley, Miss Pauline Laeerte and Mrs. Andrette Pronier, stenographers. 8. During .its stay in ilhe Congo, the Commission was eourteously reeeived by Presidenil Kasa-Vubu, some of '!;he e.uthorities in '!;he Republio and the majority of the leaders, to all of whom it wishes to express its appreoiation. The Commission is grateful to lIIr. Rajeshwar Dayal, the Speeial Represente.tive of the Secretary-General in '!;he Congo, and to the civilian and military officers of ONUC for the assistance given to the Commission in the performanoe of its te.sk. - 4 - H. A.CCO~OF TIlE COWJISSION's ACTIVITIES Arrival of the Commission's officers 9. The Commission's officers arrived at Leopoldville on 19 December·1960. They endeavoured to get into touch with President Joseph Kasa-Vubu, but he was in Brazzaville that day Md was to leave very early the following da.y for Coquilha.tville, where he was expected to remain for two days. The Chairman of the Commission sent him a letter announcing the arrival of its officers and expressing their wish to see him as soon as possible. 10. The following day two senior .officials of the Ministry of Foreign ilffairs called on the Ccmmission's officers to welcome them on behalf of the Chief of state and .said that the absence of President Kasa-Vubu was not due to'ill-will on his part, but had been rendered necessary by urgent pUblic business. They went on to say that the President did not oppose their arrival bu'~ insisted that the officers of the Commission should see him before contacting any political leaders. The two officials indicated that a meeting between the Commission's officers and President Kasa.-Vubu would. be arranged as soon as the latter returned to . Leopoldville, probably on 21 or 22 December. 11. On 23 December the Commission's officers had their first interview with President Kasa.-Vubu, in the course of which they informed him of the Commission's wish to come to the Congo as soon as possible and requested him to ~ree to a date for its arrival. They also requested him to rescind the order issued by . , the Council of Commissioners-General prohibiting hotels in Leopoldville from providing accommodation for the members of the Commission. Finally, they asked that the radio Station in Leopoldville should reSNme the broadcasting of the United Nations programme which had been susrended by order of the Council of Commissioners- Genoral. l'rosident Kasa.-Vubu promised to cMcel the order with regard to hotel accommodation immediately and to eT~ne the question of the resumption of the'broadcast. As far as the date of the Commission I s arrival was concerned, he asked to be given time before replying. He regretted ,that he had not been informed of the arrival in Leopoldville of the officers of the Commission. - 5 - 12. Thequestion of the date of the Commission's arrival ~ras discussed at two IIlOre intervi~ls between the Comn:lsaionl s officer,s and President Kasa:",Vubu., who was accompa.n:l.ed by Hr. neo, Ifi:'. Bomboko end i'ir. Adoula as advisers, President Kass.- Vubu. proposed that the date should be :3 January, However, he indicated that it would be iesirable that, betore coming to the Congo, the' COIllllIission's membership be cbanged 'lS he 'WaS opposed to the inclusion of certain members, The Commission's officers sndeavoured to advance the date 01' the Commission's arrival 'by a few days but, tn the face 61' the opposition of the Ohief 1"1' State, they agreed to the date pro ?osed, namely 3 ;ranua~. As reeiards the COllIIIlissionls membership, the offioers of the Oommission explained tbat it was' 1mpossibleto nlterit, that being a matter exclUsively tor the United Nations. They also explained to President Kaaa-Vubu that the members of the Commission, although designated by their respective gover& melI\;s, were, coming to the Congo as represelI\;atives of the United Nations and that, in conformity With tlie COllllIlission1s terms of reference, they would not interfere in the interDal at'fairs et the Congo, Following the insistence of President Kasa- .lW'u and his advisers on this matter, the offioers of the COllllIlission agreed to l!ranam1t their views to the S Oommission. Presid y See Annex!• • - 6 - Arrival of the Commission 13. In accordance With this agreement, the Collllllission arrived in Leopoldville on 3 :ranuary 1961. Its first task was to work out, in consultation WitJ:lthe Chief of State, -the itinerary for its visit to the provinces and -the list of persons it should see. The Commission's officers had dis cussed this question With President KB,sa-Vubu who had assured -them -that the Commission would be completely free to go wherever i-t wished and to make any contac-ts 11; wished. He merely desired -to be notified in advance 01' -the Com mission's travels so as to ensure a propsr welcome to -the Commission. 14. In compliance With Presiden-t Kasa-Vubu's request, -the CommiSSion drew up a list of Congolese leaders :gjlinom it wished to mee-t during i-ts stay in the Congo and an itinerary of the t01Il.' that it in-tended -to make in the prO'dnces and communicated them to the Chief ef State for his information and comments. Though this Us-t was transmi-t-ted to President Kasa-V'u.bu when the Commission me-t him on II :ranuary, 11; was not until 17 :ranuary tha-t a reply was received from him. President Kasa-Vubu advised -the Commission that he had no objection to i-ts seeing -the leaders mentioned but would like to suggest the addition of -3/ several names. a 15. .Among -the leaders linom the Cammission wished to see were several political prisonere, namely Mr. Alphonse So:cgo10 and Mr. J"ean Mircho in Orientale provinoe, and Mr. Patrice L'tlllllllliba, Mr. 2/ See Annex n. 21 SGe Annex In. -7- ~At the same time there were unverified reports of serious disaffection among A-WC troops in the cnn;p. The COlllJlIission immediaiJely asked President Kasa-Vubu for an interview to obiJain an explanation of iJhese iJwo maiJters, The Oommission strongly protested to President Kasa-Vubu. againsiJ Mr. Delvaux's insinutltions and poiniJed ouiJ that iiJ was interested in the aft'airs of the CongO, not in the fate of an individual. The President assured the Oommission that he still had every oonfidence in it. On being asked for an explaIlation regarding the transfer of Mr. Lum.umba to Katanga, President Kaea-VUbu. oonfirmed that it had been done in order to enSlU'n the safetyof' Mr. Lumu.mba; the order for the transfer had been ~ven by the aentral authorities in Leopoldville. .The President assured the Commission that it would be able to see the prisoner when 1t visited Katanga. AiJ the Commission~s request, President Kasa-VUbu gave iiJ a letter !si in which he requested the Presidents of the provinoial gove=ents of Coqu:Uhatv1lle, Stanleyvijle, Bukavu, Ellsabethville, Luluabourg and BakWanga (sio) to provide fao11ities for any contacts Which the :Commission might wish to make with leading llOlltioians, including political prisoners. U. During its stay in Leopoldville the Commission began its consultations ~ with a number ef interviews with the Special Representative of the Seoretary General and the prinoipal ofrioers of OWC to obtain information on the general situation in iJhe Congo and the aotivities of OWC. It then met the Chief of State and. other prominent leaders in Leopoldville, namely the Presid~iJs of the oentral and provinoial institutions established at Leopoldville : 'Mr. Joseph neo, the President of the Senate, Mr. Joseph Kasongo, the PrasideniJ of the Ch.~erof Representatives, Mr. Cleophas Kamitatu, the President of the Provincial Government and Mr•. Paul Kakwala, the President ef the Provincial Assembly. Their views, like those of the other Congolese leaders whom the Commission was to meeiJ later, represent Vi/o main trends. On the one side there are Mr. Kasa-V\lbu's supporters and on the other Mr. Lunrumba·s. To make this olearer, the views of tbese leaders are set forth separately in Chapter IV of iJhis report. !Jj See Annex IV. - 8 - The Round Table Conferer..ce 18. The day before the Cummission's. arrival ~t Leopoldvil~e, the Chief of State announced in·a broadcastvthat he haddeoided to summon a round table oonference on Z5 J2nUt.ry to review the country's constitutional structure and seek a solution to the present crisis and that Mr. Ileo had been instructed to organize and.convene the conference. The Commissinn discussed in detail the organization and objeotives of the conferenoe with Mr. Ilec. and his assistants, Mr. ,CY'rille Adoula (Minister of th" Interior in the I1elO gov"rnmen1>s) and Mr. Marcel Lihau (former Commissioner General for Justic~and SecretarJ of State .for JustiCe in the second Ileo government). It also had an interview on the round table conference with the Chief of State; who e"i'l~ined that the main ta.sk. of the Conference would be to seek a solution to the orisis; the conference would not assume the role of a constitu~nt·a.ssembly and its resolutions would be submitted to Parliament for approval. It was understood that those invited to the Coaferance would include not only members of Parliament but other persons Flaying a part in political life, together with certain custo~ary chiefs, in order to obtain as broad and representative a basis as possible. In the event, it did not prove feasible to hold the main oonference as early as 25 January, the date originallY chosen, beoause Mr. Tshombe refused to participate in or be represented at the conference, insisting ~hat it be held on 15 February at Elisabethville. Instead~ a preparatory oonference was held on 25 January, the main purpose of which .,as to draw up the agenda for the Round Table Conference proper. 19. At the invitation of the Chief of State, the Commission was present at the opening meeting of the Preparatory Conference but otherwise took no part and expressed no views in the Conferenoe. The Commission oonsidered the principle of holding a round table oonferenoe to be a good one; but it felt unable to commit itself to supporting the preparatory conferenoe in question since it did not represent all valid trends of opinion in the country and in practioe consisted only of groups that were not in d.isagreement on any issue. The Commission therefore adopted. a purelY wait-and-see policy with regard to the oonference. si Annex VI - 9 - 20. The Preparat.ory Conference concluded its work on 16 February; before dispersing, it. decided t.hat t.he full conference should be convened at E1isabethville on 1 March, but. in fact it has not yet been held. In his concluding address',6! Mr. Ileo, who had been responsible for organising the conference, regretted the tragic death of Mr. Imuumba. He stated t.hat. his governllIent deplored acts of violence and brutality, and t.hat, while it. was determined t.o take det.errent act.ion against trouble-makers, it. refused to prooeed by arbitrary arrests .and would act with proper respeot for legalit.y. Lastly, the Commission feels bound t.o st.ate that t.he preparatory round table conference did not give a true picture of Congolese national opinion, not only bacause of the lack of ability of some of its members but also because they had little claim to have a represent.ative character. Tour of the Provinces ~ 21. On 19 January, having concluded the first. stage of its consultations at Leopoldville, the Commission began its tour of the provinces. 'After arriving at Coquilhat.villa late in t.he morning on t.hat date, it had con versations wi-th Mr. Louis E1tetebi, t.he I'resident of the Provinci"'l Govern ment. of Equateur province, Mr. Louis Ekoko, the President of the Provincial· Assembly and Mr. Tha.dee Dombo, deputy for Coquilhatville. All these leaders expressed views generally favourable to ~'resi,lent ~~sB.-Vubu. ~ See Annex x:v :0> J.C - 2.0. Frl'llIl C"lquilhatville the Commission proceeded t(l Stanleyville, where it arrived duri~ the even~ ~f l.9 January. One M'.' the l.eaders whom the C=1ssion rod w:l.shed to meet at Stan1.eyville was Nr. Antoine Gizenga. Mr. Gizenga, however, sent Wlrd to say that he was indisposed, anCl the interv1elv took place , .'. w:l.th his representative, Mr. Ohristopha Gbenye. On bebal:t' o:f Mr. Gizenga, he pretested'strongly against the arbitrary detentinn of I·Jr. Lumumba and his t= fer to Elizabethville and informed the Oommission that he categorically re:f'used to engage in a discussion o:f substantive llIatters w:l.thout Mr. Lumumba's express permission. Although the Oommission explained to him at length the nature or its terms o:f re:ference and pllinted QUt to him that it was in the interest ('if all the Congolese leaders to assisiJ it, Mr. Gbenye Imintained his uncooperative and diScourteous attitllde. , / 23.. At StarileyvUle the Oommission also hel.d disoussiQIlE J. w:l.th Mr. A.Babadet, the President of the PrOVincial Ass6lllbl.y, and SOllle m€llllbers o:f that bOdy; it also met Mr. J.F. Manzikala, the Vice-President Of the Provi~cial Government, . several PNvincial Ministers, and General Lundula. All are loyal supporters of Mr. Lumumba. 24. The COlllIIlission also w:l.shed to see Mr~ Alph"nse Songolo and Nr. Jean Miruh9, two political leaders detained at stanleyville, and during its interview w:l.th the Provincial Government aSked that requisite steps be taken to llIake it pcssible. Mr. Manzikala f.i.rst replied that that was a llIatter :for the "Central. Govermnent", which, accorcting t\\l him, was represented by Mr. Gizenga. But the Commission argued strenuously that it was vital to the suocess of its mission that it shnul.d meet all the important political leaders, including the detainees, and that, i:f it :failed to see these at Stan1.eyville, it would find it difficult to persuade the au:thorities at Le~pol.dvUle and Elizabethville to allow it to meet the l.eadns detained in those provinces, in particular Mr. Lumumba. These ar guments seemed to llIake an im:"ression on Mr. Manzikala and his collaborators, woo promised to urge Mr. Gizenga strongly to allow the Commission to see two of the detainees held in Stanleyville. :L1 See Annexes VIII end r::: _11 - ) 2; • ~n -Jihe mtu"Ding of 21 January the' Commission had a two-hour discussion, withou.t witnesses, with Mr.. Sengalo and Mr. HiruhD 1n Mr. Manz:l.kaJ.ars offioe. The detainees were unshaven, barefented end looked fatigued, though they bore no visible traces of 1ll-tnatm.ent. Mr. Miruho mentioned an abdondnal operation he had undergone and Mr. Sengolo stated that he oould not read with his right eye due to an inj1ll'Y caused by ill-treatment. Boiih 11r. Songolo and :M:r. Miruho thought that the or1sis might be solved it' a reoonciliation was effeotedbetween President Kasa-Vubu and Mr. LUIllU!Ill>aJ' and YJJ:' .. Songolo asked the Oommission to inform. Mr. Lumumba tbat he would no longer withdravl parliamentary support from him. It was hOW9Ver obvious to the Oommission that the morale of both men was low and that the damjnant thought in their'minds was that of release. Stanlsy villa was the only :plaoe where theCo:mmission 'WaS allowed to meet, political detainees, largely through the instrumenta.lity- of General Lundula. 26. FrOm S1ionleyv1Uel the CommissiQn went en to Elisabeiihville where it stayed from the· af'terncnn ()f 21 January until the mor::dDg of 23 :ranuary. Mr. Moise Tshomba iDf<:lrmed it through the representative ",,:r ONOO that since neither his _ Government nor he bad any special problem to submii:r 110 the Oonnnission, they did Mt oons~der it necessary to receive the Commission cffioially. Mr. Tshombe pointed out that their pOf!1ti0n with regnrd ttl the problems of' the torms;!:' Belgian an~ OGllgO had been clearly stated would not be modifiedl and that the internal. :problems of Ka:tanga ware within the sole oompetenoe of his GOvernment. I"lr.Tshombe indioated that" ai.nce !le did net. «bsire to appear discourteous toUartlR ~shed viSitors, he wished to inVite the members of the Cormnission to dinner en the evening et 22 January. 27.. The members 01' the Oormn.iss1on deeply regretted the attitude taken by Mr. TShombf."' mission also decided to request its Cba1rma.nl accompnnied by the Pl'inc1:Pa1 Secretaxyt to oontact Mr. Tshom'be personally. They met l"lr. Tshombe on the mf;ll' ning Od 22 J anunry and informed him that it 'Was essential for the Commission to see Mr. Lum.um1::la.. They asked him to make the necessary aJ:'!'8.Dgsments for the visit. Mr. Tshombe refused to accept a copy of President Kasa-¥ubu s letter concerning ' t' visits to political detainees and ',said that he had no responsibility for the arrest and detention 01' l"lr. Lumumba 1 who had beeu transferred. to Kata.nea on the - 12 - ,rders of the central auth"rities in Leopoldville; in erder to see the detf',i ness, a letter lIlUSt be I 28, Since Mr, .AJ.bert Delvaux, Who had been ins"tructed by ~sil;dont Kasa-VUbu to negotiate with Mr, Tshombe concerning the round table conferenoe, was then at ElisabEithville, the Commission ret)jl.ested its Principal Secretary and Secre.. tary to gc' and see him nn the subject, Mr. Delvaux, who received them in the presence of Mr. Victor Nendaka, Chief of llt,tional Security, mamtamed that Hr. Lll-' mumba'sdetentii)n 'Was the responsibility of .the Katanga authorities, and. not of. those ef LeopoldVille. Mr. Delvaux, 'however, promised to interoedewith Mr. Tshombe and to inform the Cnmmission :l1.Imeq.iately 'If the result. 29, They Commission deoided tl'l send a telegram. .immediately to President Kasa- . VUbu ., informing him of the d:l.:f'1'iculties 'Which it 'Was encountering in visiting kIr. Lumu'llba, and requesting him to give the necessary instruotions without delay -to the persons in Whose charge Mr. Lum:umba 'WaS detained, SO that he could be visited. Neither President Kasa-1Jubu nor Hr. DelvaUX made any reply to the Commission, 30. From Ellzabethville, the Commission prc>ceeded to Luluabourg on the morning ef 23 January. It had disoussions w:l-th President Earthelamy ;'ukenge and the members of the pr:lvinoial ~vernment, a number of oustomary chiefs and various .. political: lel;\ders of the region. 9.! • Except for one .or two persons the. cthere· ooq,ressed views generally favourable to Mr. LUllMIlba. 31. EefGre returning to Leopoldville, the Commission had in'tended to go from Luluabourg to El;lkwe.nga in crder to see Mr. Albert Kalonj1~ leader of the faction of the Mouvement national eOM0lais ~oh bears his name. Mr. Kalonji, however, deol:t.ned to see the Commission off1eially, but said that he wouJ.d be glad to meet the Chl;lirman privately. The Oommission teok 'the view that, si=e Bakwanga is net a provinoial eapltal ef the C £! See Anne:x: iT. 2J Bee Annexes ~c £nd ::a. - 13 - Because of technical difficulties, the Commission was unable to visit Bukavu during its tour of the pravincBi. It had intended to go there later if necessary. However, in view of the developments in the Congo, the Commission' decided not to do so. 2aturn to Leopoldville 3~. The Commission's second stay in Leopoldville was largely devoted to consultations with political leaders. In particular, it had discussions with Mr. Jason Sendwe (Balubakat), Mr. Cleophas Kamitatu a.n.d Mr •. Felicien Kimva,y (Parti solidaire africai!!, (PM), Mr. Joseph ICasongo (Mouvement national.congolaiB, Lumumba wing), Mr. JoseJ?h Ilea (Mouvement national congolals, Kalonj i wing), Mr ~ Vital Moanda and Mr. Emmanua.1 Kini (Abako). 1iir. ~. Nguvulu (Part! du Peuple), Mr. Victor Dondo, represen-ting Mr. Jean Bolikango (Parti de l'Unite nationa.le), Mr. Albert Delvaux (Part! na.tional dll Progres), Mr. Justin Bombol~o (Union des Mongos), o.nd i:Jr. Cyrille b.G.oula (Independent) •. In addition, the Commission saw ivlajor-General Joseph Mobutu, and Mr. Daniel Ku.nza, First Burgoma.siier of Leopoldville. It also had several interviews with the Chief of State. 34. By the beginning of February, the Commission had collected sufficient ~ information to form for i°i>aelf I), fairly clear idea of' 'the positions held by the . . \' different political groups. Some leaders expressed doubts regc~ding the proposed round table conference. accordinglY,the Commission suggested the idea of a smaller meeting in a neutral place to which the most representative leaaera could go with out fear ~d where theyoould deliberate freely. This led to the idea of a summit conference of Congolese le.aders in a neutral place, if necessary outside the Congo. after discussing the matter with the Chief of State, the Commission sound~d the o?inion ot v~rious political parties on this subject and found that their reactions were generally favourable. 35. On 9 February, the Chief of State terminated the functions of the Council of Commissioners General and appointed in its stead n " provisioncl &overnmenVt headed by :iA:r. JJseph Ileotol After the appointment of the new government the Commission had a brief interview ~ith Mr. Ileo, in the course of which the latter said that it was his intention to broaden the basis of his government and that for this purpose he was negotiating with the representatives of the MNC-Lumumba, 'uhe :PSA and. the Balubakat. In cannonon with this matter, the Commission a,lso ~ interviewed 7J.:r:. Kasongo and }hr. Sendwe, who informed it that they-wished to rea.ch an agreemenJv with Mr. Ilea and help to form a government of nc"'~ional unity. :J.-.£/ See Armex XIV - Jt~ - 36. The COllllIlissi"nls persistent efforts to see Mr. Lumumba in Katanga have been described above. After its return t() Leop.,ldvUleJ the Cl"iJmiission met President Kasa-Vubu on 26 ;ranuary, the earliest datlil on which it coul.d Ilbtain an interview, and apprised him of the fact that, in spite of his assurances and his letter of mtl1orization, it had not been permitted to see Mr. Lumumba during its stay at Ellsabethville. It requested him t., issue the necessary inlltrue- ' tions so tbat it eould see Mr. Lumumba and the .,ther detainees 1mmediatelYJ since this was essential to the aceompl1sbment Qf it's mission. President Kasa 'lfubl;, :replied 'that decisions taken by him were often not carried out beo.attse 0i' unexpected'adm1n1strative difficulties. He promised to take' up the'matter again with the &tanga authorities so that the' Oommission could see Mr. Ialmmnbe.. He also promised'to give instructions that it Shfluld be permitted'tosae Mr. Finant, who was being held in detention in'the pr()vince of LeQPoldville. 37. In order to remove any administrative difficulties, President Kasa-Vubu propnsed that the Commission should resume the discussion on the follOWing day in the presence of' Mr. Victor NendakaJ the Chief of NatioDal Seoui'it:r, whom he woul.d BUIllIIlon for the occasion. When theCcmnnission saw President Kaea-VUbu again on the following day, it was imwssible to cont1J;lUe this diseussi'oln because the Chief of National Security did not present himself. During the interview, President Kasa-Vubu explained that Mr. Nendaka had just 1i:d'oi-med him'that he was unable to come because he was busy. The President prllmised to sond the Chief ,,1' Seeuritl' to the Commission to discuss the arrangemente to be made fer visi ting the ;prisoners. 3$. When Mr. Nendaka at last appeared before the 6annn1ssicm en 31 ;ranuary, he explained that he had no authority to deal with visits to prisoners who were under the exclusive jurisdietion of the provincial authorities. He added that President Kasa-Vubu could only make suggestions and recoimnendations to the Katanga provincial government and that he could not eompel it to e.llOlol the Cemmission to see Mr. Lumumba. Upon the Commission's insistence, however, Hr. Nendaka promiSed to do everythitlg in his power to enable it to Visit , , Hr. Lumumba and Mr. Fiuent. A flit.... days later Mr. Nendaka informed the Camndssion by telephone that the Procureur-General (a Belgian) was oppesed to ~ visit to Mr. Finant who,. he maintained, was held Qn a ar1m1nsl charge, and not on politi cal grounds. As tar as a visit to Mr. Lumumba was eonoerned, he had telegraphed the request t. the K'atanga autllorities but had not received any reply. He sugges ted that the Commission should see President Kasa-Vubu or Mr. Bomboko again (])n the subject. - 15 - 39. Thereu~on the Commission once again approached President Kasa-Vubu. In an interview on 4 February, the latter again assured the Commission that he was personally willing that the Commission should see the political prisoners. But he said that he was not a dictator and could not impose his will on the authori ties who were directly concerned in the matter. These authorities wished to know whether the Commission had been expressly directed by the Uni-Oed Nations to ..