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or,. April-August 1961

V0f,9 6 Meeting No. kk 2U April ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CONGO Meeting at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 2k April ±961, at 3,30 P»m.

In the Chair: The Secretary-General MenSbers:- Canada I^r. HALSTEAD Ceylon . , , Mr. SUBASINGHE Ethiopia.,...... Mr. GEBRE-EGZY Federation of Malaya Mr. ZAKARIA Ghana . Mr. DADZIE

Guinea a ... r..,j,._.., ,,. . India., ,_-,•. . ._. ,- Mr. JHA

Indonesia :; , / ,... . Ireland . . 'Mr. KENNEDY Liberia ,, . . Mr. JOHNSON '

Mali i: ,,.-...... : - . Mr. LY .Morocco . ; Mr. BEN ABOUD Nigeria ... • , Mr. WACHUKU

Pakistan .. • / : Mr. HASAN Senegal Itoe KLEINSMIDT Sudan Mr, ADEEL Sweden . Mrs. ROSSEL Tunisia Mr. SLIM ' United Arab Republic Mr. RIAD

61-11687 BKS/bg

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: The meeting is called to order. The subject of our meeting today is the result of the negotiations of the two delegates we have had in Leopoldville and in other parts of the Congo in order to prepare the ground for the effective implementation of A-2 and B-2 of tlie Gecurity Council resolution of 21 February. They had long and difficult negotiations for reasons explained in their memorandum* I wish on this occasion, first of all, to thank them — and I know I can speak for all of you -- for the very diligent and intelligent work which they have undertaken and carried through. The report is before you along with the result. The result is, of course, .1 what we must look at in particular. You will have gathered that the situation as regards the so-called agreement is the somewhat unusual one that while the other party, that is to say, the Congoleee authorities, is bound by their initialling of the paper and while, on the other hand, the negotiators on our side, are bound by their initialling, in view of the necessity for me to consult with you, the right of the Secretary-General to give his final approval or to re-open the question has been left open; that is to say/ the situation you are facing is not one in which this need be the last word, from the point of view of the United Nations. 'We have in this way reserved your right to express opinions. On the other hand, of course, we should not fool ourselves. The moment there is mutual initialling of this kind, it involves certain moral obligations, which all of us, of course, wish to take fully into account. In any event, whatever those moral obligations are and whatever our feelings for them may be, we have seen to it that this Advisory Committee is in a situation where it is free to give advice and to expect the advice to be seriously considered and heeded. With those words explaining the quasi-legal situation, I would invite the negotiators to give their own comments and also to reply to such questions as you might wish to put. NR/dp 5

(The Secretary-General)

' I should like to add that it would be my .hope that Mi-. Gardiner could go back to Leopoldville tomorrow night to get started on practical action in implementation of the agreement. I think it is highly essential to put meat on these somewhat bare bones and to test out the seriousness of the intentions stated'from the Congolese side in practical action* We cannot then leave them - in a situation where they would say that there is no follow-up because there is no response from our side. We must, on the practical side, show both . • ability and willingness to do everything that is expected of us to render possible an implementation of those clauses. We have not been able to do so while the matter was pending here, because as a matter of course every action • by way of implementation is also by implication an approval from here of the agreement itself, and I have therefore had to wait with such steps towards implementation until we had this meeting. You know very well why it has not been possible to have this meeting before today, and for that reason I have made no excuse for it. 'However, it is essential that we try to get as far as we can today — if possible, to the point where it will be appropriate for Mr. Gardiner to return tomorrow. ^ I would ask either Mr. Nwokedi or Mr. Gardiner to speak.

Mr* KWOKEDI; Mr. Secretary-General, we thank you for your kind remarks. In presenting our recommendations as contained in the report, Mr. Gardiner and I thought'it would be helpful if we explained briefly the background of some of our concluding remarks. During our discussions with the four governmental groups in Leopoldville, Bakwanga, Stanleyville and Elisabethville, we found that, with the exception of Katanga, all the Congolese authorities showed a readiness to implement the resolution of 21 February of the Security Council, The Leopoldville authorities, however, adopted a more cautious attitude, partly because of fears that implementation of the resolution would disrupt their services and partly because of the stand they had taken at Tananarive, where they had declared the resolution unacceptable. To some extent, this view also prevailed in Bakwanga, where Mr. Kalonj'i assured us that the problem of foreign elements in his army would be KR/dp

(Mr. Nvokedi) solved upon the return of his thirty-one Baluba cadets now studying in Europe. The Stanleyville authorities welcomed the resolution but made a reservation in regard to the reorganization of the Congolese National Army. In their view, nothing should be done about reorganizleg the Army until Parliament had reassentled and vested authority in a central Government that could then be charged with the responsibility of implementing the resolution. In Katanga we met with a bland refusal to implement the resolution. These different attitudes are dealt with, as you will have seen, in paragraphs 11 to 2? of the report. The next point in the report — I refer to paragraphs 28 and 29 — is the relations between the Congolese authorities and the United Nations. There seems to be a growing svareness among the Congolese that the initiative in the solution of the problem of the Congo should rest with them." Coupled with this is the increasing confidence in their ability to handle their own affairs with little or no external interference. So, while expressing appreciation for foreign aid -- especially assistance from the United Nations — they voiced with some emphasis their determination to have the final say with regard to the manner in which such aid was given. The Security Council resolutioV n of 21 February had been distorted and interpreted as an attempt by the United Nations against the sovereignty of the Republic. There was a feeling that the United Nations was trying to impose its will on them and that it adopted towards them attitudes different from those towards any other Member State with which the United Nations was engaged in an operation of assistance rather than conflict. In this atmosphere of distrust and misunderstanding, rumours about the United Nations intention to disarm the ANC readily gained credence and aroused genuine alarm among the soldiers and politicians, who consequently adopted in public a posture of defiance towards the United Nations. In combatting the aforementioned attitudes, Mr. Gardiner and I found it necessary to explain the Security Council resolution of 21 February in detail and to reassure the Congolese authorities that the object of the resolution was to assist the Congo to rid itself of undesirable and harmful elements and to rebuild the Army into a united force loyal to the Republic as a whole. NR/dp 5

(Mr, Nwokedl)

Now, turning to the text of the agreement, in paragraph 65 of the report, you will find that, on the one hand, we have restated the position of the Congo in regard to the United Nations in a manner which should remove any grounds for further fears by the Congolese authorities that their sovereignty is being infringed. On the other hand, the President of the Republic has now dispelled all doubts arising from the Tananarive conference as to his willingness to co-operate fully with the United Nations in the implementation of the resolution. The agreement contains the basic principles for future action and, in particular, the broad lines along which the United Nations is expected to assist in the implementation of the resolution. r HS/Kitn 6

(Mr, Rvokedl) In our opinion these principles constitute the basis of the next stage in bringing about the withdrawal of all the foreign personnel concerned, and the reorganization of the army. Vie consider that this next stage should be embarked upon without delay, and our recommendations, as you will have noticed, are in two parts. Paragraph 68 deals with the civil service, and paragraph 69 with the armed forces. With regard to the former, you will notice that we have recommended that a United Nations expert should visit the Congo without delay to discuss with the President the quickest way of withdrawing and evacuating all political advisers concerned. The expert, in our opinion, will assist in organizing the transfer of some United Nations personnel now in the Congo to the Congolese ministries, to replace the displaced foreign personnel and strengthen the administration. He will at the same time assist the President in setting up a machinery, possibly a public service commission as operated in certain countries, for the recruitment of additional personnel for the Congolese civil service. We also feel that he should discuss with the President such additional facilities for the training of Congolese administrative and technical cadre as ma*• y be required, V/ith regard to the armed forces, we have recommended that a military expert and such other officers as may be required should be made available to the President of the Republic, to assist in the implementation of those parts of the resolution dealing with the withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of Belgian and other military and para-military personnel and mercenaries, and the reorganization of the armed units. In addition, it is recommended in the report that a programme of technical assistance for the training of Congolese officers and non-commissioned officers in the Congo and abroad should be started. We gained the impression that the Congolese authorities were anxious that the training of array officers should be started without delay, and we feel that this important task should be placed in the hands of a military expert directly burdened with the United Nations military operations within the Congo. r HS/mtm 7 (Mr. Nwokedi) At our last meeting with President Kasa-Vubu, we received from him assurances of his determination to implement the resolution within the spirit of the agreement of general principles, and to the satisfaction of the Secretary-General. We on our part assured him on the Secretary-General's behalf that the Secretary-General would do his utmost to secure a speedy implementation of the resolution in the highest interests of the Congo,

Mr. SLIM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): I should like to thank Messrs. Gardiner and Nwokedi for the work they have done and for the results achieved which, of course, are not 100 per cent satisfactory for the United Nations, having in mind the difficulties which they had to tackle in the Congo, but the results are nonetheless satisfactory, and together with other accommodations and arrangements they may make it possible to arrive at something more substantial and lasting. ' •• I wonder, Mr* Secretary-General, whether Messrs. Nwokedi'and Gardiner are in a position to give us some clarification. I am interested for the moment in the position of Belgian and other foreign political advisers attached to the various Congolese authorities* I should like tq. know whether it 1$ possible to have information as to the number and nationalities of such political advisers) especially in Leopoldville, Elisabethville, Stanleyville and Bakwanga — the four principal areas* I wonder if it is possible to get clarification on these points.

Mr. M70KEDI; If you turn to paragraph kk of the report you will find our estimates of the number of Belgian and other foreign personnel employed by the different authorities, beginning with Leopoldville. The number in the civil service under the Leopoldville authorities is estimated at 2,300, That was the figure we received for January 1961. Those that could be classified as political advisers has not been established, but if you look at the footnote, we were able to determine about forty posts held by foreigners which could be regarded as coming wichin that category. HS/mtm - 8-10 (Mr, Nwokedl) In the armed forces ve had a figure of twelve officers, Including three chaplains. In the next paragraph dealing with Stanleyville, we were informed that there vere no Belgian or foreign advisers* V/e did learn that there vere probably two. As regards the armed forcesf we were assured by Mr. Gizenga and General Lundula and Mr. Manzikala that the figure was nil. In Elisabethville, the number of political advisers, Belgian and foreign^ could not be determined, largely because of the non-co-operative attitude of the Katanga authorities. The armed forces which constitute the main problem in the who.Le territory contain a large element of Belgian and other foreign personnel, but, here again, it was not possible to establish any accurate figures, but the estimate given to us by the United Nations personnel was anything from 400 to 500. This, of course, includes some mercenaries from South Africa, some of whom have since been apprehended. In Bakwanga, if you will turn to paragraph 56, you will see that we were able to establish that there were not more than two or three Belgian and other foreign personnel who could be described as political advisers. The armed forces contain approximately twelve, possibly, not more. I do not know if that is *• satisfactory. EC/mrm 11

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): I should first like to express my appreciation to Messrs, Gardiner and Nwokedi for the work they have done. They had a difficult task* The path which they have taken may lead to fruitful results, although we cannot speak now with finality, As soon as this document was given to -me, I sent it to my Government, .and, quite frankly, I have not as yet had a reply 'from my Government, For that -: reason I cannot speak with any finality or in any way make a judgement on everything that is involved. But I should like to have some clarification on the following points, First, is this a conditional agreement? In other words, have we to replace all this personnel of various categories when it is withdrawn? It will be recalled that in the Assembly I expressed. the very fundamental position of my Government when I said that I could not vote for the Congolese amendment if it meant, on the one hand, that my people had to die there and, on tlie other hand, that a condition would be made that the United Nations had to replace the mercenaries arid bther personnel if they were withdrawn. It would therefore help us very much if the Secretary-General could make it clear to us that this agreement in no way contradicts my Governments position. While we of course appreciate the co-operation between the United Nations and the Congolese authorities, it would be improper, to say the least, for me to . consider this document if it meant that the United Nations had to replace these mercenaries, pblitlcal advisers, and so forth j in other words, if that were a condition for withdrawal. That is a very fundamental question, and, before I proceed, I should appreciate some clarification on it from Mr, Gardiner and Mr,' '

. 3™CBICTAFT-GErTOALg Before asking Mr, Gardiner or Mr, Nwokedi to reply, I should like to say a word myself • ' .•-• -I -tliink th^-h a distinction must be made -between the two lirrfm that 'could bo taken.. The first would be to make "the withdrawal of the Belgians ' dependent on replacement. That line has already been rejected. It would be unthinkable to make such a condition. In those terms the Security Council resolution is not negotiable, BC/nna - 12 (The Secretary-General)

The other line is the pragmatic one. We must recognize, in view of the pre-liistory of Congolese administration, that they simply do not have the people they need for various posts. We cannot, on the one hand, take the stand that everybody must get out and, on the other hand, refuse to shoulder the responsibility for the consequences. That has been, so to speak, the positive aspect of the approach of the representatives* I think that this basic distinction should be made. The second line is just as legitimate as the first one would be illegitimate,

Mr, GARDINER; The agreement does not suggest that the withdrawal is coriditional. On the other hand, as regards the army, for instance, we have considered possibilities of providing the officer element as soon as some of the undesirable people now in the country are withdrawn. Looking at the figure of more than 2,000 forLeopoldville, one may get the impression that we should have to replace more than 2,000 people. But more than 50 Pe*" cent of that figure is made up of schoolteachers; the rest are for the most part technicians. We have indicated that if we had to do any replacing we might have to think in terms of about forty persons, which is quite manageable,. Thus, this is not a conditional agreement, but I think we shall be able to implement it in a very responsible way,

Mr, GEBPE-EGZY (Ethiopia): I am satisfied in that regard. My second question is this: Paragraph (3) of the agreement states that: "the United Nations is to assist the President of the Republic so that all foreign personnel, whether civilian, military or para-military, and all mercenaries and political advisers who have not been recruited or recalled under the authority of the President, be repatriated from the Congo within the shortest possible period of time,,., the President of the Republic will re-examine the appointments of foreign civilian, military and para-military personnel made under his authority and will take the necessary decisions compatible with the interests of the Republic of the Congo", • BC/rarro 15 (Mr. Gebre-Egzy. Ethiopia)

In poracraph (k) we read the following: "The Republic of the Congo recognizes the need to reorganize the National Army, it being understood that this reorganization is to be carried out under the authority of the President of the Republic...". I should like to ask this question regarding paragraph (5) — it may not relate to paragraph (k)i Apparently, the withdrawal of the troops is going to be conditicnal on the consent of the President, Let us suppose that a situation arose liks tho one we faced in Northern Katanga a few weeks ago, when. United Nations troops had to seize twenty-eight or thirty mercenaries. In such a situation, if we had to wait for the agreement of the President it mi'glit very well be too late, What is more.; in some instances he might not consent if it were not in his own interests. Where would we be then?

Mr,flWOKETir. iTher e are two factors that we should like you to take into consideration in examining paragraph (3) of the agreement. We have referred to these in paragraph 66 of our report. The first is the .question of the sovereignty of the Republic; the second is the numbers involved. The main problem, as may ba seen from the report, lies in Katanga. The President of the Republic made the point that, as regards the small number of army personnel appointed under his authority and as regards the political advisers , the United Nations should trust him, as the Head of State competent to appoint personnel, to g«st rid of that personnel; that in this matter his power to do so or his integrity should not be in question; and that what was required was mutual, ur'.cler.^ banding and goodwill, between the United Nations and him. With regard to the vast majority of personnel appointed without his authority, largely in Katanga and Bakwanga, and also in parts of the country 1 undo:;: bin ,Tj.tho.ij.ty; iie cliO nay that a joint effort by the United Nations and him woulc. "bo -.!/.:eesca::y« Ihrro is why the distinction was made.

.-- even wit*1 tliat distinction the President undertalis? Jn ihis agreement to tiko the necessary measures. Thus, we have an undertaViing that some action will be taken, with the assistance of the United Nations, to get rid of the few people who might not be covered by the first part of the paragraph. BC/rarm

Mr, JEA (India) i I should like to extend to Mr, Gardiner and Mr, Nwokedi my delegation's thanks for the work they have done. They had a very .difficult task — we have no illusions about that — and to the extent that they }iave been able to make a dent in the position of the President of the Republic and, other authorities they deserve our congratulations. IIG/efc •-• - 16 (Mr, Jha, India)

As far as the main part or the report is concerned, vhich is the agreement contained on pages 24 and 25, of course there is no question that our delegation, and as a matter of fact all of us in the United Nations, has from time to time and even HOTT affirms the acceptance of the sovereignty of the Republic and the acceptance of President Kasa-Vubu as Head of State. Therefore, any affirmation or re-affirmation 'of that is certainly agreeable and is free from objection. . As you have pointed out, there are many practical difficulties and obstacles. Even when the Security Council adopted its resolution of 21 February, it was not unaware of the difficulties and lack of co-operation in various quarters. Needless to say, we certainly have to persevere and try and bring about the implementation of thb resolutions, with patience but with determination. • • However, when :It comes to spelling out certain matters in the agreement, it seems to us that this has to be done with extreme care. As far as my delegation is concerned, I must say that we wish that we had the chance of seeing this agreement beforehand. It appears that this is subject to your approval; but as, you yourself have said, once you have initialed an agreement, there is a mora.1 responsibility that attaches to it, and even that makes your position rather difficult. Now we have to scrutinize this agreement very carefully. The intentions, when anything is committed to writing in this fashion, have to be judged from the agreement itself. I am afraid that later on, whatever might be the intentions of the parties who signed the agreement — whether the United Nations, President Kasa-Vubu or anyone else — it is the agreement itself which will be interpreted plainly,and every sentence "will be interpreted to the advantage of the party who seeks to interpret it in the sense of minimum obligations. As to this agreement, I would say that in the first paragraph I see no objection in the United Nations reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty of the Republic of the Congo in the implementation of the resolution. However, when we say that, we cannot for a moment contemplate any reduction of the force of validity of a resolution of the Security Council. As Members of the United Nations, from our point of view those are peremptory decisions, and of course the sovereignty of a State — any State, as a matter of fact, not .only the Republic of the Congo — must be sacrosanct. But to the extent that it is a HG/ek 17 (Mr. Jha^ India)

resolution vhich imposes obligations, the sovereignty of a State has in its manifestations to be bent to the application of the proper interpretation of the resolution. Paragraph 2 talks about A-2 and B-2. B-2 is concerned with the reorganization of the array. Naturally that has to be done in co-operation with the President of the Republic. As a matter of fact that was the intention when that part of the resolution was discussed and adopted by the Security Council.

However; with regard to A-2—- and we have to be very clear — that paragraph is absolutely peremptory. It urges that measures be taken for the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of all Belgian and other foreign military and para-military personnel and political advisers not under United nations command, and mercenaries. As far as we know, the intention of that paragraph was to call upon Belgium and other foreign States to take away their personnel from the Congo, and that responsibility was not placed on the President of the Republic. Therefore, the sentence to the effect that the President of the Republic of the Congo will receive all possible assistance from the United Nations seems to us to have very little validity. It has validity »• with regard to paragraph B-2, but it does not seem to have validity with regard to paragraph A-2, except that, of course, the Republic of the Congo has to co-operate in the implementation of that resolution. We now turn to paragraph 3. As has been pointed out, the first sentence states that the United Nations is to assist the President of the Republic so that all foreign personnel, etc., who have not been recalled should be repatriated from the Congo within the shortest possible period of time. It is the assistance on which will be contingent the withdrawal of all foreign military personnel, etc. Here again we have to be clear. The responsibility for withdrawal was not placed by the United Nations on the Congolese Government. That provision was directed against Belgium and others which had their foreign military personnel in the Congo. It seems to us that whatever may be the intentions -- whatever may be the explanations given here -- when this agreement is signed it will be interpreted in such a way that practically all of the force of paragraph 2 of resolution U7^1 will be removed. , HG/ek '""••• .18 (Mr. Jha, India)

Another snag here is that this undertaking -- an undertaking which of

course depends upon: the assistance given to the President of the Republic of the Congo, presumably by way of replacements -- will apply only to those who have not been recruited or recalled under his authority. Now this might make it attractive for us to get.at the Katanga mercenaries, but then we know that the President has no authority over Katanga. With regard to that, he cannot give us a valid agreement from a practical point of view. So even there the value of that, will not be too much. Take-.the. last phrase, which says: "decisions compatible with the interests of the Republic of the Congo". That is where all of the disputes will arise, If it had "decisions compatible with the resolution of the Security Council", one could understand that. With regard to the clause pertaining to technicians, of course the Security Council resolution does not apply to technicians; it applies to political advisers and military and para-military personnel. Therefore, I do not see any particular objection to paragraph k (a),and this is a matter of arrangement between the Republic of the Congo and the United Nations* But the present resolution of the Security Council does not cover technical personnel. Paragraph U(b) is all right. I myself have suggested from time to time that training institutes might be set up in the Congo. The paragraph relating to the reorganization of the National Army states that this shall be carried out with the authority of the President of the Republic, with United Nations assistance and on the basis of the proposals made by the Chief of State in his letter of 5 March 1961 to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. In this very letter the Chief of State says, in the second paragraph, that this is subject to the condition that a satisfactory agreement is reached on the matter with the military leaders at Stanleyville, Bakwanga and Elisabethville, Obviously if Stanleyville does not agree to placing its troops under the authority of the President of the Republic, well the agreement really has no value. Therefore, this is more of a case of negotiations with the various elements. As far as we see this problem of reorganization, the legal authority of the President of the Republic has to be maintained; but it may not r HG/ek 19-20

(Mr. Jha, India)

be a practical proposition to say that all of this should be under his control and authority. Our delegation strongly sympathizes with the point of view of Stanleyville,, that the first thing to be done should be the convening of Parliament, and that once Parliament convenes and there is some kind of agreed composition with regard to the Government, then other things will fit into place. I am not exactly sure as to what is the status of this agreement, whether it is something that is already a fait accompli. But all I can say is that my delegation would not like to be associated with it. Of course, if it is subject to revision or consideration, well, in that case you might consider our suggestions

Buttif it is an agreement that has already been made, in that case we should not like it to be said that we have agreed to its text ,as drafted. AE/Jvm 21

(Mr. Jha, India) I would like to say again that I very much appreciate the efforts which were mede "by Gardiner and Nwokedi, but this is a matter in which we cannot, by the terms of any formal document, dispel or erase what the Security Council intended. If we do that, we may be leaving ourselves open to great trouble because, in the final result, it is the Security Council which must say whether an agreement reached by the United Nations with any other authority, and the terms of the resolution, are proper or not. That will be the position of my delegation for the time being. I may take a few more minutes later to make other observations. • The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I should like to say a few words about what I shall call the political realities of the situation which we are facing. First of all, I want to restate what I said earlier. This agreement is initialled by Kasa-Vubu and by the negotiators, reserving the stand of the Secretary-General. That is to say, it is not a signed agreement from our side and, as I pointed out, we acted so with a view to the possibility that this V Advisory Committee might wish to express opinions on it which, obviously, should be taken into account. But in expressing such opinions, I think that the Advisory Committee should look at what I call the political realities. It is very easy to tear this agreement apart, as a legal document, but only when you abstract it from the background. The initialling took place at a stage in the events which was both politically very important and quite risky. We must speak openly here, otherwise there is no point to the discussion at all. Through United Nations action, based ultimately on what we did in July and August of last year, we finally managed to get to a position where at least some development had begun in a direction away from Tananarive and towards putting Mr. Tshombe in the right perspective. In my view, there will never be a reconciliation in the Congo so long as the position of Mr. Tshombe is uppermost, while a possibility for reconciliation will exist under Congo Leopoldville authority. Still, after all, the only common element which exists, weak though it is, is the Presidency. Leopoldville was faced with the experience of Tananarive, where they bowed to the Tshombe line. Naturally, at about this time, as a reaction 22

(The Secretary-General) to vhat had happened in North, Katanga, Tshombe was exercising, as I understand it, all the pressure against us he possibly could on Kasa-Vubu, In Leopoldville itself, there vere at least two groups with very different lines of thought. I would not put the President in either one of them, but he was the one whose weight would finally decide which group would take the lead. One group was for cp-operation with the United Nations and anti-;Tshombe-anti-Belglan, which is quite logical. The other group was anti-United Nations and pro-Belgian. That -latter group had,,recently .been uppermost in power. I don't know whether any of you read, for example, Mr. Delvaux' press conference less than a week before the signing of this paper.. It was an outright exhortation to the public, and of course that includes the army, to resistance against the United Nations,. The implications in.= what he said were very far-reaching indeed. That caused a protest from us and the exertion of pressure on the President to take a clean stand regarding the United Nations; he simply had to choose. We have had a discussion of. this before and we have tried, with the status agreement.proposal, to get him to that point• ' , but j,. in that effor' t -. we• did not succeed. .The negotiation conducted by Gardiner and Nwokedi was another, point on which this entire problem might be straightened out. What was needed was for the President to take a clean-cut stand on the elimination of foreign elements and in favour of the United Hafciono. Somewhat to my surprise, in this situation,, and under the pressure of the pro-United Nations anti-Belgian group* he got to a point where he was willing to accept a paper of this kind as _an official .document. That meant that he, for the first time I must say, came out in support of the Security. Council line, against the,. Belgian element and for the .United Nations. Our refusal because of the legal weaknesses, even to consider ,such a stand,..would have allowed time to drift by, perhaps -a.week. or.two ,or, in the. Congo, two months. All this time negotiations would be continuing, and Tshombe-Belglan influences would be exercised and it would, have been possible, ao to .speak, to lose one's life .for the pleasure of a better .hairdo...... 23 (The Secretary-General)

I could not do that and for that reason, while I could reserve the right of this Committee and myself, there was a basic need to get Kasa-Vubu, speaking for the Republic in its entirety, to take a definite stand and come out, as I call it, clean. He did so, and to a greater degree than I expected because, as you know, when this was initialled by him he held a press conference where he, if anything, underscored the points which were essential from our point of view, that is to say, his wish to obtain co-operation, his acceptance of the Security Council resolution and his wish to have tne foreign element removed. In fact, this paper and the stand taken here has a clear anti-Katanga accent, not only in that situation but, generally speaking, because the terms used, such as foreign personnel and deleterious foreign influence. '" For that reason, I feel that it is quite realistic for you to ask how much his word will weigh in Katanga. But while it is quite realistic to ask that, on the other hand, it is, in a certain sense, and with your permission, Mr. Ambassador, to beg the question because you can certainly see that our arresting mercenaries, our pressing officers out, our changing this and^that in Katanga, has an infinitely stronger chance of success, with the solid resistance we have from the Katanga authorities, if back of us we have the central authority of the Republic which is recognized by Mr. Tshombe. Mr. Tshombe's way of getting out of this situation, in my view, is not simply to refuse to comply but is, so to say, for Tshombe himself to take an anti-Leopoldville stand. As I say, this is so interwoven with the question of reconciliation and the proper balance between the various personalities that it cannot be regarded as a regular negotiation document, and especially as regards the timing and other aspects, political considerations must come very heavily into play. There is one further aspect which I think we should take into account. I will not mention names, I will not go into the policies of any particular countries, but which of the ex-colonial countries would have taken a different stand from that of Mr. Kasa-Vubu, in the face of the Security Council resolution requiring the elimination of all foreign elements, whether engaged by him and under his authority or not? It is quite right that this is addressed to other AE/Jvm 2^-25 (The Secretary-General) Powers and, as you know, in some respects we have a rather difficult negotiation going on in Brussels but, on the other hand, it is also quite right that if we mean anything at all by respect for sovereignty and for a chief of State, we must give him at least a right to leave it recognized that If he wants a particular man in his country, we cannot order that man out. HA/hm 26 (The Secretary-General)

A peremptory character, yes — but a peremptory character, after all, with some reopect for the needs of the country as fudged ty its only recognized spokesman,, That is to say, without invoking Article 2 (7), I feel ' that ve should always remember that there are limits ,to the extent to which we can force certain actions upon a sovereign Government* I would agree with you that we could wash our h&'irls of it if we had a Central Government fully functioning "because they would say the.t this is their responsibility, and nothing but. However, we do not hivve it, and we do not know when we will have it. We cannot live with the fiction that under cuch circumstances there is nobody who can speak at all for the country as such. We must give seme margin for the consideration of the need to have such a man. And I would say that, if this paper is read in good faith, it does not say more than that we recognize the country's sovereignty; we recognize that there is a Chief of State who, at least on an emergency basis, must be accepted as having certain rights in the exercise of that sovereignty; and that we say that if somebody is covered by him personally, so ,to speak, we cannot override his decision and we do not have the right to dp so. In fact, in the circumstances, that is implied in wha,t you yourself said: that the Security Council resolution is addressed to others. In such a case, I would like to see, for example, the Belgians — or whatever nation may be concerned — themselves take the action, so to speak, to get the, man back,, Bub that is one thing — and that is the line on which we are vorking. It is an-th^r tiling for UG to say to the Chief of State: "No, sir, you have no right to ,<=>mploy such a person, because the Security Council has said that you cannot do it«" You may say that this is a weakness in the Security Council resolution, or tho& this is perhaps introducing a weakness. But I ask you -- all who have been ;Ln the seme position — what your stand would have been under similar circumstances. Again, I mention no ncmes, but I think it is unnecesnary to have names, because I knew of practically no ex-colcnial country — there may be a very, very few exceptions — where the Administration has not wished directly to avail themselves for yet seme time of individuals whom they trusted, who were competent and who were willing to stay on. It is — and I repeat that — rather difficult for an outside element like the United Nations even to deny their right — what happens in practice is another matter — but even to deny their right to say HA/hm 27 (The Secretary-General) that they reserve the possibility for themselves to say "I want this man". I do not reed more into this than that, and I think that is a good-faith Interpretation. However, I am the first one to have seen, all the way through, the legal weaknesses, and it is only in the light of the total political setting that I, for my part, felt that the representatives were right in initialing it with the reservations which they made. I excuse myself fpr intervening, "because the floor really belongs to the negotiators themselves. I added this because there is also, na.turally, a United Nations aspect to this, which It is easier for me to talk about. i Mr^ HADZIE (Ghana): I would like to associate my delegation with the gratitude and appreciation that Jiave previously been expresoed, Mr, Secretary- General, for your delegation, Mr. Nwokedi and Mr» Gardiner — not merely for the very competent and thorough report they have produced, but also for the positive and constructive way in which they have gone about their task* We think that this probably represents the beginning of a break-through in regard to the tangle that has been existing since ,the Tananarive Conference. It is a mat.ter of special pride to my delegation that Mr. Gardiner should be on your delegation. He is a man for whom we have the greatest respect and admiration. For these reasons, it might appear invidious for me to make any remark of a critical nature on this agreement. However, if I make such remarks, I would like them to be regarded merely as preliminary reactions which will, I hope, lead to further clarifications from them. My delegation was also a trifle unhappy about the fact that we were not given, a prior opportunity for consultation before this moral obligation was entered into. However, we are content with the explanation you have given on the subject. We have also founji nest reassuring the remarks you have just made on the realities of the situation. However, our uneasiness is not entirely dinpelled, because pervading this agreement there seems to be on uneasy suggestion that the primary responsibility for the Implementation of the paragraphs of the resolution concerned now lies with the President of the Congo Republic, with the assistance of the United Nationn, rather than -- as previously understood, I th;ink, in this Committee — with the United Nations and you as its executive organ. HA/hm 28-30 (Mr, fladzie, Ghana)

We apprecite the consideratipns and, as you call them, the realities vhlch led to some of these formulations. We particularly sympathize with the importance of securing President Kasa~Vubuls co-operation and good will if the operation were to succeed, We also appreciate the consideration relating to respect for sovereign rights. It is also possible that, having regard to the intentions on the basis of -which the agreement was signed, the actual operation of it may in fact take place on the basis of a slightly different relationship — that is to say, we may well find that it is the United Nations which is acting with the assistance of President Kasa-Vubu, rather than President Kasa-Vubu with the assistance of the United Nations, However, in spite of all, cur uneasiness, as I indicated, is not entirely dispelled. In paragraph (2) of the agreement, for instance, there is the sentence reading: "To this effect the President of the Republic of the Congo will receive all possible assistance of the United Nations". As the representative of India has pointed out, paragraph A2 of the resolution was quite peremptory, and, looking through our Records relating to the subject, there was no understanding really that the responsiblity that we interpreted as lying with you was to be shared with anybody, let alone its being transferred to somebody else, to be carried out with your assistance. Equally, in paragraph Q, the same consideration would seem to apply. Toward the enpl, pf that paragraph, there is this formulation: "... the President of the Republic will re-examine the appointments of foreign civilian, military and para-military personnel made under his authority and will take the necessary decisions compatible with the interests of the Republic of the Congo". Later on in the report, we find that the numbers of such personnel in fact under the authority of the President amount to something like 10 per cent, and there is an implication, at the end of paragraph 66, in the Conclusions, that the remaining 90 per cent will be the subject of further measures which the United Nations may find it necessary to take. I trust that later on we may have some clarificatipn as to what further measures will be taken in regard to this 90 per cent. TL/bf -"•-. 31 ",.*••'•" -.'':-'' " (Mr. Dadzie, Ghana)

• Concerning paragraph (k) (a), we-are also a. little unhappy about the phrase reading "without however l:a\ ing a monopoly of. such recruitments". 'Earlier in the report .it was envisaged that a joint United nations-Congolese Public Service Commission-.would be responsible, for submitting recommendations to the Congolese a-thorities concerned; and if it were possible to retain this idea in the Agreement-on the understanding that, were a vacancy to occur, this Public Service Commission, in which the the United Nations is participating, would'be the first and exclusive source -- I should not really say "exclusive"; I should eay it would .be the primary source — to'which the Congolese authorities would look, this would remo\e the sorVof unhappineas that this clause. implies. What I mean to say is that it is only if and when the Public Service Commission is unable to provide the requirements of the Congolese authorities, that the Congolese authorities should resort, to other independent means of recruitment. Turning to the last paragraph, there seems to be what to my mind eraowvtp to a formal reservation of position, on the part of the Congolese authorities to agree to all this; and at the end of the Agreement, to say that "the detailed application of the basic Agreemen4- t ... shall be subject• ,• in each case" not merely to ratification but to "careful study", seems really to weaken the Agreement to such an extent as to make it rather difficult of acceptance. There is another point,.the last one, on which I would appreciate some clarification, and it is this. Throughout the report it has been suggested that the contacts with President Kasa-Vubu wore limited in their scope to the' areas within the. so-called iLeopoldville orbit. Am I to understand that this Agreement is so limited in its. applicability?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL;, Before,giving the.floor to the representative of Pakistan, I think it would be useful if one of you gentlemen, Mr. Nwokedi or Mr. Gardiner, would,clarify the^situation. r

TL/bf 32

Mr* GARDINER; The observation has been made that this Agreement really seeks to transfer the primary responsibility to the President. There was no recognition or acceptance of responsibility, and here we have not a transfer, but recognition and acceptance of responsibility. When that has been undertaken, we on our part have also promised to give assistance. If we look at the problem from that angle, I think we see the positive implications of the wording of the paragraphs to which reference has been made. I would also like to emphasize that in fact it would amount to more than co-operation when we begin to put this into practice; and that, I think, is an important redeeming feature, in spite of the wording of the text as we^have it here. The text represents really the minimum we could get, and if we start from that, we hope that we may be able to get into more than full partnership. But we cannot, we could not during our negotiations, give the impression that we wanted to impose any new schemes or any new programme on the Congolese authorities. Reference has been made to the portion which says that the recruiting of technicians should not be the monopoly of the United Nations, When the Public Service Commission has been established *with our assistance — in fact, with the secretariat, we hope, made up mostly of United Nations-approved personnel, whether we talk about monopoly or not — the main channel for making appointments will be very closely associated with the United Nations. So at least we can leave room for the Congolese authorities to bring in the exceptional individuals. That, I think, is the real interpretation of this portion which says that it should not hold a monopoly, not be the exclusive source, as you have rightly pointed out. But the primary channel of recruitment would be very closely associated with us. The Agreement is agreement on general principles. We have not been able to spell out all the details. That again is the interpretation of the last paragraph: it is not a limitation, but it seeks to make it quite clear that we have not gone into all the details required. We have examined them, but they could not all be contained in this Agreement. The whole process of setting up a Public Service Commission -- the recruitment of the personnel of the service and such things — will have to be done in detail. If you accept that interpretation, then the last paragraph cannot be read as a limitation on the Agreement. TL/bf 33-35

Mr. NWOKEDI! Just one other point of explanation... .You did ask what was meant by "further measures" in paragraph 66, wherein it is stated: "The President's, agreement that the United Nations should assist him in securing the repatriation of these personnel opens the way to Congolese constitutional and popular support for further measures which the.United Nations may find necessary to take, under paragraphs A-l and A-2, in implementation of the resolution." - -- • • I will answer, that, if I may, "by giving just one example of'the further " .measures contemplated, and that is the recent arrest of thirty mercenaries. * •'••••• Mr. HASAN (Pakistan):. Mr. Secretary-General, for almost the first time my own feeling is one of satisfaction on reading this report and listening to the exposition given by Mr. Nwokedi. It seems that these gentlemen, Mr. Nwokedi and Mr. Gardiner, have accomplished a rather remarkable feat, namely, to approach the African leaders in a manner of friendliness and not one of condescension, an- attitude which in the past has antagonized those leaders. This attitude Vill, I hope, be maintained. It is a rare day for me, Mr. Secretary-General, because I agree BO completely with you, and a great deal of what you said I thought I would like to say, myself, although I could not have said it so \rell as you did. The mandate which, you gave to these gentlemen is contained in paragraph 2 on page 1 of the.report, where there is reference to the measures to be taken for the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of all Belgian and other foreign military and para-military personnel, etc., and its implementation, .is reflected in paragraph (3) of the draft Agreement* To me it seems that this draft Agreement -- this portion to which I am referring now, paragraph (3) — is in accord with the recognition of President Kasa-Vubu's constitutional position and is in no -way in conflict with the Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961. The important point to be kept in mind is.the spirit of that resolution, its intention that the military,-.para-military and political foreign personnel created involvements and invited the Congolese authorities to defy the United Nations and made them proceed towards a civil war. That is why the Security Council said peremptorily that they must be ousted from the Ccngo. MW/bg - 36

(Mr. Pasan, Pakistan)

If we are convinced that these dangers and hazards do not really exist in relation to some foreign enterprise, it would seem to us that it would be quite unnecessary to force the President to take action to which he is opposed and which would unnecessarily make him hostile to the United Nations. Forcing always makes anyone hostile* The purpose of the United Nations operation is not the conquest of the Congo, but the re-establishment of a normal state of affairs. I see no reason, therefore, why we should argue about what the Chief of State said once upon a time. We must remember that the Security Council resolution is not law and, therefore, should have no rigidity* That this resolution is not law was borne down upon us rather emphatically on Saturday morning when the whole operation was almost abandoned by the General Assembly's refusing to adopt a vote of finance. Therefore, we must view these things reasonably in the spirit of the resolution and in the spirit of the whole operation. And the spirit is to bring peace back to the Congo, to help the President and other leaders to recognize that the United Nations is there not to vanquish them, but to help them in attaining a state of normalcy. And I am*' happy to say that these two gentlemen have made that appropriate approach in the manner in which it should have been made, and as a first step, this is a most excellent approach. Let us view the recommendations made by these two gentlemen realistically. They have made them as practical men who do not seek merely revengeful vindication of a position or of the prestige of the United Nations, but who are anxious to see a difficult situation settled. The first recommendation is that a public service commission should be set up. We are all used to public service commissions. Then they vant the President to have the power of screening the personnel in order to ensure that the staff necessary for the viability of civilian and economic life are kept and that anyone who is likely to create hazards or disturbances is ousted. And that is the purpose of the Security Council resolution; it also reaffirms the status of the President, That is one way of winning over the President, and it is more than a starting point. Once we win over the President and the people close to him, I am sure that it will be the beginning of a new process of winning over the whole of the Congo, 27 (Mr» Hasan, Pakistan)

So, Mr. Secretary-General, I personally, and ray delegation, agree entirely with the approach taken by these two gentlemen and the manner in which they have made the approach to. the President and have made these recommendations* These recommendations appear to us to be most reasonable, practical and realistic. Therefore, we will, support them. . / .

Mr. GBBRE-TCGZY. (Ethiopia): In the first place, allow, me to say that the Secretary-General has the right to make any arrangements which he deems best and, in the circumstances, it is not for me, nor for anybody else, I suggest, to create difficulties — and I am sure no one will, • On the other hand, I am certain that .if we make certain statements regarding our position, it is because we have taken a certain stand and a certain attitude, and it is only . • right and appropriate .that we make those positions clear, .. . . • ; Now, sir, earlier I said that I could not make a final statement because I do not have the views of my Government* My Government takes-a serious view of this matter, and for obvious reasons: we do not propose to send our people . 1 ** to be shot in. the Congo. We are quite fond of the Congo, but I can assure you that we are more fond of our .own highland. It is the emphatic position of ray Government that it is not conditional , in the sense that every time you pull someone from the Congo you will be obliged to put somebody else in his or her position, and its understanding io that this agreement does not mean, when it says "to assist the President", only ascistance to the President, but a two-way proposition — you co-operate with each other* With that understanding throughout the text, for the moment the most I can do is to say that I will not put myself in your way in. making this arrangement, and we wish you the best of success, particularly in view of the fact that the last paragraph, so to speak, reserves the position -- even to the Secretary-General, I should hope -- that in each instance he would have a chance to make the decision by the implementation of a specific arrangement. With that understanding, I will not put myself as an obstacle in the way of this arrangement. 38.140

Mr. DADZIE (Ghana): I was merely going to thank Mr. Gardiner and Mr. Nwokedi for the clarifications which they gave me. I was going to express further views, but I think that these views will benefit from further reflection. I shall, accordingly, reserve my delegation's position on the agreement pending such reflection*

Mr. WACHUKU (Nigeria): I want to express the appreciation of my delegation of the effort that has been made by the two representatives of the Secretary-General, Mr. Gardiner and Mr. Nwokedi, I want also to express my wholehearted support for the e;:planation made "by the Secretary-General himself a few minutes ago because I believe that that is a realistic approach to the changing situation in the Congo. When we read in this agreement "President", my delegation would like all of us to see "President" there not in terms of an individual, but as an institution; a person may be president now, but he dies tomorrow, and somebody else takes his place. It is that institution and, not the individual that is the centre round which this agreement is being woven. From my own experience since I came to the United Nations and participated in this Congo affair, either on the Advisory Committee, in the General Assembly or elsewhere, it has come to me so glaringly that a lot of decisions have been affected one way or the other by the extent to which you attach the possible effect which decisions may have on one individual or another on the Congolese scene. And I think it is necessary that the Advisory Committee should divorce itself from this constant consideration of individuals and look at the problem objectively, irrespective of who may be concerned at the moment. I think that this agreement must be seen in the light of the resolution which was recently adopted in the General Assembly. AP/dp " Ul

(Mr, Wachuku, Nigeria)

We are all anxious to bring an end to this debacle that exists in the Congo* I do not think that any country here would like'to continue to find its nationals being shot or being killed, in a foreign.land. My country has made quite a lot of sacrifices in the Congo, just as other nationalities here, too, have had their sons buried in the Congo. But these are some of the sacrifices we have to make in order to make the United Nations stand firm. As my delegation has said elsewhere, we stand to gain more from the United.Nations -- the younger countries, the weaker countries, than the more powerful countries. To us who are in- Africa, anything at all that points to,the direction of the solution of the Congolese problem would be very, very well. This agreement, however imperfect it may be — I do not for one moment say it is perfect -- but this is a pointer in the right direction. And I believe that this agreement haa to te implemented in the proper spirit, a spirit through which you win the confidence of the Congolese leaders first. ..._.. There is no agreement in the world, it does not matter how beautiful it may be legally, how well you protect yourself and secure every bit of it, if you have bad faith, it will never work. Sometimes you have very faulty agreements, but in the light of common experience, weaknesses could be put right and weaklings could be strengthened. As you pointed out, Mr. Secretary-General, the fact that the President of the Republic of the Congo has now acknowledged this resolution, which they.said they were not prepared to accept, they say now, "We do accept this resolution and we are now prepared to co-operate with the United Nations" — I think this is what we have been trying to get all these months. In this agreement we have this stated in a categorical way. I want also to examine the consequences of this agreement to ensure the sincerity of the leaders of the Congo; even before we saw this thing, we read about the declaration that was made in the press conference — an acknowledgement of that. We notice now this agreement has produced what I personally and my AP/dp - U2

(Mr» Wachuku, Nigeria)

delegation agree is a very healthy result. Here we are doubting what is the interpretation of the agreement at Tananarive. What does this confederation mean? Do the Congolese want to break up the Congo? Now, we see the centre of authority and the various leaders say, "We want a confederation, we do not want to break up our country.11 Today, if what we read in the papers is correct, the fact that Mr. Tshonbe can go to Coquilhatville and be in the same place with Mr. Sendwe, I think that is an achievement, especially to one who has been in the Congo and has known of the various attempts that have been made by Mr» Gendwe and by others to make the two bodies meet, even to discuss the problem -- because Mr. Sendwe is the leader i of that section of Northern Katanga that is completely opposed to Tshombe; the fact that those two are reported to have gone to this, conference and even to have looked at each other, I think that is an achievement, I do not know how true it is -- the impreosion in Stanleyville that now Gizenga should go to the meeting there -- if that report is true, I would say it is as a result of the efforts that have been made by the Secretary-General through his representatives recently. It means that the central authority of the Republic of the Congo is being strengthened. It is the 7iew of my delegation that anything at all that weakens any recognized authority of the Congolese authorities would be inimical to the best interests of Africa. And all friends of Africa should see this in that light. We want peace in the Congo, and anything that is done to bring about that peace is a great contribution to the people of Africa. When we refer to paragraph A 2 of the Security Council resolution S/^7^1> it says: "Urges that measures be taken for the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of all Belgian and other foreign military and para-military personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations Command, and mercenaries;" The resolution does not define "measures" \ certainly, a measure of co-operation with those into whose country we have gone; something that goes to help these i people, I think, is a good measure. AP/dp ^3

•• -•• •'•"• (Mr. Wachuku, Nigeria)

With respect to the institution of the Presidency, under the Loi fondamentale it is the President who appoints all the' office-bearers in the Central Government, as has been said here, I think it was the economic adviser of CNUC, came here the other day and said that the Army is the central institution. Even today it is from the central fund that the Army is paid. Apart from the Katanga Army, all the other sections of the Army are paid from the central fund. So that, whether Gizenga recognizes the right or not, he has no money to pay them. It is from the central fund that various armies in Stanleyville, Kivu, Leopoldville, Kasai and all the other places are paid. Therefore, wherever we find those legal and 'constitutional means that' hold the Congo together, I think they should be : strengthened and not weakened at all. I do not see anything in this clause that constitutes to the'Security Council as a governing authority or as a supra-government to run a"country. We have read a lot of resolutions that have been passed on South Africa,1 in respect of South West Africa which is a mandate; there is dispute over the whole thing, but South Africa has never listened to anybody. We had a series of resolutions • V- passed about South Africa changing certain situations,in accordance with the Charter as a Member of the United Nations, in its own State. They-have always refused to do so. The Security Council has done nothing. The General Assembly has done nothing. The Members have done nothing. Now, suppose' we, in implementation of this, pass a resolution and we show we have authorized the Secretary-General to implement this resolution, and all the Congolese authorities banded themselves together and say, "We do not wont you to do it." Suppose that tomorrow Tshombe, President Kasa-Vubu and Gizenca, all of them get together and say tomorrow, "We do not want you to implement this resolution. We want all the Belgians to stay.w What happens? Unless we go in open war against them, it cannot be implemented. We know there is dissension and that this dissension has been" created by the Belgians. And now we have a section of them, perhaps the-greater section of them, willing to co-operate with the United Nations to get them out. AP/dp • - - If If-If 5

(Mr> Wachuku, Nigeria)

Any measure at all that assists the Secretary-General and the United Nations to conclude this operation successfully, any measure that points in that direction, should "be recognized, supported and implemented. That being the case, I do not vant to analyse the various wordings and punctuations in the various clauses; I am more concerned on the ultimate effect — the thing taken as a whole. DR/mtm " ' k6 (Mr. Jaja Wachuku, Nigeria)

I think that" this is a good- Effort that iias been made by two people with great experience. I am'in the happy position that.I-know the two gentlemen concerned* I can claim'both to be Nigerians in some respect although my friend from Ghana will tell me that I am going too far because Mr* Gardiner used to be the head of the Extra-Mural Department of the University of Ibadan. In fact, he organized that section. He has to his credit the fact that when Ghana became independent the whole of the organization and establishment of the Ghana Civil Service was done by him, Mr. Nwokedi is the most senior permanent secretary of Nigeria, and he has tremendous experience in administrative matters. Therefore, regarding the efforts they have made, one can understand this if, for sentimental reasons, I would support this particular agreement; that is understandable. But that is not the only reason. Before these men of experience put their names on this, they must have seen many things that could not be put down here. This is the barest minimum that is required to establish a bridgehead. I would suggest that if we genuinely want to solve this Congolese problem and if we honestly believe that the time has come when we should forget all of the past and begin anew, this is the first page of the new chapter and to lose the new chance that is created, the new opportunity, is to say good-bye to our whole operation. Now that the General Assembly has adjourned and this agreement is writing a new chapter in the history of the Congo operation, and we know also that the General Assembly has passed a resolution asking the President of the General Assembly to appoint a commission of ceven people to assist — the key word now in the minds of all the representatives of the United Nations connected with the Congo must be "assistance" not "domination". We go to the Congo to assist, not to rule, not to govern and not to dominate. I want to re-emphasize this because my delegation and my own country does not want anything that would suggest that the sovereignty of the Congolese Republic has been trampled.underfoot by anybody. This assures the people that the United Nations has no such intention. I remember that I said here that it was necessary to say in no uncertain terms to the Congolese authorities that whoever may be spreading the rumour that the United Nations has come there to disarm them and to dominate them, that must be allayed. This allays that fear, and therefore, whatever its weakness may be, we should forget that weakness and try to make this instrument work.

^>" • DR/mtm ^7 (Mr. Jaja Wachuku, Nigeria)

That being the case, I do not think we require any long consideration of this whole matter. Vie think it is the basis for future service to the Congolese people. From discussions one has had and from reactions,according to the newspapers, of SOUK of the Congolese leaders and their representatives here, it seems to me that they themselves accept this in good faith. It would be terrible if we in New York should turn this down now or by trying to analyse it or dissect it suggest to them that we d'o not even believe in what our representatives have put down. It has been said in the General Assembly that there is one type of view here in Hew York and that is that in fact the whole Congo problem is created here in New York. • • I think the time.has come when the members of the Advisory Committee and the representatives of the United Nations should a££ee on assisting the Congolese people. It. seems to me now that, unless we accept this agreement — we can criticize various things so that those who will execute it will understand — but I would not like anything that, would suggest that we do not give it support. I say this in good faith, in honesty and in sincerity. . - When I make reference to a particula.. • r thing, ifit is not by way of criticism of the representative of India who spoke here. I hope he will reconsider his view,after careful thought, that his delegation does not want to be associated with this agreement. I think personally that it is a far-reaching statement to make because if his delegation is not associated with it, it will make it difficult for anybody connected with his own country — if I made such a statement it would make it difficult for anybody connected with my own country if they were asked to work in the Congo — to work freely without being suspected of not following fully the implications of the agreement. Thus, " considering that all of us have members in responsible positions in the Congo, we should do everything possible to give wholehearted support to a measure that is bound to produce or is already having a salutary effect on the whole Congo situation. With these remarks, I want to say that my delegation accepts the text of this agreement as a contribution to the solution of the Congolese problem. Anything that can be done to strengthen it and not weaken it should be done in order to assist the Congolese people to rediscover themselves. DR/ratra HS-50

Mr• RIAD (United Arab Republic); Mr. Secretary-General, I should like to be allowed at the outset to join the representatives who preceded me in extending their thanks and congratulations to LJr. Nvokedi and Mr. Gardiner for the positive work they have done and for their recommendations and the clarity of their report. My delegation feels great pride in having these two gentlemen here from two sister African countries. Vie believe that that is a very good thing. I should also like to apologize on behalf of Ambassador Loutfi, who was unable to attend this important meeting because the aspect under consideration is a very important one. Unfortunately, my delegation did not have sufficient time to study thoroughly the report before us. • Certain delegations here like, for example, the delegations of Ethiopia, India and Ghana, expressed their fears, even doubts^ and their comments on certain aspects of the report as well as certain articles in the treaty or the agreement, even to the extent that the representative of India declared that his delegation would not be able to associate itself with that agreement. In fact, Mr. Secretary-General, has I spoken before them, I might have expressed the same fears and the same views. On the other- hand, Mr. Secretary-General, you yourself gave us your comments based on the moral obligations and also the political gains which the United Nations had won recently after the Tananarive Conference and the relations between Mr, Kasa-Vubu and the United Nations and the relations between Mr. Kasa-Vubu and Mr* Tshombe. Mr. Nvokedi and Mr. Gardiner gave us explanations on all these things. In view of what I have said, I am not in a very good position to comment amply on that report or on the agreement. However, if the Conmittee is to reconsider the whole thing again, my delegation might be in a position to make further clarifications. In any case, we are only here, to give you advice, Mr. Secretary-General, and in the light of that I would reserve the right of my delegation on these points. BKS/mrm .. 51

Mr. JFA (India) ; I did not wish to speak again. However, I would like to make certain points clear* We are not a policy-mailing body Jn that cense and we cannot, really interpret the resolutions of the Security Council or your responsibility. Of course, we advise you whenever you ask us to do that, My dolPGAtion is appreciative of the great work that has been done by your two representatives * They have produced an excellent report. They had a very difficult task, and I do not think that anybody could have 6.one any better,, However, I would still say th?vi:. whan you formalize certain conclusions and put them in the form of an agreement which is going to be quoted and requoted, we want to make sura that there is no departure from what after all. is the basic law bn this subject, that is the resolution of the Security Council. None of us, including yourself, can say that we can bypass or modify it or read it in a sense different from what the Security Council meant.'' That is the basic position. It is absolutely true, as some representatives have said, that if wo have the support of the authorities in tha Congo ws have the best chance of implementing the resolution,, That, of course, is obvious, and wa fully recognize that there are practical difficulties to be met. In. the Congo at present there is not one authority, unfortunately;- otherwise the task would be much easier. There are the authorities in Stanleyville; and even from the report it appears that they held some very different views from those of the representatives in Leopoldville. For example, their whole insistence was on the implementation of paragraph E-l, that is to say tha immodiata convening of tho Parliament, a paragraph that has beon reiterated in the recent resolution of the General Assembly. While we fully agree that we have to have some working arrangement with President Kasa-Yubu, our only fear is that apart from the Security Council resolution, is it necessary or desirable'to enter into a formal.agreement. Onca an agreement is entered into, no amount of interpretation or clarification will be of any avail. Everybody will look to the word and will interpret it to his best interest, and we might get into very serious difficulties. So far as this is concerned, if you feel that this is quite in consonance with the Security Council resolution, we have nothing to say about it. Some day this agreement will have to be justified before the Security Council, where the members have the right to say whether .a certain agreement was in consonance with the resolution. If J,t is your view that this is all right, we would have nothing BHS/mrm •- - 52 (Mr, Jha. India) to say. While ve recognise that in some practical vay it might be ur.eful, at any rate for the time being — I use the words "time being" because nobody knows what will happen in tho Congo after three or four weeks, and how the related positions of the authorities will be — and if you feel that this is something which does not give a different direction and which does not contradict the Security Council resolution, ve will have nothing to say about it. But I do feel that even thio would require some clarification, the very clarification that you have given — perhaps an exchange of letters on that basis* Vie do. not want the sovereignty of the Congo to be touched or anybody to be humiliated. We are far too mature for ell that kind of thing. We would not like the sovereignty of our own country to be at all affected in any ve,y« Why should we want.it for another country? We have as much respect for any other country*s sovereignty as we have for our own. But we have to be careful that by coming to an agreement wo do not really lose the power, the force and the direction that the resolution of the Security Council, for good or for bad, has given to you and to the United Nations. *• Let us take, for example, one little point, which Btetee that all who have not been appointed under the authority of the President shall be repatriated,, Now practically all of tho^e, as the report itself says, £0 per cent of such personnel^ are in Katanga« At least for the time being, since Katanga is completely non-co-operative, it does not look as though that •cillbo dor.So In tho second part we note that there are about forty political advisers under the Leopoldville authorities. We may all hold very strong views aboub these people, because there is no doubt that they are causing a lot of mischief. Political advisers occupy key positions in various ministries. .1 believe this was also the view of the members of the Conciliation Commission. Now tliis means that we are giving the power to the President to decide whether or not they are in the interests of the Congo. If he says that they are in the interests of tho Congo, that is the end of the matter. Is that compliance with the Security Council resolution? The positive thing here is that he accepts the resolution of 21 February. That is very favourable; I must admit that* But the conditions that are put here raise some doubt. mrm " 53 (Mr, Jha, India)

We do not want to stand in the way* If you feel that that is a good course to take, please go ahead. But we have some doubt about any kind of categorical position that this is, "because it gives a different direction to the Security Council action. Me entirely agree with the representative of Nigeria that without mutual ccrrridenoi and co-operation by the authorities in tho Congo we cannot do very ir.uch. The United Nations obviously cannot go to war to implement any of its decisions* But at the seine time the history of this case being what it has been -- and we cannot forget recent hickory — wa hive to be careful the,t we do not do anything in derogation of the Security Council resolutions or of anything which impinges on the sovereignty cf the Congo Republic<> It has to be a delicate balance. Perhaps there should be along with this agreement some letters of clarification in wM.cn- it is put beyond doubt that there is no question of any departure from or derogation of the Security Council resolution and that the Security Council resolution wants these people to be withdrawn, with no exception and, no reservation there. Of course,*' this is a matter which has to be negotiated as to timing an£ the various other factors.. I apologize for this intervention again. I spoke because the representative of Nigeria referred to my statement and &lso because I did not want it to be understood that va want to stand in the way of any fruitful action, If the actior is regarded as fruitful, we certainly want you to go ahead with it. As it is worded at present, without further clarification, I feel it would be very difficult — and I have not had any communication with my Government on this — to associate ourselves with it.

The SECRETARY-GffKERAL; Thank you for what I think is a most valuable and helpful clarification, I should like to say a few words about how I look at the Security Council aspect of this matter, which is really the point you raise. £et me firat say that as a lawyer I would be very dissatisfied with this paper. However, this is, as we know, a mixed operation, It has its political aspects, legal aspects and very complicated psychological aspects. I must interpret the Security*Council resolution in the light of its intentions. BHS/mrm ' " " 5^-55 (The Becrotary-General)

That means that even when you come to paragraph A-2, there is the ultimate objective, the independence, integrity and harmony in the Congo, which must be a factor in the interpretation of the intentions. The resolution cays that measures should be taken for the immediate withdrawal and evacuation of these personnel. What are we to do? We have to approach all the parties which have any influence on that situation as effectively as we can, given the fact that we are not in the position of a negotiating government in relation to another government, but an international organ with certain very clear liu±!;ations in our right to act, and ever, more so in our right to exercise effective pressures. We do not e.c'b in this case with sanctions, least of all againso a Government which is our host Government* We have been negotiating, for that reason, with Belgium, so far without what either Ambassador Sahbani or I regard as satisfactory results* We have pushed them to the point which, I think, is the ultimate point for the moment* We are waiting for the formation of a new Cabinet, which obviously is a major factor in the picture. We have sent rather angular notes as soon as ws came to a case where nationals of other nations were in the Congo contrary to the resolutions, and have got this or that kind of action, in some cases very helpful, in other cases definitely 3.ess than helpful* NR/ek " ' - 56 (The Secretary-General)

what I can do n the spirit of the resolution is only to push it as far as is possible. We come finally to the Congo. You know, first of all, the negotiation difficulties in that there are very few with whom we arc supposed to talk it over. Finally, there is the President. The President necessarily is not cnly the Chief of State but also & kind of focal point for all sorts of influences. We use two highly qualified negotiators to push the matter as far as they find it posuiblc, taking into consideration the various measures which should follow and taking into consideration the whole situation. What do they arrive at? They arrive, for the first time, at a recognition of tha resolution which is binding for the Congo as such, even if it is not in the strictly constitutional form which v?ould have been preferable but ir> hard to reach because of the known circumstances. TT?.:j further arrive at a recognition that the President of the Republic will take all action to eliminate all such foreign personnel as fall under the resolution, though he reserves to himself the right to .make, exceptions. Are we to assume that he acts against the; interests of the Congo or are ws to assume that he acts in the interests of the Congo? If we are to assume that he acts in the interests of the Congo if -he avails Himself *- of that possibility, is it contrary to the resolution that we grant him the right to keep the men? Certainly not, because the resolution wac supposedly passed in the interests of the Con;ro. Further, he vants, for reasons of prestige, to get this situation described in terras which legally are rather unusual. His obligation to act in this w«y is implied in his request for assistance to do it and also, of course, in the recognition of the resolution as such. He wants to have it expressed in that way, which, so to say, subordinates us, but subordinates us in relation to him as in turn subordinated to the resolution. That is to say, he is not outnida the law. He has to interpret the resolution, and what we do is to admit that he has himself the right to interpret the resolution in the light of the interests of the Congo. Again I come back to my question: "Are we to work on the assumption that he acts against the interests of the Congo?" I know there are people, even people in. official posts, who are likely to say, "Yes, we must assume that he acts against the interests of the Congo and in the best interests of somebody else, presumably Belgium." But may I ask you the question, or ask the members NR/ek .--... 57 (The Secretary-General) of the Security Council the question: "Can we have any dealings with any State on the assumption that the Government in question is not in the first place the guardian of the interests of the country? Can we dnal with any Government on the assumption that that Government acts against the interests of the country?" Obviously the reply is that we cannot. We must work1 on the assumption that Goverrents act in the "best interests of their people. Under such circumstances, reading this paper in the way I have explained, I cannot find that this is a document which^goes against the Security Council either in its intent or in its form. But I repeat wbat I have said, that as a lawyer I would have written it in a different way, "but that ic another consideration wliich I have to forget about. • Finally, there is one thing we all know, and that is that this document, whatever explanation is given, will, on the basis of a very different set of assumptions from those I have mentioned here, be regarded as a derogation of the resolution, but that is one of those things which we simply have to taks in this Congo affair. There are very few actions of mina in the Congo affair that have not been misinterpreted, even when it has been difficult to arrive at a false interpretation. , ^

Mr. JOHNSON (Liberia): Mr. Secretary-General, my delegation seizes this opportunity to congratulate and extend its thanks and appreciation to Mr. Gardiner and Mr. Nwokedi for the excellent manner in which they have executed the terms of reference entrusted to them. My delegation wishes to associate itself with the representatives of Indonesia oi>d Nigeria by endorsing the agreement reached between the President of the Congo and your representatives. In our judgement, this marks the dawn of a new era in the United Nations relationship with the authorities of the Congo. For those of us that are concerned about the legal implications, we can only hope that all of us will realize that what might be sometimes absolutely legal is still not always expedient. My delegation would, therefore, support the recommendations and agreements submitted, and we wish Mr. Gardiner and his colleague continued success in their work upon their return to the Congo. j NH/ek .... 56

Mr. SUBASINGHE (Ceylon): I am glad that this report has come from two eminent Africans themselves, because nobody can p.ccune them of approaching the Congolese authorities or leaders vith condescension. It is a very valuable report, and, reading through it, I think that to a large extent it confirms some of the fears we have had.. Reading this draft, agreement, I am inclined to look at it from the angle of how it will affect the situation in Katanga. There is no doubt — whatever anybody may say ,-- that there have been euenents in the Congo that have acted in a way that is inimical to the inclopondcnce and integrity of the Congo. If you refer to paragraph 18 of the report of Mr, Gardiner and Mr. Kvokedi, you will sea that: "It was only Mr. Tshombe, in fact, who categorically rejected the idea of national unity. This rejection, expressed at times in a complete lack of concern for the fate of the Congo outside of the Katanga, lrJo. him, for example, to refuse to consider the reorganization of the Congolese armed forces ...". Even today, the most dangerous element as regards the independence and integrity of the Congo, in the opinion of my delegation, is Mr. Tshombe and the Katanga administration. The Belgians, who are of course the most important foraign element acting against the interests of the Congo, are concentrated in Katanga. Mr. Gardiner and Mr. IJvokedi have reported that there are approximately 2,300 Belgians in the Lecpclrilville area, most of whom are schoolteachers or persons holding such minor posts, but the people of any importance number only about thirty and could be handled quite easily. If this agreement means that Mr. Kasa-Vubu, as President, will have any say when you want to take some forthright step to deal with the situation in Katanga, if that can make a difference, then certainly this agreement is going to be detrimental to the task you want to achieve. If you have the freedom to deal with Katanga separately without Mr. Kasa-Vubu having to interfere, then personally I feel that this agreement is not so harmful — particularly because I know that Mr. Kasa-Vubu, placed as he is today, nominally the Head of State but without being able to exercise his authority on the country as a whole, must naturally NR/ek •"•'•- 59.60 (Mr« Sufrasinpfoej Ceylon) be rather perturbed about his future and. he wonts acsatance after eflourcmco from the United Nations that we will not deal with him in c.^j derogatory manner which would weaken his position further. Therefore, he wants repeated assurances. By giving him these assurances through this agreement, you can deal with him separately without allowing him to Interfere with the situation elsewhere, in collaboration with Mr. Tshombe. I do not see any harmful effect. That is the reservation that I have. What role can Mr. Kasa-Vubu play in collaboration with Mr. Tshombe when you want to dsal with Mr. Tshombe and the Belgians there, who are the most important element? That is my reservation. HS/Jvm " 6l

(Mr. Subasinghe, Ceylon) Certainly if through this agreement Mr. Kasa-Vubu feels assured that his position is not endangered, and in your future dealings with him trying to persuade him to resummon Parliament, this would have given him somo confidence — certainly, in my opinion that is to be welcomed. I, do not -know what Mr. Gardiner ani Mr. It.rokedi, have to say about that. If you are satisfied that you are giving him that confidence, and that in the near future you will be able to influence Mr. Kasa-Vubu to resummon Parliament, that is the most important thing that has to be done to bring any kind of stability to the country. Signing this agreement with Mr. Kasa-Vubu is a minor position, with all its imperfections if that can be attained, but, however,. I have this reservation. BOGS 'this agreement permit Mr. Kasa-Vubu to determine how you should deal with the Belgians in Katanga, and Mr. TshoicbaY

The r^CRET^KY-GT^Jp^AL; I would leave the floor to Mr. Nwokccli and Mr* Gardiner; but I. would a;?Licip?.te the reply and give it, I am sorry to say, in rather cynical terms* If we manage to keep Mr. Tshombe down, Mr. Kasa-Vubu will support us in every effort to get Belgians and other foreigners out of '••'•-•• . *• Katanga. If we were to lose our grip, which depends entirely on military numerical strength in Katanga, so that Mr. Tshombe was riding high, Mr. Kasa-Vubu would . pe::hap3 lisa his rights under thie agreement to side with Tshombe against us That is {;o say, the reply tD your question in dependent upon our military strength in Katanga. Thai would be my reply.

Mr. oLIM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): Mr. Secretary-General, I believe,-, as I have s^id previously, the agreement is very satisfactory for the tine being. It is more satisfactory when it takes into account the before this agreement, approximately a month ago, we ircre in a situation whereby we - were being challenged by all the authorities in the Congo. This agreement was • reached, and it led to agreeing to change a position by Mr. Kasa-Vubu, a position which. he. held on leaving the Tananarive conference in defiance of the 21 February resolution, and he has now come around to accepting the Security Council resolution of 21 February. . . HS/Jvm - 62 (Mr. Glim, Tunisia) Of course, like any agreement it is not totally satisfactory, and particularly there is the idea according to which this agreement insists on the respect for sovereignty and the sovereign rights of the Republic of the Congo -- we are all agreed on this; nobody has denied this -- but this idea contained in this agreement that the United Nations action may assist Mr. Kasa-Vubu in the implementation and carrying-out of A2 and B2 of paragrabJh 2. In this connexion I think we must remember that the agreement was reached before ly April and was signed on 17 April. On that very day, on 17 April, the General Assembly adopted a resolution which added a new idea to the Congo situation. I recall that from the beginning the United Nations action in the Cong9 was based on the terra "assistunce of the United Nations to the Pxepublic of the Congo". No prior resolution preceding that of 17 April, adopted by the General Assembly, had insisted on or referred to the obligation of the Republic of the Congo to co-operate fully with the United Nations. The last resolution adopted by the General Assembly, A/RES/l600(XV), is the only one which refers to the obligation of the Republic of the Congo, and have all the Congolese authorities co-operate with the United Nations. This resolution was adopted with an interval of a few hours of the signing of" this agreement; so the taking into account of this new decision of the General Assembly, I think this agreement should be completed by adding a paragraph which could very usefully and without difficulty be added at the end of paragraph 2, to this effect — that the President of the Republic of the Congo will receive all possible assistance of the United Nations, and will grant the United Nations its full co-operation. I think that this is a very balanced statement — the President will receive United Nations assistance, and in return will give his full co-operation. This acceptance by him to,co-operate fully with the United Nations may have very fortunate consequences for the future development of the implementation of this very agreement, and I believe that if we could add this, taking into account precisely this new attitude or this new position of the General Assembly in its resolution A/RES/l6oo(XV), we could add a sentence at the end of paragraph 4, which would be sub-paragraph (c), which would read: "The United Nations grant the Republic of the Congo all assistance in order to recruit technicians... trained administrative and technical cadre..•", and then sub-paragraph (c) would read: "That the United Nations shall give all assistance to withdraw all personnel of the above-mentioned categories that are not under his direct authority." HS/jvra - 63-65 (Mr. Slim, Tunisia) We agree that staffed directly under his authority now are fifty-two . paramilitary personnel. We are having discussions now in order to have them replaced by civilian advisers — as veil as twelve military personnel. .We could leave the three chaplains. I do not think that would be very ominous with the situation in the Congo, but for all the military, paramilitary and mercenaries. nr.i?. political advisers who are not under his direct authority, and I think this is the usefulness of this agreement -- who are not under his direct authority --. • we are there in order to assist having them removed. Later we shall see how — whether to have them fully evacuated, by the authorities, who are perhaps not in agreement with him, or to have tbcm evacuated by force, if some are caught, as was the case for thirty mercenaries x/ho were caught in Katanga, I think that the fact that Mi.1. Gardiner and Mr. Nwokcdi have signed this agreement places a certain commitment on us, and .we must not refute their authority; but since after the signatory of this agreement, the General Assembly adopted a decir.lcn which r^C^.r-red. to co-operation from President Kasa-Vubu, and I think this General As^mbly decision would very usefully assist us without making the United Nations.lose moral prestige in .the person of the two signatories to the Agreement. I think we could add a new element, the element of co-operation, in the first place, and secondly, a new -element that we shall assist the President of the Republic to eliminate and remove from the Congo any military, paramilitary, mercenaries or civilian advisers who are not under his direct authority. And here I should like to recall that I am very happy to note that between Leopoldville, where thsre are approximately thirty civilians and twelve military foreign staff,among them three chaplains; at Stanleyville there are only two civilian advisers, in accordance with our information. I think it is most important at present to start with a rapid implementation of this agreement as regards Leopoldville and Stanleyville. BC/hm ,--.. 66 (Mr, Slim,, Tunisia)

In my opinion, those ore the most important points for the time being* We must bear in mind the present felicitous development of events in the Congo — that is, the rapprochement, the, reconciliation — and perhaps something even more — betvsen M.-."0 Gizenga and Mr0 Kasa-Vubu« I think that that is very important* Indeed, if this reconciliation should tolie place, the time would not te far off whea F&rlitcrairb could be convened0 Eh2n there would remain only one point of <3lBFigre.2nent, Katanga, and Katanga would in fact be isolated from the root of the

CoEgOQ In view of the agreement ve a-e now studying, the body of resolutions th>t have been adopted and the specific mandate give..'.! to the Secretary-Genera].,, we coul take, more energetic and effective r.ction and thus arrive at better results*

Those were the observations that I wished to nakea

I would feel perfectly free to suggest emendmenta and additions, even if a new element was introduced ;into the picture, so long as they stayed within the spirit end trend of this text. I would fsel free even to go beyond that. But, obviously,, I would not like .to introduce suggestiops which could in any way justify Mr« Kd'sa-Vubu in withdrawing his signatures That, I think, would be a very bad move, politically^

VP (Morocco): I should like to congratulate Mr0 Kwokedi and

Mr0 Gardiner. They have made a tremendous effort to fulfil their task in tjie spirit of the Security Council resolution* Vie have heard many reservations, We have reservatio^c of our own to make, but I shall refrain at this stage from expressing them*

At this stage I would ask only one or two questions0

Did Mr0 Kasa-Vubu sign this agreement, on which we have certain reservations; on the assumption that he has complete control over the entire territory of the Congo? Did he sign it in the name of the Congo, as President of the entire Republic of the Congo? BC/hm 67

Mr, UWOKEDI; I think that it vould.be correct to put it this way; He epoke as ;the de jure authority over the whole of the Congo, but not as the de facto authority.

Mro_BEKABOUp (Morocco); Then I would ask this question: Did

Mr0 Kaao-Vubu act with authority — nominal, effective, or none — even over the Province of Katanga? Can this agreement "be implemented "by the two signatories in Katanga and other parts of thv3 Congo, such as South Kasai, in which some future difficulties might be envisaged?

' Mr0 GARDINER; Mr0 Kasa-Vubu signed -this agreement, knowing very well the reactions which might come from the other parts of the Congo* , Even before we left, the effects were fairly noticeable; that much we can say*

. • Mr, '.SLIM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): I should like to add just one conment to what I. said earlier. Clearly the point is whether the agreement can be improved* If it cannot be improved, it may vrell be kept as it ia I • v and we should perhaps look-for opportunities to improve it through practice*

Mrc.JHA (India): Will it be possible for Mr. Gardiner and Mr, Kwokedi, when they go back to the Congo, to negotiate further about this agreement? If tha- will be possible, I should like to, suggest that this Committee hold -another meeting en the matter on Wedensday. From my ^Limited understanding, I can see that this is an agreement of very great importance. J do not wisfe in any way to derogat from the very hard work that hao been done by Mr. Gardiner and Mr., Nwokedi, As a matter of fact,, getting an'agreement from'Mr. Kasa-Vubu is no joke; I fully appreciate that. However, I should like ,to send the agreement to my Government, along with a report on the consensus here, I certainly feel very hesitant about committing myself regarding this agreement, because I have a certain responsibility to my own Government, BC/hm

But if, as I have said, the Sepretary-General feels that he would like to go she-ad, I would not stand in, the way. However, we would not, I think, lose anything by waiting a couple of days, Of course, I do not know what sort of implicit understanding -there was about whether any changes could "be made in the agreement* If the United Nations is more or less committed, there would not really be much point in consulting our Governments % But these matters are going to ccrae up again and ogain in sons form or anothert Much as we would like it to be other-vice, we have not sssn the las.t of the Congo quastion either in the Security Counpil pr in the General Assembly. Perhaps we would gain by waiting a couple of days* I do not knew if Hjis is feasible, but I would be very glad if the Secretary-General would consider ite

gAL ; My own feeling — of' 'course, I should like to check this with Messrs. Gardiner and Nwokedi — is this: Tp rewrite this or that phrase in the agreement would not be, a very useful ex^rcieeo To propose either additions to the text or supplementary documents by way of exchanges of letters, o- letters in imp3.cments.tion of the agreement to other parties — for example, ,to the V Provincial Presidents, and so forth — would be, feasible and very reasonable. I believe that VG have to think of the psychology. The word, as it has beep signed by Mr0 Knsa-Vubu, is perhaps not sacrosanct, bu;t it is not easily charged^ On the other hand, our representatives could say to Mr, Kasa-Vubu, "This is all right, but, in order to counter such and such fears end objections, the Secretary-General would consider it very useful if we could make this addition, or, if we could agree on the text of a letter to be sent to the Provincial Presidents"* If we got that -« and it would in fact be a rather important document — then I fee^L that this paper would be considered to have been arr- established position from which we have moved on.

Mr. JEA (India): There could be an exchange of letters.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Yes. All this io, I think, perfectly possible, psychologically speaking. It makes sense provided that we feel tb^at there is no word in the agreement which is intrisically, so to speak, harmful or against what we want. jtiu/nm 69-70 (The Secretary-Generalj

My own feeling Is that, although the formulations are partly germed to a very peculiar psj'chological situation, and for that reason, as I have said,, they are not formulations which I would have chosen myself, there is no word in the agreement which can or £?iould be construed as contrary to the intentions of the Security Council:, The weakness, as I see it, under such cireumstances, is mainly that too much is ca^Ld "by implication and there are too many gsps for us to know where we really are. But that need not be a cruise of major concern,, provided it is felt that additions and supplementary documents can be discussed* In fact, there is a meeting of minds here, because I had the intention of suggesting that the Conanlttee shou?.d meet not later th=.n a couple of days from now to discuss what nay frave emerged on our side after hearing the vie"-ra of representatives here* HG/bf ...... 71

(The Secretary-General) We may then not have the advantage of Mr. Gardiner's presence, as he should return, I think, the earlier the better. But I feel, on the other hand, Mr. Gardiner, we can compare notes before you leave and you can get our observations and our suggestions ao that they reach you when you are in Lecpoldville in sufficient time to give you a basis for procoedtng. I also feel that it is very desirable that, the first time our spokesmen meet Kaea-Vubu again, he or they are in a position to explain how matters stand. Otherwise, it would look very mysterious; that is to say, I'feel that ws should aim at getting whatever proposals we have across to Mr, Gardiner in such time that at the first meeting with President Kasa-Vubu he can,present the reactions from here and present them, as I indicated, in a positive and not in a negative form.'1 How do you feel about it, you who are having the immediate impresBion of Mr. Kasa-V'-ibu's attitude in this question?

Mr. GARDINER; An exchange of letters would be very helpful. *• Any attempt to amend the text may create difficulties for us. But if an exchange of letters will achieve the same objective, then that is the method by which we would like to proceed.

Mr. SULIEMVN (Sudan): The question I wish to put to the representative is whether this Agreement has been finally signed or is it an initialled or a provisional Agreement at this time?

Mr. NWQKEDI; It was initialled as a recommendation to the Secretary-General*

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: As you can see, that leaves us the necessary leeway. EG/bf , ,-. .. 72

Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): I am Inclined to agree with the suggestion of the representative of Tunisia, that the effect of a new resolution, the one which was just passed by the General Assembly, might provide an occasion for us to make certain conditions; that is, in return for our assistance we should te assured of co-operation from the other side, and things of that kind. However, I feel that in our anxiety to make a formal gain we should not open the door to a possible retraction. Lately we have been hearing that the authorities in Leopoldville are particularly susceptible to pressures, and therefor* we do not wish to lose what we have in hand now. As you said yourself, let us not jeopardize what we have in hand. However, if we can make additions -- additions such as the ones suggested by the representative of Tunisia -- without hazard, either of a formal or of a substantive nature, let us do so by all means. But a bird in hand,•if I might remind you, is better than a dozen in the bush.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Let me put it this way. We have solid enemies in the Congo -- first of all, in Katanga. We cannot afford not to have any support or any co-operation with anybody, because that is an impossible situation. The game is really -- and it has been this way the whole time, basically -- between Leopoldville and Elisabethville.

Mr. BEN ABOUD (Morocco): I said before that I would refrain from putting more than one question, but I have now observed that the conversation has reached the stage where the second question is necessary. The implementation of this Security Council resolution now under consideration has led the Secretary-General to despatch two of his most able choices to the Leopoldville area and to sign or initial this Agreemsnt. But ypu have stated now that one of the hardest obstacles the Security Council would confront is Katanga. We all know that Katanga is only a cover for Belgium and that there is now a representative of the Secretary-General in Brussels. Do you not think that any provisional initialled Agreement, if ever accepted, would be only one part of the steps that have to be taken, and that the major obstacle to attack right now Is still in Brussels, that IJG/bf -•- 73 (Mr. Ben Aboud, Morocco the hardest obstacle on the road to the solution of this crisis io still in Katanga and that Mr. Tshombe by himself is not the person against whom the Security Council is taking measures, "but the officers, the military end para-military personnel, and mercenaries and so on? Are we not forgetting the reality as it is and .not taking again into consideration the question of Belgium as being the obstacle against which we should take new measures, if time is still being wasted?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: let us look at this text in the light of your question. The Belgian technique so far has been to go to a certain point and then, so to say, seek tJr? protection of the Congo. Ly this arrangement which endorses — and there is no reservation, miiid you, on that — the 21 February resolution, we have in fact undercut that element in the Belgian tactics. We have narrowed the field in which Ambassador Sahbani has a very tough job indeed, and which has been delayed through the Cabinet crisis, of course, I do not fully agree with you regarding Belgium and Katanga. Of course, Tshombe is nothing without the individual Belgian support and officers, and so on and so forth, and some advisers. But his igroup has a will of its own and ambitions of their own. It is not all, so to Bay, inspiration from outside. And for that reason he and his group do represent a problem in itself, which has been aggravated and rendered extremely difficult by support from outside. But I do not "believe that we judge the situation correctly if we consider it all as inspired from the outside and without individual initiative, support and conviction in Katanga itself. Their urge towards a kind of independence in relation to the rest of the Congo is, after all, very easy to explain in terms of personal interests and group interests inside the Congo. In fact, in a curious way we are facing a situation like the one we had in August, in the sense that in Katanga and in back of Katanga certain Belgian elements crystallize as the hardest core of the problem, and I would not like to lose the advantage we have at present, which I can characterize in a few words: military cuperiority for the first time in Katanga, and a working relationship with Kasa-Vubu on the other side. IIG/bf " Ik

Mr. BENABOUD.(Morocco): I would like to support the request by the representative of India. I "believe that we need some time. That is why ve did not want to express our own reservations. We are going to send this report to our respective Governments. It is, of course, a very important step forward, if appropriate, and it would be a very dangerous one if it is not adequate or appropriate and if it did not fit within the framework of the reality of the Congo. That is why I would like to support the request wbich was made by the representative of India.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I think we can agree on a Dieting on Wednesday, if that suits you. Then va can see what kind of positive • proposals we can make ourselves. Eut when you approach your Governments, may I appeal to you to put it in the total political context, because if it is handed to their legal departments, I know exactly what comments you will get back. I could write them myself.

The meeting rose at 6*2Q p«,m. CONFIDENTIAL Meeting No. 1*5 26 April 1961 ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CONGO Meeting at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 26 April 1961, at .3 p.m.

