Grand Coalitions and Populism: The Effectiveness of Sterilization

Sebastian Fernandez de Soto

New York University Professor Shanker Satyanath April 17, 2020

Abstract

In recent years, the rise of populist parties in EU countries has prompted academics to study the causes as to why we are seeing a resurgence of such parties. Many studies have pointed to several economic or cultural factors that have fueled these parties. In this paper, I will propose a different cause which is that the formation grand coalitions, parliamentary alliances between the two major opposing parties, is fueling the rise of populism in the European continent. This paper will show that such a relationship is significant and establish that citizen discontent with the performance of the democratic regime, reflected in the formation of grand coalitions, leads to the increase in vote share for populist parties.

I would like to thank Professor Shanker Satyanath and my TA Nejla Asimovic for their invaluable help and assistance in the development of this thesis. Introduction

In recent years, European Union democracies have been rocked by the rise of populist parties that challenge supposedly commonly-held beliefs about democracy and liberalism. Although many of them existed before the turn of the century, their success has increased in recent years, destabilizing monolithic political systems in many countries. There are exten- sive examples I can point to from Alternative for Germany, the National Rally (previously National Front) in France, Vox in Spain, and UKIP in the United Kingdom. This parties threaten the status quo of the post-war era, rallying voters against more mainstream parties that have controlled the government of European nations in the entire post-war era. In face of the rise of these parties, mainstream parties have resorted to the formation of grand coalitions to keep such parties out of government. At its most basic, a Grand Coalition is a parliamentary alliance of the two major parties, usually parties with opposite ideologies and fierce competition between each other. The most obvious example would be the current Merkel government formed by the right-wing Christian Democrats, along with their sister party the Christian Social Union, and the left-wing Social Democrats. The use of grand coalitions as a way to exclude populist parties is based on the logic of sterilization as defined by Wade Jacoby. The logic of sterilization, as defined by Jacoby, “sees GCs as a strategy for large parties to limit the room for maneuver of (often new) parties unacceptable to one or both of them” (Jacoby 2010). In my paper, I will seek to test the effectiveness of the sterilization logic by studying the effects of Grand Coalitions on the vote share for populist parties. My belief is that Grand Coalitions actually benefit populist parties as the members of the GC, driven to the center by the opposing party’s ideology, cause voters to shift to more extreme parties on both sides of the spectrum. It is first important to both understand the concepts of populism and grand coalitions for this analysis. Populism is a unique ideology in that it can originate and espouse values from both the left and right. The populist worldview, “that politics should be framed as a conflict between the people and the elite,” (TAP, 2019) appeals to voters across the political

1 spectrum disillusioned by the main parties and their policies. Populist parties in Europe cannot be grouped under one single ideology as they range from the virulent, nationalist, right-wing parties such as Vox, the Danish People’s Party, and Swedish Democrats to the more left-wing, Marxist parties such as SYRIZA and France Unbowed. There are even those that refuse to establish themselves on any side of the spectrum and attract a range of voters such as the Five Star Movement in Italy. Their only similarity is how they frame their politics as a conflict between the establishment and the people. For this paper, I will use the parties identified by the Timbro Authoritarian Index which uses three properties to identify authoritarian populist parties: framing the conflict in a populist worldview, majority rule without obstacles, and the creation of a more powerful state (TAP 2019). The index, developed by A.J Heino, uses these properties to identify which parties espouse a populist worldview and seek to erode democratic institutions. Research on grand coalitions is fairly new although the first such coalition occurred in Austria in the immediate post-war years. Jacoby defines GCs as coalitions “that include the two largest parties in a parliamentary system” (Jacoby 2010). Interestingly, the major parties in parliamentary democracies are often ideological opposites in that the center-right and the center-left coalesce around a specific party to achieve more electoral support and political power. Grand coalitions force an interesting dynamic between two parties that are not only fierce competitors but are also ideologically opposed to each other. My belief is that such complex coalitions will lead to an increase in the vote to more extreme parties. Beyond that, my paper will also analyze, if such relationship exists, why there is a shift to the more extreme populist parties. It could be due to voter disillusionment, infighting in the coalitions, or the shift to the center of both parties to accommodate the opposing ideologies. My paper seeks to understand the dynamic between grand coalitions and populist parties, especially what drives it.

2 Literature Review

Studies on grand coalition formation and populist parties have grown in number as par- liamentary democracies in Europe have been forced to grapple with these phenomena. In this section, I want to discuss the emerging literature on both subjects as these papers have shaped my own personal research.

Grand Coalitions The previously-mentioned study by Wade Jacoby analyzes different reasons as to why grand coalitions are formed and how this affects populist parties. Jacoby uses the most common grand coalitions in European history: the CDU/CSU/SPD coalition in Germany and the OVP/SPO coalition in Austria. He analyzes these coalitions in the context of three different reasons for grand coalition formation. Apart from the ‘sterilization’ logic, which is the most important for this paper, Jacoby identifies two others: renovation and clientelism. The logic of ‘renovation’ is where grand coalitions are formed to pursue major policy goals which are unachievable in smaller coalitions while the logic of clientelism is where the parties see these coalitions as a way to re-route benefits to their constituents and to themselves (Jacoby 2017). Although my paper mainly focuses on addressing the logic of sterilization and its effect on populist parties, especially the possibility that this could lead to gains in vote share, it is important to understand that grand coalitions form for several reasons. Studies have also focused on the management of GCs which, if done erroneously, can lead to infighting and a decrease in support for both parties involved. Miller and Muller identify several problems in managing GCs that can lead to negative consequences for both parties involved. The distribution of cabinet seats is a common problem as both parties are used to maintaining the most prominent cabinet positions in coalitions with junior partners (Miller et al. 2010). The more equitable distribution may cause some prominent politicians from both parties to miss out on cabinet positions creating incentives for these politicians to undermine the GCs. The study also identifies the problem of policy compromise as the

3 parties are forced to compromise more with an equal partner than with a junior partner. Finding such policy proves difficult as, by definition, the parties in GCs are not natural allies which makes the task on compromising on policy increasingly burdensome. A 2010 study by Clay Clemens of the 2005-2009 German GC found many of the problems that Miller and Muller described. Clemens described a “mixed legacy” for the coalition with some major reforms but often settling on “inconsistent packages meant to satisfy constituencies within one party or the other (Clemens, 2010). I will use the number of laws passed each year to test if GCs have a much higher difficulty in creating policy and, therefore, experience a much higher legislative gridlock than more ideologically-aligned coalitions, possibly leading to disaffected voters voting for more extreme parties. Another phenomenon briefly mentioned by Clemens that could affect populist vote share is the ideological divergence of the parties in grand coalitions. Usually, such parties lie in opposite sides of the spectrum meaning that their ideological distinctions are fairly easy to identify. Following the SPD/CDU coalition of 2005-2009, “voters had trouble discerning conceptual distinctions between the governing parties” leading to “both governing partners suffering defections” (Clemens, 2010). Ideological divergence of the parties, before and after the GC, and its effect on populist parties, is something that will be tested in this paper as a way in which grand coalitions could lead to populist gains.

