Internal Displacement in Sudan Background paper prepared for the Mission to Sudan of the Senior Inter-Agency Network on Internal Displacement 2-13 April 2002 Norwegian Refugee Council/Global IDP Project Chemin Moïse Duboule, 59 1209 Geneva - Switzerland Tel: + 41 22 799 0700 Fax: + 41 22 799 0701 E-mail : [email protected] Briefing paper for Sudan mission 2-13 April 2002 2 ______________________________________________________________________ Introduction More than thirty years of civil war and inter tribal conflicts have caused tremendous suffering for the civilian Sudanese population. Since the conflict escalated in 1983 there have been an estimated two million war-related deaths and reliable sources estimate that 4 million or more remain internally displaced – with little prospect for large-scale returns in the near future. During recent years there has been a major expansion of oil production inside the conflict area. This has become closely linked with increased displacement as civilians have been forced to move as the conflict has escalated in these areas. Access problems in areas such as the Nuba Mountains, Bahr al Ghazal, Western Upper Nile/Unity State, Eastern Equatoria and southern Blue Nile continuously limit the opportunity to reach the displaced with humanitarian assistance, and there are regular reports of IDPs being exposed to gross violations of fundamental human rights and the rules of war – including relief facilities being targeted by aerial bombing (ICG 2002 p3; UN November 2001 p52). Common problems of quantifying IDP populations is further complicated in Sudan by traditional nomadic migration patterns, as well as movements related to people searching for emergency assistance due to sustained drought problems and even occasional floods. The latest comprehensive estimate of displacement in Southern Sudan dates back to USAID's survey in 1994, which confirmed the presence of 1,5 million IDPs (Ruiz 1998 p153). The UN has estimated the distribution of IDPs within Government-controlled areas as follows: some 1.8 million IDPs in the Khartoum State, 500 000 in the east and the "transition zone", and 300 000 in the southern states; in SPLM/A-controlled territories, it estimates there are 1.4 IDPs (UNCHR 5 February 2002). Although the civil war in Sudan is commonly depicted as one between the Muslim North versus the Christian and animist South, many casualties over the past years occurred as a result of inter-tribal conflicts (such as between the Dinka and the Nuer ethnic groups and within those groups). The civil war has no single battlefront, but fighting and atrocities against civilians take place in several different conflict areas. This has created a very complex and fluid displacement situation (Christian Aid May 2001). Even if the civil war has a religious dimension, major geo-political and economic issues cannot be overlooked especially in the current phase when displacement has become closely linked to conflict over resources (ICG 2002 p93; IRIN 14 November 2001 pp1, 3; Christian Aid 17 May 2001 p2). Main causes for conflict-induced displacement The conflict involves numerous armed factions, including the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), – which merged with the Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SPDF) in 2001 – the Government's Sudanese Army and its Popular Defence Forces (composed of various tribal militias), in addition to several individual groups of armed militias, – partly at war and partly in alliance with the Government or fighting each other. The Government of Sudan has commonly used ethnic divide-and-rule tactics to weaken the southern-based opposition forces, for example by sowing tensions between the Nuer and the Dinka ethnic groups in the oil regions (ICG 2002 pp.129-133). Direct exposure of civilians to military activities by the various armed factions is the main cause behind displacement in Sudan. Military action with a clear intent to displace civilians has been a common pattern and practice by armed forces on both sides of the conflict. Control of Briefing paper for Sudan mission 2-13 April 2002 3 ______________________________________________________________________ territory has been a main reason for the fighting, but the acquisition of resources and assets from civilians, or the denial of resources to the opposing side have been the dominant aspects of the war. Attacks on civilian settlements to disrupt recruitment to the various militias, and forced relocation have also characterized the conflict (Hendrie 1996; OCHA 28 September 1999). Abduction of civilians is the most extreme form of displacement in Sudan. It has been reported that as many as 12,000 remained abducted by end-2000 (US DOS February 2001 sect.1b), and that this practice has continued despite several initiatives to stop it. For example, by the beginning of 2001, Government militias escorting a military convoy killed civilians and abducted between 200 and 400 children and