<. see political prisoners and, if so, which prisoRers were referred to in the directions; also whether the Commission had been appointed by the General Assembly, or merely by the Advisory Committee on the Congo for the purpose of enabling the Secretary-General to obtain more information, and lastly whe"l;her all the members of the Commission had been appointed in due form. After an hour's. discussion, President Ko,sa-Vubu, who hoo earlier informed the Commission that he had another urgent appointment, aske& it to resume the oonversation o~ the following after noon. 40. On the following day, the President's aide-de-camp informed the Commission that Presiden"!; Jtasa-Vubu wo,s indis.?osed and suggested that the appointment should ~ ~o postponed for two de,ys. Finally the Commission was again received by the Chief of Sta;'~e 01 7 February. Presidon~~ Kasa.-Vubu then informed it that he had arranged with the Katanga authorities to permit a delegation from the Commission to visit ~~. Lumumba. He added that for security reasons the visit would have to be made by a small delegation of not more than three persons. The Commission argued, without pressing the point, that for the purpose of the performance of its task of conciliaticn and of persuading Mr. Lumumba to adopt a more concilia tory attitude, it would have been desirable that the entire Commission should see him. Asthe §cmmission urged that a specific date should be fixec as soon as possible for the proposed visit, ~esident Jtasa-Vubu promised to give a reply within two days. 41. On 10 February, the Commission, whioh had boen awaiting ~~he promised reply,haard over the radio that Mr. Lumumba and his two fellow prisoners, Mr. Okito and Mr. Mpolo, had "escaped" from the "farmhouse" where they were being held in Katanga. The Commission was deeply concerned to hear this news, for it could no~~ dismiss the thought that the" escape" might well be a cover-nary concealing ~ a graver even)". It immediately requested an urgent appointl]lent wifuthe Chief of state. In spite C!f its insistence, however, it was told tha~" President Ko.sa-Vubu was not availcble and wquld be unable to reoeive the Commission before the afternoon of 14 February. -16- 42, The CoIlllll1ssion had no chnice but to wait, Hnwever, it asked to see Mr. Joseph nee,the Prime M:inister-desigmte, the same day and was received on U February by hill,jat 9 P.m, Vir, net) stated that he had taken no part, directly or indireotly, in 'the transfer 01' Mr, LUIl11lJllba 'to Katanga. 'that he had learned by teleg1'lJJll of Mr. I,umumba r s esoape, and t1lat he had been a.s muoh surprised as an~'"Ona•. He added 'that it was his ill'tention to inStitute an enquiry to datal'> mine whether Mr. LUIl11lJllba had really escaped or had in 1'aot been.killed, as SOlllO peop1ebGllievedi he promised to inf'orm the Commission of the facts as soon as he oould, The Commission warnod Mr. nee of the grave consequences thJ>.t "'ould,follow any har.m to Mr. Lumumba. 4:3.. On 13 February, the Commission was deepl.y shOcked by the news of the murder 01' Mr. Patrice L1llll1IlUba and hie t~ro com:PaniollS. The Sl)lJ1El day it had discussions With two pro-Lumumba leaders, Mr. Kasongn and Mr.Sendws. They awaared .to be greatly shaken; nevertheless, they expl'essed themselves in favour of partiCipation in a glllVeI'Illlll'\ll't 01' national unity, pl'0vided they re oeivelj, 'oertain guarantees. However, they were.Mt sure hetw in ·the a1tered oiroUllll'ltanoes the other leaders in the Oriillnta1e and Kivu provinoes, namely Mr. Gl!lzeilga.and Mr. Kashamura, would 1'Claot to suoh agovernmeni>. The Commission also saw Mr. neo and l'1r. lI.doula, who likewise expressed the desire to 00 operate to aohieve this goal, 44. On the next day, tho Com.1ssion was reoeived by President Kasa-Vubu. It expressed its profound shook and indignation' at the murder 01' Mr. L1llll1IlUba and pointed out thai> the news oould not fail to injure the aauss 01' the CongO; it reques'ted that the circUllll'ltanoes 01' this tragic occurrence should be fully investigated. President Kasa-Vubu said he would be at the Commiesion's diSpo sa:!. when he had obtained tho required ini'ormation on the ciro1J]llStanoes of Mr. L1llll1IlUba$s dea'th, but when lI1.lmbere of the Commission asked him why he had. transferred Mr. LUIl11lJllba to Katanga, and put "ther related questions tll him, he decl.ined to oontiJl116 the ~oussion. He likewise rei'used to d1sc1J!>S Mr. Fi=t's transfer to Bakwanga, maintaining that this was an internal.matter, He added that tha Commission should eoIrl'1ne 1tsel.f to its proper r01e a.,d that the questions which it 1}.ad just raised should be dau1.t with on a higher and more intermtional level•. On being asked Whether Mr. Fi=t had been t1'ans:l:e~ed . for seourity reasons I President Kasa-Vubu replied in the af'firl'Da'tiVl:'l' . - 1'7 - 45. Cln 15 February, when the Security Council was about to resume its consi derati"n of the problem of the Congo, the Commission deoided, in view of the iIJlpGrtance "f the Council's meeting tc a solution c1f the crisis, that it should communioate immediately to the Advisory Committee on the Congo a preliminary report setting forth some of its main oonclusions. This p:reliminary rePGrt was ad.opted nnanimouslyby all members present, .L.2.a. by all the Commissionfs members , U' exoept the representatives of Moroooo and Senegal, who we:re absent at the t:l.me.= The Commission also deoided tn send to the Advisory Committee a,message expres sing its profound shock at the tragio and premature death and respeat.. President Kasa-Vlibu replied that he had not yet reaeived oITiaial inf'ormation on the sUbjeat and that whEn it bcaame available the authorities would in due courSe explain what Md happened. He desired to be in possession of all the facts be1'ore replying to the Commission. The PresidE1nt added that suQh1ncidents had also taken placeelse'Nhere and. -at:i..gb.t well recur. 48. On the same day, the Commission also discussed iihis maiiter with Mr. Ueo. In.reply to the Commission's appeal to put an end to a:u acts of violence, !h>. Ueo referred to the statement he had made at the closing meeting 01' the preparatory Round Table Con1'erence on 16 February in which he had regretted the . . 13/ tragio death of Mr. LU)llI.llllba and had deploredacrts of violence and brutality.;.:;I He pointed out that Mr. Fimnt and other prisoners had been transferred to Bakwanga, before the formation 01' his GOvernment and hence Vlithout its knowledge. Dmnediatelyafter his GoverIlll16nt had taken office, he had sent his Minister of the Interior, Mr. Adoula, to Bukwanga to make inquiries. The M:l.n1ster hag. just returned to Leopoldvi1le but had not yet presented his report. 49. These converl!ations Vlith President Kasa-Vubu and Mr. Ueo marked the end of the Commission's stay in the Congo. On 20 February, before leaving LeQJ?old-. 14 . ville, the Commission issued a press release:::J in which it appealed to all Congolese to put an end to inteI'lJa.1 strife and to display that spirit 01' under standing and saari:f.'ice Vlithout which no peaaeftt1.solution could materialize. The Oollllll1ssion aJ.so aPIXlaled, to the Oongolese leaders and people to observe and. re!;lpeat 1'undementaJ. human rights in the search 1'~r e. solution 01' their problems. 5-0. After it had finished its work in the Congo, the Commission was shocked to lee.rn that a nUJDber 01' det.ainees in Stweyville had also been put to death. It wishes to record its condemnation of such political executions wherever they occur. 13.1. See Annex: XV lW See Annex XVI ~ 19_- III. TEE POLITICAL SITUATION IN TEE CONGO The September crisis 5;1. By the time the Commission arrived in the Republic 01' the Congo, the oonstitutional orisis had already lasted almost 1'our months. It had deeply shaken the struoture 01' the Congolese state, not only at the national level but also in the provinoes. 52. The gove=ental orisis began in the evening 01' 5 September, when President Kasa;..Vubu, the Chie1' 01' State, deolared in a broadoast prc.ol.ama1;ion tMt Mr. Pa trice LUlllUIIibaJ the Prime. Minister, had failed in his duties and, citing arti ole 22 01' the Loi Fondamentale, dismissed the Government with immediate effeot and ordered Mr, J"oseph Ueo, the Pre!Sident of the Senate, to 1'orm a new govern ment. The diem.issal was shortly afterwards eDibodied in an order signecl by the Ohief of State and countersigned by two Ministers, Mr. Justil3. Bomboko ancl Mr. Albe]:'t no>lvaux. 53. The Pre~idential proolalnation was 1'ollowecl by a ~ek 01' the greatest ooIli'u-· S1I.bn. Mr. LUlllUIIiba rei'uaeO. to aoo ept his dismissal, and on the night of 5 Septem ber oonvened the Oounoil 01' Ministers, whioh deoided.to remove the Chief 0: state .:from o1'1'ice 1'or violating the Loi Fondamentale~ On 7 September the C:bamber of Representatives decided by 60 ·votes to 19 ~to rescind the decisions by Whioh the Chief 01' State and the Prime Minister had each dismissecl the· other, and to appoint a parliamentary commission to reconcile the two adversaries. On the f'olloWing day the Senate met and rejected the Presidential proclamo.tion by 41 votes to 2, With" abstentions. On 9 September President Kasa-Vubu issued a statement in whioh he refused to recognize the votes of the Chamber and the Senate, and asserted that such deoisions of the Chief 01' state wre not ~Ubject to'Parli!Ull6ntaryapproval. On 10 September Mr. Ueo, Prime Minister designate, anncunoed the formation of' a new government, .mich two days later was embodied in an order promulgated by the Chief of State. On 13 Sepl;ember the two Ohambers in a joint meeting conferred full powers on Mr. L1llllU1llba by 88 votes to 5, With - . 3 abstentions j but supporters of' President Kasa-Vubu have asserted tbat the ne- oessary quorum was not present ana the result 01' the vote was not correctly announoed. The President of the Chamber oi' Representatives maintained that there lV Thll Chamber of Representatives -normallY. has 137 m~mbers ana the'Senate84. - 20 - had been a quorum and the result of the vote had been properly announced. The next day the Chief of State prorogued Parliament, bu-t the President 01' the Chamber and the Vice-President 01' the Senate refUsed -to recognize this decision. 161 5(1.. On -the evening .01' 14- Sep-tember I Colonel Joseph Mobutu -, Chief-of-Staff of -the CongoleSe National A:rm.y, announced -tha-t the A:rm.y was assuming power until 31 December 1960, that the existing central political institutions were !!l:Iautra~ ll lized , and that the government of the country would be taken over by' a coimcil of young universitaires. On 20 September Colonel Mobu-tu ~ounced -the appoint ment of the Council of Commissioners General which was embodied in an order of -the same date Signed by.the Chief of State. On 11 October President Kasa Vubu signed a lIconstitutional legislative decreefl proroguing Parliament and transferring to the Council of Commissioners General the legislative and execu tive powers normally exercised by the Parliament and Government. The authorities in Leopoldvi11e 55. Of the three central institutions for Which the Loi FondaJnentale made pro vision, only the office of Chief·- of State, held by President KaSSl-Vubu, wall still functioning, despite Colonel Mobutu1s proclamation, when the Commission arrived. The Parliament had been prorogued on 14 September J.960 and, notwith standing articJ.e G9 01' the Lai Fondamentale. has not me-t since, The Government ~ 01' Mr. Pl,l.trice Lumumba had been dismissed on 5 Sep-tember. It was to have been replaced by a new government tormed by Mr. Joseph ileo; but he had not received a vo-te of confidence from Parliament and had not taken office. 56. Power in the Central government depa..-rtments in LeopoJ.dvi11e was exercised by a CounciJ. of Commissioners General presided over by Mr. Jus-tin Bomboko. I-t was considered to be a body of functionaries responsibJ.e for the conduct 01' day-to-day business during the period of flneutralizationfT 01' normal. gover:oment ins-titutions, which was to continue until 31 December. 57. The flneutralizationll :lmposed by the army had never in tact extended to the Chief 01' state who, atter ColoneJ. Mobutu's action 01' 14 December, had .rorked alongside him. The authority of the Commissioners General, atter a difficuJ.ii start due principalJ.y to -their leok of experience and the opposition of Mr.LUIIIlllIlb and his triends, gradually became more tirmJ.y established as time passed; but 1-t was based on -the armed forces under ColoneJ. Mobu-tu and no-t on popuJ.ar support. , Colonel Mobutu was appointed Comma.mer-in-Chiet 01' iihe Congolese NGtio:o.eJ. A:rm.Y. wiiih the rank of Ma.;tor-Ueneral. on 2.3 J'an= 19G1._ .. - 21 - Although Colonel Mobutu had declared that he did not wish to concern himself ~1ith politics, he had exerted a very direct illf'luence on the Council of Commissione1'$ .,l'hine;r:al.. the regime was essent,iaJ.ly d;.omine.t,ed by Colonel Mobuiru.. President ..J(a$~Vubu a.nd Mr. Bomboko. 58. . On 9 February the Chief of State dissolved the Council of COIlllllisSioners General and replaced it by a "provisional. goverllJllent" headed by Mr. Joseph IJ} , neo • This Government took office two days later, but has not yet received Parliament's vote of confidenoe as required by the Loi Fondamentale, The matter Will be dealt With later in this report. ::n. The authority of the LeoptlldVille regime did not extend over the entire territory of ,the Congo. In fact it controlled only Leopolc7ille and Equs:heur proVince", e.:cd about two-third'" of Kasai. i.e. less than hall' the oountry.Even inside this part of the territory its control was often precariollil. In Kasai, which had been the scene of violeilttribal cOnfliots, the' population and the civilian authoDities included some very strong pro-~Ul1IlllIlba elements. The ,~ame was true of the Ewilu-Kwango areas in LeopoldVille pr'oVince, whioh are the stronghold of the Parti' solidaire af'ricain. Even Equateur provinct;. the home of' Mr. Bomboko and fJolonel Mobutu, contains pro-Lumumba elements. The other autlmrities in the Congo fIJ. In the rest of the country power was in the hands of three other de facto authorities, each supported by armed foroes., 01. As early as 11 July 1960, Mr. Moise Tshombe, Head of the ProVinciaih Govern ment 01' Katanga, proclaimed the seoession 01' that proVince. Although he has not been able to obtain international. recognition, he acts like the head of an independent State• .L-ound a nucleus 01' troops 01' the first contingent of the former Force Publigue, he has built up an army equipped With modern weapons and officered by a large number of Belgians and other foreign elements. Katanga now has its own flag, its own postage stamps and, since the begiJJ,ning 01' the year. its own currency, To do this. Mr. 'Tshombe lllUS1; have had considerable funds. It is generally believed that they come from foreign, particularly Belgian, sources. It is. also recognized that the Union MinieJ:"e o.u Eaut i(,,:cc.nga fineness the i:l'.tanga authorities to an appreciable ext.ent. - 22 - 62. However, Mr. Tshombe1s authority seems to be confined to the southern part of Katanga and even there it does not apparently rest on a large measure of popular support. Law and order prevail there, but the Africans are obviously in a state of te=or Which contrasts with the calm of the foreign population. In North Katanga, where Baluba elements predominate, the population is violen tly hostUe to him. As soon as the secession of Katanga was proclaimed, the Baluba tribes rose against the Elizabethville authorities, and only through the good offices of OWC has a precarious peace been established in this area, part of which has been made a neutral zone guarded by United Nations forces. At the beginning of 1961.,troopa of General Lundula star1led out from Stanlsyville and succeeded in infiltrating as far as Manono, in the neutral zone, whtl1:&"w:lih tl:lil~ help the Baluba leaders proclaimed a new province covering all North Katanga and called "LUalaba Province? 63. In the southern part of, Kasai, Where the population 1Iargely consis'j;s of l.§j B,aluba ,Mr. Albert Kal.onji founded in August 19iC; a "South Kasai Mining State", later called lTtheAutonomous state of South Kasai", with Bakwanga as the capital. With considerably smaller means tl:lan Mr. Tshombe, he has succeeded in forming a fairly large arJilY, recruited exclusively from the Baluba, officered by Be},gians and ether Europeans I and ;laid for by SUbsidies received trom the Forminiere Gompany. It is a fair presumption that, like Mr. Tshombe, Mr.Kalonji could not have attempted his secessionist plans Without foreign aid. President Kasa-Vubu is apparently willing to aCGept a separate provinee of South Kasa1, but not an indepandeIIt state of South Kasai. 64. Crientale Province, Mr. Lumumba's stronghold, remained under Colonel 1'10 butu's coIItrol until October 1960. After his action of lTneutralization", el,e ments of' the Congolese National Army stationed in Stanleyville arJlEIsted at his t~e orders Mr. Jean Pierre Finant, Head of/Stanleyville Provincial Government, and several other followers of Mr. L1ll!IU1tIba, and sent them to Leopoldville. At the end of the month, however, the soldiers, who had not received their pay, l1lllti med•. They arrested their officers, eleoted new ones, and allied themselvesw.!.th the gendarmeri,,\ which had always shown its attaohment toMr. Lumumba. General Lundula, the Commander-in-Chief of the Congolese National Army t-hom President Kasa-Vubu had dismissed after Mr. Lumumba's fall, thereupon arrived at Si;anley ville and restored order among the troops. At the beginning of Deoember, la! The Katanga Baluba :mu.st be distinguished trom the Kasa! Baluba. The two groups are related but distinct. The former are pro-L1ll!IU1tIba, the latter violently hostile to the former Prime Minister. - 23 - Mr. Antoine Gizenge., Deputy Prime M:tni.ster in Mr. Lumumba.ls Government, escaped from Leopoldville and ree.ched. sta.nleyville. He immediately 1lI1a.i.med that in the absence of Mr. LUll'iUmba., who was prevented from carrying out his dut$9s, the legitimate Government of the Republic was vested in him as Deputy Prime Ministerand that tho seat of' the GOvernment was being provisionally transferred to Sta.n1eyville. 65. Recently, by a number of sudden attaokst the Sta.nil.eyville regime has eonsiderably enlarged its area of IlUthority. Early this year a dete,chmant of gendarmes ca.rried out a. raid on Buka'\tU, capitaJ. of Kivu Province, during which it arrested Mr. Miruho, 'the Head of the Provincial Government, and. soma other members of his Government and installed Mr .. Anicet Kashamura, who is known for his' attachment to ]{lr. Lumumba, as the new Head of "the Provinoia.l Government of Kivu. An expedition of air-borne oommandos sent by Colonel Mobutu to retake Buka.vu· was repelled. Later another deta.ohment of Stanleyville troops carried out an ,,-,ven more remarkable raid. After covering more than 2,000 kilometres, it occupi'ed Manono in North Xatanga vrlthout opposition and established a new province called Lualaba., with a Government loyal to the Stanleydlle regime. (This is within the neutral zone conceded by a.g:reernent betwoen OHfJC and the Katanga authoritie5, but ONOC did not interfere .. ) Rival;: between the various au~horities 66. Thus the Congo is divided into four ,oamps. Mr. Tshombe controls South Katanga, Mr. Kalonji South !rasaL The rest of the' country is split into two pa.rts, one controlled by Mr. Kasa-Vubu and tb:l other by pro-Lumumba elements. Lest November, the General Assembly of the United Nations decided to seat "the delegation named by President Kasa-Vubu•. Mr. Tshombe and Mr. KaJ.onji have also sought international recognition, but have not yet obtained it. More recently, certain Sta.tes ha.ve extended recognition to the Gizenga n government". 6;. Each of these authorities is based prima.rily on armed force. The Congolese National Army, controlled by Gener8J. Mobutu at Leopoldville, consis"ts of some 9,000 men, that of General Lundula at Sta.nleyvi11a of nea.rly 7,000. Mr. Tshombe has some 5,000 soldiers, W'Jr. Kalonji 3,000. All these groups are equipped with modern weapons and include in their s"taffs a number of foreign officers. -~- 68. IJany elements of these armies, however, are merely undisciplined armed bands which pay little heed to the orders of thei!' officers and have become a standing threat to the liberties and honour of the civilian population. The authorities concerned have only a precarious control over them and, in o:t'der to hold their loyalty, are constantly oompelled to meet their exorbitant demands. The troops have mutinied more than onoe, and each time, instead of being sevem.y pll11ished, they have been rewarded. After the mutiny of 6 July they were awarded a cash bonus and even promotion; after that at ThySville in January 1961 their pay was almost doubled. It is therefore not surprising that they have only a limited oonoeption of discipline and integrity. 69. It should be noted that in the struggle for power since the beginning of -the crisis _-the leaders h!!ove not hesitated to resort to methods !hich are contrary to democratic and constitutional rights and practices. The representative assemblies constituted by the Loi Fondamentale have not been allowed to function. Op~osition has been suppressed by force. Many political leaders have been arbitrarily arrested, -im~risoned without trial, inhumanly treated and executed. Just as the Commission was about to leave the Congo it learned with deep indignation, first of the murder in Katanga of Mr. Pa:trice Lurnumba and his two fellow prisoners, and then of the summary execution a.t Ba.ltwanga of six political prisoners including Mr. Jean Pierre -Finant. There were also at that time persistent rumours tha.t fifteen political prisoners at Stanleyville had been executed in reprisal. These reports have since been confirmed. 70. Since November there have been increasing signs that some of the leaders who hold power are seeking to turn the crisis to their advantage by-resorting to military means. They are all doing everything possible to strengthen the troops under their connnand, and have even called upon foreign Powers for -technioal, financial and military assistanoe, outside the framework of the United Nations. SUch assistance has not always been refused, in spite of the Securi-ty Council and G,.neral Assembly resolutions. The various armed groups have been reinforoed recen-tly by large qua.n-ti-ties of arms a.nd munitions from various sources a.nd increasing numbers of foreign officers and military advisers. In Katanga i-t has been observed tha-t a few military planes have arrived and tha-t a foreign legion hes been formed. - 25 - 11. Hostilities have already begun. In order to compel t.he authorities at S-tanley'Villa 'to surrend'er~' a stric't, economic blockade was imposed on OrientaJ.e ProvinOG by the Leopoldvilla authorities. In Sta.nleyville and other parts of the Province there is now Et serious shortage of food and petr?l, which is beco~ing worse as time goes on. On the other hand, a.t the· beginning of -Mie year the Stanleyville armed foroes sucoeeded.in taking Kivu P~uvinoe and North Katanga. From there, these deta.obments have pushed· southward as far as Luena. in South Katanga, and westward to SenJ(iery e.nd Lamela. in trasai. Near the border with Equa;hur Province, large groups have esJ(iablishad posH;ions a.t Basoko on the .Congo, and ,at Aketi and Buta. on the Aketi-Pa.ulis rai1wa:y~2/ . 72. After these successes by pro-Lumumba. troops, the authorities a.t Leopoldville, Eli:z;a.bethville and Bakwanga., whioh were in qpposition to l\tIr. Lumumba and mainta.ined apparently amicable relations with one another,bogan nego~iations with a ~iew to ooncluding a m:i.litary~ilia.n.ce.While a.nagreement was-reached between Mr. T·shomb~· and Hr. :Kalonji, President Kasa-Vubu a.pparently felt una-ble to accede formally because such action might imply recognition of the independence oX Katanga and South Kasa.i. 73. While t.hese negotiations were going 'on, Mr. Tshombe lS "forces launched a counter-offansive to reoapture Manono. These foroes, commanded by Belgian officers, J(iook Luena a.nd Bultama in mid.-February. On 1 February the first air-raid took I place when bombs were reported 'to' have been dropped on Ma.nono by an a.ircraft of the Kata.nga. air force. The civil war which ha.s begun in Ka'tanga may spread to other parts of the Congo, particularly Equa.teur and Orientale Provinces. The forces which General r.!o'butu has concentrat.ed at Bum"!Ja in Equateur face the Stl:tn1eyville f'o1-'ces under General Lundula.· 74. At the time of writing this report, it was a.nnounced that a. military agreement had been conoluded between Mr. IlaSl, Mr. Tshombe and Mr. Kalonji. 