Populism As populist rhetoric and parties have grown in the European Continent, the studies and paper analyzing the rise of populism have grown in number. The Guardian newspaper con- ducted an investigation charting the rise of populism in Europe which showed a significant rise in populist rhetoric and vote share. Matthijs Rooduijn, a political sociologist at the University of Amsterdam, identified several causes for the rise in populist parties for The Guardian’s investigation. He identified at least four causes which include a more individual- ized society, ideological convergence of the mainstream parties, political or economic crises,

4 and widespread corruption (The Guardian, 2018). Rooduijn suggests that this creates a “fer- tile breeding ground” for the growth of populist parties (The Guardian, 2018). A reduced ideological divergence of the parties will be tested as a possible causal mechanism as stated before and I will control for corruption and certain economic crises that could potentially lead to populism. Petar Stankov conducted an empirical investigation regarding the effects of macro-shocks in certain economic indicators on the demand for populism in Latin Amer- ica and Europe. Stankov found that several economic shocks affect left-wing and right-wing populism in different ways. Both austerity measures and declines in income per capita cause an increase in left-wing populism in Europe (Stankov, 2018). Furthermore, rising natural resource rents also cause an increase in populist support in both Europe and Latin America (Stankov, 2018). Surprisingly, the study also finds that a rise in inflation and unemployment, along with greater migration flows, do not cause a rise in populist support contrary to pop- ular opinion that the migrant crisis in Europe caused the rise of populist parties (Stankov, 2018). I will control for many economic factors identified by Stankov including resource rents, austerity, income inequality, and GDP per capita. A study by Stavrakis et al. has gone further in analyzing the relationship between populism and crises essentially creating a theoretical framework that “distinguishes between systematic failures (Real) and constructions of crisis (Symbolic)” (Stavrakis et al, 2017). They find that an “economic and/or social dislocation is the necessary yet insufficient starting point” (Stavrakis et al., 2017). In addition to the actual crisis a populist representation of it is necessary to increase populist support, most likely blaming “the establishment” for said crisis while “the people” are presented as a platform for the victims of the crisis. (Stavrakis et al, 2017). Finally, such a representation causes an anti-populist backlash which can polarize a society and increase the support of said populist rhetoric (Stavrakis et al, 2017). This study finds fascinating links between the actual crisis and the framing of the crisis, arguing that both are necessary to foster an increase in populist support. It can be reasonably argued that GCs are the perfect scapegoat, the perfect representation of the establishment that

5 populists can rail against. Further study is needed into this area especially analyzing if the formation of GCs causes an increase in populist and anti-populist rhetoric. My paper will not analyze this relationship although it is important to understand that many factors can be used to explain a possible relationship between grand coalitions and populism, mandating further study in this area.

Hypothesis

Throughout this study, I wish to analyze the effect of grand coalition formation on the rise of populist parties. Grand coalition formation is an intriguing concept and its use to exclude populist parties from government in recent years has grown. My goal is to question the sterilization logic posited by Jacoby which emphasizes that GCs are a mechanism to limit extremist parties. Case studies have shown that parties involved in grand coalitions tend to lose votes but these have not established where such votes are headed, hence my first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Grand coalition formation leads to an increase in populist parties’ vote share.

Furthermore, I want to attempt to analyze the causal mechanisms that link grand coali- tion formation to an increase in popular support. I will be testing three mechanisms: sat- isfaction with how democracy works in the country, legislative gridlock, and ideological convergence. I believe all of these causal mechanisms will have a substantial impact on populist parties while, at the same time, grand coalitions will have a substantial impact on these phenomenons. The average satisfaction with democracy can definitely reflect popular opinion of an ineffective government which can lead people to other more extreme parties. Miller and Muller proposed several problems with coalition management especially policy

6 convergence which may lead to less legislative achievements as the executive branch reflects the legislative branch in a parliamentary democracy. Rooduijn posited ideological conver- gence of mainstream parties as a cause of the rise in populist support. The other hypotheses in my study reflect these mechanisms.

Hypothesis 2: Grand coalitions lead to a decrease in the satisfaction of democracy in the country which leads to an increase in the populist vote share.

Hypothesis 3: Grand coalitions lead to an increase in legislative gridlock which leads to an increase in the populist vote share.

Hypothesis 4: Grand coalitions lead to a decrease in the ideological divergence of main- stream parties leading to an increase in the populist vote share.

Data and Research Methods

My main independent variable is the presence of a grand coalition. Following my previously- mentioned definition of a grand coalition, I used data from the ParlGov database and the Parties and Elections in Europe database, backed up by the websites of the main Euro- pean Parliamentary Groups (European People’s Party, Progressive Alliance of Socialists Democrats, and RENEW Europe), to identify the parties that would form the grand coali- tion and to establish the presence of a grand coalition. Although the parties don’t have to be a member of these EP groups, most traditional parties are so their databases where used as a backup source. The variable is binary with 1 signifying the presence of a GC and 0 signifying the lack of a GC. Table A1 shows the parties per country considered to be possible members of a grand coalition. The satisfaction with democracy variable uses the data from the European Social Survey which contains information regarding political, economic, and

7 social factors for European countries. I will be using the data from the question which asks “how satisfied with the way democracy works in country.” For the number of laws passed variable, I used the European Union’s N-Lex website which provides links to each coun- try’s official legislative database. For the ideological divergence variable I use data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP). The CMP uses the rile variable which identifies the party position on a left-right spectrum as given by the 1992 paper by Michael Budge and Ian Laver titled “Party Policy and Government Coalitions.” The right-left spectrum goes from -100 (left) to 100 (right). Finally, for my main dependent variable the data I used comes from the Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index developed by Swedish think tank Timbro. The TAP is a comprehensive study of populist vote share with data going all the way back to 1980. TAP defines populism using the label of authoritarian populism which includes “the lack of respect for division of powers and minority rights; the impatience with democratic procedures; and the alarming perspective on politics as a conflict between a homogeneous people and a corrupt elite” (TAP, 2019). This is the definition for populism I will use in this paper to calculate populist vote share. Table A2 shows the parties considered to be populist for the purposes of this paper. My control variables consist of economic measures replicated from the study conducted by Petar Stankov which may have an effect on populist vote share. These include income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient, government expenditure to measure for austerity, natural resource rents, and GDP per capita in 2018 US dollars. This data comes from the World Development Indicators from the World Bank. Furthermore, as Rooduijn identifies corruption and migration as possible cause in the rise of populism, I take both into account. I measure corruption by using the Control of Corruption data from the World Governance Indicators also developed by the World Bank. This data ranges from -2.5 to 2.5 to indicate the prevalence of corruption in the country. For migration, I use the net migration per 1000 data developed by the UN Development Programme. The data is in 5-year intervals so I keep the net migration constant over 5-year periods. The use of these control variables is

8 derived from the differences in observed characteristics in scenarios where a GC is present and scenarios where a GC is not present, exhibited in the balance table in A4. The first two columns show the number of observations and mean/SE where no GC is present. The next two columns show the number of observations and mean/SE where GCs are present. The final column highlights the difference in means. For all control variables, except Election Year, there is a significant difference in both scenarios meaning I have to control for them in my analysis. My research mechanism is a cross-sectional time-series analysis from 2000-2018 consisting of all European Union countries. I will conduct multiple regressions to assess the impact of GC formation on populist vote share and the validity of each causal mechanism identified in the hypotheses. I will account for country and year-specific effects by adding country and year fixed effects to all of my regressions.

