IN the MATTER of an AD HOC ARBITRATION PCA No. GOS-SPLM 53,391 PURSUANT to the ARBITRATION AGREEMENT in the HAGUE, the NETHERLANDS

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IN the MATTER of an AD HOC ARBITRATION PCA No. GOS-SPLM 53,391 PURSUANT to the ARBITRATION AGREEMENT in the HAGUE, the NETHERLANDS IN THE MATTER OF AN AD HOC ARBITRATION PCA No. GOS-SPLM 53,391 PURSUANT TO THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IN THE HAGUE, THE NETHERLANDS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN AND THE SUDAN PEOPLE’S LIBERATION MOVEMENT/ARMY THE SUDAN PEOPLE’S LIBERATION MOVEMENT/ARMY REJOINDER 28 February 2009 Table of Contents I. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...........................................................................................1 A. The Government Has Failed Entirely to Establish that the ABC Experts Exceeded Their Mandate .........................................................................................1 1. The Government’s Reply Memorial Attempts Improperly to Expand the Grounds on which the ABC Experts’ Report May Be Challenged........2 2. Even if they Were Admissible, the Government’s Purported Excess of Mandate Claims Are Frivolous....................................................................4 3. The Government Excluded or Waived Any Rights to Claim that the ABC Experts Exceeded Their Mandate.......................................................6 B. The Government’s Fundamentally Revised Factual Case Confirms the ABC Experts’ Decision and Supports the SPLM/A’s Definition of the Abyei Area .......7 1. The Government’s New Factual Case Confirms that the Area of the Nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms Transferred to Kordofan in 1905 Comprises All of the Territory North of the Current Bahr el Ghazal/Kordofan Boundary to Latitude 10º35’N ........................................7 2. The Boundary Between Kordofan and Bahr el Ghazal Was Indefinite and Indeterminate in 1905 .........................................................................11 3. The Condominium Officials Transferred the Ngok Dinka People, and Not a Specific Area, to Kordofan in 1905 .................................................12 4. The Government’s Interpretation of the Parties’ Agreed Definition of the Abyei Area is Manifestly Wrong.........................................................13 II. THE GOVERNMENT HAS FAILED ENTIRELY TO ESTABLISH THAT THE ABC EXPERTS EXCEEDED THEIR MANDATE ................................................15 A. The Government Attempts Improperly to Expand the Grounds on which the ABC Experts’ Report May Be Challenged............................................................18 1. The Government Ignores the Definition of “Excess of Mandate” in the Abyei Arbitration Agreement ....................................................................19 2. The Government’s Efforts to Recharacterize Its Purported Excess of Mandate Claims Are Baseless ...................................................................21 3. The Purported Violations of “Procedural Conditions” Alleged by the Government Do Not Fall within the Definition of an Excess of Mandate......................................................................................................28 B. The Government Ignores the Presumptive Finality of Adjudicative Decisions and Disregards the Specialized Character of the ABC Proceedings......................32 1. The Government Acknowledges that the ABC Proceedings Were Adjudicative in Nature...............................................................................32 2. The Government Ignores and Unacceptably Denigrates the Specialized Character of the ABC and the ABC Proceedings ......................................33 3. The Government Ignores the Presumptive Finality and Validity of Adjudicative Decisions, Particularly Concerning Boundary Determinations...........................................................................................37 4. The Government Ignores Generally Applicable Principles Regarding the Allocation and Nature of the Burden of Invalidating Adjudicative Decisions....................................................................................................49 5. The Abyei Arbitration Agreement Does Not Alter the Government’s Very Onerous Burden of Proving an Excess of Mandate by the ABC Experts .......................................................................................................55 C. The Procedural Breaches Alleged by the Government Were Not Excesses of Mandate and Were Instead Entirely Appropriate Procedural Actions Fully Consistent With the Parties’ Agreements ..............................................................59 1. The Three Procedural Breaches Initially Alleged by the Government Were Not Excesses of Mandate .................................................................59 2. The Government’s New Complaint That the ABC Experts Held “Unilateral Consultations With Representatives of the SPLM/A” is Frivolous