12/ Events are suoceeding one anot.har so ra.pidly -tha1f "ohe situa.tion ma.y well ha.ve undergone further changes by the tima this report is issued.. - 26 - IV - VIEWS OF CONGOLESE LEADERS 75. In i;he courSe of ii;s si;ay in i;he Congo, i;he Commission mei; over sixty Congolese polii;ical leaders and heard i;heir views on the crisis. For convenience, these views are summari:zed below under i;hree main heads - i;hose of President Kasa-Vubu and his supporters, these of i;he supporters of i;he late Mr. Lumumba, and i;he views of i;he separatists in Katanga and South Kasai. Neverthele'ss, with the probable exception of Mr. Tshombe, it should not be concluded thai; the differences bei;ween these i;hree groups cannot be reconciled. It would not be strictly accurate to say, for example, that the political parties in the first two groups are irreconcilia.bly divided by their views on whether the Congo should be a unitary or a federal sta-tej all favoU1' a. strong central government und nearly all feel that grea.ter decentralization of governmen-tal authority is necessary in a country the size .of the Congo. All condemn, at least publioly, foreign interference in the Congo's affairs. Bu-t the views among the various factions supporting these two sides are not necessa.rily homogeneous. Most of those interviewed by the Commission, inclUding Generals Mobutu and Lundula,thought that the army should not be allowed to interfere in politics and that ii; should be reorganized if normal political life was to be res-toredj opinions on this subject differed mainly with regard to the particular troops which needed reorganization, i;he i;endency being of course to dellY i;he need for reorganization in the case of that part of the army supporting the leader who was expressing -this opinion. Nevertheless, a. number of members of Parliameni; and other leaders assured the Commission privately that no return to normal life is possible unless steps aro taken to reorganize the whole of the army, wherever it might be found, and to restore proper discipline. 76. The views outlined below are those held by the various leaders before the establishment of the Ileo "provisionaJ. government" on 9 February, and prior -to -the death of Mr. Lumumba: the deepening, crisis sinoe -those events is deal-t wii;h elsewhere in i;his report. The real dividing line between the parties was wi-th regard to the legality of the dismissal of Mr. Lumumba and the nai;ure of the political crisis and the s-teps to be -taken to resolve it. President Kasa.-Vubu and his supporters maintain thai; -the dismissal of Mr. LUIl1Uln1:a on 5 September 1960 wzs in full conformity with the Loi Fondameni;ale, and that the best way to solve the crisis is through a round -table conferenoe of leaders, parliament arians and others, to review the country's oonstitutional s-tructurel the - 27 - resbtutions adopted at that conference t9 be submitted to Parliament for adoption, in accord~ce with constitutional prooesses,after which a new governmqntwould be constitu:t.ed and presented to Pa.rli~ent. ~. Lumumba' Il supporters .argue that thore is no need fov a ~und tah~·conference since a dUly-elected Parliament exists. Either it had to be accepted that Mr. Lumumba's government was the Ilole lawful one, or Parliament should at least be qonvened in order to decide whether the dismissal of that government was lawful, the result would he the swne, they held; since Mr. Lumumba's supporters enjoyed a parliamentary major.ity. On the subjeot of politioal prisoners, Mr. Lumumba's supporters pressed for .the immediate release of all su,ch 'prisoners, while those of President Kasa-Vubu insisted t:hat e:ltceptions should be made :in the' caSe of those whom they regarded as criminal. offend.ers.• 77. The attempts of Mr. Tshombe and Mr•• Kalonji 1;0 set. up separate states in Katanga imd South Kasai respectively were oondemned by both sides, though in some oaSes a distinction was drawn between the two, it being urged by some that Mr. Kalonji had neVer openly defied the Chief of state. It seems likely that no rea~ attemp~ will be made to grapple with this secessionist problem _ the mostserious I of the many facing the Congo- until the dispute between the supporters of President 'Kasa-Vubu and those of Mr. lJumumba is settled. 78. Finally, there are a number of parties and leaders who are inclined to put. . . . the blame for th~ crisis o~ the personal ambitions of the leaders of both sides. President Kasa-Vubu' s view~9I 79. In an address delivered on 25 January 1961 to the delegates ~ttending the preparatbryRound .Table Conference, President Kasa-Vubu said nIf we wish to create a stable and durable society whioh will be Secure from the overweening. ambitions of certain people, We must go to the root of the trouble. We inherited ll. system of institutions which turned out in practice to be ineffective and inappropriate to the situations to which it was intended to be applied. We must give fresh thought to the Loi Fondamentale and the institutions derived from it, with a view to adapting them to our ideas and the requirements of a country which is SO large in the geographical sense and whose. peoples are so diverse". ~O/ Referring to various caUSes of the crisis in the RepUblic of the Congo, the President SUbmitted a number of doouments which the Commission includes as Addendum 2 to this report, and two maps (See Annex nx)~ - 28 - 80. These words well summarize his attitude towards the solution of the crisis which, in his view, is structural and institutional, rather than governmental. The boundaries of the provinces, which were inherited from the Belgians, do not in his opinion conform to the realities of -the si-tuation. New unitWmust there fore be se-t up, which must be viable and which mUS";; be given a wide degree of autonomy, more. especially financial autonomy. At the same time, there must be a strong central governmen-t; President Kasa-Vubu stated that the idea of secession was not seriously entertained W anyone. A greater degree of dec.entralization woUld, in his view, enable the central government to devote its attention to -the basic problems affecting "the ..life of the nation and, by helping to d..v.. lop 1 the interior of the (»oun"try, would Check th.. drif"t towards "the towns. It is worth noting, how..ver, that President Kasa-Vubu was at pains to str..ss "to the Commission "that the ultimate aim must be "to foster the growth of a national consciousness and to get away from the idea that offices in the central govern ment must necessarily be distributed on the basis of provincial representation. 81. President Kasa-Vubu has repeatedly insisted that. the Congo i$ a ~oaracy and tlNlt the people must app~ove any changes in the constitution through theil:" duly accl:"edited repl:"esantatives. It therefore follows that a comprehensive reform of the country's institutions must be approved by a body competent to express the popular w1ll. Re held tlNlt this could best be done through a l:"ound table conference attended not only by members of l?arliament but by other persons in political life, together with certain ~ The various tl:"ibes ~nhabiting the Congo are so numerous that it is difficult togrou;p -them ·together, more especially in view of the fact that, owing to successive migrations, isolated pockets of one tribe are to be found in the territory of another. According to a memorandum provided by President Kasa-Vubu' s staff, there are roughly speaking nine main groups of tribes (ethnhs) I (1) the Lower Congo peoples; (2) the Kwango peoples, with which should be grouped the Ba-Tshoke of Katanga; (3.) the various tribes living in Kasai; (4) the Laba peoples; (~) certain tribes in south Kat~nga whose culture has closer affinities with Rhodesian peoples; (6) the tribes living in Maniema and Kivu; (7) the peoples of Sudanese culture, including isolated pockets of other races which are. too small to form a separa-te group; (8) the Mongo group of peoples,· ooverina a wide but ·thinly-popula"teiL.area; (9) the Teke peoples. (See Annexes ID an:i XIX). - 2.9 - customary chiefs. In his broadcast of 2 Janu~, he maintained that the existing Parliament no longer represented more than a part of the country; soDle members of Parliament had died and others Were physically prevented from reaching Leopoldville or taking part in ~hat body1s work; Parliament was therefore ill-suited to under take a task which might involvll its own reform. Once the round table confel'ence had defined the powers of the central and provincial authorities, it would decide how the cantral government would be appointed. He stated finally that the resolutions passed by the round table conf~rence would be submittod to Parliament. Acoording to President Ka:sa-Vubu's original way of thinking, tho round table oonferenoe was to have been followed by a provisional gove1'l'llllent, by which ·time the Council of Commissioners General would have concluded what he desoribed as "1"ts task of eoonomio and administrative reorgan;zation". as mentioned elsewhere in this ·report, however, a provisional government was set up under ~~. Ileo even before the preparatory round table oonference had concluded its work, and Presiden'f; Kasa-Vubu assured the Commission that the programme of that government would eventually be submitted to Parliament for its approval. 82. On the subject of the release of political detainees to enable them to I attend the Round Table Conference and Parliament when i.t reconvenes, President Kasa-Vubusaid that, While that was oeJ;"tainly the intention, it had to be born" in mind that detainees who had broken the law had lost their oivil rights. The Congo was sole judge of the gravity of the offences involvedI it was not for tho United Nations to interpret the l~ws of the Congo or interfere in its internal affairs. 83. According to President K'asa-Vubu, the army's basic problem was one of equip ment, most of which, he said, had been stolen or destroyed by the Belgians. In his view, fue United Nations was largely responsible for demoralizing the ANG, by interfering with the arrest of murderers against whom warrants had been issued and by proteoting.persons who fomented disorders. He considered such interference to be one of the main causes. of the crisis and oomplained at somo length to the Commission about ONUC's failure to prevent foreign powars from interveningin the Congo. President Kasa-Vubu insisted that it was not so muoh the mandate ef ONUC that was at fault as the manner in which it was being implemented, and it had been for that reason that he had pressed for Mr. Dayal's recall. 84. President lU.sa-Vubu's response to the Commission's suggestion of a conference t of Congolese leaders to be held on·neutral ground was cautious; he told the . Gommission,after having consulted his advisers, that the possibility of holding such a meeting might be oonsidered, but that the time for it had not yet oome. - ~o - Views of President Kasa-Vubu's supporters 85. President Kasa-Vubu's ideas on the institutional nature of the crisis o.nd the need for a round table oonference as the first step towards itssolution was shared in varying degree by such leaders as Mr. Joseph Ileo, tir. Justin Bomboko and Mr. Albert Delvaux, all of whom emphasized before the Commission the need for greater deoentralization of powers and for putting an end to foreign interference. They held the view that ~ir. Lumumba's dismissal by President Kasa-Vubu was perfeotly legal and in accordance with the Loi Fondamentafe, and that Mr. Lumumba was res ponsible for the orisis by not acoe2ting President Kasa-Vubu1s order of revocation. The representatives of ABAKO, President Kasa-Vubu's own party, went further and insisted that, since the United Nations had reoognized President Kasa-Vubu as the Chief of state and the sole lawful authority in the count'ry, it therefore followed that the United Nations was obliged to assist in restoring order throughout the oountry. 86. Mr. Ileo, who deElll1Cld h1maelf to be ;peremlB grata: with all parties,.em;p1lasized. the impQrtanoe of giving the Round Table Conferenoe as broadaldrepresentative a basis as possible; he informed the Commission on 14 January that, as the organizer of the Round Table Conferenoe, he wished to persuade the leaders in Stanleyville and Bukavu that they should take part in that meeting. Mr. Ileo professed himself later on as satisfied with the work acoomplished at the preparatory conferenoe, whioh had deoided that ques'tions such as' the release of politioal prisoners and the oonvening of Parli~ent, ~hould be dealt with at the main conference. He emphasized that the resolutions whioh might be adopted by the main oonferenoe would have to be submitted to Parliament, but oautioned that it would be difficult to summon Parliament immediately, as it was uncertain Whether the neoessary quorum could be assembled, espeoially in regard to the , , . Senate. On the subject of the ~, he maintained that the problom could not be solved by disarming it, since United Nations troops would be quite inoapable of keeping order owing to the fact that they did not know the mentality of the Congolese people. He stated that he would be the first to call on the Congolese people to resist by force any attempt to disarm the ANa or to place the oountry under United Nations tutelage. (It should be mentioned here that the Commission at no time suggested suoh a solution.) What Mr. Ileo thought was neoessary was 7nited Nations assistanoe in reorganizing the ~ and in the training of its offioers: undisoiplined elements oould gradually be eliminated. - )1 - 87. The other supporters of President ,iasa-Vubu also favoured the idea of a round table conference, though it should be mentionod that at lea.st one of them, Mr. Delvaux, expressed his doubts whether such a conference would in fact achieve a positive result. Mr. Delvaux, like other supporter~ of President Kasa.-Vubu, held that, since several members of Parliament had been arbitrarily arrested and illlprisoned b;Y. Mr. Lwnumba, while others were dead, or refused to, e.ttend for fea.r of arrest, Parliament was no longer representative and, the absolute majority provided for under the Lci Fondamelltale. not be available. In suoh oircum stanoes, decisions by Parliament oould not have force of law. Mr. Bomboko thought that the only good service Which the Conciliation Commission could render to the Congo would be to'persuade leaders who refused to attend the conference to change their minds and to repeat :1;0 them the assurances that all those attend ing'it as delege.tes fully empowered to speak for their peoples would be in no danger. He added however that, if those leaders tried to disrupt the oonference or to hold political meetings, the authorities would be obliged to deal With '. them. Mr. Bombako was not inolined to favour the Commission's suggestion that United Nations proteotion should be extended to those partioipants who requested it; he said that the I,eopoldville authorities would provide proJ&eotion and that their good faith should not be questioned. With regard to the disarming of the ANC, Mr. Bomboko maintained that the troops under the command of the Chief of State in his capacity as Commander-in-Ghief of the National Army constituted the ouly legitimate army; all other troops were rebels and should be disarmed. Mr. Cyrille Adoula said that if there were leaders who expressed a desire for United Nations protection as a oonditionfor participating in the Round Table Conference, the United Nations shOUld extend that proteotion immediately. 88. With regard to the Commission',s tentative proposal for a "summit meeting" on neutral ground, the oonsensus of opinion among President Kasa,..Vubu' s supporters appeared to be that the idea was a useful One which might be put forward later if other efforts at reaching a nation-wide understa.nding failed: Mr. Delvaux, on the other hand, thought that the suggestion should be put to the preparatory Round Table Conference. In the matter of the relea.se of political prisoners, some of these leaders drew the same disi>inction as President Kasa.-Vubu between purely political prisoners 'and those who were charged with criminal offences; they maintained that where the latter were members of Parliament, their case should be ~ considered by a special parliamentary committee which WJuld decide Whether the persons ooncerned 8hculd be deprived of the~r parliamentary immunity. Others co~idered that the question should be left to the Round Tahle Conference'to decide. 89. Most of the leaders in this group thought that there was much useful work that the Conciliation Commission could do; for example, it could help to bring all the leaders in the country together, either at the Round' Table Conference or at Et "s1,UIJDlit meeting" outside the Congo, and to rid the Congo of foreign inter ference of all kinds • Mr. Bomboko expressed 'the view 'that the Co"nnni~sion should regard itself in the light of a mission of technioal assistance~ which could clear up the confusion eXisting in the minds of many Congolese 'on the 'real meaning of such terms as "federallt and "unitary" state. The members of' th~ Co~is"sionhad the 1UlIIliStakable impression at the end of the'ir'Stay that their presence in the " , Congo, although tolerated hitherto, was becoming less and less acceptable to certain Congolese authorities. Apart from occasional veiled hints the Commission unders1iood some of these authorities to have stated outright that" the presence of its members in their respeotive oountries would be more useful to the Congo, since they would be abl'e to expla.in the situation in the Congo to their com patriots and thereby help the Congo more effe.ctively. 90. The Commission also met General MDbutu, who claimed ~hat political affairs no longer concerned him and that the a~ was outside politics 'and had now returned to legality~ If he had acted as he did in the early days of the crisis it wasbeoause he had had the country's interest at heart. ' He had expressly " ' prohibited the Army from discussing religion or politics. General Mobutu also informed the Commission that although the 'a~ had been in~itad' to send observers to' the preparatory Round Table Conf'erenee, "he 'had refused to :do So. Views of Mr. Lumumba's supporters 91. As has a.lready been mentioned, the attitude of -this group is based on the view that Mr. Lumumba's dismissal was illegal, i.e. that it was not 1n aocord ance with the previsi ore of the Lei Fond-emsntale ; consequentlyt all the measures "taken subsequently by :Presiden~Kasa-Vubuhave also been iiieg~l. Therefore the crisis was p~ely governmental in nature and could only basolvad by ". Parliament, the only institution entitled to express the will of the Congolese people. , t+_'. " . - .. '~ - 92. This was in subs1ianoe the viel- ~ expr-assGd among others by .Mr. Kasongo, the President of the Chamber of Repra$l;:~tat:;'ves and himself a member of the MNC-Lumumbagy' Mr. Ka.songo held tha.t 'the Chiof of state had dismissed a Prime Ministel' who enjoyed the confidence of Parliament and-who moreover represented a party possessing a parlimnenta.ry majority. By virtue of his office, he had done what-he could a.t the time to effeot a reooncilia.tion, but that attempt had failed. and 0-010n01 Mobutu!s troops ~ preven"t$d Parliameh't from meeting. He urged the - , Conciliation Commission to help to reconvene Parliament and roturnto consti~uti-one.lity.. He emphasized that Parliament could-not bEt replaced by the Round Table Conference, which was _a device of President Kasa-Vubuts, inspired from outside to oircumvent Parliament wherein only a minority supported President Kase,...Vubu' s strong views in regard to thtit constitution and his }?redileoUon 'for a federal structure. Nevertheless, Mr .. Kasongo did Dot object to a round table conference, provided that a.ll polit.ical parties wererepresentea, that all pali"': tieal pr~soners throughout the cOUntr,yware released and thatth6 personal safety of all those -taking part a.nd 'their right' to speak freely wera gae.ranteed. The cris~s in h~s view was due to the fact t.hnt tbe army was paralyzing political life and preventing, the political leaders from finding a solution, which they were perfectly capable of doing. 93. .Mr. Kamitatu, President of the Province of Leopoldville and a. leader of 'ilia PSa pa.rty, thought thattha Conciliation Commission could contribute towards the solution of the orisis by facilitating meetings between politica.l leaders who were unable to meet one another. It was his personal belief that the crisis had its origin in Belgium and had been prepared 'long in advance. With regard to the question of the country's structure, he thought that all parties would. agree to er federation, though they might differ e..s to the extent to Which decentra.lization should be carried to give the provinoes greater autonom;y. As a result of the absence of any lawful government since Mr. Lumumba. t s dismissal, Mr. Kamitatu said that many provinces had refused to recognize the de facto central ~uthorities ggj Mr. Ke.songo' pre~ented. a number of documents to the Commission (see A(47U/Add.l) He drew particular attention to El. procla.ml),tion (dated 16 September 1960, page 25 of addendum 1) said to-have been issued by Mr. Uwmumba and mainta.ined that it· was a. forgery. Mr. Delvawt and Mr. Bomboko, on the other hand, maintained that the dooument concerned was genuine. - 34 - in Leopoldville and the country had lapsed into anarchy. In fact, Mr. Lumumba had been dismissed long before the problem of structure had arisen. The only solution, Mr. Kamitatu thought, was to form a government, reconvene Parliament and, immediately afterwards, to hold around table conference to change the country's structure. The PSA party might however COnsider taking part in the round table conference proposed by President Kasa.-Vubu on condition tha.t the excesses of the army were brought to an end, aJ.lpolitical prisoners relea.sed and that Mr. Lumumba-and Mr. G!zenga parti cipate in the conference as free men (:/at should be mentioned that this particular interview with Mr. Ka.mita;tu took place on 17 January 1961). 94. Mr. K&"'1Hatu further stated that, although he had always considered Mr. LUJll\Illlba't government as the only lawful one, a realistic approach had "bo be adopted; the decision as to the legaJ.ity of Mr. Lumumba's dismissal would ultimately rest with Parliament, which had not lost its representative character. lIe also thop.ght that one of the main reasons for the crisis was to be found in the personal ambitions of the Congolese leaders, which only too often took precedence in their minds over the nation's interests; moreover, theywe~e too willing to come undor foreign influence, though not under the spell of foreign ideologies, which in his opinion had not yet 4 taken root in the Congo., 95. As already related, the Commission was unable to see Mr. Gizenga, who informed it that he was unwell. k. Gbellye, who represented him, was not willing to discuss the situation with the Commission unless eA~ressly authorized to do so by :JIx. Lumumba. !:le did however sta-oe that the crisis wa.s not due to any conflict among the Congolese people; in his view it had been brought about by the dispute between President Kasa-Vubu and Mr. Llimumba and, if "bhat were ended, the crisis would be a;~ an end. He asserted that ¥axliament alone could solve the Congo's problems, not persons from outside the country; he dwelt on the extent of foreign interference in the Congo's affairs. Of course, President Kasa-Vubu had been recomized as Chief of state by Parliament and by the- MNC-LumUl'lba party to which he (Mr, Gbenye) belonged, but it had to be remembered that President irasa-Vubu had been elected to his office by Parliament. Parliament alone was the sovGreign authority in the Congo. Mr. Gbenye emphasized the fact that he was spea.1!:.ing as a. responsible minister of the only lal'rlul government, that of Mx.' Lumumba, which was still in being and had its seat at Stanleyville. - 3' - 96. While in Ste.nleyville, the Commission also met officers of the Provincial 23 . Assembly of the Orientale Province and was also handed a copy of a rescllition ! by tb body,' welcoming the CoImnission's arrival. in the Congo, and setting forttr the As6Elllbly's views. These may be summarized a.s follows: in order to re-establish an atmoshphere of confidence (1) all political prisoners must simultaneously be liberated; (2) interference in the a.ffairs of the Congo by any foreign country whatsoever must cease; (3) arbitrary arrests must be prohibited; (4) Pa.rlia.lllent must meet under United Nations protection in a. town where there is no possibility of a.ny pressure being brought to bear Md must sta:ta whether or not i1; still MS confidence in 1;he lawful government (of Mr. Lumumha); (5) .the blockade of the Orientale province unlet be brollght to an end immediately since it only increased the tension between the Congolese; (6) immediate cessation of foreign aid to the "dissident southeast region" of the Congo. The document goes on to say that, in the event of the bloclt.ade continuing and of a failure to return to legality, th"l people of the Oriantale Province would negotiate bilateral.greements, inclUding agreements for military assistance, with the foreign Fowers of their choice. The Commission also received ~ memora.ndum'from the 'Provincial Government.