9 Results

Table 1: Effect of GC formation on populist vote share (1) (2) Vote Share Vote Share Grand Coalition, 1-year lag 6.205*** (-1.339) Grand Coalition, 2-year lag 5.802*** (-1.354) GDP per capita -0.000** -0.000*** (0) (0) Control of Corruption -9.178*** -9.180*** (-2.683) (-2.698) Net Migration per 1000 people 0.365** 0.398*** (-0.148) (-0.148) Natural Resource Rents (%GDP) -0.591 -1.047 (-1.586) (-1.593) Gov’t Expenditures (%GDP) -0.228 -0.325 (-0.393) (-0.399) Income Inequality 0.711** 0.744** (-0.288) (-0.29) Constant 21.832 24.764* (-13.424) (-13.52) Observations 337 337

R-squared 0.851 0.849

Year Fixed Effects YES YES Country Fixed Effects YES YES Standard errors are in parenthesis *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

10 Table 1 shows a linear regression of the determinants of populist vote share. The results confirm my first hypothesis in that Grand Coalitions cause an increase in the vote share of populist parties. GC formation is significant at the 0.01 level with both 1-year lag and 2-year lags. After one-year there is a 6.2% increase in the vote share for populist parties followed by a 5.8% increase after two years. This might seem a small increase but, in a parliamentary democracy, these small percentage increases can significantly increase the number of seats in parliament therefore increasing the chances of populist parties forming a government. For example, in Germany close to 46 million people voted in the last election in 2017 which means that a 6.2% increase is an increase of 2.8 million votes for the more extreme parties. In the case of the AFD, the biggest populist party in Germany, a 6.2% increase would put them close to the results of the SPD with an 18.8% of the vote compared to SPD’s 20%. The SPD obtained 153 seats compared to the AFD’s 94. With the projected increase the AFD could most likely obtain closer to, as a rough estimate, 130 seats. That is an increase on almost 40 seats which only takes a 6.2% increase in vote share. Furthermore, we can assume that some of the votes gained by the AFD could potentially come from voters disaffected by the major parties, although such an analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. If the SPD loses more than 2% of their votes, the AFD would become the second biggest party in Germany behind Merkel’s CDU substantially increasing their influence on policy. These results should concern major parties and their attempts to form grand coalitions as these could lead to substantial increases in the votes of populist parties. The causal mechanisms through which this relationship occurs will be explored next.

11 Table 2: Satisfaction with Democracy Causal Mechanism (1) (2) (3) (4) Satisfaction Democracy Satisfaction Democracy Vote Share Vote Share Grand Coalition, 1 year lag 0.205 (-0.213) Grand Coalition, 2 year lag 0.081 (-0.194) Satisfaction Democracy, 1 year lag 1.493 (-1.112) Satisfaction Democracy, 2 year lag -0.821 (-1.337) Income Inequality -0.06 -0.065 0.3 0.335 (-0.048) (-0.048) (-0.464) (-0.574) Gov’t Expenditures (%GDP) -0.239*** -0.236*** 0.656 0.22 (-0.057) (-0.058) (-0.607) (-0.705) 12 Natural Resource Rents (%GDP) 0.21 0.198 -1.45 -0.62 (-0.229) (-0.231) (-2.532) (-2.902) Net Migration per 1000 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.19 0.336 (-0.022) (-0.022) (-0.244) (-0.261) Control of Corruption 0.756* 0.721* -13.037*** -10.834** (-0.39) (-0.39) (-4.255) (-4.829) GDP per capita 0 0 0 0 (0) (0) (0) (0) Observations 128 128 141 129

R-squared 0.88 0.879 0.872 0.873

Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES Standard errors are in parenthesis *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Table 2 shows the relationship between Grand Coalitions and populist vote share through the use of the satisfaction with democracy mechanism. The results clearly show that there is no significant relationship between grand coalition formation and satisfaction with democ- racy while also not showing any significant relationship between satisfaction with democracy and populist vote share. This causal mechanism does not explain the relationship between GC formation and populism. Nonetheless, ignoring that the relationship between the vari- ables is not significant, it is quite interesting that the correlation between satisfaction with democracy and populist vote share only becomes negative after two years. I expected a negative correlation after 1 year but the results show that the correlation turns negative after two years. Furthermore, although beyond the scope of this paper, there is a significant relationship between government expenditures, net migration, and control of corruption with satisfaction with democracy. What is interesting and could use future study, is the negative relationship between government expenditure and satisfaction with democracy. Regardless of this, for the purposes of this paper, satisfaction with democracy does not provide us with a causal story for the relationship between grand coalitions and populist vote share.

13 Table 3: Legislative Gridlock Causal Mechanism (1) (2) (3) (4) Laws Passed Laws Passed Vote Share Vote Share Grand Coalition, 1 year lag 5.822 (-12.62) Grand Coalition, 2 year lag 20.787 (-12.644) Laws Passed, 1 year lag 0.01 (-0.007) Laws Passed, 2 year lag 0.015** (-0.007) Income Inequality 0.69 1.018 0.618** 0.632** (-2.713) (-2.708) (-0.297) (-0.296) Gov’t Expenditures (%GDP 1.477 0.559 -0.013 -0.021 14 (-3.702) (-3.723) (-0.403) (-0.401) Natural Resource Rents (%GDP) 32.542** 31.694** -1.09 -1.098 (-14.95) (-14.878) (-1.644) (-1.634) Net Migration per 1000 people -1.848 -1.934 0.442*** 0.451*** (-1.397) (-1.386) (-0.152) (-0.152) Control of Corruption 16.091 18.983 -10.561*** -10.176*** (-25.287) (-25.194) (-2.768) (-2.751) GDP per capita 0 0 -0.000* -0.000** (-0.001) (-0.001) (0) (0) Observations 337 337 337 337

R-squared 0.882 0.883 0.841 0.842

Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES Standard errors are in parenthesis *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Table 3 shows the relationship between Grand Coalition formation and populist vote share using the legislative gridlock mechanism. First of all, the results show no significant relationship between Grand Coalition formation and the number of laws passed. Further- more, the correlation, although not significant, is positive which is the opposite of what I expected since I believed that the presence of a Grand Coalition would lead to a decrease in the number of laws passed. These results also show an interesting relationship between the number of laws passed and populist vote share. After 1 year there is no significant re- lationship between these variables but there is a significant relationship after 2 years at the 0.1 level. Although the effect is not very large, one more law passed causes a .015% increase in the populist vote share, the fact that there is a significant correlation, at the opposite direction than I expected, could merit future study.

15 Table 4: Ideological Divergence Causal Mechanism (1) (2) (3) (4) Ideological Divergence Ideological Divergence Vote Share Vote Share Grand Coalition, 1 year lag 2.095 (-2.567) Grand Coalition, 2 year lag 6.223** (-2.562) Ideological Divergence, 1 year lag -0.042 (-0.032) Ideological Divergence, 2 year lag -0.054* (-0.032) Income Inequality -1.328** -1.229** 0.458 0.448 (-0.58) (-0.575) (-0.306) (-0.304) Gov’t Expenditures (%GDP) 2.762*** 2.496*** 0.526 0.504 (-0.788) (-0.788) (-0.416) (-0.409) 16 Natural Resource Rents (%GDP) -5.125* -5.418* -0.711 -0.362 (-3.064) (-3.033) (-1.595) (-1.602) Net Migration per 1000 people 0.011 -0.01 0.390** 0.380** (-0.291) (-0.286) (-0.15) (-0.15) Control of Corruption -1.454 -0.479 -10.885*** -10.769*** (-5.324) (-5.275) (-2.761) (-2.743) GDP per capita 0 0 0 0 (0) (0) (0) (0) Observations 307 307 308 309

R-squared 0.443 0.453 0.776 0.78

Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES Standard errors are in parenthesis *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Table 4 shows the relationship between Grand Coalitions and populist vote share through the ideological divergence mechanism. These results contradict the relationship that was established in the first hypothesis. First, it shows a highly significant relationship at the 0.05 level between Grand Coalitions after 2 years and ideological divergence but, where I was expecting a decrease in ideological divergence, grand coalitions actually cause an increase in ideological divergence creating a positive relationship between these phenomena. Second it shows a significant relationship between ideological divergence and populist vote share. A 2-year lag on ideological divergence reveals a significant negative correlation at the 0.1 level with populist vote share. This is an expected relationship as I predicted that an increase in ideological divergence would cause a decrease in populist vote share. Coupled with the positive relationship between grand coalitions and ideological divergence, this evidence says that grand coalitions cause increased ideological divergence which, in turn, causes a fall in votes for populist parties. In essence, this result contradicts my first and fourth hypothesis as it reveals an opposite relationship than the one I expected. It is my belief that some other effect of the formations of grand coalitions outweigh the influence of ideological divergence on populist vote share, creating the positive relationship between grand coalitions and populism that was established in Table 1.

