The Role of Fort Heiman in the Western Theater of the Civil War Timothy A

16 Rivers and Rifles: The Role of Fort Heiman in the Western Theater of the Civil War Timothy A. Parsons Abstract Between 1861 and 1864, a triumvirate of Forts – Henry, Donelson, and Heiman – played a pivotal role in the western theater of the Civil War. Of the three, Fort Heiman changed hands most often, and despite its relative obscurity was a keystone for the Union and Confederacy in regulating military transport and commerce on the Tennessee River. In late 2010, archaeologists from the National Park Service Southeast Archeological Center investigated Fort Heiman to distinguish between Confederate and Union landscape features, and to shed light on the role of African American Freedmen living at the fort during its Northern occupation. Ultimately, the landscape surrounding Fort Heiman was found to be highly disturbed by relic collectors. And, although impossible to distinguish between Union and Confederate forces based on the artifact assemblage, the identification of several earthworks and landscape features sheds new light on the occupation of the area during the Civil War. Introduction Early in the Civil War, control of navigable forts in the defense and control of the rivers – waterways was of paramount strategic concern. Forts Heiman, Henry, and Donelson. The The Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers, as part subject is approached through the lens of Phase I of the Mississippi River drainage, were and Phase II archaeological survey at the Fort important transportation and trade routes Heiman unit of Fort Donelson National flowing directly into the heart of the Battlefield, as part of the National Park Confederacy. This paper recounts the Service’s National Historic Preservation Act importance of maritime superiority in the (NHPA) Section 110 site inventory and western theater of the Civil War prior to 1864, evaluation obligations. and focuses on the roles of three Confederate Controlling the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers, 1860-1863 Kentucky was strategically important to vital transportation and potential invasion route both the Union North and Confederate South. is demonstrative of the region’s role as a Demographically, the state ranked ninth in linchpin during the early days of the Civil War population by 1860 and produced important (Figure 1). Indeed, western Kentucky was of agricultural commodities such as tobacco, corn, such strategic value to both sides that President wheat, hemp, and flax; its neutral status at the Abraham Lincoln wrote, “I think to lose outset of the war thus made it desirable territory Kentucky is nearly the same as to lose the whole for both the North and the South. Even more game…We would as well consent to separation importantly, the transportation role of the at once, including the surrender of the capital” Tennessee River was recognized and coveted by (Harrison and Klotter 1975:3). both parties. The Confederate rush to fortify this Journal of Kentucky Archaeology 1(2):16-38, Winter 2012 17 Figure 1: Locational map of Fort Heiman, Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, and relevant rivers and lakes. Though this series of battles on the Henry. Despite the relatively small role played Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers is often by Fort Heiman in defense of Fort Henry and the glossed over in summaries of the Civil War, the Tennessee River, it nonetheless saw several fights for control of these important waterways subsequent occupations by Union and greatly affected momentum and strategy early Confederate forces during the war, and shaped on in the conflict. Fort Heiman, especially, is the conflict in the western theater for years to often left out of narratives of the Battle of Fort come. Defending the Rivers The Civil War in the Lower Tennessee- western portion of the state was extremely Cumberland region of western Kentucky and important due to the Mississippi, Cumberland, Tennessee was defined by the positions played and Tennessee Rivers— all the modern by three forts along the Tennessee and equivalent of highways to the heart of the Cumberland Rivers: Forts Henry, Heiman, and Confederacy if they came under Federal control. Donelson (Figure 2). Indeed, the extreme Journal of Kentucky Archaeology 1(2):16-38, Winter 2012 18 Figure 2: The locations of Forts Heiman, Henry, and Donelson along the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers. Note that Fort Henry is submerged beneath Kentucky Lake in this modern satellite imagery (imagery from ESRI 2011). In order to prevent a Union invasion along and its command over a long, straight stretch of these key transportation arteries, the the Tennessee River also contributed to its Confederacy constructed Fort Donelson on the strategic placement. Two months later, in Cumberland River at Dover, Tennessee, and September 1861, Confederate forces under Fort Henry on the eastern bank of the Tennessee General S.B. Buckner seized and occupied by June of 1861 (Cooling 1987:48). Despite Bowling Green, Kentucky in order to impede there being a more appropriate battery