In the Chair; The Secretary-General Members: Canada Mr. HALSTEAt)' Ceylon . . Mr".: SUBASINGHE Ethiopia Mr. GEBRE-EGZY Federation of Malaya Mr. ZAKMIA Ghana Mr. DADZIE Guinea India Mr. JHA ' Indonesia Ireland Mr. KENNEDY Liberia Mr. JOHNSON Mali... . • Mr.'LY Morocco 'Mr. BENADOUD Nigeria .. Mr. WACHUKU Pakistan Mr, HASAN Mme KLEINSMIDT Sudan Kir. ADEEL" Sweden . . MTS..ROSSEL Tunisia Mr, SLIM United Arab Republic Mr. SIDICY ••-•••'

61-11888 NR/mh "'" 2-5

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I think that we can begin the meeting although all are not here, "because the otners can "be brought up to date when they arrive. We have today to revert to the question of tne Nwokedi-Gardiner so-called "agreement" — I would rather call it a declaration of intentions — and our afterthoughts in view of the debate of last Monday, afterthoughts which are crystallized in the draft letter to Mr. Kasa-Vubu which you have before you. However, before turning to the text, I should like to revert for a second to what last time I called the political realities of the situation. We have, in this respect, some pieces of information which have emerged in the past forty-eight hours and which, I think,are highly relevant to the texts before us. One thing is that there is an agreement on Matadi. Colonel Mobutu and eone civilian, military and police officers of the United nations are going to Matadi today, and there is every reason to expect that they will be followed shortly by a major contingent of the Nigerian police. That night put the Matadi question out of the way and open the door to a solution, generally speaking, of the problem of freedom of movement. I think that it is correct to see this very late concession on Matadi very much in the light of the Nwokedi-Gardiner agreement. It is, of course, in a certain sense, a first implementation of the basic principle in that agreement. The second point- is this. You have seen on the tickers or heard on the radio what has happened in Coquilhatville. Yesterday Mr. Tshombe presented Mr. Kasa-Vubu with a kind of ultimatum. It had two points of direct interest to this Committee. The first one was that Mr. Kasa-Vubu should revoke his signature . to the Nwokedi-Gardiner agreement — which does show what significance Mr. Tshombe attaches to the agreement. The second point was that Mr. Kaca-Vubu should join with Mr. Tshombe in a condemnation of the United Nations operation in North Katanga. Obviously on both scores Mr. Kasa-Vubu caid no, and that does not surprise me in the light of our recent experiences. As a result, Mr. Tshombe left the conference. On this point we have still no confirmation from our people, but, according to various news sources and agency sources, when Mr. Tshombe, following up his part of the ultimatum, tried to leave Coquilhatville this morning by air,he was arrested, with hie company. HG/aJ " 6 (The Secretary«General) N '

His company, according to our confirmed information, consisted of ten , .. Belgians and three Congolese. As it can be expected that these ten Belgians vere the top advisers in Elisabethville, something really quite important has happened if Mr, Kasa-Vubu sticks to his guns and plays the game of the resolution and of his own agreement, according to which he would support our action in the ousting of Belgians who were not in the Congo under his own . personal authority. The third point is one which still is incomplete but which may obviously be quite significant too. We had.a message that at the request of the authorities in Stanleyville our man there, without any checking with Leopoldville — that is a. weakness, but I think in the circumstances it is understandable — has provided five or six officers from Stanelyville with air transport to Coquilhatville, Obviously that could not have been done without the acquiescence at least of Mr. Gizenga. That is to say, we have today, the 26th, a situation in Coquilhatville where Mr<> Kasa-Vubu, in confessed co-operation wiih the United Nations and support of the resolution of 21 February, on the one side, has arrested Mr. Tshombe and his entourage, and, on the other hand, would seem to have accepted the arrival of a delegation from Stanleyville. . I do not want at this stage to make any further comments on this. I.do not know enough about the details. But I might perhaps be permitted to say that the present trend seems to me to be the one in which we may hope for a situation in which fairly soon Parliament may be convened, because.one of the obstacles has been the unduly important role of Mr. Tshombe in the picture. Another obstacle which has been closely linked to this first one has been the difficulty of finding a bridge between Leopoldville and Stanleyville. Obviously, if this shift in the balance,.in accordance with at least my personal thinking, from Tshombe to Gizenga sticks and materializes in further acts and finally is crystallized in a convening of Parliament, we will get into an entirely new phase in the Congo operation, a phase where we could get back to our original role of assistance in constructive fields, mainly in the civilian area and for the reorganization of the army. Let us hope that the present signs are not false, and let us hope that the trend will continue in this direction* I do not think there is any different HG/aJ •'••- 7 (The Secretary-General) opinion around this table or indeed in the General Assembly as to the helpfulness of such trends. However, as I said, it is premature to comment. Things change quickly in the Congo, and ve may have all sorts of setbacks. But one thing seems to me to "be obvious, and that is that the development regarding Tshombe, regarding Matadi and possibly also regarding Oriental is something which should be taken into account in looking at our final reaction on the Nwokedi-Gardiner arrangement. You have before you a letter which tries to set out the additional observations which we consider necessary in the light of the debate here in order to be on the safe side. I would say that I hope that this letter meets your feelings or your wishes so that we v/ould be able to cable to Gardiner • the text in order that he can go ahead. I feel very strongly in this respect today, much more strongly than I felt on Monday,. l?eca.uso obviously we would place everybody in a very funny position if, after having stood up against the Tshombe ultimatun Kasa-VXTju felt that we would not accept the text which he has defended, I am informed that this text of the letter was sent out only this rorning, and it may be that you have not received it. If*so, it is before you at the table; and if you so wish, of course we will take the necessary time for you to read it.

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): During the time that other delegates are reading the letter I would like to ask you a question regarding the advisers that were "with Mr. Tshombe. Is it possible for you, Sir, to make use of the resolution of the Security Council and, so to speak, to intervene and get hold of them? It seems to me that this is clearly within your power, that you can intervene now and get rid of them.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; My view would be this. We are perfectly entitled to ask Mr. Kasa-Vubu to hand them over to us. If he does not hand them over to us, we should point out to • him that he should keep them. The next stage would be that either Mi1. Kasa-Vubu or we approach the Belgian Government, referring to the resolution of 21 February and asking them for immediate steps for their immediate evacuation. HG/aj 8-10 (The Secretary-General)

They have not engaged in anything vhich under common law is criminal, but they should, of course, be ousted from the country. We can do it o-r he can do it. Under all circumstances, they should not be let loose again. There is one question of prestige involved. I guess that Kasa-Vubu and Ileo are rather keen on being the "jailors", and there is no worry if they do not let them go* There is another source of worry and that is, of course,that in the general haggling and bargaining they suddenly will let them go before our noses. I feel, however, that the Nwokedi-Gardiner arrangement in this respect is relevant, because, as you remember, a key phrase in paragraph 3 is the one which says' that "political advisers who have not been recruited or recalled under the authority of the President" — and these are such people -- :Toe repatriated from the Congo within the shortest possible period" of"time". That is to say, Kasa-Vubu is committed to the ouster of such people according to the Nwoliedi- Gardiner agreement, and we are committed to take efficient steps to help him in getting them out. We have no direct information from our own sources concerning this arrest, and that is the only reason why instructions hav£ not been sent to our own people so far. But this is my view of it. HA/mrm --... 11

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): May I, on ray part, warn the Secretary- General — or advise him, if I may use the word — that he should take all appropriate measures (a) to know where these people are being kept, and (b) in case something slips, I think it would be your duty, Mr, Secretary-General, to do your utmost to secure them and to get rid of them. My point and my fear is this: that, as you rightly pointed out, when this sort of thing goes back and forth, they may be released or the Congolese authorities may not take good care of them, and in that time, you see, they may get away, and it would be a tragedy if we missed this opportunity. It is in that sense that I say that I would strongly advise you to find out where they are, and I think it would be pr6per for you to see that everything is done in order nob to let them slip away, because, if they go back, we will have the same trouble again — somebody else may be declared king in Katanga, and the whole story may begin again. It is in that sense that I dare to give my warning and my advica that certain msasures be taken now,

The SECRETABY"GENERAL: I could not agree with you more, Our only •"""—~•—~~ - - - ^ worry so far is that we have it only through the news agencies — this specific part of the story. News agencies are what we know them to be, and the fullest report we have is one that arrived through the news agencies only about one hour ago. It is a bit difficult to give instructions without having our own cable on the matter, so that we may know exactly what happened, I could not agree with you more on another point also, and that is that they should not be permitted to return, once we have come this far.

Mr. /.PEEL (Sudan): May I, although very belatedly, say s few words about our reactions to this tentative agreement. In that respect, I should like to associate my delegation with others in paying tribute to Mr. Gardiner and Mr. Nwokedi for their efforts. We know that their task is not easy. Our general reaction is favourable to the agreement as it stands. In our opinion, it ccnctitutes a departure from previous positions, especially the Tananarive position, For the first time, we hear of Kasa-Vubu speaking of,obligations to HA/mrm .12

(Mr. Adeel, Sudan)

carry out Security Council resolutions. And, for the first time, although in a diluted way, he speaks of his acceptance of the Security Council resolution of 21 February — although this departure is not as complete as we would have liked

to see it, But; on the other hand, the principle, of give and take is time- honoured in negotiations and in agreements resulting from negotiations. It might not have been easy for Kasa-Vubu to take this step forward. We know that he is in difficulty today for taking it. And, judging by recent events, I think it is now our position to support Kasa-Vubu against factions like Tshoinbe and those who take lines similar to Tshombe's. When we tread on the Congo, we know we tread on very thorny ground, and it is the best part of wisdom, we believe, to tread very gently. We feel that here there are constructive steps which we should encourage. As I said before, it is not perfect, but I stress again that we believe it is an encouraging beginning^' I heard several delegations speaking about paragraph (3) of tho agreement on general principles. I am afraid we do not read it in the same way that they do. We read in paragraph (5) a really helpful step, because here Kasa-Vubu speaks of this class of personnel who have not been either employed by his authority or recalled by him. This is a severe blow to authorities like Tshombe, who. just employ the. people they like. This is really a very important stipulation in the agreement. And, if the criticism that lias been levelled is true of other stipulations, it cannot be true of this one. I imagine that this is the part of the agreement which is causing him trouble with people like Tshombe. I agree, with you entirely, Mr. Secretary-General, that at this hour it would be wise for us to stand by Kasa-Vubufs side.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Welly I had to quOte just this paragraph (3) to explain the fact that we have a very strong stand when we ask for action on the ten Belgians in.Coquilnatville. '

Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): --Those among us who were in favour of the seating of President Kasa-Vubu1 s delegation in the General Assembly and who, throughout the existence of this Committee, have counselled that we support Mr, Kasa-Vubu*s position, feel to some extent vindicated today by the action that he has taken. This is probably the first time that he lias really been in a position to take such a step. HA/mrm '" 15-15

(Mr. Hasan, Pakistan)

When we last met, Mr, Secretary-General, you yourself said that we should do nothing that would jeopardize the agreement which Mr, Gardiner and Mr0 Nwokedi had entered into with Mr, .Kasa-Vubu and his people — that, in order to make a small formal gain,we should not lose something of great substance. The events of today have proved the wisdom of that course and of that advice, because today it has been proved how important the Congolese people themselves have considered tiiat agreement. lie merely reiterate what I said the last time we met: As far us my delegation is concerned, we are very well satisfied with the agreement and we think that the work dona by Mr, Gardiner and Mra Ilvoke-li was excellent work* The time has come again when we should stand by Mr, r.aoa-Yuou, because I think events have taken a happy turn, and we hope that .very, shortly the United Nations will be engaged in really constructive work in the Congo.

Mr, JHA. (India): We have had a chance to look at this agrerinont. I think we have heard on the radio certain events which may mean the removal of the principal headache in the Congo, We all hope that those events will have the significance that we attach to them, but I think that we liave to be a little careful, because events happen and un-happen in the Congo with the greatest rapidity, and I would not drav any very easy conclusions from that, Bub; in so for as it eliminates Mra Tshombe from the scene, even temporarily, I think it is a very great gain for the United Nations, In this agreement, there is no question of standing by Mr. Kasa-Vubu or against Mr, Kasa-Vubu, I am attracted to this agreement because Mr, Kaca-Vubu, for the first time, accepts the resolution of 21 February l£6l, and that is a great gain in itself. Our reservation on this arose from the fact that the agreement seems to make acceptance contingent on certain conditions, That is something which we have to avoid. It was my idea the other day, as I said in my second intervention, that, if that implication could be avoided, certainly this agreement would be a step forward. It is probably not a step that is 100 per cent satisfactory, but it is a step forward. TL/ek 16 (Mr, Jha, India)

So I think the letter you have circulated is a good letter. It puts the thing in.the right perspective, because all that ie.important from our point of view is .not to give the.,slightest implication that by this agreement, either explicitly or in its undertones, there has been'any moderation or modification of the Security Council resolution — because that we would not find possible to accept; it might sound, all right* in this case, but it is a very bad precedent and we could not go on,doing.things like that. 'So this point is made clear; I think this letter does seek,to make it clear.' ' WG do not see any objection to its going forward and to your giving approval to it. How, as regards the draft lottor, I will have certain cuggonticns to make. But, that is entirely for your consideration, because one or two sentences might be modified. I have also drafted one or two sentences .that you might wish to consider, but we would leave it entirely to you1to bring out this qualification, or rathsr clarification/ in what you think to be the b^st pr;cijible terms. TL/ek 17

The SECRETARY-GEMCTIAL: We may proceed in two stages: the first one is the general one, on the stand to be taken, and the second one is the matter of the editing of" details in the letter. I would wish to add, because it throws light on the discussion of Monday, that this letter as it is before you not only has my full approval, but has, in fact, been drafted by the two negotiators, which involves, of course, a guarantee that it is entirely in keeping with the spirit of their talks with Mr. Kasa-Vubu. On the question of principle, I would ask you, are there any further observations?

Mr» MoppaJ.__SLIM (Tunisia/(interpretation from French): In respect of this draft letter, which answerG very well, in my opinion, the concerns expressed during the discussion at the last meeting of this Committee, I believe I can say that it is an admirable completion of the points which could have given rise to confusion and misinterpretation in the agreement. Now, with regard to the question of principle, I should like to say that it shows a new spirit in which the negotiations of Messrs. Gardiner and Nwokedi have resulted. This change of direction has just been made somewhat clearer by the news received in the last few hours from Coquilhatville, Continuing along this line of thinking, I should like to know whether at the present time we have any indications concerning any more serious .form of rapprochement between Leopoldville and Stanleyville. As I said at our last meeting, it seems to me that if we can help to any extent in promoting the rapprochement between Mr. Gizenga and Mr. Kasa-Vubu and, in a general sort of way, among all political elements in .the Congo, among all groups excepting Mr. Tshombe, we will have done a very useful piece of work. Now that it seems that we have certain information concerning relations between Mr. Kasa-Vubu and Mi-. Tshombe, have we, according to the latest news, any additional, somewhat encouraging, information concerning a rapprochement between Stanleyville and Leopoldville? TL/ek 10

The< SECRETARY-GENERAL (interpretation from French): All that I know — and this is something I already mentioned,before you came in — is that our people agreed this morning to transport a delegation from Stanleyville to Coquilhatville. yhat this means I do not yet know, but still the fact is there, I still have no information to indicate that this has not been accepted by Leopoldville, but the initiative, it is clear, came from Stanleyville.

Mr. SIPKY (United Arab Republic)(interpretation from French): I should like to inquire, Mr. Secretary-General, whether the draft letter which you propose to send to President Kaca-Vubu forms part of the accor^d^ principe; in other words, does this draft letter constitute a complement or a supplement to the accord de principe? . ..---.., I:ow,with regard to our discussions here, I shall limit myself to saying that since the majority, if not all, of the meofcers present are in agreement on the question of sending this letter, and likewise on the acceptance of the accord de principe, we ourselves would have no objection to raise against this agreement, • *••

The SECRETARY-GENERAL (interpretation from French): This letter should undoubtedly be considered as a supplement to the agreement because, as you well know, the agreement was signed not only by Mr. Kasa-Vubu and Mr. Eomboko, but it was signed as well by our two representatives, subject to a reservation of position on the part of the Secretary-General. Since it was signed subject to such reservation, the reply of the Secretary-General without question becomes part of the agreement. TL/ek '" , . 19

Mr, HATJ3TFAD.. (Canada): . I should like first, Mr. Secretary-General, to add my voice to those of others who have complimented both Mr. KuokedL and Mr.. Gardiner on the. ability and talent-which they have brought to this difficult tesk, , I, should aleo like to indicate 'the preliminary reactions of the Canadian authorities to this draft agreement. We regard it as an auspicious ctep in the right direction.. It represents,, in our view, a substantial measure of agreement in principle on important issues between the United Nations and the Leopoldville authorities. In particular, it specifies President Kasa-Vubu's- acceptance of the Security Council resolution of 21 February. We'therefore; welcome this draft agreement and think that it could and should'provide a means of restoring good working relationo between tl:.e United Nations and. the Congolese authorities, and at the same time, of strengthening President Kasa*Vubu's position, particularly vis-b-vis Mr. Tuboofoe. " • Wo are of the opinion that- this agreement can be defended both on practical grounds and. on the basis of- ":ihQ general intention of the 21 February resolution. •We would agree with the Secretary-General that a.political and practical approach rather than a strictly legal one should be taken *to it. In this connexion we \ think that the arguments made against amending the resolution, at the last meeting). •;are well based and that those additional points that were suggested, and . appo.rsntly agreed on, at that meeting can most appropriately be met in the way indicated in the Secretary-General's'draft letter. We have stressed for some : :• -time that a satisfactory solution for the Congo problem can be found only through understanding ...and co-operation-between the United Nations and the Congolese •-• authorities. The agreement which Messrs. Kwokedi and Gardiner have negotiated appears to us to be a constructive effort to initiate such co-operation.- To reject or to attempt to alter such an agreement, or even to temporize on its acceptance, would, in our view, be calculated to have very unfortunate psychological results in Leopoldville and in the Congo generally, particularly in the light of the most recent developments there. The most important question now is to translate this agreement into effective action in the Congo, and we hope that the necessary degree of co-operation and j goodwill will be forthcoming now for this purpose. TL/ek 20

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Perhaps we .should cbTne to the text of the letter, because I gather from the trend .of this discussion' that it is the common feeling that we should go ahead. Then all the importance now is placed on the letter and-the way in which it is formulated, and I think, therefore, that without necessarily separating ourselves from the question of principle, the most, practical approach would "be to look at the text of the letter. I understand that the representative of India has some suggestions that he. wants to submit, and I think we shall all be very much interested in hearing them. • •.. ..-..''•• 21

Mr* JHA (India): I have Just a few suggestions. This draft is in the form of a clarification of the agreement, as well as a communication to President Kasa-Vubu. I refer principally, in the latter category, to paragraphs 6 and I, in which you say that Mr. Gardiner is going back to discuss certain points. I would prefer the clarificatory letter, which would become more or less a part of ths understandings in connexion with the agreement, to be separated from any communication relating to Mr. Gardiner's visit. If I may make a few suggestions, in paragraph 1, I would say: "I have the honour to refer to the Accord de pz-incipe relating to the Gecurity Council resolution of 21 February 1961 which was accept2d by Your Excellency.1* I would emit the words "and Mr* Bcmboko on the one hand1' becr.use I by."Lieve that Mr. Bomboko signed it since all orders of the Goverijuicnt there, under the Loi fondPripntalgj are to be signed by the Minister. But we should keep this to

the agreoment with the Chifi:? of State0 We do not want to brir.g in 'Ibis iC.ca of the recognition of the Ileo Govemmcnt and all that, which is a controversial point, and it does not seem necessary from the point of view of this caiico-^nlcation. I would say "accepted by Your .Excellency and my representatives" • Then, if you wish, you can put their names, but even that is not necessary. In paragraph 3> I suppose that the first sentence will please Mr. Kasa-Vubu because it talks of the full and free exercise of the sovereign rights of the Republic. There is no objection to that at all. Thereafter I would say |:including the recognition of its obligations as a Member State of the United Nations in respect of the resolution concerned, in free exercise of the sovereign rights of the Republic, including the recognition of" instead of saying "both in recognizing, etc." This is a part of the free exercise of sovereign rights.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Yes.

Mr. JHA (India): In the second sentence I do not know if it is necessary to have the words "and the capacity". The sentence might read: "On the side of the United Nations, the agreement indicates the intention of the Organization to afford assistance to the Republic of the Congo in meeting those obligations." 22 (Mr. Jha, India)

"The capacity of the Organization" itself is, according to the Security Council, I suppose, unlimited and'it is not necesary to indicate anything a& -to the curtailment of the capacity ofthe United Nations. ' I have no objection to the first sentence of paragraph 4. The second one, ./hich might give the impression that the implementation is dependent on " letermination to co-operate with the United Nations, might be omitted. I have in mind something to the following effect, although I do not insist upon it -- I leave it to you,' I have in mind the following;: "In according his approval to this agreement" -- this was in the third person, but it can be changed -- "the Secretary-General wishes to underline 'the mandatory character of the Security Council resolution of 21 February and the obligations which it entails on all Member Statac of the United Uations under Article 25 of the Charter, as indeed it binds the Secretary- ' General himselft In consequence, by recognizing that tnrre can b5 no variation from the terras and meaning of tha Security Council resolution, the Secretary-General regards the agreement of 1? April'as an important step in the implementation of the Security Council resolution. The agreement is a token of co-operation between the United Nations and the Chief of State towards the common objective of the speediest implementation of the Security Council resolution of 21 February, The Secretary-General hop£SSthat the spirit of harmony and co-operation which characterizes the agreement will result in immediate steps being taken to give effect to the agreement in the light of the Security Council resolution. On the basis of these understandings ard the statement made by the Chief of State on 17 April in announcing to the Press the initialling of the agreement, the Secretary-General feels certain that the desire of both sides as to the modalities' of the application of the agreement should be studied with the least possible delay and in the same spirit in which the agreement was negotiated." I would suggest something like this, but I do. not insist. As a matter of fact I had drafted it before I saw your letter. If you think there is anything in it you might adopt it, but I do not insist on its inclusion. The remaining part, as I have said, paragraphs 6 and 1, could be made the terms of another communication. MW/dp 25

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I would say that, for my part, I am happy to endorse the suggestions referring to paragraphs 1 and 3.

As you say yourself, regarding paragraph ht it is a text which should be looked at. It is not at variance with the approach in our paragraph k and may contain valuable suggestions. I think it brings out the same thought. The resolution is mandatory, but, in any event, within that limit, of course, we want to discuss how it should be done, and this is technically a step forward. I also was rather keen on bringing in the resolution of the General Assembly because I think that strengthens our case. My final point is that I think it is wise, in fact, to make it two letters. • I would make a covering letter concerning Mr. Gardiner's arrival and have the other one as a more formal text ending up, in principle,., with the first sentence of paragraph 5: "With these understandings I am pleased to signify my approval of the agreement." Then there is no confusion. This is not a chatty letter; it is part of a legal exchange of documents. So I would break after the first sentence of paragraph 5 and insert the rest in a kind of covering letter to 1, 2, 3j ^ and the first sentence of paragraph 5- Paragraph k can then be overhauled, so to speak, in the light of your suggestions. These are my immediate reactions to your suggestions.

Mr. JHA (India): I think it would be all right to stop after the first sentence of paragraph 5 anci Put the rest in a covering letter. The point about paragraph k which I thought could be brought out was — in a very simple way — that this is an important step towards implementation. As regards the meaning and the terns of the resolution, there could not be any kind of departure. I think that Kasa-Vubu himself will agree with that because, after all, the Security Council cannot be varied by anybody; so, the point that might be brought out is that this is a step towards implementation — and we should be careful not to give the impression that this is the total implementation because many points might arise. As a matter of fact, there is a counterpart to it: there is the Belgian part and there is the United Nations part, because everybody admits that when these people go, the United Nations ought to do its best to implement the personnel. That was the only thing I was anxious to put in there, and I fully agree with you that the last paragraph of the resolution, which urges co-operation, should be MW/dp 2U-25 ! (Mr. Jha, India) brought up. As a matter of fact, I had that in an earlier part of the draft which I had made.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL! I do not think there is anything in what you say which is at variance with the trend of this paragraph, and we oari certainly work it in. I agree with you that there is certainly a distinction that can usefully be brought out, ' • AP/bg 26

Mr. SIDKY (United Arab Republic)(interpretation from French): We fully subscribe to the suggestions advanced by the representative of India, which you, yourself, have endorsed. But I would suggest that paragraph 5 of the letter should read as follows: "Taking into account these interpretations, I have the honour to inform you that I endorse the agreement, which will constitute, together with this letter . .,n

The SECRETARY-GENERAL;(interpretation from 7renoh)j I think that would be all right. That would render the point of law even clearer.

Mr* HASAN (Pakistan); Mr» Secretary-General, as you said, this letter has been very carefully drafted by the two negotiators who no doubt tock into account the nuances of this agreement and o£. their discussions with the President and the Foreign Minister of the Congo. Therefore, I do not wish to suggest -- which I could easily -- several verbal changes. In paragraph 1 it has been suggested that we cut out Mr. Bomboko because the President symbolizes the authority of the Republic. Now, some time later somebody might object because it has not been countersigned by a Minister, therefore, under the Loi fcndamentale this is illegal* Perhaps it was this consideration which induced the two very intelligent and able negotiators to put this thing in; otherwise, ;Lt is patent that when the President signs a thing, everyone else is included. This is an ordinary fundamental principle of negotiations. Perhaps Mr, Gardiner and Mr» Mwokedi put it in to safeguard future objection that under the Loi fondamentale this is not valid. My humble suggestion would be to please take this point under consideration. AP/bg . 27

The._SECP]STARy*GEUEPAL; , I do not think 'we need worry about it at all, >,,...' • ~ • • - • as this letter is Addressed to President Kasa-Vubu, it is very natural to draw attention to the , fact that he had signed it. It is a communication from him to me, I replied tq> him, I thought we could avoid the point which might worry snras people without .in any way being impolite, because you 'heed not "cover the whole ground in every single communication. Another" thin£ is that, as to the constitutional aspect; the important thing in that context is, of course, that' the text, as you know, is signed by Bomboko, whether I mention it or not.

• Mr. WACHUKU (Nigeria); I was going to ask ;you a question about the same point -- when you say that you accept that the name Bomboko should be dropped, and just refer to the President alone, ~ " "' . -

The . fTnci'E'IAJTi" "CT.CTa'RAX i From my point of view, it Is a question of substance, "which we nee.d not raise, because as it is addressed to President Kasa-Vubu and it is not said H signed by"j it is said wsuch and such text which was accepted by Your Excellency" — that is quite sufficient,* We need not go into the matter

.further,, If Mr0, Boraboko did not know that his name had been included in the draft, I do not think he would ever think of it, That was my consideration*

Mr> WACHUKU (Nigeria); Mr. Secretary-General, it may look simple, but when you .take the words "on the one hand" — - //

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Delete "on the one hand" and non the other hand", ' . , " ' '

Mr, WACHITKU (Nigeria): This is a statement of fact. In any legal document you have, an agreement accepted by X and Y on one part, and Z and Z-l on the other part. It is a statement of. fact and I do not see any danger or anything at all that will flow from' this. It is a statement of 'fact that two people on behalf of the Secretary-General, and two people on behalf of the Republic of the Congo signed -- and I do not see why it should be left out at AP/bg £8 t (Mr. Wachuku, Nigeria) all. According to the representative of Pakistan, there is the other aspect; I do not think it is for us here to begin to dig into these things. They are simple facts which give the President the confidence that you record the fact that both have done this on behalf of the Republic, and the other tvo en "behalf of yourself, I think we have to be very careful here,otherwise we may give the impression that there is a certain amount of backing-out, I do not want to go into the question of government or no government in the Congo, as the case may be.

The SECTvETA-RY-GENBRALs May I ask you if you. would in any way be worried if we shortened the text even more, which would be entirely in keeping with my thought, and made the first sentence to read: WI have the honour to refer to the Accord do P'-'-^P relating to the Security Council resolution of 21 February l^Dl which

was accepted by Your Excellency at Leopoldville on 1? April 19bl0" It is only a question of identifying the agreement. It is not a question of repeating parts of it. That is my question to you,

Mre Mongi SLIM (Tunisia)(interpretation from French): Mr* Secretary- General, in order to avoid this discussion, in practice when an agreement is approved, its text is incorporated. Therefore, it might be possible to drop all this, and say: "... of 21 February 1961, the text of which I append for confirmation at the end of this letter". The text will, of course, carry the four signatures.

. . The SECRETARY-GENERAL: The text would then read; • "»•• which was accepted by Your Excellency at Leopoldville and which I append," It is a descriptive phrase and nothing but. AP/bg - 29

Mr, SU3BASINGHB (Ceylon);, So far as you arc concerned, Mra Sscretary- General, you do not. recognize the- Ileo .government,or Mr. Bombokoi. as such, but you recognize the Chief of State who is also .recognized by the .United Nations.

And Mr0 Jha is .quite right. But, on the other ..hand, the ;significence of putting in Mr. Borabokofs name in this, document is this: that ,we tie up Mra Bomboko .also.with the.acceptance of. the Security Council- resolution, which might be useful in the future. , , , -

The SECRETARY^GF-riERALs You are looking ahead* . • " *..-.-• '' .. '-•••' Mr» JHA (India); This is an agroeraent with. Mr» Kaear-Vubi:u Under constitutional practices he could put in four signatures, but really the agreement is between Kasa-Vubu and yourself, because you hr*ve bee?:; in con>iminioation, you have bean writing to him repeatedly to accept the Security Council resolution* To bring in Mr, Bomboko brings in an element of controversy, because as wa know, sitting around this table, as far as my Government is concerned w? recc^nize neither the Leopoldville government nor the Stanleyville government; but. there are countries here which recognize the Stanleyville government and there are others which recognize the Leopoldville government. The other point is if Mr. Kasa-Vubu himself, a Chief of State, can turn to an agreement with regard to the reorganization of the Army — -in the penultimate paragraph -- because de jure he is the Supreme Commander of all the Armed Forces, But that agreement with Mr. Boraboko, which really becomes the act of the Leopoldville government -- the Leopoldville government cannot bind the authorities in Stanleyville on this point. It is .a, very serious complication. Under the Loi /ondamentale the acts of the Government have to be signed by the Chief of State and a Minister to become an act of the Government, For the government in Leopoldville to lay down conditions for the reorganization of the Army in Stanleyville,without the signature also of Mr, Gizenga, does not really carry us any further. Therefore, it is safer to assume it, from our own point of view, as an agreement with Mr., Kasa-Vubu — and because we are all agreed here that he is the Chief of State, If you go further, we bring in controversial

4 AP/bg 30

(Mr> Jba, India) elements. This Committee is divided on certain points -- each of us has instructions -- therefore, you see, we do not get the greatest common measure of agreement. If I may &ay so, I agree with you it is not necessary for this letter to spell out exactly who are the individuals who signed. As far as we a::e concerned, it was an agreement between the Secretary-General -- and that is why the Secretary-General has to approve the agreement by his representatives and the Chief of State. Therefore, it would be better, in my opinion, not to mention Mr» Bomboko in this letter. Of course, Mr. Bomboko does exist on that paper,and that was Mr. Kasa-Vubu's discretion, because he could have th$ signature of two other Ministers if he thought that it was necessary to sanctify it as a constitutional act on his part. BHS/bd " 31

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: My own feeling is that ve can avoid this discuesipn, which will take us very far, "because in the final analysis, if it suits Mr. Gizenga he will recognize this agreement and Work hcppily with it, All we have to see tp is that we do not give rise to any unnecessary comments and interpretations here/ My'own further feeling is that the representative of Tunisia made- a very shrewd proposal. If the' text reads: "1 have the' hcncur to refer to the Accord1de principe relating to "the Security Cbuncir'resolution of 21 February 19&1 which was accepted by your Excellency at Leopoldville on 17 April 1961, and the text of which for confirmation is annexed to this letter", then we have accepted the full text vith all the signatures, but we have identified the document simply in a way which is narurei — vhen you address . somebody, you mention him end you need not mention everybody else who signed it. In. that w^y we leave the question entirely open* We have not'turned down Mr. BonVboko's signature,* I think that is good in relation to Mr. C1 zengn? it is good in relation, to Mr. Bombokoj and it is good enough in relation to the Security Council. ••'• * ' '

< ^ i Mr0 WACHUKtJ (Nigeria): I want to make my position clear, TJe should not do anything in this Advisory

(Mr* Wachuku, Nigeria)

Any modification of this text, as suggested by the representative pf Tunisia, that vill make for emoothly working out seme detail, should "be accepted. But certainly I will oppose any attempt to bring in controversial matters or any suggestion likely to cut across the whole question ogain. It will npt be in the interest of the Congo and it will not be in pur interest as Africansa We do not want any more chain reactions from the Congo.* I sincerely hope that everything we do here will always have that at the back of our minds•

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I think we are all agreed that we do not want to bring any controversies into tbl30 Cn afterthought, even more puritan than those V^o have spoken in that direction, I would say that with the Tunisian proposal I would shorten the sentence one step further — "I have the honour to refer to the Accord de principe relating to the Security Council resolution of 21, February i?'Sl, "li-e t.-;zt of wh;Lch for confirmation is annexed to this letter". We peed not even mou'lion Mr. Kssa-Vubu or anybody, but Just refer to tiie texts That takc-s care of the whole situation. We should recognize, as mentioned very rightly by the representative of Nigeria, that this is not an international agreement in the ordinary sense of the word until it is approved by Parliament, and that is another matter.

Mr, WACHUKU (Nigeria): If I may remind all of us, we have been acting in illegalities frpm the very beginning. The first letter was illegal and so, is the present one* We were not legal in the Congo before and we are not now. We have been illegal in everything. The United Nations is illegal, according to their position. Knowing this, we must remember it and just play softly. As long as we produce the result that we want, we can Justify this by future actions. BHS/bd 33

Mr. JHA (India): I would only like, to say that any -suggestion that I vas raising a controversy -is entirely wrong. I was trying to calm controversy. VJhatever the Minister of Nigeria may say, we know that there are different views on this matter, and there is no use hiding this fact. The- representative of Ghana has not spoken, but his Government recognizes the Stanleyville authorities. We are in a position to say that we do not recognize either regime tmd WG do not give the semblance of recognizing any regime. We muot recognize the Chief of State, and that is the important -thing, - \

Mra DADZJfl (Ghana): Since the representative of India has bean so kind as- to mention me, I Ghall, merely aahe a remark which might be thought frivolous* Even the signature of Mr. Bcmboko on the agreement itself we regard as a device, to which President Kasa-Vubu may be entitled but which we do not recognize as being valid or, indeed, ec^entl&i to the validity of the e^

Ti-»p, PECRETAflY-GEKflRAjL: The main thlrg is that people otick to ta^ir

word. It is very good if Mr» Bomboko does it «and if Mr. Kasa-Vubu docs ita As long as de facto, people have an influence, their word-hus value for us- in the practical operation. It seems to me that we can regard this text as one which we should run over in the light of what has been sai£ here but which, in the main and in substance, is regarded as en acceptable text. There are some, other matters which I would like to trouble you with in the course of this week. You have wanted to look at — the Minister of Nigeria made the suggestion — what we do in order to help towards a molding together of this country in financial and economic matters. Also, I would like to discuss with the Committee the General Assembly resolution of 17 April. There are certain questions of implementation which arise.

Mr. WACHUKU (Nigeria): Before you pass on to these matters, I wish to say something abou,t the matter raised by the representative of Ethiopia concerning these ten Belgians. I would very strongly support the idea that you send a message to your representative1 now to get in touch with President Kasa-Vubu to take charge of those ten people. BHS/bd . 3^-55

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; We can do that hypothetically by saying that "we have this information from the ticker, that we do not know whether it is true, but in any event under your general instructions you should bring home to President Kasa-Vubu that in accordance with the spirit of the resolution he should see to it that these people do not escape, but are evacuated, through our good offices."

Mr. WACHUKU (Nigeria): It will weaken the position of the other side in Katanga if those people do not get back there.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: The other point I want to mention concerns the implementation of the General Assembly resolution. An extremely difficult point is the one of stopping the imports of arms. We are now chasing every case we come upon as well as we can, but so far we have not been able to establish a consistent system to stop this kind of arms running. Thau ifj something we would like to discuss with you. We have asked our people in Leopoldville to give us their best advice on it, and they are a little bit stuck because there ere an incredible number of air strips in that country^for some reason, and we cannot be everywhere. Finally, I think it would be useful for us to give you an evaluation of our military position in the Congo. It is very much better than it was a couple of months ago, and it is improving. However, it is not yet quite what we would like. NR/Jvra 36

(The Secretary-General) I can announce to you, if you have not seen it, that Ethiopia, in its very great Generosity, has provided us with one additional battalion, that Ireland has provided us with an additional couple of companies and that Sweden has done the' same — all of which is extremely important for the Katanga operation.-

Mr.jAJDEET. (Sudan): While we are on the subject, I should like to know whether there are any military arrangements or rearrangements in Katang'i in view of these recent events which may arouse some military actions in Kateriga itse.lf. • Tae SECRgTARY-GSrroAL; We feel pretty safe in El:.sabethville in .the sense that we have the Irish battalion and the Swedish battalion in Eli&abethville, which should be sufficient to keep the matter under control. I do not know wliColier General Efkii^e has u,oy^n.ns to add. to i1';, bub I tiJ.rJs that is our General feeling0 We are strong in Karaina but we are a little landlocked in Kamina, and the question is to get sufficient mobility from +* Kamina, which is strategically very well placed in Katanga. We Lava troops north of Kamina, on the main triangle through Kanono and Nyunzu and down towards Albertville, but there perhaps we are not yet as strong as we should like to be in order to be able to meet all the emergencies that may arise. All this is under very active consideration. Those are really the points which I felt we should be able to inform you about more fully when we have had the details of the thinking of the Command in Leopoldville. kly own feeling would be that, with the Belgian element out and the mercenaries, I hope, reasonably demoralized, we are sufficiently masters of the situation not to be worried, but I should like to call on General Rikhye if there is anything to add.

General RIKHYE; I have nothing to add.

Mr, GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): Mr. Secretary-General, I meant to ask this question earlier. From the statement that you issued about two weeks ago about mercenaries, the list was rather remarkable. There were some Belgians, some South Africans and some Britishers. What I would like to know is whether you have made any diplomatic approach. NR/jvm 57

The SECREEARY-GEMERAL; Yes, indeed.

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): Quite frankly, I do not mean simply a diplomatic approach in the sense of simply saying: "Please do something about it", I mean something very strong, because we feel very strongly, and I can tell you that public opinion in my own country is mailing it very difficult. In my country they simply cannot understand that Member Nations of the United Nations would allow their people to go and do all this in the name of I know not what. It seems to me that it is incumbent upon you to push them as far as you •can, and, of course, I am sure that the house here is ready to give you all the help that it can, in order that they can exert their undoubtedly available power to pull them out. That is my first question. The second question is this. Is it not possible for the troops that you have now in Katanga — and I understand they are very capable people — to get hold of tha mercenaries? This may be rather taking the bull by ths horns, but is it possible to do something to get rid of some of them — for instance, if they come to the town or if they do something.foolish, to get hold of them and get them out — because that is where our source of trouble is?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; On the first point, as regards the thirty mercenaries, there were two major groups: British and Gouth African. We approached all the Governments at once, and the British response -was immediate* They instructed their people in Leopoldville to get in touch with our people for "an immediate evacuation". That is in their words. As you know, on the other hand, they have now used some kind of prerogative of the Queen so that the passports of these people will be withdrawn. That is to say, there is no risk of their returning. There has been — I do not remember exactly the wording of it — a similar strong and speedy reaction from Gouth Africa. There, too, passports will be impounded. That is to say, they follow a line very close to the British one, which I.find effective and satisfactory. There was one Italian, I thinX, and the Italian Government responded at once with a request for assistance in immediate evacuation. That is to say, the response in the cases where we caught people was perfect and set a very good pattern for the future. NR/jvm 38 (The Secretary-General)

That leaves us really with the question of how to get at the others. I have already said that I believe that the others will be, as I put it, reasonably demoralized by. what they have seen happening, and there are signs in that direction. However, I can tell you that the instruction means that the reply to the question of what to do when you meet a mercenary is: "Arrest him". I do not think we should go on a mercenary hunt, but we are likely to run into them in the continued operation and the line of action is clear.

Mr* HASAN (Pakistan): Mr. Secretary-General, you mentioned a little whili e ago the economic and financial situation in the Con^o. Wlien we were discussing this, I recalled that a few weeks ago we had a long discussion here on financial aspects of certain transactions and dealings, and the Minister of Nigeria raised some extremely important points about the economic situation in the Congo and dealings wiv/n th^ Belgians and so on. May I suggest tliat the Secretariat collate a working paper on this subject, so that we can discuss it here concretely rather than abstractly. I am sure that the Minister hat; come ideas on it. *•

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; It will be the intention to have a Secretariat paper. As an annex to that, I think, Sir Alexander, we could have also a copy of t?:a Ndele paper, which is a good background. Mr. ITdele, the head of the national bank, who is, by the way, coming here in a few days from now, has published a paper which is a very enlightening one, and we can add that paper as an annex. We might even think of inviting Mr. Ndele to come here if that is agreeable to him. He is a very good.,man. Anyway, we will have a background paper prepared.

The meeting rose at *i.3Q p.m. CONFIDENTIAL Meet inn; No, k6 5 Hay 1961 ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CONGO Meeting at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Friday, 5 May 19&1, at 3 p.m.

In the Chair: The Secretary-General

Members: Canada Mr. IIALGTEAD

Ceylon (Mr. GUBA3INGI-IE Ethiopia Mr. GEEP3-FGSY Federation of Malaya Mr. ZAXARIA Ghana Mr. QUAISON-GACKEY Guinea India Mr. JHA Indonesia Mr.- MASFAR Ireland I-fr. KENNEDY Liberia Mr. BARNE3 Mali Morocco Mr. BRITEL Nigeria Mr, NGILISRUMA, Pakistan Mr. HASAN Senegal Kx. CIS3 Sudan Mr. ADI?EL Sweden Mr. MALM Tunisia Mr. AYARI United Arab Republic .Mr. LOUTFI TL/en

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: The reason for this meeting is that we wanted to bring you up to date on certain developments* I think that you wish to have the full story and the inside story on ths very regrettable incident at Port Francqui, -and I think that you also wish to know more about the development of the Gardiner mission and its consequences in the field of the withdrawal and evacuation of foreign personnel as well as in the direction of the possible reorganization of the Army. We have therefore prepared oral reports for you on thece two subjects, Turning for a moment, first of all, to the incident at Port Francqui, I want to take this occasion to express our very deep regret for the losses suffered, in the first instance, by our Ghanaian friends. It was one of the most tragic events we have had in the whole Congo operation, completely unforeseeable as well as unforeseen. The loss in llvgu was considerable. I also want to extend condolences to the Swedish Government — the British Government is not here represented — for the casualties suffered by the Swedish group. May I ask Dr. Bunche to give us what comments he can on the Port Francqui incident. tf K*:» BUNCHE; These laments, Mr. Secretory -General and members of the Cconittee, will be to supplement the facts that have been presented t .• you in the report on the events in the mimeographed paper that was circulated to you last evening. I would begin with some background information in connexion with the incident indicating what led to it. This information comes from a report made by Major Bouffard after his visit to Port Francqui on 29 April. Ee says that, Go:J-nS back to 28 March, there had been a number of instances of intimidation and beating of. Baluba people working on the railway, along the railway line from Port Francqui to Mweka. These beatings were inflicted by Lulua tribesmen. Mwelia, incidentally, is a town about seventy -five miles south-east of Port Francqui on the railway line from Luluabourg to Port Froncqui, as indicated by Major Cavalc&nti on the map; In reprisal for these acts, on 10 April an organised group of Baluba staged a raid on the village of Malumalu, which is very close to Lusambo, about 200 miles to the east of Port Francqui. TL/en 3-5 (Mr. Bunche)

This incident was subsequently investigated independently both by the United Nations and by the AIJC and the Congolese Police, and the latter arrested some oeventy-five Daluba who verc accused of responsibility for the attack. These Baluba ware imprisoned at Port Francqui. Following this raid and attack, about 3>000 of the Lulua, who are in a minority in Port Francoui,evacuated the cityt The result was a very tense situation along the railway line, end there vere a number of reports to the effect that there was danger of a substantial tribal war in the area of Mweka-Muohenge. Muchenge is about sixty miles south-east of Port Francqui. The opposing sides in this imminent tribal war were the Balubas and the Bakubas on the one side, and the Luluaa on the other. (Mr, Bunche)

With the purpose of trying to relax the tension and ease the situation, the Minister of the Interior of the Provincial Government of Kacai proposed to the United Nations that he should proceed to Port Francqui and that he vould do so if the United Nations could make transportation available; and this vas done. Then, after his arrival, the Minister of the Interior made a public speech in Port Francqui vhich vas anything but helpful. This speech was made on 27 April, In it, tha Minister is reported, in the first place, to have accused the ANC of being anti-Lulua — this, in face of the fact that most of the ANC garrison in Port Francqui vas composed of Balubas, as veil as 13akubas and Bangalas. The Minister vent on to cay that the ANC, instead of preventing the trouble, vere the cause cf it, and also that if the ANC attitude did nbt change, it vould be disarmed by the United Nations troops; at the same time praising -the vork of the United Nations troops, in the area. It vas also said that the ANC resented the fact that the Minister's movements vere always under the escort of United Nations troops „ Ilence, Major Bouffard concludes thtrt it vould appear that a direct cause of the incident was this speech of the Minister of the Interior of the Provincial Government and the general attitude of the Minister during his visit to k- Port Francqui on 27 April. The United Nations garrison at Port Francqui vas small; it consisted of only ninety men, and that was too fev/ when contrasted with the ANC local strength of 300. The reason for this small garrison, vc are told, vas that, first of all, there had been no previous trouble in the area. There was no available system for varning our people against any sudden act vith aggressive intent by the ANC. The ninety troops in the community vere quartered in some six different places scattered about the town. Colonel Ankrah of the Ghana contingent — a veteran in the contingent, having been there since the beginning -- has also visited Port Francqui since the incident, and he cites the following causes leading up to it: first, the Minister telling the ANC that he vould have them disarmed with the help of United Nations forces; secondly, the United Nations troops were not able to fire effectively since they were in email units in scattered positions and their attempt to regroup once the attack came so suddenly was too late. Also, there was a flag foisted on MW/dk " - 7 . (M*** Bunche) the balcony of the hotel which was the headquarters of the United Nations personnel, and this seems to have annoyed or disturbed the Congolese civilian population. The cumulative effect of these things was that our military people were put in a very bad situation• The attack on our people, we are told, was made really by reinforcements of the ANC "which had ccme from Luluabourg. Added to these numbers, vere some ANC troops which were passing through Port Froncqui from Leopcldville at the time, e.nd iho police, the jeunsGse and the civilian population joined in* It is also significant, as reported by Colonel Ankrah, that the United Nations wor.no.ed vho had been recovered, except for three, were mostly suffering from sjiotgun wounds; orly three of them ^ere suffering from bullet wounds l~rcm rifles. This, he points out, rightly, indicated that-most of the shooting had in fact been done by civilians in the community since- the military people were obviously not carrying shotguns. Finally, I chould point out that Colonel AnKrah has refuted the announcement which \?as made by the BBC that twenty-six bodies of United Nations soldiers had teen found in the river. He says that, so far, there has been no, evidence of this. v An advance platoon of the reinforcements from the Liberian contingent has already been flown in to Port Francqui — that was yesterday. It was accompanied by the Brigade Major cf the Ghana Brigade and an ANC officer. They will be maintaining more concentrated dispositions in the city than was the case before the incident occurred. The remainder of the Liberian company, which will total 250, will be leaving Leopoldville for Port Francciui by river-vioat today and are expected there on 10 May.

The SECRETARY-C1?N3I\AL: It should be added that, of course, we protested at once to Presidont P^rxca-Vubu; these forces are under his control, not only formally, but also de__fn/;to. W have had no written reply to this first protest and I am sending a second, requesting the immediate punishment of those responsible. You have seen from the text that it is a rather dastardly story, starting out with disarming, and then shooting disarmed people who were absolutely defenseless. MW/ids 8-10

Mr« ET7TTCHE; There have been apologies from the local ANC commander.

The SECRETARY -frBTCSRAL; Short of taking action against those responsible; affairs in the ANC will never straighten out.

[I (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French): I endorse the condolences which you have expressed, Sir, to the representative of Ghnna e.nd to the representative of Sweden. I have one brief observation to offer. If we receive no reply now to this protest which you have lodged, you have said that you are going to make another in which, you will ask that an investigation be carried out and the culprits punished, I am also of the opinion that they should be made to understand that they ought to pay compensation, as is usual in such canes. Since there iz proof of complicity or involvement on the part of the Kasa-Vubu Government^ compensation ought to be paid by it.

J NR/rntn 11

Mr. GEPRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): Before I express myself on the situation before us, may I firct express our regret, "both to the Swedish Government and to the Government of Ghana, through their respective ambassadors, that this has happened. I hope you will not take this in any way other than that that in which it is really intended, but I think that warning has been given a number of tines that small detachments of troops should not be scattered throughout the Congo -- precisely in order to avoid incidents such as the present one, Ky firct point, therefore, is to ask that perhaps the whole operation should be gone over so that, if there are others in a similar position, they may be regrouped so as to sa,ve them from a similar fate. Then I should like to know the exact number of Ghanian troops that are now missing. I see that it is stated in the newspapers' that there are thirty-six missing. Apparently, from what Mr. Bimche has said, what we have heard from the Press is not confirmed. We hope it ia not confirmed, that is, that they are not actually dead. There is nothing to indicate precisely that, e.nd that is our hope. The Ghanian soldiers involved in thin business --. the missing ones-* are thirty-six. Apparently, I also gather from the newspapers, the Ghanian troops in Port Francqui numbered only ninety. Furthermore, I gather from the newspaper that apparently this whole thing started on 2^ April. If I recollect rightly, I think we have pointed out here that in order to avoid this sort of thing there should be a swift movement of United Nations troops -- originallyj if it can be avoided, that such small troop detachments should not be left in outlying areas, but, if they have to be, I think there chould be a swift movement of troops so that they can be relieved. I mcy be wrong, but I see that the whole thing started on 2^ April,-.and apparently until the morning of the 2yth, as far as I can see, no help was moved to the area. I should like to get the situation clear in this regard, because this is very, important. This happened first to the .Sudanese, and it has happened to the Ghanians. It may happen to me tomorrow, and I do not know what I can say to my Government. They will say: "What is happening?". It may lead the whole operation to direct disaster and failure. NR/dk , 12

The SECROT^RY-CENERAL: For your information, Mr, Ambassador, I should like to ask General RIkhye to cake his comments on the military aspect of it. You certainly point out what is emerging as a very major problem in the whole operation. This is the second incident of this character.

GENERAL HIKHYE; Sir, the problems which have been posed by the Ambassador of Ethiopia have been under very serious consideration by your staff here for seme time, particularly since the Matadi incident. In a number of cables vhich have been addressed to the United Nations Command, a policy has been conveyed to them that they must first establish priorities in accordance •with the tasks which the Force has been given, then further subdivide these tasks as they see them, and then allot troops accordingly. The direction from New York really cannot go beyond that, because it can hu.rdly be expected that we at this end deploy platoons and companies for ths United Nations Command in the Congo. The system which follows thereafter is that the United Nations Command, after having made its assessment of tasks, allots troops LO different sectors «• and appoints sector commanders. Thereafter the sector commanders are responsible for their own deployment, as a result of their appreciation of the situation. Naturally they are given guidance by the Force Commander, as also guidance is given to the Force Ccisicander from here. I am certainly acquainted with this particular situation in Port Francqui. The detachment which had been placed at Port Frsncqui was primarily for the purpose of protecting our own movement control detachment. The river craft coming up the river to P, rt Francqui then transfers loads to the railway. As it is a transfer point, it is an important communications centre. We have had about a company there all the time. The size of the detachment is determined by a decision of the sector commander. However, after the Matadi incident, we have sugg3Gted that there is no objection on the part of this Headquarters if the force commander decides to abandon areas which have very low priority. After all, no army commander in the field has ever in the history of warfare, had enough troops to carry out his job, and so he has to decide on relative priorities and remove troops from areas where they are not required or where he can do without them and then concentrate larger forces in areas where NR/dk • - 13-15 " (General Rikhye) they are required. In fact, this morning we were directly involved in a decision in regard to the size of a detachment to be kept at Coquilhatville. We certainly agreed with the Force Commander that the size of the detachment should "be increased, in view 'of the situations which bad developed elsehwere. The second point raised by the Ambassador of Ethiopia was that the situation in Port Francqui had been developing since 2U April. I would point out in this context that this fact has only been brought to our notice as part of a full report on the incident. It is difficult to say that the actual developments started on the 24th, because really Kasai has been disturbed ever since the United Nations has been there, and there has been continuous inter-tribal strife. Incidents between Luluas and Balubas have been going on from the very beginning of the United Nations operations0 The third point raised was with regard to fast" raove'ient. The Comnand in the Congo has never been so well off for aircraft as for the last two or three months. They are even able to contribute to external airlifts which were normally undertaken by the air forces of countries like the United States aad Canada. It has bean, for instance, possible for the United Nations Command to take the . Sudanese contingent home. So there is no shortage 4o- f aircraft in the Congo. BHS/ek 16 (General R lit by a)

Dr. Bunche has Just pointed out to me that they did send reinforcements, In fact, on the some night as the Incident was reportsd. I r2fer you to paragraph 5 of the report s-ubmittad.

Mr. GKERB-EG5Y (Ethiopia): Paragraph 5 states the 23th. The:-- is a difference between tiie 2^th and the 26th. However, that Is not really the point. The point is this: General Rikhye paid that this has always been a disturbed area, which means that those concerned must be on their toes all the time. Then we are told that they ho,ve a surplus of airplanes. In other words, they could move the troops fast enough from any place in the Congo, if I correctly understood the statement. Cut apparently even those- -v;ho wero cant on the 28th were not enough, because they were of a number that'Could be ambushed on the road, and they wera ambushed, I do not vo.nt to be hard on the cgnma-udera, but all the same I am afraid that it night vary well be an incident vhicb might have been avoided if proper action had bean taken. In other words, if 90 people are in trouble and another 90 ere sent, that will nut help very much. This is supposed to have taken place on the 20th. What happened between the 2M;h, when the whole thing started, and the 20th? I am not a military man, but I still have the ability to appreciate this fact. This is not simply a theoretical discussion, because th3 incident could be repeated elsewhere tomorrow. In such an event, as I have said, the Congo operation would be left with sticks and arrows.

General RIKHYE; I very much appreciate the concern of the representative of Ethiopia, but naturally .the report that we have at the moment does not go into all the details sunh as those that are being inquired into by him. The decision as to when reinforcements were to be cent was entirely in the hands of the sector compandor. Had he at any time asked for additional assistance, the request would have gone to Leopoldville and Leopoldville would have acted on it and would naturally have advised us here as well. We are not aware of any such request. All I can say, without knowing the details of what the representative of Ethiopia wishes to know, ic that the sector commander considered that the situation was not out of hand for him to have acted earlier. DHS/ek " - 17 (floneral

Secondly, as to why he did not use aircraft for reinforcements, again ve are net able to give you any information on that. Perhaps it vas not safe for him to use the airfield at Port Francqui. Lastly, the troops did get to Port Francqui. The ambush did not occur on the way but actually on the outskirts cf Fort Francqui. In other words, the reinforcements arrived and joined the "battle at Port Francqui, vhich vac already in progress. Why he cent only a certain number of reinforcements again is a matter cf detail, but I have no doubt that the corme.nc'or based his plan on certain information vhich vas available to him. Perhaps he did not knov the extent to which the ANC had been reinforced ard the extent to vhich the civilian population i had joined in vith the ANC.

The SECRETARY. -GHIIERAL: Hay I add tvo observations before calling on the representative of India. There are objectively speaking and Been in retrospect tvo miEjudgements, both of vhich are more or less explicable. The first one, I think, is very natural. One buildB up a picture of a situation in a certain area. We, as the United Nations, have ^never had any trouble in Pert Francqui. There had been no hostility at all, to cur knowledge, against the United Nations. In such circumstances, they felt that 90 vere enough for the necessary good-order operation. As things are in the Congo, ve have learned now that sudden flare-ups, volcanic eruptions, can come about for reasons Vhich are not at all understandable. The first ciir judgment, if you vant to call it that — and, of couroe, in retrospect it is — vas that Port Francqui could suddenly develop this kind of sharp hostility against tha United Nations. The second point — and that refers (Urectly to what you oaid about tension in Kasai — is the situation at the time cf the incident. After 24th April and during the ner.t couple of days there vere increased difficulties, but these difficulties again vere not directed against the United Nations. They vere of a quasl«tribal character and in particular' directed against the Minister a. Go the second misjudgement vas that this tension In Port Francqui could sving around and have its,.front directed against the United Nations in the vay that it did. j BHS/dk " 18-20 (The aeoretnry-General)

To judge from here, it is very difficult to say whether another evaluation would have teen possible. The facts are there. In both the first instance and in the second instance, there is this extremely difficult point that you cannot say when suddenly a group will run amuck and whether or not it will be directed against the United Nations. In order to be on the safe side, of course, ve should build uy strength enough to take care of whatever may happen, but that is extremely difficult for us to afford. However, it is a lesson and I think that the reply lies in increased mobility. That is a possible way to counter this kind of risk.

Mr. JEA. (India): May I first, on behalf of our delegation and our Government, express our sincere condolences to our colleague from Ghana and our colleague from Sweden. This is really a very shocking and distressing incident. It cuts across all recognized rules of decency and civilized behaviour. 01" course it poses many problems for the United Nations, and \;e must do some thinking as to how these things can be stopped. There should be no repetition of such incidents. You have very rightly said that it is not possible for us to make a judgement from here, and also perhaps it is always easier to be wise after the event. But at the same time I think this incident gives un a chance, since we have a fairly full statement of facts, and more might be coming in, of really applying our mind not by way of criticism but only by being inquisitive as to why this oort of thing took place, what were the loopholes and how we can plug these loopholes for the future. The first thing that strikes me is that we had about ninety United Nations troops in Port Francqui. What was their exact responsibility? Why were they there? Was it for the purpose of protecting the movement control unit and other personnel that were there to be in charge of United Nations property plans? Or was it the maintenance of law and order? DC/rf " 21 (Mr. Jha, India)

I can veil understand the first case. But, in a country where there has been ferment for many months, where there have been tribal troubles, -where there is a very large contingent, 300 or koo strong, of ANC which is generally hostile to the United Nations — perhaps not at the time, but at least in previous v^eks — how could it be expected what these United Nations troops could perform the function of maintaining lav and order there? The point that I vant to make is this: As far as I can see, the two Provincial Ministers merely informed the United Nations representatives at Port Francqui of their arrival on 26 April. Did they ask for United Nations protection? If they did not, I must scy that it is not really the function of United, Nations forces to give protsction to Ministers touring atout in their own territories. These aro supposed to be popular Ministers; they are supposed to have b^en elected. It may be that these Ministers-said-,. "We expect trouble. Will you give us protection?". Now, if the Ministers did aslt for protection, ratification from the Leopoldville authorities should really ha\e been sought. In matters of this kind we should not daal with the Provincial authorities. There should be some liaison unit with the Leopoldville authorities which wouldt-pass on these questions and officially request United Nations protection. Protecting Ministers is a rather formidable task, especially when tney are to be protected against their own people. Thus, -we must be clear in our minds about the circumstances in which the United Nations extends protection. In the present case, was it the duty of the United Nations, or was it called upon, to extend protection? I am not sure from the first paragraph of the report whether the United Nations was asked to give protection. It appears that the United Nations representatives were merely informed and, according to what Mi*. Bundle and General Rikhye have said, all that vas requested was transport — and the matter ended there. If these Ministers came to Port Francqui and found themselves in trouble, surely the United Nations should have said, "We are really not responsible for your protection; you must make your own arrangements as best you can". BC/rf 22

(Mr. Jha;,India) I think that this matter must be studied. Why is it that, whether or not we are in a position to afford protection, anyone can at any time ask us for protection? This is especially true when, a Minister of Government is involved. After all, he has his own forces, and it is not really the function of the United Nations to give touring Ministers protection in their own constituencies. If these two Ministers needed protection in that disturbed area, then some finding to that effect should have been made and, as has "been pointed out by the representative of Ethiopia, more troops should have been flown in. Those are the thoughts that strike me. I do not say all that by way of criticism, but it strikes me as rather odd that such responsibility should suddenly be thrust upon an isolated and very weak gr.rrison, surrounded by AFC • troops who are undisciplined, are obviously having difficulties -with their own Government and are in a state of semi-rebellion. I .mus.^ say that our troops tried to carry out this duty of protection and did so very bravely, but against formidable odds, against people vho recognize no rules cf decency or of warfare. I would suggest that there should be some examination of the conditions under which the United Nations gives protection. At whose request should it give protection? Once a request for protection has beeft made, how should it be cleared at headquarters? What arrangements should be made to see that the protection is effective? My second point relates to the protest to President Kasa-Vubu. It is really regrettable that the Secretary-General received no answer to his first letter and has had to write a second one. These are the things which cause difficulties in the Congo. A week or ten days ago we were all congratulating ourselves on the fact that at last there might be seme co-operation and that there was a chance of implementing the Secunity Council resolutions with the co-operation of the Leopoldville authorities and the Chief of State. But when the testing time comes, President Kusa-Vuou is silent. Either he does not want to do anything, or he cannot do anything, or he is unwilling to do anything. This is very unfortunate, especially coming in the wake of the promising agreement and the General .assembly resolution which called upon the authorities in the Congo specifically to extend co-operation. I think that the United Nations would be justified in asking for the maximum co-operation and, what is more,-' for compensation to the victims, as Mr. Loutfi has suggested, and the punishment of the offenders. BC/rf ""• 23 (Mr. Jha, India)

Murder, mutiny and rebellion are involved. And what is being clone about it? What is teirg done to bring the offenders to justice? How can the United Nations forces be expected to remain when these people cannot maintain the slightest discipline in their ova army? This is really a very difficult position. Last tii:e it was the Sudanese troops. Ethiopian and Nigerian troops have had trouble. This time it is the Ghana troops. We have troops there, too, and we are apprehensive. There are Swedish and Canadian forces in the Congo. All of us are in the came position, and we arc filled with apprehension. We must insist on thq punishment of the offenders, their trial or court martial, and adequate compensation. My third point is the following: Has the United Nations any kind of military intelligence units in the Congo? Have we intelligence information? Evidently we have not. After all, tha possibility of this kind of clash in Port Frcuicqui, where we had. a very snail detachment, could have been foreseen with suitable military intelligence. I do not know much about this matter myself, but it is something which should be considered. The United Nations has 20,000 troops in the Congo. Past experience has shown that they are in considerable danger. Perhaps the Secretary-General's military staff could «• consider this question. There should be at least some email intelligence organization spread out in certain places -- not for the purpose of doing intelligence work against the Congolese Government, but for the purpose of keeping the United Nations informed of the main trends, political, military or otherwise. A few weeks ago I suggested that we should like to see a master plan of the military operations in the Congo. I had in mind fixing, as it were, the key points, after consideration of political, military and other factors. I wanted to see what were the sources of protection or reinforcement of the forces in case of difficulties. The circumstances in the Congo seem to be such that there should be an extremely mobile reserve which could go wherever there was the slightest trouble fo^ our units in different parts of the Congo. Have we such a mobile reserve, or could one be formed? I believe that there is a surplus of aircraft, and it should be possible to have an extremely mobile reserve battalion ready to go to these trouble spots. BG/rf ' 2U-25 (Mr. Jha, India)

No army can go on if its morale is shaken in this way, if soldiers are executed, paraded naked, shot in the back, and so forth. And that is -what is happening. Another aspect which is brought to prominence is that the reorganization of the AIIC is now much more urgent than it -was before. I hope that it will he possible for the Secretary-General1s representatives in the Congo and for the Secretary-General himself, through writing to President Kasa-Vubu and other measures, to bring the reorganization and disciplining of the AKG into effect. We have an agreement now, and I think that no time should be lost in implementing it. ' I should like to touch on one other aspect. According to G.neral Rikhye's statement, the column which came from Luluabourg was 'ambushed on the outskirts of Port Francqui. How could it have been ambushed unices these people had precise information about the movement of troops? Does the United Nations have sjgnal codes tnere? Do the signal units not keep some kind of secrecy about requests for reinforcements? The ambush clearly means that this column was expectedf and so it was ambushed and beaten up. I do not think that such things should happen. * Of course, there were other ways for the information to have reached these people; someone might have sent word that the troops had left Luluabourg. HG/dk 26 t Jha, India) I should like to know what is the extent of the secrecy of movement of the United Nations forces and in what way is this secrecy ensured. I may be entirely wrong in my assumptions, but this is also something which fills one with apprehension because they ceera to know all the movements and they can just ambush United Nations forces in positions which are very advantagenous to them, After all, the country is theirs; thsy know the terrain; and even small forces can ambush very large forces. I apologize for taking so long, but I wanted to make these observations.

The- SECRETARY-GENERAL; On the last point I would like, first of all, to ask General Rikhye if he has any comments.

GENERAL RIKHYE ; Sir, there is the age-old system of communi cat ions in Africa, and that is the drum. It is quite fast and it is really quite amazing how information does pass from one village to another. Therefore, it is quite possible that they received an early warning of the movement of UN reinforcements. v Our communications are entirely in the hands of the United Nations, and we do use codes, even 'from brigade headquarters downwards. In this case brigade headquarters is at Luluabourg, and they would have used codes if necessary, codes of various kinds, and I need not go into detail. But there is a secure system of issuing and receiving orders. I will also attempt to answer the question in regard to intelligence. I think it was once answered by you, Mr. Secretary-General, in another context, that we do not really have an intelligence system, as it would not really be quite in keeping with our role there. • ' However, we do have an information organization in that we do collect all the information that is available and which comes to us from our brigades and units deployed all over the Congo, as well as our civilian operations and our civilian representatives which are located in the capitals of each of the provinces, and the flow of information is fairly satisfactory. But in this instance, again, it really blew up unexpectedly and without anticipation* It is always difficult to ensure against this sort of situation. Now that these kinds of incidents have occurred twice, I have no doubt that full precautions have already teen taken* HG/db < 21

The I5ECRETARY-GEWERAL; Before I give the floor to the representative of Nicer!a I would like to make just a few comments on the other points. With regard to a military master plan, of course General Rikhye would be closer to the question, but I would just moke the general observation that very serious consideration Is being given all the time to military planning. We have recently been in a rather active phase of it. Hovever, there are two observations to be made. One is that the master plan must have elements which must be covered by complete secrecy juct in order to avoid counter moves which might make it impossible to get the results we have in mind. And the other thing is that it is an exceedingly quickly changing situation. We make military plans which correspond to a given political situation. But, as you know, in the last fortnight, or three weeks', the political situation has changed and is still changing very rapidly. Military dispositions which are necessary end are entirely in line with our long-term policy in, for enasple, North Katanga have to take a very different form, obviously, in a situation like the one we had three weeks - ago, when Tshombe was on the move, than in the present situation, where it seems that the political background for his previous operations is breaking down. We must be ready to adjust our thinking from stage to stage in this way and at the same time, so to say, to keep very much to ourselves the details. However, I do believe that as soon as we get some kind of stabilization again in the political situation- — and I hope it will be a favourable stabilization — we should discuss the general disposal of the force in the Congo here in this Committee so as -to get the feeling of the Committee on the adjustment of the military dispositions to the political situation and the political needs. As an aside, I would say that we are really pioneering in an unknown area,, because this is a non-combat military operation that is very closely co-ordinated with the diplomatic operation, I do not think it has ever been played this way before, and it does create very peculiar problems which are completely new, at least to me. As regards the question of protection, I think that that is a matter which we should go into again. The old rule was quite simple, and that was IIG/db 28 (The Secretary-General) that anybody ashing for our protection because he was under a threat got cuch protection. That applied to political personalities of. various groups and directions; that was, in our view, part of the general protection of life and property. However, it is a"different matter to give,protection to somebody who goes on some kind of mission. I cannot quite reconstruct what has happened in this case. Anyway, the principles to be applied should be gone into. As regards the question of punishment, I can assure you that the letter to President Kasa-Vubu is in very strong terms, as the situation requires. In the light of this discussion, I would like to bring thv? question of compensation clearly into focus, too. There is one snag, and it is one which you ere Just as much aware of as we are. Compensation in the usual sense, that is to say which would be-natural in practically all other cases, is a bit difficult here. Cf course, the financial resources of those ultimately'responsible, that is to say the Leopoldville authorities, are very poor indeed, and partly it might even be a question of United Nations funds in some subtle way going around. But the principle must be maintained, and I think the principle should be made quite clear, whatever finally comes out of it. if There is, finally, the question of the reorganization of the army. We will come back to that later in the light of what has happened in the last couple of days in Mr. Gardiner's discussions. I agree with you entirely that it is an extremely urgent task. We have there one thing, which we have mentioned Before, which is a complicating factor — I will not say entirely a prohibitive factor, but a complicating factor — that is that I at least have been extremely wary of any moves regarding the reorganization of the army or assistance to the army which could be construed as partial in the relationship of Stanleyville and Leopoldville; that is to say, to the extent that we can regard those two ANC units? as under one hat, whatever way they arrange it among themselves, I think we could put very strong pressure in back of the reorganization demand. You can see from what I say that I do not include in that condition a settlement with Katanga, because I have always regarded, and still regard, the Katanga force as, so to say, outlawed. For that reason, if we are accused of taking sides — and the talcing of sides in this special contest wpuld mean for Leopoldville plus Stanleyville — that doea not embarrass me politically at all. HG/dk . 29-50

(The Secretary-General)

Therefore, as soon as v;e can treat Leopoldviille and Stanleyville in any sense as a unit, we should go ahead without any restraint at all irrespective of the stand of Katanga. I think, by the way, that if that happens we would be able to fairly quickly bring the Katanga forces into the same fold as the-secondary development. TL/pra

Mr. .THA (India): I Gold at the beginning that I was not talking by way Of criticism, but wac just inquisitive; and I think inquisitiveness is indeed justified on thia occasion, We have got really to rethink the whole thing GO far as is possible, I quite agree that the United Nations Force is not a fichting army. It has not gone there for that purpose, and the diplomatic aspect is very important. But at the same time, it is an inherent right of any army to have conditions in which it will not be subjected to this kind of humiliation; and I think, from the very fact that it is an army subject to certain discipline, there is corresponding responsibility on the United Nations, under whose discipline it is, to see that it is given maximum protection against the occurrence of such situations. Of course an army cannot egree to being kicked about in this fashion, because it then is- not really an army, but something else. I must say that the United Nations army has been extremely well disciplined. They have not taken the law into their own hands in spite of the greatest provocation and even though they could have in some- circumstances. That is a thing for congratulations and felicitations, and I must say that the United Nations Command deserves credit for that. But at the same time we have to establish a*• balance, and * in spite of the army's being a diplomatic force, it has got to be maintained as an army, VJhen I talked about intelligence I was not talking about intelligence as a counter- move to the intelligence system of the authorities, but military intelligence purely from the point of view of information where the Command is well informed, and from the point of view of the dangers and the difficulties that the array might face, so that in that manner they might take some kind of anticipatory steps, That is all that I meant. As regards compensation, I quite agree that it will probably have to come out of the United Nations pocket, but at the same time I imagine that when there is a final settlement of the Congo question there will have to be a financial settlement between the United Nations and the Congo, and anything of thia nature would go into the public debt of the Congo. Therefore I do not think that should really deter us from demanding compensation. TL/bg 32

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I do not think there Is any difference of view on any of these points, because, as I have indicated, we will raise the compensation claim for what it is worth so as at least to get it solidly c:.i record. Intelligence in the sense you indicated, Mr. Ambassador, is intelligence in the sense to which General Rikhye referred -- and that we will do as well as we can; we use all our people everywhere to collect whatever information we can, and we evaluate and translate it as well as we can in terms of action, The main point which made me take this opportunity to reply at once was the first one, because I can assure you that there is no difference of views on that at all. What I wanted to stress was the difficulties of a master plan which co-ordinates military moves with diplomatic moves in a way which is rather unusual • in history.

Mr, NGILEKUMA (Nigeria): On behalf of my delegation and on behalf of the Nigerian Government, I would like to express our condolences to the Governments of Ghana and Sweden. We are very much concerned about this matter, because, in the first place, the view which has been exprassed to the effect that the armies should be split into.small numbers is very unwise and very dangerous. In addition to this, the ANG, the Congolese Army, was trained in a very peculiar way by the Belgians so that they are always given to the idea of brutality and killing their African brothers, something which we regret very much. This brings me to the point that so long as the Belgian presence is tolerated in the Congo, no solution will be brought to this problem at all, because now that the attitude of the Congo Government, Kasa-Vubu's Government, is very co-operative and friendly with the United Nations, that will bring the Belgians to think that a solution will be brought to the problem, and for this very reason they will make up their minds to bring confusion and embarrassment, to put obstacles before the Congolese Government of Kasa-Vubu and his people and before the representative of the United Nations. .As a matter of fact, the agreement signed by your representatives, Mr. Secretary-General, and Kasa-Vubu is a very big step forward, and oil of us are thinking that an effective solution to this matter is now on its way. But once we start to feel that the problem is TL/pm 55-55

(Mr. Ngilerwna, Nigeria)

going to be solved, then the Belgians will begin to take another view altogether, I do not think the Belgians will like to feel that this problem is settled, and for this very reason they will find ways and means of causing embarrassment find of misleading the Congolese Army into doing all sorts of things which will bring about difficulties and place obstacles in the path of a solution of the matter, I clso quite agree with the Ambassador of India that the offenders must be identified and punished as soon as possible. But I would like to confine my observations at the moment to the presence of the Belgians, for they are the source of all the troubles. So long as they remain in that country there will be no solution brought to this mattar. They nre quite aware now that the move of the Congo Government is a move very much in co-operation with the United Nations, and when the imperialists or colonialists feel that those difficulties should be caused, they can do it at any time.

Mr. BARNES (Liberia): I have read with concern and regret tLls report concerning recent events in the Congo in which United Nations forces coming from Ghana and Sweden have sustained casualties. I should like to join the voice of my delegation to the remarks made by the Secretary-General and other members of the Advisory Committee in expressing condolence to the Governments of Ghana and Sweden for the losses sustained ty their troops in the Congo. Those of UG who h^ve troops in the Congo ere ree.lly sitting on edge, because there seems to be an endless series of atrocities in this area,which is of great concern to all of us. I think that the Advisory Committee should concern-itself with some action which will hinder a recurrence of these atrocities suffered by the United Nations forces in the Congo. Our forces are not there on their own volition^ but in an effort to bring stabilization and normalcy to the Congo. It reems to me that there should be free co-cperation on the part of the Congolese Government in supporting the efforts of the. United nations so as to hasten the day when normalcy will prevail in that area of the world. MW/hm - . % (Hf_* Barnes, Liberia)

My country has troops in the Congo, and we are concerned lest tomorrow, perhaps,, ve night hear that they have been subjected to humiliations, suffering end Io3c0 I was struck by the statement pf Mr* Bundle when he said that Liberian troops had been flown in to Port Francqui. He said that it had not been foreseen tha.b such thln^o would happen in Port Francqui, and so the force there was a sr.all one0 Now that cuch an incident has occurred in Port Francqui, I chould like to r.sk, for my own information, what is the size of the present United Nations Force there, end is the Liberian contingent the only one in that area?

General RIKHYE; At present there are no troops because ;they were withdrawn after this incident — except for those who were raispingo United Nations representatives went back to Port Francqui, £ccomprp.ied by the ANC Chief of Staff, from whcm we have received the fullest co~operation. The present plan is that a platoon of the Liberianp should, go wltli the A1IC Chief of Staff and United Nations representatives. The A1TC Chief of Staff, in fact, went so far as to invite them to be the guests of tiie A1JC, His invitation was not accepted, .for various re&sonso A detachment of Liberians, which is about 250 'strong, is now on ** its way and the reception arrangements for them have been completed. They will be received by the ANC. An inquiry has already been started by the ANC, on the ordere of President Kasa-Vubu and General Mobutu, Tne first step in that connexion was the removal of the ANC officer in ccmmiud in Port France^ « He has been removed from his command and token to Luluibovirg for interrogation

The^^gECgETARY-GEr^R/J-^ Through the intervention by the central authorities, we pbviously have a different situation in Port Francqui as a background for this move-in. For the moment, t'ac arrangement is for an advance party only to go with the Chief of Staff of the ANC and for the ground to be prepared for a stronger unit to move in — which, obviously, will be done only if the ANC top people and we ourselves are satisfied that that, is something which can be done without any repetition of this kind of incident. MW/bm 37 i Mr. HAS AIT (Pakistan); I only wish to sny how sad we ere that these unfortunate thinga chDuld have happened end to extend the sympathy of Pakistan to the representatives of Ghana and Sweden Tor the IOEGCS which their contingents have suffered in the Ccngo. It is particularly unfortunate that these sad events should have occurred at a time when we were all expecting that things wers improving and the situation reaching a state of normalcy,

(Ghana): May I, on behalf of my Government, thank you,

Mr0 Secretary-General, end my colleagues for the expressions of sympathy that have. been given as regards the casualties suffered by the Ghana troops in Pert Francqui,. Of course, my Government has already ccTDiaunicated with you regarding the situation. We have always, since the incident at Mstadi, expressed fears that UV.J.OSG there was some logistic backing of certain contingents in certain parts of the Congo, United Nations troops would find themselves in difficult positions, I think that I em right in saying that, cince March, cy Government h,as expressed cnxiety about our contingent in Kasai becauee there, in Kr.sai, we are, ao it were, heraned in by Kalonji on one side and the Leopoldville troops on the other side. We have always been apprehensive that something might happen. Of course, our warnings have not *• been treated with due attention; they have always been, ast it were, brushed aside, unfortunately. The fact that Kcsai has been peaceful form seme time has been due mainly to the co-operation which hcs existed "between our troops and the Kaaai authorities and th,a ANC, and I egree that whet happened in Port Franc qui might not have been foreseen* But the issue ccmes up about support of troops in outlying places in the Congo. Our contention has been that, instead of concentrating large troops in the main towns like Luluabourg and Elisabethville, etc. there should be some deployment in the bush, in areas where embushes can take place, as in fact took place in Port Franc qui, My Government is very anxious at the moment regarding the explanations which we must give to, the relatives of these soldiers who are reported missing and those who were killed. Of course, ours is a democracy and, therefore, this anxiety is well

understood, I think, by my colleagues herea But incidents such as those at Matadi and Port Francqui must definitely decide us -- that is, the United.! Nations — to give further thought to proper deployment and proper support of the various MW/ha 38-^0 (Mr. QurcJ.son-Sncfcey, Ghora)

contingents wherever they may "be. It is In the outlying prcas that trouble occurs. Therefore, we hope test It will he poseiblo not to allow a few troops cuch es we

have in Port Francqui to be Eurrouncled by about 300 ANG troops — m -whose behaviour, of ccuree, could not be predicted. However, this did happen. One pf the questions which I vent to raise is that concerning protection of llinisteroo You, Sir, have, said that vhea a Minictsr's life is in danger, protection is given to him.

The SECRETffiY-GEKSR AL ; Anybody receives protection.