women in villages near Wau (UN November 2001). Major displacement of civilians has also paved the way for the recruitment of child soldiers – which has been practiced by both Government affiliated forces and rebel groups (ICG 2002 p4). Although SPLM/A handed over 3,500 child-soldiers to UNICEF in February 2001, there still remains between 4,000 and 6,000 to demobilize and return to their homes (UNICEF 29 August 2001; UN November 2001 p82). In Eastern Equatoria, attacks from the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), traditionally affiliated with forces loyal to the government of Sudan, have displaced many people. The LRA has an appalling human rights record that includes abduction of civilians and forced recruitment of child soldiers (JRS 7 April 2001). Since 1989 displacement has increasingly been related to the expanding oil exploration and extraction in the Unity State (Western Upper Nile) and Upper Nile areas, as well as in areas crossed by the oil pipelines (ICG 2002 pp132-133; AI 3 May 2000; Christian Aid 15 March 2001; Harker January 2000). The strategy by the Government to protect the oil production has included use of loyal militias to depopulate the oil-rich areas by extremely violent means, including looting and burning villages, killing and abducting (ICG 2002 pp133, 136). In addition, civilians are often caught between the fighting of rivalling militias seeking to establish themselves in these areas (ICG 2002 p135). These attacks have intensified during 2001 and there have been reports that access roads and airstrips built by the oil-companies have been used by the perpetrators (ICG 2002 p136). According to IMF figures, military expenditure doubled to US$ 327 million between 1998-2000, and while oil production revenues are soaring to $900 million per year, human rights observers stress that no visible development is benefiting the southern populations (CAID May 2001; IRIN 11 July 2001; IRIN 14 November 2001). Recent developments During 2001 violent conflicts continued unabated in the Nuba Mountains, the states of Unity, Upper Nile, Bahr al Ghazal, Eastern Equatoria and southern Blue Nile. These conflicts force civilians to flee both within the same states as well as seeking refuge in neighbouring states (UN November 2001). The IDP situation has worsened since 2001, especially as conflict escalated in West Bahr al Ghazal, causing major displacements particularly form Raga town. Although there has been some unilateral and temporary cease-fires put in place by the GoS and the SPLM/A since 1998, they were not renewed in 2001 or were violated shortly after being declared (UN November 2001). The Nuba Mountains, once Sudan's breadbasket, has since long been the theatre of unresolved armed conflict. The Government has since the early 1990s created so-called 'peace Briefing paper for Sudan mission 2-13 April 2002 4 ______________________________________________________________________ villages' in areas under their control, where Nuba communities from areas contested with the SPLA have been forcefully moved to. During the first half of 2001 the Government launched an offensive in the Nuba Mountains. In May 2001 militia troops systematically ransacked and burned 2500 homes, forcibly displacing more people into "peace villages"(IRIN 4 June 2001). As areas controlled by the rebels diminish, the civilians are forced to flee higher into the mountains, where cultivation on the steep slopes is fruitless, and where they are cut off from humanitarian assistance. Available reports show that during 2001 and 2002 new displacement took place especially in the following areas: January 2001: Civilians displaced from Nuba Mountains took refuge in south Khordofan state as fighting between the GoS and SPLA escalated (ACT 21 March 2001). May 2001: 50,000 displaced in the Nuba Mountains because of attacks by Government troops (IRIN 23 July 2001). June 2001: Civilians flee SPLA offensive and the capture of the towns of Daim Zubeir and Raga in Bahr al Ghazal; 30,000 IDPs fled towards Timsaha and 8000 towards Ed Daein (OCHA 10 June 2001). Second half of 2001: 5000 IDPs from Raga town in Bahr al Ghazal who initially had taken refuge in Timsaha, were forced to flee a second time after GoS declared it a military area (IRIN 22 January 2002). September 2001: 7,600 IDPs in camps in Northern Bahr al Ghazal (USAID, September 2001) Frequent displacements due to PDF/Muraheleen raids into northern Bahr al Ghazal mainly along the Babanusa/Wau railway line (UN August 2001). July 2001: 4,576 new arrivals in Wau town, (Bahr Al Ghazal) caused by Murahleen militia raids. Total population in IDP camps numbering at 50,560 (OCHA 31 July 2001). January 2002: 16,000 new IDPs in Awoda Wau County fled from Bahr al Ghazal (IRIN 22 January 2002). March 2001: Arrival of over 12,000 new IDPs into Bentiu (Unity State) as fighting in the oil-rich area escalated (OCHA 31 March 2001). UN estimated in 2000 e number of IDPs around Bentiu at up to 40.000.