IN THE NAME OF DEVELOPMENT: CONFLICT, DISPLACEMENT AND GENDER TRANSFORMATION IN

AMANI EL JACK

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This dissertation is a study of the gender relations of displacement that are the result of the complex interplay between militarized conflict and development-induced displacement in southern Sudan. The dissertation specifically examines the shifts in gender perceptions and roles before and after the forced displacement of Dinka and Nuer from the oilfield territories in southern Sudan to Kenya and

Uganda. Drawing on interviews conducted with Dinka and Nuer women, men and children in Kenya and Uganda, I argue that militarized conflict in combination with forced migration and large-scale development significantly transforms gender relationships. It also provides a context within which to understand and make visible the changing nature of gender relationships of power among the Dinka and

Nuer refugees.

Extreme violence, associated with the combined phenomena of militarization and development-induced displacement in southern

Sudan, has both positive and negative consequences in the lives of refugees. A significant number of the research participants indicated that their experiences of forced displacement have produced radical changes in their ways of life. Displacement has caused physical dislocation,

iv disruption of social and cultural traditions and material dispossession.

The Dinka and Nuer refugees have been separated from their everyday practices and their familiar environment; they have experienced profound injustices, loss, trauma, marginalization and gender-based violence. All of these experiences have led to drastic changes in behaviour, perception and lifestyles.

Nevertheless, displacement has also resulted in positive transformations in the lives of Dinka and Nuer. Many of the research participants have attained some level of education and vocational training in Kakuma and Rhino refugee camps, as well as in cities such as

Kampala and Nairobi. Indeed, displacement has created new responsibilities for women that have enabled them to re-evaluate, reconfigure and significantly alter oppressive gender roles and relationships, as well as the perceptions that others may have of them as women. A considerable number of these Dinka and Nuer women have become sole breadwinners in their households. This new status reorders some of the social and cultural perceptions that previously shaped their lives. These women are now using their newly acquired skills to challenge patriarchal values and structures within their households, refugee camps, communities and beyond.

v Dedication

Three strong women, in a male dominated Sudanese society, have great

influence on my life:

In the loving memory of my mother, Amna Al Sharief

To my, aunt and second mother, Moniera kamil

To my grandmother, Haboba Haja

vi Acknowledgements

My first and foremost gratitude goes to the Dinka and Nuer women, men and children who gave me permission to study their daily experiences of oil-induced displacement, war, exile and gender transformation in Sudan. I am particularly indebted to the women who participated in this research for their selfless sacrifice of time; for openly sharing their wounds with me; and for teaching me a great deal about courage, resilience, and strength.

My sincere thanks go to Professor Wenona Giles, my supervisor and mentor, whose gentle yet poignant guidance gave profound meaning to my work. My doctoral research would not have been possible without her constant support, understanding, and reminders to move forward despite all health and personal challenges. Her confidence in me as a student and researcher gave me the courage to persist with this work.

I am very grateful to my dissertation committee members:

Professor Pablo Idahosa and Professor Ananya Mukhrjee Reed. Since the early stages of my doctoral studies, Professor Pablo Idahosa has challenged and inspired me to think beyond the confines of development- induced displacement discourses and articulate its ethical dimensions and its everyday relevance to marginalized communities across the globe,

vii particularly in our beloved Africa. Professor Ananya Mukhrjee Reed's support and knowledge allowed me to question some of the most prevalent assumptions about agency and human development.

In the course of my doctoral studies, I have been privileged to travel to several countries, meet inspirational women, and affiliate with academic institutions such as the Department of Women and Gender

Studies at Makerere University in Kampala, Uganda and the Ahfad

University for Women in Omudurman, Sudan. This dissertation would not have been possible without the support and assistance of women's groups in Kenya and Uganda such as the Sudanese Women's Association in Nairobi (SWAN); and the Sudanese Women's Voice for Peace (SWVFP); and the New Sudan Indigenous NGO Network (NESI-Network); all of which helped me to gain the trust of the Dinka and Nuer communities in

Kenya, Uganda and in refugee camps such as the Kakuma Refugee

Camp.

I am grateful to have received generous awards such the Ontario

Graduate Scholarship (OGS); the International Development Research

Centre (IDRC) Doctoral Research Award; the York University SSHRC

Funded Project: "International Development Ethics and Population

Displacement: The Nature and Extend of Canada's Obligations in

viii Developing Countries", Centre for Refugee Studies; and York University

Dean's Academic Excellence Scholarship.

I am blessed with a wonderful family and friends whose love and support has guided me through my doctoral studies. I am forever grateful to my husband Dareer for his endless love, unconditional support, and for listening to my stories. Moreover, my daughters Rawan and Razan's kisses and hugs made this process enjoyable. I am very grateful to my uncle Khalid Sharief and Hassan Sharief for their continuous support and generosity, as well as for my brothers Kamal, Tarig and Asim Awad

El Jack for their love and support.

I am grateful to my good friends and colleagues Mawahib Ahmed,

Azza Anis, Shukria Dini, Datejie Green and Punam Khosla for their friendship, support and being there through this process. Thanks to

Datejie Green and Earl Miller for editing various chapters of the dissertation.

ix Table of Contents

List of Maps: Map 1: Map of Sudan 98 Map 2: Oil Fields in Sudan 148 Map 3: Ethnic Geography in the South 164 Map 4: Refugee camps in Kenya and Uganda 208 Map 5: Kakuma Refugee Camp in Kenya 215 Map 6: Refugee camps in Kenya & Uganda- Rhino 220

Chapter One: Theoretical Frameworks: Gender, Development and Forced Migration 1 Introduction 1 In the Name of Development 5 Literature Review 8 Approaches to Development 8 i) Globalization 9 ii) Development-Induced Displacement 17 iii) Feminist Development Perspectives 30 From Women in Development to Gender and Development 32 Agency and Transformation 38 Mapping Refugee and Forced Migration Perspectives 41 i) The International Refugee System 42 ii) Predicaments of the International Humanitarian System 49 iii) Gendered Relations of Displacement 51 In Conclusion: Gendering Development, Conflict & Displacement- Theoretical Frameworks 57

Chapter Two: Research Methods 63 Introduction 63 Research Questions 64 The Fieldwork 65

x Description of the Interviews: 71 i) Group One: In-Depth Interviews 72 ii) Group Two: Feminist Activists 74 iii) Group Three: Kakuma Refugee Camp 79 iv) Group Four: The UNHCR/INGOs 82 v) Group Five: Oil Companies 83 Archival Research 85 Interrogating Personal Experiences 86 Fieldwork Limitations 93 Conclusion 94

Chapter Three: Histories of Sudan are Contested, Subjective Sites: Gender, Conflict and Development 96 Introduction 96 The "Conflicting Moral Geographies" of Sudan 97 History of the Armed Conflict in Southern Sudan: 103 i) The First Phase of the War: 1955-1972 108 ii) The Second Phase of the War: 1972-1983 110 iii) The Third Phase of the War: 1983-2005 Ill Does the End of the War Means Peace for Southern Sudanese? 113 Gender and the State: A North-South Analysis 118 Southern Sudanese Women and the Politics of National Liberation Struggles 127 Gendered Patterns of Resource Driven Development in Sudan 139 In the Name of Development: Oil-Induced Displacement in Sudan 143 Conclusion 157

Chapter Four: "Everything Was in Place When We Were Home!" Shifting Gender, Social and Cultural Boundaries 160 Introduction 160 Subjective Constructions of Sudanese Identities 161 Dinka and Nuer Profiles 163

xi Gender Relations of Power within the Dinka and Nuer Societies Prior to Displacement: 171 i) Gender Ideologies 172 ii) Gender Roles: Household Economics/ Sexual Division of Labour 179 iii) Gendered Institutions: Marriage and Family 184 Conclusion 191

Chapter Five: The Price of Oil: Gender Relations of Displacement 193 Introduction 193 The Price of Oil 194 Are We There Yet? Protraction, Isolation and Violence: 207 i) Kakuma Refugee Camp 213 ii) Rhino Refugee Camp 219 Gendered Dynamics of Protracted Refugee Situations 222 Gender Roles within Refugee Camps 233 Kakuma and Rhino Refugee Camps Compared 236 Seeds of Transformations: Education 241 Ana's Story: Contestation, Negotiations and Transformation 244 Conclusion 254

Chapter Six: Conclusion: Transforming Gender Roles and Relationships

Introduction 256 Transforming Gender Relationships: 258 Changes in Marriages/Family Relations 259 Inter-Generational Confrontations 263 Changes in Gender Roles and Relationships 265 Organizing Across Differences: New Forms of Agency, Resistance and Activism 266

Bibliography: 274

xii Appendices 289 Appendix A: List of Terms and Abbreviations 289 Appendix B: Profiles of Research Participants 295 Appendix C: Interview Questions 301 Appendix D: Consent Form 304

xiii Chapter One Theoretical Frameworks: Gender, Development and Forced Migration

Introduction

This dissertation is a study of gender relations of displacement that are the result of the complex interplay between militarized conflict and development-induced displacement in southern Sudan. I argue that militarized conflict in combination with forced migration and large-scale development radically transforms gender relationships. I define transformation as the process of contestation, renegotiations and reconfiguration of gender perceptions, roles and relationships. By transformation I do not mean the end of patriarchy or the introduction of socialism but rather the individual, collective and structural practices of resistance and agency performed by women and men.

The transformation of gender relations, in the southern Sudanese context of armed conflicts and exile, transcends daily survival mechanisms that managed to sustain livelihoods during time of wars and displacement. Transformation involves complex and substantive negotiations, confrontations and reconfigurations of power relations within the home, extended family, community, refugee camp, national and transnational arenas. One of the contentious issues in the process of

1 transformation is the reversal of gender roles, values and relationships. I understand gender role reversal to refer to the shift in the power relations and gendered responsibilities, practices and status between women and men within the family and society. Therefore, transformation requires, not only a sophisticated interplay between resistance that confronts and refutes oppressive patriarchal structures but also agency.

Following Kabeer (1999), I believe that agency could be defined as the ability to define one's goals and act upon them, even in the face of opposition, and in a manner that brings about a transformation from disempowerment to empowerment. As Kabeer states,

Agency is about more than observable action; it also

encompasses the meaning, motivation and purpose

which individuals bring to their activity, their sense

of agency, or the 'power within'. While agency tends

to be operationalized as 'decision-making' in the

social science literature, it can take a number of

other forms. It can take the form of bargaining and

negotiation, deception and manipulation, subversion

and resistance, as well as more intangible, cognitive

processes of reflection and analysis. It can be

2 exercised by individuals, as well as by collectives

(Kabeer 1999: 438).

The dissertation examines the specific shifts in gender values and roles before and after the forced displacement of Dinka and Nuer refugees from the oilfield territories in southern Sudan to Kenya and

Uganda. It examines how Dinka and Nuer refugees respond to critical changes in their livelihoods due to conflict and displacement and how these changes have transformed gender relationships of power. My fieldwork findings suggest that extreme violence associated with the combined phenomena of militarization and development-induced displacement in southern Sudan provide a context within which to understand and make visible the changing nature of gender relationships of power among the Dinka and Nuer refugees.

A significant number of the Dinka and Nuer women whom I interviewed have indicated that their experiences of forcible displacement have produced drastic changes in their ways of life. Many of my research participants stressed that they were harmed by the disruption of culture, traditions and support systems that previously provided them with relative socio-economic stability; nevertheless, the experiences of displacement have also resulted in positive changes in their lives. Indeed,

3 displacement has created new responsibilities for women, as many of my interviewees have attained some level of education and vocational training in the Kakuma refugee camp, as well as in cities such as

Kampala and Nairobi that have enabled them to challenge and reconfigure some of the oppressive social and cultural and traditional perceptions that previously shaped their lives. A significant number of the Dinka and Nuer women whom I interviewed have become sole breadwinners1 in their households and they are using their newly acquired skills to challenge patriarchal values and structures within their households, as well as in the refugee community. In some cases, the interviewee's status as the sole provider for her family challenges the long held Sudanese stereotype of women being financially supported by men. More importantly, it reorders some of the social and cultural perceptions that previously shaped women's lives. As, Adut, one of the activist Dinka interviewees said,

The skills, values and attitude that we have

acquired as women in exile have changed us. We

will NEVER [her emphasis] be the same

1 Most of the interviewed women in Nairobi and Kampala identified themselves as single mothers, divorcees and widowed and as a result, the primary providers for their families.

4 individuals again, and there is no going back to

old Sudan ... the values we have now acquired do

not make us less Sudanese (Adut, Dinka woman,

age 39).

In the Name of Development

Development is a gendered discourse, ideology and practice.

Escobar (2003) argues that development is primarily "a set of discourses and practices that has produced and sustained the Third World' as an object to be developed" (Escobar 2003: 159). Escobar indicates that the end of Second World War marked the initiation of a coherent development project, a project that encompassed -in the name of development- the total restructuring of the underdeveloped world in the pursuit of material prosperity and economic progress.

Development as a set of discourses, practices, and in its institutional forms was initiated during the 1940s, and has gained strength since the 1970s due to the proliferation of multilateral, bilateral, and private development organizations and the decolonization of Africa and Asia (Szablowski 2007). The scholarship on development provides important inroads to contextualizing development in its many meanings.

5 For scholars such as Gruner (2007), Harvey (2003), Held (1999), Idahosa

(2002), Jackson and Pearson (1998), Kellner (2002), Szablowski (2007) and Waters (2000) development means the policies and practices of development agencies implemented by national governments, international bodies, multilateral or bilateral agencies or local and international non-governmental organizations (L/INGOs). However, development also refers to social and economic change over time, as well as the enhancement of human well-being. Nevertheless, development is indeed a site within and through which multiple contestations over power, gendered identities and resources are negotiated. Following

McEwan (2001),2 I argue that development is about power

its operations, its geographies, its highly uneven

distribution and strategies for achieving it. The

analysis of power and agency is therefore central

to gender aware development studies (McEwan

2001: 93).

Development has, however, also historically embodied shifting meanings and discourses. For instance, McMichael (2000) defines

2 McEwan's (2001) perspective is informed by postcolonial theories that have been greatly influenced by Marxism and post-structuralism and heavily draw on both these political economy approaches.

6 development as nationally-organized economic growth" and the

"development project" as the adoption of a European model of economic growth (McMichael 2000:197). Similarly, Hunt (1996) states that

"economic development consists of the introduction of new combinations of production factors which increase labour productivity" (Hunt 1996:

49). By locating development in the sphere of production and focusing only on changes in economic relations, these definitions neglect gender.

By emphasizing production factors, theorists such as Hunt and

McMichael focus on formal economic activities, such as waged labour and large-scale production, areas where women are underrepresented and their contributions are devalued.

Indeed, development often takes the form of planned projects such as the anti-poverty/anti-hunger programs or basic needs programs, micro-finance, as well as large-scale infrastructural projects. According to McMichael, "globalization is now remaking or displacing development as economic growth becomes globally, rather than nationally organized"

(McMichael 2000:197).

To reiterate, a number of core issues underpin development approaches. However, there are two main bodies of literature that I review in this chapter and that have been crucial to my research. First, I

7 review the literature on development. There are three sub-categories of the development literature that contribute to my dissertation: i) globalization; ii) development-induced displacement; and iii) feminist development perspectives. Second, in reviewing the literature on refugee and forced migration in this chapter, I have divided this scholarship into several areas: i) the international refugee system; ii) predicaments of the international humanitarian system; and iii) gendered relations of displacement. Reviewing all these categories of literature will inform the articulation of the theoretical frameworks that ground my study.

Literature Review

Approaches to Development:

In this section, I will examine the literature on globalization; an emerging literature on development-induced displacement; and feminist development perspectives. I argue that development theory and practice are problematic, and adopt a feminist perspective to interrogate the fundamental contradictions and complications at its core. An examination of feminist theories of development (Boserup 1970; Elson

1994; Jackson and Pearson 1998; Kabeer 1994; Kandiyoti 1998; Scott

1989; Sen and Grown 1987; Young 1988) is significant to my

8 dissertation because, first, they challenge assumptions and practices of development, and second, they provide new and alternative approaches to gender insensitive paradigms of development, particularly on questions of agency and transformation.

i) Globalization

Globalization has been a highly contested topic, representing tremendous diversity of issues, as well as theoretical and political positions. Whether used as an explanation for advancing capitalism or as necessary to the progression of modernization, globalization debates have crossed into discussions about progress, wealth, freedom, and democracy (Harvey 2003; Held 1991; Katz 2001; Kellner 2002). As much as globalization has become a common term, the debates over its contested definitions and characteristics have made it difficult to reach a clear consensus on what globalization really is. I concur with Cindi Katz who states that

Globalization has been the signature dish of

capitalism - a system of social relations of

production and reproduction nourished by

uneven development across a range of spatial

9 scales from the local or regional to the national or

supranational (Katz 2001: 1213).

The debates about the meaning and impacts of globalization have revolved around capitalism and its neoliberal ideologies. For example,

Dale and Robertson (2002) argue that globalization has often been referred to as "the government sharing its responsibilities with the private sector and tailoring its activities to the interests of global capitalism" (Dale and Robertson 2002: 21). Globalization discourses have articulated the 'free market ideology' as the dominating force in society, and this has led scholars such as Currie and Subotzky (2000) to identify neoconservative ideology as the most prevailing influence in the debates

(ibid). The link between globalization and capitalism gained influence in the 1980s when neoliberal market theories became associated with institutions such as the World Bank (WB) and the International

Monetary Fund (IMF). These global financial institutions became central in protecting the interests of leading capitalist nations and imposed loans, debts, and conditionally on many countries in the South (Dale and Robertson, 2002). As a result, the liberalization of trade and restructuring at macro and micro politics-economic levels of countries in

10 both the North and South has become a major characteristic of globalization.

The increasing power of transnational institutions, regional and international trading blocs that include the World Bank, the IMF, the

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the North American

Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) influence and sometimes dictate decision­ making processes in national and global affairs (Shiva 1997:22). The global economic order is manifest in the implementation of Structural Adjustment

Programs (SAPs) in the South (Elson 1994) and economic restructuring3 in the North (Bakker 1996; Brodie 1995). For instance, the liberalization of trade and restructuring of the macro and micro structures of countries in the North, as well as in the South, have commonly been referred to as a "necessary but painful process of change" in response to the inevitable pressures of global liberalization (1995: 8-10). As Brodie states,

Restructuring has not been limited to the markets

or to the so-called 'imperatives' of the new global

3 SAPs in the South and economic restructuring in the North share a similar emphasis on the devaluation of national currencies; privatization of public enterprises; liberalization of trade; reduction in government spending on social services; reduction in public sector employment; and restructuring of the labour market (Bakker 1996:4; and Elson 1989:57- 59).

11 economy. Instead, we [scholars and activists] are

embedded in a process of renegotiating basic

political conventions and cultural forms, among

them our shared 'common sense' understandings

of the appropriate boundaries between the

international and the national, the state and the

economy, the public and the domestic spheres,

and the very definition of what it means to be a

citizen (Brodie 1995:10).

Since the 1980s, global institutions such as the World Bank, the

IMF, GATT, NAFTA have further advanced a neoliberal agenda and imposed more restrictions on state spending, reduced control of the economy, and export-led policies (Currie and Subotzky 2000). Economic policies of restructuring impose, to a large extent, the same standard policy package in countries of the North and the South. States are obliged to devalue their national currencies, liberalize trade, privatize public enterprises, and reduce government spending on social services (Bakker

1996:4; Elson 1989:57-59). Restructuring, however, has specific differences within and between the North and the South. The conditionalities which are strictly imposed on the states of the South as a

12 pre-condition to loans from the World Bank and the IMF are not part of the global restructuring discourses in the North (Bakker 1996).

In the Sudanese context, restructuring programs of "stabilization"4

(1978-1984) and "SAPs" (1984-1990 and from 2000 to the present) have involved fiscal and monetary policies which reduce real income and hence reduce domestic demand for imports and for exportable goods

(Prendergast 1997:51). Both have a common persistent goal of reducing the role of the state and increasing the role of the market in resource allocation (Elson 1989:60). The strict conditionality applied in Sudan has a far reaching influence on economic, social, political, environmental structures, and on the fabric of society. During the 1980s, economic conditions severely deteriorated after the adoption of SAPs. For example, the share of social services, particularly education and health as a percentage of total government expenditure decreased from 30% in 1980 to

2% in 1990. The IMF and World Bank emphasis on investment in cash crop production, in order to generate foreign exchange, at the expense of food crop production, resulted in two major famines in southern Sudan

4 Stabilization programs are short term policy packages funded by the IMF, while SAPs which are jointly sponsored by the IMF and the WB emphasize long-terms goals of expansion and diversification of the production of cash crops for export (Amadiume 2000).

13 during the period of restructuring (Prendergast 1997:50-53). The Dinka and Nuer women in particular were made vulnerable by the shift away from subsistence production, where women dominate, to cash crop production, an area of male dominance in both northern and southern

Sudan. Millions of Sudanese farmers, mainly women farmers in the south, starved as a result of restructuring (El Jack 1993).

Adjustment and restructuring policies, as Elson states, are

"particularly constraining and disadvantageous to women" (1994:38).

These policies not only fail to recognize unequal relationships of power between women and men, but also overlook their significance of power relations in the restructuring processes. Nevertheless, restructuring policies do not have a universal impact on women (ibid). Some of the

Sudanese women in the north have benefited from and/or play an active role in the creation and implementation of these policies while a significant number of the Dinka and Nuer women in southern Sudan have been subordinated by the same restructuring policies across the parameters of class, race, age, ethnicity, ability, and political power (Anis 2001; El Jack

1993). Therefore, analyses of restructuring need to recognize the differences among women, as well as the different experiences of men and women in the domestic and public domains (ibid).

14 Privatization of the public sector and social services has negatively affected women at the global level because "market forces are not capable of responding to the needs and welfare of the individuals" (Idemudia 1991:

91). In Sudan, the private sector experienced structural weaknesses and failed to consider the higher illiteracy rates and poor nutrition status among women. The privatization of social services has made education, health, and childcare unaffordable and inaccessible to a wide range of women, especially among the Dinka and Nuer. Nevertheless, restructuring does not affect Dinka and Nuer men and women in the same way. Some women have been more severely affected by the removal of subsidies and the privatization of public sector services across class, race, education, ethnicity, and ability. Indirectly, Dinka and Nuer women have been affected by the impact of restructuring on their male partners' and spouses' livelihoods which directly affects households' income, expenditure, and gender roles and responsibilities (El Jack 1993).

Furthermore, Sudanese women's and men's experiences of restructuring programs in both the north and the south reflect the intensification of violence against women caused by the changes in the sexual division of labour and the increasing rates of male unemployment and crime (Anis 2001). Violence against women during restructuring is

15 manifest in physical, as well as sexual violence against women within the private and public domains, sexual discriminatory practices against women in employment, and the shrinking of state facilities and services to support abused women (El Jack 1993).

To reiterate, globalization is indeed a gendered project that transcends the economic sphere to severely restructure the workplace, the home and the sexual division of labour. Furthermore, globalization as an ideological mechanism for deregulating national economies has restructured and depreciated the role of the state in order to advance global market agendas (Jones 2000; Currie and Subotzky 2000). Indeed, nation-states in both the North and the South have undergone major structural changes as a direct result of the influence of the globalization.

As Keck and Sikkink (1999) argue, nation-states no longer have a monopoly over national affairs and their sovereignties have been undermined by global financial institutions. As a result, the role of the state has been reduced to that of a mere provider in favour of capitalism

(Jones 2000). Carnoy and Rhoten (2002) explain:

The virtual nation-state is the site of production,

and it encourages and stimulates investments

from at home and abroad that expand production

16 activities... The role of the state is to negotiate for

its own corporations' investments abroad and to

attract foreign investments (Carnoy and Rhoten

2002: 3).

Clearly, global economic competition has focused on economic policies that improve global competitiveness rather than on domestic issues that protect social cohesion. Nation-states have been led by global corporations that maximize profits as the next section on development- induced displacement further illustrates.

ii) Development-Induced Displacement

The literature on development-induced displacement is only now emerging as an interdisciplinary discourse, but within which very limited attention has been paid to gender. Development-induced displacement refers to the process of forcing or persuading millions of women, men and children predominantly in Third World countries to move from their residences, environments, livelihoods and cultures in order to clear land needed for development projects (Vandergeest, Idahosa and Bose

2007:3). Development-induced displacement theory has been a crucial lens through which to examine development's dilemmas. The process of

17 disruption and change accompanying development-induced displacement projects paradoxically provides the space for challenging settled forms of gender, social, economic and political inequalities. It also constitutes a site through which multiple contestations over power, identity and resources take place (ibid; De Wet 2006). Traumatic experiences of development-induced displacement, notably occurring in conflict zones such as Sudan, confront and transform (in)equitable relationships of power, including inequitable gender relations.

The process of extracting and processing 'non-renewable' resources predates current development practices. However, Reed (2002) argues that in the last few decades, processes of resource extraction5 have significantly changed from "small scale operations exploiting easily accessible deposits to large, vertically integrated, capital intensive transnational corporations characterized by oligopolistic competition"

(Reed 2002:199). More importantly, resource extraction industries have relocated their operations from developed to developing countries, targeting the places where marginalized segments of the populations

5 Resource extraction in various geographical sites has characterized early historical epochs such as the copper age, the bronze age and the iron age. Historically, resource extraction has provided the basis for the three industrial revolutions that have led to the modern economies of the developed world (Reed 2002:199).

18 often reside on. Indeed, the last few decades have witnessed a marked increase in projects such as the construction of dams, industrial zones, transportation routes, commercial forests, and oil and mining exploration, which have uprooted millions of women, men and children from their livelihoods (Escobar 2003; Feldman, Geisler and Silberling

2003; Vandergeest, Idahosa and Bose 2007). In a 2002 study, the Center on Housing Rights and Evictions documented the forcible eviction of 4.3 million people in 63 countries as a direct result of development projects between 1998 and 2000. Escobar (2003) states that about two hundred million people have been "compelled by the authorities to move, whether they wanted or not, and, short of resisting, they have effectively had no say in the matter" (Escobar 2003: 157). An increasing number of those displaced by development projects have crossed the national borders of their countries to become refugees while a significant number remain internally displaced within their own countries (ibid).

Furthermore, Robinson (2003) estimated that in the early 1990s, the construction of 300 high dams each year displaced four million people. Meanwhile, urban and transportation infrastructure projects accounted for six million more displaced annually. In fact, within one decade, "at least 80 to 90 million people have been displaced by

19 programs in only two development sectors. The impact of these development-induced displacement projects has been disproportionately felt by the poorest, most marginalized groups, with an even more devastating impact being experienced by women" (Robinson 2003: 10-

11). Yet conventional development-induced displacement frameworks often justify displacement by arguing that it is vital to human development. Cernea, for example, argues that developing societies must balance benefits such as safe water supply, irrigation projects, efficient transportation systems, and oil and mining development with the cost of forced displacement and resettlement. However, he believes that such a balance has not yet been achieved:

Long-term national or regional interests served by

these programs often cut across the interests of

smaller groups, local communities or some

individuals. National interests and needs usually

prevail. Conflicts emerge because the gains

expected from these projects in the long term

impose hard-to-bear losses in the short-term. As

one resettler in India summarized it, 'for their

20 tomorrow we are giving up our today' (Cernea and

McDowell 2000:28).

Indeed, the cost-benefit methodology is problematic because the

"short-term" costs experienced by women, men and children do not tend to be compensated by the "long-term benefits". I believe one of the lessons that was not learned from Western models of development imposed on countries of the South in the 1970s and 1980s was that the development of the Vulnerable groups', particularly women, cannot be sustained in the "long-term" unless such development is solidly integrated into a country's short and long term policies.

In Sudan, development projects have historically resulted in the forcible displacement of communities. For instance, the construction of the in 1964 in the northern part of Sudan resulted in the displacement of large communities of Nubians who were resettled through the New Haifa irrigation scheme. Both Nubian men and women, who were forcibly evicted from their villages along the to clear the area for the Aswan Dam, became impoverished (Kebbede 1999:103).

Many communities, particularly in Africa, Asia and Latin America, are forced to leave their land for the purpose of development. For instance, in examining mining-induced displacement alone, it is

21 estimated that between 1950 and 1990, mining displaced 2.55 million people in India; the Freeport mine in Indonesia displaced 15,000 people; the Tarkwa mine in Ghana displaced 20,000-30,000; mining in South

Africa displaced 37,000 over five years. Also millions of peoples were displaced as a result of mining exploration and development in Papua

New Guinea, the Philippines, Peru, Venezuela, Suriname, Guyana,

Argentina, Chile, Honduras, Tanzania, Botswana, and Namibia

(Vandergeest, Idahosa and Bose 2007:12-20).

In her study of development induced-displacement in the Naya and

Yurumangi river communities of the Colombian Pacific, Gruner (2007) illustrates the direct relationship between violence, displacement and development. She argues that violence has been used as a method to displace indigenous Colombian groups in order to gain access to their strategic territories and resources. As a result, approximately 17,000 indigenous, Afro-descendents, and peasants have lived under the threat of continued displacement since 2001 (Gruner 2007).

Colombia constitutes one of those cases where conflict and development connect to produce militarized patterns of displacement.

Likewise, in Sudan oil-displacement is linked to militarization and war and has had a horrific impact on the Dinka and Nuer. Harker (2000),

22 Idahosa (2002) and Macklin (2004), illustrate that the patterns of scorched earth6 displacement policies in Sudan since the discovery of oil in 1983, have been extremely violent and chaotic, resulting in the death of approximately two million southern Sudanese and the displacement of four million people (Idahosa 2003: 231; Macklin 2004:77). Furthermore,

Macklin points to the violent and disorderly nature of oil displacement in by arguing that "given the context of civil war, securing an oil field operated by and for the northern government of Sudan (and its international partners) in a region that belongs to southern Sudan means controlling, killing, or displacing the civilian population" (Macklin

2004:100). Militarized patterns of oil displacement have exacerbated human insecurity in Sudan.

Similarly, Harker (2000) emphasizes the link between oil development, militarized displacement and human insecurity by stating

6 A scorched earth policy is defined as a military tactic, which involves "destroying anything that might be useful to the enemy while advancing through or withdrawing from an area" (Human Rights Watch 2003a: 251). In the oil field territories in Southern Sudan, the Government of Sudan (GOS) implemented scorched earth policies since the 1980s that included the burning of villages and shelters, as well as the destruction of transportation, communications, cattle and agricultural resources. These scorched earth policies resulted in massive displacement of the Dinka and Nuer communities from their territories in southern Sudan to countries such as Kenya and Uganda in order to clear land for oil exploration and production (ibid).

23 that oil extraction has exacerbated the armed conflict in Sudan in several ways: first, concerns about oil field security were causally connected to forcible displacement, pacification, and human insecurity in the Western

Upper Nile; second, oil activity intensified interethnic conflict within the south, as well as combat between the north and the south for control over rich southern territories; third, resource development has generated infra-structural development (e.g., roads and airstrips) that supported the government of Sudan in its prolongation of the war against the south

(Harker 2000:64).

Instead of enhancing human well-being in Sudan, oil development policies have constituted the basis for war and militarized displacement.

For example, members of the Dinka and Nuer communities, especially women, have been severely affected, losing their lives, their homes, and the sources of income that previously provided them with socio-economic security. Oil-induced displacement has dismantled traditional modes of subsistence production practiced by the Dinka and Nuer communities causing the impoverishment of the displaced. Furthermore, violent and chaotic processes of displacement have disrupted social networks and threatened Dinka and Nuer cultural identity (El Jack 2007).

24 Ultimately, the complex consequences of forced displacement caused by development projects have not been properly assessed because of a lack of accountability, transparency, and negotiation with those being displaced and the absence of civil society participation in project planning. Cernea (2000) does not consider whose choices and decisions should be given priority, whether it should be the funding organizations, the national governments, or the people of the local communities who decide whether the costs of a project outweigh its benefits.

In the context of Colombia, Escobar (2003) argues that development-induced displacement projects are shaped by mainstream

'top down' models of planning and implementation. This is illustrated by the fact that institutions such as the World Bank, which formulate the framework of such projects, are the same interest groups entrusted to evaluate the consequences of development-induced displacement. Such contradictory positions compromise any attempts at mitigating its impoverishment consequences.

In the World Bank series entitled "Directions in Development,"

Cernea (2000) proposes an Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction

(IRR) model as a substitute for the classic cost-benefit analysis. This

25 conceptual construct of impoverishment claims to predict and/or reverse the impoverishment process resulting from various forms of forced displacement and resettlement. The IRR model identifies eight main steps necessary to reverse the consequences of involuntary displacement and relocation. These steps identify an advancement from landlessness to land-based establishment; from joblessness to re-employment; from homelessness to house reconstruction; from marginalization to social inclusion; from food insecurity to adequate nutrition; from increased morbidity and mortality to better heath care; from expropriation to restoration of community assets and services; and from community disarticulation to community reconstruction (Cernea 1996:22).

McDowell (1996) argues that the IRR model creates the perception that impoverishment resulting from development-induced displacement is inevitable (McDowell 1996:22). Although the IRR model proposes ways to predict and/or prevent impoverishment resulting from development- induced displacement and resettlement, some of the projects that were guided by it have failed to reverse the negative consequences of development-induced displacement. Furthermore, the IRR model is gender insensitive; that is to say, it does not address how gendered relations of power affect women and men differently because women in

26 many parts of the world do not have equal access to power and resources, particularly to land, credit and employment opportunities.

This unequal access to power and resources leads to gender specific insecurities in the context of development-induced displacement.

Penz (2006) addresses the need for normative7 evaluations of development-induced displacement. He challenges and articulates the moral values involved in the justification of development-induced displacement theories and practices. Such a normative approach is significant because it problematizes notions of both development and displacement by questioning what constitutes 'acceptable' and/or

'unacceptable' development practices, and by placing the question of

Svho gets to chose' at the center of the displacement debate.

Although this normative framework of development-induced displacement constitutes an improvement over the IRR model, its shortcoming lies in its ambiguity about what constitutes "good" and

"bad" development practices, as well as its gender neutrality. Penz argues that the perception of 'harm' of those adversely affected by such development projects should be integral to the normative planning and

7 Peter Penz uses the term normative to refer to what he calls "good development". This opens the door to a number of complex ethical questions about "good" as opposed to "bad" development.