(Slum?.) : I vent to remind you that an answer was given when we raised this very issue, rnd the answer, w?-^' that you only give protect]. on to a MiDiater or a peraor.ality Qt hie houce; you do not give protection when the person is on the move 3 I raise this issue because it vas also at Port Fr2ncqui that Mr. Lumumba V£E crrestod, and I reneoiber very well thnt he as^ed for protection and Leopoldville advised then thr\t no protection s'aould be given to Lumumba, who had

asked to have protection on his waya His life was in daiiger; no protection was Given to him. The seme tj-iin^ happened at Co^uil^atville. Tshombe is a Minister,. and there he was arrectod. I on sui-c that he wanted protection; it was not given. I "bring up tliic matter "because there lo, a question of principle involved regardless of the perconcility concerned. "We must have on agreed piiiiciple- regarding protection* Cn what basis do you give protection to Ministers who hc,ve left their posts — in this cace, Luluabourg .to Fort Francqui? On what basis do you give them protection whon tlaey asl^ for it? NR/en hi

(Mr. Quainon~gac^ey1 Ghana)

I think this is a very important point because I am sure that, if protection had not been given to them, all this would not have happened. So we definitely require some reply to this, and possibly we may have to formulate a policy towards this on the part of the Advisory Coonittee. The second point I want- to raise is that we also in this communication to you indicated that it appears that, if our troops, particularly in Port Fraricqui, were doing police work — of course, the reply was that they were not doing police vcrk, but if they were not doing police work were they combat troops, were they a fighting force, which obviously they were not — it meant that it was a police action we were taking there, and it was on that basis, I suppose, that a proper logistic backing was not forthcoming immediately when the incident occurred. Seme thought should be given to this matter a3.so. The third point I want to raise is that, in our "view, there is no point in having military escapades and incidents here and" there when in fact the over -all major problem of getting the Congo back to normalcy has not been resolved. When we say "normalcy" we definitely mean the constitution of a proper authority. I believe that, if, for example, Parliament had been reconvened and an appropriate Government set up by this time, I em sure that V the work of the maintenance of law and order might be easier. As long as we go on failing to tackle the political situation, so long we shall continue to have the various troops in the various parts of the country existing from day to day, and I cannot see how long we are going to be required to stay in the Congo. It appears that, if the operation militarily is continuing -regardless of the time element, the energies which have been put in and so on, we have been, like other troops, especiaD.ly those of Ethiopia, Tunisia and Liberia, there since July, and it is really hord on our soldiers to remain in a place like the Congo without much to do and without feeling that they are there to fight and, at the same time, having the feeling that they may be ambushed or decimated at the least provocation. Therefore, I want to have an answer as to why Parliament has not been called in. Of course, I know personally that Parliament can be convened by the President of the Congo, but what efforts have been made to make him realize that is very important that Parliament should be reconvened as early as possible so as to have a proper authority .set up and so that seme of these incidents can be resolved? NR/sn ... 1*2 (Mr, Qusison-Saokey, Ghana)

The fourth point I am raising is the letter to Mr. Kasa-Vubu. I was wondering whether it would be possible for members to have copies of this conmur.icatJ.on to Mr. Kasa-Vubu, "because I have not yet seen it. The fifth point is in regard to intelligence. We are not in a position to say whether there should be intelligence or not, but at least it is very vital that where you have a movement of troops there should be some kind of military intelligence — not espionage or political intelligence, which must be divorced from military intelligence, but intelligence afcch c

NR/en

Th» SECTSTARY-GEMERAL; You have covered a very broad field. I win try to give whatever information I can or at least clarification of my own thinking on it. First of ell, you know.what we know* Go, if there is anything which is hidden, it is hidden from us as from you. That, of course, ia the principle always maintained. lu this particular case, there is a EEC rumour, the one to which you have referred. On the other hand, the information we have cones, as Mr. Eunche has snid, from. Colonel Ankrah, who is, as you knov, on the one sido, a most qualified and experienced officer and, on the other hand., certainly the cna who is most likely to give the Ghana story about this tragic event in the proper terms. So we have to wait for what Colonel Ackrch nay bring out further. H3 is a very factual man, and for that reason he o'oviously dees not want to say any more than he knows and has- boeji able to find cut. However, as soon as we know, of course, you will knew. As regards the political aspects and the military aspects, I should like to treat them together because I think that is the best way to see what the problem is. If .'we have concentrations in the way we bwe, it is because of one major function which we can never forget. *• It is true that the formal function of the Force is to maintain law and order, but there is another function which can never be forgotten, and that is that it is the bucisbcne for the political efforts to which you have referred. BHS/bg •"••- h6

(The Secretary-General) We have two battalions in Elisabethville. There is no reason to have two battalions in Elisabetbville sirrply for the maintenance of law and order. There is no law and order problem in that sense at all. But, on the other hand, if we were not in a position to hold the Elisabethville airport, quite a few things would look different, very different indeed, at present in the Congo. In the same way we have some three battalions at Karaina. That is not the strength necessary to maintain law and order in Kamina, because of course they are perfectly able to maintain lav and order among themselves. It fits into the picture in the same way. We have further concentration to which you have referred in Leopoldville. In Leopoldville there is also the political aspect in addition to the law and order aspec^. Apart from that, we have troops distributed for two different reasons. One is the minimum protection for the civilian operation; for example, Coquilhatville, Fort Francqui and Matadi. Those are-what you would call the outlandish places. We have a third category best illustrated by the situation in North Ketacga, where we have troops placed where they are to prevent moves which would be likely to provoke civil war. Those are the three main categories, and we have had to give priority to the political considerations, that is to say, to troop** concentration so as to create the greatest possible stability for trends and developments which we consider to be necessary. That brings us to the political question which the representative of Gtana raised especially the convening of Parliament. I would put it in this way. Short of having the three battalions in Kamina, short of having quite considerable troop concentrations in North Katanga in various places, short of having the two battalions at Elisabethville mainly on the airfield, we would not be in a situation where for the first time Katanga seems to be forced to negotiate as a province of a united Congo -- that is to say, there is a direct sequence between this disposal of the troops and the events which we see. In referring to events which we see, I do not in any way went to endorse specific methods used. I do not believe in policy by arresting, but that is not our business. We can take what is the substance of it, and that is the complete reversal of the balance between Elisabethville and Leopoldville, which I think is very much along the line we would like to see develop further. BHS/ids Vf (The ilocretary-General)

Provided this works out and Katanga is really forced back without battles into a unified and integrated Congo, I believe that ve vill have an entirely different situation as regards the relationship between Leopoldville and Stanleyville, That relationship at present is extremely difficult to evaluate, but we know for certain that there have been in the last few days a delegation not only from Stanleyville in Coquilhatville but also a delegation from Coquilhatville in Stanleyville. That again, in my view, would not have been possible without the developments in relation to Katanga -- that is to say, there is a logical sequence from the way in which we have disposed our troops to the developments in Coquilhatville in relation to Leopoldville and Elistxbethville, and from that development in turn to whatever may now emerge in the relationship between Leopoldville and Stanleyville. With regard to the question of the convening of Parliament, which is, of course, the crowning event we hope for and wish to see come about, I feel that this too fits in to a chain of political cause and effect developments_, where we must get at least the minimum of straightening out of the relationship between the three centres, Leopoldville, Stanleyville and Elisa"bethville, V very much in the drection which I have just mentioned. The Security Council may talk about the convening of Parliament, the General Assembly may talk about it and we may talk about it, but after all the key to the situation, whatever arguments we bring out, is an evaluation by those who are in a position to convene Parliament. For my part, I hope, as I have indicated, that the very moment this triangle relationship is straightened out in the direction I have indicated, we would get more or less as an automatic result the convening of Parliament in order to seal the reconciliation of Stanleyville with Leopoldville and the subordination of Elisabethville in relation to that axis. We are not there yet, but I hope that we arc moving in_that direction. If that move is reasonably quick, I would hppe that it would result in the convening of Parliament, .. BHS/dk - .. kB

(The Secretary General)

There.is, of course, the competing bid for the leaders' conference seen c.cning rnost recently again from Elisabethville. I thinlt we have seen enough of the value of leaders' conferences, such as those at Tananarive and Coquilhatville. They do not colve anything in themselves. For that reason, I firmly hope that Leopoldville will not give in to this kind of initiative from Elisabethville. That is also in line with the stand taken by Stanleyville. I cum up by saying that you see in this a sequence of cause and effect from the way in which we have to concentrate our troops, to the present development of the balance in the Congo, and from the development of such a balance tovards the convening of Parliament, which would also seal the whole thingj. I hope that in what I have said now there is snough of substance and not too much of wishful thinking, If I am right, we are now finally in view of.something that at least to me makes sense in the whole situation. That, however, dees not take care of the problem to which you referred, namely, these people in outlandish places. With regard to that, I agree with you that the very ocaent we have the political aspects straightened out, the problem of lav: and order would be simplified. However, that problem would not disappear. The Port Francqui development is one of those half tribal, half just anarchic outbreaks which we are also bound to have in the future. These people did not obey orders frcm Luluabourg and even less from Leopoldville. The trouble is that the demoralized army without officers is spread all over the country and forms nuclei of possible banditism, which will be a long-term problem. My own feeling, however, is that the main thing that will happen if we get a political settlement is that it will liberate the forces which we have tied up at present in Elisabethville, Leopoldville and Karri ina. And the moment we can get those troops mobile, we shall be in an entirely different position when it comes to the question of stamping out and perhaps disarming those groups which function as bands outside the control of central authorities. BBS/ids 1*9-50

I do not believe that we vill be free from the problem, but I belie/e that we will be much stronger in our handling of it because wo will be able to forget a little bit about .pres.iure positions which we maintain for the moment. As regards the question of protection, I agree with you. As I think I eaid before, I am not quiirj clear on the circumstances and the reason why these ministers were given protection. My best guess is that the people on the spot felt that these minic-cero were going in in order to help us straighten out the psychological cituation in Port Francqui. They misjudged the situation completely, but I guess that in this way they felt that protection granted was not protection to the ministers ac such bub protection to somebody who was supposed to serve a United Nations purpose and to help us in a given situation. The general principle maintained .is, ao-I-buve said, that we give protection to those seeking it, but not wherever they are. It is given at a point where we can be. That Is why we have had the "protection camps" in Bukavu, Stanleyville, and Leopoldville. We could not spread our forces and run after people to protect thera GO they were moving around* We had to tell thera to come to us. That is also why we cotfld give protection to Ltununiba in hi a house in Lcopoldville, but the moment he was on the move he presented a completely new problem. I shall not go into the details of the Port Francqui and Lumumba story. We need not take up time for that here and now, VJe still have to find out why there was a departure from that principle in this case. BC/mtm ' 51

(The Secretary-General)

I should be very happy to circulate the letter of 26 April to President Kasa-Vubiu Frcn my point of view it did not raise any problems calling for advice frca this Committee. The drafting was a simple matter once it was clear what our Gtond had to "be. In any case., ao I have said, the letter will "be circulated. Finally, I would say this about the situation reports: The difficulty concerning situation reports which refer to the future is that we are not too keen to tell what we might do, and we do not know what the others may cook up. Thus, forecasts as regards our own operations are easy but something we do not "wa want to talk too much about, and as regards t:io othar side they are very difficult and very nuch o inatter of guesswork. If we had, and could hava, an extended system of military intelligence — not in order to spy on anyone, but in order to keep our finger On the pulse — that would be very good. But, as is known, there are objections and technical difficulties as regards building up an intelligence force. I think that, in the main, that covers the points raised by the representative of Ghana. I shall now ask General Rikhye to give clarification on other points on which I think he is in a better position to give such clarification*

General RIKHYE! The Secretary-General has already replied to the expression of fear by the representative of Ghana that some of the story about the Port Francqui incident was being hidden. I have no doubt in my inind that every possible bit of information which is available — and which, incidentally, comes to us from the Ghana brigade — has been placed on table. The representative of Ghana also wanted to know the exact task of the United Nations detachment in Port Francqui, As I srid earlier, the ninety-man- Garrison, which amounted approximately to one infantry company, was assigned with a view to carrying out guard duties for the movement control detachment at Port Francqui. This meant that it provided guards in the office and residential areas of the movement control detachment, as well as areas being used by the detachment as docks for unloading United nations material and supplies coming on boats and than reloading them on railway vagons. BC/bg 52

(General Bikhye)

As has "been "brought out in the story of the events leading to this unfortunate incident, the garrison found itself unavoidably involved in settling tribal quarrels — a task for wliich it was not primarily intended. An earlier point concerned the question of assigning an adequate number of troops and ensuring that the United Nations Command geve enough support to the various garrisons in the Congo, particularly those in the bush. The first request for reinforcement which came from the brigade in the sector in question was received in March. At that time a rotation of one of their units was carried out which reduced the strength of the brigade. In view of the enormity of the task, the brigade commander asked for additional troops. At that time he was promised that the Malayan special force would be dispatched to him as soon as the i situation in Leopoldvilla improved. The promise still holds good, but, owins to various circumstances, it has not been possible .for the^United Nations Command to reinforce Kasai. Naturally the Force Commander has to use his reserves in accordance with the developing situation and priorities as they present themselves. I think that the representative of Ghana would agree with me that it was very important that en adequate force be built up in North Katanga to deal with that particular situation, in which the Security Council resolution could, as the Secretary-General has brought out, be applied to the fullest extent and with very wide results. The Ghana brigade commander was authorized to reduce his commitments if he considered that necessary. I should like to say, to the credit of the brigade and Brigadier Michel, that the brigade continued to undertake a very large tcsk, and did so extremely well, despite the fact that it was beyond their resources. They were mainly successful because they maintained excellent relations with the local ANC. It was absolutely unforeseeable that this very ANC which they were helping more or less to live and were supporting in every way should turn against them in Port Francqui, I have no doubt in my mind that this was completely unexpected.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; It not only was completely unexpected, but is still to a large extent unexplained psychologically. It is very, very curious. 53

Mr« QUAI50N-SACKEY (Ghana): I agree with the Secretary-General about the preparation for the eventual opening of Parliament. I think that this Is a very inportant matter. Could not some action be Instituted quietly to get this idea accepted by Mr, Kaca-Vubu? Perhaps Mr. Nwokedl and Mr, Gardiner, who have been doing this groundwork, could communicate with President Kasa-Vubu und get him to accept this idea of the reconvening of Parliament0 I am sure that that would be very encouraging. A resolution has been adopted providing for sending a conciliation commicslon to the Congo. I do not know when it is to he sent. In my mind, however, it would be better to do the kind of informal spadework that has besn done in the cas• e of the reorganization of the arry by the two ar~~t -Joint—~~ •s• of the Secretary- General. I think it would be better if they prepared,the ground -°r an opening of Parliament. I am wondering if this is not the .time.for tiiat kind of contact to be made. My second point relates to the question of appealing to other States in Africa to send troops to the Congo. We raised the question of the Secretary- General's asking Sierra Leone to send troops, and the reply was that that Government could not possibly be asked because Sieura Loone is not a Member of the United Nations<, If I remember correctly, however, Nigeria was asked to bring in troops even before it was independente I am wondering if a matter of principle is involved here. Sierra Locne is, after all, already independent, and its aclnlssion to the United Nations is only a question of tine. We know that Cierra Leone has very fine troops, and we \;ere rather surprised by the statement that because Sierra Leone is not a Member of the United Nations it cannot be approached about sending troops.

The SECPETABY-GEjTOAL; On the first point made by the representative of Ghana, there is a meeting of ndnds because I can tell him that exactly ths kind of instruction to which he referred has been given. This instruction, in broad terms, is that the next step after the acceptance of full co-operation with th United Nations, and after the switch in the balance, should be the convening of Parliament. That is the instruction to Abbas and it is the instruction to Gardiner. But I have left it to them to find the best way to bring this thought clearly into the picture. This is tied up very closely with the two other points referred to by the representative of Ghana — and I think that that Is logical EC/rrrtm 5^-55

(The Secretary-General) in the liftht of vhat I said before. In fact, this is in a certain sense a follow-up from our side because what is now shaping up, so to speak, as a pattern is in fc,ct the pattern we have tried to get into Kaca-Vubufs mind the whole time: the breald-ns of the political resistance of Katanga, the reconciliation of Stanley/ills, and then the convening of Parliament. HG/ek -- 56 (The flecretary^General)

It hQ3 seemed to mo the whole tine to be the Icrj-f.cal pattern and the rational pattern politically, it has taken seme tree before the seeds ctarted to shew air/thing gresn above the soil. Let us hope now that -we will be able to put out

th3 parliament leaf fairly soon,( as obviously, under pressure of circumstances, ve have more of an ear than we have had before, partly as a result cf the recognition of the need of the United Nations operation, which was one of the results of the Nvokedi-Gardiner mission. On the other point, we have addressed a group of countries of the ex-French community, and I hope that we will get a positive reply. There are indications in that direction. I cannot go further at tlilo moment. Nigeria and Mali were cacec where there was not yet membership but, if I remember correctly, at the time we addressed, them they were reco^nended for membership. It may be a fine point, and I do not make too much fuss abcnt it; DO I do not think ve should take that too seriously. The situation may change very quickly. We need not wait until the fall for the General Assembly- I"t is a little bit awkvrard, perhaps, to address them while they are still, so to gay, completely a blank from the point of view even of the Security Council. However, there is no doubt that the Security Council will happily recommend Sierra Leone; and from my point of view, that would make the contact easier and at least would avoid creating any kind of precedent. I do not know how strong the Sierra Leone army may be. You Bay that they have people of fine quality. Anybody IG welcome, BO from that point of view thare is no obstacle. I do not, however, feel entitled to hope for a more considerable contribution, I think that would be unfair to them, because they certainly have their own problems. But, for that reason, I think for the moment we can keep the question open, I feel barred as of today; I may not feel barred a week or two weeks from now. In the case of Nigeria, if I remember correctly, we were very orthodox, and no troops came until Nigeria had been admitted. But we certainly approached them on the basis of the Security Council resolution, HG/ek 57

Mr. MAIM (Sweden): May I, on behalf of the Swedish Government, thank you, ilr. Secretary-General, and the representatives around the table, for your kind condolences. The events in Port Francqui have naturally come as a shock to the Swedish public and the Swedish authorities. Cur casualties are listed in this report as missing, presumed dead — one officer and a person of another rank. We trust that the United Nations Comnand in the Congo will continue the search for the missing men and that we will soon get more information as to their fate.

The r,ECRETARY"GET]ER.\I.r. The investigation is continuing. The other matters all refer to the NvokcOLi-»GarcIi:ior agreement and the follow-up through Mr. Gardiner on the spot and Mr. Kwokcdi hore. Before turning to that, I should like to say one word about our relations with Kasa-Vubu in other respects. We sent a reply corresponding to the results of the discussion here, which accepted the conditions discussed in the Kwokedi- Gordiner agrec-mcat. It was very well rccaivcd end was a good starting point for the continued discussions. At about the same time the rather dramatic developments in Coquilhatville came about. We still do not know what.is the status of Mr. Tshonbe. He seems to be invited to return to the conference. In that sense he is not exactly what is usually called arrested, but his freedom of movement is obviously interfered with in a very, very substantive way. Our reaction to it has been, in principle, exactly the same as our reaction in the case of Mr. Lumumba. We have not felt entitled, not knowing the legal basis on which they have acted, to, DO to say, raise the legal issue with the President; but we have asserted in firm language the absolute need to observe principles of fair treatment and, in a broader sense, what may be called due process. Alas, that did not lead to the desired results in other cases, and we have no guarantee in any case, the Congo being \iiat it is. However, what I wanted to mention is that we have intervened, but we have intervened sticking strictly within what our legal advisers found were the maximum limits applicable in the case of Lumumba when he was arrested. We have been approached by others, and also by President Fulbert Youlou, not to speak about Elisabethville, with demands for interventions which would HG/ek ... 58-60 (The Secretary-General) definitely go beyond our competence; and we, of course, have had to explain that we could not act in the way desired. May I call on Mr. Kwokedi to continue the story?

-^ y°u informed the Committee at the last meeting, Sir, follov-up action for the implo^ontition of the Security Council resolution and the agreement with President Kaea-Vubu vas Immediate. Mr, Gardiner left New York on 2k April and arrived in Leopoldville on the 25th. On the same day the Secretary-General^ letter to President Kasa-Vubu, the text of which had "been considered a« the last meeting of this Conimittes, was transmitted to Mr. Gardiner for delivery to the Precidcnt. On learning that Mr. Gardiner was in Leopoldvillo with the letter, President Kasa-Vubu. who was then in Coquilhatvilie, sent the mas cage that he would "be glad to eee Mr. "ar diner. Mr. Gardiner, therefore, visited Coouilhatville from 1 to 5 May and held discussions with President Kaea-Vubu. Mr. Eomboko, other Ministers and General Mobutu were also present at some of the discussions. Although we have received no formal reply to your letter, the Coquilhatville Conference has adopted a resolution confirming the** agreement of 17 April with President Kasa-Vubu; and this agreement eeem3 to have played an important part in the proceedings of the Conference. Mr. Gardiner has now reported on his discussions in Coquilhatville and with particular reference to the reorganization of the annod forces. The discussions have led to proposals that the United Nations should provide military experts to assist in the formulation of a detailed plan for the reorganization of the armed forces, and a formal request by President Kasa-Vubu for the appointment of one or more high-ranking military officers for this purpose is expected at any moment. In this connexion, the names of General Tamm and General Ohlin of the Swedish armed forces, who were assigned previously to the Ethiopian army for the training of their troops, have been mentioned. TL/rf .-... 61 (Mr. Nwokcf'l)

Other proposals which have been put forward to Mr. Gardiner in writing by the Congolese authorities include: First, exchange of liaison officers at the United Nations ard the ANC headquarters, respectively, and also at the local levels; Second, the establishment of a mixed coirjnission .of officers and joint United Nations-.'iNC patrols; Third, the establishment of training courses and, eventually, a military school; Fourth, the replacement, with the assistance of the United Nations, of the military officers and mercenaries who vill be withdrawn from the Congo. These are proposals submitted to Mr. Gardiner as the oasis for future discussions. Mr. Gardiner is now in Leopoldville and is resvr.iing the discussions there. He is also examining vith them the other aspects of the Security Council resolution, Furthermore, there are indications that the authorities' in Elisabethville -- or those of them who are.there now in charge — are beginning to have second thoughts on the Security Council resolution. The Committee would wish to know that the evacuation of the thirty mercenaries arrested list month has been almost completed. All 'but four have v left the Congo and negotiations are now proceeding with the Governments concerned for the return of those four -- three Italians and ono Greek. There has been some difficulty in determining the legal domicile in one or two cosc-o. As regards the .five Belgians and the one other stateless European who accompanied Tshombe to Coquilhatville and were transferred to the custody of the United Nations by the Congolese authorities, tuo are being repatriated to Brussels by the first available plane and it is likely that they are now outside the Congo; the remainder, including the one whose domicile has been in doubt, had expressed the wish to be .repatriated to Brussels, and their evacuation is being negotiated. In this, connexion it might be mentioned that the results of the interrogation of the six men by United Nations officials in Leopoldville confirmed the fact that three of them came within the terms of the Security Council prohibition contained in paragraph A-2 of the resolution of 21 February, On the other hand, the. interrogation has not produced conducive evidence that the remaining three are equally covered. In view of the doubt, the three cases were referred back to President Kasa-Vubu, who has now repeated his request for their evacuation under the terms of paragraph A-2 of the resolution, and as I have already eta-ted, their evacuation is being negotiated with the Belgian Government. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I think I should add one word so that there can be no possible misunderstanding. There wore six: one stateless, five Belgians.

Three were found by us to be; under paragraph A-2, political advisers. These three were one stateless and two Belgians. The stateless one gives us some headaches legally, but we can leave that aside. The two Belgians who are already out of the Congo are the two. Belgians who were found clearly to fall under A-2. The delay as regards the other three Belgians is explained by the fact mentioned by Mr. Nwofcedi, that we referred thera tack to Mr, Kasa-Vubu, as he had found them to be under A-2 and we had serious doubts about it, Kasa-Vubu maintained his stand, as Mr. Nwokedi said. However, the difference of views between Kasa-Vubu and ourselves becunc irrelevant in view of the fact that the Belgian Government itself wished then to be evacuated and the'throe peroons concerned wished to be evacuated. That is to say, they will all get out; the last one will be the stateless one, where we have still to straighten things out a little more ti'ian we have done so far. He has a Belgian travel document bub also a High Commissioner of Refugees travel document, which puts him in a very special category of persons. He is, in fact, from the political point of view probably the most important one of them.

Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana): Mr. Secretary-General, from the report just given by Mr. Nwokedi, it does seem as if there is no truth in the news which we have received that some of these Belgians were going to be retained until the Commission of Inquiry reached Leopoldville, so as to get complete information regarding the death of Mr. Lumumba, Is there any truth in this?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; The situation is that the two Belgians who have left could never have been of greater significance. As I indicated, the important one in this context is the stateless person who was detained and who, for reasons of law still remains detained; he is the one who may be of some'interest in the context to which you referred. We will have the first meeting of the Investigation Commission on Tuesday, and the Commission couJ.d — and I for my part would hope that they would- ask for a hearing with this tr.aa. He will probably not have left by that time. Such a hearing does not require their presence, because, of course, we have lawyers on

J* TL/rf 63 (The Secretary-General) the spot and we can arrange for a legally binding hearing in good end proper form. That is to say, once they have asked for it and we have arranged it, we know where we are, In ony case his whereabouts will be known to us. On tlie point of the reorganization of the Army, .1 should perhaps add one thing.

What Mr. Nwokedi reported on was, as he said; the proposals made by the. Leopoldville authorities, by President Kasa-Vubu himself. Our stand is the one, and has been the one, which I mentioned earlier to the representative of India, that is to say that whatever we do, we cannot permit ourselves to do it in a form which in any way strengthens one side or seems to favour any one side in the Stanleyville-Leopoldville relationship. That is part of Mr. Gardiner's instructions, and our study of the proposals made will of course be on that basis; that is to say, we want to go ahead as effectively and as quickly as -possible but the restraining factor Is that we do not vant to do anything that pre.jU

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia); Just for purposes of information, what were the grounds upon which President Youlou of the Congo (Brazzaville) asked for the intervention of the United Nations in the case of Mr. Tshombe? I woulcjL like to know the considerations involved.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: It was a very short cable in which he made a violent attack on the arrest of Tshombe and said that it required immediate action and that for that purpose he wanted me to come to Brazzaville for a discussion.

Mr. GE3RE-EGZY (Ethiopia); Nothing concrete, though?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: No, nothing concrete.

Mr. GEERE-EGZY (Ethiopia): My second question is this. If I heard you rightly, you have yourself intervened — or rather, I should say, you have asked that due process of law be observed in the case of M--. Tshombe. What are the legal j considerations there? I suppose there must be something behind that request, and for purposes of information I would like to know this. TL/rf 6if-65

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; It is exactly the same as several other cases including that of Mr. Lumumba. On the one side, the legal findings here are that an act which may be considered an act of sovereignty within the Jurisdiction of a country is not an act which we can discuss short of being provided with at least the legal basis on which the action has been taken. But on the other hand, ve have the general principles of human rights which should be applied fully and for which ve have a certain responsibility. For that reason, ve should in all those ccses -- and without for that reason being considered as intervening in anything which is not our business -- try to assert those principles to the maximum degree, that is to say, what I called first here, fair treatment. MW/db 66 Secretary-General )

I remember caying in this Committee that when we use the term "due process of law:i it does not mean that certain rules should be applied in a trial; it means that all actions in relation to the individual should be in conformity with the recognized principle of law, ' including arrest. That was a thing often overlooked in the case of Lumumba because our stand there, when we urged due process of lavr, was that they should observe duo process of law also in testing their own ri^ht to arrest him or to keep him detained. As regards Mr. Tshornbe, it does not imply consideration of his position either as President of the Provincial Government or-- what he pretends to be himself -- President of the Government of the independent State of Katanga; it is his position as a human being and nothing beyond that. We have had no reply on this point. There is one difference which I should like to mention in this case and that is that while, in the case of Lumumba, I, for natural reasons, brought it up repeatedly — three times at least, perhaps four — directly and personally with Mr. Kasa-Vubu, in this case, where the whole legal situation is rather unclear — we do not know even if he has been formally arrested -- I have had to instruct Mi-. Abbas, in the light of what he knows on the spot, to take whatever measures «- ere appropriate, emphasizing the need to observe the recognized rules of proper behaviour in relation to any individual,

Mr. GE^RE-EGZY (Ethiopia): In Mr. Kwokedi's statement he referred to the status of two of the mercenaries brought to Leopoldville. Apparently, you have waited to ask the President what he would do with them.

The SECRETARY- GENERAL: There is a misunderstanding. The mercenaries were completely outside any discussion with the Central authorities. As far as they are concerned, we have gone ehead on our own and there are left, as Mr. Nwokedi said, only four — one Greek and three Italians — concerning whom the settlement is not definite with the Governments concerned. All the rest is gone. The others are all civilians who were in the entourage of Tshombe when he came to Ccquilhatville. The authorities detained Tshombe and arrested the six. They handed the six over to us, in fact, on the basis of the requesfe

M Secretary-General) sent to Kasa-Vubu immediately after our last meeting. Of those six who vere interro^r.tcd by us, we found that three were in the category of A-2: they were political advisers. One was in a responsible position, a stateless person. Two were in relatively subordinate positions, but certainly what may be called political advisers, The tares others vere not what you would usually call political advisers. Thus our lawyers ran into trobble in that they were not certain about the possibility of applying A-2, From our side, there was not sufficient evidence to apply A-2. On the other hand, Kasa-Vubu had transferred them to us on the basis of A-2. In such circumstances, of course, we had to take it up with Kasa-Vubu, saying to him: This is the situation; have you further information which makes you feel that these are political advisers? And then he just maintained his o]d stand and said: Yes, I do consider them to be political advisers. That is to say, the resu.lt of our interrogation and the result of the judgement of Kasa-Vubu differed. This has no practical significance as they were Getting out anyway. That is, of course, a situation which may arise again and again. V

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): That is exactly what bothers me. If they were not political advisers, what were they?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I will take the most typical case.- It was a journalist, twenty-two years old, I think, born in Katanga and having come over to Coquilhutvilleas a reporter. He was very young and there was no reason to believe that he was in any sense what we would call a political adviser. In any event, he was born in Katanga. That is to say, we, who have always to observe the law very strictly, could well ask ourselves the question whether we were entitled, on the basis of these findings, to send him to Brussels. That was the most extreme case. Another one was also a journalist, but one of some prominence and of Belgian nationality. MW/db "" " 6G

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): I have a second question concerning the some matter. It was not my inures sion that you had to go back to the President and ask him what to do. I know you have a certain agreement, but I should think that once you have them in your hands, it is up to you to, so to speak, get rid of them. Supposing there were some other incidents and he wanted to keep some people, then I think you would be faced with a dilemm.« But I think that once you get these people, you could make your own investigation and get rid of them without asking him, because the resolution does not entitle him to veto the power in such a matter.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; It was the other way round. The trouble was that 'he wanted a wider application of A-2 than we, on a legal basis, found defensible. In that situation, as he had handed them over to us, either we had to release them — which we could not reasonably do -- or to hand them back to Kasa-Vubu. For that reason; before settling the matter we wanted to find whether he had additional information which might influence our stand. He gave no additional information; he just repeated his judgement. However, we would not have released them. I think that would have bee*• n wrong. We would thus have had to hand them back to him unless the situation had arisen which we now face; \ that is to say, the Belgian Government,in its wicdoin, has said: They had better be evacuated. Thus it is not a veto; nor is it a consultation. It is a fact that Kasa-Vubu went further than we went and,for that reason,we were not free to act automatically, We must, of course, always see to it that our acts in relation to any individual are legal acts; and the word of the Leopoldville authorities, in our view, is not enough because you can very well run into -- I would not call it a vendetta, but acts which are clearly against what people here at this table would approve of. We must reserve for ourselves a definite right to decide whether or not A-2 applies. And that works in both directions. We may run into dilemmas in that way, but I hope that we shall be .able to solve them. One thing we know, and that is that when Kasa-Vubu finds it is A-2, even if we do not, the Belgian Government's stand is that they should be evacuated. That is all right legally. -1 -.-. 69.70 (The Secretary-General)

The other possibility is the one to which you refer; that is to say, Kasa-Vubu may not find that they are political advisers, while we may find that they are. Then we must insist on our stand,

Mr. KGUSRUMA (Nigeria): I think that there is a very good point in the matter raised by the representative of Ethiopia. How that these people who were arrested by the Congolese Government have been handed over to the United Nations and, therefore, are now under United Nations authority, I see no reason why the United Nations should go back to the Congolese authorities and ask them: What are we going to do with them? • The SECRETARY- GENIAL: The reason was the ona which I cave. We must reserve for ourselves the right to interpret what is -and what is not legal. In this case, as I said, we had three alternatives. They could leave voluntarily, and that would solve every legal problem; we would not need to bother whether A- 2 was applicable or not. If we were entirely on our own> they should perhaps be released because we did not find that t;e had the legal right to detain them on the basis of our own findings. But, as they had been transferred to us by Kasa-Vubu, they were properly not in our hands. We could riot release them without acting against what he had indicated under his jurisdiction as Chief of State in the country. He has the right, of course, to kick any foreigner out, as h:;s the Government of any country. It was not a question of consultation^, but a question > after oil, of his retaining authority wh^ch we could not go against, since he, as Chief of State, had wanted them to be evacuated.

Mil MR/pm 71

Mr. NQILERUMA (Nigeria): He had handed them over to the United Nations,

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: For evacuation. Pie did not hand them over just like that, but for evacuation, and we found that we had no legal right to evacuate them.

Mr, FASAN (Pakistan): Could anyone leave voluntarily? You said just nou: "Anyone who wishes to loavs voluntarily, of course, has the right to leave voluntarily". Is that the position?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Definitely, and I hope that the majority of the people concerned in Katanga will leave voluntarily.

Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): We hope they do. A little while ago you said that a Belgian was being detained, the one who was going to be questioned about Mr. Lumumba's decease.

if The SECRETARY-GENERAL: He is a stateless man.f

Mr. HAGAN (Pakistan): But, supposing he wishes to leave voluntarily, has he not the right to leave voluntarily?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: He has the right to leave voluntarily, but I do not think that will happen too soon. NR/pra 72

Mr. LGUTPI (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French): Personally I bolisve that the most important question is not evacuation but the promice not to ccine back. This is the point which, in ray view, is the most important. V/hat is the use. of evacuating them if we see them in Katanga again tomorrow? This is the problem which concerns me.

The SFCRETARY-GIff^AL: All I can say on this point is that in the instructions to Mr. Sohbani, who has negotiated this on the Brussels side, this has been made very clear, and he is certainly bringing it across in a satisfactory form. I think there is a natural safeguard built into the system, because I do not believe that they on the one side show an eagerness to get rid of the headache and on the other hand recreate the headache in a worse form. I should add at this point that, although it is premature .£-nd I, cannot say anything definite, it seems that the stand cf the new Belgian Government is that it will use proper means to get all so-called political advisers out cf the Congo, and this extends also deep into the military categories. I cannot be precise, because the matter is under discussion and there is a meeting today on vhich we still have no report, but this is the trend, and that is the reason why behind my somewhat ironical phrase — "voluntarily" in quotes — there is the reality of a will on the part

Mr. GEERE-EGZY (Ethiopia): The explanation is satisfactory, I agree uith Ambassador Loutfi that the point is that they should not come back. You may remember that we said earlier, and, of course, the reply you have given us is that that is something that is somehow beyond the control of the United Nations, in the sense that once they go out the best thing the United Nations can do is control the air movements or the airfields. However, I myse.lf have great doubts about this, because those who came from South Africa, for example, can easily come in again through the territories adjacent to the Congo, namely, Rhodesia and the Central African Federation. Let us hope that this will not take place. But what really worried me was that the results could happen* In other words, you could say very firmly that these are undesirable elements and therefore should leave the country. Then it might be possible f~or the President NR/pm " 73 j. /Ethiopia) to say: "No, there is a precedent in the past. You have consulted me or asked me, and the agreement also contains something along that line. Therefore,, please don't tal.e these out." In other words, it may appear theoretical now but in terras of concrete work it may create difficulties. If you think that that will not be the case, I em satisfied. But; along thet line, inthe agreement concluded by you and the President, you will remember, we have made certain reservations, and I must cay that the agreement will be justified only in terms of results. Tliat is to say, if it gives results and goes on giving positive results, perhaps the legil and political situations that it may raise may be somewhat diluted and- may die in that way. If not, of course, there will come some serious questions. Therefore, in order to do that, I wonder whether it is time now to get the results up to now and whether you have thought of sending the delegation back again in order to push this to the utmost. I Bonder what the thinking along that line is. I feel rather awlward here. Of course, it is not the function of an Ambassador to meddle in internal administration, but I thought perhaps it might help if the delegation that was sent was back there and pushing the work along the line already created. tf The SECRETAP.Y-GENKRALt With regard to the first point, we have the very important precedents set by the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Union of South Africa to the effect that these people are deprived of their passports. Naturally we have made it clear to Brussels that this, from our point of view, creates a precedent clearly indicating what can be done administratively in order to make their return impossible. I have not yet seen any response to that en the Belgian side, but they have, as I indicated to Mr. Loutfi, definitely an interest in seeing to it that these people do not return, because that would really recreate for them the same problem in a much worse form, As regards the possibility of a dilemma with Mr. Kasa-Vubu, you are certainly absolutely right, not because of the precedent, because I do not think this can be called' a consultation — this was, so to say, a development in another direction — but because of the fact that, as you remember, in the text i of the Nwokedi-Gardiner agreement he reserved to himself a kind of ultimate right NR/pm 7^-75 (The Secretary-General) to decide on the implementation of the agreement in cases of people who had been hired by him. In the rep?.y we discussed here, this was, as you will remember, a key point, and what v;e brought out in the reply, as I understand it, was that, as Kssa-Vubu has accepted the resolution, he cannot exercise this sovereign right of the Chief of State,which he reserved to himself, in contravention of the resolution. That is to say,that we, out of this kind of courtesy, respected his right does not and cannot be permitted to derogate from the resolution. Therefore, if we run into e situation where we cay that he is A 2 in Leopoldville — that is the only case where the problem can arise — eacl. he says he is not A 2, then we would have to stick to our guns. He may invoke the agreement, and we must invoke the resolution, because he has not been permitted to derogate from the resolution, and we are the ultimate judges. Then it-would come up as an open conflict, I hope that would be resolved in a decent way but I do not believe — I repeat, I do not believe — that he can read into what has happened any precedent as to his right to be consulted in all cases o.f th:.s type* The problem remains but the problem is one which will have to be resolved if and when it arises, and I hope it will not arise. ** Finally, as regards results, the first result we naw in concrete form was, of course, the handing over of the six. As regards the role of the delegation in this context, I felt that, as matters now stand, the best division of responsibilities and labour would be for Mr. Gardiner to follow it up. He is, so to say, the delegation at present, and he does that, if you will permit me to say so, with great energy and great wicdcm. He has achieved quite good results on the basis of the agreement, while, on the other hand, we would have for this erl of the story the help of Mr. Nvrokedi in the interpretation of the agreement and of the arrangements, which is essential especially in view of the fact that this was, after all, the result of very long discussionsf We need a very intimate knowledge of the thinking on their side, and it is a little awkward to depend on cables for explanations of things we do not understand. The conclusion has been the one I indicated, that the best possible arrangement now is to split the delegation into two halves: one on the spot following through there and one here helping us with the corresponding operation on our side. BHS/hm •--•- 76 (The Secretary-General)

Incidentally, I have not yet had a reply, but I have asked Mr. Sohbar.i to come here f jr a report next week. If and when he, cones, I would like him to give an oral report tc you on his discussions in Brussels.

Mr^JKA^ (India): I hope that the pressure will £e put on the Belgians to follow the saina policy of the invalidation of passports.. That can "be a very satisfactory way of ensuring the non-return of thcae people» I agree with you that it has to "be done in co-operation with the Government of the country of the national.::. As regards .United Nations rights, I do not know what legcj. advice you have received, but our .understanding of paragraph A- 2 is tliat it spealis of "shall be withdrawn and evacuated". Our interpretation is that' if there should be a situation in which you find that a category of personnel in your 'custody, as happened with the thirty at Kabalo, then I ;bhink the United Nations cannot dive3t itself of the responsibility for evacuation But,, of course, that has to be done in consultation with the Government of the nationals. I think it would be a bit dangerous to say that the United nations has no authority for evacuation. There may be instances of conflict, as you yourself have said, concerning tlie Leopoldville political advisers, and I would not like to go as far as that. Of course, the case of these six people is perfectly, all right, because they were handed to the United Nations by President Kr,sa-Vubu. It was therefore quite right to have consulted him about whet to do with these people in connexion with their evacuation* But I think the United Nations ought to retain the right of having these people, in any circumstances, come under the authority of the United Nations, however temporary that might be, whether it is by reason of surrender, capture, arrest or some military operation. I think the United Nations has to act in consonance with that

reaolution0 Not to act would be to go against the purposes of the United Nations. My final point relates to the Leop.oldville advisers. I do not know how that matter is progressing, but I believe you caid that Mr« Gardiner is negotiating the matter. BHS/lim -•-- 77

The figgg^jgY-gg^RAI;: First of all, I would say as regards military personnel, prirQ-military personnel and mercenaries, that I em entirely in agreement with the view of the representative of Indiaa . For example, in the case of the mercenaries ve dl-?. not tali: about it vith anybodyA We just vont nboad p:.th the cr.tienal Govermient concerned,, the ccse of political. fldvisers is necessarily ' a little bit mere delicateo Ite- employment or employment will "be under the Public Service CcmmisEion, vhich is being negotiated and which wij.1 have a United Nations element so that, we CPU exercise the proper influence on it, If I m&y revert one moment to the possible conflict vhich may arise concerning political advisers in Leopoldville — that is the only ares where this problem can arise — I should perhaps add to vhat I said before that in the light of the experience with these s^x people; I would rather believe that whether it is

Mra Kasa-Vubu who finds paragreph A-2 applicable or we who find paragraph A-2 applicable \rill not be of very great significance, because the very moment the stsnip A-2 has been put on e. man "by either on? of the authorities, the Belgian Government is very likely to sey that he should leave.

Mr* HASAN (Pakistan) : Did we not understand you a little while ago to cay that Mr. Kasa-Vubu was in fact inclined to take a lighter view of paragraph A-2 than you were and that the greater danger was that you might net put the stamp of paragraph A-2 on someone but that he would? If that is so, there is no danger of any conflict between you end him* Tbe mopti^.o; rose at 5«55 p»m. Meeting No. k'J 15 Kay ENGLISH

.UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CONGO

Meeting at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 15 May 196l> at 3 p.m.

In ".he^ The Secretary-General

Members Canada Mr. RITCHIE Ceylon Mr. UIJ3GOONAWARDENA Ethiopia Mr. GEBBE-2GZY Federation of Maleya Mr. ZAKARIA Ghana Mr. QUAISCN-SACKEY Guinea India Mr. JHA Indonesia Mr. LAPIAN Ireland Mr. KENNEDY Liberia Mr. BARIIES Mali , Mr.' TRAORE Morocco Mr. TABITI Nigeria . Mr. NGILERUMA Pakistan Mr. HASAN Senegal Mme KLEU^SMIBT Sudan Mr. ADfiEL Sweden Mr. MALM Tunisia Mr.. SLIM United Arab Republic Mr. SIDKY Mr* LOUTFI

61-13736 TL/cw

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; There are a few points on which we would like to bring you up to date. The most important one is the state of affairs between us end Brussels with regard to the withdrawal of the officers^ mercenaries end political advisers. As you know, our representatives have been negotiating for a long time in Brussels,' and you will certainly be pleased to hear directly from Ambassador Sahbani how he looks at the situation, how far we have gone, and eo forth. In this context, I would like to mention to you that the President of the Security Council has Just received a letter from the Soviet delegation in which the delegation says that it would be interested in official information regarding the precise number of personnel in the above-mentioned categories which has, to this date, been really withdrawn and evacuated from the territory of the Republic of the -Congo, what number still remains in the Congo, and when the withdrawal of all the personnel will be fully implemented. In this communication of course other questions also are raised, but I wanted to mention this partly as a background to the report regarding the situation in Brussels. We may then add some words about the situation in the Congo. With your permission, I would like to invit*• e Ambassador Sahbani to report on the negotiations.

Mr. SAHBANI (interpretation from French): To begin with, and before sketching an account of the mission which I have carried out in Brussels, I should like to tell you how greatly I appreciate the honour done to me by the Secretary-General in entrusting to me this mission in Brussels. It has been a rather delicate and difficult mission. I have endeavoured to carry it out to the best of my abilities and with the benefit of the information and instructions which the Secretary-General conveyed to' me daily, basing myself also on the general orientation I received in the course of some of the meetings which you have held and which I have attended. NR/en

The mission turned out to be a long one. I left New York for Brussels on 20 March and returned from Brussels only on the 12th of this month. Hie mission was longer than anticipated, for a number of reasons. To begin with, there were the elections in Brussels, which dragged out at seme length. The elections «• >v>e followed by a governmental crisis which was longer thn.n expected. Never in a.. memory has Belgium undergone so lengthy a governmental crisis as this one. The mission was a long one also because in the middle of the crisis I perceived a glimmer of hope, that is, the installation of a Foreign Minister who is recognized as having rather advanced ideas on the matter of decolonization. But even during this crisis I did not fail to push the matter further, to investigate as well as I could and to make contact with personalities in the old Government as well as with those that might come to power in the new one, and also with all or almost all the personalities that might have had some influence on the development of the political situation in Belgium. Moreover, a good deal of my time in Brussels was spent seeking information, because among the tasks assigned to me by the Secretary-General was the one of collecting certain information in Brussels, information which was lacking here or information which had to be compared with information we had obtained fron the Congo. I might delineate two phases of my mission. First, there was the one which concerned the Eyskeus-Wigny Government, the pre-crisis Government, and then, of course, the one which concerned the Lefebvre-Spaak Government, which is the present Government. I shall not give you a detailed account of'all my interviews but I shall endeavour to draw the broad outlines of the Belgian Government's attitude to the resolution of 21 February and the evolution of this attitude in the light of the events that occurred in Belgium and in the Congo between 21 March and 10 Kay last, Let me briefly outline the attitude1 of the Belgian Government on the Security Council resolution at the time when I arrived in Brussels. You know, as I do, that the Belgian Government unceasingly proclaimed its willingness to co-operate with the United Nations in implementing the resolution of 21 February. The Belgian Government felt obliged to make this confession of faith by reason of Article 25 of the Charter, which says: "The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and,carry out the decisions of the Security Council ...w. NR/rl 7 (Mr. Sahbani)

But this attitude, although outwardly liberal, was none the less a theoretical one because practically it did not yield concrete initiatives. Without refusing categorically to co-operate with the United Nations, the former Belgian Government tried to place such co-operation into a framework which in effect rendered it futile. The former Belgian Government tried to classify the personnel covered by the United Nations resolution into a number of categories. First, there was the category of former administrative personnel and former personnel of the Force publique. The former civilian officials and officials of the Force publique alike were considered by the Belgian Government as not being Belgian employees, even though they had Belgian nationality. According to the Belgian Government, they were under the authority of the Congolese Government. They were Congolese officials, the Belgians said, over whom Belgium had,no authority. The second category was that of agents sent out by Belgium after- ,30 June - after the proclamation of independence - to the Congo - still according to the Belgian Government - to try to strengthen the former staff. The Belgian Government does acknowledge that it has sufficient authority over these people to have them recalled from the Congo. This was a rather contradictory attitude, in effect, because when the Belgian Government sought to re«all some elements in this second category it ran into the categorical opposition of these taen. Let me cite three cases: the case of Major Weber and the cases of two officials whose names have recently been revealed in connexion with the Coquilhatville incident, Henri and Antoine. These were staff members sent out by the Belgian Government after the proclamation of independence. They were supposed to return when recalled by the Belgian Government, but when Major Weber refused to heed the recall order of the Belgian Government and the Belgian Government has done nothing eo far in his case. As for Henri and Antoine, I was told at one point that all officials in category B had been already recalled by the Belgian Government and that all of them had returned to Brussels except Major Weber, but it was subsequently realized that not all had returned, because obviously Henri and Antoine had not. These two were officials sent to the Congo by Mr. d'Aspremont-Lynden, former Minister for African Affairs, long after the proclamation of independence. The third category was that of mercenaries. The Belgian Government said it had no powers over them at all, that it washed its hand of them and, as far as it was concerned, the United Nations could do anything it wanted with them. NR/en ~~ 6-10

(MrvSahbani) Then there were the political advisers• Belgium pretended that it had no political advisers in the Congo. The Belgian Government affirmed that it had sent technicians there,placing them at the disposal of the Congolese Government, but that some of these technicians had set themselves up as political advisers in defiance of the will of the Belgian Government and without consulting it. The political advisers in the Congo may originally have cane from certain private categories, having been lawyers or something of that kind. The Belgians wanted the United Nations to tell Brussels what officials and what persons in particular were to be classified under ohab heading* The attitude of tha Belgian Government presupposes that a unilateral withdrawal by Belgium of Belgian personnel in the Congo would constitute interference in the domestic affairs of that country on the grounds that these are Congolese and not Belgian employees. Therefore, if Belgium sought to withdraw .them, it would be acting as if it were intervjciDg in affairs which were not within its competence. For these reasons, Belgium criticized the attitude of the Security Council, with regard to the resolution of 21 February. As far as the Belgian Government was concerned, the Security Council had adopted a very grave decision incompatible with the sovereignty of the Congo. The Brussel*'s position was that this was a poor precedent, out of keeping with the spirit of the United Nations Charter. HG/rl 11 (Mr. Sahbani)

Easing itself on this view, the Belgian Government -- that is, the old Belgian Government; that is what I am talking about -- tried to take the role of the defender of the Congo. It sought to set the United Nations and the Congolese Government in opposition to each other, pretending that it would defend the Congolese Government. In this respect, it was acting as a defender. This attitude of the Belgian Government was unfortunately supported by the attitudes, positions and actions of certain Congolese personalities. At the time when I went to Brussels we still lived in the Matadi atmosphere. The Congolese — or some of them .-- wished at that time to base themselves on the Belgian Government in order to gather the strength to oppose the United Nations. The attitude of the Belgian Government was refuted in the course of our, mission. We refuted all of the arguments since all of them struck us as being utterly lacking in validity. We took the well-known attitude of the United Nations, an attitude you have helped to clarify. " We rejected the three-fold classification offered by Belgium. We demonstrated clearly that Belgium could not be relieved of its responsibilities so easily on the grounds that it had nothing to do with problems raised by its citizens abroad. In the case of the mercenaries, even though I was prepared, as a matter of tactics, to accept the claim that these mercenaries have left Belgium without the knowledge of, and in defiance of, the will of the Belgian Government, I took the position that Belgium's responsibility was, nonetheless, conmitted and that the Belgian Government continued to exercise full authority over its nationals abroad. Even though this was not the object of our mission, we suggested certain ways and means designed to enable Belgium to withdraw these mercenaries or to exert pressure on them. As regards political leaders, it must be acknowledged that Belgium's attitude was rather embarrassing for ue* When the Security Council urged the withdrawal and evacuation of political advisers, it did not bother to define that category. This is a difficulty which Mr. Mestiri and myself side-stepped in our talks with the Belgians. We wished to avoid speaking about political advisers in theory* We preferred to cite names and we quoted some names, and that is where we felt the essential need of having a list drawn up of Belgian political advisers or of persons who could be classified under tfyat heading, even HO/db ' 12 (Mr. Sahbani) though that list was not exhaustive. We explained to the Belgian Government that unilateral withdrawal by Belgium was not interference in the internal affairs of the Congo since, on the contrary, what was involved waa avoiding action by a Governnent in a country alien to it, action which did take the form of interference, interference of varied forms — sometimes administrative or political or economic, and sometimes even military. I must say that the attitude that we encountered in Brussels gradually evolved. At the outset no form of co-operation with the United Nations was vouchsafed. Subsequently we ran into some sort of a thaw. I can already find it in the letter of 1 April, which letter did not contribute too much; but it does • accept the principle of withdrawal. As you know, I was not going to negotiate with the Belgian Government. The resolution of the Security Council is mandatory and peremptory in its terms. But at all costs we had to get the Belgian Government to announce that it had decided to withdraw. The letter of 1 April was proposed to me as a draft, and I participated in its elaboration. I rejected it at the outset. Of course, I first referred it to the Secretary-General. I Dejected the first draft, which draft did not even commit the Belgian Government to withdraw political and military personnel which fell under the provisions of the Security Council resolution. In any event, we secured the insertion of this phrase in the letter, which is important, because the Belgian Government cannot tell us any more that it does not commit itself to the withdrawal of those personnel, therefore, in addition to the decision of the Security Council, there is an undertaking by Belgium. There is one point which we completely rejected; the question of a tripartite conference. The Belgian Government proposed the establishment of a tripartite commiscion — the United Nations, Belgium and the Congo — to study the implementation of the Security Council resolution. We categorically rejected that proposal, stating that the United Nations could not accept this precedent. We rejected this In principle because it would mean that a country alien to another sovereign country would be acknowledged openly to have an interest and HG/hh - . «L5-15 (Mr. Sahbani) a say in the affairs of that country. So much for the attitude of the Belgian Government. During my first weeks..in Brussels, availing myself of the governmental crisis, I had tried to enter into contact with a substantial number of personalities. Even before the elections I contacted Mr. Spaak, who in our first unofficial conversation at his home, when he was only the head of a political party, seemed to be clearly cognizant of the necessity of withdrawing all military personnel from every part of the Congo. But he struck me as being rather more reticent as. regards the technicians. He did not have sufficiently clear ideas about the distinction to be drawn between political advisers and technicians, strictly • speaking, who worked in the Congo. He seemed eager to have Belgian technicians kept in the Congo. On the other hand, he clearly.disapproved of the quibbles and the "hair-splitting", as he himself called it, of the previous ministry. He said that if he ever got into the Government the Ministry for African Affairs would be abolished. He also disapproved of:the fictions bred by the Defence Ministry about matters relating to the Congo.- Once Spaak had been informed of his appointment to the present Government, the first condition he set was the abolition of the Ministry for African Affairs — tnis was before accepting office -- and the centralization of all Congolese matters in the Foreign Ministry. For your information, gentlemen, I should like to make it clear that Congolese affairs were scattered among a number of Belgian agencies. There was the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. There was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thirdly, there was the Ministry for African Affairs. This is a euphemism in itself; it used to be called the Colonial Ministry. Finally, there was the Defence Ministry, which was interested in the problem under the heading of "evacuation". Now all matters relating to the Congo are under the Minister for Foreign Affairs — not just the Ministry, but the Minister,personally. I then took the precaution of entering into direct contact with the head of the present Government even before he had been designated as President of the Council, Mr. Lcfebvre. BC/nm . 16 (Mr. Sahbani)

I did not find that Mr. Lefebvrc had the same attitude as Mr. Spaaic. Mr. Lefebvre was far more reticent. He is the President of the Social Christian Party, and is therefore bound to have the same view on. the Congo as that Party has. I even felt a measure of bitterness towards the United Nations in his attitude. Before he became Prime Minister, I had very courteous but rather heated discussions with him. I was particularly struck by one observation he made -- namely, that Belgium had granted independence to the Congo and WGS eager to prevent the Congo from falling under a new type of colonialism, albeit collective. He did not fail to lavish promises on me as regards the priority which he would attach, if he were appointed, to the examination of the problems of the Congo. Three days later he was indeed designated to form a Government. Later, I had a number of discussions with Mr. Gpaak and his aides. In the meantime, of course,the agreement of 17 April was concluded between the Secretary-General and the Chief of State of the Congo. That agreement had marked repercussions on Belgium1s attitude and the orientation of our Brussels mission. Brussels sought to use the agreement to bolster its position and to subject the implementation of any decision by the United .Nations and the Congolese V Government to a precise order issued by the Chief of State of the Congo. The Belgian liaison agent was trying to influence the Congolese Government to keep some Belgian agents in Leopoldville or elsewhere in the Congo — I do not blame him for that; he was acting in the interests of his country — even if the United Nations were some day to declare that these persons came under the provisions of the resolution of 21 February. We explained to the Belgian Government, which was bitter at the conclusion of the agreement of 17 April, that it was the fault of the Belgians themselves that the agreement had had to be concluded. It was a question of "tickling" the amour propre of the Belgian Government of the time. We explained that the agreement was a result of the Belgian Governments negative attitude and that the United Nations would have wished Belgium to undertake the withdrawal of the personnel covered by the Security Council resolution, without waiting to be constrained to do so under the terms of a new instrument* Meanwhile, there occurred the episode of the arrest of six.-persons in Coquilhatville — five Belgian and one stateless. Luckily, the United Nations managed to solve the, problem in a way which gave satisfaction to the Congolese BC/hm ' 17 (Mr. Sahbani)

Government and to the United Nations and which left the door open to future co-operation with Belgium as regards the implementation of the resolution of 21 February. .... This brings me to an account of the attitude of the present Government to the resolution of 21 February. I must admit that the attitude of the present Foreign Minister has evolved in comparison to his attitude before he became part of the Government. This evolution from the point delineated in our first conversation has not been in the direction we should have wished. He does not seem to have as free a position as he had before the present Government was formed. I am fulli y convinced that he wants to do something, that he is trying to do something, but that this something is not likely to go as far-as our requirements. Unquestionably, very strong pressure is now "being exercised on the Belgian Government. This pressure comes from right-wing circles. It is fed by the entire -- and I repeat: "entire" — Belgian Press, which is exceedingly pro-colonial; with the exception of a single newspaper, almost the entire Belgian Press is asking for a firm and hard position with regard to the Congo. Mr. Spaak told me that he wanted to avoid t*he present ambiguity in the Belgian policy on the Congo. He said that he was prepared to withdraw all the political advisers now in Katanga, but for the moment he does not seem to be as prepared as we would wish him to be to withdraw immediately the political advisers operating in Leopoldville. He is prepared to withdraw Belgian military personnel from everywhere in the Congo except Katanga, where their presence is said to be indispensable to the maintenance of order. I must say, moreover, that the maintenance of 'the Tshombe regime is not unconnected with the attitude of the Belgian Government. Mr. Spaak's Government has also informed me that it is absolutely opposed to the presence of mercenaries in the Congo, and at the present time administrative as well ac legislative measures are being prepared to withdraw mercenaries from the Congo. We suggested a number of such measures to Mr. Spaak: the revocation of passports, a steps which has been taken by the United Kingdom; a condemnation of the principle of having mercenaries; the drawing up of a list pf names of mercenaries, which is difficult because they do not seem to know the names of all the Belgian mercenaries; an undertaking not to accept service in foreign armies, o measure which is now under study in legal circles in Brussels; and so forth. BC/hm 16-20 (Mr. Sahbani)

In the course of ny last meeting with the Foreign Minister, the following proposals were submitted to me. These proposals, incidentally, contain practically an outline of the last version of the attitude of the Belgian Government with regard to the resolution of 21 February; f The Belgian Government considers that the agreement-" of 17 April must be regarded as a technical instrumentality for the solution of the problems to which the resolution of 21 February gives rise. The Belgian Government, says Mr. Spaak, is also prepared to recall from the Congo persons who, under the agreement between Mr. Kasa-Vubu and the United Nations, are covered by the resolution of 21 February i — but only persons whose departure Mr. Kasa-Vubu explicitly requests. ' And here, again, an exception is made in respect of Katanga. So far as Katanga is concerned, Mr. Spaak would have wished to see the conclusion of an agreement' between the United Nations and Katanga, an agreement similar to the one we concluded on IT April with Mr. Kasa-Vubu. If the United Nations is not prepared to conclude such an agreement, he proposed that it should draw up a list of names of political advisers for submission to the Belgian Government and said that he would'endeavour to follow the indications thus furnished. So much for the political advisers. In the opinion of the Belgian Government, the question of-military personnel gives rise to a problem of the maintenance of law and order. I should like to emphasize this point. The Belgian Government does not refuse to withdraw the Belgian troops in the Congo. It does propose a joint examination with the United Nations of the programming, phasing and modalities of such a withdrawal. Mtf/rf , 21

(MrvSahbnni) Moreover, measures in these respects are under study end the results will appear soon. These ppints were covered in a letter 'which the Foreign Minister sent to me on 6 May. The Secretary-General considered that, at this stege, it vas necessary for me to return here to report orally on this question in order that the situation which I have just outlined may be examined and the various appropriate measures studied. I would not wish to bring this brief statement to an end without suggesting some conclusions and outlining some practical recommendations. Even though practical results have not hitherto emerged in a fully satisfactory manner, I consider that the United Nations mission in Brussels has at 3,eact made it possible for the attitude of the Belgian Government to evolve. At the outset we almost ran headlong into a wall, fre were refused co-operation, although such refusal vas enclosed in a velvet glove, Then came the decision regarding the principle tf withdrawal. Since then, co-operation has not been denied to. us, although attempts are being made to delay euch withdrawal as long as possible. Nevertheless,, the co-operation of the United Nations is sought in order to bring it about. It is my "impression that the v Belgian Government has seen the light — not necessarily as a result of my mission, but especially as a lesult of events both in the Congo and in Belgium. It is also my impression that the Belgian government is beginning to understand the necessity of finding seme new orientation. There are a number of straws in the wind,. The Belgian Government now feels that it is standing with ;its back to the wall. It is casting about for a new orientation of its policy. There are, of course, circles in Belgium which have yet to assimilate completely the idea of Congolese independence. These circles have many assets still, many assets also In the Congo; and these assets are not necessarily Belgian. There are some non-Belgian assets, and even some which are Congolese, and they are still Belgian trumps. These gentry would not wish to sabotage,, necessarily, but at least to frustrate the work of the United Nations in the Congo, There are seme straws ip the wind indicating that Brussels is willing to reorient its policy in the Congo. Let me cite two or three. , There has been the abolition of the African Affairs Ministry... There has been the dropping of some persons frcm the present Government. The Foreign Minister for African Affairs is no longer in the present Government, These are important MW/rf ----- 22 (Mr, Schbanl) steps alorg the proper road. Then, you, might recall my observation that Katanga is a master key in the hands of Belgium. Belgium would "be prepared to let go all of Congo except Katanga. It -will in the end let go .of Kptonga, of course, but not as easily as it will let go of the rest of the Congo, That is why it ia my personal feeling that our efforts must essentially be focussed now on the problem of Katanga to the point of provisionally, and for teclinical reasons, closing our eyes to the political advisers and military personnel outside Katanga. Those involve a question of time. Right now all our efforts must "be focussed on Katanga. There is also one piepe of advice which, with,your permission, I should like to offer for consideration* At all, costs we must avoid a break or a clash between the "United Nations and Brussels now. A break must be avoided; contacts must be maintained -- persuasive contacts-- with Brussels-, ,I• it is possible that such ccntQctswill not yield practical or tangible results. Even if they do not, they will have served at least to rule out the possibility of sabptage or of frustrating the work which we are endeavouring to carry out in the Congo. It is a matter not of mastering, but of reducing the significance of some elements between Brussels and the Congo in order to serve interests that ar.e not always, to put it mildly, the interests of the Congo itself* Belgium's attitude, does not seem to me to have been uniformly constructive — shall we say? — but Mr, Gpaak's letter of 6 May to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General does not shut any doors. We should endeavour to cultivate an atmosphere which would enable us, on the one hand, to maintain our. positions firmly while, at the same time, acting with all necessary flexibility, I have a few recommendations to put forward. To begin with, ;Ln view of the new attitude of the Belgian Government, it is indispensable for Mr. Kasa-Vubu to send a letter to the Congolese Government calling for the withdrawal of military and para-military personnel and political advisers from the Congo — at least from Katanga, Secondly, it is essential for Mr, Kasa-Vubu to ask the United Nations to proceed to the evacuation of military and para-military personnel and political advisers from Katanga* We do not really need this letter, of course, in order to act since there io the clear resolution of the Security Council, but it is useful to have a letter of ,this kind in order to minimize any hesitation or reticence coming from Brussels, Next, it is indispensable to draw up as broad end MW/rf •-•- 23-25 (Hr._ Snfrbani) comprehensive a list as possible of political advisers or persons who might be classified winder that heading. Even though that list may turn out to be, unjust with regard to seme persons,, any injustices may be repaired subsequently* The main point is to get a start* Next, ve are categorically opposed to the claims and pretensions of the Belgian Government, which wanted us to subject the withdrawal of military personnel to their being relieved by the United Nations. V/e said that simultaneity could not be supported and would not be supportede There were a number of considerations which militated against thisa But I personally reel that it is necessary for the United Nations also to prepare to carry out ' somethini g which, in practice, may be something like a relief operation* As they say, ve cannot let go of Katanga or let Katanga sink. Nor should we in effect ignore the Belgian argument to the effect that, If--•certain personnel leave Katanga or the Congo, irreparable damage may Jae caused,, Thank you, Mr. Secretary-General. If necessary, I am available for any additional information. BHS/pm 26

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador, and I am sure that I speak for everybody in doing so. I thank you not only for this report but also for* the very extensive and heavy work which you have undertaken in Brussels. I may perhaps add a personal accent to these vrords of thanks, and that is that I hove great admiration and gratitude for the great skill, elegance and firmness with which you and your collaborator, Mr. Mestiri, have conducted these negotiations, Ghort of those qualities, we would not be where we are. You have said rightly that there has been quite considerable progress diplomatically. You have also said, and I am sorry to have to agree with you, that we are very far from what we want to see done. I feel that the Belgian attitude is still full of reserves so that quite acme job has to be undertaken before the results emerge. I think we were all very interested to hear-your observations on the way in which Belgium has to be approached in order to achieve the best results. The advice you gave in that respect stands, of course, in sharp contradiction to other and perhaps1 more drastic methods, but you, as we hero, have been guided by one consideration, and that is that we want to achieve the result. Before calling on members of the Committee, I would perhaps want to add that subject to what reservations you may wish to make, I feel that tile problem of the mercenaries is probably, as a practical question, behind us. It will resolve itself by disintegration. That is the result not only of the somewhat drastic measures which we have taken from the United Nations side, but just as much of the fact -that this is a point on which Mr, Kasa-Vubu's line is clear, and Mr. Muncngo!s line is clear to the extent I understand it, arid where, therefore, whatever reserves there may be on the Belgian side, they do not count too much in the picture. We still have the full co-operation from other countries which have found their nationals in the group. As regards the officer cadre, it is, as you pointed put, really a Katanga problem and practically nothing but a Katanga problem* There we have a few rounds to go with the Belgians before reaching results. I believe you are quite right in stressing the need for concentration on that problem. Finally, we come to the political advisors. There again I would say that we have quite a distance to go. Both as regards their category -'.In itself and ae regards their role in Katanga, the Spoak attitude is not sufficiently advanced BHS/ptn . 27 (The Secretary-General) to give promise of definite success. Again you stressed the need to concentrate on Katanga. I think that we have reasons to hope for success there with the assistance of the people in the Congo. The attitude of

President Kasa-Vubu is clear and I think that the.attitude of Mr. Munongo is increasingly clear. However; the Belgian resistance seems still to be something that we have to break when we come to this category in Katanga. However, the total picture is in no way discouraging, and in fact I think that, given the circumstances, we have done roughly as much as we could hope for in the time availrxble. Referring back to the question I mentioned before calling on Ambassador Sahbani, it is quite obvious that the situation thus characterized regarding the implementation of the Security Council resolution and the resolution of the General Assembly is not one which you can in any fair way translate in terms of statistics. May I now call upon Ambassador Jha of India.

Mr. JHA (India): Mr. Secretary-General, I am sorry to speak just after Ambassador Sahbani, but I must attend another meeting and I hope you will bear with me if I make a few observations. I feel that we all can agree with your last statement that the situation is not at all discouraging. As I heard Ambassador Sahbani, I was greatly impressed by the manner in which he and his colleague^ Mr. Misteri, tackled this problem, about t£e difficulty of which we really had no illusions. They have been able to make a dent in the Belgian attitude, which dent may also have been contributed to by the developments themselves in the Congo. Nevertheless, we were glad to hear that the Belgians seem at last to have seen the light and that there is possibly a new orientation of policy. I think the degree of the new orientation will depend largely on continued efforts by the United Nations and continued success in the measures that hove been taken in the Congo, rather, I should soy, the parallel efforts that have been made in the Congo. At the beginning when we embarked on the question of the implementation of the Security Council resolution of 21 February, the Advisory Committee advised you, and I think you accepted that proposal, about Ucving parallel efforts in Brussels as well as in Leopoldville. Taking the total picture, I would not say BHS/pm S'8-30 (Mr. Jha, India) that we have had very great success in Brussels, but we have had some success in Leopoldville. So long as there is success it is a matter for gratification, from whichever direction it comes. It is the end result which is important, and to that extent we feel with you that the picture is much more encouraging and much more hopeful with respect to the implementation of paragraph A-2 of the Security Council resolution of 21 February. The recommendations made by Ambassador Gahbani toward the end of his statement seem to me to be very appropriate, but I would suggest that since these are rather weighty recommendations, perhaps you will give them further consideration and see in what way they should be translated into action. Beyond saying that prima facie they all seem to be all right, I would reserve any further views on these recommendations until after you have formulated some concrete line and perhaps translated them into draft coinrnunications. I would like to know from Ambassador Sahbani, in. relation to his mission, first, what action has been taken by the Belgian Government in regard to the invalidation of passports of Belgian nationals who continue to serve in the Congo, whether in Katanga or elsewhere,.-contrary to the wishes of the Belgian Government and the resolution of the Security Council? We understand that the British Government has taken some very salutary action. Was the question of the invalidation of passports brought forward and, if so,.with what results? It seems to us that we must go on pressing this point. The invalidation of passports is one of the most important instruments in the hangls of any Government against recalcitrant citizens. Perhaps it would be a good thing to go on pressing this point in the further mission which I assume Ambassador Sahbeni will be undertaking in continuation of the work which he has already done in Brussels. TL/cp 31 (Mr. Jha. India)

The second point I would like to know is what the morale, the attitude, of the Belgians is in the context of the recent setbacks to Tshombc, and to the mercenaries and others, that have taken, place in the Congo. I should have thought — and this is the impression that ve have — that somehow these recent successes of the United Nations in getting hold of mercenaries and military and para-military personnel and securing their evacuation, vith the co-operation of the Governments concerned, is really — and I hope I am not "being too optimistic « breaking the back of this problem of the mercenaries and the problem of Katanga. I wonder if it is viewed in Brusssls in that light, I think it should Thrive a very salutary result if these recent events should have the effect of lowering Iv.i2 morale of the i reactionary Belgian element and of persuading the Belgian Government to make a further orientation in their policies in the direction in which a beginning seems already to have been made, With regard to further work in this connexion, I would say that this mission should be continued, and, of course subject to your own consideration of this matter, it might be a good thing if Ambassador Sahbani should continue his efforts. Naturally, much will depend on the trend of events in the Congo, which seems at the moiucnt to be rather hopeful, I speak particularly of the possibility of reconvening the Parliament. If that should conie about, I have no doubt that many of the problems might resolve themselves, even though temporarily they might come into conspicuous relief, I would conclude by saying that we are very appreciative of the work that haa been done by Ambassador Sahbani and his mission* He certainly has pursued his mission with great vigour, and his presentation this afternoon has been equally vigorous and showed what amount of time and endeavour have gone into his mission.

Mr. SAHBANI;(interpretation from French): I shall reply first to the Ambassador^ first question. He asked me what measures had been taken by the Belgian Government to invalidate passports, and he also asked me whether the question had been brought up. As a matter of fact, I did raise this question. On the day when I learned, i through the Secretary-General, that the British Government had decided to invalidate the passports of its nationals who wished to go to the Congo with a view TL/cp 32 (Mr. Sahbanl) to becoming members of any military body whatsoever, I conveyed this decision to the Belgian Government, which had received the same information from the British Ambassador at Brussels, I asked the Belgian Government to take similar measures, end I must confess that I' have received no affirmative and final reply on this point. The Minister for Foreign Affairs was away, attending various intentional conferences. He went to Bonn, then to Oslo, and he will be away likewise for the next feu days. Since he took office, Mr. Gpaak has practically forbidden other persons to deal with the Congo problem since he insists on devoting his personal attention to it. But at any rate, I did raise this issue, and I think that within the framework of the general measures being considered at the present time, this- step will also be taken, If I understood Mr* Jha correctly, he also asked me what is the attitude of Belgiun vis-a-vis the setbacks to the mercenaries and to Mr. Tchorcbe, To tell the truth, I did not wish to pursue very far my efforts to ascertain the attitude of the Belgian Government with respect to the misadvantures of Mr. Tshombe, and I barely touched upon the matter, I did not wish to give the impression that the United Nations was interested to any great extent in the arrest of I'lr. Tshombe. *- I was asked on one occasion what the attitude of the United Nations was in this regard, and I replied that the problem was a purely domestic one, that it interested the Congolese alone and that for the time being it was in the hands of the Chief of State of the Congo, so that the United Nations could not legitimately intervene except to draw the attention of the Congolese authorities' to the necessity of observing elementary rules in regard to human rights. I was asked what purpose would be served by the arrest of Mr. Tshombe. I said that as a Representative of the United Nations and of the Secretary-General I could not answer this question. I was advised to donsider to what extent the United Nations should intervene to bring about the release of Mr. Tshombe, for, I was told, if he was kept in prison, power would pass into the hands of certain' people in Katanga who are more extremist than he. To this I replied — and this was during the first days following Mr. Tshombe!s arrest — speaidng Informally, that, judging by the latest news, it did not appear that Mr, Munongo, who was taking power, was any more extremist, any less understanding or any less intelligent than Mr« Tohombe, and I said that in any case this matter did not fall within the purview of the 33.35 (Mr. Rahbani)

United Nations and that the United Nations could not intervene in this problem since it is for the Congolese people themselves to settle it. I hope that with this reply I have answered Mr» Jha's question.

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): I really do not have much to say. I simply wish to express my appreciation for the work of the mission headed by Ambassador Sahbaiii. I am very happy that this work has produced some good resultsi I know he has worked very hard to bring this about, and I am sure that with perseverance further good results will be obtained. At the earne time, I must say that some of the statements he made contained, oo uio ut Ica^t-, a conso of frustration* For example, his statement of what the Lolgia:.i authorities have said! with regard to Katanga — that is, the military aspecb of Katanga and the modalities under which the technicians are to be withdrawn — of course made me rather unhappy. This, however, does not mean that with further effort we cannot get better results. But after all this effort on the part of Ambassador Sahbani and my friend Mr* Misteri, the Belgian authorities, I regret to say, are still more or less in the same position, although, as I said, there are certain aspects which indicate a good trend. «• Ambassador Sahbani'0 statement, therefore, contained very positive elements on the one side and some rather discouraging news on the other. For that reason, we could not here today give our views as to accepting this or that, as to recommending that this be accepted and that rejected. I would prefer to see the written statement, read it and study it overnight, and after you yourself, Mr. Secretary-General, have proposed measures to be taken, then I would be able to make my recommendations, tomorrow, if you wish to convene us tomorrow, or later, However, in all seriousness, I could not say that I am prepared to make statements in the sense of accepting some and rejecting others and in the sense of proposing what further measures should be taken, I can say, at least,.without any hesitation that I could not accept this idea that the Belgian Government has to negotiate the modalities of who is to be withdrawn and who is not to be withdrawn, considering that we have said a long time ago — and 1 think it is accepted by the Advisory Committee — that the Belgian Government could not impose i any kind of condition as to who is to be withdrawn. Furthermore, it is not for the Belgian Government to argue that Congolese sovereignty is involved; it is for the Congolese to do so if they wish. r i

NR/ids 36

(Mr. Gebre-Eprzy, Ethiopia)

Hovcver that may be, it is not for the Belgian authorities to say that you have to negotiate the modalities and you have to do this and that. There is only one requirement on the part of the Belgian Government, and that is to withdraw their people. It is quite simple enough in the resolution and should be simple enough now. So what I propose is that we should come tomorrow to take up the recommendations of Ambassador Sahbani and to see what we can accept from their point of view and what further steps could be taken, I can also say today that we can continue the mission. That is very obvious. It has given good results and should be continued with vigour. 1 Finally, since I have the floor I should like to say one more word about Mr. Tshombe. If I recollect rightly, when the Prime Minister of the Congo was made a prisoner, there was no formal charge. Against Mr. Tshombe there is a formal charge, and I must say it is not our business -- it is none of my business, indeed - to tell the Congolese what they can do with him. That is entirely up to them. It is, as Ambassador Sahbani has said, completely and fully an internal matter. I see from the letter that you have sent on.12 May 1961 that you conveyed to the President that Mr. Tshombe should be given fair treatment, that is to say, due process of law. I think that is perfectly all right, it is-vhat you have done in regard to others. But I think we cannot go beyond that, for the simple reason that we would really be interfering in internal Congolese affairs. It is one thing to say, as you have done here, that due process of law should be observed and that the General Assembly resolutions should be observed, but I believe that we cannot go beyond that and ask for his release, as that Would be highly improper., I do not know of any instance where the United Nations could intervene and ask for the release of a political prisoner in any other country, particularly when the prisoner himself is a secessionist, and I might remind you that in some countries secessionisin is the highest crime that can be committed. So it is not for us to say that this is a good or a bad law. That is entirely for the Congolese. However — and I agree with you completely in this — we have to ask, as you have done properly in the letter of 12 May 19&1, that due process of law be observed. NR/db "" , 37 (Mr. Gebre-Egzy, Ethiopia)

That is all I have to offer now, I hope that tomorrow or after tomorrow, at your convenience, we can convene to discuss your propositions on what measures have to be taken.

The SECRETARY-GEN^PAL: Before giving the floor to the representative of the United Arab Republic, may I say two words. First of all, we have circulated this letter regarding Mr. Tshombe for your information. I did not see any reason to trouble you for consultation, as this was in line with the policy which we ^3,ve pursued so far. It represents both what we should do and the maximum of. wriat we, In my view, can do. There io one slight nuance in relation r,o the previous letters of a similar type, and th-vU is, of course, that the General Assembly resolution has intervened with its request for the release of political prisoners in the interest of reconciliation, and, as a kind of guardian of these various resolutions, I have of course to draw attention to It. That is an added element historically, not in substance. On the other point, I think I should say one word about the procedure. We should like now to give you the text of the letter Ambassador Sahbani received <- from Mr. Spaak. I do not believe that it would be a practical way of using our time to sit down together as an editing committee and write the reply for Ambassador Sahbani. In fact, there is a draft which Ambassador Sahbani has prepared and which, I think, is a very wise one. It is part of the current negotiations and for that reason a little outside what we can discuss in this way. However, I feel that, on the basis of a total evaluation of the situation — Mr. Spaak1a letter and what we can say about the situation in the Congo — it would be very good to have in this group a consideration of our tactical moves in various respects. It is not simply a question of replying to Mr. Spaak — I think that we should leave that to Mr. Sahbani — but a question of how the future of the Brussels negotiations should be co-ordinated with what we do, with Mr. Kasa-Vubu KR/idfl " 38

(The Secretary-General) or what we do with Mr. Munongo or what ve do ourselves on our ovn in the Congo. It is a global operation which--'we are pursuing, and I think that we could prepare the ground "by giving you a kind of summary of our latest news from the Congo in relevant respects. We are not prepared to do that now. In fact, every day, practically every hour, gives us new news, and for that reason I do not helieve it would he very useful to sit down and look at this tomorrow, as we have not had this information available in good time, but I think that later in the week we should do BO, and then on the basis of all the information available. ... I have asked Ambassador Sahbani and Mr. Mestiri to return to Brussels tomorrow night in order to catch Mr. Spaak before he goes on further trips as Foreign Minister. Mr. Sahbani then obviously would have to reply to the letter he has received. To sum up, if Ambassador Sahbani goes back tomorrow, he should bring a letter which follows the general philosophy which you know about. That letter is only a stage in the negotiations. The real problem which this group has to take up for consideration is how the further- steps in Brussels could best be co-ordinated with what we do in various respects in the Congo, and I would propcce to you that we get back to that on the basis of fuller information somewhat later in the week.

Mr. SIDKY (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French): Mr. Secretary-General, first of all I should like to pay tribute to Ambassador Sahbani and his delegation for the noteworthy efforts they have made in the negotiations carried out .with the Belgian authorities. We note with regret that the Ambassador's statement shows the intransigent attitude of the Belgian Government and the obstacles it is placing in the way of compliance with the resolution of 21 February. The recommendations and conclusions in Mr. Gahbani's statement certainly deserve very careful study, but first of all I should like, through you, Sir, to ask Ambassador Sahbani for clarification of one point. In his statement, , 39-140 (Mr. Sidky. United Arab Republic) he eaid that Mr, Spaak was prepared to withdraw the political advisers from Katanga but not from Leopoldville. Moreover, he wae prepared to withdraw the military personnel,., except from Katanga. Perhaps I have not correctly understood this point, Mr. Secretary-General, but perhaps at a later sta^e you might be able to tell me whether you think it would be appropriate to make a preliminary report to the Security Council on Mr. Sahbani's mission, although of course this is entirely for you to decide. In conclusion, I reserve the right to speak later in the debate, and I thank you for giving me the floor. i Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana): I have had no doubts at all about the ability of Mr. Sahbani to carry out his mission. I have oat with him on the Conciliation Commission. While I do not want to indulge in any log-rolling, I have always felt that he has been the best man to be placed in that position in Brussels. There is a point which he made in his statemen*• t which to my mind emphasizes the problem as I see it, the problem of the withdrawal of the Belgians from the Congo. HG/cv in y, Ghana

I am sure that he made it very clear to the Belgians that the United Nations is requesting them to withdraw their military, para-military and political advisers, not because ve do not like the Belgians but because they ctand in the way of a solution to the Congolese problem. They make it impossible for the Congolese to think for themselves politically, especially in Katanga. They make it impossible for the United Nations operations to succeed, by putting in its way all kinds of obstacles. Mr, Sahbani made a particular point about Katanga, This point has also been made by Mr. Spaak in his letter. It refers to the agreement which was reached between the United Nations and Mr. Kasa-Vubu. May I make it quite clear that, in our view, the United Nations has no right at all to negotiate with any province of the Congo. Therefore, that position should be emphasized when Mr. Sahbani goes back and continues with his efforts. We are not in a position at all to negotiate with any provisional President 'in* 'the Congo, and that point should be made very clear. Secondly, in the report prepared by Mr. Nwokedi and Mr. Gardiner the fact is emphasized that throughout the Congo there seems to be a concentration of Belgian advisers and military and para-military personnel. This is true much more in Katanga than in the other provinces. This fact also bears out the point which Mr. Sahbani made, that possibly we might want to concentrate our attention on Katanga for the time being. If that is agreeable, then I would definitely support his suggestion without reference to my Government, that we should get Mr, Kasa-Vubu to make it very clear to the Belgian Government that he would like to see these military and para-military personnel and political advioers withdrawn from Katanga, I specify this not because I do not want the other provinces to "be affected, but I say this against the background of, the report submitted to us by Mr. Nwokedi and Mr. Gardiner. The second point which I want to stress is this. I would like to know the trend as to the withdrawal of the Belgians. It is true that from Mr. Sahbani ls report there does not eeea to be any headway being made as to the actual withdrawal of the Belgians, but I am sure that a certain amount of withdrawal has been taking place* Short of asking you, Mr, Secretary-General, to give us HG/cw " 1*2 (Mr« Quaison-Sackey, Ghana) in detail the number of Belgians who have withdrawn, ve should at least like to have an indication as to the trend throughout the whole of the country. I also feel that the news concerning the reconvening of Parliament has an important connexion with .the general problem of the. Congolese crisis. If a proper authority is constituted with the "blessing of Parliament, of course our \ray will be very clear, and we will not have to inquire too much about a number of matters. In that connexion, I would like to have some concrete , information about the convening of Parliament. The information I have received has been through newspaper reports and from Mr, Bunche's statement over the weekend, where he was quoted as saying that the United Nations would support Mr, Kasa-Vubu in the reconvening of Parliament with all the necessary protection that can be given to the members of Parliament. I think if we can have official information on this, it might help our discussion a great deal. These are the general points which I thought I should make in connexion with Mr, Bahbani!s report. My last point refers to something which vac already a fait accompli, and that is your letter to Mr. Kaca-Vubu about Mr. Tshombe* Here again, while I do not quibble with regard to the advisability of" guaranteeing human rights, and BO on, in the Congo, may I say that I have had the impression that in respect of issues regarding political prisoners we think largely of those prisoners who have something to do with the Central Government. I agree that political prisoners fall into a number of categories; but to write a letter about a single person who has no connexion at all with the Central Government of the Congo, who is only a traitor, a OQcecaionisty a provisional President, seems to me that J we are over-emphasizing the situation a bit with regard ;o Mr, Tchoabe0 However, as I said, this is a fait accompli; and whatever I say here might be possibly be of no use,

The g-RCHTilTARY-GISNI'lHAL; We have officially received today the text of Mr. Kasa-Vubu1s statement with regard to the convening of Parliament, The request has been made that it be circulated as a document, and it will be circulated as a document. That is really all we know about it. HG/cw -. . Uj-Ujp

(The i^ecretary-General)

As regards the other point, I do not think we should enter into any discucsion on it; but, traitor or no traitor, the fact is that Mr, Tsbombe is the holder of a position which is recognized in the Constitution, in the Loi fondamrntalej and he is recognised as a political leader. Under such circumstances^ the argument concerning conciliation, as making necessary such practical arrangements in the field as may open the door to discussions, certainly applies to him as well as to anybody else. As regards human rights, they apply to acybody.

Mr. RITCHIE (Canada); First of all, on behalf of our delegation I would like to thank Mr. Sahbani — and I think we all feel the same way -- for the fineness and patience with which he has conducted these very delicate negotiations and also for his report today which, "if £ may say so, is a model of clarity and frankness, a sort of thing which is really of value to this Committee. I think the objectivity of his approach was very clearly shown in the realism with which he put his finger on the importance of the Katanga problem, while at the same time as the man who has been on the spot, giving us very *• valuable suggestions as to the way in which and as to the spirit in which the next phase of the negotiations with the Belgian authorities should be conducted. I wonder whether, since I thought Mr. Eatbani was reading from a report, that report, if you agreed and the Ambassador also was so disposed, should be circulated, I believe that it would be of great help to us. HA/hh

Mr. NGILERUMA (Nigeria): I should like to put on record my delegation's appreciation or the very good and hard work done by Ambassador Sahb&ni in Brussels. I should like to say that his report is a good proof that the Belgian Governnieiit hac all along taken a keen interest in Katanga. We said more than once that Tshorabe and the Katanga Government vere merely an agency of the Belgian Government, and this is a very good proof. In spite of his hard work, the report appears to me very discouraging. I would say that the United Nations should do everything possible to support and co-operate with Kasa-Vubu and to see that no obstacles are introduced either by the Belgian Government or by TshorabeTs aides in Katanga. With Kasa-Vubu now co-operating, it is time for the United Nations to go out openly to help Kasa-iVubu and the Central Government. I arn glad to hear that Ambassador Sahbani is going back to Brussels to continue his efforts. Similarly, while I endorse "the view expressed at our last meeting by the Ethiopian Ambassador that it is not our function to interfere with the internal administration of the United Nations, I would also like to suggest that the Gardiner-Nuokedi delegation should return to the Congo to continue its efforts. The difficulties raised by Belgium in Katanga cannot be settled in Brussels alone; they should also be handled in the Congo itself. I would therefore suggest very strongly that the efforts begun by Gardiner and Nwokedi in co-operating with and helping Kasa-Vubu should be continued. I should also like to ask one or two questions. First, I should like to know what Gizenga's attitude is toward Kasa-Vubu's Central Government. We have been talking about Katanga and about Tshombe, but we are getting out of date as regardj what is happening between Kasa-Vubu arid Gizcnga. I think the Committee should, have some information about that. Secondly, I should like to have some information about the disposition of the United Nations forces in the Congo — their number, where they are, and so on. Finally, I should like to stress the point that Kasa-Vubu's Government needs the co-operation of the United Nations, particularly on the question of Katanga. I am quite aure that Belgium and Katanga do everything possible to place obstacles in the way of the Kasa-Vubu Government. The way I look at it, a failure by Kasa-Vubu1s Government would be a failure of the United Nations. We must therefore see to it that no obstacles are put in his path. HA/hh i>7

The SECRETARY-GENERALt On the last point, I think there is very full agreement* Vie operate in that direction as well as we can. Regarding the two questions you put, it is, in a sense, easier for me to reply than Tor Ambassador Sahbani. We are very uncertain about the present relationship "between Gizenga and Kasa-Vubu* I have already" mentioned to this Committee that there has been an exchange of delegations on a military level between Stanleyville and Coquilhatville. The latest information is only a small detail, but I think that I might mention it. The United Nations representative in Stanleyville had a cocktail party yesterday at which most of the top men in Stanleyville were present -- not Gizenga, but Gisenga's chef de cabinet and others. At that party, one also found three Leopoldville officers, one from Thysville and two from Ccquilhatville, which indicates that current contacts are maintained between Leopold ville and Stanleyville. AS regards the United Nations forces, that is a 'somewhat larger problem, It may be that General Rikhye can give you an o.Cf->Uie'-c\lfi' picture Of it, but I would suggest that, if he does GO, it should come after this phase of our discussion, if that is agreeable to you, since it takes us on to new ground, so to speak.

