The Case of Sudan John K

Distributing Food Aid as a Civilization is Dismantled: The Case of Sudan John K. Morris The southern Sudanese comprise 30 Cet article examine la situation des "refugies de l'interieur" dans un pays oh la percent of the population consisting of guerre civile oppose depuis de nombreuses annees le Nord contre le Sud et oh two main groups: the Nilotic group of la famine menace constammentles plus pauvres. Au-dela des effets de la guerre cattle-herding Dinka, Nuer and et de la famine, l'auteur evoque les changements dans les droits fomiers qui, Shilluk whose animals graze the cen- dans l'ensemble du pays, ont prive des agriculteurs et des eleveurs de leurs tral grassland of the south; and the terres au profit de grandes plantations mecanisees privees. L'extension et la Christians and animists, who cultivate multiplication de ces vastes domaines, tres visibles dans le paysage, sont the wooded lands along the borders of fortement encourages par le gouvernement en raison de leur contribution aux the country. exportations des cultures de rente. L'auteur decrit ensuite les evhements qui Sudan has a complex demographic jalonnent la periode recente du conflit et les succes et obstacles que rencontrent make-up that has been reduced to a les organisations humanitaires pour distribuer l'assistance dans un pays d4- North-South dualism supported by chire par la guerre civile. racial, ethnic, cultural and religious differences, with correspondingpoliti- Introduction organizations (INGOs) have faced in cal and economic disparities. The trying to get aid to those who are in north comprises two-thirds of the land The rains in southern Sudan usually need. The displacement of people in mass and population of the country, begin in April. They mark the end of Sudan occurs in a cycle of war, disloca- and dominates the south, which re- the government's annual military of- tion, drought, flood and famine, along mains largely undeveloped. Tensions fensive against the Sudanese People's with the effects of pushinglpulling which naturally occur between north Liberation Army (SPLA) in the south. peasants off common lands. This and south are further inflamed by a This past dry season-from about movement off land is accompanied by process of Islamization that has be- January to March-was a bloody one a move from sustainable agriculture to come very aggressive in the latter part in southern Sudan. The armed forces unsustainable monoculture. Follow- of this century. of the government were able to get the ing this introductionis a description of Half of the people who live in the upper hand against the SPLA, which the land and situation in Sudan which south of Sudan have been uprooted. has been embroiled in infighting. Re- is strongly affected by mechanized They left their homes primarily be- ports of new assaults appeared in the farming. This is followed by a descrip- cause of war and drought, and 1994 western media in mid-February this tion of the reasons for displacement in marks the eleventh year of war be- year. Fighting led to a large movement the country. The last section recounts tween the government of Sudan and of refugees travelling toward the Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), an the southern Sudanese who are cur- Ugandan border. This latest assault agreement between military groups rently on the defensive. Besides was accompanied by a drought that and aid agencies for the free passage of 600,000 displaced in the south, some put 1.5 million people at risk of starva- aid to those affected by drought and two million others have moved tion in southern Sudan. Aid workers famine. north-many migrating to the squat- say that unless food comes quickly, ter settlements around Khartoum. they can "contemplate the worst fam- The Current Situation Four hundred thousand others have ine in Sudan since 1988, when up to There are an estimated 28 million peo- left the country for refugee camps in 300,000 people died" (Economist 1994, ple who belong to 132 distinct ethnic Uganda, Zaire, Kenya, Ethiopia and February 12). groups in Sudan, the largest country in the Central African Republic (Econo- This article considers the internally Africa. People of Arabic race and Mus- mist 1994, February 12). Most of these displaced in Sudan, the context of lim religion/culture live in the north people originated from the hardest hit these displacement, and the difficul- and dominate the capital, Khartoum. regions of Western and Eastern ties international nongovernmental They are also found in central Sudan Equatoria (ibid; see map). where they are mainly riverine farm- JohnMorris, a geographer, is currently a postdoc- ers, pastoralists or rain-dependent The Land toral fellow funded by the Social Sciences and Research Council of Canada at CRS, York farmers. Camel breeders live a no- The White Nile runs through Eastern University. His studies focus on the refugee madic life in the scrubland of the north Equatoria, feeding the largest swamp experience, and nongovernmental organiza- and west, and to the south, the Baggara in the world. This mosquito and croco- tions serving refugees and immigrants. Arabs herd cattle, dile-infested expanse known as "The