17 Discussion

These results show that none of my causal mechanisms explains the relationship between grand coalitions and populist vote share. The relationship between these two variables exists as shown by Table 1. As previously mentioned, the presence of a grand coalition leads to a 6.2% increase in populist vote share after one year and a 5.8% increase after two years. Yet none of the causal mechanisms I tried could successfully explain this dynamic. We can begin to consider several explanations as to why certain causal mechanisms fail to explain the relationship between grand coalitions and populism. Linde et al suggest that the indicator ‘satisfaction with the way democracy works’ is “highly sensitive to the party preferences of the respondents” (Linde et al, 2003). The positive or negative answer given to the previously mentioned indicator strongly depends on the party preference and if that party is currently in power. This defeats the purpose of the question as it should reflect how democracy works as a whole not the political ideologies of the respondents. Linde et al establish that “‘winners’ are supposedly more likely to believe that ‘their’ government is interested in and more responsive to their needs, and thus they are inclined to be more satisfied than the ‘losers’ with the performance of the government” (Linde et al, 2003). Furthermore, it is established that satisfaction with democracy is affected by the age of the democratic system in the country as an older democracy has more ‘satisfied’ losers than a younger one (Linde et al, 2003). The age of a democratic system affects the perception of how good democracy works further complicating the problem of measuring satisfaction with democracy. The inability of the legislative gridlock mechanism to explain the relation between Grand Coalitions and populism is probably due to the use of coalition agreements and coalition com- mittees to preempt conflict between the coalition partners (Miller et al. 2010). Coalition agreements are politically binding to the government parties and typically contain compro- mises on the most relevant policy issues the coalition plans to legislate on” (Miller et al. 2010). The use of coalition agreements is growing and not only in grand coalitions. These

18 agreements preempt conflict and avoid major legislative gridlock that otherwise might hob- ble the grand coalition. In addition to coalition agreements, coalition committees have also begun to attract attention. The Austrian and German Grand Coalitions in the 21st cen- tury have used both coalition agreements and coalition committees to set out the legislative agenda and manage any conflict without creating legislative gridlock. Miller’s investigation of the 2005 German Grand Coalition reveals that When conflict did occur the coalition com- mittee often served, again as prescribed in the coalition agreement, as the central arena for managing and mostly resolving them” (Miller et al. 2010). Although other coalitions with less parliamentary support also used these coalition management mechanisms, data suggests that these mechanisms were especially vital for the functioning of grand coalitions (Miller et al. 2010). Coalition management mechanisms avoid legislative gridlock, eliminating this causal mechanism as a way to explain the rise in populist vote share. The ideological divergence mechanism also generates interesting results but, just as the other causal mechanisms, it fails to explain the relationship between GCs and populist vote share. Even more, it reveals an opposite relationship as there is a positive correlation between ideological divergence and grand coalitions. After a lag of two years, grand coalitions cause an increase in the ideological divergence of the parties present in them at the 0.01 level. This suggests that, due to the fact that grand coalitions are made up of parties with no natural ideological similarity, grand coalitions actually expose and highlight the substantial differences between the parties leading to a hardening of more ideological position. Furthermore, as the coalition partners are most likely their main opponents next election, each party will seek to emphasize their differences and establish more extreme positions so that they are not viewed as the same. Since Grand Coalitions occur often out of necessity and not ideology, parties attempt to maintain a distinct profile inside the coalition so as not to lose voters to the sides. This was reflected in the 2009 Bundestag campaign where the social democratic policies of the 05-09 Grand Coalition forced the CDU to separate itself more drastically from its SPD partners while the SPD was forced to attack a supposed market

19 radicalism which the CDU had abandoned (Clemens, 2010). These results are interesting and are further compounded by the fact that the relationship between ideological divergence and populism is the expected one. A 2-year lag on ideological divergence reveals a significant negative correlation at the 0.1 level with populism. This means that an increase in ideological divergence reduces populist support which is something that I expected. Rooduijn identified ideological convergence as a driver of populist support, which my research supports, even if it establishes a different relationship between Grand Coalitions and populism than I expected and that my initial results show.

Robustness Checks

Ideological Divergence For the ideological divergence mechanism, I used the parties designated as possible mem- bers of grand coalitions to calculate the ideological divergence. I omitted certain populist parties that occupy the majority of one side of the political spectrum as that did not fit into my ideological divergence mechanism. The idea was to test what happens when the two major opposing parties shift towards the center in a Grand Coalition. But, what happens when one of the major parties is in itself a populist party? As far as my research goes, no populist party has entered into a Grand Coalition with other major opposing parties which is somewhat expected as entering into a coalition with one of the major parties can easily interpreted as a betrayal of their promise to challenge the establishment. But, considering populist parties as possible members of Grand Coalitions does change the ideological diver- gence calculation. In here, I will consider populist parties in several countries as possible grand coalition members and test the ideological divergence mechanism. There are several examples where populist parties have occupied an entire wing of the political spectrum such as Fidesz in Hungary and AKEL in Cyprus. Fidesz has monopolized the right-wing of Hun- garian politics, until very recently, while AKEL has been the major left-wing party in Cyprus

20 in the post-war era. As you see in Table A5, this robustness check once again shows that the causal mech- anism of ideological divergence does not explain the relationship between grand coalitions and populist parties. The results show a similar relationship between grand coalitions and ideological divergence. After two years, ideological divergence increases with the presence of a GC by 6.2 units meaning that parties will attempt to maintain their distinct profile so as to not lose any voters in the following elections. There is a difference in these results in that a significant relationship between ideological divergence and vote share is no longer significant. Once we include populist parties as possible members of GCs, there is no signif- icant relationship between ideological divergence and vote share. This can be explained by the fact that populist parties have not been part of a grand coalition and that divergence between the populist party and the mainstream parties is the factor that drives voters to the parties. Therefore, populist parties will not lose voters if they increase their divergence from the mainstream ones.

Satisfaction with Democracy As previously stated, the measure ‘satisfaction with the way democracy works in your country’ is subject to several pressures and factors that make it a somewhat unreliable measure of citizen satisfaction with how the democratic regime works in practice. A paper by Hofferbert and Klingemann tested several other indicators as a measure of satisfaction with the performance with a democratic regime. In their study of Central and Eastern Europe, Hofferbert and Klingemann tested perceived human rights condition and perceived economic condition as alternative indicators of citizen satisfaction. They concluded that perceived human rights conditions, or the avoidance of bad actions as they termed it, was a much better indicator for the performance of a democratic regime. Their analysis was based on post-communist countries meaning that citizens in those countries were keenly aware of regimes that violated said human rights making it a good indicator of perceived performance.

21 Using this analysis, I conducted a regression using data from Freedom House’s Freedom in the World report that measures the civil liberties and political rights in countries around the world. Although Freedom House uses academics and experts to debate the scores, they rely on interviews and data from local sources in each country, making the data a credible subjective measure of human rights. As you can see in Table A4, the results are surprising to say the least in that the human rights causal mechanism explains the relationship between grand coalitions and populist vote share. After two years, there is a significant negative relationship between grand coalitions and human rights at the 0.1 level. Furthermore, there is a significant negative relationship as well after both one year and two years between human rights and populist vote share. This means that the presence of a Grand Coalition causes a decrease in perceived human rights which in turn causes an increase in the vote for populist parties. My belief is that people see their political rights threatened by the omission of populist parties from government, causing them to question the fairness of the vote as several populist parties have gained sufficient following as to warrant a place in government. Their exclusion would have people questioning if the political parties are actually respecting the will of the voters, therefore, it allows populist parties to amplify their rhetoric against the “establishment” causing an increase in their vote share. Furthermore, this data highly questions the effectiveness of the sterilization logic as a short-term exclusion from government causes an increase in votes for populist parties in the future, potentially creating one-party rule that removes major obstacles for such parties to implement their autocratic policies, threatening long-held European beliefs of democracy and liberalism. Poland and Hungary have become prime examples of the dangers of one-party rule, especially if said parties have autocratic tendencies. The implementation of the sterilization logic makes the problem worse; a short-term solution that creates much bigger long term problems for mainstream political parties and, depending on the type of party in power, democratic institutions. It is important to note that human rights are varied with different areas such as political