4- Mr. NGILERUMA. •(Nigeria); I was not asking you to supply the information now, but at our next meeting.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: We will supply it, with pleasure. I thought that General Rikhye might have the information in his head — but, in'any event, it would be better to have it in writing, if possible.

Mr. JHA (India): I am sorry to intervene again, but I wish to make a few observations on the text of the letter by Mr. Gpaak. I understand that Ambassador Sahbani is going to reply to it -- before he leaves to return to Brussels, I assume. ' • This is the sort of difficulty that we have always experienced with Belgium: When it comes to replying to a communication in respect of the resolution of 21 February, they do not budge an inch. Actually, the contents of this communication from Mr. ttpaak do not really appear to me to be very different from what has been going on before. For example, he says, in paragraph 2: HA/hh ..... 1*8-50

(Mr. Jha, India)

On several occasions the previous Belgian Government informed you that it was prepared to co-operate with the United Nations in giving effect to the resolution of 21 February." That is to say, there were two or three letters which we discussed here a few weeks ago, soon after the passage of the resolution of 21 February. Mi'. Spaak then goes on to say: "As I understand it, however, it has not so far been possible to reach agreement on the form which that co-operation should take." In that single sentence, we are meeting all the difficulties. He goes on to say, on that same page: "Am I to regard /the/ agreement ^/between the United Nations and Mr. Kasa-Vubu/ as the technical means envisaged by the United Nations for solving the problems posed by the resolution of 21 February? "if that is so, it seems to me that the Belgian Government could officially announce that it is ready to recall from the Congo (with the exception of Katanga, to which I refer below) all persons who, by agreement between the United Nations and President Kasa-Vubu,would be considered to «- come within the scope of the. resolution of 21 February ...". iiy comments on this paragraph arc two-fold. First, this really turns the tables. The agreement between the United Nations and Kasa-Vubu refers, in a sense, to the mercenaries, etc., in Katanga. That is, Kasa-Vubu says: ''if somebody has not come with my consent, you can get him out." And, as we discussed at an earlier meeting, 90 per cent of these people are in Katanga. But this paragraph excludes Katanga. Mr. Cpaak actually does not accept the validity of the agreement with regard to Katanga, which means that he does not accept the validity of Kasa-Vubu as Chief'of State. In fact,,,the way the tables are being turned in this Congo drama is really remarkable. Actually, we were accused all the time of not recognizing President Kasa-Vubu, arid Belgium was the great champion of President Kasa-Vubu. Today, however, we all recognize him as Chief of State -- but the paragraph I have read does not seem to recognize him as Chief of State or as having any authority to make any agreement with respect to Katanga. I really do not understand this at all. j BC/en 51 (Mr. Jha, India) In the same paragraph we find the words "would "be considered to came within the scope of the resolution of 21 February". As far as I remember, the agreement between Mr, Kasa-Vubu and the United Nations does not refer to a determination of who ccmes within the scope of the resolution. Certainly, it phases the matter scincvhatj it perhaps'slows down the implementation a little. As I recollect — I do not have the agreement before me — it says this: those who came without my consent will go; with regard to the others, we shall have to decide which are essential and which are not. But there is nothing in the agreement which makes the question of who comes within the scope of the resolution of 21 February a matter for negotiation between President Kasa-Vubu and the United Nations. It has always been the contention of my delegation that the content of paragraph A 2 of the. Security Council resolution of 21 February — which was reaffirmed by both resolutions adopted by the General Assembly a few weeks ago — is not negotiable. We would respectfully submit that in any reply this position should be made quite clear, irrespective of the a^t.ituc.e taken by Belgium. If we do not make that clear, we shall not be paying the necessary respect to the Security Council resolution* ^ At the top of page 2 of the letter we read the following: "If the United Nations signs with the Katanga authorities an agreement similar to that of 17 April, there would in principle be nothing to prevent the Belgian Government ...". In the first place, the suggestion appears to be that the United Nations should commit an illegality -- that is, that there should be an international agreement with the Congo. In the second place, even if such an agreement should be concluded, we are told that: "there would in principle be nothing to prevent the Belgian Government from taking the same attitude towards that agreement as it has taken towards the agreement of 17 April" -- in other words, it would be for Katanga and the United Nations to agree then on who comes within the scope of the resolution of 21 February. BC/en ~ 52 (Mr. Jha, India) Mr. Spaak*s second assumption is that the United Nations refuses to negotiate with the Katanga authorities. Evan that assumption Is not valid: there is no question of a refusal on our part, "because it would be unconstitutional for the United Nations to negotiate with a provincial authority an agreement as to the interpretation and modalities of implementation of the resolution. The third paragraph on page 2 of the letter states: "With regard to military and para-military personnel, I am still prepared to consider what action should be taken in their case with a view to first reducing their number and, if necessary, removing them from . Katanga ...lf. There• are so many reservations. Again, this attitude is not compatible with the Security Council resolution. In the fourth paragraph we read: . ... .,' "I undertake further to inquire into the question of mercenaries and to take the legislative or administrative measures necessary, if not to remove all Belgian mercenaries, at least drastically to curtail their number . .."• What is the justification for this phrase t?if not*-to remove all Belgian mercenaries*'? That is directly in contradiction with the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. I do not want to raise any difficulties so far as Mr. Sahbani's negotiations with the Belgian authorities are concerned. I certainly think that these negotiations should be carried out with all patience and flexibility. But I would suggest that in any reply to Mr. Spaak we muot not yield on the question of principle. For our part we would not regard that as showing proper respect for the Security Council resolution and the General Assembly resolutions, which categorically reaffirmed the Council resolution and deplored the continued lack of co-operation by Belgium. All these things must be .stated to the Belgian authorities — very politely, of course. We cannot take any position different from the total effect of the Security Council resolution of 21 February and the General Assembly resolutions, particularly the first one, which in its preamble and paragraph 1 makes it quite clear that Belgium has not lived up to its responsibilities in carrying out its obligations under the Charter. BC/en ... 53 (Mr. Jha, India) To cum up, I would say that in reply to this letter we should "be very; very careful. We would not be happy about any reply which gave the slightest impression or implied in any way that we were really cooling down on the Security Council resolution. Of course, so far as the modalities are concerned, I agree, as I have said, that patience and a certain measure of flexibility are necessary — and Mr, Sahbani has already shown such patience and flexibility.

Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): The impression which I was able to glean from the very eloquent exposition of Mr, Sahbani was that the Belgian Government is not acting very wisely in insisting on keeping these Belgian personnel still in the Congo. That Government seems to be oblivious to the important events occurring daily in the Congo. One would expect great wisdom from a person like Mr. Spaak. Therefore, I hope that during the next few weeks, when Mr, Spaak has had a chance to reconsider the situation In the Congo, the attitude of the Belgian Government to the entire situation will be very different. It is inconceivable to me that the Belgian Government should think that these mercenaries and military and para-military personnel in the Congo can change the course of events now taking place in the Congo, where problems are being solved by the action of the Congolese people themselves and of President Kasa-Vubu, It seems to us that, with Mr. Tshombe's arrest, Katanga will not be able to hold out much longer. There is always a conflict between the means and the end, but in this case the end seems to be an end to the secessionist tendencies in the Congo. Perhaps I am being too optimistic, but I think that the whole question of Belgian personnel in the Congo is perhaps not so important today as it was a few weeks or a few months ago. With the problem of the Congo being solved by the Congolese themselves, this whole affair of Belgian personnel will come to assume a rather minor role. The important thing is that we should do whatever we possibly can to add to the prestige, status and strength of President Kasa-Vubu. That will perhaps be the central point in the future of the Congo. I hope I am not being over-optinietic. However, about a week ago we read in the newspapers that a large number of these mercenaries were being sent out by the Katanga authorities themselves, and that a statement had, been issued by someone in authority to the effect that these mercenaries had been more of a BC/en -•-. 5lf-55 (Mr. Hasan, Pakistan) burden than a help. If these people are beginning to realise that the mercenaries cannot help them to solve their problems and to keep up the farce of secession, perhaps the problem will solve itself. Of course, that does not mean that we should pot do everything in our power to help solve it. That is why I said that Mr. Sahbani's exposition was excellent. We appreciate all the efforts he has made in Brussels.

- (Mr. Hasan, Pakistan)

The letter from Mr. Ppaak is about ten days old, and perhaps within these ten days certain developments have taken place, such as the one which I mentioned. I understand that about sixty of these mercenaries have been sent away from Katanga, and if that process continues, .perhaps in a few weeks there will not be a very significant number of Belgian personnel of any kind left in Katanga or in the rest of the Congo* I.am always optimistic, and I hope that my optimism in this case is justified.

Mr. GEDRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): I apologize for speaking again, but I must make my position clear with regard to this letter. i As I said a little while ago, we do not believe that the Belgian Government has any say as to who can go out from this part of the country and who cannot -- that is to say, within the terms of the resolution of.,the Security Council of £1 February. We accept the analysis given by the representative of India and, therefore, I do not have to go into it fully. I cannot accept the paper at all as far as I am concerned. Negotiations on the form of implementation — that is to say, in terms of taking the people out — will be perfectly all right and are acceptable as far as we are concerned, but as to^negotiations on the principles involved, that, I regret to say, we cannot accept. There'fore, I must make full reservation on this letter«

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I might perhaps mention that before Mr. Loridan went back to Brussels I had had a report from Mr. Sahbani and had seen the letter. The points made here were made orally with considerable vigour from ny side, especially the last one mentioned by the representative of Ethiopia; that > is to say, that whoever interprets the resolution, it is not the Belgians who can discuss who falls and who does not fall under the different categories. I also made it clear that, from my point of view, this letter was unsatisfactory. I had to accept it as a stage in negotiation. I did not consider it so negative as to loud us to say the negotiation was up, but I did cot regard it ao narking any progress beyond the position already taken. That has been said by me orally and, of course, transmitted by the Ambassador to Brussels. What remains, however, is the more elaborate reply by Ambassador Sahbaoi, which, obviously," must be fitted into his continuing exchanges with the authorities in Brussels. KU/hm '""- 57 (The Secretary-General)

I do not know whether Ambassador Sahbani would find it useful at this point to explain his attitude, especially as to the question of principle raised by the representative of India.

Mr. SAHBAITI (interpretation from French): Before deciding finally regarding the letter to Mr. Spaak which the Secretary-General asked me to write, I wanted to hear the views of the Advisory Committee. I must say that the reactions which I have heard are such as I might have expected and which I have had myself. Your attention was indeed attracted to the second last paragraph of Mr. Spaak1s letter in which he said: • "All this seems to me fairly constructive, and I trust that I have convinced you .of my willingness to co-operate effectively. I was therefore somewhat disappointed when one of my associates reported that you had told him that your mission was. over and had been unsuccessful. To me the outlook did not seem so discouraging at our last conversation." I wish to tell you briefly what this paragraph refers to. I did have a last meeting with Mr. Spaak, which I mentioned to you, and during *' that meeting I was informed quite clearly about the proposals which were going to be presented to me the next day in this letter. On the same day, I met the new Director of the Congo Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. That Department had just been set up and the Ambassador was an old friend of mine. I told him that this letter was bound to give rise to disappointment on the part of the Secretary-General and the members of the Advisory Committee. I told him that I myself felt disappointed. Thus, through this high official, I let Mr. Spaak know that the letter did not meet my personal hopes and that on practidally every point the letter was such that I could not give it my agreement, and that this would surely be the response of the Secretary-General as well. I caid that I had hoped that, with the arrival of the Spaak Government, the Belgian Government itself would take certain initiatives, that it wovJLd co;jj]it itself ppontaueously to a sew orientationf th.it it would put into practice the promises which had been held out to roe for some weeks. I also told him that in sending a letter of this kind to me, which only contained promises, promises which could not satisfy our wishes, Belgium was going to run into certain difficulties which it would not find it easy to overcome.

.. . ..-..JJ -60

Ac regards principle, I had stated verbally to Mr. Spaak, when we discussed these proposals, what our position vac going to be and, the next day, through this Ambassador, I let him know my opinions. I said that, on the level of principle, it was inadmissible for Belgium to reopen the question, or to envisage reopening the question, of the provisions of the resolution of the Security Council, that there could be no question of a differentiation between Katanga and the remainder of the Congo since the country was one and the Chief of State was one, the United Nations having admitted the Congo to membership of the Organization as a single State and having undertaken to safeguard and respect the integrity and unity of the country. There could be no question of the United Nations recognizing, elifliough indirectly, the existence of a State carved out of the Congo by concluding any sort of agreement with the provisional authorities of Katanga which would be parallel to the one which we signed with the Chief of State of the Congo. Co much for the problem posed by the proposal to conclude a new agreement with Katanga. Let me take up the letter paragraph by paragraph and I shall explain how I intend to answer it. By all means I shall make it clear that, concerning the problem posed by the cases of Mr. Henri and I IT. Aritoine, or • rather by reason of the six who were arrested at Coquilhatville by the Congolese Government and subsequently handed over to the United Nations for protection and then shipped to Belgium by the Belgian Government, I am personally gratified that we have achieved this result, that the Belgian Government has finally shown some understanding, and that I, for my part, hope that it is the prelude of more effective co-operation between the United Nations and the Belgian Government, BHS/rf . 61 (Mr, SahbRni) It was indispensable, however, to point out that we did not consider the problem finally solved because we were hopeful and we trusted in fact that people expelled from the Congo would not be given the opportunity of returning to that country some day against.the will of the United Nations and of the Congolese Chief of DtQteo With regard to paragraph 2, in my opinion we shall have to reply that the previous Government had in fact informed us that it was prepared to co-operate with the United Nations, but that this co-operaticn had never gone beyond the stcge of words, that it was never translated into concrete measures to be adopted by the Belgian Government, and that the former Belgian Government1s notion of the consent of CD-operation with the United Nations was not accepted by the United Nations. It vas one which the new Belgian Government should -by no manner of menns be encouraged to adopt on its own account. . . • ., Next, we shall answer that the agreement of 17 April which the United Nations concluded with the Congolese Chief of State was a conseguence of the passive, indeed the negative, attitude of the Belgian Government. We would have wished not to be driven to such a pass and ve would not have reached it if the Belgian Government had displayed a more co-operative spirit* With the agreement of 17 April, even the. benefit of making a gesture will have'been forfeited by the Belgian Government* As regards the lists of persons whom Mr. Spaak would wish the United Nations to present to him so as to, specify who are the political advisers,, the following answer will be forthcoming. The Belgian authorities told us, and reaffirmed time end again, that they were discontented at the activities engaged in by certain Belgian agents in the Congo, They said that the Belgian authorities had only sent technicians to the Congo but that seme of the technicians had set themselves up as political advisers. Now our comment is that the Belgian Government should , not have waited for peremptory appeals frcm the United Nations to comply with this* Once Belgium recognized the existence of these advisers, it should have withdrawn them of its own accord and had them removed from the Congo before being urged to do so. On this point I think our answer must be very vigorous, because it will enable us to moke gains along two lines. I am sure that Belgium will draw up a i list of ita own and will try to satisfy the United Nations to a cer.tain extent, but we chall not lose anything because we will draw up another ^.iet. The more persons of this kind we see leave, the greater will be the gain* BHS/rf 62 (Mr, RahbftnQ

With regard to Katanga, I have already given the answer to this suggestion that we conclude an agreement with the authorities of thet province* The same argument certainly applies with regard to political advisers in Katanga as to military advisers elsewhere. With regard to the military personnel, our attitude is dictated by the considerations put forward by the Ambassadors of India and Ethiopia. We cannot admit the notion of a debate on the principle of the withdrawal of military personnel from Katanga or on the., simultaneity of their replacement and withdrawal. Cur answer on that is going to be very vigorous, because otherwise we would find oursleves failing to implement the Security Council resolution. , With regard to the mercenaries, even though the situation of these men is evolving in the Congo itself and even though Belgium will have forfeited even the benefit of making a gesture, in this case we cannot turn down the proposals of the Belgian Government out of hand when the Government takes the position of condemning the principle of talcing hired soldiers and holds out the premise of legislative and administrative measures in order to fulfil it. This is how I personally envisage an answer to Mr« Spaak's letter. I think *• ve shall have to show a considerable measure of flexibility, which should also encourage a flexibility on the part of Mr. Spaak,

The_SECRETARY-GENERAL; I believe this gives a very clear picture, and you can Bee that on no point does Mr. Sahbani's intention fall short of the critical reactions which have been voiced here. I can only add that those critical reactions are very much in mind and have already been verbally transmitted to the Belgians. It might have been a good idea to let you have a chance to look at the words used in this let.ter of reply, but I felt that a cargin in that respect should be given to Mr. Sahbani, while the, general attitude is something vhich is very much the concern of th^.3 Committee. Are there any observations on Mr, Sahbani'a analysis and suggestions for reply? BITS/rf - - 63

Mr, LQUTFjC (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French): I regret that I came into the meeting after Mr. SaLborii made his first statement. With respect to the provisions of the resolution of 21 February, I wish to reaffirm the fact that on..this point we can make no concessions. We connot negotiate with respect to a resolution -which was adopted "by the Security Council and reaffirmed by the General Assembly. A resolution of this type must be carried out, end there is no doubt possible on this point. I have a brief comment to make, whicji I am sure is merely a question pf drafting,, w£th respect to the reply to Mr. Spaak. At the end of poge 1 Mr. Spaak says: " ... it seems to me that the Belgian Government could officially announce that it is ready to recall from the Congo (with the exception of Katanga, to which I refer below) all persons who, by agreement between,the United Nations and President Kasa-Vubu, would be considered to come within the scope of the resolution of 21 February and whpse departure would be agreed to by the President of the Republic of the Congo." I should not like to have, the President of the Republic of the Congo very deeply involved in this matter. Unfortunately, we have become accustomed to see certain turnabouts in his. position. Let us not

4 Mr» HASAN (Pakistan): There is an old saying: you might win all the arguments but Ipse the. case. We do not want to be in that unhappy position in dealing with Mr. Spaak. Without any disrespect and without any inadequacy of appreciation of what has been done by Ambassador Sahbani, for which we have very great admiration and we all expressed that very genuine admiration, I was wondering whether it would facilitate matters if you, as the Secretary-General, were to write BHC/rf ---. 6^-65 (Mr. Tins an, Pakistan) • t i to Mr, Spask. Mr* Spaak is a man of international reputation, a very great nan, and if en appeal were to be made to hie, I do not want to use tfte word,vanity, but after all the greatest of us has a certain amount of 'vanity, "by having en international figure written, to by another international figure, then perhaps matters might be facilitated. I ara not thinking of protocol at this time. Tlae idea struck me that if it was a question between my Foreign Minister and another Foreign Minister, I would probably request my Foreign Minister to write instead of my going there directly as Ambassador, I, wonder whether you vould consider that possibility as being of any help at all. TL/pm " 66

The SFC^ETARY-GEi^IERAL: I will consult Mr. Sahbani on this point. My own reaction is as follows. As Mr. Spaak's letter was addressed to Ambassador Sahbani, the correct thing, obviously, is that the substantive reply should go frcm him. But I do not see any objection on my part against an additional letter which does not go into the matter of substance but is, so to say, tied to Mr. Sahbani*s reply, a letter in which I say certain nice things about this and that but where I express directly, on the one side, my sincere disappointment in certain respects, and in other respects, my feeling of lack of adjustment to the legal situation which has been created by the resolution. I think on those two points general statements on my side may serve the purpose you have in mind and at the same time strengthen Ambassador Sahbani's hand. Therefore, I would like to discuss that with Ambassador Sahbani and see how we can adjust things ^so that they fit together as well as possible. You raised, and Mr, Sahbani raised, a point which I think is extremely essential. It is that of course we should not win all the arguments and lose the case. That is what I tried to express at an earlier moment by saying that of course we want to achieve results, not to strike a pose. It is exactly the same. I feel that very strongly and I feel that that is a point which is certainly appreciated around this table. But it is not generally appreciated that there is a kind of unrealistic impatience which, curiously enough, would be satisfied by our banging the table but which does not fully recognize that this is a question of using quietly but effectively our faeble means so ao best to achieve a great result. And we have to achieve the result. I believe this can perhaps be considered as concluding this part of the discussion, I will not take up your time with anything concerning substance, but I would like to mention to you that' we have received not less than three long letters from President Kasa-Vubu. The first one requests the United Nations to undertake to disarm Congolese troops under the command of foreign military personnel or mercenaries and prevent dispersal of such troops,so as to avoid the creation of armed bands which would endanger security. If this request has nation-wide applicability, it is good and fine; it is certainly in line with the general tasks we have. If there is a situation involving less than country-wide applicability, another question does arise, however. TL/pra • 67 (The Secretary-General) The second letter requests that the United Nations disarm illegal armed groups with a view to preventing the danger of civil v.ar or other disturbances. ACSin, this may be perfectly all right, but if it means that the United Nations should serve as an armed-force for suppression of this cr that competing political leadership, then, of course, we enter upon ground where we have no right to go. The third letter requests that the United Nations clarify the distinction to be drawn between the Chief of State's authority in maintaining public order and security, and activities that may be considered as falling within the realm of civil war. This question,raised in the third letter has, of course, a very important bearing on the two other letters, as that is Just the question. The stand maintained by the United Nations all along has been clear, and of course there will be no question of changing it.--However, the reply to this letter involves a rather sensitive issue, because it must firmly r.:aintain our stand of neutrality and non-intervention while, on the other hand, being effective as to the maintenance of law arid order and as to the prevention of civil war. I would therefore like to invite you to meet here again, let us say Ylednesday if that is convenient to you, to go into this 'specific problem on the basis of a draft reply to these three letters* That might also be the best occasion for us to give you a picture of the military situation and what we can do in such respects. I have already mentioned that we will circulate a letter concerning the convening of Parliament. I can finally mention that there is a fifth communication, not addressed to us nor to the public in general, but addressed to the Belgian Government. It covers exactly the grounds we have been discussing today. It is, in the main, satisfactory, but it also has, of course, certain reservations which may give us considerable headaches later on. However, at present we must concentrate on other matters, perhaps first of all Katanga, and for that reason I do not think we have any immediate cause to feel concerned about this aspect. It really lies very close to the agreement of 17 April between us and Mr. Kasa-Vubu wherein Mr, Kaca-Vubu reserved to himself certain rights which we reinterpreted as rights which could be exercised" only within the framework of the resolution; that is to say, while we recognized that there are TL/pra , 68-70 (The Secretary-General) certain things which Mr, Kasa-Vubu is entitled to decide, we maintained, and v:e continue to maintain, that in his decisions ho must follow the line indicated by his acceptance of the Security Council resolution -- thus, he can act, but in action he must implement the resolution. Thus I would suggest that we meet Wednesday, if it suits you at the sane hour, for the purpose I mentioned.

Mr. KGILSRUMA (Nigeria): I would like to ask just one question of Ambassador Sahbani, with regard to Katanga. What is the attitude of the Belgian Government towards Katanga? Does it regar• d it as an independent Gtate having nothing to do with the Republic of the Congo, or does it consider it to be a province in .the Republic of the Congo? What is their attitude? ......

Mr, SAHPANI (interpretation from French): I do not think the question is as embarrassing as it might seem. The Belgian Government has two attitudes with regard to Katanga: an official one which io clear and unambiguous, and a real attitude, the behind-the-scenes attitude, the lobby attitude. The Belgian Government regards the Congolese State as one State. It considers Mr. Kasa-Vubu to be the Chief of State and wishes to co-operate with him as Chief of State. On the one hand, it has sent a chargd d* -Qffa ires, practically, a diplomatic person, to Mr. Kasa-Vubu even though diplomatic relationG "between the two countries remain severed. On the other hand, however, the authorities -- I am not saying the Government; I am being very careful — the Belgian authorities are acting with the provincial authorities of Katanga as if the latter were the authorities of an independent State. No ambassador has been accredited and no charge* d'affaires. There is a concul in Elisabethville. 'Discussions are held; economic conanitments are undertaken directly between Brussels and Elisabethville. The Foreign Minister from Elisabethville may be received in Brussels, and discussions are held with him not as Foreign Minister of Elisabethville but as representing the foreign policy conducted in Elicabethville. There is a Finance Minister of Katanga, who wont to Brussels and also entered into discussions and made certain commitments with respect to Brussels. But official papers , relating to Brussels and Elisabethville do not say that Katanga is considered a State; they do refer to it as a "government" -- and of course ambiguity can exist in the interpretation of the word "government". r KR/en '""""_ 71 (Mr. Sahbani) We also say there is a Government -- a provincial Government — and they

feel that it is a Government of another kind tut they do not say "provincial" or "central"; they just say ttCoverrcnent". In effect, they deal with Katanga as if Katanga were not a mere province. In fact, I should like to make a little observation. When it vac requested that the United Nations intervene to liberate Mr. Tshombe, and I said that the United Nations could not intervene, because it was a question exclusively within the Jurisdiction of the Congolese, I turned the question around: "Why don't you intervene, you Belgians, with Mr. Kasa-Vubu, for the liberation of Mr. Tshombe?" They answered: "Well, because this is a strictly domestic question,•and we do not wish to cause Mr. Kasa-Vubu umbrage." So you see that there is a certain amount of • duplicity in this story.

Mr. NGILERUMA (Nigeria): Thank you for your very lucid explanation. I am sorry to bother Mr* Sahbanl again, but I should like him to make clear what the distinction is between the "Belgian Government" and the "Belgian authorities". As a layman, this is not quite clear to me. *• Mr. SAHBANI (interpretation from French): The Belgian Government is a Government as the term is used in every country: it is the authority which represents the State. But that does not prevent a member of the Government from acting in his private capacity, if you wish, without committing his Government, as an official. That is why I used the term "Belgian authorities". You may call them "Belgian personalities", but when these Belgian personalities commit the Government of Belgium or the Belgian Administration with regard to the Government of Katanga, one cannot say that these personalities are still acting in a private capacity. However, the Belgian Government would never openly admit that it is acting officially via-&»via Katanga as the Government of a State, This question is very complicated. The situation is not very clear, but, as far as that goes, the situation in Katanga is not very clear either.

DUMB NR/en .--.. 72

The _SECRETARY-GENERAL; I guess that if you find that Ambassador Sahbani's reply was not very clear, we can agree that the fault is not Ills. It is a consistent policy of ambiguities.

Mr. NGIIERUMA (Nigeria): I do not want to bother him any more. Thank you.

The meeting rose at 5*35 P-m. CONFIDENTIAL Meeting No. kB 17 May 196l ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THS CONGO

Meeting at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 17 May 1961, at J p.m.

In the Chair: The Secretary-General Members: Canada Mr. RITCHIE Ceylon Mr. WIJEGOOMWARDENA. Ethiopia Mr. GEERE-EGZY Federation of Malaya Mr. 2AKARIA Ghana Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY Guinea India Mr. BHALKAMKAR Indonesia Mr. MASFAR Ireland Mr. KENNEDY Liberia Mr. JOHNSON Mali Mr. THAORE Morocco Mr. TABITI Nigeria Mr. NGILERUMA Pakistan Mr. HASAN Senegal Sudan Sweden Mr. MALM Tunisia Mr. BOURGUIBA United Arab Republic Mr. SIDKY

61-13976 KR/ep 2

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; We have before us today, in the main, two things: on the one side, three letters from President Kasa-Vubu, to which I referred at our last meeting, and the draft of a reply in one single letter to tliptte three documents. This is only a draft, and we want to profit from your observations and comments on the present situation before trying to make the text f ir.al. Ths other point is related to a promise made last time to Ambassador Ngileruma, that is, to give a survey of the military situation as of tod?,y in the Congo. There are one or two addition?.! points, but to begin with, if it io agreeable to you, we might perhaps devote our time to the two I have just mentioned* Then it would be my suggestion that we start with the three letters and the question of how to treat them and how to reply. They have been distributed, I think, before the meeting; at least, they are before you on the table. If any member wishes to give more time to a study of them, of course, we could start with the military survey. I am in your hands, but if you are ready to discuss the letters my own suggestion would be that we start with the letters and then proceed to the military questions. If that is agreeable to you, we shall proceed accordingly. I have really no comment; to make on the letters except the.t they seem to us to overlap considerably. Thsy are in fact only different aspects of one and the same problem^ a problem regarding which we are not policy makers — neither you in the Advisory Committee nor I on the Secretariat side. For that reason, I think that in cur replies, ao regards general statements on what ore basically hypothetical questions, u«=5 hftve to refer to the rules which have been laid down for our activities by the Security Council and by the General Assembly, To go beyond that into a discussion wc.uld be to write new law and elaboration of general principles. I feel extremely hesitant regarding the visdom of doing so. Of course, on the other hand, it may be said that this is a very meagre product in reply to the three letters and for that reason it lacks the kind of courtesy and attention which we certainly sho'dld show, but I think we must recognize that when courtesy leads us to use too many words it is dangerous because it leads us into ambiguities, and this is not a field where it is good to have too many and too elaborate texts, because they may easily start discussions which basically are sterile*

, i NR/ep 3-5 (The Secretary-General)

This much by way of explanation of the approach we have had In mind to these three letters, that Is to say, the approach reflected in the draft reply to which I now wish to draw your attention and which you have before you.

Mr ^ BTUTiKAM.iAR (India) : To be quite frank, Mr. Secretary-General, these papers have been given to us — I know, through nobody

YjTETjBRAL: I am quite certain that in this, as in many other cases here, we will have to Iiftve two rounds: that is to say, there will "be a new draft in the light of the discussion here. The draft letter before you is not put out in order to provoke discussion but to give at least some kind of peg on which to hang a discussion, and we want to go over it sgein and cake another draft in thd light of -the discussion.

nil llllllH HG/rf •""-- 6 (The Secretary-General) I would therefore suggest that we treat the matter la a way vhich meets our needs and at the seme time leaves the door open for you, sir, to come "back with your observations even after consulting your Government, and that ve listen to those observations which delegates may be ready to make here and now so aa to give us an opportunity to give further attention to the draft and then to submit the draft in,, let uc sey, a oooewhat improved shape to taie Ccmmittee a couple of days from now. At that stage we will have ;fche possibility of profiting from such additional observations as mey be made* There is, of course, nothing in the stars which says, that the essential observations must be made now; it may be the other way aroundo We may take the easy observations now and come back to the essential observations on a later occasion. I frankly felt so hesitant about the technique that we should apply in the handling of these three letters that I felt very mucfr the need before crystallizing my own thoughts, to profit from a discussion here.

Mr« HASAN (Pakistan): We may be tirelessly repetitious here, but ve have said hundreds of times that the responsibility for decisions is yours, Mr* Secretary-General^ we are only advisers, and you have to interpret the resolutions of the Security Council and of the General Assembly, which resolutions demand that you take certain actions* The three letters of the President of the Congo raise some very important Issues, and in the draft reply that we have before us at this time a situation has been created where, I think, one has to think profoundly in terms of law and in respect of what responsibilities you are assuming when you tell him that you do not wish to undertake those responsibilitiest For example, in the second paragraph of your draft you have accepted — and this is incontrovertible•••- that the fundamental responsibility of the United Nations in the Congo relates to assisting the Congolese authorities throughout the territory in the maintenance of integrity, law and order, etc. Then in the next paragraph you have accepted that, even by force if necessary, the controversies between the two authorities . in the various parts of the Congo must be prevented from growing into a civil war. Very well. That having been accepted — the maintenance of law and order and integrity, and the avoidance of civil war between various groups and troops, etc* — HG/rf 7 (Mr» Hasan, Pakistan) then you go on to say that you have no right, to forbid the Central Government from taking any action which they do wish to take. If I were the President of the Congo and I wished to force you into action, a] 3 1hat I need do is to send some troops somewhere and create a situation where either lav find ordsr is threatened or a civil war is threatened, or some sort of discord is threatened which, according to your own acceptance of functions, would force you to come and help tiie central authorities. On pags 2 you say the following: "I can only endorse the clear acknowledgement contained in your letter of 5 March that the UN Force cannot be expected to subdue organized armed forces regarded as dissident "by any authorities in the Congo*" Then the President can argue in this case that these dissident forces ore a factor vhich may threaten the. possibility of a civil war or that they are a factor which threatens law and order. In effect, you are accepting their situation, thpt whatever may happen, the responsibility eventually io that of tha United Nations* I do not say I disagree with that* But if that is the position, let us face it clearly and let us accept it, being conscious of what we are accepting,* Let there be no mistake about the fact that a situation might be created where you viU be forced to intervene by force, becauae under Presidential Order in the Congo — vhich we respect end recognize — the Congolese, forces may be sent to a province which might contain what you call dissident forces* On page 2 you say -it is not your intsution to control them> and( yet you will be forced into e situation whare you will have to control them. The whole thing takes a form which might be interpreted as either a threat to. law and order, which it would be, or as a threat to developing into a civil war. The whole thing, as I say, is a very legal situation, and I am sure you have considered it* However, I thought I would mention it.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; This is, in fact, to be regarded as an anthology of stands which are.recognized as official stands of the United Nations* Of course, I felt it extremely difficult, to go beyond that into an interpretation of the resolutions in hypothetical cases* Alas, we have to interpret these various decisions in concrete cases, but to interpret them, in theoretical cases is to write new law; and that is what I had tried to avoid. That leaves it a HG/rf 8 (The Secretary-General) little bit open to the kind of discussion which you have embarked on here; that is to say, to show — I would not say "contradictions" — but the situations into Vjich these various stands that have already, been taken may lead us* I have just explained the technique in the approach here*

I?rjJ[!l§£S (Pakistan): But there is the awareness that this probably might lead us into those situations?

The SSCRET/BY-GEHSRALi It may very veil lead us into those situations, but it does not mean that we would side, with any party who may tske the initiative, not even with the President* If the. President becomes party to civil war, then we are not on his side or on the other* We try to stop them from getting into civil war* After all, whet is said here is that "the United Ilatlons has no right tp forbid the Central Government to take any action which, by its own means, etc*,", provided that civil war does not threaten or occur and that law and order are not Jeopardized by the actions taken, by the Central Government, That is what happened in early August when Mr* Lumumba aeked us to wage war on Katjanga, which we did not do. He did not do it either, but that is another matter. i Mr* GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia) : With regard to the letter that you have prepared to President Kaea-V^u, all I can say is that I em not ready to give my advice and, therefore, I era in the same position as .the representative of India; and I hope you will not press me in this regard hers* If you do 1 will have to tell you that, it is upon your own responsibility and that you have to make your own decisione. With regard to the second report, I would very much like to know whether the reservations which my delegation and other delegations have made in regard to the agreement go side by side with this report. If you remember, the first time we met on that agreement we made a number of comments which were in the nature of reservations. Secondly, the next time we met I also made a specific reservation , that the justification of the agreement was that it should yield positive results* I do not know what this report makes of that reservation* HG/rf 9-10 (Mr* Gebre-Egzy, Ethiopia) I do not insist that our reservations be printed in the report, but I would li&e to go on record that our not putting obstacles in the way of the agreement we* K^de vith certain rpacific reservations vhich still stand, I think it is my undvrstaniiing tfcfit probably -when this is read it is understood that the full record is raad in conjunction with the summary record, because this simply docs not tell the HA/cn 11 .

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: As to your first point, I have already replied that I do not wish to press anybody. Any assistance that you can give us on this occasion is welcome. Any assistance you can give us on a. later occasion, when we v,ill have to revert to the text of the reply, vill also be velcome. But nobody's hand is being forced. We want to profit as soon as possible, and as much as possible, from your advice.

The other point you raised is indeed a very complicated one; I think that I had at least as strong reservations concerning the agreement as you have, and I do not know how to take them into account. We cannot make summary records of the meetings here into public documents in the usual sense. We can see to it, of course, as we did on an earlier occasion, that this summary record is in the hands of the members of the Security Council, as it should be under any circumstances, and that their attention is dravn to it as an additional document of significance. •" As I see it, the problem arises partly because a certain natural impatience to receive the report forces us to report at a stage when — and I would like to emphasize this — no Government with experience, engaged in a continuing negotiation, would make a public report to Parliament. If such a question were raised, the Government would reply to Parliament that that was not the time for a report. Here we do not have the same possibilities. A demand is made, and we have to report -- and we therefore have to report in a way which necessarily is incomplete, not only in the respect you mentioned but also in regard to what has come out of the agreement. As we know, this agreement has had a decisive significance for the whole political situation in the Congo. I cannot bring that out- That is extremely awkward, but that is the position we are in. I am sure that your colleagues in the Committee also have views on this point, because there was quite an exchange concerning the so«*called agreement. Before ending this reply to you, however, I would draw attention to the fact that the letter of acceptance of the agreement was a letter which was also discussed here in detail and on which I think we reached agreement that this was the way in which a reply should be made. In that sense, this reply embodies, in its way, the reservations made* In any event, the members of the Committee have heard the views of the representative of Ethiopia, and they may wish to express their own views both on that point and on other points. HA/cm 12

Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana): Mr. Secretary-General, I have hurriedly read through your draft reply to, I suppose,,the three letters from Kasa-Vubu, and I see in it a total absence of a centra} theme which ve have been harping on hsre in this Committee, that is to say, that although we consider Mr. Kasa-Vubu as the Chief of State ~ this is certainly true as far as my delegation is concerned — ve do so only within the context.of theconetituion of the country. You will find that in his letter he is trying to say that he, as Chief of State, has every authority, with your help, to subdue the various armed units in the country, and in fact he is asking for the blessing of the United Nations to do that. You have already indicated that that is the same request which was made by the legal Central Government, then headed by Mr., Lumumba — that the United Nations should help the Central Government to get Katanga back to order. And, if I remember correctly, the Security Council, decided against that — although there was a clear indication that if the Central Government, by its own resources, was able to send its own men to get Katanga back, nothing would be done by the United Nations to stop it. Since then, of course, the resolution of 21 February, vith its reference to civil war, has come into tjeing. But I felt that in your reply you could indicate very clearly that, while the Chief of State, under the Lei fondamentale, is in fact responsible for the armed forces, his responsibility rests within the realms of constitutionality, and that in fact he cannot, simply by himself, act without prior reference to Parliament. This is not so clearly stated in the Loi fondamentale. But his position is a legal and constitutional position, and not extra-constitutional, and I think this point should be made very clear in your reply to him, because it seems that the central theme of the three letters sent to you concerns his powers as Head of State. This is my first preliminary reaction.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: We certainly should consider that and bring it out if you feel there is a need for it. I felt there was no need for it, since the implications of the quotes from previous stands are that we cannot help him In any way on the points which are extra-constitutional, so to speak. HA/cn IJ (The Secretary-General)

In fact, the situation is even more restricted than it was in early August with Mr. Lumumba and Katanga, because then the stand was the one you find in the third paragraph on page 1 of the English text of the draft reply. It is, in fact, a quote from the Security Council discussion: ".,. the United Nations 'has no right to forbid the Central Government to take any action which, by its own means, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter, it can carry through1 in relation to any province." That is to say, our stand was that we cannot make OKUC an arm of the Central Government, the legality of which we do not contest — but, on the other hand, we cannot interfere with legitimate actions of the Central Government. Now, something has been added, which is cited previously -- and that, of course, is paragraph A-l, If A-l had been in force at that s'tage, I wonder whether we could have said unreservedly what was said. I wonder whether we would not have had to add a reference to "peaceful means" — that we will not interfere with any peaceful means used for the purpose. But that is speculation* In any event, if you take the August stand on Katanga together with the stand in A-l, I feel that it follows very clearly that, also without a reference to the Loi fondamentale, he cannot get what he asked for. But, of course, that in no way excludes bringing out what you say, if we can find a proper way to do it. The only point which worries me a bit, and which makes me say "if we can find a proper way to do it", is that we should not fall into the other trap —» of starting to interpret the Loi fondamentale in an official document.

Mr. caUAISOH-SACKEY. (Ghana): I agree with you — but the third paragraph, as it stands, does not answer Mm clearly.

The SECRECY-GENERAL! Not at all.

Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana): I thought an opportunity must be seized by indicating to him that it would be in the interests of the Congolese if a return to constitutionality were brought about. In fact, I am sure that if Parliament were to meet as soon as possible, and a proper Central Government HA/cn 1U-15 (Mr. Quaison-Sackey, Ghana) set up, all these problems about reorganizing the army — and -what in fact would be, in our view, a dissident army — would be very clearly indicated. I thought an opportunity at least should be seized of indicating this to him.

The SEGRTJn^KY-GENSRALs There is certainly absolute agreement in substance between us, and what you say now leads me in a direction which I- think is easier than the first one I took on the basis of your statement. If, instead of interpreting, so to speak, the Loi fondamentale in a negative direction, we could express the same idea in a positive direction — that the civil war element takes on entirely different aspects the moment there is a return to legality, which would be created by Parliament, and so on and so forth -- then we would be getting an extra point in favour of Parliament, saying in fact what we want to say. We will give thought to that and see how we can work it out. *•

Mr. SIDKY (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French)t Permit me at this Juncture to make.a preliminary comment on the draft second report. I refer to paragraph U, on page 2, which relates to conversations which Ambassador Sahbani had with the new Government. We read in that paragraph; "These conversations have enabled him to detect a slightly new trend"in. the position of the Belgian Government, which would appear to be better prepared to envisage the withdrawal of the personnel mentioned in the resolution of 21 February." We think it would be better to be content with just a portion of this, wording — that is, to say "These conversations have enabled him to detect a slightly new trend in the position of the Belgian Government" — and to stop right there. The Belgian Government, after all, has introduced substantial reservations, and,-in view of the peremptory nature of the resolution, I do not think we should follow this draft.- EC/mrm 16

The SECRETARY-GEITOAL (interpretation from French): We shall take note of that comment. I would add — this goes almost without saying — that the portion dealing with Mr* Sahbani's conversations was drafted by him. Of course, however, we are completely at liberty to make thi suggested change. For the time being, I would propose that, if possible, we should concentrate first on the question of the letter --of course I do not wish to close the door in any way to debate — and revert later to the question of the report. But I repeat that we shall take note of the comment Just made. (Continued in English) Is there any further preliminary guidance — I use those words to avoid any misunderstanding — on the editing of the reply or the handling of the reply to Mr. Kasa-Vubu? If there is not, I shall turn to the military aspects and then to the report; I put the report last because it has only just been circulated*

Mr* GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): I should like to ask the Secretary-General for some information on what is really happening in the Congo as regards the convening of Parliament. I am told that there have been stories in this respect in the newspapers — I have not seen them myself — and I should therefor© like to have some complete information, if it is available,

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; In addition to Mr. Kasa-Vubufs speech, of which the Committee has seen the text, there was a message yesterday from Mr. Gizenga. I would stress that in saying that we have the speech and the message from Gizenga I am also, obviously, saying that we have had no message from Mr. Kasa-Vubu. So far we have no request from him. It is a bit difficult to interpret the message from Gizenga. The message is signed by him as President du Conseil and Vice-Premier-Ministre; he uses the two titles. He does not say that he or anyone else has decided that Parliament should be convened. What he says is that it has been decided that a zone of 100 kilometres ell around Kamina should be a neutral zone. Then, he says that i within that neutral zone, when Parliament meets — and he still does not say who should convene Parliament, if it has been convened or if he intends to convene it — order should be maintained, not by any Congo forces, but solely by a composite contingent from the United Nations. He says that that contingent BC/mrm 17 (The Secretary-General)

should be composed of troops from the following countries: the Sudan, Togo, MaM, Guinea, Ghana and the United Arab Republic. Of those six countries, only Ghana has at present any contingent at all In tfce Congo . For i;he reat, there is nothing in the communication. . It is indeed difficult to interpret. We do not know exactly what Mr. Gizenga refers to in connexion with the convening of Parliament. We do not know how to interpret his wishes — I cannot call it anything more — regarding the maintenance of law and order. We do not know in which of the two capacities he addresses us, or if he is address ing U3 in some other capacity. Mr. Gizenga has also made a radio speech, on which so far we have no detailed report.

Mr, GE3RMKZY (Ethiopia): From the ''information which the Secretary-General has so far on this aspect of the problem, I think that we can conclude, happily, that the two leaders, Mr, Kasa-Vubu and Mr. Gizenga, are at least of one mind on convening Parliament. - • .• • , •

The SECriF.TM^»OT?yER/t?i! (Two persons ueay be of one mind about marrying the same girl, too, but that does not make for peace. • -- •

Mr. CE3RE-3S3Y (Ethiopia) : I think that with regard to this particular problem it is fortunate that both leaders wiah to convene Parliament. In other words, both leaders wish to make Parliament the supreme Judge of their difficulties. It was in that sense that I used- the word "happily", . I think that we can also conclude, from the clarification Just given by the Secretary-General and from what Mr. Kasa-Vubu has, I think, said himcelf , that one of the two leaders wishes the area where Parliament will meet to be neutralised. If we really pursue this line, the other, secondary problems can be solved in due course: that is, the place,. how many soldiers should be Involved, whether the area should be 100 kilometres in radius, and so forth. The fundamental problem is the convening of Parliament. All members of this Advisory Committee and the General Assembly itself have been asking for a long time that Parliament should meet, should take matters into its own hands and make decisions. From that point of view, I think that the present tendency is very good. EC/mrm 18 (Mr, Gebre-Egzy, Ethiopia)

I am therefore wondering what steps could be taken in order to bring about the convening of Parliament. What can the Advisory Committee do, what can the Secretary-General do, to push matters somewhat and bring about what both important leaders, Mr. Gizenga and Kir. Kasa-Vubu, have said, in one way or another, that tnry wish to bring about?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I want to apologize for my somevhat flippant remark. The reason for it — and I hope that the representative of Ethiopia will excuse me for it — is that I do not know if these are mutually supporting bids or if they are competitive bids. I have every reason to believe that they are competitive bids. Both Mr. Kaca-Vubu and Mr. Gizenga agree that Parliament should be convened, but each considers that Parliament should be convened by him and not by the other. That is the reason for my comparison with certain relationships to girls* I think that on the who^e the Gizenga approach lends itself to the interpretation that it is a competitive bid: convening Parliament is no good if it is done by Mr. Kaea-Vubu; it should be done by Mr* Gizenga* If that is the case, even if we have an agreement in principle we may nave a conflict in practice. That is the circumstances which worries me. The other problems are, of course, subordinate ones; Leopoldville or Kamina, this or that kind of zone, and so forth, I think that we can agree that it would be very improper to start dictating the composition of the force for the maintenance of security, because those doing the excluding, if they were Congolese authorities, would be expressing in a most unmistakable form a vote of no confidence in the country excluded. I think that that is a dangerous thing, to which the United Nations cannot be a party. Thus, even among the details there are questions at which I think we must look very, very carefully. However, the concrete question was: What can we do in order to further this end? We have, of course, been beating this convening-of-Parliament drum the whole time. We have hastened, in relation to Mr. Kasa-Vubu, to express our wish to lend all the necessary assistance. We are instructing our people in Leopoldville to study all the practical aspects of tie problem so that they can handlo wa-btcrt*• I think all we can do is keep the people involved to their word; that is to say, to go ahead with the formal convocation. At tkwj same BC/mrm 19-20 (The Secretary-General) time, we should have discussions with those who are responsible for law and order.

There is the Minlcter of the Interiort Mr. Adoula, a man of quite considerable personal qualities, and other such persons. We, further, have what I think is a reasonable responsibility to use wactever influence we have to change what may be competitive bids into mutually supporting bido. That I regard as the most essential task we can possibly have. But I wonder on that point whether a more important role might not be played by Member Governments. We do have a voice in Stanleyville and in Coquilhatville and Leopoldville, but Member Governments have in some cases a stronger voice, ft greater impact. MlT/ida 21 (The Secretary-General)

I vould feel therefore, that It would be highly desirable if those Governments which have access to the main personalities here would bring out just what you caid, Mr. Ambassador: the positive value of a Joint vill to s?3 Parliament convened and to get back to legality, but to bring out also ttie responsibility which any one politician takes who plays this as a kind of a personal gome for self-aggrandizement and insists on its being his show and nobody else's. That is to say, I hope that, Just as people will say to Mr* Kasa-Vubu that he should keep the cloor open for Mr. Gizenga and, so to say, accomodate bin in all possible respects as regards conditions for the meeting of Parliament, and so on, in the sams way Governments can say to Mr. Gisenga that this is most definitely not the stage where nev difficulty should be created on the road to legality, especially not by the party which, like Mr. Gizenga, lias been the one who certainly has used the word "legality" moot often in the discuso.tone. + Mr. GRBRM3RZY (Ethiopia) As a gallant highlonder -. if you will forgive me for saying that — if I were one of the competing contenders, there is no doubt that I vould love to run o^f with the beautiful lady. But I would agree with you on the latter part of your statement; that is to Bay, that ev2n though they are competing, I think we should do everything possible — tho Advisory Committee and other Members of the General Assembly — so that their -wish which, after all, I think is now a declared end publicly stated policy, to go to Parliament, ohould be fulfilled. Even though they are competing, if Parliament says: you are the husband we prefer, then he should be tho maeter of the Congo. There is no doubt about that. Competition in that sense, I think, is something which is unavoidable. It is there, whether it is in the Congo or in any other country. I would agree with you that perhaps there is a competition in the sense that one wants it to be in this area, and the other in another area, but I think we could work in such a way that one of them could agree to a certain area and the other could say, rightly and Justly : that is the place where we want it to be and we have no cause to believe that we shall be cheated one way or the other. Then, under such — I would say, for my part — ideal conditions, 22 (Mr. Gebre-Egzy, Ethiopia) if they -would go and face Parliament and Parliament would say, this is the way it is going to be, I think that the verdict would be acceptable to both 3ides. If, on tho other hand, such conditions do not exist, it is probable that one side vill say: the outcome was the result of your influence and, therefore, I will not accept it. It is both from the point of view of trying and from the point of view of accepting ths result that we have to look at this question of neutralization of the area where Parliament is to meet, and all the rest of it. As I said, I agree with the latter part of your statement that we should not be alarmed about this point, but rather push them as much as possible by wise advice and cautious expression of the views of the United Nations so that they may be encouraged to meet and to face Parliament finally.

The^CBE^lr-GB3mAL; I think that the real, possible conflict which may be read into the two initiatives is the conflict as to who is entitled to convene Parliament. As you know, Mr. Gizenga, on behalf of hie Consell cVEtat, claims to be the sole authority of the Congo, pushing aside Mr. Kasa-Vubu, while Mr. Kasa-Vubu, on the other hand, naming himself on the previous history, denies any legality to the Consell d'Etat; and this, of course, is much more than a conflict of prestige; it i3 a conflict of competence which, in fact, is preliminary to the fight for positions. I agree with you that the final word should be that of Parliament and, for that reason, they should — to continue the comparison which we made of the two boys and the girl — submit the final decision to higher authority.

Mr.' KSGILBRUMA (Nigeria): Your draft letter to President Kasa-Vubu of the Republic of the Congo appears to be satisfactory, Mr» Secretary-General, Therefore, I do not want to make any further comment because you have made quite clear to him the United Nations stand and the views of the Advisory Committee on the resolution of the Security Council. Therefore, I would say that the letter is good. 23-25 (Mr* Negtleruma, Nigeria)

X But there is one thing vhlch worries me very much; that although Mr. Kaea-Vubu IB talcing a very good step In co-operating with the United Nations 6^1 appears to be seeking co-operation vith ths other Congolese authorities, irsluding Mr. Gizenga himself, it is apparent that Mr. Gizenga is nov very i-.luctftn-b ~ or rather, I would say ho is not challenging Mr. Kasa-Vubu's position as Head of State, and this will be very dangerous for the Congolese and for th-3 interacts of the United Nations. What I was thinking all along was that when Mr. Kasa-Vubu succeeded in convening the Parliament, Mr. Gizenga would come along and work with him as the recognized Head of State, although we know very well that Mr. Gizenga is claiming to be the legal heir of Mr, Lumumba. Mr. Lumumba, however, was not the Esiad of State; Mr. Lumumba was a Prime Minister. Mr. Kaea-Vubu has been Head cf State since the Congo achieved its independence, and now we read in the newspaper that Mr. Gizenga is challenging him as the Head of State. I believe that an of us — the Security Couficll and tha General Assembly — should help Mr. Kaca-Vubu in getting the Congolcoe together because it appears to me that the Congolese need a great deal of guidance and we must be very patient with them. It will be very dangerous if we allow the continuance of that attitude on the part of Mr* Gizenga to challenge Mr. Kasa-Vubu's position aa Head of State. I do not blame Mr. Gizenga for saying that Parllamant must be convened. All of us, of course, are thinking that once Parliament is convened, it is up to it to discuss the matter of choosing a Prime Minister. Whether the Prime Minister nominated by Mr. Kasa-Vubu will be ratified by Parliament, or whether Parliament is going to appoint Mr. Gizenga that is a different matter altogether. What worries me now is the challenge of the position of Head of State. This may produce a great deal of trouble in the Congo and perhaps new disturbances. 26 (Mr. Ngilerumay Nigeria) So I would like to say that all of us should be determined to support Kasa-Yubu, to co-operate with him and to help him convene the Parliament, and to support him in the good line, the good steps he is now taking; otherwise all our other efforts will "be frustrated.

gBCF^AHr>GENERAL! May I ask you. if in your view the test support to Kasa-Vubu could not "be to give Gizenga the very good advice to 'play "ball1 if Parliament is convened, and, following the idea expressed by our colleague from Ethiopia, to accept the verdict of Parliament, that is to say, to subordinate himself to the will of the people?

Mr. MGIIERUMfl. (Nigeria): That is what I mean to say. I support that idea. • • '

The SEORETATO~q]?KERJ\Li If we have given him safe conduct, I do not think he will be put in a, cell. It is a different situation that would arise, and I think we can take the responsibility, if asked to do so, at Kamina or at Leopoldville or at any other reasonable place. The real trouble arises when somebody runs around on his own, however legitimately, and then something happens because it is inore difficult to get people out of Jail thanJbo-stop them from getting into Jail. TL/cif 2?

Mr. QtmiSON-SACKEY (Ghana)t The Chief of State holds that office because the Parliament elected him, but the Parliament can change its mind.

Mr* NGILERIWA (Nigeria): Who is going to convene the Parliament? That is what I mean to oay.

Mr* QgBRS-KC-ZY (Ethiopia )s I just want to say that I have not started the analogy; and what is more, I think that if I ever wished to make the analogy,

I would never, I can assure you, involve Mr3Tshombe in that category.

The SKCIgiTARY-GnimiiRALg It seems that the discussion is turning in a direction which is pleasant but perhaps not very productive. For that reason, as we have deviated somewhat into the matter of the convening of Parliament, ws might perhaps conclude this deviation and go back to what we had originally as our items « Before doing so, I would sum it u£ as I understand the line to be — I shall not try to commit you, but sum it up as my own conclusion -- that of course the United Nations should do everything it can to further the convening of Parliament; that we have no reason to be too fusey as regards formalAtiejj since we are not the interpreters of the Loi fondamentale; that ia, prima facie we must recognize it, and we have always recognized that the Chief of .State is entitled to convene Parliament and that it seems reasonable for competing political leaders, especially those who base themselves on the claim of legality, to submit themselves to the rules of the game in Parliament* That seems to me to be the reasonable approach from the United Nations side, a-ad I do nob think there is anything controversial in it unless one has made up one* a mind beforehand on what the outcome is that one desires — and we have no right to do tlaa-i^ we have no possibility of doing it« I would therefore suggest that our line should be encouragement, without too much formalism but sticking to the prima facie legal picture which we have before us. However, we have this letter, and if there is no further observation now, we will look It over again. You look it over again, and we will have a second round when you have had time to think it over both as to the question of substance and as to the question of form. I would not like to wait too long, TL/cw 28 (The Secretary-General) because ve shpuld try to get the letter away at least over the weekend. We should reply, within a week, and J think that that should he possible. If we could have perhaps not too long a meeting on Friday afternoon, or thereabouts, we might round off this special aspect of our Job, Now then, we have the progress report, "but I would suggest, with your permission, that "before turning to it we invite General Rikhye to give his reply, in substance, to the question raised at the last meeting,

Mr. BASAN (Pakistan): Before we request General Rikhye to give us his appreciation of the military situation, may I draw attention to a piece of news that I have here, so that General Rikhye may take notice of this also in giving his appreciation. This-is news that has come over the ticker, dated 15 May, and may I read the first few lines. It says: ., "Three hundred United Nations Indian troops have been. moved from Kamina Base to the North Katanga town of Kabalo, scene of recent U^Nc Katangan clashes, It wa• s•'•• announced ' today* "... "Observers said that the move would tighten tension here since Katangan government officials have a strong fear of the Indian troops, which they say have been sent as 'colonisers' by Indian Prime Minister

Jawaharlal Nehru0 "The Indian troops have been sent to Kabalo to replace two companies of Ethiopians who were being withdrawn with the rest of their battalion on completion of their tour of duty in the Congo. "Kabalo has been in U.N. hands since South African and British soldiers of fortune led an abortive attack on it on behalf of the Katangan government last month." The significant part comes now: "The U»N» Representative here, Georges Dumontet, was visibly surprised at the Indian move because he had no advance information of it» But he later confirmed the move to the Katangan government, a U.N* spokesman here said. TL/cw 29 (Mr* Hasan, Pakistan)

"Observers said Dumontet has been at pains to cultivate friendly relations with the Katangan government, in particular with Godefroid Munongo, Interior Minister who now heads the government." I presume this news has been seen by you, Sir.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Yes.

Mrft RA.SAN (Pakistan)s We would like to know whether it is necessary to re-create a controversial situation where otherwise, perhaps, it might have been avoided.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I am certain that General Rikhye will cover the question of substance*, As to re-creation of tension, I would say that that exists more in the minds of the observers and the**newspapers than in the minds of the people in Katanga or Elisabethville, because Mr. Munongo himself has not raised his voice concerning the movement of the 300 troops. I should like to say one thing here. I do not know which country so far has not, at one stage or another, been accused of imperialistic intentions in the Congo.

Mr* HASAN (Pakistan): Pakistan has not been so accused.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Your turn will come, Mr. Ambassador, I promise you.

General RIKHgE: I will first give a very brief resume on the military situation in the Congo» In order to implement your instructions to restore the neutral zone in North Katanga and to re-establish freedom of movement for United Nations troops in that area as soon as possible, General McKeown visited, Kabalo on 15 May. On learning that the morale of the Katanga gendarmerie was lowering and that they were not likely to resist any United Nations troop movements, General McKeown ordered that on l6 May operations to clear Nyunzu and Alberbville should commence. TL/cw 50 (General Rikhye)

The first phase of the operation was the relief of the Malayan Special Force "by the Indian battalion which had already besn flown into Kabalo.on 16 May* The second phase of the operation should also have been completed today. The Malayan Special Force was to drop off a company at, ITiembe, which is halfway between-Nyunzu end Albertville, and then move on to Albertville* They were directed on to the airfield in order to secure it, and then to move into the town to gain the United Ke-tions troops the necessary freedom of movement required to facilitate our operations* General lyassu has been placed in direct over-all command of these operations and should have reached Albertville this morning. Contrary to the report just read by the representative of Pakistan, Mr* Munorigo.was forewarned of this intended operation a few days ago by our representative, Mr. Dumonteto 31

The SECRETARy^nENERAL; May I here Intervene to say that that is also a very explicit denial of the newspaper report that Mr. Dumontet did not know about it.

General RIKH3CB: Mr. Muncngo expressed surprise at the United Nations intentions, as he considered that all was peaceful in North Katanga. The genclaruerj^ command in Elisabethville and in Albertville were also informed "by our military representatives, and they expressed similar views to that of Mr. Munongo "but did not convey any intentions on their part of opposing the United Nations operations. Peaceful conditions may exist, "but only on the surface, as the population in the areas has "been forced to evacuate through the gendarmerie action over the last few weeks, and all the villages e,re empty. The Indian troops from Kamina continue to be flown into Kabalo. The last of the 500 Indian troops who were in transit in East Africa are now being air-lifted •* to Kemina, and with their arrival the move of the Indian brigade group would be completed. In Kasai, Kalonji still continues with his offensive designs. While hie drive towards Luiza, that is, towards the south of Luluabourg, and then on to Tahlkapa has been kept in check, tension remains among the tribal factions in those areas. Kalonjifs northern advance directed on to Lake Mukamba required continued vigorous action on the part of our troops. The area between Port Francqui and Mweka has also been disturbed, causing some dislocation in railway traffic. In order to enable the United Nations troops to take more vigorous preventative action and at the same time avoid small isolated detachments, which may not be able to protect themselves adequately, the Ghana brigade in Kasai has been redeployed. They have withdrawn from Bakwanga temporarily, which has resulted in a temporary transfer of the refugees relief organization from Bakwanga to Lake Mukamba. Our latest reports on the Port Prancaui incident are that all other personnel have been found with the exception of the following: two Swedes and two officers and twenty-five other ranks from Ghana, These are still missive;, but the search operation is still continuing. We are carrying out rather large-scale rotations at present. The Tunisians are being rotated, and almost one complete battalion has been changed over by now. NR/hm 32 • (General Rlkhye)

Ethiopians are being lifted from Coquilhatvllle and Kabalo to Entebbe in Uganda, from where the United States Air Force is taking them home and bringing freeh troops back. Lastly, tha Nigerian battalion in Bukavu is being flown home, and a fresh battalion is being flovm back on the same aircraft to Bukavu. I will now give some broad outlines of the deployment of the United Nations Force in the Congo. "In the city of Leopoldville we have approximately 3>800 combat troops> consisting of two Tunisian battalions, one Indian battalion and a reconnaissance element of the Malayan contingent. In Leopoldville we also have about 2,500 administrative troops. We recently moved 400 Tunisians to Kitona, and they .; relieved the Indonesians before they left for home* Equateur Province: 280 Ethiopians were in Coquilhatville. Recently we have made arrangements with the Congolese authorities to Increase the strength there to a battalion. The new battalion being flown frofe Ethiopia will be localed in Coquilhatville. Orientals Province: In Stanleyville, the Ethiopian brigade, has two tattalione with a strength of about 1,100. Kasai Province: In Luluabourg, the Ghana brigade has a combat strength In the city of 390, and atainistratlve strength 1*25. They still have a few small detachments at Mvreka, a company at Bene Dibele, a company at Mwene Bitu, In the aouth, a Llberien contingent of 203 in Port Francqui, a Ghana ccmpeny In Luputa and so on* As you will notice, this deployment is primarily to check the two-pronged advance of Kalonjl's private army one to the south and the other to the north, * should have mentioned that at Lake Mukamba we now have ^25 Ghana troops — one battalion less one company —., and orb Tshikapa 200 LIberian troops. Kivu Province: At Bukavu, there is a Nigerian battalion of 506 combat troops; 1*36 Nigerians and Malayans In Coma; 150 Malayans in Kindu. Katanga Province: In Albertville, approximately 350 Nigerian combat troops and another 300 administrative troops* As I have already mentioned, there should be by today a company of Malayans at Nlembe,, and the rest of the Malayan battalion, which is approximately three companies, in Albertville — it should have arrived there by now. There is an Indian battalion, less a company or so, In Njyunzu. In Manono the situation remains unchanged* There are 400 Nigerians NR/ep 33-35 (General RiKhye)

— with the second Figerian battalion. la Kabalo there were 900 Ethiopians, who are now "being flown hone, and thsy are "being relieved "by Xndian troops. In Elisabethville, 1,239 Irish and Swedish troops — recently they have also received reinforcements in the shape of armoured cars* Both the Irish and Swedes are now equipped with armoured cars, and they have approximately one squadron of these in Elisabethville, At Kamina base, a couple of days ago, there were about 1,500 Indian combat troops — as you know, most of them are now in the process of "being airlifted to Kabalo. As regards the dep,loyment of the Bp3JLnter Congolese Army and the Katanga gendarmerie, there are certain aspects of some interest to the Committee• In the north, General Mobutu has 2,000 troops still at Bumba, on the river, and has 300 troops at Lisala. He has approximately .1,000 troops in CoqiiilhetviHe and 325 troops at Boende. So you will notice that he has a vety large concentration right on the border* Facing them, General Lundula!s army consists of 835 at Aketi, 1,350 at Basolio, 200 at Opala, 1,650 at Stanleyville end 1,28O at Kindu. So here again we find that General Lundula continues to keep the bulk of Ms army on the border of Equateur. Further to the east, General. Lundula has deployed two strong battalions on the border of Ruanda-UruncLU They have been there for some time, and the position remains unchanged. There are 920 in Goma and 900 in Bukavu. Needless to say, both these areas are receiving our full attention* 36 (General Rlkhye) In North Katanga the Katanga gendarmerie concentrations remain unchanged. We are welting for a report on today's action, and we will then be able to really know exactly how much of the gendarmerie has, been removed from Nyunzu and Niembe as a-resv.lt of our action. However, the situation at Manono is still not satisfactory and will receive our attention immediately after we have finished our operations along the railroad line and up to Albertvilla. At Manono our first report was that there were about 800 Katanga gendarmerie, and we had unconfirmed reports of their having increased to 1,000; but we believe there are about 8-00 now. I have been asked by the Secretary-General to give you some background in regard to our operations now being conducted in North Katanga. You may recall that in the very early days of our operation in the Congo the area of North Katanga ceased to be under the control of the Elisabethville authorities. The ' Balubakat movement increased in size and in intensity as the political differences »*'"'•'• continued, until an area of approximately one-third the size of Katanga ceased to remain under the control of Elisabethville authorities. This area is bounded by the general line starting with Albertville, which was first out of control; but later in September or October, after vigorous efforts on part of kato&ga •'• gendarmerie, was brought under control by them and they were able to establish a battalion there. Thereafter; Just excluding that but including Manono (which is to the south), including Kab&lo (oa the railway line just above Kamina), including Kongolo (further to the north along the KLvu border), that area stayed out of control of the Elisabethville authorities, and that was the area where we arranged to have Neutral Zone A or Neutral Zone North during October of last year. Since October the Katanga authorities in Elisabethville have not had any control over that area of any kind until very recently. As you know, they had increased the size of the Katanga gendarmerie to about 7*000, and then they conducted large-scale military operations at a time when the United Nations forces in the Congo had been reduced in strength considerably. They took over control of Manono, Albertville and Nyunzu. They attempted to take over control of Kabalo, which we were able to prevent by the use of the Fourth Ethiopian Battalion in Kabalo, and we further reinforced it with the Nigerians and the Malayans. HG/en 37 (General Rikhye)

Going back a bit, the operations being conducted by the Katanga gendarmerie were, if you remember, being led by foreign mercenaries, and they used small Dove aircraft,which carried a couple of bombs, against the tribesmen, who were mostly armed with bows and arrows and very old muskets. Therefore, as the Katanga gendarmerie columns advanced towards Manono, and at the same time other columns from Albertvi3J.e and Kongclo towards tbe ipterlor °* North Katanga, the population fled and abandoned their villages, So, although during the last month or so the Katanga gendarmerie has succeeded in establishing their units on the fringes of North Katr-nga, they do not aa yet have any control over the population« In fac-b they have not had such control at any time. There is still no administration, and they are unable to bring this area under their control, this being the area of the Balubakats who, as you know, are opposed to Elisabethville authorities. As the neutral zone had been abrogated by the Elisabethville authorities contrary to our arrangements — and, if you remember^ , we discussed the fact at one of our meetings that a column from Stanleyville ha

The SECRETARY-GENERALt All of these operations in North Katanga are, of course, under A-l and, on the other hand, they have, as I said the other day, quite a considerable political significance because they undoubtedly are very much in the background of the progress we have been able to register in Coquilhatville in the direction of — if I do not call it "reconciliation" — at least the integration of the Congo. Are -chere any questions?

Mr. NGILSRUMA (Nigeria); I would not like to ask any questions of detail new because I would like to have the report and I wish to study it very carefully,first. I ask only one question which involves a matter of principle. Now that the Head of State is co-operating — and I believe the forces under his authority are also co-operating — I would just like to ask General Rikhye whether there is some spirit of co-operation betweeo the forces under the command of the Congolese authorities and the United Nations* ......

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Such a spirit has developed in the area under the control of President Kasa-Vubu as a consequence of the general improvement of atmosphere. We still have risks --we saw it in Port Francqui, and we may see it in other places — that a unit of the ANC breaks loose from the general trend, but the general trend is definitely favourable. It is the beginning of at least scaie kind of co-operation. In the same way there is co-operation in Oriental. I would not can it co-operation in Katanga, but the relations, man to man and group to group, are not hostile; they are at least on terms of negotiation. I think this is the impression we get. Are there any other questions? Well, gentlemen, you will see this report in the record. HA/ep Ul (The Secretary-General)

We then turn to the second report, on certain steps taken for the Implementation of the Security Council resolution. It is, of necessity, a very dry and very short report. We are running the course, and then one cannot give the time for arrival at the goal* That is the reason for the rather undramatic character of the report. But, if you feel that there Is anything that should be added or deleted, I would very mush like your advice. As members of the Committee, of course, or as a Committee, you are not and cannot be committed to such a report. But nevertheless we have always found it extremely useful to have an exchange with you, I have noted the observation made by the representative of Ethiopia, There is, as I said, a difficulty in it. But if the members of the Security Council get the summary record, it covers, so to speak, that aspect — and I do not think that In this case there is any need to distribute that same summary record to the whole General Assembly, because there Is not that kind of interest in the matter at the present stage* Therefore, if the representative of Ethiopia feels that it would be sufficient to give that information to the members of the Security Council, which is a matter of routine, but perhaps with a special note drawing their attention to this question, we could perhaps let it stand like that. On another occasion, of course, we distributed the summary records, to the whole General Assembly, But that was at a phase when the position taken here was of immediate significance to the debate in. the General Assembly, and that justified an exception to our general rule,

Mr, GFiHRErBOZY (Ethiopia): I would not wish to depart from what we have done in the past, but I think we might satisfy my position and the position of my colleagues if, in paragraph 7> on page 5, where it says MAfter consultations with the UN Advisory Committee on the Congo concerning the agreement , • ,rt, we could say — if that does not cause much disadvantage or delay the paper — HAfter consultations with and comments by members of the UN Advisory Committee on the Congo • »«M, and then, in a footnote, say that "The comments appear in the summary records distributed to members of the Security Council". That would take care of my position. HA/ep

The SECRETARY^GENERAL; Of course, if a direct reference, is made :to it in that way, that makes the paper distributed to the members of the Security Council a kind of official document. I had in mind the other thing: that one would write to the members of the Security Council when this was distributed and say ttWe wish to refer you to the summary record", Then we would not make it a public document, but the members of the Security Council would be drawn into the pictureo The difference is only that you would like to have it printed here, and I would have it in. a letter to the members of the Security Council,

Mr, GB3RS-EGZ.Y (Ethiopia): I would not Insist on the footnote —

' The SECRETARY -GENERAL; But you want the reference to comments by the members of the Committee, yes, that would be perfectly all right. First of all, as you see, it uses the words "After consultations", not »' "In consultations". Secondly, it refers, to the letter, regarding which there was the agreed unanimity we usually have. On the other hand, nothing is said concerning the so-called agreement itself, . ., • •

ftlr. BHADKAMKAR (India): I hope I may suggest a few small amendments to the report. I am sorry I have not been able to read all of it, but I have a few suggestions concerning the portion we have managed to read. In paragraph 3, it says that Ambassador Sahbani proceeded to Brussels win order to negotiate with the Government of Belgium .«,". Could we not use the term "to-arrange with", rather than "to negotiate with"?

The SECRETARY •GENERAL; You are quite right. In a formal sense, it is not negotiation. We can say "to make arrangements with".

Mr. BHADKAMKAR (India): Almost immediately following those words in paragraph 3, the draft speaks about "withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of BA/ep U3 (Mr. Bhadkamkar, India) all Belgian military and para-milItary personnel, as veil as Belgian political advisers". Would we not want to add !land mercenaries"? That, I think, was part of the whole description.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Yes, we could do that.

Mr* EHAIKAMKAH (India): In paragraph k, on page 2, there Is a reference to "useful information on the distribution of Belgian military personnel in the various provinces of the Congo". Is that going to be part of this report, or is it separately available?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; We had not intended to make it public at this stage•

Mr. SHADKAMKAR (India): But will it be made available to the Committee?

The SECRETARY -GENERAL i Certainly, if you wish. There are, of course, always margins of uncertainty. There is an intermediate stage of exploration, so to speak, and we have the habit — good or bad *- of not putting into official documents things which we do not regard as definite results of our work. But, for information here in the Committee, it will be available as a matter of course*

Mr« EHADKAMKAR • (India); In paragraph 6, is it necessary for us to say that "In this document, the President accepted the resolution of the Security Council of 21 February and, in particular, paragraphs A-2 and B-2, while the UN undertook ..."? If we do not have to say it, perhaps we should not say it. We might simply delete that last sentence of paragraph 6.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; We could very well do that. The reason for inserting that sentence in full was that very many will never go to the documents and very many will find the documents somewhat thorny reading* Therefore, one can simply esctract from them in one single sentence what is said on the two sides. In fact, I myself would not have used the word "agreement" because it is not, HA/ep lfM*5 (The Secretary-General) in the usual sense of the word, aii agreement. It is a declaration of intention on the part of President Kasa-Vubu, and a natural reply from our side. It is our duty to assist in implementation. But ye can very well reduce the summing-up to the first part, which is the essential part of the agreement -- the essential part being just the undertaking to implement the resolution by the Congolese authorities.

Mr. BHADKAMKAR (India): Coming back to paragraph ^, I see the sentence: "The Representative's discussions have made it clear that the Belgian 'Government unceasingly reiterated its wish to accept and apply the resolution of 21 February." Can we 'not say "implement" instead of "apply11? That is what the Belgian Government has really been asked to do -- to implement the resolution.

The SECRETARY -GENERAL; I think that would be fine, but I would like to have a look at the French text, which is the original.

Mr. BHADKAMKAR (India): In the same paragraph, toward the bottom of the page," there is this passage: ' "... the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs in a letter to the Special Representative dated 6 May set forth a series of concrete proposals which, in the view of the Secretary-General and Ambassador Sahbani, only partially answer the letter and spirit of the resolution of 21 February. While this letter of 6 May has necessarily called for objections and clarifications on the part of the Secretary-General and his Representative, there are certain hopeful signs that Belgium may in future adopt an attitude more constructive and more in conformity with its obligations," Does this not give the impression that it is possibly the. new Government which is giving an indication of a new trend? I think the impression is that possibly even the older Government had in a way altered its attitude and was prepared to proceed on these hopeful lines, I do not really know how we should put that, but I was wondering about it. BC/rf U6

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I do not know, either., Of course, this reflects the first-hand experience and evaluations of Mr* Sahbani. I must say that I am not very happy with the English formulation "there are certain hopeful signs" « I think that we could cover Mr» Sahbani! s thought Just as well with a less objectionable phrase sucja as "there is hope that Belgium may in future adopt an attitude o.o "• What Mr0 Sahbani wtints to say, certainly, ia what I have expressed in another way: we do not regard this letter as the last word on their eide because, their oral statements are more forthcoming than what they wish .to put in writing. As wa know, that can happen and has happened in several cases0 What we have to brjng out is merely that we are not too discouraged by the shortcomings of the letter* That can certainly be ecid in a way which meets the point of the representative of Indiad In any caae, I do not think that "hopeful signs" is good.

Mra BHADKAMKAR (India): With reference to the conversations with Mr. Spaak and new trends, it is probably not fair to say that these things were true before he became Foreign Minister and not afterwards. \

1 Th3 SECRETARY-GENERAL; MrQ Spaak s attitude was at least as forthcoming before as after.

Mr3j BHADKAMKAR (India): That is why I think that we can put it in a different way*

SECR5IEARY-GENERAL: We shall have a look at it0 I do not know exactly how to phrase it in order to be true to the author, \diich I feel we should be«

Mrc GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): My problem in this regard relates to the absence of any reference to the cosments of the members of the Advisory Committee* For my part, I have said quite bluntly that the letter is not acceptable to me. Unless the Committee feels otherwise, I think that the report should state that the Secretary-General hac consulted the Ccnomittee, which has said that the letter is not acceptable to it* BC/rf

The SECREOIARY-GENSRAL; I think that this does constitute a gap in the text* IThare should "be reference to the Advisory, Ccmmittee and its stand, which corresponds to the stand mentioned in the report^

Mr? GflBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia) : I recall that in answer to my specific question the Secretory-General said that the 'letter was unacceptable*

Hhe SECRETARY-GETOI.L; I believe that I said that it was < unsatisfactory, and acceptable only as a step on the road; thus: unacceptable as a result* '

Mr* GS>3RE-aGSY (Ethiopia): As regards paragraph 6 on page 5, I do not understand the point made by the representative of India with regard to the lost sentence,: , .* ' ' rt *0« the President accepted the resolution of the Security Council of 21 February and, in particular, paragraphs A-2 and B-2, while the United , Nations undertook to render him assistance "in the implementation of the resolution"* . That is a quite faithful reproduction of what actually happened* Many members here have expressed reservations about this, but we have said that in -this instance assistance to the President means assistance in order to meet the objectives of the resolution of 21 February* It was in that sense that 'I, for example, said that I would not stand in the way of the agreement. But I thinK that the record must be clear to, the members of the Security Council and to the Members of the General Assembly, I do not think that we should keep this from them* Let it come out openly* If they feel differently about it, we should know their reaction* I am not saying tjiis to safeguard the position of my Government; that position is already saf eguarded* I am, rather saying it from the point, of view of the factual and historical record. This is exactly what happened* If a member of the Security Council does not like it, I think that he is entitled to say> "You have . made a mistake* You should not play with the policy decision which we have made"* In such a cose the Advisory Committee would have to accept the criticism for what it had done, end the Secretary-General would have to accept the criticism for what he had done* But I think that the record must be clear* BC/rf

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Of course, the. record does come out clearly becauoe of the annexes; the full texts are there* I did not understand that the representative of India wished to suppress anything in this story. I felt — and that is why I agreed vith him easily — that nothing new was really added because the essential new fact is that on, 17 April we came to the point where President Kasa-Vubu accepted the resolution* That is what is new, so to speako Of course,, we have r.'J.l the time had the duty to see to it that the resolution is Implemented* That is to say,, our stand is the time-honoured one which must be ours; his stand is a new stand. That is my interpretation* In any case, this ia not a major point; it is a question of taste more than a question of substance.

Mr« BHADKAMKAR (Injiia); The Secretary-General has actually said more or less what I was going to say. The agreement is annexed to this report, and it »• specifically says what the United ITations is to do* In fact,, it is to recruit the technicians needed by the Republic of the Congo, and so for.th. That is vhy I felt that the sentence in question was not really necessary. The agreement is annexed to the report and, as I have said, it states what the United Nations will doa In any case,, the whole operation is to assist 'the Congo; this is not limited to the agreement. We therefore feel that the sentence in question IB not. absolutely necessary and that the document may be more precise without it»

The SSCRETARY-GENERAL; Perhaps it could be left to our judgement as to what would be the best way of expressing this. I repeat that it ;Ls really a question of taste, not of substance. I would be the last one, Mr. Gebre-Egzy, to wish to suppress anything, whether it is palatable or not. • Mr» GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): I merely said that this is a historical document. We are saying that A, B and C have happened, and I think that the point in question should also be included. BC/rf 1*9

Mr« DADZIE (Chan*): Referring to the remarks of the representative of India, I would esy that if it is thought necessary to .retain the formulation in question, perhaps in the interests of accuracy we ought to stick to the text of the Secret ary-Gener&l1 s own letter, which says that United Nations assistance is intended to facilitate President, Kesa-Vubu1 s wholehearted co-operation in the implementation of the resolution. It is soinswhat incomplete to state tha.t we undertake to render him assistance in the implementation of the resolution.

The J^CKETARY-GEysffRkl,: The trouble is that the full text refers to our letter and not to the agreement, which on that point was, as we round this table all noted, not quite fortunate in its formulation.

Mro DADZIE (Ghana): What I mean is that if we are going to set out the extent of our undertaking we might as well do it I,»n the sense that we understand it here and as set out in the Secretary-General^ letter. i The 8ECRF.TARY«.GEHSRAL; Exactly. • Mr. HASAN (Pakistan) t I have a couple of small drafting pointaj I do not know whether it is worth while to mention them, tut the Secretary-General might wish to take note of them. First, I would refer to the phrase on page 2 of the draf,t report which reads w "in the view of the Secretary-General and Ambassador 3ahbani f I wonder whether it is necessary to mention Ambassador Sahbani in light of the fact that normally the Secretary-General* s view should include the views of his representatives, and in this capacity Ambassador Sahbani is acting as a representative of the Secretary-General. In the same sentence of the report we read: wpnly partially answer the letter and spirit of tjae resolution of 21 February". I do not know whether a spirit can be answered. . One could say: "this is not in full accord with " spirit of the resolution." BC/rf 50 (Mr« Hasan, Pakistan) . In paragraph 2 on page 1 the phrase "the danger of emerging civil varfl is usedo I think that that is a lititle awkward* Furthermore, the phrase goes on "has been eubB bantially lessened" • Since the Secretary-General has now been given the power to use force to prevent a civil war, one would normally expect that, the danger of civil war had not only been lessened but hc»d been entirely obviated* Mtf/cn 51

The SECRETARY-aEKERAL! On the first point, it is a bad translation of French because the French text is quite accurate* On the second point, as long as we cannot change the hearts of men, I am afraid that there may be the risk of civil war* But ve will look at the nuance* The first point will have to be rewritten because, at the moment when we bring it to the Advisory Committee, it is obvious that these objections should be given formulation which suits all those who have to deal with it on the United Nations side in some proper form* There were no two views about the letter of 6 May.

Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): That is perfectly all right, but I think, from the practical point of view —

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I agree, but we have to rewrite it in any event*

Mr« S3DKY (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French)s It appears that you considered it appropriate not to publish for the time being the letter of 6 May from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium to Mr. Sahbani.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; If I may interrupt, I would find it a bit unfair.

Mr. SIDKf (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French): But we see here that the report itself refers to a number of concrete proposals which were made on 6 May, and I do not know what is customary and whether it would not be better to alter the drafting to reflect the actual situation.

Tne SECRETARY-GENERAL (interpretation from French): There is certainly a problem involved here because to refer to proposals without being specific is not elegant. But you will realize that, in view of the inadequacy of the letter itself, we have to deliberate and to continue our negotiations on the basis of that letter. The functions of Mr,.Sahbani are, of course, to Mii/cn 52 (The Secretary-General) carry out these negotiations, and I thought that it would be better not to give to the public the text of the letter inasmuch as it forms part of his negotiations. (Continued in English) I should like to add, particularly for the benefit of the representative of Pakistan, that we seat two letters — or rather, Mr. Sahbani will send his letter when he gets to Brussels, but he had in his pocket a letter from me to Mr. Spaak, which did not go into the substance at all but gave the background and, at the same time, took care of the courtesy aspect of the matter. If there is nothing to add, we shall proceed with this, and I do not think that we should trouble you again with the text of the report. We should get it out as soon as possible — perhaps tomorrow if we can. On the other hand, if you are agreeable, I would ask that we meet again to settle the question of the proper reply to the three letters of Mr. Kasa-Vubu. I would suggest Friday at 3 o'clock, if that is convenient.