27 evaluation of development goals. However, women and marginalized groups of men, who are both more severely impacted by development- induced displacement than others, are most often excluded from the decision-making and negotiation process concerning such projects.

While Cragg (1999), Drydyk (2000) and Penz (2006) argue that normative approaches emphasize the importance of consultation, open negotiation and ongoing public participation in the management of development projects, the question of how to ensure such forms of participation remains unanswered. Many countries where development- induced displacement occurs lack the mechanisms to ensure appropriate, fair assessments of displacement conditions, intervention on behalf of the displaced, and the involvement of women and men in the political decision-making and the planning of these projects. While some development-induced displacement programs are monitored according to national and international guidelines, most of those occurring in zones of conflict and under authoritarian regimes tend not to be strictly monitored and have, therefore, led to mass impoverishment and human rights violations.

Proponents of mainstream frameworks of development-induced displacement such as Cernea (2000) attempt to mitigate the negative

28 socio-economic consequences of displacement which include: landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, food insecurity, higher mortality rates, loss of access to common property resources, and community disarticulation. Idahosa (2002) argues that such frameworks overlook the significant socio-cultural costs of development-induced displacement: first, the devastation of complex systems of social integration involving participation in networks of social relations and kinship ties; and second, the destruction of reciprocity arrangements embedded within complex trading and welfare systems within and across ethnic groups. Indeed proponents of mainstream approaches also omit the psychological and social damage done to those who lose their sense of place and identity.

To reiterate, the literature on development-induced displacement seeks to address and mitigate the negative consequences of displacement induced by development projects such as dams, industrial zones, transportation routes, commercial forests, and oil and mining exploration, which forcibly displace millions of women, men and children from their livelihoods. A principal flaw of the literature on development- induced displacement is that it remains gender insensitive. Nevertheless, the emerging feminist contributions (Lund and Lie 2005; Zalik 2004) to

29 development-induced displacement approaches enhance our understanding of how the processes of change and disruption open up spaces to readdress previously accepted oppressive power relations.

The next section examines feminist visions of development, outlines a shift in development discourses and discusses alternative approaches to mainstream development theories. Feminist visions of development are significant because they attempt to recover voices of the marginalized, the oppressed and the dominated, through gender sensitive reconstructions of development. They challenge the notion of a single path to development and provide instead, complex and diverse understandings of human development.

iii) Feminist Development Perspectives

Since the 1980s, feminist scholarship has contested the concept of development and made unequal gender relations a central concern of the development debate (Elson 1994; Jackson and Pearson 1998; Kabeer

1994; Kandiyoti 1998; Scott 1989; Sen and Grown 1987; Young 1988).

Feminist visions of development have challenged women's subordination by recognizing the male-biased nature of mainstream development theories and institutional practices (Elson 1998; Moser 1989). Feminist

30 definitions of development are conceptually distinct from definitions of development held by other development theorists such as Hunt (1996) and

McMichael (2000). For instance, Sen and Grown (1987) challenge gender insensitive assumptions of development by defining development as

Socially responsible management and use of

resources, the elimination of gender

subordination and social inequality ... the

empowerment of women, and the progressive

changes in public-private relations to benefit

women (Sen and Grown 1987: 2).

Feminist development perspectives (Elson 1994; Jackson and

Pearson 1998; Kabeer 1994; Kandiyoti 1998) stress that development processes have systematically privileged men over women through unequal access to resources and power. They challenge the male dominated processes of mainstream development theories and institutional practices. They argue that inequalities are entrenched in institutional discrimination against women at the "conscious level" and through "unconscious perceptions" (Elson 1994: 1-8). More specifically,

Elson (1994) emphasizes that concepts such as 'male bias' are fundamental to women's experiences of development. She argues that

31 development theorists typically view the household as a place of homogeneous interests where resources are shared equally by women and men. However, women face distinct vulnerabilities within their households and in their communities. She further stresses that gender relations are reduced to invisibility by the application and use of theoretical categories, such as "household", a concept that can be used to effectively normalize bias, so that gender relations, and the conflicts within them are reduced to invisibility. Similarly, Moser (1989) employs the concept of women's invisibility to identify the many ways in which the results of labor and the efforts invested in the production of commodities remain unrecognized. She points to the lack of recognition of women's roles in the processes of social reproduction when livelihoods are lost due to development projects.

• From Women in Development to Gender and Development

Feminist theories on development began with a focus on Women in

Development (WID) in the early 1970s, with the aim of integrating women into development processes involving "economic, political, and social growth and change" (Jackson and Pearson 1998: 2). Feminists analyzing the WID approach argue that WID specialists relied on neoclassical

32 economic-growth models to achieve the goals of development (Barriteau

2003). However, they failed to examine whether the concept of economic efficiency may be premised on excluding the specific gendered constraints women encounter in their productive and reproductive capacities. Kabeer (1994) states that in the late 1970s, this focus shifted to a Women and Development (WAD) approach, which, rather than adding women into problematic development paradigms, emphasized the specific "relationship between women and development processes" (ibid).

Then, in the 1980s, a Gender and Development (GAD) strategy began to articulate and challenge both the social construction of gender roles and women's subordination (Sen and Grown 1987). The main aim of GAD policy has been to transform the position of women from one of subordination to one of equality (Barriteau 2003).

While the mainstreaming of gender perspectives into development theories and institutional practices has often led to an increasing awareness of women's needs by multinational corporations and INGOs, and to investment in services such as education, health and income generating activities, it has, on the other hand, failed to confront the ideological basis of discrimination. In the context of Sudan, although displaced Sudanese women in countries such as Kenya and Uganda have

33 been given priority for training by the Development

Program (UNDP) or by NGOs such as OXFAM, there are still some forms of gender inequality that remain unchanged. Despite initial attempts to do so, such institutions maintain entrenched in hierarchical gender differences.

Indeed, gender mainstreaming has mainly responded to women's practical interests arising from their placement within the sexual division of labour. As Molyneux (1985) states, women's strategic' interests, which require transforming "social relations in order to enhance women's position and to secure a more lasting re-positioning of women within the gender order and within the society at large" remain underemphasized

(1985: 232). In this regard, the distinction between 'practical and strategic' gender interests is significant to my dissertation. This is mainly because such a distinction reveals the tension between development policies and projects that end up reinforcing gender inequalities because they lack a "strategic" focus and those that recognize women's practical needs as simply a starting point from which to challenge and strategically transform patriarchal relationships of power. Therefore, perspectives such as Pearson and Jackson (1998) are significant to my argument because they demand

34 better analytical and conceptual tools for the

development of a theory of social relations which

would encompass not only the so-called economic

relations of society but what have also been called

the relations of everyday life (Pearson and

Jackson 1998: 1).

Such an analysis also contributes to my dissertation not only because it points to the institutional structures of subordination, but also to the need for agency and to the appropriate resources and institutions required to transform women's position within a structurally unequal set of social relations. For instance, Marilyn Thomson (2002) examines the social construction of gender by specifically identifying best practices and approaches to transform gender insensitive perceptions among children and young people in countries such as Angola, Rwanda,

Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Colombia, Liberia, Peru and the UK. She challenges the perception that "boys will always be boys" by showing that boys' masculine identities, while constructed in social and cultural contexts, are more importantly constructed through education, media, family and peer groups that can stimulate an awareness of different gender issues among children and young adults. This study is significant

35 because it stresses that in order to transform unequal relationships of power, gender sensitive frameworks that aim at empowering girls and women, should also focus on male gendered identities and address the negative aspects of male socialization.

As Jackson and Pearson (1998); Munck (1999); Kabeer (1994);

Kandiyoti (1998); Scott (1989); Young (1988) argue, feminist approaches to development are not simply about deconstructing male-dominated mainstream development theories. Rather, they provide a more comprehensive perspective of constructing a conceptual framework that addresses complex and shifting gender relations.

Feminist perspectives have had a considerable impact on gendered approaches within development studies. They have demonstrated *why women are important, and why gender is an indispensable concept in the analysis of political cultural movements, of transition, and of social change' (Moghadam, 1994: 17). Studies on indigenous cultures, traditions, practices and prevailing knowledge by feminist scholars and activists in the North and the South have contributed to gender sensitive theories of human development (Amadiume, 2000: 176). They have produced a home-grown understanding of development based on

36 relevant and empowering ideas generated by indigenous cultures and daily survival strategies.

Drawing on fieldwork data in Malaysia and China, Lund and Lie

(2005) examine the gender dimensions of global development projects.

Their study shows how women and men strategize to accommodate social and economic changes as a result of the adverse impacts of development projects. They demonstrate how gendered responses as a creative force increase women's options for challenging and transforming oppressive gender roles and relationships.

Similarly, Frances (2002) explores the gendered impact of development-induced displacement policies and practices by examining concepts such as gender relations and masculinities in situations of violent armed conflict. Drawing on research in northern Uganda, the book examines the intersection of gender relations with race and class, and how masculinities collapse when men are stripped of their breadwinner status as a result of displacement.

Informed by such literature, my dissertation seeks to problematize the relationships of power in Sudan by articulating gender as a lens through which to understand the dynamics of social and economic change. Planning for development is often viewed strictly as a function of

37 economics, social or political change. However, as Sen (1994) might say, development could also be conceptualized as an enhancement of human well-being which integrates cultural rights, the absence of gendered violence, and securing livelihoods under changing, volatile circumstances. My focus during this period of conflict and transformation in Sudan concerns the renegotiation of gender and gender relations within ongoing processes of change at local and global levels and the ways these processes have radically transformed entrenched forms of inequality.

• Agency and Transformation

The problematic nature of development is manifest in the way that dominant paradigms of human development overlook the complexity of the structural relationships within which agency and resistance take place. In the context of South Asia, Mukherjee Reed describes the story of Mukhtar Mai who was gang-raped near her home in Pakistan.

Mukhtar's rape was ordered by her local tribal counsel as a punishment for a crime allegedly committed by her younger brother. She fought back against her attackers in the courts, and won a financial settlement, which she used to open an elementary school in her village to influence

38 the education and empowerment of girls and young women in Pakistan.

Mukherjee Reed states,

... a struggle which begins as an isolated struggle

of one victimized person, might well lay the

groundwork for a collective endeavor spanning an

entire spectrum of social institutions from the

family to the state and beyond. Many of the well-

known successes of human development reveal

exactly this kind of complexity (Mukherjee Reed

2008: 218).

The analysis of agency within development theories tends to prioritize the enhancement of individual well-being. This analysis often sees actions taken by agents such as the state, international humanitarian organizations and civil society groups as leading directly to the development of human capability and therefore agency. For instance, the

UN Secretary General states at the Millennium Summit: "the poor, the vulnerable, those trampled by conflict or suffering under tyranny and discrimination — all are waiting for us to act" (United Nations 2002:20).

While it is true that transforming oppressive power relations may require the above mentioned agents to effect change, change also happens through

39 resistance, mobilization and organization at the household, family, community and grass-roots levels. For instance, the decision by the Dinka and Nuer women to open or attend schools in refugee camps and cities in

Kenya and Uganda is an engagement in a struggle, a confrontation with power relations and a reconfiguration and transformation of social relations at both the individual and structural levels.

To reiterate, in this section on approaches to development, I have examined the shifts in development discourses and discussed alternative approaches to mainstream development theories. I have focused on feminist perspectives of development because they challenge the notion of a single path to development and provide instead a complex and diverse understanding of human development. Feminist perspectives suggest that, "development policies cannot succeed if they are not engendered" in a way that counts women and appropriately considers their needs (Young 1988: 98). These critiques of development have been significant in influencing international development theories and praxes.

International institutions and agencies have committed to assisting women in developing regions, and their programs and funding have to some extent helped women. However, they have operated within the

40 paradigm of development as modernization and therefore overlook the contradictions embedded in this model and their implications for women.

Feminist perspectives of development, in contrast, have analyzed and conceptualized how existing models of development are detrimental to women, and they have therefore explored and implemented alternative development discourses and models.

Mapping Refugee and Forced Migration Perspectives:

The literature on forced migration predominately focuses on migration patterns induced by armed conflict; it does not articulate the link between conflict and development. In reviewing forced migration perspectives in this section, I seek to understand and collapse the apparent distinction between political violence and development as driving forces of forced migration. I also explore the gendered implications of how elements of both conflict and development converge in Sudan to produce gendered and militarized patterns of displacement.

Furthermore, this section examines the literature on the international refugee system; the predicaments of the international humanitarian system; and the literature on gendered relations of displacement. An examination of this literature is significant to my

41 dissertation because research on refugees often draws on concepts of loss, stress and trauma to depict the refugees as traumatized, victimized, as well as threats to national/regional security (Crisp 2003; Jamal 2000;

Merkx 2000). However, as Harrell-Bond (1999) argues, "the emphasis on the perception of refugees as weak, dependent and deficient has serious consequences" because it reinforces simplistic images of refugees as passive, vulnerable, and powerless and therefore overlooks the complex gendered, socio-economic and political relations of their displacement

(Harrell-Bond 1999:150).

i) The International Refugee System

Historically, the international refugee regime has emerged to address global and local refugee patterns caused by wars. Indeed, the

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was established after the Second World War to respond to violence experienced by millions of Europeans as a result of the war (UNHCR

2003). Zetter (1999) states that articles 1, 55, and 56 of the United

Nations Charter provide political and legal frameworks for the protection of 'refugees', 'displaced persons', and other Vulnerable groups' (Zetter

42 1999: 55-56). This led to the birth of the 1951 Convention Relating to the

Status of Refugees. The Convention states that a refugee is a person who

... as a result of events occurring before 1

January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of

being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,

nationality, membership of a particular social

group or political opinion, is outside the country

of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such

fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection

of that country; or who, not having a nationality

and being outside the country of his former

habitual residence as a result of such events, is

unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to

return to it (UNHCR 1995:115).

The definition of refugees is indeed limited because it does not address how unequal gender roles and relationships influence women and men's forced migration experiences. Such a definition of refugees was informed by ideological debates of post-war European politics. Betts

(2006) states that the 1951 Convention was designed to apply to refugees in Europe displaced by historic threats of Holocaust and Communism.

43 Although about 125 states are currently party to the Convention, it remains both explicitly and implicitly Eurocentric and limited because it does not reflect the reality of many refugees who are forced to flee their homelands on grounds that are not comprehensively articulated in the

Convention (Betts 2006).

The 1951 Convention advocates a hierarchy of rights. Deng argues that "Unlike the victims of civil and political oppression, ... persons denied even such basic rights as food, health care, or education are excluded from the international refugee regime (unless that deprivation stems from civil or political status" (Deng 1995: 74-75). The protection of political and civil rights is clearly privileged over economic, cultural, and social rights. This means that communities that are impacted and displaced by development projects, natural disasters and related economic and social crises are excluded from the protection of the international refugee system as defined above. This raises the question of how a Convention established in 1951 responds to the concerns of non-

Europeans who continue to be forcibly displaced fifty-five years later.

In response to the perceived inadequacies of the 1951 Convention, the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees amended the

Convention. The Protocol created equal access for all member nations to

44 define individual civil and political rights. Loescher (2001) states that the

1967 Protocol expanded the refugee definition, however, the geo-political landscape on which the basic premises of asylum were founded remained geographically exclusive and Eurocentric.

In 1969 the Organization for African Unity (OAU) added a legally binding provision to the Convention. Despite its gender insensitivity and limitations, the OAU version is useful to my study because it articulates various aspects specific to African refugee dilemmas. While the OAU includes the 1951 Convention definition, it emphasizes that

the term refugee shall also apply to every person

who, owing to external aggression, occupation,

foreign domination or events seriously disturbing

public order in either part or the whole of his [her]

country or origin or nationality, is compelled to

leave his place of habitual residence in order to

seek refuge in another place outside his country

of origin or nationality (OAU: Article 1.2).

The OAU definition constitutes a departure from the 1951

Convention. It has been instrumental in responding to the socio­ economic and political realities of many African countries and in some

45 ways has been significant to my examination of the Dinka and Nuer experiences of oil-induced displacement in Sudan.

In 2006, over fifty percent of the global refugee population, who fall under the 1951 Convention, have been confined in long-term refugee situations for extended periods of time (Campbell 2006:26). As Crisp

(2003) argues, the phenomenon of 'protracted refugee situations', which describes conditions where refugees have been confined to camps for five years or more, is extremely problematic. Indeed, protracted sites such as the Kakuma Refugee Camp in Kenya and Rhino Refugee Camp in

Uganda where some of my research participants have resided for over ten years, raise the question as to how and why protracted refugee camps have persisted for so long? As I articulate in Chapter Five, the implications of refugees' 'encampment' for prolonged periods of time with limited opportunities to re-establish livelihoods is devastating.

Although long-term camps offer needed emergency protection to refugees, in the long run, they often undermine refugees' freedoms and productivity. Jamal further argues that protracted refugee situations are

"neither natural nor inevitable consequences of involuntary population flows" (2003:11); rather, they are caused by political actions in the country of asylum, as well as by fear of persecution or violence in the

46 homeland. Since most of the host countries in Africa are poor, often insecure, and mistrustful of external commitment to shared responsibility for refugee protection, they tend to view refugee camps as a means of isolating potential troublemakers and forcing the international community to assume responsibility for them. Many of these host governments lack the capacity to ensure that refugees have the necessary physical and economic and human security to lead productive lives.

Chen (2004) refers to long-term refugee camps as 'warehousing,'8 and a violation of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of

Refugees. He argues that this kind of confinement is "degrading, immoral and a waste of human potential" (Chen 2004:40). He stresses that since the enactment of the Convention, more that two-thirds of the refugees in the world have been denied the basic human rights granted by the

Convention, including the right to earn a livelihood, access education, the freedom to move about or the right to seek justice when wronged

(ibid). Since refugees do have rights starting from the moment of their

8 Chen (2004) defines the concept of refugee warehousing as the process of confining refugees in camps for a long period of time.

47 flight, the exercise of these rights should not be postponed while the international community searches for more permanent solutions.

As Van Hear (2006) argues, given the increasing costs associated with the process of escaping conflicts, migrants' socio-economic backgrounds, determined by their access to resources, shape the forms, patterns and effects of their displacement (Van Hear 2006:125). However, it is equally important to emphasize that gender relations and inequalities, as well as age, religion and ethnicity influence decisions determining who migrates and why.

To reiterate, most of the 'refugee literature' I refer to above has tended to focus on evaluating the effectiveness of UN and donor agencies' responses to protect and assist refugees. While this literature engages in country or region specific research, as well as thematic examinations of refugee situations, it also emphasizes a macro-level analysis of the refugee situation. In many ways, the literature is very descriptive, policy- oriented and gender insensitive.

48 ii) Predicaments of the International Humanitarian System

Forced migration literature by authors such as Horst (2006), Indra

(1999) and Harrell-Bond (1986) point to the dilemmas of humanitarian assistance in the international refugee system. Barbara Harrell-Bond's

(1986) pioneering independent study of emergency assistance programs examines Ugandan refugees in southern Sudan (ibid). Though her research findings are specific to Uganda/Sudan, she raises critical questions for other regions concerning the role of short-term emergency aid in contrast to sustainable development oriented programs.

Adelman and Sorenson (1994) explore the role of the international community in managing long-term refugee camps internationally and criticize the politicized nature of . They further address the inadequacy of the UNHCR in dealing with the perpetuation of long- term refugee camps in various zones of conflict, and its failure to provide urgent forms of development aid. They compare the seemingly successful long-term integration of Rwandans in western Tanzania with the failed resettlement in southern Uganda in the 1990s, emphasizing the severe consequences of forcible "voluntary repatriation".

Also, drawing from the examples of Rwandan refugees in Zaire and

Tanzania in mid-1990s, Loescher (2001) examines the tension that exists

49 between the moral principles and pragmatic realities of the UNHCR performance regarding human rights, conflict resolution, preventive diplomacy, and the delivery of humanitarian assistance. A specific aspect of this debate focuses on the tension between the UNHCR as a defender of refugees and the demands of those governments that provide the financial resources and often the solutions to various refugee crises. The millions of refugees existing in long-term refugee camps in various zones of conflict since the 1990s indicate that the protection of human rights has often been sacrificed.

Payne (1998) examines the conditions of Sudanese refugees in

Northern Uganda. She argues that despite the devastating impact of war, violence and displacement, the Sudanese experiences of exile reveal an extraordinary ability to make use of available limited opportunities. The study evaluates the effectiveness, as well as the shortcomings of the

OXFAM program to rebuild Sudanese communities in refugee situations.

This study contributes to my understanding of the role of agency among

Dinka, Nuer and other groups of southern Sudanese in the unstable and rapidly shifting refugee dynamics in Uganda.

In contrast to militarized patterns of displacement across the

Kenyan and Ugandan boarders, Abusharaf (2002) engages in a

50 qualitative study of the migratory experiences of the Sudanese in North

America. She argues that a national Sudanese identity and bonding emerge more strongly among North American immigrants than among

Sudanese at home. Her study contrasts previous patterns of northern

Sudanese migration to oil-rich Arab countries including Kuwait, Iraq,

Saudi Arabia, , and Qatar with contemporary modes of both their forced and voluntary migration to North America. This study is useful to my dissertation because it articulates how Sudanese refugees and immigrants have experienced displacement and reconstituted social relations across time and space.

iii) Gendered Relations of Displacement

Feminists such as Doreen Indra have been instrumental in calling for greater "cross-fertilization" between feminist social analysis and refugee studies. As Indra argued, sometime ago:

a genderless stereotype of the refugee made

possible in part by the isolation of refugee women

from bureaucratic decision-making and policy

formulation structures severely marginalized

concerns, which were restricted to a few women's

51 issues such as protection, adequately feeding

children and the like (Indra 1989:222)

Feminists contend that while all refugees undergo the same process of forced migration, women refugees' experiences differ from those of men. For instance, Horst (2006) stresses that being a refugee is experienced differently by women and men. The socially and culturally constructed roles for women and men influence the way they experience the trauma of being a refugee.

Colson (1999) argues that both men and women experience disadvantages within their household and communities due to the disintegration of extended families, kinship and support systems, and the undermining of traditional modes of livelihood. For instance, refugee men who fail to meet their 'breadwinner' status may react to these changes with depression, alcoholism and a breakdown in physical and in psychological health, all of which can lead to a loss of self-esteem and marginalization.

Jok (1999) examines the impact of armed conflict on gender and reproductive health among internally displaced Dinka and Nuer women.

His study elaborates on women' responses to gender differentials that impact their health and well-being during armed conflict and instability

52 (Jok 1999: 427). His work also examines how women organize to challenge and change the oppressive structures that violate them.

Giles and Hyndman (2004a) argue that incidents of 'everyday' violence, particularly domestic violence, increase as communities break down during and after displacement. Moreover, 'everyday' violence escalates in sites of masculine and militarized conflict. Cockburn (2004) also argues that displacement exacerbates gender-based violence, notably physical, sexualized and emotional violence against women in public and private spheres. She states that the "female body processes such as menstruation, gestation, parturition, lactation become more burdensome, uncomfortable and dangerous" (Cockburn 2004:39).

Moreover, many refugee women, particularly in protracted situations, lack access to health services, education and means to earn a livelihood and, therefore, experience severe disadvantages. Girls and boys must often assume many responsibilities within camps and households, caring for younger siblings, the elderly and the sick. This shift of gendered and age related responsibilities and roles exposes the future generation to new gender manoeuvring.

However, not all women suffer because of the refugee experience.

El Bushra (2000) argues that demographic imbalance due to higher rates

53 of male death and family splits as a result of the armed conflict and displacement processes often lead to more women becoming heads of households and thus results in shifts in the gendered division of labor, the creation of new opportunities for women, as well as possibilities for the negotiation of gender roles and relationships. Indeed the absence of male spouses provides some women with greater decision-making power within refugee camps, households and communities.

As well, El-Bushra (ibid) examines gender negotiations and changes in relations of power as a result of armed conflict in Rwanda,

Somalia and Uganda. She argues that conflict should be understood in relation to both its antecedents and potential outcomes, and stresses that

Conflict appears as an unusually dramatic form

of an ever-present social change, and adaptation

to an evolving global environment. It may be

understood as the disintegration of social

relations, while also heralding opportunities for

reconstruction and assertion of new values. It

may or may not, provide a window of opportunity

through which marginalized and powerless

54 groups find ways to exert influence over the shape

of the world they live in (El-Bushra 2000: 6-7).

In some instances, migration may entrench traditional gender roles that discriminate against women. For example, Babiker (2002) reveals how women's oppression and segregation have been reinforced by the migration of their spouses from villages in Pakistan to Saudi Arabia.

Upon return, some of the male spouses imposed the stricter Islamic dress codes (purdah) that they had observed in Saudi Arabia on their wives. As a result, and in contrast to the situation before migration, some of these wives in Pakistan experience stricter gender roles within their families.

In contrast, de Alwis and Hyndman (2002) examine how some women benefit from the shifts in gender roles as a result of displacement that was caused by the armed conflict in Sri Lanka. They point to the benefits experienced by some women who have been given priority for training and access to development programs in health and education, as well as income-generating activities by OXFAM-GB. They argue that the skills provided to Sri Lankan women have enabled them to assume new roles within their households and communities (de Alwis & Hyndman

2002:12). Some of the indicated changes in gender roles and

55 responsibilities represent a move away from conservative 'masculine' and

'feminine' roles. However, de Alwis and Hyndman state that stereotypical and gender insensitive values continue to inform the development processes and institutional practices of organizations such as OXFAM

(ibid).

Similarly, Byrne (1995) examines how displaced Sri Lankan

Muslim women in the oil-rich Gulf States have, as a result of war, been able to make use of their distinct experiences to negotiate gender roles within their households and families. Byrne argues that some of these women have been 'empowered' by taking on labor participation in a new country. Further, they have gained new skills and employment opportunities. As a result, some of these women exercise greater decision-making power.

The literature reviewed above is significant to my study because it illustrates how displacement provides a space where women and men find ways to negotiate new gender relationships that can shape their daily lives. It is true that such changes may expose women and men to new vulnerabilities, but change also provides new opportunities to challenge traditional gender roles and can significantly transform oppressive power relationships.

56 In Conclusion: Gendering Development, Conflict & Displacement - Theoretical Frameworks

The literature reviewed in this chapter has addressed the complex interplay between violent armed conflicts on the one hand and militarized patterns of displacement caused by oil development in Sudan on the other hand. My study seeks to contribute to bridging the gap between these two sets of literature. My goal is to provide a context within and through which to understand how the convergence of conflict and development produces gendered relationships of displacement. This context also opens the space for understanding the transformation of relationships of power, particularly pertaining to gender relations.

As well, much of the literature that I have discussed pertaining to international refugee systems is premised on the understanding that people and cultures are rooted in certain places (Crisp 2002; Zetter

1999). Therefore, being displaced is often equated with being uprooted, uncultured and victimized. These perceptions that 'normal life' can only be restored when refugees return to their roots, to their places of origin, inform the UNHCR, as well as international refugee policies (Lund and

Lie 2005). These policies assume a powerlessness and victimization of

57 refugees, overlooking the fact that experiences of forced migration point to struggles for recovery, and to agency rather than passivity.

I argue that my research participants have been violently displaced to economically, socially, politically and culturally new and different settings. This has posed specific disadvantages, but at the same time has opened normative, ideological and socio-economic spaces for vigorous challenges to oppressive relationships of power. More importantly, it has made visible the changing nature of gender relationships among the

Dinka and Nuer. These changes have led to forms of inter-generational negotiations, autonomy and transformation.

Since gender is a "key relational dimension of human activity",

(Indra 1999:2-3), I articulate gender as a shifting social construct rather than simply an account of women's and men's prescribed social function.9 The process of gendering development, conflict and displacement, entails "making the invisible visible, bringing the margin to the center, rendering the trivial important, putting the spotlight on

9 Establishing gender aware contexts in studying development-induced displacement should ensure that gender does not exclude a consideration of other forms of dominations that include race, class, ethnicity, religion and culture.

58 women as competent actors, understanding women as subjects in their own right rather than objects for men" (Reinharz, 1992:248).

If women's experiences have been judged as salient only to the extent that they relate to men's experiences, then it is important to pose questions that relate specifically to women's experiences. This is not exclusive of their relationship to men since in order to understand how differences and boundaries are constructed, we have to concretely create appropriate cultural understandings of development-induced displacement processes by re-locating women and men through a

'relational understanding' that identifies their often mutually re-enforcing and dependent links to each other.

Gendering development, conflict and displacement stresses that gender differences have been embedded in social relations and constituted through other forms of differences, notably ethnicity, class, religion and language. Therefore, uncovering gender differences in the

Sudanese context leads to an understanding of power relations in the society and exposes the contradictions and injustices inherent in those relations.

To understand and deconstruct the gender, racial and ethnic identities that have previously been taken for granted, I engage with

59 historical construction theory. This approach is significant in questioning the conventional view that some social categories are natural and essential. Using the standpoint of the interviewed Dinka and Nuer women and men, my dissertation challenges essentialized views of poor and extremely exploited people as powerless, and instead describe their ability to mobilize and use limited opportunities to improve their lives.

I am particularly interested in testing an actor-oriented conceptual framework. This framework regards "human beings as active subjects with the capacity to process social experience and invent new ways of coping with life even under extreme coercion" (Lund 2005: 12). Even though the displaced Dinka and Nuer are not fully rooted in either Kenya or Uganda, they continue to struggle to reinvent their identities. Within the limits of their socio-economic contexts, women and men of different age, class and ethnic backgrounds join together to solve the daily challenges facing them, intervene in social events around them, and benefit from the experiences of those surrounding them, notably

Kenyans, Ugandans, and the international humanitarian agencies that host and support them.

In summation, in this chapter, I have articulated my dissertation statement and reviewed the literature on globalization, development-

60 induced displacement, feminist perspectives of development, and the literature on gender relations of displacement. In reflecting on the literature reviewed in this chapter, I have argued that development theory and practice are problematic and have adopted a feminist perspective to interrogate the fundamental contradictions and complications at its core.

Moreover, in this chapter I have problematized the approaches and practices of development-induced displacement. I argued that development-induced displacement theories are not only gender insensitive, they are also problematic because they take displacement for granted by arguing that it is vital to human development (Cernea and

McDowell 2000). The literature on development-induced displacement has then been supplemented by reviewing the perspectives on forced migration. Gender sensitive perspectives on forced migration have

significantly enhanced my study. This is mainly because the literature on the gender relations of displacement explains how social relations get reconstituted through displacement, and further examines its gendered

implications.

Nevertheless, certain gaps still remain in development, conflict and

forced migration literature. For example, macro-level studies of

61 development, conflict and forced migration overlook the historical, cultural, cross-contextual and individual differences among refugees. The reviewed literature outlines how displacement exposes women to new vulnerabilities, but it can also provide new opportunities to improve women's lives and change oppressive gender relations. My dissertation contributes to this literature by revealing how Dinka and Nuer refugees utilize newly acquired knowledge and skills to challenge past narratives of victimization, and to transform oppressive relationships of power that shape their future.

The review and reflection of theoretical frameworks concerning feminist perspectives of development, development-induced displacement and forced migration, sets the stage for my discussion of the fieldwork methods adopted in this dissertation in Chapter Two.

62 Chapter Two Research Methods

Introduction

This dissertation adopts a "standpoint" that the perspectives of those who are excluded or marginalized can lead to a "stronger understanding" of social reality because such groups are less likely to have a stake in maintaining it (Harding 1987: 7-8). The research participant's perceptions of their experiences of conflict, development and displacement are central to this dissertation. Therein, I recover voices of the marginalized, the oppressed and the dominated, through a gender sensitive reconstruction of conflict, development and displacement.

In this chapter, I describe the research methods employed in my dissertation. I raise the central questions that have led to this research, outline the research methods utilized in the fieldwork and provide a fuller description of what these methods are and why they are significant. My research arose from a number of unanswered questions with which I struggled when researching the gender relations of forced migration produced by armed conflict and large-scale development projects in Sudan. I was particularly interested in examining how militarized patterns of displacement transform gender relationships.

63 Research Questions

The research questions that shape my dissertation are as follows:

• What is the relationship between development and displacement in circumstances of extremely volatile armed conflict? • How have Dinka and Nuer women, men and children experienced militarized patterns of displacement in the oilfield territories? Also, how have individual women's and men's lives been distinctly affected by such displacement? • Do women's and men's experiences of displacement differ? • Do gender roles and relationships change from the period prior to displacement? • How do changes in gender roles affect relations between women and men in families, in refugee camps, and in society at large? • In what ways have Sudanese women and men who reside in Nairobi, Kampala, and Kakuma refugee camps responded to displacement? Do their responses include resistance? • How have Dinka and Nuer communities created or recreated social structures and forms of organization when confronting violent, fluid and unpredictable situations? • What kinds of strategies have the interviewees adopted to challenge and transform oppressive social, economic, political and patriarchal relationships of power?

One of the ways I have answered these questions is through an examination of struggle, resistance and change. My fieldwork findings show that increasing numbers of both women and men in Dinka and

Nuer communities are losing their homes, their sources of income and their lives. Women in particular have been severely affected by oil- induced displacement. Nevertheless, oil-induced displacement has offered possibilities for transformation. Displacement can, in fact, lead to

64 significant changes in women's as well as men's roles within the household and the community. These changes offer the potential for re­ evaluating and reconfiguring gender relations of displacement. The period of disruption following development-induced displacement allows women and men to challenge hierarchical ideologies and practices previously taken for granted. My dissertation centres on how possibilities for change during periods of militarized displacement and conflict transform gender relations.

The Fieldwork^

My dissertation sample consists of 60 interviews in total. Between

June and November 2003, I interviewed 40 Dinka and Nuer (20 women,

15 men and 5 children: three girls and two boys) who had been forcibly displaced from the oilfield territories to Nairobi and Kampala. In addition

10 Prior to my Ph.D. fieldwork in 2003, I was engaged in two different research projects where I interviewed Sudanese refugees in the Horn of Africa. The first project was entitled "International Development Ethics and Population Displacement (EDID)," for the Center For Refugee Studies at York University, and the second project was entitled "Engendering Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Horn of Africa," for the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC). This earlier fieldwork helped strengthen my contacts with members of women's groups in Kenya and Uganda, some of who became close friends. These women were a great help in facilitating interviews with refugees and INGO employees for my 2003 Ph.D. fieldwork.