22 rights, civil rights, individual rights, etc. To understand if the relationship revealed in Table A6 is driven by an area of human rights, I break down the data gathered from Freedom House. The score given by Freedom House to countries is an aggregate score of respect for political rights and civil liberties. Each country has a score for political rights (out of 40) and for civil liberties (out of 60). Tables A7 and A8 analyses if the effect of human rights is more pronounced through perceived loss of political rights or through perceived loss of civil liberties. Table A7 shows us the relationship between grand coalitions and populism through the perceived respect of political rights. Results show no relationship between grand coalitions and respect for political rights but there is an expected significant negative relationship between political rights and populism. Any perceived loss in political rights will drive people away from the status quo, into the arms of parties that propose more power to the people. On the other hand, the effect of the human rights mechanism is present when using civil liberties, as shown in Table A8. There is a significant negative relationship between grand coalitions and civil liberties and there is also a significant negative relationship between civil liberties and populism. This shows the effect shown in Table A4 of the human rights mechanism is driven by the perceived loss in civil liberties not political rights. This could be due to the structure of parliamentary democracies themselves. Even if the populist party is excluded from government, the increase in votes causes an increase in parliamentary seats giving it much more power. In a sense, votes are not wasted in parliamentary democracy as in a first-past-the-post voting system that other countries employ. Furthermore, any increase in seats by a populist party could very well likely push government parties to adopt policies closer to the populist party’s voters to avoid said party gaining more votes. Hence, although the party is excluded from government, the increase in votes can indirectly influence the policies of government parties. In this way, people might see that their political rights are not threatened even though their preferred party is not in power. On the other hand, there could be a perceived loss in civil liberties. Civil liberties have a characteristic that political rights do not which is that they are politically-sensitive. For example, a more secular individual could

23 perhaps see their right of expression threatened by policies instituted by a more conservative and religious government. Furthermore, indirect consequences of a government policy might be perceived by people as an attack on their civil liberties. An example of this is Angela Merkel’s decision to open up Germany’s borders to more than a million refugees in 2015. This decision provoked a nationwide conversation about the wisdom of welcoming in so many refugees including many who argued that cultural differences between the refugees and Germans were too different for peaceful cohabitation. Their argument was bolstered by the multitude of sexual assaults reported around the country during celebrations for New Year’s Eve in 2015. Thousands of sexual assaults were reported by women across the country with the media reporting that a majority of attackers were of ‘Middle Eastern’ origin. A person might interpret these attacks, an unintended consequence of Merkel’s decision, as a loss in civil liberties such as freedom of assembly or expression. Since civil liberties sometimes depend on culture or ideology, they are more politically-sensitive than political rights which might explain their relationship with grand coalitions and populist parties. Additionally, it is important to note that Hofferbert and Klingemann’s study focuses on Central and Eastern European countries in the 1990s, right after the fall of communism. They theorize that post-communist countries have a higher sensitivity towards perceived loss of human rights given that they have experienced regimes which denied them basic rights. This means that their attitudes towards democratic performance might be more highly correlated to human rights perhaps driving the relationship we see in Table A6. To analyze if this is the case, Table A9 uses only Western countries in the regression while Table A10 uses only post-communist countries in its analysis. The results in Tables A9 and A10 show that, although communist countries are more sensitive to human rights violations, the relationship shown in Table A6 is driven by both Western and Post-Communist countries. Table A9 shows a negative relationship between a 2-year lag on grand coalitions and human rights in capitalist countries while Table A10 actually shows a significant positive relationship between grand coalitions and human rights, reversing the effect seen in Table A6. This shows

24 the significant negative effect seen between grand coalitions and human rights on Table A6 is driven by capitalist countries. Voters in capitalist countries might have grown tired of the parties present in grand coalitions especially since these parties have been in power for most, if not all, of the post-WWI era. The formation of grand coalitions could generate a dissatisfaction in voters especially those looking for change promised by the campaigns of said parties or by voters of other parties. As these parties are mainstay elements in their countries’ political systems, with the biggest organized capital and government experience, voters will continue to vote for them perhaps out of loyalty or fear of the more extreme parties. But, as they could be seen as representing the old guard, voters relishing change might feel their civil liberties threatened by the status quo policies of grand coalitions. On the other hand, in post-communist countries, grand coalitions cause an increase in the perceived respect of human rights. This is perhaps driven by the youth of their democratic institutions coupled with their experience with authoritarian regimes. Voters in these countries might see these parties, formed on the blueprint of the major Western parties, as defenders of democratic institutions and human rights, which could possibly explain the perceived increase in respect for human rights. It could be interesting to measure if over a significant amount of years, this relationship is flipped, following the pattern of Western countries, due to the age of their democratic institutions and possibly young generations who did not experience the brutal living conditions of the post-WWII authoritarian regimes. Furthermore, results in Tables A9 and A10 show that the negative relationship between human rights and populism is present in post-communist countries while there is no significant relationship between human rights and populism in Western countries. This could back up the assertion by Hofferbert and Klingemann that post-communist countries are more sensitive to human rights violations, as such making a good indicator of democratic performance, but it is interesting to see that the perceived loss drive voters to populist parties. It could be that their rhetoric about up-ending the status quo and giving power to the people is attractive to voters who feel unsatisfied with the democratic performance of grand coalitions, especially in voters who have actually

25 experienced an authoritarian regime. This could also be why there is no relationship between these two variables in capitalist countries. Perhaps a bigger trust in democratic institutions and oversight might stop people who lose confidence in the democratic performance of certain political parties from switching to more extreme parties that might threaten such institutions. We see that a further breakdown of the data gathered by Freedom House shows a much more complicated picture of the relationship between grand coalitions and human rights. Seeing human rights as a measure of satisfaction with democratic performance does pro- duce some interesting results but it assumes that human rights survey questions accurately capture the electorate’s satisfaction with democratic performance. Should this be the case, it shows a significant decrease in satisfaction with democratic performance associated with the formation of grand coalitions, which eventually leads to a boost of support for populist parties.

Conclusion

This paper analyzes the relationship between grand coalitions and populism in European Union countries. With populist parties on the rise in many European democracies, main- stream parties have been forced to enter into coalition agreements with their traditional opponents to keep such parties out of office. This was defined as the logic of sterilization by Wade Jacoby in which traditional opposing parties ‘sterilize’ parties unacceptable to both by forming a coalition between them, hereby keeping such parties out of power. My research shows that sterilization, while being a short-term solution, creates a much bigger long-term problem as the formation of grand coalitions leads to an increase in populist party vote share. This is due to a decrease in the satisfaction with democratic performance by the grand coalitions represented through a perceived loss in human rights. The evidence showed in this paper posits the theory that forming grand coalitions will only increase the vote share of populist parties.