26 RepUge, Vol. 14, No. 1 (April 1994) Barrier" is one of the SPLA's major strongholds. In the dry season, however, some of the swamp dries, making it accessible to the military, and forcing many people to flee. In the province of Bahr el Ghazal to the southwest, relief officials report that more than 200,000 people have been surviving by gathering wild food. In the same region, United Nations officials estimate that since 1989, a wasting disease carried by a sand fly has killed more than 60,000 people trapped by fighting. The disease, Kala- Azar or visceral leishmaniasis, can be cured in thirty days by proper medical attention (Lorch 1993). Sudan is a fertile country, but the areas from which people are being displaced, and the areas in which the government is building "peace camps" for their forced resettlement, tend to be incapable of supporting life. Some of these are located in the desert 30 km west of Khartoum. The wind there never stops blowing; it is abrasive to exposed skin and eyes. Under the sand the ground is so rocky that latrines can- not be dug deep enough to guard against diseases (Flint 1993, March 13). Further south and west of the Nuba Mountains (see map), food shortages have led the government to relocate the Nuba to peace camps. One-sixth of the Nuba population (163,000) are now held in one hundred "peace villages"-a number of which are in Map by J. Morris Kordofgn's provincial capital of Khdugli. In these camps, men are con- under threat of being shot. The camps a shortage of medicine. In a nearby spicuous by their absence. Reporter are located in the precarious geopoliti- squatter settlement, Dar-as-Salaam, Julie Flint of the Manchester Guardian cal boundary between north and south there is only one functioning bore hole for 218,000 people (Flint 1993, spoke with women about the absence Sudan. A relief worker commented: April 30). of men. They said that their husbands Look at the location of these peace were either shot by government forces villages: most are in insecure areas. The need for camps is partly the result before the relocation, or later, after The Nuba are being used as human of a change of land tenure endorsed by having arrived in Khdugli. Other re- shields [by the government] (Flint the government that has resulted in ports suggest that some of the men 1993, April 24). the development of many large mecha- have been taken from Kadugli to Many of the peace villages are also in nized farms. Nahud-a groundnut farming area the vicinity of large mechanized farms Mechanization of Farming and the outside the Nuba Mountains that suf- where Nuba land has been sold to the fers from chronic labour shortages Jalleba-the urbanized, Arab trading Loss of Soil/Nutrients (ibid). class-who exploit the camps for Mechanized farms now dominate ag- Some of the peace camps are in cheap labour. Health conditions in the ricultural land in Sudan. Since inde- northern Kordofln, while others are camps are dreadful. pendence, the Jalleba, who have even further afield. The Nuba are not In as-Salaam, two clinics treat three dispersed throughout Sudan and the allowed to leave the peace villages hundred children everyday, despite neighbouring countries, have focused

Refuge, Vol. 14, No. 1 (April 1994) 27 on large-scale rain-fed mechanized Mechanized farms account for the and uprooting perhaps three million farms. The 1970 Unregistered Land bulk of cash crops available for export southerners-roughly half the south- Act facilitated a restructuring of land from the country, although these farms ern population-from their homes. tenure by evicting or buying off peas- are controlled by just one percent of Piece by piece, an entire civilization is ants and ignoring traditional rights to farmers. Some 8,000 largely absent being dismantled. The most recent es- common grazing lands. The establish- leaseholders, tend to be horizontally calation of civil war in Sudan has con- ' ment of mechanized farms has been structured in the production, distribu- tinued uninterrupted since 1983, when strongly supported by the government tion, and trading of their cash crops. the civilian government in Khartoum since the 1970s because they provide