65 to these 40 interviews, five interviews were conducted with Sudanese refugees at the Kakuma Refugee Camp (three women and two boys) between September 8th and 15th, 2001. I decided to include these five earlier interviews in my dissertation because I was not permitted to return to Kakuma Refugee Camp in 2003 due to security threats.11

In addition to the 45 interviews conducted with the Dinka and

Nuer refugees who were displaced from the oilfield territories in southern

Sudan to Kenya and Uganda, I conducted five interviews with oil- companies employees: three were Canadians employed by Talisman

Energy and two were Chinese employed by the Greater Nile Petroleum

Operating Company.12 Furthermore, I conducted 10 interviews with non-

Sudanese who were engaged with International Non Governmental

Organizations (INGOs) in Kenya and Uganda that have provided humanitarian support to Sudanese refugees in these countries. Three of the INGOs officals were from the UNHCR, two were from Oxfam GB, two

11 While I was granted permission from the Kenyan government, as well as the UNHCR to visit Kakuma in July 2003, the UNHCR later cancelled my visit because of intensive fighting between the Sudanese refugees and the Turkana, indigenous Kenyans residing near the camps. This cancellation illustrates the political volatility of such camps. 12 The Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC) administers the main on-stream oil concessions in Sudan which develops oil deposits in the Unity and Heglig oil fields in Southern and Western Sudan.

66 were from the Lutheran World Federation (LWF), two were members of the Sudanese Council of Churches, and one was from UNCIEF.

The choice of Dinka and Nuer participants as the empirical focus of this dissertation was based on: i) Dinka and Nuer refugees constitute a predominant majority of those who have been displaced as a result of oil development in the oilfield territories in southern Sudan; and ii) Dinka and Nuer refugees who I interviewed identified themselves as the sole providers for their families. Therefore, their perspectives are central to my analysis of how displacement leads to transformations in gender values and roles. I aimed to explore the gender relations of displacement by examining how Dinka and Nuer refugees respond to critical changes in their livelihoods due to conflict and displacement and how these have transformed gender relationships of power.

The 45 southern Sudanese research participants were selected through a 'snow ball' sampling method, which was made possible by my established connections13 with Sudanese women's groups in Kenya and

Uganda. The reason I used this method is mainly that "the refugee

13 During my Ph.D. fieldwork, I was affiliated with the Department of Women and Gender Studies at Makerere University in Kampala, Uganda. In Kenya, I was affiliated with the Sudanese Women's Voice for Peace, a grassroots organization I have been connected with since 1994.

67 experience can make women intensely suspicious of institutions, governments, and individuals [researchers] representing these bodies"

(Korac 1998:33). Through my knowledge of feminism and activism in the

Horn of Africa and my previous research in the region, I was able to visit places where displaced women and men were located, to attend social/political events,14 and to go to a market where a few displaced women were selling goods. Meeting displaced women and men in these contexts helped me to gain the trust of many interviewees.

I was unable to interview a larger sample of participants because of security risks. I am currently a Canadian citizen, born in Sudan and my ongoing political activism against the military Islamic government in

Sudan prevents me from conducting interviews in the closely monitored contested oilfield territories. Furthermore, conducting interviews with refugees in camps such as Kakuma was extremely difficult and risky. I first had to get security clearance from the Kenyan government and then the approval of the UNHCR to visit the camp. As a Sudanese national visiting the Kakuma camp, I raised the suspicions of the Kenyan

14 I was in Nairobi on June 20th 2003, the Africa/World Refugee Day, which is celebrated on that day in several countries. There, I was able to meet with refugees from various camps and villages. They were of significant help in introducing me to a wide range of people displaced both by war and oil development.

68 government. They were concerned I may have been associated with either the Sudanese government or the Sudanese People's Liberation

Movement/Army (SPLM/A). After confirming my identity, running background checks, and determining the purpose of my study, I was authorized to spend just one week in Kakuma. Moreover, the restriction on my movement within Kakuma to areas that were directly administered by my host, the Lutheran World Federation (LWF), significantly lessened the number of Dinka and Nuer that I could interview. These constraints prevented me from interviewing more of the many refugees in Kakuma who were willing to be interviewed.

Another problem I confronted is that the UNHCR is suspicious of researchers conducting interviews with refugees in long-term refugee camps such as Kakuma. I believe their reservations about allowing an independent researcher such as myself to conduct interviews in the

Kakuma camp is attributable to their apprehensiveness about having the horrible living conditions within the camp exposed.

Also causing complications, is the fact that although I am a

Sudanese researcher studying the plight of women in my homeland, social differences and unequal power relations such as class, education, religion and geographical location led to the research participants

69 positioning me as an outsider. My own identity as a 'privileged' northern

Muslim academic who is interviewing 'marginalized' southern Christian women and men has influenced the size of the interview sample. For instance, some potential interviewees refused to participate in the study because of my ethnic and religious background. Furthermore, explaining

I was a Sudanese-Canadian led to queries about how Canadian oil companies in Sudan have intensified the interviewees' suffering.

Various other factors have led to the above apprehensiveness.

First, given the political and social context surrounding refugees, trust became an issue. Some of the interviewees feared the stories they shared with me in confidence would be disclosed despite my assurances. Some of the interviewed men in particular did not want their wives to discuss husband-wife relationships and polygamy because these issues are regarded as private in southern Sudan. Second, because they had experienced violent displacement and exile, the interviewees were extremely cautious about who they talked to. Third, another challenge in interviewing refugees who are experiencing hardship is the tendency to focus on discussing the economic problems that impact their daily lives.

My challenge was to balance their concerns with the purpose of my study, as reflected in the questions I asked.

70 Their apprehension was overcome in most cases by my openness in sharing my personal experiences with the participants. In addition, I found that asking broader questions before moving to follow-up questions helped me learn more about the interviewees' experiences.

Finally, encouraging the participants to ask as many questions as they saw fit before shifting the focus to my study helped in establishing acceptance, openness and trust.

Description of the Interviews

My data was collected through intimate in-depth interviews, life histories, observations and questionnaires. After I completed the fieldwork processes, transcribed and coded my data, I placed the research participants into five groups: i) Group One: In-Depth Interviews; ii) Group Two: Feminist Activists; iii) Group Three: Kakuma Refugee

Camp; iv) Group Four: The UNHCR/INGOs; and v) Group Five: Oil

Companies. This categorization has significantly shaped the organization of my dissertation.

71 i) Group One: In-Depth Interviews

Group One consists of 35 research participants who were interviewed between June and November 2003. The interviewees consist of eight Dinka women, seven Dinka men, eight Nuer women, seven Nuer men and five children (three girls and two boys whose ages range from six to eighteen years old). All of the research participants were forcibly displaced from the oilfield territories in southern Sudan. Their stories illustrate how militarized conflict in combination with large-scale oil development impacted their lives. Twenty of these interviews were conducted in Nairobi between June and November and the remaining 15 interviews were conducted in Kampala in July 2003. Most of the interviews took place in the participants' homes while others were conducted in the participants' work places. The duration of each interview was approximately two to three hours. Some of the interviews were conducted more than once. Brief profiles of the 35 participants are located in Appendix B of this dissertation.

The 35 interviews were in-depth, and they mainly comprised semi- structured or open-ended questions. I find this method of interviewing contributed greatly to my research because the open-ended question format generates a variety of responses from the research participants

72 and provides the basis for follow-up questions. More importantly, it allows participants to engage in the interviews and share their personal experiences.

In the interviews, I posed questions addressing a range of topics including what socio-economic conditions were like before the interviewees were displaced, and what perceptions they had of gender roles. I also asked the participants questions about the forcible migration process, for instance, how they experienced it and how it affected their lives. I asked them specifically about the different ways women and men experience displacement. I was particularly keen on inquiring about the gender relations of displacement, particularly how the participants' gender roles and values were changing as a result of conflict and development. I engage in a detailed analysis of the participants' testimonies in Chapters Four, Five and Six of this dissertation.

During these in-depth interviews, I often found myself in dialogue with the interviewees, and on some occasions, I shared my perspectives, as well as my personal experiences of exile in Canada. I was invited to attend one of the cultural events organized by some of the participants in

Kampala in July 2003. I also went to the local market where many of the participants were selling crafts. Meeting with these refugee women and

73 men in these contexts helped me to gain their trust. Connecting with the participants on a personal level opened the space for both formal and informal interactions that have positively influenced me both personally and research-wise.

ii) Group Two: Feminist Activists

Group Two consists of five interviews conducted with women who identify themselves as feminist activists. They are associated with various women's NGOs in Nairobi: two of the activists, for instance, are associated with the Sudanese Women's Association in Nairobi (SWAN), two with the Sudanese Women's Voice for Peace (SWVFP), and one with the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). These organizations represent numerous members of the displaced communities and offer literacy, training and counselling services to women and a few men in the major cities, refugee camps and librated areas of southern Sudan.

I first interviewed these five activists in October 2001 when conducting fieldwork for the EDID project. After transcribing and analyzing the data collected in 2001, I again interviewed them in 2003.

They are among the most prominent, outspoken women in the Horn of

Africa, and internationally. For decades they have engaged in political

74 activism. They have advocated social and political justice, equitable power sharing, the economic development of the south, and unconditional equality for women.

My participatory research, moreover, situated me in dialectical relationship between myself and the activists whom I interviewed. This allowed me to pose questions that examine how women and men respond differently to critical changes to their livelihood. More importantly, it allowed me to consider how these changes can be transformed to form new gender, social and political relationships of power. All of the names used are pseudonyms to retain confidentiality. These names are listed below in alphabetical order:

1. Adut, age 39, is a Dinka woman, activist, who in 1996 was

displaced from southern because her village was in close

proximity to the Heglig oilfields. She crossed the border to Kenya

and lived in Kakuma refugee camp for three years. Adut, who has

a secondary education degree, worked as a government official in

southern Sudan before she was displaced. She is currently

working as a secretary with a women's NGO in Nairobi. She is

divorced with custody of her four children.

75 2. Ana, age 42, is a Nuer women's activist, who in 1997 was displaced

from the Heglig oilfields in southern Kordofan. She crossed the

border to Kenya with her ex-husband and, resided in Kakuma

Refugee Camp for five years. She fought and managed to get a

divorce in 2000. She then moved to Nairobi where I interviewed her

in 2001 and 2003. Ana has a university degree from the University

of Juba in southern Sudan and was a social worker before her

forcible displacement. At the time of the interview, she resided in

Nairobi with her two daughters and worked as a senior staff

member of SWAN.

3. Mama, age 65, is a Dinka women's activist, displaced from her

village in Western in 1982 when oil pipelines were

constructed by Chevron. Mama was internally displaced in Sudan

for over ten years where she worked as a postal clerk. She arrived

in Kampala in 1994 where she knits and sells clothes to support

herself. She is one of the founding members of the Sudanese

Women's Voice for Peace. A widow, she is supporting her two

surviving children.

4. Susan, age 49, is a Nuer women's activist who was displaced from

the Upper Nile provinces in early 1983 following the discovery of

76 oil. She lived in IDP camps in and worked as a domestic.

Widowed, her husband, a SPLM soldier, was killed in the war. She

does not know the whereabouts of her four children or if they are

alive. She crossed the border to Kenya, residing in Kakuma camps

for five years. Currently, she resides in Nairobi. She is an active

member of the SPLM's women's wing.

5. Olivia, age 29, is a Nuer woman who was displaced from the Heglig

region south of Kordofan in 1997. She fled with her son, Aguer, age

11, who was also interviewed and profiled. They crossed the

border to Kenya and lived in Kakuma for five years. Currently

residing in Nairobi, Olivia has a secondary level education and

teaches adult literacy classes at SWAN.

In interviewing these five feminist activists, I used a life history method. I asked these activists questions about the impact displacement had on their lives, particularly how it changed gender roles within their households, communities, and refugee camps. I asked, for example, whether or not it transformed attitudes towards marriage, divorce and custody of children, and polygamy. Some of these questions examined the mandates of their organization, as well as the activities they offer to

77 refugee women and youth. I was particularly interested in examining the role of the UN and NGOs in providing these women's organizations with training and vocational support to improve women's lives. I was also interested in how this support impacted gender dynamics within their households and the community, particularly how men were impacted and how they responded to women's empowerment.

Furthermore, my questions generally focused on identifying new skills and knowledge gained by the activists in exile, and how they used these skills to challenge oppressive gender relationships of power.

Moreover, I examined how women of different class, racial, cultural and geographical backgrounds engage in feminist activism, and how they manage to organize across their differences. I also studied the kinds of strategies they adopted to challenge oppressive power relationships. The perspectives of these feminist activists are vital to this research because these women articulated their perception of development-induced displacement from a feminist perspective and reflected on the various ways it affected their activist and gender ideologies.

78 iii) Group Three: Kakuma Refugee Camp15

Group Three is composed of five interviewees in Kakuma Refugee

Camp. The Camp was established by the UNHCR in north-western Kenya in July 1992 to accommodate 16,000 teenage Sudanese refugees fleeing violence in southern Sudan. There are significant numbers of youth (both boys and girls) heading households in the camp, and they are commonly referred to as Sudan's "lost boys" and "lost girls". In addition, the

Kakuma camp accommodates a diverse population of Sudanese, as well as African refugees from surrounding conflict zones.16 The camp is divided into three Sections: Kakuma One, Two and Three. These sections are then subdivided into various zones. During my fieldwork in 2001, it was estimated that about 75% of the Kakuma refugees were from Sudan

(UNHCR 2002). Most of the Sudanese refugees are from southern Sudan, notably the oil territories of Upper Nile provinces.

15 The Kakuma refugee camp was created by the UNHCR in response to the influx of over 16,000 Sudanese refugees fleeing the armed conflict in southern Sudan in 1992. Since then, the camp has expanded to house about 86,000 refugees from dozens of ethnic groups and from nine countries. 16 Other residents of Kakuma include refugees from Somalia, , , Rwanda, Burundi, , Democratic Republic of Congo, and Uganda.

79 My visit to the Kakuma camp was hosted by the Lutheran World

Federation17 (LWF), one of the INGOs administering humanitarian assistance in the camp. I paid for my airfare, as well as for the food, water and accommodation that the LWF provided in their compound in

Kakuma. I conducted my interviews in Section One of Kakuma, the oldest and largest section of the camp that houses a significant number of Dinka and Nuer refugees, and contains both the UNHCR and NGO compounds.

In this dissertation, I am focusing on five interviews that were conducted in Kakuma Refugee Camp in the week of September the 8th,

2001. Two of these interviews were conducted with the "lost boys of

Sudan" while three interviews were conducted with Dinka female heads of household in the camp. These interviews are significant in understanding how age and gender differences among refugees collapses the previously taken for granted gender relationships of power.

Furthermore, this sample allows for the examination of how Dinka and

Nuer participants experienced encampment. The interviews in the camps

17 The Lutheran World Federation (LWF) was granted the role of Camp Manager in 1992. Its activities in the camp include food distribution, provision of primary and secondary education, maintenance of the water system in the camp, and the implementation of gender, youth and social programming.

80 lasted one to two hours. I was introduced to some of the participants by the LWF and then met with all of them individually. I explained the purpose of my study to them and the ethical guidelines governing my research, consent form and the confidentially of the interviews.

The Kakuma interviews highlighted the gender-specific disadvantages experienced by young and old refugees as a result of conflict and displacement. I asked the participants questions about the impact of long-term refugee experiences on their lives, focusing on changes in gender roles and relationships. I also explored the role of the

UNHCR and INGOs in affecting changes in their experiences as refugee.

I found the interviews in the Kakuma camp very emotionally charged for both the participants and myself. Throughout the week I stayed in the camp, I had great difficulty controlling my emotions. This was mainly because the research participants had been experiencing traumas due to the extremely brutal nature of their displacement. They had suffered the loss of family members, and they had been deprived their homes, familiar surroundings and their livelihood. Nevertheless, I was moved by how this suffering along with the hardship of life in the

Kakuma Refugee Camp had actually produced a resilience that had

81 enabled many of the participants to question the values that had previously shaped their lives, particularly patriarchal gender roles.

Overall, the time spent in Kakuma was particularly intense and productive. This was mainly because all staff and visitors are confined in a single compound. They take their meals in a common dining hall. The camp experience was also useful in collecting information, informal conversations, and simply being there, observing and listening.

iv) Group Four: The UNHCR/INGOs

Group Four comprises 10 employees of institutions providing humanitarian support to Sudanese refugees in Nairobi. Three are from the UNHCR, two are from Oxfam GB, two are from the LWF, one is from

UNICEF, and two are members of the Sudanese Council of Churches. I used email to contact members of the other INGOs, explaining the purpose of the interviews and arranging when and where they would take place. I encountered difficulties entering the UNHCR premises, and had to rely on my contacts with women activists in Nairobi to arrange for an appointment.

My line of questions aimed at understanding the distinction between short-term emergency supports in contrast to a long-term

82 development orientation and the impact of gender roles and transformation. All the interviews with the UNHCR and INGO employees took place in the offices of these organizations. The interviews lasted between one and two hours and were relatively formal compared to the interviews I conducted with the previous groups.

v) Group Five: Oil Companies

Group Five is composed of five European employees of oil companies (three Canadians employed by Talisman Energy and two

Chinese employed by the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company).

The interviews took place in their offices in Khartoum, Sudan. The interviews each took about an hour. I asked the participants about the context of forcible displacement in the oilfield territories in Sudan. I was attempting to understand how national and global processes led to the forcible uprooting of communities. Then, I asked a question about how displacement is justified in circumstances of sustained violent armed conflict. I was interested in examining whether or not these oil company representatives see themselves or their companies as bearing any obligations and responsibilities for the displacement. This set of

83 interviews was the most formal and the interviewees were among the most defensive.

To reiterate, the responses across all the groups of the research participants do not represent a homogeneous view of displacement in and from Sudan. Their responses indicate differences as well as similarities. Some of the refugees speak in detail about their experiences before, during and after the process of oil-induced displacement. They demonstrate a will to survive harsh displacement processes through their struggles to re-establish and even improve their livelihoods in foreign, often hostile cities and/or refugee situations.

The participants' oral testimonies constitute a primary source of data in this dissertation. In addition, I decided to broaden the scope of my dissertation to include the perspectives of key players in the oilfield territories who were interviewed by others.18

18 I draw on interviews conducted by scholars such as Sondra Hale (2005) with southern displaced women. Furthermore, I also draw on interviews in a film "The Price of Oil: Talisman " produced by Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) in 2000. In particular, I refer to the transcripts of an interview with Talisman CEO, a Sudanese government official, as well as an interview with Bona Malwal, a prominent southern Sudanese politician. This documentary is important to my study because it was filmed in the oilfield territories.

84 As required by York University Guidelines on Research With

Human Participants, before engaging in the interview process, an informed consent form was read to all participants, who were then asked to sign it. In cases where interviewees could not read and/or write, their approval was taped prior to their participation. The participants were informed of their right to end their participation in the interviews at any point, and abstain from responding to any questions with which they were uncomfortable. Although all the sixty participants agreed to be interviewed, very few were selective about what experiences to reveal. The interviews were conducted in either Arabic or English (my first and second languages, and the languages of the interviewees). I then recorded, translated and transcribed the interviews into English.

Archival Research

The experiences of the participants were supported by secondary and archival sources. For instance, in order to comprehensively understand the change in gender roles and relations, I consulted archival sources that examine i) the historical construction of southern Sudanese identities, perceptions, values and ii) the cultural practices that shape gendered refugee experiences. Both these sources and the testimonies of

85 those I interviewed have been central in examining the social values, cultural practices and the customary laws affecting Sudanese refugees.

The research participants' testimonies have been integrated with carefully gathered quantitative data and secondary sources from a range of archival sources: international development agencies including the

UNDP and OXFAM; multinational oil companies operating in Sudan such as Talisman Energy and the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company offices in Khartoum; and local and international NGOs. This method of collection is central to this research because quantitative data in refugee camps and government statistics offices are often missing or flawed due to the instability in militarized zones of conflict. I believe that comparing and contrasting primary and secondary data in this context has helped me alleviate the problems I had with accessing quantitative research in refugee camps.

Interrogating Personal Experiences

The class, race, culture and gender assumptions,

beliefs, behaviors of the researcher him/herself must

be placed within the frame of the picture that she/he

attempts to paint ... we need to avoid the 'objectivist'

86 stance that attempts to make the researcher's cultural

beliefs and practices invisible while simultaneously

skewering the research objects' beliefs and practices to

the display board. The beliefs and behaviors of the

researcher are part of the empirical evidence for (or

against) the claims advanced in the results of research

(Harding 1987:9).

The outlined methods of research have been influenced by qualitative feminist methods in many ways. Firstly, feminist methods contribute to studying women from the perspective of their own experiences and stresses that they are not only objects of knowledge but rather are knowers and active agents of social change (Code 1995).

Secondly, feminist methods have helped me as a researcher to place the question of subjectivity at the center of this research project (Harding

1987:8-9). Through the process of this research, I have examined how my own intersecting identities as a 'privileged' 'Muslim', 'northern'

Sudanese woman interviewing 'marginalized' 'Christian' 'southern' women and men have influenced the research project and shaped its analysis and results.

87 Although my experience of peaceful exile in Canada is very different from the research participants' experience of violent, military displacement, my family and I have nevertheless shared the pain of being away from home and the loss of belonging that this encompasses. The fact that we spoke a common language and that I knew of some of the places from which the research participants were evicted helped me shape this dissertation. Furthermore, my own status as a wife and a mother, who was also pregnant during the time of the fieldwork, established a unique bond with some of the interviewees, particularly the mothers.

However, being a 'privileged' northern Muslim academic, interviewing 'marginalized' southern Christian women and men did not always constitute common ground between the research participants and myself. My relationship with the participants was never an equal one. My gender, class and age raised questions of power and authority regarding how the research and research questions were defined, the interview process and the outcome of the research. These also raised issues about how to use the narratives of the interviews in my dissertation in a way that honestly and comprehensively articulates the participants' stories.

88 The majority of the interviewees were supportive of my research, as well as generous and accommodating. However, I did encounter some bitterness and resistance during the fieldwork processes. For instance, one of the Nuer women I interviewed in Kampala in June 2003 asked:

Why should we trust you? You are not one of us!

And why would a northern [Sudanese] woman

come all the way from Canada to talk to us? In

the many years that I have been in exile, I have

never seen any northern women interested in

our plight because they simply do not care about

what 'their government' is doing to us (Anisia,

age 60).

For me, coming from northern Sudan had meant a nai've celebration of an imagined heterogeneous Sudanese identity, which overlooked the otherness and subjugation that causes discriminatory divisions of ethnicity, language, religion, and culture. This research process forced me to face my own intersecting identities as a 'privileged' northern Muslim woman, conducting interviews with 'marginalized' southern Christian women, men and children. Indeed, for some time, I struggled with identifying who I was, in the sense that I could neither

89 identify myself as an Arab, (except that Arabic was my mother tongue), nor could I identify myself as a Muslim, (except for being born and socialized in a conservative Islamic society). However, during the process of this research, I have confronted the benefits I have gained from being part of a dominant system that has constituted the oppression and violation of women's and men's basic rights in different regions of the

Sudan, particularly in the south, the home of the research participants.

This self-realization has arisen out of my experience as a feminist in exile in Canada. First, upon arriving in Canada, I experienced the shift in my own identity from being an independent feminist who was privileged and middle class, coming from an ethnically dominant19 group, to being labelled as a dependent visible minority woman or woman of color by Citizenship and Immigration Canada, after being sponsored by my

19 However, it is important to emphasize that the North has never constituted a homogeneous group. Indeed, hierarchies and discrimination based on skin color, social status, class and so forth are widespread within and among various northern ethnic groups/tribes, including the Jaalieen, the Shaigia and the Falata. For example, within the same family, darker skinned members are discriminated against while lighter skinned females get preferences in arranged marriages. It is in this context that I contest my privilege as a northerner and view my status in relation to marginalized southerners and other groups in the country.

90 husband.20 Such a shift of identity has given me a tangible sense of what it means to be the 'other.'

I have engaged in this research process as someone who is personally committed to and involved in feminist community activism.

However, my fieldnotes raise the concern of how, as an academic researcher, I can contribute to social change at the community/grassroots levels in a country such as Sudan, particularly in the context of the coercive and militarized nature of displacement in the oil territories. I was also preoccupied with questions such as what constitutes activist scholarship, and how can my research bridge the community activist/scholar divide? Qualitative feminist methods have been significant in developing an approach that addresses the tension between activist and academic feminists. Wine and Ristock (1991) note how academic feminists sometimes cause alienation in a community context:

20 The term 'women of color' is problematic because it makes the false assumption that Svomen of color' are a homogeneous group, and as a result, it overlooks the differences among and between them. The term also conceals the different forms of racism that continue to exist within the Canadian black communities, namely towards African (continental African) women. Also, I think that the term Svomen of color' is inappropriate because it links racism to skin color and, therefore, ignores different forms of racism embedded in linguistic, ethnic and cultural practices.

91 Women in the community sometimes object to

feminist scholars using [study participants] for

research, re-interpreting their experiences in

inaccessible academic language, and gaining

academic credibility through such use (Wine and

Ristock 1991:18).

Despite this legitimate concern, I think that feminism, as a politics of change in both the academy and the community, shares the same goal of affecting positive change in women's lives. Lorraine Code stresses how

"feminist research makes a difference. Hence, the method question becomes in effect, a question of how it makes a difference, and what precepts need to be adopted to make sure it makes a positive one" (Code

1995:21). Moreover, academic feminists have been most successful in constructing feminist methods that are non-hierarchical and non- exploitative of women and in attempting to reinforce the link between women in the community and academy (Kirby and McKenna 1989;

Harding 1987).

The methods employed in this dissertation are feminist methods of research. As Harding (1987) argues, although feminist researchers often use mainstream methods, they address questions regarding gender, race,

92 class, age, power and ethnicity differently than non-feminist researchers do. As a feminist researcher, in my fieldwork, I have spoken to both men and women who have gained a new awareness of gender roles, and in doing so, are transforming oppressive relationships of power, notably patriarchy.

Fieldwork Limitations

The most significant limitation of this dissertation was the refusal of my request to conduct fieldwork in refugee camps in 2003. Another related limitation is the brief amount of time I was permitted to spend at the Kakuma Refugee Camp in 2001. In one week it was difficult to interview many refugees, agency employees and individuals concerned with the protracted refugee situations at Kakuma. However, I managed to gather much important information in this short period of time.

It was extremely difficult to conduct follow up interviews after the end of the fieldwork period in 2003. This was not just due to logistical and financial reasons. With the exception of the five activists, I also had difficulty getting feedback on the transcribed interviews with refugees due to a lack of communication links with them.

93 Moreover, conducting research with refugees experiencing financial hardship and, consequently, needing economic assistance was a challenge during the fieldwork period. The matter of reciprocity in my relationship with the participants troubled me a great deal. The participants willingly agreed to be interviewed, but I was unable to give back what they desperately needed: financial support. However, I believe that by telling their stories and expressing their pain during the interview process, some of the research participants managed, in some ways, to confront and address their traumatic experiences of displacement and exile. This dissertation attempts to accurately interpret their narratives, thus shedding light on gender relationships within refugee Dinka and

Nuer communities. It is my hope that through its contribution to gender and forced migration studies, this dissertation will positively impact the women and men refugees whom I met.

Conclusion

My personal experiences combined with feminist theory have significantly helped shape my understanding of the role of gender relations of power in conflict zones and, more importantly, have determined both my research and fieldwork questions. My dissertation

94 espouses the view that the perspectives of the excluded or marginalized can lead to a greater understanding of social reality. I should make it clear, however, that such a recognition does not render the group of women and men I interviewed as homogeneous, but retains their distinct experiences and identities. In the next chapter, I attempt to unpack some of these differences by examining the and Sudanese women's struggle.

95 Chapter Three Histories of Sudan are Contested, Subjective Sites: Gender, Conflict and Development

Introduction

This chapter seeks to provide a historical context within which to understand how militarized conflict in combination with large-scale development of oil produces gendered and extraordinarily chaotic processes of displacement in southern Sudan. The objective of this chapter is to show how resource extraction, particularly oil exploration and development, cannot be studied in isolation from the armed conflict in Sudan.

The chapter begins by examining the "Conflicting Moral

Geographies"21 of Sudan. Indeed, Sudan's geographies have been historically contested due to its rich natural resources. The struggle to control these resources, specifically oil territories, constitutes a major factor that caused and has intensified what is now fifty years of armed conflict. This exploration is framed by a cursory overview of the history of

21 This expression has been used by De Waal (2007: 182) to describe the historical and ethnographical dilemmas that ground the current crises in region in western Sudan. However, the phenomenon of the "conflicting moral geographies" is applicable throughout the whole of Sudan.

96 the armed conflict in Southern Sudan, and finally a thorough examination of the gendered dimensions of conflict, development and forcible displacement.

This chapter illustrates the impact of oil development as told by those displaced from the oilfield territories. Studies conducted by

Amnesty International (2000), The European Coalition on Oil (ECOS) in

Sudan (2006) and Human Rights Watch (2003a) document that

Government of Sudan (GOS) has practiced 'scorched earth' policy to clear the land of civilians and to make way for the exploration and exploitation of oil. My research participants' stories were consistent and mutually reinforcing in illustrating that the violence associated with the combined phenomena of militarization and development-induced displacement have resulted in massive and indiscriminate killings, the complete destruction of the means of livelihood, arson and gross human rights abuses.

The "Conflicting Moral Geographies" of Sudan

Covering two and a half million square kilometers (966,757 square miles), Sudan is the largest country in Africa. As Map 1 indicates, Sudan is bordered by nine countries: Kenya, Uganda, Democratic Republic of

97 Congo, Central African Republic, , Libya, , Eritrea, and

Ethiopia. Such a location has enriched and complicated its geo-political significance (Map of Sudan: Human Rights Watch 2003b).

Map 1: Map of Sudan (Human Rights Watch 2003b).

98 In January 1956, Sudan achieved its political independence from the British. Since the 1980s, Sudan has been of strategic interest to a range of regional and international powers including Canada, China,

Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kenya, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi

Arabia, Uganda and the . Regional, as well as transnational strategic interests, particularly, in oil exploration and development have directly implicated foreign capital in the domestic war, as well as extending and accelerating the rate of displacement in the oil territories

(Harker 1998).

Sudan is also one of the world's most geographically diverse countries, including deserts, mountain ranges, swamps and rain forests.

Three general climatic regions characterize Sudan (see Map 1): a desert area in the northern and provinces, a semi-arid central belt, as well as a tropical rainy region in Bahar Al Ghazal, Upper Nile and

Equatoria provinces in the south. Sudan is also rich in contested natural resources, which are mainly located in the southern provinces such as

Bahar Al Ghazal and Upper Nile. These resources include oil, iron, copper, chromium ore, zinc, mica, silver and (Abusharaf

2002). Since the 1950s, the GOS and SPLM disputes over ownership and control of these resources, particularly oil, have been directly linked to

99 causing and intensifying militarized patterns of displacement in the oilfield territories in southern Sudan, particularly in Bahar Al Ghazal,

Upper Nile and Equatoria provinces as Map One indicates.

Catastrophes in Sudan's oilfield territories were directly linked to the broader conflict between successive central governments in the north and the economically, politically, and socially marginalized majority of the population in the south, west and east. The southern region, which is the primary focus of my dissertation (which includes provinces of western Bahar Al Ghazal, northern Bahar Al Ghazal, western Upper Nile, western Equatoria, Bahar Al Ghazal, and eastern Equatoria, see Map 1) is one of the most underdeveloped regions in the world because it has historically been starved of development infrastructure. It relies on a pastoral and agricultural subsistence economy. Most of the contested oil resources are in these southern provinces. For instance, between 1972-

1983, these provinces were recognized as southern territories and were administered as one political entity by the Southern Sudan Regional

Government (Kebbede 1999). However, since the discovery of oil in 1978, the boundaries of the southern regions have undergone several changes in order for the GOS to control oil wells and reserves.

100 In 1994, the current Islamic military government redrew the map of the south to comprise ten provinces22 that include 26 states (see Map

1). The main purpose for altering the geographic boundaries of the south was to place oil field territories under the strict control of the GOS

(Kulusika 1998). Southerners, particularly Dinka and Nuer communities, protested the location of the oil pipeline in the north and the construction of the oil refinery in the northern city of Port Sudan on the

Red Sea province because these projects diverted profits and employment opportunities from the south. Furthermore, oil development was considered an integral aspect of the "oil-war" that debilitated the south from 1983 to 2005 (ibid).

The Government of Sudan and the SPLM signed the Sudan

Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005. The CPA specifies the resolution of conflict over resources. The CPA states that

The sharing and allocation of wealth emanating

from the resources of the Sudan shall ensure

that the quality of life, dignity and living

22 The contested boundaries of the ten states are the Upper Nile, Unity, Jonglei, Warap, Northern Bahar Al Ghazal, Western Bahar Al Ghazal, Lakes, Eastern Equatoria, Bahr Al Jebel and Western Equatoria (Kulusika 1998). The geographical boundaries of these states were changed many times since Sudan's independence in 1956.

101 conditions of all the citizens are promoted

without discrimination on grounds of gender,

race, religion, political affiliation, ethnicity,

language, or region. The sharing and allocation

of this wealth shall be based on the premise that

all parts of Sudan are entitled to the benefits of

oil development (Human Rights Center 2007:18).

The CPA contains a range of other principles and measures that also offer a coherent framework for sharing revenue from power and resources, particularly oil wealth. The CPA allows the GOS and SPLM to equally share oil revenues in South Sudan. However, in September 2006, the Minister of State for Energy and Mining in the Government of

National Unity in southern Sudan stated that the boundaries of oil territories remain unresolved:

We signed a peace deal last year but the

government [the central government in the

north] is cheating. There's no proper sharing of

resources. Khartoum keeps the oil for

themselves. They don't want the south to

develop (Oxfam International 2007:3).