26 Although this paper conducts a sound statistical analysis using quantifiable and verifiable data, there are some limitations to the results which show more research is required in this new and exciting area. First of all, a singular definition of populism and grand coalitions is not widely accepted by scholars. The term grand coalition is a relative new term in studies of parliamentary democracies and a widely accepted definition has not yet been agreed upon. Most scholars who study this agree that it involves the major parties in an election forming a coalition. Wade Jacoby defines grand coalitions as “coalitions that include the two largest parties in a parliamentary system” (Jacoby, 2010). Miller and Muller define them as “a specific type of government known in Austria and Germany as the cooperation of the main competing parties in government, rallying behind the governments’ vast parliamentary majorities” (Miller et al. 2010). Most seem to agree that it includes two major opposing parties but classical grand coalitions described in these studies, those being in Germany and Austria, are formed of parties of opposing ideological perspectives. In my paper, I focused on grand coalitions made up of the largest parties of ideological opposites but an argument certainly can be made that this is not a requisite of grand coalitions. In a similar vein to this, the definition of populism varies depending on the research paper. The database of populist parties that I used for these papers, the Timbro Authoritarian Index, includes populist parties with authoritarian tendencies. There are certainly parties that most likely can be defined as populist but lack certain authoritarian characteristics which can lead them to not be included in this database. The differing definitions for both grand coalitions and populism could very well mean that another statistical analysis using other definitions could potentially give different results. Another limitation of this paper is that the systems of several European democracies are not suited to the formation of a grand coalition. Countries such as Finland and Luxem- bourg have three major parties that span the ideologies of social democracy, liberalism, and conservatism. Liberalism is the defined center of the majority of European politics. Since my definition mandates opposing ideologies, I only counted as grand coalitions those govern-

27 ments containing the left-wing and right-wing parties. Other people might differ in that all three parties should be present in the government for a grand coalition to be formed. Fur- thermore, other systems such as Belgium’s confederation model provides challenges as well. Since certain parties in Belgium split into French-speaking and Flemish-speaking factions, I only count a grand coalition in Belgium if both factions are present in the government although this tends to be the case as government formation in Belgium is extremely com- plicated, requiring multiple parties. Ireland also provides challenges as its parties are not spread in the traditional European left-right spectrum but their ideologies are defined by Civil War factions. The two major parties in Ireland, Fianna Fail and Fine Gael, can both be described as centrist with limited differences in policy. In this scenario, a grand coalition in Ireland had to include both even if they don’t fit the typical ideological spectrum. There are other countries that presented challenges to the grand coalition model, needing certain flexibility to adapt their political systems but identifying the major opposing parties was possible in all cases. Finally, this paper does not state that allowing populist parties to govern is the solution to reducing their support. It simply provides evidence saying their exclusion by mainstream parties will give them a medium-term increase in votes, most likely bringing them closer to governing. Some people argue that including populists in government will eventually decrease their support. Certainly examples like SYRIZA in Greece and the True Finns in Finland, in which they were removed from government in favor of mainstream parties after a single term, could potentially show that populist parties also lose votes while in government. On the other hand, the experiences of FIDESZ in Hungary and PiS in Poland show the dangers of authoritarian populist parties in government. A government-led by the AfD in Germany or the National Front in France could prove permanently devastating to Europe’s democratic institutions. Perhaps, the solution lies in bringing in parties outside the mainstream but that don’t have extreme views. In recent elections around Europe, Green parties have made significant gains at the expense of mainstream parties. An innovative and first-of-its-kind

28 conservative-green government was created in Austria, possibly showing a new alternative to grand coalitions that also keeps populist parties out of power. In Germany, the Greens have been surging in recent opinion polls even as the Social Democrats have slipped substantially, creating a chance for a conservative-green government in the next German federal elections. In the Netherlands, the Green Left party surged at the expense of the traditional center left Labour Party. All of these considerations lie beyond the scope of this paper but it is important to note that much research is needed in this area. Analyses can be conducted showing if grand coalitions have the same effect on green parties than on populist parties or are these simply parties born out of concern for the environment. There are many unknowns in this field that need to be investigated especially as the number of grand coalitions keeps growing in parliamentary democracies around the world.

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32 Appendix

Table A1: Possible Members of GCs Countries Political Parties Austria Right: Austria People’s Party (OVP) Left: Austrian Social Democratic Party (SPO) Belgium Right (Confederation Model) Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats (VLD) Reformist Movement (MR) Left Francophone Socialist Party (PS) Flemish Socialist Party (sp.a) Bulgaria Right United Democratic Forces (ODS) 2000-2001 National Movement for Stability and Progress (NDSV) 2001-2009 GERB 2009-today Left Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) Croatia Right Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) Left Social Democratic Party of Croatia (SDP) Cyprus Right Democratic Rally (DISY) Left Democratic Party (DIKO) Czech Republic Right Civic Democratic Party (ODS) Left Czeh Social Democratic Party (CSSD) Denmark Right Venstre (V) Left Social Democrats (SD) Estonia Right Estonian Reform Party (ER) Left Estonian Centre Party (EK)

33 Finland Right National Coalition Party (KK) Left Social Democratic Party (SSDP) France Right Rally for the Republic (RPR) 2000-2002 Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) 2002-2015 The Republicans (LR) 2015-today Left Socialist Party (PS) Germany Right Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) Left Social Democratic Party (SPD) Greece Right New Democracy (ND) Left Panhellenic Social Movement (PASOK) 2000-2014 No major center-left since - left-wing occupied by SYRIZA Hungary Right FIDESZ 2000-2002 No major center-right since - FIDESZ became a populist party Left Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) Ireland Right Fine Gael Left to Center Fianna Fail Italy Right Forza Italia (FI) 2000-2008, 2013-today The People of Freedom (Pdl) 2008-2013 Left Democratic Party of the Left (PDS) 2000-2001 Democrats of the the Left (DS) 2001-2008 Democratic Party (PD) 2008-today Latvia Right People’s Party (TP) 2000-2010 Unity (V) 2010-today Left National Harmony Party (TSP) 2000-2002 For Human Rights in a United Latvia (forHRUL) 2002-2006 Harmony Centre (SC) 2006-2014 Social Democratic Party "Harmony" (SDPS) 2014-present Lithuania Right Homeland Union (TS-LKD) Left Social Democratic Party (LSDP) Luxembourg Right Christian Social People’s Party (CSV) Leftt Luxembourg Socialist Workers’ Party (LSAP)

34 Malta Right Nationalist Party (PN) Left Labour Party (PL) Netherlands Right People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) 2000-2002, 2010- today Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) 2002-2010 Left Labour Party (PvdA) Poland Right Electoral Action "Solidarity" (AWS) 2000-2001 Civic Platform 2001-today Left Democratic Left Alliance (NL) 2000-2007, 2011-2015 Left and Democrats (LiD) 2007-2011 No major center left parties as of 2015 Portugal Right Social Democratic Party (PSD) Left Socialist Party (PSP) Romania Right National Liberal Party (PNL) Left Social Democratic Pole of Romania (PDSR) 2000-2004 Social Democratic Party (PSD) 2004-today Slovakia Right Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK) 2000-2002 Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKU-DS) 2002-2016 Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) 2016-today Left Party of the Democratic Left (SDL) 2000-2002 Smer-Social Democracy (Smer-SD) 2002-today Slovenia Right Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS) 2000-2004 No major center-right parties - right occuppied by populist SDS Left Social Democrats (SD) Spain Right People’s Party (PP) Left Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party (Smer-SD) Sweden Right Moderate Party (M) Left Social Democrats (SAP) United Kingdom Right Conservative Party Left Labour Party

35 Table A2: Populist Parties Countries Political Parties Austria Freedom Party Austria (FPO) Alliance for Austria’s Future (BZO) My Voice Counts! (GiLT) Free List Austria (FLO) Communist Party of Austria (KPO) Socialist Left Party (SLP) Belgium Vlaams Belaang (VB) (Confederation Model) Workers Party of Belgium (PVDA) National Front (NA) Left Socialist Party (LSP) Committee for Another Policy (CAP) Bulgaria ATAKA Bulagrian National Movement (IMRO) National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria (NFSB) People’s Party (PG) Volya Revival Order, Law, and Justice (RZS) Bulgarian National Radical Party Bulgarian Communist Party (KPB) Bulgarian Communist Party - Marxists (BCP-M) Union of Communists in Bulgaria (SKB)