~ Mr. Manzika.la, the Vice-President of the Provincial Government of the Orientale . "\. ,t . Province, referring to the question of disarming Congolese soldiers, said that it was irrelevant so far as Stenle~ille wa.s co~cerned. He described Colonel Mobutu's troops as a ba.nd of rebels who should be the first to be disarmed. 97. At Luluabourg, the capital of Kasai Province, the Commission met Mr. Multenge, the President of the provincial government, and a large number of other political leaders. Four political parties in the province had formed a commcn frcnt and submitted a memorandum giving their agreed views.gzf These need not be referred to in detail, since they are very similar to those at1;ributed elsewhere in this section to Mr. Lumumba's supporters: the main points being that all political leaders should be released a.nd that Parliament should meet under United Na.tions protection and find a solution 1;0 the crisis. MUch stress waS laid on the need to abide by the Loi Fondamentale and to put a.n end to foreign interference, especially the supply of arms and a.mmunition ;f'rom abroad. ?:2.!Annex VlI!. 't:J Annex IX. §2/ Annex XI. ,- • ..... • - )6 - 98. Somewhat naturally, in view of events in the southern part of the province, • the political leaders whom the Commission met in Luluabourg were greatly exercised by the question of the future structure of the country. Mr. j\lukenge emphasized that that was a matter which should be left to the Congolese people to decide, he thought tha.t 75 per cent of the population of his province was in favour qf a unitary state, but the Commission found in subsequent discussion with local poutical leaders that there was considerable confusion in their minds as to the difference between a unitary state, a federation and a confederation. Mr. Onia, the provincial Minister of Agriculture, said that inter-tribal rivalry had been fostered by the Belgians in the past and was still being exacerbated by them as a means whereby they coUld prOlong their exploitation of the country. He criticize, , OWC for its policy of non-interference in internal. affairs. Mr. Mubanga, the provincial Minister of Justice, roundly condemned that doctrine which, he said, inevitably resulted in OWC supporting one of the opposing parties, he fcund it difficult to understand how in fact the United Nations could help the Congolese without interfering in their internal affairs. 99. To obtain a full understanding o'f the posttion of the pro-Lumumba group it would ~f course have been essential to ascertain the views of Mr. Lurnumba himself. • Unfortunately, as already related, the Commission, despite repea~ed efforts on its part, was not permitted to see him before he met his tragic and untimely end. The Commission's reaction to his murder is dealt with e[sewhere in this report. Views et Itr. J. Sendwe -(Balubakat) 100. Fine,lly, reference must be made to the views of Mr. Jason Sendwe, the leader of -Balubilkat, the party in Katanga which is opposed to Mr. Tshombe. While supportiJ: na.tional unity and the thesis that the crisis was governmental rather than structural, Mr. Sendwe advocated a greater degree of decentralization of powers and a more equitable distribution of revenues between the centre and the provinces. In effect, he seemed to favour a tederal state in the USUally accepted sense of the term, with national defence, foreign-affairs, higher aducation,telecommunications,ett directly under the central government, the provinces being responsible for such matters as roads, primary and secondary education, public health, mining concessions and the gendarmerie. He declared that if Mr. Tshombe were prepared to accept such a scheme of federation, he (Mr. Sendwe) would be ready to abandon his stand in • favour of a separate province of Lualaba. On the other hand, Mr. Sendwe thought that it would be wrong to establish provinces on a purely tribal basis, since the - 37 - people would -then te~ to place their tribal interests first. 26/1.9 for the army, he told the Commission that, if he had his way, the whole of it, in~luding of coUrse 'the private armie"s 0:1:' Mr. 'ishombe and Mr .. Kalonji, would be disarmed. immedia;tely by the United N~iiona at the request of'the Ohiafo:!:' State~ He added that the;n~~lY oonstituted neti6nali~t bloc (FaONACO - Front national congolais), of which-he was 'cha~rman and which comprised Balubakat, MNc..tumumbe., CEREA (Centre de Regroupement afr1cain).. PSA ~ some other smaller ~rt1es" was thinking aloDg those iines. lOi.. .Atthough Hr.' Sendwa was not optimistic about the prospeots of' the" Round Table Conference - unless all political prisoners were first released - he and other reprasentatives of his party a.ttended the prepara.tory conference in the hope of persuading President Kasa-Vubu 1.0 set' up aI government responsible toPa.rliament.J unless such- a government w~re set up on a o~al:i.tion ba,sis, lieihought that the crisis wouia"ne"ier be solved.. Las~iy; Mr. Sendwe informed the Commission -that he would be 'willing to meet Mr~ Tshombe under United Nations protection. , " Views of the Sevaratists 102. As mentione~ ~arlier, Mr~ Tshombe refused to discuss Congolese problems with I the Cormdssi'on 'on the, ground that'hispositlon had been cl'early sta.ted to the worlda.nd that he would not chBnge it. As" understood by the Cornmfssion his position fa gi'V'~n below. 103. According to Mr. Tshombe, Kata.nga. -is geographically, ethItically and ec'onomioally a. region completely separate from the rest of the Congo; it had been the Belgian colonialists who, in theil' own interests, had treated it as a,pa.rt of the 6ongo. 104. Mr. Tshomba maintains that after independence he tried to co-operate with the Central Government in Leopoldville within the framework of the Loi Fondamentale but that he found its provisions unworkable. Whiles. provincial government possessed the various powers enumerated in a.rt.icle 220 0:1:' the Loi Fondamentale it had no a.dequa.te fine.nciaJ. resources to function autonomously. During the first few days of July, Mr. Tshombe had tried to see Mr. Lwnumbe. wit.h a view to disoussing these ma.tters but the la.tter had refused to meet him. When the army mutinied., bringing disorder and cha.os to the country, ha had hed t.o Sa.ve Ka;te.nge. and had. ha.d. no option but to secede.. Mr. Tshombe denounced the Lo! Fondamentale on the ground This view we.a also expressed to the Commission by politic£1J. leaders at " Coquilhatville. - 38 - that it had been drawn up by the,Belgi~ and had n~t been ratified by the Congolese people; the Belgians had drafted it in order to suit their own purposes and interests. He strongly critioized Mr. Lumumba and his government which, he said, had been responsible for the ruin of the Congo; as a result of Mr. Lumumba's policies, all foreign technicians had left the country. Now the Congo sorely needed such experts but was unable to attract any. Katanga on the other hand had retained all its foreign technicians. Mr. Tshombe considers that there is no Congolese capable of ruling the Cong~ as a united state. Consequently, he feels that each leader should devote his attention to developing his own province; l'resident Kasa-Vubu, for example, shot:.ld confine himself to his own Eas-O:mgoregion. In Mr. Tshombe's view it is unnecessary to envisage any central government in the future. 105. Now that Katanga was independent, Mr. Tshombe declared -that he wa Ill. The crisis began with the mutiny of the Force Publigue (now the Congolese Nr.tional Army) followed by Belgian milita.ry intervention which compelled the Government of the Republic to turn to the United Nations fo~ military and other a.ssistancefor the restoration of law and order. 112. There were other important ceuses: (a) Foreign interference by certo.in states in the internal affairs of the Republic of the Congo compounded the complexity and gravity of the crisis. This interference larzely counteracted the efforts of the United Nations to assist the Congolese to resolve their difficulties. (b) The riValry of Congolese leaders resulting from their personal ::unbitions and tribal nationalism and their inability to subordinate personaJ. and tribal interests to the interests of the Congo. These rivalries greatly exacerl\ated the conflict of views in regard to the constitutional and political structure of the newly independent Stll-te. (c) The persistence of differences among political parties and leaders as to the kind of changes to be made in the Loi Fondamentale, the provisional constitution of the Republic of the Congo, which had failed to end the mutual antagonisms of those who stood for a unitary state, those who favoured a. federation and those who demanded a confederation. (d) The distrust of certain political leaders who were sus;:>ectad of a1m1ng at the establishment of a unitary State under a one-party political system, and at the abrogation of the parliamentary form of government im favour of a presidential one. (e) The failure of certain Congolese leaders, while in office, to observe the Loi Fondamentale. -41- (f) The introduction of polities and bribery into the azm1 as a; means of gaining and maintaining power in the state 'an~"orinversely the in·~erference of , the military in the political lifa of the countr,Y and the recourse to terror to prevent the restoration of constitutional government and democracy. (g) The exacerbation of tribal differences and antagonisms as a means of attaining and maintaining political power. Ca-uses of the continuing crisis in the Copso ll}. While the above may be regar<'led ea the main causes of 'lihe Congo crisis th'a drift towards catastrophe .coult!. Mve been arrested and the problems largely resolved but for the other factors Which have made the crisis a con tinuing one. Some of these are: (a) The failure- of Belgium to comply SJ,)eedilY and fully with the Security Council and General Assembly r'1solution, and in particular to withdraw its military and para-military personnel and military advisers from' the Republic of the Congo and to refrain from interference in its interna. affairs. (b) The indecison of the United Nations in formulating an une 114. It is by exllIllining these factors carefully and objectively that the Commission has been led to arrive at the conclusions that it h~ ~resented to the Advisory Committee as the basis for a sol~tio~ of the difficulties between the Congolese political leaders, in ord@r to bring stability to the Republic of the Congo. VI.. CONCLUSION 115. The situation now prevailing in the Republic of the Congo is extremely dangerous. The country is divided betwe~n four warring factions. Civil war h'~s indeed already begun in North Katanga. and i"b threatens to spread into other provinces, and lead. to direct fo;reign military interventions. The economic situation is rapidly worsening and the state treasury is nearly empty. Despite the efforts "of ONUC, several regions are suffering from famine and threatened with epid.emics. It is no exaggeration to say that the country is on the verge of oatastrophe. It a political solution to the present crisis is not found urgently, very grave events will oc:our that will anda.n.ger not only the Congo but also" Afrioa and indae"l the whole world. ll6. In aecorda.nce "lIdth its tems of reference, the Cottlission has endeavoured to make a thorough study of the situation"in the Congo and, without interfering in~e internal affairs of the country, to help to reconoile the various trends of opinion in order to achieve a peaceful solution to tbapresent crisis. U7. The Commission found ~ong ma~y leaders, belonging to both the pr.o-Lumuroba. and pro-Kasa-Vubu groups, a general teeling of weariness and a sincere desire to reach agreement with their opponents and achieve a peaceful solution to the crisis; they welcomed the Commission's "efforts and eoopera.ted with it. u8. :But a. small number of other leaders seemed reluctant to accept the Commissiont s " oonciliation efforts. Mr. Moise '.l's~ombe and Mr. Albarl, Kalonji declined to receive the Commission officially because they said they had no special problems to submit for its consideration. V~. Antoine Gizenga considored himself to be the sole representative o~ legal authority and refused to discuss ~ problems with the Commission unless and until it had obtained an authorization from Mr. Patriee Lumumba. Their unwillingness to cooperate with the Commission has greatly hampered its work. 119c Pxesident Kasa-Vubu considers the Commission as merely a form of United Nation technical assistance in the politioal ~ield. He gave it oourteous cooperation within the limits of his i:nterpretation of its terms of referenoe. TOWards the end of the Commissionfs stay he was still courteous but his cooperation seemed to be less read.D.y given. Had it not ~been for this chcmge of attitude the Cornmissioo might have achieved much better results. -44 - 120. I~ is worth noting that the less cooperative leaders are the very persons who are now holding the reins of power in one or another of the opposing camps. I~ is difficul~ ~o avoid ~he conclusion ~ha~ they fear tha~ negotiations and reconcilia~ion may result in ~heir having to relinquish a meo.sure of the power they now hold; they ~herefore appear to prefer a military rather than a political and constitutional solution of the present crisis. 12l' Because of the uncooperative and' intr~igent attitude of certain leaders, the several at~empts made by the Commission to reconcile 'the opposiDg groups have not led to positive results. Nevertheless, ~he C~mms.s'sion was able to make a careful study of the situation and to ascertain tlie views and feelings of most of' the le~ers concerned. It rea.ched a number of conclusions which might form the basis of future conciliation efforts. 122. When the Security Council was convened in February to examine the Congo probl~m, the Comniission had already reached certain' princip~ ciDn~lusions. In view of the importance of the Security Council discussions for the solution of the crisis, the Commission decided on 15 February 1961 to inform the Advisory Committee on the Congo immediately, in advance of this reporl, of ~h~se conciusions• .§1/ The Commission1s conclusions are set forth in greater de~ail below. (a) Loi Foudamentll.le 123. The Loi Fondamentale concerning ~h'l struc~ur'l of the Congo has been widely criticized end interpr~ted in different and of~en ccntradictcry ways ever since it was ad~pted by the Belgian l'arliamen~ on 19 May 1960. Many Congolese lead~rs, while ready enough to qucte it in support ~ their actions 'Vhenit suits them to do so, ha~e expressed ~he view ~hat it is ill-adapted to conditions in the Congo and that it is ,• l' largely responsible for the presen~ crisis, and have deliberately chosen to ignore it when it suits them. Almost all of them have requested that it be revised without dela.y·" 'l.lthough their opinions differ as to the stage at which this should be done. 124. The Commission considers that many of the criticisms mode of the Loi Fondamentale are weli founded•.It is. ~onvinced that this l~w is incomplete ana ill-adapted to the needs of the Congo. Consequently the Commission is of the view that its anendnemt or replacement by a new constitution aa soon as possi'!.lle ~uld , ' contribute greatly to a so1l.1.tion of the crisis. However, until this has b0'3n dc-ne, and in the absence at any other basic le.w in the Congo, it is desirable that !1ll concerned should uphold the Loi Fond£ment.ale as the basic law at the Republic• .§1/ See A/4696. (b) PrGvisieonal gove~~ 125. In eel.l;,ly February, the Council of Commissioners - General was replaced by a t'provisional governmentllheaded by Mr. Joseph Ileo. After the formation of' his government, Mr. Ilea told the Commission that he intended to broaden its basis so as to make it a national unity government, that six ministerial Fosts, including a Vice-Premiership and the Ministr,y of National Defence, had been left vacant for that purpose, and that he was negotiating with the pro-Lumumba group in order to include ncminees of t.hat group in the government; this was subsequently oonfirmed by those concernod. The Commission also discussed this matter with Mr. Kasongo, a pro-Lumumba leader, and Mr •. Sendwe, the leader of the Balubakat, who stated tha't theY' were willing to participate in the Ilaw government and the.t a tentative a~eement on the question had indeed been reached with Mr. Ileo. This was later co~irmed by Mr,- Ileo himself who told -the Commission that the governmen't was on the point of being broadened, Were it not for the death of H~. Lumumba, an event which delayed this movo, but which did not alter his intentions. 126. The CommiSsion repeatedly urged on President Kasa-Vubu and other Congolese po:m'ted. OU"t leaders the need to form a constitutional central government, and/that the United Nations oould not treat with the Council of Commissioners.General as a government. The Commission considers the replacement of the Council of Commissioners-General by a "proVisional gCrvernmeut"headed by 114'-r. Ileo to be an encoureging step toward an ea.rly r·aturn to constitutiona..lity WBut it is only a step, for the Ileo govern ment, in its view, cannot be considered as lega.l until i1i is approved by Parliament ina.ccordanca wi.th the Loi Fondo.m9Ilta.le. The Commission deemed it essential that the basis of the newly formed nprovisional gcvernment" should be broadened without delay so as to make it 0. government of national lUlity, by including nominees of important politioal groups which are not now appropriately represented in the provisional government. (c) Militaryoperationfi! 127. The Commission noted with the deepest concern that. fighting had broken out between .Mr. Tshombe l s troops and Baluba in North Katanga and. the possibility of its spreadidlg 'to the border areas bet.ween the Kasai, Equateur and Orientale Provin~es where the forces of General Mobutu and General Lundula face one another. It fears that ~L civil strife is not oh~ked at the outset, it oould well degenerate into warfare of the most uninhibited kind between different tribes all over the Congo. This danger has been rendered all the mora imminent by the recent mo.sso.oros of political detainees which has further inflamed political passions and tribal hatred and which may set off a series ot repritals Qy the opposing caWps. ~See Armex XVII. - 46 - 128. 'Th" Commission s-!;rongly feels that -the mili1;a.ry operaUons whieh are now in progrega in Katanga and those which may be launched in other provinces of the Republic of the Congo must be halted immediately -to avert the imminent danger of civil war. Por that reason and klso to obviate the danger of foreign military intervention, it recommeniied and st.ill maintains that attemptB b~' Congolese leaders to achieve a military solution of the present crisis must be cheoked immediately. (d) Reorganization of the Arm"e nationale congolaise l29. The ColllJllission is firmly convinced that until the various armed group,s in the Congo are insulated from politics and reorganized, normal political and constitutional functioning cannot be restored not a lasting settlement achieved. It is also of the opinion that these various armed groups, indisciplined members of which may at any moment break loose from their command ann terrorize the popula.tion, J constitu6e a constant J6hreat to law and order. 130. The Commission considers it essential that the brm"e nationale congolaise and the other armed groups now operating in the territory should be insulated from politics and 'reorganized. Feeling that the proposed reorganization would be made more difficult without the co-operation of all the Congolese leaders concerned, it suggests that this reorganization be carried out with the aSsistance and under the guidance of the United Nations through a comprehensive training scheme under a national defence council to be set up by the constitutional central authority of the Republic i.e.the centrlil a.uthority established under the !:2! Fondamenta.le. 131. The Commission also feels that during the period when the armed groups are being reorganized, the United Nations forces in the Cringo should assist the authorities in the Congo in the maintenance of law and order -bhroughout the entire territory of the Republic in co-operation with the Congolese authorities, and also help to protect the unity and territorial integrity of the Congolese State. 132. The Commission realizes that in order to carry out its increased responsibilities, the United Nations Force will have to be strengthened to a consider'lble ext~nt, both in men andmoc.ern equi:;Jment, and ho,es that all Eember States will co-operate fully with the Secretary-Genere.l in this matter. - 47 - (e) Summit meet;ng of Copgolese leaders 133. The st:tu<,ture of the Congo as defined in -the loi Fondamentale is widely criticized by Congolese leaders as being ill-adapted to the special ccnditions prevailing in the Congo and in particular to its tribal and regicnal set-up. Many of these leaders contend that the defects in the Lci Fcndnmentale were partly responsible for the secession of Katanga and South Hasai and that failure to remedy them may lead to further secessionist movel1lents (Seo paragraphs 134~ 136·). 134. The Commission is of the view that in present conditions e federal form of government can alone preserve the national unity and territorial integrity cf the Congolese State. It feels, ~oreover, that it will not be particularly difficult for the Congolese leaders to reach an agreement on such a form of constitution, for there is a general desire among them for a greater do centralization of the powers of the Central Government aru1an equitable distribution of revenues between the Centre and provinces. However, the Commission is of the view that this is a matter upon which only the Oongolese peOJ.>le and Parliament can finally pronounce. 135. The Commission notes that the Round Ta.bIe Conferonce whioh President Kasa-Vubu had proposed .to convene on 15 February for the purpose of re-exemining the structure of the Congo encounterod opposition from some leaders and had to be postponed. It is doubtful whether the conferenoe cnn be convened in the near future and, oonsidering the way in which the preparatory conference was held, whether the conferonce as conceived by l?resident Ka,sa-Vubu will be fully representative or ef~eetive if it does take place. 1,6. The Commission feols tho.t a representative meeting of the principal Congolese leaders would be more likely to achieve better results. Most of the leaders consulted by it have reacted favour",bly to the idea of this Congolese nsummitn but some have observed that the meeting. should be held at a neutral place. The Commission, therefore, suggests that a summit meeting cf Congolose political leaders be convened in the near future at 0. neutral place, oUt:;,ide the territory of the Republic if neoessar,y, with a view to achieving national reconoiliation and agreement on the formation of a government of n~tional unity and on measures necessary to re-ustablish normal conditions, and on .iesired changes in the Lai ~"',.'-,... - Fondamentale concerning the structuro of the Congo, more especially in the direction of groater decentralization of the powers of the Central Government - 48 - and an equitable distribution of revonuos between the Centre and the provinces. If suoh a meeting is held within the Congo, tho Commission feels that the United Nations would be well advised to givo all possible assistance in this matter and should extend all necessary protection to those participants who request it. The Commission desires to make it clear that this summit meeting is not intended to replace, bypass or circumvent the ParlilllIlent which alllno is the :l.uthority empowered under the Loi Fondamentale to take the steps necessary for any anendments to the Loi Fondamentale. All that was intended was that if at a prior informal summit meetinglikethe ana suggosted leaders oould agree on tho changes considered necessary, it would expedite and facilitate the passage through Parliament of the desired amendments. as the suggested Congolese summit meeting laoks a constitu tional character, its conclusions will necessarily have to be submitted to Parliament for study and ratification. (f) !'olitice.l deta$.nees 157. In its message of 15 Febru~ry to the advisory Committoe on the Congo, the statlld that it Commission/considered the continued incarceration of prisoners as hostages or on other pol 1't'l1ca grounds. to/beundes1rable,,,1n the 1nterest 0 ft'nil, 1cna1 reoonC1'l't'1a 10n and unity. It recommended that political porsonalitios who were being detained in the Republic of the Congo should be released and a general amnesty granted immediately folloWing th,; establishment of a govel"lIlllent of national unity. It is not the Commission's intention that this general amnesty should extenu to those who have oommitted capital offences. 