Mr. GEBHE-EGZY (Ethiopia): I think that Friday will be a bit difficult for me; after all, there is only one day between.

The SECRETARY-QENERAL; Do you plead in favour of Saturday?

Mr. GEBRE-EG2Y (Ethiopia): Or Monday. Your letter contains a number of serious matters and I do not think it will be possible to have the position of my Government so soon.

The SECRETARY -GENERAL; Let us make it Monday morning. In the meantime, however, I should like to send a message to President Kasa-Vubu in order to be reasonably polite, saying that the matter is under consideration with the Advisory Committee. We shall meet on Monday morning, then, at 10*30 •

The meeting rose at k«55 p.m» CONFIDENTIAL Meeting No. 22 May 1961 ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CONGO

Meeting at United Nations Headquarters9 New York, on Monday, 22 May 1961, at 10.30 a.m.

In the Chair: The Secretary-General

Members; Canada Mr. RITCHIE Ceylon Mr* WIJEGOONAWARDENA Ethiopia Mr. GEBRE-EGZY Federation pf Malaya Mr. ZAKARIA, Ghana Mr. Qt&ISON- SACKEY Guinea India Mr. JHA Indonesia Mr. WIRJOIKANOTO Ireland Mr. BOUND Liberia Mr. JOHNSON Mali Mr. TRAQRE Morocco Mr. TABITI Nigeria Mr. NGILERUMA Pakistan Mr. HASAN Senegal Sudan Mr, ADEEL Sweden Mrs. ROSSEL Tunisia Mr*. CHELLI United Arab Republic Mr. LOUTFI

61-11*339

,::,U H'llHTlUill'lm lllHllH MJ/rd

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; As you remember, we agreed to have a discussion today about the best way to handle the three letters received from Mr. Kasa-Vubu which were distributed at our last meeting. You had before you on that occasion a draft letter in reply covering all three communications received from Mr. Kasa-Vubu. I explained that this draft was only a springboard for a discussion and that we wanted to profit from your views and your reactions before giving a more definite form to our reply. There was a kind of preliminary discussion when we last met, which, however, did not take us very far. I remember, in fact, only one observation which was made and which, I think, should be taken into account, and that was whether we should not try to include some kind of reference to the loi fondamentale and Parliament. It was an observation made, I believe, by the representative of Ghana. It seemed to us, on afterthought, that as the discussion last time was so short and did not go into the depth of the matter, there was no use, in fact, to try to make a new draft for this meeting; we ha

Mr* .ADEEL (Sudan): In my opinion, Mr. Secretary-General, the three letters of President Kasa-Vubu can be summed up in three questions. His first question relates to the possibility of the United Nations disarming, or assisting him to disarm, the Katanga gendarmerie. The second one, although it does not say so in so many words, is whether the United Nations would disarm, or assist him in disarming, the troops at Stanleyville. To these two questions you answer on page 2: "I can only endorse the clear acknowledgement contained in your letter of 5 March that the UN Force cannot be expected to subdue organized armed forces regarded as dissident by any authorities in the Congo," His third question is whether his undertaking an expedition -- what he calls "any police action" — In Oriental Province and Kivu would constitute civil war. Your answer to that is given in the third paragraph on page 2 of the draft letter: MW/rd 3-5 i

"In so far as civil war docs not threaten or occur, and law and order are not Jeopardized, the United Nations Thas no right to forbid the Central Government to take any action which, by its own means, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter, it can carry through* in relation to any Province•* r NR/mnn 6 (Mr. Adeel, Sudan)

If I read that correctly, you say that, If Kasa-Vubu undertakes an sedition against the Stanleyville authorities, that does not constitute civil var. I wonder whether that is the interpretation meant* As I read the sentence, you say; *As long as civil war does not threaten or occur, the Ur/.bed Nations cannot forbid any action by the central Government"• I wonder what then would constitute civil war, if an expedition does not prima facie cause civil war,,

The SECRETARY -GENERAL i I may perhaps reply to this last question right away. The interpretation you imply here is not the one intended. If the central Governing at, or rather Mr. Kasa-Vuvu at present, through Mr. Mobutu,

t^ied an expedition against Stanleyville or Orientalf we should, in my view, resist It and interpose ourselves. That is to say, that would be a civil war case. ' The reason for the ambiguity, I think, in this sentence is a two-fold one. !The quotation in Itself, which referred to another situation, the eituatioa In August, is not so complete as we would make it now, because now we have again and again stated — and I think it Is stated here somewhere too — that we do not envisage or endorse any attempt at a solution by military means. Another ambiguity is: "does not threaten or occur11. That is exactly the point where .what I have Just said should be brought out, that is to say, that if they start a military operation we regard it prima facie as a case of civil war. There is a third observation which I think should be made, and that is that this is also the point where, I think, a reference to the constitutional situation discussed by Mr» Quaison-Sackey last time is in order. Obviously, even if a military step would not in itself be regarded as constituting a step in the direction of or implying civil war, that could only be said to apply If the authorities undertaking it undertook it within the terms of the J,oi fondamentale. However, the President has no authority in that respect under the Loi fondamentale, and under such circumstances I would regard it also legally not as an act In maintenance of law and order but legally as an act of a civil war character* NR/mrm 7 (The Secretary-General)

That is to say, summing up my reaction to your question, I find this sentence insufficient and even a little dangerous, as it can be read in the wrong direction. It should be clarified that certainly, if action is taken tAttalde the framework of the lot fondamentale, any military initiative would be considered as implying a step of a civil war character, and further anything which at present meant an attempt to solve the internal political problems by military means would also have to be regarded as an act of civil war, that is to say, something that should be resisted by us.

Mr, JHA (India): Mr. Secretary-General, we have had some time to think over the issues raised by the communication to you from Mr. Kasa-Vubu. Vie feel that we should be very careful in sending a reply to him. He is raising some very fundamental issues relating to the entire role of the United Nations in the Congo, We suggested postponement on the last occasion, partly because of this reason and partly because we have offered Indian troops . As you will recall, in the letter which I sent to you on behalf of my Government we made it clear that our forces were not to be used for taking sides in internal conflicts in the Congo. Some sort of reply has to be given to Mr. Kasa-Vuvufs letter* Of course, I have not a draft or anything, but I would like to be as precise as possible • I think the reply should really begin with what is contained in the last paragraph of your draft letter, that is to say, that the United Nations, not only in General Assembly resolution 1615 but throughout the consideration of the Congo situation, has expressed itself in opposition to a military solution of the problems of the Congo and has emphasized the need for solution by peaceful means, by conciliation and negotiations. I think we could make this a starting point and say that the contents of the letter of President Kasa-Vubu really point to an intention to try to settle the conflicts in the Congo by military means, and to that extent it would not be in consonance with thfc United Nations Intentions, and naturally you could not endorse any such action. Having said that, I should like to submit to you what our understanding of the United Nations resolutions IS. Let us take the first resolution of Ik July I960, which in operative paragraph 2 says: NR/rarn 8-10 (Mr, Jha. India)

"Decides to authorize the Secretary-Ctenaral to take the neceseary cteps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of Ihe Cionc to provide the Government with such military assistance, as u/iy "be necsflsary«.,n and BO on. 11 (Mr. Jha, India)

Now, the words used are "authorizes the Secretary-General" • The Secretary-General is not bound; he has to use his discretion. The Congolese Government cannot expect that they can have the Secretary-General or his forces in the Congo at its beck and call. Authorization does not mean compulsion. Discretion is necessarily vested in the Secretary-General and, of course, that discretion is to be exercised in conformity with the intentions of the United Nations as expressed in its resolutions* The resolution of 9 August stated the following: "the United Nations force in the Congo will not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise". (S/W*g6, Page 2) Then the General Assembly resolution of 20 September stated the following: "Requests the Secretary-General to continue to take vigorous action iu accordance with the terms of the aforesaid resolutions and to assist the Central Government of the Congo in the restoration and maintenance of law and order throughout the Territory of the Republic of the Congon. (lft7k (ES-IV)) In the resolution of 21 February the previous resolutions were reaffirmed. That resolution also stated the following: "Urges that the United Nations take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including arrangements for cease-fire, the halting of all military operations, the prevention of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort". And then, as you have pointed out, in resolution l6CO (XV) there is a very useful provision which calls upon the Congolese authorities to desist from attempting a mlD.itary solution of their problems and to resolve theu by peaceful means. Now these resolutions lay down the precise terms and conditions of the authorization to the Secretary-General in paragraph 2 of the resolution of l*f July. The resolution of the Security Council of 21 February goes further and tells the Secretary-General that in certain circumstances he must intervene, with ;he use of force, if necessary, to prevent a civil war and to halt military operations . It seems to us that the request made by President Kasa-Vubu, the first of which is directed against the army in Katanga and which calls upon the United Nations to arrest the so-called illegal army and to place the captured personnel at the HG/pm 12 (Mr, Jha, India) disposal of the Government in Leopoldville, is not really contemplated in the resolutions of the Security Council and of the General Assembly. Although there is a great deal in what Presi'-derrt Kasa-Vubu says — that here is a diesideut Government, more or less a rebel from the Central Government which set up its own army — so far as the United Nations is concerned, it cannot have mopping up against this army and hand over the captured people to the t Lecjxldvllle authorities. The f teat communication aims at action against the Stanleyville army which, according to Mr, Kasa-Vubu, is a private militia without any lawful authority. Now, there may be different opinions. Actually our information is that it is a part of the ANC which has gone over to Stanleyville , They may, of course, have her* Ta^. position is that this sort of action would land not only le but the United Nations in a civil. -war, and this is entirely contrary to the purposes of the Security Council resolution of 21 February. The second communication, of course, really raises a hypothetical question* President Kasa-Vubu stated the following: nl should very much like to know whether, within the framework of the various resolutions of the Security Council, particularly the resolution of 21 February 1961, and the special agreement of 17 April 1961, the United Nations Force in the Congo could disarm these illegal troops or help me to disperse them and to take all other steps which may be necessary ..." In your draft reply you have already dealt with this point. It wao not disarming it was reorganization. President Kasa-Vubu, in the agreement of 17 April, states it is not to be by arrangement with Stanleyville and other authorities. It seems to me, therefore, that these letters from President Kasa-Vubu have to be replied to very briefly. We should not really go into too much detail. We could certainly say that where it is a question of the legitimate maintenance of law and order we would naturally, as in the past, assist the authorities; but where, under this guise, it is intended to undertake large-scale operations against organized armies, which amount to or could amount to civil war, the United Nations is not only not bound to assist but will be obliged to interpose under the terms of the resolution of 21 February 1961. HG/pra 13 (Mr* Jha, India) Then, of course, we should emphasize to President Kasa-Vubu and advise him.that the entire sense of the United Nations has been to prevent a military solution and to encourage solutions by peaceful means and through conciliation* That would be our line of thinking. But I feel there should be no erobiguity left in the mind of President Kasa-Vubu. Our reply should be quite clear, quite firm, but very brief. I do not think we should enter into arguments with him.

Mr. LOUTFI (United Arab Republic) (interpretated from French): I find muself in agreement with what the representative of India has just stated. I think it would be better not to get into any arguments with President Kasa-Vubu and not to make any interpretations of resolutions which might be a source of reproach to us later. I think that theoretical questions should be avoided as much as possible in any exchanges with President Kasa-Vubu; and I think ,.» that the last paragraph of your reply would, in my view, be almost sufficient by way of reply to him* Perhaps you could tell your Special Representative to explain these things orally rather than putting them down on paper« He could explain these theories orally, and I think that that would be far more diplomatic because, after all, we cannot forecast the future, and I would not want us to embark upon interpretations of resolutions particularly in letters of this kind.

The SIJEREflMY-GEKERAL (interpretation from French): It is for this latter reason that we have confined ourselves to quotations, and simply to quote is somewhat dangerous because there is too great a possibility left open for interpretation of these various quotations in different ways, (contined in English) I am very much in agreement with the whole thinking of Ambassador Jha on this point. Gentlemen, should I interpret your silence as showing that Ambassador Jha has spoken for everybody? HQ/bg

Mr« QUAI90N-SACKBY (Ghana)* I have not intervened "because his point about peaceful means emphasizes my point on a political solution, the calling of Parliament and the re-establishment of legality* I think Ambassador Jha has summed up the various thoughts which we expressed in a preliminary vay last vo-.V:, 16

The SECBETAHY.-GBNSRAL; It would mean, first of all, that we would give the "no military solutions* the lead, and then I would have that followed by some kind of reference to the necessity of action within the terns of the . Loifondaroentale under all circumstances. That cuts out various thinga. Then, after that, following the lead given by Ambassador Jha, we could look at what t.oL/its have to be brought out in order to clarify what this means « what points h«,ve to be brought out from the previous record, from previous resolutions. And then we might leave the rest, as Ambassador Loutfi suggested, to oral comments. That would be a somewhat shorter letter than this one but would cover roughly the same ground, although in another order* And, of course, we would see to it especially ^hat we would avoid the possible misinterpretations in the direction indicated as a risk by Ambassador Adeel. There is one little point I want to mention, not by way of reservation in relation to what has been said but as a comment oft the problem. Mr. Kica-Vubu has his reasons to treat the gendarmerie in Katanga in the way he talks about. We have other reason-:* We have other reasons because that gendarmerie remains a factor which can lead to civil war. If we now take certain steps in relation to the gendarmerie, as we have already done, it will look very much as if we were acting on behalf of the Central Government or, rather, on behalf of Mr. Kasa-Vubu. That is an ambiguity which may be unavoidable but which obviously makes it necessary to make certain rather clear distinctions here, eo that it is made obvious why we act and on what basio we may act. For that reason, I have asked myself whether one should not, in one respect, perhaps broaden the ground covered in the reply, that is, point out that the very cause of forestalling civil war may lead us to certain actions, which later, of course, may be construed in "different ways by others. A concrete example is this: Let us say that in North Katanga one of the gendarmerie units, which obviously nowadays are not too well disciplined, were to -- let us call it -- surrender. What are we to do? We should not make them prisoners, we cannot put them under our own Command, and we cannot let them Just stay there with all their arms and the possibility that they will change their mind and take another stand the day after tomorrow. That is HA/bg 17

(The Secretory-General) to say, we must do something about it if they surrender. My own feeling is that in that situation, without putting them under our Command, and without in any way detaining them, we should say that under such circumstances they have to deposit their arms, because we cannot have them around in any other shape or form, and that further they should agree that a certain number of United Nations officers should join the group and, so to speak, take care of tccou Those would be the two things I would do in a preliminary vay« That would, of course, look very much like disarming them and putting them under United Nations Command* But you can see that the principle is rorjc.-thing entirely different and something that we Lhould do and, I think, cj.-:> perfectly entitled to do, under the resolution?;.* I brought that up first because you may wish to express views on how such a situation should be handled if it arises -- which I do not at all exclude -- and, secondly, you may wish to comment on whether such an alternative should or should not be taken into account when we explain our stand. My reason for tying the two things together is, as you see, that I do not warrt* to write a letter such that, later on, Mr. Kasa-Vubu will coma and say *Well, this is what you tell me, but, after all, you go ahead and do it" — that is to say, *You refuse to take certain actions -- and then, as soon as I do not ask for them, you undertake them*. Those who have had to deal with the political debate in the Congo know very well that that is the kind of distortion which is quite possible. This last point is not a major one, although it is one I wanted to mention* The point of some significance is what we should do if the situation were in fact to arise* I feel fairly certain about my reply, which seoms to make sense, but you may have views on it, I should add that there is, of course, a fundamental difference between people of non-Congolese nationality -- because they are disarmed and detained and evacuated under all circumstances, and there is no discussion about that — and these people of Congolese nationality that we are talking about. 18

Mr« JBA. (India): As you yourself have said Just now, Mr. Secretary- General, there may he two types.of cases. There may he a surrender cf foreigners those who are mercenaries or Belgians -or others' who may he in the regular armed cervices of the Katanga Government. In respect of those people, I think you have already had some experience --.I helieve you have negotiated for . r^petriation with the Governments of the respective countries *- and, so far as 1 inn understand, that is likely to continue to he the process. I do not think that any question of handing over such people to President Kasa-Vubu arises. The . next possibility is that armed forces of Congolese nationality may . eurrsnderv. That is a possibility, although I do not know whether there is any probability of that at. the present time. In that case, what is to be.done?. Tney could be disarmed. Of course, if they surrender, it means they are. t» willing to give up their arms* But are they to be surrendered to President Kasa-Vubu? With all the experience of the killings and tortures that have gone on, I think that it would be very difficult to contempls-te . Buch a situation. If you should be faced with a situation of that.kind, I believe it'-would be a good thing to report it to the Security Council and ask for the Cotuicil's instructions, because it seems to ice that for a temporary : period it might be necessary for the United Nations to tree.t thece people perhaps as refugees and to have camps for them until there is some kind of . • •. final settlement. But I think that that would be a situation serious enough to ask for instructions from the Security Council. That is my own feeling about what should be done if there is any such large-scale surrender, and so on.

The SECHETABY-GENERAL; To clarify my own stand, let me say that as a matter of course I would under no circumstances envisage that they should be handed over to Mr. Kasa-Vubu. They would be our responsibility, and that is the end of it. It is simply that, as I pointed out, we might in that situation have to put in some officers of our own temporarily, and we might have to ask those people to deposit their arms. Those are two concrete measures. HA/bg 19-20

(The Secretary-General)

I quite agree that if this turned out to be a large-scale development — I do not believe that is likely — it would certainly be something that the Security Council might wish to look at, unless we had got the reorganization of the army going on a country-vide basis, because then it should somehow be switched in on that line* I might take this opportunity to mention that according to the latest estimates ve have -- and I think they are correct — there is at present a maximum of 100 mercenaries left, and desertions are a daily occurrence* That is to say, the mercenary problem, as I said the other day, is for all practical •purposes resolved on the basis on which the mercenary group was built up before* There is, of course, the risk that new initiatives will be taken in relation to new countries which are less interested in following our line than those which have been concerned so far* As you know, the two countries that have been most concerned are the United Kingdom and the Union of South Africa, and Loth of them have co-operated fully with us as regards evacuation* I think ve can take some satisfaction from the fact that, although ve will never know how many mercenaries there really were, the problem has been brought down to these rather modest proportions, and that the trend is quite clear* HS/ek 21 (The Secretary"General)

Well, it may be there is such full agreement that we have no need to prolong this discussion at all. That is certainly most satisfactory. Tfcen I would suggest that we revise the.text right away and we eend it out to you in the course of the day so you can have a look at it; and the indications being as clear as they are, I hope we can proceed without having a new meeting. We will Just call around to you and check with you before we send the letter.

Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): I have a small question to ask. It probably would not have been necessary for me to aflk this question had I been punctual in attending this meeting, but I did lose part of the discussion this morning. You might recall that the last time we met I raised some questions about this draft, tind one of the observations you made was that in certain given circumstances the Precident, Mr. Kasa-Vubu, and his authority will be a party to a civil war, in ••-..» which case the United Nations will not be bound to go to his assistance. in fact, we vould have to treat him as part of a civil war. Arioing put of your replies to the questions today, I have this question: would the United Nations be obliged to intervene if Mr. Kaaa-Vubu takej military action against Katanga to reunite the Congo? If BO, would it not be contrary to what you say here in your letter, that the United Nations"has no right to forbid the Central Government to take any action which,by its own means, in accordance with the principles and purposes of the Charter, it can carry through in relation to any province." There would appear to be some conflict between the two.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I think it emerges from the discussion and from what I have said that, at least in my view, also a military Initiative by Mr. Kasa-Vubu in relation to Katanga would have to be resisted by the United Nations, and I would say that this is so for two reasons. It would lead to repercussions which definitely would involve the country in a civil war situation, and, further, his initiative in itself, as he has not the constitutional authority, but only the de facto authority as the leader of one part of the country, would make it a civil war act. There is in my view no contradiction with this statement here, although as I pointed out already to Ambassador Adeel, H3/ek •""•- 22 (The Secretary-General)

this is a bit ambiguous in the context. There is no contradiction, firot of all, because this sentence obviously refers to a Central Government functioning as a Central Government under the Constitution; that is the first point. The second point is that at that stage, and even more now, after the 21 February resolution, it was understood that action to be taken was action to solve the problem not by force, but by peaceful means. Now this is quite clear. If you combine this sentence which dates back to August, in fact, with the general appeal for a peaceful solution and the prohibition of civil war acts, it is quite obvious that the sentence has to be read with the proviso that this can be done without anybody engaging in a civil war initiative, or starting or provoking a civil war act. However, that was said before you came, Mr« Hasan, :

Mr. BASAN (Pakistan): Would it be civil war, Mr. Secretary-General, if the Central Government marched againct a province which chowed secessionist tendencies and disobeyed the Central Government? After all, one of the purposes of the entire United Nations operation in the Congo is to preserve the unity of the Congo*

The gECRETAPY-GEpRAL; Yes — but first of all, on this philosophical point* I do not think you preserve the unity by trying to solve the present internal problem by military means. i think you deepen the rifts within the country. The second point is that there is no Central Government having the country- wide constitutional authority entitling them to suppress rebellions in other places. It is one leader fighting another leader. And the third point is that rightly or wrongly from the point of view of the Congolese, there is now an injunction by the Security Council and by the General Assembly that, first of all, HS/ek 2J

(The Secretary-General)

they should solve their conflicts by peaceful means, and secondly, that the United Nations should intervene against the risk of civil war, and to this last injunction I think one should give a fairly vide interpretation. This is why I gave the reply I gave to you*

Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): Am I to infer, Mr. Secretary-General, that you as the Secretary-General of the United Nations have any doubt about Mr, Kasa-Vubu representing the Central Government of the Congo?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I have n;o doubt at all about Mr, Kasa-Vubu being Chief of State of the Congo, but I am quite sure that as Chief of State of the Congo he has only the prerogatives which are explicitly stated for him in the Loi fondamentale, and they do not include starting a war on anybody in the Congo. That is to say, we have here the ambiguity. In the term "Central Government". As we know, in the debates very many are called "Central Governments'*. I do not think there is any central government in the sense of the Loi fondamentale •> provisions. There is a Chief of State. He has certain rights. He has de facto assumed other rights but to the extent toe has aesuoed other rights vhich are not hio under the Constitirbion, he is not Chief of State nor the Central Government; he Is a political leader, in fact, like other political leaders.

Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): But to suppress a rebellion, I should think, is the privilege and prerogative of any Chief of State, whatever the law may state. It is one of the most fundamental functions of a Chief of State.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; You are now in a field of theory where I am afraid that the Loi fondamentale does not correspond to your theory.

Mr. KGILERUMA (Nigeria): The last paragraph of your draft letter of 16 May has emphasized the need for peaceful means. Of course, this is what is in the minds of all of us, and in connexion with this I would like to ask Just one simple question, that is, have you any official requests, either from Mr. Kasa-Vubu or from other Congolese authorities for assistance, for protection of the political people to convene Parliament, because we are Interested in seeing that Parliament is convened. Therefore I would like to know if any of the Congolese authorities have made an official approach for political protection. HS/efc 24-25

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; President Kasa-Vubu has Indicated his intention to address such a request to us. He did that in the statement you have seen. However, so far he has not addressed a formal request to us. I guess he means that he should wait with that until Parliament is formally convened. On the other hand, Mr, Gizenga has addressed a request for two Etepe neutralization of an area around Kamina base, and protection of Parliament at Kamina base by certain military contingents of the United Nations. Those are the two things we have in hand.

Mr. QJJAISON-SACKEY (Ghana): Actually, I was going to raise these issues which have been raised by the representative of Nigeria, hoping that we had finished the question about the letter.

The SBCRBTARY-GENSRAL;. I think we haVe. We cfin get back to it, of course. BC/cw 26 < Mr. QUAISON-3ACKEY (Ghana): I should like to know whether ve have received copies of any communiques which have teen issued in Coquilhatville or Leopoldville regarding the Coquilhatville conference, so that we nay kaov exactly what decisions have been taken. So far, all the information that I have about the conference has been from Press reports which I have read. Secondly, with regard to the opening of Parliament I should lifte to know whether the Secretary-General, has received a direct request from Mr, Kasa-Vubu, like the one received from Mr, Gizenga, Should we not discuss the matter of the venue of Parliament? I know that this is not yet a live issue, but a request has been received from one of the principal personalities involved in the conflict in the Congo, Hence, it might not be a "bad idea for us to have at least a very preliminary exchange of views on the matter of the convening of Parliament in a neutral place and the kind of protection which might be given to Members of Parliament and their families, both 0s regards their travelling arrangements »» and as regards their living arrangements,. As a member of the Advispry Committee, I would be helped by knowing the thinking on this matter of you, Mr, Secretory- General, and other members of the Committee, I may say that my Government has actually been approached on this question by certain personalities in the Congo, and it has asked me to find out the reaction here* We are definitely in favour of the opening of Parliament in an atmosphere of concord and peace. We. think that if Parliament met in a neutral place, where Members of Parliament would be completely free from molestation either by the civilian population or by various armed units, it would be possible, in the first few days of the session, for it to resolve seme issues, which might pave the way to a better harmonization of views among the Members themselves. We ere therefore definitely In favour of Kamlna base as the venue, subject to what the Secretary-General can tell us about Leopoldville or Stanleyville — or, for that matter, any other place in the Congo, We think that Kamlna would be a good place, because the United Nations has complete control there; there are no warring political factions in the area; and therefore it Is most likely that Members of Parliament who came to Kamlna would be free from any attacks, either civil or military. On the other hand, if the United Nations were in fact in a position to give all the necessary guarantees of protection in Leopoldville, where of course the parliament building is, we should then have to consider the matter in that light.

"f^ BC/cw 27 (Mr. QuaiBon-Sackey, Ghana)

I would point out that, In fact, the area of the Parliament building in Leopoldville is, under article 69 or. article 103 — I am not sure which — of the Loi fondament&le, a neutral area. I think, however, that the issue is not so much the Parliament area, hut the hotels or houses in which tl\e Mcrfpere of Parliament and their families will live; those, too, must be protected,, Thus, it would be helpful if the Secretary-General could give us an indication of the kind of protective measures which could be taken in Leopoldville as against Kamina, That would assist us in making a decision on the matter o Those are my preliminary viewa on the question of the convening of Parliament in a neutral place, and I should like to hear the Secretary-General's comments*

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; We frave receivecf no copies of resolutions adopted at the Coquilhatville meeting. We know roughly what you know, because we also have to base our knowledge on what appears in the newspapers. Of course, it is very doubtful whether the newspapers report correctly; we do not know

exactly what sources they havee There are a few bits and pieces which our man in Coquilhatville has managed to hear, but they are not of a character which, sc to, speak, makes them fundamentally more valuable than what we have read in the Press, For that reason, I consider that we are in a state of great ignoranceo For whatever reason, the people assembled in Coquilhatville have not wished to inform vis, and we have not, as it were, found it appropriate for us to go and ask them. We detach ourselves very much from the conference as such. Regarding the convening of Parliament, I think that it would be easier for us if that were done in Kamina, but our preliminary thinking indicates that we would be perfectly capable of managing it in Leopoldville. In fact, quite a , lot of thought has been given to the situation which would arise in Leopoldville. A memorandum has been elaborated, which General Rikhye has in his pocket; he is now in Leopoldville and will be there for another week or so. The most interesting thing, of course, would be to have the results of his discussions with our people ;Ln Leopoldville, because they have a first-hand knowledge which we do not have. However, if you feel that it would be helpful to see what our BC/cw 28 (The Secretary-General) preliminary thinking on this side has been -•* without checking with the Leopoldville people — I should be happy to give you a suranary pf thoae notes. . They cover, very broadly, the very question you have raised, Mr* Quaiso^-Srtckey. We, too, have felt that the protection of Members of Parliament outside the Parliament area and the protection of their families were the two real problems.

Mra LOUTFI (United Arcb Republic) (interpretation from French): I had . Intended to raise the same question as has Just been raised by Mr. Quaison-Sackey, Like him, I think that if Parliament is to meet it must meet in a neutral place; Members of Parliament nust. be protected; measures must be taken to guarantee the safety of their voyage0 Ify feeling in this regard is reinforced by certain ... events vhich have recently taken place in the Congo, In my opinion, such protection is necessary. Like you, Mr* Secretary-General, I think that Kainina base would be an excellent place, even frcra the geographical point of view; the base is located at a place where Members of Parliament, could be given better protect!on, thus enabling t&em to go there without fear. According to my information, there are Indian troop/3 at the base who could protect It and allow Parliament to meet without incident,

Mr. GEBRE-EQZY (Ethiopia): Since I arrived late, I should like to make known now my Government1 s position on the letter of 16 May* Our position is that no clear-cut, definite and concrete answers should be given, for the reason that that may lead to a civil war. Consequently, we believe that the answers to points (l) and (2) must be drafted in a rather general way so that they will not make possible the undertaking of any war in the Congo, Regarding the answer to point (j), we feel that it is not up to the United Nations to be the constitutional authority for the Congo and to state what are or are not the powers of the Chief of State, SC/cw 29-30 (Mr» Gebre-Egzy, Ethiopia)

As regards the third paragraph of the letter, ve feel that as it is cow drafted, particularly with the inclusion of the quotation, it may do exactly the contrary of what is intended. That is to say, by interpreter;! on tke Congolese authorities may feel that they can un£ert£&e any war in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter. For. that reason, I nuj

any kind of war that will get the United Nations involved more and more0 (Mr* Gebre-Eggyf Ethiopia)

With respect to the matters raised in points 1 and 2 regarding the mercenaries, we feel that the Security Council resolution and the United Nations can talte care of them. We feel that the answers should be given in such a way as to throv back the whole thing to the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, vith emphasis on political conciliation and the meeting of Parliament so that it can decide the future of the country.

The SECRETARY-GENEPAL; I feel that the reactions that you have expressed will be very well taken care of along the lines indicated previously in the debate especially by Ambassador Jha, lines which will serve as the basis for the redrafting of this letter. Specifically, the point you raised regarding paragraph 3 has attracted cjuite some attention, and I think we are agreed that it is dangerous because it is ambiguous. For that reason it will not remain as it now stands. ,* Mr. WIRtTOPRANQTO (Indonesia): I would like to make one brief suggestion with respect to a matter which I think our colleague from Ethiopia and our colleague from India have already mentioned. I would like to add at the end of the. letter some emphasis on the steps that we expect from the Head of State of the Congo in the future. We are now entering a period of cease-fire when there is no bloodshed, according to the latest news from the Congo. That itself is a good sign, but that is not .enough. We expect another step to take place, the convening of Parliament. I do not believe that some leaders in the Congo will follow the philosophy of what in England is known as Her Majesty's loyal opposition. We therefore still expect some opposition if there is a meeting of Parliament, I would like to stress most strongly that the Head of State, who now claims many powers for himself, should be the first person responsible if, in the future, there is more bloodshed and killing. In this connexion, I agree fully with the suggestion made by the Ambassadors of Ghana and the United Arab Republic with regard to the convening of Parliament. I think that both parties, the party of Kasa-Vubu and the party of Gizenga, agree that there will be a meeting of Parliament. However, that 32-35 (Mr. Wirjoffranoto, Indonesia) does not mean that there will be no contention and no competition. This matter is not as though there are two men who love the same girl. I believe the position is quite different* The two leaders of the Congo must consider the Congo as the mother and themselves as two sons who have to make sacrifices of personal ambitions in the interest of the mother and for the eafsty of the mother. For this reason I would like to state that because Kaea-Vubu now has so many powers — many countries have recognized him and even the United Nations is dealing solely with him — he has to make some sacrifice in the interest of the countryo I would like to repeat, Mr. Secretary-General, that it would be fruitful to stress at the end of the letter that the Congo leader should follow only democratic methods and should avoid any kind of bloodshed in the future. They have learned a lot, they have bitter experiences, and they have lost many of their sons in the struggle. This should be a kind of guide for the next step in the future.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Is there anything to add regarding ths letter for our guidance? If not, we shall make a new version of it and send it out in a few hours. We shall telephone you to see whether there is anything you would like to discuss. If the new draft turns out to be non-controversial, we shall send it immediately, the sooner the better. If it is in any way controversial, we may have to call on you again in order to give it final approval*

Mr. LOUTFI (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French): I hope that when you have some news of the Coquilhatville conference you will convene a meeting in order to see what can be done with regard to tte meeting of Parliament.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: As soon as we have some trustworthy information from Coquilhatville, we shall let you know. I assume that this will call for a meeting of the Advisory Committee. TL/mh 36

Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana)s I am sorry, Mr. Secretary-General, to spsek when we all want to be on cur way, but there is a rumour which got to me ' end which I thought I must raise here, and that is that there was a clash somewhere in South Kasai and that 'this involved ANC troops from Stanleyville and Kalonj lets', &nd that Nigerian troops disarmed the ANC troops from Stanleyville. This seemed to me a horrible rumour, I know that the Nigerians are in North Katanga, but I thought I must raise the question here because the rumour is circulating. I would like to know exactly whether or not in fact there has been any clash in North Katanga, or whether people are confusing North Katanga with South Kasai.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; For South Kasai anyway the story is absurd because there are no Nigerians there, in the first place, and secondly, because, to our knowledge, there are no ANC troops from Stanleyville in that area either. What has happened in South Kasai is- on entirely different matter, and that is that after Port Prancqui we made, as you may know, a regrouping, because the units we had in Bakwanga were so weak as to be dangerously exposed. For that reason the military command switched over to a kind of containment operation. I am not happy with it, and we will see what we can do in order to get back into control of Bakwanga, mainly in order to keep the whole situation under control. I do not recognize any incident in North Katanga which can possibly be interpreted in the way you indicate. That is all I can say.

Mr* HASAN (Pakistan): There is one other small question, Mr. Secretary-General. Is there any truth in the press report that Gizenga is building up forces on the frontiers of Kasai?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; We have no information to that effect.

Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): But you have seen the press reports? / •

TL/mh \ 37

SECRETARY-GENERAL; I have seen the press reports, but we have 110 Infom'ation to that effect. As you heard the other day from General F.ikhye, farther north, that Is to say on the border of Equateur, both sides have fairly strong groups. But there is no new development, They are stable; but a little bit stronger than we like them to be, on both sides.

The meeting roae at 11*50 a«m. CONFIDENTIAL Meeting No. 50 27 toy 1961 ENGLISH .

UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CONGO

Meeting at United Nations Headquarters, New York,' on Saturday, 2J May 1961, at 10.56 a.m.

In the Chair: The Secretary-General Members: Canada Mr. RITCHIE Ceylon Mr. EDWARD Ethiopia Mr,. GEBRE-EGZY Federation of Malays MT..ZAKARIA Ghana , ... , Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY

Guinea . ;

India Mr.;JHA Indonesia Mr. WIRJOFRANOTO Ireland Mr* BOLAND Liberia Mr. BARNES Mali Mr. TRAORE Morocco Mr. TABITI Nigeria Mr. NGILERUMA Pakistan Mr. HASAN Senegal Sudan Mr. EL SANOUSI Sweden Mrs. ROSSEL Tunisia Mr. CHKT.T.T United Arab Republic Mr. LOUTFI HG/rd 2-5

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: As you know, the reason for this meeting is that we have felt in the Secretariat that we would need your advice regarding the way in which we handle the issue of the Parliament in the Congo. You have received - and bove studied certainly «• the two documents which refer to this question* One is the statement made by President Kasa-Vubu and the other one is the message received from Mr. G-izenga. From the two gentlemen in question we have not received anything more; that is to say, so far no direct act convening Parliament has been issued, nor have we received, in a formal sense, any request for detailed measures beyond what is implied in Mr. Gizenga!s message. We have obviously a major responsibility in this matter to use our means as well as we can in order to further an early convening of Parliament. I would say we have, however, beyond that another responsibility, and that is to do so in a form which is productiva on the CoagoXese scene; tnat is to Bay, which creates the best possible conditions for a successful operation by Parliament, and also which is in line with what the United Nations should stand for, and thus be in the best interests of this Organization itself. I would not like to venture myself at this stage of the discussion into any- concrete conclusions or even into any theoretical conclusions, but I feel that by way of Introduction eome rather obvious observations should be made concerning the legal situation facing us* Let ue start with President Kasa-Vubu and his declared intentions. According to the Loi fondamentale it is obviously one of the prerogatives of the Chief of State to convene Parliament. I guess that different views may be expressed regarding the question whether he can do so without the counter-signature of a member of the legitimate and legal Central Government. My own inclination would be to read the Loi fondamentale so that such counter-signature is necessary in order to meet the full requirements of form established in the Loi. However, it may be said that, as far as circumstances at present permit, President Kasa-Vubu, if he convenes parliament, would be acting within the limits of his prerogatives and that thus his decree from our side should be regarded as a most valuable and important element in our action. If such a decree to convene Parliament is accepted by the Parliamentarians even without counter-signature, we have nothing to worry about. If it is challenged because of a lack of counter-signature, we are, of course, facing an imperfection at least in the legal situation* BHS/bg 6

(The Secretary-General)

Let us now turn to the situation of Mr. Gizenga. It Is first of all clear from the Lot fondamentale that the head of the Government Is not authorized to convene Parliament. That is true of the President of the Council himself and it is necessarily also true of the one who, in accordance with hie own interpretation of the situation; regards himself as automatically having succeeded as the President of the Council of Ministers, However, obviously Mr. Gizenga himself regards the situation in a different light. I suppose he does so on the basis of his previous decree that President Kasa-Vubu is no longer in office and that the leadership of the State has been taken over by the Conseil d'Etat. Such a declaration by Mr. Gizenga is, of course, open to ' different interpretations. It can be an act which is considered by himself as' outside the law, a kind of de facto intervention in the situation. If so, of course, it has to be looked at as a de facto ^element with whatever effect it' can have because of his effective control of Parliament. It is, in a sense, an insurrectionary movement and, in' a sense, perhaps a kind bf secessionist move. However, he may also, and perhaps more likely, look at It as an emergency measure under the Loi fondamentale. The Fundamental Law opens certain possibilities in such a direction. But then we must remember that r Mr. Lumumba himself took a similar decision in September and that this decision was declared non-valid by Parliament, and a Parliament which, as you know, had what I guess should be regarded as a pro-Lumumba majority. This has to be taken into account in an evaluation of Mr. Gizengafs move* I leave the conclusions to you, but it is quite obvious that these facts, which I mention to you off the cuff -- it is not a prepared legal opinion — have to be taken quite seriously when we decide on the form of approach to the various gentlemen and the line we are pursuing. I would not like us to run into a conflict where we would either, so to say, de facto interpret constitutional law in a sense which would mean an interference in their internal affairs, nor would I like us to act in a way which would be open to the charge and the challenge that it is in conflict with the legalities of the situation. BHS/bg 7.10 (The Secretary-General)

We have the question of the convening of Parliament, the question of the place to b<5 chosen, the question of the security measures to be taken by the United Nations, the question of how to reach agreement on those security measures, and we have further questions which are none of our direct concern but which are obviously very much in the line of our interest, namely, what would be the natural and iniuadiats purpose of Barlicinent if and when it meets. -What I have said so far ie, as I said, only by way of introduction and by way of a general background. It does not pretend to be in any sense authoritative. It is just natural observations which I hope may be helpful in the further discussion, which I hope will give us guidance in our own actions in the next few days and weeks., I should perhaps mention, bub I do not want to go into any of the details, that the question of the seat of Parliament ia to a certain extent influenced " ' ,* by legal considerations* We can perhaps revert to that matter later. However, I believe that practical end political considerations are more important than legal considerations as regards the question of the place* If practical and political considerations lead to certain conclusions, I believe that in the somewhat dim land of legality in the Congo, the members of Parliament may themBelvee agree, and if they agree, we can forget about formalities.

Mr» QtaiSQN-SACKEY (Ghana): May I say that I am very chary of intervening immediately after your exposition. I am doing so because, knowing that we were going to discuss this very matter, I have given consideration to it very carefully, and therefore,I feel bound to intervene at this juncture to state as objectively as I can the views of my Government on this question. In our opinion, the time has come when the Advisory Committee, which is advising the Secretary-General on the Congo situation, should seize this responsibility and give him as objective a view as possible on the question of the convening of Parliament. At the moment everything in the Congo is illegal. This is borne out by the speech of Mr. Kasa-Vubu himself, when he said, "I hope that the convening of Parliament will mean not only a return to legality but alqo a rebirth of the life of our peoples". TL/pm . . U ' •'•'-" (Mr» Quaison-Sackey! Ghana) It means then that what we should do Is to try to'help all those in the Congo to be reconciled in the matter of the convening of Parliament. It is true f • . that the Head of State can call Parliament, but it is also true that in the Loi fondamentale it is provided that Parliament'can meet as of right. There Is en article in the Loi fondamentale which says that Parliament can meet as of right on 20 March and on 20 September every year unless it is convened earlier by the Head of State. This means tiiat Members of Parliament can decide at any r time, when the dates of meeting arrive, to meet without any prompting by the Head of State. This action can be taken by the President of the Chamber of Representatives and by the President of the Senate, consulting on this matter. '•- However, the situation has been such that these two men— or at least one of them — have found it impossible to'get Parliament t'o meet. I am referring to Mr. Kaeongo, who is the President of the Chamber of Representatives. The other : person concerned is Mr. Ileo, who la President of the Senate. While prior to Mr,~IleoTs appointment illegally as Prime1 Minister, Mr. Okito, was supposed to' act, Mr. Okito at the moment is but 6f the scene'— he has been killed. To sum up on this matter of legality and practicability as to who must call Parliament, our view is that it is'impossible for Parliament*to convene because there has been a crisis of confldenc'e^ so that there:'haB been suspicion among ••• the Members of Parliament 'and even if'the Head of State drills 'Parliament he will be hard put to have Parliament convened unless proper arrangements are made for all Members of Parliament to agree to come together. When we were in the Congo as the Conciliation Commission, we went into this matter. I know very well the attempt made, particularly by Mr» Adoula and Mr, Kasongo, to prepare lists of all Members of Parliament in the country. At the moment I cannot give you a detailed account of what transpired in connexion with the preparation of these lists, but it was discovered that out of 137 Members of Parliament in the Chamber of Representatives, only 69 could be brought in to meet at any moment of time. Maybe the situation has changed. Summing up on this, I want to impress upon 'the Advisory Committee, and upon you, Sir, that the issue is not who calls Parliament, the issue is that Parliament should meet. If'it is possible for Mr. Gizenga, Mr, Kasa-Vubu and Mr. Ileo *-• all of them -- to agree to have Parliament convened, I think we should regard that as a blessing.

Ji TL/pm 12 (Mr» Qualson-Sackey, Ghana) The decision to call Parliament of course must be related to the venue of Parliament, and that la where the second point of my intervention comes in, I have gone through the preliminary suggestions for certain particular steps which might be considered in connexion with the arrangements relating to the convening of Parliament, prepared, I suppose, by a member of the Secretariat« I see that the suggestions are confined only to the Leopoldville area and that nothing has been done to indicate to us whether other places in the Congo could be considered* May I say here that in our view the base of Kamina will be the proper place to have Parliament meet* We say this, of course, subject, as I said last time, to any other expert advice that can be given in this regard* Our view is fortified by the suggestions which are contained in this paper. The suggestions indicate that If Parliament is convened in Leopoldville, the United Nations will have a Job to do to safeguard Members of Parliament and their families and also the civilian population. In fact, it seems that it is going to be an uphill task for the United Nations to be able to control the cityr to control the bars and restaurants. Indeed, it is going to be a very huge task for the United Nations to ' - 11 -' - -i ....':. . ' . prepare the ground in Leopoldvtlle, We must, not forget that In Leopoldville there is a large concentration of people of a particular tribe, the Bakongo tribe, who are particularly loyal to one group of politicians in the Congo, and therefore, even if measures are taken, Leopoldville will be what it is: there are bound to ba Incidents here and there. It might mean that United Nations troops will be sent to quell a riot, even to use measures of force In quelling disorders* On the other hand, if Kamina is chosen, there we have an atmosphere of tranquillity, there we have complete control by the United Nations already of the place/ and therefore there is no civilian population to deal with. Secondly, the need for complete elimination of suspicion and the crisis of confidence at which X have hinted should decide whoever is going to advise the Congolese to choose a place where they can meet in complete confidence without any fear at all from anywhere* That is why in our opinion Kamina would be a good place. Our concrete suggestion which we wish to offer is that the Secretary-General get one or two people -- I em always referring to one or two people because I have in mind Mr* Nvokedi and Mr. Gardiner — to do the silent prodding behind the scenes, to talk with Congolese leaders — especially with Mr. (JiSanga, Mr. Kaaa-Vubu, Mr. Ueo, Mr* Bomboko and Mr, Adoula — and try to explain to them the essential TL/pm 13-15 (Mr , Quaison-Sackey, Ghana) nature of the security which they are requesting from the Secretary-General. If the views I have expressed regarding Kamina are,correct, there la no reason why they should not be able to advise the leaders to choose Kamina for the obvious reason of eliminating suspicion and misinterpretation « because in this matter I do not think we should range ourselves behind this particular leader or that particular leader. I think statesmenship is required, objectivity is required, and we should not choose Leopoldville because one leader thinks Leopoldville is the place, nor should we choose Kamina, of course, because another leader thinks Kamina the proper place. We should view the matter, I repeat, in a more objective manner. Sir, I seem to have rambled a bit, but I am very clear in my own mind that if we approach this matter sincerely and objectively, a solution will be arrived at which will make it possible for the Parliament of the Congo to meet in an atmosphere of peace and amity. BC/db l6

The SECRETARY-GENERALs Just to avoid any ml sunder standing, I would make It clear that if I have considered It useful to make these observations on the varying degrees of legality or illegality in the actions taken by the two gentlemen, that is not in any way because I make the convening of Parliament dependent on this: it is because it necessarily has a certain influence on the form in which we approach the different gentlemen* who are very wary and jealous of each otherf as vc know. We are acting in a slightly competitive situation, where we have to break through inhibitions and avoid creating new complications by false moves» For that reason it is wise to keep in mind what arguments they can put up in favour of something which may prove an obstacle. \fy Interest in the legal aspect does not go beyond that very meagre point.

Mrft JHA (India): Before making my observations, I should like to ask the Secretary-General whether he has any information as to whether the substance of the communication addressed by Mr, Gizenga to -the United Nations is also a matter of discussion between Mr« Gizenga and Mr, Kasa-Vubu. I believe that there have been some indirect contacts between them, and I am wondering whether the Secretary-General has any Information to the effect that Mr. Gizenga has put out feelers about holding the session of Parliament in Kamina,

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; We have no knowledge about such approaches, or, in general, about the substance discussed in the contacts between Leopoldville and Stanleyville.-

Mr. JHA. (India): I would therefore assume, from the following statement in Mr, Gizenga1s communication to the United Nations: *».•! should be obliged if you would do everything in your power toi *(l) Send the units of the above-mentioned countries to Kamina, ' (2) Facilitate the holding of the debates by ensuring the complete safety of all Members of Parliament11 (S/^Bll, pp. 1 and g), that there Is really no negotiation on this matter between the parties. Several points have been raised; the representative of Ghana has already dealt with some of the matters which I wished to mention. The position is that BC/db . . IT (Mr. Jha, India) the General Assembly, in resolution l6oQ (XV), urged: ".•.the convening of Parliament without delay/ with safe conduct and security extended to the .Members of Perlioment by the United Nations..*1*. It. thus becomes an obligation on the part of the United Nations to arrange for the security and safe conduct of the Members of Parliament. Furthermore, in his speech of 12 May, Mr. Kasa-Vubu said: "I BhaJJL seek assistance from the United Nations in order to facilitate travel by all Members of Parliament required to attend the session and to ensure that they en^oy, in addition to the privileges conferred upon them by the Fundamental Law, every guarantee for their, personal safety, and that of their families*4 Then, as I. have already stated, there is a communication from Mr. Glzenga. It seems to me that in those circumstances the United Nations does in some way become the focus of reconciliation of Different points of view with regard to the convening of Parliament,.and also that,its responsibility for safe conduct and security is more or less reinforced from all quarters* As regards the authority which,should, convene Parliament, we .think that, whatever may be the provisions of the.fundamental Law, it is most desirable that Parliament should, meet* .The end result: — ..that is, the .meeting of Parliament — is 'so important that we should .not argue too much about who convenes Parliament. As I have said, the important thing is. that Parliament should be convened. So far :as we are concerned, we should welcome the .convening of Parliament by President Kasa-Vubu* At the same time, however, the circumstances in which . Parliament -should meet are very important. Now, in the normal course, Leopoldville would be the venue of Parliament. But many things have happened during the last nine or ten months. Many Members of Parliament have been executed or arrested. In fact, in the.Congo today the

dominant feeling must be that it is a great liability to be a Member of Parliamentf Furthermore, we have had the recent example of Mr. Tshombe's arrest in Coquilhatville; that was also an instance of a group of soldiers arresting someone who came to a conference. It;.IB not a question of whether Mr. Tshombe is a good or a bad .man. The point, is.that as this sort of thing continues everyone naturally begins to fear for his safety and begins to wonder whether he

I BC/db 18 (Mr* Jba, India) can really participate vith the elementary freedoa which must be the right of any Member of Parliament or, in fact, any member of a deliberative body* The question ie tbie: Can there be in Leopoldville the necessary freedom from "that apprehension? It seems to us — of course, we are not the final judges in the matter, but, as I said earlier, the United Nations has some Kind of responsibility in the matter of safe conduct and security, and it is therefore probably legitimate for us to express our views and give our advice on the question — that in all the circumstances it is extremely doubtful whether the necessary conditions of freedom and security, the necessary conditions for conciliation, are available in Leopoldville* We must not forget that there are about four thousand ARC soldiers in Leopoldville* If this were a disciplined army, definitive arrangements could be made vith it. But we know from experience that by and large this is not a disciplined army. Different groups of ANC have frequently taken the lav into their own hands and arrested this or that person, molested people, victimized their families, and se? on. Should we, therefore, - assumo that the activities of that army could be contained while Parliament vas meeting? ' • * •' • •',- "' '"-'-• :.•-.•.- •. • . -. , . , ,. Mr* Kasa-Vubu a ays that he vould like to ensure all conditions of personal safety and freedom. We can assume that ha ie sincere in expressing that desire* But the whole history of the Congo shows-that desires cannot be translated into meaningful actions because of the lack of discipline and of control over the army* The next question is this: Can the United Nations guarantee security in Leopoldville? The paper which the Secretary-General has very Kindly circulated — and I assume it is only a tentative document, because it contains prelim!nary suggestions — certainly tries to go into the matter fairly thoroughly* But, in the face of these four thousand ANC soldiers, can the United Nations take the responsibility of stating that it vould be able to guarantee not only security of life, but also those conditions of freedom of movement and freedom of negotiation which are essential to the successful convening of Parliament •• and this refers not only to the discussions going on within the four walls of Parliament, but also to informal contacts and talks outside? It seems to me that that vould be an extremely difficult responsibility to assume* Suppose that a situation should arise in which there vas.a falling cut vith regard to the composition of the

.- -i''! BC/db 19-20 (Mr* Jha, India) government. It la quite possible; that General Mobutu and some faction of tbe army might decide to take the law into their own hands, feeling that if a certain Parliamentarian were eliminated .a solution might be much easier* Those are ,, circumstances which it mightfce-,ver ydifficul t for the -United Nations to eliminate entirely* ; . - Of course, the United Nations can take broad-based measures. I think that the measures mentioned in the document of 25 May are,, by and large, sound, and I do nob criticize them* But I dp think that if the ANC should become hostile . or should want to take the law into its own hands, or -if it were instigated to do so by the Leopoldville regime, it would not be possible for the United Nations, unless it practically took over military control of Leopoldville, to ensure the. security and safety of the Members of Parliament. ; Then, the following question arises: Since the meeting of Parliament IB.BO important; should It not be convened at spine other place -- without, of course, prejudice to the position that when normality is restored Leopold viHe, if it remains the capital; must -naturally be the.: venue of -.Par ligament? A suggestion has been made by Mr, Gizenga that; Kamina shpuld be the, . yen,ue. As the representative of Ghana has, pointed out — and I do not want to repeat his reasons — Kamina is a place where the United Nations could really guarantee , security and safety more effectively. MW/mh ' 21 (Mr» Jha, India)

However, Kamina or any other place mutually agreed upon would be equally suitable, although I think that any other place than Leopoldville would be preferable as far as the United Nations is concerned for the purpose of taking over the responsibility of safe conduct and security. As I said earlier, the United Nations has to take some initiative in this matter because of the resolutions of the General Assembly because of the speech of President Kasa-Vubu, and because of Mr, Gizenga! s communication. Of course, officially and openly, it may make the situation a little bit difficult] but I agr.'o^ that psirhaps consideration should be given in this particular case to the idea of the United Nations officials — whomsoever you may choose as bcj* suited for the purpose — to perform some kind of unofficial mediation batwecua the parties in order to arrive at an agreed venue of the conference. That should be tried first. It seems to me that it is no use having a conference in Leopoldville if the Gizenga group is not able to go there; it is no use convening Parliament there if the Gizenga group does not agree to go to Leopoldville. Secondly, as I said earlier, it will be a heavy responsibility for the United Nations to guarantee those conditions in which Parliament can meet freely, can discuss freely, and roach da^aiona aecep-bable to all c,oncer;ne

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia); I should like to ask one question. Is there a third place where the United Nations could give equal protection? That is to say, if we exclude Leopoldville and if we are not to appear as imposing on one side the choice of the other, is there a third place which the United Nations could suggest where equal protection could be given?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; So far, we have given thought only to Leopoldville and Kamina for the simple reason that those two places have been mentioned. I would say, concerning them, that, as already indicated, the study made of Leopoldville leads us to the conclusion that we can provide protection at Leopoldville, although it does present quite considerable problems of a practical nature. As regards Kamina, it is definitely easier to provide the MW/mh 22 Secretary-General) protection there "because the security problem is much more limited. I suppose that the same conditions as at Kamina might prevail, for example, at Kitona, where we also can close off the area. As I said, we have not studied any other possibilities, but it has been mentioned that one possibility might be to close off the university area in Leopoldville and thus to have the meeting in Leopoldvil but not in the city itself. This is all I can say about it for the monent.

Mr «, BARNES (Liberia) : I am very much heartened by the fact that President Kasa-Vubu has now seen the great need to convene Parliament as a forward step in endeavouring to restore stability and normalcy in the Congo. Resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council have all reflected the great desire for the reconvening of Parliament in an effort to bring about stability to the strife -torn situation in the Congo. ••''.•' •» . My Government has always considered President Kasa-Vubu as the legal head of the Congo and, under the Loi fondamentale, it is within the scope of his authority to convene Parliament. Should we here raise objections or questions as to the legality of his convening Parliament, I think that we ourselves would be defeating our desire to see Parliament reconvened, and I should like it to go on record that the Government of Liberia feels that President K&sa-Vubu is the proper authority to convene the Congolese Parliament. As regards the venue of the meeting of Parliament, Leopoldville is the seat of the Congolese Government and Parliament should normally convene in Leopoldville If it were convened in any other place , it would be an exception to the rule. As we have seen from the letter of President Kasa-Vubu, he wishes to call upon the United Nations to afford security for the meeting of the Members of Parliament, I think, therefore, that it is for the United Nations to advise President Kasa-Vubu as to the desirability of convening Parliament in Leopoldville if conditions will permit the security which may be needed to protect the participants — that is, the parliamentarians. It is rather difficult for us here to compare another place in the Congo with Leopoldville as far as security conditions are concerned, since the preliminary suggestions which have been submitted are concerned only with Leopoldville. If suggestions had been made as to Kamina or Kitona, or any other place where security conditions would be better Mf/mh 23 (Mr. Barnes, Liberia) than In Leopoldville, it would be a different matter, but since It la the United Nations Itself which must provide security for the Members of Parliament, I think It Is within our purview to aok President Kasa-Vubu whether the United Nations would be able to provide the necessary security arrangements for a meeting in Leopoldville. If the necessary safeguards could be provided in Kamina, my delegation would be willing to go along with that. I think that the important thing is the meeting of Parliament, and we should not hammer upon any particular place for any personal or selfish reason. We should take i^wO consideration whatever place In tho Congo where the United Nations is able to provide adequate security. If it is Kamina, we are willing to go along; if it is Leopoldville, we are willing to go along. Therefore, if the Secretary-General is in a position to give us some information as to whether Kamina can offer better security arrangements, We shall be glad to receive this Information in order to be in a position to consider whether we shall support the holding of the meeting in Kamina, or advise President Kasa-Vubu that it should be held in Leopoldville.

The SECRETARY><3ENEPALt ''I have already said that,from our point of view. Kamina offers a security which has much greater possibilities* I would therefore regard that aspect of the question, from our point of view, as a pragmatic one. The difference in advantage, frqn our point of view, is not such that we should make this or that choice of place a condition. We should not add to the difficulties; we should adjust ourselves as best we can to the needs within the range of our possibility. But we should, on the other hand, Indicate clearly where it is easier for us and where, for that reason, we would prefer it in practical terms. We may come back to this because it is very much a question of the approach to the parties concerned. I get a little bit into that field when I try to characterize how I feel we should, from our angle, present the Kamina case. I repeat, we should present in realistic and very frank terms as to the possibilities, without, from our angle, making this or that choice of conditions. MW/mh

Mr« KGtJUSRUriA (Nigeria): In the view of my Government, Mr. Kasa-Vubu IB the legal Chief of State, and my Government would regret very much to see his office challenged by Mr. Gizenga or anybody else. I myself am getting confused in this qonmittee because I see that a legal head of'state, supported by most of the .Governments, is not being allowed to carry out his functions properly* AP/mtm 26

(Mr. Ngileruma, Nigeria)

I do not know whether Mr* Glzenga, when be was making his suggestion that Parliament should he reconvened and Kamlna should he need as the place for Parliament, has discussed the point with the legal Head of State — if Mr. Glsenga has accepted Mr. Kaea-Vubu as the legal Head of State. But If he Is Dot accepting him as the Head pi'./^tate and he is challenging hia poet, this is a different matter altogether. And as I eey, the Head of State, Mr» Kasa-Vubu, and Mr. Gizenga all agree to reconvene the Parliament — and ve are also agreed on this point, Now, the question is, where are they going to meet: In Laopoldvllle, In Kamina, or In another place? However, since the United Nations Is working very closely with Mr. Kaea-Vubu as the Head of State, oud he Is co-operating with the United Nations — and we are alwo advirers to the Secretary-General of the United Nations — I would say that tha views of Mr. Kasa-Vubu •.flhoul d prevail. But whether the security in Leopoldvllle or In Kamlna or anywhere else Is easier to handle hy the United Nations, that is a different matter altogether. If in the view of the Secretary-General and of the United Nations the security in Leopoldville Is as easy as anywhere else, then I would say that Parliament should meet, at least for the first time in Leopoldvllle. And when Parliament meets, the United Nations should provide protection for members of Parliament and for their families; at that meeting it should he left for the members of Parliament to decide where the future venue of Parliament will he* Whether they will meet in Leopoldvllle or whether they will choose another place, in my view, should be left entirely to them; it is purely a political matter. But at the moment, as ve have mentioned on many occasions, the Congolese need guidance, and one of our main duties is to advise them properly. At this juncture the Head of State needs a good deal of our support. When he was not co-operating with the United Nations, of course, we were not co-operating with him although we were very anxious to see that peace and tranquillity should he brought to the Congolese. We had In the back of our minds the lU million Congolese. But now he himself has come to co-operate with us, and therefore if we ourselves tried to make the situation difficult between Mr* Gizenga and Mr* Kasa-Vubu by giving some doubts to Mr* Gizenga that he could be given a chance to reconvene the Parliament, I think that we are thus contributing to the Congolese confusion. AP/mtm 2j

I think the Gardiner-Nwo'kedi agreement, signed under their delegations, began some- -very good work. My friend .from Ghana Jias mentioned that this delegation should continue and I entirely support his. .view because Mr* Nwokedi and Mr* Gardiner have gained the confidence of the Congolese. _ I vould say that * one of their duties might be to reconcile Mr. Kasa-Vubu and Mr. Gizenga,.-at;ffc*£st behind the "ecenes . It is very^lffiportant for them, being respected persons who.; enjoy "the confidence of the Congolese, that they should try to bring together .t

Mr. Kasa-Vubu and Mr. Gizehga, because both of them now are taking the same :; . view> they are both agreed on the reconvening of Parliament; -but they need some guidance on whether they are going to meet in Leopoldville or in Kamina or. somewhere '«lse » For this reason I support the view that they should be brought.

together. , - • ;,-• __...... -.y

I would again say that they should meet in Leopoldville for the first time :?»-.

if the- United Nations considers that the protection in Leopoldville is just as 0. easy in Kamina or anywhere else, then it must be left entirely. to them to make ... : their own views. •'••- '...-- • ;-..•;.••;: v ,: . ..r .... . •;-.>.-•- -.• •- •. , . .. . .^^

Mr. Mamadou TRAORB ^Mali) (interpretation. from tranch): .At this moment the Advisory Oommitee is dealing with -a major problem, namely, the of convening parliament* -"Therefore), ve are ; in duty bound to give objective .-

advice to the secretary-General on this . matter v> - ;:; ... - . •< ,; ; ,., . .. - Fortunately — and I want to stress this point — Mr. Kasa-Vubu and Mr. Glzenga have at the same time asked for the convening of Parliament. . Those.

who' have spoken before me have, -I think, sxifficlently drawn the attention of :.,;.: this Committee to the circumstances surrounding the convening of Parliaments they have also stressed a number of elements which I think to be very important and which should warrant consideration by us in view of the circumstances. I also want to recall the fact that my Government has always recognized Mr. Gizenga as Chief of State and Chief of Government, The United Nations has recognized Mr. Kasa-Vubu. The Secretary-General has stressed, as far as the convening of Parliament is concerned, the fact that there is a type of understanding or agreement on the part of these two gentlemen. I believe that this type of . agreement is somewhat watered down by the fact that Mr. Gizenga has not suggested Stanleyville but Kamina for questions of security and efficiency. But, Mr. Gizenga could have chosen Stanelyeville. AP/mtan 26-30

• •>- (Mr. Mamadou Traore,T Mall) I think that If Parliament IB to meet In Loepoldville, that indicates once again that it vould be tending.to Mr. Kasa-Vubu's sidej and,as I said, we must be objective in our consideration. Therefore, on behalf of my Government I tend rather to choose Kainina because I believe that Leppoldvllle 10 the centre of the Bakongo group vhlch supporta Kaoa-Vubu. In order to avoid a return to that problem which has already ciaieed uc co much trouble in the past, I feel that Kamlna could be the provisional seat, of Parliament, as Mr. Gizenga has suggested. There is another point which seems important; the choice of Kamina would avoid diesensions again between Leopoldvllle and Stanleyville — and this Is a matter which Is Important and should be borne in mind — and equally it will allow, if we choose Kamlna, ue to reaffirm the authority of the Central Government over the entire territory of the Congo, because with respect to Katanga, Katanga has rebelled against .the unity of the Congo. ,1 repeat, the choice of Kamlna will allow us ones more to reaffirm the authority of the Central Government over the entire Congo, which is a point that the United Nations has always maintained. On behalf of my Government, we'prefer to choose Kamina. I was very happy to hear the Secretary-General say that conditions were better in Kamina. This is our opinion, too, and that is why my Government certainly supports the idea of a neutral zone of 100 kilometres around Kamlna for the holding of Parliament. We do not reject the proposal of our friend.from Ghana, Mr. Quaison-Sackey, vho has asked for a new mission of Nwokedl-Gardiner to carry out some type of conciliation and contacts which may lead to the convening of Parliament there.

i NR/mrm 31

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia) i Prom the viewpoint 6f security and ''•"*• impartiality, that is to say, from the viewpoint of making the result acceptable to all, I think that the request tliat Parliament should be convened in Kamina is • • • ^ • f not unfair. I think it id eminently fair in principle; But what I myself would like to do IB what was suggested by the representative of Ghana, ' ' Mr. Quaison-Sackey, that is, to leavs it to your two -member delegation, Mr. Gardiner and Mr. Nwokedi, to make contact to see whether Mr. Gizenga and ' President Kasa-Vubu would be agreeable to Kamina or/ as I said earlier, another • place. It may be that President Kasa-Vubu will say, ttLook, I want Leopoldville , and you want Kamina. Now let us accept what Mr. Gardiner arid Mr. Nwokedi ; suggest «" It is possible. So t would say that we could leave it to them, It seems to me that the important thing is how to bring off the agreement rather than insist on one place or the other. Prom th$, point of view of the

Ethiopian Government, we should be very happy to see it in Kamina; because we ' do not have our troops there and do not have to guard it, and BO we would not be involved. But I think the most important thing is how to bring about? the agreement of the two. So I would say, let us leave it to the two gentlemen and see what " they can make out of it", but we are quite prepared to support the convening at Kamina...... - .

The SECHffilAKr^ERERAIit I think the two gentlemen rightly can ask for »."''. i ..-'.' j • • , • • • ' ~ ' • - - \ •*• some guidance, and that is what we are trying to elaborate.

Mr. LOTJTFI (JJnited Arab Republic) (interpretation from French): I have already, at our last meeting,' made known the position of' my delegation on this point and I only want to add a few words to that. What is important here -- and a number of my colleagues have already stressed this — is that the Parliament be convened, because we have United Nations resolutions, specifically that of the Security Council of 21 February last and that of the General Assembly of April last, calling on us to make all efforts towards the reconvening of Parliament. A second condition which is mentioned in the resolution is the security of the members of Parliament. This condition must, of course, play a great role in the choice of the place for the meeting of NR/mrm 52

(Mr, Loutflf United Arab Republic)

Parliament. Prom what you tyive stated with regard to Leopoldville, I realize that there are difficulties there. In your statement you have said that the question of security of members of Parliament cannot be assured. In these circumstances I feel that, as you yourself have said, it would be better for Parliament to meet in Kaasina, where security can be afforded by the United Nations more easily. In Leopoldviile, boo, there is a danger of clashes between United Nations troops and those of the ANC and certain tribes in that area. This could be avoided in a place like Kamina. I agree with the proposal .made "by the representatives of Ghana, India and Mali that Mr, Gardiner and Vds colleague should contact the two parties and try to reach common ground on the convening of Parliament, This should of course be done as soon as possible, because we have resolutions that have been awaiting implementation for seven or eight months, and this matter should be pushed ahead aa rapidly as possible. . •'

. Mr, RITCHIE (Canada) t . !5o far as my Government is concerned, we do not have any doubts about the power of Mr, Kasa-Vubu, as Head of State, to convene Parliament. We also agree, as Ambassador Jha has put it, that the United Nations could serve as a sort of focus of conciliation in this matter. The same thought has been expressed by others, including the representative of Ghana. We believe that much could be done behind the scenes to make it certain that both parties should be represented and that,Mr. Glzenga should come to Parliament. On the other hand, of course, Mr. Kasa-Vubu and his supporters have also to come to Parliament,, It is encouraging at least that, from their different aspects and angles, the two sides are, agreed upon one thing, that is, the necessity that Parliament should now be convened. I think it is unfortunate that Mr, Glzenga, in his letter of 16 May, should have registered a decision on his part that Kamina should be the site of the next session of Parliament, because unfortunately that rather gives the impression that Kamina is Mr, Gizenga's choice and that by meeting at Kamina you in some way by implication recognize his general authority; I mean, that Is what might be read into it. That is one difficulty. On the other hand, as we see, President Kasa-Vubu, in his speech of 25 May, a copy of which we have before us, speaks of convening the Parliament at Leopoldville. So the two positions have been, as it were, staked out, and this is a complicating factor. NR/mr„«/ m 33• • '*•••- (Mr* Ritchie, Canada)

Leopoldvllle would, of course, be the normal .place for Parliament to meet, and it would be certainly a sign of progress in the Congo •- an encouraging sign • if all the. parties were able to come to the capital, and it would register some progress in the preceding negotiations and, in fact, some hope for the future. • • •' . •'>>. Besides this, Leopoldville is to some extent the symbol of the unity of the

Congo.— (it is the capital — and we certainly do not want to see tendencies in the Congo encouraged which derogate from that principle of unity. So in general ..; I think that Leopoldville would be the preferable place. That brings us to the criterion of security. Apparently it is thought In a preliminary way by the United Nations authorities that it would be possible to safeguard the security of the members of Parliament in Leopoldvllle but that it would be a more difficult Job, That is obvious in a large city, with all the possibilities of trouble that there might be. S6 that is a real consideration I think our view would be that in any event It would be a great pity if the summoning of Parliament were to be delayed by a squabble over where it should meet. If it is possible to have it in Leopoldville and if it is possible to Induce Mr. Gizenga to see that as a solution, that would be the optimum one. If not, I am inclined, like the representative of Ethiopia, to think in terms of some third place. I am rather attracted by the suggestion thrown up by the Secretary-General, that you could perhaps close off the university quarter of Leopoldvllle, if that simplified the security problem, I think it would be interesting to look into that. But I think that the next step must be, as has been suggested here, that the different parties in the Congo should be approachad behind the scenes by the senior representatives of the United Nations concerned, with the aim of not allowing this question to be ,built up into something which delays the summoning of Parliament, and I must admit a general preference for Leopoldville if the security question can be satisfactorily solved.

Mr. BOIAND (Ireland): I find myself in the happy position of agreeing with most of what everybody else has said. I think that we all feel that, in discussing this question of the reconvening of the Parliamnt in the Congo, we are approaching a vital milestone in the history of the United Nations operation in the Congo. (Mr. Boland, Ireland)

I agree vith what Ambassador Loutfi said: the supreme objective is that Parliament should meet. That is something that is not only enjoined upon uo by the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council; it is something that is in the supreme interests of all of us and of the United Nations, because once Parliament mee^s it will make it possible for the Congo to return to legal authority and constitutional government, and many of the differences which have divided us here and which have dogged the United Nations operation in the Congo from the start will be resolved. HO/bd 36 •»..''..'. • (Mr. Boland, Ireland)

As other speakers have said, .it is really most gratifying and encouraging that both Mr. Gizenga and President Kasa-Vubu agree pn the point that the Parliament should be convened* As you have said, Mr* Sepretary-General, there are difficulties of a legal and constitutional character. We have to*recognize their existence. They exist not only between Mr. Gizenga and President Kasa-Vubu, they'exist between us here* We /take, different views of the legal and constitutional position in the Congo, I agree that we cannot resolve these here. They axe matters which will have to be left to the diplomatic skill of your representatives on the spot, Mr, Secretary-General, and I do not think we should^ attempt to go into them here or make, any positive expressions of opinion on them. They will just have to be dealt with. The. one thing J would say — and I think it will be the feeling of moat of us here •*•- is that these difficulties, great as t£ey are, should not be allowed to stand in the way of .the Parliament, meeting. The supreme objective is that t&e Parliement should meet* wad it will be a matter, I think, for you, Mr, Secretary-General, and your representatives in the Congo to do the utmost that can be done, to ensure that those thing : s are: surmounted and that the Parliament •••••••'•'•" • . ' v.. > .v; .:/, . ; '., . ••••;• is; able to meet,, ,, . , , ..., ,.,. . ., ...:•-. As between Leoppldyille and Kamina as the places of meeting of the Parliament, it eeems to me that we have to have regard to two factors. One is the ease with which United Nations protection can be ensured. That is a matter aleo ; I do not think we can offer you any advice on, Mr, Secretary-General, because you will >e guided mainly by the advice of your representatives on the spot, / The second, factor -which I think we have to bear in mind is the factor of confidence. It is very important, I think, from our point of view that when the, Parliament meets it should meet, on as broadly representative a basis as possible, I think we should be influenced in .choosing or in advising with respect to the site of the meeting of Parliament by the thought that it is very important that everybody should be able to come there with the feeling that they would be safe and that the United Nations guarantees of. protection could be effectuated • in practice* But, once again,.. I £o not think that this is a point —. the choice of Leopoldville pr Kamina --. on which this. Committee can take any kind of firm view or press any firm, view* Once again -— and in this I agree with my colleague HO/bd 37 (Mr, Boland, Ireland) from Canada — I think it would "be our feeling, and I think it vould be the feeling of many members of the Cocnittee, that the question of the site of the meeting should not be alloved to stand in the way of the meeting taking place* < Mr*. WBUOmwcS (Indonesia): After reading the speech of . President Kssa-Vubu, we are given some hope, because it ia a new voice. I notice here that the hostile altitude of Mr0 Kasa-Vubu towards the United Nations operation is decreasing; mid I 'hope, with this speech of President Kasa-Vubu, we will really have a freah start, a fresh start for the restoration and rebuilding of the Congo, a fresh start which is urgent because, according to our delegation, we are now entering into a mew period, a period of the reshaping of the political structure and, more important than that, the reshaping of the economic structure of the Congo in the interests of its people* Under these circumstances, with new conditions, we should maintain the climate of •reconciliation between themselves, because there ere strong indications"that the contending parties are going to •'"•,.•• • • .- reconcile. In this connexion, one of the concrete steps for the reconciliation is the 5 . : . • . ; . ' . . reconvening, of Parliament* One cannot be separated from the other* Because of this, Mr, Secretary-General, I regret that In this important period, according to the publications, you are not, sending a Special Representative to the Congo after Mr* Dayal leaves the Congo. In tJiiB connexion, perhaps it nay be desirable to say a few words to Mr* Dayal. Our delegation is grateful for all .that he has done in the Congo In laying the conditions for the hew atmosphere. But it is not up to us to make a jfull Judgement. Maybe only history can make a full. Judgement in respect of Mr. Dayal. Nevertheless, there will be a sort of gap, My neighbour, our President of the General Assembly, mentioned just a few minutes ago in connexion with the means for bringing about reconciliation that . there should be some diplomatic move on the part of the United Nations operation. But if there is no Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Job there will be more or less administrative in character, then that Is something which I am worried about. However, with or without any special representative of the Secretary-General, I believe there are channels by which we can communicate our views to the responsible Congolese leaders. HG/bd 50*1*0 (Mr« Wlrjopranoto, Indonesia) * • * • • . ~ . ' i •'..'. I agree fully with what the Ambassador of. Indict; Mr. Jha, said a few minutes ago; that is, there should-be.-more- intensive good offices In this matter* Between the contending parties, os I have said, there is a strong Indication for reconciliation. There is a strong Indication toward finding, a cannon ground, a ground not only physically speaking — -where the Parliament should convene — but, more important, the cannon ground of the mind. The Parliament is only an Instrument* We have to deal with people, and the mind Is more important than the physical geography of the place where Parliament will meet. . ., BHS/rd Ifi (Mr* Wirjopranoto, Indonesia)

In this connexion, if I may make a suggestion I would say that ve should avoid any imposition of ideas from the outside* I fully agree with our colleagues •who have supported the view that ve can offer suggestions and advice but that we should not impose anything on the leaders, on one side or the other* Any kind of imposition from the outside is always very bad* My delegation is not worried about which authority should convene Parliament or where Parliament should meet* We. believe it is more important to have common ground and a meeting of minds before Parliament is convened. It is therefore important that Parliament should be,representative ae well as effective. In my view, a session of Parliament devoted to the question of politically and economically reshaping the country cannot last only one, two or three months. It will last six months, or perhaps even one year. This is a very difficult task. It is difficult for the simple reason that the Congolese leaders must now liquidate the old mind* If some leaders were influenced in the past by foreign tf interests or ideas, they must now find their own identity. They must find some formula which will truly reflect the wishes and desires of the Congolese people themselves. To liquidate the foreign heritage of the past requires time. For this reason, I believe that the session of Parliament cannot take only two or three months, but might last one year. This is a practical consideration with regard to safeguarding the security not only of the members but also of their families* If the session is going to last longer than six months or for one year, I think the members will bring their wives along, and perhaps even their children* For this reason, I leave it to the Secretary-General to use appropriate channels to convince the leaders to select a place with a quiet atmosphere, in the sense that the members will be truly free, especially from foreign intervention and intrigue. I am of the opinion that foreign intrigue still exists in the Congo* We must eliminate this foreign intrigue in the interests of the Congolese people. I think when Parliament convenes it should begin with an effort to create a new Central Government. We are not interested in which leaders will be the rulers, but we are interested in the character of the Government and in the line which will be followed by the Government. We believe that the Government should, be nationalist in mind and that it should follow a truly nationalist line in the interests of the people of the Congo. If Parliament is able at the beginning, or shortly thereafter, to create a new Central Government, the Central Government should be effective and should act in the best interests of the Congolese people*

« BHS/rd U2-U5

1 However, even before creating, a new Central-Government I think that Parliament could adopt some resolutions, for example, appealing to the people to observe discipline. Until now we have noted that there.is a lack of discipline. - All these steps, therefore,- which can be undertaken from the very beginning of the convening of Parliament should be directed towards establishing peace: and order in the country. The best way to safeguard peace, and order in the country is not by physical force but more by persuasion and by the forceful appeal of Parliament. For this'reason too it is necessary that Parliament should be truly representative. Early during .the session of parliament I think that we shall see the first fruits of this institution in the field of keeping peace and order in the Congo. That is a very important field, because it opens the way for the stability of the country and of the new Government. Without such stability there will be no healthy Congo. ^ . In this connexion, *we have before us a report on the economic situation. I shall not talk-about' this now,'-since some time is needed to:stu

For these reasons, Mr. Secretary-General, we have no preference as to who will convene the Parliament, nor have we any preference as to where it should be convened. But there are, objectively speaking, some requirements as to qualifications which we should take into full account now, and this entire matter can he carried out,without imposing in any way on the leaders, perhaps through frank and intimate talks wli;h the leaders of the Congo» .

Mr, NGILERUMR. (Nigeria )& I am taking the floor again Just because I wish to endorse the visws expressed "by previous speakers that the matter of choosing a place to convene the Parliament should not be an obstacle "before the Congolese leaders. Since there is a unanimous desire among the Congolese leaders to reconvene the Parliament, I think it should be left to them to choose the place* The idea that Mr* Nwokedi and Mr. Gardiner should approach .* them and negotiate with them is a very beautiful onej but, as the representative of Canada has pointed out, Leopoldville is Kasa-Vubu's choice and Kaaina is Gizenga*s choice, and we around this table; should not side blindly with one faction or another. As. your advisers, I think we should concern ourselves with principles and policies* I fcave not been to the Congo and I think many others among us have not been there. We are using only our experience in advising you* We should not expose ourselves to the suspicion that we are siding with Kasa-Vubu or elding with Gizenga, and if we are inclined to do that, then we are not giving you good advice. We should confine our activities and our advice to principles and policies, as I said. When I said that Kasa-Vubu!s view should prevail and Leopoldville should be the place for the meeting, I had In mind the fact that Kasa-Vubu is the recognized Head of State and that Leopoldville is the headquarters of the country. But I am not very strong in my views on this. It should be left entirely to them to make the decision when they negotiate with your representatives. Therefore, it would be a very bad thing for us to side with one faction or another, for if we do so, then we are going to be divided around this table -- so-and-so siding with Kasa-Vubu and so-and-so siding with Gizenga -- and this will be really a very bad thing for us and not at all in the best interests of the United Nations or of the Secretary-General. TL/bg 47 (Mr, Ngllerumai Nigeria)

I therefore fully endorse the view that since there is unanimous agreement for the convening of Parliament, we should not give weight to the views of Kasa-Vubu except in so far as he is the Head of State, and not give weight to the views of Gizenga, unless they reach a reconciliation and agree to work together and choose the place themselves* I will leave it entirely to your representatives to negotiate this on the spot. I do not think it is our duty .. to choose the place for them from New York* It is not the duty of the members of the Advisory Committee to say that they should meet in Leopoldville, that they should meet in Kamina or that they should meet in any other place. My own feeling is that this should be left to be negotiated by your representatives and the Congolese leaders* So long as there is the unanimous view that the Parliament should meet, this meets with our intention, this is our real aim,. We wish to see the Parliament reconvened no matte•' r where it is going to meet. If it is going to meet under the protection and .security p.f the United Nations, then it Is-all,.right^ It should be left entirely to them. ..

Mr. EDWARD (Ceylon)* , We are all agreed that the supreme objective fo,r, which we have, striven .all these months> .namely,, the, convening of the . . Parliament, is almost within realization, and in order to ensure that this eminently desirable objective is not thwarted, we should not have the question of the venue coming in and destroying this objective which we have been trying to achieve. With regard to the venue, one would assume that Leopoldville, being the capital and the symbol of unity of the country, would be the most appropriate place, in normal circumstances. But since the Ambassador of India has very clearly and lucidly expressed the difficulties that the United Nations itself might have in providing the security for the convening of Parliament, we should certainly look to other places where the United Nations has the ability to provide this security* And in this respect, it is also agreed, I think, that Kamina is about the best place to have the convening of Parliament. But if we do support entirely the idea that it should be convened at Kamina, we might also be giving the impression that we are taking a partisan attitude in this matter. For that reason, I strongly agree with and support the idea put forward TL/bg If8-50 (Mr« Edward, Ceylon)

"by the representative of Ghana that your represented V3S in the Congo should use their good offices with the leaders there to come to a mutually agreeable place where they can convene Parliament* If they agree, to have it in Kamina, it would "be an eminently acceptable solution for all of us. I must, however, emphasise that this is a matter that the Congolese themselves must decide and that it is not a decision that we should impose on the Congolese leaders. It would be, as I eay, a great pity if at this stage we quarrelled over the venue of the convening of Parliament, and if we could use the good offices of our officers there to persuade the leaders to agree on Kamina, or, as you said, possibly somewhere outside LeopoldviHe, it would be acceptable to us. I strongly urge that this approach -bo the leaders be made by your officers in Leopoldville* .•.'..' ' * Mr'» QUMLJSON-SACKSY (Ghana); May I say, as a postscript, that Keicina is in Katanga, and I personally think that it would be a good idea if Katanga were brought into the fold by a meeting there o However, I would suggest that if the idea of prodding behind the scenes is accepted, the two men should try to explain the advantages in the various places of the Congo, as to the venue* By that, they could reconcile the views which I thought could be brought about by this kind of behind-the-scenes prodding. BC/pm 51

Mr*. HASAN (Pakistan); I shall not make history by keeping silent today. ..-.-.,• ' We are all agreed that a meeting of Parliament would be the coneunauetibn of the United Nations objective of assisting the Congo to return to a state of legality and normalcy. The only vestige of legality left in the country is the President. Fortunately there has been very little disagreement round this table about President Kasa-VubuTs position as the Head of State. During the many months in which this Committee has been in existence, we • have heard time and time again references to the sanctity of the Loi fondamentale. Under that law, which most of us have, at one time or another, referred to and invoked, it is for the Head of State to convene Parliament. I have heard no • •-"• objection to that position. Fortunately, the Head of State has now reached the conclusion

Mr. KGILERUMA (Nigeria): My personal feeling is that at this stage the Secretary-General's two representatives, Mr. Gardiner and Mr. Nwokedi, could do more useful work than a commission. The commission would be a larger group, and these two gentlemen have already done good work and have gained the confidence of the Congolese* I do not oppose the idea of sending a commission, but my own feeling is that that should not be done now. The main duty now concerns the BC/pm 53*55 ..'...* ./..; ,\j,. (Mr. Ngileruma, Nigeria) negotiations for the convening of Parliament. Once it meets, Parliament will have .many .duties to .carry out* At that time the proposed commission could go to the Congo and get together with the Members oftParliament, the Head of State and the Ministers, and In that way achieve something* If ye were to send a commission at the present moment, it would,not be easy for such a large group to negotiate. That, qan more easily be done by two men who have already done good work and have gained the confidence of the Congolese* Once Parliament meets, it will be entirely up to the Congolese to see the conciliation commission and to accept such • • • • x • • • • ,''••• a Commissions guidance* . I. believe very strongly that Parliament will need a great deal of guidance for some time. / ' . . .. . ' . . . i. . For that reasoii, I see no urgency in sending; the proposed conciliation commission to the Congo. . .