102 To date, most of the CPA basic promises have not been met. In particular, the definition and demarcation of the oilfield boundaries continue to hinder the achievement of peace in Sudan. Indeed, disagreement over mapping the boundaries of the rich oil territories in southern Sudan has played a significant role in prolonging the armed conflict. Currently, it is impeding the achievement of comprehensive peace as the next section outlines.

History of the Armed Conflict in Southern Sudan:

Histories of Sudan are contested, subjective sites. The armed conflict in southern Sudan has stemmed from deeply entrenched forms of oppression, inequality, and exclusion. Historically, the conflict has been attributed to unbalanced development between the north and the south. Unequal gender, social, economic and political inequalities have incited the conflict. The armed conflict is in large part the product of a history, which dates back to slavery in the mid-nineteenth century, occurring predominantly in the south but connected to the economic development of both the north and the south at that time. This tradition of the exploitation of the south continued into the 1980s, and is run by the political elite of the dominant north.

103 The armed conflict in Sudan has been Africa's longest ongoing war.23 The war between the northern and southern parts of the country began with Sudan's transition from colonial domination to national statehood in 1955 when a violent mutiny occurred in Torit,24 Equatoria

Province, in Southern Sudan during British colonialism (Ali and

Matthews 1999:193). The war continued through three periods of democratic governments (1956-1958; 1964-1969; and 1986-1989), and through three military regimes (1958-1964, 1969-1985, and 1989-2003)

(ibid). Throughout these decades, bitterness and hostilities between the north and the south intensified.

Northerners and southerners perceived the armed conflict differently. National governments in northern Sudan, both civilian and military, had not addressed the armed conflict with a sense of urgency.

23 There were numerous wars between the north and the south as well as within the south. Indeed the SPLA itself did split, producing a bloody intra- South conflict (Sudan National Archives: 2003). 24 Immediately before British colonialism subsided, and because of tensions and insecurity about the future of Sudan, the southern Torit garrison accompanied by police, prison guards and civilians revolted against northern administrators who were in charge of the southern territories during the transition from British rule. Many northern casualties among civilians, including women and children, were documented (Ali and Matthews 1999:193). The mutiny and loss of Arabs' lives caused continuing antagonism, which in combination with other differences, later escalated to a full-blown war between the north and the south.

104 Rather, they considered it a 'southern problem' (Deng 1995). Sikainga, for example, observes that northern politicians have always viewed the south as "an afterthought, an appendage and a marginalized section of the society" (Sikainga 1993: 81).

Successive democratically elected governments - the Umma Party

(UP) and its sectarian twin, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) - have consistently shifted attention from addressing the root causes of the conflict, instead attributing the armed conflict to external factors such as colonialism, imperialism, communism, Christianity and Zionism (Ali and

Matthews 1999:196). Since 1989, the northern Islamic military government in Sudan has been claiming that "crusades targeting their religious orientation have contributed to the war in the south" (ibid).

Each of these governments failed to attribute the root causes of the armed conflict to deeply constructed forms of oppression and inequality.

Historically, the conflict in Sudan has been defined by scholars and historians, such as Francis Deng, as a Svar of visions' between Muslims and Christians, north and south and Arabs and Africans (1995). While some scholars (Idris 2001, Kebbede 1999, Nyok Kok 1994) endorse

Deng's pragmatic culturalist vision, they generally view the unequal

105 distribution of resources as central to the understanding of the armed conflict (Kebbede 1999: 95).

The perception that the conflict was due to one static root cause is problematic. Armed conflicts are not static; they change over time. In

Sudan, the overlapping nature of the armed conflict was demonstrated by many factors. First, it was a direct result of the lack of socio-economic development in southern Sudan. Second, it was the legacy of bitter colonial and post-colonial memories of a past marred by human enslavement, predominately carried out by northerners. Thirdly, the conflict is attributed to a series of untrustworthy acts, unkept promises and dishonoured peace agreements between southerners and northerners. Since 1983, oil discovery and production has added a new dimension to an already volatile situation, literally fuelling the war. As

Ayak states,

The war resumed again in 1983 when news

about oil spread out. The Arab army began

chasing our people [Dinka from the Western

Upper Nile] without warning. They came, they

shot at us, burned our villages and destroyed all

that we own! They killed my mother, Mary, who

106 was 60 years old and two of my uncles. An Arab

militia raped me along with, I do not remember

exactly how many, but many of the women in

my village, including little girls as young as

seven ... The government of Sudan killed, raped

and displaced us because the government is

greedy for our oil (Ayak, Dinka woman, age 43).

Similarly, Tut who was displaced along with his Nuer relatives in

Heglig region, south of Kordofan in the early 1980s, sees a direct link between oil production and the war:

The Sudanese government is using oil money to

kill us. There was no militia [SPLA] present in

our area. We had no guns, and could not defend

ourselves. The government built a new weapon

factory in Khartoum from oil money and they are

using those weapons to kill and displace us.

They came in the evening and fired mortars

without warning. Our food, cattle, village and

everything was burned down. All this war and

107 suffering is because of oil (Tut, Nuer man, age

37).

To reiterate, the interconnection of war and oil development intensified the conflict and led to the oppression and displacement of

Dinka and Nuer communities from southern Sudan. A historically unequal distribution of power has led to revenues largely generated from the southern oilfield territories financing the war there, and likely continuing to be a basis for the conflict in Darfur, in western Sudan

(Harker 2000, Idahosa 2002, Macklin 2004).

i) The First Phase of the War: 1955-1972

The 'Southern Policy' created by British colonialism in 1922 is significant for understanding the background of the war.25 Between the

1930s and the 1940s, southern Sudan was rendered a Closed District by the British. During this period, northerners were barred from the region without British permits. The Southern Policy was rationalized by the

British colonizers on the grounds that the south needed protection from northern exploitation, and that this approach would encourage economic

25 One could trace it back further, of course, to the slavery that took place from the early part of 19th century during the Turco-Egyptian imperial period of modern Sudanese history (1820-1884).

108 self-reliance. However, with the exception of limited powers exercised by tribal leaders in the south, the Southern Policy failed to develop the south. Britain's typical "divide-and-rule" policy would in fact, eventually lead to the marginalization of the south (AH and Matthews 1999, Kebbede

1999). For instance, infrastructure such as education was strictly controlled by the British, as well as foreign missionaries who imposed the teaching of Christianity in the South in contrast to Islamic teaching in the north. Indeed the primary aim of education during the British colonial administration in the south was not to develop the south or promote indigenous knowledge but instead to exploit the people of the south by emphasizing the teaching of practical skills, and manual labour that facilitated the exploitation of the rich natural resources in the south.

The divide-and-rule policy, reinforced by post-colonial governments, led to institutionalized patterns of uneven distribution of resources, intertwined with politicized ethnic, religious and cultural patterns of oppression. The result was an intensification of inequalities and mistrust between the north and the south, as well as within various regions of the country. This divide has led to the prolonged armed conflict in Sudan.

109 The first phase of the war of national liberation, led by the

Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM), occurred between 1955 and 1972. In 1955, Southern Sudanese leaders feared that the process of national independence simply meant a replacement of British colonial rule by Northern/Arab Sudanese colonialism. The SSLM's aim was to liberate the south from Arab-Islamic domination, creating a 'new' secular, culturally diverse country (Danforth 2002). The first phase of the war lasted for seventeen years. It ended when the central government in the north and southern leadership in the south signed the Addis Ababa

Accord in 1972, which gave the South relative control of its territories and resources.

ii) The Second Phase of the War: 1972-1983

A second war broke out in 1983. At that time, the Addis Ababa agreement provided the south with an unprecedented degree of autonomy over its rich mineral and oil resources which posed a threat to the government in the north and restricted its regional influence in the south. The Addis Ababa agreement was violated by the north, in the early

1980s, as a direct result of the discovery of oil in the southern territories.

In 1980, Nimeiri's military government redrew the borders between the

110 southern and northern provinces to remove the oilfields from the south

(Ali and Matthews 1999:208).

Another catalyst for the escalation of the war in 1983 was the division of the south into three regions and the subsequent implementation of Shari'a Islamic law to the non-Muslim communities in the south. The imposition of Islamic laws resulted in non-Muslims in the south being subjected to detention, public floggings, amputation of hands, and other human rights violations by the northern government

(Human Rights Watch 2003a).

iii) The Third Phase of the War: 1983-2005

Because of the intensification of Islamization throughout Sudan, after 1983, the construction of the war by the northern government shifted from being described as a 'civil war' to a 'holy war' or "Jihad" against infidels. This changing nature of the war was demonstrated by the shift in the portrayal of the war. In the early period of the war, successive central governments in the north misinformed the public about the magnitude of a war that was conducted in complete secrecy.26

26 All central governments in the north have considered information about the war as classified. The media coverage of the war has been censored as successive Ministers of Information and National Defense have strictly

111 None of the post-colonial governments ever made statistics public that demonstrated the number of casualties, injuries and prisoners of war, or pointed to the destruction of infrastructure and resources in the south.

There was fear that a populist backlash in the north would arise if the human and economic costs of the war were revealed. In fact, frustration about the war was among the factors behind the two populist uprisings that overthrew military governments in October 1964 and April 1985

(ibid).

The militarization of the country has been rigorously sustained under the current Islamist military government of Umar Hasan Al-Bashir that has been in power since 1989. All segments of Sudanese society are now either mobilized or forced to assume their national duty in defending the Islamic nation.' Since 1989 and for the first time in the various phases of the war, civilians in the north have been mobilized, and public sector employees have been forced to attend military training units and fight in the war. Moreover, before attending colleges/universities, students are required to train in the Popular Defense Forces.

monitored radio, television and newspapers reporting of the war (Ali and Matthews 1999:198).

112 Furthermore, casualties of the war are celebrated as martyrs, with their families financially compensated and publicly honored.

The struggle between the northern and southern parts of Sudan has spilled over to other oppressed in the country such as the Nuba in southern Kordofan, the Fung in southern , the Fur in western

Darfur and the Beja in the Red Sea province (see Map 1) . These ethnic communities have publicized their marginalization by the hegemonic northern government. Some members of these groups (predominantly men and very few women) have joined the SPLA/M and fought in what is characterized as a national liberation struggle (Babiker 1999).

Does the End of the War Means Peace for Southern Sudanese?

Despite numerous previously failed peace agreements,27 the war

'ended' with the signing of the 'Comprehensive' Peace Agreement28 (CPA)

27 Among previous peace agreements is the 1971 Addis Ababa agreement as well as the Machakos Protocol, outlining an overall framework for peace, signed between the Government of Sudan and the SPLA on July 20, 2002. The Machakos Protocol did not include any agreement on a ceasefire and was followed by violent fighting around the oil fields of Western Upper Nile. 28 The CPA has been based on principles Self-Determination, security arrangements, wealth-sharing (including provisions for the division of oil revenues), and power-sharing in which the SPLA and northern government have formed a government of national unity with a decentralized system of administration in the south (Prendergast and Mozersky 2005).

113 between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A in Nifasha, Kenya on the 9th of January 2005. The agreement was brokered by the United

States and several European countries. Elements of the CPA called for a permanent ceasefire between the north and the south. Therefore, both the Government of Sudan and the SPLA agreed to a military standstill, and a symbolic end of the war. The core principles of the CPA are power- sharing, an equitable distribution of oil revenues between north and south, democratization and self-determination for the southerners through a popular vote for separation of the south from the north in

2011.

In June 2005, when the government of national unity was formed, it gave the national government in the north 52 percent of the seats in the National Assembly, and the south 28 percent of the seats. For the first time in Sudan's history, John Garang, a southerner and the leader of the SPLA/M became a Vice President in Sudan's Government of

National Unity and the President of the Government of Southern Sudan.

Southerners' dreams of peace were aborted a couple of weeks later when

Garang's helicopter crashed into a mountain on the Uganda-Sudan border in July 2005 (De Waal 2007:2). Southerners' riots and protests of

114 foul-play in Garang's death opened yet another phase of the north-south conflict and mistrust, challenging the core of the CPA.

I believe that the greatest weakness of the CPA is that despite the label 'comprehensive', the peace agreement did not halt existing armed conflicts within various regions of Sudan. While the war was declared over in the south with the signing of the CPA, the armed struggle continues in various pockets within southern Sudan, as well as in contested territories in the east and more intensively in the Darfur region in the west. Furthermore, by the time the CPA was agreed upon, almost all communities in the south were violently and chaotically displaced from villages surrounding oil wells and oil-infra-structures. Oil-induced displacement continues to devastate the southern population, particularly the Dinka and Nuer, who have been deprived of their homes, food, education and basic health services. The majority of these communities continue to be displaced in Kenya and Uganda and are encamped in refugee camps such as Kakuma.

The signing of the peace agreement has not brought peace to southern Sudanese women and men. In 2006, in an interview conducted by ECOS with Chief Choi Nul, he states,

115 This is a new phase of the oil war - a "cold war"

...We have heard about peace, but seen nothing.

I want to see a big hospital, schools, roads, free

movement to Malakal and Renk without

Government militias on the way. The CPA means

employment, no hunger, hospitals and schools,

no fear and UN troops on the front lines to

monitor the ceasefire and the oil. Then, there

will be peace (cited in ECOS: 2006).

De Waal (2007) states that the Sudanese military planners have been quietly preparing for yet another phase of a civil war in the country

(2007:1). He cites a speech delivered on the second anniversary of the

CPA on January the 9th, 2007: "Salva Kiir, the president of Southern

Sudan, who is also current vice president in Sudan's Government of

National Unity, issued a stark warning: The war will return to the south if peace is not achieved in Darfur, and that is really our fear" (cited in De

Waal 2007:1-2). I believe that the conflict in Darfur is deeply rooted in a familiar phenomenon of regional exploitation of marginalized people and resources by the central government in north. The incomplete resolution of the north-south conflict has caused the intensification of the war.

116 As the CPA dictates, the resolution of the armed conflict in Sudan will ultimately rely on a popular vote that will take place in the south in

2011 to determine whether the majority of the southern population will chose to separate the southern territories from the north or remain united. Opinion polling is not advanced in Sudan, but internal surveys suggest that over 90% of southerners will vote for separation (ibid). Given the historic northern economic interests in the South, this further hinders the future of peace in Sudan. After over 50 years of militarized upheavals in Sudan, it should have been unconceivable for northern and southern leaders to consider resolving their differences through wars.

However, as De Waal (2007) points out,

War creates war. The military mentality had

become so embedded among Sudan's politicians

that fighting was not only thinkable, it was the

default option. Today, despite the palpable

disasters brought by a history of unremitting

violence, there are still men ready to fight.

Leaders on both sides know that a new war

would be a catastrophe for all. It would begin

with violence in the cities and lead to the

117 disputed secession of the South. The certainty of

such disaster has not prevented war makers in

the past and will not do so again (De Waal

2007:5).

To reiterate, systemic inequalities and imbalances in the distribution of power and resources constituted the basis, as well as prolonged the gendered and racialized armed conflict in the southern territories of Sudan. Throughout this half-century history of war in

Sudan, gender relations have never been profiled as integral to its articulations despite the evident gendered implications of the conflict.

Critical to our understanding of gender roles and relationship is the state's relationships to its citizens as the next section demonstrates.

Gender and the State: A North-South Analysis

The state is often constructed as the representative of "gender regimes" and in that regard is implicated in gender relations. However, the state, as is often the case in Sudan, has the power to consolidate patriarchal gender relations or change them through enacting reforms.

Within Sudan, highly patriarchal, conservative values characterizing nation-states since independence in 1956 have had serious implications

118 for both southern and northern Sudanese women. For example, in the south, Nuer and Dinka women have been located in a subordinate position to men because of certain cultural practices, as well as Christian and customary family laws (Beswick 2001). Similarly, in the north,

Islamic Shari'a and customary laws concerning family and personal matters discriminate against women in terms of inheritance, marriage and custody of children (Badri, 1986).

For instance, in the southern Sudanese context, educational and religious institutions facilitated by missionaries and colonial administrators imposed western models of clothing and reinforced patriarchal gender values (Mama 1995:52). Amina Mama argues that in an effort to "civilize the savages," in many African societies, British legal and administrative colonial systems altered traditionally accepted gender values and roles and instead applied very strict perceptions of femininity and masculinity (ibid). Abuk, who was displaced from the Equatoria province in southern Sudan, states that

In the old days, we [Dinka and Nuer people]

used to wear few clothes when we were in the

village. It was quite natural for adult men to be

totally nude except for beads around the neck or

119 wrist. Married women commonly wore goat skin

as skirts while unmarried girls would be nude...

we also used to remove some teeth for beauty

and valued personal grooming and decorative

designs that are cut into the skin. But all of this

is considered outdated now (Abuk, a Dinka

woman age 63).

Indeed, the British colonizers between (1898-1956) influenced by patriarchal values that existed in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries introduced to southern Sudan a "Victorian ideology of domesticity" and imposed the doctrine of separate spheres for women and men. In southern Sudan, the methods and philosophy of missionary education aimed at training men to dominate public affairs while women were given training to prepare them for domestic life. Patriarchal perceptions about gender roles and values informed which roles are appropriate for women within their households, communities, as well as in social and political contexts.

120 Furthermore, the colonial states had consolidated the economic position of traditional political parties29 in the north and favored mainstream political parties in the north, such as the Umma Party (UP) and its religious sectarian twin, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), by granting them substantial ownership of agricultural and industrial resources. This favoritism directly influenced the formation of a gendered northern bourgeoisie that has historically dominated southern Sudan's politics (Babiker 1984). This has laid the foundation for the post-colonial class formation and the rise of the "northern bourgeoisie," who have played an important role in shaping the and exploiting southern people and resources (Woodward, 1990).

While colonial policies have laid the foundation for a gendered, classed and racialized post-colonial state, the process of national liberation in Sudan has not challenged structures of domination instigated by (pre)colonial powers. Instead, in 1965, a 'compromised,'

'negotiated' political independence condoned systematic gendered and racialized relationships of power that privileged northern groups, mainly

29 The main political parties in the north were dominated by religious sects such as the Mahdiya and the Khatmiya. Before independence in 1956, British colonial authorities empowered these political parties by granting them considerable shares in government contracts and providing them with cultivatable lands (Woodward, 1990).

121 the Arab and Muslim bourgeoisie class. Since independence, successive governments in the north have underdeveloped the south. Post-colonial national states discriminated against marginalized groups of women and men not only in the south but also in Darfur and other parts of western and eastern Sudan. Moreover, (post)colonial policies established and consolidated uneven class formation processes (Babiker 1984).

Socio-economic and political underdevelopment in south Sudan is compounded by the lack of investment in education. Colonialists originally discouraged education for both women and men throughout

Sudan. When Sudanese were needed to serve in the junior ranks of the civil service, the British prioritized the education of boys and men, tailoring education to enforce traditional gender roles and values (Hale

2005). Female education30 was established in 1907 in the north and three decades later in the south. In both the south and north, girls' schools had lower academic standards than boys' schools and

30 Girls' education was initiated in Sudan in 1907 by Babikr Badri who established the first informal school for his daughters and nieces in his house. Then in 1921 the British administration opened five schools for girls in the north followed by the Girls' Training College for Teachers in Omdurman (Badri, 1986). As for the South, the missionaries established the first girls' school in 1930. In 1974 a first secondary school was established for southern girls' and the first university in the south -Juba University- was opened in Juba (Amin 1981).

122 predominately focused on training girls in stereotypical gendered activities such as cooking, baking, home crafts and needle work. Babiker

(2002) and Badri (1986) note that women's education and training were oriented towards the preservation rather than the challenging of patriarchal norms and values. The aim was to prepare women to be educated, knowledgeable and ideal housewives, who would therefore, take better care of their husbands and children and positively influence the next generation.

However, men's attitudes toward women's education were not always negative. Historically, secular men advocated women's emancipation in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, pushing for women's access to education and other societal resources (Jayawardena

1986:260). Indeed, anti-colonial nationalism in 'developing-nations' equated the liberation of their countries with the emancipation of women

(Moghadam 1994). This is why the early supporters of Sudanese women's rights were nationalist elites - secular, progressive men who situated the women's question at the center of the anti-colonial national struggle

(Badri, 1986). In fact, a few privileged, educated women who were from the upper-middle class in both the south and the north were mobilized to join the national liberation struggle. Although not a mass movement,

123 these women managed to challenge institutional discrimination against women and campaign for equal rights for women in the public sphere

(Anis2001).

In the 1950s, the national struggle to liberate Sudan and empower its women was aborted by the eruption of civil war between the north and south, and in 1958, the first of a series of military coups that initiated oppressive militarized dictatorships that have since characterized the history of Sudan and oppressed civilian populations.

Nevertheless, southern and northern Sudanese women's resistance and activism led to suffrage rights being extended to Sudanese women in all parts of the country in 1965 (Badri 1986). In the next decade, the 1972

Addis Ababa peace agreement signed between the north and south emphasized the principle that all citizens should have equal rights and duties before the law without discrimination based on race, national origin, birth, language, sex, or economic and social status. This principle positively impacted southern Sudanese women who had managed to enter the formal job market and earn salaries. For example, southern women such as Anne Itto Leonardo, who received a doctorate from the

University of Khartoum and in the 1970s was employed by the Regional

Ministry of Agriculture in the south, as well as the University of Juba,

124 states that "I worked myself out of this femaleness .... I also saw myself as strong as a man" (cited in Beswick Beswick 2001:42).

Furthermore, given the declaration of the UN Decade for Women in

1975 and investments by international agencies to set up "women's projects," significant attention was paid to women's rights in the south and north. Although Sudanese women's issues were co-opted by state- sponsored feminism under the banner of the Sudan Women's Union, according to the Public Service Ordinance of 1973, women were granted labor rights such as equality in civil service hiring, as well as equality in promotion and training. Women were also granted gendered rights that pertain to them as wives and mothers, including equal rights access to educational leave along with paid maternity and lactation leave, paid leave for mourning a death of a husband, and unpaid leave for accompanying husbands traveling abroad (Amin 1981).

By the beginning of the second civil war in 1983, a number of

South Sudanese women were exercising their newfound options mainly due to the relatively peaceful 1970s and the emergence of a relatively small, white-collar class of bureaucrats and businesswomen and businessmen. Furthermore, the establishment of the Sudanese People's

Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) to fight the northern Sudanese

125 government forces led to a considerable increase in women's military participation compared to the first civil war. Many trained as combatants and later as administrators, thus acquiring education and training and, therefore, enhancing confidence and self-esteem. As Susan, a Nuer activist proudly states, "I chose to join the SPLM/A because like men, I do have the right to defend my territory" (Susan, Nuer woman, age 49).

In contrast, since the late 1980s, Sudan has experienced one of the most repressive periods in its history. Women's lives were affected not only by the general political and economic decline, but also by armed conflict, oil-induced displacement and a violent ideological offensive directed at women by the government of the National Islamic Front in

1989. As a result, Sudanese women in both the south and the north were forced to revert to their role as guardians of the faith, family and morality. Furthermore, in 1996, the Islamic military government in

Sudan imposed strict Islamic Shari's laws on non-Muslim southern women. Dinka and Nuer women were not permitted to walk in the streets at night or travel without the company of a male spouse. Many of the gains of the previous years such as family benefits, labour and civil rights were revoked.

126 To reiterate, over the course of history, the various Sudanese governments have sent contradictory messages to women in the south and the north; at one point opening spaces for women but in other times constraining their activities and activism. However, southern Sudanese women's agency and activism have been instrumental in explicating women's oppression within their family and society. The Sudanese women's movement discourses (Amin 1981; Babiker 2002; Badri 1986) concede that the majority of women are subordinated to men. However, southern Sudanese women's participation in the national liberation struggle has opened spaces for transforming the power dynamics between men and women both in public and private spheres as the next section articulates.

Southern Sudanese Women and the Politics of National Liberation

Struggles

Feminist scholarship articulates that women do play multiple and sometimes conflicting roles in times of war and peace (Jacobs, Jacobson and Marchbank, 2000: 4). In Sudan since the 1980s, women have been represented in the international media as passive victims of war and dependent recipients of foreign aid in refugee and IDP camps. Such

127 images have recently become ubiquitous in the wake of the crises in

Darfur region in western Sudan. While these depictions point to the trauma and extreme violence experienced by women, men and children,

I, nonetheless, argue that Sudanese experiences of the armed conflict, particularly those of women, are more complex and varied. They continue to shift as the (post)conflict phases evolve.

Southern Sudanese women have been active and powerful agents of both war and peace in their capacities as recruited fighters in national liberation struggles,31 as well as in their active roles in peace building processes. Nevertheless, southern Sudanese women face a complicated process in positioning themselves vis-a-vis the politics of nationalism and the national liberation struggle. Anderson argues that nations are

'imagined communities' and suggests that nationalism is akin to kinship

(Anderson 1983). However, this notion of community is not neutral but

'hierarchical'. Anderson overlooks issues of gender, sexuality, racial, ethnic, religious and class contestations within the 'imagined community'. In the context of Sudan, the nation is indeed gendered,

31 Sudanese liberation movements include the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) representing southern Sudan, the Beja Congress representing the eastern Sudan, and the Sudanese Alliance Forces representing northern and central Sudan.

128 racialized and defined in contrast to the 'other' - the 'minority' and the

'refugee'- both within and outside of the contested national boundaries.

Jayawardena argues that women's emancipation in many Third

World countries was advocated by nationalist movements in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Jayawardena 1986:8). It is true that the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement equated the liberation of their southern territories with the liberation of women (Sudan Tribune

2006:13). Both the SPLA/M and the national governments in the north have advocated women's rights to education, employment, and other societal resources and recruited women as fighters. They certainly mobilized women to participate in the nationalist struggle as members of the national collective, as well as recruited fighters in ways that unsettled traditional gender roles. In my interview with Mama in the outskirts of Nairobi, she states

I fought in the Anyanya war in the 1960s and

then fought again to defend the oil territories in

1985 ... Although not many of us were

encouraged to fight in the front lines, we

insisted. Our commander, John Garang, [the

late leader of the SPLM/A] was very good and

129 supportive ... Wearing the military uniform and

fighting in the battlefield was a powerful and

noble thing to do for our nation ... we knew that

we were there to kill the enemy or get killed, that

was what we were trained for. And yes, at times

it get very scary but defending our people is

what we were motivated to do (Mama, Dinka

woman, age 65)

In my interview with Abuk she reiterates

I joined the Sudanese People Liberation Army

(SPLA) in 1983 because the SPLM called upon all

of us as southern Sudanese to defend our region

and our oil territories. Both my husband and

myself joined the liberation movement in 1983.

He was a military commander and I worked as a

nurse, in the battlefield ... we did not ask about

women's rights or women's issues, the time was

not right for that. Our goal [when we fought in the

war] was to liberate our people from the injustices

130 of the Arab governments of the north ... (Abuk,

Dinka woman, age 63).

Southern Sudanese women such as Mama and Abuk participated in the national struggle, and gained relative autonomy within the SPLM.

However, women's issues are often advocated when they fit wider nationalist goals and are suppressed when they threaten male political or nationalist agendas and priorities. As Abuk indicates, southern

Sudanese women's participation in the national struggle did not organize around gender specific questions or what Molyneux calls "strategic gender interests" such as challenges to the gendered division of labor, women's social and political rights, personal autonomy and sexual and reproductive rights (Molyneux 1985:232)

Although they did not have a women's specific agenda when engaged in the national struggle, some of the Sudanese women whom I interviewed believed in and fought for the establishment of a liberated nation that would secure their 'practical gender interests', that is, food, employment, health and education -the necessary tools to their survival, development and liberation (ibid:233).

Moreover, women were not mobilized to participate in the struggle as equal partners, but rather due to the need for their services/labour.

131 Unlike men, women fighters rarely engaged in military combat partly because they constituted only two percent of the SPLA in the 1980s. As well, women recruited to the military mainly worked at civilian tasks that were viewed by some of the SPLA to 'best suit' women such as nursing, preparing food, washing clothes, liaison and hiding rebels. Some southern Sudanese women, like Abuk, have found that coming into an emergent nationalist movement through the accepted feminine roles within the military such as nurses, cooks, and bearers of the community's memories and children is empowering. In considering conflicts elsewhere in the world, Cynthia Enloe similarly argues "being praised by men in the nationalist movement for bearing more children and raising them well doesn't always feel like being patronized or marginalized" (Enloe 1989:55).

Indeed some of the male interviewees associated with the SPLM held very conservative gender perceptions about the engagement of women in the liberation struggle. For instance, Lue, one of the SPLA officers in Nairobi in 2001, states that

war is not a woman's business ... We felt

[referring to himself and other SPLA

commanders] that it was our duty as men to do

132 the fighting, and the women should take care of

the children. Therefore, most of the women were

discouraged from the army. When we told them

that fighting was not your work, they didn't

quarrel. They just went away in peace and got

married and had babies. But nowadays many

women and women's groups are making a big

fuss about women's rights and women's

equality. We keep telling them that we are not

against women's equality. Women are the

mothers of our nation, and the new Sudan will

be built on equitable share of rights and

resources for all (Lue, Dinka man, Age 54).

Nationalism reinforces stereotypical feminine roles for women. The

'nation' is often constructed as the 'mother', family' and 'home,' and women are presented as the symbol of that feminized nation. Pettman argues that "in this construction of the nation, women are the symbol of the nation and men are its agents, regardless of the role women actually play in the nation" (Pettman 1996:49). The construction of Sudanese women as 'mothers of the nation', and 'guardians of the culture' within

133 the SPLM, has historically constrained women and endangered their activism. Sudanese women's rights including political participation and equal economic representation, have often been advocated when they suited wider nationalist goals, and suppressed when they threatened male dominated political and national interests.

Furthermore, within the southern Sudanese context, the construction of masculinity and manhood is connected with weapons and fighting. A man without a gun is often not considered "a real man".

Masculinity and femininity are defined in ways that suit and privilege the

SPLA and at the same time subordinate women. In my interview with

Malwal in July 2001 in Nairobi he states:

Women are not supposed to be exposed to

danger. In all the communities in southern

Sudan, arms are carried by men, not by women

and I have never heard of a woman from one

community moving to attack other women, that

simply does not exist. Protection is the duty of

men. The man is supposed to protect her as a

woman, to protect her children and to protect

her properties. So women are passive victims in

134 a game, which they understand to be a game of

men (Malwal, Nuer man, age 50).

The perception that men fight wars while women safely stay with children and the elderly at home has not been realistic for some time. In many conflict zones, the battlefield comes to women working on their land, targets their homes, and kills, abducts and displaces their families.

As in other conflict zones, "where it was once the purview of male soldiers who fought enemy forces on battlefields quite separate from peoples' homes, contemporary conflict blurs such distinctions, rendering civilian women, men and children its main casualties (Giles and

Hyndman 2004:3).

Undoubtedly, southern Sudanese women, namely the Dinka and

Nuer have been more adversely impacted by the war that is raging in their territories. These women and men face distinct disadvantages within their households and communities and constitute an increasing number of war fatalities or casualties. Nevertheless, the characterizations of women as passive victims of armed conflicts is complicated by the fact that women, like men, are actors in times of war in their direct or indirect support of armed conflicts, including their active participation in liberation movements. As Ana, a Nuer women's activist states

135 Southern Sudanese women are not passive

victims. We are fighting everyday wars at our

homes, communities and in exile. The war may

be over, but we will [her emphasis] continue to

fight against discrimination, racism and

intolerance. We will fight for women's equality

and equal representation in the government of

the new Sudan ... I would say that in the

process of the crisis, we were forced to move

from one place to another. As a result, we are

exposed to new culture, new ideas and new

feelings. All of which are making us stronger in

challenging all forms of oppression (Ana, Nuer

women, age 42).

Adut who is a Dinka activist stresses the importance of organizing during the armed conflict and states that

The experiences of women in nationalist

struggles in many countries indicate that it is

easier to eliminate the "enemy" than to eliminate

gender insensitive traditions within our own

136 society. We have seen how our neighbours in

Eritrea were treated after the end of the conflict.

And we do learn from their lessons to organize

and build alliances across class, race, religion,

education, age and so on ... (Adut, Dinka,

feminist activist age 39).

Women's participation in the liberation struggle strengthened a sense of responsibility and created the solidarity to fight for women's rights and bring to the forefront issues such as women's personal autonomy, division of labor within the family and in the society, sexual and reproductive rights, social and political rights, and violence against women.

Women's activism in the National Democratic Alliances and peace movements started before the signing of the CPA. However, the scope of women's activism has expanded since 2003. Since that time many intellectuals, working class women, grassroots women and some of the ex-combatants have been mobilized to fight for women's rights. The southern Sudanese women's movement has expanded to include over thirty women's organizations in Nairobi alone. Moreover, organizations such as the Sudanese Women's Voice for Peace, an association of

137 southern and northern women, aims to have women's voices heard in the process of peace-building - at both domestic and international levels.

Women activists such as Adut have articulated that the voices of women, including refugee women, must be heard if civil society is to play its fundamental role in building a peace,

We met in the Netherlands in preparation for the

CPA to ensure that women's issues are

integrated in the peace agreement, and for fair

representation of women. We specifically

demanded that the UN and INGOs provide

appropriate assistance to Sudanese refugee

women, in areas such as empowerment,

capacity building, advocacy and development

(Adut, Dinka activist, age 39).

Southern Sudanese women are using strategies of daily resistance to challenge the oppressive norms and laws that discriminate against them. Their slogan is "we will not yield." Some of their activities have included protests, demonstrations and hunger strikes. As Ana affirms

"southern Sudanese women are fighting for an independent southern

138 territory, but we want it to be democratic, secular, and supportive of gender equality".

To reiterate, during the national liberation struggle, appropriate gender roles and behaviour were defined in a way that constrained

Sudanese women's activities and activism. However, southern Sudanese women are not passive victims; they are actors. They have always resisted within the limited resources available to them. As Ana illustrates, community disruption as a result of the violent processes of armed conflict and displacement have led to significant changes in gender roles and relationships within the southern Sudanese communities. Subsequently, as the next section outlines, gender links the violence of war at its various stages and boundaries to broader interests: the social, economic, political, national and the transnational.