Croatia Human Shield (ZZ) Croatian Democratic Aliance of Slavonia and Baranja (HDSSB) Croatian Party of Rights (HSP Croatian Party of Rights Dr. Ante Starcevic (HSP-AS) Cyprus Progressive Party of Woking People (AKEL) Solidarity Movement (KA) National Popular Front (ELAM) New Horizons (NEO) European Party (EVROKO) Fighting Democratic Movement (ADIK) Czech Republic Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM) Dawn-National Coalition (USVIT) Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) Realists Party of Civic Rights (SPO) Worker’s Party of Social Justice (DSSS) The Association for the Republic (SPR) Order of the Nation (RN) Bloc aganst Islamization Denmark Red-Green Alliance (EL) Danish People’s Party (DF) Progress Party (FRP) Estonia Conservative People’s Party of Estonia (EKRE) Estonian Independence Party (EIP)

36 Finland True Finns (PS) Change 2011 Finnish Communist Party (SKP) Communist Workers Party (KTP) Finland’s Labor Party (STP) Blue and White Front (VP) Finnish People’s Blue-White (SKS) France National Front (FN) Unbowed France (FI) French Communist Party (PCF) France Arise (DLF) National Republican Movement (MNR) Movement for France (MPF) Left Front (FG) Revolutionary Communist League (LCR) Worker;s Struggle (LO) Germany The Left (PDS/Linke) Alternative for Germany (AfD) National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) Marxist-Leninist Party of Germany (MLP) The Republicans (REP) Greece Communist Party of Greece (KKE) Golden Dawn (XA) SYRIZA Independent Greeks (ANEL) Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) Front of the Greek Anticapitalist Left (ANTARSYA) Comunist Party of Greece (Marxist-Leninist (KEE-ML) Society-Political Party (KIONWIA) Front Line (PG) Workers Revolutionary Party (EEK) Socialist Worker’s Party (SEK) Party of Hellenism Hungary Fidesz - Hungarian Civic Alliance (FIDESZ) Movement for a Better Hungary (JOBBIK) Hungarian Workers Party (MM) Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIEP)

Ireland People Before Profit Alliance (PBP) Workers Party of Ireland (WP) Socialist Party (SP) Socialist Workers Party (SWP) Italy Northern League (LN) Five Stars Movement (M5S) Brothers of Italy (FDI) Power to the People (PaP) CasaPound (CPI) Italy for the Italians (lal) For a Revolutionary Left (PuSR) The Right (LD) New Force (FN) Tricolor Flame (FT) Rainbow Left (SA) Civil Revolution (RC) Communist Workers Party (PCL) Communist Refoundation Party (PRC) Italian Communist Party (PdCI)

37 Latvia National Alliance (NA) Who Owns the State? (KPV-LV) For Fatherland and Freedom (TB/LNNK) All for Latvia! (VL) Lithuania Order and Justice (TT) Lithuanian Centre Party (LCP) Young Lithuania (JL) Lithuanian Nationalist Union (LTS) Socialist People’s Front (SLF) Socialist Party of Lithuania (LSP) Front Party (FRONTAS) Luxembourg Alternative Democratic Reform Party (ADR) Communist Party of Luxembourg (KPL) Free Party of Luxembourg (FPL) Citizen’s List (LdC) Malta Maltese Patriots Movement (MPM) Alliance for Change (AB) National Action (AN) Netherlands Socialist Party (SP) Freedom Party (PVV) Reformed Political Party (SGP) Forum for Democracy (FvD) Pim Fortuyn List (LPF) One NL Party for the Netherlands (PvN) Center Democrats (CD) New Communist Party of the Natherlands (NCPN) Poland Self-defense for the Republic of Poland (SD) Law and Justice (PiS) League of Polish Families (LPR) Kukiz 15 Congress of the New Right (KNP) Movement for Reconstruction of Poland (ROP) Polish National Party (PPN) Polish Labor Party (PPP) Portugal Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) Left Bloc (BE) Portuguese Workers Commmunist Party (PCTP) National Renewal Party (PNR) Socialist Alternative Movement (MAS) Workers Party of Socialist Unity (POUS) Union of Democratic People (UDP) Romania Greater Romania Party (PRM) United Romania Party (PRU) Romanian Socialist Party (PSR) New Generation Party (PNGCD) Romanian National Unity Party (PUNR) Socialist Labor Party (PSM) Slovakia Slovak National Party (SNS) People’s Party (LS-HZDS) People’s Party Our Slovakia (LSNS) Communist Party (KSS) Association of Slovak Workers (ZRS)

38 Slovenia Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) Slovenian National Party (SNS) Next Slovenia (NPS) List of Journalist Bojan Pozar (LNBP) United Slovenia (Zsi) The Socialist Party of Slovenia (SPS) Party of the Slovenian Nation (SSN) Linden League of Communists of Slovenia

Spain United Left (IU) Podemos Vox Communist Party of the Peoples of Spain (PCPE) Communist Unification of Spain (UCE) Sweden Left Party (V) Sweden Democrats (SD) Alternative for Sverige National Democrats (ND) United Kingdom United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) British National Party (BNP) The English Democrats (ED) Socialist Labor Party (SLP) Respect Party (RP) Scottish Militant Labour (SML) Socialist Alliance (SA)

39 Table A3: Descriptive Statistics GraCoal = 0 N mean sd min max

Laws Passed 467 158.565 144.694 15 962

Satisfaction Democracy 163 5.011 1.073 2.42 7.45

Ideological Divergence 427 18.653 13.343 0 65.9

Vote Share 468 16.536 14.223 0 69.7

Income Inequality 292 31.626 3.714 23.7 39.6

Gov’t Expenditures (%GDP) 468 19.593 2.746 11.9 27.93

Natural Resource Rents 441 0.603 0.666 0 3.62 (%GDP) Net Migration per 1000 people 468 1.402 4.957 -11.6 18.1

Control of Corruption 443 0.975 0.779 -0.9 2.47

GDP per capita 468 26705.46 18301.74 1609.882 119000

GraCoal=1 Laws Passed 62 202.339 180.392 44 998

Satisfaction Democracy 19 5.876 0.762 5.01 8.42

Ideological Divergence 64 18.966 9.543 0 32.975

Vote Share 64 19.236 11.095 3.9 50.5

Income Inequality 47 30.498 2.714 26.8 36.9

Gov’t Expenditures (%GDP) 64 20.424 3.232 13.74 26.24

Natural Resource Rents 63 0.423 0.455 0.01 1.88 (%GDP) Net Migration per 1000 people 64 4.284 6.015 -3.8 18.1

Control of Corruption 61 1.473 0.788 -0.19 2.28

GDP per capita 64 45558.53 27344.68 1757.444 116000

40 Table A4: Summary Statistics of Control Variables Characteristics, Based on Presence of Grand Coalitions No Grand Coalitions Presence of Grand Coalitions Difference in Means

Variable N Mean/SE N Mean/SE (1)-(2)

Income Inequality 292 31.626 47 30.498 1.128** [0.217] [0.396]

Gov’t Expenditures (%GDP) 468 19.593 64 20.424 -0.831** [0.127] [0.404]

Natural Resource Rents (%GDP) 441 0.603 63 0.423 0.180** [0.032] [0.057]

Net Migration per 1000 people 468 1.402 64 4.284 -2.882*** 41 [0.229] [0.752]

Control of Corruption 443 0.975 61 1.473 -0.498*** [0.037] [0.101]

GDP per capita 468 26705.458 64 45558.530 -1.89e+04*** [845.998] [3418.085]