Mr , QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana): I would mak,» e the sam» e poin.-•'..t as has bee. n. '•. made by the representative of Nigeria, In fact. I think that; if Parliament is ., .... - ....•/.. r* ..,••-. -..- • •-' . V. r •'..". - •'•'• '.-:/•'• recovened it might.be a good idea for the entire Advisory Committee to be there for .the occasion, ..

. The .SBCRHCARY-GEI^ERA^! , This is perhaps an appropriate time to make at (least a te,ntat;Lye summing-up,, , First, quite apart from.the fact that there is a clear injunction in the various resolutions that Parliament should be convened, it is obviously the concensus (he.re not only that this is a most urgent requirement, but also that the time is now. Under such circumstances we should of course 4o our utmost to achieve the result, . It has been said today that the United Nations can serve as a focus of conciliation for the convening of Parliament. I think that that correctly describes what should be the function of the United Nations, The other tasks — security,.and so on -- more or less follow automatically. MW/db 56 (The Secretary-General)

To be a focus of conciliation It is, of course, necessary that we enter into contact in a discreet way, a fruitful way, with all'the parties concerned. We have devoted our attention here mainly to Mr. Kasa-Vubu and Mr. Gizenga. Let us note that there are others who should be heard, others with whom contact is essential. Let us, however, also note ~? and I think that this is the view generally held — that Parliament, short of co-operation between Mr. Kasa-Vubu and Mr. Gizenga, is not Parliament in the sense in which we want to envisage it. They must co-operate, and Mr. Gizenga must be a party to it just as Mr. Kasa-Vubu. For that reason, we must try to find a common ground for the two gentlemen. The common ground exists to the extent that they both wish to have a meeting of Parliament, and in that respect we have no difficulty. Difficulties may arise in two respects. There may be different views as to who should, so to say, be the spearhead of the move, and there may be different views also as to the place ..••.'•' ' > where they should meet. Regarding the first point, I believe that it is a point which we should try to convince the parties that they should leave aside. It i\s not essential; the essential one is that they agree on the substance and on getting'together, and I am sure that we can help them to find a form which does not involve anybody in a question of prestige. However, I should like to add that, in our own arguments, we must, of course, take due account of the legal arguments which may be brought forward on the two sides. In doing so, we need not in any way exaggerate them. We should, on the contrary, in my view, try to convince the gentlemen in question that this is basically not a question of law and that the fruitful development now before us as a possibility should not be allowed to stop for reasons of prestige. In a certain sense, a similar attitude seems to me to be natural as regards the place. I have already said that, in my view, we should naturally stress the practical possibilities of providing for security and making other arrangements which are adequate. If we could get the two gentlemen to agree that this is a primary consideration, I believe that this also is a point which we should be able to straighten out in direct contact with the parties concerned, because if they can forget for a moment about the prestige aspect and subordinate similar aspects to what is really essential - which is that people get together at a point where they feel eafe - then the Vhole operation can be carried out. In that respect Mtf/db 57 - (The Secretary-General)

I must give first priority vithout hesitation to Kamina. However, that, as I said before, is for me a pragnatic question and not one which we should permit to develop, either from our side or from the side of others, into a Question of prestige or ' principle which might render progress impossible. Now, to get across these commbn sense views' — because I regard them as- • common sense views - we should, of course, establish contact with the gentlemen concerned. And there is the question of the way in; which we should establish the contact, and also the form in which it should be established. As to the way, I feel that, for the moment, those members of the Committee are fight who consider that the nev conciliation cooraission, as envisaged by the General Assembly, io a bit too clumsy. This is in fact a case for discussion in various smooth forms ' with closed doors, it is something where you argue sitting at the same side of the table with the various gentlemen trying to work out formulas which are ; ' .. . • ...»•. mutually acceptable. For that reason, I believe that the contact should be a sinple one* Of course, we should not forget that we also have in our pocket the possibility of introducing the conciliation commission'on the stage! as soon as that commission has been constituted. '; But in the- meantime I feel that we do no.t lose anything — on the contrary, we may gain — by choosing a simpler approach* There has been reference to the absence) after Mr. Dayalrs departure, of any special representative. I do ttot believe that, in the present situation, this weakens our case because, in fact, it is a question o£ having people who, irrespective of their formal position, have access to the persons and -can argue with them in the proper way. In such circumstances, I believe that with :>" Mr. Gardiner on the spot 'and Mr. NWokedi here, and the other people we have in the Congo, we certainly can play it in a way which is just as fruitful as any other and more formal arrangement. I need not go into the question of why, for the time being, we feel that we should leave "the post of Mr. Dayal vacant; it has no direct bearing on this immediate conciliation problem. Mr. Gardiner is on the spot. Mr. Nwokedi is here. The two have been mentioned. I would also like to indicate that Mr. Linner, who is in charge of the civil operation and, for the moment, officer in charge, has also very good personal relations with the people concerned, I would not wish to establis any kind of special channel or special form* Anyone vho can serve a useful purpose by MW/db 58 (The Secretary-General) arguing in the right way with those concerned has ,a function to fulfil* So much about the channel, about the way to approach the people. Then there is the question of the form* As I have already indicated, I feel a little bit wary on that question because of the legal element which exists and also because of the sensitivity of .the parties to their position* I believe that we could, by the.wrong kind of approach to Mr* Gizenga,, render it more difficult for Mr. Kasa-Vubu because he would see that —. or might interpret that — as a kind of deflation of the position which he has in his own eyes and in the eyes of this Organization.. Therefore, I .believe that the approach should be made by those who speak for us in such a way as to irnrk the relationship which does exist for us with Mr. Kasa-Vubu, and also.the kind of position which he has under the Log fvir.flccentalo^ as recognized here. For that reason also I believe that it is reasonable to begin the discussions with Mr. Kasa-Vubu, but to remark .to him as a matter of course that contact must be established with others because it is, in fact, a problem of finding common ground, and we cannot let formal considerations bar us from trying to find such ground. Ify conclusion, therefore, would be that, in the first place, those who have been mentioned here, but also, anyone who can usefully be put in the picture, should, in the first instance,.take this matter up with Mr* Kasa-Vubu, try to explore the ground, try to forestall hasty and premature statements which would. tie anybody's hands, and seek as much of an approach as possible from his side to the stands which we tanow to be the stands of others — in the first place, Mr. Gizenga's* They should also make it clear to Mr. Kasa-Vubu that, as a matter of course, we must explore the views held by Mr. Gizenga so as to be able to fit the pieces together. After that, the other necessary contacts would follow. That does not mean that we need to be without any current contact with Mr. Gizenga; it only means that we do not, so to say, open the game formally with him in a way which may render life more difficult on the other side. This is roughly my own thinking on the matter and I must say that, around this table, it seems to me that there has been a very large concensus of opinion and nothing said which runs counter to the way in which we, when we have discussed it on the Secretariat's side, have envisaged the matter. MW/db 59.60 •-••••• (The Secretary-General)

I would, however, like to invite you to make whatever corrections and amendments and to introduce whatever new answers you want in this attempt to outline an approach. Were you to agree with this approach, our first step would be to tell Mr. Kasa-Vubu that we would like to explore the field with him with a view to finding the common ground wliich would get the convening of Parliament under way very soon. We would then at the same time, of course, try to see tp it that, as I said, nothing is said which might render the operation more difficult. The only thing which I have to add is that I believe it is wise not to formalize this or to put any kind of official hat on any of those who approach . Mr« Kasa-Vubu and Mr. Gizcnga and the others because if anything is a proper field for quiet diplomacy, this seems to be ons» It is for the Congolese to decide what they want. We can never be anything but, so to say, midwives in this operation, and the greater discretion we ;vbovr, the less we formalize our part in the story, the better I believe it is. " * " . AP/mh 61 (The Secretary•General)

But I Invite you to comment on what I have said. Perhaps I have followed more my own llr«e of thinking than the line of any direct quotations or conclusions from special interventions. 'But I felt entitled to do so because it seems to me that there is a very considerable harmony between this way of handling the problem and the views expressed around the table. If nobody has anything to say, then we will do our best to get somewhere on this line• Before you leave I think it would be useful if Sir Alexander MacFarquhar would make some comments on the financial paper which has been circulated as a document. It is a statement by Mr. Ndele, but there are some observations to make regarding our own way of handling the matter.

Sir Alexander MACFARQUHARs The situation can be very briefly explained. •HWMMHMM«MMaMaMMMMraMMM|MiMM*«*«^«W«mMBM«MMUM«» •? • The Congolese Treasury has been approaching the limit of its credit with the Central Bank, and the Central Bank has consequently put it on notice that even if that limit is legally raised, the Bank would be very reluctant to use the Increase In the limit. Mr. Ndele has also brought this to public notice in the address which has been distributed. Mr. Ndele then came to New York and to Washington. He has had discussions with us, with the Bank and with the International Monetary Fund. As a result of these discussions, Mr. Ndele has advised President Kasa-Vubu - and President Kasa-Vubu has agreed • to make a request to the Secretary-General for assistance from the United Nations and for a discussion with his Ministers as to what measures are necessary to deal with this situation. The Secretary-General has instructed Mr. Philippe de Seynes to undertake this task; he will be in Leopoldville either tonight or tomorrow morning. We do not expect any long-term decisions out of this mission. But what we do hope for is the beginning of a rehabilitation of financial and treasury disciplines in the Congo. If we can get on to that basis, then there would be firm ground for helping in the financial and economic rehabilitation. AP/mh 62 (air Alexander MacFarquhar)

The other field In-Which Mr. Ndele consulted with us was the question of the Congolese portfolio and the Congolese national debt'— feotto of which have not been settled-in Belgium. In that fifeld the decision by President Kasa-Vubu has been to ask the International Bank to make one of its studies which will go into the whole question of the debt and of the portfolio and will, at least, prepare the way for negotiations between the parties when the time is ripe and, in the meantime, conserve the situation and freeze the assets,

Mr, HASAN (Pakistan): Mr. Secretary-General, we have Just received this paper and it is a very difficult question. Naturally, we wish to study this paper and study the whole situation. In fact, I was wondering whether some of us could have tan opportunity of discussing details with somebody representing the National Bank of the Congo. I do not know whethep Mr. Ndele is here or whether some of his representatives are here with whom we could discuss the whole situation.

In my opinion it is a much more difficult question than the political questions( because this will affect the well-being and the economy of the Congo for years to come;'it might even be for generations to come* Therefore, we want to be extremely careful about this. We do not want to give any opinion without looking over all the questions and examining the whole outlook for the future — the present difficulties, what loans have been taken, the liabilities and the assets and how the whole thing is going to be settled. The United Nations as such has certain responsibilities In that matter. . i. •« Therefore, I would suggest you give us some time to study this paper and perhaps you could e&H us 'another time for discussion on this subject*

The SECRETARY -GENERAL; I would welcome very much a discussion about the matter, but I think that we will have better grounds after the exploration made by Mr. de Seyries on the spot. As of today I intended only to give you tiito* pieces of information as background. We have to revert to it in much greater detail when we come to the policy-making stage. Mr. Ndele has left* He is In Europe now* On the other hand, you will find it useful to discuss the details with Sir Alexander MacFarquhar who is very well briefed on thia» AP/mh 63

Mr* NOIIERUMA (Nigeria): I endorse the views expressed by the representative of Pakistan. The economic crisis —I do not know how to describe it, either crisis or situation — in the Congo also appears to "be serious* Therefore, we should not discuss it now. We would like to study the whole thing and then perhaps when we meet again, go into it very carefully.

The SECRETARY-GENSRAL; We will do that. • Before concluding, I should like to say that this is the last occasion when we will have the privilege of having Ambassador Dayal with us. One of the members of the Committee has already voiced the gratitude which we feel, and which we.... have very strong reason indeed to feel, for his contribution in the Congo and here at Headquarters as regards the Congo operation* But I would not like this occasion to pass without voicing also my own gratitude. We carry in the Secretariat — all •* of us — very heavy responsibilities, and may I say simply that it is a blessing in such an operation to be able to count on somebody like Ambassador Dayal as a collaborator* I have already said in the press release that his very great ability has been matched only by his loyalty to the United Nations purposes and his extraordinary personal integrity. You can well understand how strongly I feel about this matter, how much I regret losing this invaluable collaborator and how anxious I am to put on record with the Advisory Committee my great feelings of gratitude which, I am sure, are shared by all who have been able to follow the great work undertaken by Ambassador Dayal. We wish hint all good luck in his regular assignment, to which he now returns. We hope that he will always keep in touch with us and with our operations in the Congo, and that once in a while I may even have the advantage of having his very informed personal advice. Unless there is anything else you wish to raise, I shall now close the meeting,

The meeting rose at 12*50 p»nu . r CONFIDENTIAL Meeting No. 51 7 June 196l ENGLISH -

UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CONGO

Meeting at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 7 June 1961, at 10.JO a.m.

In the Chair: The Secretary-General Members: Canada Mr. DCBELL . i . Ceylon Mr. SHANMUGARAJAH • Ethiopia - Federation of Malaya Mr. ZAKARIA ' Ghana Mrr DADZIE : Guinea • . f Mr. COLtST r-- India Mr. BHADICAMKAR Indonesia Mr. WIRJOPRANOTO ' Ireland Mr. NOIAN .•••":•'' '•• l Liberia Mr, JOHNSON '' ' : Mali Mr. TRAORE <• •: Morocco . Nigeria Mr. HEAGWU. Pakistan 'Mr. HASAN Senegal Mr. CISS Sudan Mr. ADEEL Sweden Mrs. ROSSEL Tunisia Mr. CHELLI United Arab Republic Mr. SIDKY

61-15598 IIG/ida 2

The SBGRETARY««GBITOALt In spite of 8coe absence* I think va should begin, In view of the other duties vhlch ve all have. First of all, I vould like to draw to your attention the documents you have eeen vhlch cover the various recommendations and resolutions from tlie conference in Goquilhatvllle. I have, from our side, no comments on them. They have been circulated for your Information. The second point I would like fco raise is the military situation, on vhlch General Rikhye will give a report. Finally, I would like to give you some information on the situation as regards the convening of Parliament and related matters. With your permission, I would invite General Rikbye to the table.

General P.TKHYS; A map of the Congo has just been distributed to you on which there is Indicated the deployment of the Unltad Nations Force in the different areas there* These are positions as known to us on 1 June. This IB thd time whan ve sent the map for printing, and th&re have been no changes since then worth reporting at this stage* The main deployments durirg the last two or three weeks have been tha relief of the Nigerian brigade by tho Indian brigade In North Katanga. The garrisons o£ a Nigerian brlgada vhlch was previously ot Altertville, Manono and Bukavu have already been relieved, except for the one at Manono, and these troops have been moved Into Kamina. The ManorP garrison will be relieved starting tomorrow. The Nigerian brigade, after completing its concentration at Kamina, is Intended to be moved into South KG sal. In Kasai we are about to lose part of a battalion from Ghana, aa they are reducing their contingent there about the middle of thla month. Hence, it was necessary to bring in additional troops, as the situation in Kasai continues to be serious. It is considered that eventually the Nigerian brigade will take over the responsibility of Kasai* BC/da 3

(General Rikhye)

With the increase of tension In South Kasai, a new Irish group, which was originally intended for Katanga, was diverted to Mwene Ditu in South Kasai. As a result of their arrival, the Ghana brigade has been able to stop a southward movement of Kalonjists across the railway line, a movement directed towards Tshikapa. The Ethiopian brigade is in process of rotation. Part of the brigade has already been rotated, and the remainder will be rotated towards the end of this month. Their unit in Coquilhatville has been increased from a company to a battalion. The entire battalion is not in Coquilhatville yet, but it is in process of being moved there. I shall now cay a few words about the operational situation. The main disturbances during this period were in Kivu Province. It may be remembered that the Omari Government was established by Mr. Glzenga in Kivu some months ago. They belonged to a groutf of tribes from Maniema, whereas Bashi continued to be the predominant tribe in Kivu. Ths Bashi succeeded in outvoting the Government many times in the Provincial Assembly. However, the ANC in Kivu are loyal to Stanleyville, and they supported the Omari Government* The Bashi were therefore not in any position to implement their resolutions. The Omari Government decided to stop these anti-Government activities and ordered the arrest of many of the important political leaders of Bashi. This led to these disturbances. Some of the Ministers and senior Government officials and some Deputies were arrested. An attempt was made to arrest some of the chiefa, including one chief who was living about forty miles south of Bukavu. There was serious fighting, in which two ANC soldiers were killed. In reprisal the ANC killed approximately fifty Bashi and, it is believed, destroyed two villages. As soon as the disturbances broke out, the Malayan special force which bad just established its headquarters in Bukavu, under Brigadier Hamid, took over control of the situation. Mr. Omari also requested United Nations assistance, as he expected Bashi to attack Bukavu with a view to releasing their comrades who were being held there in prison* The United Nations immediately informed Mr. Gizenga and General Lundula of the situation* They decided to send a delegation down to bring law and order to the Province. That delegation was BC/ds ' lf-5

' (General Rikhye) transported in United Nations aircraft and, provided with the necessary protection. A senior Major of the ANC was also brought down from Stanleyville to take direct comnand of the Stanleyville ANC in Kivu Province* On bis arrival, tMs Major — Major Bangala — was able to bring about some order among the ANC, He has been fully co-operating with Brigadier Hamid and the Malayan contingent in restoring law and order, Tne delegation succeeded in arriving at some agreement. It was decided that the session of the Provincial Assembly should be continued, and United Nations assistance was asked for to bring in Deputi3s from the interior. That has been done, and the Assembly*s session started on 1 June. The tension continued for about a w^ek tliereafterj but the latest reports are that things are quietening down and the United Nations troopa are In full control of the situation. They have been patrolling intensively the border with Ruanda-Urundi, as well as the interior and, in particular, the Bfushi area. I turn now to Katanga Province. I have already indicated that the Indian .* brigade, group has moved from Kamina and tfi&an over responsibility of Ilorth Katanga. Witt, the arrival of the Indian brigade group, the United Nations troops in Katanga now number approximately 7;000* 7.ii3re.fore the United Nations is now recJ.ly in full military control of tbet area* There are throe brigades in Katanga: tha Indians in North Katanga, the Nigerians in Kamina and the Swedes and the Irish in Elisabethville. Since all the thrse brigades are working in very close conjunction with each other, some kind of co-ordination was considered necessary. ONUC therefore decided to send General lya'isu to Elisabethville to take over temporary command of all United Nations units in Katanga. This will facilitate co-ordination of the activities of the three brigades, will ensure better liaison with Katanga authorities and will assist , General McKeown in handling this situation, since from Leopoldville he found himself rather at a distance. AP/dp 6

(General Rikhye)

Seme words about the situation In Kasal. During the conference at Coquilhatville, Kalonjirs troops Increased their activity. You may remember that we were obliged to withdraw temporarily a Ghana battalion from Bt^wangH and bring it to the area of Lake Mukamba, which is indicated on the map that has bean distributed to you. The tactics adopted by the United Nations troops then were, that as the activities of Kalonji's troops were manifold and in different directions, and as we were not strong enough in Bakwanga itself, to prevent the advance of Kalonji's troops into other areas on the outer circumference of the circle. At the same time negotiations were opened with the authorities in Leopoldville, and presumably they have had a very good effect as we were informed on 2.6 May by the Commander of the Kalonji forces that he had received orders from Mr. Kalonji to withdrew Kalcnji troops to within the original territory which has been claimed by Mr. Kalonji. On 30 May, Mr.^Kalonji, on his return from Coquilhatville, v:.oited the United Nations troops at Lake Mulseiriba and confirmed that these orders had been given. He indicated his desire to co-operate with the United Nations with respect to the various United Nations programmes in th.3 area. Our troops now report that Kalonji forces are withdrawing into the ar?3. as indicated* This should considerably ease the situation in Kasal. There was a para-commando unit of General Mobutu at Lusembo, which is in North Kivu, and their continued presence created a very tenae situation in the area. We have been able to arrange for its withdrawal and it has already returned to Leopoldville.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Are there any questions or clarifications that you would like? I think the map adds to the report what is needed for you to Judge both the strength of the force in the various places and the present main trends of our policy. The most striking feature is, of course, the strong concentration of United Nations forces in Katanga where the situation has wa2o it necessary to establish a special command. There is no reason for me to give any comment on it. You know how it ca:se about historically and you know the importance it has in the present political situation. AP/dp 7

(The Secretary •General)

Points which cause real worry at present, as it appears from the report, are to be found in Kivu, where, however, things seem to be straightening out, and, perhaps at present to a lesser extent, in South Kasai. None of t/.o fievelopyn&zits, however, are such as to detract from our attention to the Parliament problem which takes our best thinking and best efforts together, of course, with the question of the withdrawal of the Belgians which remains, to my very great regret, a somewhat sticky problem. If you have no questions, I would ask my collaborators to circulate a letter from Mr. Gizenga. I would ask Mr. Norasimhan to give his comments on this letter. As you will gather from the report, perhaps a somewhat rigid attitude reflected in the letter does not give a full picture of Mr. Gizenga 's position, &nd for that reason the Judgement on the letter should wait for those comments which I now invite Mr. Narasimhan to present.

Mr. NAflASBglAMs The letter from Mr. Gizenga, which has Just been distributed, is in line with earlier communications from him, and also the letter of Ik May to which reference has bean made. I think it is noteworthy, however, that ths main reason for insisting on Kamina as the venus for the convening of Parliament is that, and I quote from the fourth paragraph of this letter: "It will be difficult to give guarantees for total security in Leopoldville, where the President of the Chamber, Joseph Kasongo, and so. many other members of Parliament and those of the Government have for several months been deprived of their liberties and are under the protection of the United Nations.0 This is the reason given for insisting on Kamina as the venue for a new Parliament. There are indications, however, that this letter from Mr* Gisenga, which is undated but which was probably prepared about two weeks ago, is not the last word on the subject, The United Nations representative in Stanleyville received a call from Mr. Gizenga 'a Chef de Cabinet on 29 May* It was then indicated that Mr. Gizenga would request discussions with the United Nations on technical matters concerning the meeting of Parliament, such as security, transportation, etc. Our representative actually met with Mr. Gizenga on 31 May and had a long discussion with him* AP/dp

(Mr. Naraa imhan )

The main points made by Mr* Olzenga at this meeting may be summarized as follows. Mr. Gizenga declared hie full confidence in the United Nations. . Precisely because of this confidence, he favoured Kamina as the right venue for the convening of Parliament, There are no other troops in Kamina except United Nations troops* These troops, besides guaranteeing security, would also provide a propitious atmosphere for debate amongst the Congolese leaders free from outside interference* HA/mh 11 Naraslmhan)

Thirdly, Mr. .Gizenga stressed that h6 did not wish to place artificial obstacles regarding the meeting of Parliament. He attached importance not so much to the place cf the meeting as to the security and other measures necessary for Parliament to vork satisfactorily. If the United Nations had any other proposal on this subject which met this important condition of security, l&, Gizenga and his colleagues would be glnd to discuss it. Finally, Mr. Gizenga raid he would be wi3J.ing to depute his representatives for preliminary talka with other political leaders of the Congo under ths United Nations1 auspices, to discues various problems such as transport of Deputies, their housing, the premises for the meeting of Parliament, etc. If such talks were to be arranged in Leopoldville, he indicated hi.'; villirgness to send his representatives there* These are the four main points emerging from •th* e discussions between our representatives in Stanleyville e,nd Mr. Gizenga. I should perhaps add that Mr. Gardiner may be visiting Stanleyville shortly for further talks with Mr. Gizenga. Mr. Gardiner has also visited Elieabethville recently — as recently as last Sunday — end, in the course of his discussions there with Mr. Munongo, the following points emerged: Apparently, Mr. Munongo mentioned three conditions as a prerequisite for the meeting of Parliament with their full participation. Firstly, Parliament should meet with full United Nations protection and under United Nations auspices. Secondly, before Parliament meets, Mr. Tshombe should be released. Thirdly, Parliament should meet outside the Congo. After further discussions with Mr. Gardiner, Mr. Munongo dropped the last condition, so that the only condition remaining to be met is the condition regarding the release of Mr. Tshombe. Perhaps the Advisory Committee will also be interested to know what action has been taken since the last meeting of the Advisory Committee on this subject on Saturday, 27 May* The summing up of the discussions by the Secretary-General toward the end of that meeting were communicated to Mr. Linner, the officer in charge at Leopoldville. Following this, the subject has been discussed in a friendly and informal manner with the Leopoldville authorities, particularly Messrs. Bomboko, HA/mh 12 (Mr* Narasimhon)

Adoula and Ileo. The Indications are that there is a strong preference for LeopoldviUe as the venue for the meeting of Parliament. Tbia preference seems largely to "be influenced by considerations of prestige and also partly by legal considerations. Among the latter, I may mention the view that Parliament is only adjourned and should now resume at the same venue where it adjourned. From a further talk that Mr > I/inner had with Mr. Ileo, he has gathered the impression that a definite decision on this subject has not yet bean taken.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; On the last occasion, we discussed the possibility of proceeding speedily and efficiently toward a meeting of Parliament. I felt that we should meet at about this time, at all events, although very little progress has been registered. The main interesting point is the one relating to Mr. Gizenga's stand and ,» its development, which, of course, shows a certain flexibility vhich may make it possible to frlnd a common ground. In fact, the forthcoming visit of Mr. Gardiner to Stanleyville has precisely the purpose of preparing the ground, so to speak, for the further joint exploration of the ground on which agreement can be reached concerning the relevant facts for the convening of Parliament, I also felt that, although nothing very much has been added to the picture that we had on the last occasion, we should profit from whatever further thinking you may have. . • Of course, ao I have already said, the convening of Parliament ranks as the top objective ve have in view now. It is a difficult and delicate operation, because it is an operation where necessarily the authority rests with the Congolese themselves and where pressures and interference are not good form, good order or wise psychologically. All the same, we have a responsibility which derives from our general aims, not from our power or our authority in the field, and whatever means we may have — and, alas, they are rather modest — must necessarily be used as effectively and as intelligently as possible. This is the reason why a continuing consultation with the members of the Committee is, from my point of view, rather essential. We may provide our best thinking, but it is necessarily limited — although I claim it is not biased — HA/mh 13 (The Secretary-General) and, for that reason, the widening of the approach "by this type of discussion is something which I value, and we value, very highly. Naturally, you have your contacts with groups having influence in this situation, and it would therefore be quite natural if you. had advice to give which might help us. If that is not the case for the moment, I would suggest that, privately and together, you give your beat thought to this matter co that, in whatever form you choose, you way take initiatives and give us such suggestions es you feel are worthwhile. On this point, I should add that, as you probably know, Mr. Conner O'Brien, who has also been acting as a member of this Committee, has joined the Executive Office, and that he will in fact go to the Congo today. He will, in the first instance, tak3 up the assignment of Mr. Dumontet in Blisabetaville. I em East happy to welcome him in this job. I am sure that he will make a very fine ,» contribution indeed and, with your permission, I should like to take tliis occasion to wifcft Mm good luck. .We will depend very much on his wisdom, on his initiative, and on his power of convincing people to do the right thing* Now, does anyone wish to take the floor?

Mr. IFEAGWU (Nigeria): First, I should like to ask a question. Have we any indication whatsoever as to the likelihood of Mr. Kasa-Vubufs sending to the United Nations a letter formally asking for assistance in connexion with the convening of Parliament within the next week or so?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; We have no clear indication. As you may understand, very broad contacts have been established in Leopoldville, because, as you know, it is not only Mr. Kasa-Vubu,in spite of his position, but quite a few personalities of significance who are found there and whose views have a bearing on the situation. But it all remains rather vague. What has been mentioned as a possible date is 25 June, but I think that is mainly dictated by a wich to get Parliament going before Independence Day« If this ia a plan, or wishful thinking, I cannot tell* CONFIDENTIAL

CORRIGEI1FJM

Verbatim Record of meeting No. 51, held on Wednesday, 7 June 1961, at 10.30 a.m.

Mr. WIRJOPRANOTO (Indonesia) Page 16, line 7 Full stop after "Congolese leaders" and Delete rest of sentence,

61-157^9 HA/mh JA-15 (The Secretary-General)

On our eide, I con only repeat what I have eaid: We are very Keen on this, and ve are very keen also as regards the earliest possible convening of Parliament. For that reason, although difficulties will arise from the security side if wa get very little time for preparation, we will never let our practical considerations influence the decision in a way which would delay the convening. TL/rh 16

Mr* WIRJOPRANOTO (Indonesia): I would like to note that there has been a change in the Congo in the sense that while the United Nations in the past had an unpleasant responsibility, the time has now come vheu the United Nations has a pleasant responsibility in the Congo. The trend among the Congolese leaders to accept United Nations operations and assistance is now; I think, clearer, and it seems to me a matter of wisdom to maintain and promote this acceptance on the part of the Congolese leaders of the principle that responsibility may lie outside the Congo• Another change which I notice is the trend of ra'pproche^ent among the leaders themselves. The letter from Mr. Gizenga, and also later on the conversation, are strong indications of goodwill from the Gizenga group in this matter. If the Leopoldville leaders during the next days will also show the same goodwill as has Mr. Gizenga, then there will be opportunity for talks in Leopoldville between the representatives of Mr. Gizenga and the other groups in Leopoldville; under the

auspices} and even perhaps with some guidance, of the United Nations personnel in Leopoldville. I think this would be a very good development; and I think the difficulties lie Just in the preliminary talks* For this reason I wish to stress the importance of these preliminary talks in Leopoldville between Mr. Giseaga's representatives and the leaders of Leopoldville. If these talks are successful, I think the next step; that of convening the Parliament, will be easier and will not meet with such great difficulties. AS to the place for the convening of Parliament; I think what Mr, Gizenga stated is correct. The place is not so important as'is the guarantee for the complete security and freedom of the members of the Parliament, Also; it is not just for a few days of one month, as I stated before, but perhaps rather for a long time that Parliament will meet, because I have the impression that they would like to reshape the whole political and economic structure.

The SECRETARY -GENERAL* I have just now received, at the table, a new letter from Mr. Gizenga which I think I should read to you. Since it came only now, we have not had the chance to distribute it, but it is an important addition to the picture: TL/rh 17 (TtV3 Secretary •'General)

(continued in French) nMr. Secretary-General, "I have the honour to inform you once again of the desire of the Government to encourage and facilitate the convening of Parliament with the aim of re-establishing national agreement. If the Government suggested Kamina ae the provisional headquarters for Parliament, it vas for a variety of reasons, particularly the complete security which that location offers by reason of the presence there of the United Nations troops and the presence of Congolese armed forces, -whatever they may be«' "This attitude indicates that ve still retain our confidence in the United Nations. "In case this proposal gives rise to objections, the Government is prepared to reconsider it and afford to the United Nations a free choice of a site which would meet the requirements of the Government as set forth in j» its letters of 1^ and 16 May 19bl, vhich, among other things, mentioned the guarantees for the security of Members of Parliament, the evacuation of Congolese armed forces to a distance of 100 kilometres from the neutral zone of Parliament, the convening of Parliament under complete jprotec t:'.on by the ' forces of the United Nations, and the complete removal of all foreign influence. "Within the framework of the assistance which we have never ceased to afford the United Nations in order to facilitate its task, the Government, further, accepts the principle of negotiating, under the auspices of the United Nations, with the parliamentary opposition, if it exists, to work out practical methods and procedures. In this connexion, an immediate meeting among parliamentary representatives of the two parties would be desirable, always under the protection of the United Nations. "In view of the firm desire on the part of all to put an end to the crisis through consultation in Parliament in accordance with the laws of the country and with the resolution of the Security Council of 21 February 19^1* I am convinced that this letter will meet with the acceptance of all men of goodwill* nl have the honour ...M etc. TL/rh 18-20

(continued in English) The first point in this letter is that Mr. Gizenga does not insist on Kamina. The second point is that he does not insist on any particular composition for the forces used by the United Nations. The third point is that he wants United Nations protection in all places of operation. The fourth point is that he wants the establishment of a meeting between parliamentary delegates from what he calls *Tthe two parties" and that such meeting should also take place under the auspices and protection of the United Nations and should be devoted to the question of procedures and modalities. This naturally is an attitude which has to be further explored and which I hope will prove constructive and helpful towards a solution. In fact the Gardiner visit to which I referred sc^s to be very well timed* With this background there is quite an area which he can usefully explore in detail. .» Mr* ADEEL (Sudan): I am glad to note that the attitude of Mr. Gizenga is becoming increasingly encouraging and flexible. I read that now he does not insist on a specific place or composition of the United Nations troops to secure the protection of the members of Parliament. I think that it is now for the United Nations to say whether it will be easier for them to give these guarantees of security in Kamina or in Leopoldville, considering all the relevant questions of accommodations, availability of troops and the absence of the ANG from the locus. MW/pm 21

Mr. CHELLI (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): My delegation is very happy to note the renewal and the further manifestation of confidence in our Organization, After several months of crisis and disappointments, these manifestations are welcome. It seems to us, after the reading of this letter from Mr. Gizenga, that the time has come for ua to hasten to the utmost degree possible the accomplishment of the Nwokedi-Gardiner mission so that we may know whether any concrete proposals will be submitted to us regarding the choice of another locale than Leopoldville or Kamina and, if another place is chosen, whether we can have agreement on such choice from the authorities at Leopoldville and Stanleyville* With you, Mr. Secretary-General, my delegation fully shares the opinion tjiat all of us — and I am referring to the members of the Advisory Committee — should try, through our contacts with Congolese leaders, to convince them and to lead them towards a better understanding of our responsibilities and their need to work out an agreement.which will enable them to resolve the crisis that has been dividing them for almost a year. Before concluding, I should, like to ask a question concerning the approximate date on which you think Parliament might convene. Is there any likelihood that the meeting could be held before the first anniversary of the proclamation of independence?

The SECRETARY'GMERAL (interpretation from French): I think that the reply to your question depends entirely on the attitudes of the Congolese themselves. As far as we are concerned, the time is short, but it should be sufficient. I repeat what I have said, that the difficulties on our side should not be the excuse for any delay. (Continued in English) I should draw attention to one point before giving the floor to the representative of Mali, and that is that Gizenga still has the condition "the evacuation of Congolese armed forces to a distance of 100 kilometres from the neutral zone of Parliament11. I do not need to point out what that would mean in the case of the city of Leopoldville. MW/pm 22

Mr* TRAORE (Mali) (interpretation from French): I should emphasize that this letter is a source of great satisfaction, particularly as Mr. Gizenga has full confidence in my Government; and I should add, like the representative of Tunisia, that the problem is now again before the United Nations. For my own part, I see two important issues: firstly, the problem of

security, and secondly; the position of the opposition, as Mr. Gizenga sflid. I think that, at this level, the United Nations should now get in touch with the opposition to try to find a solution, and should make contacts for the purpose of working out the best means of reconciling the two positions. I must refer to our proposal at the last meeting to the effect that the despatch of the Nwokedi-Gardiner fact-finding and conciliation mission to the Congo would be welcome.

Mr. IFEAGHU (Nigeria): My delegation is pleased to note the rapidity with which events are developing in the direction .-that we have all been hoping for. It is quite obvious now that all factions — both in Elisabethville and in Leopoldville arj well as in Stanleyville — are looking toward the United Nations, This is an opportunity which we must not let slip. In the first place, about a month ago:the representative of Ethiopia suggested the resuscitation of the Nwokedi-Gardiner mission. The Nigerian delegation made the same point* About two weeks ago the representative of Ghana re-emphasised this point, supported by the representative of Mali; and today, the representatives of Tunisia and Mali have again stressed this point. I can only add the voice of ray delegation in support of this suggestion. We feel that the time is ripe, the circumstances favourable, and that we must seize the opportunity. Important as it may be to stay here at Headquarters and give instructions, my delegation feels very strongly that events in the Congo are developing which necessitate dealing with the matter on the spot, I think that it would be a great credit to the United Nations if we could enable Parliament to meet before the first anniversary of the independence of the Congo, and my delegation is strongly of the opinion that we must do everything possible to bring this about. MW/pw 23

The SECRETARY-GENERAL* As to formal arrangements 9 we have been holding back a little bit because we wanted to know more what the map was like politically in the Congo before engaging in anything which, BO to say, took on this or that kind of publicity aspect. Now, with the most recsnt discussions, and especially vith this letter from Mr. Gizenga — which came indeed in o, very timely way for this meeting — I feel that the map is clear enough for a decision on the issue which you have raised. Mr. Gardiner has been, -as you know, proceeding the whole time, but, of course, with the approach of the convening of Parliament, and with the manifold problems arising in that context, the question of the strengthening of our representation in the Congo becomes quite acute.

Mr* HASAN (Pakistan): If it were known generally that the selection ~ ,» of the place for Parliament to meet has been left to the United Nations — and I would suggest that whatever you can do in spreading that knowledge in brief would be desirable —• then that element of prestige would be obviated. In that caee> even if Leopoldville were selected by you, it would be your selection and not that of the Central Government or anybody else; and that would be extremely desirable. So I would suggest that you take every 6tep possible to get that information around to all the parties. Whether it is Kamina or Katanga or Leopoldville, it is your selection, your choice, and not anybody else's. In that case I suppose it would be easier for Mr. Gardiner to persuade all the parties — two, or three, or four -- as to what place would be desirable" It seems to us that we are reaching the end of this unfortunate story and that whatever we can do to accelerate that conclusion would be something to be wished for.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; We have, naturally, concentrated very much on the question of locality, also in talks in Leopoldville and Coquilhatville, with the aim of softening attitudes. However, we have not got them yet on record with an attitude corresponding to the one now put on record by Mr. Gizenga. I agree with you that the fullest possible knowledge of the stands is now desirable as guidance to discussion round this whole matter, and we shall see what way we can find MW/pm 2U-25 (The Secretary-General) for it* I would be happier if, at the same time, we could, so to say, register formally the stand of Leopoldville in a sense which really handed tfo crdestioa over to us. I do not think we can do BO formally — I repeat "fox-nally'1; in substance, I am not worried. Perhaps you feel that we have given enough attention to this matter now, so we can move on to the meeting of the Security Council, I thank you for this meeting, and I shall call you again as soon as there is anything which you need to know.

The meeting rose at 11,^0 a.m« Meeting No 52 19 toe ENGLISH

ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Meeting at United IJatlonp Hsa/lqi^rters., New York, on Mccciay, 19 J^ons 39^1, at 10,^0 a.ra.

In thehairt The Secretary-General

Canada Mr. RITCEIE Ceylon Mr. W-tJHiaOOMWARDEim Ethiopia Mr. GB3RE-EGSY Federation of Malaya Mi'. ZAKATvIA Ghana Mr. QUA.I50N-SACKEY Guinea India Mr. JEA. Indonesia Mr. MASFAR Ireland Mr. EOIAM) Liberia Mr. BARNES Mali Mr. TRAORE Morocco Mr. BRITEL Nigeria Mr. IFEAGWU Pakistan Mr. SHAHI Senegal Mr. CISS Sudan Mr. ADEEL Sweden Mr, WILLIE Tunisia Mr. CHELLI United Arab Republic Mr. SIDKY

61.16330 HG/en

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; This meeting has been called in order to consider especially the financial agreements which have been negotiated by Mr. De Seynes and his collaborators. Mr. De Seynes will, later on, report on these agreements and will reply to your questions * We also have with us here today Mr. Frasca, who is at present in charge of the financial operation on the United Nations side in the Congo, However, before giving the floor to Mr* De Seynes and Mr. Frasca, I would like to invite Mr. Narasimhan to give a short report on the development of negotiations regarding Parliament. I am sure you are all rather keen to know where we are in that respect, and for that reason I have asked him to sum up what we know, in general terms, as of today.

Mr. NARASIMHAN; It was mentioned at the last meeting of the Advisory Committee, which was held on 7 June, tha•t* there was no agreement on the subject of the venue of a meeting of Parliament. It was also stated that Mr% Gardiner would be shortly visiting Stanleyville for discussions. Mr. Gardiner and Mr. Khiari visited Stanleyville about ten days ago. Following their visit, a team of three members from Stanleyville, Messrs. Massena, Kihuyu and Malango, arrived in Leopoldville a week ago. The Leopoldville authorities were represented by Messrs. Adoula, Bolikango and Lihau. The two groups have been discussing the question for the last five or six days. The meetings have been held in the Royal under United Nations security. Agreement has been reached between the two groups that the venue should be the Lovanium University, and the security arrangements are being made on this basis. In regard to a number of other questions, also, agreement has been reached between the two teams. There are, however, two or three issues raised by the Leopoldville authorities which remain to be settled. No firm date has yet been set for the meeting of Parliament. HG/en 3.5

The SECTARY-GENERAL: I do not think there is any need for further clarification, but as a matter of course/ this delegation from Stanleyville, as headed "by Mr. Massena, vas sent at the formal request of Mr. Gizenga, and ve provided transportation end security for them at the formal request of Mr. Gizenga, Thus, these negotiations, which started in fact on Tuesday of last week, are the firrat formal negotiations between the Leopoldville and Stanleyville authorities. They are formal also in the sense that on both sides the top political leaders are fully in back of their negotiating teams. IT BHS/ek 6 (The Secretary-General)

That In Itself Is naturally a very Important step forward,. In fact a revolutionary step In the light of the history since early last fall. Agreement vas quickly reached on the question of venue and on a number of other questions, as Indicated by Mr. Narasimhan. As for the remaining questions, let us hope that the next few days will bring a settlement. We have given instructions which involve not only the speeding up of security arrangements on the United Nations side, but also a policy from the United Nations side which in all respects will fT^ilitats the convening of Parliament at an early date. Mr. Nwokedi, ao you know, has returned to the Congo. Discussions have been conducted by Mr. Khiari and Mr* Gardiner, as mentioned by Mr. Nsxasimhan and, of course, also by Mr. Nvrokedi after his arrival* That is what we can say as of this moment* ^Are there any questions on any of these matters?

Mr> GEERE-EGZY (Ethiopia): Would it be proper to ask what the two or three issues are that have been raised and whether they are of such a nature as to cause further delay?

The GECTffiTARY-GENERAL; As we know about those issues by virtue of the fact that Mr. Khiari sits in on the meetings, I do not think that I am in a position in which I am entitled to mention thorn here. I can say, however, that in my personal opinion none of them is of such a nature that it should permit further delay. Perhaps we can now turn to the financial issues, and I call on Mr. de Seynes.

Mr. de SEYNES (interpretation from French): The background situation of the mission to which I was recently entrusted in the Congo, I believe, is well known in broad terms to most of the members of this Committee. It was described in a statement made by Mr. Endele, the Governor of the National Bank, a few weeks ago, the text of which I believe was circulated to the members of the Committee. (Mr. de Seynes)

Since that time the serious situation cct out in that statement has not improved. Far from it. In fact, certain supplementary factors have even led to a deterioration in the situation. Furthermore, th-jre has been Mr. Endelefs mission to New York in order to preiare for the visit of a United Nations group to discuss the question of international assistance and the invitation of President Kasa-Vubu himself, which brought about my departure for Leopoldvilie. The two main features of the situation are, on the one hand, the accumulation of budgetary deficits and, on the other hand, a decrease in the country's supplies. With respect to tha budgetary deficits, they vary from month to month between k$Q million and almost 800 million francs. This is due to a decrease in receipts, which has resulted from the financial separation of Katanga and also from the fact that certain fiscal offices happen still to be located in Belgium. They are alno due to the disorder and inactivity which characterize the administration of public finances in the country. With respect to public expenditures, following the statement made by Mr. Endele, new sources of difficulty arose from the fact that a change had taken place in the status of public officials on Jl May 1961, granting salary increases retroactive to 1 January of this year. This is an additional reason which has compounded the earlier deficit which had been largely the result of the comparatively high pay of the ANC. This pay has recently been changed to include housing and food allowances but its total amount has not been reduced. Payments to soldiers at present amount to 6,700 francs a month for a married ffan with two children, whereas it had been 815 francs a month, which was the minimum pay before independence. However, at that time food and housing allowances had to be added to the pay. Another reason for the deficit in public expenditures is the so called payments of a political nature,i.e., expenditure on the personal staff ministers and expenses related to parliament and the police force. BUS/efc 8-10 (Mr. de geynes)

Finally, to this picture ve must add the situation of the parastatal bodies, which cany out some fundamental public functions, for which there h^o not only bean operating difficulties but also reductions in receipts and difficulty in reducing expenditures. The status of these bodies and their possible elimination have not as yet been determined. These expenditures are by no means commensurate with the situation in a newly independent country and with the services which these bodies render. That is the first aspect of the prccent situation - the accumulation of budgetary deficit - which, so f«i;, has been covered up to 90 per cent, thanks to advances nade by the Ine-bitirfa d'e'pilfiRion. Of course, this process cannot go on forever. BC/ds 11 (Mr. de Soynes)

As regards supplying essential foodstuffs and goods to the country, there has teen a rather large decline in imports, owing to the fact that exports have been considerably reduced, that the monetary reserves of the country e::e very lii^.ted arid th&t, in collaboration Tilth the Monetary Council, presided over by Mr. Prsaca, a very strict control h-%3 been exercised by the License 1/j.reau irlth the- aim of preserving the mo^t'Tary reserves. Exports per mcfich h?,ve now been rc.vucod from 1,100 million to abouL 6.30 million, and ir-ports have probably been reuv.cod from 800 million to less tliaa 500 million. Recently the H.^nss Bureau lis.3 issued licenses for iripcrts retailing about 500 million per month — that is, a slightly increased sum — to meet the ie.ll in inventories and the position of several firms that cannot mcJ.ntein their ecpipmont. in t'ne field of public finance, too, toe lack of spare parts and capital goods is 02ing more and more fel*. The combint-.tion of those two factors -- a reduction in supplies and n deficit i?.i public finances — can produce very carious inflation, which the country has been able to avoid up to now for a number of reasons, the majority of which cannot apply indefinitely. One of them vas that, in a country so large aa the Congo, vliere communications are slow, comparatively speakirg, the stocks were normally large and, therefore, some activities could be maintained for a longer period than would be regarded as normal elsewhere. Furthermore, the creation of fiduciary money through advances by the Central Bank, to which I have already referred, has been compensated for to a large extent by the reduction in bank credits. But, here again, we are faced with a process which can take place only once and is not likely to go on forever. Finally, and above all, there has been, simultaneously with the increase in public expenditure, a reduction in offers of employment in private industry owing to a decline of economic activity and to unemployment. In other words, the minimum of financial stability which has been maintained so far — for the fact is that prices have risen by hardly more than twenty to twenty-five per cent, and not everywhere at that -- has been bought only at the price of economic stagnation and a vertical drop of probably more than forty per cent in the country's economic activity. That, too, is a very disquieting situation requiring action in the very near future. BC/ds ' "- 12

(Mr. de Seynes) I would add that the dangers of inflation are further increased "by the prospect of on increase in offers of private employment resulting from a Legislative Decree on Contractual Labour which is supposed to £o into effect cts from 1 July of this year. The effects of this lav are still not at all well known, and the measures of implementation are being left more or less to the discretion of the provincial authorities. Bub this lav could have the effect of increasing the salaries of workers and unskilled labourers by 100 or 200 per cent, or perhaps even more. Hence, this cause of financial stability may also be eliminated, without a^y increase in productivity or production. Those are the very serious reasons which have led President Kasa-Vubu to ask you, Mr. Secretary-General, to send a mission to study the possibilities of international aid. From Mr. Ndele's visit here, and even more from the conversations which I had with President Kasa-^Vubu and various Congolese authorities responsible in one way or another for the management of public finance ,y and for the country's economic well-being, it was clear that international aid could be extremely useful in the framework of a programme of economic and financis. recovery undertaken by the Congolese authorities themselves. In all the conversations that we were able to have, we spoke Just as much about indispensable measures of economic and financial recovery as about the modalities of international aid that could be envisaged, The measures which the Congolese authorities propose to take are recorded in the letter from President Kasa-Vubu to the Secretary-General, the text of which has been distributed to members of this Committee. It is hardly necessary for me to paraphrase that letter now. Of course, I shall be glad to answer any questions which members of the Committee may wish to put to me. Broadly speaking, President Kasa-Vubu has undertaken to hold the line on public salaries — that is, not to agree to any further increases for the moment, no matter what disparities may exist among various wage-earners in the public field, and particularly the disparity which continues between the armed forces and the civilians. I must recognize that the President and the Congolese authorities seem to have an admirable understanding of the necessity of a moratorium on any kind of rises of salaries in the public field at the present time; they even indicated that they were prepared to study certain measures aimed at spreading the burden of recent increases over a reasonable period, in particular through what might be called certificates or savings bonds, BC/ds

(Mr. de Seynes) by which the payment of a part of the public salaries could be spread over a period of several months instead of being paid in the immediate future. There has also been recognition of the necessity of Improving control over public expenditure; at present, such control barely exists. To improve it, President Kasa-Vubu has requested supplementary technical assistance, which we are r.t present endeavouring to furnieh. Finally, President Kasa-Vubu himself has recognized the necessity of restoring a minimum of unity to the Congolese economy. There is no doubt that, when one considers the Congolese problem from che economic and financial angle *•- and that is the only angle from which it was envisaged within the limits of my mission -- the cornpartnie realization of the Congo is a very real evil to which a remedy must be found as soon as possible. Moreover, I believe that the Congolese authorities have realized full well that financial assistance by the United Nations cannot be discriminatory, but must go to all parts of the Congo. HA/ids 16

(Mr. de Seynes)

As to assistance proper, it takas the form of a classical agreement, and /o is meant to remedy the Lituation aa far as the "budget and foreign trade ••:rc concerned^ For foreign trade, a credit has been granted — a credit in :7:/:eign currencies which may "be used vithout any conditions of origin, The '•.-•odit has "been granted to ths Monetary Council, and itB utilization is subject •i •• a counter-signature by a United Nations official. The counterpart of the currency thus made available is isiidc available by the importers, and it is paid into a sub-account of the general account of the Republic of the Congo, and it is meant to finance certain "budgetary expenditures — and this, again, with the counter-cignature of a United Nations officislo This is a classical type of. agreement, -which has been used quite often in financial assistance after the -war. In fact, it served as a model also for the agreement of 31 August, , an agreement under -which the Congo was to receive some $5 million cvt that time* I believe that that is jueb about all I should say by way of introduction.

The. gflCRETARY-GEfrlERAL; I am sure that the members of the Advisory Committee heve points vhich they would like to have further clarified, llhis is a rather important step, predicated obviously on our side by a very great concern that, while ve may be straightening out the political aspects, economic disintegration may overtake us and undo yftat we have tried to do in other spheres. HA/ids 17

(Ghana): As you have just said, Mr, Secretary-General, one cannot actually handle the economic sltun^on -without at the same time "bearing in mind the political stability of the country0 In our view, while we think some amount of economic afcsiotance ic required, we fuel ths.t Icaiis purely to finance imports and to serve as mere politics for the time "being ars cp'G what is required and that we will have to tackle the problem frcm tha roots » If this should "be dorse, if you are Going to tackle the economic tritu^tion in the Congo, you Qi-e required to b.2.ve sor,2 kind of legal authority — I know that this is a point vbich the Secretary-General hi;-nsel£ has in nind — ar.d my Government felt that this was an opportunity that should have "been used by the Uiiited Nations, before the loan was fr.Vven, to let the author 1 tie B in Leopoldvill-5 realize that no emount of money given "by the United Nations can help the situation and that it vac in t.ielr interests to try to bring about seme uaity of purpose politically, which me-;ins that Parliament should reopen in tine find have a proper government set up, so that the United Nations can deal with seme legal authority .and have the whole economic situation of the Congo properly curveyacL and dealt with* However, the deed baa 'been done, end we can only hope that this will not impede any progreso which may be maie politically in Leopoldville, and ye are very happy that negotiations "between tfte two side,£ f:re proceeding apace, I JIC.VQ two questions to ask of Mr, de Seynejj One ia on tha Monetary Council, Wlien we were in the Congo, we were informed that the Monetary Council . included the Finance Ministers of the six provinces — Katanga, Kaaai, and so on. May I know whether this io in fact the situation: that the various Finance Ministers still attend the meetings and that the Council's composition is maintained intact? Secondly, what has happened to the foreign exchange accumulated by the Congo before Independence? If this foreign exchange is tied up in Brussels what has been 'done to get it released? What is the point in having all this money tied up while the Congo suffers? I know that imports have not been coming in: when you go through the stores, especially in Leopoldville, you find that HA/ids 10

fius*flon-Sacke y , Ghana) there has not been any replenishment for months. But I thought that this should r:-» tied up with pinching the Jtelginu Government Gbout the accumulation of foreign

'• change by the Belgian Congofl Thsoe are the two questions that I vant to bring up for the time being.

: ?^-^^e?JSL"I?^§S5i Before giving the floor to Mrs de Seynes, I may T.'Vvb^ps say on 2 word about ul?.«3 fir at question raised by the representative of C'liani-io In iny thinking, I was very ctroagly influenced by the fact that, independently of any u.?e of economic pi-esnurc-fi, we fc&d made such considerable progress, that the political situation eeerriod to be on the verge of beir>3 straightened out» At all events, it *£3 quite obvious 'chat the political pressures, the e.xperience and the time and wh&t not, had brought the Leopoldville authorities to the point •where th^ fully realized tlie need for reconciliation and the corrvcnlrig of Farlionente Evidence of that is the fact that it vas a mp-tter of less than twenty-four hours for thca to accept ,the suggestion of Mra Gizenga to start formal negotiations vlth S.tanleyyllle. In time, that coincicJed, as you know, with the o'bher developmente Another point is that in ray o^m experience — I would not say as a matter of political ethics, but in my own experience — economic pressures are not good tools in this kind of policy, when you move on the margin of a cold necessity and emergency. A, very unpleasant element enters when the alternative is to let people starvee That is to say, when you introduce economic pressure for political purposes in that situation, you may, for humanitarian reasons, have to back down, and than it takes on the character of blackmail* The economic situation, in my view and also, I think, in the view of Mr0 de Seyn.es and Mr« Frasca, is such at present that something simply has to be done about ito I would then like, if I could, to avoid the element of bluff involved in this kind of pressure. If, on the other hand, it is a situation in which you offer an advantage which you can withhold without serious damage to the people, then I think the argument of the representative of Ghana is absolutely right. Such an advantage should not be offered unless it is in the context of concessions on the other side in the political field and in the direction of general pacification. HA/ids 19-20

(The Secretary-General)

However, these two considerations — the fact of considerable progress politically and the fact thrt vhat we really had to do was cuch a minimum on the mar-gin of an extreme emergency — led me to dioconnect the tiro things and go ehead with this one as suggested*

I now give the floor to Mr, de Seynec0

McjLJl!LJ^X?iI:§ (interpretation from French): I believe there is come Blight confusion "between the Monetary Council, which is a provisional body pending the entry into action of the Congolese National Bank, and the meeting of Finance Ministers -which took place some weeks ago .and on which Mr. Frssca may be better qualified thao I to give you information. The Monetary Council is not composed of the Provincial Finance Ministers. There has been a meeting of ,» the Provincial Finance Ministers and, during the negotiations that I conducts^, it appeared that such meetings were eninentlly desirable and indeed necessary. President Kasa-Vubu himself referred to this in his letter to the Secretary-General! in which he indicated that it was his intention to convene a meeting of this kind shprtly. It seems to me that auch meetings ought to -Sake place from tice to time. I might now ask Mr. Fr&cca to complement ,the information I have given, with special reference to the Monetary Council. MW/hin 21

Mr, FRAgCA; These ore two different tilings. The composition of the Monetary Council has in fact nothing to do with what was enviGaged at the time, ^oth as to the composition of the Board of Directors of the national Bank -- which ki.i3 not come into existence as yet — and the regular meetings with the Ministers of Finance of the Congo, which was dealt with during the Coanilhatville Conference, ^fortunately, if I may say so, not all of the Ministers could participate because <;:." Gome political differences at tiie moment. The reason why it is highly desirable to have regular meetings of this kind i.i'-i 'liie future is that the whole r.ystein of expenditure and receipt in the whole of the Congo — which was centralized in accordance with ths protocol of 19^2 of the Belgian a&cinistr.v'iion of the Congo — has of necessity been decentralized. In other words, what wo are trying very hard to have execute3. is an agreement whereby ea:.'.i Province would liave to take care of its own expenditure and receipt, thus avoiding What is a peculiarity of the present system, which is that, through the co-called debit off.ice, which f;re debits automatically put iir';o the budget, expenses for the month cnrne from the Provinces vi'i.V^i.it the Central Government in Leopoldville having any power, so to speak, to justify these expenses. In fact, • the impact of these expenditures which come from the Provinces, especially Stanleyville — and this is strange because Stanleyville is the Province witll which there are more differences for the time being.? tot vrtiieh differences could be eliminated in the near future; although this nl^ht appear as a paradox, it io nevertheless soo Thus, this meeting at Coquilhatvillc aimed precisely at having come sort of general agreement whereby all the local governments, the local Ministers of Finance, could be consulted, thus avoiding in a system to be revised — we have had several talks about this but, of course, for the time being it is rather premature to arrive at conclusions; nevertheless the principle remains that each Province must be controlled in its expenditure. Each Province will have its own budget, and this has to be kept completely aside from the Central Government, the Leopoldville Government, if you prefer. We have not yet succeeded, although I have exerted as much pressure as was humanly possible, because it is the Monetary Council — it might be necessary to explain here that the Monetary Council is in fact entrusted, in the present procedure, MW/hia 22 (Mr* Frasca) with the two main requirements which have to do with the two problems of the moment; that is, the tremendous financing for the budget and, secondly, the foreign exchange which is needed for imports. These are the two points in the situation now* In so far as it concerns the budgat, all statutory ceilings of the old Belgian Central Bank for the Congo had already reached sone ^.5 billion franco before independence. Then it wen1!; 'i/nrou^h from July to October with subsequent increases in that amount. Finally, in October the Monetary Council was created ar.d there were further decreases — one of 7^0 million francs, the other, 2«5 billion francs — so that, all in all, to simplify this rather Gloomy picture, up to a mouth ago the authorized total of advances by the Central Bank to the Government stood at 7«5 billion fr?ncs, which is a tremendous figure considering ,» the general situation* This was ax; the end of May, so it was necessary to enact a new legislation; that is, to authorize by decree a further increase in the total advances by the Central Bank to the Government, This increase, 1 was aeked to authorize up to 5 billion francs, which I refused to do because, in the meantime, I preferred to tackle the situation month by month. There has been a tendency in the Congo's administration of finance to set a definite amount, saying: we need

500 or 600 million francs every month. This, I always refused to consider, i said that I would authorize the exact amount resulting from a status of expenditure and receipt so that we could see how the machinery worked, whether there was any of the improvement which, as you said a few minutes ago, is highly desirable• Nevertheless, at the end of May, when the new coiling was authorized, the Minister of Finance asked the Monetary Council for an outright advance of about 1 billion francs a month. That was nearly double what they had been using so far; in other words, a situation which was rather difficult to cope with, on the order of 500 million francs a month deficit, was merely doubled. The reason why it was doubled was clearly explained by Mr. de Seyaec. In fact, we were all taken aback by this strange and unexpected event, namely, an increase in salary scales which had been decided and approved during the Coquilhatville Conference, and of which we were not aware. In fact, the knowledge came to me only about twenty-four hours later. I said that the Monetary Council would not consider any increase in expenditure which was originated by these factors — which, of course, had the impact which one may well imagine. MW/hm 2>25 (Mr. Frasca)

At the end of May, however, it was necessary to give the Central Government r-ouie money, GO I said that, pending receipt of the complete documentation « --Y-.cn I received three or four days later — I vould authorize £00 million : .canes, but would not consider giving it as a right to draw up to 1 billion francs month as far as the budget was concerned. To sum up, we are to have talks with the Central Government in order to have -o provincial treasury system reorganized and, secondly, to see how the process • •:' expenditure and receipts goes every month, begging whatever help is needed on the old basis, and especially now after this new agreement which has been signed with the:,i, to see whether it will be more effective. In other words, ve know they need help, and this hiO_p was completely justified because something had to be done before th-2 situation deteriorated further to such an extent that it did not affect one or the other Government, R merely affects what we want to keep all in one piece — that is the Congolese territory. Thus, regardless of the various difficulties which we night envisage in the near future between one Province and another — Kasai, which is divided, and Oriental Province, where there have been troubles lately, where the demand for consumer goods has increased, where there are perrons,! political differences -- it is necessary to do something. If this something can be dene — as it will be done, I hope — by putting into force an even more effective control, we can say, as we certainly shall, at any given moment: what have you done during the thirty days of June, for example? We want to see the trend; we want to see whether you are living up to expectations, that no more unjustified expenditure is incurred. Then this will continue, and should continue, as the only possible way to cope with the situation, which otherwise it would be too late to attack. r

HS/bd 26

(Mr. Fracca)

Foreign exchange is the second problem you mentioned. In fact; foreign exchanges in the Congo were practically depleted. Before the end of tb3 y~ar, going back to October 1960$ they ran very low. By mentioning ths words "foreign exchange reserves" you have to take into consideration two elements which are the components of the foreign exchange reserves. On one side you have the Central Bank reserves- Up to new the Central Bank for the Belgian Congo, but as of the first of August -- I have just come back from Brussels — it will be the National Bank of the Congo zone reserves, plus the reserves of the banking system. In other words, the reserves of the seven banks which compose the banking system, which are mostly, except the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bets, all the remainixig banks -- the Credit Bank, Banque clu Congo, Credit congolais — are all Belgian or Belgian-interest banks — Banque Beige -Afrique,

Although this was provided for in the old legislation, the foreign exchange reserves of the banking system have not been mobilized yet. Why have they not been mobilized yet? Altogether they amount to a sura which may reach between 750 million to 1 billion francs a month in the equivalent, so that would be between thirty and forty million dollars, which is very little, but nevertheless you have to count the reserves of the Central Bank plus the reserves of the banking sector. Why were these reserves not mobilized? Because it is through the banking system that invisible o and imports are financed. The banking system does not apply to the Central Bank purchasing foreign exchange. Even if they did, in so far as they have a plus position in foreign exchange, I would not allow the Central Bank to do it. If they run short in some currency, they are entitled to get covered, but in so far as I can see through the data in my possession that the banking system does own a certain amount of foreign exchange with which they can face the every-day routine requirements both for imports, which is the main item, and for the invisibles, which is a very disturbing element — the second one — the invisibles — there is no need to mobilize for the time being, but we have the power to do so if it is necessary. In other words, we could create a system of working balance and then ask them to turn it over to you, which is done in several countries. HS/bd 27 (Mr, Frasca)

Nevertheless, there Is no tendency to show that the foreign exchange reserve does not increase, but in the long run shows a constant curve to decrease. Why? r.".a-;re are no invisibles coming in. There is no foreign capital investment law. r-2n if there was one I do not think at today's stage it would be very encouraging --L- foreign investors to invest something in the Congo. Secondly, because of the considerable amount of foreign exchange which is iV.x'.d by transit passengers or transit firms or enterprises in the Congo, which cjss not go to the banking system because of the tremendous difference which exists between the official market and the so-called parallel market -- in other words a dollar whicn is worth fifty or fifty-one, which is the official rate of exchange, was sold in the black market a week ago at about 110 or 115 — so ' whoever is the bearer of this foreign exchange docs not really see the necessity. Fortunately it is a black market which is not organized. They deal mostly with big denomination dollar banknotes. The country as a whole does not receive foreign exchange through invisibles, and for this reason they are not sold to them. It does not receive through foreign exchange the proceeds of exports, because exports are also running very low. If we had an upward trend in exports — and the Monetary Council is now trying very hard to encourage imports which are aimed at fostering exports — transportation, for instance, vehicles which would assure a connexion within the territories wherein the industrial production is more or less holding out — and thus more imports, if that is to encourage exports -- which in turn would mean increasing the available revenue in foreign exchange. This would be and must be one of the immediate measures to be considered. To do this it was necessary for the Monetary Council through the good offices of Mr. Hasan during his mission, and also because President Kasa-Vubu had agreed and seen that point, to see that the whole of these two components -- the licensing bureau, which issues the licences of foreign imports against foreign exchange which is allocated to them by the Monetary Council, and the exchange control, which is the body which is already under the Monetary Council — the perfect operation of these three together would help create a more complete machinery, a discriminating machinery to assure that licences are given for those essential goods. ES/bd 28-30

(Mr. Franca)

This is more of lees "briefly summarized, tut this is the critical situation which exists in these two sectors. So if at this stage aid can "be realized, which is the only possible solution --an aid, which as we said, should not be an aid considered as such, so that they would put all other forces aimed at implementing and bettering the machinery of ths administration, "because it depands on themselves, as well as the fact that the Congolese must show to uc they are making their own efforts to help in this, EO the t/o things combined — it would be premature to foresee in any given number of months, but I think the situation could slowly but steadily be bettered. This, of course, depends also on the settlement of political differences. This is more or less the situation. The old Belgian Central Bank for the Congo and Ruauc.^-Uruii'j.i is in liquidation. After my last trip to Brussels three days ago it had been decided that on . 31 July the National Bank of the Congo will take' over the responsibility for the liabilities and take over the assets. The management of the old Central Bank in Belgium is going to be dissolved between 31 July and 31 August, so that will cease to exist, i'he whole of the staff has been dismissed. r

TL/cn

Mr, de SEYNE3, (interpretation from French): I do not know whether •';bG question asked by Mr, Quaison-Sackey was in fact answered in full. So far ;-:• the monetary reserves to which he referred are concerned, I believe that •uat he had in mind was the situation concerning the monetary reserves that - .--Id at present be found in Belgium* He probably had in mind the considerable u'll^ht of capital that preceded independence and continued through the month v//' Jnl}} following independence and until such time e.s exchange controls could be •:..-.'c?.blished in the Congo* On 1 August last year there were extremely weak reserves left in the Congo, thanks to the flight of capital which had been taking place ever since 1959 almost without interruption until independence) and since exchange controls were not established until 1 August,, there still was a flight of capital during the course of the month of July I960. Of course, the financial ,/ separation of Ka£anga, which was the main source of supply of foreign exchange, prevented the rebuilding of that monetary reserve which is at present being jealously preserved by the Monetary Council undsr the guidance of Mr. Fraaca^ so that licences and exchange authorizations are given only for urgent, necessary and in fact essential needs. So far as I myself could see in the Congo, this is, I believe, just about the only sector in the financial or in the economic administration which is at present operating more or less satisfactorily. There is no impression that licences or exchange authorizations are being abused or issued in any discriminatory fashion. It would appear that this machinery is operating quite smoothly at present. There are still, likewise, foreign exchange receipts that might exist in fiscal offices in Belgium, at Brussels or Antwerp; in any case, there might likewise be certain sums belonging to para-governmental organizations, although these would appear, rather, to be in the red. I believe, of .course, that the settlement to which Mr. Quaison-Sackey refers requires negotiation. Up to the present time it has not been possible to start negotiating, but in the letter which he has addressed to the Secretary-General, President Kasa-Vubu indicates that it is his firm intention to spare no effort to assure that everything that is due to the Congo will return to the Congo, particularly so far as foreign exchange is concerned* TL/cn 32

Mr, gSAHI (Pakistan): Mr. Secretary-General, my delegation would like to extend its congratulations to you and to Mr. de SeyneB and his collaborators for having concluded this agreement with President Kasa-Vubu. I tnink that, although late, the agreement is a very g:od beginning,. It should have come earlier, "but we know that, owing to ths state of political affairs in the Congo, it did not prove pcscible to come to an agreement with the Congolese authorities in regard to arresting the galloping inflation and general deterioration of economic cor.dltions in the territory. Speaking from memory, we know that the agreement envisages assistance up to $10 million* We would be grateful to know what is the rough estimate,

Wra Secretary.-Goneral. of your advisers in regard to the aid to be extended to tac Congo to restore the situation to something like normal, and if you are thinking in terras of supplementing this initial aid by further amounts as and when funds may become available, •• We are particularly glad that the condition has been inserted in ths agreement that this assistance will be applied, without discrimination and that all parts of the country will share in asy benefits that may accrue therefrom. It is a very important concession in principle obtained from President K/isa-Vubu, but we vould like to know how, precisely, this can be implemented by the Monetary Council and whoever the authorities are who are in charge of implementing this agreement, to see that the benefits of imports and any other supply of goods from this aid can reach the other provinces. This is my second question. My third question is: To what extent has the blockade that had been imposed- on the Stanleyville authorities by the Leopoldville authorities- been lifted, and to what extent is there a free flow of the products of Stanleyville and KLvu going through Leopoldville for export and for other markets in the Congo?

The SECRETARY-GEITflRAL; May I, before inviting Mr. de Seynes to reply, make one or two comments which in fact combine your two first points with the one previously made by the representative of Ghana when he brought in the political aspect. TL/cn 33

(The Secretary-General)

The condition to which you referred was, from my point of view, an absolute necessity* Short of such condition, there would not have teen any agreement. That is a matter of course, because we do not help any faction, vv do not help any part of the country,, If we help the co'ontry, it ie, as Mr, .rrasca pointed out, in order to serve the interest of integration, and nothing but that« For that reason, success in implementing; the condition to vMch you referred would be decisive in our consideration of continued aid, T.I " -rcn-ild say that it will be decisive even in the implementation of the arraomsirl, financially, on our side.,, That is to say, we have the matter in our hand and should have il in our hand* You also have observed that tho countered gnature of the United Nations is necessary en the various acts b/ which money is orava and Imports perraittccLo KoY; in this cense the reply to your question concerning further aid, and even concerning the full amount of the ^10 million; i<3 linked up vith the implementation of the condition to which you referred; and that in fact is a Bide comment to the point raised by Mr« Quaison-Sackey*

Mr« de SEYTJ33 (interpretation from French)s Mr« Secretary-General, it is extremely difficult to give an answer to the first quest-ion, that is, the volume cf assistance that may be required for the Congo. As I have already said, the whole economic machinery of the Congo is at present running at a speed which is reduced by some ^0 per cent* The question that might occur is this: In how long a time and to what extent would it be possible to get up come greater upecd in this economic apparatus? There is a variable there upon which the amount of assistance might depend, I might add here a piece of information that I have not yet given to this Committee, and that is that in Leopoldville itself, and thanks to aoeiot&nce from the agents we may have in the provinces, an appraisal and an evaluation of import priorities is being made. In fact, this is a most thorough survey for an import programme that might be applicable to the next three or four months and which might have to be brought up to date all the time. Once this list has been established, some most valuable information would be available concerning (Mr* de Seyneg) the present economic situation in the Congo and in respect of the various factors to vhich I have referred: the depletion of stocks and inventories, the lack of E--:ira parts necessary for the maintenance of equipment, the ijrnnediate need for certain equipment, capital expenditure in order to maintain the economic structure ox* the countryo All information of this nature will be provided "by this surveys But I can tell you right, now that so far as the "balance of payments is concerned, the need for imports, thio first instalment of ij/10 million to be granted to the Congo under the agreement to which the Secretary-General has just referred, is very limited and on the low side* We believe that the licensing V\?eau could be placed again under the authority of the Monetary Council, that i:v under the control of Mr* Frasca here* The exchange office is already m«5.er that body0 So you have aa apparatus here which could ensure that imports ,/ vould noli te "brought in for the benefit of one single sector of the CongoleEG economy, but that full fairness and justice would prevail and that everything vould "be done with the purpose of restoring the economy of the Congo. I might say also that the exports from Stanleyville are essential* They are at preeent being blockaded because of the difficulties that have arisen between Orientalc Province and the Leopoldville authorities; and this involves a danger far beyond tha innneciiate danger, that is, tha immediate loss of crops that cannot be exported. AP/Jm 36 (Mr. fle Seynes)

If the situation were not to improve rapidly there would be very serious danger that the planters would refuse to BOW again and there might be another fiscal year put into jeopardy. As to the blockade; it is rather difficult to have precise information* It appeared to me that the blockade had disappeared for most consumer goods, at least, .-

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia) : I should like to have a description, if it :'s possible, by Mr. de Seynes and Mr. Frasca about the financial relations of the I'rJ.on MinJere with the Congo as a whole. I may be wrong, but I have the feeling t'x.t it is making a profit and that it is in a position to contribute to the Central Treasury* If I am wrong, I should like 'to get some clarif ice.tion, because it is a bit odd that a country like the Congo, with KatangaI G riches, dees not have enough foreign exchange. What happens? They send the things outside. Where do the things go? It seems to me that perhaps the Secretary-General should do something about this.

Mr« de SEYNES (interpretation from French): This is obviously a very important point. The Congolese economy is basically viable; in fact, it is one of the wealthiest economies of Africa, and after a certain span of time -- to correct various breaks in the administrative machinery -- it should not be in need of international assistance at all. Quite the contrary is true. It is an economy which should go at a considerable rate for an African country. One of the key aspects the restoration of this situation is the problem of Katanga. Since independence, Katanga has been in a state of complete isolation, a situation quite different from what is the case with respect to various blockaded and counter- blockades effecting Orientale and Kivu Provinces, Across these blockade lines some exchanges kept taking place and also seme collections and transfers of funds did take place. But as far as Katanga is concerned, the situation is quite different. There has been a complete blackout, Katanga collects its own revenue; according to what we know, the Union Miniere operates and, in fact, is collecting AP/Jra 27 (Mr. de Seynes) considerable profits; at the time of the meeting there will be good reason to look vsry carefully into the amounts of these receipts — what is due to the Congo, r.uc tonally, as a whole. But, with the exception of attempts at inquiry and investigation which ve may carry out, ve do not have much means of action. As regards transfer of receipts collected by ths ynionj-lim^, whether fiscal, ar- a result of their operation, or as regards availability of foreign exchange criminating from their sales abroad, 30 far the Katancanecs authorities have •cumed a completely deaf ear to the requests addressed to them.

: cf Bourse, the hard core of the secession — and one of the very hard cores of the problems nay arising between and the rest of the country if, as we hope, the rest of the country will be unified — la that unification should, of course, extend to Katanga; and if It does so, it should be on a basis which provides for access of all of the Congo to the income of Katanga; short of thai, things would not ricks much eons e« However, in order to achieve that, of course, WG nead two things: we need reconciliation in the rer^t of the country, and wo. need sufficient political strength for the rest of the country in relation to Katanga. For me that has been an additional reason for, so to say, "backing the rest of the country in relation to Katanga, We are not supposed to interfere, but we can, of course, to a certain extent let our weight fall in such a way as to help in what is in the long run a necessary development — in this case, access to the income of all Katanga for the budget of the entire Congo.

Mr. GTOBRE-ECZY (Ethiopia): I am sorry, I do not think my question has been answered. What I want to know is, when the Union Minlfere_ made a contract some years ago, probably when the Congo received its independence, it must have been reviewed, if not reviewed, there must have been some relationship between the Central Government and the Unlqn^MirJ.ftra. I cannot visualize a situation whereby the Union JMi£i

The _SBCRETARY-G?;_rirgAL; May I at this point osk Sir Alexander MacFarquhar to explain where we are in this investigation. I agree with you that that is a very necessary thing and we have done what we could in order to get it going.

Sir Alexander MacFAPvOUHAR : The immediate situation is that there has been a request from President Kaca-Vubu to the World Bonk, He has asked them to help him clear up the whole financial relationship between the Congo and Belgium and, in particular, the situation of the public debt and the situation of the portfolio which, of course, includes the shareholdings in the Union Miniere and various other things. Me understand that the Bank is very willing to do this at its own expense, provided Belgium is also willing to be a partner. So far as we kro./p correspondence is now going on between the Bank and Belgium to get that tied up, ••

5M;: I can e(ic3> only that we have backed very etrongly, in fact, provoked this demand — I can make that confession — to the Bank. We have put whatever pressure we could exercise on Brussels in order to play along with the investigation so that the Bank can go ahead,

Mr a GEBRE-EG-ZY (Ethiopia) : That means, as of now, you really do not know what the legal situation is, what the relationship is, where the money is or anything of that sort?

The SECRETARY-GENIAL; No, we can guess, but we really do not know. But if the World Bank gets into tl?e show and makes this kind of investigation, I am sure that this will, so to say, unravel all these various aspects, because they will have to go to the bottom; otherwise, there is no use, and they are quite willing to do so. Of course, you know that in all these months Katanga has established its own Central Bank and has its own reserves; that has established another kind of curtain which has made it very difficult for us to get any reliable information; but we would break in from the Belgian side, so to say, if we get the Bank investigation going, ER/en 4l

Mr. JHA (India): Mr, Secretary-General, many of the points v?v'.ch I wish to have clarified with regnrd to this agreement have already bo M3ked. But I em not quite clear yet about certain points. This agreement, vhr.ch basically is, I think, fully within the purposes of the United Nations resolutions, seens to me to have several facets. The first part of it is that the United Nations places at the disposal of n,r_d for the benefit of the Congo certain amounts of incncy from time to tv-rio by way of foreign excising::; that it to say, you make available foreign exchange for the purchase and import of essential commodities. That is v^rfectly understandable. In transactions of this nature the proceeds from J:~i& sales in the cov^vrifis concerned are put Into counterpart funds, Lub normally those funds ara at the disposal of and belong to the country or tlie authorities making available foreign exchange,. That is a normal sort of international transaction these days. But the agreement goos a little further, that is to say, these funds are more or less mede available to the Congo for certain purposes, that Is, for the purpose of paying salaries and maybe some other expenditures vhich the United Nations may consider Justifiable, So it means that the United Nations in effect and through an indirect process is making available funds • for the payment of salaries in the Congo. That in itself may be a perfectly legitimate form of assistance, but I think we ought to be clear as- to the quantum and magnitude of the liability that the United Nations is undertaking in that respect. It seems to me that it is a very big liability. And where do we stop? This $10 million will probably go in just a month or two in payment of salaries, and after that we have to pay another amount and another amount. I want to be clear as to what is the conception'of the liability of the United Nations. After all, we all know the difficulties in getting money for the Congo operations. It is true that these amounts have been made available frcm the Special Congo Fund which was authorized r

DR/en If2 (Mr; Jha, India)

by way of voluntary contributions by the United Nations in the resolution of the emergency session of 21 September* But even the quantum of voluntary contributions has a limit. It seems to me, I may be wrong, in my understanding^ what the United Nations is taking over is more or less the responsibility for paying salaries in the Congo. As I said, I em not against it; it may be a legitimate thing, but we ought to know what ou:r ultimat-2-responsibility and ultimate liability is. It scorns to me— considering -iiie financial possibilities, the potentialities c:-:1 the Congo, the various arrangements that are under way which we hope will bring them all the funds end the finance which are at present .locked up because of arrangements with Brussels which need untangling—that the Congo is really a potautially wealthy State, and I would say that while the Unite! Nations ought to make funds available for payment of salaries and so on for a temporary period, I do not see any reason why thece should not be by way of loans to bs ultimately settled when there is a final settlement of the Congo problem. These ough« to go into the public debt of the Congo because, after all, it is the elementary responsibility of every State to pay for services, to pay for essential administration and all that. Go I should like to be clear, speaking purely, rather theoretically, as to the quantum of responsibility that is envisaged under this agreement. The agreement says in article I: "The United Nations shall put at the disposal of the Monetary Council of the Republic of the Congo, in accordance with the conditions stipulated in this Agreement, sums of foreign currency the amount nnd denominations of which shall be indicated at the time they are made available." From this it means that we are not bound to make funds available. That is true, but once a trend is started there will be pressures that it should be continued, and we do not want to get into the position of being told after one installment has been paid that the United Nations is now being stingy, that "they did something which was good for the Congo and now they are withdrawing their hand". That is one thing. DR/en lj-3 (Mr. Jha, India)

The second point. Basically, as I said, this is a good agreement. '.:-.~-:c is a grertt. need for essential connodities in the Congo, ^e population l:-j.:< been starved for supplies. There is galloping inflation for that res sou. Therefore, the more commodities that go into the Congo, the more you. are helping to bring down inflation and make available essential necessities aii?. essential comforts of life to the people. This indeed has been a very e::.'.:?icult situation in the Congo, and our information is that it has been ni-.i:;h more difficult in the eastern part of the Congo -- Stanleyville, Kivu and Kasai — than in Katanga or Leopoldville. I look at this operation not as a means of helping a particular regime bit helping the people of the Congo. Looking at it frcm that point of view, - VJ should like to be cure -- and here I want to say that you yourself ,* have been very much aware of this point and have put all these conditions in your letter. President Kasa-Vubu has also indicated that he will 6.0 certain things in that direction. But we want to be absolutely sure that this is an operation not for assistance or bolstering up indirectly or in effect a particular regime or a particular government, but it is an operation meant to help the people of the Congo. It is only in that eense that it will be justified. As I have said, Mr. Secretary-General, you have very wisely said in your . letter that: "the action of the United Nations is designed to benefit the whole country through the channel of the Treasury. Any discrimination in the use of the financial assistance made available to you would be contrary to the spirit in which it is extended and would jeopardize the chances of further action. I am glad that you saw fit to record clearly your agreement with this view." President Kasa-Vubu, in his letter to you replied, said: "We undertake also to facilitate the unhindered movement of all goods throughout the Congo." This is very desirable. I do not know if there is any hindrance now. I had the feeling that there is a hindrance in the movement of goods between Stanleyville and Leopoldville and the Stanleyville authorities have, I think — DR/en M*J*5 (Mr* Jha, Indie.) that knowledge Is available to most of us — been in an extremely difficult situation with regard to supplies. The other thing that President Kasa-Vubu says is that: "we are contemplating in this respect ... to place the administration of the Bureau of Licences under the jurisdiction of the Monetary Council/1 That is a very good step. Ha also sayc: "We shall take steps to ensure that merchandise delivered to the Congo as foreign aid is sold through normal trade channels and that the revenue from such sales is duly collected." All these are very desirable considerations and conditions. Sometimes there is a great gap "between professions and practice, and the United Nations has again very wisely kept control GO far as the withdrawal of funds is concerned in Stanleyville, in Leopoldvillo and in New York in its own hands because there ,* is the requirment of counter-signature by designated United Nations representatives* We think that that should be used as a lever to ensure that all these conditions which have been stated in the letters; for instance, if an importer applies for a licence from tlie Monetary Council and the Monetary Council -- I suppose that the idea is that the Congolese bank of issue will function on behalf of the Monetary Council, either directly or through the Congolese bank of isaue -- wants the release of a certain amount of funds in dollars.* I think that it would be necessary for the United Nations to ensure that this particular withdrawal was meant for the distribution of goods throughout the Congo; that means that the importer has the proper distribution system; it means that if he has on any previous occasion made use of any United Nations assistance in this way he has played the game. All these things have to be looked into very carefully because otherwise you feel, knowing the history of,the Congo, although at present there are good signs of reconciliation, that you can never be too sure. HG/ek h6 (Mr. Jha, India)

We must be certain that this will not be used for gathering adherence to aiy particular regime,by exercising this very great patronage in the distribution oi? goods, thus making available essential goods to th<3 people. Secondly, if the counterpart funds ere to "be available for the payment of r-Caries, etc., to civil service ani the armed forces, thio fchculd also be on an ^"J.-Congolese basis. Aft^r all, the ANC is one. It ic true that part of it .. r,.-;w is in Stanleyville. The civil service is one. The Governments change but the bureaucracies remain the same. Therefore, it in our view t?nnt the civil servants and the armed forces should be paid wherever they may be, and no distinction should be made in that regard. After all, they are a part of the same forces and they are going to be the Game. Let us hope that when Parliament meets thera will be a reconciliation. Then, of course, the entire Congolese army will be one. The civil service is one, and it will function as one in the future, That also bsa to be insured. Finally, we feel that it would be desirable to have come set of regulations or" instructions in this rege/rd,' much more elaborate instructions, -whan perhaps have been contejiplated in the past,, They may be by way of instructions by you, Mr. Secre.tary-Gcneral, to the designated officials as to what the safeguards are and as to the points they should look into before they authorize the withdrawal of funds. We should be very glQ(i to have a look at it, in all confidence, if you have no objection. We would appreciate looking at the kind of general directives to the officers who are entrusted with the control of the withdrawals. There is one more point on which I chould like to have a clarification* Article V of the Agrcflnsnt states: "No funds may be withdrawn from the special foreign currency . . • account referred to above without the written approval of a representative designated by the United Nations." Artice IX states: "Withdrawals from these counterpart funds for the purposes indicated in this Agreement may not be made unless they have been requested by tho certifying treasurer and have been approved in writing by the representative designated by the United Nations.11 HG/ek i^Y

(Mr. Jha, India)

Who asked for the withdrawals? Is it the Government or the Monetary Council? It is not stated as to who the authorities are that vill be entitled to apply for withdrawals. I have the feeling, by reading President Kaca-Vubu'c letter, that he probably has an impression that the Government can apply for withdrawal of these funds. That is the kind of impression tnat is contained in that letter. I should like to know who is to be tha applicant for the withdrawal of these funds. It does not se.y who is to apply for the withdrawal. Perhaps corns kind of clarification with regard to instruations in this respect may be obtained.