Meanwhile, traditional subsistence adopted a program of Islamization for cash crops for export, particularly sor- agriculture still forms the basis of live- the whole country-a policy which ghum (83 percent of total cropped lihood for two to three million peasant resulted in the formation of the SPLA. area) and sesame (16 percent). Mecha- farmers (Suliman 1993,106). The situation worsened with the mili- nized farming, as practised in Sudan, Sudan has been partially forced into tary coup in 1989. General Omar is really tractorized farming as it in- the production of cash crops through Hassan al-Bashir seized power with volves no other machines. Usually mechanized farming. In the twenty the support of the National Islamic only ploughing and seeding are year period between 1972 and 1992 Front, a party resistant to any concilia- mechanized, while land clearance, Sudan's foreign debt increased from tion with the SPLA. The coup occurred weeding, planting and harvesting con- $298 million to $14 billion. Exports to- just hours before government repre- tinue to be done by hand. These prac- talled $315 million while imports were sentatives were to meet with members tices create high demands for a mobile valued at $1.3 billion. Its GDP in 1992 of the rebel SPLA, and was staged to wage labour force. was $5.2 billion with an inflation rate prevent the talks (Burr 1993, 3). At There are 34 million hectares of rain- of 150 percent and unemployment at stake was the question of regional au- fed arable land in Sudan. Mechanized 30 percent. This economic situation al- tonomy for the African peoples that farming is consuming this land at a lowed the WorldBank to impose struc- inhabited the three southern prov- staggering pace, a trend observed tural adjustment plans over the twenty inces: Western and Eastern Equatoria, since the late 1960s. In 1968 there were years of borrowing. In turn, these plans and Jonglei. The new military regime 2.5 million hectares of land under cul- have encouraged the export of pro- imposed a stricter Islamic Law, si- tivation, today there are 7.5 million duce from mechanized agriculture. lenced or eliminated opponents in the hectares. This doubled the amount of The International Monetary Fund's North and forced the SPLA out of most land under traditional rain-fed agri- pressure for Sudan to export continues of the areas it had previously control- culture to 3.8 million hectares (Suliman unabated. Even during the famine led. In subsequent peace negotiations 1993a, 6). These farming practices are years of 1982-85, Sudan exported between the SPLA and the govern- far from sustainable: quick economic 621,000 tonnes of sorghum to pay ment, the unresolvable issue has been returns are emphasized with the creditors. The country's debt has al- the government's unwillingness to re- knowledge that there is still yet more tered the pattern of land tenure in the peal imposed Islamic Laws for non- land to plant when the present land country leaving large numbers of dis- Muslims. becomes depleted; fallow periods and placed with resentment toward the There have been efforts to bring crop rotation tend not to be practised. Jalleba. peace between the SPLA and the gov- Shrinking yields render land under ernment. A negotiated agenda was re- mechanized farming unprofitable af- Reasons for Displacement solved between SPLA factions at a ter about seven years. With the par- By 1984, some 4.5 million people had meeting convened by government ticularly marginal soils and low become displaced. Their only alterna- ministers from Uganda, Kenya, Eritrea rainfall of Sudan, soil degrades quickly tive was to move to towns and relief and Ethiopia in January of this year, and is slow to rejuvenate. The effect is centres where food aid was available. and SPLA negotiations with the Suda- that the topsoil on approximately half This created dependency on begging, nese government were to follow in of the rain-fed arable land in Sudan, or charity, occasional labour, theft or Nairobi. Khartoum had supported seventeen million hectares, has been prostitution (Suliman 1993, 107). The these talks, but since February has lost (Suliman 1993a, 19). Loss of plant country's situation is worsened by the taken a different course-war (Scot- cover, particularly of trees used for move to a cash crop export economy tish Churches, 1994). gum arabic or fuelwood, also contrib- making it vulnerable to international Khartoum's failure to negotiate utes to topsoil loss. Almost all of the markets and the countrfs well publi- with the SPLA after neighbouring forests in eastern Sudan have been cized famine of 1984-85.' countries intervened in preparations cleared for mechanized farming. If this While there has been nearly con- for peace talks adds further support to trend continues, there will be no for- tinuous fighting since independence the image of Khartoum as pariah. Most ests in northern Sudan in the next dec- in 1956, this past decade has been most observers note that the government is ade (ibid). destructive: claiming one million lives more influenced by international than