location Union railroad operations in the region on the elevated bluffs overlooking the western (Eisterhold 1974:43). This opened the door for bank of the river, due to Kentucky’s neutral further Confederate military inroads and the status, Fort Henry was placed upon low-lying building of fortifications in the state. ground in Tennessee. Its proximity to Kentucky Journal of Kentucky Archaeology 1(2):16-38, Winter 2012 19 The Construction and First Confederate Occupation of Fort Heiman Upon Brig. Gen. Lloyd Tilghman’s arrival Construction began in December 1861 with as commander of Forts Henry and Donelson in the arrival of the Twenty-seventh Alabama and late 1861, he immediately recognized Fort Fifteenth Arkansas infantry regiments who, Henry’s susceptibility to floodwaters (Lampley along with some 500 slaves, were tasked with 2008). Indeed, Fort Henry’s position was building the works. Its suitable defensive described as “wretched” by both Major J. F. position—protected by 150 foot bluffs in front Gilmer, a Confederate engineer who arrived at and impassible roads and rough terrain in the the fort after its construction and would select rear—stood in marked contrast to the poor the location for Fort Heiman (United States War placement of Fort Henry (Eisterhold 1974:45). Department 1882:131), and by Tilghman himself, as shown in his report of the battle and Tilghman had hoped to place large Parrott Confederate surrender. Tilghman understood rifles overlooking the Tennessee River by the what Confederate engineers apparently had second week of February (Eisterhold 1974:45; not—nature was more certain to destroy Fort Lampley 2008). On the morning of February 3, Henry than any Union gunboat, and wrote that General Tilghman made an inspection of the “the history of military engineering records no incomplete works at Fort Heiman. Satisfied parallel to this case” (Tilghman 1882:139). with the progress, the General subsequently left Thus understanding the fort’s precarious for Fort Donelson to make a similar inspection situation, Tilghman sent Colonel Adolphus (Tilghman 1882:137), with work to continue on Heiman, commander of the Tenth Tennessee the bluffs of the Tennessee River. Unbeknownst Regiment, and his chief engineer Major Gilmer, to Tilghman, U. S. Grant’s army of 17,000 to the high bluffs on the Kentucky bank of the Federal troops on gunboats and transports, river to determine if the land could commanded by Commodore Andrew Hull accommodate heavy artillery and suitably Foote, had been moving toward the forts from protect Fort Henry. Gilmer selected a location the north since February 1 (Eisterhold 1974:43; approximately one-and-a-half miles from the Force 1881). Though not yet formally named, existing fort, on the opposite side of the this army eventually became known as Grant’s Tennessee River (Figure 3). Army of the Tennessee. Journal of Kentucky Archaeology 1(2):16-38, Winter 2012 20 Figure 3: The only known contemporary map showing the location of Fort Heiman, along with Fort Henry and Union and Confederate military positions. The map is contained in the Robert Knox Sneden Scrapbook (Mss5:7 Sn237:1 p. 437) curated at the Library of Congress. Courtesy of the Virginia Historical Society. Journal of Kentucky Archaeology 1(2):16-38, Winter 2012 21 The Battle of Fort Henry By February 4, Grant’s army had arrived On the morning of February 6, 1862, at three miles downstream from Forts Henry and 11:45 a.m., Commodore Foote’s seven gunboats Heiman at Bailey’s Ferry. This prompted engaged Fort Henry from the north. The river’s Tilghman to order a retreat from the unfinished high winter floodwaters had reached the banks and unequipped Fort Heiman to reinforce Fort Henry across the river. By this time, Fort Henry of Fort Henry’s earthworks, allowing the was partially inundated by the Tennessee River approaching Union gunboats to direct fire on following heavy rains. Tilghman, in recognition nearly level flight at the fort’s parapets and guns. of the difficult situation, ordered the majority of By 1:00 p.m., only four of Tilghman’s guns the solders to assist in the defense of Fort remained operational, with the General himself Donelson. He later rationalized this decision in operating a 32-pound rifle to relieve the his after-action report, saying “I deemed it exhausted soldiers. Even worse, only nine of 17 proper to trust to the fact that the extremely bad roads leading to that point would prevent the guns remained above water and could serve as movement of heavy guns by the enemy, by defense (Gott 2003:88-89). Several of the guns which I might be annoyed [at Fort Henry]” experienced mechanical problems during the (Tilghman 1882:138). Furthermore, Tilghman battle, with the 10 inch Columbiad vent reasoned that a centralization of troops at Fort accidentally spiked and making it unusable, and Donelson might allow it to be held, while Fort one of the 32 pound guns loaded with improper Henry was a likely loss regardless of troop ammunition exploding and killing two of its number due to its precarious placement and flood waters that continued to rise.

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