The .SECR-:TA.nY-GENg

Mr. TFEAflWU (Nigeria): On behalf of my delegation, I should like to express our appreciation for the two reports which have ^ufit been mads, one on the present situation politically, and the second on this financial Agreement. On the political situation, I should like to state that my delegation is gratified to know that contact has been established between Leopoldvilla and Stanleyville and that, in fact, nogctie^ionti are proceeding. We have beon pressing for developments In this direction, and it is a matter of satisfaction to us that agreement has already been reached on the venue. We hope that agreement will shortly be reached on a definite date. As we have pointed out once before, we hope that this can happen in time for the independence celebrations. My delegation has always, felt that political stability is very essential to the real needs of the Congo, that is to say, peace and quiet, in order to enable them to carry on the work of economic and social development and reconstruction, which is needed in the country. Many things are badly needed, especially after many years of colonial rule which, in fact, did not prepare them for the great responsibilities ahead. My delegation wants to indicate that we have always been advocates of aid without strings. In this connexion we should be quite unhappy if this assistance were to be used as a sort of pressure to influence the political situation one way or the other. We in Nigeria would resent that if it were attempted. EG/ek U8 (Mr. Ifeagwu, Nigeria)

However, we feel that the type of string which has been attached — the demand c\? countersignatures by the United Nations authorities — is desirable. We feel Jngrined when economic aid is given and is dissipated, thereby going into channels that, in fact, do not help the people, but finds its vaylcto tho Dockets of a few individuals. We hope that this type of string will help to correct that. We are in favour of any string that will lead towards the effectiveness and efficiency of the aid that is given. We are opposed to political strings because the political situation in the Congo is one which must be decided by the Congolese themselves. With regard to the political situation, we read in the newspapers that tha United Nations forces have gone back to Matadi. I should like to get the true picture of the situation from the Secretary-General himself. We feel that this is a matter that is important enough to be report'ed to the Committee. Therefore, we would like to know the true facts instead of just what we have read in the newspapers.

The SECRREARY^GETIPRAL; I can cover the last point, perhaps, as it is a separate one. It is quite true that the Nigerian police have finally gone back as a group of 100, unarmed in accordance with the wishes of the Nigerian authorities themselves. The reception has been good. The only comment we have had from Matadi is that they ware received with something most like curiosity. But I would say that, if I use the word "curiosity", it does not indicate any atmosphere of tension. In fact, the matter has been in the unking for very long because at an early stage the Loopoldville authorities accepted our resuming control over our own operations in I/atadi. Various complications had arisen later, but I am most satisfied to be able to register now that we have gone back. We regard this, more or less, as a door-opener, because I believe that within a short while, if we consider it necessary and if the situation so indicates, we shall be able to strengthen the representation in Matadi in various respects. UG/ek 1*9-50 (The Secretary-General)

The movo in itself means that Matadi is, from our point of view, open again. One of thoce curious things which do happen is that Matadi at the present moment, for technical reasons, is a bit less important than it was in the beginning. The whole incident is, of course, one of the most deplorable ones we have had from the beginning to the end; a^d let us now hope that this is the end. BHS/ds

Mr . de^ SEYNES (interpretation from French): VJith respect to counter- part funds, this is a problem which has often occasioned difficulty, since the procedure is one which is not in itself manifest as long as it is ".nerplained. There is no liability on the part of the United nations as far as these counter-part funds are concerned. To a considerable extent, this is an •'ccounting device inasmuch as e:cpenditures that might have been covered by these counter-part funds could just ac veil be covered by other methods. They have in fact been covered hitherto, as I neve pointed out, by repeated advances from the Central Bank to the Congolese authorities. The advantage of the counter-part funds is not in the counter-part funds themselves but in their ingredients, which are foreign exchange, making it possible to introduce commodities into the Congolese 'economy. The effect of these additional means of payment is neutralized eventually. The use and control of these counter-part funds is determined by an anquLysis of inflationary pressures at any one given moment rather than by the nature of the expenditures for which they are to be earmarked or for which requests are made a In any event, these counter-part funds will only at best represent a function of the means of payment available to the Congolese authorities. Accordingly, the control which might be exercised in this matter is only partial at bejt. On the other hand, this control may make it pccr.ible to limit or augment the total means of payment available which are poured every month into the Congolese economy, I think tills point should meet another question asked by Ambassador Jha, namely who will ask for the release of such counter-part funds. The agreement in this respect is very careful to avoid the introduction of political considerations at this point. They are to serve essentially for personnel expenditures which are statutory. Automatically every month the administrative authorities have to carry out certain ^payments without the intervention of the political authorities. These are acquired rights by all categories of Congolese citizens, and these rights have to be respected and observed at the end of every month. No intervention by political authorities is called for at all. This is a quasi -automatic demand which is made to meet the statutory monthly expenditures, especially for personnel. As regards the desire to avoid discrimination in the use of foreign exchange which will be made available through international assistance, BHS/ds 52

(Mr» de Seynes) I should like to repeat what I said a while ago, namely that import licenses and exchange permits for the transfer of revenue or capital will have to be authorized, under the procedure which we provided for at the time of the negotiation of these agreements; by the Monetary Council, which is an authority outside the realm of politico and which has hitherto served the various parts Of the Congo without the possibility of any discrimination. As regards the possibility of instituting some regulations for United Nations authorities responsible for supervising the use of these funds, perhaps the Secretary-General might wish to answer that question.

The SECRETARY-GENERALa With regard to the last point, I think it is highly desirable; for the reasons mentioned "by Ambassador Jha, to have such rules, and I would invite my collaborators to go ahead while Mr. Frasca is here ,# to prepare the background work for them. The philosophy which they should express, I think, is rather clear. But all the same it would certainly be of assistance to our people to have -them. T vou3.d^ for irv part, be most happy to be able to consult this Committee on the text of such detailed rules,

Mr.^S! OLANP (Ireland): I quite see and indeed it is very important to have the counter-part fund. I think in any exercise of this kind involving foreign aid given for the purpose of avoiding inflation and of stabilizing the economy, it is necessary to have counter-part funds. I think it is very desirable that releases from the counter-part fund should be subject to the approval of the representative designated by the United Nations. There is Just one small point that I want to ask. I am sure I am right in thinking that what you say, Mr, Secretary-General, in your letter about discrimination should apply not only to the approval of releases from the special foreign currency account, provided for in article V, but also to the exercise by the representative of the United Nations of his right to approve in writing releases from the counter-part funds under article IX.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; That is my understanding and, as you may see, the condition is raised with a reference to"the spirit" of the agreement and the spirit of the agreement is, of course, that no part of this operation should serve the interests of any one faction. BHS/ds

Mr. JIIA (India): I thank you, Mr. Secretary-General, for your observations. I am glad to hear that you -will try to formulate some rules and directives to safeguard the points that were raised vith regard to the withdrawal of funds under articles V and IX• Lut I would also be grateful if I could have your views and those of tlr. de Seynes on the question of whether j.t is contemplated that the United Nations should undertake by way of ^sistance — not by way of loans, as it appears to me now -- the payment of

salaries of civil servants0 I feel that if we do that, we really undertake a tremendous liability and the United nations does not have a bottomless purse. We merely have to look, when we deal with difficulties with respect to financial matters, at the last session of the General Assembly. Is it the intention that these counterpart funds should ba used entirely for the payment of personnel^ civil end military, or only a :7:action, cr whatsis to be tne nature of the assistance? Would it be possible to indicate to the authorities that this, or a large part of it, could only be treated as a loan and not as a gift? I do not see why the United Nations should undertake this very elementary responsibility of any government, I do not know what the views of the other members of the Committee might b3, but I am somewhat apprehensive about undertaking this very heavy responsibility which, with our financial resources, we might not be able to fulfil. My other point related to the lack of discrimination with regard to withdrawals for the purposes under article IX, that is to cay, the payment of civil servants and so forth. Is it possible to ensure that the civil servants, who at present, and temporarily we hope, find themselves divided with regard to the people from whom they take orders, receive their salaries from this fund whether they belong to Leopoldville, Stanleyville or Elizabethville? BC/ids 56

As to the technicalities I would refer the questions to my collaborators; "but as to the question of principle, I may perhaps say a word myself. I think that one should moke a very oharp distinction "between the aid proper > which is the aid to finance essential imports — that is, where we give the money — and the counterpart funds4 Mr« de Seynes rightly pointed out that counterpart funds are a kind of bookkeeping device which mokes it possible for the Central Bank authorities — without any undue risk, of ir.flr.tion — to make advances, if we can put it tjiab way, to the Government* That is to scy, we do not finance a "budget de:Cicit, I would regard that as seme-tiling entirely beyond our capacity and "beyond wb.at we should engage in as a question, of principle.

What we do is to fj.nar.co a certain amount of essential importsc Una fact of these imports gives a certain Isewey to the Central Bank authorities to extend credit to the Pentral authorities without the inflation risk which would otherwise rise. That is part of the financial mystique which has developed since the war, but I think that in order to see where our responsibility ends it is necessary to keep this distinction very eharply in mind9 I do not regard advances based pn counterpart funds by the Conseil mone'taire as a United Nations liability at all. It is a secondary effect which is possible in light of the general monetary considerations* I regard the United Nations aid operations as ended with the financing of the essential imparts. If from this, the Congolese authorities would wish to draw the concluuion that we have aoGuaed some kind of responsibility for covering budgetary deficits, I would disenchant them completely by saying: No,, that is not our task and that is not an obligation we can apsume for the future, I believe that Mr. de Seynes should reply to the other questions.

Mr. de SBffiTfre (interpretation from, French) : I think that the Secretary-Generca has covered the essentials. The counterpart funds do not belong to us; they belong to the Congolese. We can prevent disbursements where disbursements ere felt to be unneceosary or dcrgerous -- unnecessary because other revenue has filled the treasury or dangerous because they might give rise to BC/ida 57 i ( Mr • dr» S eyne a ) greater Inflationary measures than, are desirable. But it is not a loan granted

"by the United Nations to the Congo9 The loan is in the form of foreign exchange. In this respect, I should like, to pick up the question raised by

»'"rc Jha. concerning possible reimbursements Kro Jha has surely noted that t£e question of possible reimbursement was ^oncifced upon during the negotiations It WC.G dourly e*cpl?.tned to the Congolese :,athoritics that their country wcs a potentially wealthy ou3 ar.d that at present it'innncial assisteucc, granted to potentially -wealthy countries vns usually granted in the form of loans — although reimbursement conditions are usually so liberal that they leave little of the notion of Iocin0 We mentioned the conditions .in which the net: Ir.te^a'.atl 0:2,11 revolopjmifc .Agency £.r«?nt^ credits, under remftrfcebly liberal conditions: no reimbursement for ten years end a 1 per cent Concrtization for the next ten years and a ^ per"' cent amortization for the period thereafter, ^his certainly does not in any vay represent the cost of the capital involved, but it maksa it possible to establish andmcrintain the principle of a minimum reittbiirBemsnt; for pera^ions of this nature* I "believe that the principle is of some significance for a country liks the Congo, vhich has a vest foreign debt, the settlement of vhich has not yet been .tackled, let along undertake^ This principle must ba reserved for the jtime vhen negotiations are undertaken on the question of the settlement of the debtt Fundamentally there ia no reason fit all "why the United Nations should be in the position of a creditor whose circi^stanc-ss are less favojureble than those of other creditors. That is vhy we have maintained tha principle,

The S"BCRSTAJj :MflTOgF AL : I would add one thing. In my view, this same principle — that repayment io posolble — applies to the major part of what we do in the Congo0 Of course, very much, of it has been in fact assuming this or that responsibility for the Government. If we talk about law and order, that, of course, is a primary responsibility for the authorities,, and for that reason it should not be — if I may put it that way — on the dole» In a certain sense, BC/ids 58

(The SecretQry-GenojBl) it nay be nore difficult, as I see 1% in the long run to ncintaln the repayment pr;Lnci£le as regards the Congo Fund, although ve have dons it and do vant to do it. Repayment to the Congo Fund would, GO to speak, establish a .kind of fund for the United Nations, once created for the Congo, regarding vhich the General Assembly would tben> of course, have to decide as to its use, I should "be very happy indeed for the Organisation if in that way we cou^Ld fi'nally get a modest rotating fund -which could "be used in cimilcj: situations. Hence, I merely wish to say that the principle raised "by the representative of Indie,, on vhich Mr, de Scynea has commented, is a principle -which in my view has a very wide application indeed as regards the aid to the Congo, and that in this specific case — where fundamentally our aid is "based on voluntary contributions, vhich have the character of a gift to the United Nations — the Situation may he a bit different, but that there io nothing which I would say militaten against a request for repayment even in this case, ac tlio fund thus created for the United Nations certainly wo.u.ld "be a most useful element in the United ITatiGns picture in the future. Are there any other questions? If not, I chall take it .that wa have reached a point of necessary clarification — for the moment at least* The Committee will have another chance to consider the matter when we present .the rules and regulations, which would be instructions for our representatives*

The meeting rope at 12,^0 p<.m9 CONFIDENTIAL Meeting No. 53 3 Aucust 196l ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CONGO

Meeting at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 3 August 1961, at 10,30 a.m.

In the Chair: The Secretary-General

Members; Canada Mr, PARRY Ceylon Mr. EDWARD Ethiopia Mr. GEBRE-EGZY Federation of Malaya Mr. KAMIL Ghana j Mr. DADZIE Guinea Mr. COLLET India Mr. BHADKAMKAR Indonesia Mr. WIRJOERANOTO Ireland Mr. NOLAN Liberia Mr. JOHNSON Mali Mr. MAIGA Morocco Mr, TABITI Nigeria Mr. NGILERUMA Pakistan Mr. HASAN Senegal Mnie KLSINSCHMIDT Sudan Mr. SULEIMAN Sweden Mr. MALM Tunisia Mr. ClffiLLI United Arab Republic Mr. CHEHLAOUI

61-19389 HA/dp

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I do not think we should wait any longer to open the meeting, because I do not want to take too much of your time. This meeting was planned to take place some time last week. It had to be postponed because of the events surrounding the Tunisian crisis. I cm happy to welcome you today for the very same purpose which led me to wish to have a meeting last week, that is to say, to bring you up to date on the developments around Parliament in the Congo. I say "around Parliament" as we ourselves/ as Secretariat, have had no line of communication directly to P^rlia^oat. It so happens that in the last few de.ys events have taken a very quick course and, as we meet this morning, you have before you. a report on decisions of Parliament taken yesterday. It is contained in .document S/^913- I should also like to draw your attention to other documents of relevance to the question, if you have not already observed them: the letter from the Soviet delegation of some days ago,-I'/ two letters from Mr. Giscnga,-2// and a reply sent yesterday to Mr. Gizenga's letters.— However, the immediate problem before us is the situation which has arisen after the decisions of Parliament yesterday. I wish later to revert to the steps on our side which now seem to be possible in the light of the clarification of the constitutional situation. First of all, however, I should like to call on Mr, Nwokedi to give a short account of the Parliamentary development as such.

Mr. MWOKEDI; The latest information is that both the Senate and the Chamber of Representatives yesterday accepted a new Central Government with Mr. Cyrille Adoula as Prime Minister. The new Government, comprising twenty-seven Ministers and fifteen Secretaries of State, was approved unanimously by the Chamber of Representatives' with only one abstention. It received the Senate's confidence by acclamation. The names of the members of the Government are listed in Annex I of Security Council document S/^913. It may be useful to record that, following the agreement of 19 June 1961 between the representatives of the Leopoldville and Stanleyville authorities (circulated as Security Council document S/kBkl), the United Nations representatives in the Congo took steps to finalize the arrangements which had I/ 8/1*908. S/U911 and Corr.l and Add.l sA911/Add.2. HA/dp 3-5

(Mr, HwcJredi]

"been started to facilitate a meeting of Parliament under conditions which guaranteed maximum protection for the parliamentarians* This agreement, which cleared the way for a meeting of Parliament, envisagad certain obligations on the part of the United Nations which the Secretary-General accspted ar.d which have been fully mett Parliament was reconvened, although not on i!5 June, and is now in session; no armed Congolese soldiers or police ha^a circulated in or around Leopoldville, except for a few armed ANC that are guarding ir:l litary installations and a number of public buildings in the city; the security of the parliamentarians is fully guaranteed by the presence of strong detachments of United Nations military forces in and around Lovanium and there has not been a single incident or complaint by any parliamentarian concerning the United Nations security arrangements; the entrance to Lovanium is strictly controlJ.ed and no unauthorized persons are allowed to enter the place. HS/ids ., 6 ,>• (Mr. Nwokedi)

The decree reconvening Parliament on 15 July 1961 was signed by r President Kasa-Vubu on 5 July. Parliamentarians began to arrive at the Lovanium on 16 July* The United Nations offered to provide necessary .transport for all those who requested it and. parliamentarians from Stanleyville, Kivu and Bakwanga availed themselves of this offer. By 18 July most of the parliamentarians had arrived at the Lovaniinu Guarantees of security were offered by the United Nations to Mr. Gisenga personal]y and to i-Ir. Tshombe in respect of the representatives from South Katan^/ tut neither IIr« Gizenga nor the South Katanga representatives have joined their colleagues at Lovanium, As a result of a check on credentials by the Ccmnission of Validation of Credentials, twenty-one persons were disqualified arid sent out of the Lovaniura. Parliament.then settled down to work and the Senate and the Chamber of Representatives held their first formal meetings on 22 and 23 July respectively. Throughout the period, delegates were engaged in continuous negotiations on the formation of a Government. By unanimous agreement of all the Senators and Deputies, President Kasa-Vubu was invited to address a joint session of both Houses on 27 July. He was also invited for consultations on a number of occasions. Two senior United Nations personnel were similarly invited for consultations. It should be observed that the agreement of 19 *Tune, Security Council document S/^341, in no way restricts the freedom of Parliament in-cession to make any decisions regarding the conduct of its business as it is obvious that no agreement made before the meeting of Parliament could bind Parliament itself. On 1 August, President Kasa-Vubu charged Mr. Cyrille Afioula with the responsibility of forming a Central Government, and as I already indicated, the Dew Government received the approval of both Houses of Parliament yesterday, 2 August.

The SECRETARY-GENERALS I do not know if Dr. Uieschhoff would be prepared to give the statistics of the two houses of Parliament. I think that may be of interest to the Committee. HS/gp

Mr. WIESCHHOFF; Of course, this can only be regarded as a nost preliminary analysis regarding party statistics involved in this situation. As members of the Committee no doubt recall, there are a total of twenty-seven parties registered as members of Parliament, many of thorn having only one or two representatives. The new Cabinet which was introduced has. of course, a total membership of twenty-seven. There are three perrons in t!\3 list which we cannot trace at all. They are not members of the Chaucer cf Depuv'.ss ror of any other of the governmental agencies previously existing. A.: to the rest, that is to say, some twenty-five members of the Cabinet are distributed as follows in terms of party terms: The MNC — Lumumba has five ministers, COAKA — Kasai Party, closely associated with the Lurauaiba group, has one representative. REKO, from the Kivu area, also associated with the Lumumba Party, has two representatives. CEREA, from the Kivu area, has one representative. This, too, has in the past been associated with Lumumba. The PSA, the party of Gizenga, has two representatives. The Cartel Katangais and BALUBAKAT together, that is to say, the northern Katanga Parties, have two representatives. PUNA, the party of Bolikango, holding perhaps the centre, has one representative. AEAKD, the Party of Kasa-Vubu, has two. UNIMO, a party of the Province of Equateur, of whom Mr. Borcbako, the Foreign Minister, is the spokesman, has two representatives. The Progress Party — PHP — is in the Cabinet represented only by one of its branches, namely, the LUKA Branch of Kasai, with one member. The MNC — Kalonji — the party which before independence broke off from the MNC — Lumumba — has three representatives. Then there are two independents — independent persons of whom, of course, Adoula, the Prime Minister, is the most prominent. Finally, there are, as I indicated, three persons about whose affiliation we know nothing. Further balance in the party distribution eeems to have been secured in appointing fifteen Secretaries of States. Among these there are four about whose political affiliation we cannot find any information here. M//cn •""'- 11 (Mr. Wieschhoff)

As to the rest, they are distributed as follows: the PSA, Gizenga's party, one; the I«-Lumumba, two; GERM, one;' the EALUBAKAT, ono; the A3AKO, one. Then the PHP which, as I said, was not directly repreeented in the Cabinet, has two plus an additional member of 'a splinter group called MSDERCO. These in brief are the statistics as seen from here. I probably should add that, of course, tfcsre is no' guarantee that perty lines are drawn, in fact, quite as strictly as it appears from research based on paper here.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; At this stage, are there any questions or observations which you would like to malceV I shall turn later to the practical issues which we have to consider.

I-ir« MAIGA (Mali) (interpretation from French): I simply'wished to ask a question. We have the list of the compositio,» n of the Government. I: should like to know whether those designated on this list have agreed to participate in the Government.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL (interpretation from French): We have no information on the subject, but it appears reasonable to presume that those who are in Lovanium have signified their acceptance. After all, they all took part in the debates, negotiations and votes. As to those who are not in Leopoldville, we do not even have the basis for presumptions.

Mr. WIRJOPRANOTQ (Indonesia): .Ify delegation is grateful for the convening of this meeting because, it has been a long time since we have had a meeting of'.the Advisory Committee and, in the meantime, political developments in the Congo are proceeding very rapidly. At any rate, we are met together this morning and we have heard your statement, Mr. Secretary-General, and also the statements of the other officials concerned with the Congo. We also have before us a report on the latest political situation. All this news, if I may say so, is good news. Nevertheless, my delegation is not yet .able to sing the Congolese song. We are not able to do so because we do not know as yet the position of Mr. Gizenga. Mf/cn "" 12-15 (Mr. Wirjopranoto, Indonesia)

Mr. Gizenga's name has been mentioned here as one of the Vice-Premiers. But I think that it is important and even necessary to know what his position is with regard to the new Government. Therefore, Mr. Secretary-General, if you could give us some more information about the latest news from Stanleyville, we should be very grateful. The second point which I wish to mention is that although there is indeed good news, this is the beginning of a new stage, a new period, and there is still a long way for the Congolese people to go before they can be happy in their independence. A fresh start has been made, but it is only the beginning. In this beginning there are, however, indications which give us reason for hope. Although the Congolese people, and especially their leaders who are still alive, have had bitter experiences, such experiences mean a certain enrichment in their progress. Without these bitter experiences,.the situation would be more difficult. Although the Congolese people have lost one year in the rebuilding of their country, they are now able and ready to make some sacrifice of personal interest and to make the utmost use of their abilities, and so I think that the Congolese people will be able to make up for the time lost in the past year, bearing in mind the bitter experiences of the past. However, we do have good news, and I think that the ne::t step to be considered is the role of the United Nations, and in this connexion the Advisory Committee should now take account of the assistance which we have given to the Congo until now. Assuming that Mr. Gizenga agrees to accept the new composition of the Cabinet, assuming that he will be in the Cabinet, and assuming that there will be a new government, I thinli -Ghat we must reconsider ways and means of assistance. What I should like to stress is that the United Nations should fix some kind of target date or time-limit with regard to the continuation of its assistance. Perhaps it is not agreeable to mention this here in the first phase of the new Government, but I think that it is necessary. It might also act as a stimulant to the new Government in planning its activities and would be welcomed b United Nations Members which have paid all the expenses of the operation in the Congo. BHS/hm .. 16

(Mr, Wirjopranoto, Indonesia)

Most important in the new approach to the new Government on our side is that we should better understand the new Government, its wishes and its attitude. In the past mistakes have been made on many sides, I think that if we have the right approach and the right evaluation of the new Government — of course this should be reciprocal -- relations between the United Nations operation and the Congolese leaders should "be better and not as complicated as tl?.ey were in the past. The reciprocal confidence which now exists between the r.ra Government and the United Nations operation should be carefully maintained, I think that is one of the essential points for the near future in the follow-up of the Congo operation.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Before calling on the representative of Nigeria, I may perhaps comment briefly on the intervention just made. First, as regards the practical consequences for the United Nations operation, that is, in fact, in my view, the main subject for us to consider at this meeting, The Secretariat has prepared a memorandum with some points which we think should be brought up at once. That will provide a good opportunity to discuss these aspects of the matter. Further, I would say that you have all the information that we have. Although it is true that Mr, Khiari and Mr. Gardiner have been at Lovanium, they have not served in any way as rapporteurs. We have no Inside information through them. When they were asked by Parliament to assist, they yrre, from niy point of view, in the service of Parliament, and nothing but that. They were invited to Parliament, as we understand it from the reports received, on the initiative of the Gizenga group, but with the full consent of the others in Parliament. They have not been any kind of liaison officer for us with Parliament, Dr. Bunche points out that they were never at Parliament sessions. Mr, Khiari and Mr. Gardiner were invited for consultations. As regards the uncertainties which are part of the present situation, you are quite right that those who have not been present, and even those who were present, may of course say that they do not want to take the job. That is anybody's individual right to do. But there is one thing that should be remembered. I understood the position of the General Assembly and of the members of this Committee to be that what was necessary and desirable was to return to or to maintain the legality of the situation, and in the interpretation of legality one BHS/hm ^ 17 (The Secretary-General) has always given Parliament the top role, overriding that of eny other authority or any individual in the country. I want to draw attention to.that "because it means that even if Mr. X or Mr. Y or Mr. Z would say "I do not like this", it would not change the fact of a parliamentary decision which establishes legality. I should also point out that the Katanga problem remains. It has not been resolved as there were no people present from Katanga. On the other hand, reports indicate that representation from Orientale and related provinces has "been complete with the single exception of Mr. Gizenga, who at first was ill and who later, perhaps for other reasons, did not attend.

Mr. NGILERUMA. (Nigeria): Before asking one or two questions, I would like to congratulate the United Nations for its achievement in the Congo. Despite all the difficulties and obstacles, Parliament has convened and a Government has been appointed. The attitude of the Nigerian Government has always been that the Congolese problem should be solved politically and that a political solution was to have Parliament meet and to have a Central Government appointed. This has now been done. Now the Members of the United Nations should support the new Government and the Head of State and should contribute to the solution of their problems in a peaceful manner. I think it is essential, particularly for the African Members of the United Nations, to support the new Government, because the solution of Congolese problems is entirely dependent on the new Government. If any country, whether African, Asian, European or otherwise, sides with any other Government apart from the Central Government, it will only contribute to the difficulties of the Congolese people. I am very anxious to see all African States in particular, and all Members of the United Nations, join together in support of the new Government so that no other crisis will develop again in the Congo. If we are serious and sincere in Africa that the problem of the Congo is an African affair and a challenge to Africa, we must build towards its solution. After seeing this good beginning, if we turn back to join various sides or factions in the country, we shall not be genuine or sincere in our attitude towards the solution of the African problem. BtIS/hm '""'- 10-20' (Mr. feileruma, Nigeria)

I shall now turn to my questions. In the list of members of the new Government I see the name of Mr, Gizenga -- I do not know whether he will accept the post, and this should be left entirely to the Congolese themselves -- but I do not see the name of Mr. Tshombe. We have been working all along for the unity of the whole of the Congo, and not to break it up. The position of Mr. Tshombe may be very important in these Congolese affairs, and I would like to know something about his position in this respect. BC/mh •••-•- 21

(Mr. Ngileruma, Nigeria)

My second question is the following. Of the original number of Members .of Parliament, how many attended the session and how many did not attend? Those were the two questions which I wished to ask at this time*

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; As regards the first question, I should like to take this opportunity to correct a slip of the tongue * In a previous intervention I said that Katanga had not "been represented: but it was Scuth Katanga that was not represented; North Katanga was. The name of Tshombe does not appear on this list, nor does the name of anyone from his particular group. However, as you know, Tshornbe and his group did not participate in the session of Parliament. I do not know what the situation may "be. Perhaps with the very flexible Cabinet system they have in the Congo they have the intention of also including, at a later date, Ministers from Katanga in the event of the very desirable -- indeed, necessary -- * reconciliation. I do not know. f As regards the assumption to which the representative of Nigeria has pointed, that is to say, the unity and integrity of the Congo, I am sure he realises that this has been firmly — too firmly, in the view of some people -- maintained by the United Nations as the basic principle. Naturally, it remains the basic principle. I can only assure him that what it has been humanly possible to do in order to get Katanga to participate in the session of Parliament has been done from our side, in all the various ways available to UG. I regret very much that Katanga was not present. However, the newspapers today are carrying a statement by Adoula in which he expresses optimism concerning a solution of the Katanga problem. On the other question, I shall ask Mr. Wieschhoff to give such data as we have.

Mr. WIESCHHOFF: We do not have very precise figures about the number of members attending Parliament, but we can give a rather reasonable estimate. It will be recalled that the total membership of Parliament is 137* The only party which was not represented was COHAKAT, from South Katanga, with a total membership of eight. Furthermore, as has been pointed out, Mr. Gizenga BC/mh ----- 22 (Mr. Wieschhoff) of the PSA did not attend. It is possible that one or two other members were absent. Thus, 127 members — plus or minus one — of the lover House, the Chamber of Deputies, were present. The Senate has a total membership of ninety-six. All the members of the Senate were present, except for the Katanga Senators, numbering four, who belong to the COKAKAT party. Again making allowances for the fact that one or another Senator may have been absent, I would say that at least ninety Senators were present out of a total number of ninety-six.

Mr. MAIGA (Mali) (interpretation from French): I should like to emphasize right away that I would be very happy if this Government had the assent of all the parties. The Secretary-General has drawn our attention to the fact that in practice the agreement of those named as members of the Government is not required because it is Parliament which is sovereign. But that is the crux of the matter. We have seen letters from Mr/'Gizen^a complaining that the security guarantees were not respected. Proceeding from that, we are entitled to wonder' Whether the composition'of the Government is legal ahd whether Parliament ratified that composition.' If there had been no complaints about the security arrangements, it could be argued that the meeting of Parliament was '• entirely legal. That is why I wish to enter a reservation on this point. There 'can be no question of legality if Parliament meets in very bad conditions. I merely wished to make that clarification.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Of course, I have already drawn attention to the two letters from Mr. Gizenga. I would also draw attention to the reply to the allegations made by Mr. Gizenga. However, much more important than that reply is, of course, the fact that the House of Representatives itself has made a statement regarding this very matter. They are on the spot; Mr. Gizenga is at a considerable distance from the spot. BC/mh .-... 23-25

Mr. JOHNSON (Liberia): It is a Qource of great pleasure to my delegation to learn of the convening of the Congolese Parliament. This step forward will provide a clearer path for the Secretariat in dealing with matters involving legal and parliamentary decisions in the Congo crisis. I should also like to express my delegation's appreciation for the efforts of Mr. Linner and other personnel of the Secretary-General's staff in the Congo and for the important role they have played in providing the necessary security and protection for the officials of the Congolese Parliament. In my delegation's view, the wise course of action for us now would be to continue to deal strictly with the officials of the newly appointed Government, since, in our opinion, the will of the Congolese people has now been expressed in choosing the officials and representatives.

Mr. HASAN (Pakistan); The composition of the new Government and the nearly unanimous vote given to that Government show that the conciliation sought so devoutly and for so long by all of us has at last been achieved — and mainly by the Congolese themselves. The Congo is an independent, sovereign country. We in Pakistan regard the Congo as a friend. It is a friend's privilege to help another friend, and beyond that we cannot go. We can only now welcome the latest developments in the Congo and hope that they will lead to a solution of the problems that still remain unsolved. The United Nations Gecretary-General must, of course, continue to play an important role in helping the new Government constitutionally and legally and in all other respects. We hope that with the assistance of the United Nations and the friends of the Congo there will now be stability and peace in the Congo. If I may be permitted a personal note, I would say that it has been a privilege for me to bo associated with the work of this Coisnittee. The success of the United Nations enterprise in the Congo is due in large measure to the Secretary-General's own devotion and the faith with which God has endowed him and which prevented him from being daunted by difficulties that at times seemed almost insuperable. This is the last meeting of the Advisory Committee that I shall be privileged to attend. I should therefore like to wish you, Mr. Secretary-General, all success and good fortune and, through you, convey my best wishes to the new Government and the people of the Congo. DR/vi "" 2.6

The SECRET/RY-GENERAL; Thank you very much for your kind wo.ds. I am sure that I speak for all of us when we thank you for your contributions during the sometimes very arduous "work of this Committee. We were happy to have p you with us. Ue are sorry tp see you leave, but I can assure yju, and again I feel quite certain that I speak for all of us, that we shall continue in the same spirit of mutual confidence and abidance "by principles which I think "we rightly may say has guided our work so far. In fiat wv./ we hope that we will be able to live up to your confidence in us. • •

Mr. BHADKAMKAR (India): This document that we saw this morning of course gives us very good grounds for jubilation, if I may say so, for congratulating the people of the Congo and also ourselves. If what we have here is entirely agreed by those who are named and by those who have passed these resolutions, I am sure that our congratulations will not be premature. TV: my delegation, Mr.. Secretary-General, this ..Annex III, the "Text -of the resolution adopted unanimously by the House of Representatives and the 3enate on 2 August. 1961" seems to be a very important statement, especially the first and last paragraphs because the first paragraph refers to the adjournment of Parliament"and the death .of Mr. Lumumba, Prime Minister of the first central Government of the Republic of the Congo," and the last paragraph refers to the fact that: "The new Government of national unity shall be ths legal successor of . the first Central Government of the Republic of the Congo." As I said, if the agreement of those mentioned hare is thi-,-re -- and we •• assume it is there; otherwise they possibly would not have been mentionedi it would be extremely unhappy to hear later that that is not there, but we are assuming that that is so, I must say this. If this unanimous or nearly unanimous resolution has any force, I think that the task of the United Nations should be considerably easier in having a very precisely defined legal government with whom the United Nations may • deal. I presume that in terms of the Security.Council resolutions, including the first one of 1^ July I960, the United Nations should be not only free, but quite correct and entirely within its legal competence, to render every possible assistance to that Government. DR/vi 27

(Mr. Bhadkrurkar, India)

Vie have of course the unfortunate situation where the approval and support of a very important part of the Congo has not been forthcoming either in the deliberations of Parliament or in the formation of the Go •, eminent. It is possible that in complying -with the requests of the legal G^v eminent there may be seme difficulty on that account. But our hope is, and my delegation hopes very sincerely, that in the light of the trend of events which, after a great deal of unhappiness, bloodshed, difficulties, bickerings, recriminations, heated debates and extraordinary loss of temper among ourselves here and in the General Assembly, we have finally come to a stage where it seems t;; settle down. I presume that this new Government here covers nearly every important element in the Congo*s political life. We therefore hope, Mr. Secretary-General, that should that very tricky problem arise the solution would be found in obviously, shall we say, peaceful means and without going outside the bounds that the United Nations has most correctly set for,,itself.

The SECRHT/-.RY-GENERAL i You raised again this question of the consent of all those mentioned, and that brings us back to the question raised first by the representative of Mali. There are perhaps one or two points which I may add to TJhat I said before in my attempt to reply to questions of the representative of Mali, points which deserve being brought to your attention. Mr, Gbenye, who is now in the new Cabinet the Minister of the Interior, has to be considered as the very personal spokesman of Mr. Gizenga a personal representative of his. He is a member of the House of Representatives, That means that at least it has been with his concurrent vote that the first resolution of the House of Representatives was passed. It means further, knowing the circumstances the way we do, that there is at least a very strong presumption that he cast an affirmative vote as to the Cabinet, as to the composition of the Cabinet itself. I would also like to point out what Mr. VJieschhoff mentioned that in fact out of twenty-five, eleven directly or indirectly may be considered as belonging to or affiliated to the Gizenga group which, as you see, is quite a considerable number, and further that the first paragraph in the second resolution — DR/vi 28.30 (The Secretary-General) the one passed by both the Senate and the House of Representatives, ond to which you drew special attention -- that this first paragraph lays a "basis for the consideration of the legal situation prevailing after the death of Mr, Lumumba,which certainly has been considered most helpful from Gizenga*o point of view. If we take all these matters together, I feel hopeful that these decisions are decisions which really also have the full support c/f all persons concerned. But we have to live on guesswork. We can only conclude from what we know, and I just wanted to bring this to your attention for what it is worth. It may perhaps be the time to turn to the practical issues which do arise in the present situation and the memorandum which we have prepared will now be circulated. By way of comment I should like to say that in this case of courso it is not the wording that matters but the substance, as this would not be a document handed over to the Congo authorities but an instruction to our representatives in Leopoldville. HA/cw •""•- 31

Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): There are one or two rather small points that I would like to raise in connexion with the section on "Civilian Matters:f. Now that we have what we might call a constitutional government in the Congo, duly empowered by the Parliament, I was wondering whether questions such as "the africanisation of the adrainistration by elimination of remaining political t? advisers of foreign origin*C t would any longer be c, concern of the United Nations. I ask this in view of the fact that there is now a proper government, with proper constitutional authority behind ito Do you not think; Mro Secretary- General, that this question should now be left to them to decide in any manner that they wish? In my opinion,the stresses and the circumstances which prevailed when we passed those resolutions and adopted those instructions -- that we should get rid of all the foreigners, etcc, etco -- no longer prevail in the Congo. That is ray first point. Secondly, I might recall to you, Mr. Secretary-General, what was mentioned here many weeks ago: that we should consider, in Consultation with the new Government of the Congo, the question of treating as loans the very considerable financial advances --we might call them "assistance", because the terra "assistance", in the present economic jargon of the world, includes loans also -- that we may be obliged to give them during the coming months or years to establish the economy on a viable basis and to undertake the urgent developmental work that may be necessary. I was wondering whether you had considered that possibility.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; On the first point, I would say only this: There have been, of course, a series of measures taken by us for what I call Africanization. They have been taken with the full approval of Mr. Kasa-Vubu. They have reached a very advanced stage in Katanga, and a less advanced stage perhaps in Leopoldville. However, they have led to the creation of a kind of joint screening board, a kind of public service commission. Of course, we now have a new situation, because I do not regard any agreements which have been adopted in the past, if they are agreements which are under parliamentary authority, as valid short of approval by Parliament. On the other side, there is a new Cabinet — and a new Cabinet has, of course, its freedom of action in relation to such arrangements as have been made. I think that HA/cw -.. 32 (The Secretary-General) we can say, however, in the light of previous experience, that the target set by the Security Council is also the target of the Congolese authorities, or of all those authorities I know about. Under such circumstances, this simply means that we do not jump off the boat but that, on the other hand, we will have to have discussion of a follow-through of the operation with the Government, leaving the margin which you see here -- "engaged or recruited by..." -- leaving the margin which in the obvious one* They will continue to need our assistance, to a certain extent, because this has been a very sticky operation, to say the least. As regards your second question, concerning the advances, it is a bit in the same category as the one raised by the representative of Indonesia, I would not like the newly born child to face the bills of his predecessors. Nor would I like them to get the shock of a statement from our side'that we get out. I feel that what is said in paragraph I (2) on the point of liquidating the military operation is what can be said now, and, im the course of discussion, we can of course easily introduce the fact that we would like to get out as quickly as possible. There is an element of urgency in it both for financial reasons and for political reasons and in view of the fact that we certainly all wish the Congolese authorities to be able to carry on their affairs themselves, which is the best way, of course, for full self-assurance. As regards the advances, we have, so to speak, made reservations. We are in a position not to enforce them but to raise them again. But, as you know, financial matters are in very bad shape* However, if we now get co-operation over the major part of the Congo, and perhaps over the whole Congo, that will create an entirely different basis for the straightening out of the financial and economic questions. The very moment we see a dawn in the economic situation, the very moment the present squeeze diminishes on all the authorities in Leopoldvi'lle and Stanleyville -- wherever they are, apart from Elizabethville — I think that it is right and proper for us to regard this as a joint undertaking, where the financial relations should be straightened out in. the direction you indicate. But I should like to feel that they themselves are more at ease than can possibly be the case today, before we raise this particular question. IIA/uw 53.35

Mr. NGILERUMA (Nigeria); I should like to as& a question with regard to paragraph 2 of the section on military matters, which reads: "We hope that at a very early stage units of the ANC vill "be able to take over, under the Government, responsibility for law and order in certain regions..."

That is not quite clear to rae0 Why "in certain regions"? It is the responsibility of the new Government to take care of lav and order in all the regions. That is why we think that the political l^c.clers of all regions must be brought together politically under the new Government, so that the Congolese problem may be solved in a very peaceful manner* Secondly, now that the new Government has been established and we are looking forward to its success, it is our hope that the United Nations will not stay in the country for long. It is not the intention, is it, for the United Nations forces to remain in the country forever? For this reason, it is very, ,» very important for the Government to take care of the maintenance of law and order. That is why I appeal to all Members of the United Nations, and in particular to the African Members, or to African Heads of State and Governments, to work together in support of the new Government both in the United Nations and outside the United Nations, to see that it succeeds. Otherwise, all our efforts will be frustrated. The most important thing in the Congo now is the maintenance of law and order, because the masses wish to live peacefully and to have peace restored to all people in the Congo, so that they can .farm and earn their livelihood and live in peace. But, unless it is clearly explained to me, I fail to understand what is meant by the phrase "in certain regions".

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I can explain it both historically and in terms of the facts of today. Historically, it goes back to a discussion -- I would even say an agreement — which I personally had with Mr. Lumumba and Mr. Mpolo. Mr. Lumumba felt strongly that the ANC was not in a position to take over responsibility for law and order all over the country, that one had to proceed gradually, because the units of the ANC would have to be reorganized, there would have to be new officers trained and put into positions of authority, and so on. Therefore, the approach last July was that one should speed up the retraining of the ANC and the reorganization of the ANC in order to get functioning units as quickly QG posnible — and, as soon as functioning units were established, they should take over responsibility where the Government wanted them to and that we would fade out correspondingly* HS/mf ' - 36 (The Secretary-General)

The situation we had at that stage and the situation nov are in some respects fairly similar. I do not believe that the ANC after all that has happened is in a position suddenly to take over law and order in general terms. I believe that the Government is very likely to feel that some units are ready to do so; other units are not ready to do so. Pending full take-over, they would be most happy to have back-stopping by continued help from the United Nations. Instead of "certain regions*1 1 could have said "to all extent possible", because I do not have in mind any special regions or any special problems in the area. My own view would be that as soon as the Government itself feels that this or that unit of the ANC is ready to take over, they can take over, and shall take over where the Government would like them to take over. That is the thought in back of this. • I believe that for the time being the problems which have arisen, for example, in South Kasai, are problems on which they are likely to wish assistance, because ac you know, that is not a political situation of 'law and order in the civil war sense. It is much more one of flare-up of age-old tribal conflicts, and they may feel that some back-stopping for their own efforts to straighten it out may be desirable. The whole spirit of this paper 10'one which is most clearly reflected in paragraph II (3) — that is to say, that at the very moment we are again in a position, without controversy in the United Nations, to deal with the Government which is based on legality. We should decide' in accordance with the voice and vote of that Government. On the other hand, we have a voice too, and that voice leads exactly in the direction you indicate. We must limit the United Nations continued operation in the Congo as much as we can and as quickly as we can.

Mr. NGILEPIMA. (Nigeria): The supplementary question I would like to ask is, if ANC takes the responsibility for law and order in certain regions, who is going to take the responsibility of the other regions? '

The^GECRETARY-GEinilRAL; Pending the possibility of the ANC to take over everywhere, we, at the request of the Government, would have to do our best. It will, however, lead to the possibility of a reduction of our effective force — I hope fairly quickly. How quickly,'I cannot say. :' IIS/el 37

Mr. WJIUOFRMOTO (Indonesia): I would like to have none information, first about the letter of Mr. Gizenga. It seems to me there is some error In the date. That letter is 20 July,

The SECREEAPY-GEMgRAL; There is a corrigendum.

Mr. WIRJOPRANQTO (Indonesia): What is the correct date?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; 25 July.

Mr. WIRJOPRANOTO (Indonesia): Al£o in connexion with the memorandum there is mention about the military matter* I would like to point out that the first business of what the new Government should do and what the United Nations Command should promote and assist, is the security. I mean in the sense that as scon as possible there should be an atmosphere of feelings, not only among the members of Parliament, "but among the whole population. I think it is very important, because as long as this atmosphere of peace and security does not prevail, I am afraid the entire action of the new Government might be paralysed. I think that is one of the reasons why Mr, Gizenga himself did not come to Leopoldville. In one of his letters is mentioned some agreement that all the Congolese soldiers of Leopoldville should be disarmed, and so forth. He ia complaining about this. Of course, I understand it vas dated before the formation of the new Government, and now with the formation of the new Government, the new Government is responsible for the nev situation. But in spite of that I think the United Nations Command should Give some help in the sense of promoting national security. When this has been done I think other actions and other steps of the new Government will come more smoothly. In short, what I have in mind is that we should put in focus all means to have the stability of the new Government, Maybe politically speaking there will bo acme stability, but physically speaking, I do not know. In the experience of the last year there was always a wide gap between political minds or political ways of thinking, and the physical minds of some leaders. HS/el 28-to (Mr. Wlrjopranoto, Indonesia)

In this connexion I would like to point out some matters that might be negative situations in the sense that they can "be obstacles to the new Government. To he clear and frank could you tell us what the reaction of Mr. Mobutu is in this connexion? In the past we know that the A1IC was more or less in the hands of Mr. Mobutu, more or less an instrument of Mr. Mobutu, and in the past he played an important political role beyond the role ol the army. So if you are able to give us some infcrnation ar, to uhct tl:.e reaction of Mr. Mobutu is in this new development, I think our delegation and the Committee in general will be very grateful. The second point is the attitude of Belgium, We do not know what the new approach of the,Belgian Government will be — come Belgian elements who are working in the Congo. MW/dp -.., 14-1 (Mr* Wirjopranoto, Indrneata)

Most of the troubles in the past have been caused "by intrigue — foreign intrigue from Belgium. In this new situation, what is the attitude of Belgium? The third point also is a minus point; it concerns the attitude cf Tshcrnbe. Perhaps the Secretary-General could tell us something about this. According to the newspapers, Mr. Tshcmbe tried to make contact with Mr« Kasa-Yubu, but perhaps the United Nations Command would be in a position to give us some information. What I should like to know is the real relations between Mr, Tshombe and Mr. Mobutu and the role of Mr. Kasa-Vubu in the last days before the formation of the new Government. I put forward all this because what we have to do is to connect the positive points and to maintain the positive points9 but we should not forget the negative points in this development. As soon as we have ths negative points and are able to control them, this may be part of the asyistaaoc we can give to the new Government . ,»

The SECTARY-GENERAL; If you will permit me to say so, I think that you are wise to bring to our attention the negative points, because there are negative points and, although we may be happy for the step taken, we should not forget them. May I first, before going on to your direct questions, refer to the Agreement of 19 Juns and what it said concerning the ANC at Leopoldville; the terms are quite precise and should be recalled , It is in paragraph 5 of the Agreement of 19 June, which, as you know, was approved also by the Stanleyville authorities through Mr. Massena and the other delegates which Mr. Gizenga had sent to Leopoldville . This paragraph runs as follows : "ANC forces and police at Leopoldville and in adjoining zones shall not circulate in the city and the said adjoining zones carrying arms, which must be deposited beforehand in armouries under guard of the respective foreces." , Annex III, page l) In his reply to Mr. Gizeuga, Mr. Linner said on this point: rtl must also assure you that all movements of troops or armed soldiers within Leopoldville are supervised by the United Nations Force and that the conditions required to ensure absolute safety at Lovanium may be considered fully satisfied." (sA9-U/Add.2) MW/dp ij.2

(The Secretary-General)

You may also remember what Mr. Nwokedi said''about this very point. His more detailed description corresponded exactly' to pnrngroph'5 in the Agreement. There has never "been disarming required in any cense beyond the explicit terms of this Agreement.1 "' • • ••• ' •• • < • , •— The questions which you have raised ere difficult "because they go into fields where we have to reJy partly on guesswork, and i'or that reason you may find tny reply a "bit meagre. But I will do my b^t. As regards Mr* Mobutu's attitude in the pa?,t, It is well knovn. As regards his attitude facing the present situation in Parliament, I do not knew. But I must say that if he were in any way consistent with his own previous attitudes, the fact of unanimity, or practical unanimity, cuts the base away from any positive action from his side. He would be in insurrection if he did anything. I can also tell you that has been made very clear to him; and I should ndd that, for the time being, given the needs of the situation, we have military superiority in Leopoldville and, quite apart from the question* of consistency, he, as a military man, can also indulge in some arithmetic, As regards Belgium, I have again to make a distinction between the Belgian Government and this or that Belgian individual in the country. I had last month a very thorough, more or less full day talk, with Mr. Gpaak and I feel that, in the light of that, I am on a safe basis in saying that we now have full co-operation for our aims with the Belgian Government as represented by the Foreign Minister. That gees also to the point that he sides with us against those Belgians who indulge In political activities in the Congo, and he has assured me that hie influence will be exercised in no uncertain terms against such efforts by individual Belgians. I put it on record. I cannot say anything beyond it because I cannot check what the Government is doing; but, of course, we must always live on the assumption of confidence in the word given in solemn form by a Government. As regards Mr. Tshombo it has been, perhaps to use a somewhat frivolous term, a constant back and forth, I have already said that our representatives have with great forcefulnecs exercised all the influence we could in order to get Mr. Tshombe and his people to bow to Parliament; to bow to Parliament, firet of all, by coming and, naturally, by abiding by whatever might come out of Parliament. At sane stages It has seemed that we would succeed; at other stages, suddenly MW/dp ' ...... U3-^5 (The Secretary-General)

Mr. Tshombe faded out of the picture. I believe, however, on the basis cf the information we have, that ve have finally reached a point where those who take a serious view of the Katanga problem in Elisabethville are aware of the fact that neither Tshozribeism nor Munongoism is a livable preposition and that they have no future in Isolation. In such circumstances, I believe that there is a fair chance that in this "back and forth" the final stage will t>3 forth and not back. I also believe that this elementary wisdom has started dawning on come of those who represent the economic interests in Katanga. A landlocked Katanga in a hostile world, in a hostile Congo, is certainly not a future for anybody. I can also say here as a sort of personal declaration — I think I have said it before in the Advisory Committee — that iny own irpls,n" in this matter has been that the moment we could get national reconciliation -- first cf all, Stanleyville and Leopoldville — the moment we could reach that point, the line for Katanga, even if we had a difficult period of transition, would be given. They would have no choice, whatever antics they might show in the meantime. That is the reason why I, for my part, have felt that the non-co-operation of Tshcmbe in relation to Parliament could not, from our point of view, in any way be respected as an obstacle; that the very moment Stanleyville and Leopoldville were going to Parliament, and the very moment they were co-operating in Parliament, they should have our absolutely full support both in their efforts and in their work, irrespective of the stand of Tshcmbe. That is, of course, throwing the weight of the United Nations in — call it on one side — but it has been strictly on the side of legality. In such circumstances I have not felt that that wao in any way departing from the rule that we do not interfere in the internal affairs of the Congo, That is all I can say for the moment* You asked also about President Kasa-Vubu. I can only talk about a persoanl impression from the very many conversations which our people have had with him. I think it is fair to say that, in the final phase, in the last two months, he has been solidly on the line of Parliament as the only organ which could straighten out affairs. I mention that because, os you know, there has been Q counter-bid from Tshcmbe asking for a summit meeting, Mr. Kasa-Vubu has not been agreeable to a summit meeting outside the framework of Parliament. If they did not come to Parliament, of course, they could discuss on whatever level they liked privately; but there would be no other discussion. That is all I know about it. BHS/ids 1*6 (The Secretary"General)

I would like to refer to my collaborators to see whether I hive forgotten anything or whether I have Given it a colour which is too personal. They seen to agree with this summing up. ,

• Mr*. MAIGA (Mali) (interpretation from French): Some of the- questions vhich I wished to ask have already been asked by the representative of Indonesia, and I Shall therefore not revert to them, I have no objection to the contents cf the memorandum. The only reservation I wish to make applies to the reference to public order in the region, in paragraph 20 The representative of Nigeria '•- '- - lias raised this problem, and you have replied to him. I would like merely to express a wish in relation to the manner of presenting this letter. We have been told — and we are not very well informed •— that the whole development took place very rapidly, and I would express the wish that this letter should not: be sent to Mr. Adoula. 'The first paragraph says that Mr. Adoula "should be informed that, with the investiture of the Government by Parliament. ,," and I" think it would be well to wait two or thr'ee flays to see whether the Government" -Is actually instituted and Invested' by Parliament.1 I 'do not think that the letter should be sent immediately. ••..-.-

The SECRCTARY-GENERAL; There are two poosiblities here. -I would agree with you that the timing of any formal d|marche_ take very seriously into account the legal situation." On the other hand, we have this group which - is probably meeting today as a Cabinet, and for that Cabinet it. may be fair to '• -..-. . be informed about the general attitude concerning our work on the hypothetical-.' .. ~ basis that this Cabinet is continuing its work, as ye hope.. . I •.-.would thus ogree . • with you and accept your wish as regards a -formal demarche- vhich in . any sense formalizes relations this morning. On the other -hand, I .feel -that, our •• . people should be in a position to reply to fair queqtiono from those,- who work* •••-.• in the Cabinet,: which I suppose must be constituted today, so a.s~ to indicate •-. our general, attitude not regarding the Cabinet but regarding .our duties ii\ case 'the constitutional Government continues to work, as we hope, it will.1 . BHG/ids "" - 47

Mr* KAMIL (Federation of Malaya): I have a few questions to ask. First, would it be possible for you to tell us today the present state of our military build-up in the Congo? Secondly, in the light of certain recent withdrawals and in view of recent developments, whether it is contemplated to increase the number to what it wao a week or so ago?

Colonel EOWITZ; The total strength before the Tunisian withdrawal was about 19,700. The Tunisian withdrawal, which was requested on 20 July, has now commenced and as of the morning of 3 August, 1,517 Tunisian troops have left the Congo, and 1,359 are still there. The Tunisian troops consist of approximately 3,000 men all together^ Within a week, when we anticipate the completion of the withdrawal of the Tunisian troops, we shall be down to about 16,500 to 16,600 troops. As you know, the Secretary-General has requested some countries to contribute more troops in order to replace the Tunisians. Go far Sweden has agreed to have its battalion now in Gaza transferred to LGopoldville. The lift of this battalion commenced today and the battalion vill be in Leopoldville on 5 August.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; In other cases we have made approaches which, on some points, have led to a negative reaction, which does not surprise me, and which on other points are still pending. I think for the time being it is very desirable to maintain strength, because it is a safety lock, as we know, against any adventures of the kind to which you referred, Mr. Ainbascador.

Mr. BHADKAMKAR (India): My delegation only wishes to confirm an earlier suggestion which I think, you yourself hold, namely that before making this approach to the new Government, you raight wait a few days or a little while, I take it that the intention was not to make any immediate demarche.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Not to make any formal demarche,. but to give guidance to our people on the general approach as regards our operation; that is to say, something which is based so far, in the view of some people, on a hypothetical situation which we hope will materialize as definitive. • Mr> BHAPKAMKAR (India): Would those.of us who have contributed forcea to the United Nations Force in the Congo be at all justified at this stage in hoping or assuming that in the not very distant future gome part of our forces may pocsiblybe able to return home, or would that be a rather premature hope?

The SECRETARY-GENITAL: I believe it would depend very much on the attitude of the Government itself. The hope vonld obviously be that we may be able to reduce it and even start to maks a planned withdrawal based on a take-over by the ANC. However, you must remember the fact thr-.t no parliamentary decision resolves tribal conflicts* Ihey are yh?,t they are, and I repeab what I saidt if the Government would feel that it is not ready to cope with those tribal. conflicts and that we still must try and separate various groups, I would consider it unfair from our side to throw this problem in their lap prematurely, I would feel that we should listen very much to what they say. But as to the hope and the intentions on our side, there is no-question. ,# Mr. BllADKAMKflR (India): My next question is in a sense hypothetical, but perhaps some thought may be given to it. It derives from item 2 of paragraph 1 of the memorandum, that in the near future some elements of the A1IC may_be able in certain regions to take, over responsibility for lav and order. What would be the connexion of any action that they may undertake in the course of their'duties, police action or.law and order action, with the interpretation of the civil war angle in the Security Council.resolution of 21 February?

The SECRETARY-GFNBRA.L; I can only give you my own personal opinion, and. that would be that any action undertaken by a Government-which is a legal Government is outside the realm of civil war. Civil war is fighting between units which do not have a clear constitutional status. For that reason: the situation which you have in mind would not be one which, under the resolution, should be resisted by the United Nations„ DC/en 51

I-!r. BIIADICAMCAR (India): I should like to ask one more question. Once we know — say in about two or three days — that the Government of Mr. Adoula is firmly in the saddle, what attitude is it proposed that the United nations authorities in the Congo should now take in dealing with the Katanga authorities? Is it the intention to deal with the Katanga authorities,, as in the past, as de facto controllers of the situation, or is it the intention to deal with them on matters concerning the country through, the Central Government only?

The HKCRETATiY-GENERAL: A reply to that question would have to be preceded by a discussion with the Central Government, because I feel that there should be full co-ordination of our approach. For example, if the Central Government wishes continued pressure to eliminate certain elements in Katanga and is not in a position to exert that pressure itself, we shall act within the sphere of its authorization and decires and continue on the de facto basis; on the other hand, if the Central Government says, "We shall take the matter into our own hands", that will be a different matter, of course, what the representative of India said regarding civil war situations applies also to the relationship between the Central Government and Katanga.

Mr. WTRJOPRANQTO (Indonesia): At its last session the General Assembly appointed a Conciliation Commission. I understand that the members of that Commission have been named. Perhaps the Commission already has plans to go to the Congo to implement the General Assembly resolution. In the light of the new development, I wonder whether it would be wise to send the Commission to the Congo at this time. I an inclined to take the attitude of "wait and see11. If everything is working favourably for the new Government, I see no reason for the Commission to go to the Congo. That is only the personal opinion of my delegation. Of course, it is not for my delegation or my country to prevent the Commission from going to the Congo, but I think that it is our duty to make these observations. llfl""'

BC/cri 52

The SECRETARY -GBKERAL; This question is, of course, outside my competence; it is entirely in the hands of the General Assembly and the President of the Assembly. I believe that there are still one or two vacancies in the Commission. In any event the Commission has not been constituted, By way of information, I can say that I have been approached on the question raised by the representative of Indonesia by one or two members who have agreed to serve on the Commission, % reaction to them has been that I felt that once the Commission was constituted its first task would be to take stock of the situation in the Congo and decide for itself how it would want to organize its work in the light of the developments. I have said nothing more than that. I think that the question properly belongs to the Commission, because . it is the authorized organ and must make up its mind. Perhaps we have now come to the end of this useful discussion. We shall keep the Committee closely in touch with developments when we may now again enter a more active phase.

The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m. CONFIDENTIAL Meeting No. $k 11 August 1961 ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CONGO Meeting at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Friday, 11 August 1961, at 5 p.m.

In the Chair; The Secretary-General

Members: Canada Mr- DOBELL Ceylon Mr. WIJEGOONAWARDENA Ethiopia Mr. GEEHE-EG2Y Federation of Malaya Mr. ZA.KARIA Mr. QUAISGW-SACKBY Guinea India Mr. BHADKAMXAS Indonesia Mr. WIRJOFRANOTO Ireland Mr, 0'SUIiIVAN Mr. BARNES Mr. MA.IGA KG:.-G?.CO Mr. BENHIMA Nigeria Mr, NGII£RUMA Pakistan Mr. SHAHI Senegal Mr. CISS Sudan Mr. SULEIMAN ' Sweden Mr. MALM Tunisia Mr. CHELLI United Arab Republic Mr. RIFAI

61-2002^ AC/pm

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: First of all I should like to apologize for calling you on such short notice, but the reason is a simple one* There is an exchange of letters which is of seme urgency. I did not want to bypass the Advisory Committee in view of previous discussions; on the other hand, I did not want to delay a reaction. You remember that a week ago we discussed an approach to the new Central Government in the Congo and I think one or two said that we might perhaps wait a couple of days in order to see if greater clarity could be gained concerning the constitutional situation. I followed the advice of this small minority and we have made only informal contacts necessary for the progress of the work. So far, therefore, there has been no formalization of our relations with the new Central Government. HG/cw 3

(The Secretary-General)

However, the clarity that those representatives wished to obtain has, I think, been sufficiently created by later developments. There are several factors to vhich I could refer. One is that Mr. Gizenga has declared, according to reports we have received ourselves, that he recognizes, especially, the resolution vhich was unanimously passed by the Senate and by the House of Representatives, according to which the new Government established under Mr. Adoula was the only legal Government. Further, we have a letter which you sec before you from Mr. Adoula, and we are informed that this letter is something which he has presented to his colleagues in the Cabinet, and. thus represents a desire expressed by the Cabinet. You will remember the composition Of the Cabinet. It is true that Mr. Gizenga has not yet .come to Leopoldville and taken up his post as Vice Prime Minister; but apart from this there are ten other members of the twenty-five -man Cabinet who are of his party or affiliated parties. Further, the Minister of the Interior in the Cabinet Is Mr, Gbenye who, as you know, is to be regarded in a certain sense as the closest spokesman of Mr. Gizcnga. If you take the Gizenga statement on the one Uand and, on the other hand, the fact that thu Cabinet is now functioning with this composition, and that the Cabinet, to the best of our knowledge, is back of this letter from Mr. Adoula, I think that the problem as regards Stanleyville is clear. There rcma: •o a vroblem regarding Katanga. The parliamentarians from South Katarjga are in Ivcpoldvi.lle, at least the Dijor'.ty of them, Mr. Tshombe himself still hn:-, not ucue tr: Leopo.ldville but may go ab any time. In the present situation it is therefers clear that there may be a remaining element of so-called uncertainty with reference to South Katanga. If we reply, as I for ay part consider obvious, positively to Mr. Adoula1s letter, the only possibility of, so to say, establishing a front line by that would therefore be a front line against South Katanga. But even that is doubtful because I do believe that the general trend at present is one according to which Katanga would bow to the Parliament's decisions and co-operate in the new Central Government -- or with the new Central Government is perhaps the more correct term, aa there is no Katanga minister in the Cabinet, Under the circumstances, I have considered that the reply you have before you as a draft is the obvious reply. It obviously also is a reply which should not be delayed unnecessarily because of the consequences that it may well have by way HG/Cw l*-5 (The Secretary-General) of uncertainty, ambiguity and this and that kind of distrust. You may ask why, under these circumstances, I found it necessary to bring the matter up with you. I can say that it is just simply as a question of good order. As the question of the approach of the Government was discussed a-week ago, I think this Committee should take note of the later developments. With these words, I would like you to study further, if you have need for it, the letter from the Central Government and the suggested reply, and give us the advantage of your observations, if any.

Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana): I have no doubt that the news about the reopening of Parliament and the setting-up of the Government has already "been checked by this Committee. At least views were expressed on the matter when you met here on 5 August. We are also happy that it was possible for the members of Parliament to get together in order to approve a Government, There are one or two questions I want to ask. In the first place, am I right in assuming that there was a quorum for Parliament, in which case, even though South Katanga was not represented, we could say that Parliament met and approved the Government? That is very important and comes within the purview of the Loi fondamoritale» Secondly, as we have also heard statements from the Press about Gizenga's intentions, I was wondering whether you have any document or statement to give to the Committee in respect of Mr. Gizenga^s viewpoint. It would help those of us who have taken a firm position in recpect of the legal Government of the Congo to make up our minds, because there seems to be a lack of contact between us and Stanleyville and Leopoldville. Therefore, any information you may have in that regard will be very helpful. Thece are my preliminary views. I must say that I feel that what has happened in the Congo is a good development. It is in conformity with the resolutions of the United Nations, particularly the resolution stressing the fact that Parliament should meet. Parliament has met and the Central Government has been established, and all went well. I think that the development which has taken place in the Congo augurB well for the future. All of us should be very proud of the work which was done behind the scenes to bring this about. DR/dp 6

The SECRETARY-GENERAL;. First of all, Mr. /Jnbassador, there is no question at all about the quorum. In that respect the situation is quite clear and quite solid ond uncontestcd* Secondly, as regards Mr. Gizenga's attitude, I can refer you to a report dated 8 August which I want to read to you. I excuse myself for reading this in French, (continued-in French) "Yesterday on 7 August in Stanleyville, Mr. Gizenga announced the dissolution of his Government and the recognition as the sole legal Government of the one presided over by Mr. Adoula since the latter hed obtained the regular investiture of the two Chambers." Then further on: "A few hours .after this declaration, Mr. Cmari Adrien," (the Kivu man who belonged to the same group) "sent a long cable from Kivu to Adoula tendering his congratulations, assuring him of his loyalty and placing himself entirely at the disposal of the Government." (continued in English) That is, I guess, as much as we can get unless Mr. Gizenga would write to us 4irectly. .1 do not see any reason vhy Mr. Glzenga should write to us. His declaration in the Congo is, of course, the relevant fact.

Mr. QUAI50N-5AGKEY (Ghana): At this juncture do you not think that the very same contacts which brought about the event which we have witnessed in Lovaniura could very well produce this result which I em thinking about, that there should be direct communication? After all, he did communicate with you when he in fact suggested that Parliament should meet at a neutral place. In other words, he has assumed a certain position which he cannot abrogate. Therefore, he must inform you through your representative that he in fact accepts what has happened in Leopoldville. I am not saying that by his doing that it does not detract from the Government set-up, but he has maintained a certain relationship with you, and in fact some of his correspondence has been read here. I feel that there would be no harm if this same kind of prodding which has produced the result which we have seen can be brought about to get seme information from him so that we know exactly what he is thinking. DR/dp

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I would like to Bay first that over the last veek-end a delegation from the Central Government headed "by Mr* Gebenye was in Stanleyville; that is to say, there is a running contact between those in Lccpoldville and those in Stanleyville. He returned and he took up his job in the Cabinet and so on and BO forth. I would personally react quite strongly against an approach even in the most informal way by us or by me to Mr* Gizenga, asking him to cay that he, so to say, gave up his prior claims in view of the dec ir. ion of Parliament. I would regard it as highly objectionable from the point of view of the Central Government that I approach a single person who ic c. merJber of the Cabinet in this way, with the possible implication of a mild provocation, "Do you really take this seriously?" So I feel barred from that kind of contact. I think that what he says in the way he has said it -- .in the presence of a representative of the United Nations in fact — that has to count for my part.

Mr. QUA IS ON-SA7KEY (Ghana): I did not know that a representative of the United Nations was present, I am sorry to have dragged this matter on.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I want to check my memory of it. General Rikhye, who has just returned, said that our man was called in immediately after the meeting with ambassadors and told what had been stated to the ambassadors, and it seems proper to regard such cm oral statement to our man in Stanleyville as covering the field you had in mind.

Mr. NGID5RUMA (Nigeria): Thank you, Mr. Secretary-General. The attitude of my Government is quite clear with regard to the new Government in the Congo. What in important now when we meet here is that fl list of the members of the new Government was submitted to us and, most important of all, is the position of Mr. Gizenga. What I should like to know is whether he has accepted the post offered to him; I know that he is not in Lecpoldville, he is in Stanleyville. lias he accepted the post offered to him? In connexion with this, what I am going to say, any relationship between Mr. Gizenga, Mr. Tshombe and with any other leader in the Congo is now an affair of the Central Government. DR/dp 8»10

(Mr* Ngileruma, Nigeria)

I think vhat the United Nations can do in the Congo now is quite rightly to support them and to give them advice to vork in co-operation, in harmony with the leaders who have not ccme to Join them. If there is any misunderstanding or any difficulty then it is up to the United Nations to see that they are brought together and to bring them to some mutual understanding, 3o the draft letter which is placed before us, the one cent by the new Government and the reply of the Secretary-General — I am not going to discuss it in substance now but in principle it is a very good thing for the United nations to make it clear that they have recognized the new Government. It is therefore very important for all Members of the United Nations to know that the United Nations is supporting the new Government, is working throggh the new Government, that everything, whether it is financial aid or whatever it is, technical aid, political discussions, everything should be channelled through the Government, for whose formation we have been working very hard. This is the purpose of this Advisory Committee and the purpose of the United Nations itself. So whether Mr. Gizenga is willing to come to Leopoldville or whether he is willing to accept his new post, it should be a metter for negotiation between the new Government and the leaders concerned. We should not create any difficulties for the Congolese; we whould help them in their way of getting together, co-operating among themselves. Much has been done in the Congo; there has been much strain, bitterness, political struggles for political power in the Congo* All this must now "be forgotten by the Congolese themselves and anyone who hjs the interests of the Ik million Congolese at heart — the United Nations and its members muct eee that they work together among themselves. We should not allow any foreign intervention among them in order to create more difficulty end chaos. I will come to the question of substance later on, but in principle it is a very good thing for the United Natiuns to say that it is supporting the new Government and recognizing it so that other Members of the United Nations should know the United Nations stand. BHS/vi 11

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; We have no information about Mr. Gizenga's personal intentions beyond the fact that he obviously had the intention of going to Leopoldville this week, I do not know why it has not ccme about« But there is another point of view which members of this Committee must certainly have in mind* The attitude of the United Nations all along has been that we should act on the basic of locality. Here we have a unanimous Parliament investing a Governmento Over and above tii?t we should note that in all the time which has elapsed since the investiture — ten days, or whatever it is — when all the parliamentarians have been in Leopoldville, having left Lovaniuin and left the individual protection which they previously had, there has not been a single voice which has put in question the legal procedures of Parliament, nor hao this been done from Gtanleyville. Quite the contrary has been the case, as we see from the declaration to which I have referred. In such circumstances, the question of legality is resolved in a vay vhich I think should alco convince the skeptics. Legality must rule our actions* I fail to understand; for ray part, how. any one man, whatever attitude he may take, can override recognized legality. In this respect I am in entire agreement with you* Either we meant what we have been saying all along, or we did not mean it. If we meant it, there cannot be two views about what government we have to deal with at present.

Mr* MAIGA (Mali) (interpretation from French): Far. Secretary-General^ you said a moment ago that you would object to addressing yourself directly to the Stanleyville Government. May I make one suggestion I think it would be good, in order to satisfy the .Ambassador of Ghana and r^yself, for you to address yourself to the Government of Mr* Adoula and asl: him to furnish the information. It would be better for us to be informed with respect to these matters —- which persons have accepted appointment to the Government and which have not. This question does not apply only to Mr. Gizenga, It applies to the whole list of Ministers who were included in the document which was presented to us concerning the composition of the new Government. This would involve no stand on your part, You would adhere to the legal position, and the Committee would be informed of these matters and would be in a position better to access the documents before us. I trust that you will find this procedure unexceptionable. BHS/vi 12

Mr. GEBRE-EqZY (Ethiopia): The last time we met I did not speak because, quite frankly, I did not know what was going on. In other vcrds, it eeemed to me that the solution with which we were presented seemed rather too simple* While I wished to believe it, I VQS compelled, on the other hand, to reserve my position and to wait to eee exactly what had occurred. This was not because we wished the Congolese any ill will; it was not becauce we preferred one faction to another; it waa simply because of complete bewilderment. After a year of fighting and controversy, we suddenly found this constitutional situation. We welcome it if it reflects completely, or at least in good part; the political reality prevailing in the Congo* That io to say, if they have come together and if they have agreed on a government, whether it be Mr. Adoula, Mr. Gizenga or anyone else, we accept it. Therefore, when we refrained from speaking on the subject, it vas not because we preferred one person or another; it was because we really feared that this vas rather too simple and that something might be beyond all of 1!.. Again toaay I shall hava to wait and Bee, not because we wish the Congolese any ill will or because we prefer ore personality over another. In fact, we do not know them. It is because there may be something more involved. However, we have been told — I do not know whether or not it is true — that Mr. Gizenga has made some reservations with regard to the composition of the Cabinet. We would like to obtain some information on this matter. It is easy for us to say there is a legal Government which has been constitutionally voted and we accept it. At the sometime, however, we cannot help but wonder whether this really resolves the problem and establishes a Government which the Congolese want. We do not wish to cast any doubt upon anyone there. Wo simply feel that perhaps a little more time is needed in order to comprehend the exact situation prevailing, I have no direct information from the Congo, but I have been told that certain quarters have made some reservations, for example that Mr. Gizenga has said that he would accept the position in certain conditions. Secondly, I have been informed that Parliament is meeting. I should like to know whether this is correct and, if so, what they are meeting about. BKG/vi 13

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: As regards the alleged conditions on the part of Mr. Gizenga, they are all rumours and they are limited to the point that, with respect to one specific post, he would like to have a special candidate. We do not have any information which we can trust. These are rumours which we ourselves have not had, but which you may have come across because they have been tossed around, I chould confess that I on a bit bewildered by your question. Much as I share your wish to know whether this expresses the views of the Congolese people, I do feel that we are not in a trusteeship position in relation to them, and I do feel that we are bound to live up to what we have adhered to before regarding the decisions of Parliament as valid for the Congolese people. Parliament is meeting at present in Parliament Building, in conditions where we have agreed,at any moment, when any one member of Parliament asks for any services in the direction of security, for such services to "be rendered. But that is to be done on their initiative. With respect to what they have to do, you know there is quite a lot to be done. There is very much that Parliament has to settle, and for that reason I do not think we need to worry about their agenda. It will necessarily include various financial questions and various arrangements and agreements that have to be made, I suppose they are also more or less starting to talk about the constitutional arrangements. As you may know, the investiture of the government was tied to a three-month period during which Parliament intends to try to find a solution of the problem of the proper constitution under which new decisions as regards the government may be taken. The cum total of this is that I fail to understand what more we should wait for from the point of view of legal form.

Mr. Q.ULTBOH-fi/XCKEY (Ghana): I think it is very .important for us to express views on this matter, bocause all along it has been this Committee which has been in a position to give views and guidance* This Committee has in fact been very instrumental in obtaining the results which have been achieved in the Congo through the Secretary-General. I feel that we must leave these meetings fully satisfied that the trend is good. We do not want any doubt to exist as to any future political problem in the Congo. BllS/vi 1H-15

(Mr. Q,\3pison-Sackeyj Ghana)

Certain elements had to be reckoned with in the convening of Parliament and in setting up the Governmentf That is why I asked my questions about Mr. Gizenga. He was a factor to be reckoned with in all this matter. I feel that because there are still doubts, not that these doubts actually count a lot, as to the legality of the present Government, but that it is in our interests that the quiet negotiations which took place should not lapse, that if in fact there have been reservations on the part of Mr. Gizenga, those reservations should be heard in order to clear them, if in fact they have been made. • . . , AP/mtm l6 (Mr. Qualson-flackey* Ghana)

That is why, in approaching this draft reply to Prime Minister Adoula — whom I know very well, and who, I think, is going to be a good Prime Minister -- you must not commit yourself immediately as to his Government being the sole legal government in the Congo. I feel that in the first instance time must be allowed so that for example a report should be made to the Security Council in conformity with the 21 February resolution which called for the convening of Parliament. I think that as coon as a report ie mde to the Security Council, and poocibly the Security Council meets to round up, as it were, a discussion of the problem, all the other present, as it were, intransigent positions might be resolved; because then the Security Council will address itself as to the legality of the Government* There is no question at all per se as to what has happened de facto or even de jure; Parliament has met and set up a government. I do not think it to be a good idea to reply immediately to him and say that his is the sole government, when in fact the various elements in the whole Congo are not completely known. I feel that possibly the lapcc of a Cay or two or even a week,, before y^u reply, may help a great deal. A reply in that vein, in a week's time, would be all right. But I would be chary of saying immediately that his is the sole government.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: First of all there has been a report to the Security Council on the decision of Parliament and also on the resolution passed unanimously by both the Senate and the House of Representatives that this is the cole legal government,, When did the Security Council in any way indicate any doubts as to the right of Parliament to decide — especially in the case when it decided unanimously? I fail to see what the Security Council Is in any way entitled to rule on in the light of its own history in the case. They have put Pa.-:"'.lament at the centre. So has the General Assembly. Parliament decides* Then we put questions. I am sorry, but 1 cannot follow this. I can see that those who are disappointed in this or that element of the composition may be unhappy with the decision of Parliament, But I do not see how they can question the conclusions to be drawn from the decision of Parliament. AP/mtm 17

Mr. BARNES (Liberia): I have just had an opportunity to read this letter from Prime Minister Adoula to you, and the draft text of your reply. I vould vant to say straight avay that my delegation ia in full accord with your reply, Mr, becretary-General, which points out that the United Nations will deal with the Government of Mr. Adoula "as the sole Government of the Republic of the Congo". For several meetings'of this Advisory Committee we have contended strenuously here that a first step towards the resolving of the situation in the Congo was the meeting of Parliament. Parliament met. Security arrangements were made, on the request of the Congolese Government, by the United Nations to ensure the participation of all elements, of all political factions in the Congo in the meeting of Parliament. As I understand it, Parliament reflects the will of the people. And if the Parliament has decided "by a large majority to organize a government under the leadership of Mr. Adoula, I think it is the duty of the United Nations to respect that government and to consider it as the sole government of th^ Congo* VJe have had, as I see it, two problems in the Congo — and I call it the situation in the Congo, and the situation of the Congo. The situation in the

Congo has been the internal situation therea There has been a forward step to resolve that situation by the organization of a government* I think if we assist the people of the Congo by supporting the legitimate government of the Congo, as called upon by the Parliament, we shall in a large measure be

resolving the situation of the Congo0 I want to cay that my delegation is in support of this letter that you have prepared to send to .Mr. Adoula. I do not think we should give any semblance of disagreement with the Congolese on who should be or what government should be the true government of the Congo. That is their internal affair. If they have decided upon Mr. Adoula as the Prime Minister, we are bound to recognize him. If the Parliament had named Mr. Tshombe or Mr. Gizenga — and that was a majority view — it would be the duty also of the United Nations to recognize that. Following the practice of my government to respect all constituted governments, we have no alternative in the circumstances that Mr. Adoula!s Government is the sole government of the Congo — and the United Nations should recognize it as such. AP/mtm

Mr•_SHAHI (Pakistan): Mr. Secretary-General, on behalf of my delegation, I should like to express our complete concurrence with the draft text of your reply to Prime Minister Adoula. In particular, we entirely concur vith that statement in the second paragraph of your draft letter that you -will deal — as charged by the Security Council — -with the Adoula Government as the sole Government of the Republic of the Congo. We feel that after the Parliament met and invested the Adoula Government and voted its confidence, legality demands that the United Nations treat -with that Government and no other Government. Otherwise it -would be going contrary to its own past stand, and insistence on legality. Having worked vith my distinguished friend, the Ambassador of Ghana, I can testify to his great concern for the solution of the Congolese problem. As far as I could understand him, perhaps his stand might, not be inconsistent vith the text of the letter if vhat he has in mind is that the officers of the Secretary- General who have played such an important part in bringing about reconciliation between the Congolese factions and in the establishment of a Government of national unity, vcre to continue their informal attempts to persuade Mr. Gizenga to enter the Government. We are impelled to say this because although the legal and constitutional problem has been solved, it has been solved from the point of view of legality3 But we should remember that the other problems of the Congo now will need cttentioru the problem of the reorganisation of the Congolese army; its insulation from politics} the unification of that army; and then the administration of the United Nations to reach all parts of the Congo impartially to ameliorate the lot of the inhabitants. So, although we greatly welcome the dissolution of the Stanleyville regime in compliance with the decision — in acknowledgement of the consequence of Parliament's decision —- we hope that it will not lead t-v an eirl:.ra-lcsgal situation by which a de facto authority is maintained in S.^uj-eyvllle which would obstruct the writ of the legal Government of the Congo. I would like to inquire, Mr. Secretary-General, whether you would think it would be inconsistent with the stand you have taken — and with which my delegation agrees entirely, and we consider it completely correct — whether you would think it would be inconsistent for your officers to continue their informal AP/mtm 19-20 (Mr, Shahi, Pakistan) efforts, unofficial efforts, to see if Mr. Gizenga could take upon himself his office. But at the same time 1 would like to make it clear; on behalf of my delegation, that the legality of the constitutional validity of the Government of the Congo is not affected whether Mr. Gizenga does take upon himself the office which he has been offered or nott But perhaps from the point of view of the larger political question, we would like to know whether you would consider it out of order for your representatives to make unofficial efforts. GRR/dak 21

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: My reply is very siuple. We still have a representative in Stanleyville, as I said in my reply to the representative of Ghana regarding this declaration by Mr. Giz=cga, He remains in contact with the Stanleyville authorities "but I think his role, even the most informal and most modest role in the field of bringing people closer together, has "been considerably reduced by the fact of the strong representation of Stanleyville within the Cabinet itself. I have mentioned the fact that 1-Ir. CT^enye and a ccuple of others were in Stanleyville over the week-end, for discussions with LIr. Gizenga and then returned to Lecpoldville, obviously taking up their functions vithin the Cabinet. That shows that there is a rather close relationship. Why Mr. Gizenga has not taken up his post is something about which we know nothing, just as we know nothing about what was said between Mr. Gizenga and Mr, Gbenye, In sura, therefore, the situation is that there is no objection at all against continuing our direct contact with Ijr. Gizenge. for what it is worih. On the other hand, of course, agreements and dealings with the Congo vri.ll have to take account of the resolution which, as you will remember, was unanimously passed by both the Senate and the House of Representatives r.r.d which st -fried that, "on the formation of the now Government arid from the moment vrli3n it had obtained, a vote of confidence in the Chambers, no other Government might claim to act as the constitutional Government of the Congo". It was a unanious vote of the Senate and a unanimous vote of the House, and in line with the role th-3 Unit.ru Nations has consistently ass-.imed, in dealings with anything which iri to be considered aa a government, it is this Government, the Government invaded by Parlifjuient in Leopoldville, with which the United Nations must deal v.nder this resolution.

r (Ethiopia): Would it be possible to know what the Parliament is do-.."g no;T in L- ypolcV.'ille? Is it doing anything more in regard to the formation of 'Lhe Goveransnt?