28 Refuge, Vol. 14, No. 1 (April 1994) internal pressure. But recently Khar- SPLA-United is reported to have col- noted that observers flying over a vast toum has cornered itself into a reliance luded with government troops area around Ayod and Waat, where on the members of the Islamic Confer- (Chazan 1994, February 10). By Febru- some 300,000 head of cattle had been ence by alienatingthe rest of the world. ary2,280,000 people had fled to Kenya, enumerated in the early 19808, sighted Worse yet, its support for Iraq during Uganda and Zalre. The SPLA called for "not one single COW."^ For the Dinka, a the Gulf War created rifts within the the UN to impose sanctions on Khar- people for whom cattle is the basis of Islamic Conference. toum and to establish an air exclusion commerce, there could be no greater The United Nations Human Rights zone in the south. tragedy (Burr 1993,24). Commission has accused Sudan of Few observers believe that a mili- Over the course of time many of the widespread executions, torture, deten- tary solution is possible in Sudan. Nilotic peoples from the Upper Nile tion and expulsions, and voted to ap- While the government may currently and Bahr el Ghazal provinces (see point a special investigator. Last year control more of the south than a few mapbthe Dinka, Nuer and Shilluk- the United States accused Khartoum of months prior, the rainy season will fled to the squatter settlements that having close ties with Iran and Libya again stop major military operations. ring Khartoum. The city's Muslim in- and harbouring known "terrorist The difficulty of maintaining this con- habitants have treated these people groups," including the Palestinian* trol, given the long supply lines and severely. Over the decade, various group Hamas, Islamic Holy War and deep antipathy of the region's popula- governments in Khartoum have insti- the Party of God (Lorch 1993). More tion, has been proven in the past. In tuted campaigns to disperse the squat- recently, the United States placed Su- this situation aid agencies struggle to ters and destroy their settlements. In dan on its list of countries that engage prevent mass deaths of people with no 1990, a displaced southerner living in in terrorist activities. In early March food supply. Fortunately, Western at- northern Sudan auld hardly expect to 1994, the UN special envoy to the coun- tention is increasingly being focused own land, drink clean water, attend try submitted his report which has on Sudan. Christian leaders have vis- school, be vaccinated, vote, or raise poised international human rights in- ited to help bring attention to the hu- objections to the government's pros- struments against Islamic law. Sudan man destruction that is occurring in ecution of the war in the southern responded by attacking not only the the south: the Pope visited in 1992 and Sudan (Burr 1993,2). report but also the envoy-making the Archbishop of Canterbury visited Nearly one-quarter of the children liv- him a minor Salman Rushdie (Econo- in late 1993learly 1994. There is a con- ing in these encampments are severely mist 1994, March 5). tinuing openingand closing of famine- malnourished, two-thirds live in Since 1991, the SPLA has become a affected regions to journalists and unsanitary conditions and only 10 per- less effective opposition due to a split international aid agencies which cent of the displaced children attend into at least three different factions. shows that the government does in- school (ibid, 7). International aid aged- This dissension seems to have eased deed respond to.Western pressure. The cies have worked together to form an the government's intention to plunder followingconsiders the struggle which institution that coordinates aid activi- the south. Consider recent infighting aid agencies have experienced in the ties. between SPLA factions in the context past few years in Sudan. of the Government's role in the south. Operation Lifeline Sudan ~ormed At the beginning of the presevt dry International Aid Agencies in In response to the effects of civil war season, in December 1993, a stalemate Sudan and the famines of the 1980s, the UN, occurred with John Garang's SPLA- The massive famine due to civil war NGOs and International Committee of Mainstream holding most of Equatoria and drought in 1984-85 was