and Entirely Without Substance ................................................62 D. Three of the “Substantive” Breaches Alleged by the Government Were Not Excesses of Mandate and Were Instead Manifestly Correct Interpretations of the Parties’ Agreements and the Evidentiary Record ............................................63 E. The ABC Experts Did Not Allocate Grazing Rights and the GoS Reply Does Nothing to Advance Its Argument.........................................................................67 F. The Four Violations of “Mandatory Criteria” Alleged by the Government Were Not Excesses of Mandate and Were Instead Entirely Appropriate Aspects of the ABC Experts’ Decision and Reasoning.........................................67 1. The Government’s Complaints About the ABC Experts’ Purported Failure to Give Reasons Remain Frivolous ...............................................68 2. The Government’s Complaints About the ABC Experts’ Purported “Ex Aequo et Bono” Decision Remain Frivolous .............................................68 3. The Government’s Complaints About the ABC Experts’ Purported “Failure to Rely on Specified Legal Principles” Remain Frivolous..........69 4. The Government’s Complaints About the ABC Experts’ Purported Attempt to Allocate Oil Resources Remain Frivolous ..............................71 G. The GoS Excluded or Waived Any Rights to Claim that the ABC Experts Exceeded Their Mandate .......................................................................................73 1. The Abyei Arbitration Agreement Did Not Waive Pre-Existing Rights ...74 2. The Government’s Estoppel Arguments Are Confused and Wrong .........75 III. THE GOVERNMENT’S FUNDAMENTALLY REVISED FACTUAL CASE CONFIRMS THE ABC EXPERTS’ DECISION AND SUPPORTS THE SPLM/A’S DEFINITION OF THE ABYEI AREA..........................................................79 A. The Government’s New Allegations Regarding the Migration of the Ngok Dinka to the Bahr Region Are Implausible and Wrong.........................................83 B. The Government’s New Allegations Regarding the Differential Impact of the Mahdiyya on the Ngok and Misseriya Are Implausible and Wrong .....................91 C. The Documentary Record Provides No Support For, and Instead Contradicts, the Government’s Claims Regarding the Location of the Ngok Dinka in 1905....95 1. The Pre-1905 Condominium Documents Record Provides No Support for, and Instead Contradicts, the Government’s Claims Regarding the Location of the Ngok Dinka in 1905 .........................................................95 2. The Post-1905 Condominium Documents Record Provides No Support for, and Instead Contradicts, the Government’s Claims Regarding the Location of the Ngok Dinka in 1905 .......................................................107 3. The Inter-War Period (1918 to 1936) ......................................................112 4. The Period Prior to Independence: Contemporary Documents ...............119 5. The Government’s New Claims Regarding Abyei Town........................122 - ii - 6. The Government’s Criticisms of Professor Daly.....................................123 7. The Cartographic Evidence......................................................................127 8. The Government Almost Entirely Ignores the Environmental and Cultural Evidence.....................................................................................136 9. The Government Makes No Claim that Any People Other than the Ngok Dinka Were Settled South of 10º35’N Latitude.............................141 10. The Bahr el Arab Was Not, as a Matter of “General Repute” or Otherwise, the Dividing Line Between Black and Arab Tribes ..............141 D. The Government’s Self-Serving Claims Regarding Oral Evidence Are Based on “Facile Assumptions” Regarding the Probative Value of Oral Tradition and Ignore the Factual Record....................................................................................142 1. The Government’s Reliance on Out Dated Historical Methodology to Criticize the Use of Oral Evidence is Groundless and Would Improperly Limit the Tribunal’s Fact Finding Capabilities.....................143 2. The Government Ignores and Distorts the Use of Oral Traditions and Evidence in National Court Proceedings .................................................145 3. The Government’s Four Objections to the Ngok Dinka Witness Statements Are Unsustainable .................................................................149 4. The GoS’s Three Allegations of ‘Demonstrably Untrue’ Statements by Ngok Witnesses Distort what the Witnesses Said and the Actual Statements Are Not Contradicted by Any Other Evidence .....................164 5. The Government’s Witnesses Are Unreliable .........................................169 E. The Boundary Between Kordofan and Bahr el Ghazal Was Indefinite and Indeterminate in 1905 ..........................................................................................173
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