Gendered Patterns of Resource Driven Development in Sudan

The history of development in Sudan, most notably resource extraction, has persistently been gendered and racialized. In Sudan, development practices through resource extraction have often marginalized women and ethnic minority groups. More recently, the globalization of this process has served to reinforce the interests of global

139 hegemonic transnational corporations, national governments and local privileged individuals/groups (Muggah 2000).

The processes of resource extraction have significantly changed from "small scale operations exploiting easily accessible deposits to large, vertically integrated, capital intensive transnational corporations characterized by oligopolistic competition" (Reed 2002:199). More significantly, resource extraction industries have relocated their operations from developed to developing countries. Intentionally or indirectly, the consequence of such relocations is to increase the vulnerability of the more marginalized segments of their populations across gender, class, ethnic, religious and racial lines (Vandergeest,

Idahosa and Bose 2007).

In Sudan, post-colonial governments in the 1960s promoted the agricultural-based industrial sector, and enhanced the production of sugar, cotton and food. However, Sudan lacked the major prerequisites needed for industrialization, namely, capital, technical and scientific expertise and markets. This necessitated the shift from attempts to industrialize (including agribusiness) to extracting natural resources that were mainly located in the south. Large-scale development projects such

140 as dams, agricultural schemes and oil exploration were established

(Suliman 1999:88-89).

One of the most ambitious large-scale projects was the construction of the Aswan Dam in 1964 in southern Egypt. This dam created , which extended into northern Sudan and resulted in the displacement of large communities of Sudanese Nubians. To clear the way for the project, they were forcibly evicted from their homeland along the Nile and resettled through the New Haifa irrigation scheme.

Both Nubian men and women were impoverished by the resettlement

(Colson 1999: 26), but Nubian women were more disproportionately affected. After the displacement and resettlement processes, these women not only lost their traditional support systems within extended families and communities, but also lost ownership rights to land around the Nile, which had provided them with economic security in the past.

Furthermore, Nubian women lost independent sources of income in their new location because they no longer had access to subsistence food production. Consequently, they became dependent on their husbands, who gained strict control over the cash crop production of cotton for export. This meant that men began to monopolize household income and resources in New Haifa (ibid.).

141 In southern Sudan, development projects such as the Jongeli

Canal drained the marshes of the at Jongeli city in the south in order to increase the flow of water downstream for the irrigation of fertile land in the north. Changes to the canal directly affected the traditional modes of livelihood of the local communities and forcibly displaced groups such as the Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, Murle, Bari and

Anuk (Suliman 1999:89). Construction impacted women and men in gender specific ways. Since the communities affected were traditionally agriculturalists and agro-pastoralists, many women could not transfer the skill sets that would enable them to survive in urban centers. In addition, these groups of women faced a disintegration of community that resulted in an understandable lament for their loss of traditional support systems within their extended families and communities, as well as for their customary rights over land (Amin 1981). These groups of women, therefore, lost independent sources of income, namely, subsistence food production, and thus became further marginalized. For these women, development projects reinforced new forms of vulnerability and dependency.

Development projects including the Jongeli Canal and the Aswan

Dam have resulted in displacement and in the impoverishment of the

142 Nubian communities in northern Sudan and communities including the

Dinka and Nuer in the south. Women and men within these communities were distinctly affected. However, the violence associated with the combined phenomena of militarization and oil-induced displacement in southern Sudan, as the next section examines, sets it apart from such previous development-induced displacement in Sudan.

In the Name of Development: Oil-Induced Displacement in Sudan

The oilfield project was proposed as a "development" project that should have, it was often argued, been a "catalyst for economic and social development that [would] ultimately improve the standard of living in Sudan" (Harker 2000: 15). In reality, however, there has been a violent military occupation of the oil region and the practices of oil production and development induced displacement have been based upon destroying harvests and looting livestock in order to prevent the return of the displaced population. Adut, a Dinka activist contests the characterization that oil contributes to development in southern Sudan:

I don't call what has happened in my region

[southern Kordofan] oil "development". It is a

policy of the government in Khartoum to get oil

143 at any cost. Millions of people were killed in

order to get oil. Young children were killed in the

bush. The government's Antonovs and gunships

killed thousands and thousands of our people.

Hundreds of villages in our territories were

destroyed. Our cattle were killed and the natural

environment is polluted. Our communities are

even poorer that before. And the whole region

lacks basic goods and services; there is no

education, health services or clean water to

drink, and they call this development? (Adut,

Dinka woman, age 39).

A similar story was reiterated by Magot, a Dinka man who rejects the notion that oil production in a context of war is a development project. He describes the indiscriminate killing and violent displacement in his village:

I would say that there used to be around 400

people in our village in western Upper Nile. They

were mainly Dinka as well as few other tribes.

We used to live by herding our animals and

144 cultivating the land. We move during the rainy

season to places where there is green grass and

pure water ... then, the Arab government and

foreign companies started digging for oil. My

village was completely destroyed. They killed a

hundred on one day, among them were my

parents, my sister and three of my brothers. We

had no warning that they were coming to kill

and displace us in order to take our oil. The next

day, government militias came in the evening

and destroyed everything, including the graves

of our ancestors, nothing was left in the village

(Magot, Dinka man, age 36).

Yii, a Dinka man echoes the aforementioned:

In July, 2000, government militias attacked my

village, Nhialdiu. They burned every hut and

displaced all of us ... the militias rounded up the

elderly, put them in one hut and burned them

alive... they also killed many of our young

145 children on the same day (Yii, Dinka man,age

37)

The oil field projects in southern Sudan reveal an extreme violence that involves exceedingly chaotic displacement, the massive loss of lives, and in most cases, the complete destruction of the means of livelihood.

Indeed, elements of both development and war converge to exacerbate the economic and military processes of displacement. The oilfield project has directly implicated Western/foreign capital in the domestic war, as well as extended the extremely violent processes of the militarized displacement of the Dinka and the Nuer communities from the contested oil territories.

Indeed, oil and the control of the rich oil territories in the south have been central to the war between the north and the south (Kebbede

1999: 44; Jok 1999: 429). Since the late 1970s, skewed resource allocation has compounded the conflict and further fuelled the war through the discovery, expansion, and exploitation of southern oil by a partnership between the Sudanese Islamist state and transnational oil companies.32

32 Due to the importance of oil to countries around the world, particularly its strategic importance, it is no longer clear where the distinction between private and national interests lie. Private companies

146 Oil exploration33 in the contested territories of southern Sudan began in 1978 when Chevron was granted a concession to construct an oil pipeline that extended from the southern oilfields to northeastern oil refineries located at Port Sudan, on the Red Sea coast. Oil, moreover, was the main cause of the resumption of the war in 1984 and massive displacement of southern communities. For instance, the government forcibly displaced tens of thousands of Dinka and Nuer civilians to open the way for oil exploration in the Western Upper Nile. Immediately after the war started, the SPLM/A declared oil infrastructures and personnel as military targets, killing three Chevron expatriate staff and injuring six during an assault in 1984. This attack led to the suspension of

Chevron's operations later that year (Human Rights Watch 2003a).

have a stake in oil regions, as do national oil companies and governments. 33 Oil exploration in Sudan started when Italy's Agip was granted concessions in the Red Sea area in 1959. It was not until 1978, however, that Chevron, operator of a consortium in which Shell took a 25% interest, discovered massive amounts of oil in Western Upper Nile region.

147 Map 2: Oil Fields in Sudan (Miller 2003)

B\mm Oil and HoWn« 1 lUMyl 4 -, •* 14 a (Htgtlgji t * 1 * (KtlkiHttf i» / 31. ijomA, icmci

i«s| " "duMI I P .- «*

if R*»t«t} $i

titeftl

Since 1978, the main on-stream oil concessions in Sudan (see Map

2) are administered by the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company

148 (GNPOC), a Sudanese parastatal, which, in partnership with the various multinational corporations,34 develops oil deposits in the region south of

Kordofan known as Heglig, as well as in the Unity State, a region around the Western Upper Nile. Since 1998, Talisman Energy, Canada's largest independent oil and gas Exploration Company has operated in Sudan.35

As Mr. John, senior Talisman Energy employee, states:

The oilfield project that Talisman operates

includes a 1,500-kilometer pipeline from the

southern oil fields to Port Sudan. The total oil

production averaged 304,000 barrels a day in

2004, up from 270,000 b/d in 2003. This is a

development project that has in fact benefited

34 In 1981, Chevron made a second discovery in a predominantly Dinka area east of the White Nile. Chevron was forced to stop drilling for oil in 1984 after the murder of three of its workers by the SPLA. The Canadian company Arakis Energy explored for oil between 1990 and 1998. 35 Since 1998, substantial deposits of oil were discovered in the contested region of Western Upper Nile and Bahar El Ghazal provinces in southern Sudan (see Map 2). The Islamic military government in the north began large-scale production of oil in 1999 in collaboration with international oil companies like Canada's Talisman Energy, Sweden's Lundin Oil, Malaysia's Petronas and China's state owned China National Petroleum Corporation. In November 2003, Talisman sold its 25 percent interest in the consortium to ONGC Videsh Ltd., a subsidiary of India's national oil company Other companies involved in the GNPOC include the National Iranian Gas Company; Gulf Petroleum Company, Qatar; Royal Dutch Shell; Agip, Italy; and Total Fina, France.

149 the local communities and enhanced their well-

being ... the stories that the media report which

allege that the oil field is causing displacement

and violence are not founded (Mr. John, a

Canadian man, Talisman Energy employee).

However, various reports (Gagnon and Ryle 2001; Harker 2000) have documented that gunships regularly fly sorties from Heglig, attacking civilian settlements as part of an ongoing campaign to control territory that could be used for oil development. Such military action clearly illustrates that oil not only caused the war, it also increased the scale of the conflict because oil revenues were reinvested into the war. In fact, oil revenues, which currently make up half of Sudan's annual war budget, were greatly increased by global capital, technology and expertise

(CEOS 2006).

Idahosa (2002) argues that, beginning in 1998, displacement increased due to intensified oil exploration and drilling in the Western

Upper Nile territories and the shipping of crude oil to the Red Sea, as

Map 2 illustrates. It was at this time that oil development and counterinsurgency came together. Approximately 85 percent of southern

Sudan's population has been forcibly displaced since the discovery of oil

150 in 1983, destroying much of the region's indigenous production and trade infrastructure (Idahosa 2002: 11).

Areas near oil installations became targets for southern insurgents in 1998; their actions escalated the struggle and expanded its zones, all of which increased human displacement and exacerbated parallel conflicts among rival rebel groups. In turn, this led directly to an oil- induced famine in the Western Upper Nile region in February 2001 (ibid).

This pattern of oil-induced displacement has created socioeconomic chaos in its destruction of established trade patterns among various ethnic groups, leading to massive human rights violations and human insecurity (Macklin 2004). Mary, a Dinka woman, states:

If they [the oil companies] are giving us

development, they must make sure that we have

an equal share in it. They must make sure that

the southern Sudanese are also benefiting from

development. But where are we now? ... Nobody

thought of us ... For any development to happen,

we must see that we obtain peace. You cannot

have development when war is taking place, and

151 while there is fighting and bombardment (Mary,

Dinka woman, age 43).

The oilfields project has not been a "catalyst for development," but rather a mechanism to serve the interests of the Sudanese government through the oil companies' goal of securing global capitalist interests

(Macklin 2004). The marginalized Dinka and Nuer groups reject the idea that the oil operation is legitimate economic development. One of the women interviewed by members of the Canadian Fact Finding Mission, for example, describes the dismal conditions of those affected by the oilfields project:

The people here are displaced, there are many

diseases, water is polluted ... civilians, cattle and

children have been killed and our tukuls (houses)

burnt. The discovery of oil has caused these problems

- before in the 1970s and 1980s the northern

(governments) were not able to exploit the oil but now

they can with the help of the west (Harker 2000: 85).

Those who have suffered forcible displacement believe that they have been 'harmed' by the 'presumed' benefits of development. Both women and men have been devastated by the violent experiences of

152 displacement when oil and the war intersect. Women, however, faced further gender specific disadvantages not always recognized or addressed by the mainstream frameworks of development-induced displacement

(Cernea 1996; McDowell 1996). For instance, many of the participants repeated emotional accounts of their experiences of rape. Ayak, age 43, states:

We were raped more than once by government

militias, when we were fleeing our villages. They

took my sister to the bush, and six of the

military soldiers took turns raping her, she was

unconscious but they did not care they kept

raping her over and over again ...we were also

raped when we went to collect firewood so that

we could cook something for our children ... the

Arab militia followed us to take what we had and

rape us. When they finished they shot at us.

Two of my friends were killed. I was hit in the leg

but managed to escape (Ayak, Dinka woman,

age 43).

153 The militarized processes of displacement are compounded by the political, as well as the legal context of violence. Significantly, the

Sudanese state is not party to the Convention on the Elimination of All

Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Such indifference to what many consider a fundamental protocol of human rights clearly draws upon a complex history of women's subordination in Sudan. Such a lack of concern has contributed to a disregard for violence against women and to the indiscriminate aerial bombing and the razing of areas and villages where women engaged in their daily activities.

Similarly, when coupled with a deep history of bondage and of generalized violence against women, this indifference has unsurprisingly expanded the number of abductions, rapes and non-combatant deaths of women. If gender issues are not articulated in the analysis of such situations, then assessing those affected by violence becomes impossible, and accessing the views of those caught between the costs and benefits of the projects that displace them, becomes problematic.

Large-scale ethnic marginalization in Sudan, and the corresponding oil-induced displacement practices adversely affected the

Dinka and the Nuer. It has also resulted in the rejection of the idea that the oil operation is a legitimate economic development. Among the Dinka

154 and Nuer communities, women are equally articulate in voicing this rejection.

The [Sudanese] government and oil companies

are displacing us to use our land. The people here

resisted. They refused to leave their homes. In my

presence, twenty-one of them were shot dead.

When the rest saw the twenty-one people dead,

they were forced to flee the land ... we walked for

fourteen days without food; most of the children

lost their lives. Oil production is causing these

problems. Now northern Sudanese governments

with the help of oil companies are forcibly

displacing and killing us, and that is not fair (Aza,

Nuer woman, age 47).

The GNPOC and the military government of Sudan view the population of the south with suspicion, particularly those people in close proximity to oil-rich regions and to oil infrastructure such as pipelines.

They see southern men as either directly or indirectly involved in fighting and southern women as offering food and support to opposition groups.

Since they are regarded as potentially jeopardizing the government's oil

155 operation, Dinka and Nuer men and women have become targets of violence and forcible displacement.

An examination of the cost of war goes beyond macro-economic statistics and should take into account the human cost of the oil-induced war. Since 1983, about two million people have been killed and over 4.5 million men and women have been displaced from the oilfield territories in Sudan (Amnesty International 2000: 7; Idahosa 2002: 225), challenging the core premise of development as an enhancement of human well-being. Despite the claims of much mainstream development- induced displacement discourse, which promotes development projects under certain circumstances using approved practices, primarily because they are supposed to generate benefits to the displaced, oil exploration in

Sudan reveals displacement to be a deliberately oppressive destruction of the oil fields for development. Moreover, conscription to fight in the war resulted in a considerable number of men and some women being taken out of the productive process for extensive periods of time. It is difficult to calculate the cost of these factors. How much will the country have to pay to rebuild displaced communities and a traumatized people and what will be the price of lost opportunities and lives?

156 Conclusion

This chapter has examined how a history of conflict and development have intersected to produce gendered, militarized, violent and chaotic patterns of displacement among the Dinka and Nuer communities in southern Sudan. The situation in Sudan illustrates that under the guise of development, oil exploration and production comes at a tremendous human cost, especially when combined with militarized conflict. Few countries in the world have not had some kind of conflict induced by a contestation over resources, wherein the state or the transnational corporations extracting resources have argued that resource development will improve the well-being of all interested parties.

In the case of the Sudan, as elsewhere, it less about development, which may or not take place, but more about the uses to which these resources have been put: keeping a government in power through force of arms.

One need only think of Columbia, Nigeria, and numerous other places throughout the third world, to underline the point that where development projects take place there will be beneficiaries, but not always development. As well, those people who are considered to be obstacles to resource utilization, defined self-servingly as "development", are often displaced with the most brutal violence. The participants'

157 stories in this dissertation reveal extreme violence, which involves exceedingly chaotic displacement, a massive loss of lives and the complete destruction of the means of livelihood. These conditions are directly associated with the phenomena of militarization combined with oil-induced displacement in southern Sudan.

By presenting the voices and experiences of my research participants in this chapter (as well as those to come), I show southern

Sudanese women and men to be powerful advocates for their rights despite enormously difficult circumstances. Their experiences of conflict and displacement are complex and continuously changing as the conflict/post conflict processes evolve.

I have argued in this chapter that the Dinka and Nuer women's experiences of conflict, displacement and transformation are not isolated from the broader socio-economic, political, cultural and nationalist processes of collective struggles. Indeed, prior to their displacement, significant changes in Dinka and Nuer gender roles and relationships are directly linked to the gains that Sudanese women's movements have achieved since the 1940s, which include political rights; relative protections under the law; the struggle for democratic rights and values; solidarity work; and most of all in addressing the structures of inequality

158 that shape the wider political and economic environment. The rich yet contested history of the Sudanese the women's movement constitutes a solid ground for the radical changes in gender roles and relationships constituted by violent experiences of displacement.

In Chapter Four, I will examine the specific shifts in gender values and roles prior to the forced displacement of Nuer and Dinka women and men to Kenya and Uganda. Moreover, the next chapter will argue that the extreme violence of oil-induced displacement coupled with militarized conflict provides a context for understanding the changing nature of gender relationships of power among the Dinka and Nuer.

159 Chapter Four

"Everything Was in Place When We Were Home": Shifting Gender, Social and Cultural Boundaries

Everything was in place when we were home. We

lived the way our ancestors did. We loved our

land and people. We loved our traditions, the

good ones, and struggled to change the bad ones

... But now everything is gone because of war

and displacement... (Ana, Nuer women's activist,

age 42).

Introduction

This chapter addresses social institutions, cultural practices and perceptions that have played a significant role in shaping and influencing

Dinka and Nuer women's and men's position in southern Sudan prior to their displacement. It examines the gendered relationships of power within the Dinka and Nuer society that arise from social and cultural institutions and expectations. In Sudan generally and southern Sudan more specifically, gender relations expose the ways women and men interact and are often characterized by unequal access to power, resources and decision-making processes. As a result, gender relations

160 embody institutionalized discriminatory values and attitudes, particularly towards women and girls. However, gendered perceptions and values are not fixed, but are processes that change over time. By examining the patriarchal relations of power within the Dinka and Nuer societies prior to their displacement, this chapter attempts to provide the context necessary to understanding processes of change and transformation during periods of militarized conflict and displacement. I argue that stereotypical assumptions about gendered roles and relationships are created and sustained by individuals, as well as social and cultural institutions such as households, communities, schools and workplaces. Indeed, "it is these institutions which reinforce and perpetuate gender discrimination, and it is these institutions which must be challenged if gender injustice is to be transformed into equality of treatment, opportunity and rights" (El Bushra 2000:3).

Subjective Constructions of Sudanese Identities

Sudan's population is estimated at 42 million (Witthoft 2007). Due to the lack of water in most northern desert parts of the country, half the population lives on about 15 percent of the land, along the Nile and its branches. The Sudanese people are characterized by a high degree of

161 heterogeneity in ethnic identification, cultures, languages and religions.

They comprise over 500 ethnic groups36 who speak more than a hundred different languages and dialects. Arabic is the national and official language of the country while English is used as an official language in the southern territories. Sunni Islam is practiced by about 70% of the

Sudanese population who live in the northern two-thirds of the country

(Sidahmed and Sidahmed 2005: 13). In the south, 25% practice traditional African beliefs while five percent are Christians. In terms of gender, the ratio of males to females at birth is 1.05, and the life expectancy for Sudanese women is estimated at 58 years while it is 55 years for men (ibid).

There are about eight million people living in southern Sudan

(Human Rights Watch 2003a). It is estimated that the armed conflict has killed 25% of the southern Sudanese population and skewed the population structures so that young persons under 15 years make up

53% of the population (Jok 2001). Moreover, due to the large number of men who were either killed or displaced during the armed conflict,

36 In 1956 census, the only ethnic census taken, the composition of ethnic groups was 52 % black (Dinka were the largest group, comprising 12% of the total population), 39% Arab (the predominant cultural group in the north), 6% Beja (in the east) and 3% "other" (Sidahmed and Sidahmed 2005: 13).

162 females are estimated to comprise about 55% of the population in 2005

(Hale 2005). Indeed, women have had to take on a wide range of responsibilities that they did not have before the conflict and displacement, challenging family dynamics in a largely hierarchical male- dominated society (ibid; Jok 2001).

Southern Sudanese are heterogeneous communities and include broader ethnic groups such as Dinka, Nuer, Azande, Bongo Didinga,

Lotuko and Shilluk (Kulusika 1998:25). My dissertation focuses on the

Dinka and Nuer refugees because the government of Sudan practiced a

'scorched earth' policy to clear the land of the Dinka and Nuer communities in order to make way for the exploration and exploitation of oil in their territories. As a result, a significant number of the refugees who were forced to flee to Kenya and Uganda were Dinka and Nuer.

Dinka and Nuer Profiles

The Dinka37 and Nuer are branches of the Nilotic groups who have historically been associated with the Nile River. The Dinka are considered the largest ethnic group in the south (Beswick 2001).

37 Though known for centuries as Dinka, they commonly identify themselves as Moinjaang, meaning the "people of the people" (Beswick 2001).

163 Map 3: Ethnic Geography in the South (Human Rights Watch 2003c)

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164 The Dinka are tall, slender people who graze their cattle in the grasslands between the White Nile and its western tributaries, as Map 3 illustrates. Although many of the Dinka maintain traditional pastoral activities, some are fishers while others engage in agriculture and grow grains, peanuts, beans, and corn among other crops. The cattle are central to the Dinka culture and identity (ibid). The Nuer communities, on the other hand, are one of anthropology's most celebrated indigenous peoples. Hutchinson (1996) states that the Nuer have been more widely theorized about than any other "imagined community within the anthropological discourse" (Hutchinson 1996:21). They engage in agro- pastoral activities, grow sorghum and raise cattle. Their activities require semi-annual migration between marsh-laden savanna land and the major tributaries of the Upper White Nile (see Map 3). The Nuer are an egalitarian community. Their political organizations are predominately based on kinship and residency affiliation.

In contrast to the people of the south, the northern Sudanese have historically been identified with Arabic culture and language and with

Islam. However, ethnic groups within the north are, also, characterized by a high degree of heterogeneity in ethno-linguistic, cultural and religious traits. They include tribes such as the Beja, Danagla,

165 Hadandwa, Jaleen, Mahas and Rubatab (AbuSharaf 2002:2-5).

Nevertheless, the Arabic elite in the north have historically dominated the executive and legislative branches of state power and have controlled the economy. The majority of the Sudanese populations such as the Beija in the east, the Nubians in the north and ethnic groups in Darfur and the in the west (ibid:5), are marginalized. Although these groups have historically been oppressed, the degree of their marginalization varies depending upon gender, ethnicity, class and access to power and resources.

To reiterate, neither the south nor the north represents a homogeneous group of Sudanese people. There are noted differences between and within the two parts of the country, yet, since the eighth century, Arab travelers and later European explorers and anthropologists

(Baker 1866; Seligman and Seligman 1932; Evans-Pritchard 1940) have classified the people of Sudan into binaries on the basis of geography

(north versus south), ethnicity (Arabs versus Africans) and religion

(Muslims versus Christians). Consequently, the north has been identified with Arabic culture and language and the south has been considered a region populated by "people without history" (Idris 2001:15). Idris argues, "The northern Sudanese have become known as Arabs, Muslims

166 and 'civilized' whereas the southern Sudanese have been labelled 'black',

'heathen' and 'primitive'" (ibid). These polarities have set the context for the exploitation of southern communities and their wealth of resources.

For example, during Turkish-Egyptian rule between 1820 and 1882, the

Dinka communities in southern Sudan experienced the "worst slavery anywhere in the world" when around two million southerners were sold to Arab, European, Egyptian and Turkish traders (Idahosa 2002).

Furthermore, Islam as a dominant religion, and Islamization and

Arabization38 as political strategies imposed by post-colonial governments with the aim of assimilation, have had devastating consequences for marginalized segments of the Sudanese society. The government's denial of southern identity is articulated by the leader of the dominant Umma Party and former Prime Minster of Sudan, who states,

The dominant feature of our nation is an Islamic

one and its over-powering expression is Arab,

and this nation will not have its entity identified

and its prestige and pride perceived except

38 Beginning in the 1920s, scholarship on Sudan has equated Islam with Arabism, a term that consolidates race, ethnicity and culture (Idris 2001; Jok 2002).

167 under an Islamic revival (Ali and Matthews

1999: 201).

Due to histories of systemic racism and slavery, the southern

Sudanese people have been persistently been perceived by northerners as 'sub-humans' (Idris 2001:15). This perception is illustrated by the statement of a prominent Minister of the Interior in the military government of Gaafar Nimeiri (1969-85):

Most of its [the south] inhabitants are heathens

who worship stones, trees, crocodiles, the sun,

etc. ... All this presents a civilizing challenge to

all of us as Arabs... Southerners are not credited

with a sense of historic development or

progressive engagement with the world (Idris

2001:17).

These claims by prominent Sudanese politicians can only point to the enormity of northern Sudanese ethnocentrism, chauvinism, and racism that has been embedded in a violent, oppressive history. The most marginalized women and men are, with the exceptions of the Beja and Nubians, blacks from southern Sudan, the Darfur region and the southern Blue Nile (Nyok Kok 1994: 37). Deng (1995) states:

168 Northern Sudanese see themselves as Arabs and

deny the strongly African element in their skin

color and physical features. This denial of the

African element is grounded in their perception

and association of these features with the

Negroid race... [northerners] see it as the mother

race of slaves, inferior and demeaned (Deng

1995:3).

Southern Sudanese scholars such as Deng (1995), Jok (2002) and

Nyok Kok (1994), as well as the Dinka and Nuer participants in this dissertation view themselves as people with a cultural heritage and moral values. They perceive the northerners as people who are "confused" about their own origin. For instance, Choi, a Dinka woman, observes

Northerners think that they are Arab, but look

at their skin color and features, they have no

resemblance to the Arabs, other than their

Arabic language ... We are the indigenous

population of Sudan. Our Nilotic cultures,

values and histories are deep. We are the origin

of this country and our liberation struggle aims

169 at transforming oppressive power relations and

building a new peaceful and democratic Sudan

(Choi, Dinka woman, age 28).

I have examined the subjective and contested construction of

Sudanese identities in this section in order to make two basic points.

First, there are shifting ethnographic constructions that play a central role in the complex historical characterization of the Sudanese39 people.

Constructing Sudan's people through binaries such as the northerners- southerners has not only distorted the understanding of the complexity of Sudanese identities and politics but more importantly has suppressed ethno-racial (Arab-African) and religious (Muslim-Christian) diversity.

Nevertheless, the north-south axis is significant to my dissertation because it specifically reflects the perception of Dinka and Nuer as

"primitive" and even "less than human". Second, this perception has made southerners easy subjects for the brutal exploitation of one of the most violent conflicts in Africa. Southerners reside on resource rich land, but are not subjects of development; rather, they are obstacles to and

39 Indeed, for De Waal (2007), the construction of Sudan's Nilo-centrism running though the North-South moral geographies has been made especially clear in the context of the conflict in Darfur. This has obscured locally formed and regionally established histories, relationships, and influences from, for instance, West Africa and Sufism.

170 objects of exploitation. Indeed, dehumanization is used to legitimize violence against southerners, particularly the Dinka and Nuer women, men and children in order to control their territories.

To reiterate, despite the heterogeneity of the Sudanese ethnic identification, cultures, languages, religions and histories, common gendered features and systems position Dinka and Nuer women and men differently within their societies. Amin (1981) argues that patriarchal gender roles within the Sudanese society at large and the Dinka and

Nuer communities, more specifically, place women in an inferior position to men. Men control the productive, reproductive and community aspects of their families. They assume social roles for the representation of their family, as well as the role of main economic providers (Amin 1981: 198).

In the next section, I will examine gender relations in southern Sudan.

These relationships of power encompass elements that include gender ideologies, gender roles, and gendered institutions.

Gender Relations of Power within the Dinka and Nuer Societies Prior to Displacement:

Since gender relations is a contested term that has various

connotations, I examine the changes in gender relations through an

171 exploration of distinct yet interconnected gendered elements: i) gender ideologies, ii) gender roles (household economics and sexual division of labour), and iii) gendered institutions (marriage and family). Gender ideologies inform the value and belief systems that underpin gender relations; gender identities describe socially accepted patterns of behaviour expected of women and men; gender roles embody various tasks expected of women and men in the division of labour; and gendered institutions include the refugee camp, the household, the community, as well as national and international sites.

i) Gender Ideologies

Prior to their displacement, strict patriarchal ideologies and values governed both Dinka and Nuer communities. Patriarchal notions of femininity and masculinity are central in shaping such gendered identities and institutions. For instance, a famous Nuer saying that was commonly referred to by my research participants states that "the man should be the ruler of the home, and his wife should unquestioningly act according to his will." That explains why in the Dinka and Nuer communities, male children were given preference over females. Anisia, a

Nuer woman, recalls that

172 Back home, male children were preferred to

females because they were considered to be the

heirs of the family lineage. It is believed that

girls would get married off to other families while

boys carry and preserve the family's name and

heritage. Therefore, in my village (in Eastern

Upper Nile) there was a lot of pressure on

pregnant women, from their families and in­

laws, to give birth to male children. Not bearing

boys is often considered as a woman's fault.

That is why some men feel justified in marrying

a second wife [or more wives] in order to give

birth to a male successor (Anisia, a Nuer

woman, age 60).

As Anisia illustrates, boys are generally given preference over girls.

Since early childhood, Dinka and Nuer girls and boys are socialized to occupy strict gendered behaviors and roles. Children are taught to respect and obey their parents and the elderly, particularly male figures.

Females are obliged to obey their male relatives when they are young, and such obedience is automatically transferred to their husbands and

173 male in-laws upon marriage. Bakhita Amin (1981) states that the ideal

Dinka and Nuer woman is the one who is "hardworking, thrifty, and caring for her family, to which she is expected to be loyal, respectful and submissive" (Amin 1981: 201).

My fieldwork, however, revealed that in terms of the gendered dynamics in Sudan, the Dinka and Nuer communities, who have been displaced to Kenya and Uganda, exhibit shifting perceptions about gender roles and relationships. Some interviewees, particularly men, often misconceived or rejected ideas about gender inequalities on the grounds that they are Western constructs and, therefore, culturally inappropriate to Sudan. For example, Lual, a male SPLM leader states,

How can we talk about women's rights in the

context of forcible displacement, war and

suffering? During the current crises in Sudan

both women's and men's rights are violated by

the military government and by the

multinational oil companies. I think that talking

about women's and gender issues at this time is

a luxury that we cannot afford to engage in. This

focus on gender relations and feminism is a

174 Western concept that is foreign to our culture

and social values. Even our women do not

embrace it because they understand that it is

the woman's responsibility to take care of her

husband, children and household while the

man's job is to provide for his family members,

protect them and defend the country (Lual,

Dinka man, age 57).

Specifically referring to the SPLM, some of the interviewed women expressed more of a concern over institutional gender discrimination.

Susan, an activist who has been an active member of the SPLM's women's wing in Nairobi states that

The SPLM have taken an approach of "peace

first, rights later". They prioritize human rights

first, children's rights second and then women's

rights last. They tell us [SPLM female activists]

that peace is for everybody, human rights are for

everybody, children's rights are for everybody.

But our men think that if we give rights to

women to be free, then they will come out of the

175 kitchen - and who will be in the kitchen then?

(Susan, Nuer woman, age 49).

Also, Adut, one of the activist Dinka interviewees asserts that,

Women have historically been oppressed within

the Sudanese society. Negative traditional

attitudes towards women have always existed.

Women are discriminated against in Sudanese

society, and they face even worse problems

during this difficult period of displacement. Our

politicians do not take women's issues and

concerns seriously because men are making ALL

the decisions. If a woman has got brilliant ideas,

her ideas are not accepted as such. For a very

long time, women have been left behind. We are

constantly told by our spouses and leaders to

forget about 'selfish' gendered demands... but

that has to stop ... The skills, values and

attitude that we have acquired as women in exile

have changed us. We will NEVER [her emphasis]

be the same individuals again, and there is no

176 going back to old Sudan ... the values we have

now acquired do not make us less Sudanese"

(Adut, Dinka woman, age 39).

Furthermore, activists such as Adut and Susan raised concerns that gender frameworks, as often defined by development and humanitarian agencies, divert scarce economic resources away from programs that used to mitigate specific vulnerabilities experienced by women and girls in order to focus more broadly on women and men.

More specifically, Adut stresses the need to concentrate on economic and political institutions and structures in which women/girls continue to be underrepresented.

Women's groups are struggling to survive and

struggling to affect change in other women's

lives. Our funding has been significantly cut.

Compare this to our male colleagues who have

decent accommodation, access to cars for

transportation, and other necessary means to

function. Taking myself as an example, I am

really struggling. Recently, my landlord evicted

my family and I had to ask some of my relatives

177 who live in the west for financial support. I

believe that in order for us [as women's

organizations] to empower the many categories

of women who come to us asking for assistance,

we need adequate funding, personnel and basic

services (Adut, Dinka woman, age 39).