The ^gRETARY-GEPJERAL: The Parliamentarians left Lovanium when they considered themselves as having set up the Government. GRR/dak. 22

Mr« GPRE-FGZY (Ethiopia): We do not know any of these people and if we hesitate to "be jubilant about it it is not because ve wish anyone any ill, "but I repeat again that I think it would be prudent and vise to wait a few days until we get more adequate information* I am not saying that this Government is unconstitutional, far from it, but what I am saying is that it is always possible to get a constitutional vote, and that is all very right and proper, but the man who really counts in the ssnso of being an important element in a national government was not there and our only fear is that something may happen which may push us into a position in which it may be difficult for us to continue the effort to bring them together. It seems to me that it is pocsible to wait a few days, to try to get them to come to Leopoldville and to put them on the right road. We are simply anxious to know in a more definite, more concrete and more realistic way whether they have now come together and whether they are. in Leopoldville looking after their national existence. We having nothing .else in mind*

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I see your point, but I would remind you that this is a question of law, not of politics. I am very sorry, but the Organization has to deal on a basis of legality, as has been demanded so often and so rightly. The moment there is a decision of Parliament it is not for us to judge the viability of the decision in political terms — that is not our business. By saying that we cannot reply at the present time you are, in a certain sense, saying that we do not accept the second resolution of Parliament, but hov are we entitled to do so? There is also the other point I mentioned at the beginning, that if this reply should be considered controversial in any direction, it is in the direction of Elisdbethville•

Mr. MAIGA (Mali) (interpretation frcm French): We must call things by their proper nsmes. I think we are not going directly to the question. No one has said here that the Parliament was not sovereign, but our reservation bears upon one point alone. If the Parliament deliberated with troops surrounding it and threatening the parliamentarians, if it voted under those conditions, could you say that the decision coming from that Parliament wes a legal decision? I do not say that this happened, but our reservations boar upon this point, whether they are the reservations of the representative of Ghana cr others which have been expressed here. We wanted to have all the elements which would allow us to assess GRR/dok 23 (Mr. .Maiga, Mall) whether Parliament had met in the proper conditions end therefore whether its decision became automatically legal. There is no dispute on thio point, because up to now I have heard it stated that the Parliament, which is sovereign, has readied such and such decisions, but the Secretary-General himself has not been able to give us all the information We were told several times at the last meeting thit we do not have all the information, and therefore our reservations bear upon this point, namely, that we should wait a little to have precise information before taking a decision. It is certain, as far as we at least are concerned, that if Parliament met in viable conditions we recognize the Government, whether it is Aaouia or another; the decision of Parliament will be valid for us. It is a imply a question of urgency. We have received a letter, we reply inmedj ately, you have stated yourself that you do not want to write to Gizenga because it mi^ht cccprcmi^c you, it would be dangerous to reply immediately to Adoula because it night ccomlt you later, and the concrete problem on the spot might not have found a solution and the action of the United Nations would not reach its goal in such circumstances. I do not think we should avoid this point; it is a question of how soon we should reply and we ought to have the proper information. Some people are in L^opoldville and others are in Stanleyville. You can read the communique; it is a communique in the Press; Mr. Gizenga is reported to have stated ncmntb.ing or other, but it is not official. If I am wrong you can correct :cv?,

The rr nHETA^Y--GI^vy.L ; Ib was a declaration by the authorities of Stanleyville to the representative of the Unitdd Nations, it was not a press report. As to the conditions nD'ivrr which Parliament met, I think I should again bring to your atV,nt;".o--., the ''uct i/i^t tiro House of Representatives, which as you know has a very itrcr?, rtjresentacion of the Gizenga group and which met under the presidency of Mr, Kacongo, pacsed a resolution in which it is stated that the "debate o had tp.ken place and the dccicion hai been adopted in an atcmocphere of absolute security, free from threat or coercion". I also mentioned at the beginning that the parliamentarians had been in Leopoldville, free to express any views they liked, for something up to ten days, and during that time nothing had reached anybody to the effect that they disagreed with the resolution uhich was unanimously passed by the Eouoe of Representatives. What are we waiting for — GRR/dak 2l*-25 (The Secretary-General) what could the additional two days "bring — new allegations that the House of Representatives did not Irnow the conditions under which it met? That is possible, that is one way of undoing the work of Parliament, but we as an Organization have to stand by Parliament. It is not just a question of Parliament; you are quite right in bringing out that it is a question also of the conditions in vhich Parliament met, but I fail to underctnad that anybody is in a better position than Parliament itself to say under what conditions it met. AC/hh 26

Mr, SULEIMAN (Sudan): I should like to state that I completely support the sending of this draft answer to the Adoula Government on two bases. First of all, when we met here on 5 August the Secretary-General presented issues which had to be dealt with by the United Nations with this Government, and I think any delay in recognition now would also mean a delay in the work of the United rations with this Government. Since the legality of the Government has now been established beyond doubt,, I do not really think that any delay is advisable. As far as whether Mr. Glzenga has accepted the job, this question could easily be regarded in the same light as whether Katanga or South Kasai has joined it, and the same argument could be applied both ways. I really think that we should proceed immediately to recognize this Government, and on behalf of my Government I think that we should work to that end.

Mr, CISS (Senegal) (interpretation from, French): All I have to say is that I wish to repeat what the representative of the Sudan hac just said. My delegation welcomes the decision of the Parliament which has unanimously extended its confidence to the Auoulo. Government. My delegation has always been in favour of a decision by Parliament and has always felt that Parliament was the faithful expression of tnt Congolese people. The Security Council, on 21 February, urged the convening of the Parliament precisely in order to bring about a resumption of the normal life and relationships of the Congo. The General Assembly adopted a resolution urging the convening of Parliament without delay. Clearly, the United Nations and the Members of the United nations attached particular importance to th? decision c.-? the Congolese Parliament. My delegation would take an unfavourable view of the United Nations's hesitating for a single instant to recognize the new Congolese Government. Tiiis does not mean that we are for Gizenga, AJoula or Kasa-Vubu, All that we are for is the Government designated by the Congolese Parliament, and this happens to be the case in the opinion of my delegation. We fully agree, therefore, to the reply which the Secretary- General proposes to dispatch in his letter.

Mr. KGITfSRUMA (Nigeria): I should just like to make a very brief observation on the substance of the two letters before us. I should like to say on behalf of my delegation that both letters are acceptable to us. It is AC/Mi " 27

(Mr. flgileruma, Nigeria) very courteous for the Secretary-General to seek our advice on these two important letters, but the time factor is very important. I see no reason why we should waste any time. It is very urgent for the Congolese to receive a reply from the Secretary-General and to know the attitude of the United Nations. The only question I have is in connexion with the text of the draft reply from the Secretary-General. The penultimate paragraph reads: "My representatives in the Congo have instructions to keep your Government informed of the activities of the United Nations mission in the Congo in the civilian field, as also in regard to the United nations force ..." I should like to have a little clarification from the Secretary-General as to what kind of information with regard to the United Nations force is being imparted to the Congo-less. It is not quite clear to me.

The SECRETARY-GETOAL; It is what has always been our principle but which we have sometimes found difficult to implement due to the confused situation: that the Government should know about our deployment, where our troops are, and in what force they are there. It is not a consultation3 it is Just so that the Government is fully aware of the situation, because, of course, we carry governmental functions in the sense that when we are maintaining law and order we are doing something which, BO to say, the Government should normally do with its own resources. Naturally, in the kind of relationship one wants, the Government may then say, for example, that they feel that the tribal situation in South Kasai is such that they would welcome the strengthening of their resources there. That is a perfectly legitimate observation; and we should comply to the fullest possible extent with their wishes because it is entirely -in line with our mandate. But the b3"is of this statement here is simply that they should always have full kno::l^d£e of where the forces are and how strong they are for tte tasks whicii £.ra irirU ally recognized tasks. AC/hh 28-50

Mr. rHADK/MCAR (India): My delegation would merely wish to scj.nd a note of caution. You would naturally ask us why this caution. The whole situation we are dealing with is in a eenee abnormal. The very fact that around this table we should be discussing the Government of any Member State, either its legality or its lack of it, is in itself an abiionaal situation. For example, a chance of government or the formation of a new government in dozers of countries is not a new thing at all, and I do not think the United Nations takes the slightest cognizance of it; we do not come into the picture at all. What government a country has or what government a nation has does not concern us. But the fact that we are concerned about this matter in this particular instance would I think confirm our observation that this is an entirely abnormal situation. We are talking of Parliament, and I think that no delegation is probably happier than we are ourselves that this has corae * about; that a Government is reported to have been confirmed and elected. But it is the same Parliament which also elected the firct legal Government of the Congo which is referred to in the first part of the resolution; and we also know what happened to that first legal Government in a very short time. If that was the first legal Government and this is the successor legal Government, what was in between? The United Nations also dealt with that. I mean that whatever came in between, according to this resolution, would not have been the legal successor to the first legal Government. Therefore, the resolution which was passed unanimously gives us I would say 99 per cent hope that an absolute and a final solution has been found; but that 1 per cent doubt merely compels us to suggest,purely in the capacity of your advisers -- because ouch action as you may wish to take in respect of the letters addressed to you are naturally not in question — but in that capacity of tendering advice we should merely suggest, as I said, caution, and caution for the large variety of the very abnormal situations that we have faced in the last year. As I said, if this were not abnormal we would not be concerned with it. KG/gp 31 (Mr. Bhadkamkar, India)

You mentioned the press statement and the oral statement that was rcade to the United Nations representative in Stanleyville. In fact, we would have "boon helped tremendously, I think, if Mr. Gizenga, who has sent you communications in respect of other matters -- for example, on 25 July and on 1 August, when bo had certain doubts about the Parliament .-- sent you another communication which would have stated that thic Government has teen formed. As he claimed for some time to "be the surviving head of the first legal Government, I think it would have "been most desirable to have received something from him. We have a char go* d'affaires in Leopoldville, and my Government is not actually concerned with what Government is in power. Uc are accredited to the Government of the Congo; so that does not concern us in the sense of "being a country having diplomatic relations with the Congo? I think we would have the leo.st desire to interfere in that regard or to have any say at all, Because it is certainly no concern of any outside Power. However, cimply "becauea of the background of the last tvelve mouths, we would merely sound a note of caution^ Mr. Secretary-General, a"bout the statement in the second paragraph of your letter, which says that in tho activities with which the Secretory-General has been charged by the Security Council. — you are addressing the new Price Minister -- the United Nations "will deal with your Government as the sole Government of the Republic of the Congo". v7o fed that this is perfedtly justified, but we suggest that you wait just a little while. Ac I said, we cannot give a concrete reason for sounding a £oto of caution, but there has been talk here of recognizing a Government, if a11, the United Nations does not gc about recognizing governments when a new Government is formed. Therefore, tlio ".:^1c o^ration is rather abnormal, /.s we are dealing with a situation th .OrU.^.tly out of order, we would merely strike a note of caution.

Tlv?. JTr':?V"/;j Y.-GEKTIFvYT,: Perhaps at this point I may restate how the situation lookr i'rot- -my angle, First of all, the resolution which was passed both by the Senate and the House of Representatives makes direct reference to the death of Lumumbafc Later on it speaku of a- lack of a Central Government, Whether the lack of a Central Vei> 32

Government, fron the point of view of the two Houoes, JfatOS back to September Or dates back to the death of Iusu::.tQ, I do not know, I'; guess is thut this c-ubi vilfully chosen in order to give both sides what the,/ VJ..';;iccL Anyway, they indicate clearly the absence of any Central Government after tte death of Lumumba. From our point of view, however, from September forv.ird, we dealt with the Government in Leopoldville, the Government in Stanleyville and the Government in Elisatethville, of course, only on a de facto "basis. We have not regarded it as possible in regular form to have any agreements with • hcin. The only agreements which we have been able to conclude have teen with Kara-Vubu within the limits of the- competence conferred upon him "by the Constitution. In other words, we can now draw from the second resolution the conclusion that we can deal with the Government in Leopoldville not only on a de facto tasis, which is natural and is beyond any question, but also on a legal tasis. That does not involve recognition. It is just a working relationship which has a legal foundation, and for that I think the second resolution provides the Justification, In this context I wish to rcake a change in the text of the reply letter. It would read as follows: "in the activities with which the Secretary-General has "been charged "by the Security Council, will, in response to the decisions of Parliament, deal with your Government as the sole Government." In other words, on the basis of the resolution a legal basis is created whereby we can deal with the Adoula Government. As the Central Government it does not involve any decision on the constitutional issue "beyond this central point. However, I now come to the question of time. You have said that we are dealing with an abnormal situation, and indeed we are. But I fear that we may invite even greater abnormality than we have at present, because I would say that any prolongation of anbiguity in our stand would in fact serve the interests of one party -- Elicabcthville. It, so to say, creates the vacuum in which they can renew their cessation claims; and that is something which worries me quite a lot, and I want to fill any gap in that direction. They cannot claim to be treated in the same way as the Adoula Government in Leopoldville, and I would in fact try to reduce the contacts de facto as much as possible, and if this letter is sent, the instruction would be from our side that dealings with Katanga on all matters of principle should go via Leopoldville. You can very well see the political advantage of that. HG/gp 33

Mr. GF^HY-EG7.Y (Ethiopia): I am sorry to take the floor once more, but I simply wish to nay that we have no desire to challenge the constitutionality or the viability of the Government whatsoever. I agree with you that on the question of Elisabethville it is necessary that it "be directed in such n way that it will come to the Congo. However, I have to cay again quite frankly that I do not think much would be loot if we waited a few days. Now we have given this as our advice. I know full well that constitutionally you have to make the decision. I can only give my advice and, as I said before, it is up to you to make the decision. But I can say with perfect honesty that we do not have all the information we desire, and 1 would not be in a position to say that this is so or is not so. I believe you will agree with me that it is my privilege to reserve that right. Finally, we have given our advice to the best of our ability, and then we can only leave the judgement in your hands.

The SEgRETARY-GENEHAL: You are not only entitled to it, but it is welcomed that you express your doubts and hesitations. I believe we are cort of in a family group here and, therefore, I can add something. I would have been happy if you could have convinced me about the wisdom of waiting, but you have not.

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): I tried, Sir.

Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana): There seems to be some miBunderstanding about our position. We tire not challenging any decision which has been taken by Parliament. All we are saying is that in this Committee we have taken a stand all along which was compounded by de facto situations and legality. We hive always ctrecsed the need for reconciliation. That is why I feel I should no.ke the point that if there has been reservations on the part of one of the elements concerned, then we should not merely accept the fact that, because Parliament has met and approved a Government, everything Las ended. All I am trying to say is that in the came way in which ve have been stressing the need for reconciliation, the time has come now when we should Intensify our efforts only for a day or so in order to get the required results. (Mr. Quaison-Sackey, Ghana)

Ey doing this, I am not in any way challenging the Adoula Government. In fact, I am cure the representative of Fakictan will agree that the m cults which have been obtained here were sought "by us. We feel that reconciliation is of great value. I agree with you that from now on legality should be the sole criterion in our dealings with the Congo, That is why it is important that a chort delay be utilized in properly straightening out the matter. After all, this situation has been with UG for a year. It would not hurt to wait another day or two, and it would not detract from the legality of the situation which we are witnessing. It would in fact help you and would prevent the Committee from having to discuss the whole situation all over again. DR/pra 36 (Mr, Quaison-Sackeyj Ghara) I think that what has happened in the Congo is very clear* Forlici._. t definitely IBS met and has made a decision which must be respected. But there is a limit to reconciliation which should not be forgotten, I felt that I had oo make cut the points very clearly because I era here to give views and advice when necessary although the advice may not necessarily be taken, as my colleague frcia Ethiopia indicated. Lastly, I welcome the amendment which you, Ivir, Secretary-General have made in paragraph 2 of the draft letter.

Mr. WIRJOERANOTO (Indonesia): I think, Mr. Secretary-General, that at the last meeting I had stated on behalf of my delegation that we had good news from the Congo, from Leopoldville but, as I stated at the time, we are not able to sing the Congolese song. The only reason and the simple reason is that there is something missing for us to be in a festive ractxl as the mood that the news gave us, • ' • For this reason they have asked you -to give us complementary news because there was something missing; however we had not received the complementary news at the last meeting. Meanwhile, :a few days later, there is other news in the newspaper and we are trying to have this neus confirmed; I am referring to the news that Mr. Gizenga has dissolved his Government. Vie failed in our efforts to get confirmation of this, We arc new in a meeting here to advise the Secretary- General about his letter to Mr. Adcula, but the complementary news that we have been waiting for to put us in a -festive mood, if I may say so, is still missing. For this reason I hope that you understand our position in stating our views about the letter .you,ere going to send to Mr, Adoula. The position of our delegation is clear: we do not like to meddle in the internal affairs of the Congo. Whether or not Mr. Gizenga will or will not accept the position of Vice-Premier is his own affair. But the existence or, to be more clear, the burial uf a government end the substitution of this government by other governments, in spite of the fact that both governments are legally formed and the fact that both governments have been formed by Parliament -- in spite of this, the disappearance of a legal government and the ,„*«!"

DR/ptn 27 (Mr. Wirjopranoto, Indonesia)

birth of another legal government is a very important matter in the internat.-i'-nal world. There ore many countries involved in this matter. This, in our opinion, is very important, and I think this is a good reason for us not to be in a hurry. I can understand the concern of our colleagues from Ghana and other countries because my own country is also concerned about this. What we should like to have frein the beginning in this new s ';art is that we should be careful to maintain every positive point, as I mentioned at the last meeting. For this reason, Mr. Secretary-General, I do not think that there will be any really strong reason not to wait for a few days just to have officially the complementary news which will really be good news.

I think, Mr. Secretary-General, it is a matter of conduct, of tact, because in fact the rle facto and do jure relations between the United Nations Command, between the Secretary-General and the new Government can go along without any interruption; in fact, there can even fee some iinproveiucntc* This is not the hindrance. But to send a letter in this way just now -- well, there is something missing which hac a repercussion in the international world whicn might introduce some other obstacle in spite of the fact that nobody wants to have obstacles. Perhaps there can be a pretext or excuse to put seme obstacle in the way. For this reason, Mr. Secretary-General, I am inclined to support the idea that we should wait a short while and in the meantime look for come confirmation which gives us more reason to be really glad to receive such news co that we can state cur good wishes to the new Government fully and wholeheartedly,

Mr. BARNES (Liberia): I regret that I must intervene again, but I only do so to say that if no communication has been received by you, i-lr. Secretary- General, which expresses reservations to the Constitution of the Government in the Congo, I see no reason to delay your reply to the Prime Minister except if it is intended by delaying1 that reply to invite reservations. I .think there is more danger in delaying the letter than in sending it. That is all I wished to say. DR/pni 30-40

Mr. SULttlMAN (Sudan): I only want to say that we should not delay this note until we have received news to the contrary, as was better expressed by the representative of Liberia. Secondly, I had a question, but perhaps it would not be pertinent to put it to the representative of Ghana in mentioning that certain elements really have reservations. I do net think he is going to answer that. There is one thins about this question of reconciliation. By naming the Government itself of national unity and political reconciliation, I thought that we would really help quite a lot in political reconciliation and national unity. The sooner this Government has been recognized and has had the chance to carry cut its work of political unity and political reconciliation, the better. I do not really think that the representative of Ghana, having all these considerations in mind — end he has worked very hard really to initiate this term -- would think otherwise of delaying this note. BHS/cw 111

Mr. Gins (Senegal) (interpretation from French): I must repeat that the longer we wait the more we risk putting doubts in the minds cr the parliamentarians who met a few days o.go at Lovanium and viio are still deliberating in Leopoldville. It seems to me that a parliament is always sovereign and that having elected a government "yesterday", it can throw it out tomorrow. If it happens that in a month or in a few months Parliament legally throws out the Government which it had elected, the United Nations and the Member States can do nothing about it except to recognize the new government that will be elected by Parliament. I think in all parliamentary bodies there are contingencies of this kind that can occur. If the United Nations and the Member States make considerable effort to bring about the national reconciliation of the Congo, the various Congolese factions must also try to make some effort so-tint our efforts will be crowned with success. The Member States that are friendly with these various factions must try to bring them to accept reality and to understand that their interests reside in national reconciliation and in co-operation, I shall not say within a new government "but at least with a parliament which represents the Congolese people. I must therefore repeat the wish which I formulated a while ago and which corresponds to that of most of the members of the Advisory Committee, namely that we favour the sending of this letter.

Mra BUMIIMA. (Morocco) (interpretation from French) : Thank you, Mr. Secretary-General, for calling upon me even though I have not jet male formal contact with the Organization or with my colleagues. I believe that Morocco's position must be made explicit at a time when this discussion is at a crucial stage. I was glad to see that in all their statements the members of this Committee noted with great satisfaction the positive elements that have occurred in the development of the situation in the Congo. We greatly desired the meeting of Parliament, which at times appeared tliat it would not take place. There was a time when this Organization felt that thj Ilec Government was fully legal. This did not prevent the Organization and thj whole world from considering that there was another factual situation, one which tended to alter the situation which was then regarded by Leopoldville as being legal. There are representatives of BUS/ cw if 2 (Mr, Bc-nhim?,, certain countries in Stanleyville and they have not reported to our Govj.jrr.ie^t that the Gi^enga GovernriGnt has ceaoed to exist. By recognizing the Adcula Government, we arc being called upon to discontinue our recognition of the Gizenga Government. But we have certain responsibilities which are founded on a legnl basis vhich we believe has existed since the beginning of the crisis. VJe therefore thinl: that there are sufficient reasons for asking the Secretary- General to delay the sending of this letter until this other legal situation is clarified. This situation serves as a basis for the relationship between our Government and the Gizenga Government.

The gTCCRBTAr/Y ' -GENERAL : May I ask the members \7ho have diplomatic relations with Stanleyville whether they have received any reports on the approach by Mr. Gizcnga to their ambassadors to the effect.- that he recognizes the decisions of Parliament, Have you had any report to that effect, Mr, Ambassador?

Mr . _ QUAISOM -S ACKEY (Ghana) : No, Sir.

Mr. SMHI (Pakistan) : I regret to have to intervene for the second time. Some members of the Advisory Committee have suggested that your reply to Mr, Adoula should be delayed by about twenty-four hour;3. Of course, this would bo no crcat matter and we would see no reason to object provided we were sure of what would be gained by it. Can it be ascertained whether Mr. Gizenga is going to enter the Government and whether he will give certain assurances? If he were to Give them, then there would be no doubt in the mind of anyone here. But, on the other hand, if he were to change his mind and not give those assurances or if other developments were to take place, then I fear that the United Nations would be placing itself in a very difficult position. In other words, it would mean that the resolutions of Parliament and the investiture of the Government would not be recognized by us because one political element, and no doubt a very important political element vhose reconciliation was necessary, may have changed his mind or may not agree to those decisions. BHS/cw 1*3-1*5 (Mr. Shahi, Pakistan)

Many of tho problems of the United Nations in the Congo have emanc.tcu froi; the fact that this Organization was confronted with tho question of locality and whether to recognize this or that person. If we withhold recognition^ the United nations might DO starting vita the new Government on the wrong foot and many of those urgent problems of the Congo, vhich the formation of the legal Government alone makes it possible to solve, may not be solved. The relationship of the United nations vith the new Government may deteriorate, and that in itself my create many obstacles to the promotion of the other aiius and objectives of the United Nations in the Congo. It seems to me that any kind of approach to Mr, Gizenga and any kind of action on our part about recognition which is contingent on his consent or concurrence may expose us to a very dangerous course.

Mr, KCILERUMA. (Nigeria): I wish to associate myself with those vho have expressed the view that the Secretary-General's letter should go to Mr. Acioula as soon as possible, As a matter of fact, I do nob understand the purpose of delaying the sending of the letter. There is a Central Government with which the United Nations should deal. We around this table represent sovereign States, and everyone is a representative of his Government. Everyone is free to make reservations and there is no compulsion on anyone* But we are dealing with the same Parliament vhich elected Mr. Lumumba. This is the

Parliament which elected the new Government. How we are talking about legality; overlooking the importance of the members of Parliament and the wishes of the Congolese people. It is true that there is a misunderstanding between the new Government and some personalities. In this situation, it would be beet for those who are closely associated with the personalities to ad/ise them to got together with the new Government and to work in harmony with it. If we widen the gap between the new Government and the personalities, we shall only contribute to chaos in the Congo, (MJ% Npileruma* Nigeria)

For this reason it is the view of my Government that the draft letter siiould go to the now Government as scon as possible, because we want to know the stand of the United Nations publicly — that the United Nations has recognized the new Government and every Member State should know that this is the stand of the United Nations. That is the purpose of this letter* I cannot understand what the purpose is of delaying it. Because we want a certain personality to CCILC into the Government within twenty-four hours or forty-eight hours? That is a different matter altogether. It is the internal affair of the Congo* Now, there is a Central Government, We ought to support them* Let us persuade the certain personalities who are not happy with the formation of the new Government. Perhaps they would like to have a higher position — or something like that. But it is up to Tarliarnent and to the Central Government, and to the Head of State to consider all these matters. It is an internal affair. I see no reason why we should delay the despatch of this letter.

Mr •^GETOE-F.G£ Y (Ethiopia): I think there is a misunderstanding why we are asking to delay the despatch of this letter. As I recall, none of us have challenged the constitutionality or the viability, as you put it, of the Government, Vie admit it is not for us to challenge that. But what we are saying is, Just delay for one or two deya before you reply to the letter. I note that you received the letter on 10 August and today is 11 August, I remember-instances where I think we have token a good deal of time before we have replied. In that connexion, I think it is possible for us to say quite honestly that we would like to have time to request instructions from our Government* It would not be inappropriate at all bece.use this is a serious question and we could really refer the matter — as I am going to refer tonight — to our Government and have the views of the Government expressed. But I am sure you appreciate the fact that today is 11 August. The letter was received 10 August. Consequently, a waiting period of one or two days would not be inappropriate* I knew instances where we have taken a week's time before we have replied concretely to questions coming from the Congo — perhaps it was not a week, but I think we have delayed giving concrete answers at least a few days. So that is one fact I think we have to take into consideration. AP/dp 1*7

(Mr. Gcbre~Ep,7.y, Ethiopia)

The second consideration is that if there is someone that is not goin^ in the Congo, then I think the Secretariat will he able to Approach that p^ vhich is not coming along and do its utmost to convince it to cone alon^. In other words you will be maintaining strict neutrality; that is to say, you will not Give any appearance that the Secretariat is on one side or not -- and that is very important. You ha

TheSECnETARY-GENEPAL: As to the question of neutrality. You know it is a very common occurrence that the Secretariat is accused of lack of neutrality when it stands for a principle and for law. And aa regards principle and as regards law there is no neutrality, I agree. You had a very good example less than a fortnight ago. So from my point of view there cannot be any discussion on that basis. If there is a clear legal situation, I have to take the criticism for recognizing the clear legal situation when it io not palatable to this or that Power. AP

(The Hr-cretary-General)

On the other point — twenty-four, thirty-six, forty-eight hours. l.^at is the supposed additional fact? Mr. Gizenga has stated that ha recognizes this resolution — and the Adoula Government. He has not said that he will talie his post in the Government, Obviously, you would have no objections — those who are hesitant --if he took up his post in the Government. But may I ask you, vhat would be the legal consequences if he did not take it up? The legs,], consequence to begin with is none at all because the Government is net undone -- as now invented by Parliament — by one Minister not taking his post. What will then happen? FarliaEsnt may reopen the question. They may reinstitute another Government. What do I know? And following the rule of legality we would then have to recognize that Government,, But it is Parliament and only Parliament that con draw i'rom GU unwillingness by Mr.. Gizcnga to Join the Cabinet personally the possible conclusion that this Government has no longer its confidence. As long as 1'arlicmsnt has not withdrawn its confidence, even the absence of Mr, Giseuga cannot change its legality as long as the present decisions of Parliament stand. I think that is good, firm, constitutional law. For that reason wo would have to vait not only for a possible "no" from Mr. Gisenga, but also for the reaction of Parliament to that "no". Should we not wait aloo for Katanga? I find it extremely difficult to cec how you arrive at the optimistic conclusion that a aelay Of twenty-four hours would, GO to say, give another situation than the one we have new. If it vcru a question of twenty-*lour hours, it would not matter, I would agree with you entirely. But there must be a reason also for the twenty-four hours —. which is not the reason that would be valid for x times twenty-four hours -- ana then I get very worried,

Mr» MAIGA- (Mali) (interpretation from French): Mr* Secretary-General, I should like to answer your question about the information received from the new Government. We have a representation in Stanleyville just as the Government of Gtanleyville has representation in Mali. On this point my Government has received no information* GRR/vi ^1 (Mr. Kai^a, Ko.li)

After the other interventions, I realize that what we have been GayLnj is being wrongly interpreted. I have said several litres that there is no one around this table who now doubts the viability of the Government. It is for that reason that at the beginning I e imply asked that you should write to Mr. Adoula's Government for further details so as to complete our own information. That would do no harm; the information would be in our archives and would enable us to have all the necessary elements. 1 am somewhat troubled to see, throughout the discussion, the matter presented as if those who express reservations do not wish to recognize ML". Adoula's Government or think that within two or three days lir. Gizenga will refuse and that he would then be politically committed. At present I am completely ignorant. Perhaps, since yesterday evening, Bamako has had to recognize Lir. Adoula's Government t I cannot say. It is therefore a question of advice which we are trying to Give in the light of the situation, You have Just said that a delay of twenty-four hours ha 3 no practical interest. Cut here in New York, we have been the witnesses in the apace of even twelve hours of many Governments and many permanent representatives being nominated. YJhat we are asking is to be put in possession of all the information so that we can pass it on to our Governments, It is certain that the United Nations has no need to write a letter saying that it only recognizes as the Government of the Congo the Stanleyville Government or the Leopold ville Government. If there is a Government in the Congo it will send its accredited representative here, since I believe that the Congo is a Member of the United Nations. We have never said, and I do not think that my colleagues from Ghana and Ethiopia have ever said, that the Government is illegal or that the meeting of Parliament was irregular. We have said, at least I have,-, that it is at least possible that the meeting of Parliament did not take place in normal conditions, lhat is my personal opinion; 1 am just making a supposition. j;t has nothing to do with our attitude; Parliament has deliberated and the Government has been set up. These ore facts, but there arc other facts; it is not merely a question of recognising the Leopold ville Government, it is also a question of seeing whether such recognition could provide a solution to the problems of the Congo. That is all I wish to say to remove any misunderstanding. GRR/vi 52

The_SECRETARY»GENERAL; What you have ncv ewid positively 1,; ^ui-.. enough as a background lor what we have said in this tirai't letter.

I'lr. Bll/vDKA^^.R (India): With your permission, I should like to intervene a^ain to ensure that ue are not misunderstood. We ore talking of Parliaments; we believe intensely in the Parliamentary system and we recommend the system to all those who would like to take our advice, but theve arc many countries which have no Parliament, so we shall not make a fetich of Parliament. There are"many countries which have no Parliament and which have had no elections for years and years, but still they have Governments and we have the closest relations with those Governments. Go we shall not make a fetish of Parliament and say that because there is a Parliament there is a Government. Ue would GO along with it ninety-nine per cent; we welcome the meeting of Parliament, but obviously it met under abnormal conditions, This sovereign Parliament, if it is one as it probably 'is, clioul'l not in ordinary circumstances require an array to enable it to meet, nor" should the United Nations be concerned with it* But for very special reasons we have been concerned with it and so we cannot immediately say that because the Parliament has passed a resolution electing a Government that Government is there — although I will say the evidence is all in its favour. The Secretary-General*c letter makes very categorical statements on behalf of the United Nations, and we merely wish to say that we have not had an opportunity of showing it to our Governments. Of course, it is not necessary for our Governments to pass any judgement or make any coiunents on the letter; but c-G you have gathered ua here in this Committee and we are expected to make sugccstions, technically on behalf of our Governments, we have not had' a chance to show it to our Governments. We could have that chance in twenty-four hours, and that was our point in suGcestinc a delay. Perhaps a reply to a letter received only yesterday need not {30 on the next working day; after all, the letter does not raise any urgent problem nor does it ask for an immediate reply. It is a normal communication from a Government and according to our experience sometimes the United nations takes longer than two days to reply to our communication. Go I do not think that there is so GRR/vi 53

(I'.r. Ijhnd ^crucir» T- ;c" •' a ) much urgency about replying to it. The Prime Minister hac> not posed any question or suggested that the United nations deal with liiin and with no other; he has drawn attention to the resolutions of Parliament; he has expressed the hope that ths United Nations will give it a full assistance — and naturally the United llationc will give its full assistance and so I presur.e will every Government give full assistance — to the Goveirranont of the Congo. We merely wish to have the opportunity of showing thcce communications to our Go/erriucnts, not that that is absolutely necessary, not that if they were not show.i to our Governments any trouble would, arise., but merely because we are gathered here and you have marked this reply "draft text"* You would have been within your rights in sending it without showing it to"us, but since you did we think that in twenty-four hours we could show it to our .-Governments. I think they vould say that it is perfectly all right, but still we should be enabled to go through that operation. Some representatives have constantly repeated the question of recognition. We do not think there is any question of the recognition of the Government. It is not the business of the United Nations to recognize a new Government, but even if it were it would not be the function of this Advisory Committee; it would have to be some other body and I thinl: the only body that could coine into it would be the Credentials Committee at the time when credentials are examined during the session. I do not know any other body which could consider the recognition or legality of a Government. That is all I wish to say; the delay 1 suggested was only to enable UG to show the letter to our Governments. They have not seen it yet.

The SECriETARY-OKIMATi: I would draw your attention to a phrone in Mr. Adoula's letter which runs as follows: "On the basis of the Parliamentary resolution quoted above, my Government is the only Government with which the United Nations should deal in pursuance of the decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations." The two organs referred to have always spoken about the Central Government* It is a question of interpretation for the Secretary-General whether there is a Central Government GRR/vi (The Secretary-General)

or which one is the Central Government. That is the question raised, end that is the only sense in which the word "recognition" has been or could have been used here, as I understand it.

tLLJ^^^j|C/\R (India): The same Central Government was forced legally by Parliament; on 2 August, so I presume this would be the first communication conveying this assurance to the new Central Government. Tliis is intended to be sent today, 11 August; all ve were suggesting was that perhaps 1he next working day would be as good.

The t^riCR^^Y-C^tTFJlAL ; It would be quite as ^ood a day, especially as it is a week-end. But that is not the question; the question is why. You have given a perfectly valid reason for a diplomatic procedure. We have been discussing a question of substance, and that is why I have been, quite frankly, bewildered .

Mr. DIIADKAMCAR (India): % Government will probably say, "Why did you send it to us, what is tha problem?"

I>jr« RIFAI (United Arab Republic): I find xryself also in the sorae predicament, since this draft letter was brought to my attention just now and I cannot express an opinion on whether it should be sent immediately or whether we should take our time and consider it more carefully before vo send an answer, and also before we know something more about the situation, which ne3ds to be clarified a little further. In this connexion I chould like to say that we certainly recognize that it is your own responsibility; you will decide and you will take the responsibility. This Advisory Committee: has nothing but a consultative status; you have called it together to exchange views with regard to the important situation in the Congo and the difficulties that have arisen in the Congo from time to time in the course of the last year. AC/mtm 56

(Mr. IUfai; United Arab Republic)

But at the same time I would say that in vlev of the situation that Las been brought to our attention at this tiiio, while I knew that it vac brought to our attention as well almost a week ago, you must realise that some of my colleagues around this table find themselves in the came situation as I find myself today* Their Governments have recognized the Government of Mr. Gizenca and have no information co far as to the situation obtaining there, especially in view of come of the reports or at least ruuov.rG, "whether- true or untrue, which scmetiir.cc, at least from the silence of Mr* Gizenga, GO to speak, seem to be corroborated occasionally or which cannot be ignored completely. For that reason it has become somewhat ir.ore difficult, at least as far as I am personally concerned here, to say whether we should go ahead immediately with this letter and send it out today in reply to the letter which vac addressed to you, Mr* Secretary-General, by the new prime Minister/ Mr. /kloula. I should like to say in this connexion that certainly I do not reflect at all on the legality of the new Government in any way whatsoever.* I do not not iuow how iLy Government will react. I am cure that if the legal situation is completely clarified within a short period of time, we will be second to no one in rejoicing at this accomplishment. la the meantime I should also like in a cense to appeal to you to consider a delay of one or two days so that you give us the opportunity — I know that you just, asked for our views, the views not of each of us personally but certainly of cur Governments as we represent them here — to consult our Governments 011 the point in question, which is really a point of basic importance* I. think that in the future we might find that our caution hero had been fully justified. Because, as you Kno\; and as many members of this Advisory Corrmittee well know, the situation in the Congo in the pas-is year has given us many surprises, and for that reason, as my colleague from India has said, I should always be inclined to be very cautious in taking any hasty decision with regard to any matter that obtains there or any matter with reference to new developments in that territory. It seems to me that in considering this point from a practical point of view there is not going to bo any real difficulty in delaying this letter. It seems to me that the United Nations has today already indicated in a sense that they are collaborating with the new Government, at any rate,and giving it the assistance it desires. AC/mtm 57

(Mr» JUfai, United Arab Republic) There is nothing of "basic importance that is called for at the present time in order to make this sort of decision* I think the United Nations is not called upon to give any formal recognition. They are there helping the country and I am sure they are basically assisting the Central Government of the Conco at the present tiroe^ if that Central Government; as we are told; is the legally constituted Government of the Congo. For that reason I would again in a sense appeal to you to consider delaying this letter a few days until we have had an opportunity to consult our Governments on this question — that is, if you wish to have the views, after consultation, of these Governments on this important letter, and I am sure you would wish also to have the agreement of all members in general .before you do something of such basic importance in regard to the future of the Congo «

^^'^lli2 ~ certainly want to have the consent of all to something tliat i:. uasic for the Congo, but a question of lav is a question of law.

Mr o DOrF 1'7-j ' ( Canada ) 3 My delegation has always regretted the fact that the Congo has ha.l the 'effect of dividing members of the United Hations. We had thought and hoped when Parliament took its unanimous decision in support of the Government of Kr, Adoula that this vote would clear up the breach. We were particularly happy when we herrd that Mr* Gizenga had cpoken to the heads of mission of count.'.- i.ec which ..y.^.i representatives in Stanleyville. In our view these two actions would have had a. conclusive effect* We recognize, however, that communications with Stanleyville are slow, and if, as representatives of the countries which have representatives in Stanleyville inform us, they have not yet received ..vny information directly of this statement by Mr. Gizenga, then perhaps one can understand the reasons for their caution. However, we hope that they will have this information very soon and be in a position to approve the letter which has been drafted. From the point of view of my delegation, if you, Mr. Secretary -General, are completely satisfied that the statement was made by Mr. Gize-nga, we should be happy to have you send this letter off now, confident that the statement which he made would be received in a very short time by the representatives who have AC/mtm 50-60 (Mr. Dobell, Canada)

expressed reservations. If, however, you prefer to wait over the week-end in the hope that they would have received this information in that period, that too vould be satisfactory to us. And if you were to receive information from these representatives orally and decided to go ahead and send the letter without a further meeting of the Advisory Ccrmlttee, that too would be satisfactory to us. O^r one concern is that the delay should be limited. Y7e note that this letter from Prime Minister Adoula was written on 10 August, which we understand would be two or three days after Mr. Gizenga had spoken to the heads of mission in Stanleyville. This would mean that F^aiier Adoula was satisfied that the problem no longer existed with Stanleyville; that the problem to which he was addressing himself in this letter was the problem of Katanga. Therefore, we feel that a delay, if you decide to agree to a delay, should not be of more than a couple of days. f

^i^^^^Y^i.-(Ethiopia): All I wish to cay is that, speaking about Gizenga13 concent; wo have never, ay a matter of fact, passed on the constitutionality of any Government in the Congo from the beginning to the end, so that what will be the position of my Government if he ascents or if he goes back on his word or does not honour the commitment of his deputies is not for me to say now* But I think the political reality will of course be something difficult which again I cannot contemplate now. Secondly, speaking of the neutrality of the United Nations, I wish to say only that it is because you kept that position that you were able to bring about the present situation, and it is our hope that if we delay this letter, then there is something that is not yet fully within the national Government,. and you will be able to bring that about because then you will be able to negotiate and be able informally to bring them to join, and it is in that sense that I wish this to continue. UG/dok 61 -Eqzy^ Ethiopia )

With regard to the time clement, I oaid twenty- four hours or thirty- six hours or forty-eight hours. It may be "by next Monday, It rcay be that I was optimistic or pessimistic, I do not know. But I just hope that within the shorter time interval you will "be able to make the necessary progress, As you know, we have always said the best solution was a reconciliation. We oaid this because we felt that if we reached come cort of an agreement in terms of concrete situations, the whole thing would be solved. It was in that sense that I spoke of neutrality, meaning to acsist cne who is, GO to speak, hesitating. If you take that position, then your people will be able to act and bring him back into the fold. As I have said, we are happy this has come about but, because of our experiencea, we cannot help but express a certain element of doubt and to advise caution, so that when we say that it has been successful, we will be able to say so one hundred per cent.

_Mr, miLERUMA (Nigeria): Mr. Secretary-General, it is now up to you entirely to decide whether or not you are going to urgently send the letter, Ac the rcvrc tentative of Canada r,aid,t:ie Congo is a problem which divides the minds of ell Members of the United Nations, end I quite agree with him. However, I do r.~/f. see any purpose in delaying the matter. I understand the point which was raise 3 by some representatives, .that they have not yet received instruction f;-:^r;. their Govr.v,ament3 and, therefore, they have to make reservations, This is quite cicar, We are here in an advisory capacity. We are your advisers, and we have given yo'i cur advice. But in respect of the question of the Congo, I think we must be optimistic. We expected the Parliament to meet. We have worked a whole yet*r toward that end, and now they have met. What is worrying sane of our colleagues ic the question of Mr. Gizenga, But even the position of Mr. Gizenga, in a way, is not very important. If he accepts the offer, he will come along. The wishes of the Congolese are important, and their wishes are reflected by tho members of Parliament. r HG/dak 62 (Mr. Ngilerumn, Nigeria)

The position of Mr. Gizenga and of the twenty-seven other members is the some. Any one of them is free to accept the pout. It is up to Mr. Gizenga to decide vhether or not he is willing to serve the new Central Government. That decision Is entirely up to him. If he decides not to do on, then it is up to the Head of the Government and the Head of the State to nominate somebody in his place. This is the parliamentary practice as we know it. Therefore, just for the interest of one or two personalities — Gizenga and Tchombe — I see no reason why we should not respect the views of the Parlaament and of the Government. This is our stand, I had thought that the situation in the Congo was improving, "but I am sorry to see that we are now divided in our opinions. If my fellow representatives feel that they should seek instructions from their Governments, that is a different matter altogether; they can nnke their reservations. But, in raising questions of legalities and illegalities after the Porlioment has met, we ore trying to inject a sort of chaotic situation into the Congo. I am sorry about that situation, Mr. Secretary-Ceneral. This is the stand of my Government*

Mr* cram (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): Mr. Secretary- General, my delegation wishes to express its agreement to the draft letter you have submitted to us, with the amendment which you have inserted into it» As regards the date for dispatching of the letter, I believe that the question raised at the outset by the representative of Ghana waa due rather to a concern to insure optimum conditions of future stability for the new Congolese Government rather than to considerations of a legal character. I do not see a great urgency in sending the letter right away, nor can I see the reasons for delay in dispatching the letter. If it is a mattering of ensuring optimum conditions of-success for the new Government, I do not see in what way the dispatching of the letter could affect such stability. I rhould like to ask one or two questions. The first concerns theapproximate date when you think, Mr. Secretary-General, the effectiveness- of the United Nations presence in the Congo can be reduced. As you know, the financial credits for CWUC for 19ol expire in September; and in view of the difficulties encountered last year, I do not think we ore entitled to continue a situation which requires considerable effort and outlays frcia some Member States. HG/dak 63 (Kir. Chelli, Tunisia)

The second question has no bearing at all on our discussions tcday, tut I would like to know, for reasons of organization of work, how much longer, Mr. Secretary-General, you think you will require the advice end counsel of this Committee.

The__TECRETARY^GENFPAL: As regards the number of troops, it is a question to which it is extrenely difficult to reply short of having had a consultation with the Central Government because we are, for present law end order purposes, on the weak side. The Government hns a right to express its views as to how much is needed end what they can assume as obligations for themselves. The indication we have given them is that we want as speedy a reduction of the nunber of troops as possible, on the assumption that their AIIC will be able to take care of functions themselves; but obvioucly this is a matter which requires further consultation with them. It is also related to the question of the reorganization of the .ormy, which is highly urgent and which will follow next after the convening of Parliament* All I can say is that it is our intention to work in that direction, for the reasons you have given and others, as quickly as we poccibly can. As regards the other question, I would for my part hope that if this new system proves stable we would be able to reduce the work of this Committee to very little in.leed, if anything, becauce if we have a stable, functioning Government in the Congo, the whole operation, although of an unucual size, would be on the rails, end the right consultative committee would be in fact the Government itself and not this body. So there again the development of the cabinet and its strength will decide this factor. I would like to mention, however, one thing on this point, and that is that on Monday Mr. Linner will be here for a week's consultations, and I believe that all of you would like him to report orally to you. You can ask any question and you can get, certainly, quite a few details filled in vhich we have not been able to clarify for you sufficiently. So I would ask you kindly to be available for a meeting on, let us say, Wednesday of next week for an oral report by Mr. Linner on his various experiences with the situation and on what he knows about matters generally. HG/dak Gif-65 (The Se orGtary-Goneral)

He vill certainly "be able to clarify also the possibilities of a etep-by-step reduction of the civilian operation, which is also fcirly costly and which I would lihc to oee reduced "because, with an effective government, ye should "be able to hand back to them quite a few functions which we have carried in the last ten months. DR/hh 66

(The Secretary-General)

As it is 7.20 p.m. now and as no one else has anything to say,, I shall try to sum up -- vithout wishing to close the door to later interventions in any vay. I must say that I have noted with some concern the trend of the discussion here today -- with concern bccauce it indicates on the one side a recognition of the legal situation which prevails and which ic as clear as it can ever be, but on the other side, a tendency to lie low, regarding the conclusions to be drawn from this legal situation, for reasons of a political nature. I would on this point like to make a little confession, ar.d that is that there is one thing which worries LJC very much in the United nations generally, and that is the tendency to be too politically prudent when the question of principle is clear. At least I do not think that the Secretary-General can permit himself that kind of policy of expediency,. Different views have been expressed here to such an extent that you certainly will understand it if I wish to give them further study and think them over. I will have to take on my own responsibility the decision which I consider to be the right one, and I use the word "right" in its nost narrow and most precise sense. I thank you for your advice. I am not reedy to say what the next step will be. I have, however, I thinK, given a clear indication of the direction in which I consider it my duty to move by referring to this as a question of right. I note one thing which I think is important, and that is that even those who, for various reasons, have felt that it would be a good idea to wait to see what further clarification can be brought about, even those, all of them, have affirmed that they havo no basis on which to question the legality of the present Central Government in the Congo. For my part that is all for today. If you gentlemen have nothing to add, that will be all.

The meeting rose at 7*25 p.in. CONFIDENTIAL Meeting To. 55 <7 August 1961

UNITED MATTOHG ADVISfRY COMMITTEE OH Tlffl UUiJGO

Meeting at United Nations Headquarter::., Wev; Yorlc, on Thursday, 17 Au(juct 1^61^ at ^> p.iri.

The fiecr^tary-General

Canada Hoylon Lthiopia Federation of Malaya Mr. KAMIL Ghana Mu-. QUATGOM-SACKEY

Inci i a Mr. JIIA

Tr inland Mr. O'CULLTVAN Liberia

Morocco Nigeria IV; kid tan .sir Monai.iucd ZAFRULLAH KIIAN Mr. cir.;."] Gnu in 1^. GUT.Tlir^AIJ fwcdon l\r. HALM Tur.lJla Mi-. CIJELI.I United Arab Republic I'Ir. RIFAI

61-20322 HG/en

^1^?^I:Z:lnX"nL:.illT:^Hi: AG y°u know> tnlG mooting was planned in orcler to give.- you gentlemen an opportunity to discuss ir.attors with Dr. Linnor, who will be hors fur a Week, or o Tow thys lonror. It is not a question in the normal cense of an oral report fron Dr. Ltnner; but I am sure that you will wish him to take the i'lcor first and irake whatever initial observations he might find useful as an introduction to this discussion. With your permission, therefore, I would invite Dr. Linn-r te- take the floor.

Mr. TT NITER: Mr. Secretary-General, the Advisory Committee is, I take it, already quite well infoin^d about thw go-n^-ral picture in the Conco. I v.Tould thenjfcr^. like to limit myself to a few introductory c avjQ-ntc, putting myself -with ^reat pleasure at your disposal for any such questions as you may care to azk. During the last fevj months our vrv>k dovn th-ro ho.a obvioucly centered on i.ho p'lrli.-viacntary insue. When the- Con^ol-joo finally ace 1-led to f^..t Loj_%th--r at Lovanium, Me on our side faced a series of rather iiibricate probleias ixi connexion with the security arrangements, I am happy to say thai th.-Se arrangements worked out quite smoothly and efficiently, and to th~ satin-faction of all Congolese concerned, as evidenced by their unanimous vote of thanks to the United nations at the end of the session. The i;ombera of the new Government, with the exception only of Mr. GizGnra, ore ,iust now in the course of installing themselves in their now functions and offices. It is therefore obviously too early to rrakc even a tentative assessment of the trend of the new Govcriii'ijnti'o thinking and acting. Two comments, however, may be perniitted. The first one is that the new Government seeir.s to be inspired by a genuine determination to translate the official proclamations about reconciliation into concrete action on a nation-wide basis, not the least in the sense of breaking down the economic barriers within the country which nave for too Ions a time been an important block on the read towards economic recoveiy. The second comment also bears on the ^conomic issue, or rather, perhaps, on the general principle of technical assistance, namely, that Government members of all party affiliations have made it a point IIG/cn 3.5

(M^-. LInnjr_)

to stress over and over arain their desire to see fore!en aid channelize. through and co-ordinal, d by the United Nations. AS I caid, our work has for quite some tine been centred on the conciliation efforts. Frc.ii the military side, th-..re are no events of particular interest to report. With all due caution, I should lil:e to express a certain degree of optimism as to the possibility of the nrw political atmosphere implying a certain reduction on our military side. I mi^ht be permitted to quote an episode that happened only a feu days aco. Mr. Kalonji, Head of the so-called South K.acai otntc, came along and sa.id that he wanted me to be cure that from, now on th^-ro would not really be any moi-c trouble of a military nature in his pa it of the country. He had felt obliged in the pant, IK.: said, to build up a certai.ii military force and to tal:c certain actions; but now ho had formally and officially handed over this military pow^r to Mr. Adoula, with the assurance that in the future there would not be any further disturbances* I for one wovJd b^ inclined to believe that we might look forward to quite a positive development in that area. BC/ds

(Mr, I1nn

^AL: Thank you very much, Mr. Linner. I am sure that there are quite a few questions which representatives here would like to have clarified, now that they have this opportunity,

Mr«__tlM (India): I should first like to seek come clarification as to the way in which llr, Tshonibc fits into this whole picture, I should like to have a little more information from Mr. Linner and his assessment on that point. I am not referring to any existing patchwork that may have been BC/dB 7

(Mr. Jho, achieved. What I Should like to have from Mr. Linner is on assessment of the oituotion in GO far as Katanga ond Mr. Tchombe are concerned in the slic'"tly .longer future. My second question is the following. How are the ormed forces in Katanga oriented towards the Amide rationale congolaise? Have they actually been integrated, not only on paper but physically and from tlie point of view of discipline, ond co forth? Could Mr. Linner throw -. ome lieht on those points?

. question related to Mr. Tshombe's position in this proce;33 of reconciliation, I, personally, hnve vo:-y little doubt thnt if Mr. Tsbcmbe alone could make the decision on thic r.at'cor, he would hove been in Leopold viJU.e quite come time nn;o. He is, however, surrounded by corns close advisers of both Katan^ese and foreign extraction, whose interests ore in another direction. I would cuess that the balance oi' power bctvoen U.'shcmbo end hie two closest Cabinet members must first be sorted oat, as it were, a little more before wo can see tho final outcome of thic i issue. But jivlging from cnother pcint of view, I feel quite confident that once the StauleyviJle ^roup ond tho J/-jOj..oldville group Yiove got together, the Katanc^ issue irill be solved as a matter of course. I really do not cee what other possible solution they mL-ht envisage. I think that with very careful timing ond with the application of Q certain amount of pressure , we shall fairly r.con see the time when Kotan^a will rally round. The second question concerned the relations, militarily o peaking, between the Katanca forces and the Central Governrnent forces. It will be recalled that before the Government "v.;QG formed General Mobutu went over to I'.ntanco and ectablir.hed eo^e kind of military pact. I think that that pact can now U.1 regarded Qs belonging to the pact and that a completely new donl will hnve to be nnde. In this respect, it might be of interest to note that one of Tchombe 's Mlriistera who was in Leopoldville in connexion with the neceion of rarlicinent wont bnck to Irli.sabethville c few day3 ap-o in order to pcrounde Tnhombc to withdraw hio cjondoriLcrie from North Katanga and side with the new Government's forces . Possibly thic solution would be encouraged if T0hon.be were to agree to replace the present Belgian commander of the K BC/ds 0-10

(llr. Linnfvr) forces, Colonel. Crevecoeur, by Q Kntancese colonel vho ia on tho epot ond is quite a qualified colonel0 To nun up, therefore, I vould cay that on tho first point I am quite optimistic that ve chall see a positive development , arid on the second point 1 am also confident that ve cha.ll see £ood results.

^]';m?/\L; I vould intervene to ask Dr. Linner to complete the picture: in one respect "which I cm cui-c ics of interest to all representatives here. He referred to Katangese and other advisers to L'shombe. lie alno referred to Colonel Crevecoour* I think tViat it vould be useful if he vould state vhere ve are on the situation of the so-called foreicn political advisero in Katanga -- that is an issue vhich in a certain cense has been resolved — and -where ve are on the situation of Colonel Crevecoeur. DR/ids ... 11

As far as the political edvicera &re concerned, we are making quite ccod progress. Lists have been wctatlishcd, as you knew, of the men .wo wont to get out, end we are following a timetable there which GO far, I think, has Veen quite cntiofeotory. The military entrGnchr.cn t ia cancwhat more difficult to (yet rid cf . Also, more caution has to be exercised to a certain decree frcra our side GO as not to provoke panic amongst the population should they seg the military advisers being thrown out too quickly. But there also wo are making headway . Go far as Colonel Crevecocur'c personal position is concerned, I think, it is weakened considerably, especially after General Mobutu *G visit to i:?itanr;a which had a psychological impact on the Katenecsc in the scirje that the Katanc^se for the first Limo, co to c^oak, were confronted, vicually with the fact that Congolese soldiers in Leopoldville were under cci.inand of African officers. They wore or less suddenly realized that they were in a veoy peculiar r.r/1 unfavourable position in that Katanga is still under the commend of white foreign officers .

: Am I not correct in saying that as regards Colonel Crovccoour there is on record, and with continued pressure from our side, a demand for his withdrawal?

Mr. LTTTMER ; That is quite correct.

The nKnrraTARY-GEN]?T?AL; And that it is really a question of time, as I understand it.

Mr, MA IATA£KI

Mr. TUTOR: As you know, Mr. Gizonga is still in Stanleyville. He has ir/.ide on efficinl ctntcnMit that he bos dissolved hie own Government and reco£nizes the nuw Central Government. Prink • Minister Adoula wont up to Stanleyville yci:terday, got a very cordial wolcuine. Ac to what the outcome of thGt conference- is I am afraid that I have not yet any further news.

l^^^-^OL"™^^1 Uc liave had- no report on it. As you know, Mr. Adoula is there with Mr. Gbonyc as well.

Mr. NniLERim (Nigeria) : I should like to ask one question. We are very anxiously awaiting the outcome of Mr. Adoula1 2 v:U.it to Gtfi.ilcyvillo "because the case of Mr. Gizcrca is a special case, I want to know if other ministers of the Cabinet hrrve accepted the posts offered to them and if they are working unanimously as a team?

_ as I know, Mr. Gizonga is the only exception. The others have taken up their posto or are in the process of taking their new offices. The man froui the Stanleyville uido vV.o l.as a ccatirnl position. is obviously Mr. Gbenve, the Minister of the Interior, ai.d from many lonn; talks I had the- pleasure of having with him, I am personally (juitc convincud that h(,' is set on np.tionwide -conciliation. He says it quite clearly to anyone who cares to listen that the time is over when the country cculd afford to bu cplit into factions and that if the Congo is to be saved from financial and economic collapse, this is it. Unification is the only answer to that,

The n^CTlKTAriY-nEMT^AL: When you say "taking up their posts", it does not mean in the iormal Genuu, it meauc that they, GO to say, trim themselves to the job in the chair but that they ore already active as members of the cabinet -- all but Mr.

Yes.

(Nieerla): The other question: was Tshombe's name considered by the new Premier or by the cabinet for a ministerial appointment or not? DR/ids

J nia sure tha1i fc° vould hove been very favourably considered for a Government post if he had not waited GO lon^ QS he nao. I do not know what the position would "bo now if be cane down to Leopoldville. My personal impression, for whatever it is worth, is that they would be anxious in the Central Government to give him or nom-body else from the Ka tango cide scir.e kind of poet in the new Government. But which poet and to whom I would not dare guess.

i' **• Dinner referred to Gouth Katanga. As you know, Ncrth Katanga is already represented in the new Government by Mr. Sendwe who is one of the Vice-rrime Ministers.

Mr. LTNNTR; Yes.

- a): Mr. Secretary-General, you .mentioned the desire on the part of the United Nations Operation to withdraw troopc from the Congo in the near future. I am wondering whether, in your estimation and judgement, would it be neccccary for troops that are cln for rotation, ray in September, would there be niiy necessity Qb all of these troops to bs replace;]? Vie have in mind o'(r own situntion where the nuintenonce of troops in the Con^o IIQL; been a cource oi1 financial imponition on uc to a certain extent. V7e ore wondering whether we can think In terms of being relieved.

A^V~GErTriTY\_j;,: I may perhaps reply to that and say that our first target end hope would be that the troops duo for rotation would not be replaced = — but, os I said ot the last meeting we do necessarily depend on the attitude of the Central Government because they will have to assume certain responsibilities. This, however, is a first natural target.

_ (India): Mr. Linner has indicated that thought was being given to the question of possible withdrawn! or rather curtailment of United Notions forces in the Congo,, and thnt certainly is a very desirable thine. I think it is good that now the United Nations Comirnnd and you yourself here, Mr, Secretary- General, and your colleagues chould be considering this question. The Central Government of the Congo has been formed after a great deal of difficulty. DR/id

In fact, we have had to -wait over a year, veil over a year, for the ccr.cn -mat I on of Uii;j event. It is very ucslrablj that tills Government should "be enabled to establish itself as a goinc concern and to brine about order and discipline in the Congo. How of course the greatest enoray of this Gcvcrnnont, I suppocc, would be the internal i Lvalrieu, end VG vould hope that those will "be sorted out. But it cecrcs to us thcio with an anriy of about 6,CCO, 7,000 or ^,000 veil-trained persons in Katnnca who are not yet, an far as I can understand, integrated, physically, militarily or even onoticnally, with the army of the Central Govcrr;T.Gn^, that would be another danger to tlio Ccntrr..! Government. We vould "be veiy happy — it is our wish — j I' the large drain on the United Nat/ions caused by the presence of a lorco body of United Nations forces should be reduced progressively or as quickly as posniVle. But I think it is desirable not to go too fact. Thoro in a practical darker which the uisGiduitn, the 6,000 or 7,000 irr.ri orEy, inicht represent to the regime that hoc been ectabliched after BO much difficulty. r BHS/mh -.... 16 (Mr. Jha, Inn la)

Another dancer that ceerr.o to me to exist is the /.NC itself. J a:n r.ot s'.ire to what e::tent -- and here I would like to hx.ve come -information -- the prcvi.ua indiscipline, pronececo to irresponsibility and to tali.ing power in its own hands to supcrocde the lawful authority, all those tendencies have abated. What is the dancer of a revival of this hind of thine? This brings us to the question of the proper disciplining and training of these forcoc, which VQD port of the very important re solution of the Security Council of 21 February, what progress has "been achieved in that direction? Assuming that all GOCS well with this Government internally -- and that would be our fervent wish -- one might think of a time-table preceding the eventual withdrawal of United Nations forces from the Congo. It seems to us that the withdrawal oC United Nations forces from the Congo would Le the greatest achievement of the United Nations. We should like that time to ccmi> as soon as possible, but in a well thought out, orderly, phased way. We would "be very happy to see come kind of a tirce -table drawn up, if possible. As I cay, it all depends on how well the ncwliy constituted Central Government pets going, to whet extent they are e.Vle to forge unity among themselves and to "bring order and discipline to the Congo.

I can perhaps anticipate what Dr. LInner would say concerning the various details of this problem by saying that, as a matter of course, the first aspect to which the representative of India referred, the possibility of the Katanga f^ncMrrv-'ric remaining a threat to the stability of the State, is just one of those things which are covered by my General reference to what the Government itself feels that it can shoulder. Certainly evea if we cannot and should uot fight lor the Government, they should be able to trust that they will not "be in any way deserted by uc. If tha national Gnvernraont feels that it needs a continued counter-weight of this type, it would, at least for ray personal part, be an imperative reason for us, in consultation with them, to bow to their wish. With thia general observation, which applies of course not only to Katanga but Q!;:O to ICLvu and Kasai, although there we have rather promising prospects for the moment, I would like to call on Dr. Linner. BHG/mh ... 17

Mr_._LIT^n?R : I am rather hesitant to pass judgement on tho morale and discipline of the AI'C troops, cincc I am a civilian tu'id there is a nilitQry adviser sitting behind EC, but I do think that there hnn boon quite en irrprovezmt with respect to morale? ana discipline in the ATC cin^o last year's riotous events. With reference to our contributions to their f a> -fcher training, the first step is obviously to be token by tlio Central Govcrnr.:ont itself in bringing at Out a rapprochement "between General Limdula and General Mobutu mid to sort out the responsibility they would chare. Mcnnwhila, we have declared ourselves ready to put ct their disposal a certain nui:ibcr of officers who, in the first place, should help the Congolese Government to establish a sound financial and budgetary basis for the new ar::«y setup, AD it is new, I am afraid there are rather va.jue ideas about the econcnic resources that could bo considered reasonable for a militnry organization .in the Congo. Also, from a military point of vinw, where and how these troops should be disbursed. There arc quite a low practical questions to be cleared up. We are quite ready to help with respect to IcgiEtics, communications end health and other queations in the ariry, should they ask us to do so.

Tho fECTCTA^-GrjraAL: I think it nifrht be of interest for General Rikhye to say a fev; words following hie recent experience in Leopoldville.

Gir^ during ^7 recont visit I was very clad to note a very definite improve, .i.uit in the c-neral standard of tho A1IC. A very significant fact is that there were no untoward incidents durJnc the L.eetin.^n of rarliai:icnt. Tlic dcnire on the part of the political Icauera is very ci-rcn^ to kocp the an:y outside any future i'aetjcnal incidents, and that hns had r.n ir.ir.cdiato effect c.n the aii.y. All the officers that I ::iet during ny lrr;t visit expressed tlieir dcjire to spend their time en their profession and in i:r.rrovii!£ the-vi;elves. A cereiiicnial parade was held recently at which the arr.y took c.n oath to .its Minister of LaTcnce -- it was a very significant laove. It was a (jocd pair.de. The troops conducted thcr.se3.ven extremoly ucll. IL is Quite ccraeii in :::ost nrniec to juc'^3 sccndr.rd of troops from ceremonial parades. Our view is that they (ANC) conducted themselves rather well, besides the fact that the parade was held to honour the new Defence Minister. BIIG/mh --- 18-20 (General Rlklryg )

We are soiled with the probleri of providing the Congolese army ir-mdi assistance, which is part of a request from the Congolese Government, u:d : c will be t;cn'jrally a.Lcng tho linen of the CoquilhatvJlln Conference. We have to rind then the necessnry number of military advise) G for the staff as veil as for the Ministry of Defence. They have anked us to conduct a course- i'or their senior officers. We are in the process of mailing arran.gcir.cnt3 for such training, and we hcpc to start in about a month. They have rcked us to coin them in a .Joint coirjnission where the future of the armed forces wculd be diGCUCoed -- its future shape; the form of training necessary, its ci-e and GO on. I/e vrould hnve to provide a number of French speaking officers, and cy colleagues are new vorking on the actual requirements. We shall very coon bo ccming to the dolGgaticns with a request for this staff , which I am sure you all will agree is urgently required.

The ^En^TAT-lYj^ENF? \L: You may rencr.bar frori previous meetings of this Ccnmittee that this approach is of Icng stanrl i.ng and long planning on cur side in accordance with the- resolution of the Security Council. 3o Icnrj ns wo could not r.-c'ard the arn:y as a non-political instrujinnt of a conctitut.icual £ovorii.:it;ni; of national unity, practically any raovo wo took would lend itself to the claim that we wore helping this or that faction, and thab held us back. V,Te hr.VG also left aside in our thinking tho specific problem of Katanga in the sense that the fact that this unification may not in fact rind do facto extend to Katanga should not stop us the moment we can deal with a Central Government functioning on a parliamentary basis and bein^ the natural political responsible head of the armed forces. v AP/vi 21 (The r!-?cretnry-C-enGrnl )

We have reached that state now and I hopo it will remain stable. If that is so we have, or course, juut to nut into effect tho project for the rot ruini and reorcanization of the army which wo had in rund the whole time ar.rl which now, of r.ourGC; chould be staged in assistance to the national Government and in close consultation with them along the linen mentioned by General Rikhyc* 1 would cay that from Headquarters 'side perhaps the moot encouraging element in the whole picture, apart from the politicr.l development, ID the fact that also the members of the AUC ceeia to have learned frcr.i tho ten or twelve months experience that ib is the death of an nr.Ly to play politics.

(Nigeria).' I wish to put on record the appreciation of ray delegation for IU-. Linner 'G co-operation vith tiyj African ctaff ir.emberc of I lie United nations in the ConTo and also for 'his co«opGrat.i.on with the Cont'jole.ie. ThiLi io very j.nportant, for without his co-operation things voul'^ I'ave been more aifficult in t)ie Con{jO because in Africa wi renpcct enyone i.ho rc'peotfl IKJ, In the Cou^o, Uiceria^ Ghc.iva, err in my otber count. ~y in Africa^ I wculd cay tl.rvt anyone who is willing to co-cjerate with uu that we will respect him. I must cay that the co-operation cf for, Linner has contributed a fircut doal to the peaceful solution of ConQ;:;lc:;c aifairc. All oloug the Nigerian Govcinmciit hau been thinl-inc that tlie colution cf the Congolese affalrr) is a political solution and the attitude cf lir, Linner io 'to co-operate with the Conrolece and not rno any fo?:ce to Lririfj about the solution to the Congolese afiuirs. Tlicoe are very important j.c&uoi; for uu. For tliio reason I nucL admit that we appreciate very i^uch hin work in the Conro. Secondly; tLero r>re two or throe matters of urconcy in the Gonco. One is the viuit cf iii-. .Adoula to {]tonlcyville; .tf.iic hi s voiy important bccaune r,iny thine will depend on it. I am thinking of one or two preliminary arrangements which AP/Vi 22

(!'.r« will contribute towards the solution of the Congolese affaire. Ci1 ccv.nse/ I't Is the duty of every sovereign State either to recognize a new Gcvernr.ent . or not; this is left to the sovereign G-tatco to dnoid~. Eufc if tiio sovereign States who arc f 'crofter a of tho United nations, particularly in Africa, can join together to recognize the new Government, that will contribute a great deal towards the peaceful solution cf ths Congolese affaire,, iJc*r that the United Haticns has decided to work through one Goverm.',-;nt, ar.d all the other sovereign States in the world arc Members of the United Nations, if the sovereign Ctates will consider che recognition of the new Government under the hcnd of St;,v;e of the Congo; th?,t will help not omy the Congolese but it vill also help Africa as a whole. rj'ho second point which I have in mind — it in outside the Con^olece cc'Lpetcncu — that is the rccrcani nation of the army which ve hive been tall'ir.^ about for Go:ao time; thie also is very ur^-rnt. Cf cource, I have not been to the Congo9 bub I have learned a fjcat deal about the Congo , ar.d in a Ir.r^o country like the Cop.r"o vitii co many diiTcrcnt onr.y factions vcitfcrJng about, doJns a"!J. sort.?, of d^;,.'!Ge to the public, tliiG will enure a f^e.:.il: deal of trouble. For this reason it io very important for the United ifaiionr. to Gee thc-.t tho reorcni'»i2:.itiou ond the training of the Congoicce L'AU'it take place 03 scon as pCG^lble, Ibw that the political colutioa is on itc wny, tlien tl:o E:ilitary training m:d orccnizatioii; oconcmic and conGt.itU'jional solutions Kiuet fcllovr. The United Uationc hoc ir.any things to do. We knew very well that the Congolese Parliarient alco has jr:any ttaiiQ^s to do. It is the bf^iraning of their stability. Therefore, it depends on thea to work very hard towards their unity. This leads me to the question of political cdviscrc in Stanleyville and in Katanga. I do not know how L^ny political advieeir. are still in Katuncu and in Stanleyville. If these political advisers arc loi't clone to do viiai they want to do, they vill never work tcwr.rdc the unity cf the Console nej they will widen the c^P* For this reason I should like to know more about the politico 1 p.dvisaro in Katanga and in Gtanleyvillc. It is very important for the United liationo and the representatives of the Gecretary-General to continue their efforts in Getting the Congolese together and in ceeing that the political orlvicerc are not given the slichtest chance to widen the gap among the Congolese. r

AT/vi 23-25

l^JHJIIM (Sudan): Earlier I thought you etatcd that wa officer trainees vere cent to Belgium Tor training* I s Juct wonder Ir;tj •whether these persons had returned to the Con^o and had taken their places in the National Congolese Array, or whether some of tkejn are still in Belgium, AC/cn 26

I2LII;: According to our information, approximately el, lily officers have roturnc'.] to what wee formerly the LcopoLdville sec cion or tic nn.ry, e::d u'cout seventy have returned to Katanga end twenty to BQiwan^Q, There- ore, nearly 200 trained officers have returned froii BolgLuvi end alrcr.uy jcvinjd the different \rnita, mainly infantry, -with others i" -c^a ci' the technical tranches liKc the signal ccrpa. laece officers are f c Lrly well trained and are expected to be of grc-o. t assistance in the reorganization of thin cruy..

. -Ambacsador of Nigeria raised the question of political aciviscro "n Stanleyville. If you Lave anytnlug to adci to that point, it would be of intere:^.

Mr* T.Tir^R ; As to tiic political . advir.ers in Dtndeyville, I am afraid vo have vciy little ir.fon:/.. Lion. V.:e lic.ve trie;! to ^et details about who would be functioning in what pou.vi'.iun, but t.:e inclic rations o.ro rather vogvc, Ao to ratci-oga, \;o liave established tvo different liotu. One of thecc is n list of politj.cal ad.viacrc that L»,ionld be inu^dicbcly c::polled -- and you will perhaps remember that in the CUGG of I'lr. Thysccms, for instance, wj did not hesitate to take rather definite action when it vr>s fcund necessary* The other lict is of a slightly l'.:r.s urgent character, that ic, come delay in allowed. But I could not nay how many advisers still ren:ain; bccauoe the situation actually charges Ii'om day to dn.y. Lut if you are catisfied with the indication that in the very near future this elate will have been cleaned, I think that is a fair a G Gumption.

although^ of courcs, the jnatter has not been negotiated uitii the Dclciunc, they having cn1.y bcj^n im'orniaci about it, we have Mr. Gpaak1 c promise of full co-operation from tlicir side in the expulsion of the pcrconr en tho lists, which r.ro -l^finitivj from our jpoint of view unices new people tui-n Up, in which case they will be added to the list. 'till'

AC/cn 27

Mr^C'imLT (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): I'r. Linncr mirfnt be able to give us seme information on the future importance of United rbtzcns activities in the Corgo end whether he believe.; that ve ought tn we it until the political situation stabilizes before increasing the United nations effort or reducing it, and in particular -whether the new government should "be permitted to nr;k for civilian technical assistance on a bilateral basis.

Mr«_LTTTT'JEIl_ (interpretation from French): I think that the Central Government is extremely interested in continuing to j occive technical assistance on more or lees the uruno scale QS heretofore. On the other hand, ve have had excellent results from various courses thch have been set up, as you knew, Tor training Congo'lcue cadres. Their progress has "been so rapid and GO positive that I would personally view with seine opuriisn. the possibility of reducing our assistance froj the point of view of ctaiT. I'erhaps I might venture to cite just one example which I felt was, very impressive of the ability of the Congolese to r.dnpt th^nr.elve:; to higher education ranch more quickly than had b>.>cn general ly forc:x;:n. 'ilvla is the rr:ne of rtudcnts who nave been sent i.o France for mcdicul otuJy nt the Univcraity of II.'ntpellicr; for exr-'x-le, SCILC tiir.o ago the rector of the Univeroity told un that the Congoleae at the preseni tine arc at the head of the fjroup of foreign students, end that after a year they had obtained exceptionally good rcrultc. As you know, with all our strength wo are accelerating these courses, and I believe that tiic immediate future will produce even more positive results, so that as soon as we see on our port that there is the slightest opportunity io fill a technician1 o post with a Congolese, we chsll be only too happy to do so. 1 think t:]C attitude of the Central Government ia above all one of wishing to sc3 a cadre of r.dvisero installed in the Ministries, and thin would be a cadre which I think should not be too largo. ;?.p calling among ourselves, we should mention a figure of perhupn 50 highly quoiiiJod people as advisers. /Vo^rt from thin consideration, technician:.; at lover levels would obviously be ncc.lcd. I should not like to give any figures, but cuch personnel would be required in lec:.;er nuiiibera; for e.cunple, as a personal estimate, I mghb coy perhaps 200 technicians would cuffico. But of coarse all of this ic going to be diacunocd wil:h the Government upon my return and it will be for them to cay to -what extent they wlch to avail themselves of our assistance. AC/cn 23

55l°Jl^!I^?]L"Jl^Er!^: I vlsh to Qdd Q Glorification, and tar.t is that in beck of l-!r. Linner's statement there lice a philocophy on their 6i3e vliich corrcspondo entirely to our thinking, and that is that increasingly ve should direct our efforts in two directions: first, to help in getting advanced training end education for the Congolese: GO as to enable them to step in as parly no possible; and secondly, to ccrve as a hind of qualified labour exchange "by finding proper candidates from tlic appropriute arcc,:^ leaving it to the Government itself, of course, to decide on the choice they would moire and to engage the people. We then ccme in as a Kind of screening board in the cense that ve want to avoid having candidates put up who DIG;/ later prove to "be persons vho misunderstand their role, an ::•::! be to themselves political significance, and do not pit. y ball according to the rules of the c^r.o as the Congolese would lilic.

To the extent that ve succeed along these two linos ; the need for technical anoietance in its traditional form from the United Ilnticus "become E much loss pronounced end v-o can ti-top by ~ trp pV.ase out and reduce our operation to G technical assistance opcratio-i of tae land ve have in seme forty or forty- five countries, peri'ur:pn on r. lorgor scale for the time bcin^, but in principle of exactly the samo chare cter.

Mr. JTIA (India): I hope you will forgive rcc for interveniog I have no desire to do r,o, but I vo.s rather frightened by certain figures that Mr. Linner gave, such as five hundred advisers.

Th e r.flCRET AH Y- GENERAL ; Two hundred, and they were experts on the lower levels,

Hr._JnA (India): Maybe two hundred, the number is not too important. I think your explanation was i ether reassuring. It LCCHIS to me we must nob make the snme mistake; we must not c:ubstitule ourselves in place of Belgian ndvisciti and ctiiers. I do not like the terminology at all-. It is certainly desirable for the United Nations to help thrm to get technical personnel and to help in the recruitment of people for whatever they wish, but I think this whole thing needs to be gone into very carefully. I cm not criticizing the idea, AC/US 29-30

(Mr._Jhn, India) but I think ve should be very careful, both for political end other reasons which I no GO. not dilate upon nov, to woil: out this vhole scheme very, very carefully. 'We should lihe to be informed, if there is DO objection, of exactly what ic proposed to "bo done. TIG important thin-; ic that the people vho are hired by the Central Government of the Congo uhculd be people whom they need, they should be hired by the Congolese thornselves, and the United Nations should assist in the hiring of technical personnel. I should not lll;e th3 United nations to provide advisers in non-technical departments like the Foreign i'-lnistry or any other ministry of that kind, or even the Interior Ministry, lIA/cto Jl

(Mr,

I am speaking entirely off hand .nt present, but It ceems to nie that we wovld be ill-advised to substitute ourselves In place of the Belgians. I think that this v/'hole inottnr has to be gone into very carefully. TUG methods of supplying the Central. Government of uhe 001:30 with the :iiuch rc-eci?d personnel 11Q7C to be carefully considered, and oho political implications -- not merely in tho Congo, because I cm thinking even more oi' the implications in the United Nations \ with wliich all of us have been familiar during the last year -- have also to be carefully considered. I hone that thece remarks will not be taken cut of place, but I tnir.l; that any such large number as kOO or 5 CO advisers should be cc me thin ^ which v;e have to be careful about, and we should really (30 into this natter very thoroughly,

Y-.nFNFrAL: :; do riot think there is any difference of philosophy or vio'./poliit. The .i'unJr.nontal distinction bct.wcen the Belgian approach and car approach i:j,, of couv^c, that, v.-hilo obey v/cr.t ':.,'). to nrivo c, Toe Miolcl, GO to epcak, \ro liave exactly the oppojibo objective' T,,"e \;ill always stay shcrt in such a way ns to force l.he Congolese to accurao as mucli reopens ib ill Ly an tlioy possibly can assurac thcr.iselves. Let UG cay that cur operation io an operation of liquination of c-GfJictancc, reGpondiii^ only up co the point, Uiere their .needs are imperative. AG regards 200 advisers, I think there is a sl:'eht misunderstanding. I think a better terrainoloGy vrculd be that of technicians having no advisory capacity at all; they will just have to do a practical job for wliich there are no qualifioa professionals of Ccn^olcGO. nationality at the moment. But even that would, as I oee it, be en the camo basis -- that is to say, not orJy because v,ro are short of iiicans, but also as a L.attor of principle, we shouJcl. always be. on the short side, GO u:i to create a continuous mild pressure for Lho Concjolo-ce not: to come to rest, depending upon us or f ore-Ignore in general. In that r;en:;e, -we have a consistent policy of what you might call "Africanization", or you iai;jht call it "Conjolization", That is so deeply built into the system that everything which is said should be interpreted in that light. We have also made it clear to the Congolese authorities that this is our approach, quite independently of the scarcity of means. • I (If l)|M.|ii(|IHH|pH r IlA/eto 32

I con give ycu an example, however, without mentioning exactly the post in question. It is an example which I have, in fact, met in a few other countries in Asia -- very much of a similar typo. It is a very important poet in the judiciary. You know that so far there are, I thjnk, no Congolese with Q satisfactory law degree, much less with any Ie~nl training. Th^L is to coy, it is a typical T pest -- a professional post of a non-political naturu; ',, i;erc they do depend ui Getting somebody froni the outside, They have ccme to us, and we hc.ve said that we do not want to help than Till the post. What we can do is to canvass candidates on the basis of the assumption that the person selected rhould, of course, be trained in the Ic^al system which is traditionally applied in oho CYngo, that he should be French- cpcaKinf*; -- that ^oes without saying -- but, further-, that he should be from an area which does not give rice to any suspicions -- whatever qualities of integrity he has -- any suspicions from onybcdy cloc. On that basis, we would suggest one or two, or perhaps three, countries frcui which such a man mi^nt be recruitel. "v/e '.'ant first oi all to know whether those countries are agreeable

to ycu. If they are agreeable, we she. 11 approach tno Governments end (_:ot; lists of possible candidates. ;..jo will screen those candidates, so to speek -- but, once we have screened them politically, ae will put Lhe list c/f candidates up to you, and then it will be entirely for the Congolese Govei-iin.ent 'bo decide whether this is the kind of man it wants, and it will hire him on its responsibility for this

special Oob." I think this is the best service we can render, and I think that it keeps the possible Political implications to an absolute minimum. If it had been a post i'or which t/e could have hoped, within c reasonable time, to see siuebcdy cf Congolese nationality professionally qualified, my reply would have been: 1'Go for h:un. Kven if he is weak in the bc^imdng, he will learn his Job os lie goes along." However, we are absolutely chert of anybody of thai professional schooling. For chat reason, we1 choose this very cautious formula, ;-/hich, ao I have ^aid, has in cur experience been applied i\ few- times in similar situations in Asia, and which seems to fit the problem of a Government in the situation in which we find the Central Government of the Congo. IIA/ctu '*""" 33

etnry-Ornorol)

I would add. one thing: that, as a matter of course, the manont Mr. Lirme-r has bed the possibility, after his return, to diccucs thece principles and their iiralementntion, we would like to report to this Committee for its observations on details and aspects und approaches.

Mr ._ .TTIA (India): I think that clarifies the position a great. dealt I wanted to give expression to certain qualms that 1 had with regard to this whole ratter. 1 assume frcm wh&t you have said that it would be quite cpen for the Central Government of the Congo to find any people for themselves in the open market if they wish.

The nECREVA^Y-GI'iKERAL: As & matter of course.

* J-fr_t_ JIIA (India): It is only when chey seek the United nations -•-

Tli G^ f. ECR ET/vi \ Y-GFNER.A L : Only when they ccme to us and aslt uc to canvcss possibilities —

Mr. tTITA. (India): Then certain procedures and principles are laid down?

The S I'lCH FTATt Y-G ENERA L ; Certainly.

Mr. Jli'A (India): I am sure that other members of the Committee would like, in due course, to see a paper on this. It would bo extremely useful.

..^Jj: Ycu wil1 hQVe that. But this io assistance; it is not comL-thiiig iinpoacd on the Congolese. If they have a £ocd candidate^ they could end should take hiu. If they do not have the chance to find good candidates, it is very natural to turn to us . I would add one thing: If they obviously rnnde a very unwise choice, I would feel free, in a very informal and non-official w£?y, to uiake our views linown to them. But it would be restricted oirnply to making our viowo oa the matter known. In all HA/cto ^ ( Tl 10 • )p c i "G t n ry -0 o re r al ) innocence j they mlpht saddle themselves with new political advisers or an objectionable character. If we have reason to surpccb that, we c-Grfcainly G-::GU..I tell them that, virile \:c leave the decision to then, ve ure unhappy ah out; it.

Mr. LTin^T;R: Before the meeting close 3 f ir.ay I cay a vortTof gr to the rcproccnlative ol Nicoria for his very kind remrkc a short vhila I am am:iou:^ hov/cver, to aveid the impression that I personally should have too groat a oharo of credit for this. Bellini Y/iiatcver GUCCOGD has been achieved is teoiLYJcrl; -- anO., I niiclit add, very inspiring teamwork to vitnesc and participate in. Tlve declalve raon in this context, have "been Mr, Khiari, of Tunisia; Mr. Ccirdincr, of Ghana; and Mr. rivokedi, of Higoria. I would like to tako this opportunity to put on record the invaluable contributions that these three gentlemen, nave made to thu worlv done there,

Mr« rTGT.T.E'RUl'l^ (Nigeria): I hope you will continue your co-operation with them.

T-2j^''Jli:T3T;!,:5vilI;:;^Ti: ll-y ^ turn that around and say that I hope they will continue their co-operation with us. If thcic is nothing to he added, I thank the members of the Committee and I thank Mr, Linner for his explanations.

The meeting rose at U',20 p.m.