followed the Red Cross (ICRC) successfully ne- and RiekMachais SPLA-United hold- with an even worse famine between gotiated the formation of Operation ing the Upper Nile. At this time the 1986 and 1988. In this latter period the Lifeline Sudan (OLS) with the govern- government held several of the main UN estimates that three million Suda- ment of Sudan and the SPLA. This fa- towns. In January it built up troops nese were displaced. Between 400,000 cilitated a large, coordinated relief and supplies in Wan and Jab$ and in and 500,000 persons died during this effort between ICRC, UNICEF, World February began aerial bombardment period (Minear 1991, 6). Inadequate Food Program (WFP) and INGOs via of remote SPLA-held towns and vil- rainfall followed this tragedy. In 1990- negotiated "corridors of tranquillity." lages. This turned the stalemate with 91 there was again crop failure and the The Islamic African Relief Agency, the the SPLA into a major dry season of- numbers of destitute and dispossessed Sudan Council of Churches and local fensive with theintention of cutting off continued to grow. In November 1991, NGOs also took part in providing aid. Garang's Ugandan supply lines. it was reported that "even the birds Between March 1989 and December Camps for the displaced and refugees have moved south" froh northern 1990 direct contributions to the OLS have been targeted as well as towns Kordofan and Sodiri, a town of 20,000 reached $200 million and in total, $300 and villages. In the offensive against people, was nearly de~erted.~Simi- million of resources were delivered to John Garang's SPLA-Mainstream, larly in 1993, a report by USAID-Sudan one and a half million people. War ex- penditures in the same eight month nese could starve with eleven million around Khartoum by 1992 (Burr 1993, period, however, exceeded $400 mil- affected in 1991if multinational assist- 26). More recently the situation has lion for the Sudanese Government ance was not received. The govern- improved with the signing of a new (RPG 1992,38). Generally, it is agreed ment, however, seemed unconcerned OLS agreement that gives aid agencies that this first OLS, or "OLS I," was a with the projection and blamed inter- limited access to the countrfs interior huge success. It demonstrated to the national relief agencies for the domes- (Economist 1994, February 26). aid community that it was possible to tic food shortage because they had provide humanitarian relief in the been buying up domestic sorghum.' The Sudanese Government, SPLA midst of a civil war (ibid). The editor of the government's news- and International Involvement Although famine and war contin- paper made public its attitude toward The events that led to the decision of ued into 1991, it was not possible to the foreigners: many aid agencies to leave Sudan in obtain agreement from the govern- The Sudanese people are smart late 1991 were characterized by the ment and the SPLA to mount an OLS 11, enough to understand that most of government and SPLA using their nor the following yeai's OLS 111. Re- the relief agencies have religious ob- power to frustrate relief efforts. Both cently, however, a new agreement has jectives and many of the Western groups at times blocked, diverted been made between the government, agencies understand relief as offer- and/or destroyed aid and assets, such SPLA and aid agencies for safe access ing assistance to the rebels in south- as the senseless bombing of ICRC's to provide food aid (Economist 1994, ern Sudan. It is not beyond the food aid barge. Sudanese people's intelligence to February 26). know that the problem of the South In the fallof 1990, for example, when During the interim when OLS I1 and would not have been so aggravated drought and war led to dramatic in- I11 failed to gain endorsement by all if the Western agencies had not sup- creases in the price of cereals in Khar- parties, aid agencies were treated by plied [the SPLA] with the means of toum, the Minister of Commerce both the government and the SPLA subsistence and added fuel to the fire ordered the sequestration of all food with repugnance. An example is a case in the form of arms, ammunition and stocks held outside government ware- which occurred in mid-1990 in which food. houses. Both the UN and U.S.Ambas- USAID attempted to transport food Planning for OLS I11 was due to com- sador to Sudan raised strong aid by barge southwa~dfrom KBsti mence during the Gulf War that began objections to the government's behav- (see map). An agreement was in effect in January of 1991. Meetings with high iour but could not persuade al-Bashir dating back to 1986, when both the level UN personnel did occur, but Su- to release the relief