Election Year 468 0.263 64 0.250 0.013 [0.020] [0.055] The value displayed for t-tests are the differences in the means across the groups. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level. Table A5: Ideological Divergence (with Populist Parties as Members of GCs) (1) (2) (3) (4) Ideological Divergence Ideological Divergence Vote Share Vote Share Grand Coalition, 1 year lag 2.554 (-2.545) Grand Coalition, 2 year lag 6.282** (-2.542) Ideological Divergence, 1 year lag -0.038 (-0.033) Ideological Divergence, 2 year lag -0.052 (-0.035) Income Inequality 0.068 0.16 0.618** 0.596* (-0.548) (-0.544) (-0.303) (-0.303) Gov’t Expenditures (%GDP) 2.058*** 1.812** 0.049 0.024 (-0.753) (-0.753) (-0.417) (-0.413) 42 Natural Resource Rents (%GDP) -3.474 -3.784 -0.77 -0.402 (-3.032) (-3.003) (-1.677) (-1.702) Net Migration per 1000 people -0.261 -0.279 0.451*** 0.449*** (-0.288) (-0.284) (-0.159) (-0.158) Control of Corruption 1.346 2.144 -10.429*** -10.303*** (-5.127) (-5.086) (-2.824) (-2.822) GDP per capita 0 0 -0.000* -0.000* (0) (0) (0) (0) Constant -32.722 -29.138 20.919 21.993 (-25.559) (-25.378) (-14.132) (-14.114) Observations 327 327 327 327

R-squared 0.423 0.434 0.834 0.834

Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES Standard errors are in parenthesis *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Table A6: Human Rights Causal Mechanism (1) (2) (3) (4) Human Rights Human Rights Vote Share Vote Share Grand Coalition, 1 year lag -0.352 (-0.337) Grand Coalition, 2 year lag -0.581* (-0.338) Human Rights, 1 year lag -0.860*** (-0.218) Human Rights, 2 year lag -0.476** (-0.224) Income Inequality -0.239*** -0.246*** 0.345 0.755** (-0.072) (-0.072) (-0.313) (-0.336) Gov’t Expenditures (%GDP) 0.246** 0.265*** 0.072 -0.253 (-0.099) (-0.099) (-0.406) (-0.426) 43 Natural Resource Rents (%GDP) 0.079 0.112 -0.825 -1.141 (-0.399) (-0.397) (-1.631) (-1.678) Net Migration per 1000 people -0.117*** -0.117*** 0.349** 0.514*** (-0.037) (-0.037) (-0.157) (-0.171) Control of Corruption 1.240* 1.193* -9.047*** -8.791*** (-0.674) (-0.673) (-2.807) (-3.083) GDP per capita 0.000* 0.000* -0.000* -0.000* (0) (0) (0) (0) Constant 95.116*** 94.831*** 113.800*** 73.859*** (-3.017) (-3.012) (-25.524) (-26.679) Observations 336 336 322 298

R-squared 0.934 0.934 0.849 0.853

Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES Standard errors are in parenthesis *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Table A7: Political Rights (1) (2) (3) (4) Political Rights Political Rights Vote Share Vote Share Grand Coalition, 1 year lag 0.129 ’(-0.166) Grand Coalition, 2 year lag -0.096 (-0.168) Political Rights, 1 year lag -1.306*** (-0.499) Political Rights, 2 year lag -1.117** (-0.513) Income Inequality -0.083** -0.083** 0.543* 0.822** (-0.036) (-0.036) (-0.311) (-0.33) Gov’t Expenditures (%GDP) 0.120** 0.130*** 0.052 -0.235 (-0.049) (-0.049) (-0.412) (-0.426) 44 Natural Resource Rents (%GDP) 0.205 0.201 -0.734 -1.179 (-0.197) (-0.197) (-1.657) (-1.676) Net Migration per 1000 people -0.031* -0.029 0.413*** 0.546*** (-0.018) (-0.018) (-0.158) (-0.169) Control of Corruption 1.192*** 1.152*** -8.198*** -8.060*** (-0.334) (-0.334) (-2.89) (-3.1) GDP per capita 0 0 -0.000** -0.000** (0) (0) (0) (0) Constant 37.028*** 36.986*** 76.498*** 68.753*** (-1.493) (-1.495) (-23.037) (-24.286) Observations 336 336 322 298

R-squared 0.882 0.882 0.844 0.854

Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES Standard errors are in parenthesis *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Table A8: Civil Liberties (1) (2) (3) (4) Civil Liberties Civil Liberties Vote Share Vote Share Grand Coalition, 1 year lag -0.480** (-0.228) Grand Coalition, 2 year lag -0.427* (-0.23) Civil Liberties, 1 year lag -1.152*** (-0.306) Civil Liberties, 2 year lag -0.528* (-0.31) Income Inequality -0.171*** -0.173*** 0.326 0.777** (-0.049) (-0.049) (-0.316) (-0.338) Gov’t Expenditures (%GDP) 0.104 0.11 0.005 -0.295 (-0.067) (-0.068) (-0.406) (-0.426) 45 Natural Resource Rents (%GDP) -0.161 -0.126 -1.027 -1.291 (-0.27) (-0.271) (-1.636) (-1.68) Net Migration per 1000 people -0.076*** -0.079*** 0.360** 0.531*** (-0.025) (-0.025) (-0.157) (-0.171) Control of Corruption 0.299 0.303 -9.736*** -8.929*** (-0.457) (-0.458) (-2.812) (-3.094) GDP per capita 0.000* 0.000* -0.000* -0.000* (0) (0) (0) (0) Constant 58.597*** 58.382*** 99.590*** 58.587** (-2.045) (-2.051) (-23.224) (-23.943) Observations 336 336 322 298

R-squared 0.93 0.93 0.848 0.852

Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES Standard errors are in parenthesis *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Table A9: Western Countries (1) (2) (3) (4) Human Rights Human Rights Vote Share Vote Share Grand Coalition, 1 year lag -0.304 (-0.27) Grand Coalition, 2 year lag -0.490* (-0.287) Human Rights, 1 year lag -0.511 (-0.385) Human Rights, 2 year lag -0.18 (-0.398) Income Inequality -0.049 -0.059 0.394 0.666 (-0.074) (-0.074) (-0.382) (-0.436) Gov’t Expenditures (%GDP) 0.359*** 0.372*** 0.355 -0.008 (-0.1) (-0.1) (-0.532) (-0.568) 46 Natural Resource Rents (%GDP) -0.113 -0.068 0.768 0.438 (-0.549) (-0.547) (-2.783) (-2.911) Net Migration per 1000 people -0.182*** -0.180*** 0.377** 0.537*** (-0.03) (-0.03) (-0.172) (-0.187) Control of Corruption -0.847 -0.862 -16.427*** -15.283*** (-0.641) (-0.638) (-3.317) (-3.846) GDP per capita 0.000*** 0.000*** 0 0 (0) (0) (0) (0) Constant 89.366*** 89.326*** 82.784** 49.983 (-3.11) (-3.091) (-38.482) (-41.656) Observations 213 213 200 184

R-squared 0.931 0.931 0.821 0.823

Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES Standard errors are in parenthesis *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Table A10: Post-Communist Countries (1) (2) (3) (4) Human Rights Human Rights Vote Share Vote Share Grand Coalition, 1 year lag 3.429** (-1.445) Grand Coalition, 2 year lag 1.385 (-1.104) Human Rights, 1 year lag -0.905*** (-0.331) Human Rights, 2 year lag -0.486 (-0.328) Income Inequality -0.227 -0.23 0.651 1.167* (-0.154) (-0.157) (-0.599) (-0.623) Gov’t Expenditures (%GDP) 0.380* 0.342* -1.222 -1.338 (-0.202) (-0.205) (-0.772) (-0.805) 47 Natural Resource Rents (%GDP) 0.772 0.486 -1.727 -2.432 (-0.628) (-0.628) (-2.35) (-2.408) Net Migration per 1000 people 0.045 0.119 0.684 0.667 (-0.14) (-0.141) (-0.536) (-0.573) Control of Corruption 2.881* 2.943* 11.262* 9.114 (-1.574) (-1.608) (-6) (-6.437) GDP per capita 0 0 -0.002** -0.002** (0) (0) (-0.001) (-0.001) Constant 77.730*** 79.157*** 90.375** 43.472 (-6.661) (-6.765) (-37.077) (-36.62) Observations 123 123 122 114

R-squared 0.888 0.883 0.89 0.892

Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES Standard errors are in parenthesis *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1