138. The Commission was profoundly shocked to learn of ~1r. L~bats murder~ It was equally shocked a few days later, to hear that i.Ir. Jean-Pierre Finant and five other political prisoners at B~tcwanga h.ad been tried by a customary court, sentenced to death and executed. Subsequently, it he"::,-"d the ni.lWS that fifteen poli~ical prisoners at Stanl~yville had been executed as a reprisal. The Commission cannot too strongly condemn the inhllman practice of resorting to executions to eliminp.te political oponents or in reprisals. The Commission f_ls that'in view of the recent tragic developments, all political prisoners should be .released. forthwith \'lithout a:rr:r further delay, and. the arbitrary arrests, transfers and executions of political leaders, members of lOc:r:ll'Sment and provincial asser.1blies. should be prevented.. §2/ See Annex XVIII. - 49 - (g) Parliament 139. The present crisis will not be solved unless Parliament is reconvened without • ~he Commission realizes that in the present conditions of unrest many members of Parliament may fear for their safety. It feels that adequate measures should be t'akenby the United Natillons Forae to give protection to such members of" Parliament as may desire it, so as to guarantee the exercise of the rights and immunities to which they are entitled and to enable them to discharge their responsibilities without fear. (h) Foreign interference 140.. All the Congolese leaders interviewed by the Commission referred in forthright terms to the necessity of putting an end to foreign interference in the internal affairs of the Congo. While it is of aourse true that what they had in mit;ld was the support given from abroad to their opponents, the fact remains that foreign interference of all kinds, whether open or secret, and more espeaially when it takes the form of providing arms, wnmunition and military personnel to one or the other, of the contending factions, exercises a most baneful influence on the whole situation; it encourages the various leaders to adopt intransigent attitudes and to shun all attempts at conoiliation. The Commission is convinced that no oonciliation can be achieved unless foreigninterferenoe in all its forms is stoppe 143. The Commission feels that an appeal should be made to all States _to abstain from aDY kind ofinterferenoe in the internal affairs of the country and, in particular, to avoid assuming ally attitude which might aggravate the opposition between the different tendencies in the Congo Rnd thus make reconciliation more difficult. (i) Concluding observations 144. The Commission concluded its work in the Congo on 20 Februery, but its principal conclusions, which form the basis of this chapter' of the report, were lllflmSmitt"d in an interim message to the Advisory Committee on the. Congo on 15 February. 'There have been a number of important developments since then. It is thereforenecossary that ,those conolusions pe viewed ag&inst the background of s'Qba6quent event... The situation in the '1ongo is changing almost daily.' It is not possible for the Commission to comment on all these "developments, but it has felt it necessary to make the folloWing supplementary observations. 145. The COllUDission has noted with speoial interest the, Seourity Council's resolution (S/4741) of 21 February 1961, which it-welcomes as a positive contri bution towards the attainment, in co-operation with the Congolese people, of solutions of present difficulties in the Republic of the Congo. It notes with satisfaction that its own conclusions and recommendations and the above resolution are generally in acoord. 146. With regard to the COllUDission's conclusion on the subject of the Loi Fondamentale (paragraphs 12:5 and 124), it: is felt that technical assistance could be extended by the United Nations in the form of a team of experts who could oooperate with the Congolese authorities in their endeavour to return to legality and constitutionality, in the revision of the Loi Fondamentale and the drafting of a new constitution for the country, in the drafting of new laws and their implementation, as well as in the administration of justice. . 147: As regards the "provisional government" (paragraphs 125 e.nd 126), the COllUDission feels that the present T\pr Goneva, IlJ March 1961 (Signed) Jaja A. Wachuku Agha Shahi Md. Sopioe Alioune Cisse Hallas Andom Fadl Oboid Rameshwar Rac Taiob Sahbani G. Flamma Sherman NOTE ~ Throo monbors of the Commission wero not present at Geneva when the report was signod. The obsorvations submitted by 11:1:'. A. Quaison-Sackoy (Ghana) appoar in annex XX; tho notes and re·sorvations of the Chairman, Mr. Jaja A. Wachuku (Nigeria), wbo signed the report in New York constitute annex :XXII. Mr. Ahmcd Snoussi (Morocco) was unable to bo prosent at the meetings of the Cornmission either at Genova or in Now lork. A note of clarification by Mr. Rameshwar Rac (India) forms annex XXI. - 52 - ANNEX I 4. Telegram from Chairman of the Commission tl\ the Secre1>ar;y-GenereJ. dat<'>d 26 December 1..960 Sopiee, Andom and myself hed 3-hour meeting with Kasa-Vubu morning twentysixth. Lomboko and Adoula, who represented Ileo, were present. Meeting was very cordial and three questions ~ere disoussed as follows I :to Da1>e of arrival of Conciliation Commission Kase.-Vubu proposed that Commission arrive Leopoldville on 3 January. He stated tha1> dongole~e authorities would cooperate with UN to insure adequate hotel accommodations for i1>s members. On our suggestion it was agreed that pending arrival of Cnmmissionl we would prepare ground for work of Commission in cooperation with represente.'Gives appointed by Kasa-Vubu. Latt.er designated Ileo' ani!. Bomboko jas relJresentatives. 2. Composition of Conciliation Commission Kasa-Vubu, supported by Bomboko and Adoula, objected to presence of Ghana, Guinea,UAR, ~orocco and India in Commission. They stated that these countries were biased and did not offer guarantees of objectivity which were indispensable. Moreover, Congo population did hot repeat not accept them and if they came there might be incidents for which Congolese authorities had to decline responsibility. We replied that we could not repeat not alter composition of Commission and pointed out that members of Commission acted as individuals and not repeat not as representatives of their respective Governments, that three countries, namely Guinea, Mali and UAR, hed already a.nnounced their withdrawal from Commission, that Commission was composed of a majority of representatives from oOllrrories ~o whioh Congolese authorities had raised no objections, and finally that Commission would be objective in its work.. We appealed to Kasa-Vubu not rpt not to ;?ress on matter. Kasa.-Vubu, however, insisted on his objection. :Fine.1ly, we informed Kasa Vubu that we would immediately inform Secgen of his views on composition of Commission and in particular his objections to coming of certain members so that Secgen would take any decision he saw fit in consultation with J.dvisory Committee for Congo. Kasa-Vubu agreed to propcsal but Adoula added that we should urge Secgen to persuade unwelccme members to withdraw voluntarily in order to ensure full cooperation and success of Commission. ANJ:lEX I I 3. r,adio Broadcasting of' UN programmes In reply to our request made at previous meeting regarding use of radio facilities by UN, Kasa-Vubu stated that UN could not rpt not operate its own broadcasting station, but that there were no objections to broadcasting UN programmes over Congolese station, provided programmes be submitte Most disappointed with Kasa-Vubu's reaction your point 2. Composition of group is 'sole responsibility of UN and oannot ·be changed at request of Kasa-Vubu nor can such request be considered valid reason for proposal to any country to withdraw voluntarily. Were conditions re composition to be maintained, this is for us tantamount t.o refusal to receive commission as set up and would have to go on reoord as such refusal. Matter will be taken up in Advisory Committee Thursday afternoon, and if there is no change in Kasa-Vubu's attitude, these are the comments wi'~h which it woul d have to be reported. Were, as I take for granted, my interpretation of the situation t,o be confirmed by Advisory Committee, matter would have to be reported to G.A. In these circumstances, before taking matter to Advisory Committee, I would hope that, Kasa-Vubu would reconsider situation and drop condition. l~y other stand could not but lead to moct strained relations with UN and leading members of ..organization and would tend seriously to harm president's own position with friendly ANNEX I membere. This is particularly un:t:ortunate at time when Congo I s own interest would s?eak for efforts from the President t? work in exactly the opposite direction, as indic~ted in my letter, in order to render possible continued UN contribution and in order to give weight ,and value to what he may have achieved during his visit to New York. Naturally, it is essential to h&ve reaction of President to my letter before meeting of advisory Committee. e. Letter dated 28 December 1960 from Mr. Justin Bomboko addressed to the Chairman of the Commission i:1r. Chairman, ,The President of the ,Republic of, the Congo has requested me to convey to you the following message: "Our conversation of this afternoon has enabled me to note that you have agreed to the prinoiple of non-interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of the Congo. "Furthermore, you have given roe assurances that the members of the Conoiliation Commission would conform with this principle and that they would in no way substitute themselves fOT the Congolese authorities in' the search for a solution to the problems which pre occupy us. "The message of the Secretary-General shows that it is impossible to change the composition of the Commission. Be!J,I'ing in mind this diffiCUlty as well as the assurances which you have given, we agree to abide' by the .§'tatus quo. "Our only concern has been to fe.eilitate your task and, when we wanted to re-examine the composition of your Commission, it,wa,s only to remove the elements which, by their previous attitUdes, had o.cted in a way whioh can be called interference in the internal affairs of the Congo." Please accept, Mr. Chairman, the assuranoe of my high oonsideration. The President of the College of the Commissioners-General (signed) J. M. BOMBOKO - JJ - ANNEX I •D. Letter dated 29 December 1960 from the Chairman of the Commission to President Kasa-Vubu Mr. President, Mr. Justin Bomboko has transmitted to me, by a letter dated 28 December 1960, the message that You have kindly addressed t.o me regarding the Concilie:non Commission of the United Nations. My colleagues and I wish to thank you very warmly for your expression of friendship and collaboration shown by this letter~ We have immediately transmitted the text of your message to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration. (signed) Jaja A. WachUku President of the Conciliation Commission • :.NNEX II Provisional'Liw.of COngolese Leaders whom the Commission ma,y wi eh to meet LEOPOLDVILLE l~ HEADS OF INSTITUTIONS (a) Chief of'State (Joseph Kasa.-Vubu) (b) President of the Senate (Joseph Ileo) (c) President of the Chamber (Joseph Kasongo) (d) President of Provincial GOvernment (Cleophas Kamitatu) (e) :President of Provincial 1.ssembly (Kakwale.) 2. LEIlDERS OF POLITICAL PARTIES (a) MNC-Lumumba (htrics Lumumba,*) (b) PNP (Albert Delvaux Md Pe.ulBolye.) (c) pSA (Cleopoos Kamitatu o.nd Sylvain Kama) (d) ABAKO (Nzeza. N1s.nbu) (e) PUNA (Jean Bolilmngo) (f) Ca.rlel Balubllko.t (Je.son Sendwe and Isnac Kalonji) (g) UNIMO (Justin Bomboko) (h) 1'.1'. (Alphonse Nguvulu) (i) Independent (CY"rille 1l.doulo.) 3. OTHER PERSONALITIES (a) Colonel I.Iobutu (b) Joseph Okito* (c) Dllniel Kanze. (d) Finant* (e) A. Ndele COQUILHATVILLE 1. President of Provincial Government (Louis Elteteki) 2. Presiaent of Provinoial Assembly (Louis Ekoko) * Reported to be in prison. - 57 - ANNEX II S'£llNLEYVILLE 1. Acting President of Provincial Govermneut (Manzikala) 2. President of Provincial Assembly (A. Babadet) 3. Leader of the pro-Lumumba group (Antoine Gizenga) 4. Leader of the anti-Lumumba group (Alpbonse Songolo*) 5. President of Provinoial Govermnent of KIVU (Jean Miruho*) :BUKAVU 1. Vioe-President of Provinoial Govermnent 2. President of Provinoio,l a.l!lsembly 3. Leader of CEREA (Allioet Kasbatimra) ELISABETHVILLE 1. President of Provinoial Govermne1J.t 2. President of Provinoial Assembly LULUABOURG-BloKWllNG./;. 1.' President of Provinoial Government (Bo,rtbolemy Mukenge) 2. President of Provinoinl Assembly (Dominique Mauono) 3. Leader of MNC-Kalonji (Albert Kalonji) * Reported to be in prison. .I\.NNE"A: III Letter dated 17 January from Mr. Joseph Xasa-Vubu to the Chairman of the Commission Leopoldville, 17 January 1961. 1Ir. Chairman, I have had the honour to receive. the list you vere good enough to send me of the leaders whom the COllciliaU'on Commission could usefully see"during its stay in the Republic of the Congo. I agree entirelY with -bhe names en this listl but I would suggest that you meet the delegations of the different parties rather than the leaders chosen by you in each of them. Furthermore, I would add to the list of official leaders in Leopoldville the Vice"President of the Provincial Government, Mr. Gaston DIOiJlI, and the Vice-President of the Assembly, Mr. Joseph IlTllIDU. Regarding politioal parties, I ought to draw your attention to' the . existenoe of the following: a) Leopoldville JJ3AZI, lUlLK (Lake Leopold 11) b) LUluabourg C01&, United Basonge 0) Bultavu RECKO - CEI.'l.E.il. (WEaEGEMERE branch) d) Coquilhatville Representatives of the UNDlO and :J?Ulji. parties. You may think it advisable to meet them as well. I repeat my most sinoere wishes for the success ,of your mission. Please ~ccept, MX. Chairman, ••••••••etc. President of the Republio: Pres idenJu, (sgd.) Jose;;>h KaSA-VUBU Collage of General Commissioners: General Commissioner for Foreign Affairs (sgd.) Justin BOMBOKO - 59 - Translated from French Letter dated 18 Januttry, from :Mr. Joseph Kasa-Vubu to the Presidents of -,frovinoial Govarmnen1is Leopoldville, 18 Januar,y 1961 To the Presidents of the GovernmQuts in Coquilhatville Stanleyville Elizabethville Luluabourg Ba.kwanga Bukavu Mr. President, I, have the honour to introdUce to you the United Nations Conciliation Commission, bearer of this letter. The Conciliation COIlJD1ission is touring the different provinces of the Republic of the Congo -in order to make personal contact with the largest possible number of political leaders. Kindly give the Conciliation Commission all the facilities it requires for accomplishing its missiono I should be grateful if you yoursolf could take all necessary steps to ensure its welcome and to assist it to tnake any contacts i't WJ.y wish. I should ba obliged if the members of the Conciliation Commission could also visit the political prisoners detained in establiShments under your authority. President, Republic of' the Congo (sgd.-) Joseph Kasa-Vubu - 60 - Translated from French J:.NNEX V ~tter..AeJi..ed 22 Ja.nu~ 1961J ..l.!:om theJlll.airman to Mr. Joseph Kasa.-Vubu EUsabethville, 22 January 1961 Mr. President, i,.s we informed you a.t Leopoldville, the Commission desires to see, during its tour of the Congo proviuces,the CQngalese leaders now in detention. You were good enough to agree to this plan, and to forward to me for that purpo'sea letter addressed to the provincial authorities. However, when I informed Mr. Tshombe of the CommissionI s desire to see l:ilr. Fatriee Lurnumba, and showed him your letter, be told me that he was not responsible either for Mr. Lumumba's arrest. or for his detention, and that you should send a letter to the parson specifically responsible for guarding Mr. Lumw:nba. To ena.ble the Commission to carr,y out its impoJ:tant mission it is bound to see Mr. Lumumba, at present detained in Katango.. This is particularly im,portan-:b because the Commission, d1U"ing its stay at Btanleyville, was a.ble to gain . . permission to see the prisoners Mr. klphonse Bongolo nnd Mr. Jea.n Mi~o, by satisfying the local authorities that it expected "0 see the polit:l.cal leOOer$ -. partieulal"l,y Mr. Lumumba - deto.iD,ad in the other places. In this way H 'ml,.S a.ble to see Messrs. Songolo and lliruho, without witnesses, {ft the offioe' of t.he President of,the Provincial, GoverJiment. I hava the honour to remind you of your assurnnce that you would give us every facility to see the politioal detaineas in the various parts of the Congo J and to request you kindly to telegraph to us with all speed El. further letter addressed to the person at present responsible for' gua.rding 'Mr. Lumumba., giV'ing him speoific instructions to allow the Commission to see Mr. Lumumbl1 immediately. I have the honour to be etc. Jaja A. Wachuku Chairman, Conciliation Commission - U.l,. - Ju"'IJNEX VI Address bro&?-cast by :Mr. B'.asa.-Vubu on 2 Janua,51 1961 MY dear fellow-countxymen, Two days ago I conveyed to you my good wishes for the New Year.. In the diffioult ciroumsta.nces in which we are living, these wishes were imbued with fatherly concern: hardly six months ago we were full of joy in achieving independence; we ma.de endless pllUls and wishes for the prosperity and greatness of our eountr,y. Today the future of the Congo is beset with serious obstacles of which we are all aware. How is it that we have come to such a pass? This is not th~ time to scrutinize the mistakes that ho.ve been made, but how is it possible not to recall the action of a GovermnElut that was more sensitive about vain prestige tll2Jn ooncerned about the welfare of the people? It was under its guidance tha:t, 'the oountry wE/nt downhill towards economic disorganization, internal strife and. the unsettling of institutional struotures. Two months of_wild agitatio~1 !abrile speeches and the excit~tion of peoples' minds, and the Congo found itself on 1:ihe brink of ruinl Aware of my responsibilities to you, I ha.d to put an end to this regime. In doing so, I had in mind the thousands of persons who are now employed, , . '. the children who are being weakened for life by hunger and priva.tions, and the dead whose number was being uselessly mUltiplied by fratricidal strife. Sinoe then, we have entered upon a period of difficult and slow recove~; the stage~ are long and the result8 may be scan:t.y in measure ~ While we can sta.te today that we have made some headway, no one would d.a.re to say that the wind of the tornado has stopped blowing and that the storms of the past months have been followed by oalm end peace .. '.rhat is why, at the beginning of this year, I must once more call upon you to close your ranks in order the better to struggle against the internal and external forces which threa.ten us. We cannot cry victory yet, and the same strict discipline which was necessary during the harsh da.ys of Septembert must continue to prevail if we wish to avoid ever,ythfng being ruined for good. Therefore, despi-be what some people are saying, there OM be no question of oh.o.nging our route a.nd I should like to take a.dvantage of this opportunity to tell you as c1ea.r~y a.s possible what are the objectives in view for the weeks to come. ANNEX VI First of all, it may be recalled that we are faced with the probiemof the very structures of the oountry: 'entire regions have felt that." they oould find the solution in seoession;, other regions a.re threatening to do so; provinoes are on the point of splitting uPJ in short, we are faced with ~ institutional crisis. It is the Fundamental lAw which is at stake: the mechanisms" which it visualized have not he.d the desired results or they have shown' themselves to ba ine.dequate o Thus, in failing to organize the financial a.utonomy of the provinces, the Funda.mentalLaw merely ma.de theil;' autonomy illusory; for ex.ample, while free to decide upon" the building of a. new school the Provinoio,l Government waS" not giVen the neoessar,y meaQS to pay for it. It is easy to realise that,"beingsubject~d to such an" inappropriate regime, the oountr,y'~annot restore its health by resorting to pa.rtial remedies which do not attack the root of the evil 'with' all .' the necessar,y means. Serious illnesses require strong' remedies, and in order to reform from top to bottom the law which must be the solid foundation of oUr country, it is not possible to turn to a. parliament wherein certain regions of the country arano longer represented. What value ca.n a.ttach to the deoisions of'a. Sanata.; 'of a., geographioal nature such as ours, when an entire province" refuses to atten~, while other regions ask for more valid guarantees in order to have a . ' grea.ter d.egree of a.utonomy? It is the whole of the institutions of the eoun~ry that is being ca.iled in question and to wish t~ entrust' their reform to oertain bodies among them, the Chamber nnd the "Senate in'partioula.r, is EL failure to see that this Parliament no longer represents more than a part of the country, an important pa.rt no doubt, but a. pa.rt which is not empowered to ensure the return of the minority within the framework of the whole. It is also El. fa.ilure ~ recogni.ze thfJ.t the parliament itself, in its structure, is oalled in questionp und that it is hardly qualified in its present composition to reform itself oompletely by itself. The cure in such a.. difficult situa.tion oannot be found in nom.a.l ways I you c~ot fight evil by evil. We re~lize that oe~ain foreign countries are seeking "ha drag us a.long this pa.th; it 10 obviously in their interest to do so; a.s long as our crisis l~sts, we a.re not a very serious oompetitor for them. But, when some of our own political leaders fall into step with them, that is something that is ascribable to an erroneous conception of national interest or implies that the a.ppetitQ."for power and honours is dangerously guiding some of theme Translated from French @fflEX VIr Just as one does not build on cracked or deteriorated foundations, so too one cannot call upon existing institutions in order to bring abou~ the· reconstruction which the country awaits•. Something else is therefore neededa.nd that is Why we have conceived of this Round-Ta.ble Oonference in which all· opinions and all regions of the oountry will be represonted. In its oomposition, this Conferenoe will a.lreaaY gather more people than the present Parliament can do, and by this token alone, it will be a SUQcess. It will not be hampered by a frame· of· work, by methods and rules which ma.y proveI in practice to be a burdensome ·yob, a.nd its ftmc1i,ioniDg rill develop in a. flexible wa.y ·which is' often 8 oondition for effioienoy. Its task will be to reoonsider the institutions of the Congo, to adapt them better to the' situa.tions ;whioh the crisis has rev_led, so as to rebuild them' in a fasting way, in keeping with the aspirations of the people.' It'will therefo·re ha.ve to take decisions, among others, on the powers, method of J:lOminction' and' . responsibiliti;esof the 'future oentral government of the country and will thus provide :US with the preoise framework for the 'funotioning of thi's 'govirmnen-t, the authority of whioh will be recognized everywhere. We shall than be able iio entrust the reins of 'power to th~ .'heWn of men whioh the present "formateur", Mr~ Ileo, ha.sthought· of gathering around him in order to oarry out the second phase of the operation of general recovery. The CoUncil , of COl1l!l1issioners-General will have then ooncluded its task of economic and administrative reorganization and we shall then be able to hail, u.S is proper, the safeguarding action which it undertook under diffiCUlt -- even perilous conditions. It oontributed to restoring order in the count~ while. the institutional crisis prevented the setting up of So government and thus ma.de it possible, thanks t9 the competenoe and devotion of its members, and thanks also to the effeotive support of the National A1:my and its Chief, to avoid the chaos which seriously threa.ten.ed us'. I must now allay certain misgivings; the' .. conferenoe oannot be a. failure, and a.ocordingly we must devote the time o.nd the oare whia~are neoeasar,y for its prepa.ration. That is why I h~va decided that Mr~ Ileo, who remains the "formateur" of the future Government, as I said, will ba instructed to organize and to set up this Conference. He will be a.ssisted in , . his task by a. commission of leaders coming from different regions of the oountry. This Commission will start to work very shortly as I b.o.ve decided the:h the Conference should open on 25 January, at El. place to be decided la.iler. Here, then, are the goa.ls and. tlw work progrnmme for the-· weeks to. come. ~ 64 • ANNEX VI Ever,yone must now shoulder his responsibilities before the countr,y which is suffering and which remains torn asund~r: if individual appetites do not give way to the general interest; if the political lenders make no efforts to silence the sowers of disoord,· and do not prevent them from doing harm; if ever,yone does not get down to work immediately, in order to ensure the economie activity or the proper administration of the eountry; we aball face days whieh will be even darker than those we have knOm1. But I know that no one wishss to come to such a pass, and I am sure that it will suffice to outline charly the road, for enchone, showing his civic spirit, even thOUgh this may represent persona.l so..orifices, to aocept the . iUseipline and sacrifices which ime llOUl:ltry asks of him. I know that for you the :independence fc,,: whioh we have :taught and which has taken the lives of JlIIl.DY citizens, ·does not mean regression or a step backwards, hunger or death, but the~progress and happineas of each and his family~ Our people need bread and seouritYlthe entire world ia giving us its help to·ena.ble,us to get out of our·difficultiesl for our. brothers and in the face of the world which ia looking at ~us,' we shall be able· to make 1961 the year of national concwrd. We shall. sUllceeil if ea.ch Congolese wishea it. For my part, I ahall devote all my strength. to this' pU11'0se. and with the help of God I am convinced that we shall. sucoeed. - u:; - ANNEX VII Ethnic groupin..,g (Document communicated by the services ot Mr. Kasa-Vubu) Owing to the large numbBr and repeated migrations of the Congolese races, it is often difficult to assign them to groups. In some cases the ethnic frontiers as drawn do not coincide with the true boundaries of an ethnic group, as, for example, where a part of a population has emigrated towards another group) and there forms an ethnic island. Such a case cannot be ,taken into aocount for the purposes of an administrative division, unless the ethnic island gains 'an ascendancy by reason of its political power or ita population density. In this way, we obtain nine large population groups linked by cultural affinities or having e. common origin. These groupings might serve as the ~ais for the formation of mne federal provinces or States. ,..