To reiterate, I have argued, so far, that gender perceptions were historically defined in ways that privilege male-dominated structures while, at the same time, they subordinated women. However, gender values are not static but rather changing very rapidly and radically in

Sudan. As noted by Scott (1989), gender has become a useful and almost inescapable concept in women's studies and feminist theory. However, the divisions between male and female are not as fixed and clear cut as once thought. Militarized displacement and conflict have created the space for many women such as Adut and Susan to question, negotiate and redefine, on their own terms, gender sensitive identities and relationships. In order to better understand these processes of transformation and change, the next section examines the contested gendered roles and relationships within the Dinka and Nuer

178 communities prior to their forcible displacement from the oilfield territories in southern Sudan, to Kenya and Uganda.

ii) Gender Roles: Household Economics/Sexual Division of Labour

The gender division of labor embodies the daily roles and responsibilities that women and men are expected to perform within their households and communities. The boundaries between the public and private domains have historically been defined by the nature of work that women and men perform. Certainly, Dinka and Nuer men depend upon women for several aspects of their lives, but the division of labor assigns certain 'public' functions to the men, such as fishing and herding, periodic hunting and feeding the cattle. In contrast, women are responsible for 'private' household activities, including managing the household, taking care of the children and extended families, preparing and serving meals, cleaning the home, milking the cows and farming. As

Mama, a Dinka activist recalls,

In the past, the roles played by women and men

within southern Sudanese households and in

the society were clearly defined. In rural areas,

men were responsible for building houses and

179 providing all the household necessities. Rural

women on the other hand, fetch water, collect

firewood, store wild food and cook. In urban

areas, men bring money to the household, they

pay for school fees and provide women and

children clothing while women take complete

care of their families (Mama, Dinka woman, age

65).

Also, in describing the gendered division of labor within the Dinka and

Nuer households prior to displacement Kuat states

Within the households, women take care of the

family and perform all domestic chores such as

cleaning, cooking and caring for the family. Girls

learn to cook at an early age, but boys are not

required to. Women are also responsible for

planting and preparing the food. Men engage in

trading, hunting and feeding the cattle but they

do not participate in the domestic work because

that has traditionally been the women's job

(Kuat, a Dinka man, age 54).

180 Historically, the Dinka and Nuer subsistence economy revolved around elements such as livestock, principally cattle, agriculture, trade, and wild foods. For example, the ownership of cattle dominated almost all sectors of the Dinka and Nuer economy. Cattle are significant to acquiring political power and prestige in the Dinka and Nuer communities. Furthermore, the importance of cattle in their culture is also evident in their religion. Early anthropologists, such as Evans

Pritchard (1940), state that most Dinka and Nuer societies practiced traditional religions that involved totemic worship of a high god, ancestral spirits and deities. Their religious practices consisted of animal sacrifices, particularly a cow, at the beginning of the rainy season and for the blessing of the crops. Such traditional ceremonies have historically connected cattle and masculinity and have only been performed by adult men (ibid). Moreover, the Dinka and Nuer rely on subsistence agricultural production. They cultivate crops such as durum, sorghum, groundnuts, sesame and millet.

Furthermore, the Dinka and Nuer maintain gender-based specific roles for women, men, and children. Women, for instance, are mainly responsible for the majority of subsistence agricultural work while men are largely responsible for herding, fishing, hunting, as well as preparing

181 farm land. While the men tend the cattle, boys tend sheep and goats

(Nyok Kok 1994: 37). It is the gendered responsibility of the women to collect wild food from the bush, which the Dinka and Nuer community depends on. Gathering food and firewood is a gender role that has historically exposed women to gender-based violence, specifically rape.

In the Dinka and Nuer communities in southern Sudan, women and girl's roles are confined to the "private domains," which includes their homes and land assigned for agricultural activities, particularly in rural areas. Women cannot own land, and they cannot have access to credit unless they have permission from their male spouses. Women's activities within the private domains were historically institutionalized in the structures of the family and community. Anisia points out

We used to cultivate our land in upper Nile and

feed our families. It did not matter to us who

owned the land at the time as the family allowed

us to use it season after season. If you needed

money to buy seed or fertilizers, your male

spouse (husband or father) would get if for you

from the bank or borrow it, and you would repay

it after the harvest... yes, we did experience

182 discrimination but overall we were valued,

respected and taken care of (Anisia, a Nuer

woman, age 60).

Certainly, women found recognition and value in their roles as mothers, midwives, ritual performers and spiritual healers. This explains why, while some women challenged discriminatory attitudes towards women, many of the research participants recall embracing such traditional roles. While Anisia in the above quote accurately describes the past situation of women in the south, I argue that gender perceptions, roles and division of labor are not static but rather are fluid. These roles have been significantly altered as a result of displacement as Chapter

Five and Six articulate.

In summary, Southern Sudanese women in general and the Dinka and Nuer in particular have always been active in the social and economic aspects of their societies. Historical changes in gender roles as a result of exposure to external pressures imposed by colonial, as well as northern domination have resulted in strict, hierarchal gender roles and relationships. Even though women continue to engage in agriculture and community work, men dominate all aspects of the society. Indeed, displacement has worsened economic and social conditions that were

183 tenuous to begin with. The shift from subsistence farming in southern

Sudan to urban cash economies created increased dependence on women's work in income generating activities which were previously reserved for men. These conditions have resulted in the people of

southern Sudan becoming dependent on relief combined with a gradual loss of the cultural means of coping with crises.

The strict rules that governed traditional gender roles prior to displacement have now given way to shifting gender roles and relationships amongst the Dinka. As a whole, the Dinka and Nuer

societies have been severely affected, however, women have been more

disproportionately impacted. In the absence and or incapacity of male

labor, Dinka and Nuer women have adopted new economic roles, learned

new skills and assumed leadership of their households. These radical

changes in attitudes and behaviors have slowly made their way into the

general culture and planted the seeds for transforming gendered

relationships of power.

iii) Gendered Institutions: Marriage and Family

Between men and women is an old braided grass

rope. Women pull together on their end of the

184 rope while shouting, "We have the right!"; men

pull back on their end while shouting, "No, we

have the right!" Though this rope is very old and

frayed, it has not yet snapped (Hutchinson

1996:158).

Strains on the rope that used to hold together the Dinka and Nuer marriage and family institutions increased considerably prior to their displacement from southern Sudan to Kenya and Uganda. Historically, for most Dinka and Nuer communities, having a family is considered the fulfillment of life; consequently, marriage is a primary life goal. The

Dinka often marry outside their clan (exogamy), a practice promoting more cohesion among the Dinka as a whole. Marriages are usually very stable. When they fail, it is most often because of the inability of the woman to conceive. Polygamy is a common practice in Dinka and Nuer communities. Polygynous marriage customs are critical to the Dinka and

Nuer's political, military and economic power, and they are linked to a

strong local economy, which is based on cattle. However, these marriage

and family institutions have undergone tremendous changes as a

consequence of militarized conflict and displacement.

185 Marriages are traditionally moderated by bridewealth40 payment by the groom's family, always in cattle as well as, on some occasions, in cash. Marriage entails the relinquishing of control of the bride's reproductive and productive ability from her own lineage and granting it to her husband. Bridewealth not only allows men the right to control the labor and productivity of women but also that of their children. This patriarchal practice indicates that Dinka and Nuer women are considered as male property transferable through marriages. Duku

(1998) states that

Once a women is married to a family and bride

wealth is paid, she is considered as a

asset/wealth, referred to locally as "torlDuti lo

mede".41 She has no right to desert the family

when the husband dies...(Duku 1998:45).

Southern Sudanese traditions and customs celebrate the practice of 'ghost marriage' and widow inheritance (Jok 1999, Hutchinson 1996).

When a husband dies or goes away for an extended period of time, both

40 A "bridewealth" is paid by the groom's family to finalize the marriage alliance between the two families.

41 The Dinka communities in southern Sudan use the phrase "TorTDuti lo mede" in Dinka language to refer to wealth, assets and/or properties.

186 the Dinka and Nuer traditions require that his widow (of reproductive age) will be inherited by a younger male relative, preferably a brother in order to ensure that the deceased husband's name, and thus the name of his lineage, is carried on. In the absence of brothers, first cousins become the second most eligible, followed by the sons of deceased or absent man's older brother. Such tradition is commonly known in the

Dinka language as "lahot entering the hut". 42 Jok (1999) states that the

"institution of the levirate compels the woman and the family to find a suitable man to remarry her for the sole purpose of producing children"

(Jok 1999:14).

If a man dies young, before getting married, the Dinka and Nuer traditions require that a woman is married and offered to the deceased brother or relative in order to bear children in the name of the deceased.

Similarly, in the case of infertility, Dinka and Nuer men offer their wives to their brothers or cousins. Jok (1999) further explains that

If the infertile man is elderly with many wives,

some of whom may have adult children, this

patriarch gives his younger wives to his sons in

order to have children in his name. The offspring

42 "Lahot entering the hut" is a phrase used in Dinka and Nuer language to describe ghost marriages.

187 from this arrangement are basically the brothers

of their biological fathers (ibid).

Hutchinson (1996) argues that some of the men wished that their wives would die before them so that the woman would not be inherited by another male member of the family and their children compromised.

Indeed, marriage rules and the sexual division of labor within the Dinka and Nuer communities clearly demonstrate that women are considered property and highlight the magnitude of power and control that men exercise over women's productive and reproductive capacities. For a number of reasons, women's attempts to challenge and transform these institutions prior to displacement were relatively unsuccessful. First, even though many customary laws were discriminatory against women, some women found economic and social support from institutions such as levirate marriage to provide and care for their families. Some of the inherited women gained the respect of their communities as mothers of the heirs of their communities. Second, practices such as polygamy or levirate marriage caused rivalry among women and as a result undermine women's solidarity at the local level to campaign for change.

For instance, competition over husband's emotional attention or limited

188 resources creates tension and resentment among co-wives. For instance

Nya, a Nuer woman, further notes,

Struggle over money and gifts leads some

women to pursue harmful cultural practices. It

used to be quite common in southern Sudan for

women to seek the help of a fortune teller who

would foresee the future and reveal the status of

one's marriage. The fortune teller used to advise

on whether a husband would marry a new wife

or not. Also, many women used to seek

witchcraft in order to gain the husband's sole

love and attention. Other women also used to go

even further by seeking to prevent the husband

from taking a new wife or even casting a spell

that would harm the other co-wives (Nya, a Nuer

woman, age 43).

I have argued that the Dinka and Nuer women and men have always been active in the social and economic aspects of their societies, although more engaged in agriculture and community work. While,

Dinka and Nuer societies are very patriarchal, their gender ideologies,

189 roles and institutions have undergone significant changes as a consequence of militarized conflict and oil-induced displacement. For example, the women I interviewed consistently rejected ghost marriage as unfair. Choi, for example, argues that

The purpose of levirate marriage was to bear

more children who will be regarded as the

deceased's kids and carry on his name and

legacy ... Levirate marriage was believed to

provide support for widows and their children as

all children of co-wives were raised together.

However, in recent years ghost marriage

becomes a burden on women as in most cases

they end up having to take care of themselves

and their children.... If you ask me personally, I

think that Dinka and Nuer men often rationalize

practices of Levirate marriage in order to avoid

the refund of bride wealth to the husband's

family (Choi, a Dinka woman, age 28).

190 Similarly, Nya raises questions about ghost marriage:

In Dinka and Nuer communities, particularly in

rural areas, the institution of 'ghost marriage'

used to keep the network between families and

communities strong. The system was kept intact

through bride wealth exchanges. In the past,

when a woman refused to comply with

traditional expectations of such marriages her

community used to abandon her and may even

pressure her to leave...However, the loss of cattle

due to displacement undermines institutions

such as 'ghost marriage', particularly for us here

in exile (Nya, a Nuer woman, age 43).

Conclusion

This chapter has addressed the shifting construction of gender roles and relationships, gendered divisions of labour and family structures in southern Sudan. The chapter emphasized that forcible displacement opens up sites for women and men to renegotiate and transform oppressive gendered relationships. I have suggested that

191 gender roles and relationships in southern Sudan are not fixed, and that the subordination of women and the dominance of men are neither natural nor eternal.

The next chapter traces the radical changes in gender ideologies, gender roles and relationship among the Dinka and Nuer refugees that occurred as a direct result of violent and traumatic experiences of displacement from south Sudan to Kenya and Uganda. I argue that women's experiences of displacement have brought further changes in the meaning of gender and gender relations.

192 Chapter Five The Price of Oil: Gender Relations of Displacement

Introduction

Research on refugees often draws on concepts of stress, trauma, loss and separation to depict the refugees as traumatized and victimized

(Cernea and McDowell 2000: 4; Crisp 2001; Jamal 2000; Merkx 2000).

Scholars such as Harrell-Bond caution that "the emphasis on the perception of refugees as weak, dependent and deficient has serious consequences" (1999:150) because it reinforces simplistic images of refugees as passive, vulnerable, and powerless and therefore overlooks the complex gendered, socio-economic and political relations of their displacement.

This chapter examines how militarized and violent processes of displacement result in turmoil that consequently leads to opportunities for transforming oppressive gendered traditions, cultural values, and beliefs. Nolen-Hoeksema and Davis argue that "times of conflicts, disruption and destruction have the potential to be eventually beneficial and liberating experiences which are conducive to personal, social, economic and political growth" (2002:602). I argue that the violent processes of oil-induced displacement in southern Sudan have not only

193 destroyed the Dinka and Nuer homes, cattle and resources, they have also destroyed people, families and communities, along with the kinship ties, traditions, cultural institutions and practices that shaped their lives for centuries, as illustrated in the previous chapter. However, the decimation of the cattle herds, which constituted the very core of the

Dinka and Nuer patriarchal cultural practices and male dominance, has also conversely, paved the way for re-evaluating oppressive relationships of power. Furthermore, the new skills, knowledge and education that refugees and displaced populations are gaining in exile, have also made it possible for the formation of new identities and for gender roles and relationships to be re-negotiated along more equitable lines.

The Price of Oil

Death, destruction and displacement devastated

our lives because of the discovery of oil.

Helicopter gunship and military aircrafts were

shooting at us from all directions. I heard the

shooting from far away, carried my three

children and ran naked to the bush. I am lucky

that I made it in time; many of my relatives were

194 not so lucky! Our village was completely

destroyed. Our churches were burned down, our

cattle were all killed ... we were violated and

terrorized to leave our homeland and become

refugees here [in Uganda] (Ngor, Dinka man, age

49).

The relationship of the war and displacement campaign to oil exploitation in Sudan is evident in Ngor's testimony. All of my research participants have reiterated similar violent, traumatic experiences of displacement. Human Rights Watch (2003a) has also documented the

Sudanese government's systemic, "ruthless scorched earth policy", employed to clear the way for oil exploration and production (Human

Rights Watch 2003a:247). Since 1983, the influx of refugees accelerated because of intense fighting between the GOS and the SPLA. Moreover,

Robinson argues that in more recent years, the northern government targeted and burned villages in order to secure areas around the oil fields. In one area of the Eastern Upper Nile, 48 villages were burned and

55,000 people were displaced in a 12-month period (Robinson 2003: 10-

11). Anisia, who was displaced from the Eastern Upper Nile in 1983 due to oil-pipeline construction, explained that:

195 We fled our homes [in Eastern Upper Nile] in the

middle of the night when the government of

Khartoum resumed bombing our village for the

third day. So, we deserted our homes in a hurry

and did not have enough time to consult with

our elders who know the best routes to travel ...

We were not able to carry any food, water or

cattle with us. We travel across many villages

and most the villagers were very kind as they

shared their very scarce food and water with us.

When travelling in the bush, we had to eat grass

and snakes in order to survive ... Four thousand

people left our village but less than 2,000 made

it to Uganda... (Anisia, Nuer woman, age 60).

The largest refugee exodus in Sudan took place after 1983 when more than 80 percent of southern Sudan's population was displaced at least once and often repeatedly. For instance, according to Idahosa

(2002) 85 percent of southern Sudan's population have been forcibly displaced since the discovery of oil in 1983, which destroyed much of the region's indigenous production and trade infrastructure. Moreover, since

196 1998, displacement rates have accelerated due to intensified oil exploration and drilling in the Western Upper Nile territories and the shipping of crude oil to the Red Sea (Idahosa 2002: 11). The export of crude oil constituted a turning point in the armed conflict as oil revenues enhanced the government's capacity to obtain weapons and ammunition, enabling it to intensify the war and accelerate the rates of oil-induced displacement (Human Rights Watch 2003a: 1). It is estimated that about

4.4 million Sudanese were displaced at the end of 2001, including an estimated 4 million IDPs.

Sudanese refugees primarily lived in eight countries, including approximately 150,000 in Uganda, 80,000 in Ethiopia, 70,000 in Kenya,

70,000 in Congo-Kinshasa, about 35,000 in the Central African

Republic, 18,000 in Egypt, 15,000 in Chad, and 1,000 in Eritrea (UNHCR

2003). In addition, when I was conducting my fieldwork in 2002/03, more than 3,000 refugees filed new asylum applications in Western countries.

The livelihoods of Dinka and Nuer people were disrupted by a systematic and extreme level of violence and destruction. The testimonies of the Dinka and Nuer assert that they have been deliberately targeted and displaced because of oil. Indeed, oil development has been

197 accompanied by the violent displacement of southern Sudanese from their communities in the oilfield territories. The Dinka and Nuer civilians were targeted because the government considered them a security threat to the oil infrastructure based on the fact that they have contested the geographical boundaries of the oilfield territories and challenged the government's control of oil resources. Furthermore, the Dinka and Nuer civilians were perceived as either sympathetic to, or supporters of, the

SPLA and other southern militia groups, and as a result, were targeted.

Choi, who was displaced from the Western Upper Nile in 1999 following the bombardment of her village to clear the land for oil exploitation, recalls the chaotic terror of the attacks:

The government of Khartoum insisted on

clearing our land in order to control oil wells.

Thousands of villages were destroyed. All of our

cattle were killed. The government's Antonovs

and gunships killed millions of southern

Sudanese because of this bloody oil. Young

children were killed too ... We were caught

between the Khartoum government and the

198 insurgent guerrillas of the Nuer and Murle in

southern Sudan ... (Choi, Dinka woman, age 28).

The uprooted civilians' search for safety and food took them in different directions, as Sara recalls,

The government soldiers killed my husband

while he was asleep in our front yard. I was left

with the five children. Thank God we all

managed to cross the borders to Rhino camp in

Uganda. It took us three months walking by foot

to reach the Ugandan borders from Hegling area.

We carried grain, but when the food was

finished, we ate groundnuts and grass in the

road like animals. Hunger was our main

problem. If it wasn't for the rain, we wouldn't

have made it alive (Sara, Nuer woman, age 39).

Ngor, who was violently displaced from the Upper Nile recounts,

We ate the leaves of the trees and kept going. We

encountered dangerous wild animals like lions

in the way. We had to run and change our route

to protect ourselves... Some of us ran to the

199 Ugandan borders while others managed to cross

the Kenyan border. There was no food, milk or

clean water. We collected the bones of animals,

which had been dead a long time and tried to eat

them. We cooked a soup with the leaves of

trees... many of relatives died from diseases

such as malaria, relapsing fever, and skin

diseases (Ngor, Dinka man, age 49).

As the testimonies illustrate, Nuer and Dinka civilians experienced the brunt of the war in their oil territories through oil-induced displacement, disease, hunger, dislocation, asset destruction and death.

Ngor, who was very passionate about the cattle he used to raise before displacement, told me that they tried to save his animals, but they "were too exhausted to keep up with the long journey" and would have been attacked by lions on the way.

These socio-economic consequences are not the only measure of the interviewees' experiences of displacement. There is also the infliction of significant socio-cultural costs, that is, the devastation of complex systems of social relations, family networks and kinship ties. Indeed the erosion of their resources and changes in relations of subsistence and

200 other production gave momentum to a fundamental breakdown and reworking of social relations that allowed for the transformation of gender relations and dynamics of power that had previously been accepted as traditional. Certainly, oil-induced displacement has exacted an extraordinarily high toll on the displaced Dinka and the Nuer communities. The interviewees have experienced acute suffering, psychological and emotional distress due to dislocation and loss of cultural and social values and support systems. Oil-induced displacement has negatively affected the Dinka and Nuer women, men and children. And it has impacted them in gender-specific ways.

The interviewees assert that many boys were conscripted to fight, while many women and girls were physically and sexually violated.

Marko, one of the boys I interviewed in the Kakuma Refugee Camp, was forcibly inducted by Nuer pro-government militia. He states that, "they first captured me and then took my sister as a wife [raped her]. I was very upset, so they hit me again and again before I escaped to Kakuma"

(Marko, Dinka boy, age 13). Dan recalls the violence, trauma and loss she experienced as she states,

We traveled for two months from the Heglig area

in Western Upper Nile region to reach the

201 Kenyan borders. Many died from hunger and

starvation. All the cattle that we hoped to take

with us died in the way. We had no food, no

water, and no medicine. We sold our clothes to

the villagers on the way in exchange for

sorghum, maize or any kind of food ... Many

died on the way, many pregnant women aborted

their babies and went into shock (Dan, Nuer

woman, age 42).

Kamala, also, describes the horrific conditions of her displacement by recalling:

I gave birth to a baby boy on the road with no

midwife, traditional or medical support ... I

endured so much pain walking for months after

delivering the baby. There was no time or way to

rest, so we had to keep walking and walking. My

eldest children, ages six and eight, took turns

carrying the baby who was crying most of the

way. The baby became very sick and died before

202 we crossed the border to Kenya (Kamala, Dinka

woman, age 32).

Similarly, Choi, who was displaced from the Western Upper

Nile, recounted,

I still remember very vividly what happened in

my homeland [Upper Nile] as if it were occurring

in front of my eyes right now. When I sleep, I

have constant nightmares about the suffering we

endured to flee our homes ... My child had died

in my arms when we were fleeing Sudan. We

were so exhausted and did not have the energy

to bury our beloved ones, so I had to leave the

body of my baby girl under a tree. Many of us

had to leave our dead behind. The images of the

bodies lying out there for the animals to eat still

haunt me day and night... (Choi, Dinka woman,

age 28)

Such horrendous experiences of Dinka and Nuer women and men, including that of Dan, Choi and Kamala, point to an extraordinary degree of violation and trauma. Harrell-Bond traces how refugees are often

203 perceived and described as a uniform group of helpless, powerless victims, entirely relying on others' assessments and definitions of their problems and solutions" (Harrell-Bond 1999:147). The Dinka and Nuer refugees' testimonies clearly reveal that vast numbers of them have suffered due to their brutal experiences of loss, destruction and violence.

They have suffered most through enduring the traumas of dispossession and relocation. Other research has identified the cultural trauma associated with this displacement, pointing to the deep attachment to place that many Nuer and Dinka women, men and children feel, and the shame that accompanies the compulsion to move. To the Dinka and

Nuer communities, southern Sudan "with all of its deprivations and troubles is the best place in the world. Until recently going to a foreign land was not only a rarity, but a shame" (Deng, cited in Abusharaf

2002:54).

However, Dick argues that people place catastrophes such as war, trauma and shame into their collective social memory and engage in finding meaning in what happens to them. Such a process involves reinventions of new identities and restructuring of south Sudanese gender relations (Dick 2002:7). Many of the Dinka and Nuer interviewees have mentioned that their strong convictions, religion and spirituality

204 have helped them to make sense of the atrocities that they have endured.

I asked some of the interviewees about how they perceive themselves in relation to questions of power and control in contrast to powerlessness and victimization. Olivia, who was displaced from the Heglig region south of Kordofan in 1997 replies,

We southern Sudanese people are very strong. If

we are weak, we could not have survived all the

suffering inflicted upon us by the Arab

government in the north. If we are weak, we

could not have survived the harsh and

dangerous process of the flight to arrive here in

Nairobi (Olivia, a Nuer woman, age 29).

Magot, who was displaced from Western Upper Nile agrees,

We Dinka communities are very strong, and our

history can tell you that. Our culture and

traditions are based on sharing and taking care

of each other. Even though we became refugees

here and lost all our cattle and land, we still

take care of each other. If one of us is sick or is

in trouble, we help take care of them. We do not

205 wait for the UNHCR or the churches to help us

because usually they do not. We learned to take

care of each other and that is how we managed

to survive (Magot, a Dinka man, age 36).

My observations when interviewing the Dinka and Nuer refugees affirm their strength and resilience. They were self-confident, friendly and open about their own views, capacities and dreams. Through the revelations of their testimonies, in conjunction with my own investigations and research, it is clear that their adaptability in redefining their concepts of family, community and kinship has greatly helped them adjust to their new realities.

To reiterate, some of the literature on refugees has a tendency to overlook the complexity of refugee experiences. It often overemphasizes the negative and harmful aspects of refugees' lives in general and in camps in particular. The testimonies of the Dinka and Nuer refugees in this section illustrate two main points. First, they reveal their harsh experiences of displacement. Many of the interviewees were very emotional when they recalled the loss of their family members and the loss of their cattle. Nevertheless, the refugee testimonies clearly indicate that they are not merely victims but survivors. Second, even though the

206 destruction of the Dinka and Nuer families, communities, kinship and cattle that have sustained them for generations have been severely devastated, new opportunities for forming positive and equitable gender relationships have simultaneously emerged.

Are We There Yet? Protraction, Isolation and Violence:

All the 45 Dinka and Nuer refugee women, men and children who I interviewed fled from the oilfield territories in southern Sudan and crossed the Sudanese borders to Kenya or Uganda. They had all lived in refugee camps for a period of time varying from two to ten years. Some took refuge in the Kakuma Refugee Camp in northwest Kenya while others were in refugee settlements such as the Rhino Refugee Camp in northern Uganda (please see Map 4).

Except for the five interviewees who I spoke to in Kakuma Refugee

Camp in 2001, the forty other interviewees managed to leave these camps and reside in Nairobi and Kampala where I interviewed them in

2003. They had all lived in refugee camps for a period of time varying from two to ten years. Some took refuge in the Kakuma Refugee Camp in

207 northwest Kenya while others were in refugee settlements such as the

Rhino Refugee Camp in northern Uganda.

Map 4: Refugee camps in Kenya and Uganda (Global Report 2003a)

This section emphasizes the participants' gendered experiences of displacement. I asked about the impact that a protracted refugee

situation has had on their lives and whether, for example, they

208 recognized changes in gender roles within their families and in the camps. As well, I asked them about the role of institutions such as the

UNHCR and INGOs in effecting changes to their experiences as refugee, their gender roles and relationships.

In analyzing the characteristics of protracted refugee situations in

Africa, Jeff Crisp (2003) argues that one of the main dilemmas of Africa's refugee situations is that they are "usually to be found in peripheral border areas of asylum countries: places which are insecure, where the climatic conditions are harsh, which are not a high priority for the central government and for development actors, and which are consequently very poor" (Crisp 2003: 6). Indeed, Sudanese refugees have been protected in camps in very harsh and insecure parts of Kenya and

Uganda (Crisp 2003, Jamal 2000). According to Merkx (2000) camps such as Achol-Pii, Ikafe and Rhino in northern Uganda (see Map4) are isolated places that lack socio-economic infrastructure, markets and security (Merkx 2000: 9). Ngor, describes his experiences of violence within the Achol-Pii camp:

We thought that we would be safe when we

crossed the Ugandan borders and settled in

Achol-Pii camp in north Uganda in mid-July

209 1996. Little did we know that the camp was a

war zone in itself. The second day after we

arrived in the camp, we were attacked by the

Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). There was looting

and killing everywhere in the camp. I think

around 30 refugees were killed, including two of

my brothers and my uncle. I think that over a

hundred southern Sudanese were badly injured.

That is why the UNHCR moved us to another

camp, Rhino camp, where we stayed for six

years before coming to Kampala last year (Ngor,

a Dinka man, age 49).

Merkx (2000) corroborated Ngor's story and notes that in July

1996, an estimated 76 refugees were rounded up and systematically shot and killed while 21 more were wounded in the Achol-Pii camp in north

Uganda. Furthermore, Merkx states that in August and September 2002, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), a rebel group based in southern

Sudan and northern Uganda, launched four attacks on the Sudanese camps, further displacing around 30,000 Sudanese refugees (2000: 9).

Furthermore, Aban, recounts that

210 We did not feel safe most of the time when we

were there [at the Rhino Camp]. As I told you

before, we have been attacked by the LRA many

times. It is not only the LRA that attacks us but

other Ugandan soldiers and militia often come to

the camp at night and loot. They forcibly take

our food and belongings. What can you say to an

armed police officer? You let them take all that

they want and hope that they wouldn't come the

next day! (Aban, Nuer man, age 37).

Similar to the situation in Uganda, Crisp (2000) argues that refugee camps such as Kakuma and Dadaab camps in Kenya are also located in remote and semi-arid areas, populated by very marginalized and poor nomadic and pastoralist Kenyan tribes. For instance, the border areas of north-west Kenya where most of the Sudanese refugees are staying in the Kakuma Camp have always been poorly secured. These areas are characterized by cattle rustling, insurgency and violent clashes between the Kenyan army and the armed local Turkana, an indigenous

Kenyan tribe (Crisp 2000: 618). Amira, recalls her experience after crossing the Kenyan border:

211 We ran and crossed the Sudanese borders to

Kenya with my mother, children, and sisters.

When we first arrived in Lokichogio, we had to wait for days to be processed by the UNHCR.

After a while, a white man came along with

Kenyan officials and gave us bottled water and

30 sacks of sorghum. It was hardly enough food because there were thousands of very hungry people there, specially children ... When the

United Nations gave us food, we became easy target for the Turkana, who attacked us shooting and killing many. I am not sure about the exact number, but they killed many in order to take the food and the medicine. After that incident, the UNHCR divided us into small groups. I was placed with my five children and was taken to Kakuma Camp where I stayed for four years before coming to Nairobi. I still do not know what happened to my mother and three sisters! (Amira, a Dinka woman, age 46).

212 These testimonies of the Dinka and Nuer refugees emphasize the horrendous conditions of their forcible displacement. All of the interviewed women, men and children have survived the long, chaotic and extremely dangerous experiences of displacement. They all have endured the violent and traumatic experiences of political violence, having suffered the death of their loved ones, as well as experiencing social, economical and cultural exclusion. Their experiences of displacement disrupted their social order. Not only did the Dinka and

Nuer refugee lose their homes and families, they also lost some of their traditional values and practices. The next section elaborates on the gendered dynamics of long-term refugee situations. It examines how the extraordinary changes experienced by the Dinka and Nuer refugees can prove to be a site for transforming gendered relationships of power.

i) Kakuma Refugee Camp

Kakuma Refugee Camp is one of 38 globally identified protracted refugee situations (Crisp 2003; Merkx 2000). During the time of my fieldwork, it was estimated that the Sudanese refugee population in

Kakuma Camp grew at an average rate of 500 persons per month (Peter, a Dutch UNHCR Officer). The camp distance is 120 kilometres from the

213 Sudanese border.,There is a highway to Lokichogio, a large city on the

Sudanese/Kenyan border (see Map 5). The Kakuma Camp, divided into three sections, which are then subdivided into various zones, houses mostly Sudanese women and men who constitute 75% of the refugees staying there. Almost all of the long-term Sudanese refugees in the camp are from southern Sudan, particularly from the Upper Nile Province, the

Unity state and Bahr Al Ghazal oilfield territories. The majority of the southern Sudanese refugees are Dinka, Nuer, Bari and Didinka (Merkx

2000: 4).

The Kakuma Camp was established by the UNHCR in north­ western Kenya in July 1992 to host 16,000 teenage Sudanese refugees fleeing militarized violence in southern Sudan (Merkx 2000). The teenage refugees have been commonly referred to as the "lost boys" of Sudan, however they included a significant number of teenage and pre-teen girls

(Witthoft 2007).

214 Map 5: Kakuma Refugee Camp in Kenya (UNHCR 2002)

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215 Gender disaggregated statistics indicate Kakuma Camp is considered as an exception to the rule that the majority in most refugee camps are women and girls. Eighty percent of the Sudanese refugees in

Kakuma are young men and male children between seven and seventeen years of age (UNHCR 2003). The phenomenon of a young refugee population in Kakuma is due to four main reasons: first, most of the refugee children were separated from their families or lost one or both of their parents during the violent processes of their displacement. Second, prior to displacement, the social and cultural system in southern Sudan, as Chapter Three illustrates, was characterized by very large families due to traditional practices of 'ghost marriages that produce many children who were targeted during the processes of oil-induced displacement.

Third, the birth rate of the Dinka and Nuer population in Kakuma is very high according to UNHCR statistics. And finally, many adult women and men managed to leave the Kakuma Camp to find work in major cities such as Nairobi or managed to re-settle in countries of asylum in Europe or North America (John, an Australian UNHCR officer), while the young people had to remain.

One of two lost boys, Marko, 13, who was displaced with his two younger brothers in 1999 from the Western Upper Nile told me that,

216 We do not see many northern Sudanese here in the camp. I know some of them live in Nairobi. I hope to go and live in Nairobi too because the schools here are up to certain grades, and if you want to go to high school you have to go to the big city, but the UNHCR does not allow us to walk outside the camp... I came to the Kakuma

Camp when I was young. Before that, I used to live in the SPLA garrison near Torit in the liberated areas inside Sudan. I lived there with my uncle who was one of the high ranking SPLA commanders. The officers there trained us to fight, and we were doing great before our garrison was attacked by the government of

Sudan. Then, my uncle had to go to the bush and fight deep inside Sudan. He said that it was not safe for me to go with him, so he arranged for me to come and live here in Kakuma. A couple of my friends from the garrison came too

(Marko, a Dinka boy, age 13).

217 The second 'lost boy' interviewee, Nouri, says that

I came to live here in Kakuma along with my two

sisters and big brother seven years ago. My

parents died in Sudan when our village in the

south was attacked. We came with my uncle and

his wife. We walked for a long time to reach

Kakuma ... My uncle was very lucky. Last year

he was approved by the UNHCR to go and live in

America, and he is very happy there. He sent us

some letters, pictures and a hundred dollars

from there this month. I would like to travel to

America. My uncle promised to send for us when

he gets his papers [US residency/Green Card] ...

The conditions in the camp are very tough, but I

still like it here more than when I was in

southern Sudan because of the school. I am also

on the football team (Nouri, Nuer, age 19).

This young generation of southern Sudanese refugees have lived most of their lives in protracted situations of exile and have been educated in refugee camps. Some of this young population has been born

218 and brought up in refugee camps. They have lost their native language, culture, and knowledge of their 'homeland'. However as Thomson (2002) argues, this allows for the reinvention of new gender identities through education, media, family and peer groups. My observations in Kakuma

Camp were that this age group is very active, productive and proud.