food or admit pub- government and the SPLA agreed not dan's support for Iraq created consid- licly that there existed the possibility to attack barges carrying humanitar- erable tension between the of a famine in Sudan. For a short time ian assistance. The barge stood by at government and the international in November 1990, Washington cut off K6sti intending to move aid south- community. In the end, OLS 111 could food aid passing through Khartoum, ward to Malakgl. The government had not be negotiated, for as one senior instead diverting maize supplies from not been able, however, to dislodge the Western official put it: "We don't trust Kenya to southern Sudan. Later in the SPLA from Melut and used "regional them and they don't trust us."5 Given month, the government's representa- security conditions" to block the the worsening relations in Sudan, tive at the United Nations quietly ap- movement of food aid. The people of USAID/Sudan announced on October pealed for "immediate food assistance MalaMl, who had not received food 1, 1991 that it planned to cease being of 75,000 tons for urgent delivery to aid in nearly a year, started to move the primary implementing agency for drought stricken areasa6 Donors northward. Military officials, seeking food aid in Sudan, transferring that quickly came forward. to avoid reports of large numbers of function to the WFP. Further, all eco- The government has attempted to displaced in the area, ordered the de- nomic development projects were ter- rectify its food dependency through a parture of the last of the expatriate minated for 1992. At the same time, the number of national campaigns. In INGOs working south of KBsti (Burr government restricted INGO access to January 1990, it made the elimination 1993,12). Using aerial attack, the gov- the settlements it was creating to re- of wheat imports a national goal when ernment then attempted to sink the place squatter settlements around it ordered an increase in wheat cultiva- barge. Their effort was not successful, Khartoum and the Nuba Mountains. tion to 255,000 hectares. In a speech but civilian casualties did result. The political climate in Sudan contin- made by al-Bashir in North Darfur USAID, the instigator of OLS, uses ued to decline and by late 1991, INGOs people were told, satellite technology information to like Save the Children-Canada pulled Because we do not want to beg for predict food needs in famine prone out of Sudan. In essence, only UNICEF our food and we do not want the regions through Famine Early Warn- and the WFP, both of which demanded relief agencies to humiliate our dig- ing System (FEWS) project (Nature little accountability of the relief sup- nity, through you the homeland and 1991,545). In the winter of 1990, FEWS plies provided to Sudanese agencies, through your production, we will rid estimated that five to six million Suda- were left to service the displaced ourselves of this bitter humiliation.'

- Wge,Val, 14, No. 1 (April 1994) Translated into action, Bashir's pro- complicates this transition in Sudan, -. 1993. "Battle to neat Sudan's tains." nouncement became a desperate situa- however, is the presence of civil war, Manchester Guardian, April 30. tion when the government decided not massive debt burden, and a worldwide -1993. "Warpath in North Africa." Man- to send aid in the months following the recession that when considered to- chester Guardian, April 24. region's poor harvest. Later, the IMF gether leave the resultant displaced -. 1993. "Freedom galls to the charm of- commented that the precarious state of labour out of the economy. The situa- fensive." Manchester Guardian, April 22. -. 1993. "Aid gnaws at the edges of the tion for these former subsistence farm- fwd reserves in 1990 was caused by hunger triangle." Manchester Guardian, the sale of "large stocks" of grain ers and nomadic peoples is grim. What March 17. abroad. Even more sickening, the New makes their situation worse, from an -1993. "Trickle of hope for Sudan's starv- York Times noted that the foreign ex- outsider's view, is that this displace- ing." Manchester Guardian, March 10. change earned was "spent on weap- ment is indirectly supported by the Grinker, Lori. 1993. "Disaster in the Sudan." onry from China to continue the civil international economic system that is Nnu York Times, February 12, A33. insensitive to the repercu'ssions of loan Hazell, Gillian. 