<>" 1. The first group would comprise the races of the Lower Congo, namely the BA-SONGOLO, the BA-WOYD, the MA-YOl1E, the BA-8UNDI, the BA-KONGO and the BA-M.B4TA. 2. The second group comprises tbe tribes of the Kvlango and of part of what is at present Katanga. It comprises the BA-LUNPA, the BA-TSHOKE, the BA-FENnE, the BA-YAKA, the BA-SUXU, the BA-MBALA, the BA-HUANA and the BA-NDINGA, these ~poPulations having eultural affinities or a common political history. The BA-TSHOKE of Katanga should be amalgamated with those of the Kwango, because of their common origin 'and identical culture and with a view to economic betterment. The BA-TSHOKE of Katanga live in a prosperous region with an agricultural economy, while the BA-TSHOKE of' the Kwango have a poor econom;y" compelling them to live at the expense of their neighbours. A combination of these two populations would result in a balanced economy, helped by the common origin of the two popu1ations~ the poor group could provide manpower for the prosperous region. 3. The third group consists of the people of the Kasai: the BA-KUBA, the BA...SHTI,EI.E, the BA-SONGO-MENO, the DENGESE, the ~-L1JLUA and the Ba-KETE. . . ~ . 4. The fourth group comprises the LtIB1\.. complex, to which the BA-SONGE and the BENA-KANIOKA are linked cult.urally. 5. The southern part of the present Katanga contains population groups wbichare culturally closer to Rhodesia, among them the BA-YEKE, the BA-SANGA, the BA-Lt'WIBA, the BA-BnmE and the BA-TAMB'VIA .. 6. The sixth group comprises the peoples of ManieIna and Kiw, in particular the tWll.-REGA., the WA-ZIMBA, the WA-BEMBE, the BA-BU'YE, the WA-NL\NGA and the BA-KUMU e 7.. The seventh group is that of the races having a Sudanese culture. Its principal representatives are the l-"'"tZANDE, the MANGBETU, the BA-KONGO, the ilBA-BUA, - 66 - AlTh1EX VII the NGBANDI. and others. In addition. this group oomprises a fe,~ subject races suoh as the ALUR and the BA-HEMl., which are numerically too small to form a separate group. 8. The eighth group consists of the peoples oommonly referred to as the MlNGO people. whose influence extends to Luslaba. This group comprises the MONGO themselves, the GOMBE, theKT.i1'lDU. the BOYELA, the EKONDA, the Ba-MBOLE, the Wa-LENGOLll.. the Mi-WKU. the Wa-NGENIli.. the, Ba-TETELA and the Ba-NKUTSHU. The size of this area. which is relatively large in comparison with the others. oauses no serious difficulties, as the density of population is very low and its eoonomic resources limited.' 9. The ninth group oomprises' the mE peoples and others having a oommon origin or cultural affinities with these~ 'notably the Ba-Y1l.NZI, the Ba-WUMBU, the Ba-BONA, the Ba-SAKA.TA and the Ba-LESA. - 67 M Translated from French M9j.ion of the Provincial AssemblY of the Or!entale ;?}'ovince dated 20 Januan ·1961 The I':tovinoial A.ssemb1y of Orientale Province, the oapital of which is at Stanles'Ville, freely elected in May 1960 and representing the populationsof tbe said Province, welcomes the arrival at ste.nleyVille of the Conciliation Commission of the United Nations. It expr~sses its fervent wishes for the success of the Commission's endeavours and for the restoration of a climate of c9noord and confidence in .the Congo. This climate can only ba restored if the .following measures are taken in the near future: ..( 1) Simultaneous release of El.ll politiee-l pr.isoners ~ in particular of His Exoellency the Prime Minister Patric~ LrrM~A; (2) Strict non-llrl.iervention in the domestic affairs of the Congo by any foreign ooun~r.Y Whatsoever, since the problems of the Congo ought to be Solved by the Congolese with the nctive co-Operation of the United Nations. It follows from this principle that all foreign offioers ought to be expelled from every unit .0£ the arll\V end national police force. Any technical assistance needed in this field ought to coma exclusively from the United Nations. (3) Reastablishment of human rights in the Congo by the prohibition of all arbitrary arrests; warrants of arrest should only be issued by the. regular jUdicial authorities l1lld should be submitted for confirmation within the time limits prescribed by law; (4) The meeting of the Congolese Parliament under the protection of' the United Nations as a guarantor of its freedom, in ata,wn in which all possibi~ity of pressure is exclUded; the Parliament should state Whether or noii it maintains its confidence u;. the legitimate gove~ent since the ~ facto authorities whioh have imposed themselves in Leopoldville have never convened Parliament and have not even succeeded in forming a gover.nment " ' I for presentation to Parliament; (5) Immedia.te lifting of the blockade which, by attem.pting to drive oertain regions to eoonomic ruin, only compels these populations to resort to solutions of force and increases the tension be~waan children of a same country and the division of the country J - 68 - ANNEX ,VIII (6) Absolute and immediate cessation of foreign aid to the dissident South East region of the Congo which claims to be independent, whereas it merely attempts to set up by force in a sIliall area an African Kuwait without any concern for the miserable lot of the majority of the people of Katanga. * * * If these measures are adopted the Provincial Assembly of the Orientale Province undertaltes to support the preparation by the Parliament of an a.uthentio Congolese oonstitution guara.nte'eing: - human rights and a general amnesty; - autonoII:lY of the provinces in matters of their own concern; - e. status of intarnatione.l neutrality for the Congo; - the unity of the oountzy; - the protection of persons and property; - oo-operation between Congolese and all foreigners who do not interfere in the domestio affairs of the oountr,y. Lastly, it must stress that if the blookade oontinues and if the rule of law is not restored throughout the entire countr,y, the peoples of this Province will not yield to a test of strength. They will, in turn, negotiate with foreign Powers of their choioe bilateral assistanoe agreements, including agreements for militar,y assistl'lnoe, which the people would have wished to be concluded with the United Nations alone by a free and united Congo. The people cannot be reproaohed for doing so as they will have been forced into this situation and they have plaoed the responsibility where it lies. Those who refuse to allow the funotioning of demooratio institutions do so only in the fear of being disavowed by the people. The transfer to Katanga of His Excelleney, the Prime Minister, is a glaring proof of this. If this situation is not remedied by a return to legality, we can have only one policy : general mobilization of the people and an appeal to ~1l States whioh will offer us their help. This will mean the internationalization of the ocnfliot;, this will mean a serious threat to world peace, for which,we shall not have been responsible; Stanleyville, 20 Januazy 1961 (sgd) A. BABADET Tranelated from Fre~oh Memoredum. dated 20 Jenua. 1 1, fr01ll the Provincial GOvernment of the Or1ent!lle Pro ca i j Th$ Council of Provinoial Ministers of Orientale Provinoe respectfully wolcomes t~~ Conoiliation Commission, whioh is instructed to propose to Congolese lea.ders.formulae that may.help them to flettle the Congolese crisis o.rising out of the dispute between the Hef,1,d of sta.te, Mr. JosaphKASA-VUBU, o.ndthe head of the legitima.te Gove:rnment, Mr. Paotrice LUMUMBA (eleoteel democrc.tico.lly by the Oongolese people and invested with a vote of oonfidenoe by the Congolese Ba2'liament~ the sovereign nationo.l body). It wishes the Commission every sucoess in gathering all the· neoessary evidenoe, so that at the end of its study 0. solution may be found whi~h ,1111 help the young Congolese state tq emerge from the oha.os now prevailing iu its territory o..nd threatening to undo \the steady efforts of 80 years made under the oppressive and obscurantist Belgian colonists. li; wishes in pa.rticular "to pay solemn tribute "to the promoters of this noble venture,.for it gratefully appreciates the oonoern which oarte-in friendly countries have to help the young Congo Republio out of its prasent plight. It Wishes, however, further to the meeting it has held With the CommissionJ to stress oertain points. It has to.ken very oareful note of' the Commission' s oonoern-~o avoid at a.ll costs any interfer~noe in Oongolese internal affairs, and to propose its formulae . . without favouring either party to the confliot, and o.skss (1) Wha~ guidanoe does the Commission propose to give "the Congolese to help them to re-estc.blish parliwmentar,r institutions? (2) ~he Counoil of Pro~ncial Ministers also deems it fitting to a.sk you to be good enough to approa.ch Mr. KASA-VUBU and propose to him tha:b he convene the two Congolese Chambers, so that you mo..y hea.r the verdict of the elected representatives of the Nation, whose decisions are irravocable, sinoe Parliament is sovereign and the two opponents have left it, () ~he Council bes tWken careful note of your desire to see the political prisoners now in Stanleyville, partioularly Mr. SONGOLO ana Mr. MIRURO. It will enable you to visit these prisoners with the consent of H,E, Mr~ Ant-oine GIZEN'GA, Vice-Premier of the legal Government. On the other lmnd, it urges you not to f00il to conta.ot, in addition to Mr. IiOMf]t1BA, who has belm transferred to the Elisabethville prison, also Mr, Jean-Pierre FtN.AN'r a..nd Mr. Camille YANGARA., respectively President of the Provinoia.l Government and Distriot Commissioner of Upper UeU, who are now held at Luzwuu (Leopoldville). a 70 .. . ·AmOOC IX (4) Xt declares unequivooally that the Congo crisis will be solved as if by magic if the Commission suooeeds in re-establishing frank oollaboration between Mr. KA8A~VUBU, Head of state, and Mr. ~, Head of the legitimate Government ~ (5) It asks that all Belgi~ trooi.$ stationed in our garrisons in Katanga leave Congolese territory without dela.y~ It is astonished the.t the UN, which has taken the initiative, allows this situation to persist, which can only perpetuate' the Congo crisis. (6) It draws ycur serious attention to the thre~t to the Congo, oonstituted .. by the sendinG' of trvopa by members at NATO, und urges the immediate withdrawal of these troops, which are stationed nea.r the front;ier at Kisenyi. To illustrate this declaration, it points out that eight of. them are here, who 'Wore captured durina the battle of Goma between ou:r t~pps and the NATO troops from 12 to 14 J~ua~ 1961. The question of' Usarming Congolese soldiers is irrelevant hare. 0uJ:' soldiers bAVG never gone to atta~k Mobutu's band of rebels, .on the eontrttr.Y, they have been their viotims many times. As evidenoe, we have here Mobutu rebels captured during their attaok on us at Kivu, and.inoluding Belgian ·paratroopers. To bring about disarmament of our peaoeful .and valiant sola1i.ers, thesa rebels' should he disarmed first. Stanleyville, 20 January 1961 President of the Council (signed) J.F. lMNZlXAU Viae-President, Prorincisl Government of Orientale xrovinoe 'lranslatec1 trom Frellch .ANN)iiX X aide-memoire §Ybm4ttad on 23 Jenu,lY 126t by the l'lpvineial GonmmqAt OiXasai MEASJ}RES NECE§SAR1 TO SOhVE TlIIS POLITICAL CRjsts 1. His Excellency Mr.l'atrice- LUMU.ciB,A., the laWf'ul-;Prime Minls1ler, and. ell his political colleagues who hew beenarbitre.rily arrested, must be set free unconditional~. --- . 2.. The first If.'.wful government of the Congo, namely that heeded by :MT. LtrulU'!'ABJ.., must be allowed to take affice immedia.toly. 3. The Congole3G ?arliame~t must be reopened as Boon as possible•. ~11 negotiations connocted with the political crisis must first be conducted with this bolly, instead of the dictators. Parliament derives direotly from the people and is therofore the sole supreme authority in the country. 4. All rebei soldiers, such e.s those of Mr. Kalonjinnd LUt. Tshombe's Belgil'ms in Ke.tanga, rau.st be immedil1taly end oOO1pletely disarllled. 5. The United Ho:liionsmust be plaoed ELt the disposa.l ot the lawful Congolese Governmen-b J that of Mr. LUi'z."'1J.M"B,A.. This is because, on the pretext that it must not inte;rfere in the inte:rIJ.a.l e.ffa.irs of the country, the United Nations takes no steps to intervene in favo\l1" of the lawful Government, though it is ree.dy to interfere against the le.wful GoveJ.'Il,Il1ent. 6. The territorial integrity of the Republic of the Congo must be d.efended with the help of the United Na.tions. The six provinces musii remain provinoes with provincial govert1It\ents. Cho.nges can· be made only by the Congolese :?e.rlia-ment. (s!.gned) F. &l:rGA-~ENGELE For the Members of ~inister of Publio Health the Government (signed) Clement veTO ,(signed) A. ONIA Minister of ?ubl10 Minister of Agriculture Works and Poatel Servioes J. LUltATA ~ister of the Interior = 72 - Tli! MAIN RE4§ONS EOR THE CONGOLESE POLITIClL CRISIS 1. The fact, known throughout the world, toot the territory of the Congo come-ins ~e'9'eral tribes hlls inevitably given rise to some degree of inter~ tribal riw.lry. This rivalry has I1chievad no resultcs. Since the depertUl'e of the Belgian colonialists, and indeed even before the Congo became independent, the Belgi~ns have used it to further their political intrigues. This eXl?lains thasecession of the Xonaket tribe in Katango., the Bakongo. in Leo]?oldville, and ""ha Baluba in Kesai. 2. At the Brussels Round Ta.ble Conf'arenca the Congolese themselves voted of their o~ free will for a unitary state, and the Belgian colonialists seemed to S'l.'Ppo,.-c it; to-c.D.Y, however, this idea has been e.'1t aside, with the sole niT. of ·)';artho··:)wing ill.:> lawful Government. In other 'Words, the Belgian coloi4iE1,2.i.::1.s ('..J,'o3 makina use of certain minorif,y tribes to do ell they cc.n to proJ.oua thd:- sta.y in the Congo for the sole pu.1;'pose of oontinuing to exploit 1to 3. The occU]?ation by the United Nations, the world organizati~m, to which the lawful Governmen~ appealed in order to banish Belgian aggression from our cH.··..::o:h:;::{; b~t instead of serving tlmt lawful Government the United Na~ions h~c ~een'Gonducting a two-fcced policy. It hr.s even illegally supportet. ihe opposition parties (see whe,t is being done by Mr. Kase.-Vubu, the provisional Head of State, who is now ralgning instead of' governing). We !mow VG1'Y well toot that was the fault of the Secretory-General of the United Nations., wh.o should ha.ve carried out all the resolutions adopted' by the Security Council. 4. The ettitude of certain Western oountries in. sUpporting Mr~ Ka.sa""Vubu's illegal position by financing him, tlms enabling him to suborn the sold-iars of the .w."ID and place the JI.2':qy' in his power. The proof is that $:30 million emanating from certain American financial ci:l'oles has been seized at StanloyVille. A French aircreft containing arms intended for Bakwanga has been seized et Luluabourg. Beoause of all this illegal support, the Congolese Parliament is no longer functioning, though Parliament is the sole sUJ?xeme o,uthority in all democratic countries; and the hend of the Congolese Govurnment, UIr. Petrice LumtlIilba., the lawful Prime Minister, hos been imprisoned.and ill-treated in the presence of the United NationB. (signed) A. ONI! ,-' ANNEX ==1 MEMORANDUM DATED 23 J4IDlflRY 1961, FR01iT~ COMlviON FROl'1T OP THE FO"LITIIJAL PARTIES n~ KASb.I * The politioal parties constituting the ~ommon Front ~re: (1) the Oongolese National Lumumba Movement; (2) the Congolesa National Union; (3) COAIrA (Ka.sai Coalition); and (4) the Congolese Peopla 1 s Movement' o.nd the' Basanga Unity Movement. The people of Kasai Province acve the signal honour to welcoma the members of the United Na.tions Conciliation Commission on the occa.sion of t~eir attival in Lulun.bourg, the beautiful capita.l of Ka.aai :Province. The peoples of the Congo, anc. po.rlicularly those of Y..asa~ Province, perturbed by the political crisis of our Republic, request the United Nations to help them in all fields in order to break the decdlock. Through its authorized representatives here present, the people of Kasai axpresses its desire to see the Concilio.tion Commissiont s work croWned with s"uocess so.tho.t our country can put ~ end to the chaos, into which it ~s been plungea~ In order to faoilito:t.e yourto.sk at Lu1uo,bou:rg, the Common Pront of the Kaso.i poli'bieal parlies' trmsmits to you its meClO ra.ndum, whioh oontains the following points: 1. The COMMON FRONT requests the immedia.te libera.tion of 0.11 politica.l prisoners in the Republic of the Congo. 2. The immediate re-convening of the Congolese Parliament, undor United Nations protection in order to end the politic~l orisis. 3. If the Fo.rliament is not reconvened, the Congolese people will be obliged to resort to a popUlar referendum~ 4. If the secessionists of South 'Kata.n.ga, SouthICa.sai end Be.s-Congo refuse to resume their po.rtieipo;\;ion in Congolese national unity, the Provinces of Kasai, Kivu, Orienta1e, Lualabe, a In.r~e pa.r'li of tha K'l1a..ngo-Kwilu-Lo.c teopold II a.rea in Leopoldville Province, and po.rt of Equator Provinoe will fo~ a unified government with Stimleyville as provisional oo.pi·'uc..l. 5. Re-esto.blisbment of the lagn.l Government headed by His Excellency the :Prime Minister, l?atrioe Lumwnba.. 6. The slleed¥ disa,rIn&.Dlent of the illega.l troops of TSBOMBE, e,nd of nLONJI in South Kaso.i, which o.re not po.rt of the Congolese National AU11Y. 7. Kasai :Province supports and maintains the unity and national integrity' of the Congo. 8~ We a.gree to attend the Round Ta.ble Conference advoev:bed by Mr~ KASA-VUBU on oondition that: (a) Prime Minister LUMUMBA and all the politionl prisoners in the Congo are freed two weeks before the opening of the Round Ta.ble Conference; (b) the Round Table Conference is held either at some neutral place or outside the country so tho.t everyone ma.y Sj?eak freely; (c) the Round Table Conference is composed only of' persons elected by the people, i.e~ provincial counsellors and members of the National Parlicm.ent. (sir,:ned) Ber.ui. Ghislain MUKElNGESRA.YI President of the CammoD Front (signed) Fro.ncois XA,TSHUNGA. Raphatn DUlIDU For the Congolese Na.tional Lumumba Movement (signed) Fro.ncois LUA.KA.BUANGA A,lidor BllNGULA. For the Congolese Natiouo.l Union (signed) Bruno BINYANGA bfu.rcel TSRIBA1\fGU For the Congolese People 1s Movement (signed) Felicien KEMANKINDa For the &.song6 Un!ty Movement (signed) ('1) KANDOLO For COAEA (lesal Coalition) - 75 - Correction to Common Front Memorandum 1': The Common Front of the Ke.sai Politica.l Pe.rtiS6 requests of the Conciliation Commission: ~. ~e complete suppression ot the private militias of Kalonji in South Kasai and Tshombe in South Katanga. and the integre:tion of these forces into . , the National Army. 2. 