Moreover, it is an age group where adaptability to the new environment is significant for transformation in terms of acquiring new gender sensitive values, customs and traditions.

ii) Rhino Refugee Camp

While I did not conduct interviews in any refugee camp in Uganda due to security reasons, all the Dinka and Nuer refugees I interviewed in

Kampala resided for three to ten years in the Rhino Refugee Camp. The

Rhino Camp is located in the Arua district in Uganda and covers an area of approximately 225 square kilometres (see Maps 4 & 6).

219 Map 6: Refugee camps in Kenya 85 Uganda- Rhino (Global Report 2003b)

SUDAN

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Merkx (2000) argues that after housing these refugees in transit camps close to the border, "The Ugandan government, in cooperation with local councils and elders, provided land on the West Bank of the

Nile, on which three refugee settlements were established, namely Ikafe,

Imvepi and Rhino Camps" ( see Maps 4 85 6; Merkx 2000:17-18).

The UNHCR estimated that, during the time of my fieldwork in

Kampala in July, 2003, the refugee population in the Rhino Refugee

220 Camp was about 25,812. Similar to the gender dynamic in the Kakuma

Refugee Camp, the majority of the Sudanese refugees in the Rhino Camp were young men and children. In 2003, men and boys constituted 52 percent of the refugees while women and girls represented 48 percent

(UNHCR 2003).

To reiterate, the persistence of refugee camps for extended periods of time in Kenya and Uganda, as well as globally is based on the reality that the international community has paid very little attention to resolving the dilemma of protracted refugee situations. UNHCR (2000) argues that repatriation rather that local integration of refugees in host countries is often considered the preferred solution to refugee problems in Africa as well as other third world countries (ibid). There are four reasons for this. First, refugees have been increasingly regarded as an economic and environmental burden on the countries that host them.

Second, refugees, are often regarded as a security threat both locally and nationally, especially in situations such as Sudan where the Dinka and

Nuer have often been implicated in the armed conflict as well as connected with the SPLA forces in Kenya. Third, previous efforts to promote local settlement and self-reliance in many African countries have not been very successful. And finally, repatriation is prioritized

221 because some African states dealing with protracted refugee camps in their territories often assert that the burden of hosting the refugee population has mainly been endured by poor developing countries. It has yet to be adequately shared by the wealthy developed countries (Crisp

2003, Harrell-Bond 1999, Jamal 2000).

Gendered Dynamics of Protracted Refugee Situations

Feminist scholarship on forced migration stresses that displacement and relocation involve 'reordering' gender relations within different societies (Babiker 1999; Indra 1999). Such reordering, however, is largely based on previous culturally-inscribed notions of 'maleness' and Temaleness', informed by the pre-existence of gendered structured experiences. Moreover, women's experiences of protracted refugee situations vary, depending on gendered assumptions about women's roles within the family and the refugee community (Indra 1999:2-3).

Dinka and Nuer refugees fled their homes in rural areas and major towns in the rich oilfield territories in southern Sudan and resided in the

Kakuma Refugee Camp in Kenya and the Rhino Refugee Camp in

Uganda. These women, men and children experienced displacement, trauma and violence in both similar and different ways. During the

222 process of their displacement and settlement in long-term refugee camps, they confronted distinct disadvantages within their households and communities due to the disintegration of extended families, kinship and support systems. Both men and women in Dinka and Nuer communities are at a disadvantage when it comes to meeting their traditional

'responsibilities' as spouses/husbands and mothers/wives. However, marginalized groups of Dinka and Nuer women and children, who have already been subordinated by the structural inequalities of male dominated Sudanese society because of their gender, age and class, have been more adversely affected by displacement and protracted refugee situations.

The militarized processes of displacement targeted and destroyed their means of production and rendered these women, men and children vulnerable and dependent on humanitarian assistance. Upon arriving in

Kenya and Uganda, governments in these countries as well as donor institutions such as the UNHCR and INGOs implemented what Jeff Crisp

(2003) calls "long-term care-and-maintenance programs" that paid little attention to the refugee's self-reliance and economic security. Crisp further argues that the UNHCR, as well as governmental and non­ governmental refugee agencies, "had a vested interest in perpetuating the

223 'relief model' of refugee assistance, which entailed the establishment of large, highly visible and internationally funded camps, administered entirely separately from the surrounding area and population" (Crisp

2003: 4). The main priority of humanitarian assistance to refugees in protracted situations has focused on emergency short-term food relief because essential self-reliance and sustainable development oriented projects have been threatened by UNHCR budget constraints.

In Kakuma, long-term refugees have been dependent on inadequate food assistance. The World Food Program (WFP) has recently cut its food distribution to Kakuma camp by half, not based on the actual needs of refugees but mainly because of budgetary constraints

(interviews with WFP, Rome, 2006).43 Amira, who lost her mother and sisters in Lokichogio, recounts this food shortage:

In the camp, food ration is not enough and it

does not last the 45 days that the UNHCR says

that it would ... When we first arrived in

Kakuma, we used to get better food. If you are

lucky, a family used to get seven items in the

food basket. But now most of us only get three.

43 I conducted the interviews with WFP in Rome in May 2006 for the Protracted Refugee Situation (PRS) project at York University.

224 What can you do with that? It is not even

enough for few days... (Amira, a Dinka woman,

age 46).

Indeed, during the time of my fieldwork in Kakuma, the

International Red Cross (IRC) revealed that in 2001, the global malnutrition rate in the Kakuma Camp was over 17 percent. The IRC published the following statement: "What is more alarming is that global malnutrition rates in Kakuma have not significantly deviated from this level for the last six years." These severe malnutrition rates have been experienced by the refugees who struggle on a daily basis to deal with food shortages within their households in the camps. In the refugee context, men find themselves dependent on humanitarian aid and are stripped of their provider/protector roles. This has led to a contestation of the gendered division of labor in the household because refugee men have lost the traditional means of providing for their families. As Jok

(1999) argues, relief agencies have brought changes in Dinka culture, which have elicited different attitudes toward foreigners because of the perceived powers of aid workers. For example, during the distribution of mostly insufficient relief goods, community representatives often provide inflated population figures to try to gain greater access to supplies.

225 Others also attempt to portray their particular communities as more needy than others. Furthermore, Jok also stresses that the "behavior of portraying oneself as poor and needy is a direct result of relief aid, because this is something Dinka [and Nuer] try not to show under normal circumstances" (Jok 1999: 3).

As displaced women and men become poorer, they resort to stigmatized behaviors such as begging, doing odd jobs, or lying about their actual conditions in order to survive. For instance, Bui who was displaced from the Heglig region south of Kordofan in 1997, states "what does it matter in front of foreigners who do not know me personally; it does not take away my dignity if I say to a foreigner that I am poor (Bui, a Nuer man, age 29). Sitana, who was pregnant when I interviewed her in

Kakuma in 2001, explains her vulnerability in the camp:

We suffer a lot here in Kakuma. There is not

enough food, and when your child is crying

because you cannot feed him, that makes you

cry too ... We lost so much when we left our

homes. What I missed the most was the help

that I used to get from my mother and sisters.

We used to cultivate our land, milk the cows

226 together and feed our kids. But look at us now,

we lost everything here! No family, no friends or

no neighbours to help you when you need

them...(Sitana, Dinka woman, age 29).

Women, who are traditionally agriculturalists and agro- pastoralists, do not have the required skills to survive in urban centres or in protracted refugee situations. The dislocation from community, kin, and extended family results in the loss of traditional support systems, as well as customary rights over land. As Olivia, (a Nuer woman activist, age

29) points out; women have lost independent sources of income, namely subsistence food production, and as a result, have become more vulnerable. Similarly, Nouri, one of the "lost boys" speaks about his experience in Kakuma Camp by saying,

When you are on your own, you learn how to

survive. It is not easy, though. Our biggest

problem is that we do not have good food here.

The amount of food that the World Food

Program and others give us is not enough to feed

you three meals a day. Some people in the

camps try to help you, but you see with your

227 own eyes that they, themselves, do not have

enough either, so that is a big problem (Nouri,

Nuer, age 19).

Many of the interviewees reiterated that securing their daily food needs has always been a challenge because the food aid that they receive is insufficient. For families where both husband and wife remain together in the Kakuma camp, often with their children, a situation that is prevalent among those refugees, the gendered dynamics of displacement mean that once men lose either their land or their jobs, women are expected to take up the burden, finding ways to provide for themselves and for their families. Dinka and Nuer women's economic activities in their homeland include cattle rearing and breeding, cultivating food products, and brewing and selling traditional liquor. When arriving in camps such as Kakuma, the interviewed women found themselves economically vulnerable and subjected to accelerated rates of violence within the camps.

Violent processes of oil-induced displacement, as well as harsh experiences in protracted refugee situations in Kenya and Uganda negatively affect women, men and children. But women face disproportionately difficult situations in the Kakuma and Rhino refugee

228 camps. Dinka and Nuer men who are in long term refugee camps and are, therefore, demeaned, humiliated, frustrated, and unable to meet their 'protector' and 'breadwinner' roles, tend to violate and sexually abuse 'their' women. These women most often experience physical violence, rape, beatings and other forms of violence by their husbands and by close male kin. Sitana continues,

Physical violence and social tension became the

reality in Kakuma. Clashes that cause serious

injuries and death happen almost everyday.

Nobody feels safe on a daily basis ...(Sitana,

Dinka woman, age 29).

More specifically, the gender roles that women assume often expose them to gender based violence and even death. Many of the women were raped only because they were performing the 'traditional gendered duties' of collecting fire wood. As Nya explains,

We do not have enough food to feed our

children, so we wander around the camp to

collect enough firewood, poles and grass that

you can sell to feed your children. I did not used

to sell firewood before, but since our food basket

229 was reduced by the UN, we have no choice but

to go and collect the firewood ... We are aware of

the risk of rape by the Turkana men and all

kinds of other men who prey on vulnerable

women, but what kind of choice do you have

when your children are starving? (Nya, a Nuer

woman, age 43).

Certainly, many of the interviewees reiterated that protracted refugee situations have rendered them vulnerable to various forms of sexual and gender-based violence. In Kakuma Camp, Moona, (a Dinka, a woman, age 33) illustrates that there is a direct connection between the reduction in food rations by various aid agencies and gender based violence. She reveals that inadequacies of international assistance expose women and young girls to accelerated rates of violence. Haram also observes,

Women are stressed and traumatized simply

because of repeated rapes we experienced inside

the camps ... Rape is not only directed towards

us but young girls, even seven year old children

are raped. In our camp [Rhino camp], a woman

230 who had just given birth to a child (about seven

days old) and had no food at all, went to the

bush with some other women to collect food and

fire wood all were raped more than three times

... you are never expected to have HIV/Aids but

because you are just raped, or you are forced to

have sex with men, many of the women here and

their children have the disease, which is

spreading very fast all over the place (Haram,

Nuer woman, age 24).

While it is morally important to emphasize the severe impact of violence on women and girls, it is also important to note that men and boys are not privileged in protracted refugee situations. Boys and men similarly experience gender-specific vulnerabilities and violence and are often raped and violated in the course of violent conflicts and forcible displacement (El Jack 2007). Nevertheless, almost all the men and boys that I interviewed during my fieldwork in 2003 were very reluctant to speak about their experiences of rape and sexualized violence. I believe this is mainly attributed to the stigma attached to male rape, particularity in the Dinka and Nuer communities. Our increasing

231 knowledge of how men, too, are the victims of sexualized violence necessitates the need to interrogate the cultural constructions of masculinity/femininity, and to establish a gender-relational framework that articulates how women, men and children are differently violated in protracted refugee situations.

Some of the literature on protracted refugee situations highlights the psycho-social situation of refugees who have experienced violence in protracted long term refugee camps (Crisp 2000; Jamal 2000; Jones

2000). Crisp (2000) notes that "reports from medical and social services workers in the camps make frequent reference to the 'nervous depression and dependency' of the refugees, describing them as 'traumatized',

'aggressive', 'highly stressed', and as suffering from 'emotional and behavioural problems'" (Crisp 2000:624). Further, Jamal (2000) notes that "the most apparent and prevalent mood in Kakuma Camp today is a sense of despair and low self-worth" (Jamal 2000: 17). With regard to

Uganda, Jones (2000) states that the refugees he interviewed were characterized by "despondency, lethargy, boredom and feelings of inadequacy" (2000: 36). Like these reports and interviews, my research findings point to the negative consequences of the violent, militarized processes of displacement. My findings also highlight the constraints

232 imposed upon Dinka and Nuer refugees in the Kakuma and Rhino camps. However, I assert that the Dinka and Nuer refugees in these camps are not 'passive victims', nor are they 'inadequate' to the task of survival.

Indeed, the extreme violence associated with the combined phenomena of militarization and oil-induced displacement in southern

Sudan provides a context that makes visible the changing nature of oppressive relationships of power among the Dinka and Nuer refugees, especially gender-based ones. The next section examines the changes in gender relationships of power. More specifically, it articulates how the

Dinka and Nuer refugees benefit from the limited resources available to them in refugee camps, such as education and training in order to strengthen their capacities, re-evaluate their values, reassess their cultural traditions, and radically transform their gender roles and relationships.

Gender Roles within Refugee Camps

Unlike the Dinka and Nuer refugees who had been located for many years in Kakuma Camp, those who resided in Rhino refugee camp in Uganda were not protracted and therefore not completely dependent

233 on humanitarian assistance. Their experiences were different for two main reasons. First, because the Dinka and Nuer refugees in Rhino share ethnic ties with the local Ugandan communities, they have been permitted to interact with these communities in the areas surrounding the camp. Secondly, the Dinka and Nuer refugees in the Rhino Camp have also been allowed to engage in limited agricultural work in the areas in proximity to the camp and to perform limited economic activities. In

1999, the UNHCR with the assistance of the Ugandan Government launched a self-reliance strategy programme. The objectives of the program were to empower both refugees and nationals to become self- reliant (Merkx 2000:22).

The implementation of the self-reliance strategy, which aimed at increasing agricultural production and food security from refugees, has led to a severe reduction in food rations. Merkx (2000) argues that nutritional surveys and socio-economic surveys conducted with refugees in settlements in north Uganda after the implementation of the self- reliance strategy indicated that the refugees' food security has been greatly undermined. This is mainly because very few Dinka and Nuer refugees in the Rhino Camp, for instance, were able to farm or keep animals. Merkx notes that the refugees complained about "the lack of

234 land, the poor quality of land, and the limited markets in which to sell their produce" (2000:24). Kuat explained that:

We struggle to have adequate land to cultivate

because we are not allowed to cultivate

anywhere outside the Rhino Camp. Even when

you have a good year and manage to get enough

grains or vegetables, there aren't many places

where you can sell them. Then, you are asked to

pay taxes on what you cultivate. So, you end up

losing anyway (Kuat, a Dinka man, age 54).

Similarly, Naya, states:

Women, do not sell our crafts and baskets due

to the limited size of the local market, high

transportation costs, a lack of information on

market conditions, poor terms of trade and the

imposition of taxes on economic activities inside

the settlement (Nya, a Nuer woman, age 43).

When reflecting upon their experiences in the Rhino Refugee

Camp, the Dinka and Nuer refugees that I interviewed in Kampala recalled their struggle with food insufficiency while in the camp. They

235 stated that food assistance was drastically reduced during their long- term stay in the camp. Food items such as milk, sugar, salt, beans and canned fish, which they used to receive before the implementation of the self-reliance strategy, were drastically decreased. They state that the amount of money that they earned from their work to supplement what they received from humanitarian agencies was rarely enough to meet their basic needs. The poverty that the interviewees experienced in

Kakuma and Rhino refugee camps, however, reveals complex survival strategies, as well as resilience and strength despite enormous hardship and suffering.

Kakuma and Rhino Refugee Camps Compared

In Kakuma Camp refugees were denied the right to engage in wage-earning, agriculture and income-generating activities, whereas refugees in the Rhino Camp were allowed to develop livelihoods outside the camp. However, in the case of the latter, their restricted access to land, fertilizers and commercial loans made it extremely difficult to survive. Furthermore, the restrictions on mobility of Rhino Camp refugees constrained them from engaging in trade.

236 Despite the distinct experiences of these refugees in Kenya and

Uganda, Dinka and Nuer in both camps shared common concerns. For example, they had both been in long term situations of displacement and exile for five to 20 years. In addition, they have both experienced the erosion of their basic human rights, to which they are entitled under the provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Indeed, the Dinka and Nuer refugees were deprived of the basic freedoms available to nationals in

Kenya and Uganda. Jamal argues that southern Sudanese rights to asylum in these countries are "implicitly but emphatically, premised upon their complying with certain restrictive conditions" (2000: 7).

Anyang, who was displaced from the Upper Nile provinces to Rhino camp comments on these restrictions in my interview with him:

We as refugees felt very constrained in these

camps. You become like an animal that cannot

move without the directions of its owner. When

we were in southern Sudan we used to move

back and forth with our cattle in the rainy

season, but here you need a special permission

to leave the camp. If the police stop you outside

the camp they asked you to pay a fine or even go

237 to jail. If you go to jail, you do not have any

rights because you have no residence rights and

are pretty much considered as living here

illegally (Anyang a Nuer man, age 48).

Susan, a Nuer woman activist who managed to leave the camp and was residing in Nairobi during the time of the interview, complains about the restrictive conditions that were imposed on her freedom when in the

Kakuma:

We did not have much freedom or many rights

when were in Kakuma. The camp authorities

banned us from engaging in any political

activity. When we wanted to form an association

that would help us as refugee women to

negotiate with the camp management, they first

stop us from meeting. The camp manager came

one day to our group and said that we are not

allowed to hold mass meetings in the camp

without authorization. After lots of convincing,

he came with a long list of conditions that we

have to adhere to in order to form our

238 association. Then, we formed an association that

addresses our needs as women. The association

was very useful to many of us. Through the

association we were able to deal with many of

the concerns that affect us as women in the

camp (Susan, a Nuer women's activist, age 49).

Despite the harsh conditions that Dinka and Nuer refugees experience in Kakuma and Rhino camps, the Dinka and Nuer refugees have not been passive recipients of aid. They draw on their own strengths and capacities to creatively engage in various livelihood strategies in order to improve their quality of life in a long-term refugee situation. For example, engaging in a women's association in these camps has enhanced many women's self-esteem and allowed them to develop social and political awareness. To attain a radical transformation of patriarchal gender identities, El-Bushra notes that it is urgent for both women and men to "participate as active partners in negotiating and eventually changing oppressive gender ideologies and practices" (2000:4). I believe that the women's association that Susan and other women founded in the Kakuma Refugee Camp constitutes the starting point of a process

239 that has enabled these refugee women and men to question, re-evaluate and significantly transform their gender roles and relationships.

To conclude, the testimonies of the interviewees in this section highlight the challenges that protracted refugee situations posed to the

Dinka and Nuer refugees in both the Kakuma and Rhino refugee camps.

As noted earlier, the Dinka and Nuer are predominately Nilotic cattle- keepers from the Upper Nile, Bahr Al Ghazal and the Unity provinces. In protracted refugee situations, refugees from these communities can no longer grow the subsistence food crops that they used to rely on for centuries, nor can they rear their cattle or pursue their traditional means of living. The interviewees have also been constrained by their inability to establish or sustain their own livelihoods; instead, they have become, for the most part, dependent on humanitarian aid. These critical changes in their livelihoods have altered some of the social and cultural perceptions that previously shaped women and men's lives. More importantly, the changing nature of gender relationships of power among the Dinka and

Nuer refugees have been brought to the forefront.

Given the insufficient yet still decreasing levels of humanitarian assistance, the majority of the Dinka and Nuer refugees live in extreme poverty. The main concern voiced by the interviewees was the erosion of

240 their social status in the camps, as well as the denial of their basic human rights, freedom of movement, limited civil, political and legal rights. The restrictive conditions imposed on these refugees have significantly altered their gendered roles and responsibilities. Women have responded by establishing an arena for a dialogue to negotiate their differences and build coalitions across differences. I have argued that the relative success which has been achieved, and the ongoing struggle, have indeed resulted in tremendous changes in the meaning of gender, opened spaces for resistance in the patriarchal structures and significantly transformed gender relationships of power. Yet at the same time, their refugee situation has opened the space for negotiating oppressive relationships of power, notably gender oppression, as the next section articulates.

Seeds of Transformations: Education

A systemic lack of education has historically constrained the economic and social activities of southern Sudanese women and men.

For instance, in the south, education for women and girls has received even less acceptance. Kuat, who was displaced from the Western Upper

241 Nile reiterates the concern of Dinka and Nuer men who feared that education would devalue girls:

Many Dinka and Nuer men strongly oppose

women and girls' education. Until recently,

many Dinka men used to have a low opinion of

educated girls. They worried that they would be

culturally changed and would not be easily

controlled. They feared that they would learn

about women's rights and human rights and

therefore abandon their culture and heritage

(Kuat, a Dinka man age 54).

Similarly, Mama, a Dinka women's activist observes,

The majority of women in southern Sudan are

illiterate. Therefore, there were very few

opportunities for girls and women, particularly

those living in rural areas, to improve their lives

... And until recently, even women themselves

did not recognize the importance of education as

a window that opens many opportunities for

enhancing girls' or women's lives. However, upon

242 enrolling in schools in refugee camps and foreign

cities and experiencing tangible benefits of

education, many families for the first time insist

on the education of their girls and boys as well

as seeking adult education (Mama, a Dinka

woman's activist, age 54).

Mama describes what has been affirmed by almost all of the interviewed Dinka and Nuer women that education is, indeed, a means for women's empowerment, as well as that of the larger community. For the research participants, education appeared to be of paramount importance and is the subject of their aspirations and hopes for a better life and a better future.

In summary, the displaced participants have managed to make use of available education services in exile to re-evaluate, renegotiate and gradually transform oppressive relationships of power, notably unequal gender relations, that were previously taken for granted and sustained by

Dinka and Nuer social and cultural institutions. For instance, Mama further explains that prior to displacement many women activists conveyed their belief that women's rights must be seen within the context

243 of the welfare of the family and the community and must be sought on the basis of their socio-cultural traditions.

Ana's Story: Contestation, Negotiation and Transformation

As an entry to questions of agency, resistance and transformation,

Ana's story exemplifies the daily experiences that displaced Dinka and

Nuer women face as they confront, challenge and transform oppressive traditions, cultural institutions and patriarchal power relations.

Ana is a forty-two year old Nuer woman. She is an activist who is recently divorced and lives with her two girls, age 16 and 14, in Nairobi where I interviewed her in 2001 and 2003. She has a degree from the

University of Juba in southern Sudan, where she practiced social work professionally before her forcible displacement. She was displaced from the Heglig oilfields in southern Kordofan in 1995. She crossed the border to Kenya with her ex-husband and resided in the Kakuma Refugee Camp for five years.

She described her marriage as compromised and unhappy when she lived in southern Sudan, prior to her displacement. However, Ana was not able to get a divorce due to the strict laws concerning divorce and bride-wealth processes. After arriving in Kakuma Camp, her marital problems intensified. Ana's ex-husband, who also has a university

244 degree, was not able to find a job at Kakuma Camp and became very depressed and emotionally and physically abusive towards her and their two girls. Ana volunteered as a teacher at the adult literacy schools in the camp for eight months before she was finally hired part-time and paid a modest salary for her work. In February 2000, she declared that she wanted a formal divorce from her husband and moved, with her daughters, out of the family compound. A local family court that is administered by the Dinka and Nuer elderly in Kakuma ordered her to immediately return to her husband's compound. When she refused, she was fined 8,000 Kenyan shillings for breaking the marriage/bridewealth agreement. She was pressured and harassed by the community in

Kakuma. In spite of the pressures that she experienced, she said that she received great support from the women's association that she had helped to establish in Kakuma Camp. Negotiations around her divorce situation divided the community, the elders' council and the customary court in Kakuma.

Ana asked the Kenyan authorities, the police and the UNHCR in

Kakuma to intervene on her behalf against her community. Supported by the World Food Program (WFP) in the camp, she pleaded her case to the

UNHCR, repeatedly, until she was granted a divorce in December 2000

245 and was moved by the UNHCR to Nairobi. Douglas, a British WFP official, states that the majority of Dinka and Nuer refugee women in countries such as Kenya, Uganda and Egypt are either divorced or single mothers

(Douglas, a senior British official at WFP, interviewed in Nairobi in June

2003).

In Nairobi, Ana worked as a senior program coordinator at SWAN and engaged in grass-roots women's activism. She states:

I am now working with SWAN to influence

changes in women's lives. I know for a fact that

many women are going through what I

experienced in Kakuma. No one has to go

through that in silence. I am telling them that it

is OK to confront and resist oppressive

marriages at the individual level and resist

discrimination and oppression in camps, cities

and the society at large.

Her story reveals that refugee women in long-term refugee situations like Kakuma can overcome structural patterns of oppression and points to the struggle and resistance that many Dinka and Nuer women confront in exile as they challenge and transform patriarchal

246 traditions and cultural institutions and values. Ana's testimony illustrates the radical changes that happen at the individual, collective, and structural level, from households to communities and beyond.

Indeed, the seeds for change were planted prior to the Dinka and

Nuer displacement. For example, the 1972 Addis Ababa peace agreement between the government of Sudan and the southern liberation movement brought about significant changes to Dinka and Nuer women and men in the south. Beswick states that

For the first time in the history of Sudan,

southerners were granted their basic human

rights as citizens, which entailed having equal

rights and duties before the law without

discrimination based on sex, ethnicity, race,

religion, language, or economic and social

status. For the first time, a number of Southern

Sudanese women entered the formal job market

and earned salaries (2001:41-42).

Gradually, women began to earn their own income and become entitled to own land, apply for credit and purchase fertilizers. The 1970s and early 1980s, prior to the second civil war in 1983, brought about

247 relative improvement in southern women's lives. Many Dinka and Nuer women took advantage of their new freedoms in the 1970s, when their territories were at peace. As a result, a small group of white-collar workers emerged. At the same time, with the founding of the Sudanese

People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), women's enlistment in the military also increased considerably. Many women trained as combatants and later as administrators, therefore, acquiring higher degrees of education along with an enhanced self-image. However, Kuat states

Overall, in southern Sudan, women were

considered as the caretakers, while men were

the protectors of their families. I say that in a

positive way because these were our traditions,

which were passed on from one generation to

another. But these roles are changing now

because of the war and displacement. Men are

no longer there to feed their families and many

women are now stepping up to take care of their

children and their families (Kuat, a Dinka man,

age 54).

248 Similarly, Mama recalls that in the past, traditional gender roles were respected and valued by both women and men. Transcending these defined gender roles often resulted in conflict within the family. This led to various forms of gender-based violence that includes domestic violence against women, which took the form of wife beating, abandonment and forced divorce. However, such gendered perceptions have significantly changed during this period of displacement as Mama explains:

Nowadays traditional roles are rapidly changing

both within southern Sudan and in exile. The

cost of living is very expensive and neither a

woman nor a man alone can afford to provide for

their families. More and more women are taking

on new roles and responsibilities particularly in

circumstances where they become the sole

providers for their household in refugee camps

and foreign cities (Mama, Dinka woman, age 65).

Some husbands lost their traditional male means of livelihood due to displacement. Without being able to access these familiar gendered resources, many have also been unwilling to accept changes in traditional gender roles. Many men have become idle and therefore

249 unable to provide for their families. Such changes have significantly altered the traditional division of labor. As Anyang, who was displaced from the Upper Nile provinces in the early 1980s notes, changes in gender division of labor have led to resentment of and resistance to new gender roles:

Back home your wife respects you and obeys

your orders ... When you leave your country you

are exposed to all kind of ideas, good and bad ...

you know, here all the talk about women's rights

has corrupted our women. Nowadays as a

husband you have NO authority. You cannot

shout at your wife or discipline your children; if

you do so it is considered as a crime! You cannot

tell your wife what to do or talk to her if she

comes home very late. She is now the actual

head of the household (Anyang, Nuer man, age

48).

As Dinka and Nuer women refugees assumed the role of providers and supporters of the families in cities such as Nairobi and Kampala, many of them began to assert greater involvement in decision making,

250 particularly on financial issues an area traditionally considered the sole domain of the men. Such a shift has created a sense of uneasiness among men in Kenya and Uganda. For instance, many men feel that their masculinity and authority in the family and over women has been questioned. Such feelings result from women going out to work and becoming the family breadwinners, while men perform what were traditionally defined as women's gendered roles. As Bui states

When my wife goes to work, I have to cook, go to

the grocery to buy food, and do other household

chores. On my way to the grocery, I used to look

on all directions to make sure that no one sees

me doing women's work. Being seen by a fellow

southerner creates an embarrassment ... at the

beginning it was sensitive. I used to hide it but

now many of the men I know perform household

activities, so I guess it is becoming OK! (Bui, a

Nuer man, age 29).

Shifts in gender roles have created a sense of helplessness among some southern Sudanese men living in exile in Nairobi and Kampala.

Some of the men experienced anxiety over their perceived loss of

251 authority within the family. As well, when wives work outside the home, husbands have less control over them. For a former farmer or middle class Dinka or Nuer man, it is a matter of duty and prestige to be able to support one's family. Moreover, when a role reversal takes place - for example when a wife supports an unemployed husband- his position within the nuclear and extended family is threatened. Indeed, some of the more illuminating consequences of role reversal were often emphasized during my interviews in relation to children, childcare and husband-wife relationships. And Steve, a stay-at-home father (Nuer, age

26) indicates that in those situations where Dinka and Nuer men assume familial roles such as cooking and taking care of the children, they became more aware of the difficulties that women experience.

Comparing the situation in Sudan with that in Nairobi or Kampala led some of the fathers to realize the important role women play in caring for the children and shouldering the family responsibilities. As a result, they come to value the strength of women, especially when it comes to dealing with children. For instance, Magot declares,

In Sudan, some fathers did not experience

children's noise and their daily demands

because they spent most of their daytime

252 outside the house. There is a common saying

among the Dinka that translates into English as

"women are foolish." However, here in Nairobi

after taking care of four children and seeing first

hand how difficult it is, I came to the realization

that men are the ones who are fools, not women

(Magot, a Dinka man, age 36).

The gender role reversal has both negative and positive consequences on the research participants. For example some of the men who are not prepared to assume traditional female roles such as cooking, and childcare resort to excessive alcohol consumption and to abandoning their wives and children. This situation has caused conflict within families that has led to separation and divorce. Some men attempt to reinstate their dominance and control by leaving the house immediately when the wife returns from work. Adam explains, "you cannot believe, as soon as my wife arrives home from her work, I will just sneak out of the house. I feel very demeaned because I am worthless and my wife is the one who is supporting the family" (Adam, a Dinka man, age 41).

253 I have, thus, argued that displacement has intensified economic hardship, poverty and exposure to unfamiliar environments, cultures and lifestyles. Being marginalized in the new setting of exile, the Dinka and Nuer refugees find traditionally defined roles, expectations and behaviors are put to the test, questioned, resisted and even reversed. The shift in gender roles, however, provides the space and opportunity for

Dinka and Nuer women and men to reconstitute power relations between each other, within the family and society. As Dinka and Nuer refugee women assume the role of providers and supporters of the family financially, many of the interviewees assert their involvement in decision­ making, an area that had previously been the sole domain of men.

Conclusion

This chapter has engaged participants' reflections on their experiences of displacement, disruption and protracted refugee experiences in Kakuma Refugee Camp in northwest Kenya, as well as in

Rhino Refugee Camp in northern Uganda. The testimonies of the research participants parallel that of thousands of Dinka and Nuer women, men and children who were forced to flee their homeland and livelihoods under chaotic and extremely violent conditions. The women,

254 men and children I interviewed have been affected by displacement in distinctly different ways. However, they have survived in common the severe and extremely dangerous experience of the flight into exile; suffered similar abuses and traumas; had their lives disrupted and their resources constrained; and together they have experienced the disintegration of community and support systems. The violent and traumatic experiences of displacement such as social, economical and cultural exclusion, the political violence of dispossession, the death of their loved ones, and material and cultural losses have forced them to re­ evaluate their perceptions, values, roles and relationships with and between each other. Moreover, both women and men have been positively affected by the exposure to new cultures and values introduced by NGOs.

Other factors that have been significant in the restructuring of the Dinka and Nuer gender relations have been the new education, knowledge and skills acquired by the Dinka and Nuer refugees as I have described in this and the previous chapters. In the concluding chapter, I describe how these factors have influenced processes of transformation.

255 Chapter Six: Conclusion Transforming Gender Roles and Relationships

Political emancipation is the reduction of man

[sic], on the one hand, to a member of civil

society, to an egoistic, independent individual,

and, on the other hand, to a citizen, a juridical

person. Only when the real, individual man [sic]

re-absorbs in himself the abstract citizen, and as

an individual human being has become a

species-being in his everyday life, in his

particular work, and in his particular situation,

only when man has recognized and organized

his "own powers" as social powers, and,

consequently, no longer separates social power

from himself in the shape of political power, only

then will human emancipation have been

accomplished (Marx 1867).

Introduction

Feminists raise questions about power relations within a given society and how women's and men's identities, roles and relationships

256 are significantly transformed in the context of conflict and displacement

(Lund and Lie 2005; Peteet 2005). Julie Peteet, in her study of

Palestinian women's resistance argues that situations of conflict and displacement lead to alterations of many cultural, social and gendered relations between women and men. As a result, meanings commonly attached to cultural practices and gender expectations are challenged, redefined and transformed (2005: 6). In the context of southern Sudan,

Dinka and Nuer women's experiences of conflict, displacement and transformation are not isolated from the broader socio-economic, political, cultural and nationalist processes of collective struggles.

Indeed, significant changes in Dinka and Nuer gender roles and relationships are directly linked to the gains that Sudanese women's movements have achieved since the 1960s.

I have defined transformation as the process of contestation, renegotiation and reconfiguration of gender perceptions, roles and relationships. By transformation I do not mean the end of patriarchy but rather the everyday practice of resistance and agency performed by the

Dinka and Nuer women and men as they subvert and transform oppressive gender roles and relationships.