1993. "Villages destroyed by repayments. So while economic re- war." World Food Program Journal, 26:6. Conclusion sources have been made available to Huband, Mark. 1993. "Aid agencies pull out The problems in Sudan seem resolv- Sudan, life for a large part of the popu- of Southern Sudan after SPLA faction's able only through increased toleration lation is desperate.. threat." London Times, April 1. on the part of the government and the Kiley, Sam. 1993. "Famine fear in Sudan as Notes army attacks the rebels." London Times, SPLA factions. A mixture of human August 12. induced problems, including the 1. Suliman (1993a, 107) citing Duffield, M. (1990,8). Lautzse, S. and G. Wagner. 1993. "Southern IMF's loan policy, has made Sudan an Sudan relief operations." Nairobi: economic basket case-a condition 2. Burr (1993,16) citing AIDIOFDA (1990, USAID-Sudan. August 24). that will continue for many years to Lorch, Donatella. 1993. "Sudan is described come. Beyond ethnic tensions and ef- 3. Burr (1993,16)citing Lautzse and Wagner as trying to placate the West." New York forts to impose Islamic hegemony, (1993). Times, March 26, A3. changes in land tenure have marginal- 4 Burr (1993,16) citing New Horizon (1990, Minear, Larry. 1991. Operation Lffrline Sudan, ized fanners and nomadic peoples to November 3). Trenton, New Jersey: The Red Sea Press. the point that their lives may never 5. Burr (1993, 16) citing Washington Post Nature. 1991. "Spotting famine from space." (1991, February 23). resemble what they were in the past. Nature 350545. Further, the accompanying destruc- 6. Burr (1993, 16) citing Washington Times Nnu Horizon. 1990. "No famine in Sudan: (1990, November 2). tive farming practices are ruining the Karar blames agencies for supply short- 7. Burr (1993,4) citing Radio Omdurman, age." Khartoum, November 3. fragile soil of an unnecessarily poor 1715 GMT, February 4,1990. New York Times. 1991. 'African dilemma: nation. Food aid may prolong war and famine." 8. atingNew YorkTimes Efforts to provide aid have contin- Burr(1993,4) (1991, May May 12). 12, E3. ued in Sudan, even with the frustra- Refugee Policy Group. 1992. "Sudan." Inter- tion of the government's contrary References nally displaced persons in Africa: Assistance policies and practices. Aid agencies AIDIOFDA. 1990. "Sudan-civil strifeldis- challenges and opportunities. Washington: seem able to rise above the mayhem placed persons." Washington DC, Au- RPG. and focus on the marginalized who gust 24. Rogge, John. 1985. Too many, Too long: Sudan's regularly starve. At times the need for Burr, M. 1993. Sudan 1990-92: Foodaid, Famine twenty-year refupdilemma.Totowa, New DC: Jersey: Rowman and Allanheld. aid calls into question the govern- and failure. Washington U.S. Com- mittee for Refugees. Scottish Churches' Sudan Group. 1994. "War ment's claim to legitimacy and Chazan, David. 1994. "Khartoum bombers hit and peace." PeaceNet, February 5. sovereignty. If Sudan were more geo- divided rebels." London Zmes, February 10. Suliman, Mohamed. 1993. "Civil war in the politically, or economically interesting Denger, Francis M. and Larry Minear. The Sudan: From ethnic to ecological con- to the West-particularly the United chalknges offamine relit$ Emergency opera- flict." The Ecologist 23(3):104-109. States-a military challenge might be tions in the Sudan. Washington: The -1993a. "Civil war in Sudan: The impact levelled against the government. Yet, Brookings Institution. of ecological degradation." Distributed as recent history shows, Western mili- Duffield, M. 1990. Sudan at the crossroads. In- by [email protected] in tary intervention is rarely effective and stitute of Development Studies Discus- gn.apc.org, October 15. civilian casualtiesare often higher than sion Paper 275. Sussex University. United Nations. 1994. Memo to NGOs inter- The Economist. 1994. "Sudan cites higher au- estedin the Horn of Africa re: World Food expected. Programme Reports, February 23. Viewed historically, and optirnisti- thority." March 5,4243. -. 1994. "In flight." February 26,434. Washington Post. 1991. "Sudan's government cally, the current condition in Sudan still won't ask for help as drought grows "Thelost years." might be viewed as a Western-style -.1994. February12,39-40. worse." February 23, A6. evolution from subsistence farming to Flint, Julie. 1993. "Nuba rebel leader appeals Washington Times. 1990. "Sudan government an industrial economy. What further to Britain." Manchester Guardian, May 24. denies new famine." November 2. a

Refige, Vol. 14, No. 1 (April 1994) Refuge Vol. 14 No. 1 April 1994 CANADA'S PERIODICAL ON REFUGEES REFUGE wwe York Lanes Press Centre for Refugee Studies Suite 351, York Lanes, York University 4700 Keele Street, North York Ontario, Canada M3J 1P3 Phone: (416) 7365843 Fax: (416) 736-5837 Electronic Mail via Bitnet Address: [email protected] Postage Paid in Toronto, Canada Second Class Mail Registration No. 5512 Return Postage Guaranteed

Development Aid and Repatriation