'lhe tempore.ry con,tp~ete disarmamen't of the Congolese !National Army in order to permit the normal funotioning ot national and provincia11nstitutions. During the period of the Congolese Army la diaa.rmament the United Nations forces will mainta.in public order in the country, and the legitiIllate Government of the Congo, assisted by United Nations autborities, w11l undertake tbe training of Congolese eoldie:rs and tbe weeding out of undesirable elements. ~. The Common Front requests tbe Conciliation Commission to Clalete paragraph 8 of the memorandum tre.nsmit~ on 23 Je.nuary.1961 and toreple.ce it by the Common Front's refusal to attend. the RoundTa.bl~ Conference advoca.ted by Mr. Kasa-Vubu. (Signed) Benri Ghislain "Mukengasha.yi President of the Comtaon Front (signed) FranIJois Luka.bua.nge. Alidor Biangula For the Congolese National. Union (signed) Bruno Binya.nge. Marcel Tsbibangu For the Congolese Peoples f. Movement (Signed) F~lic1en Kimankinda For the Baao::lge Union Movement (Signed) ( t) Kand.olo For Coake. ( Coalition of Ka.sai) - to- ANl\i"EX XII Address delivered'by Mr~ Kasa-Vubu 0A 25 Ja.nuary 1961 My dear fallow~countrymen,· In the period of barely seven mon-bhs that has elapsed since our'Republio attained its independence, it has cour~gaously passed through some diffioult times which have left deep scars upon it. lis a result, its administration a.nd eoono~ have been tragicall~'disorganized;whole regions h~ve thought to solve these,d!fficu1ties by seceding. Instead of combining against a common ene~, we have had to witness grevious and' blooay fratrioidal struggle's. The Congo' was on the brink'of disaster. At this junctura Ishn!l not list the blunders that were mooe, a,lthough their gravity and the punishment which they call for are undiminished; but, if I wm to place ~ decision in its proper perspeotive, I cannot refrain from recalling once again the aotions of n. government which was oon.cerned above all with its own prestige instead of with the welfare of the people. Faced With the tra.gic spectacle of all those thousands of unemployvild who, had been deprived of their livelihood,of childron weakened by famine, of the many mothers who mourned their loved ones, I decided. in the light of Diy responsibility towe.rdsY;ou~ my'dea.r fallow-countrymen, to put no' end to a regime ",hichwp.s leading the countr,y to ruin. On 5 September 1960, tn accordance with article 22 of the Loi Fondamenta.le, I dismissed Patriae Lumumba, the Prima Minister, and certain other ministers. .at the same time I called upon Mr. Joseph Ilea, the President of the Senate, to form et. government which was subsoquently to ha.ve been submitted to Parliament. But the refusal of oertain ministers to comply, a.s it was their duty to do, with the order of dismissal created a perilously explosive situation. General Mobutu, to whom I wish to pay a warm tribute, took the step of entrusting to our universitaires the task of ensuring the proper functioning of the Administra.tion of our Republic. In the higher interests of the Na.tion, I approved General Mobutu'~ deoision and I officially installed the College of Commissioners-General which has provisionally taken over the executive and legislativapowers of the Republi0 • Since then, the country has entered upon a slow and difficult period. of recover,ya the stages in that recover.y are still laborious and its results are limited. Who today would venture to maintairi that calm and peace have replaced the storms of past months? MY dear fellow-countr,yman, I make a pressing appeal to you to close your ranks and to unite in the struggle against the pressures from within and without which threaten the RepUblic. That is the reason Why, three weeks ago, I entrusted Mr. Ileo with the task of organizing R oonference of national unaerst~ding. Today, thanks to his anuaavoUl's and to those of his a.ssistants, we are met together to consider the ~erious problems whiCh afflict our countr,y. I extend a. cordial welcome to our brothers from the Frovinoes and fraternal greetings 'to all of you here present. -77 - ANNEX XII I greet first of all the members of Parliament who make up the great majority of this conference. Deputies ~d Senators, despite the long ~d necessary recess, you are ~d you remain the genuine representatives of our peoples and of the varying views they hold. It is upon you primarily that the country counts. I thank 'Ghose who organized this meeting, and I thank you, all of you, who have hearkened to our appeal. The fact that you are here sl;J.ows, better than e.ny vain protestation of patriotism, your interest in your country and your desire to solve its problems. As you know, those problems are many and complex and they can only be solved by an honest exchange of views betwoen all people of good will in this country, free from e.ny.external pressure. As I said in ItG' address of 2 January, we are confronted with problems of the actual structure of the country. The crisis through which we are passing is a crisis of institutions. Therefore, if we wish to create a sta.ble and durable society which will be seoure from the overweening ambitions of oertain people, we mud go to the root of the trouble. We inherited a system of institutions whioh turned out in practice to be ineffective cnd inappropriate to the situations to which it wa.s intended to, be applied. We must give fresh thought to the ~ Fondementale and the institutions derived from it with a view to adapting them to our ideas c.nd the requirements of a country which is so large in the geographical sense and whose peoples are so diverse. You will agree, gentlemen, that this is a very considerable programme, whioh will need oare and time to consider. In order to enable the - conference to ll.DhL"r.e_ its full purpose, Mr. Ileo, the Chairman of the Committee of the l~ound Table Conferenoe, prompted by his desire to ensure that I,I.t should be a ree.l natione.l gathering whiCh would show results, h0.9 proposed to me that it should take place in twc stages. . I agreed to that suggestion, since it is calculated to ensure that cur work will be done more efficiently. I will not go into the agenda of the oonferenoe, since that is a matter for those partioipating in it to consider; but I feel I should draw attention briefly to the main points to which particular attention should be paid. Irmuediately after the Congo became independent, the international community recognized it with its present geographical boundaries. Whatevor form the State me.y find it nece<.lsary to adopt, we all realize the need to preserve its unity. Yet, if.we are. to be rea.listic, that unity must take account of the wide diversity among the component parts of the State. We shall no'G preserve the unity indispensable to our countr,y by clinging to structures and institutions whiCh were prescribed for us and which, as is de,y by de,y a,ppai-ent; are ill-adapted to the aspirations of its peoples and to local requirements. You do not build' up a countr,y with slogans. In the course 01 this gathering I want you, mybrothors J to be yourselves, to be Afrioans, to be Congolese and to view this oountr,y's problems purely from the Congolese angle. . The crisis through whioh we are passing has revae.1ed the inadequaoy QIld in me.ny instances the inappropriateness of the machinery devised by the toi Fondamentale. It will be for the conferenol'l to decide what should be the respective prerogatives of the central and provinoial authorities. It must deoide what form the country should take and what political structure it should have, elUUlline the political ANNEX XII dirlsions_o.f .the Republic and estnblish the rules whioh should govern the organization of regional and. local units. In oodition t.o these matters, there will be questions which affect the life end s~ourit¥, both internal and9.xternal, of the Statel problems of public freedoms, public finances, the maintenance of law and order, and fOTe ign policy. . I In acldition to these various questions, the conferenoe will hava to solve the u-rgen"li problem of establishing a central government whioh will express the will of the whole N~tion and whose authority will be reoognized everywhere. SoUlQ people are alarmed. at the evident and everspreading trend. towe.rds a new form of political orga.nization for the oount.t'y-i theree.l'a many who see in it EL threat which might undermine national unity. In b\Y view, there is no foundAtion for these misgivings. On the. contrary, I am convinced the.t that is the direction in whioh our salvat.ion lies. Our institutions will be viable and lo-sting only if thgy draw ·their life-blood .from 'the reelities of the Congo. History has shown and coniiinues 'to show that peoples san live in peace and happiness only if -they have institutions which they bava freely chosen for themselves, ~D acco~ance wi~h the social, economio and political requi:rements ot their oountriese The regime which should be envisaged is one which would facilitate the. j administration of regj,onal an,d local unitst .it should relieva the central authorit.~ of minor duties of 1000,1 COnoern and thus enable it to devote its attention to the basic problems affecting the life of 'the nation. It will be the conferenoe!s task·to estnblish with preoision what are to be the respeetive competences ofprovinoinl una central o,uthorities•. After that, it will ha.ve to decide wha.t should be the powers of the future central government of the country, how tha.t govermnent should be appointed a,nd wba't its responsibilities'" should be. The oonference must also set ou't the prinoiples in accordance with which t116 . politioa.l subdivisions of the terri.:tory will be determined. It is no secret that the existing artificia.l boundaries of ~he provinces do not pay sufficient heed to the faotsotthe Congolese situation 'and oonsequent~ they no longer meet the wishes. of our. peoples. To insist on maintaining those boundaries a:t all costs would be to build on se.nd., ~ew pro"'finoial units mus-b necessarily be brought into boing. Nevertheless, 1 ask those whl? contemplate the este.blishment of fresh sub divisions to let themselves ba guided by a desire toaee how they OM best serve the people rather than by the u;rgeto satisfy their personal ambitions. They must grasp the fundamenta.l tru-th.that the faot that e. province exisiis on paper ana contains e. gi'Ven ·people is not enough to· enable it to subsis1i1 'it must be in e. position -lio shoulder the iiloreasingly heavy burdens whioh will fall. to the lot. of regional and local poli'tical units, W'ithout expecting the central authority to· do everything for it. The path of wisdom will be taken by those who x-ealize that, given the ciroumatances ·preva.iling in the regions from which they come, their interest lies in· joining up wjth o~her groups~ M1NEX XII j~s I see it, the new structures which wa are envisaging should enjoy a very wide degree of eutonomy. The predominant objective of the authorities should be to promote the advancement of the peoples of the interior. It will be difficult for us to take" more effective aetion on their behalf if we cling obstiuBtely to the preservation of the e:rlsting struoture. We must not lose sight of the tact that-,t-he more we concern ourselves with the interior, the less powerful will be the siren-call of the towns. By so aoing we shall be setting up frash" centres of interest whQse inn~bitants will become stabilizing f~ctors in society. I Those who claim to represent the maSSGS mm:t proYs by their ~,ction3 -that they do in fact cara for them and desire their welfare. Declarations of good intentions are no longer enough; they must be ba.oken up by actual deeds. Before long there will be new provincial units, and the destinies of those fledgling units must be taken in hand by men who are able, determined and conscientious. The pe0ples of the in-terior Ill'Ullt realize t~lQ,t we are thinking of their l'roblemsand exerting ourselves to find the proper 'solution for them. Among the matters which will require your, attention are pUblic £ree~om, national Md provincial finances, ma.intenance of order ana, finally, foreign relations. These a.re," ~s you know, the fundamenta.l elements of every modern society. At a time where certain factions, aided by El. few t,roublc~mck.ers, are trying to force on our country ideological principles which strike at the roots of human dignity, the universally rocognized democratic freodoms must be enshrined in tlonsti-tutional texts without, however, relieving the authorities of their duty to regulate the exercise of these freedoms. But if they are to guarantee the normal enjoyment of tha'-:lG freedoros, the authorities must possess the requisite meMS of effective control. They should be able, if necessar.Y, to check the abuse of the spoken and written word. To carry out this task deme.nds an efficient logislative apparatus and appropriate means of enforcement. This is one of the funotions of the orgD.1ls that have been oreated to maintain public order. The extent of the ta.sks entrusted to the police and gend.armarie, and the sources from which they should derive their authority, must be clear~ defined. We must not r.gain fall into confusion such as we have already seen in our country. If we admit that for efficiency's sake the police and gendcrmerie might recruit from within regiona.l Qutities, the Army must remain the symbol of no.tional unity. As in foreign affairs, the central authority cannot delegate its prerogatives in matters of national defence. In public finance, the distribution of the product of ways and means must necessarily take acoount of the new structures whioh will be provided. The autonomy which we intend to leave to the provinces must be made effective, and. we must therefore afford them the opportunity of creating new resour.ces for themselV'esJ. - 80 - ANNEX XII Nevertheless, we must not lose sight of the fact that even a large measure of decon'~ralization does not always bring about a P:roI",rtionate roduction in the oentral authority's responsibilities. It would be dangerous to atterrrpt to deprive the oentral authority of the essential means of oarrying out Hs task. Gentlemen, these are some of the principles which should guide your work. * * Fellow-countrymen, the time of easy demagoguery has passed. From now on we must resolutely face the problems before us. We mu.3t prove to the world that we are mature and can so:ve our own problems. We must put aside vain personal quarrels. Me~ com<'- and go, but the Nation remains. I ask e£;on and every one of you to realize the ~Griousness of the situation, to ~e the general interest your first concern, and thereby to pl:ove yourselves wortby of the coni'id()uoe placed in you by the people. Eaoh one of you must show patriotism and a oonstruotive attitude. This mee'~ing gives new hope to the peoples of our oountry. Following this fraternal gathering, the country 1I1llst onoe again enjoy peaoe; the Republio of the Congo mnilt make a fresh start along the road 1;0 prosperity and the peaceful conquest ot its rightful plaoe in the family of free and in-iepend()ut nations. Such is ~ wish. Gentlemen, may it serve as the guide and aim of your work. - 81 Translated from French ~XIII Letter, dated 1 February 1961, from Mr. 1•• Delvaux to the Chairman of''tfie .. t:lommission Sir, In r~sponse to YOllr invi'bation to state rl\Y viaws cs Presiden';; of the LllZA and 5ecret"ry-C""lueral of the Nationcl Progress Party, I hereby coniirlU tha statGments end suggo!rtions which I made in that capacity. iJfu;1 'I first of ell give a brief s\llllllllU'Y of our conversation, To yo'U" quesM,olll "Is the Ph? prepLred 'bo see the immediate ostablishment of co, ccntral governmont?", I gr,ve an affirtla.tive reply, It is indeed clear that the political imbroglio has lasted only too long nnd that wh~t we ne~d is a government responsible to thll nll:b '.on. Tlwt is undoubtedly the o1'inion of the gre,,;;, mejorUy of people i,' '.his C>Juntry. But I hr.stenedto add tho.t it seeGed to me impossible for su~h c ~cvernment to present itsalf before the Congolese Reuses of Perlio'1lent, wm,o;' ,b] fore" of circumstances have lost their rep:::'escniative character. I pointed out that Et number ,of deputies nnd senators hnd beon arres':-'ed, that sowe had died (in some ce.s~s by -~orture) nnd that others couli: not geJo Joo Leopoldvi11€,. I therefore expre,ssed th" view the/o We must find 11. new forIilllla better adapted to the present speci&.l oircumstances. DafoN defining this formula, I drew your attention to the delict1..be ?roblem of the Congolese Parliament, whioh, as I he-ve said, is no longer truly representative of the country. Some of its members are under arrest and it can no longer reaoh a quorum. I made e distinction between the ~embers arrested, often arbitrarily, for politioal reasons '+'ld tho'se arrested for ordincry penal offences against whom judicial prooeedings are being taken. First in this latter oetegory must be mentioned, as I told you and as the Head of State l1o.s cnnounced on more than one oocc,sion, the e:lle-Prime Minister Lumumb!l.. I also s""id JohClt in ~ view the only Congolese institution 'still valid was the offioe of tho Heo.d of State and that, the Heed of State's deoision to dismiss Mr. Patrice Lumumba was undoubtedly legal and in accordance with the constitution. At -l;he Round Table Conference in Brussels ill January 1960 the politiolJ.l leo.del's, and those of rl\Y 0'\'iIl Party in particular, asked that 1ir. LlllilUmba should sit with them and take pert in the work of the Conference. Mr. LUl1lUIIlbc w~,s then under arrest by the Belgian Colonial Administration following c t~icl which had plaoed upon him the direct responsibility for tho inoidents at Stanleyville in, October 1959 in which Llore than thirty people were killed. i.!Ir. Lumumba was accordingly released nnd from then on the Congolese leaders witnessed, in almost - 82 - AJIITOO( XIII cOlllJ?le"te helplessness, the taking-over of power by Mr. Lumumba. It W!1S not until much leter that Mr. lArmumba was dismissed and nrrested by tbe Congolese authorities JUdicial prooeGdings "'re under way and hence the cnse of this lender is sub judice• .All '~his should convitlce you that ii; is difficult if not impossible to estnblish c centr",l gcverDffiunt in the immedinte future OLd that the results of the Eot1!l.d Table Cord'o:::-ence '.lUst be awaited before such a government can be .desie;nated. To your question: "Do you think thnt the Round Table Conferenoe will be successful?" I also replied itl the atfirme.tiv", but drew your attention to the non partici]ction ~y certcin provinoesin the work of the. Conference cnd tho difficul-;;ies wilich t"" authorities would oonsequently encounter in the :"reotioal applioation of the c~nolusions of the Conferenoe. * * * I t,~ now to tho suggestions whioh I made to your Commission. Sinoe the present oiroumstances preclude the imQediato designation of a centrel government and since ciroumstances will prob!\bly also preolude the nppliclJ,tion of the conolusions of the Round Table Conferenoe to the whole of i;he Congo, it is neoessar,y to seek new formulae. I stated that I oould see two possibilities: the first would be to reunify the Congolese National Lrray by incOl'!>oro;l;ing the Katanga Il.I1d South !rasai detachments, and then to tcke th" offensive, conquer Orientale and rrivu Provinces and other rebel territories and illIJ?ose the conclusions of the Round Tnble Conference by force. In wy view, however, this solution should on~ be ndopted in case of absolute necessity. The shedding of Congol"se blood must be avoided, ~~d above ell it is necessar,y to avoid the development of a situation which might end in civil war and even a more generalized conflict of the Korean type. This solution, then, would be applied on~ if the second. solution which I am about to mention should prove unsuccessful. The s"cond solution. is thet of negotil1tion between the principal Congolese loaders. The extreme urgency and seriousness of the issue would be stressed and e "summit conciliation meeting" would be arranged. l..t the invitation of the United N!\tions, issued on the basis of a list prepared by the Head of State 'I a number of the most representative Congolese leaders, not involved in ordinar,y penal offences, would meet in a neutro.l city outside Africa (for example Geneva). - 0) - ANNEX XIII The ~eeting would be under the chairmanship of a United Nni~ons represontative (for example, the chairman of the CorJrnittae of Good Offices, assisted by his s1;o.f':£).- .The chc.irIlltUl's only functioD.would. be to preside over the discussions. I ·thin!: that suoh eo conciliation meeting could very soon find the basis for Po settleoenJG, of· the deadlock in the CODgO. In 0. few dtws, these leaders, meeting fo.oe to face and conscious of the gz1l.vity- .of the situa.tion and the weight of their responsibility, could restore nn atmosphere of mutual confidence nmongst 'themsalves, .,i.e. among all gr·oups of the populo:lJion,which"are at prasent living ino.n c:bmosphere of complete di$trust. The meeting would p:J:'epo.re n docurnant,to b~'so~eIDn~ signed by all the pnrticipants, 'recording their 'decision to co","opercte closely ,and to bringaboui;. a truce in the country. The meeting would I U designate' from nmong its members a "Political Directorate , which would work ,with the Hea9-. of state and which would be instructed: (l1J;to organize the Round Table Conference ·originnlly schaduled.:tol', 15 February; (b) to pacify tha Cl,ountry with the assistance of United Net~on,s police forces; (c) to supervise United No:Hons c.ctivities in the Congo; (d) to put into effect the'decisions of the Round Table Conference with· 0. view to the es"liablisbmant of the future central gove:rnm(;m-h, which would "bhen te..ke over the functions of the Directorate. The }lacif1eo.tion of the countl:'.Y' 'Would of course, ns I have pointed. out, represent an essential phase in the lJi:J:'Gctorate' s programme. It would. involve close co-oparation between the Congolese National l~~ end the ONUC forcsn, which in practice would mean mbted operations 1:.0 disarm all forces rebelling against the autho:J:'ity of Leopoldville. Only aetachments approved by the Direotorcte would form part of the ONUC forces. * * * I concluded my statement by saying that hitherto the United NfJ.tions had only po.rtly fulfilled its mission in the Congo. This pe.rtial failure, due in many mstrmces to politica1pressure on the United Notions Secretariet and a lack of Ua.'"lderstc.nding of the United Na.tions mission in the Congo, has c.roused in "hhe Cougolese El. keen and justified resentment against theUnitad Nc.tions. - C;I.. - MmEX XIII However, in Yiew of the threat of communist subversion and the neo-colonialiso of cericin. !fro-Asian countries, I think that ~he Congolese would not wish to see the work of the United Ne-tions in their coun-hry end in complete ftdluro. The' sole object of lIlY proposal for tramt co-operation is to avoid a further deterioration of the Congolese political situation'and particularly to avoid El. oivil war with all its_unforeseeebie consequences~ But there is ona condition , . to this proposal: the de]?(l.Z'ture of Mr. DaifThl. As the Head. of State has already said soveral times, this United Nations official no. longor enjoys the confidence of the legitimate Congolese authorities, who' consider, justifiably in DtY opinion, that 4is attitude is the reVerse of what should bQ expected from the representative of the world orgnnization to whioh tho Congo ~ppe&led to praserve peaoe within its i'rontiers and in Mricc.., La.stly, I said that the arrival of the Committee of Good. Offices ho.d aroused no great enthusiasm mnong the Congolese lcooers. r think that following our oonversation, which wa.s iimrkEld by frank understanding and c desire to be of assistanoe, your Commission might take a constructivo step by proposing to the Seourity Council oonclusions taking Buggestions into account. I 'Wish to thnnk. you; Sir, for your objeotivity and candour, which I regard as the certain augur,y of a possible understc.nding between man of good will. (sigried) ALBERT. DELVJ..UX President of the LUKA Seoretar,y-General of the PNP - 85 - ANNEX XIII' .9o!J!2osition of_the "l:iummit~.,C~~~ilix-tionMe~" gopo$ed list": , ..... ::.:~'."~.. T£lis list is confidentia.l. It still has to be submitted to the Read. of Ste.to for hiS epprovo.l and is onlY a. proposal" It includes four delegr:tes from eaoh p:rovince, chosen from among the mO$t representative personalities OT those who obt~ined thagrectest number of votes during the last elections. TIlG Hend of $tnte: M. Kasa...Vubu The Presid.ent of the Sena.te I M. Ileo The President of the House of ~pr&sentatives: lb Kasongo The Commander-in-ehief of the C.N.A.: Major-General J. Mobutu 0000000000 l..be.J.to Moando. Vital P .S.A. Gizenga, kLtoine L~ Delvaux, Albert L.L.!I Massa, Jo.cques P.E~P. Bolyc, :feul UNIMO Boinboko, Justin Mederco-PNP l.nekonzapa, J;ndre Puna· Bolikango, Jean Orieniia.le:_ 4 PNP Dericoycrd, Jean-Pierre Individual Dtmga l1NC/Lu Songalo, Alphonse (in prison) 1iNC/Iiu i.me.rJy'. Amio i CEREk. m:.shcmure, 1&nice"t CEREJ.. W~regamere, Chrys. (in prison) Individuc.l Mopi)?i, Francois Cerea Milambo. Jules Concket Tshomba, 14oi80 Conako.t Xibwe, J OQ.D. Balubaltat Sendvre, Jason Atco.r Wrunga Ka.sni: MNC/Ko.lonji Kalonji, Albel1i MNC/Lu Kih~, Etienne UNC (Luluo.) Ilunga, .b.l:phonsa PNP Kepongo, S~bastien. - 86 Translated from Frenc 1ill!:!EX XIV Constitutional Legislative Decree of 9 Febr"ary 1961 concerning the exercise of tho legislative and exocutivopowers bY the central authorities. and Ordinance of the some date appointing the provisional governrrLGnt I. CONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATIVE DEGREE OF 9 FEBRUARY 1961 CONCERNING THE ElrERCISE OF THE LEGISLATIVE MID EXECUTIVE POWERS BY TIlE CENTML AUTHORI'rms We, Joseph KASil.-VUBU. President of the RGpublic, Her~by give notice that the Council of Commissioners-General has adopted, and that we approve. the follo\dng provisional Article 1 The functions of the Council of COllll!lissioners-General., established by the Constitutioual Legislative Decree of 29 September 1960. are terminated. Article :2 Until the date, to be appointed by the Head of State, when the Legislative Chambers are able tameet ldth the participation of the parlitJlJlentary representative of each province, the Government shall be termed the Provisional Government. i Article 3 The legislative power vested in the Chambers bY the Loi Fondamentg.le of 19 May 1960 shall be eXElrcised by the Provisional. Government by means of 1egis1ativEl decrees count.ersigned by the Prime Minister and the Minister concerned. Article 4 This Constitutional Legislative Decree enters into force on today's date. We hereby promulgate this Constitutional Legislative Decree and direct that it be published in the Monikur Congolais. Leopoldville, 9 February 1961 (signed) J. K1l.Sil.