257 Transforming Gender Relationships

Dinka and Nuer women's resistance, agency and transformation are not individual but collective and structural. Nevertheless, human development discourses tend to ignore the complexity of how resistance and agency engage complex and substantive negotiations, confrontations and reconfigurations of power relations within the home, extended family, community, refugee camp, national and transnational arenas. As

Mukherjee-Reed argues, in these struggles, women aim to challenge and transform prevailing configurations of power relations:

The processes through which this challenge is

mounted reveal a kind of agency that appears to

be inseparable from resistance. They may focus

on specific goals like education or human rights,

but are connected to a broader struggle for

structural change that lays bare the underlying

structures through which injustice and

exclusion manifest themselves (Mukherjee Reed

2008: 216).

In order to better understand processes of change and transformation, it is important to examine gender roles and

258 relationships, gendered divisions of labour and family structures. I believe that it is within these institutions that renegotiations, contestations and transformation occur between women and men in response to changing circumstances in Kenya and Uganda.

Changes in Marriages/Family Relations

The sexual division of labour in exile, as well as in southern Sudan is not static. Similarly, the subordination of women and the dominance of men are neither natural nor eternal. I have argued in Chapter Four that polygamous marriage customs used to constitute a common practice in Dinka and Nuer communities prior to their displacement. Historically, polygamy, ghost marriage and the practice of widow inheritance used to be moderated by bride-wealth, and were considered critical to the Dinka and Nuer political, military and economic power.

The historical rationale for institutions such as polygamy and ghost marriages among the Dinka and Nuer communities is that it provided them with support during times of crisis. Currently, these institutions are no longer prevalent except in some rural areas within southern Sudan. However, Jok (1999) argues that the Dinka are a polygamous society with 45-60 percent of men having more than one

259 wife at the same time at some point in their lives. His field research with

Dinka communities in 1999 generalized that "despite some of the changes in the Dinka marriage patterns, the core of the system in the community remains the same (Jok 1999:200). While this has been true for some time, my research findings clearly demonstrate that displacement has significantly transformed traditional marriage and divorce patterns due to many factors. For instance, displaced Dinka and

Nuer men can no longer afford to marry more than one wife due to the very expensive costs of life in camps and cities and the loss of cattle that used to secure the bride-wealth. As Mama states

In the old days the Dinka and Nuer men in

southern Sudan used to marry many wives.

Polygamy used to solve family problems. Also,

ghost marriages used to force brothers-in-laws

to take responsibility of widowed women and

their children. But now they do not. It is chaos.

The system has completely collapsed due to the

destruction brought about by the conflict and

displacement ... nowadays, the majority of our

men are no longer able to provide for their wives

260 and children. The situation in Kakuma and

South Sudan is all the same. With the loss of so

many men in the war, many Dinka women have

discovered that the age-old societal safety net

[polygamy and ghost marriages] are no longer

working (Mama, a Dinka women, age 65).

Similarly, Ayak, who was displaced from the Western Upper Nile, recounts her experiences after the death of her husband

After my husband died in the war, my husband's

family did not offer any kind of financial support

for my children or myself when we were in

southern Sudan, despite my cries of help. In our

culture before, it is the responsibility of the

husband's family to make sure that widows are

taken care of through ghost marriages. When

the attacks escalated in my village in Western

Upper Nile, I had to flee with my kids to Kakuma

Refugee Camp. Now, I have nothing and are

completely dependent on the United Nations

261 food rations, which is barely enough to cover a

little part of our daily food needs (Ayak, a Dinka

woma,n age 43).

Indeed, cultural institutions, traditions and values constantly change and are subject to various interpretations. Access to formal education, empower both women and men and enable them to challenge and alter institutions such as marriage and divorce. Moreover, traditional practices such as polygamy or ghost marriage, which are considered by many of the research participants as 'something of the past,' have been radically transformed as a result of the introduction of new/foreign cultures by NGOs and host populations in Kenya and Uganda. This is demonstrated in the refusal of educated Dinka and Nuer women to accept polygamy and instead endorse a more nuclear family. Olivia, an educated Nuer activist who teaches adult literacy classes with SWAN in

Nairobi reiterates

In recent years, many educated women have

begun to demand monogamous, companionate

marriage, with fewer children and more privacy

from other relatives. Today, the wives do not

want their husbands to acquire another wife and

262 many seek divorce if a husband decides to marry

a second wife (Olivia, a Nuer woman, age 29).

In summary, the centuries-old patriarchal institutions of polygamy, levirate marriage and widow inheritance which have been central to Dinka and Nuer culture, traditions and practices in southern

Sudan, have currently become irrelevant. These social and cultural institutions and value systems that inform the Dinka and Nuer histories, ideologies and gender identities have been subject to rigorous interpretations. As the testimonies of the research participants illustrate, these roles and relationships have been irrevocably disrupted as a direct result of the Dinka and Nuer experiences of displacement, and radically transformed by acts of collective re-evaluation and resistance while in exile.

Inter-Generational Confrontations

Militarized conflict in combination with the massive scale of forced migration has not only displaced the Dinka and Nuer communities but, more importantly, it has also disturbed their patriarchal cultural institutions and values and, therefore, radically disrupted gender relationships. Employing the notion of "lost masculinity," Turner (2001)

263 states that conflict and displacement produce changes that challenge

"the unquestioned authority of the patriarch" (Turner 2001: 67). For the

Dinka and Nuer fathers or husbands who have traditionally assumed the roles of the patriarch, changes in gender roles deprives them of their traditional sense of control and power over women and children. As Kuat illustrated in Chapter Five:

Everybody in this camp [Rhino Camp] is

focusing on women and children. Old men are

not longer important. We used to be the source

of wisdom and advice, but now our women think

that we are outdated ... this is all because all the

attention and resources are directed towards

them (Kuat, a Dinka man, age 54).

Anyang, also, states,

We have a saying back home that old trees have

deep roots. And it was these deep roots that kept

the young growing. But here in a foreign land,

refugee camps and big cities, our young are

losing their roots. They no longer benefit from

the skills and knowledge that we learned from

264 our grandparents and from our traditions and

social values. They are all gone. I guess when we

go back to southern Sudan when peace comes,

we all have to start over again (Anyang, a Nuer

man, age 48).

The concerns voiced by Anyang and Kuat reflect the reality in the

Kakuma Refugee Camp where the majority of the refugees are young boys and girls under the age of 17. The southern Sudanese youth in

Kakuma are assimilating the new reality of unsettled and transformed gender values that have resulted from protracted conflict, destruction of historic ways of life, displacement, exile, resistance and social change.

Together, these illustrate the radical shifts and transformations of gender values and roles among Nuer and Dinka women and men in Kenya and

Uganda.

Changes in Gender Roles and Relationships

While mainstream paradigms of human development often overlook the complexity of the structural relationships within which agents act, my research illustrates that violent processes of oil-induced displacement in southern Sudan have not only destroyed the Dinka and

265 Nuer homes, cattle and resources but also destroyed families, kinship, traditions, cultural institutions and practices that shaped their lives for centuries. Paradoxically, this very upheaval has also paved the way for re-evaluating and transforming their individual, collective and institutional gender roles and relationships.

One of the contentious issues in the process of transformation is the reversal of gender roles. I understand gender role reversal to refer to the shift in the power relations and gendered responsibilities, practices and status between women and men within the family and society.

Gender role reversal is examined in the context of how the gender division of labor is constructed and exercised in southern Sudan, as

Chapters Four and Five illustrate, in comparison to shifts in gender division of labor and authority among the Dinka and Nuer refugees in

Kenya and Uganda.

Organizing Across Differences: New Forms of Agency, Resistance and Activism

We want our New Sudan women to be well

informed about politics. They are the majority of

the population ... The time has come for us to

266 equally dance with our men in the political

arena. No man is born a politician and no

woman is born a cook! (SWAN Pamphlet, 2003).

Since the emergence of Sudanese women's studies as a field of inquiry (Amin 1981, Badri 1986, Hale 1996), it has predominately been associated with the northern women's movement. Sondra Hale (1996) argues that the scholarship on the Sudanese women's movement, including her earlier work, centered on juxtaposing two seemingly antagonistic forces: the Sudanese Women's Union (SWU), a wing of the

Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) in contrast to the cultural nationalists and Islamist women's political parties.44 As an essentially nationalist and state-sponsored women's movement, the Sudanese women's movement has, until recently, omitted the questions and agendas of southern Sudanese women, as well as many marginalized women in eastern Sudan, and in the western regions of Darfur and the Nuba

Mountains. It was compromised by an urban, middle-class and racial bias. As Ana remarks,

44 By cultural nationalists/Islamists I refer here to women in political organizations such as the women's wings of the Umma Party, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), and the Islamist women of the National Islamic Front (NIF).

267 Arab women's organizations in the north do not

care about the concerns of southern Sudanese

women [Dinka and Nuer]. They do not care

about what has historically happened to us in

terms of slavery, institutionalized racism,

Arabization, Islamization, and class exploitation.

They do not care about the extreme violence that

is currently taking place in our oil territories. If

you look at the writings of the northern women's

movement, we [Dinka and Nuer women] do not

seem to belong or exist (Ana, Nuer women's

activist, age 42).

Ana's criticism of the northern women's movement highlights how

Northern Sudanese ethnocentrism and racism, predating British colonialism and having been sustained systematically through Sudan's colonial and post-colonial institutions, has favored the politically dominant Arabic, Muslim peoples of the north. Indeed, the north-south dichotomy has led to a subjugation of southern Sudanese communities, namely the Dinka and the Nuer, leading to the southern uprising and the instigation of a civil war for liberation. Nevertheless, despite their historic

268 limitations, Sudanese women's movements in the North have achieved certain socio-economic and political rights for all Sudanese women since the 1940s including relative success in opening space, in terms of suffrage, equal pay for equal work, and relative protections under the law. The women's movement has also made progress in many areas of law reform, public employment, the struggle for democratic rights and values, solidarity work, and most of all in addressing the structures of inequality that shape the wider political and economic environment. The rich yet contested history of Sudanese the women's movement constitutes a solid ground for the radical changes in gender roles and relationships constituted by violent experiences of displacement. Out of this legacy, a new generation of Sudanese scholars and activists

(Abusharaf 2002; Anis 2001; Jok 2001) has risen up. They are deconstructing the view of communities as a unified groups of women, men, and children and they are highlighting the different ways that gender roles and relationships are deconstructed, reconfigured and radically transformed as a result of displacement.

The displaced southern Sudanese women activists that I interviewed in Nairobi between 2001-2003 (Adut, age 39; Ana, age 42;

Mama, age 65; Susan, age 49; and Olivia, age 29) have established,

269 throughout the 1990s, a grass-roots women's movement that worked in collaboration with UN agencies, donors, INGOs and local communities in

Kenya and Uganda. They adopted a gender sensitive approach as a critical tool for bringing about genuine transformation through resisting, mobilizing and challenging oppressive relationships of power. These activists have been successful in creating a space for women within various political institutions. To better coordinate their activities, they worked with community organizations to set up the New Sudan

Indigenous Organizations (NESI) network. They engaged in advocacy and service delivery in the non-government-held areas in southern Sudan.

For instance, NESI network established centres that provided legal advice and socio economic assistance to women who survive gender-base violence rape and other traumatic expereinces. The Sudanese Women's

Voice for Peace (SWVP) ran training courses on conflict resolution, peace monitoring and leadership skills in collaboration with international and

UN agencies. The activism of the Nairobi-based women's groups developed around a very strong and critical discourse, which demanded structural changes in women's roles and gender relations in post-conflict reconstruction. In fact, two of the five interviewed women activists joined the SPLM negotiating team at the formal peace talks in Machakos and

270 Naivasha, Kenya in 2003. As well, they played an instrumental role in formulating a clear plan to tackle structural obstacles to the full integration of women-specific needs in the Comprehensive Peace

Agreement (CPA) that was later signed in 2005, resulting in the military ceasefire and the political resolution of the civil war. However, although women representatives of civil society organizations associated with the

SPLM/A attended briefings and consultations, they - including women's organizations - were excluded from the formal peace negotiations.

When analysing and reflecting on the work and gains of southern

Sudanese women to create social change and transform traditional gender roles in exceptional circumstances and periods of crisis

(protracted refugee camps, displacement, militarization, migration, extreme personal and political violence), the question remains as to the larger impact of such gender transformations. Should it be viewed as resistance, because it confronts and refutes centuries-old practices that serve patriarchy and undermine social justice for women and men?

Should it be understood as agency, because it arises out of the simple, yet uncharted acts of women individually and collectively taking up space, exercising their power and successfully rising to fulfill the responsibilities of traditionally male roles? Or should it be equated with

271 emancipation, because the fact of women challenging gendered social norms has been as revolutionary a socio-political process as their support for the southern liberation movement, their struggle to ensure collective survival in a time of war, and their work at all levels to secure meaningful peace for their communities and the wider Sudanese public?

Transforming gender relations in the southern Sudanese context of civil war, exile, and now post-war reconstruction has required and will continue to require a complex interplay between resistance, agency and emancipation - one that adapts to ever-changing pressures and circumstances, builds on old and new collective strengths, and brings forward progressive visions of equality and justice for the wider Sudanese society. Based on the experiences that my research participants generously shared, it is clear that displacement not only radically alters gender relations, but in so doing creates unforeseen opportunities for new types of social consciousness, and new social relations. Indeed, the exceptional changes experienced by Dinka and Nuer refugees, particularly the women's development of new knowledge and skills, economic independence, involvement in organizations and assumption of leadership roles, have not only influenced their individual and collective

272 transformation, but have effected their transition into being primary agents of social change.

This dissertation illustrates that militarized and violent patterns of oil-induced displacement in southern Sudan have resulted in turmoil that consequently led to significant transformations of oppressive gendered relations. However, this process of becoming conscious of the power dynamics within social relations, of evaluating them, challenging and transforming them along gender and cultural lines, has not been free from trauma and tension. Such challenges and changes between women and men, their families and communities conflict with their traditional gendered values and roles. Yet despite this contradiction, I argue that the new skills, knowledge and education gained by Dinka and Nuer refugees while in exile have constituted individual and structural changes and transformations of social institutions from the family and community, to the refugee camp, the state and beyond.

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288 Appendices

Appendix A: List of Terms and Abbreviations

Anyanya Is a word used in southern Sudan to describe poison. The term is used to identify the southern Sudanese rebel army who fought in the first civil war from 1955 to 1972. Arakis Arakis Energy is a Canadian oil exploration company. Arakis acquired part of the Chevron concession in Blocks 1, 2, and 4 in the Basin in Sudan in 1992. In 1997 Arakis formed and led a consortium, the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC). It was acquired by Talisman Energy Inc. in October 1998. Chevron Chevron Corporation is an American multinational integrated oil company that was granted oil concessions in Sudan in 1974. It pulled out of southern Sudan in 1984 for security reasons after the murder of two of its employees by southern liberation groups. In 1992, Chevron sold off its Sudanese concessions. CNPC China National Petroleum Corporation, a Chinese state- owned oil company that has owned the largest, 40 percent, share of the Greater Petroleum Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC) since 1997. CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement, signed in 2005 between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the ruling National Congress Party (NCP). DAWN Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era DUP Democratic Unionist Party is a dominant Sudanese political party that has historically been based in the Khatmiyya Muslim religious sect in eastern Sudan. The DUP was traditionally headed by the El Mirghani family. Its leader is Mohammed Osman El Mirghani. Dinka The Dinka is the largest ethnic group in Sudan comprising approximately 12 percent of the population in 1983.The Dinka people live principally in the Bahr El Ghazal and Upper Nile provinces of Sudan. They speak Dinka, a western

289 Nilotic language, and believe in a Dinka religion but many have converted to Christianity. ECOS The European Coalition on Oil in Sudan is a group of 80 European organizations that call for action by governments and the business sector to ensure that Sudan's oil wealth contributes to peace and equitable development. GAD Gender and Development

GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GCID Gender Concerns in Development

GNPOC Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company, the joint venture among Talisman CNPC, Petronas, and Sudapet that owns and develops Blocks 1,2, and 4 of Sudan's Muglad Basin oil fields. It also owns the pipeline connecting the GNPOC oil fields to the Red Sea and the port built on the Red Sea for oil supertankers.

GOS Government of Sudan

GOSS Government of South Sudan

HIV/AIDS Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome

IDPs Internally Displaced Persons

IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development comprising Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, Kenya, and Uganda. IGAD has hosted peace negotiations between the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A since 1993. ILO International Labor Organization

290 IMF International Monetary Fund

Jallaba Arabic term for merchant, trader, or importer. In southern Sudan, the term Jallaba has the additional (historical) meaning of slave trader, and is applied generally to describe all northern Sudanese. Kakuma The Kakuma camp was established by the UNHCR in north­ western Kenya in July 1992 to host 16,000 teenage Sudanese refugees fleeing militarized violence in southern Sudan. LRA Lord's Resistance Army, a Ugandan rebel group noted for its gross abuses of human rights. The LRA has been supported by the Sudanese government and operates in northern Uganda out of bases near the government garrison town of Juba in southern Sudan. Lundin Oil A Swedish oil company. Lundin Oil had a 40.375 percent share in Block 5A of Sudan's Muglad oil fields and retains a 24.5 percent interest in Block 5B. Muraheleen An Arabic word for "travelers," now referring to Baggara tribal militias of southern Darfur and southern Kordofan armed by successive Sudanese governments. In 1989, the Muraheleen were incorporated into the GOS militias under army j urisdiction. NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement

NDA The National Democratic Alliance is an opposition alliance of political parties and armed groups formed in exile. The NDA members include the SPLM/A, DUP, Sudan Alliance Forces, Beja Congress, the Umma Party, and others. NESI New Sudan Indigenous NGO Network NGOs Non-governmental organizations

291 NIF The National Islamic Front is a militant Islamist political party that came to power in 1989 after a military coup overthrew the elected government. It was initially known as the Muslim Brotherhood Nilotic Refers to ethnic groups or a language group to which some southern Sudanese belong, including the Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk and Anuak Nuba Sudanese ethnic groups who reside in the Nuba Mountains areas in Southern Kordofan. Nuer Sudanese people who live in the Upper Nile region of southern Sudan. The Nuer are the second largest ethnic group in southern Sudan after the Dinka. They speak Nuer and believe in a Nuer religion although many have converted to Christianity. OAU Organization for African Unity OLS Operation Lifeline Sudan is an NGO that facilitated humanitarian assistance to war-affected areas of southern Sudan. Since 1989, The OLS humanitarian operation has come under the U.N. Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan, based in Khartoum. OLS in the south is a consortium of six operational U.N. agencies and forty-five international and Sudanese nongovernmental organizations. PDF Popular Defence Force is an Islamist government-sponsored militia under the jurisdiction of the Sudanese army, which trains, arms, and supervises these forces. PetroChina A Chinese oil company, formed by CNPC's domestic Chinese assets and liabilities in 1999. CNPC owns 90 percent of PetroChina. Petronas The national petroleum corporation of Malaysia. It owns a 30 percent share of the GNPOC. Since 2003, Petronas acquired 41 percent share of the Block 5B concession. Rhino Camp A refugee camp in northern Uganada where the many of the Dinka and Nuer research participants resided for a period ranging from five to ten years.

292 SAPs Structural Adjustment Programs

SCC Sudan Council of Churches

SCP Sudanese Communist Party

SPLM/A Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army, is the main political organization and army of Sudanese rebels formed in 1983. It remains the largest rebel group in Sudan. SWAN Sudanese Women's Association in Nairobi

SWVFP Sudanese Women's Voice for Peace

SWU Sudanese Women's Union

Sudapet Sudapet Ltd. is the state-owned oil company of Sudan. Sudapet only owns a 5 percent share of the GNPOC consortium and 5 percent share of the Block 5A consortium. It owns 10 percent of and is co-lead partner on Block 5B with Petronas. Sudd The name for the large blocks of aquatic vegetation that obstruct the channels of the swamps of the White Nile in southern Sudan. Sudd was derived from the Arabic word sadd meaning barrier or obstacle. Talisman Talisman Energy Incorporation is the largest independent Canadian oil and gas producer which is headquartered in Calgary, Alberta. Talisman was the operational partner and owned 25 percent of GNPOC from October 1998 until early 2003. Umma Party This political party was historically a dominant party in coalition governments between 1986-89. It is associated with

293 the Sunni Muslim sect of the Ansar and its spiritual leaders, the Mahdi family. UNDP United Nations Development Program.

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund

UNIFEM United Nations Development Fund for Women

WAD Women and Development

WID Women in Development WRC World Relief Corp is an American Christian, non-profit organization that provides humanitarian aid, disaster, and emergency relief in Sudan. It has been engaged in community and economic development, welfare reform, refugee resettlement, and immigration issues in Sudan, Kenya and Uganda.

WFP World Food Program

World Vision An international Christian, nonprofit humanitarian relief and development organization that works with marginalized ethnic communities in Sudan.

294 Appendix B: Profiles of Research Participants

These profiles contain a brief description of the interviewed women, men and children to whom I refer to as Group One in this dissertation. All of the 35 research participants are from the Dinka and Nuer communities in southern Sudan. The interviewees have all been forced to flee their homes in villages in or surrounding the oilfield territories in Western Upper Nile, Eastern Upper Nile, as well as the

Heglig region south of Kordofan.

1 Aban, age 37, is a Nuer man displaced from the Western Upper Nile due to oil and war. During this conflict, he lost his wife and newborn son. He was forced to cross the Sudanese border to Uganda where he lived at Rhino refugee camp for six years. He survived several attacks at Rhino camp by the Lord Liberation Army, as well Ugandan soldiers/militia before he moved to Kampala where I interviewed him.

2 Abuk, age 63, is a Dinka woman displaced from the Equatoria province in southern Sudan due to war as well as oil-pipeline construction in the early 1980s. Abuk joined the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in 1983 where she worked as a nurse. She lost her leg in a landmine accident in 1985. Her husband, a soldier for the SPLM/A, was killed in action in 1989. Abuk, currently residing in Nairobi, is unemployed and illiterate. She has no children. She is financially supported by the SPLM/A, as well as occasional support from relatives in the west.

3 Aguer, age 11, is a Nuer boy who, along with his mother, Olivia (one of the profiled inteviewees in this list), was displaced from the Heglig region south of Kordofan when he was a baby. He and his mother crossed the border to Kenya in 1997 and lived in

295 Kakuma for five years. They are currently residing in Nairobi where Aguer is currently in grade two.

4 Amira, age 46, is a Dinka woman displaced from Western Upper Nile. She crossed the Sudanese borders to Kenya with her mother, children, and sisters. The UNHCR located her with her five children in Kakuma Camp where she stayed for four years before coming to Nairobi. She is separated from her family and does not know what happened to her mother and three sisters.

5 Anisia, age 60, is a Nuer woman displaced from the Eastern Upper Nile in 1983 due to oil-pipeline construction. She lived in the IDP camp in Khartoum and worked as a domestic worker. She is illiterate, unemployed and dependent on financial support of local NGOs and relatives. She is divorced with no dependents; her children died in the conflict. She crossed the border to Uganda. At the time of the interview, she resided in Kampala.

6 Anyang, age 48, is a Nuer man displaced from the Upper Nile provinces in the early 1980s after the discovery of oil. He crossed the Ugandan border and resides in Rhino camp for six years before settling in Kampala where I interviewed him.

7 Ayak, age 43, is a Dinka woman displaced from the Western Upper Nile after her village was destroyed due to oil production in the early 1980s. She lived in Sudanese government IDP camps for seven years. She was imprisoned by the government a couple of times for brewing beer in the camps. She returned to the Upper Nile in 1990 to escape harassment. She crossed the border to Kenya in 1992 and has lived in Kampala ever since. She continues to brew beer and sell food.

8 Aza, age 47, is a Nuer woman who was displaced from the Equatoria province in southern Sudan due to the construction of oil-pipeline in her village. She walked for about fourteen days, with some of her relatives, without food and crossed the Sudanese border to Kenya. She resided in Kakuma camp for six years before settling in Nairobi where I interviewed her.

296 9 A Dinka girl, age 6, was born in Kakuma Kamp in 2000. Her mother, Choi, age 28, is profiled in this list. Since 2002, she has been living in Nairobi, where she attends kindergarten. She desperately wanted to talk to me when I was interviewing her mother. She drew me a picture of children holding hands and playing. Her family, supported by the UNHCR, is seeking resettlement in the west.

10 Bui, age 29, is a Nuer man displaced from the Heglig region south of Kordofan in 1997 when Canadian companies started exploring oil in his territory. He resided in Nairobi during the time of the interview and was pursuing resettlement process to Australia.

11 Choi, age 28, is a Dinka woman displaced from the Western Upper Nile in 1999 following the bombardment of their village because of oil. She crossed the border to Kenya, remaining in Kakuma until 2002, where she gave birth to her daughter profiled in this list. Currently she works as a hairdresser. Registered with the UNHCR, she is seeking resettlement in the west.

12 Dan, age 42, is a Nuer woman who was displaced from the Heglig area in Western Upper Nile region in southern Sudan. She crossed the Kenyan border and resided in Kakuma refugee camp before settling in Nairobi where I interviewed her.

13 Haram, age 24, is a Nuer woman displaced from Equatoria province who crossed the Sudanese Ugandan borders to reside in Rhino camp. I interviewed Haram in Kampala where she talked about gender- based violence and women's experiences of rape in the camp.

14Jur, age 32, is a Nuer man displaced from the Upper Nile provinces in the early 1980s due to the discovery there. He lived in IDP camps in Uganda. At the time of the interview, he was working in a restaurant in Kampala.

15 Kamala, age 32, is a Dinka woman displaced from the Heglig region south of Kordofan in 2000. She endured the very traumatic process of giving birth to a baby boy on the road while fleeing the Sudanese border to Kenya. Her newborn son became very sick and died before she settled with her other two children in the Kakuma refugee camp.

297 16 Kuat, age 54, is a Dinka man displaced from the Western Upper Nile due to oil and war. During this conflict, he lost all five children and his wife. He lived in IDP camps in Sudan and worked in a fish market. Harassed by the government, he relocated to Kampala with the support of church groups and relatives.

17 Lola, age 15, is a Nuer girl who was displaced from the Heglig region south of Kordofan in 1998 when she was seven. She fled with her family, but both of her parents died on their way to Kenya. Lola crossed the border to Kenya and lived in Kakuma camp where interviewed her. At the time of the interview, Lola was attending literacy classes in the camp.

18 Lual, age 57, is a Dinka man and well know SPLM leader. I first interviewed Lue in 2001 when I was conducting fieldwork research in Kenya for a project entitled "Engendering Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Horn of Africa," for the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC). Then, I interviewed him again in 2003.

19 Lue, Age 54, is a Dinka man and one of the renowned SPLA commanders in Nairobi. I interviewed Lue in 2001 when I was conducting fieldwork research in Kenya for Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC). I interviewed Lue for the second time in 2003.

20 Magot, age 36, is a Dinka man displaced from Western Upper Nile. In 1998, when government forces destroyed his village, he fled to Kenya. Interviewed in Nairobi

21 Majok, age 57, is a Nuer man displaced from the Heglig region south of Kordofan in 1998 after Canadian companies started exploring oil in the Heglig area. He crossed the borders to Uganda and resided in Rhino camp for few years before I interviewed him in Kampala.

22 Malwal, age 50, is a Nuer man and one of the SPLA fighters in Kenya. I first interviewed Malwal in 2001 when I was conducting fieldwork research in Kenya for the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC). I interviewed Malwal again in 2003.

298 23 Marko, 13, is a Dinka boy who was displaced with his two younger brothers in 1999 from the Western Upper Nile due to the destruction of their village in the oilfields. He resided with his brothers in Kakuma camp and is also supported by the Sudanese Council of Churches, where one of his relative works.

24 Mary, age 43, is a Dinka woman, who fled her village in Equatoria in 1998 when the village was bombard and destroyed by the Government of Sudan. She fled the Sudanese border and resided in Rhino camp for 4 years before settling in Kampala where I interviewed her.

25 Ngor, age 49, is a Dinka man displaced from the Upper Nile. He raised cattle before displacement. Harassed by the government, he crossed the border to Uganda. Illiterate and unemployed, he resides in Kampala where he is dependent on the UNHCR.

26 Ngunt-Deng, age 50, is a Nuer man displaced from the Heglig region south of Kordofan in 1997 when Canadian companies started exploring oil in the area. He lives in the Kakuma camp.

27 Nouri, age 19, is one of the identified "lost boys" of Sudan. He is a Nuer. I interviewed Nouri in Kakuma Refugee Camp where he spoke about his experiences in the camp.

28 Nya, age 43, is a Nuer woman who was displaced from the Upper Nile provinces in early 1980s following the discovery oil. Currently, she sells traditional African textiles to NGOs.

29 Olivia, age 29, is a Nuer woman, displaced from Bahar El Ghazal province who survived the harsh and dangerous process of the flight to arrive in Nairobi where I interviewed her.

30 Sara, age 39, is Nuer woman displaced from Hegling oil fields. The GOS soldiers killed her husband while he was asleep in their front yard in the Hegling. She fled with her five children and crossed the borders to Rhino camp in Uganda.

31 Sitana, age 29, is a Dinka woman, who used to work as a farmer in Upper Nile province in southern Sudan. She was pregnant when I interviewed her in Kakuma in 2001.

299 32 Steve, age 26, is a Nuer man who was displaced from the Heglig region south of Kordofan in 1997 when Canadian companies started exploring oil in the area. Prior to displacement, he raised cattle. Previously living in IDP camps near the Ugandan-Sudanese border, he now resides in Kampala. Illiterate, he works as a vender in a vegetable market. He is unmarried.

33 Rosa, age 14, is a Dinka girl displaced with her mother in 2000 from the Western Upper Nile due to the destruction of their village in the oilfields territories. She and her mother crossed the border to Kenya where they lived in Kakuma camp for three years. Her mother died in 2002. During the time of the interview, she is living with relatives in Nairobi where she is attending school and is supported by church groups and relatives.

34 Tut, age 37, is a Nuer man displaced from the Heglig region south of Kordofan in 1996 due to oil refining. He crossed the border to Uganda and lives in Kampala.

35 Yii, age 37, is a Dinka man displaced from the Upper Nile region. He used to raise cattle in an area now restricted to oil production. Harassed by government forces and accused of supporting the SPLM, he crossed the border in 1998, remaining in Kakuma for three years. He has a primary level of education and is currently employed by the Sudanese Council of Churches in Nairobi.

300 Appendix C: Interview Questions

Sample of broader interview questions:

• What is the relationship between development and displacement in circumstances of extremely volatile armed conflict? • How have Dinka and Nuer women, men and children experienced militarized patterns of displacement in the oilfield territories? Also, how have individual women's and men's lives been distinctly affected by such displacement? • Do women's and men's experiences of displacement differ? • Do gender roles and relationships change from the period prior to displacement? • How do changes in gender roles affect relations between women and men in families, in refugee camps, and in society at large? • In what ways have Sudanese women and men who reside in Nairobi, Kampala, and Kakuma refugee camps responded to displacement? Do their responses include resistance? • How have Dinka and Nuer communities created or recreated social structures and forms of organization when confronting violent, fluid and unpredictable situations? • What kinds of strategies have the interviewees adopted to challenge and transform oppressive social, economic, political and patriarchal relationships of power?

Sample of questions for individual Dinka and Nuer interviews

• Background information about the participants: o Name, gender, religion, ethnic group, age, years spent in exile, marital status, number of children (if relevant), educational background, ...etc o Socio-economic conditions prior to displacement o How many countries have the participants been to prior to coming to Kenya and Uganda? o What perceptions the participants had of gender roles and relationships prior to displacement? o How the participants (particularly females) negotiate power relations within the family and society prior to displacement?

301 o How has the displacement experience (and protracted refugee situations in long-term camps such as Kakuma and Rhino refugee camps) affected gender roles, values and relationships both within the family and the refugee community? o Who are the main providers for their families prior to displacement? Has that changed as a result of displacement? o What are some of the critical changes in the participants' livelihoods and socio-economic conditions as a result of conflict and displacement? o How have these changes affected gender values, roles and relationships? o What are some of the new skills and knowledge the participants have acquired while in Kenya and Uganda? o How have changes in gender roles affected relationships between women and men, family and marriage relationships? o How have the participants (particularly females) negotiated power relations within the family and society during the processes of displacement and its aftermath? o How do the participants use their newly acquired skills, knowledge and experiences to challenge some of the social, cultural and traditional aspects of southern Sudanese society? o How do the participants use their organizational skills and capabilities to improve their lives and that of their communities? o How do the participants resist the victimized and dependent image of a refugee woman? o What kind of future are the participants aspiring to?

Sample of questions for women's activists

o What is the name of your organization? o When was your organization established and why? o What are the mandate/objectives of the organization? o What kind of activities/services does your organization offer to Dinka and Nuer women and men?

302 o Who funds the activities of the organization? o How is the organization structured and managed? o What cultural aspects of the southern Sudanese society do the organization members view as obstacles to women's freedom and equality? o What strategies have women used to challenge some of these cultural aspects?

303 Appendix D: Consent Form (in English and Arabic)

My name is Amani El Jack, and I am a doctoral student in the Graduate Program in Women's Studies at York University. My Ph.D. dissertation title is "Engendering Development-Induced Displacement in the Sudan." Under the supervision of Dr. Wenona Giles, I plan to study the gendered causes and consequences of development-induced displacement in Sudan as well as the multidimensional impact of development-induced displacement on women and men.

You have been invited to participate in my research because the oil development, militarized conflict and displacement have impacted you and your community. The interview is 1-2 hours long, and is to be scheduled at your convenience and at a location of your choice. During our conversation, you have the right to refuse to answer any question(s) that you are not comfortable with and to withdraw from this study at any time.

I will audio record and transcribe the interview (transfer it to paper). In cases where the interview is conducted in Arabic, I will translate from Arabic to English. The tapes of this interview will be kept in strict confidence and will be destroyed after they are transcribed.

I, Amani El Jack, shall use this interview in my Ph.D dissertation and future publications, but I guarantee that the identity of the interviewees will always remain anonymous. I shall use pseudonyms where appropriate, change names of places and remove any other details that may reveal the identity of the participants.

By signing this consent form, you indicate your agreement to this interview.

Do you agree to take part in this research?

Yes No

304 Printed name of participant:

Signature of participant:

Date:

Signature of researcher:

305