-VUBU by the President of the Republic: (signed) J. BOMBOKO President of the Council of Commissioners-GeneraJ , (signed) M. LIHIl.U Qommissioner-Generul of Justice - 87 - ANNEX. XIV n. ORDINANCE NO. 10 OF 9 FErmUARY 1961 APPOINTING THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT Wel Joseph KASA-VUBU, President of the Republie, Having ragard to the Loi Fondwnontll1e.of 19 May 1960.relating to the structure of the Congo, and partieularly article 22 theX''6ofl Having X'egard to the Constitutional Legislative DecX'ee of 9 FebI'UaX'Y 1961 conceI'D.ing the eXe1'cise of the legislative and oxecutive powers by the cent:l'a1 authoTitiesI ~.DIRECT: AX'ticle 1 The Provisional Govel'DIllent is eonatitutoo llS follows: Prime Minister M. ILEO Joseph Deputy Prime lli.nisteX' and Minister of Information M. BOLIKANGO Jean Minister of the Interior M. ADOIJI.,A Cyrille Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade M. BOMBOKO Justin Minister of Finanae M. NKAY Pascal Minister of National Education M. BIZALA Cleophas Minister of Labour M. KIHVAt Felicien Minister of Economic Affairs and of the Middle Classes M. DERICOYARD Jean-I'. Minister of Planning and Co-ordination M. KABANGI Alois Minister of Publia Works M. ILUNG!, Alphonse Minister of Agr1culture M. MQPIPI Fransrois Minister 01' Public Administration M. BOLYA Paul Resident Ministor M. DELVAUX Albert Minister of Soeial Affairs M. MASSA Jacques Minister of State in charge of Parastatll1 Organizations M. KISOLOKELA Charles Secretary of State for Justice M. LTIfAU Mercel SEleretary of State for Foreign Relations M. KASONGO Julien Secretary of State for Mining and Po\~er Resources M. MAHAMBA Alexandre Seeretary of State tor Economic Affairs and the Middle Classes M. MBWANKIEM Vincent Secret1.I'y of State for Comumcations M. MlJKWIDI Article 2 The Prime Minister shall be responsible for carrying this Ordinance into effeet. Leopoldvi11o, 9 February 1961. (signed) J. KASA-VUBU By the Presid~t of the Republic (signed) J. ILEO Prime Minister (signed) J. BOMBOKO Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade - 88 - TransJ.ateJ. fr·JID.. PrLlch '•. ANNEX XV Address delivered bY Mr. Joseph Ileo .!2!1 16 February 19.Q:1 lV dear brothers. In an important speech on 2 January last the Prosident of the Republia made a solemn appeal for'national understanding and harmony. The country which had been plunged into anarchy. chaos and misery should find the Wa::f to salvation through its own sons. From all parts of the Oongo you have gathered together in response to the appoal of the Head of State, thus giVing conclusive pro!"f of your patriotism and your desire to save the country. On 25 January occurred the solemn opening of the great national meeting which everyone rightly considers to be the 501e opportunity of - at the very least proving our maturity. For twenty-one days all of you. members of Parliament. customary chiefs. notables. official representatives of Parliament and representatives of prOVincial governments and assemblies. have conscientiously devoted ycurselves to the country's problems. For twenty-one days you have laboured in the fields to Which. in the future. you will bring the seed so impatiently awaited by the people whom you represent here. The results speak for themselves. Your disoussions have been conducted with dignity and with regard fOr the higher interests of the country in an atmosphere of complete understanding. Your meetings have been nc whit inferior to the meetings of the assemblies of the so-oalled highly civilized countries which I have had the honour to attend. and I ccngratulate you on this. All the matters discussed at this pre-ccnference have been brought to conolusions which you have accepted in accordance with the rules and practices of democracy. You have.proved. gentlemen. that democraoy is inherent in the Congolese nature. You have above all proved. gentlemen. that ~e are capable of settling our problems ourselves and that we have no need of any outside interference. On the contrary. such interference intrOduoes confusion and disorder. Underlying the unhappy situation of our RepUblic is the harmful in£luence which certain foreign oountries continue to exercise with the object of serving. not the interests of the Oongolese people, but the interests of their own countries. Before th~ opening of this pre-conference who would have believeq~ in view of the difficulties 'Which our country is experiencing, that it 'Wo~d be so successful? The expectation which many people had of the results of the 1 pr&=-Conf'erence were depressing and discouraging. Today, gentlemen,. you have given to the 'World the ma~tcategoricaldenial of the allegations of certain iil~intentioned countri.,ea~~ The first stage in our great national ~eat:l./.1g'he.~ been successf':Ql4y completedo The second stage 11hi ANNEX XV ?wW government is opposed to acts of'violence and savage brutality. It is aeainst any arbitrary arrest~ it will act with respect for legality and intends as soon aa possible to restore the normal 'functioning of our democra'~ic institutions. It is attached to respect for democratic freedorns and human rights. My governm,ent is attempting to get 1n touch with the authorities of Katanga and obtain an explanation of this unfortunate event. Just as my government is opposed to violence and brutality, it is also categorically opposed to any act which will result in disorder. Peace and good order are essential conditions for respect for legality. My government has decided to take the severest measures against trouble= makers who would destroy the country and the people. It must be understood that you cannot build with hatred and disharmony, and if this is not understood, my government will carry out its duty of imposing peace and order. Y'q go'Vernment was called upon to take over the reins of government in a moment of extreme difficultyo It will first of all combat with all its might the threat of tru.steeahip which is levelled at us. We are not against the United Nations, of which we are members. The Gongo still needs the assistance otthe United Nations. Nevertheless we insist on strict observance of the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of our Republic. Consequently, the assistance given to us by the United Nations cannot in any way imply any encroachment upon or subordination of our na.tional sovereignty, which remains whole and entire, with all the consequences which that implies. Gentlemen, every one of you has the duty first and foremost of preserving that sovereignty. This means that your co-operation in this Government of national unity is essential. At the time when we are going to disperse temporarily and you are going to return to yOlll'" various localities for a few weeks, I wish to offer you my sincere congratulations on the admirable way in which you have completed this pre-Qonference. ralso congratulate my colleagues of the Committee of the Conterence~ the first Vic~President, Mr. Dieasi, the Second Vice-President, , - Mr • .li.doula, the Secrsta.ry~ Mr-. Lihau, and Mr. N'Gwenz/;l, Mr. DelvaWt' and Mr. Kimanda, the Commissioners~General, the secretaries" and all the conference staff for their , . devotion to the work of this pre-conference. Its success is proof of your maturity. - 91 .AJ:.lNEX XV The sGcond and more important phase of the Round Table Conferenc~ must confirm this maturity. ~ing this second phase you will have to provide the. Congo 'With la new structure which will meet ,the deeply felt desires of our people. This is a noble task which only th~ Congolese themselves can achieve with the necessary oompetenne•. Although during the preaconference there was a general feeling that. regional characteristics sh~u1d be preserv~d, the major' concern should be to 'pr.otect our national integrity. The Congo is a homogeneous entity, and that homogeneous . entity' must rentain indi~isibla i!l its intern~tiona1 relations. Diversity in 'Unit1 and unity for the greatness of the Congolese people. Gentlemen~ the eyes of the world ~e upon us, and the Congolese nn.tion pla:ces its trust III you. You have not been found ~anting during this first phase, and I am sure. that you will do credit to the people 'Whom you represent. For my part, I plaoe my trust in the wisdom of ,,~hich you have just given the most strd.king proof. I therefore think that we can look to the future with optimism. Long live the Republic of the Congo! - ~<::: - .ANJ:IlEX XVI Press Release issued bY the Oommission on 20 February 1961 Leopoldville, 20 February 1961 la The United Nations Conciliation Oommission for the Congo, under the Ohair:ma.n.ship of the representative of Nigeria E),lld including members from Etb..iopia, the Federation of Malaya, Ghana, I!idia, Liberia, MoroQ.Oo, Pakistan, Senegal, Sudan and ,Tunis:'..n, ar:o:-ivad l.n Laopoldville on 3 January 1961. Its task was to make a thorough s~udy of the sltuat~on end to oontribute to the conciliation of the various con.flictl;:,g trel:O-s of opinic.ll in the Oongo in order to achieve a peaceful solution to "\ihe COL.golesu c..:-isiS a The Cam:mission has now completed its task with regard to the study of the situation. On a number ot occasions it lent its good offices to effect a reconciliation betw~en the various pOlitical groups, without however interfering in the internal affairs ot the Republic. 2. The num~rous oontaats whioh it Jias had with Congolese pol1ticaJ. lee.ders enabled the COJmniss:!.on to rO?oh .oertain conclU3iona whiah it believed oould lead to a solution of tr.:.s ~r1gis. It has submitted its preliminary conolusioIlS to the United Na'~ions Advisory Comm::.ttes on the Congo. The CqmmisSlon ls a.bout to leave for Geneva t-o prepare 1ts final report. 3. The Commission believes that a peaoeful solution could soon be found whioh would. guarantee the in1ependenoe, ULity and tarritartal intagrity et the country. It is nevertheleas oon7ino&d that suoh a satisfactory outcome is not possible as long as foreign intervention continues. It appeals to all countries and men of good 1trlll to refrain from adopting an attitude ~>1hich might worsen the situation and compromise the few remaining ohanoes of a. solution. , 4. The Commission earnestlY appeals to all Oongolese to avoid all feelings of hatred and passion, to pu.t an end to internal diBsunsions and fratrioidal struggles and to seek that spirit of mutual· understanding and self-sacrifice without which ao peaceful solution can be achieved. The Commission finally appeals to the Congolese leaders and people to observe and respect fundamental human right~ in resolving the1: politioal proble~ and differences~ - 93 AWr.Q~.Xm .tress li.ulci so i~6'UE?d by the Coa.::rl.ss,ion 011 1 ~~[·.rch 1961 GenevaI 1 March 196J ti'he United lJrtions Concilidion Cou..u5sion for the Congo ~~i.st ;;rest.erdcy for the first ti.JO in Geno\!"£, to consider its drd't report to the Ldvisory Lonmittee on the ConJQ. In vieu· of :-:d.s1i.lterpretc.tiona in the press rse;rrdinL o~-:.e of the princip"l conc111sions co!l.tmned l,.'l.its interim mess;::ge of 15 Februcx;,r to -[-·he j~dvi60ry CoI:lTllittee, the Go:.lllli3sion feels obligEd to clt.rii'~" tl:ia point. It lUeS be~ll nlls3ed in cerlD.in netlS}LperS thrct the Co:n.Jission has endorsed the 1100 provisioml £;overn.ilent f.nd. rcco~1e:;'1ded its recoc,nition. The Cor.nnission 'td.shes to ,-!cite it e.bsolutely clel'.r thct 'this inter:)ret~:i;ion is not correct. The CoLLission considered that the re::,:tlc.cetli;mt of the Council of Commissionsrs-Gsnercl. by c. ]>l'Ovisioncl. Gove:rnm~nt Ut S t...'l encourr.ging step +'ol'rm.'d. en eerlv return to constitutiom:.lity. However, any governmnrct mu.st pr~sent itself' befQre e~ch or the Clu:.mhers of Pm"li'~j.ent for ~ vote 01' conficsnce" in accordance ..nth crticle 42 of the h0..!. FondCiil~nt~le~ It is not the responsibility of the ComJission to deal with the question of recognition or nOil-recognition of ;-;overnmenta. The c-_ueation of recog:'1izin{; or net recognizi.i1'; the 1100 )rovisional ~ovsrn.-:tenl;, cs such did not therefore ~.rise. It inust be pointed out that in ite interim report the Corndssion reoommended thD.t ~n <)·Pl1saJ. cnust be).a;;,de to Ell ,states to evoid asaurni.rlg c;ny Dttitude which raiJht a&,r.-rf.-vcte the oppoaition betueen the different tendencies in the Coneo Old r.1ake coi.1cllic.tion ~lOre difficult. :Lbe Commission once again emphasizes this t )peal. - 94 .. ANNEX XVII;b TELEGRAH OF 17 FbBRUAftY 196* TO THE ADVISORY cor~rrTTIill ABOUT THE DEATH OF HR.- LUHUUBA The Conciliation Commission has been deeply shocked by the tragio and untimely death of Patrice Lumumba and his two colleagues. It strongly condemns the evil practice of resortir1.g to violent means to elilninate political op:>nents as a denial of the lJ!.ost elementary h.uman rightSe The 'l,ll'lfortunate event may well compromise the chances of a peacefulsol~tion of the Congolese crisis. The Commission trusts that those responsible for this heinous crime will be impa.rtiaJ.1y tried and punished. . - 95 ANNEX XIX MAPS 1. Ethnic Groupings 2. Linguistic Map .," <, ..... ' , ' I'. , ':.-.1 f~ ·...... W'OlUtIC 01' 'fill CONGO . KO N LUBA o "" 90 -:: Annex J9$ OBSl!.RVAlI0NS BY THE RE~SENTATIJ OF GHANA REGARDING THE RI!J!ORT OF Tm. CONCIUArlON CO~J.!SSION ¥!.l!Q York '~ March.. 1$51 I would 'pave signed the report o:f :the Concilia.tion COJllIDiSSill~ b~t for the :folloWing considerations: : ' (1) Ths whole report h"1.S been overtaken by events which hav'~! 1;4ken I ,: JJ.'l.ee in thQ C~ngo since l4 February. I: '. (2) 'rhd Jl:J.t.h.:>rities in the Congo dealt with the Commission ~ bad faith, especiallY in the formation of a possible Gavernkent of , I ! 1a~icnal Unity. I (3) 111'3 Ilt::o Proviaiollal Governm~nt was set up without any c0ncs8~ions t~o th<3 Nationalist Group (FRONaCO) who had, thro1LSh the n~got:i.ationa initiated by members of the \ .~ Commission behind the saenes,a,greed to a Governm~t of :., i ! Na.~ional Unit.y on the .following conditions: I • • i : Ca) All poUti:::a.l prisoner.s must be released. i Cb) Messrs. Lumumba, Gizenga, Kashamura,Gbenye and ~a.y must be included in the proposed Government of Nati,mal Unity. I: : I, (c) Where one aide l'laS given a. Ministry the other side ~ust be given the Secretary-ship of State. '\ " {d) 'rhe Prime Minister should be an independent - ill!". Adoula. : . was acceptable to both sides before the announcemen~ t~r the Government. :\ .~ (e) Parliament shOuld. reconvene to approve of the proPOsI\e~ Gove:mment of Nationa.l Unity. : (4) Though it 'J.'IJay be true that a fedieral system of Governm.ent\ ~ou1d help solve the problem, 1IiT cont~ntion has been that the f?~ of , Constitution which Congo should adopt should best be left tc the Congolese people and their duly'sleoted Parliament. I ~ l! !! 11 ii I· I I Nev York, 15 1. While .subscribing to the Report of the COmmission" I wish the followilng statement and clarification of my position: (1.) P~tl!..l2~t ~andl ~47:- I~ is my understanding that broadening iOf the basis of the nprovisional Governmentlt means t re ~or~tion ~ ~ nati~n~l all-Congolese Government representativel'of all important elements of public opinion. The realisation of sJch a government bust be through processes involving the particiP~tioJ of all element!s and an agreed composition of the Government inCIUd~ ~::s:':::;~\:~"::o:o .:~:;;tif o::::i:eg::::.,: not more i.mportant than the result. Without tho sense of part:i~ipa tion in theise processes, on the basis of conciliation, no broad~ibased national al.~.-Congolese Government can. emerge and even if a gOV10~.ont is formed" ~t is not likely to enduro and be conducive to the :ity and territo~ial integrity and stability in the Congo. ; (2) ~a~ 136:_ This paragraph does not soek to express th1: views of the CornJ!Ij1.ssion as to·the internal structure of the Repub],ic 9~ Congo. This is a ~tter for the Congolese themselves to consider ~d f~r de cision by si freely elected and rUuy representative Parliament. I: The contents of:: paragrt'lph 128 in :my view merely soek to record the i~owa of most Congolese leaders 'Whom we met and who thought that the ttimate politicsl ablution in the Congo lay in t he direction of grcClt<,;lr I~ccen trallsation: of powors and compotcncas Bnd constitutional re-al~lbation of rev()nues' ,,'!Dd power of taxation as between the Control Govor . nt I and tht:l Gov~rnmcnts of the Provincos. ,: . (3) P!$as. ~37 ,and. l~: .. The Commission has in its messngo fO the Advisory Co~ttee on l>fr. Lumumba r s murder (para. 45 of report) prgod. an importinf triol and the punishment of all those responsible. : I nm of the opinion that this suggestion should extend to the exccut~~ms in " - 100 - ANNEX XXI Bakwnnga nnd Stanlcyvillo as well, in fact wherever they may have teken place, and the Commission's recommendation of general amnesty cannot extend to those responsible for those heinous crimes. (4) Pnra. 1'0:- In m:r conception the "constitutional centrl11 authority of the Republic" i.e. "the central authority established under the Loi Fundamentalo" is the Chief of StatO' acting on the advice of 11 Central Government, duly constituted end responsible to Pg rlimnent. 2. In addition to the above clarifications, I would like to draw attention to the following! (a) Para. 54:- When Colonsl Mobutu announced the "neutralization" of the existing political institutions, he indicated that he. wos neutralising the Prime Ninister, the'Chief of Stete, and 1111'10 Parliament. " fIe repeated this to the .Commission when we mot him. (Pl1ra .90), (b) Pern, 54:-_President KfIsawbu's "constitutional legislative decree" transferring logislativo powers to the College of Commissioners -- General does not appear to be ~sed on anY powers derived frolll the Lei Fondnmentale. (c) Pnrll. 65:- At the end of the para it is mentioned thl'lt the ONUC did not interfere with the reported troop movemonts. It would be logical to point out that the ONUC did not int()rfore with anY troop movements in the Congo whether initiated by the authorities in Leopoldville, Stnnleyville or Katanga, (d) Chapter V. Pnro.]13(c):.Whilc I agree with the genornl proposi tion contained in this paragraph, I would like t~ point out that in the circumstances of the Congo nnd because of various unconstitutional actions that have been taken by different authorities and more par ticularly because of non-adherence to the"legal framework and institu tions embodied in the Loi Fondamentale, it is not possible for the United Notions to declare its unequivocnl acceptance of any of tho rivol authorities, Indeed, to do so in tho present circumtances would have leid the United Nations open to accusations of pllrtisanship. 3. This note of clnrification may please be appended "\10 the Report. !! - 101 - I ~ ! !! A!OO:X XXI I 4. In submit ing these cia.rifieations'I would like to point out ,bat " - ' • ," I I have had no , ferences ,of' opinion on tliese' POiri:t~ With the other,leeven members of' the fommiSSion with whom I he."e un~ly subacribed t the l report and SiSIljr'd 1t. :' I, ! I!, ... (Signed), Itetr.e.ehwar RAO Ii i, " f ~ •• , " " , 'I Annex XXII MOThS AND RESERVATIONS ON THE REPORT OF' TliJ!ia coNcffmi!onOlYllv11SSION BY MR. JAJAC:KA.CRUKU ( ) New 'York 11 lfarch 1961 The function ot the Conciliation Commission on the Congo as defined by the terms of reference may be divided into two major parts: a) Study ot the situation throughout the entire territory of the Congo Republic; b) An injunction to assist in the conciliation of Congolese leaders ult1.ma.tely resulting in the restQration ot }:t\rliamentary in stitutions and return to constitutionality within the Congolese Republic. Following the work of the Commission on the Congo and as a result ot I its studies of 'the complex situa.tion in the Congo, the Commission was con fronted with a. number of' pertinent questions which are of material and indeed of fundamental importance and must be answered it any lasting solution to the Congolese question is tg be attained. As it is clear now, the whole Congolese problem in relation to the United Nations operatien may be divided into three partSI 1) Civilian technical assistance; 2) Milltary assistance; 3) and lastly, political assistance. It is with this last phase that the Commission is concerned.. The poUtical conflict between the President of the Congolese Republic and the First Prime :VJinister has created such complication that the last two aspects gf the Congolese operation have completely oversha.dowed the other aspect. Indeed, the pollticsl aspect holds the key to the solution of any other pro blem involving the Congolese Republic. The questisn of the legality or iUe!aUty of 'bhe cl?-smissal of Prime MiniQter Lumumba The present Congolese crisis, although it did not start with the dismissal of Prime Minister Lumumba by Presid&nt Kaeavubu, has been - .l.U) sustained and in eed aggravated as a result of that act of dismissal. i: In 11 the course of th • studies of the Commission it had been held by the 11 supporters of th diSIID.,' ssed Prime ¥Jinister that the whole act Of, di, 3'ssal of the Prime VJin°'ster and his government by the President was illegal On , ' : . the other hand, resident Kasavubu and those who support him hold tha his act of dismissallwas not only legal and constitutional but was also j~stifiSd. ! '. '. I, In this c~exion a number of questions requiring answers come tQ one t S : I~ mind flowing froJjl evidence before the Commission. i, ( For examplej . ; I' l) Is the: PresidentIS action of dismissal of the Prime Minister and . his'governmant ccimstitutionally valid? I, . ; 2) Has th~ Prime Minister the power under the constitution ltl dismiss I the President? ; , i 3} Can the Senate reject or countermand the order of dis~ssa~,made by the President? . I, .' , I 4} Was t~ appointment of Mr. Ilea and his Gdvernment on the 10th of September 1960 ct:nstitutione.lly valid? I. 5) Is a jpint meeting ef the two Chambers of Parliament under ithe con~ stitution competbnt to revoke the llrder of the President or to con£e~ confi- dence on the dismissed Prime Minister and ministers? i' . As has be5l1' stated in the repcrt, this question of legality or i' illegality of the dismissal (1)f the first Prime Ii'Jinister and his Gove~ent by the President i~ the fundamental dividing line between the contestinef parties in the Congolese> dispute. I I i There are C1ther questions involving constitutional legality or I illegality that ,&.lso require t6 be answered for the Congblese problBJjlto be solved, ftlr exanlple; I 1) Can tile President continue to suspend Parliament for as 1o~ as he has done w:l.thout,jecpardising his ",wo constit1.ltional authority and 1Sition? 2} Was the ,claim 8f Mr. Gizenga to represent the legal gove~t of the CongoleSE! R I I I - 104 - These problems involve constitutional and legal interpretation but con sidering that the terms of reference of the Conciliation C9mmissiol) do' not " expliCit1y request it to express an opinion onthEise points the Members have not thought it neoessary to do so in the report. !!le ONUC Operation in the' Congo :,' The other matter which the Commission had to deal with is ,the question :af the operation of the United Nations Operation in the Congo., It, ~ad'peen suggElsted by those responsible for the Operatienin the Congo that the Commission has no right to 'comment on the activities ef, tile owe or to make comments on the .operations there. I, on j;he other hand, hold the view that the terms ,of reference of the Commission whioh ,empGwer ,the committee to study the situation throughout the Congo Ill'Cinclusive enough: to bripg the Uriited Nations bperation in the Congo within the ,scope of this study, and therefore the Commission is competent to comment on theope~ti.on ~f " ,·ONOO insofar as the nature ot the operation affected the possi"\l,ilities of conciliation of the opposing political factions in ,the Gongo•. The Members of the Commission' have worked under very great strain and difficulty. Some M6IOOers are representative$ of states that ·have taken certain positions in relation ttl the Congo situation. Sometiines positions which were contrarY to, the views or 'positioo8 held by their respective Governments, but because they are appointed as individuals, not as repre 's,entatives of their' Governments, while serving in, the Commission" they are not bound by whatever views their respective Governments might have,held. Again the Members of the Commission have, had to work under various pressures from different directions, but the desire of the Members to try as much as possible to arrive at unanimity of views on fundament,als in relation to the problemef the Cong" has governed their line of action, and conse quently, a series ef compramises had ,te be made,in producing the present report. It is in the light ot this spirit ef compromise and in order to maintain their atmosphere of unanimity and in appreciation of the great effert and hard work ljf all the Members of the Commission whe have 'been able te> come to - 105 - i I such an agreemen I in a situation of very d!tvergent views of Governmenta I I, that I' , they. represent, ,hat 1 have decided to res~~ my opinions on the abpV•. e questions until . ch a. time as the report be discu6sed either iP. the I I ',1 Asse~J.y. Advisory Committ Ie or in the General I' I I I Similarly, :c have some reserfl'ations in respect of paragraphs 20~130, 35, 44, 59, 62, 64. 65, 73, lOS, and 126. I also hold:that the text of the Congplese constitution should included as IBrt' of this report. It is only by reading this ooneti : and familiarising onesel£ With the text 6~ (signed) JajaAnucha WACHt1KlJ - ...... I I i